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Can Gender-Targeted Employment Interventions Help Enhance Community Participation? Evidence from Urban Togo

ANITA BREUER [a] and EDWARD ASIEDU [b,*]

[a] *German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn, Germany*
[b] *University of Ghana Business School, Accra, Ghana*

Summary. — The Participatory Development (PD) approach aims at improving the quality of governance by empowering local populations. Particularly for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), PD is regarded an opportunity to help shift from unjustified centralization to more decentralized forms of governance. Yet, PD projects are frequently fraught with undesired effects of elite capture which critics ascribe to insufficient appreciation of local context. Our study adopts a sequential quantitative–qualitative mixed method approach to broaden the empirical foundation needed for context sensitive project design. By exploring the effects of gender and employment on community participation we contribute to narrowing two research gaps: First, political science research on female participation in SSA has mostly focused on participation in national-level processes. Second, while development economics literature has devoted much attention on effects of female employment on intra-household bargaining, it has so far omitted the question what this means for the empowerment of women beyond the household, that is in the public life of their communities. Analyzing original survey data of over 1,300 respondents, collected across four urban municipalities in Togo, we find that unemployment negatively impacts community participation. Specifically, we show that this effect is mainly driven by female unemployment and establish self-efficacy driven by norm perception as the causal link between female employment and participation. Complementing our quantitative findings with data from 98 qualitative interviews, we show that employment constitutes an important psychological resource that enables women to overcome multiple discrimination barriers to community participation. However, this effect is stronger for women in a formal employment situation than for those working in less formalized settings. We conclude that gender-targeted employment interventions can help to increase community participation. We recommend that such efforts should not fixate on the creation of female job opportunities but also seek to strengthen the role of female informal workers in local political processes.

Key words — participatory development, unemployment, self-efficacy, gender empowerment, Togo, Sub-Saharan Africa

1. INTRODUCTION: PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES IN AFRICA

The Participatory Development (PD) approach aims at giving control over planning decisions and investment resources for local development projects to community groups. Over the past decade, PD has gained considerable importance as an instrument of channeling development assistance. The World Bank's lending for PD projects has risen from US$ 2 billion in 2003 (Mansuri & Rao, 2004, p. 2) to US$ 30 in 2013 (Wong, 2013, p. 1). In 2013, the World Bank supported approximately 400 PD projects in 94 countries. The largest numbers of these projects were located in Africa, followed by South Asia and Latin America (Wong, 2013, p. 1). This trend has largely been motivated by the recognition of decentralization and democratic local governance as key to sustainable development.

It has been argued that particularly for Africa decentralization will be the strategic imperative for the post-2015 development agenda (Crawford & Hartmann, 2008; Nganje, 2013) with both the 2011 Busan-High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 and the 2012 Rio+ 20 Conference on Sustainable Development emphasizing the centrality of the local space to any future development agenda for the African continent.

In this context, PD is as an opportunity for Africa to strengthen local institutions through more inclusive decision-making processes that seek to engage and empower local populations (see e.g., the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development of 1990 and the International Monetary Fund's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2014). However, critics have noted that empirical evidence of a sustained positive impact of PD initiatives considerably lags behind the rate at which such projects are implemented (Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Oakley & Clegg, 1998). In fact, PD projects frequently fail to effectively target marginalized groups and are frequently fraught with undesired effects of elite capture (Agarwal, 2001; Cornwall, 2003; Eversole, 2010; Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Rao & Ibanez, 2003; Wong, 2013). In essence, researchers agree that the effectiveness of PD projects frequently suffers from insufficient appreciation of local context in project design (Cornwall, 2003; Mansuri & Rao, 2013).

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Against this background, there is still surprisingly little research on the determinants of community-level political participation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Although the body of literature on the barriers to community participation in the region is growing, many of the qualitative studies in this field concentrate on the institutional set up of specific PD projects rather than on individual-level factors (see for example Kilewo & Frumence, 2015 or Yamada, 2014). Thus, to date most of what we know about the individual-level determinants of political participation on the African continent is informed by cross-national comparative research based on Afrobarometer data (see for example Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2011; Isaksson, Kotsadam, & Nerman, 2014; Kuenzi & Lambright, 2005; Resnick & Casale, 2011).

Furthermore, and despite the fact that the political marginalization of women and their discrimination in the labor market are commonly recognized as a major development obstacle in Africa (see e.g., African Development Bank, 2015; Saba Arbache, Kolev, & Filipiak, 2010) we still know little about the extent to which African women's employment status and situation affect their ability to impact the public life of their communities.

On the one hand, much of the political science literature that studies the relation between female labor force participation and female political participation, both in Africa and worldwide, focuses on participation in formal political institutions at the national level such as turnout in national elections, partisanship, and gender representation in legislative assemblies (e.g., Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008; Rai, 2011; Resnick & Casale, 2011). On the other hand, the strand of development economics literature that studies the relation between labor force participation and female autonomy has focused on women's bargaining and decision-making power in the household (see Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; Antman, 2014; Atkin, 2009; Dharmalingam & Philip Morgan, 1996; Heath, 2014; Majlesi, 2016). Hence, a research gap exists concerning the community-level impact of female employment which may partly be due to the lack of a clear theory linking employment to community participation outcomes.

In their cross-national analysis covering over 27,000 respondents across 20 African emerging democracies, Isaksson *et al.* (2014) found employment to have a marginally positive impact on voting and a sizeable positive effect on inter-electoral participation, measured as the frequency with which respondents "*get together with others to raise an issue*" (Isaksson *et al.*, 2014, p. 305). The authors' interpretation of this difference is that inter-electoral participation is a more active form of political participation than voting, since it takes place in groups rather than individually and hence requires access to social networks which can be provided through employment (Isaksson *et al.*, 2014, p. 311). Nevertheless, their cross-national analysis also found that individual employment does little to explain the gender gap in political participation (Isaksson *et al.*, 2014, p. 308). To shed light on this puzzle, we provide an in-depth analysis of the impact of female employment on women's participation in community meetings. We consider female participation in these meetings as particularly relevant since this is the place where bargaining and prioritization of local development needs takes place.

In this paper we propose internal political self-efficacy driven by norm perception as a possible link between unemployment and community development participation. The basic premise of psychological self-efficacy theory is people's beliefs in their ability to produce a desired outcome by their own actions (Bandura, 1977; Maddux, 1995). The concept of political efficacy derives from this premise but has been differentiated as having two dimensions. Internal efficacy describes the extent to which a person believes to understand politics and perceives itself as being able to influence politics, whereas external efficacy refers to the extent to which a person trusts in the responsiveness of government to citizen demands and interests (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Gamson, 1968).

We hypothesize that being employed has psycho-social implications in terms of enhanced internal political self-efficacy which, in turn, encourages women to engage in the public life of their communities.

Internal efficacy has long been an established predictor of electoral participation (Beaumont, 2010; Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; Niemi, Craig & Mattei, 1991), and it is only reasonable to assume that its impact on community participation is at least equally strong or even stronger than on the anonymous act of voting. In African culture and African traditional life just as in other places in the developing world, gender is strongly defined according to roles and functions in society (see Ngubane, 2010). Patriarchal systems in Southern Africa have made a major contribution toward the discrimination of women (Njenga & Ng'ambi E., 2015). According to Mwaba (2010), African women are generally regarded as subordinate to their male counterparts and have less voice and autonomy. In addition, as discrimination can take many forms, many women face multiple discrimination because, for example, of their age, ethnic background or income status.

Discrimination can negatively impact women's political self-efficacy in different ways. First, women who have internalized existing gender stereotypes may think that (by virtue of their sex category) they do not have the necessary abilities to successfully engage in politics (compare Evans, 2016a, p. 391). Second, the behavior of individuals is guided by their perceptions of social norms (Evans, 2016b; Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Hence, if women believe that the majority of their community's members regards women as politically incompetent and consider the participation of females in politics as inappropriate, their intrinsic motivation to engage in politics themselves may be diminished. On the one hand, they may fear that transgressing these norms by trying to influence political decisions in their community could lead to their social rejection. On the other hand, they may ex ante have little faith in the success of their participation. "*It would be pointless for someone like me to attend community meetings and speak my opinion about politics*," they might conclude, "*if nobody will listen to me, why even try?*" In this context, employment could be an important psychological resource that could help women to act against the discrimination they experience from fellow citizens in their everyday life and to make their voices heard in decision-making processes that affect their communities. Evans (2016a), for example, who investigates the causes of the rising proportion of female members of parliament in Zambia, finds that growing flexibility in gender divisions of labor has led to a gradual erosion of gender stereotypes and fostered women's political leadership. By performing work previously presumed to be outside their abilities, women are increasingly perceived of, and perceive of themselves, as equally capable of leadership. We thus hypothesize that female employment positively impacts female community development participation.

