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Arizona Cases

THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE.

1850.

REPORT from the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to consider the best Means which Great Britain can adopt for the final Extinction of the AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE. Presented in Session 1850.

THAT the Committee have met and considered the Subject Matter to them referred.

In following out the Inquiry intrusted to them as to the most effectual means for suppressing the African Slave Trade, have felt it to be their duty, first, to examine the means hitherto employed for this end; to ascertain the amount of success which had attended their employment; whether they could be rendered more effectual, and if so, by what means; the objections urged against them; and whether any other means could be devised, either as substitutes for these, or as accessory to them.

The means which have been hitherto employed are: (1.) The formation of Treaties with the various civilized States for the prohibition and suppression of the Slave Trade, and the punishment of those who engage in it by confiscation of their ships. (2.) The formation of Treaties with the Chiefs of Africa, prohibiting the exportation of Slaves from their territories. (3.) The maintenance of certain Forts upon the African Coast. (4.) The maintenance of armed Cruizers on the Coast of Africa, to enforce these Treaties.

As regards the first of these means, a large measure of success has attended the efforts of this Country. At first,

with the exception of the United States, she stood alone in denouncing the Slave Trade as a crime; whilst every State possessing American Colonies actually encouraged this iniquitous traffic; but gradually it has been renounced by all civilized countries; and the concurrence of the Leading Powers in the principles, and to a considerable extent in the measures, of England, has now been obtained. The Slave Trade is now entirely limited to Brazil, and, in a very reduced degree, to the Colonies of Spain, in which it is carried on in a reduced degree; both those Powers being bound by Treaties with England entirely to abolish the traffic, which is condemned by the laws of both as a great crime.

Thus, as to those Nations by whom alone the Slave Trade is now carried on, England possesses an unquestionable right to insist on its total cessation.

(2.) The Treaties concluded with the native Chiefs of Africa are of great value, from the power which they give us of enforcing their stipulations upon the Slave-trader. Where they have been concluded, no question can be raised as to the lawfulness of the destruction of the goods stored in the barracoons for the prosecution of the trade—a course of action which (as the evidence of all competent witnesses proves) strikes the greatest blow at the trade; but a misconception with regard to the legality of destroying Slave Factories which was not explained until the year 1848, prevented the execution of the Treaties concluded previously with the native Chiefs, so that the full efficacy of this means has not yet been practically experienced. These Treaties are also of eminent service in directing the attention of the Chiefs to the possibility of their obtaining by lawful commerce those European goods, the desire of which alone leads them to maintain the Slave Trade. Much has been done already to this effect.

(3.) Closely connected with this means of repression is the occupation of certain Forts upon the Coast of Africa. Of these, the principal is that of Cape Coast Castle. The effect

of this Fort is described by the witnesses as being very great along the Coast, on each side of it, and even far inland; so that the Slave Trade is entirely suppressed over a district extending 100 miles to the southward, and 60 to the north; while the total expense of the whole government of the Gold Coast is only 4000*l.* a-year. In the neighbourhood, moreover, of the Danish Forts, a similar good result has followed.

(4.) With respect to the effect of the Squadron on the Coast of Africa, it appears, in the first place, that all other means of direct repression, as well as all moral influences which tend to the same result (such as the extension of Christianity and commerce, the return of liberated Africans and others to their native countries, &c.), depend on its maintenance; that, in proportion to its efficiency, these become more widely spread and more deeply rooted; but, if withdrawn, or materially reduced, that these secondary means could not continue to exist.

With regard to the actual and direct effect of the Squadron in suppressing the Slave Trade, it has been proved, that when its operations began, the traffic extended over almost every part of Africa, from the Equator, as far as Cape Verde, a distance of nearly 2,500 miles. To this quarter the efforts of the Cruisers were entirely confined from 1815 to 1839; the Slave Trade south of the Equator, from which Brazil was almost altogether supplied, being prosecuted with perfect security, and indeed protection. Yet, within this time, the Slave Trade has been expelled from every quarter north of the Line, except from the Bight of Benin, a space of less than 300 miles. In the Bight of Biafra (in which 15,000* Slaves per annum were very recently exported from the River Bonny alone, while a large export also took place from the Old and the New Calabar, the Cameroons and other Rivers), the Slave Trade has been entirely extinguished. Complete Treaties, enabling the British force to land and put it down, if resumed, have been concluded;

* By an error of the press, this was printed 1500 in the Report.

and a Consul, resident at Fernando Po, periodically visiting these Rivers, and assisted by an occasional visit from a vessel of war, will, it is expected, be able to secure their fulfilment.

In the place of the Slave Trade a great and increasing commerce is springing up in this Bight. Mission Stations have been established, and the comparatively small means which suffice to prevent the revival of the Slave Trade, compared with those which were required to put it down, show that wherever the Slave Trade has once been effectively suppressed, a large reduction of force may follow without danger of its revival.

On the Gold Coast the influence of the English Forts has entirely eradicated the traffic.

At Cape Palmas to the northward, as far as Cape Mount, the settlements of Liberia have been equally efficacious to that end.

At Gallinas, under the Treaty of 1840 (the operation of which was long suspended by a doubt as to the legality of destroying factories), the Slave Trade has been recently entirely rooted out, mainly by the assistance of the surrounding natives. In this quarter a Government Agent or Consul on shore, aided by the presence of a single Cruiser, will, there is reason to hope, prevent the Slave Trade breaking out afresh, so that here, as well as in the Bight of Biafra, effectual repression may be followed by a great reduction of force.

Further north the natives themselves have risen against the traffic, requesting the Captain of a Cruiser to land and destroy the factories. A profitable trade has sprung up in its place, and the Sierra Leone Commissioners report, that not a Slave has been shipped for the preceding twelvemonth.

To the south of the Equator the continuance of the Slave Trade is owing partly to the shorter period during which repressive measures have been tried; partly to the inadequacy of the force which has hitherto been employed in that quarter; and in some degree to the assistance derived from

the occasional connivance of certain of the authorities in the Colonies of Portugal. But there is no reason to doubt that an adequate force, employed on the best system, would soon reduce that traffic to a very small amount.

The general tenor of the Evidence establishes in our minds, beyond all doubt: (1.) That the English Cruisers have greatly checked and crippled the Slave Trade. (2). That their removal would be the signal for its breaking out with unexampled vigour at every available port along the whole sea-board. (3.) That this would lead, amongst other results, to the whole coast swarming with piratical vessels, which would utterly destroy the legitimate trade, now daily increasing in value between Great Britain and Africa; whilst all the beginnings of civilization, and all attempts to Christianize Africa, would be wholly defeated and destroyed. All the witnesses agree that the legitimate trade cannot co-exist with the Slave Trade; and that its slower returns cannot compete in immediate apparent profit to the Chiefs with the Slave Trade; but that, if the Slave Trade be suppressed for any lengthened period, its revival would be prevented by the lawful trade.

Turning now to the suggestions which have been made to the Committee for rendering these means more effectual, they would call the attention of the House to the following as most worthy of consideration:—

(1.) The habitual disregard of Treaties on this subject with this Country, on the part of Brazil, and, to a great extent, also on the part of Spain, appears to be the main hindrance to the suppression of the trade; and to this, therefore, especially, the attention of Her Majesty's Ministers and of Parliament should, in our opinion, be directed.

The suppression of the Slave Trade can never be declared impossible to England, until she has at least attempted to oblige Brazil to fulfil her Treaties.

A plan for obtaining greater practical efficiency for these Treaties has been suggested, which will be found fully detailed in the Evidence, and which the Committee consider

worthy of the best consideration. Its main feature is the giving, by Treaty, to Mixed Commission Courts at Rio and the Havannah, power to declare free all Slaves brought before them who shall have been imported after a day to be fixed. There appears to be in Cuba a large, and in Brazil an increasing, party, who might be expected to support this country in requiring and maintaining such a Treaty.

It is also, in our judgment, worthy of consideration, whether the three great Maritime Powers, France, the United States, and Great Britain, could not at the present time be brought to combine in joint representations, and, if need be, active measures, for obtaining from Spain and Brazil an actual suppression of this traffic.

The admission of Slave-grown Sugar into the markets of Great Britain, which, in the judgment of all the witnesses, is a great and direct stimulus to the Slave Trade, seems to require of Great Britain that she should use every effort in her power to prevent so great an evil accruing to Africa from her new commercial policy.

(2.) The Committee would recommend the consideration of the wisdom of extending further our Forts and Settlements on the Coast of Africa; of encouraging the free Settlement of Liberia, which secures 350 miles of coast. The Committee have learned with satisfaction that a Treaty has already been entered into with Denmark for the purpose of obtaining possession of the Danish Settlements on the Gold Coast.

(3.) Of countenancing the Settlement, on different parts of the Coast of Africa, of Free Blacks from our own possessions.

(4.) Of establishing Consular Agents on the points of the Coast where the Slave Trade has been extinguished, and which are best fitted to become emporiums of trade.

This last recommendation leads them to another. The Slave Trade cannot be permanently suppressed by any means which do not at the same time foster a lawful trade by which the desires of the native Chiefs for European goods

can be supplied. To promote, therefore, this trade should be one chief object of our exertions: it appears to be capable of almost unlimited increase. The present great hindrance to its extension is the existence of the Slave Trade, which, wherever it continues, renders all security for life and property impossible in Africa; prevents the due cultivation of its most fertile soil, and the consequent increase of lawful commerce. Cotton and almost all tropical productions might, it appears, be largely produced in Africa, if this one master impediment were removed; whilst the habits and inclinations of the Africans are such as would naturally incline them to become an eminently commercial people, and thus at once secure a supply of most important productions for our own markets, and open an unlimited demand for our manufactures. Direct trading establishments should be encouraged under the protection of every British Fort on the Coast of Africa. Various important suggestions bearing upon this point will be found in the Evidence we have reported.

(5.) As the maintenance of the cruising Squadron on the Coast of Africa is, in our judgment, an essential condition towards the success of every other effort, we have paid especial attention to any suggestions made to us for increasing its efficiency, and we would especially report as worthy of attention those which follow.

The testimony of all witnesses goes to prove, that the Squadron has never been maintained in the efficiency needful for its full success; and hence the bravery and skill of our Naval Officers has been continually thwarted by the insufficiency of the means at their disposal.

The ships employed have been unfit and ill-equipped for that peculiar service. We would specially recommend that much smaller vessels, victualled on their stations by transports, should be substituted for those now in use. A large proportion of these should be Screw-steamers, which are peculiarly suited for this service from their power of ordinary sailing, and of using their steam when extraordinary speed is required. Many of the captured Slave-vessels might, as has

already been done in more than one instance, be fitted up at a very slight cost, for use amongst our cruisers. By a judicious adoption of this recommendation, the efficiency of the Squadron might, it appears, be doubled at no, or a very slight, additional expense.

The Evidence we have taken would also prove, that the efficiency of the Squadron has been greatly injured by the frequent, though unavoidable, change of its Commanding Officers, rendering it of the first importance that special instructions, founded on the aggregate experience of all his predecessors, should supply the place of personal acquaintance with the service on the part of each new Commodore. Hitherto no uniform system of operations has ever been laid down to guide those who have assumed the command, without any previous knowledge of that peculiar service. Thus, the best system has at no period been acted upon by the whole force employed; and the want of clearly defined objects and consistency in the mode of action, combined with an insufficient numerical force, composed of vessels not suited to the service, fully accounts for the degree of failure we have encountered. It appears by the concurrent testimony of all the naval witnesses, with perhaps a single exception, that in-shore cruising, directed to prevent the shipment of Slaves, is the most effective mode of employing the Squadron. We would recommend that the Commanding Officers on this station should receive from the Admiralty such general instructions as would embody the experience of their predecessors in command.

It appears to us that the gallantry of our officers and men have been further impeded by uncertainty as to the extent of their powers, and the apprehension of exposing themselves to be harassed afterwards by legal proceedings. We would specially instance the proceedings instituted against the Honourable Captain Denman for burning the slave barracks, and the stimulus afterwards given to the trade by the spread of an impression that such a course was illegal. On this head we would recommend: (1.) The giving to our

Officers more explicit instructions; and, (2.) That any practicable legislative measures should be taken to secure them from such legal proceedings.

We would further recommend that a small force of Screw-steamers should be stationed on the Coast of Brazil, to intercept any vessels which have escaped our Cruisers on the Coast of Africa.

The witnesses agree that nothing would more tend to suppress the Slave Trade than to render all persons found on board Slave-ships liable to punishment; and it was suggested to the Committee, by a witness of great authority, that the needful power might be obtained by merely passing an Act of Parliament to that effect, which should save the rights of other nations, by allowing them in all cases to claim their own subjects. The Committee would recommend the consideration of this suggestion.

We think it further worthy of consideration, whether it is not expedient to alter the system of fixing the amount of prize-money by the number of the Slaves on board the prizes which are captured by our Cruisers, since the tendency of such a system must be to direct the chief attention of our Naval Officers to the intercepting vessels with Slaves on board, rather than to prevent their embarking their cargoes, which is the great object. This, though perhaps inoperative, from the high feelings which animate our Naval Commanders, is unjust, and opposed to the principles on which prize-money is granted, and has exposed our Navy to the most unfounded imputations.

We have taken Evidence upon the chief objections urged against our present system, and especially against the maintenance of the Squadron. These objections have been:—
1st. The assertion, that the maintenance of the British Cruisers enlists the national honour of Brazil against the suppression of the trade. From the best evidence we have been able to collect, we believe that this opinion is wholly unfounded, and that, on the contrary, the Anti-Slavery party in Brazil, and a large and increasing party in Cuba, are

unanimous in desiring the maintenance and success of our Cruisers. The second objection we would notice is, the assertion, That an unrestricted Slave Trade would soon extinguish itself, through the fears which would be excited in Brazil and Cuba by an unlimited importation of Africans. This opinion, so far as it applies to Brazil, the great market for Slaves, appears to us to be wholly unsustained by the Evidence we have taken. The vast tracts of virgin land as yet uncultivated in Brazil allow of the scattering of an unlimited number of new hands, and it is only the combination of newly-imported Africans which is dreaded. The third objection to which we refer is the allegation, That the existing Squadron increases the sufferings of the transported African. Even if this had been established, we do not conceive that it would have been a sufficient reason for withdrawing the Squadron, since the sufferings of the transported Africans, fearful as they are, is the least evil of a system which fills the populous Continent of Africa with intestine war, insecurity, and bloodshed. But, further, we cannot conclude, from the Evidence before us, that these sufferings are increased by the presence of the British Squadron, when compared with the horrors of the middle passage, even under the regulated trade. The presence of the Squadron has led to the employment of faster transports; it has greatly increased the value of the living cargo; and the withdrawal of the Cruisers would, in the judgment of some, even of the witnesses most favourable to such a course, lead to the employment of a worse class of vessels than those now used in the trade.

Finally, we would report, from a full examination of all the Evidence brought before us, that, in our opinion:—

1. The past efficiency of the cruising Squadron has been greatly undervalued.
2. That its cost has been much exaggerated.
3. That, with proper precautions, it is not an unhealthy service.
4. That to withdraw the Cruisers in part, and to administer

a regulated Slave Trade (as has been suggested), would be impossible of execution, no material saving of the cost of the present system, and utterly at variance with every past profession of Great Britain on this subject since she abolished the British Slave Trade.

5. That against the present cost of the Squadron should be set the advantage of nourishing and maintaining a valuable and increasing lawful trade, which must be utterly extirpated if the Cruisers were withdrawn, and which might be developed to an unlimited extent if the Slave Trade were suppressed.

6. That to abandon the suppression of the Trade, to which, in the face of the whole civilized world, Great Britain is solemnly and repeatedly pledged, would be a fatal blow to her national honour.

7. That there is every reason to believe that the present system is susceptible of a large and immediate increase of efficiency by the adoption of such improvements as we have recommended; and that if these improvements be adopted, aided by the other measures recommended, there is reason to believe that this great object may be speedily and certainly obtained.

And the Committee have directed the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, together with an Appendix and Index thereto, to be laid before your Lordships.

15th July, 1850.

*Now ready, and may be had of the Publishers of this
Pamphlet.*

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WEST INDIA INTERESTS,
AFRICAN EMIGRATION,
AND
SLAVE TRADE.

BY THE HON. CAPTAIN DENMAN, R.N.

LONDON:
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A part of these observations were thrown together in great haste, and, in the first instance, privately printed, addressed to the Members of the Sugar and Coffee Planting and of the Slave Trade Committees. The former has since made its Report, and a careful study of the published evidence has, if possible, strengthened the convictions which the writer now ventures to lay before the public. He is so deeply sensible of the awful importance of coming to a right decision at this momentous crisis, that he could not rest satisfied if he omitted any effort that seemed to have the least chance of contributing to produce it.

JUNE 4TH, 1848.

WEST INDIA INTERESTS, AFRICAN EMIGRATION, AND SLAVE TRADE.

CHAPTER I.

The condition of the West Indian Proprietors is wholly without precedent or parallel. No class of men ever held more powerful claims on the justice of the State and on the sympathy of their countrymen, reduced as they are to the verge of ruin by successive acts of the Legislature.

The cultivation of those valuable Colonies must be abandoned in the course of a very few months, unless succour is instantly afforded, and but a short delay will convert the West India Islands into swamp and jungle, and consign a large number of worthy families to hopeless and irretrievable ruin.

It is impossible that these results should be unattended with injury to the public interest at large, which must be to a great extent identical with that of the West Indies; the loss of a certain market for three millions of British manufactures, and the utter ruin of a whole class spending their incomes in this country, cannot be regarded as light evils, even if the misery thus inflicted on thousands could fail to produce the deepest feelings of pain and compassion.

Admitting that a moderate protection would save these Islands from their impending fate, what should we say of the man who may derive thousands per annum from his property if he pleases to make an annual outlay upon it of a few hundreds, but who refuses the outlay, and prefers that his land should go out of cultivation.

For a long course of years the British Government and Legislature steadily devoted their efforts to the extension of the Slave Trade; the settlements on the Gold Coast were formed for this avowed object, and the monopoly of the Slave Trade, even for the supply of foreign countries, was constantly a prime object of our policy.

The Slavery of those Islands was, therefore, a national sin, in which Great Britain is far more guilty than her unhappy Colonists. The mother country encouraged the Slave Trade, not so much for the advantage of the West Indians as from the delusion that her maritime greatness depended on the preservation of this nursery for Seamen! and more than once Slaves from Africa have been forced upon the Colonists against their urgent remonstrances.

England, then, was bound to bear her full share of the losses and sacrifices occasioned by a tardy conviction of the iniquity of Slavery. The grant of twenty millions was no equivalent to the Colonies for the loss inflicted on them; and justice and true policy equally required Great Britain to afford the West Indies such further support and assistance as might be necessary to enable profitable cultivation to be maintained; and the most solemn pledges to this effect were given on the passing of the Emancipation Act.

It may be useful, in a few words, to allude to the measures which have gradually reduced the West Indies to their present desperate condition, premising, however, that the abolition of Slave Trade and Slavery were acts of obedience to the voice of justice and humanity, with which questions of profit and loss can never be brought into competition—concessions to those sacred principles which form the spirit of the Law of Nations, and by the violation of which the whole fabric of human society, whether in its public relations or its social obligations, is shaken to its basis.

The first interference with a view to mitigate the horrors of the Slave Trade took place in 1788, when Sir William Dolben's Act was passed, which in some degree, reduced the sufferings of the middle passage, and had the important effect of warning the planters of the probable abolition of the traffic at no remote period, thus inducing them, in anticipation of that event, to import women in a much larger proportion than before.

Hence when the Slave Trade was abolished in 1807, the disproportion of the sexes was less than has ever been known in other countries dependent on the Slave Trade for supplies of labour; for on the acknowledged principle that it is cheaper to buy than to breed, scarcely any women are for the most part carried in the

Slave Ship. A witness,* personally conversant with this subject, has recently stated before the Sugar and Coffee Planting Committee, that in the Brazilian Slave Trade on an average four women are imported to one hundred men, and that if the Slave Trade were thrown open, the proportion would not increase.

There was necessarily some falling off in the population of the West Indies for a few years after 1807, until the sexes became equalized, still that evil was greatly mitigated from the cause we have stated; and after a comparatively short interval, the population has steadily increased up to the present time.

In 1834, twenty-seven years had elapsed since the abolition of the Slave Trade, and the Islands had thus long depended on the natural means of population. Thus the influences of the ties of relationship on the soil they cultivated—the mitigation of treatment necessarily observed towards Slaves bred and born on the land, as distinguished from those supplied by continual importations—the effects of contact for so long a period with civilization—and last, but not least, the labours of the Missionaries, all united to prepare the Negroes of the West Indies for freedom. Perhaps no page in the history of mankind presents so bright an instance of practical Christianity—of charity, humility, gratitude, and forgiveness, as the conduct of the emancipated Negroes of the West Indies, a race to which the delusion of self-interest has sometimes denied the title of human beings.

If we contrast the events of St. Domingo with those of our own Colonies, we may appreciate the power of these influences; and we may estimate the consequences which must inevitably follow when a population of recently imported Negroes suddenly shakes off the yoke—a reflection not without its bearing on the question under consideration, but which belongs to a subsequent part of this paper.

For the protection of Colonial interests, a prohibitory duty had always been placed on Foreign Sugar; but in 1845, this duty of 63s. per cwt. was removed from Foreign Sugar raised by free labour, and was continued only with regard to Slave-grown produce. Thenceforth, Free-grown Foreign Sugar was to be admitted at a duty of 23s. 4d., while that on the produce of the Colonies was reduced to 14s., thus keeping Slave-grown Sugars still out of the market, and affording a protection of 9s. 4d.

* *Vide* questions 1,545 and 1,599.

against the Foreign Sugar admitted. This measure, as nearly as was possible, reconciled the interests of the Colonies and the discouragement of Slave Trade, with the clamour for cheap sugar.

But in 1846, the prohibition against Slave-grown Sugar was withdrawn, and all Foreign Sugar placed on the same footing in our markets. At the same time the differential duty was lowered at once to 7s.; to diminish on the 5th of July 1847, to 6s.; and at an annual decrease of 1s. 6d., to expire altogether in the year 1851! Then Slave-grown and Colonial Sugar are to come into the market at the equal rate of duty of 14s. per cwt.

The consequences of this measure are now before the world: our own Colonies have been sacrificed to the misapplication of the principles of Free Trade, while a great impetus has been given to the Slave Trade, and a corresponding discouragement to those high and righteous principles of which England has been for so many years the voluntary champion.

Much as we may deplore and condemn the Slavery of other States, we have no right to interfere with that institution, wherever it exists under the sanction of municipal laws. The views of this country should be confined to those cases in which Slavery is supported by Slave Trade; and, with regard to such, we would have urged the maintenance of the prohibitory duties as a powerful check upon the Slave Trade, while the prospect of the removal of the same, in case of the *bond fide* relinquishment of the traffic, would have operated with no slight effect in producing its abolition from motives of interest. This principle has, however, been abandoned, and even if there should be no hope of its re-establishment, the Slave Trade can be put down by the other means at our command. The question seems to be, whether it would be better to abandon the West Indian Islands, or to lower the duties to the extent necessary, for their salvation?—a differential duty as regards Foreign Sugar of 10s. is the lowest protection which at the present moment can keep them in cultivation. If, then, the sugar duties shall be arrested at their present point in the sliding scale, and as regards the West India Sugar an increased protection granted of 4s. for a certain guaranteed period, the Mother Country, by the fulfilment of her pledge to suppress the Slave Trade, will enable those Colonies, after a short time, to maintain a profitable cultivation without such assistance.

The present duties are, on Foreign Muscovado Sugar, £1; British Colonial, 14s.; and if West Indian and Mauritius should be lowered to 10s., this great object would be attained at a sacrifice not to be compared with the importance of the interests at stake.

The report of the Sugar and Coffee Planting Committee which has been presented since the foregoing observations were printed, urges this measure as indispensable to the preservation of the West India Colonies.

CHAPTER II.

A portion of the West India Proprietors, in their despair, have joined in the demand that the attempt to suppress the Slave Trade shall be abandoned; while many unite in the claim to seek for labour on the Coast of Africa without restriction, in order to land Negroes in the West Indies as free labourers.

But no large amount of labour can be obtained from Africa, except by the purchase of Slaves from the Native Chiefs, and this would perpetuate the Slave Trade of the interior of Africa, which comprehends by far the worst part of its horrors. Whether the abandonment of the attempt to suppress the Slave Trade be specifically urged or not, it is only too obvious that if England resumes the traffic on the shores of Africa, she can no longer pretend to interfere with that of other nations, or claim the fulfilment by Spain and Brazil of compacts she herself is violating.

