Department of Philosophy and Classics
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Item Kwasi Wiredu’s Consensual Democracy And The Problem Of Identity Politics(University Of Ghana, 2022-06) Adjei-Mawutor, G.This thesis argues for a critical application of Wiredu’s consensual democracy to the problem of identity politics that have bedevilled postcolonial Africa. By doing so, it lays bare the present understanding of identity and identity politics and contextualises this to the African experience. The thesis, proceeding through an historico-philosophical examination of colonialism, surveys the tension between the imperial ideologies of legitimation and the anticolonial ideologies of legitimation, uncovering the deficiencies that resulted in the numerous catastrophes in the short existence of many African postcolonial nation-states. Subsequently, a case for a reconfiguration of the postcolonial African nation-state is made to divorce it from all colonial imperatives. The thesis also compares colonially inspired majoritarian democracy and indigenously inspired consensual democracy, emphasising the foundational presuppositions between these concepts as grounds for evaluation. I argue using the moderate communitarian framework that consensual democracy if applied through the primordial public allows for the hybridisation and nomadization of identities; thus, as conceived by Wiredu, political associations open the space for people to associate with different political associations that fits their perspectives. It is further argued that this reduces the dimension of antagonism among political associations (a dimension that affects political parties in majoritarian democracy) and instead transforms this dimension into agonism, thereby removing the tendency to politicise identities and thus diffusing the tendency to identity politics.Item Ifeanyi Menkiti’s Notion of Personhood and the Problem of Human Rights(University of Ghana, 2020-07) Erzuah, E.Motivated by the problem of human rights, this thesis engages in a critique of Ifeanyi Menkiti’s notion of personhood. According to Menkiti (1984), his conception of personhood is characteristic of a society that gives priority to individuals’ communal duties and recognises individual rights as secondary. This led Kwame Gyekye (1992 & 1997) to criticise Menkiti’s conception of personhood that in his (Gyekye) estimation fails to take individual rights seriously. Gyekye in turn was criticised that he fails to understand Menkiti’s conception of personhood and that, a charitable interpretation of Menkiti’s notion of personhood reveals that Menkiti does not threaten individual rights (Wiredu; see Eze & Metz, 2015, Molefe, 2016 & 2017 and Ikuenobe, 2018). In the light of the fact that Menkiti’s conception of personhood recognises individuals such as criminals and social deviants in the lived-world as non-persons; and these individuals appear not to be treated well in as much as their rights and dignity claims as human beings are not taken seriously, this thesis, in examining the debate on personhood between Menkiti and Gyekye aims to find an answer to the question of how human rights and dignity were safeguarded within Menkiti's conception of personhood. How is it ensured in Menkiti’s conception of personhood that an individual human such as a criminal ends up not being treated in an undignified manner by members of a community? The thesis findings reveal that, Menkiti’s conception of personhood appears to consider that the actions of individuals are what go into securing human rights and dignity. And that whilst individuals ought not to lose their basic moral worth as beings with dignity when they fail to act in a morally appropriate manner, they owe it to themselves as moral agents to live morally good lives so that the consequences of their actions do not ruin their rights and dignity status.Item Individual Autonomy And The Public Interest: Some Theoretical Considerations(University of Ghana, 2011) Morgan, S.N.This thesis starts off by showing or giving some evidence to support claims that traditional Akan societies, as well as many other traditional African societies, by some of their traditional beliefs and practices, suppress individual autonomy. That is to say, the continual observance of some beliefs and practices of traditional Akan societies makes the attainment of individual autonomy a problem. The observance of these beliefs and practices leads to the suppression of individual autonomy which in turn leads to frequent tensions between those who want to maintain the continuous practice of these traditional norms and beliefs and some individuals' attempt to be free. The thesis therefore seeks to show the importance of individual autonomy to every human being, both in traditional societies and even in modem states. The thesis also challenges some interpretations of the term 'public interest' as justifications given for the suppression of individual autonomy. To show that individual autonomy is not entirely antithetical or foreign to some of the beliefs and practices of traditional societies, as it is frequently argued, the thesis concludes by proposing a theory of a traditional Akan society that accommodates individual autonomy while still maintaining some of the principles that underlie the continual practice of some of their cherished and inherited cultural beliefs.Item Plato And The Education Of Citizens(University of Ghana., 2012-07) Batinge, P.A.K.This thesis is primarily an exegetical examination of Plato's views on education in the Republic and Laws. It examines what Plato thinks of the general purpose of education; the means that should be employed in educating citizens to be relevant to their society. However, in addition to the