Our hypothesis translates into two research questions:

(RQ1) *Can gender-targeted employment interventions help to increase overall community participation?*

(RQ2) *Which factors mediate the relationship between employment and community participation?*

To investigate these questions, we use original survey data from 1.300 respondents across four urban municipalities in Togo. We complement these quantitative data with two sets of qualitative field data that provide (a) more nuanced information on the specific way in which individual socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics influence respondents' community participation, and (b) expert knowledge on relevant aspects of local governance and the decentralization process in Togo.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the country case of Togo with a particular focus on contextual constraints on political participation and female labor market participation. Section 3 reports on the sampling process and modeling strategy for the analysis of our survey data and discusses the quantitative findings. To gain a better understanding of the causalities underlying our quantitative result, in Section 4 quantitative findings are substantiated with insights from qualitative field research. Finally, Section 5 outlines the main conclusions and related policy recommendations arising from our study.

2. THE CASE OF TOGO: STAGNATING DECENTRALIZATION AND GENDER INEQUALITY IN AN UNDERDEVELOPED LABOR MARKET

Given its political situation, the structure of its labor market, and the nature of donor engagement in the country, Togo makes for a highly relevant case for the study of the potential effects of gender-targeted interventions on community participation in the context of PD efforts. Over decades, Togo was highly dependent on development aid, with net ODA representing on average 51% of GNI per annum during 1965–92 (Kohnert, 2016, p. 3). In 1993 most international and bilateral donors officially suspended their development cooperation with Togo due to the blatant human rights violations of the authoritarian Eyadéma regime. After the resumption of aid in the late 2000s, aid dependency continued on a much smaller scale (average net ODA 7.1% of GNI p.a. 2011–14) (WDI, 2016). Following the logic of the PD approach outlined in the introduction, both international donors such as the UNDP, the World Bank, and the EU, as well Germany and France as the major bilateral donors to Togo, have since made the promotion of decentralization a central component of their development cooperation with the country. They pursue this goal either directly through programs of support for decentralization reforms, or indirectly through PD projects that seek to reinforce community participation in specific development sectors such as sanitation, restoration of soil fertility, conflict prevention, and basic livelihood improvement.

To provide a better understanding of the political and economic environment in which the above described efforts to strengthen community participation in the development process are taking place, in the following we first briefly outline the state of decentralization and local governance in Togo. We then proceed to describe the challenges that women face in Togo's labor market.

(a) *Stagnating decentralization*

Togo belongs to the impoverished fragile states according to OECD criteria and has been classified as "partially free" according to the Freedom House index of political rights since 2008 (Freedom House., 2005). Gnassingbé Eyadéma assumed the presidency via a coupe d'état in 1967 and ruled as Togo's authoritarian head of state for 38 years. Following his unexpected death in 2005, Eyadéma's son, Faure Gnassingbé, was unconstitutionally installed as new head of state by the armed forces and won a hastily organized election to confirm his position. His disputed victory triggered a wave of violence that forced over 40,000 Togolese to flee to neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2005). Giving into international pressure, in 2006 the country's rival political factions signed an agreement that led to the first free parliamentary elections in 2007 in which Faure Gnassingbé's Rally of the Togolese People (RPT) party secured the majority. Since then, voter participation has been steadily declining, which observers of the country's political scene attribute to a general frustration over lack of reform.

Togo's commitment to decentralization was an important condition for the resumption of development cooperation with the European Union in 2012 (EU Council, 2004, Commitments No 1.6 and 1.7). To date, however, the process of decentralization has not gone beyond the stage of legislative announcements (UCLG, 2015). The last municipal elections were held in 1987. In 2001, the central government appointed Municipal Councils consisting of 11 members who were charged with managing the daily business of the municipalities until new elections are held (Amlalo, 2007). Not being democratically elected, the Municipal Councils suffer from insufficient legitimacy among their constituencies (Gnamke, 2015). The government's strategy to delay local elections time and again is largely interpreted as a lack of political will of the ruling elite to devolution of power to the local level (Gnamke, 2015; Kohnert, 2016; Togo Breaking News., 2014). Furthermore, Togo's municipal councils co-exist, and at times compete, with two other types of legally recognized local authorities, namely traditional chieftaincies and neighborhood development committees (*Comités de Dévéloppement du Quartier*/CDQ) whose competences are only vaguely defined by law.

Article 143 of the Togolese Constitution recognizes the traditional chieftaincy as "*guardian of tradition and customs*" and chiefs continue to play an important role in local politics with their most important function residing in their legal role as conciliators on civil and commercial matters at the local level (Gardini, 2012). The CDQ are the main development structure that exists at the municipal level. The declared purpose of the CDQs, who were created by decree of the Ministry of Social Affairs, is to "*enable local populations to take charge of their own development*" (CIDR, 2008, p. 42). However, the ability of the CDQs to live up to their role as grassroots organizations "*focused on fighting poverty through a participatory process*" (IMF, 2014, p. xiv) is limited given the poor legal definition of their competencies and insufficient budget allocation (PASCRENA., 2014). According to a presidential decree of 2012 that set out the attributions, organization, and functioning of the CDQs, their members must be elected by the residents of the neighborhood. However they are often co-opted and strongly influenced by local chiefs and notables. While by law women and youth may be members of CDQs, they are reportedly rarely allowed to participate in decision making and are mainly mobilized for activities relating to community sanitation and infrastructure maintenance (CIDR, 2008).

(b) *Gender inequality in an underdeveloped labor market*

With an annual GDP growth of 5.7% and a GDP per capita of 570 US$ (World Bank, 2015), Togo belongs to the low-income countries according to the World Bank classification. The country's labor force stands at approximately 3.2 million of a total population of 7.4 million. According to official esti-

mates, unemployment is relatively low at overall 7.6% and 13% for youth. The gender gap in official unemployment is minimal with male unemployment at 7.3% and female unemployment at 7.9% (LO/FTF Council, 2015, p. 12). However, as in other developing countries, the interpretation of the official unemployment rate as an indicator of a well-functioning labor market is problematic. Where the formal economy cannot absorb the labor force and economic inactivity is not an option to ensure a person's survival, work of some sort has to be found, usually in the informal economy.

The importance of Togo's informal economy is reflected in its overall contribution to the economy, as well as employment generation. The informal sector contributes more than 50% to the GDP (ILO, 2013) and accounts for over 70% of non-agricultural employment. The most important activity in the informal sector is trade (49%), followed by services (29%), and manufacturing (23%). Street vendors account for 75% of the trade component. Employment in the informal sector increases by more than 3% annually. This trend is expected to be maintained given the continuous influx of rural youth into urban areas in search of non-existent formal jobs. Presently, it is estimated that over 90% of all newly created employment is in the informal sector.

As elsewhere in SSA, the informal economy is dominated by women: Countrywide, about 70% of workers in the informal sector are women while only 30% are men. Most women in the informal sector are self-employed in small shops or ambulant street vending (LO/FTF Council, 2015, p. 15). Yet, only 35% of small enterprises have female participation in ownership (World Bank, 2009). Disaggregated national-level data on the exact nature of women's informal economic activities are hard to come by, yet 2012 survey data from the capital Lomé (Herrera, Kuépie, Nordman, Oudin, & Roubaud, 2012), indicate that they primarily engage in, and dominate trade, particularly street trade (Table 1).

Despite the fact that Togo's new Family Code from April 2014 constitutes a considerable improvement toward legal gender equality, women's employment opportunities continue to be strongly shaped by social norms (LO/FTF Council, 2015). For example, in rural areas it is not uncommon for husbands to veto their wife's taking up a job that would require them to travel outside the village (Filmer & Fox, 2014).

That said, it would be wrong to assume that Togo's working women in the informal economy are necessarily unable to translate their employment into political influence. The case of the "Nana-Benz", for example, speaks to the contrary. This all-female group of cloth traders earned their nickname from the fact that they were wealthy enough to buy Mercedes-Benz. During the 1970s, the revenues from their trade activities temporarily bypassed that of the country's phosphate industry (Kohnert, 2016). The lucrative business of the Nana-Benz profited enormously from their clientelist relationship with the Eyadéma regime: in exchange for patronage such as a virtual monopoly on the trade of cloth and the construction of a market-hall at the outskirts in Lomé, the Nana-Benz added to Eyadéma's charismatic cult through public displays of support to "their" president (Soble, 2007).

Exceptional cases like that of the Nana Benz aside, the majority of informal sector workers in Togo is de facto excluded from the formal political representation of their interests. Togo's trade union movement only started to extend its services to the informal economy in 2012. By 2014, the National Confederation of Trade Unions (CNTT) had affiliated 53,410 trade union members from the informal economy, corresponding to merely 1.7% of the labor force. This is reflected by the fact that currently less than 5% of the population has coverage of some sort of social protection. A social security law, passed in 2011, that envisages the expansion of social security arrangements to independent and informal sector workers, has not been implemented to date (LO/FTF Council, 2015; Van Domelen, 2012).

Summarizing the above, it can be said legal dispositions in Togo theoretically provide citizens with different points of access to non-electoral participation. In practice, however, their effective participation remains constrained by diverse contextual factors including the lack of political will of the ruling elite to devolution of power to the local level, parallel structures of formal and informal institutions, and insufficient interest representation of workers in the informal sector, the majority of which are women.

3. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH

(a) *Case selection and sampling*

The survey data presented in this paper constitute the baseline for an impact measurement study of a decentralization program by the German KfW Development Bank in Togo. Consequently, the sample of the household survey conducted in March 2015 was constructed to be representative of the target population of the KfW intervention, i.e., citizens aged 15 years and older of the intervention's three target cities Sokodé, Tsévié, and Kpalimé plus the city of Atakpamé which serves the function of a non-treatment control city in the design of the impact measurement study. In adherence to the "do-no-harm" principle, the three target cities of the KfW intervention—while similar in population size and economic situation—were chosen to ensure geographic, ethnic, and religious heterogeneity among the beneficiary populations.

The sampling procedure for the survey followed a randomized three-stage cluster design modeled after the example of UNICEF's Multiple Issue Cluster Surveys (UNICEF, 2006): From the list of enumeration areas of the Togolese General Population and Household census of 2010, ten enumeration areas for each city were randomly chosen as primary sampling units (PSU). A household listing operation was carried out in order to create maps and an updated list of all households in the selected PSUs. Households were then chosen randomly using probability proportional to size sampling (PPS). During the listing operation, enumerators contacted the heads of households to obtain a complete list of all resident household members aged 15 years and older. During the actual phase of data collection interviewers used an Excel tool to randomly choose the individual interview respondent among the resident household mem-

Table 1. *Women's share of informal employment by branch of economic activity in Lomé*

Agriculture	Trade	Street Trade	Non-trade services	Construction	Manufacturing	Total non-agricultural
43.7%	79.8%	82.7%	35.3%	1.6%	52.9%	57.1%

Source: Herrera et al. (2012).

bers. These efforts resulted in a sample of 1,498 respondents. After data clearing and deletion of cases with missing values we obtained a working sample of 1,353 cases.

(b) *Dependent variable*

To assess community participation the survey asks: "In the past, have you attended a meeting of the development committee of your neighborhood (CDQ) or other public meetings in which community affairs are discussed?" This participation measure has two advantages: It is rather encompassing in the sense that it is not limited to the state-imposed institution of the CDQ but also accounts for less institutionalized, traditional forms of community deliberation such as gatherings convened by local chiefs, or meetings of other groups or organizations that work for the development of the community. Second, while it is an active form of participation it is less confrontational than alternative measures of non-electoral participation such as attending protest marches or demonstrations.

While recognizing the importance of confrontational participation, the focus of our paper lies on the analysis of the impact of female employment on women's participation in the development process by partaking in community meetings. We consider female participation in these meetings as particularly relevant since this is the place where bargaining and prioritization of local development needs takes place. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) for example show that women leaders who serve as policy makers in local village councils provide public goods that are relevant to the needs of women.

(c) *Explanatory variables*

Our set of explanatory variables was chosen based on individual-level factors that have been identified as impacting political participation in previous cross-national survey research on Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2011; Isaksson *et al*., 2014; Kuenzi & Lambright, 2005; Resnick & Casale, 2011). To measure economic status, we used a Likert-scaled item that asks the respondent to give an assessment of the economic situation of their households. Responses include: (1) We have no problems to pay for food, housing, and bills and can make some savings, (2) Our income is just sufficient to pay for food, housing, and bills but we cannot make any savings, (3) Sometimes we find it difficult to pay for food, housing, and bills and our income is spent before the end of the month, (4) We have severe financial difficulties and have to incur debts (or borrow money from friends or family) to pay for food, housing, and bills.

Gender is measured as a dichotomous variable with 0 for male and 1 for female respondents. Age is a continuous variable. Education is measured by five categories: (1) no schooling, (2) non-formal schooling (alphabetization program, koranic school etc.), (3) primary school, (4) secondary school, (4) post-secondary education. Employment is a dummy variable that differentiates respondents who indicated to have been primarily engaged in either "salaried work" or "self-employed work" over the past six months from those who indicated non-income generating activities, including studying, being primarily responsible for domestic work at home, being retired, and looking for a job. For simplicity, in the remainder of this paper these latter categories will be referred to as "unemployed". To assess internal political self-efficacy, we used the Likert-scaled question "How much impact do you think people like you can have in making your community a better place to live?" Response options included (1) a big impact, (2) moderate impact, (3) small impact, and (4) no impact at all. Ethnicity is a categorical variable of all major ethnic groups. Religion is also a categorical variable of all major religions. In addition, we created ethnic and religious minority variables which capture whether the respondent lives in an enumeration area where s(he) belongs to a minority group. Based on the expectation that parents could regard community participation as an investment in the future of their children, we also included the number of children living in a household as an explanatory variable. The number of children in a household who are 15 years and below is captured as a continuous variable.

Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The sample includes 1,353 respondents between the ages of 15 years and 110 years with a mean age 37 years (Std. dev = 15). Among this, 51% were women and 49% were men. The distribution is quite representative of the overall adult population in Togo. The table also presents the economic situation of respondents in our data. Based on the basic households needs fulfillment question, 15% of respondents experience severe financial difficulties and have to incur debt to pay for their households' basic needs. Approximately 30% experience some to cover basic household needs, whereas 37% experience no problems in covering basic needs but cannot make savings. In terms of employment, 61% of the respondents are economically active (salaried or self-employed), whereas 39% are not gainfully employed. We also find that 34% of the respondents live in a community in which their ethnic groups constitutes a minority and 32% live in a community in which their religious group constitutes a minority.

Table 2 also shows the average education to be 'primary school'-level education. To avoid a male-biased sample, we did not restrict our sampling to household heads. Thus, our sampling yielded a mix in which 56% of respondents are household heads and 44% are not household heads. The average number of children in a household under the age of 15 years is 3.3 (Std. dev = 2.5), which is lower than the total fertility rate of 4.7 for Togo (UNICEF, 2013). We attribute this to the urban setting in which the survey was conducted.

Table 2 furthermore presents information on the internal political self-efficacy of respondents. We see that a relative majority of respondents (44.6%%) think that they cannot make any impact on the quality of life of their community. 18.6% of respondents think they can make a small impact, 18.7% think they can make a moderate impact, and 18.1% think that they can make a big impact. In order to simplify our estimations and interpretations, we collapsed the original self-efficacy variable into a binary dummy variable where respondents who think they have no to small input are categorized as having low self-efficacy and those who think they have a moderate to big impact as having high-efficacy. According to this classification, 37%% of respondents have a high self-efficacy and 63% a low self-efficacy level.

Finally, Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the key dependent variable we examine in his paper. We find that despite ongoing donor efforts to increase community participation, it is still at a relatively low level of 16%. Initial *t-test* comparison shows that men participate more than women (23%% of men *vs*. 9% of women) ($p = 0.000$). We do not see differences in poverty between men and women ($p = 0.666$). As expected, more households in our sample are male headed (75%) than female headed (38%) ($p = 0.000$). While we observe significantly higher levels of education for men compared to women ($p = 0.000$) there is no significant gender difference in employment ($p = 0.5813$). Men and women in our sample are also similar regarding age ($p = 0.2177$). Finally, we find a significantly higher level of internal political self-

Table 2. *Economic, demographic, and social backgrounds*

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev	Min	Max
Poverty (economic) variable	1,353	1.575	0.945	0	1
Severe financial difficulty and has to incur debt to pay for food etc.	1,353	0.147	0.354	0	1
Sometimes, difficulty to pay for food	1,353	0.307	0462	0	1
No problems with food but savings	1,353	0.369	0.483	0	1
No problems with food and savings	1,353	0.177	0.382	0	1
Unemployed (dummy)	1,353	0.394	0.489	0	1
Ethnicity	1,353	2.258	1.570	1	7
Religion	1,353	1.653	0.892	0	4
Ethnic minority (dummy)	1,353	0.342	0.474	0	1
Religious minority (dummy)	1,353	0.317	0.466	0	1
Female (dummy)	1,353	0.512	0.500	0	1
Age	1,353	37.304	15.623	15	110
Education	1,353	2.295	1.218	0	4
Household head (dummy)	1,353	0.560	0.497	0	1
Number of children under 15	1,353	3.304	2.502	1	24
Self-efficacy	1,353	1.103	1.161	0	3
No impact all	1,353	0.446	0.497	0	1
A small impact	1,353	0.186	0.389	0	1
A moderate impact	1,353	0.187	0.390	0	1
A big impact	1,353	0.181	0.385	0	1
Community participation (CDQ)	1,353	0.158	0.365	0	1

efficacy for men in our sample compared to women ($p = 0.000$).

(d) *Specification and estimation strategy*

In this section, we examine the drivers of community development participation. Based on earlier studies on participation we selected a number of controls that we expect to *a priori* impact participation. These set of controls are informed by the literature on participation, particularly the literature on political participation and participation in resource management. Unlike other studies on participation, we explicitly add extra controls for individuals' internal self-efficacy regarding community development. Thus, in order to examine the drivers of community development participation in urban Togo we specify the following econometric equation:

$$CommPart_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Un\_employ_i + \alpha_2 X_i + \alpha_3 P_i + \alpha_4 C_I + \alpha_4 B_i + \vartheta_n + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where *CommPart* denotes community development participation, which is measured as a dummy. Un_employ_i is a dummy which represents whether the individual is economically active. The vector X_i reflects individually observable characteristics such as age, gender, ethnic affiliation, religion, education, and the number of children under 15 years living in a household. We also include the economic situation of the household (P_i) in order to capture the impact of poverty on community participation. The vector C_i contains minority group affiliation, i.e., whether or not the individual belongs to an ethnic or religious group that constitutes a minority in his community. [1] The variable B_i captures individual's internal political self-efficacy and ϑ_n denotes controls for city fixed effects.

(e) *Results of the estimation*

To examine the potential impact of unemployment and self-efficacy on community participation, we estimate Eqn. (1) with and without self-efficacy. Table 3 presents the estimation results of Eqn. (1). Marginal effects are obtained by estimating a linear probability model. Estimates from standard probit models are found to be qualitatively similar. Column (1) reports the results without controlling for self-efficacy while column (2) presents estimates controlling for the effect of self-efficacy. We present both results to show that economic and social factors have psychological implications which impact community development participation. In no stretch of our imagination, we assume these effects to reflect causal relations (see e.g., Pearl, 2014; Stanghellini & Pakpahan, 2015). Thus, this linear model is a first step in our empirical analysis, which allows us to examine partial correlations between community participation and other variables specified in this model.

In column (1), we observe a negative effect of unemployment on community participation. The coefficient is significant at 5% level of significance. Thus, employment appears to increase individuals' propensity to participate at the community level. The coefficient implies that the unemployed are about 4.3% more likely to participate in community meetings. It must be said that this effect represents a correlation and not necessarily a causal effect. At a later stage, we will improve these estimates by examining causal impact. Even though the effect is not causal, it provides a first indication of a relationship between unemployment and community development participation. It could be that having a job increases a person's confidence in his ability to positively impact the life of his community, i.e., his internal political self-efficacy. This self-worth and its connection with employment could be embedded in the social structure of the society. In societies where being employed or doing something economically productive is not that important, the association between unemployment and self-worth could be weak. Therefore in addition to examining the causal impact we will also examine self-efficacy as a possible channel at a later stage. [2]

While it could be assumed that poor persons have to dedicate more time to the fulfillment of their basic needs which leaves them with less time to dedicate to community activities than wealthier persons, we do not find a significant difference in community participation between the poor and non-poor. This provides the first signal that the observed negative effect

Table 3. *Community development participation*

	Model 1	Model 2
Poverty (economic) variable		
Sometimes, difficulty to pay for food	0.002	0.002
	(0.029)	(0.028)
No problems with food but savings	−0.028	−0.013
	(0.029)	(0.028)
No problems with food and savings	0.002	0.024
	(0.036)	(0.036)
Ethnic minority dummy	−0.028	−0.032
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Religious minority dummy	−0.058***	−0.063***
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Unemployed dummy	−0.046**	−0.037*
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Are you the household head	0.007	−0.006
	(0.025)	(0.024)
Number of household member under 15	0.012**	0.009*
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gender of respondent	−0.125***	−0.111***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age of respondent	0.003***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education of respondent	0.027***	0.016*
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Small self-efficacy		0.033
		(0.024)
Moderate self-efficacy		0.177***
		(0.030)
Big self-efficacy		0.153***
		(0.032)
R^2	0.13	0.17
Observations	1,353	1,353

The reference group for the economic variable is severe financial difficulty and has to incur debt to pay for food etc. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Additional controls include city fixed effects. *Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 10% level.

of unemployment may not be due to the concomitant effect of lacking financial resources, but due to the socio-psychological effects of unemployment. Before examining this relation in more detail, we briefly discuss other determinants of community participation.

Age is observed to have a positive impact on community participation with older individuals being significantly more likely to participate. The same applies for individuals with a higher level of education and individuals living in a household with a higher number of children under 15 years. At the same time, we observe individuals whose religious group constitutes a minority in their enumeration area to be 5.6% less likely to participate in their community's public life. Finally, we observe a considerable gender gap in community participation with women being 12.5% less likely to participate in community development.

Column (2) displays the results which controls for the psychological measure of self-efficacy. The estimates show that including self-efficacy improves our model. The R^2 value increases from 0.13 to 0.17. Comparing columns (1) and (2), the results show that the unemployment dummy is now marginally significant at the 10% level signaling the behavioral ramification of unemployment. The result in column (2) does provide us with a signal of the possible channel by which unemployment impacts participation.

We also find that education, which is positive and highly significant at the 1% level in column (1), is marginally significant at the 10% level in column (2). This result also shows the interaction between education and self-efficacy. The effects and implications of the remaining factors on community participation are similar to column (1).

Before we proceed to examine our hypothesized channel from unemployment to community development participation, we begin by next establishing the causal impact of unemployment. We acknowledged that unemployment in Eqn. (1) may be endogenous and as such the results we have shown so far are simple partial correlations. For example, an omitted variable (ε_i) could impact or be correlated with unemployment, thus influencing the observed impact of unemployment on community development participation shown in Table 3. Therefore, before we proceed to show the causal path from unemployment to participation, we first show a reduced form causal impact of unemployment on participation.

We use two approaches to examine the causal impact of unemployment on participation. First we use the instrumental variables (IV) estimation approach. Second, we augment our IV estimation method by showing estimates also from the 2-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) estimation method.

We instrument unemployment with personal possession of a mobile phone. The underlying assumption is that a person who owns a mobile phone can more easily be contacted by potential employers (from both the formal and informal sector) when a job opportunity becomes available. In addition, a person seeking employment in the formal sector where CVs are required could include his/her personal mobile phone number for the job application. Similarly, a person applying

for a micro-loan to start a small business could more easily be contacted by the informal financial institution. Since community meetings are publicly announced in the community, one would not expect mobile phone possession to directly impact community participation. However, the choice and use of an instrument is always open to criticism. Therefore, as robustness check we also include the residuals from our first-stage IV regression (employment equation) in a second stage of a residual inclusion model "control model" (2SRI).

The logic behind the 2SRI is that if the omitted variables (or the error term) in the participation model that impacts unemployment were known, they could be included in the second-stage model of participation together with other observable controls (see Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008). In this case, the endogeneity of unemployment will cease to exist (Terza *et al*., 2008). Therefore the inclusion of the residuals from the first-stage IV into the second stage addresses the endogeneity problem.

The first-stage equation from the IV estimation is:

$$Un\_employ_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 X_i + \delta_2 Z_i + \delta_3 P_i + \delta_4 C_I + \delta_n + \varepsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

where Z_i denotes the instrument. The definitions of other variables in Eqn. (2) are the same as already defined in the community participation model of Eqn. (1). We start by reporting the estimates from the IV equation and then the estimates from the 2SRI.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 reports the IV regression results while column (3) reports the 2SRI regression results. We first focus on the first stage regression results from our IV strategy. Column (1) shows among other things that women are less likely to be unemployed compared to men. This buttresses our point that in the Togolese communities under study the economic enterprises that the majority of women can aspire to and are de facto involved in do not require high capital investments, while men could hope and wait for a formal and capital intensive job opportunity. A similar reasoning could explain the result that educated people are more likely to be unemployed. Column (1) also presents results on the suitability of the instrument. The first stage coefficient on our instrument is −0.171 which is highly significant at the 1% level, showing that having a mobile phone significantly reduces unemployment. We find that The F statistics for the excluded variable from the first stage regression is 24.96 and the minimum eigen statistics for the Stock and Yogo test for weak instruments is 25.60. Since both statistics exceeds their critical values ("10" as the rule of thumb for the *F* statistics and "16.38" for the Stock and Yogo statistics) at the 5% level we reject the presence of a weak instrument.

Turning our attention to the participation model (second-stage regression) of our IV regression, we see that those who are unemployed are less likely to participate in community development. We also show that the results from the IV

Table 4. *IV Estimations: community development participation*

	First-stage (unemployment)	Second-stage (participation)	Second stage (2SRI)
Poverty (economic) variable			
Sometimes, difficulty to pay for food	−0.062	−0.010	−0.010
	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.031)
No problems with food but savings	−0.107***	−0.051	−0.051
	(0.38)	(0.034)	(0.034)
No problems with food and savings	−0.209***	−0.036	−0.036
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Ethnic minority dummy	0.045	−0.021	−0.021
	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Religious minority dummy	−0.051*	−0.067***	−0.067***
	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Unemployed dummy		−0.219*	−0.219*
		(0.124)	(0.124)
Are you the household head	−0.023***	−0.037	−0.037
	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Number of household member under 15	0.007	0.013**	0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gender of respondent	−0.056***	−0.133***	−0.133***
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age of respondent	−0.004***	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education of respondent	0.017***	0.027***	0.027***
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Exclusion restriction			
Mobile phone	−0.171***		
	(0.034)		
Weak instrument test *F*-test (*p*-value)	24.96		
	(0.000)		
Stock-Yogo statistics	25.60		
Residuals			0.177
			(0122)
R^2	0.17	0.09	0.09
Observations	1,353	1,353	1,353

The reference group for the economic variable is severe financial difficulty and has to incur debt to pay for food etc. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Additional controls include city fixed effects. *Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 10% level.

regression are similar to the general control function that includes the residuals from the first stage into the participation model. The results in general show that the impact of unemployment that we show in the earlier model in Table 3 are not merely correlations but indeed unemployment has a negative effect on community development participation.

(f) *Alternate specifications—mechanism (path)*

Both the IV and the 2SRI regressions already demonstrate a causal impact of unemployment on community participation and thus constitute an improvement over the results of previous studies demonstrating correlation. We now proceed a step further by examining the path from unemployment to participation. Thus in this section we proceed to test our hypothesized channel of internal political self-efficacy as the link between employment and development participation.

As Bandura (1977) notes, unless people believe they can produce desired effects by their actions, they have little incentive to undertake activities or to persevere in the face of difficulties. Taking up on this notion, we argue that unemployment negatively impacts individuals' self-efficacy which, in turn, diminishes their confidence in being able to positively affect the life of their communities and hence their motivation to participate in community meetings. By doing so, we combine both economic and psychological measures to explain participatory behavior.

Broadly speaking, unemployment could also impact community participation through other channels; for example, the job search channel, i.e., direct effect. The idea that the unemployed is preoccupied with looking for a job and therefore does not have time to participate in community activities could be an important channel.

To further address the potential endogeneity problem and validate our hypothesis channel through which unemployment impacts community development participation, we estimate a bivariate simultaneous equation model with community participation and self-efficacy (B_i) as endogenous variables (see Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Amemiya, 1978; Lee, 1978; Zellner & Theil, 1962). The simultaneous equation model that we estimate is as follows:

$$CommPart_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 B_i + \alpha_2 X_i + \alpha_3 P_i + \alpha_4 C_I + \alpha_5 Un\_employ_i + \vartheta_n + \varphi_c + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

$$B_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Un\_employ_i + \beta_2 X_i + +\theta Z_i + v_i \quad (4)$$

As mentioned above we measure self-efficacy using a four-point Likert-scaled item asking respondents to assess their ability to make their community a better place to live in. For simplicity the self-efficacy variable is recorded as a dummy i.e., moderate and strong self-efficacy is coded 1 and small and no self-efficacy is coded 0. As presented in Eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain identification through exclusion restrictions. Thus, in Eqn. (3) we restrict the value of the coefficient of our two instruments (dummy for television ownership, radio ownership) to zero. Our augment here is that, owning a television or a radio increases ones information set (knowledge level about the world and the country) and as such enhances individual's self-efficacy. [3] The inclusion of Un_employ_i in Eqn. (3), measures the impact of unemployment on community participation through alternative channels other than through self-efficacy. [4] Joint estimation in a simultaneous system allows us to take advantage of cross equation correlations resulting in gains in efficiency (Lorentzen *et al.*, 2008).

Each equation in the system has causal interpretation (Wooldridge, 2009). The recursive bivariate probit model mirrors the 2-Stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure (see Wooldridge, 2002; Zellner & Theil, 1962). The results from the recursive bivariate system equations provide further support and strengthen our IV and 2SRI results.

As discussed earlier, we expect the coefficient β_1 to be negative and significant in the self-efficacy equation (Eqn. (4)). If the effect is solely due to self-efficacy, then we do not expect unemployment to be significant in Eqn. (3). However, if the opposite is true, then unemployment can impact community participation through other channels.

Table 5 presents the structural equation results for Eqns. (3) and (4). The coefficient on the unemployment dummy in the self-efficacy equation in column (2) is negative and significant at the 1% level. This shows that the unemployed are about 8.5% less likely to believe that they can positively impact the development of their community. The coefficient on the gender variable is negative, implying that women are significantly less likely to have high internal political self-efficacy. Also consistent with our expectation, education has a positive and significant effect sign on self-efficacy.

Turning our attention to column (1) of Table 5, we find that while unemployment negatively impacts self-efficacy in column (2), higher self-efficacy significantly enhances community participation. As people's self-efficacy increases from low to high self-efficacy their likelihood of participating at the community level increases by roughly 38%. At the same time, the coefficient on the unemployment variable is not significant in the participation model in column (1), i.e., we do not find a direct effect of unemployment other than through the effect of self-efficacy. This confirms our hypothesis on self-efficacy as the link between unemployment and community participation.

Furthermore the results in column (1), indicate that belonging to a religious minority group has a stronger negative impact on participation than belonging to an ethnic minority The general directions of these results are consistent with evidence in Table 3.

Overall, the estimation results for the participation equation in our system of equations are very consistent with the earlier models that show partial correlations. The religious minority variable is negative and significant at the 5% level. Also, as expected household head coefficient is positive and significant. Gender has a negative and significant coefficient. Age is positive and significant. We find that the effect of education on participation completely works through self-efficacy: those who have a higher education have a higher self-efficacy and tend to participate more in community development.

We also find our exclusion restriction variable of owning TV significant in the column (2) implying those who own TVs at home have a high self-efficacy. We do not find radio to impact self-efficacy even though its coefficient is positive.

In Table 6, we report the results across gender. Columns (1a) and (1b) present the results for females and columns (2a) and (2b) present the results for males. One of the striking results is that, while unemployment impacts women's self-efficacy, unemployment does not have any significant effect on the self-efficacy of men. Thus, a switch from unemployment to employment increases the likelihood of a woman reporting herself as having a high self-efficacy by 11.1%. And a switch from a low self-efficacy to high self-efficacy increases the likelihood of participation for a woman as much as 38.8%. [5] Notable also in the results presented in Table 6 is the effect of poverty on female participation, with women from poor households being significantly less likely to participate in community development.

Table 5. *Joint estimation of community development participation and self-efficacy*

	(1) Participation	(2) Self-efficacy
Poverty (economic) variable		
Sometimes, difficulty to pay for food	0.014	−0.103**
	(0.025)	(0.041)
No problems with food but savings	0.026	−0.214***
	(0.027)	(0.040)
No problems with food and savings	0.066**	−0.239***
	(0.032)	(0.045)
Self efficacy	0.384***	
	(0.050)	
Ethnic majority dummy	−0.023	
	(0.018)	
Religious minority dummy	−0.047**	
	(0.019)	
Unemployed dummy	−0.019	−0.085***
	(0.019)	(0.027)
Are you the household head	−0.043*	0.094***
	(0.023)	(0.032)
Number of household member under 15	0.004	0.012**
	(0.003)	(0.006)
Gender of respondent	−0.074***	−0.078***
	(0.023)	(0.028)
Age of respondent	0.002**	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education of respondent	0.001	0.059***
	(0.009)	(0.012)
		(0.055)
HH ownership of Radio, radio recorder		−0.006
		(0.028)
HH ownership of a Television		0.056*
		(0.029)
Observations	1,353	1,353
Log-likelihood	−1285.40	

The reference group for the economic variable is severe financial difficulty and has to incur debt to pay for food etc. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Additional controls include city fixed effects. *Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 10% level.

4. QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

To provide a better understanding of the context and the causalities underlying the quantitative findings described above, in this section we report findings from two sets of qualitative field data.

The first data set (set A), collected during March 2016, comprises 60 expert interviews with local and national state officials and civil society actors, who were questioned about influence networks and power structures in local governance in Togo. The second data set (set B), collected in May 2016, comprises five focus group discussions and 33 individual interviews and digs deeper into the effects of individual determinants of community participation. For interview set B) we developed a semi-structured interview guideline based on the quantitative findings described in the previous section. Respondents were asked about their participation in public community meetings and about other ways in which they usually engage in the public life of their communities. They were also asked to assess the degree to which they thought to be able to influence community decisions, as well as to explain which factors they thought strengthened or weakened their ability to exert such influence.[6] Statements from both data sets were anonymized, translated from French and local Togolese languages to English and subsequently organized and coded using Atlas.TI.

The expert interviews confirmed the co-existence of formal and informal influence structures in the communities under study. While citizens sometimes address the municipal council directly to express their needs, the local development committees (CDQ) and local chiefs are important intermediaries between the population and local government officials. Especially chiefs have an important role in passing on citizens' demands to the municipal council.[7] The main function of the CDQs, in turn, is to deliberate on projects and organize collective works in their respective neighborhoods.[8] Therefore, meetings of the CDQ or at the chiefs' places are key to the process of identifying and prioritizing local development needs. However, given their position as intermediaries between the local population and the local government, both CDQs and chiefs can also act as gatekeepers in the process of local development policy formulation by privileging the needs of certain social groups over those of others.

The results from the focus group discussions and individual interviews show, that while the majority of respondents (22 out of 38) participated in community meetings, there is a clear gender bias with more males participating than females (Table 7).[9]

Interview data also suggest that abstention from meetings cannot simply be interpreted as a lack of interest in community affairs or general political apathy, but is rather caused by multiple forms of discrimination which may translate in feelings of impotence.

