Department of Banking and Finance

Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://197.255.125.131:4000/handle/123456789/23056

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Author: search.filters.author.Agbloyor, E.K.Subject: search.filters.subject.Corporate governance

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    Regulations and banking crisis: lessons from the African context
    (Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2022) Ofori-Sasu, D.; Agbloyor, E.K.; Kuttu, S.; Abor, J.Y.
    Purpose: This study aims to investigate the coordinated impact of regulations on the predicted probability of a banking crisis in Africa. Design/methodology/approach: The study used the dynamic panel instrumental variable probit regression model of 52 African economies over the period 2006 to 2018. Findings: The authors observe that banking crisis is persistent for few years but dissipates in the long run. The results show that board mechanism and ownership control are important in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. The authors found a negative impact of regulatory capital and monetary policy on the predicted probability of a banking crisis, while regulatory quality was not strong in reducing the likelihood of banking crisis. There was also evidence to support regulatory capital and monetary policy augments the negative impact of board mechanism and ownership control on the predicted probability of a banking crisis. Research limitations/implications: The limitation of the study is that it did not explore all measures of regulatory framework and how they impact banking crisis. However, it has an advantage of using alternative measures of regulations in a banking crisis probability model. Therefore, future studies should include other macro-prudential regulations, regulatory environments and supervision and observe how they are coordinated to reduce possible crisis in a robust methodological framework. Practical implications: The research has policy implications for monetary authorities and policymakers to set coordinated regulations through internal banking mechanisms that are relevant in sustaining banking system stability goals. Countries in Africa should strengthen their quality of regulation in such a way that it can play a strong and complementary role to a robust internal control mechanisms, so as to maintain stability in the banking system. In general, regulators and policymakers should design greater coordination of external and internal regulations through a single regulatory framework and a common resolution mechanism that make the banking system more robust in curbing possible crisisSocial implications: The policy implication of the study is to build banking confidence in society. Originality/value: This study analyses the interactions of different components of internal and external regulatory framework in helping to reduce the probability of a banking crisis in Africa.
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    Does corporate governance structures promote shareholders or stakeholders value maximization? Evidence from African banks
    (Corporate Governance (Bingley), 2018-04) Kusi, B.A.; Gyeke-Dako, A.; Agbloyor, E.K.; Darku, A.B.
    Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance structures and stakeholder and shareholder value maximization perspectives in 267 African banks from 2006 to 2011. Design/methodology/approach The authors used the Prais–Winsten ordinary least squares and random effect regression models to explore this relationship to ensure consistency and efficiency in results. The data for this study were collected from Bankscope. Findings The results of this study show that corporate governance structures such as CEO duality, nonexecutive members and extreme large board size lead to a reduction in both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. However, audit independence and board size also promote both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Although gender diversity promotes profit maximization, it was not significant in any of the models estimated. The results further suggest that the same corporate governance structures promote and detract shareholder and stakeholder value maximization in Africa although the effect of corporate governance structures was weightier on shareholder value maximization confirming the agency theory. Practical implications From these findings, bank management must pursue the institution of good corporate governance structures and avoid weak corporate governance structures to promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Also equity holders may have to pay particular attention to corporate governance structures because they benefit the most from the institution of good corporate governance structures. Originality/value This study explores and compares how corporate governance structures promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization separately in African banks. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first of such studies.