knowledge and intellectual amusement derived from examining what Plato thought about education in his ancient Greek society emerges a subsidiary focus: the implication of Platonic conception of education in the contemporary Ghanaian society. This second aim, which is not given extensive attention as the main aim, nonetheless, argues why philosophy is relevant to national development.Item The Concept of Consciousness in Akan Philosophical Thought(University of Ghana, 2011-05) Buckman, E.Y.I have made the attempt, in this thesis, to understand the concept of consciousness in Akan metaphysics. The analysis of the concept of consciousness has taken centre stage in most philosophical discussions in ancient and in modem times, but philosophers have failed to agree on the subject due to their own different views on the subject. This is particularly the case in Akan metaphysics where few literary materials exist on the subject. It is my aim in this thesis to explore the possibility of understanding consciousness as an amene (brain) process or as an activity of the okra (soul) in Akan metaphysics. With the understanding that a person in Akan conception is composed of not only the honam (body),of which the amene is part, and okra but also the sunsum. we shall attempt to also understand consciousness as an activity or a function of the sunsum, a component that is not part of what a person is in other conceptions of a person, for instance, in the West. In addition to the examination of consciousness and ascertaining whether consciousness is a physical or a non-physical or quasi-physical activity in Akan metaphysics, other pertinent notions related to the analysis of consciousness, the metaphysical significance of Akan terms for consciousness and a person (a subject of which consciousness is a feature) ,will also be discussed. The thesis will also discuss a possible relation between consciousness and personal identity in the context of the Akan belief in life after death. The relevance of this discussion is to inquire if consciousness has any definitive role to play in the determination of a person's identity in Akan metaphysics.Item A Rousseauean Justification of Punishment(University of Ghana, 2019-08) Agbenosi, H.This thesis is an attempt to arrive at a more suitable justification for the institution of punishment. The problem arises because punishment discriminates between those who are considered offenders (one who has broken the law) and those considered non-offenders. Punishment also goes beyond distinguishing between the offender and the non-offender to inflict some pain or deprive some right to the one considered as an offender. Both the discrimination and the pain inflicted or right deprived to the offender require a justification to be acceptable. This is what has engaged many theorists in penology. There are various positions on the matter. One of the traditional positions like the desert-based retributivists, a variant of the Retributivists justification for punishment says the offender deserves to be punished because he or she has committed a crime and deserves a punishment that inflicts a pain which is equal to the crime that has been committed. The other traditional position is the utilitarian position which suggests that it is justifiable to punish the offender because such a punishment will preserve the society by maintaining social control. This thesis proposes a rational contractarian approach based on the ideas of the contractarian Jean Jacques Rousseau. This thesis suggests that a more plausible justification for punishment could be based on freedom as an essential characteristic of the human being. When a person is deprived of his or her freedom the person loses their humanity. The thesis further suggests that when a person lives according to rational nature, they will live according to the general will, which is always good and makes him free. However, a person who lives according to the will of another or according to one‟s passions, will live in subjugation to another person‟s will or passions against the general will and by so doing is not free. The actual will of a person rises against the general will (the person‟s real will), and this results in a split will. Such a split will is one which makes a person commit a crime and become an offender and unfree. This thesis proposes that punishment remedies this situation when the laws which are based on the general will are applied. The rational will of the person discerns the general will and from that makes the laws. When a person is punished based on the law, then, one punishes oneself and is thus subject neither to another nor to one‟s passions and so is free; there is no distinction between the sovereign who makes the law and the offender who has broken the law. Punishment is thus applied to make a person free since by going against the general will one has made oneself unfree. This thesis seeks to pick some positive attributes of the traditional positions, while avoiding some of their major criticisms and adding its own unique features like concentrating on human freedom as an essential basis to give a more suitable justification for punishment.Item Is Non-Reductive Physicalism a Plausible Theory of Consciousness?