Nor will the evil be confined to the increase of the Slave Trade of Brazil and Cuba to its original amount;* for with the example of England, the only check on the cupidity of man will be removed, and the newly-annexed States of the Union will enter into this unhallowed competition for African "Emigrants." The relaxing tone of feeling in this country has even now found an echo across the Atlantic; the Southern States are exulting over the anticipated backsliding of Great Britain, and two Slave States have already repealed their law prohibiting the introduction of Negroes from those adjoining. Let England yield to this demand for free emigration, and the Slave Trade will rage with unprecedented fury; Africa will be ravaged to furnish labour for the virgin soils of Brazil, Texas,

* 150,000 in 1839.

and Mexico, ever expanding markets, which will afford an unbounded stimulus to the traffic in human flesh.

But how will the West India Islands be benefitted? For rather how can they exist in such a competition, unless with the Slave Trade the condition of slavery is also restored, and the yoke again fixed on the necks of the enfranchised people of the West India Colonies.

Who can suppose that Negroes from the wilds of Africa, utterly unused to habits of continuous labour, will be induced by other motives than force to perform the same amount of work which will be wrung from their brethren in Slave Countries under the lash, by drivers armed to the throat, and with bloodhounds at their side.* It is well known that at a particular crisis of the sugar harvest Slaves are often compelled to labour day and night, even as much as 18 hours out of the 24!

If England were thus to sanction the Slave Trade under the name of emigration, she must at least regulate the traffic—one or two to a ton burthen of the vessel—so many women in proportion to the men; but each man will cost as much to the English as to the Foreign trader, and the price of the women will be so much dead loss. *The rival sugar planter will be bound by no such conditions*; he will import his Negroes at the least possible expense, he will buy no women, and he will still work his victims on the principle of extracting the largest possible amount of labour in the shortest possible time,† it being cheaper to buy than to breed: those killed off he will continually replace by new importations. In fact, it seems certain, that if protection is refused, a million of free labourers would not save the West Indies, and that unless Slavery as well as Slave Trade be resumed the West Indies can derive no benefit whatever from unlimited “African Emigration.”

It is absolutely necessary that the country should know what it is about when it adopts the opinion that such is the remedy for West India depression; no large emigration can take place except by resuming the Slave Trade, and of consequence throwing that traffic open to the whole world. But, imperishable as will be the

* *Vide* the evidence before the Sugar Planting Committee of Lord Howard de Walden, and of Messrs. Geddes, Higgins, Borthwick, and of Dr. Norton Shaw.

† *Vide* Dr. Norton Shaw's evidence, answer 11,634.

disgrace of this apostacy, not only will the Colonies be still ruined but the large and rapidly increasing commerce with Africa must be annihilated; for all experience shows, that with the African Chiefs the Slave Trade is the favourite pursuit, and that if it should be allowed to rage unchecked, the cultivation of the natural resources of the country will be universally abandoned.

The mass of evidence proves, beyond question, that the amount of free labour to be obtained is very small. The liberated Africans at Sierra Leone, amounting to 40,000 souls, which, perhaps, may include 10,000 men fit for labour, but who are certainly in general not disposed to emigrate, and the race of Kroomen,* would together supply a limited number of free emigrants, if proper measures were taken to encourage them to engage themselves.

It is contended that a small supply might be obtained also from the neighbourhood of the Cape Coast Colonies and of the River Gambia; but, admitting this to be true, all these together, and put at the highest possible figure, would, at the present moment, certainly fail to furnish 5,000 labourers per annum.†

From no other part of Africa could a Negro be obtained, except by the purchase of him as a Slave. It is well known that the society of Africa is based on the system of domestic Slavery—mild in its character, when not aggravated and embittered by Slave Trade. No Chief would give away his property—no Negro, if left to himself, could be persuaded to embark of his own free choice to seek labour in unknown regions. The Sea and the Slave

* This fine race of men resolutely prefer death to Slavery, and are therefore valueless in the Slave Market. The Kroo Coast is the only part besides the English Colonies where Free Emigrants can be obtained. Many would readily embark for the West Indies if a vessel were sent commanded by an officer well known to them from long service on the Coast of Africa; and in a little time the numbers would greatly increase, but to what amount they might be ultimately induced to emigrate, cannot be accurately estimated.

† The reports of the Committees now sitting on the Slave Trade and on Sugar and Coffee Planting will undoubtedly have a powerful influence on this important question. We have, however, before us the report of the Committee on the West Coast of Africa, which sat for the whole Session of 1842, commencing their labours in April and making their report on the 3rd of August. This Committee applied itself to the question of "Free Emigration" from Africa, and was clearly of opinion that it could be carried on from British Colonies alone. The report of this Committee entirely supports the views we entertain in stating that no materials for Emigration existed on the Gold Coast. It distinctly states that the Gambia and Sierra Leone are the only places from whence it would be possible to obtain free labour.

Trade are indissolubly connected in his mind, by his own experience and by the traditions of centuries. The heart of Africa must be ravaged to supply this demand on the Coast; nor will the Chiefs recognize the pretended distinction between Slave Trade and Emigration; so that the Brazilian Slave or the British Emigrant will be procured by the same horrible outrages.

It has, indeed, been asserted that the trade in Palm Oil is so firmly established in the countries at the mouths of the Niger that it would be impossible to restore the Slave Trade; that a cask of Palm Oil worth but 26 bars* a few years ago, now costs 300, and that the Chiefs have thus learned that the Slave Trade is against their interest.

For this reason, we are told, we might obtain an unlimited number of Emigrants from these parts; that the Chiefs might be induced to emancipate their people, and encourage their emigration to the West Indies.

But it is, surely, obvious that the Slave Trade can have been thus extirpated only by the Chiefs having discovered that the labour of their people is worth more than their price in the market; and is it probable they will rise so superior to motives of interest as to emancipate their Slaves, and encourage them to emigrate for their own benefit and advantage? But if this knowledge of the superior value of their labour has not been established, there can be no security against the revival of the Slave Trade when temptation offers, and then, of course, the highest bidder will carry the day.

But though it is impossible to obtain any large amount of labour from Africa, except by means of the Slave Trade, on the other hand, every effort should be made to procure really free Emigrants; and providing the Government take measures to prevent the possibility of one Slave being carried over under that name—of a single Negro being embarked without his own free will and concurrence,—the country is bound to afford its best assistance to the West Indian Proprietors for this object. But to assert that emigration can be obtained to a large extent except by the Slave Trade, is a fraud on the country, as gross as is the delusion palmed on the unfortunate Colonies, that by any such means their ruin can be averted or even delayed. The pur-

* A bar is a measure of value in African trade.

chase of a single Slave by the sanction or connivance of England will remove the sole remaining check of justice and morality. The present is no time for such dereliction of principle.

The West India Islands can be saved only by the restoration of differential duties, to be continued until the effects of the suppression of the Slave Trade have been felt in those countries where it now is carried on, after which, at a gradual reduction, all protection may be ultimately dispensed with; and with the force now employed, the Slave Trade may be stopped in six months from the day on which Great Britain resolves, in earnest, to accomplish this great work.

CHAPTER III.

Because the measures hitherto pursued have not actually extirpated the Slave Trade, the great diminution effected is undervalued or forgotten, and even altogether denied by many, while some have assumed that the efforts of Great Britain have not only aggravated the horrors, but actually increased the amount of the exportation of Slaves from Africa. Hence, also, has sprung up an opinion that force is altogether improper as a means of putting down this detestable traffic, and that coercive measures should be discontinued. With as much reason we might dismiss the Police and trust to pure reason for the repression of all other crime.

It is perfectly true, that if the native Chiefs knew their own real interests Slave Trade would cease, but it is beyond all doubt that the lesson has not yet been learnt. The same truth might be affirmed with respect to the general question of using force to prevent crime, for nothing can be more opposed to a man's true interests than the commission of murder and theft, and yet, even in civilized countries, such crimes frequently occur. In no part of Africa has the Slave Trade been abandoned until the efforts of the squadron have rendered it a losing concern to the European Slave Traders.

Owing to this pressure from without the Slave Factor has often abandoned the traffic, but in none has the supply of Slaves from the interior of Africa in the first instance abandoned him.

Since 1839 only, could England entertain any hope of success in her efforts to put down the Slave Trade; until then no impression was made, or could be made, from the insufficiency of the powers she possessed; and it is contrary to all experience, that in so short a time a habit so inveterate, the favourite pursuit of the Chiefs of Africa for centuries, should have been totally obliterated. It is the favourite pursuit, inasmuch as it requires no labour, no system, no intelligence, but merely the savage exercise of brute force, congenial to barbarous habits, and connected in no slight degree with their notions of power and dignity.

Besides, habits of industry cannot have been already so deeply rooted in this indolent and barbarous people, as to enable them to resist the temptation of an unlimited demand for Slaves, and a consequent large increase in the price paid for them in Africa. How far such principles would be established and confirmed by the relapse of Great Britain into the crime, can be no subject of doubt.

It may be necessary to explain in a few words why, for so many years the efforts of England should have been of necessity futile. Formerly, no vessel, though equipped for Slave Trade, could be captured, unless Slaves were actually found on board; but between 1835 and 1838, treaties were generally concluded providing for the seizure of equipped vessels. These greatly checked the trade at first, but it soon came to be universally carried on under the abuse of the flag of Portugal, who refused to modify her treaty, by which, in north latitude, no vessel could be seized unless Slaves were actually found on board, and in south latitude no vessel, even full of Slaves, could be interrupted on any pretence whatever. After this had been submitted to for some time the Government issued orders to seize all vessels under the flag of Portugal equipped for Slave Trade, wherever met with; and an Act* of Parliament was passed empowering the Vice-Admiralty Courts to condemn such vessels.

Thus, it was not until 1839 that the treaties with the whole civilized world, justifying the capture of equipped vessels, came into practical force; every Slave vessel became then subject to seizure by her Majesty's squadron, excepting only those of

* This Act was repealed in 1841, when Portugal entered into a new and efficient treaty, which she has since, on the whole, honourably fulfilled.

America; but the law of America* treats Slave Trade as piracy, punishable by death, and no Slaves have been carried by United States vessels, though some indirect assistance has undoubtedly been given by the sale of vessels at the Slave Factories.

The power to seize equipped vessels rendered a new and effectual course of proceeding for the suppression of the Slave Trade for the first time possible. Before the treaties were thus altered, the writer, when serving on the Coast in 1835, has seen ten equipped vessels lying together off the Slave Factories of Whydah; he has anchored in the midst of them, and sent his boats on board them all, to observe their state of preparation for receiving Slaves. So long as a man of war was in sight, no vessel would of course render herself liable to seizure by embarking Slaves, and the Cruiser was obliged to proceed out of sight of land to take the chance of intercepting the laden vessel on her voyage. Each Cruiser was obliged to leave her station for a fortnight or three weeks for water and supplies after three months cruising, and the number of vessels would not admit of any system of relief. This was well known to the Slave dealers, and on these occasions tens of thousands of Slaves have been carried off without the possibility of interruption; but at all times the chances were at least ten to one in favour of escape.

The practice was, before Slaves were embarked to send out vessels to reconnoitre and ascertain either the absence or the exact position of the Cruisers, when what was considered a good opportunity offered, the vessel about to sail shipped her Slaves, and all the empty vessels in the port set sail at the same time, so that if the Cruiser saw the only one subject to seizure at all, she was by

* The security against citizens of the United States engaging in Slave Trade has been increased by the treaty of 1844, in which that Government engaged to keep a squadron, mounting eighty guns, on the Coast of Africa, to prevent any abuse of her flag, and no case has occurred for some years of a Slave vessel assuming the character of an American.

The treaty with France, granting the right of search, was abrogated in 1845, when a new treaty was concluded, by which France is bound to maintain a force of no less than twenty-six sail of vessels to prevent the same abuse of her flag; and the severity of her penal law against the crime, together with the certainty of detection, renders it equally out of the question that a French vessel should engage in Slave Trade.

In this treaty the right to visit a vessel suspected of assuming a false national character, and of ascertaining whether her papers prove her right to wear the flag she bears, was established as a general principle by the joint declaration of the contracting parties.

no means to be distinguished from the rest, nor were the chances of escape diminished by the fact that most of the Cruizers were dull-sailing ten-gun brigs.

On one occasion the writer, at daylight, observed five sail of vessels on different points of the horizon, four of which he was, by great efforts, able to visit before dark, all being empty though equipped, and therefore secure from seizure. Twelve months afterwards he captured, on a fresh adventure, the vessel which had been the fifth on the former occasion, and had then escaped with 600 Slaves.

But the seizure of equipped vessels enabled the squadron to stop the Slave Trade, by never leaving the Factories open for the embarkation of Slaves: the prevention of the Slave Trade became the first object, and the capture of vessels entirely secondary, for now the Slave vessel could no longer approach the Depôt in security, but was liable to seizure at every step. This has been the foundation of what is termed the "Blockade system," *i. e.*, the constant watch of the Slave Depôts, to prevent the exportation of Slaves, as distinguished from the former practice of desultory cruising at a distance from the Coast.

This system was recommended when our markets were closed to Slave-grown sugars, and before the great stimulus given to Slave Trade by their admission, while other adverse circumstances have also occurred: but ultimate success is certain if this course be pursued with energy, and followed by the other measures recommended in the same memorandum,* especially the destruction of Slave Factories, and the formation of small establishments at Whydah and three or four other places.

Sir Fowell Buxton estimates, from the best authorities, that in and before the year 1837, 150,000 human beings were carried across the Atlantic and landed in the West.† Mr. Bandinel, in his work on Slave Trade, states that in 1838, 94,000 Negroes were landed in Brazil alone, and that the whole amount of Slave Trade to Brazil and Cuba was in that year 122,000, in 1839, 81,000, and in 1840, only 28,714.

* This memorandum has been printed in the report of evidence taken before the Coffee and Planting, and the Slave Trade Committees, now sitting.

† "Some Account of the Trade in Slaves from Africa, as connected with Europe and America." By James Bandinel, Esq., 1842. Longman and Co.

The Havannah Commissioners report that in 1840 the yearly importation suddenly fell more than 10,000, viz., from 25,000 in 1839 to less than 15,000 in 1840.

The subsequent accounts from the Havannah showed the numbers imported to be, in 1841, 9,000, in 1842, to 3,000, which they attributed to General Valdez, whose noble conduct is above all praise. But, in 1843, although he continued Governor until September, the imports rose again to 10,700, and in 1844 amounted to 10,000. Again, in 1845, with *a new Governor, who encouraged the traffic, the numbers fell to 1,500; in 1846 to 2,000, and in 1847 to 1,000!*

The Slave Trade of Cuba in 1840 decreased 10,000, because from April the supply from its "principal mart and stronghold" was cut off, and the establishment itself destroyed at the end of November. The farther diminution in 1841 and 1842 was undoubtedly in a large measure owing to the apprehension of similar measures.

So, in 1843, when the publication of the Queen's Advocate's opinion satisfied the Slave Dealers that they were secure from such proceedings, they immediately re-established the Gallinas Factories, and renewed the traffic to a large extent, in spite of the efforts of General Valdez.

It flourished in 1843 and 1844, and would have soon sprung up to its original amount, had not the "blockade system" been adopted in about July, 1844. We have just read its effect in the importations of 1845, 1846, and 1847. With respect to Brazil, the returns are far more vague and uncertain, but from 1840 to 1844, the numbers imported are stated to have been from 14,000 to 22,000.

But in 1845, just as the blockade system would have produced its effects, the Brazilian Slave Trade was left for several months to rage without check or limit. The squadron had no power whatever against it, and officers were compelled to allow scores of Slave vessels to pass unmolested! Nevertheless, the Sierra Leone Commissioners state, "the number of Brazilian vessels captured during 1845 has far exceeded those captured in any previous year, notwithstanding that the British and Brazilian Court of mixed Commission ceased to adjudicate in August last, and that, with the exception of the *Adelaide*, detained on the 12th of August, and

subsequently given up, no vessel with Brazilian papers was taken by any of Her Majesty's Cruizers between the 23rd of July and 23rd of October, in consequence of the expiry of the Convention, and the Act of the 8th and 9th Victoria not having come into operation."*

The enormous profits during this interval gave an immense stimulus to the Slave Trade of Brazil, towards the end of 1845, and when the effect of the admission of Slave-grown sugar is also taken into account, there can be no doubt that a large increase of the importation of Negroes took place in 1846.

It has also been asserted that in the same year the British Cruizers were withdrawn from that part of the Coast whence the Brazils is mainly supplied, and that the suppression of the Slave Trade in that quarter was left to the Portuguese squadron; and it appears also that in one part of the Coast the British vessels cruized from 20 to 50 miles from the shore,† which was an utter abandonment of the main principle of the system supposed to be in force.

If there should be no error in these two statements, possibly 60,000 Slaves may have been imported into Brazil in 1846; but, under any other circumstances, it is utterly incredible to practical men that 120 vessels (at an average of 500 Slaves to each) should have escaped the vigilance of Her Majesty's squadron. If these errors should have been once committed, their effects will have been too obvious to render their repetition possible; and whatever the returns may show from the reports gathered from the Slave Dealers in Brazil, the present most efficient squadron cannot fail to cut down the traffic to a very small amount before the end of the present year.

But who can doubt, for a single moment, that the Slave Dealers of Brazil have found their interest in greatly exaggerating their success in order to persuade us that, in spite of every effort, the Slave Trade continues, and always must continue, wholly unchecked? But, even if we were to take for granted that 62,000 Slaves were carried to Brazil and Cuba in 1846, would not this amply refute the assertion, since in 1837 the Slave Trade num-

* *Vide* Correspondence with British Commissioners relating to the Slave Trade. Class A., 1846.

† *Vide* Sugar and Coffee Planting Report. Dr. Mc Crae, 13,304.

bered 150,000 victims, which by this time would have increased to 200,000, or even more, but for our exertions?

A more plausible objection is, that we have aggravated the horrors of the voyage; and the delusion seems still to exist in some quarters that a "licit" Slave Trade is a humane pursuit. But the necessity of the Dolben Act of 1788, and the evidence then taken before Parliamentary Committees, are sufficient proofs of the fallacy of this opinion, and that the horrors of the Slave Trade, when left to itself, were scarcely capable of exaggeration.

There cannot be a doubt that whatever the present sufferings may be, they are, through our efforts, endured by a comparatively small number of human beings; and that though the Slave Trade may be now carried on in smaller vessels, the very reason for their use, namely the quality of fast sailing, reduces the length of the voyage one-third. Another advantage is, that a small vessel will only contain a single Slave deck, which receives a constant supply of air from the hatchways, and the ventilation is therefore far better than that of the heavier vessels, which carried perhaps three or even four tiers or decks, in which these wretched victims were stowed as closely as it is possible for human beings to be packed. It was proved before Committees of both Houses, previous to the passing of the Dolben Act, that the space allowed to each Slave was 16 inches in breadth and 5 feet 4 inches in length; they were chained by the hand and foot, besides being shackled to ring bolts on the deck; they were allowed but a pint of water per diem, and were at stated periods compelled to dance for exercise under the lash. If the Slave Trade is now again thrown open, no Dolben Act can be applied to Spanish or Brazilian Slave vessels. We know the powerlessness of these countries to enforce their laws in their own territories; and a reference to the evidence on which our own Slave Trade was regulated, will enable us to form a just estimate of how far the cause of humanity would be consulted by the abandonment of the attempt to suppress the Slave Trade.

CHAPTER IV.

It is urged by those who condemn the use of force as a means of suppressing the Slave Trade, and that after the squadron has been withdrawn, some powerful moral influence will succeed in accomplishing this great object. These views are entertained by men who utterly abhor the crime; but as the influences to which such power is attributed are various, and as those who hold these opinions are by no means agreed as to which is to be the remedy, it may be useful to refer to them severally. Our own confident persuasion is that if force is abandoned, the alternative must be unlimited and perpetual Slave Trade.

Some believe that after the squadron has been withdrawn the Slave Trade will be extirpated by Free Trade; but as a general rule, these principles are calculated to increase the commerce to which they are applied, and there can be no doubt that the result in this instance would not belie the expectation. Free Trade has already had a most baneful influence on this question as connected with the West Indies, which in truth, formed a complete exception to the general rule, but to which, nevertheless, it was ruthlessly applied. The warmest advocates of Free Trade should be the first to protest against a misapplication of its principles, by which it may be perverted to increase and perpetuate the traffic in human flesh and blood, the greatest curse that ever afflicted mankind, the most enormous crime that ever disgraced Christianity and civilization, "*Le mal des maux, l'iniquité des iniquités.*"

In other quarters we are assured that "Free Emigration" from Africa will put down the Slave Trade, partly by its own effects on that Continent, and partly by the example which it will enable our Colonies to hold up to imitation, that Free Labour is more profitable than Slave Labour.

But it has been before shown that large emigration can only be obtained by the purchase of Slaves to be landed as Labourers in the West Indies. If we adopt this principle, we must enter into competition with the Slave Traders of all nations, and must throw the traffic open to them; we must become accomplices in the Slave Trade to the fullest extent as regards Africa, in the desolating wars, rapine, kidnappings, and murders, which will be

thus created and rendered perpetual. That unhappy Continent will be thrown back into a state of misery and degradation yet deeper than that from which (owing to our efforts, and greatly to our profit) she is only beginning to emerge; while this country, at a tremendous loss to her true commercial interests, will incur also the obloquy of having betrayed a most righteous cause, for her conduct in which, for more than a quarter of a century, she has claimed the admiration of the world.

It is pretended that the individuals carried over will be greatly benefitted; and provided we in the first instance deliberately convert Africa into a hell on earth, it possibly might be so in some respects, could we deem the rupture of every tie of nature of no account, or recognize the right of trafficking in human flesh and blood. Let us beware how in these days we assail the first and most sacred right of human nature; or sacrifice, to motives of interest or to vague theories, those principles which it has so long been the proudest honour of England to defend and uphold.

So far from "Free Emigration" being the means of putting down Slave Trade, the things are identical: when England sanctions "Free Emigration," she becomes again a Slave Trader.

That the planters of Cuba and Brazil, on the conviction that Free Labour is more profitable than Slave Labour, should dismantle their Slave Ships and enfranchise their Slaves, really seems too extravagant a proposition to be entertained in the same breath with that which urges "Free Emigration" on the public as the remedy for West Indian depression.

Beyond all question Free Labour can only compete with Slave Labour, when the latter ceases to be recruited by fresh importations; they can only come fairly into comparison with fixed populations born and bred on the soil they cultivate. Nor if this be true, when a Slave bought for £2 or £3 will fetch in the American markets from £50 to £100, will our case be improved when the price raised in Africa to £6 or £7, shall have fallen across the Atlantic to £15 or £20.

The "Free Emigrant" will cost as much in Africa as the Brazilian Slave, for the notion of subsequent emancipation will have no influence with the Chiefs, still less will the Slave have any voice in the matter, only when actually landed and enfranchised in the British Colony his labour will fall far short of that

which would have been wrung from him had he been landed in Cuba or Brazil, in Mexico or Texas.

On the other hand, effectually stop the Slave Trade, and what will be the result? In the first place, the disproportion between the sexes in Cuba and Brazil* must cause a great falling off in the population, until the sexes are equalized, by which time our own Colonies will be the more thickly peopled, and will be enabled to compete with their rivals with advantage. Again, a new system must be adopted in the Slave Countries; a regard for the health of their Slaves will become a matter of interest; "the largest amount of labour in the shortest possible time" can no longer be the maxim; and the expensive† system of rearing Slaves upon the soil must be substituted for that of importing only the bone and sinew of labour, and renewing or increasing the same continually by fresh supplies.

Then, and not till then, will our Colonies be able to stand alone; and if we persevere to this end, we shall at last reap the fruits of our glorious struggle in the prosperity of the West Indies, in the commerce of Africa, the value of which it would be difficult to over-estimate, and in the just admiration and gratitude of mankind.

Equally groundless is the notion that any moral conviction can lead Brazil to emancipate her Slaves, until all importation shall have ceased for a long course of years; for to set free a Slave population, a large portion of which had been recently landed from Africa, would be to ensure the extermination of the Whites under all the horrors of the insurrection at St. Domingo.

One theory however is, that but for our interference, the overwhelming numbers introduced would have long ago produced this result; and even if this were true, it would be no cause for regret, for who could desire the freedom of the Negroes on such terms, or regard the contingency, without horror. But though the number of new Slaves is a reason why enfranchisement would be at present impossible, we believe that such a population is more easily kept under control than one bred on the soil would be after

* The women are stated to be only 10 per cent.

† Mr. Geddes states, that out of a gang of 200 Slaves, often there were only 60 working hands. This refers to the British Colonies *after* Slave Trade had been abolished some years. (*Vide* Evidence before Sugar and Coffee Committee, 9, 132.)

the lapse of a certain time: all history shows a perpetual state of Slavery of the labouring class to be impossible, except in a Colony supported by a powerful parent State.

