Central bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa: Examining the moderating role of political institutions

dc.contributor.authorAgoba, A.M.
dc.contributor.authorAbor, J.Y.
dc.contributor.authorOsei, K.
dc.contributor.authorSa-Aadu, J.
dc.contributor.authorAmoah, B.
dc.contributor.authorDzeha, G.C.O.
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-13T09:39:08Z
dc.date.available2019-12-13T09:39:08Z
dc.date.issued2019-12-02
dc.descriptionResearch Articleen_US
dc.description.abstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to primarily investigate the ability of independent central banks (central bank independence (CBI)) to improve fiscal performances in Africa, accounting for election years, and also to examine whether the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance is enhanced by higher political institutional quality. Design/methodology/approach – Using recent CBI data from Garriga (2016) on 48 African countries, 90 other developing countries and 40 developed countries over the period 1970–2012, the authors apply a two stage system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust correction estimator to examine the impact of CBI and elections on fiscal policy in Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Findings – The authors provide evidence that unlike in other developing countries and developed countries, CBI does not significantly improve fiscal performance in Africa. However, the effectiveness of CBI in improving fiscal performance in Africa is enhanced by higher levels of institutional quality. Although elections directly worsen fiscal performance in Africa, institutional quality enhances CBI’s effect on improving fiscal performance in election years across Africa, other developing countries and developed countries. Practical implications – The findings of the study are significant as they provide insight into the benefits of having strong institutions to complement independent central banks in order to control fiscal indiscipline in election years. Originality/value – The study is the first among the studies of CBI-fiscal policy nexus, to measure fiscal policy using net central bank claims on government as a percentage of GDP. In addition to the use of fiscal balance, this study also uses cyclically adjusted fiscal balance as a measure of fiscal policy. This is a critical channel through which independent central banks can constrain governen_US
dc.identifier.otherDOI 10.1108/IJOEM-08-2018-0423
dc.identifier.urihttp://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/handle/123456789/34171
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherInternational Journal of Emerging Marketsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries14;5
dc.subjectAfricaen_US
dc.subjectDeveloping countriesen_US
dc.subjectInstitutional theoryen_US
dc.subjectcentral bank independenceen_US
dc.titleCentral bank independence, elections and fiscal policy in Africa: Examining the moderating role of political institutionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Files

License bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.6 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: