Social identity’ and ‘shared worldview’: free riders in explanations of collective action

Abstract

The notions ‘worldview’ and ‘social identity’ are examined to consider whether they contribute substantively to causal sequences or networks or thought clusters that result in intentional group actions. Routine reference to such purportedly key components of agents’ intentions are presumed to help explain their collective actions. But problems emerge when we consider the theoretical details of attributing one worldview and identity to each individual, or a shared worldview to a whole community. Where does one worldview, or type of identity, leave off and another begin? Comparable fuzziness surfaces when we inspect the notion of distinct worldviews as inherently incommensurable, or distinct social identities as inherently antagonistic. Three proposed explanations of sectarian conflict or ethnic violence are analysed as examples of theories that link intentional group behaviour to the worldviews and social identities of the individuals directly involved. But as will be shown, it is not facts about worldviews and identities as such, but historically specific facts and contingent circumstances that impinge upon those individual agents’ welfare (as well as their beliefs and values) which need to be examined in order to explain their group-motivated behaviour—be it violent, conciliatory, or otherwise.