The Slaves imported from Africa consist of fifty different nations and languages; of races often more hostile to each other even than to their white masters, and amongst whom no union can exist. But people bred upon the soil, speaking the same language, and having imbibed some part of the civilization of their masters, must sooner or later achieve their own freedom, if it be obstinately withheld. The influences which fit them to receive freedom with moderation must ensure its attainment in the course of time.

Many years must elapse after the Slave Trade has ceased before Brazil can, with a due regard to her safety, attempt to convert her Slaves into a free peasantry, however strongly a sense of her ultimate true interest may urge her to the change; but woe to her if the step be delayed too long, for such a revolution effected by violence must be of fatal consequences.

The present development of the resources of Brazil might be thus checked for a time; but the means by which she endeavours to obtain a fallacious prosperity is a gigantic crime, and no less a gross error—a crime which England stands pledged to put down, which Brazil has solemnly bound herself to abandon, and to deal with in its proper character of piracy; nor can England suffer the compact to be broken without betraying the best interests of humanity.

The fulfilment of her pledges to Africa is now irresistibly demanded by her perishing Colonies, and by a just estimate equally of her own moral and material interests. Shall we, who suppressed our own Slave Trade and Slavery at such cost, be checked now in our righteous course because the exports of Brazil may fall off if she fulfil her compact! We owe the fulfilment of our pledges to our own character amongst nations; and if we fail in them we incur imperishable scorn: our duties are to our own Colonies, to our own Commerce as well as to Africa; but if the interests of Brazil were a legitimate object of our care, should we not denounce the continuance of the Slave Trade as a gross blunder, and urge its suppression as the first step towards her regeneration?—one absolutely necessary to the preservation of her existence amongst

nations; for to talk of prosperity in a State without a people, is to speak of a rope of sand.

Another opinion is, that we have only to remove all checks on Slave Trade to insure its extirpation in a few years; that after a certain period the traffic will be abandoned, because the American markets will be glutted, and the demand supplied.

We may observe, in passing, that when England abolished the Slave Trade it had existed for 200 years, and that though its progress was very slow until a certain development of newly-planted countries had taken place, it constantly and steadily increased so long as it was unrestricted. In 1807 the whole amount was estimated at 100,000; and, notwithstanding the abolition of the British Slave Trade, which then amounted to 38,000, thirty years afterwards its amount was 150,000!

That the Slave Trade does not carry with it the seeds of its termination, but on the contrary secures its own perpetuation, is perfectly clear. It will not be denied that it is cheaper to import than to breed; and in this view, as we have before shown, only four women are carried in the Slave Ship to one hundred men; an overstocked market can therefore provide for no permanent increase of population, and will cause only a temporary slackness in the demand. But considering the enormous extent of lands which, if the Slave Trade be thrown open, will all seek for labour from Africa, it is impossible that all the markets should be overstocked at one and the same time.

In this terrible event the supply must be at all times less than the demand; but in any quarter where a glut may occur, new lands will be brought under cultivation, which will soon absorb the surplus, or at any rate, mortality will in a very few years renew a demand, which can be furnished by the Slave Trade alone.

As for the influences of commerce, it must languish and perish under the pestilential effects of the unlimited exportation of Slaves; nor need we urge how infinitely such a result must be detrimental to our interests, or how deeply we are concerned in encouraging and fostering the African Trade, of which we possess a practical monopoly, and which has sprung into importance as the Slave Trade has diminished. Can there be a question that, whatever may be the case of a few individuals who may expect to profit by

the supply of the Slave Factories, that the true interests of this Country require that the commerce in African produce should be maintained and encouraged, instead of that vast Continent, teeming with the richest gifts of nature, being converted into a mere Slave market for the Western World.

Nor do we underrate the influences of Christianity and civilization, but, on the contrary, regard them, in combination with commerce, as most powerful auxiliaries in a struggle, in which we must undervalue no assistance, but combine all to the consummation of the great object: but to these influences, as well as to that of commerce, we would apply the same remark,—where Slave Trade rages they can have no existence—where they previously existed they must perish, and the first opening to them must be made by the prevention of the detestable traffic in Slaves.

CHAPTER V.

That the suppression of the Slave Trade should by many be deemed impracticable is not surprising, when we consider how long a period has elapsed since the attempt commenced, and that complete success has not been yet attained.

This opinion has more recently been strengthened by the disappointment of the hopes excited by the Niger expedition, and the failure of that undertaking has been followed by a despair no less unreasonable than were the expectations formed of its possible results.

In 1839, for the first time, England obtained the full exercise of those powers which placed success within her reach; but, most unfortunately, almost at that very crisis the Anti-Slavery party adopted the theory that force ought to be altogether repudiated, and that the extirpation of this atrocious piracy should be left entirely to the operation of moral influences.

But in the struggle no assistance can be dispensed with; and while we fully recognize the inestimable importance of moral influences, which, closely following on success, assume step by step, more prominence and power—while we admit these to be essential to the final triumph, on the other hand the forcible suppression of the Slave Trade can alone open the way to their operation.

If England act with the determined vigour becoming this great Country so deeply pledged in such a cause, instead of raising the craven cry now but too often repeated, complete success is within her reach: the Slave Trade must be suppressed in a few months from the moment that, with becoming spirit and energy, she grapples with the difficulties to be surmounted.

The state of the public mind enables interested parties to palm on the credulity of the nation the most unfounded statements, which derive increased influence again from the dictates of a false economy; but on the narrowest view of the latter subject, it is capable of demonstration that the suppression of the Slave Trade is a grand commercial object, fraught with the greatest profit to Great Britain; that the maintenance of the squadron till this is effected, is the only economy; and that to remove the force at the present moment would be to inflict a heavy blow on the present and prospective interests of the country.

It is strange to see how the suggestions of concealed interest or of erring judgment are thus encouraged—how every objection, however shallow, and every effort to undervalue each effective blow, is eagerly listened to.

The Slave Trade, amounting in 1837 to 150,000 and in 1838 to 122,000, was cut down in 1840, and the five succeeding years to 28,000! But, because some increase has taken place in one quarter, it is confidently asserted that our efforts do not in the slightest degree even check the Slave Trade, and that every demand for Slaves is surely and fully supplied. The Coast of Africa, once the “nursery for Seamen,” is now termed their grave, and the Squadron is called the “Coffin Squadron,” though week after week the press announces the arrival of vessels not having lost a single man in three years’ service. If Slave Factories are destroyed, we have a picture drawn of the imaginary sufferings of Slaves who may arrive from the interior, from the want of shelter: but in the case to which this objection is urged, the arrival of Slaves from the interior had altogether ceased for many months, all exportation having been prevented by the vigilance of the Squadron. Then we are told that such operations are of no service in suppressing the Slave Trade, because the Barracoons are only built of wood; but in the measures recommended not only the Barracoons, but all the Factories, including the goods, without

which Slaves cannot be purchased, and all the implements, without which Slave Trade cannot be carried on, would be at the same time destroyed, and the further prosecution of the traffic rendered impossible. With the loss of the stock-in-trade, the sources of future profit must cease to exist; and when the Slave Dealer learns that the same measures will be generally enforced, it is evident that he will not consign his property to certain destruction by re-establishing his Factories.

Again, the Slave Trade is compared to smuggling; and we are told that when profits are 30 per cent., no efforts can put down that offence; but if this were true as applied to Slave Trade, would not competition keep down profits to something like that percentage, whereas we know in a successful Slave voyage they amount to 200 per cent. The truth is, we have powers against the Slave Trade such as no State ever had for the enforcement of her fiscal laws. The smuggler, under a foreign flag, is completely secure until she comes within our coast limits. The Slave vessel, on the contrary, may be seized at every point of her progress, before as well as after her Slaves are shipped, and also in the well known haunts where alone she can procure her cargo. We protest against the comparison in every point of view—Slave Trade is no more smuggling, than murder is petty larceny.

Again we are told to contemplate these enormous profits, and despair: but, on the contrary, here is a striking proof of our success; for when a Slave is bought in Africa for £2 or £3, and sold again in Cuba or Brazil for £50 or £100, what can cause this enormous disparity but the forcible prevention of the traffic? Does not this prove that the supply falls infinitely short of the numbers which would be infallibly imported if force were to be withdrawn and substituted by moral influences. The greater the profit of a successful voyage, the more nearly must the trade in general be a losing concern—a result which, even at this moment of general discouragement, we are not far from having produced.

When we read of a single Cruizer* having captured twenty-nine Slave vessels, it must be at least admitted that the losses have been enormous.

The complete success of our efforts has undoubtedly been retarded with respect to Brazil by the stimulus to Slave Trade,

* Her Majesty's Ship *Styx*, Commander Chads.

given by the causes specified in Chapter III, by the Sugar Bill of 1846, and still more by the expectation it produced that the British Government would be compelled to yield to public clamour, and throw the traffic open. The blockade system did not come into full operation until the end of 1844, and its effects, under favourable circumstances, could not have been fully developed for three years. Long, however, before the lapse of that period it was condemned as a failure, and the hopes of the Slave dealers that England would abandon the contest seemed daily to be approaching fulfilment.

The destruction of Slave Factories under treaties with native Chiefs, by which Great Britain should be empowered to put an end to Slave Trade, if resumed in violation of these engagements, formed a principal feature in the plan proposed. The evidence of Captain Matson shows most strikingly how powerfully this expectation has operated in deferring the conclusion of such treaties.

Restore the conviction that England is in earnest, and there will be no difficulty in inducing the native Chiefs to make such engagements voluntarily, though the time has arrived for England to repudiate the absurd doctrine that every paltry Chief is to be treated with all the formalities of diplomacy. The affectation of a delicate regard for the independent rights of these barbarians is a strong point with the advocates of the Slave Trade. It is pretended that every Chief has an inviolable right to outrage the ties of nature and humanity on his own shores, to deliberately prepare for the commission of the same crimes on the high seas; and that thus the Spanish or Brazilian Slave Trader, having made a native Chief his accomplice, in order to defeat the solemn compacts of his own country with Great Britain, may even habitually make British subjects his victims, branding their flesh with his initials, and shipping them off to a life of Slavery with absolute impunity!

Where is the principle laid down which would place such Chiefs among recognised powers?—and what reasonable objection can be urged against this country preventing the breach of her treaties, and compelling Africa to abandon the export of Slaves?

Places where depôts of that horrible traffic are established should be treated as waste lands, destitute of all law and government, and

instead of being dealt with on the footing of perfect equality, should be coerced for their own ulterior advantage, and for the benefit of humanity at large. Let England, then, eradicate this plague, which blasts the prosperity of a whole Continent, and keeps it in a state of perpetual crime and degradation. Let her root out the Slave Dealers as scourges of mankind, who, for motives of gain, inflict sufferings which no imagination can conceive on millions of their fellow-creatures.

With a firm and steady hand, under stringent regulations for the real good of the natives, and for the protection and encouragement of lawful commerce, let England forbid every preparation on the Coast of Africa for violation of the Law of Nations on the high seas; let her thus suppress the traffic on the shores of Africa, and in a short time no Slave vessels will exist to keep alive the jealousy of Foreign States, and prevent the world from joining in the declaration that Slave Trade is piracy.

The blockade may be termed an expectant system, certain to put down the Slave Trade, wherever it is pursued with unremitting energy and perseverance; but while in progress the Slave Dealers may always hope that a relaxation of vigilance will afford them opportunity, perhaps in a few days, of retrieving the losses of months.

When Slave Factories are destroyed, with their contents, the speculation is at an end; nor can the traffic be re-commenced without its re-establishment from head quarters, after a long interval, and at a large outlay, *which will only be risked when it is known that such measures are not to be repeated.* To destroy the Slave Factories, with all the goods necessary to buy Slaves, and the implements requisite to carry on the traffic, is to uproot the tree. The blockade is the perpetual lopping of the branches as they prepare to throw out shoots, which will lead the owner to cut down the tree which continues unproductive, and replace it with one bearing more wholesome fruit.

Nothing can be more complete than the proofs we have had of the efficacy of destroying Slave Factories.* In 1840, those

* Extracts from the answers given by Captain Matson, an officer distinguished for his activity and success on the Coast of Africa, before the Committee on Coffee and Sugar Planting:—

ANSWER 7068.—In the year 1842 I consider the Slave Trade almost to have

of the Gallinas and New Cestos were destroyed, which had previously exported from 12,000 to 15,000 Slaves annually to Cuba.

Shortly afterwards the Slave Factories of Cabenda and Ambriz were also destroyed. From these places an exportation of upwards of 10,000 Slaves per annum took place, principally to Brazil.

The Slave Dealers were struck with despair, the factories were on the point of being abandoned, in the belief that these measures would be followed up; but at this crisis, most unfortunately, the Queen's Advocate's opinion seeming to condemn such proceedings as illegal, became known on the Coast, and the Slave Factors re-established themselves with renewed confidence. *Had the destruction of Slave Factories been persevered in, the Slave Trade was at an end.*

The Slaves imported into Cuba in 1839 are stated on authority at 25,000, and it is admitted that the importations fell to 14,000 in 1840, and have never since reached even the latter number.

ceased, owing to the measures which had been adopted by the Government, and the success of the Cruizers for two or three years previously.

The first great step we took was in 1839, when the Portuguese Slave Trade Suppression Bill was passed. That was the first blow to the Slave Trade. The Government afterwards (1841-2) issued orders to burn the Barracoons, with the consent of the Chiefs, if it could be obtained, which at that time was not at all difficult—it was, in fact, very easy; and, failing to obtain their consent, in certain cases, to do it without. It was, however, never necessary to do it without their consent, which was always obtained for a very trifling subsidy—a small annual subsidy for five years, generally, altogether amounting to very little.

7072.—They engaged to suppress the Slave Trade, and in every one of those treaties there was a stipulation, agreeing that if they failed to fulfil the treaty, we should be allowed to employ force. Those treaties the Slave dealers themselves advised the Chiefs to enter into, inasmuch as they gave them notice that they could no longer carry on the Slave Trade: they entertained no hopes whatever that they should be able to bring any more goods to Africa, on account of the measures of the Government, and the burning of the Barracoons.

7073.—It was in the year 1842 that we engaged with those Chiefs (of Ambriz) by a treaty to put down the Slave Trade, one of the stipulations being that we should employ force, failing the fulfilment of the treaty. Before the first annual subsidy arrived, that unfortunate letter of Lord Aberdeen appeared, and they then refused to receive the subsidy.

7074.—Of course that (letter) could not have been meant to be taken in the light in which it was viewed in Africa, because the Slave traders exaggerated this letter to an enormous extent. So far from telling the Chiefs that they would not be enabled any longer to carry on the Slave Trade, they (now) represented to those Chiefs and natives of Africa, that there was a revolution in England for the purpose of carrying on the Slave Trade. The story they told was this—that the people of England had risen *en masse*, and obliged the Queen to turn out Lord Palmerston, and that there

But the Gallinas, whose export, on the lowest computation, was 10,000 Slaves, and that exclusively to Cuba, was destroyed in November, 1840, after nine months' effectual blockade, in which only 600 Slaves were carried off, and yet this is altogether overlooked as having even contributed to this striking result. Can any one suppose that these events should be totally without effect on the Cuba Slave Trade, or that they should have had no share whatever in the diminished imports in 1840? It is not pretended that during 1840 the authorities of that Island made the slightest effort to check the Slave Trade. General Valdez did not arrive until March, 1841, some time after the destruction of the Gallinas

was a revolution at this time going on in England to oblige the Government to carry on the Slave Trade, as the Blacks expressed themselves, "all the same as they had done one time before."

7075.—If that system had been persevered in for one or two years, and the whole of the Chiefs of Africa could have been induced to enter into treaties with England, containing a stipulation that you might use force, failing their good faith, it would have been impossible for the Slave Trade to be carried on. I do not think a Brazilian or Spaniard would have trusted goods on shore in Africa if they had thought that the English had a right to land and destroy them; but the danger afloat is now very trifling.

7076.—You think the danger afloat is very trifling? It is now, because they can afford to lose many more vessels than they could then. The price has increased very much; and there is a feeling, both in Africa and Brazil, that we are not determined, as they thought five or six years ago we were, to suppress the trade.

We quote this evidence to show from Captain Matson's own experience of what took place when he was on the Coast. He quitted the station in 1843, and his testimony as to the present state of things is, of course, of less value, as not being the fruit of his personal knowledge.

Captain Butterfield, who was senior officer on the same district of the Coast as Captain Matson, and who has twenty years' practical experience of the subject, states, in a private letter, "From the strict blockade kept up by our boats (those of the *Fantome*, his own ship), by the *Waterwitch* (Captain, then Lieutenant Matson), and the *Brisk* (Lieutenant, now Commander Sprigg), the Slave Trade was knocked up in several parts, and the Slave Agents were embarking for Brazil, orders having arrived to break up all those (Slave Factories) at Ambriz from Rio. The caravans had ceased to bring Slaves, except in very small numbers, and were bringing ivory and gum copal from some mines in the interior, of which the Americans carried off many cargoes. Had Lord Aberdeen's letter never appeared, and the Sugar Duties kept on, the Slave Trade would now, in my opinion, have been stopped. The agents all owned the risk was too great, and from their heavy losses, they could not continue. When I left the Coast I consider the Slave Trade to the southward to have been nearly stopped. The last cargo of Slaves (531) I took had been fourteen months purchased before they were embarked; and, I think, six months after I left there was only one Slave vessel captured by five Cruizers."

factories became known at Havannah, and his subsequent success was, undoubtedly, in a great measure owing to the panic produced by this heavy blow.

But since these observations were written, the first Report of evidence taken before the Slave Trade Committee has been printed,* in which it is asserted that the destruction of Slave

* *Vide* the evidence of James Bandinel, Esq., before the Slave Trade Committee :—

3,341. CHAIRMAN.—The attention of the Committee was called by some naval officers, whom the Committee examined, to the practice of destroying Barracoons upon the Coast of Africa, as a very important means of extinguishing the Slave Trade. You have paid a great deal of attention to all parts of this subject, and, judging by your experience of the success which has attended the operations of the British squadron on the Coast of Africa, should you be of opinion that the destruction of Barracoons would effect the permanent extinction of the Slave Trade, or should you rather incline to the opinion that such a measure would be soon counteracted by the Slave Traders by their devices?—I am of opinion, from the facts which appear, that it had no effect, from the very beginning in repressing the Slave Trade, and I think that the effects are hurtful. I took the trouble to look at the account of the Sierra Leone Commissioners, who are the people who have the best information; they generally collect the information upon that Coast, and their reports are very valuable. I have their account of the effect of it from year to year.

3,342.—Will you be so kind as to recite that to the Committee?—On the 31st December, 1840, they say, talking of the good effects of the blockading system, “Great, however, as the good effects of this blockading system may appear, we have yet to communicate to your Lordship what we consider a much more important feature in the history of the Gallinas Slave Trade, which is the total destruction of the eight Slave Factories established there, and the emancipation of 841 Slaves, who were on that occasion given up by the native king Seacca to Captain Denman.” “These measures of hostility towards the Slave Dealers were, as we are informed, conducted by the native Chiefs, between whom and the Slave Dealers, we think, there is now so serious a feud established, as to render impossible, at least for a considerable time to come, the re-establishment there of Slave Factories.” Such is their report of that transaction, and such was their anticipation. They also say, “The panic which the destruction of this stronghold of Slavery has created is very great, and the foreigners have quitted the Gallinas in the greatest alarm, in the belief that their lives were no longer safe there, from the ill disposition manifested by the natives.” That is in the year 1840. Now what is their report the very next year? In the very next year, 1841, the Commissioners observe, “In their last Annual Report, Her Majesty’s Commissioners, alluding to the destruction of Slave Factories at the Gallinas, expressed an opinion that those measures of hostility having been conducted by the native Chiefs, so considerable a feud must have arisen between them and the Slave Dealers, that the re-formation of similar establishments, for a considerable period at least, was rendered highly improbable. We regret, however, to be obliged to say that this opinion has not been borne out by the result. We have received information that during last rains no less than three Slave Factories were settled in the Gallinas, whither the factors and goods had been conveyed in an American vessel.” In the next year again, 1842, they go

Factories has no effect in repressing the Slave Trade, and that such measures are hurtful, inasmuch as they drive away legal commerce.

As regards the Gallinas, to which this evidence principally applies, it cannot be too broadly stated that there was not the smallest admixture of lawful commerce. The Chiefs avowed that none had existed for fifteen years, that Slaves formed the sole export, and that no single object of commerce was raised in their whole territory.

on to say, "At the Gallinas, the Slave Trade, which had been paralyzed for a time," not much time, "by the sweeping destruction of the Factories and Barracoons, is stated to have again partially revived." Then in the year 1843 they say, "Your Lordship will perceive that unhappily for the cause of humanity the Slave Trade has greatly increased during the year 1843." "The Slave Trade in this neighbourhood has been most successfully and extensively carried on. At the Gallinas the Slave Trading establishments have been all restored, and are in active operation." So that, notwithstanding the persuasion which they had at the very first that the system which had been pursued would be very effective, in the very next year they were forced to declare that they had been mistaken. Then it appears by the Reports which you have from the different naval officers afterwards, and from the Commissioners, that there are such facilities in collecting Slaves from the interior at various places, and marching them down to the Coast, that the destruction of Barracoons on any particular part of the Coast is of no use whatever. Many people are of opinion that it is hurtful to the trade; it frightened away the legal trade, as well as the other.

3,343.—By producing a spirit of hostility on the part of the natives?—Exactly so. It frightened away the legal traders, because it produced a spirit of hostility to all European traders; that has been what I have read about it.

3,344. MR. E. J. STANLEY.—Would it not rather appear that the destruction of Barracoons was imperfectly effected, and that the resumption of the Slave Trade was from not continuing the same practice, as the immediate effect of it was to frighten the Slave Traders, and prevent them returning again; and they only returned when they considered that that practice would be discontinued?—No; it frightened all people away; all Europeans instantly. It did not frighten away the Slave Traders from getting Barracoons immediately again, because the very next year they were there. I have asked other people about it, who seemed to know about those things, whether they thought it was hurtful to trade. I asked Mr. Jamieson, and he said especially that he thought it was hurtful and indisposed the Chiefs. I asked him in writing, that he might give his opinion in writing upon it.

3,345. CHAIRMAN.—Have you his letter before you?—Yes.

3,346.—Will you be good enough to read it?—His letter is very interesting altogether. I will read that part of it:—"To supplant Slave Traffic, therefore, and make friends of the Africans, you must give them legitimate trade; and every act preventive of its introduction, where the traffic exists, is an act against the good of Africa; and the violent destruction of Barracoons is one of these, inasmuch as it exasperates the Chiefs against us, and so hinders the introduction of our honest commerce." That is his opinion; and my opinion is simply, as I say, the collection of different opinions in one; the aggregate of them.

But applying this view more generally, it is well known to the natives on the Coast that the Slave Trade is unlawful, for they are accustomed to witness the shifts of the Slave dealers, and often the capture of their vessels. On the other hand, the power and determination to punish these evil-doers gives the strongest security, and opens the fairest prospect to lawful commerce, which, where the Slave Trade rages, can have at best but a feeble and precarious existence. In point of fact, this apprehension is totally unsupported by any single occurrence which has followed the destruction of Slave Factories in the several places where such measures have been resorted to during the last eight years.

As for the repression of Slave Trade thus produced, the extent of the Factories at Gallinas may be imagined from the fact of upwards of forty white men being employed in them; and during the nine months immediately before their destruction, besides four vessels, which landed between 200 and 300 tons of goods, no less than five large vessels discharged all their cargoes on consignment from Havannah for the supply of the then existing Slave Factories. The place is described by the Governor of Sierra Leone as "the most celebrated mart and stronghold of Spanish Slave Trade on the whole African Coast," and, beyond all question, prior to 1840, it had annually exported, at least, 12,000 human beings.

Neither when these operations took place were any extravagant expectations formed of their results: it was distinctly foreseen that the Slave Trade would not be abandoned, and it was only by perseverance in the measures of 1840 that its ultimate extirpation was looked for.

In 1841, an attempt was made to establish a Factory, not from a cargo landed, but from the *debris* of the old Factories, with what success and to what extent, compared with the former state of things, may be learned from the Annual Report of the Commissioners for 1842, quoted in the evidence in question; but after the passage "the Slave Trade is stated to have again partially revived," they add, "We have heard, however, of only one cargo of Slaves having been carried off recently from that neighbourhood;" and in the course of this same document, to account for the diminution of Slave Trade, they specify, first, the condemnation of equipped Portuguese and Brazilian Slave vessels; secondly, the practice of blockading the places resorted to by the Slave dealers;

and, thirdly, the destruction of Slave Factories, to which, they say, "may be ascribed, more than to either of the other causes we have named, that decrease which has been so remarkable during the past year."

Next year, however, the Report is to a very different effect. The Commissioners state that, during 1843, "At the Gallinas the Slave Trading establishments have been all restored, and are in active operation. The notorious Pedro Blanco has lately returned from the Havannah in an American vessel, called the *Elsinore*, to Gallinas, with a full cargo of Slave Trading merchandize."

Now it is most important to observe that the Queen's Advocate's opinion, which was construed into a condemnation of the proceedings at Gallinas, and which laid down that if Slave Factories were destroyed, *the goods found in them should be carefully exempted from such treatment*, was published in England in the Report of the Committee on the West Coast of Africa, in August, 1842; so that *precisely at the moment when the Slave Dealers found they were secure from losses they incurred in 1840, they then, and not till then, ventured to re-establish their Factories to any considerable extent*. As before stated, the Slaves imported into Cuba, only 3,000 in 1842, sprung up in 1843 to 10,700, and it was only on the restoration of the blockade system, by orders from England, that it was reduced to 1,500, 2,000, and 1,000, in 1845, 1846, and 1847, respectively.

In order to show with what confidence and with what reason the Slave dealers relied on this opinion as tying the hands of Her Majesty's officers, and placing them in absolute security, whatever outrages they might commit, some extracts are offered from the Slave Trade Correspondence for 1845. (Class A.)

The subjects of Great Britain at Sierra Leone have been constantly made the victims of the Gallinas Slave Trade, and to such an extent had this prevailed that the term "grinding over again" was invented to describe the process by which a British subject was converted into the property of a Spanish Slave Trader. It was this that caused the Factories to be uprooted and the Spaniards expelled in 1840, but they no sooner returned than, with the coolest assurance, they resumed this enormous practice. In November, 1844, two British subjects were captured in a Slave ship, having been bought and sold, and branded on the breast by Don Angel Ximenes, the Slave Factor at Dombocorro!

Commodore Jones, after several attempts to obtain satisfaction for this outrage from the native Chiefs by letter, which was answered only by the grossest falsehoods and by deliberate insult, at length determined to enter the river with an armed force.

In his letter to the Governor of Sierra Leone, dated the 7th of February, he states, the only use made of the time allowed them for reflection was for Prince Manna to place in ambush "the body of fighting men who had just returned from carrying on a Slave war up the country. In all these designs and perverseness they acted under the counsel of Don Angel Ximenes, who comforted them with assurances *that I should not dare to molest them, and that they would be protected in London.*

"Having, on the morning of the 4th of February, received no redress or reparation for our grievances, nor any satisfactory answer whatever from the Chiefs who had committed them, I perceived that the time was arrived when it became imperative upon me to undeceive these Chiefs as to their assumed right of enslaving British subjects.

"Accordingly I entered the river Gallinas with 286 men, in eighteen boats, from Her Majesty's ships *Penelope*, *Growler*, and *Larne*. At eight a.m., Commander Buckle occupied Dombocorro, where the Spanish agent, Ximenes, received him with cool defiance. He had sent away all the Slaves, and had placed a quantity of merchandize in the Barracoon, where Peters, a British subject, had been confined in irons. *On being confronted with Peters, this Spaniard had the audacity to avow 'that it was by his order that the man had been branded with his mark on the breast.'* Upon this, *all the goods were carefully removed and placed in safety*, and when the Barracoon, where so great an enormity had been committed, was emptied, it was levelled with the ground, and its materials removed to a short distance and burnt. No other article of property was taken or injured at that place, and our people were withdrawn."

The execution of the treaty under which this man ought to have been expelled was demanded but not enforced, and his only punishment was the destruction of a Barracoon not worth £50; and though a native town was burnt, and a fine of 800 dollars demanded, which does not appear to have been paid, punishment did not fall on the guilty parties, nor was the slightest security obtained against a repetition of similar outrages.

When such facts as these are brought forward to show that the Slave Trade can never be suppressed, the answer is obvious, that they fully account for our efforts not having been yet crowned with perfect success, viz., that, with all her great expenditure, England* has never devoted herself to the task with that energy and determination which can alone prevail.

The opinion that the destruction of Slave Factories has no effect in repressing the Slave Trade, does not seem to be borne out by the facts which have been here submitted; but while, on the one hand, it is not contended that such operations as isolated and exceptional measures (followed by the assurance of their cessation), can eradicate the traffic, on the other, there seems no room to doubt that should they be carried into force as the general rule, it will be absolutely impossible for the Slave Trade to be continued.

These facts also refute the assertion that the Slave Trade thus put down in one part, will infallibly spring up in another. Here it is shown that the supply cut off by these measures produced no compensating traffic elsewhere, and that when it did spring up again, it was at its old haunts where the Slave Dealers were encouraged, by the assurance of security, to re-establish themselves.

We would now venture to offer some observations on the state of the law with respect to the Slave Trade, and also in connection with the native Chiefs of Africa and the treaties with European powers.

One of the pleas in a recent trial was, that the plaintiff was violating the laws of his own country, Spain; but, either from the non-existence of such law, or from intimidation or corruption, no evidence could be produced to establish the fact, for in order to prove what the law of a foreign country is, it is necessary to produce the evidence of those learned in the law of such country. This

* Speaking of the destruction of the Gallinas in their Report for 1840, the Commissioners say, "We earnestly hope that the good thus effected will be followed up in that manner which will secure for the cause of Africa all the advantages which prompt and judicious measures would obtain; and that we may not now be doomed to witness the revival of the odious traffic at the Gallinas, as was the case in the river Sherbro, after the total destruction of the trade there in the years 1825 and 1826, by the late lamented Governor Turner; when the re-establishment thereof that trade might, by a comparatively small and well-applied expenditure, have been prevented, thereby giving to Sierra Leone for lawful trade one of the most fertile districts on this part of the Coast, and which trade would, by this time, no doubt, have increased to an amount of considerable importance."

plea was therefore given in favour of the plaintiff. But in the treaty between Great Britain and Spain, (embodied in an Act of Parliament passed in 1835), Spain pledged herself to pass a law without delay prohibiting the Slave Trade, which, at least as far as British Courts are concerned, would seem to be tantamount to proof that the laws of Spain do prohibit Slave Trade. The contrary doctrine admits the principle that if Spain has not fulfilled her compact, she may, in the person of one of her subjects, take advantage of her own wrong, and that in an English Court of Justice.* But even had the existence of the Spanish law been considered as proved, it was laid down that it would have been no defence, inasmuch as the Spanish Slave Dealers were not violating the law of the State in which they were residing,—viz., the barbarous country of Gallinas!

What an extraordinary fact, that a British Court of Justice should be bound to entertain a claim for losses avowedly incurred in Slave Trade! The laws of England treat the traffic as felony, robbery, and piracy; all civilized States treat it as a crime, and the united voice of Europe pronounces it to be repugnant to “every principle of humanity and universal morality;” yet the redress which no Slave Trader could obtain in his own Courts he is allowed to seek in those of this country! If the crime, not being unlawful in Gallinas, compels an English Court to entertain the case, by the same argument our Courts may be disgraced by a similar recognition of any other savage or barbarous custom: the sacrifice to the Fetish, the Indian Suttee, or the banquet of the Cannibal, may receive the virtual sanction of a British tribunal, inasmuch as these abominations are not contrary to the laws of the countries in which they are practised!

The time surely has arrived for shutting our Courts against future cases of Slave Trade, by passing an Act of Parliament to render proof of engagement in Slave Trade an effectual bar to the recovery of damages in any action not already commenced, and that British Courts should be prohibited from entertaining any future cause on proof to this effect being established.

* The plea in question was wholly immaterial to the defence of the action alluded to; but other cases may arise of a different description.

CHAPTER VI.

The first great principle on which the Law of Nations is founded, proclaims that "all men have by nature a liberty and an independence, which they cannot lose but by their own consent:"* it establishes the equality of the States of the world, on the natural equality of all mankind, and the example of a giant and a dwarf holds good with respect to men with red hair or brown, with white or black skins.

The sole case in which the Law of Nations would justify Slavery is thus stated by the same author:—"Can one reduce prisoners of war to Slavery? Yes; in the case where one has the right to put them to death; when they have rendered themselves personally culpable by some attempt worthy of death. The Ancients sold their prisoners of war as Slaves; they believed they had the right to put them to death. On every occasion where I cannot innocently take the life of my prisoner, I have no right to make him a Slave. What, if I spare his days to condemn him to a lot so contrary to the nature of man; I only continue with him the state of war; he owes me nothing. What is life without liberty? If any one still regards life as a favour when one gives it him with chains, *à la bonne heure!* let him accept the boon, let him submit himself to his condition, and let him fulfil his duties! But let him study them elsewhere!"

But it may be argued that the Law of Nations governs the intercourse of nations with each other, and therefore does not interfere with Slavery as a municipal institution; but if this be granted, the Law of Nations imperatively denies the right of the subject of one State to place his fetters on the natives of another. For instance, the custom of Africa and the law of England permitted Slavery; but the custom of Africa could no more prevail in the Colonies of Great Britain than the law of England could on the shores of Africa. When the native Chief sold a Slave he could not transfer his power over him, derived from native custom, beyond the limits of his own territory. The natural right to be free asserted itself the moment the Slave passed from such

* Vattel. Préliminaires. Idée et principes généraux du droit des gens.

jurisdiction, and he became again a Slave by what is to be considered as a new act, which it was out of the sphere and beyond the power of the municipal law of the country of his purchaser to sanction or justify. The moment the Slave was beyond the operation of African custom, the immutable voice of the Law of Nations proclaimed that his natural right to be free was restored to him, and that piracy was committed when he was consigned to the foetid hold and carried off to Slavery in a foreign land. On these immutable principles Slave Trade has ever been piracy.

The practice was long sanctioned by the "Custom of Nations," and it is undoubtedly true that a few States, for a long course of years, pursued and encouraged it. But with respect to the "Customary Law of Nations," or the "Custom of Nations," Vattel lays down that "When a custom or usage is generally established, whether between all the civilized nations of the world, or whether only among those of a certain Continent—Europe for example; if that custom is indifferent in itself, and the more so if it is useful and reasonable, it becomes obligatory to all those nations who are understood to have given their consent to it; and they are bound to observe it one towards another, unless they have expressly declared their desire to follow it no longer. But if this custom involves anything unjust or illicit, it has no force, and every nation is even bound to abandon it, nothing being able to oblige, nor to permit a nation to violate the natural law."*

It cannot be disputed that the custom of Slave Trading was both "unjust and illicit," and that it directly violated the first vital principles of the Law of Nations—the very keystone of the whole fabric; but though by force of custom or convention these principles were practically suspended, they were, nevertheless, indefeasible.

The Custom of Nations had long "violated the natural law" by sanctioning the Slave Trade, and several States still encouraged the traffic, when Sir William Scott's celebrated judgment in the case of the *Louis* was pronounced, declaring that the Slave Trade was not piracy, or contrary to the Law of Nations,—a judgment which has had immense effect in retarding the recognition of the Slave Trade in its true character, now the conventional sanction (which, however, never was valid or binding) is at an end.

* Vattel. Preliminaires.

In 1815 the Congress of Vienna formally declared the practice to be contrary to the Law of Nations, when it pronounced the "Slave Trade to be repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality," and that "the public voice in all civilized countries calls aloud for its suppression;" all the States represented at the Congress declared "the wish of their respective Sovereigns to put an end to a scourge that desolates Africa, degrades Europe, and afflicts humanity."

In accordance with these declarations, the Slave Trade has since been prohibited by every civilized State; England, France, the United States, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Belgium, Sardinia, Tuscany, the Roman States, Naples, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Brazil, the Hans Towns, and all the States of South America, declare Slave Trade to be a crime, and visit it with punishment more or less severe.

Instead, then, of a conventional sanction, which had in truth no force or effect at any time, we have now the universal condemnation of the whole world. The Slave Trade, so long held to be sanctioned by custom, is now to be considered as though it were commenced for the first time in the history of the world.

Can it be questioned, that the indefeasible principles of the Law of Nations pronounce it to be piracy? What was the real character of an Algerine Cruizer carrying 500 Spaniards chained together in her hold to the Slave Mart at Constantinople? Would not each captive be entitled to resist to the death, to regain his freedom by whatever means? Would it be a crime if he destroyed his oppressors in the attempt? Would not every ship of war, nay, every human being be bound to assist in his deliverance, and to treat the crew as pirates?

Wherein does the Slave vessel differ from the Algerine Corsair, excepting, indeed, that the latter would not have been condemned by her own law? She is manned by a ruffian crew, treble the number required in lawful trade; she is built entirely for fast sailing; she carries a powerful armament without authority, and is in every respect only adapted for piratical purposes; in point of fact, almost all the piracies of recent times have been committed by Slave vessels. In the hold she carries hundreds of human beings, in a state of misery insupportable. In a great number of cases the vessel is avowedly entitled to no flag, subject to no law,

and belonging to no State or Nation; but if she can establish a national character, the laws of whatever State she may belong to, condemn her and her crew as guilty of an atrocious crime.

By the Law of Nations each Slave has a natural right to be free, which sacred right is violated on the high seas, without even the colourable sanction of any municipal law; and acts of violence committed on the high seas by unauthorized merchant vessels, not strictly required by self-defence, constitute piracy; that growing out of the first act of violence, the shipment of the Negroes cannot, of course, constitute such a necessity.

Although, however, the Slave Trade is undeniably piracy by the immutable principles of the Law of Nations, and the Custom of Nations which once violated those principles has ceased to exist, yet it is not contended that a single nation should take it on herself to seize every Slave ship as a pirate; it is admitted that the formal declaration of civilized States is necessary, in order to deal ~~with~~ the crime in its true character.

The Law of Nations would not only permit, but it actually requires, all nations to league together for the suppression of the Slave Trade, and the general duty in this respect is to be clearly traced in various parts of the great work already referred to.

After stating that, in the case of injuries inflicted by individuals of a State which accustoms or authorizes its citizens to commit habitual wrong, the State whose subjects are thus aggrieved may justly punish the entire nation, he exclaims, "What do I say? *All nations have the right to league against her, to repress her, and to treat her as the common enemy of the human race.* Christian nations would be no less justified to unite against the Barbary States to destroy the haunts of these Corsairs, with whom the love of pillage and the fear of chastisement are the only rules of peace or war. But the Corsairs have the prudence to respect those who are most in a state to chastise them; and the nations who know how to keep the route of a rich commerce are not sorry it should remain closed to others."* The last passage is very important, as showing that this right is not limited to those who have actually suffered injury.

Vattel lays it down as a duty not to suffer injustice:—"If there should be a nation which made openly profession to trample

* Book ii., chapter vi.

justice under foot, despising and violating the rights of others, whenever it found occasion, the interest of human society would authorize *all the others to unite to repress and chastise it*. We do not forget here the maxim established in our preliminaries, that it does not belong to nations to erect them into judges, the one of another. In particular cases, and susceptible of the smallest doubt, one must suppose that each of the parties may have some right; the injustice of that which is wrong may come from his error, and not from a general contempt for justice. But if by constant maxims, by a sustained conduct, a nation shows itself evidently in that pernicious disposition, if no right is sacred to her, the welfare of the human race requires that she should be repressed. To form and to sustain an unjust pretension is to wrong only him who this pretension interests; to mock at justice in general, is to wound all nations.”*

 another place† he says, the laws of natural society are of such importance to all States, that all Nations “have the right to repress by force that which openly violates the laws of the society which nature has established amongst them, or which attacks directly the good and the welfare of that society.”

Again: “If the justice of each State ought in general to limit itself to punish the crimes committed in its own territory, it is necessary to except those wretches who, by the quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public safety and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, incendiaries, by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized, because they attack and outrage all nations in trampling under foot the foundations of the common safety. Thus it is that pirates may be sent to the gallows by the first into whose hands they fall.”‡

Would the Law of Nations be violated or fulfilled if “Slave Traders” were added to the above category? for, though all civilized States condemn the crime, it unhappily still exists with the connivance of one or, at the most, two nations. Is it probable, nay, is it possible, that such a declaration can be long delayed? Have we not the strongest grounds for believing this in the events of the last few weeks. The emancipation of the Slaves in her

* Book ii., chapter v.

† Preliminaires.

‡ Book i., chapter xix.

Colonies by the French Government, and the preparatory measures of Portugal for the same object, are striking instances of the progress of opinion on this great principle.

By her own voluntary acts England has become the depository of the rights and the arbiter of the fate of millions of mankind. If she persevere, her triumph is certain; and as the means of finally extirpating this curse, she should use every endeavour to induce the civilized world to join in the declaration that Slave Trade is piracy, or a crime subject to the same treatment as piracy. But all depends on the continuance of her repressive measures. Her example alone sustains the Anti-Slave Trade principle in the United States, and if her moral weight be withdrawn or thrown into the opposite scale, by the adoption of "Free Emigration," the Southern States must prevail, and the influence of the Mexican and Texan States will plunge America also into the crime. England will have betrayed the dearest interests of humanity, and will be directly responsible for all the sufferings to which countless multitudes of mankind will be consigned for ages yet to come.

Nor can it be doubted that this moral degradation will be attended also by the most serious injury to her material interests, not only with respect to her commerce and her Colonies, but by the blow she will strike at her own character and station among civilized powers. Africa is scarcely more interested in the present crisis than Great Britain herself; and the result which may be arrived at on the West India question is in every point of view fraught with the most momentous influence on the destinies of this country.

THE END.

FREE TRADE

Richard Croft

IN

NEGROES.

NOT PUBLISHED.

from the Author

Capt^r The Honble Joseph Denman

APRIL, 1849.

General Post

from the other

Capt. R. M. P.

FREE TRADE

IN

NEGROES.

THE extinction of the Slave Trade would unquestionably be an event productive of the greatest advantages to Great Britain. The lawful commerce with Africa which has made such surprising progress during late years, would increase in a yet more rapid ratio, and might be expected in a short time to become of the highest value and importance; the West India Colonies, at present sinking from the advantage which Slave labour even now derives from Slave Trade, would be saved from destruction. These important interests are obviously intimately connected with, and to a large extent dependent on the course which may be adopted with respect to the Slave Trade. For if that traffic be suffered to rage without check or limit, if our present policy be reversed and the squadron withdrawn, all who examine the question without prejudice will acknowledge that the cultivation of the West Indian Colonies, and the lawful Commerce with Africa must both perish; the former because compe-

tition against the present importation of Slaves quadrupled, would be hopeless; the latter, because confidence and security are essential to the raising of produce by native industry, and an unlimited Slave Trade would spread over every part of the African coast universal habits of plunder, violence, and bloodshed.

But the movement directed against the Squadron, numbers among its supporters some West Indian proprietors, who demand that a part of the expense thus saved shall be applied to African Emigration. The fact is however established, that no large number of Africans can be obtained unless by entering the Slave Markets on the coast against the Foreign Slave Traders. Thus England would again become an accomplice in the Slave Trade, she would be responsible for all the horrors which an unlimited Slave Trade must spread over Africa, and would be justly obnoxious to the charge of sacrificing the great principle she has so long defended, for the basest and most sordid motives of self interest. But though taught almost to despair of extirpating the heinous traffic, public feeling regards the crime with unmitigated abhorrence, and those who imagine that any such advantage will accrue to themselves if the squadron should be withdrawn will be disappointed, and have reason when it is too late, bitterly to repent their error.

Great Britain has repudiated differential duties on Free Trade principles; she prohibits her own subjects from the crime of Slave Trade; she stands pledged to suppress it, and is armed by the only nations which still encourage it, with ample powers for the purpose. The redemption of that pledge, the full exercise of those powers, may be demanded by the West Indian body with irresistible force and justice; and this even on Free Trade principles. It is their last and only remaining hope; but if England, honest and true to her former principles should fulfil her duty, they are saved. Those countries which in defiance of the law of nations violate their compacts and continue the Slave Trade, are the very rivals which threaten the Colonies with destruction—and it is this traffic that constitutes their sole advantage. But at this supreme moment when their existence turns on the vigorous exercise of the incontestable rights which England possesses, the West India proprietors divided and despairing fail to urge this righteous claim, and those who do not madly join in the agitation which must consummate their ruin if it should succeed, remain at least passive and consenting.

If all check on the Slave Trade be removed, Cuba and Brazil will strain every nerve, and assisted by the secret aid of British capital,

will multiply their imports of negroes, and taking new lands into cultivation, will soon supply the deficit produced by the abandonment of the British plantations; and thus the Colonists, brought low by the measures of the mother country, will receive the final blow from their own apathy or misdirected efforts.

To withdraw the squadron all parties agree, would cause an immediate and great increase in the amount of Slave Trade; but the advocates of this course contend, that such increase would continue but for a short time; that an unlimited Slave Trade must ~~work~~ its own cure and discontinuance, and eventually that it must lead to the extirpation of Slavery itself.

These ends could be only produced by one tremendous event, which would lay prostrate the Country in which it occurred, and which must for ages cease to be civilized or producing. That event would be the insurrection of the Negro population, composed in a great measure of savage tribes recently imported, and amongst whom no tincture of civilization could have spread. The massacre of the whites would be succeeded by anarchy and desolation. But it is not thus that the extirpation of Slavery can be anticipated, at least by those who require the removal of the squadron for the sake of cheaper sugar and increased exports to Brazil;

even they would scarcely sacrifice so much to advantages they expected to perish almost before they could be gathered. But in considering the subject solely with a view to interest, the peculiar state of Brazil is a very important feature to be well and maturely weighed, before substantial interests in possession, the secure continuance of which is in our own hands, be thrown away. Let us beware lest we sacrifice solid and if we choose, enduring benefits for visionary theories and a delusive shadow.

There can be no stability in a country without a people, and such is the condition of Brazil; her labouring class, the foundation of all strength, is composed of a distinct race torn from a remote continent, which instead of a safeguard, forms a constant source of suspicion and alarm to the white population. Besides the perils arising from the overwhelming number of the Negroes, tribes of Indians from within threaten her with destruction, and on the south Rosas is said to be meditating an inroad, against which no resistance could be for a moment maintained. Such is the condition of that country, the whites so demoralized and destitute of vigour, so feeble the government, so inoperative the laws, and so imminent and various the dangers, that all British authorities acquainted with its condition and unprejudiced by interest would unite in declaring a prolonged existence impossible, and

that it is even now tottering to its fall: all history, analogy, and reason, amply confirm the opinion.

Thus in a day Brazil may be laid with the dust, but the interests which will have been sacrificed are not to be retrieved. Africa will have been thrown back a hundred years by the crimes of two or three, and nothing short of madness would again invest capital to reclaim, and restore the cultivation of the West Indian Colonies. These calamities will go down to posterity in eternal connexion with the disgrace of England, who deliberately intending to sacrifice her principles to her interest, blundered and destroyed both. That the Slave Trade can work its own cure, except through the massacre of the white population by the Slaves, carries with it its own refutation, if fairly considered; that it can by any other means lead to the extirpation of Slavery is equally contrary to common sense and to experience.

The only Slave Trade that now exists is that directed to the Spanish Islands in the West Indies, and to Brazil. The Slave population in these quarters numbers only ten or twelve per cent. of females, and the mortality is calculated at five per cent.; it must therefore follow that unless largely recruited by annual importation, the population must rapidly decrease. Estimating the Slaves in these

countries in round numbers at three millions, there would be an annual loss of 150,000, and putting the births even so high as 30,000, a deficit of 120,000 remains to be supplied by the Slave Trade.

If this supply be stopped, population must annually decrease until the lapse of time shall have gradually equalized the sexes ; after which the amount of population will depend on natural laws.

This calculation is supported by the numbers of Slaves introduced into Cuba and Brazil before any extraordinary stimulus had been given to the traffic or to Slave labour, and while the powers under treaty were so inadequate as to render every effort on the part of England of necessity futile. It is on all hands admitted, that the Treaty of 1835 for the first time rendered any check on the Spanish Slave Trade possible : for the fifteen previous years the number of Slaves imported into Cuba is estimated at 39,000 per annum, the Slave population being upwards of 200,000.

So in Brazils where the Slaves were reckoned at above 2,000,000, so long as the abuse of the Portuguese Treaty continued to cover that Slave Trade with complete security, it was reckoned by the British authorities in the country to amount annually to more than 90,000.

If the Slave Trade should be thrown open and all restrictions removed (except perhaps regulations which would be mere waste paper), production in our Colonies must cease—and then conceive the stimulus given to the Slave Trade as regards these countries alone. In Cuba there is a large amount of virgin soil, in Brazil the extent is unlimited ; every corner of Africa would be ravaged to furnish labour, and these countries alone would probably import double the numbers formerly landed.