In fact, the majority of respondents stated to be interested in the public life of their community and to actively engage themselves for their community. The most frequently reported type

Table 6. *Joint estimation of community development participation and self-efficacy: specifications across gender*

	(1a) Participation	(1b) Self-efficacy	(2a) Participation	(2b) Self-efficacy
Poverty (economic) variable				
Sometimes, difficulty	0.061**	−0.175***	−0.051	−0.044
To pay for food	(0.030)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.059)
No problems with	0.056*	−0.269***	−0.041	−0.181***
Food but savings	(0.032)	(0.056)	(0.117	(0.058)
No problems with	0.131**	−0.333***	−0.034	−0.138*
Food and savings	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.093)	(0.072)
Self efficacy	0.388***		0.271	
	(0.051)		(0.485)	
Ethnic majority dummy	−0.023		−0.017	
	(0.022)		(0.033)	
Religious minority dummy	−0.029		−0.075*	
	(0.024)		(0.044)	
Unemployed dummy	−0.007	−0.111***	−0.049	−0.035
	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.051)	(0.047)
Are you the household head	−0.018	0.071*	−0.053	0.159***
	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.087)	(0.057)
Number of household member under 15	0.006*	0.011*	0.004	0.016*
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Age of respondent	0.001*	0.0000	0.003	0.002
	(0.0006)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education of respondent	−0.007	0.046***	0.033	0.065***
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.050)	(0.022)
		(0.060)		(0.134)
HH ownership of Radio, radio recorder		0.009		−0.012
		(0.033)		(0.048)
HH ownership of a Television		0.022		0.117**
		(0.034)		(0.048)
Observations	693		660	
Log-likelihood	−538.34		−731.81	

The reference group for the economic variable is severe financial difficulty and has to incur debt to pay for food etc. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Additional controls include city fixed effects. *Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 10% level.

Table 7. *Participation in community meetings by gender*

	In the past, have you participated in a meeting of your neighborhood's CDQ, at the chief's place or other public meetings in which community affairs are discussed?	
	Yes	No
Females	3	12
Males	19	4

of community engagement was participation in collective works such as road maintenance and cleaning gutters (17 mentions).[10] The importance of such alternative forms of public engagement should not be underestimated. The concept of participatory development (PD) includes the self-organization of collective action by local populations (Schmidt *et al.*, 2016; Servaes & Hoyng, 2015). It is widely recognized that the absence of adequate sanitation, for example, has a serious impact on health and social development (see e.g., WHO, 2008). In areas of limited statehood, the state frequently fails to provide basic public goods, including the provision and maintenance of sanitation infrastructure. Under such circumstances the ability of citizens to organize themselves in order to provide public goods is an important contribution toward development (Livingston & Walter-Drop, 2012).

The second most frequently mentioned form of community engagement was membership in a civil society organization (10 mentions).[11] Other reported forms included raising awareness about development matters, mobilizing others, and donating money. Only eight respondents stated not to engage in the public life of their community at all.

Notwithstanding, many respondents were skeptical about their ability to influence decisions concerning the development of their community. The most frequently named obstacle to exercising influence within the community was ethnic or religious minority status (nine mentions),[12] followed by female gender[13] and poverty (both eight mentions),[14], and young age (five mentions).[15]

Regarding ethnicity and religious affiliation and the opportunity to influence community affairs, several respondents stated that individuals not belonging to the locally dominant groups are either not invited to participate in meetings and collective community works or denied the right to express themselves in debates concerning community development.[16]

Regarding age, several younger respondents felt that they were judged as incompetent to contribute to the development of their community both when interacting with elders and with local authorities.[17] Poverty was cited as an obstacle to community participation both in terms of the poor having more pressing needs to take care of than to participate in meetings, as well as poor people perceiving their opinions and interventions in community meetings to be less valued than those of wealthier community members.[18]

Regarding female gender as an obstacle to influence community affairs, it is interesting to note that gender discrimination

appears to negatively affect female internal political self efficacy primarily through women's perceptions of social norms, rather than through internalized gender stereotypes. In fact, only one female respondent in our sample expressed doubts about her cognitive ability to successfully intervene in community meetings:

> "*I'm not informed and I don't go* [to community meetings]. *Sometimes I tell myself that those meetings are above my level and that I wouldn't be able to say much there.*" *(Female hairdresser, 27 years, from Tsévié).* [19]

The notion of women being primarily preoccupied with the upbringing of their children and domestic affairs and not showing interest in politics was almost exclusively expressed by male respondents. Female respondents, by contrast, clearly indicated discrimination by men and the resulting prescriptive gender norms as an impediment to their ability to influence community decisions [20], as illustrated by the following two interview excerpts:

> *''Normally, women should participate* [in community affairs] *with equal rights as men. But they are not associated. The men don't involve them. They prefer their wives to stay at home. They tell themselves that women aren't on the same level with them; that women are just women; that they can't do much* [. . .] *a woman hasn't got the right to go and seek for information, the right to go and ask things about development*" (Female food street vendor, 23 years from Kpalimé). [21]

> "*Normally when there is a consultation meeting and a woman attends that meeting, her opinion will be neglected. There will be men who say ''woman, what are you doing here, your place isn't here, your place is at your home!*" *And this is what discourages women from taking interest in the management of community development.* [. . .] *It is necessary to sensitize the men because it is due to them that the women are not attending meetings.*" (Focus group discussion with housewives from Sokodé). [22]

It is noteworthy, that the strongest statements about female discrimination regarding participation in community affairs were made by women who were either not economically active or working self-employed in informal, low-qualification enterprises such as petty trade or hair braiding. Generally, both male and female respondents in a more formalized employment situation were more confident about their social standing in the community and hence their ability to influence the community's public life. For some respondents, this confidence was based on the fact that they felt well connected to other community members through their professional networks. [23] Others felt that either their specific job skills or the revenues generated by them were recognized as important assets for the development of the community by their fellow citizens. [24] As illustrated by the following two interview excerpts, particularly for women, this confidence can translate into increased levels of political self efficacy:

> *''I'm a resident midwife, so even at night I have to leave the house if I am needed to help the women in my neighborhood. Every day I do something to help somebody and this contributes to the development of my neighborhood* [. . .] *Thanks to my employment I can say that I have a little bit of influence. Just seeing the respect with which people treat me, I know that if I wanted to initiate projects for the community I would be very influential* [. . .] *My age, my religion or my ethnicity do not play a role in my case. Young people come to me just as older people do and we discuss normally* [. . .] *everybody just calls me ''Maman Bassar*" [25] *and wherever I go I am well received*" (Midwife, 48 years from Sokodé). [26]

> *''I often do not have the time* [to attend meetings] *but I'm informed afterwards and if I have any ideas to contribute I do so* [. . .] *I also contribute financially.* [. . .] *Normally we, the Togolese, don't have this education to participate at the grassroots. It is always our mentality to expect that somebody else will come and do it for us. But I don't agree with that. Recently, I took a part of my salary to buy gravel to fill the potholes on our street* [. . .]. *My education tells me that change is inside me; that nobody will come and do it on my behalf.*" (Female bank employee, 44 years from Kpalimé). [27]

Over time, the increased political self-efficacy of women gained through their employment may become a vehicle for social change. Evans (2016a) for example shows that in Zambia women's demonstration of equal competence through their participation in the labor market led to the endorsement of their political participation and shifted people's perception of gender norms. The below interview extracts suggest that similar dynamics might be underway in Togo. While some economically inactive women appeared to be willing to comply with existing prescriptive gender norms, even if they disapproved of them, economically active women showed more confidence to criticizes and challenge these norms:

Extract from focus group discussion with housewives from Sokodé:

> **Respondent**: ``*If you are married and there is a meeting to which everybody has been invited, it's the husband who will attend the meeting instead of sending his wife. He will tell you to stay at home*."
> **Interviewer**: ``*And why is it that husbands won't allow their wives to participate in community development activities?*"
> **Respondent**: ``*In a household, the husband is the chief of the family. So it's for him to decide about the whereabouts of his wife. If he doesn't want you to go someplace, you may not go—you have to stay at home. For example, even if your father dies and your husband prohibits you to go* [to his funeral] *you will not go. That's the way it is here.*" [28]

Extract from interview with female street vendor, 29 years, married, from Tsévié:

> **Interviewer**: ``*In your opinion, which factors could encumber a person's participation in community activities?*"
> **Respondent**: ``*In fact, currently there are some* [women] *who say that their husbands don't authorize them to participate in community activities. But it needs to be said that these men themselves are sluggards who don't want to do anything. For me, currently, there's nothing that can keep me from doing what my heart desires to do.*" [29]

Furthermore, our data show that, particularly for women who work in less formalized settings, having a platform that allows them to exchange appears to be an important empowerment factor that contributes to their self-efficacy as illustrated by this excerpt from an interview with a young female trader at the market of Tsévié:

> *''At the meetings* [of the market women's association] *we learn how to behave towards the clients at the market, and in life more generally* [. . .] *It's a pleasure to participate in those meetings because it keeps us from being isolated and helps us to establish good relations with others. This is why, whenever there is a meeting, I attend. Through these meetings I get to know a lot of people and people know me.*"(Female market vendor, 41 years from Tsévié). [30]

The feeling of self-confidence and social connectedness expressed by this woman contrasts starkly with the following extracts from a focus group discussion with female ambulant bread vendors from the city of Kpalimé who belong to different ethnic minority groups and who lack an organization that represents their interests:

Interviewer: *How do you normally engage in the life of your community?*
A: *We're not informed about anything.*
Interviewer: *Would you consider yourself citizens of this town?*
A: *No we are strangers here. Maybe our children will be able to profit from this status because they were born here.*
B: *No, because if that was the case, the chiefs should invite us to their meetings to discuss our everyday problems and try to find a good solution for everybody* [...]
Interviewer: *How would you explain this situation?*
A: *The problem is that we are not organized and we don't know any organization that we could adhere to.* [...].
Interviewer: *And why is it that you don't discuss development matters with others?*
C: *Those who are leaders don't motivate us to do that. And we are also afraid of problems so we try to avoid all this and try to not get involved.* [...].
Interviewer: *Do you attend the meetings of your neighborhood's development committee?*
A: *We don't know anything about that.*
Interviewer: *And is there any other way that you engage in the life of your community?*
B: *No, why? Nobody asks us to. Nobody comes to invite us to any meeting* (Group of 4 female ambulant vendors, aged 30–76 years from Kpalimé) [31]

