Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Poverty in Africa

dc.contributor.authorGyeke-Dako, A.
dc.contributor.authorAgbloyor, E.K.
dc.contributor.authorAgoba, A.M.
dc.contributor.authorTurkson, F.
dc.contributor.authorAbbey, E.
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-02T16:23:53Z
dc.date.available2022-06-02T16:23:53Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.descriptionResearch Articleen_US
dc.description.abstractThis article discusses the extent to which central bank independence (CBI) can be used to mitigate the regressive nature of inflation. Using 44 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries from the period 1970–2012, the article first examines whether CBI has any influence on inflation by distinguishing between legal independence and governor turnover rates. The evidence shows that CBI helps control inflation, and that inflation generally reduces poverty, and this effect is even stronger, in an environment of low CBI.en_US
dc.identifier.otherDOI: 10.1177/09726527221078434
dc.identifier.urihttp://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/handle/123456789/38121
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSAGEen_US
dc.subjectCentral bank independenceen_US
dc.subjectinflationen_US
dc.subjectpovertyen_US
dc.subjectAfricaen_US
dc.titleCentral Bank Independence, Inflation, and Poverty in Africaen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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