But when England withdraws from the conflict, and treats this hateful pursuit as a matter to be recognized and regulated by formal conventions, her own subjects alone withheld from direct engagement in the traffic, will still seek to share its profits through foreign channels. Thus the terrible consequences of her backsliding will not be confined to the increase of Spanish and Brazilian Slave Trade,* but many a State now unstained by the crime will be tempted to share in its advantages, and finding it no longer a “malum prohibitum,”

* The consequences of this terrible example to the world may extend to regions where the crime has been hitherto unknown. If the enormous strides of civilization should be thus accompanied by a retrograde morality, increasing Slave Trade may very possibly be driven for victims to new quarters ; thus parts of Asia and the Islands in the Pacific may hereafter have reason to join with Africa in cursing the name of England, to whose betrayal of the cause of mankind they would justly attribute their sufferings.

will be only too likely to declare it not a "malum in se."

Imagine now the Slave Trade counting from 3, to 400,000 victims a year, and let us enquire *how* it is making progress towards its own cure; and by what steps the extinction of Slavery itself is approaching.

Some believe that the former result will be attained the moment the markets across the Atlantic are glutted, which they declare will be the case very shortly after the trade has been "left to itself;" we might as well pretend that if Smithfield market were overstocked to-morrow, thenceforward the Metropolis would cease to require sheep and oxen. The cases are precisely parallel, as surely as a fresh demand would speedily arise for more cattle, so certainly would the rapid absorption of the surplus negroes cause a new demand; in each a temporary excess is wholly incapable of furnishing a permanent supply.

Even Dr. Cliffe, whose object was to prove that the Slave Trade ought to be left to itself, and who would omit nothing likely to reconcile the people of England to this course, let out a fact which utterly destroys such a delusion.

After stating that 4 females only are now carried to 100 males in Brazilian slave ships, he distinctly admits that the disproportion

would not be lessened,* if all restriction were removed. These facts prove the absurdity of believing that the Slave Trade can work its own termination.

As regards Slavery, nothing can be more firmly established than that by far the cheapest form of labour (at least as applied to the cultivation of sugar,) is that supplied by the Slave Trade, which carries only the bone and sinew of labour in the shape of men, and works them off, constantly replacing them by fresh importations; thus it is while the repressive measures cause a difference of 1000 per cent between Africa and Brazil! The Slave bought for £3 brings £60 at Rio de Janeiro, nor is it possible to believe that the advantage of the Planter will be diminished,† if the removal of the squadron should lower the price to £30 in the Brazilian market.

But some persons are sanguine enough to look for the suppression of the traffic and emancipation of the Slaves in Brazil, from an Anti-slavery party in that Empire itself!—Brazil has no parent state to fall back upon for protection, her Slaves are for the most part not bred on the soil, but savages recently imported,

* Vide Sugar and Coffee Planting Report Question, 1555.

† The price in Africa would probably rise from the increased demand, to £8, or perhaps £10.

and there can be therefore no medium at present between Negro Slavery and Negro Domination. Thus the yoke is rivetted by the instinct of self-preservation itself, and the idea of emancipation is in the mind of every white man, indissolubly bound up with the dread of all that is terrible in suffering, and hideous in excess.

But setting aside these facts which distinguish the case of Brazil, let us ask if experience in other quarters affords the slightest ground for such hopes. The Colonists of Great Britain, when would they have abolished Slave Trade or liberated their Slaves had the determination of these questions been left to themselves? Were they carried with the consent of even a small portion of the West India body? Was it not on the contrary united as one man in the most strenuous resistance to these measures even to the last moment? Has the result shown the Planters were mistaken in opposing them as injurious to their pecuniary interests; or to aid those arguments which failed to convince them, can we now point to the example of advantages having accrued to our unfortunate West Indian proprietors, and so tempt the Brazilian planters to the same great measures of justice through motives of interest.

Can the most sanguine emancipationist in the American Union flatter himself that such a spirit is growing up in the Southern States.

Congress long since abolished the Slave Trade, it may hereafter decree and enforce the enfranchisement of the Slaves; or the Slaves may achieve their own freedom; or in the course of the next century the yoke may gradually and insensibly disappear, and the Negroes become a free peasantry. Either of these solutions is possible, but that the Slaves should in the present state of feeling and circumstances be set free by the voluntary act of their masters, can only arise from a miraculous change of every feeling and sentiment they now entertain.

The Slave Trade can never be extirpated from any quarter in which it has once taken root, except by a force external to such a country: In this sense the United States in Congress were a force external to those interested in its continuance; and thus England, whose interest in the crime was too indirect to blind her moral sense, put down the Slave Trade and ultimately Slavery. Brazil can never shake off the stigma by any internal effort; but Great Britain is by the act of Brazil herself, armed with complete power to enforce its repression. She has bound herself to England to abolish the traffick, and does not attempt to fulfil the pledge; in the same compact she agrees that her subjects engaged in it "shall be deemed and treated as Pirates" by the contracting parties. Great Britain is then the external force by

which the Slave Trade of Brazil must be suppressed, and she bears to it a relative position similar to that which she bore to the Slave Trade of her own Colonies, or the United States in Congress to the Slave States.

The crime never has been and never can be suppressed unless by force. Force has perfectly succeeded in England, in the United States, and in various other countries, and will as certainly succeed elsewhere when properly applied. Nothing is more absurd than to call the Slave Trade smuggling, and then to declare because it is smuggling that it never can be put down! If it could be properly compared to smuggling at all, it would be where it is prohibited, and not where it is encouraged; and where prohibited, it is extinct. But the effect of applying this gentle term to a pursuit which the civilized world has denounced with one voice, is to divert the public mind from its true character, and so pave the way to its recognition, as an innocent and even laudable commerce, to be perpetuated and extended under the auspices of Free Trade principles.

Let us at least call it by its right name, a monstrous crime; and in the words of the Congress of Vienna "repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality," "a scourge that desolates Africa and afflicts

humanity," and for the suppression of which "the public voice in all civilized countries calls aloud." Has the boasted progress of the last thirty years led us to a higher morality, a clearer perception of right and wrong, or of those first principles from whence the rights of human nature take their source, if we are at this time of day to term it *smuggling*; no longer a crime to be prohibited, but a commerce to be recognised and left to itself. But if England is really prepared for this unhallowed course, let her at least scorn the hypocritical pretext, that she throws the Slave Trade open because she believes it will work its own cure, and extirpate Slavery. The world well knows that her noble objects would be cheaper sugar and increased exports to Brazil, and how are these to be reconciled with the belief that a speedy insurrection of the Negroes (by which alone such results could be accomplished) would utterly destroy Brazil, both as a consumer and a producer!

Although the number of those who advocate this policy may be considerable, we shall find it to consist of a variety of parties, who from different, opposite, and taken severally, the most fallacious reasonings unite on this single point alone. Conclusions thus arrived at will make no impression on the good sense of the

country, and a body, however numerous, composed of elements so discordant can carry but little authority.

Probably each opinion contains amongst its supporters persons directly interested in the Slave Trade, who pull the strings, and stimulate the exertions of their unsuspecting friends, in order to retrieve past losses, or reap future profits from "leaving the Slave Trade to itself." For though the fact of the employment of British capital in this crime is undoubted, the guilty parties are completely unknown; great is the temptation, the risk of detection very small, and it is certain that the present apparent wavering of the public mind would be improved by them to the utmost. Persons directly interested would of course be comparatively few in number, but their secret motives would give an intensity to their exertions, and from their intimate knowledge of the subject they would exercise an immense influence over those who they had joined only to mislead for their own purposes.

An example of the excessive proneness to believe blindly any statements confirmatory of foregone conclusions on this question, is shown by the eager reception of Dr. Cliffe's evidence by the Committee of the House of Commons, although that witness had an evident interest in lowering the price of slaves, for he avowed

his desire to "increase his store" of Negroes, by adding 500 to the 200 he already possesses, and though a citizen of the United States, (by whose law Slave Trade is Piracy,) he declared that he had been engaged in the crime.

In considering the opinions of those who have united to require England to reverse her policy against the Slave Trade, the party represented by the Morning Chronicle must not be overlooked, who proclaim the Slave Trade to be a "*malum prohibitum*," rather than a "*malum in se*;" who would persuade us that Christian principles warrant Slave Trade and Slavery; who vindicate the citizen of the United States guilty of Slave Trading, by urging the state of public opinion in Brazil; and who quote with glowing approbation those who condemn as *uncharitable* the terms crime and criminal as applied to Slave Trade and the Slave Trader!

With the country at large such pernicious fallacies require no refutation, but there is reason to fear that they are much more general than might at first sight be believed; for when thus formally advocated by a leading * Morning Journal, which must to some extent follow, and to some extent guide, public

* It is a remarkable fact, that this journal has been selected as the medium through which the proceedings of the Committee of the House of Commons on the Slave Trade have been defended and justified.

opinion, we may be assured that such doctrines find favour with a considerable number whose suffrages are for unrestricted Slave Trade.

Unfortunately the most prominent of the Free Trade party have joined in this movement, but is it possible that they mean to include human beings in their category of objects of commerce? If Free Trade should declare that whatever is to be sold, it is innocent to buy, might not a Slave Trade be established upon the very soil of England herself? Free Trade if universally adopted and extended over the whole world, would be undoubtedly a bond of peace; it proclaims its basis to be the equal rights of mankind, and its development is to go hand in hand with the interests of freedom and justice, to the first elements of which the traffic in mankind is abhorrent. The only part of the Free Trade system that can possibly be thought even indirectly to sanction the continuance of the Slave Trade, is that which deprecates the interference of one State with another; but a fair consideration of the principles of Free Trade prove this to be an exceptional case, and demand that the vital parts shall not be sacrificed to one of the more remote consequences.

Considering the Slave Trade as a *commerce*, to the subjects of Great Britain it will always be prohibited, and therefore Free Trade

can never be extended to it. But the Slave Trade is not properly a commerce, but a *crime*. The presence of men habitually committing these enormities in armed vessels on the high seas is utterly incompatible with the security of merchant ships; and even if the traffic were thrown open, Slave ships must still be armed against attempts at insurrection on board.

Instead then of advocating a measure which would cause the immense increase of such vessels, Free Trade should insist on the duty of purging the great highway of nations of a traffic which involves the peaceful intercourse of mankind in continual peril. The whole civilized world has condemned the crime, Spain and Brazil alone still pursue it, each being pledged to England to put it down, and each having invested her with the right to demand and enforce its suppression. To abandon this right would be to inflict incalculable injury on the progress of civilization and on public morality. Is it for Free Trade to demand the perpetual and unrestricted rage of this fearful scourge? Should it not rather urge its immediate extirpation, and endeavour to unite all nations in freeing commerce from the stigma of such fellowship. Free Trade professes to teach that nation should trade with nation on perfect terms of equality, and fair dealing, thus to spread peace and brotherhood over the whole

earth, and to knit the human race in perpetual amity, founded on the endless succession of benefits springing from their unrestricted intercourse. But what can be so diametrically opposed to these principles as the Slave Trade, which teaches man to look on his brother as an object of traffic, to be seized by force, or entrapped by fraud—to be torn from his native soil and every tie that nature holds dear, and to be worked to death in a remote quarter of the globe, for the benefit of strangers!

Can the Free Traders hope for public confidence if they obstinately maintain such a fearful inconsistency? Or if their doctrines should warrant the desolation of a whole continent that the British manufacturers may derive a temporary profit, it behoves the people of England to consider whether they will be blindly led away by a name, which, thus perverted, threatens the general interest with serious injury, and the national honour with a perpetual stain.

Nor would the horrors of unlimited Slave Trade be less repugnant to the objects of those who demand the withdrawal of the squadron on the principles of universal peace, and who repudiate the use of force under every possible circumstance, as contrary to Religion. For though war may be justly considered in the abstract, as equally foolish and sinful, reasonable

men cannot admit that this opinion involves the passive endurance of every crime by the powers that be.

The Gospel, while it bids us if struck on the right cheek, to offer the left also, by no means commands us to abandon our brother to wrong and violence; to be consistent, such advocates for universal peace must declare that measures essential to the public defence are sinful in a government; they must condemn the office of magistrate, and the functions of police, and demand that burglars and murderers be left only to the sting of their own conscience.

If it were a case involving some advantage which affected only herself, it might be right for England to submit to the injustice and the wrong; but the only treaties she has ever suffered to be broken are those for the suppression of the Slave Trade, and the breach of these has inflicted unutterable sufferings on millions of human beings. Possessing the most unquestionable right to enforce their fulfilment, she is bound to put an end to this iniquity by every moral obligation that demands the suppression of crime on her own shores. Conceive the Slave Trade restored by the act of the first of civilized nations, a title that belongs to England principally from her prominence in this great cause! Imagine all her success abandoned, all her steps retraced; Africa a hell on

earth, one frightful scene of pillage, rapine, and murder, all from the misapplication of the principle of universal peace!

Had the good Samaritan arrived sooner on the scene of violence, would he (had he been a Christian) have been bound to refrain from all active interference, and while each blow might be fatal, was he to limit his efforts to pious exhortations and moral precepts, and prepare his balsams in case the thieves might still leave life in their victim? But suppose they had been fellow travellers, and the good Samaritan had promised to succour and defend him, could he without sin before God and just disgrace in the eyes of men have thus deserted him! This is the position of England towards Africa—may she be saved from such notions of Christian duty!

But the most serious blow which has been struck at the Suppression of the Slave Trade has come from those who as friends and even as champions have united in the clamour against the use of force for the purpose.

The Anti-slavery Society are actively engaged in condemning every effort which can by possibility lead to success, and declare that it is by *moral influences* alone the monster can be overcome; by good example, gentle measures, by Christianizing and Civilizing Africa, but mainly by proving that free labour is more profitable than that of the Slave. Thus they

seriously believe Africa may be made too good, and Brazil too worldly wise to continue to trade in or to hold Slaves! It is true Brazil is already Christian, but so was Spain, so was Portugal, so were the Colonies of England, and in all of these Christianity was powerless against self-interest.*

It was the Christian and not the Savage who commenced the Slave Trade, and who still maintains it. Can any thing then be so visionary as the expectation, that in a vast continent where Christianity, on a few isolated spots alone, has got the slightest footing, whose civilization is in general Mahometan and not Christian, Christianity within any assignable period can be so universally embraced, so firmly established, and so purely followed, as to put an end to a crime which no civilized State, after having been Christian for centuries, was able to resist when the temptation arose.

Nor is the prospect of converting Brazil through her interest less absurd; have the necessary proofs made the slightest progress, is there the smallest indication which affords the faintest reasonable hope of such a consum-

* If the Slave Trade has been abolished in the Colonies of England, France, Holland, and various other nations, it was because the mother countries were interested in a remote degree, their moral and religious sense was awakened, and the Colonies were compelled to acquiesce in every instance against their vehement remonstrances.

mation? Does not the ruin of our own Colonies stare such dreamers in the face and laugh them to scorn. It is proved as clear as the sun at noon that the competition of unprotected Free labour, against Slavery assisted by Slave Trade, is only another name for despair.

Or have we the more reason to expect that the people of Brazil will form the sole bright exception, and make that great sacrifice to justice and morality which no community similarly circumstanced has ever yet had the virtue to make? On the contrary, we know that such an effort is impossible, for the Brazilians are far from remarkable for high principle as a nation, and we know besides that the obstacles to such a righteous course are far greater in this case than in any other that has ever existed.

But to return to Africa; good example and gentle measures are as likely to divert the tiger from his prey as to influence men steeped in the crimes which are comprehended in Slave Trade, tempted as they are by untold profits, profits only to be diminished by the vast increase of victims. If the Slave Trade is let loose, rapine and desolation are spread over the land, all social bonds are torn asunder, and Africa and her people must resemble wild beasts in a jungle. Imagine this scourge raging with full licence, and then say whether even the first traces of Christianity and civilization

which we now witness springing up on a few spots of the coast can be maintained: that these influences should prevail in such a contest and extend themselves over this darkened and desolated continent, it is absurd to believe; all the facts prove that the only possibility of maintaining the ground already gained—the only prospect of extending these great blessings to mankind, solely and distinctly depend, not on any gentle measures, but on the resolute and uncompromising application of force to the prevention of this greatest of crimes.

The Slave Trade is a Hydra, against which no weapon can be thrown away—no assistance spared; lawful commerce and missionary labour are of the greatest value, but all must combine and join heart and hand in the fight. By force the victory must be won—by Christianity and Civilization it must be secured. The union of moral influences, when they have the field of action cleared for them, will teach Africa (what England should have learned ere this,) that the labour of her sons may be far most profitably employed on their own shores, supremely gifted as they are by Providence; and that to transport them by tens of thousands as beasts of burden to a distant land for the benefit of strangers, is a folly, as it is a crime, unparalleled.

Let then the people of England distinctly know that the Slave Trade can be suppressed

only by force ; let them reflect on the inevitable results of withdrawing the Squadron, and few will have the hardihood to join in the cry "leave it to itself." Let them only examine those absurd assertions, prompted by interested parties, and blindly adopted by many who should know better, that the Squadron has never even checked the Traffic; that failure must necessarily attend all its efforts, because there is some mysterious and inherent energy in the pursuit which defies control; that even if it could be maintained only at a dead loss and in the face of severe punishment, still the spirit of gambling which it excites would ensure its continuance! Such statements as these have been repeated with so much clamor and perseverance, that the country was at one time almost persuaded of their truth; but what has already been done with a very small force, proves that complete suppression may be effected if the only principles on which a Naval force can be employed with success are adopted and steadily acted on.

The fact of the Squadron having produced a gradual and rapid decrease of the Traffic may be considered as most satisfactorily established, on what we must suppose the reluctant testimony of one who advocates its withdrawal and the substitution of gentler measures; though what his particular remedy may be, he has

shrouded in mystery. Mr. Bandinel, in his elaborate work, published in 1842, shows the rapid diminution of the Slave Trade for several successive years ; that of the Spanish Islands he expressly contributes to the Treaty with Spain of 1835 by which the right of seizure, before restricted to laden slave ships, was extended to all vessels *equipped* for the trade ; but as he does not specify the *cause* of the yet more surprising and rapid decrease of the Brazil Slave Trade, (which cause had also the effect of preventing the restoration of that of Spain to its former amount,) it is necessary to detail it here.

It is true that the equipment articles of the Spanish Treaty of 1835 struck a heavy blow at the Traffic ; but the slave dealers had, in order to evade it, universally adopted vessels really, or nominally Portuguese, in which the Slave Trade of Cuba would have soon flourished as before, because the Treaty with Portugal, like the old one with Spain, allowed the seizure of vessels only when Slaves were on board, and prohibited that of equipped vessels.

But even this restricted right of seizure under the Treaty with Portugal existed only North of the Equator, and such was its effect on the Spanish Slave Trade, which was carried on almost entirely in North Latitude.

In South Latitude the same Treaty with Portugal strictly prohibited the slightest inter-

ference with Slave Vessels, though laden to the water's edge with Slaves, nor could any possible circumstance justify an exception from this most stringent rule.

Almost all the Coast of Brazil lays in South Latitude, and extends to more than 1800 miles South of the Equator; nearly every Slave was embarked from the parts of Africa laying also in South Latitude, and all were carried in Portuguese vessels. It is therefore clear as the sun at noon, that so long as the Portuguese Treaty remained in force the Slave Trade of Brazil was wholly out of the reach of British cruizers; its amount, by the concurrent testimony of all the British authorities in the empire, had been for many years above 90,000 per annum.

Let these facts confute those who assert we have struggled in vain for thirty or forty years; the struggle only began in 1839, when Her Majesty commanded her cruizers to capture all Portuguese slave ships whether laden or equipped, and whether met with in North latitude or in South, a course which the legislature afterwards sanctioned by empowering the Vice Admiralty Courts to condemn such vessels. At this time the Slave Trade to Brazil formed more than three-fourths of the whole traffic; we shall see that this measure in two short years cut down the imports of Brazil

from 94,000 to 14,000! or to one-sixth of its former amount.

Having supplied an important omission as to the *causes* which enabled the Squadron to produce such results, Mr. Bandinel's work will now show the facts :—of Cuba, he says—

“ In 1821, on the imperfect Treaty coming into operation, a momentary check took place in the importation.*

“ But the slave traders contrived to evade the operation of that compact; and the number of Slaves imported for the next fifteen years was still nearly 40,000 a year.*

“ But ever since the treaty of 1835 came into operation, the diminution of Slaves imported has been marked and gradual, and is become more striking every year.

“ By a particular and detailed report from Her Majesty's Commissioners at the Havana, for the year 1840, it appears that although in Cuba new sugar plantations are yearly laid down for cultivation, and although the sugar trade of Cuba has increased so much that more sugar is exported from that island than would supply the whole demand of Great Britain, still the number of Slaves imported into Cuba is yearly and strikingly decreasing.

“ In 1838, the number of Slaves imported had decreased to 28,000.

“ In 1839, the number imported was only 25,000;

* See Report from the Havana Commissioners in Papers presented to Parliament.

and in 1840, the number had further diminished to 14,470, which were thus divided :—

“ To the Havana	10,104
Matanzas - -	1,650
St. Jago - -	500
Smaller Ports -	2,200
—————	14,479

“ So that the number of Slaves imported into Cuba in 1840 was only one half the number imported in 1838, and only about one-third the number imported before the Treaty of 1835 came into operation.

BRAZIL.

“ In Brazil the recent diminution in the importation of Slaves appears to be still more striking than in Cuba.

“ By returns from the British functionaries in Brazil, it appears that in 1838 the importation of Slaves into Rio de Janeiro and the immediate neighbourhood was reported to have been 47,000.

“ It is estimated that the number of Slaves imported at Pernambuco, Bahia, Pará, and other places along the coast, equals in the whole the number of Slaves imported into the capital and its neighbourhood ; so that the total of Slaves supposed to be imported into Brazil in 1838 amounted to 94,000.

“ In 1839, according to the same authority, 28,000 Slaves only were imported into Rio de Janeiro. Following up the same calculation as before for the out-ports, the whole amount of Slaves imported into Brazil in 1839 may be estimated at 56,000.

“ But in the year 1840, by accounts from the same quarter, it appears that only 7122 were imported into Rio ; and the diminution at the out-ports was even still more marked ; for at Pará, during the last half-year of 1840, not one Slave was imported, So that taking for the out-ports the same importation as for the capital, too much will probably be taken ; and yet, upon this calculation, only 14,244 Slaves were imported into Brazil during the year 1840 ; **so that in 1839 the importation of Slaves had diminished upwards of one-third since the preceding year, and in 1840 the number imported was only rather more than one-fourth part of those imported in 1839, and not one-sixth of the number imported in 1838.*

“ The diminution in the importation of Slaves does not, however, arise from a slackening in the demand for them, for in Port Rico a newly-imported negro used to sell for 200 dollars ; the price now is 450 dollars. In Cuba such negros sold in 1821 for 100 dollars : the price now varies from 425 to 480 dollars. In Brazil a newly-imported negro used to sell for 100 milreis ; the price now is 400 milreis.”

The depression of the Slave Trade continued throughout the years 1841, 42, 43, & 44 ; it has since partially revived in Brazil owing in a great measure to the Caffre war, which led to the temporary removal of the Cruizers from the east coast of Africa.

But the Committees are surely not fulfilling the trust committed to them, if they confine

* We have taken the liberty of printing part of the extract from Mr. Bandinel's work in italics.

themselves to ascertaining what every one knows, viz., that complete success has not been attained, and thence jumping to the conclusion that it is therefore unattainable. The Country has a right to expect a full enquiry into the causes which cut down the Slave Trade at one period, and those again which caused its subsequent partial revival. They are bound to ascertain whether the success may not be brought to a perfect consummation, and whether the failure has not arisen from causes which are capable of remedy.

The great reduction of the Slave Trade, the increasing demand, and the quadrupled prices continued to advance progressively from the time specified by Mr. Bandinel until 1843, and then we learn from Dr. Cliffe that the price of a negro was more than eight-fold what it was prior to 1839! This result was produced by a Squadron of only eleven or twelve Vessels, acting generally on the principle of closely watching the Slave Factories, and aided by the destruction of some of these great central depôts.