The comparison between the above two interview excerpts is revealing for two reasons. For one, it illustrates that having an organized platform for interest representation can help women working in the informal sector to overcome social isolation and encourage them to actively participate in the political process of their communities. Yet it also points to the differences that varying degrees of informality in employment can make on social inclusion and influence in local-level political decision processes. In Togo, both street vendors and vendors selling at built markets can be classified as informal sector workers given that they operate at a very low level of organization, raise the necessary finance for their trade at their own risk, do not pay income taxes, and the revenues from their activities primarily serve the purpose of ensuring their families' survival. Different from ambulant street vendors, however, vendors at built markets pay a monthly license fee to the municipality that entitles them to the use of market stalls. In absence of predictable and rule-based intergovernmental transfers from the central government, these license fees constitute the major source of municipal revenue generation. [32] According to expert interviews, the importance of their financial contribution to the municipal budget gives the market women a considerable leverage in the political decision-making processes of their communities. [33] In each of the municipalities under study, the market women dispose of an officially recognized association which represents their interests and whose demands the local government usually tries to accommodate in municipal planning processes. [34] In cases where the market women feel that the local government is unresponsive to their demands, their association may also contact a CDQ with the request to intervene on their behalf. [35] Ambulant vendors, in turn, do not dispose of a comparable financial leverage or organized interest representation to ensure the consideration of their livelihood security in community planning. Further aggravating their situation, their activities are often regarded as illegal and they are frequently displaced from their habitual vending places leaving them more vulnerable and without a workplace. [36]

Summarizing the above, our qualitative data substantiate and elucidate the major finding of our quantitative analysis i.e., the positive effect of employment on community participation, particularly the participation of women, and the mediation of this effect through political self-efficacy: The ability to generate their own income, combined with the social recognition of their skills and increased social connectedness through professional networks make female employment a powerful psychological resource that encourages Togolese women to overcome multiple discrimination hurdles and to actively participate in their communities'public life. However, given that the Togolese labor market is currently dominated by the informal economy which is, in turn, dominated by women, female employment can only fully unfold its potential for the political empowerment of women if the political interest representation of informal workers is improved. At the community level, this could best be achieved through targeted measures aimed at strengthening the capacity of female informal workers to engage in local politics, and through the establishment of platforms and procedures to ensure that the needs of informal workers are considered in local planning processes.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper set out to investigate if and how increases in female labor market participation can positively affect overall community participation. The motivation for this investigation was twofold:

First, research in development economics that studies the effects of female autonomy has thus far largely focused on the question of how female employment affects women's bargaining and decision-making power in the household. At the same time, little attention has been paid to the question of whether female employment also empowers women beyond the household, particularly in the public sphere of the communities they live in, i.e., the arena in which local development policies are deliberated, formulated, and implemented. By closing this research gap, we hope to contribute to the theory building on the developmental effects of female empowerment.

Second, we respond to the demand to broaden the empirical basis needed for the design of Participatory Development (PD) interventions. The PD approach aims at supporting a shift from centralized government to increasingly decentralized forms of governance by engaging the participation of local populations in initiatives designed for their benefit. However, PD initiatives are frequently socially biased in that they disproportionally benefit those who already have privileged access to political decision making. Several critics have attributed this undesired effect of elite capture to insufficient appreciation of context in project design. With most PD initiatives today being located in Africa, we thus need to gain a better understanding of what drives community participation in the region. Yet, to date most of what we know about the determinants of political participation in Africa is informed by cross-national survey research that focuses on participation in national-level processes. By investigating the drivers of community participation in a Sub-Saharan African country we thus hope to contribute valuable information that can help development practitioners to improve the design of PD initiatives for this region.

We use survey data from over 1,300 survey respondents and data from 98 in-depth qualitative interviews collected across four urban municipalities in Togo—a country that makes a particularly interesting case for the question under study given that it struggles with both a stagnating decentralization process and high gender inequality in the labor market.

We start by hypothesizing that employment has the psychological effect of positively influencing people's internal political self-efficacy which, in turn, positively impacts community participation. Using a 2-stage bivariate model we test the link between unemployment and community development participation via self-efficacy as a possible link. We find that unemployment has a significant negative impact on self-efficacy in our pooled survey sample. In addition, in the pooled sample we also observe a significant positive effect of self-efficacy on overall community participation. However, splitting the sample into males and females, we find that the overall positive effect of employment on community participation is mainly driven by the positive effect of employment on the self-efficacy of women: While unemployment negatively affects the self-efficacy of women, which in turn negatively affects their community participation, these negative effects are not observed for men.

Our qualitative data confirm and elucidate our major quantitative finding, i.e., the positive effect of employment on community participation, particularly the participation of women, and self-efficacy as the causal factor mediating this effect. We find that employment positively affects the self-efficacy of women through three mechanisms: 1) their increased social connectedness through professional networks, 2) social recognition of their job skills as valuable community assets by their fellow citizens, and 3) the ability to dedicate a part of their self-generated income to the development of their community. Female employment thus constitutes powerful psychological resource that encourages Togolese women to overcome multiple discrimination hurdles and to actively participate in their communities' public life.

To some extent our evidence is consistent with research on the effects of female employment on political participation in Zambia (Evans, 2016a) which suggests female labor market participation as a potential vehicle of social change as the increased self-efficacy of women gained through their employment contributes to the erosion of existing gender norms. However, as societal change is slow and incremental it is beyond the research methodology applied in this paper to rigorously trace the lagged effects of employment on female political participation. Longitudinal quantitative analysis and qualitative ethnographic methodologies such as participant observation and life story interviewing should be better suited for this purpose.

Furthermore, our qualitative analysis also adds an important differentiation to our quantitative findings, namely that the positive effect of employment on women's participation crucially hinges on the degree of formality of their employment, with more informal employment settings decreasing the possibility of women to exercise political agency.

Given that the Togolese labor market is dominated by the informal economy which, in turn, is dominated by women, this means that female employment can only fully unfold its potential for the political empowerment of women if the political interest representation of informal workers is improved.

These findings can be translated into two main policy recommendations. First, gender-targeted employment interventions should be included into the toolbox of instruments of participatory development interventions that seek to support a shift from centralized government to decentralized forms of governance. Particularly in the context of patriarchal cultures that discourage female participation in politics, gender-targeted employment interventions could have the double beneficial effect of female social empowerment and increased local participation in community development affairs. Second, in countries with a large, female dominated informal economy, gender-targeted employment interventions should not fixate on the creation of job opportunities for women. Rather than that, they should also aim at improving the conditions of female informal workers. Such efforts should not stop short at providing female informal workers with better work infrastructures and improving their access to capital but also seek to strengthen their role in local political processes. At the community level, this could be best achieved through capacity building measures aimed at strengthening female political agency, and through the establishment of platforms and procedures to ensure that the needs of informal workers are considered in local planning processes.

NOTES

1. It is also well known that certain variables have both individual as well as societal implications (see Isaksson et al., 2014). For example living in a Christian dominated society or living in a society dominated by an ethnic group.

2. It should be noted that majority of existing studies stop short at correlation using ordinary least squares (OLS). We will improve on earlier estimates by examining the causal impact of unemployment on the community development participation, and also examine the causal channel.

3. This is particularly important since there are no community-level television stations in the communities under study. At the same time, while there are local radio stations in all of the four communities under study, these report about affairs affecting the public life of the entire region/country rather than on issues affecting particular neighborhoods which are, in turn, typically discussed in meetings of the local neighborhood development committees (CDQs) and meetings at the traditional chiefs.

4. Results without the inclusion of Un_employ_i in Eqn. (2) are presented in the Appendix. These results are qualitatively similar.

5. Remember that women in our sample are more likely to be employed than men.

6. Interviews from both rounds of data collection were confidential responses were anonymized and numbered consecutively. In the remainder of this paper footnotes indicate the data set and interview number that findings are based on. A summary overview of the interviews is given in Tables 8 and 9 in Annex 1.

7. Data set A) 8, 14, 16, 17, 22, 31, 49, 50.

8. Data set A) 19, 21, 26, 28, 31, 35, 54.

9. Focus group interviews were conducted with gender homogenous groups. For closed questions, the answer given by the majority of group members was coded as the group's answer.

10. Data set B) 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 17, 18, 19, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33.

11. Data set B) 2, 3, 4, 19, 20, 22, 25, 31, 34, 36.

12. Data set B) 4, 5, 18, 19, 21, 24, 31, 36, 37.

13. Data set B) 1, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 24, 29.

14. Data set B) 2, 6,10, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24.

15. Data set B) 12, 15, 19, 21, 35.

16. E.g., Data set B) 19, 24.

17. E.g., Data set B) 15, 19.

18. E.g., Data set B) 24.

19. Data Set B) 11.

20. Data Set B) 1, 13, 15, 24, 28, 36,

21. Data Set B) 28.

22. Data Set B) 24.

23. Data set B) 25, 37.

24. Data set B) 6, 8, 19, 30.

25. Maman = big sister in Ewe language, Bassar = ethnic group from the Centre-West of Togo who constitute a minority group in the respondent's community.

