Abstract:
This thesis focuses on the issue of how we, human beings, can show that our beliefs about our physical environment are justified. This is called the concept of epistemic justification. What is central to the concept of epistemic justification is the epistemic regress problem (regress problem). In relation to the regress problem, I will examine Laurence BonJour‟s thesis that basic beliefs which are „immediately‟ obtained from our sensory contacts with physical objects adequately prove other beliefs of ours as instances of justified beliefs. With this account, he claims that he has resolved the regress problem. Moreover, BonJour denies as inadequate D. M. Armstrong‟s and C. I. Lewis‟ various proposed solutions to the regress problem. My view is that BonJour‟s criticisms against the above mentioned philosophers are generally tenable. Nonetheless, I will argue that BonJour‟s own account fails to be adequate in resolving the regress problem. Hence, the analysis made in this study will show that his notion of basic beliefs cannot serve as adequate basis for justification.