When Dr. Cliffe states* that in 1843, he gave 850 milreis for "a child no bigger than a dolly," he bears the most striking and conclusive testimony to the effect of these root and branch

* Vide Sugar and Coffee Planting Report of Evidence Question 1490.

measures, though he would fain persuade us that it was owing to "*other causes*"; but what other causes he does not specify nor did the Committee care to know. The main depôts of Brazilian Slave Trade, Ambriz and Cabenda, were destroyed in 1842, and hence the rise of price so fatal to Dr. Cliffe's hopes of buying 500 more Slaves! but he, disinterested man! assures us that the measures on the Coast of Africa had nothing to do with it whatever, and he has actually persuaded the Committee that the only efforts which ever produced even the smallest reduction in the Slave Trade, were those on the Coast of Brazil. He totally ignores the fact of these Factories having been destroyed, and the Committee seem to have been without that specific knowledge of the facts, which would have enabled them to refute him from his own lips. Let the Committee only enquire how many Slave vessels were seized on the Coast of Brazil in 1842 and 1843, and they will see how utterly such captures were inadequate to produce the effects attributed to them. Let them turn to Africa and they will see the true cause, in a ten-fold number of captures, and in the up-rooting of the Slave Factories; unhappily to be very shortly re-established, owing to the terms in which the Queen's advocate's opinion was referred to in Lord Aberdeen's letter, producing a misconception shared alike by the Slave Dealers and by Her Majesty's Officers.

It has only been discovered very recently that the Queen's Advocate's opinion was entirely misinterpreted, and thus for more than six years Her Majesty's Officers have been prevented from adopting these most effectual measures, by a blunder.

The subject was surely worthy of the consideration of Mr. Hutt's Committee, but it is singular that when Officers were under examination, who had directed these transactions, and who could from personal experience have given the fullest information respecting such measures and their consequences, the matter was carefully avoided; subsequently however the speculative opinions of several persons who had no practical knowledge on the subject were recorded as evidence condemnatory of the destruction of Slave Factories: the result is what might be expected; the printed evidence represents as the inevitable consequences of such measures, a series of evils no one of which did ever in any one case, actually result from them. The mortality, the disorganization and demoralization of Her Majesty's ships, the change of locality of Slave Trade, the driving away of legal Traffic, &c. &c., never did in any single instance arise from the destruction of Slave Factories, though Mr. Hutt's Committee in its blind eagerness to support its foregone conclusions, places these erroneous speculations in its

reports, in place of the real facts which were fully within its reach.

Information has just arrived of the destruction of the Gallinas Slave Factories by Sir Charles Hotham. Ask that officer the extent of those depôts, all established on the security inspired by Lord Aberdeen's letter, and all maintained at a vast expense and without any adequate return, in the daily expectation of a reversal of the policy of England (encouraged by the press and the reports of Mr. Hutt's Committee) and of which the Act of 1846 was deemed the forerunner. Ask how many Slave vessels have escaped while these enormous establishments have been kept up at great cost; look to the Slave Trade of Cuba, of which this place has been the main depôt—for the last four years the annual average importation has been from every quarter, only 1500 Slaves! But we are told no more Slaves have been landed in Cuba because there is no demand! Who then are the persons who have maintained these vast establishments? The merchants of Havanah. Is it credible that they should thus waste their tens of thousands, if this were the case? These statements refute themselves, but no pretence is too absurd to persuade a large body of Englishmen that the naval force which has so long striven in this most arduous service has had no share in pro-

ducing results of which it has in truth been the sole and exclusive cause. The system which England laid down for herself when she commenced the struggle, and to which she long limited her efforts, was undoubtedly open to objection; during twenty-four years she was continually baffled, for no sooner did one State conclude an effectual treaty, than the Slave Trade sheltered itself by adopting the Flag of some other State which had not then entered into a similar engagement. Now, every civilized nation has invested England with the powers she required, excepting only France and the United States; but these countries strictly enforce their own laws, and no Slave vessel dares to pollute the flag of either. An American naval officer explains why no Slave vessels have been captured by the United States Squadron, in these terms :*—" Our national ships can detain or examine none but American vessels, or those which they find sailing under the American flag. But no Slave vessel would display this flag. The laws of the United States declare the Slave Trade if exercised by any of its citizens, punishable with death; the laws of Spain, Portugal, and Brazil are believed to be different, or at least, if they threaten the same penalty, are

* Vide Journal of an American Cruizer, Page 177. Wiley and Putnam, 6, Waterloo Place.

“ certain never to inflict it. Consequently all
 “ slavers will be careful to sail under the flag
 “ of one of these latter nations, and thus avoid
 “ the danger of losing life, as well as property,
 “ in the event of capture.”

The law of France against this crime is also very severe and would be strictly enforced ; if then Slave ships pretended to be French or American it would only increase the risk ; nor would it avail them when met by a British cruizer, for the reasons specified would convince the Commander that the flag was fraudulently assumed. Nothing is therefore now to be gained by the use of false colours, and the Trade is universally carried on either under the Spanish or Brazilian flags, or in piratical vessels destitute of any national character whatever.

But though it might be unwise if the struggle were commencing, to adopt the same course with the prospect of prolonged and repeated disappointments, until the flag of all nations alike should deny protection to the crime—it would be madness when we at length *have* obtained all the powers we desired, when no loop-hole or subterfuge remains to the Slave Trader, if we were to abandon the field. Let England vigorously exercise the powers she now possesses, let her enforce fidelity to their yet unfulfilled engagements on the part of Spain and Brazil, and no longer limiting herself

to measures afloat, let her also act with energy and decision on the shores of Africa for the benefit of the natives at large, and success must speedily crown her efforts.

The tremendous consequences of a wrong conclusion, the question at issue being whether a sacred duty involving the fate of millions be abandoned or fulfilled, demand that every individual shall form his judgment, not on the hearsay statements of prejudice or interest, but by thinking and enquiring for himself. Public opinion must decide the question and if the country should betray the cause, heavy will be the responsibility of those whose credulity has made them willing dupes, and by whose blindness and indifference the train of error has swelled into "public opinion." A few subjects are suggested to the consideration of those who having trusted to the assertions of others, are even now almost prepared to join the demand to remove the Squadron, and to "leave the Slave Trade to itself." This opinion has been recommended either by the statements of Dr. Cliffe and others as to the aggravation of suffering during the middle passage caused by the Squadron; or by the assertion that an unrestricted Slave Trade will be humanely prosecuted from motives of interest; or thirdly, by the belief that it might be regulated by Treaty with Brazil and Spain, and rules and restrictions

introduced by which the sufferings of the middle passage would be prevented.

To refute Dr. Cliffe's assertions, it is only necessary to read the whole of his evidence before both the Slave Trade and the Sugar and Coffee planting Committees, for no one can fail to discover the most apparent proof of interested motive and unbounded exaggeration ; to specify instances of inconsistency and contradiction would be to transcribe his whole evidence, of which no syllable can be depended upon, except when he suffers a fact to escape him unawares, adverse to the cause he advocates.

Some instances of increased suffering have certainly been caused by the repressive measures, but would it not have been evident from the very first, that when such measures began to obstruct the traffic, sharp swift-sailing vessels would be employed to escape capture, and that when the Slave Trade was stopped, those Slaves collected at the Factories would endure much misery.

But if the Slave Trade were thrown open, will any one pretend that the present class of Slave Vessels unfitted as they are for every other purpose, (except indeed piracy in the general sense,) would be discarded, and Spaniards and Brazilians would from motives of humanity set about building vessels for the comfort of their victims? is there not the

strongest reason to believe that every one of the evils now attributed to the Squadron, would be extended to quadrupled numbers in the competition of unlimited Slave Trade?

As for the humane influences of self interest, those who have been thus deluded are bound to consult the records which show what the traffic *was* in the hands of Englishmen prior to 1788, when it was first regulated. Those regulations were carried by public opinion, the public mind having been harrowed by detailed proofs of the enormities and horrors which were brought to light by the Parliamentary enquiries. Then, it was established to the conviction of every unprejudiced mind, that the middle passage during unlimited Slave Trade was in the last degree horrible and inhuman, and that motives of interest were powerless to protect the negroes; now, after the lapse of only sixty years all this has been forgotten, and we are acting exactly as if the question were for the first time discussed!

And if we follow our enquiry we shall find that between 1788 and 1807 ample proofs were recorded that a Slave Trade however strictly regulated must still be a horrible pursuit, that in the habitual violation of every human right and every divine precept, habits of ruthless violence and cruelty were engendered, and that such are inseparable from Slave Trade even in its

mildest form. Yet, granting that the regulated Slave Trade of Great Britain, (so far as regulation could reach) was less horrible than it was when unregulated, or than that of any other Nation has ever been, we must bear in mind that Brazil is avowedly and notoriously unable to enforce her own laws; how then could she give effect to her Slave Trade regulations if such were enrolled among her laws? the slightest reflection will show that they could not be enforced by the British authorities. The effect therefore of throwing open the traffic would be not to establish the state of things which existed under the British flag *after* 1788, but to perpetuate all the horrors of an unrestricted Slave Trade raging with fury and to an extent unprecedented.

Those who would “leave the Slave Trade to itself” on these grounds, have taken the middle passage only into consideration, which cannot be compared with the horrors inflicted by the Slave Trade in its previous and subsequent stages. What are the sufferings of three weeks compared to the terrible and hopeless anguish of existence in a Brazilian sugar plantation; or of all ties of nature trampled on in Africa, of whole countries laid waste and left desolate, of populous towns ravaged and burnt to ashes to supply the Slave ship!

England must extend her view to *all* the consequences of unlimited Slave Trade before she dares to condemn the negro race in two vast continents, to the perpetual endurance of such misery, on the *pretext* of mitigating the sufferings of the middle passage. She knows that this terrible scourge must spend its chief fury and produce its most intense sufferings in Africa, but of this there is necessarily no earthly record. The misery it inflicts on millions of victims in Cuba and Brazil is however before her on the most undoubted testimony, misery inseparable from that terrible Slavery in which population is sustained, not by natural procreation, but by constant importations from a foreign shore.

The following facts are published in reports of evidence taken by the Committee of the House of Commons, on sugar and coffee planting.

Mr. Alexander Geddes states "I ascertained that as many as 500 men, without a woman, were worked on one estate and bloodhounds lying close for the purpose of keeping them together, I crossed the Island on Sunday, and I saw the gangs universally at work, driven by the lash." "My own conviction is that one half of the persons held at this moment in Slavery in Cuba are held in that state in violation of the existing Treaties between this Country and Spain; and I say so seeing the ages of those

people, knowing how soon the Slaves are worked out and killed, for there is no reproduction there.”

Mr. Higgins speaking of the common practice of hiring out Slaves, says “the way the work of the estate was done, was this: they worked them during the whole of the day, and in the evening they gave them about half an hour for their supper, and then collected them all before the works, and told them off into two gangs; one of these gangs went back to work till twelve o’clock, and afterwards they were relieved by the other till six in the morning; and then they were all sent out into the field again, so that they got eighteen hours work out of every one of them, men and women. But then they work these hired people to death; they were not likely to treat them more leniently than their own Slaves.”

To the question “a task gang is worked harder of course, than the Slaves of the estate”? the answer is “If possible. It is just the case between your own horse and a job horse which you hire. If the planters find it pay, they will work their own slaves to death. They admit it to be a mere financial question.”

“Did you witness yourself the working of the Slaves upon some estates?” “I did: They were very hardly worked indeed; they were dreadfully emaciated and thin, and so weary that I saw them dropping asleep in all directions.

On the Saratoga estate, where the administrator was a very humane and intelligent man, and deplored the work he was obliged to make these people do, the machinery of the estate not being equal to the crop, he was obliged to keep the mill going all night: he attracted my attention to the fact that towards six in the evening, and towards twelve at night, when half the gang had been always worked eighteen hours, the whip which you did not hear in the day-time, was heard constantly going during those hours."

When asked if the severe labour he here described was an exception to the general rule, in consequence of the machinery not being equal to the crop, the witness replies "No I am certain it was not; I think on the contrary, the administrator of the estate was a humane man, and that he would willingly have spared those people the work if he could, and that he did his best to alleviate their condition."

It is the general rule to work the Slaves day and night during the sugar season, and he thus describes the manner the whip is applied. "The driver has a long whip like a French post-boy's whip, and he leans over the bar in front, when they are feeding the mill for instance; The negroes run up with their bundles and throw them down into the mill. Sometimes the mill is not fed and then this fellow from his rail strikes the first man that comes

up with a bundle of canes. I said to him once 'that is the very man you ought not to strike,' but he told me it came to the same thing in the end, and I have reason to believe it did. Upon none of the estates did I see any of the men formally punished. I suppose they would be unwilling to let me see it. I only saw them struck in that way. I remember a deformed woman who was put to scrape the bits of cane out of the channel for the juice, which got choked if the bits of cane were not removed. This woman gradually dropped to sleep, and then the fellow would go to one side and strike and holloa at her, just as you would strike an animal."

"The people in the field are stimulated by a driver or mayoral on horse back armed with sword and whip. They usually have dogs with them to prevent the slaves from skulking in the large fields of cane; they could never get them out without dogs."

"I think it is estimated that the black men are to the women about ten to one; but this gentleman with whom I staid, told me that he had been employed on a plantation where there were four hundred and no women, and that the results were too horrible to be mentioned. I was myself on one cattle farm where the proprietor told me he never allowed any woman on his estate at all."

“ They appeared really so debased and degraded that they did not seem to have the energy to be sulky. I never had been in a Slave country before, and I could not conceive that human beings could be so debased.”

“ I cannot express what a relief it was after leaving Cuba to go to Nassau (an English possession), where there is a very fine race of negroes ; to see the impudent looks of these people, and to hear the saucy observations they made upon us was quite refreshing after witnessing the downcast and weary looks of the Cuba Slave.”

The witness states that the drivers go armed with a long cutlass and attended by a couple of bloodhounds ; that the Slaves are locked up at night in a large square stone building when not at work, with dogs outside. He says these dogs are very well trained, “ I observed to one of the Americans that his dogs looked rather heavy ; in order to show me how good they were, he caught hold of a negro and pretended to struggle with him, and the dogs would instantly have attacked him if the American had not lifted up his hand to stop them ; they walked about among the negroes without pretending to see them as it were, just as a well behaved dog will walk by a cat ; they never appear to fraternize with the negroes at all.”

The writer has only one of the seven reports of the sugar and coffee planting committee by him, from which these extracts have been made, but the facts are in every particular entirely borne out by the evidence in the other reports, of Lord Howard de Walden, Mr. Borthwick, and Dr. Norton Shaw, all eye witnesses of the horrors they describe.

The only facts which appear in the House of Commons' Reports respecting Slavery in the plantations of Brazil, are to be found in the guarded statements of Dr. Cliffe,* who himself a Slave holder in that country and advocating the cause of leaving the Slave Trade to itself, yet lets out enough to show the horrors inseparable from this hateful system. He states the disproportion between the sexes in the

* The prospects of the negro race if the Slave Trade should be thrown open, may be imagined from other statements of Dr. Cliffe.

"We could grow it (Sugar) to any extent; within ten leagues of the part where I lived there is an extent of sixty leagues and ten or twelve in breadth; that is the finest land I ever saw in my life, and there is abundance of timber from twenty to twenty-five feet in diameter, such as I hardly ever saw in any part of the world. In this wood district the cane becomes ripe in ten or twelve months." This description would apply to thousands of square miles in Brazil now uncultivated; he says, "since you have crushed the West India Islands, sugar plantations in Brazil have risen up to a great extent:—and the government of Brazil are now making very extensive establishments on the river M—— between Bahai and J——; they have offered land to any body who will go and take it: they offered some to me."

sugar plantations as ten to one. When asked whether slavery in general in Brazil is of a cruel description, he replies "that would be difficult to say. Among the poor people there are some that are cruel, but I should say that those are the fewest in number: people regard their Slaves as you regard your horses; you never treat them cruelly for the sake of treating them cruelly, but you treat them well and the more care you take of them and the more comfortable you make them the more valuable they are; if you treat them well and take care of them they are not so licentious or such thieves."—as what—why the general rule is evidently the same debased and degraded wretchedness as exists in Cuba. We recommend this testimony to the notice of the Society for preventing cruelty to animals, for if worth any thing, it must be a pure delusion to imagine that cab and omnibus horses, or cattle in Smithfield market, *can* be cruelly treated, because it is for the interest of the owners to treat them kindly. Conceive millions of despairing men with only this security!

But Dr. Cliffe when pressed on subjects that do not suit him, shelters himself under the danger he says he would incur on his return to Brazil, if he answered, but an able pamphlet by Stephen Cave, Esq., (Murray,) supplies us with a frightful picture of the horrors of a

Brazilian plantation, by extracts from a work published * at Rio de Janeiro.

“ Atrocious punishments are common among us, nevertheless the false opinion is propagated that we are the best of Slave Masters. On the great sugar estates in the north of Brazil, it would horrify any humane person to witness the misery of the Slaves, whose bodies covered with wounds sufficiently indicate the treatment of which they are victims; in the province of Piaupy, and Paraham a flogging for nine successive days is an ordinary punishment. The victim is fastened to a cart and there receives two hundred or three hundred lashes; the mangled flesh is then cut, cayenne pepper and salt put into the wounds, on pretence that this is needful to prevent corruption. The punishment of the tourniquet, band and neck-stocks, thumbscrews, and many others are common on our plantations; to expose a Slave for a whole night, tied to a stake over an ants nest, *or on a cross* to the sting of mosquitoes, as in Rio Grande de Sul, are refinements of barbarity peculiar to Brazil.”

Have Dr. Cliffe's gross and palpable exaggerations as to the middle passage, so overpowered the better judgment of this country that it is prepared to sanction and encourage all the

other abominations of the Slave Trade, and to abandon the African race to perpetual and hopeless wretchedness? To the slightest reflection it is apparent that regulations for Brazilian Slave ships must be utterly without effect; for to confer benefit on the negroes, they must greatly diminish the profits of the Slave dealer, and to enforce such regulations (even if the inclination existed) the power would be totally wanting. But if it were possible to divest the transit of all suffering, could any mitigating influences be extended either to the ravages of the Slave Trade in Africa, or to the bitterness of existence in a Cuba or Brazilian sugar plantation? on the contrary—to throw open the Slave Trade would greatly aggravate the former by causing an immense increase in the demand for victims—and as regards the latter, the lower the price of Slaves, the less would be the sole frail security which interest supplies, against wanton cruelty. If now that a Slave costs sixty pounds it answers to the owner to work him to death in five or six years, (vide Dr. Norton Shaw's evidence) what term of existence will suffice to repay the purchaser when the price is but twenty pounds?

Eternal reproach would rest on England if she threw open this infernal traffic with these consequences before her eyes. Through her

influence and efforts, since 1815 the United States, France, Holland, Denmark and Portugal have all abandoned the trade: Spain and Brazil alone pursue the crime in violation of their treaties with England, affording thus a complete *casus belli*, and therefore justifying every measure of coercion.

In Africa the most effectual steps may be taken, and the only course England can pursue with a due regard to her honor and her best interests is to fulfil the duty she has pledged herself in the face of the world to perform—herein consists her only safety, for is there no peril in destroying her prestige among nations, in incurring the hatred of her ruined Colonies, or in betraying millions to despair after having voluntarily promised them succour and deliverance? Those Colonies, first severely injured by England's horror of Slave Trade and Slavery, are they now to be finally sacrificed because our honesty and fidelity fail us; because increased exports of Manchester cottons, and low-priced sugar, have become dearer to us than those sacred principles which it was once the proudest boast of England to uphold!

The battle has still to be fought and the result is scarcely doubtful, yet history will record to the astonishment of future ages that after such sacrifices, after a struggle of thirty years, with

the large measure of success already won, and with complete power and unquestioned right to extirpate the traffic, the proposal should be seriously entertained and powerfully supported to relinquish every effort to suppress the crime, and to recognize henceforward a Free Trade in Negroes.

F I N I S ,



the large measure of success already won, and
with complete power and unquestioned right to
extinguish the traffic, the proposal should be
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and to recognize henceforward a Free Trade
in Negroes.

FINIS.



LORD DENMAN
ON
THE SLAVE-TRADE.

Second Edition, corrected.

A LETTER

FROM THE

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A LETTER

FROM

LORD DENMAN TO LORD BROUGHAM,

ON

THE FINAL EXTINCTION

OF

THE SLAVE-TRADE

Second Edition, corrected.

LONDON:

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

PERCEIVING, as I thought, that a crisis in the Slave-trade had arisen, in which public opinion was tending unawares,—at least without adequate consideration, by dint of the constant repetition of *ex parte* statements,—to re-establish that tremendous iniquity more firmly than ever, and to spread and prolong its visitation, without the hope of extinguishing it, or applying any check, except through consequences more horrible even than itself, I determined, in concert with Lord Brougham, to bring the subject before Parliament, for the purpose of awakening the attention of the thinking part of the community.

We apprehended that, from various circumstances, the people of England were becoming indifferent to the enormous criminality and unspeakable misery involved. What most alarmed us was the apparent probability that a Committee, ap-

pointed by the House of Commons, expressly to provide means for its extinction, would report that it never can be extinguished, and that no means ought to be employed for that purpose. Such a Report seemed to us likely to be founded on evidence utterly unworthy of respect or credit. We entered, at some length in debate, into the reasons on which these conclusions were founded, invoking, at the same time, the aid and coöperation of the public press. I pointedly requested that powerful body to abstain from lending their great talents and influence to an unrighteous cause, and instead of producing an impression by the selection of certain particulars, to take a comprehensive view of the whole question, and thus to secure a full understanding, and a just decision.

My speech was so incorrectly reported that I thought it necessary to write and publish my letter for the same purpose. And I trust that a degree of attention has thereby been drawn to the subject, not quite disproportioned to its immense importance. I am well aware of the defects of that publication, and have taken some pains to remove them in this second edition, in hopes that the letter may be rendered more worthy of the illustrious friend to whom it is addressed, and that it may furnish fewer points of attack on the cause, through its advocate. Defective and inadequate, after all my care, I feel

that it is and must remain. A critical analysis of the evidence would require far more time than I can command, and an impartiality to which I fear my claim would scarcely be allowed. Nor do I pretend to enter on a full discussion of the whole subject, or to state the argument in a strictly logical form, or even according to the most methodical arrangement. Fully confessing myself an advocate, I seek to avert a sentence, fatal to my clients, which was about to be passed, as I think, on garbled statements and fallacious views, and in defiance of the fair weight of the evidence. And I call attention to those parts of it which seemed to me to prove the apprehended sentence altogether unjust, and to counteract the effect of those portions which have already appeared, inviting the public to a careful examination of the whole.

I accept an offer which has been made to me of a statement of the true question, as far as it goes. "Is the difference between what the Slave-trade is now and what it would be if our squadron were withdrawn *worth what it costs us* to keep the squadron where it is?" * And I answer that, in my opinion, that difference is worth the cost. But the cost of the squadron is but a small part of the question, as I regard it.

England is actually engaged in a mighty contest

* Times, 24th October, 1848.

with a stupendous evil. Some persons, from interested motives, and some from the views which they conscientiously entertain, and some of these filling the seat of authority, would persuade her to withdraw the most powerful weapon with which she has hitherto carried on the war. They insinuate that the importance of the end has been overrated, and that the means are wholly unable to effect it; they hint some doubt of the lawfulness of the attempt in which she has so long been engaged; and they boldly assert, that it has not only failed, but that it has increased, to an incalculable amount, the evil at which it strikes.

My object is to defend my country for her long perseverance in those righteous efforts; to convince her and the world that no end presented to the mind of man was ever equally important with the extinction of the Slave-trade; that the attempt is perfectly lawful and praiseworthy; and that she is bound, by her position, still to employ those means, unless they are proved to be ineffectual, or she loses the capacity of doing so.

Having proved this, my first proposition, or rather, having revived the memory of obliterated proofs, which, in former times, had been universally admitted, I then proceeded to offer, in the second place, reasons for thinking that the efforts already made have actually wrought a great and direct diminution of the evil; that experience holds out a rea-

sonable prospect of wholly suppressing it at no distant period ; and without affecting to dictate the manner in which that naval force ought to be employed, I venture to argue from proved facts, that that result would have followed even before now but for the intervention of untoward circumstances, the nature of which I endeavoured fully to explain.

I contended, thirdly, that those aggravations of the evil that are charged upon the attempt to suppress it, flow from the master evil itself, and are, for the most part, inseparable from it, and that those aggravations which are so produced, even when exaggerated as they have been from interested motives, bear an infinitely small proportion as well to the evil itself as to the good accomplished ; and farther, that they cannot justly be imputed to any but the original wrong-doers, whom it is sought to restrain and defeat. Besides this I have endeavoured to prove, from the evidence, that the abandonment by England of her design to extirpate the evil, would cause the growth of it to an unlimited extent, and with consequences infinitely calamitous to a large portion of mankind, ruinous to her own colonial possessions, most alarming to her commercial interests, probably requiring a still larger expense, and utterly subversive of those great moral principles on which human society is founded.

Whether the price paid for any advantage may not be too costly depends on other considerations, as well as the nature and amount of the advantage itself. But I confess, it appears to me that scarcely any sacrifice of treasure can be too great for this object. The Government, the Parliament, and the People of England, with their eyes open, cheerfully for years devoted the sums that have been thus applied, and no murmur was raised against them, till a certain pecuniary interest in the increase of the Slave-trade was created, by cheapening our sugar and improving our revenue in proportion to it. I presume, however, that nobody would expect, even if our squadron were recalled, that our naval force would be actually reduced by that amount, and the whole expenditure saved.