26. Data set B), 20.

27. Data set B), 30

28. Data Set B), 24.

29. Data Set B), 1.

30. Data set B), 5.

31. Data set B) 36.

32. According to law, the revenues of Togolese municipalities include fiscal transfers from the central government which are channeled through a Support Fund for Local Collectivities (*Fonds d'Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales*, FACT). In practice however, the FACT—though legally instituted in 2007—has not been fully implemented to date (Data set A), interviews 14, 21, 56) which leaves intergovernmental transfers highly unpredictable (Data Set A) interviews 1, 9, 40). While the central government sometimes uses fiscal transfers sometimes uses fiscal transfers to "reward" certain municipalities (Data Set A) Interview 1), in most cases, the municipalities do not receive any money from the central government (Data Set A) interviews 9 and 20).

33. Data Set A) 37, 45, 53.

34. Data Set A) 12, 19, 22, 25, 37, 45, 53.

35. Data Set A) 53.

36. Data Set A) 19, 21.

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APPENDIX. JOINT ESTIMATION OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PARTICIPATION AND SELF-EFFICACY

	(1) Participation	(2) Self-efficacy
Poverty (economic) variable		
Sometimes, difficulty to pay for food	0.016	−0.106**
	(0.025)	(0.041)
No problems with food but savings	0.032	−0.221***
	(0.026)	(0.040)
No problems with food and savings	0.072**	−0.242***
	(0.031)	(0.045)
Self efficacy	0.397***	
	(0.046)	
Ethnic majority dummy	−0.024	
	(0.018)	
Religious minority dummy	−0.044**	
	(0.019)	
Unemployed dummy		−0.094***
		(0.024)
Are you the household head	−0.040*	0.102***
	(0.023)	(0.032)
Number of household member under 15	0.004	0.012**
	(0.003)	(0.006)
Gender of respondent	−0.069***	−0.076***
	(0.023)	(0.028)
Age of respondent	0.002**	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education of respondent	0.001	0.057***
	(0.009)	(0.012)
		(0.055)
HH ownership of Radio, radio recorder		−0.008
		(0.028)
HH ownership of a Television		0.048**
		(0.028)
Observations	1,353	1,353
Log-Likelihood	−1,288.67	

The reference group for the economic variable is severe financial difficulty and has to incur debt to pay for food etc. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Additional controls include city fixed effects. *Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at10% level.

ANNEX 1

Table 8. *Qualitative Data Set A) interview overview*

No	Interview_ID
1	International_State Actor
2	International_State Actor
3	National_Non-State Actor
4	National_Non-State Actor
5	International_Non-State Actor
6	National_State Actor
7	International_Non-State Actor
8	National_Non-State Actor
9	National_Non-State Actor
10	National_Non-State Actor
11	National_State Actor
12	National_Non-State Actor
13	National_State Actor
14	Municipal_Non-State Actor
15	Municipal_Non-State Actor
16	Municipal_Non-State Actor
17	Municipal_Non-State Actor
18	International_State Actor
19	Municipal_Non-State Actor
20	Municipal_State Actor
21	Municipal_State Actor
22	Municipal_Non-State Actor
23	Municipal_Non-State Actor
24	Municipal_State Actor
25	Municipal_Non-State Actor
26	Municipal_Non-State Actor
27	Municipal_Non-State Actor
28	Municipal_Non-State Actor
29	Municipal_Non-State Actor
30	Municipal_Non-State Actor
31	Municipal_Non-State Actor
32	Municipal_Non-State Actor
33	Municipal_Non-State Actor
34	Municipal_State Actor
35	International_State Actor
36	Municipal_Non-State Actor
37	Municipal_Non-State Actor
38	Municipal_State Actor
39	Municipal_Non-State Actor
40	Municipal_Non-State Actor
41	Municipal_Non-State Actor
42	Municipal_Non-State Actor
43	Municipal_Non-State Actor
44	Municipal_State Actor
45	Municipal_Non-State Actor
46	Municipal_State Actor
47	Municipal_Non-State Actor
48	Municipal_State Actor
49	Municipal_State Actor
50	Municipal_Non-State Actor
51	Municipal_State Actor
52	Municipal_Non-State Actor
53	Municipal_State Actor
54	Municipal_Non-State Actor
55	International_State Actor
56	Municipal_Non-State Actor
57	Municipal_Non-State Actor
58	National_Non-State Actor
59	National_State Actor
60	National_State Actor

Table 9. *Qualitative Data Set B) interview overview*

Age categories					15–24 = Youth		25–34 = Young Adult		35–54 = Middle Aged	55+ = Senior
Household economic situation categories					Can pay for food and lodging and make savings = 1		Can pay for food and lodging but cannot make savings = 2		Faces difficulties to pay for food and lodging = 3	
ID	Location	Interview type	Sex	Age category	Religious minority	Ethnic minority	Education level	Employment status	Domaine of profession	Household economic situation category
1	Tsévié	Individual	Female	Young Adult	No	No	No schooling	Self-employed	Petty Trade	1
2	Tsévié	Individual	Male	Youth	No	No	Secondary	Unemployed	n.a.	3
3	Tsévié	Individual	Male	Young Adult	Yes	No	University	Unemployed	n.a.	3
4	Tsévié	Individual	Male	Young Adult	No	No	Secondary	Unemployed	n.a.	3
5	Tsévié	Individual	Female	Middle Aged	Yes	Yes	No schooling	Self-employed	Petty Trade	3
6	Tsévié	Individual	Male	Middle Aged	No	No	Secondary	Salaried employee	Veterinary	3
7	Tsévié	Individual	Male	Young Adult	No	Yes	University	Salaried employee	Office Employee	1
8	Tsévié	Individual	Female	Young Adult	No	Yes	University	Salaried employee	Media	2
9	Tsévié	Individual	Male	Young Adult	Yes	Yes	Secondary	Salaried employee	Media	2
10	Tsévié	Individual	Male	Middle Aged	Yes	Yes	Secondary	Self-employed	Religious	2
11	Tsévié	Individual	Female	Young Adult	No	No	Primary	Self-employed	Hairdresser	2
12	Tsévié	Individual	Female	Young Adult	Yes	Yes	University	Salaried employee	Office Employee	1
13	Tsévié	Focus Group	Female	n.d.	Yes	Yes	n.d.	Housewife	Domestic	n.d.
14	Tsévié	Focus Group	Male	Young Adult	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	Unemployed	n.d.	3
15	Sokodé	Individual	Female	Young Adult	Yes	Yes	Primary	Self-employed	Hairdresser	3
16	Sokodé	Individual	Female	Middle Aged	No	Yes	Secondary	Housewife	Domestic	3
17	Sokodé	Individual	Male	Middle Aged	Yes	Yes	Primary	Salaried employee	Security	2
18	Sokodé	Individual	Male	Middle Aged	Yes	Yes	University	Self-employed	Retail	3
19	Sokodé	Focus Group	Male	Young Adult	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	Self-employed	Artisan	3
20	Sokodé	Individual	Female	Middle Aged	Yes	Yes	Secondary	Salaried employee	Health	2
21	Sokodé	Individual	Male	Young Adult	No	No		Self-employed	Transport	2
22	Sokodé	Individual	Male	Senior	Yes	Yes	University	Salaried employee	Education	1
23	Sokodé	Individual	Male	Young Adult	Yes	Yes	Primary	Self-employed	Hairdresser	1
24	Sokodé	Focus Group	Female	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	Primary	Housewife	Domestic	3
25	Kpalimé	Individual	Male	Senior	No	No	University	Salaried employee	Education	1
26	Kpalimé	Individual	Male	Senior	No	No	Secondary	Self-employed	Artisan	1
27	Kpalimé	Individual	Male	Senior	Yes	No	Secondary	Self-employed	Religious	2
28	Kpalimé	Individual	Female	Youth	No	No	Primary	Self-employed	Petty Trade	3
29	Kpalimé	Individual	Female	Middle Aged	No	No	Secondary	Self-employed	NGO	1
30	Kpalimé	Individual	Female	Middle Aged	No	Yes	University	Salaried employee	Banking	2
31	Kpalimé	Individual	Female	Youth	Yes	Yes	n.d.	Self-employed	Petty Trade	2
32	Kpalimé	Individual	Male	Senior	No	Yes	Secondary	Salaried employee	Education	2
33	Kpalimé	Individual	Female	Middle Aged	No	No	University	Salaried employee	Education	1
34	Kpalimé	Individual	Male	Senior	Yes	Yes	Secondary	Retired	Education	2
35	Kpalimé	Individual	Female	Youth	No	Yes	Secondary	Unemployed	Office Employee	3
36	Kpalimé	Focus Group	Female	n.d.	Yes	Yes	n.d.	Self-employed	Petty Trade	3
37	Kpalimé	Individual	Male	Middle Aged	No	No	Secondary	Salaried employee	Education	1
38	Kpalimé	Individual	Male	Middle Aged	No	No	Secondary	Salaried employee	Education	1