(University of Ghana, 2018-07) Barimah, G.K.According to the non-reductive physicalist, mental properties are not identical to physical properties. In order to distinguish non-reductive physicalism from epiphenomenalism, the non-reductive physicalist considers mental properties as not just a by-product of physical processes but posits that mental properties can cause physical events thereby violating the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. The problem which this thesis seeks to investigate, therefore, is that, if physicalism suggests that the only reality is the physical kind and that all other things including the mental depend on the physical domain then is the position of the non-reductive physicalist with respect to the independence of mental properties and their causal powers consistent with physicalism? I posit in this thesis that non-reductive physicalism is a plausible theory of consciousness by clarifying concepts such as monism, physical, physicalism and materialism. I also assert the plausibility of non-reductive physicalism by showing that non-reductive physicalism upholds the principle of the causal closure of the physical against Kim’s (1993) criticism that it does not.Item Is Rorty a Jamesian? A Comparative Analysis of William James and Richard Rorty on the Pragmatists‟ Conception of Truth(University of Ghana, 2018-07) Rahim, M.T.A.This thesis is a comparative analysis of William James and Richard Rorty on the pragmatists‟ conception of truth. In this thesis, I argue that Rorty‟s notion of truth is similar to James‟s pragmatic notion of truth, contrary to the claims that it is not. Also, I argue that Rorty remains a Jamesian in respect of James‟s pragmatic notion of truth. Rorty agrees with James‟s position that truth is the expedient in the way of our thinking. However, Rorty argues for other positions regarding truth which seem to contradict James‟s view about truth. Rorty appears to be selective about what he considers to be James‟s notion of truth. Again, Rorty argues that there is no theory of truth and that the idea of truth could be replaced with justification. James emphatically calls his position a theory of truth, and never argues explicitly for the replacement of truth with justification as Rorty does. Despite the view that Rorty‟s claim differs sometimes with James‟s position, Rorty maintains that his position is similar to James‟s position. In line with Rorty‟s position, I argue that Rorty‟s denial of a theory of truth is in fact not a rejection of a theory of truth. It is to repudiate the idea of the correspondence theory of truth. In addition, I argue that Rorty‟s replacement of truth with justification is not only because there is no practical difference or practical consequences in doing that. It is also the case that James argues a similar issue by suggesting that truth is just a process just as health and wealth are processes and the naming of these processes are just our own labeling. I argue that James‟s and Rorty‟s position on truth is established on practical importance, and other things are secondary. The accepted necessity, practical importance, gives a strong support to the claim that Rorty is a Jamesian and his notion of truth is similar to James‟ pragmatic notion of truth.Item Karol Wojtyla’s Conception of Love and Responsibility and Its Application to the Use of Contraception(University of Ghana, 2018-07) Dery, L.This study probes the perspective of Wojtyla’s sexual ethics regarding his views on love and responsibility and his synthesis on the ends of marriage and the morality of the use of contraception in marriage. “Love and Responsibility” is the title and the theme of his book on sexual ethics which reflects his own brand of moral philosophy. Karol Wojtyla argues against the use of contraceptives for married couples. His view is that contraceptive sexual intercourse is reductive, does not fully respect the dignity of the other and does not fully express human spousal love. This thesis investigates Karol Wojtyla’s position and defends the possibility of exercising responsible human love whilst using contraceptives in the sexual life of married couples.Item Is Rorty a Jamesian? A Comparative Analysis of William James and Richard Rorty on the Pragmatists‟ Conception of Truth(University of Ghana, 2018-07) Rahim, M.T.A.This thesis is a comparative analysis of William James and Richard Rorty on the pragmatists‟ conception of truth. In this thesis, I argue that Rorty‟s notion of truth is similar to James‟s pragmatic notion of truth, contrary to the claims that it is not. Also, I argue that Rorty remains a Jamesian in respect of James‟s pragmatic notion of truth. Rorty agrees with James‟s position that truth is the expedient in the way of our thinking. However, Rorty argues for other positions regarding truth which seem to contradict James‟s view about truth. Rorty appears to be selective about what he considers to be James‟s notion of truth. Again, Rorty argues that there is no theory of truth and that the idea of truth could be replaced with justification. James emphatically calls his position a theory of truth, and never argues explicitly for the replacement of truth with justification as Rorty does. Despite the view that Rorty‟s claim differs sometimes with James‟s position, Rorty maintains that his position is similar to James‟s position. In line with Rorty‟s position, I argue that Rorty‟s denial of a theory of truth is in fact not a rejection of a theory of truth. It is to repudiate the idea of the correspondence theory of truth. In addition, I argue that Rorty‟s replacement of truth with justification is not only because there is no practical difference or practical consequences in doing that. It is also the case that James argues a similar issue by suggesting that truth is just a process just as health and wealth are processes and the naming of these processes are just our own labeling. I argue that James‟s and Rorty‟s position on truth is established on practical importance, and other things are secondary. The accepted necessity, practical importance, gives a strong support to the claim that Rorty is a Jamesian and his notion of truth is similar to James‟ pragmatic notion of truth.
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