Whether the sacrifice of life, the loss of the best and bravest of our countrymen, by a pestilential climate, may not exceed the proposed advantage, is an awful question. But the fact of the loss must be established before the comparison can be made: and here the greatest contradictions exist. The most searching inquiry should be made on this point. That controversy rests with two very able disputants, the *Times* and the *Morning Herald*. I must say that the weight of reason and authority appears to me greatly to preponderate in favour of the latter. The deaths,

twenty years since, at Fernando Po, on an encumbered coast, prove nothing as to the present healthiness or unhealthiness of the station at sea. And the average of 21 years, if swoln by the dreadful mortality in the Growler and L'Edair, and if that was the result of casualties wholly unconnected with the climate, as I am informed, is obviously most fallacious. Sir Charles Hotham, and his predecessors in the command, have made a different report during a considerable course of years. Every one will rely, when opinions differ so much, on his own observation; and those who, like me, have the happiness of personally knowing several officers, who have served at various periods off this coast, and who retain perfect vigour of body and mind, will be slow to believe in the correctness of the sinister reports.

It is often urged that *the squadron* cannot suppress the Slave-trade. That alone it cannot, I fully believe. But in union with other causes I have no doubt it may, and I am convinced that it is an indispensable agent. Treaties with the civilized powers are also essential. Treaties with the native powers are no less so, and legitimate trade, and persevering missionary labours. But these three causes, I suspect, will act under extreme disadvantage if the squadron is removed.

Since this letter first appeared I have understood, from the best authority, that the law of

Brazil as well as the treaty between that state and England, condemns Slave-trading as piracy. I have also witnessed the efforts of enlightened Brazilians to awaken abhorrence of that crime, and prove its impolicy to be equal to its inhumanity and injustice. The names of Andrades and Barbacena bid fair to attain a glory which may rival our Granville Sharpe, our Clarkson, our Wilberforce, our Buxton. But if Britain should be persuaded to resign her efforts to suppress the Slave-trade, we must expect those virtuous men will follow her degenerate example and despair.

ERRATA.

- Page 1, line 5, *dele* any.
9, line 4, *for* was *read* am.
9, — 5, *dele* entirely.
9, — 6, *for* might *read* may.
9, — 7, *dele* should.
9, — 8, *after* but *insert* I write.
10, — 16, *for* or *read* and.
29, — 7, *after* and *insert* to.

LETTER,

&c.

THE sentiments which we have both been long known to hold on the important subject of this letter, besides some recent proceedings in the House of Lords, have led me to address it to you in print, without your permission, or any previous knowledge of its contents.

The differential duties on the importation of sugar, which had operated as a just protection to our colonists, and a powerful discouragement to the Slave-trade, have been removed. We combated the theoretical fallacies, as we deemed them, by which the Act of 1846 was recommended, disputing the application of the principle of Free Trade to the dealing with human beings as articles of commerce; denying that limited free labour can sustain a competition with the labour of slaves recruited without limitation,

seeing no proof that our colonists would monopolize the advantages of improved machinery; and doubting whether the market for labour brought into cultivation, as it may be, by British capital in the vast fields of the Brazilian empire, is likely to be overstocked for centuries to come. We thought, in a word, that great and certain evil was deliberately done, on a very doubtful speculation, that good might eventually ensue from it.

We do not renew that discussion. The Act, passed as a final settlement, has been already superseded by a measure, which recognizes the principle of protection to our colonies by discriminating duties. They are, however, by no means such as to promise a diminution of the Slave-trade. On the contrary, they will leave untouched the operation which was predicted by the author as well as the opponents of the superseded measure, still that traffic will receive stimulus and encouragement from the change.

Some persons most hostile to the Slave-trade, have declared their opinion, that the measures now pursued on the coast of Africa ought not to be continued since the Act of 1846. We admitted, we even denounced, we still deeply lament, the inconsistency. But in a case of inconsistency, what must be the choice of the honest man? Must he abandon the right or the wrong? And if, from unfortunate circumstances, he is prevented or deterred from

taking the straightforward course, is he bound by regard for consistency to tolerate and encourage all other abominations that may flow from the same bad principle? But the authors of the Act of 1846 never relaxed in their professions of detestation and abhorrence for the atrocious, infernal, and accursed traffic, and expressly declared their resolution to persevere in the efforts for its suppression. Indeed the removal of one expedient for that purpose seems to bind them the more strongly to a perseverance in every other that holds out a reasonable promise of success.

The only external force remaining to act against the Slave-trade was the squadron on the western coast of Africa: and strong symptoms have betrayed themselves of a wish to remove that check also. A committee was indeed appointed by the House of Commons to consider of "providing the best means to be adopted for the final extinction of the Slave-trade;" but the honorable member who proposed it, introduced his motion by the avowal that his mind was fully made up with respect to it. He concluded his able statement of the obvious objections by announcing a preconceived opinion. "He might be asked how he would deal with the Slave-trade? he would reply, without doubt or reservation, Leave the Slave-trade to itself."*

In the same debate other honorable members,

* Hansard, vol. xcvi. p. 1100. Mr. Hutt's Speech.

afterwards named on the committee, appear to have expressed much the same opinion, (before the inquiry began) which I confess several questions propounded in the course of examining the witnesses seem also to betray.

Parts of the evidence were from time to time inserted in the public papers, but such parts only as happen to fall in with that opinion of the honorable chairman. A resolution to the effect of recommending the abandonment of all coercive measures is said to have been proposed in the committee, but not carried. Still partial extracts and most confident assertions were made, and were silently working their way in the public mind. An opinion was daily gaining ground, which, even if just, was not fully considered, that all the attempts of England had been founded on erroneous principles; that all her successive governments had been mistaken, all her acts of repression mischievous; and that her only prudent course was to retrace her steps, and abstain from further interference.

I am fully persuaded that no committee ever had so momentous a duty to perform. A wrong decision, rashly adopted, either as to the importance of the end or the efficacy of the means, may tempt hundreds to the commission of crime unparalleled in extent and enormity, and plunge millions into unutterable misery:—misery, from

which I see no refuge or escape, but by the simultaneous rising of the oppressed, to wash away their wrongs in the blood of their oppressors. But who shall say that even this would secure a remedy for existing evil, nay, who shall deny the possibility of a renewal of it in other hands, with fresh revenge and hatred, with "the spirit of the first-born Cain," exciting, multiplying, and perpetuating every other evil that can afflict the sons of men?

To form a sound judgment on these weighty matters, I have studied to divest my mind of every bias. But if any one expects the contemplation of them to awaken no emotion, which may find a vent in some vehemence of language, I think he requires correct reasoning from an understanding that must have lost the best security for discerning truth, the moral perception of right and wrong, and a sense of the value of justice and humanity.

Let me add, that language is however sometimes censured as heated and overcharged, when it is not the style but the fact related in the simplest terms, which fills the reader with horror and indignation.

We wished for a more comprehensive survey of the evidence, and on the 22nd of August, the attention of the House of Lords was called to what had occurred. The selection of the committee was not at all impeached. The ordinary bias

of party was entirely absent from it. The several public offices conversant with the subject—the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Department—had proper representatives: so had the West India interest, and the mercantile interest. Perhaps the great bulk of our fellow-subjects in the colonies, the emancipated Africans, might have wished for the presence of some member likely to sympathize more directly with them: but some of the committee at least had an intimate knowledge of their condition, and, for their own sake, must be desirous of their welfare and contentment. The most numerous class, however, and the most deeply interested, had no representative, either actual or virtual.

To the long contention, of which the inhabitants of Africa were the subject, they themselves were no party. The generous advocates who with persevering zeal espoused their cause, had no instructions from the clients, no communication with them, no delegation from them. They had no means of collecting from the sufferers themselves either the extent of their miserable degradation, nor how acutely it was felt, nor their own rude notions of what might be best attempted for their relief. In the unapproachable depth of their despair, the tens of thousands annually sacrificed could only make their cry of agony heard through the reluctant reports of their oppressors. And

though some members appointed to serve on this committee were known as active friends of the African, and many questions proposed show a just sense of their claims, and great ability, every one must be aware of the difference between exertions prompted merely by these feelings, and those which are called forth by the personal activity of interested friends and acquaintances, by constituents, partizans, or even clubs and gatherings.

This is not mentioned as a complaint, but as an inevitable disadvantage to the absent and injured. While it was impossible, throughout the prolonged discussion, for them to take one step towards their own relief, their adversaries have eagerly profited by every thing that their advocates have stated, either as fact or opinion, which could operate to their prejudice. It must ever be the policy of the Slave-trader to shift the controversy from its real merits to some point incidentally stated; to refuse the claims of justice to the natives of Africa, because their "friend" may have believed an ill-authenticated narrative, put forward a bad argument, or given offence to some "respectable" ally of the Slave-trader, or entertained some irrational dogma. And he who pleads their cause, may well tremble lest it should be impaired in the minds of his countrymen, by some indiscretion of his own or some personal quarrel dexterously raised with him.

Let us suppose a dark-coloured citizen of Sierra

Leone, or Liberia, to have been admitted to these remarkable investigations. Samuel Crowther, for example, who was made captive in his native village, (fired for the purpose of making captives,) laden on board a slaver, captured by an English cruizer, and brought to England, where he was educated, ordained to the ministry by the present Bishop of London, and now a missionary among his benighted brethren; do you think he would not have proposed some pertinent questions which could not suggest themselves to other members?

The evidence taken before the committee has been published in three blue books. It is not a proceeding in the committee, but a publication accessible to all, calculated to influence the minds of many. No document can be more entirely open to examination and comment. I freely remarked upon the contents in my place in Parliament, on the answers of witnesses, and the no less instructive questions of those who framed and propounded them. In making those remarks, I carefully abstained from censure on the committee, as a body, or on any member of it, especially from imputing motives to any one. But I called attention, and hope that I may have succeeded in fixing attention on the preconceived opinions expressed, or plainly shown to be entertained, by several who bore their part in those interesting dialogues.

After a careful perusal, I shall state the effect of

this evidence on my own mind, and earnestly ask the great body of my countrymen to possess themselves of the same data, and then form an impartial judgment whether my conclusions are just. I was not entirely without hope, I confess, that they might be thought worthy of consideration from the committee, before they should report an opinion, but also with the design, if that final opinion should appear unfounded, of appealing against it to the people of England.

The persons who, under the general name of negroes, may be called the materials in which the Slave-trade deals, belong to several nations widely differing in race, feature, language, character, habits, and in their degrees of superiority to the savage state. They appear to be for the most part mild, docile, sensible of kindness, capable of forgiving injuries; addicted to commerce, not averse to labour, ready to seek improvement in the comforts and conveniencies of life. There are in the interior of that great continent populous cities, powerful chiefs, some government of course, and some police; some notions of religion, strong natural affections, some decency of manners. Some tribes, however, are almost barbarous; as the Filatahs, who might be properly called the Cubans and Brazilians of Africa, keeping up a commercial intercourse with those subjects of civilized states, and capturing their neighbours for the periodical supply of the Slave-market.

Slavery should seem to be universal among these nations, but it is of a mild character, which may give the power of compelling labour, but imports no more right to treat human beings as articles of trade than of food. That right (if the word must be applied to such a trade,) was taught them, and the practice was introduced and fostered by the sons of civilized and christian Europe. The trade has, however, been wholly suppressed in some quarters, and in all of these a legitimate commerce has taken its place.

Negroes are procured for the Slave-trade through conviction for crimes, or by warlike incursions, or by kidnapping. As the demand for them is unceasing, and the temptation strong, false accusations will be preferred, or convictions asserted without accusation, war excited without real cause of difference. "The greater part are obtained by *Slave-hunts*, partaking of the character of war." It is impossible that civilization or security can exist, where the Slave-trade prevails. But the kidnapping is more destructive of all hope for Africa, than even the horrible Slave-hunts. It implies the violation of every social tie. Sons even have been sold by their parents, yielding to their excessive appetite for gain, —rarely, no doubt, but the nature of such practices is to grow worse and worse, and establish themselves by widely-spread corruption. The Slave-traders, who tempt them to commit this outrage

against human nature, and have confirmed them in the habit, impute it to the natural disposition of the injured and calumniated African.

The captured negroes are driven, chained and in gangs, often through some hundreds of miles of bush and jungle, to the sea coast; there stowed in barracoons till a vessel arrives, and they can be loaded on board. They sometimes wait for a long period, and are said to suffer occasionally, or even to perish, from want of food.

The description by the witnesses of their condition as a cargo on board the vessel which receives them, is truly revolting; close packed, jammed together like oranges or figs, *into* one another. The crews jump upon the planks by which they are tightly kept down. They cannot turn themselves. Physical evil is at its extreme point; the filth, the stench, the bruises, the loathsome diseases !

Dire was the tossing, deep the groans, Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch,
And over them triumphant Death his dart
Shook, but delayed to strike.

He is represented as ever busy among them, from the moment of loading till the discharge.

A large per centage is said to be allowed to make good the deficiency caused by those who are killed by this treatment. The remnant, sometimes not half the original number, landed

in the west, are sold to labour in the plantations or the mines. They are worked under the lash, to yield the most work in the shortest time, and then would die happy, but that they know that new shoals of their countrymen, their brothers and their sons, are doomed to succeed to their fate,—the capture, the chains, the loading, the passage, the landing, the toil, the life and the death of slaves.

Such things were at one time generally practised and defended. At length, after a protracted struggle with unprincipled cupidity, assuming, as in our time, a thousand disguises, England, become sensible and ashamed of such wickedness, prohibited the trade to her own subjects in 1807. In the following year her example was followed by the United States. All European nations have now done the same, and many of the transatlantic nations, including Brazil. At the Congress of Vienna a solemn and unanimous declaration was made in assertion of the elementary principles of justice, and in condemnation of this the most audacious invasion of them.

England and some other states, first acting singly, afterwards in concert, employed force to suppress the practice; but it was not till 1839, that a general consent was obtained to the use of all the necessary means. From that time, however, those means were employed with perfect

success: the liberation of the prisoners from the barracoons, the destruction of factories erected for the single purpose of Slave-trading, and the confiscation of property collected there for such dealing.* The rescued were sent to Sierra Leone, they became British subjects and Christians, artisans and tradesmen, respectable members of a community, which, notwithstanding some unaccountable detraction, is proved by those best acquainted with it, to rival in morality and good conduct the average of persons of their station in this or any country.

Let me indulge myself by pausing one moment on the only agreeable part of a most painful and revolting subject, and expressing my unbounded respect and veneration for the missionaries whose disinterested labours have done so much for Africa. Their services are above all earthly praise. Their evidence on the condition of Sierra Leone, and on other important points,

* Some of those officers who deny the usefulness of our operations on the coast of Africa, qualify their opinion. They doubt of the operations, "as they now are carried on." I believe this to mean—carried on to the extent of forfeiting property, but not of punishing those concerned in the Slave-trade. But Captain Chads, who uses the expression, and who captured twenty-nine vessels in a few months, while others were equally successful, surely does injustice both to his own services and theirs, when he states that the Slave-trade has not been materially diminished by the squadron.

before the committee, was clear, decisive, and quite uniform.

For two years from the end of 1840, the barracons and factories that had been destroyed were not re-erected, nor does it appear that new ones were raised during that time in other situations. The important fact that the Slave-trade did not spring up in new quarters, but was materially diminished, and became actually a losing concern, is placed beyond the reach of doubt by the testimony of Captain Butterfield and Captain Matson, and by that of Senhor José Cliffe, an unexceptionable witness on this point, and by the returns made by our consuls and commissioners. That it revived and flourished afterwards, and the cause of that change, will appear from the following extracts:—

“4126. Sir R. H. Inglis to the witness Cliffe. —Was there not one year within the last six years in which there was little or no Slave trade between the west coast of Africa and Brazil? —There was for two years; there was very little done.” “4127. Was not that reduction in the amount of Slave-trade owing in great measure to the zeal and energy of the British squadron blockading the western coast of Africa, or, *if not owing to that cause, to what other cause do you attribute the reduction?*—A difference of opinion exists upon that point; but I believe the real consideration is this: *we* considered then that

the British Government would be so effective in their measures which they would carry out, that people were afraid to attempt it; *we* soon found that they *could* not carry out their views so largely as they wished to do." He adds in paragraph 4129, "*We* considered that whatever England undertook, she would carry out effectually; *we* afterwards found that it could not be done, and *therefore* whatever the amount to which you may increase your squadron at the present time, so long as it is a profitable article of commerce, and *we* have means of fitting out vessels, you will never check it."

The honorable chairman lower down takes up this line of examination, and asks (4141) whether the witness is "of opinion that this reduction of the Slave-trade was produced by the activity of the British squadron, or by *other causes*?" and he answers — "By *other causes*." 4142. You do not attribute it to the activity of the British squadron, or to any new expedients resorted to by the British squadron?—No. 4143. You are of opinion that it must be referred to *other causes*? — To *other causes*, entirely different. 4144. I think you stated that the operations of the Brazilian traders had been checked by a belief that Great Britain would succeed in any undertaking to which she set her hand?—Yes, that *was* the opinion. 4145. And that deterred per-

sons from engaging in the Slave-trade?—Yes. 4146. I understand you also to state that since that time, *the undertaking having been put to a fair experiment*, it has been found to fail?—Entirely so. 4147. And that the opinion entertained in Brazil now, is that it would be utterly impossible for Britain to succeed in such an undertaking?—Yes, that is the opinion prevailing.” He is again pressed (4175) for the “*other causes*” for the diminution of the number of slaves imported in 1842 and 1843; and again he answers, “*We supposed that Great Britain would put a more effective check upon it than really practice enabled them to do.*”

Other causes! other causes! As if the repetition of the word could create the thing. But what causes? inquires Sir R. H. Inglis, (4127) and receives no answer! Mr. Hutt, despairing, I suppose, of better success, does not even put the question; but, after some time wasted on other points, Sir Robert proposes it once more, and elicits a most remarkable answer: “4161. To what do you attribute the great increase in the Brazilian Slave-trade?—The real answer would be that *we can* bring the slaves in with greater chance of success than we formerly could. 4161. The question referred not to the facility of introducing a given article, say a human being for a slave, into Brazil; but to the object which any person

might have to introduce him, and the question therefore in other words was this: Why did the Brazilians seek to introduce slaves in greater numbers in 1847 than in 1845, for example?—Because it is now reduced to something of a science; the system of introducing slaves is better understood, and the facilities or the possibilities of bringing them in are greater now than they were in 1845. *I believe the Sugar question had a good deal of influence on it, the taking away of the differential duties.*” “4162. By the ‘Sugar Question,’ you mean the removal of the differential duties?—Yes.” “4163. By the removal of the differential duties, do you understand the removal of restrictions to the consumption of sugar cultivated by the labour of slaves?—In the year 1847, it was known that the removal of the differential duties presented a stimulus to the growth of sugar; that there would be a better market for the sale of it.”

But the proof that *other causes* had produced the diminution must not yet be parted with. The squadron had been peculiarly active at that period and had resorted to the new expedient of relieving slaves from barracoons by the thousand; yet it did not reduce the number of slaves imported into Brazil! The traders had weakly thought that the power of England would wholly prevent the supply, yet to its actual suspension to a considerable extent,

the power of England contributed nothing ! There were other causes for the decrease, of which we have no explanation. Among the causes for the increase in 1847, the Act of 1846 is stated as the most prominent.

Let us turn to Captain Matson's evidence, who destroyed the barracoons and factories at Cabenda and Ambriz, and so put down the Slave-trade there for a time at least.

" 1256. I consider that in 1842 the Slave-trade had almost ceased ; in fact the Slave-trade, I consider, had very nearly ceased when Lord Aberdeen's letter made its appearance in 1842. 1257. What letter ? — A letter written in May 1842, calling in question the legality of some orders issued by Lord Palmerston, which authorised us to destroy the barracoons." Afterwards, 1258. Those orders and the execution of them, " had such an effect on the Slave-traders located on the coast of Africa, that they gave notice to the native chiefs that they would no longer be enabled to carry on the Slave-trade ; and they prompted the chiefs to enter into treaties with us to allow us to destroy their barracoons, or at any rate to suppress the Slave-trade ; and in every one of those treaties there was a stipulation, whereby we were authorised to employ force, failing the execution of the treaty by the chief. Most of the chiefs of Africa, in fact all the principal ones, entered into treaties with us."

“ 1261. On the appearance of Lord Aberdeen’s letter, the Slave-traders altered their tone very much towards the chiefs ; instead of assuring them that they would never be able to bring any more goods, (in fact they were winding up their affairs,) they represented a false report. In the first place, they said that there was a revolution in England ; that the people had risen, and obliged the Queen to turn out Lord Palmerston, because he wished to suppress the Slave-trade ; that there was now a revolution going on in England to oblige the Queen to carry on the Slave-trade, as they expressed themselves, ‘ all the same as they had done before.’ This was believed along the whole coast, not only by the chiefs but by the Slave-traders themselves,—the people who were in the interior, collecting slaves. So fixed was this belief, that on one occasion my boats captured a vessel full of slaves just at the time there was a change of admirals on the station, and consequently a change of flags ; and the first question asked by an old Portuguese supercargo, who was on board the vessel, and had been previously stationed in the interior, collecting slaves, was whether that flag belonged to the Queen or the Parliament ; he fancied there were two parties, and he was surprised at being taken as he thought by a friendly flag. This was believed not only by the chiefs, but by the Slave-traders. 1262. Sir

R. H. Inglis. Was it believed by such men as Pedro Blanco?—No, he was just one of the very men who propagated the falsehood.”

“1330. Did you find that the Slave-trade had revived at all in those places where you had destroyed barracoons?—Not before I left the coast; there were only the first symptoms of it. Before I left the coast in 1843, the vessels were beginning to come over full of goods, and the very same men that had left the coast of Africa the year before, I met *returning from Brazil*; men who I was very well acquainted with, and *who had before relinquished the hope of carrying on the Slave-trade.*” “1343. You think that the system of

operation which you have described, carried on for two years, would effect the extinction of the Slave-trade at the expiration of that time?—I do. I really have no doubt of it upon my own mind.”

“1344. Are you of opinion that if the same operations were adopted now, at the expiration of two years the Slave-trade could be extinguished on that portion of the coast?—Yes, but it would require a much larger force.” “That is the only condition?—Yes, that no doubt is the only condition, instilling *a belief into the minds of the people that you are determined to do it.*” “1346.

The Earl of Lincoln. What circumstance would render a larger force necessary now than in 1842? Because the Slave-trade has so very much increased. A stimulus has been given to the Slave-

trade by the admission of slave-grown sugar, and the belief *which is entertained* in Brazil, and also in Africa, that we *are not doing our utmost* to suppress the *Slave-trade*; therefore it would take longer to persuade the people that you are determined to do it."

One general fact is clearly proved and universally acknowledged. The most formidable enemy to Slave-trading is a well-established legitimate trade: they cannot exist together. But the profits of the Slave-trade are so much the highest as to secure its triumph in the competition. Where the legitimate, however, has had time to take a firm hold, the Slave-trader afterwards finds it difficult to obtain a footing, for though its direct profits are much less, its other advantages are appreciated and felt, and secure the victory in the long run. Hence the hostility of the Slave-trader is even bitterer to the legitimate trade than to the squadron, which alone can give it effectual protection, and the opportunity of strengthening itself in any district. We have some account in the testimony of Mr. W. M. Hutton,* of the corrupt and infamous practices adopted by the Slave-trader for the embarrassment and extirpation of trade, properly so called, the falsehoods and frauds, the dismantling of its strongholds, and the destruction of its stores and property. The honest merchant who conducts himself with ordinary prudence, while he has

* First Report of Evidence, p. 168.

everything to fear from the annoyance and competition of the slaver, has no real ground for apprehension from the British cruizer, but has reason to feel grateful for his interference.

The enormous profits of successful Slave-trading must never be lost sight of. The temptation they present to all who come within its reach, and can, however indirectly, share in them, few can resist. Even the functionaries, who are placed in those distant regions to watch and prevent it, have been known to yield to the allurements of a share in the profits, or presents, or some mode of bribery, and betray their sacred trust. For one Spanish governor, who, like Valdez, or one Portuguese, who, like Noronha, faithfully discharges that difficult duty, three perhaps have been induced by bribes to "go to their country seat," when they were apprised that a loaded slaver neared their port, or have openly encouraged the adventure, and boasted of their share of the spoil. Infinite are the ramifications, through which this spirit is at work through conscious abettors, or unconscious instruments. The Slave-trader's interest is equally promoted by cunning hints, that it is irresistible and all-powerful, and by helpless wailings over some instance of its partial success, and the horrors which are inseparable from it, even in its mildest forms. Another result of the immense gains derived from Slave-trading is often found in the colouring given to evidence and opinions

obtained from the coast of Africa. Too much caution cannot be exercised in weighing all reports from that quarter.

