Problems with Wiredu’s Empiricalism
Date
2012
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Legon Journal of the Humanities, University of Ghana
Abstract
In his “Empiricalism: The Empirical Character of an African Philosophy”,
Kwasi Wiredu sets out to reject some logical and epistemological categorial
distinctions that can be deployed as instruments for misunderstanding and
denigrating African modes of thought. Towards this end, he enunciates
a doctrine he calls ‘empiricalism’, which he considers is conclusively
characteristic of Akan philosophy. In doing so, Wiredu ascribes some
ideas to Akan metaphysics that I consider disputable. This paper aims at
contesting those ascriptions. I begin with Wiredu’s thesis and arguments
in favour of empiricalism, and proceed to formulate and discuss what
I perceive to be the major problems with the doctrine. The paper ends
by offering suggestions on how the problems engendered by Wiredu’s
empiricalism may be resolved, and by surveying the prospects of the
doctrine for African philosophy.