The same consideration will prove that if we really desire that the Slave-trade should be extinguished, no means to that end can be safely dispensed with. All must be vigorously employed. And looking to the moral corruption of the agents in that iniquity,—greater even than the physical degradation of their victims,—we cannot reasonably expect to work on them by any motive but fear;—fear of an attack from the cruizers of civilized nations—fear of legal punishment, which, however, from the difficulty of obtaining proof, must however often fail to reach them—fear of the loss of gain, by the direct application of physical force employed in preventing the evil.

To the efforts of the squadrons I am led to ascribe the important and notorious fact that Cuba had well nigh resolved on the abolition of the Slave-trade and Slavery itself, and that at Rio Janeiro the trade was abandoned by many as a losing concern. More might have been effected if some personal suffering had been inflicted on captains and crews of Slavers, in addition to their loss by the liberation of imprisoned Africans, and the confiscation of the vessel. But still more might be done by converting the vessel from her original destination into an instrument for suppressing the trade, for which her build is well adapted, or she

might be turned into a hulk for the employment of the captain and crew, when condemned, in compiling public works; and if they were placed under the superintendence of African overseers, every one would acknowledge the penalty to be most appropriate to their crime.

When (qu. in 4146) Mr. Hutt suggested to the chief witness that he thought the undertaking "had been put to the test of a fair experiment, and had failed,"—a suggestion readily adopted by that witness,—he forgot that the peculiar plan of suppression, which the Admiralty and the Government had thought most promising, had never been tried at all. But he is not answerable for one argument, stated, I now forget in what paper, so extremely unfair and disingenuous, as to be worthy of the cause it may serve. The Slave-trade of Brazil from 100,000, was reduced in 1839 to 81,000; in 1840, still lower, to 28,714. In 1841, 14,000.* During these two years the measures of the squadron had been most vigorous, and must have contributed to that effect. But when in 1842 these measures were supposed to have met with the disapprobation of the English Government, and in 1843 they were dropped, the Slave-trade increased and continued increasing. In 1847 the increase was still greater, the repeal of the differential duties having intervened. In Cuba the decrease was still more marked. Did you observe

* See Mr. Bandinel's Work.

how this reasoning is met? By clubbing all the years together, taking an average from them all, and then arguing that the suppression had produced no effect, as if in the entire period there had been no change of circumstances whatever.

But the committee examined one witness, whose opinions would appear to decide the question at once in favour of the proceeding recommended by Mr. Hutt in the House of Commons. "Leave the Slave-trade to itself." I have already cited from this witness such facts as he must have reluctantly admitted, but could not deny. But before facts and opinions of another character are received on his authority, let us inquire who he is, and to what degree of credit he is intitled.

I speak of Senhor José Cliffe, M.D., a born citizen of the United States,—which of them I know not,—and domiciled in Brazil. Now when a foreigner is brought even by legal compulsion to bear witness in an English court, both that court and the parties interested, and the public, have a right to know something of his character, habits, and previous history. He wants all the ordinary securities for truth that our residents possess. In this case, we have not even the sanction of an oath. Who, then, is Senhor José Cliffe, what beside being a native of America, and a resident in Brazil? His fifth answer is, that at one period of his life he was engaged in the Slave-trade.

He is one then who has broken the law of his

native country, passed in 1808,* and by another law, enacted in 1820,† has incurred the guilt of a pirate, and the penalty of death. By the solemn declaration of his adopted country, in the treaty of 1830, he is to be “deemed and treated as a pirate;” by the law also of that country, passed at a later period, Slave-trading is expressly declared to be piracy. To some of England’s most distinguished senators he proclaims himself guilty of a crime for which he would have been, if a British subject, convicted before 1837, a pirate, a robber, and a felon, subject to be hanged by the neck till he was dead; if convicted now or at any time since that period, subject to transportation to our penal settlements for the term of his life. We have not been in the habit, in this country, of yielding blind confidence to the assertions of such a man.

But, *nemo adeo ferus est qui non mitescere possit*. God forbid that the worst of criminals should be debarred the privilege of repentance and amendment of life, or that society should not profit by the disclosures that may in some degree atone for his crime. The midnight invader of reposing families, the hireling assassin, the vile instigator of a furious mob to shed blood, each of these may make their peace with heaven, and obtain pardon from his fellow-creatures. But in the first place, may we not expect some better proof that he has re-

* Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, 193.

† Ibid. 149.

tired from his gainful calling than his own statement? May we not ask, whether he has made restitution of his plunder? Dr. Cliffe, on the contrary, avows, that he still possesses 200 slaves, and is desirous of being the proprietor of 500! This is stated in his evidence before the Sugar and Coffee Committee. Is it not reasonable to inquire when, why, and to what extent, he left off business as a Slave-trader?

The hon. Chairman thought this inquiry reasonable.—“Were your transactions in the Slave-trade attended with profit?—They were very profitable. What induced you to discontinue it?”—The question appears to have been expected and the answer prepared. “In consequence of the great loss of life attending it.” Chairman.—“It was from repugnance to engage in a traffic which was attended with a loss of life and suffering.—With loss of life and an increase of human suffering.”

For my part, I frankly avow, that if I were on a jury, and heard such a witness state such a motive, not only should I find it difficult to believe that assertion, but it would throw discredit on every other made by the same witness. Not from any prejudice against foreigners, nor merely from the nature of his former pursuits, but from the character he there assumed, and the advice he offered.

If he really has ceased to become a Slave-trader, though he expressly refused to tell the year, I can have no doubt, from phrases in his evidence

already transcribed, that he did not discontinue practice before 1841 or 1842, when, according to his own account, "*We* (the Brazilian traders,) really thought that England could carry out her scheme of prevention." Most likely his concern for the loss of life and increased human suffering followed hard on the losses of profit inflicted upon him by that activity of our squadron,—that activity of which he cannot deny the existence, though he would dispute its consequence. He offers just the advice we might expect from one who had at this moment four Slave-ships on the African coast; the advice too that would best serve his interest as the purchaser of 500 more slaves.

It does not seem unfair to feel some suspicion of the influence under which such a person has been induced to come and offer his assistance, through a committee, to the Imperial Parliament, deliberating on a question of unparalleled extent and interest, affecting the lives and liberties of countless thousands of our fellow men. Why is he in London? Is it by mere accident, on a tour of pleasure, or of observation, or on some speculation of profit? If on such speculation, the judges will wish to know the nature of it, otherwise they can have no notion how his views may be biassed by his interest. He may, for example, be a candidate for the office of Commissioner to conduct African emigrants to the West Indies. Or he may have come to negotiate

for the sale of manufactures to be employed in Slave-trading by the joint-stock companies of Rio which carry on the Slave-trade. Or he may have come as a general agent for those companies, to watch for them the proceedings of a committee whose deliberations may end in their enrichment or impoverishment, and give all occurrences, as they arise, the most favourable turn for their profit.

Could he do better for such an object, than by representing the profits as enormous, the power of the joint-stock companies as irresistible, the efforts of England as unavailing? Yes. One thing he could do still more effectual: he might familiarize the minds of Englishmen to his crime; might lead them to discard as antiquated prejudices their ancient abhorrence of plunder and bloodshed, and so tempt them to a free and open participation in the fruits of the iniquities perpetrated.

One thing justice always requires at the hand of the repenting criminal—a full disclosure of the secrets of his dishonest trade, an explanation of the arts which have succeeded, and may hereafter be defeated, by our understanding them. If Vidocq,* the prince of thieves, but now become the prince of thief-takers, desires to expiate his former felonies, let him instruct the police how to baffle the same enterprises in future. But if Vidocq, when tendering his advice on the best

* Morning Chronicle, 24th August, 1848.

means of preventing, tells us only that we cannot prevent, we may rationally suspect that his heart and his interest are still with his old associates.

“4118. To what circumstance do you attribute the failure of the British efforts to stop all Slave-trade by means of an armed force?—I would decline to answer that question, because if I enter into the minutiae of the Slave-trade, and describe the system which is now carried on, of course, that will make you *au fait* to *everything that is going on*, and you will take additional means to prevent it; therefore with respect to describing it to the committee, as I have yet to live in that country, I would beg to decline to answer that question. To any gentleman personally I would give *some little information* on that subject, but not to form the ground-work for a new plan of operations.” Chairman.—“You do not wish to expose yourself to the prejudices and passions of the people amongst whom you live?—No, nor to expose you to expending a larger sum of money, from which you would have no more success than you have already had.”—4152-3.

“4154. Sir R. H. Inglis.—As you have declined to answer whether any means of force would suppress the Slave-trade, would you think that such a trade could be more easily suppressed at the ports of exportation than at the ports of importation?—I should decline to answer that question entirely if I comprehend that question properly.”

4155. Chairman.—“ Do you consider that any means of force made use of on either side of the Atlantic would stop the Slave-trade, so long as there was a demand for slaves?—I had better decline answering that, because no good can arise from the answer which I would give.”

There is something whimsically candid in this avowal of the absence of candour; a strong exemplification of the duty of a witness, in his promise not to tell the whole truth. The minutiae which he knows of, and will not permit you to judge upon, are evidently the only things he can tell which are worth knowing. “ The system,” “ everything that is going on,” all is to continue as it has been; and notwithstanding his appearing before a tribunal charged to ascertain “ the best means for the final extinction of the trade,” though he knows of additional means that might be practised, his regard for your expenditure deters him from explaining them. He does not inform the Chairman why he should incur more odium at Rio by publicly giving his little information, than by whispering it into the ear of “ any gentleman personally.” I presume, however, that no English gentleman coveted this confidential intercourse.

The logical inference drawn by the Hon. Chairman from this no-information is equally surprising. “ 4120. You cannot *then* conceive of any measure which the British Government *could* undertake

for the purpose of entirely suppressing the Slave-trade by an armed force, which *could* be attended with success?—No.” “4121. You look upon it as altogether *hopeless*?—As altogether *hopeless*.” And the examiner and the witness, sinking in one common sentiment of despair, drop the unfruitful subject.

Passing to the evidence which he vouchsafes to give, we find that it tends precisely to the same result as the introductory proposition of the honourable mover. Leave the trade to itself; interference only aggravates its horrors. And this doctrine must be allowed to have obtained some currency with the people of England. Well-intentioned members of what has been called the anti-slavery party have, in moments of despondency, adopted it. Even Sir Thomas Buxton,* whose name and memory we so much love and venerate, when his ardent and benevolent mind was almost overthrown by the bitter anguish of his great disappointment, gave vent to the feeling. Be it remembered, however, that when he spoke thus (inconsiderately, may I venture to say?) of our efforts on the coast, it was in the hope of recommending other measures, far more desirable undoubtedly if they could have succeeded, but whose signal and entire failure, while it has afforded satisfaction and merriment

* It appears, however, from his life, lately published, by his son, that he was always an advocate for maintaining the squadron on the coast.

to those who regard with aversion every attempt at suppressing the trade, urges the more strongly on the rest of mankind the duty of not lightly abandoning any means of attaining their desired object.

Of all the well-turned phrases, which have passed current without examination, and assumed the guise of public opinion, this dictum has probably been productive of the greatest practical mischief. It has paralysed English humanity by inspiring it with distrust of its own best exertions, and prevented the acquisition of an inestimable good, when almost secured. It was caught up by such as deem the use of force unlawful for the most laudable purposes; loudly echoed by those interested in the trade on both sides of the Atlantic; encouraged by such of the colonists as still sigh for the return of slavery, and hope that the restrictions on the proposed immigration will not be too stringent: it was welcomed by many who found relief in despair from dwelling on a heart-rending, but worn-out subject, and carelessly adopted by that still more numerous class who rejoice in any excuse from the trouble of thinking for themselves.

In the face of these prepossessions, I shall maintain, and offer some reasons for thinking, that the dictum is founded in error. I agree but to a certain extent with Captain Matson, who, asked, by question 1485, whether the presence of the squadron has aggravated the horrors of the Slave-trade, replies: "I think it has very

much aggravated the horrors and misery to be endured by *those who are embarked.*" But I would narrow this number by a further qualification, and add, "embarked in hurry and agitation from the fear of disturbance by cruizers." When that fear has led to their being supplied with a less provision of food or water, more confusedly jammed together, with less of order, regularity, and cleanliness, with less space to move in and of air to breathe, the excess of misery over what might have been otherwise imposed, may be traced to the squadron as its cause.

This excess cannot be precisely ascertained. But I must remark that the disgusting particulars so unsparingly described in the evidence of Dr. Cliffe, that he may impute them to the squadron, and obtruded on us as a fair sample of the whole mass, must necessarily form a rare exception. For though no principle or feeling would prevent the Slave-trader from inflicting all this suffering where it appeared to promote his interest, *that* must impose *some* limitation on the ill-treatment of his cargo; and if any considerable proportion of those shipped in Africa were landed at Rio in the state depicted, they would not be worth landing. Instead of fetching £70 or £80, the slave would not command his prime cost. They would be a burden, and no benefit. They would cause expense in healing the sick, restoring the diseased, feeding the useless, tending the labourers whom the im-

ported negroes must infect. This witness gives a much higher per centage by deaths than any other, thirty in the hundred of those shipped. But he speaks from data, which he does not communicate, which are accessible to none but Slave-traders, and very difficult to be obtained with accuracy, even when there is a disposition to arrive at the truth.

Our officers make no such report. The state of some captured cargoes was indeed deplorable, but many seem to have been far removed from that desperate condition. The most successful adventure produces a state of misery unequalled in any other mode of human existence ; but there is reason to believe that the Slave-traders practise gross exaggeration in relating their own cruelty and its horrid consequences, for the sake of fastening on our squadron the guilt thus taken upon themselves.

It is by close packing that the human frame is injured. But are the cruizers the cause of it? In the apprehension of those dreaded visitors, I can well understand why the slaver should sheer off with only half her cargo, but why should she waste time and increase that burden? The time gives the cruizer the opportunity of coming up with her, and the weight impedes her escape.

Captain Matson's evidence furnishes a different explanation of this over-crowding. Answer to question 1474 :—" The effort of a Slave captain is to land as many slaves as he can on the coast of

the Brazils, but as it is not possible for the most practised eye to tell a healthy from an unhealthy slave by seeing him in the barracoons, if the vessel could take 300 slaves moderately crowded, the captain would take half as many again, say 450, and cram them on board, below and on the decks, for the sake of putting them to the test, knowing that all those who were not likely to cross the Atlantic, would sicken during the first forty-eight hours; then *directly they show the symptoms of weakness, on account of their weak constitution, they are put on one side on the deck*, no food nor water is given them, *and they are allowed to die*; they are then thrown overboard. Then, at the end of forty-eight hours, that man has a prime cargo of slaves of those who do not sicken. Those whose constitutions are strong enough to stand the first crowding and the heat, will live till they have crossed the Atlantic, they will live during the passage.

“ 1475. You have stated that the sickly slaves are placed on deck; for what purpose are they so placed?—That they shall not live; that they shall be allowed to die.

“ 1476. In other words, you mean to state to the Committee, that it is a deliberate plan of the Slave-dealer to embark, to take your own illustration, *450 slaves on board, knowing that he cannot hope to carry more than 300 to the opposite coast*?—Yes, it is a very common practice.

“ 1477. And that in the process one-third of

the whole number will inevitably perish?—Yes, after the first two or three days, perhaps, they will not lose more than one in a week or ten days, or perhaps scarcely one.”

Thus the captain of a slaver puts a greater number on board than he hopes to unload, on a cool calculation of what he must allow for the deaths which his own avarice renders inevitable. He jams them in his fetid hold to be stifled and poisoned by the jamming. He packs them close, because so many must expire from his close packing! Surely then the deaths which may happen to be more numerous than that speculation requires, are falsely and impudently styled the fault of the cruiser. They result from that ruthless cupidity, which, by grasping at incompatible gains, loses its hold on what it possessed.

Again, when a loaded slaver is chased, the captain scruples not to throw his sick negroes into the sea, and of this the chasing cruiser is certainly the cause. And now that the course of argument imposes the dreadful necessity of balancing such accounts, the question must be deliberately stated, whether to the man who languishes in the Slave-ship's hold, doomed to perpetual slavery when his voyage is ended, life or death is the greater evil. Let us face each alternative, and make the hard attempt to believe it practically possible that the situation of the pinioned negro should be our own. With all the chances of mutilation and disease,

of a gradual death, by lingering torture, after a life accompanied with the horrors of that floating lazaret-house, with the dreadful uncertainty and dark prospect of the doom which awaits the landing, which of us would regard sudden death as the worse alternative? The African himself has often embraced it with rapture as a deliverance. He rejoices when his brother or friend is plunged, living or dead, into the sea, to rise no more. When the trade was unrestricted, the vessel was surrounded by a net, to prevent his leaping overboard: instruments of torture were employed to force him to take needful sustenance: the whip was applied to compel him to dance on the deck for exercise, for the preservation of that life which he loathed. Again, is death less to be desired than life in the plantation? in Cuba, for example, where "the slaves work eighteen or twenty hours a day; where in many estates no woman is allowed to be; where, upon a calculation of economy, the best thing is to work out the whole energies of the negro in the cultivation or manufacture of sugar, and not to allow of any distraction of any kind; where the overseer invariably goes armed, and has his cutlass and his dagger, and their bloodhounds at his heels, close by him?"*

In vain the sages of political economy would here offer the consolation of a favourite theory—

* See Lord Howard de Walden's evidence given before the Sugar and Coffee Planting Committee, confirmed in all respects by M. J. Higgins, Esq.

the owner will be careful of his negroes, because they are his own, as he would of his "sheep and pigs." We need not vouch the records of cruelty to animals practised by the owner of them, for the experiment has been tried in the treatment of the negroes, whom the Slave-trader dares to call his property. We have good reason to remember the result. During the long period when the traffic was considered legal, and specially protected by treaties and statutes—when it was carried on undisturbed by the wealthiest men,—the merchants who were princes, the traders who were esteemed the honourable of the earth, perhaps (as the newspaper observed) the ancestors of men who may now hold seats in parliament, and may possibly be engaged in pursuing this inquiry,—even then the barbarities that were practised in carrying it on were proved as clearly and as severely denounced, as now, when it is in the hands of low Brazilian traders.

In 1788 the first law was enacted that imposed any restrictions on the mode of carrying it on, founded on a strict enquiry* into the fact, directed by Mr. Pitt. A certain limited number was to be conveyed in each vessel, and a certain space left for them between the decks. The introduction of the law was opposed in both Houses of Parliament, as unnecessary and even absurd, because the interest of the owner will always ensure a kind and humane treatment of his

* Bandinel, p. 82.

slaves. Successive statutes, passed year after year with the same object, attest the insufficiency of this motive to protect the victims of injustice. New penalties were devised to compel men to take care of their own property,—all in vain. With such additional inducements to prudence and humanity, their dictates were so completely set at nought, that the true representation of a loaded Slave-ship was that which produced those emotions of horror and indignation in the People of England, which made them with one voice demand, and at length enforce, the abolition of the execrable traffic.

Dr. Cliffe gives evidence on this point, which, if followed up by particulars, might have been important. “Before 1830,” he says, “the sufferings of the trade were very trifling: the slaves were brought in as good a condition as possible, precisely the same as emigrants. The captain took pride in losing the fewest possible number; he carried a surgeon also, and they had very fair attendance.” No one who reflects, will believe that their sufferings were ever trifling, but it would have been useful for the discovery of truth, and especially so for the support of Dr. Cliffe’s opinion, to make their real state appear. A comparison of the losses before our squadrons interfered, and since, might have been obtained from less suspicious sources. Details and minutiae, from authentic

documents, would give a valuable insight into the cause of change and the remedy. But I do not remember any other evidence of the fact, than that of the doctor; and I am slow to believe that the Brazilian Joint Stock Companies made better provision for the *comfort* and accommodation of their cargoes, than the merchants of Liverpool in former times.

One forgotten fact in the data will often baffle the most ingenious argument of the economist. The fact here overlooked is in his own proposition. The negroes are neither sheep, nor oxen, nor swine; they belong to the genus MAN. They are of like passions with ourselves, they have some reasoning power, however weak and undeveloped, some faint ideas of right and wrong, some instinctive sense of the value of freedom and the curse of slavery, some memory of home and kindred, the struggles of just resentment for intolerable present injury, and the natural dread of the fate that is reserved for them. If not manacled, they would infallibly have mastered their oppressors, and slain their captors. The fetters, the tortures, even the maceration and feebleness, formed the security of the captain and his crew. Things ill begun make strong themselves by ill. Violence was necessary to accomplish the work it had undertaken; and that violence was exasperated by the state of the pirate's mind,—the fear of

resistance, and the shame inspired by that fear, the mere wantonness of tyranny, and the immortal hatred borne by the persecutor to his martyr; all perhaps inflamed, in this instance, by his dark complexion, and supposed inferiority.

One of the witnesses most properly summoned before this committee, was James Bandinel, Esq., a gentleman long employed in the Foreign Office, and the author of a work of great merit on the Slave-trade. On matters of opinion, perhaps, too much was expected of him; indeed, though urged to pronounce one on such important matters, he was wisely unwilling to commit himself to any advice that he had not previously well considered. He evidently distrusts an impression of the moment. He seems much disposed to look for the "other causes" of the decline of the Slave-trade in 1841 and 1842, but is by no means successful in discovering any. Some mistakes made by him in the returns of numbers, have been corrected from his own book.*

He is asked to state from documents (3,409—10,) particular well-authenticated instances of the great cruelty with which the Slave-trade is now carried on, and gives several cases of aggravated suffering, of which I transcribe the most important. (3,412.) "The 'Pons' was at anchor at Cabenda for about twenty days before she took on

* In Captain Denman's pamphlet.

board the slaves, during which time she was closely watched by her Britannic majesty's brig* 'Cygnet.' At about nine o'clock on the morning of the 27th of November, the 'Cygnet' got under weigh, and stood to sea. Immediately, Berry gave up the ship to Gallano, who commenced getting on board the water, provisions, and slaves; and so expeditious were they in their movements, that at eight o'clock that evening, the vessel was under weigh, having embarked 903 slaves.

"Two days afterwards we captured her. The next morning I regretted to learn, that eighteen had died and one had jumped overboard. The vessel has no slave-deck; and upwards of 850 were piled almost in bulk, on the water-casks below: about forty or fifty females were confined in one half the round-house cabin. As the ship appeared to be less than 350 tons, it seemed impossible that one-half could have lived to cross the Atlantic. The stench from below was so great, that it was impossible to stand more

* An American captain, writing from Toulon, (so in Morning Herald, Oct. 19,) believes the Cygnet to have been an American vessel. I have no means of verifying the fact from documents, having only copied out the evidence given by Mr. Bandinel. It is immaterial to the argument. Whether British or American, she performed her duty nobly. But I rejoice to witness this emulation, and I am happy to bear testimony to the exertions of American captains on the coast, as well as to their gentlemanly bearing, their kindly feeling, and intelligence. This note will, I hope, meet the eye of officers who visited Boa Vista in 1845 and 1846, and they will know on whose authority I found my observation.

than a few moments near the hatchway. Our men who went below from curiosity, were forced up, sick ; then all the hatches were off. What must have been the sufferings of these poor wretches when the hatches were closed ? I am informed, that very often in these cases, *the stronger will strangle the weaker* ; and this was probably the reason why so many died, or rather, were found dead, the morning after the capture. None but an eye-witness can form a conception of the horrors these poor creatures must endure in their transit across the ocean."

I shall here suppose my imaginary representative of the African race a member of the committee, and a hearer of this report, to have been one of the nine hundred rescued by the ' Cygnet ' from that infernal dungeon. Surprised that his own case should be adduced as a complaint against the squadron, we may conceive that he might advert more particularly to his share in the history of the Slave-trade.

" In the prime of youth, I was driven by the firing of my home into the hands of the marauders who had kindled it, and who waited to seize all the inhabitants of the village scattered by the alarm ; torn from a parent * whom I loved, dragged in chains under a burning sun

* Mr. Crowther, at the end of twenty years, had the happiness to find his mother still alive in her native country.

some hundred miles to the coast, there kept in a barracoon, till the Pons arrived. Her captain and crew were busy twelve hours in huddling us on board, still chained, with far less tenderness than they would have shown to swine. I was laid on my side, close pressed against two other human beings, one before me and one behind, similarly placed. The pressure was dreadful, the stench poisonous. All use of my limbs was impossible; the side on which I lay was worked into sores. In this state I must have remained, unless some of those around me died and had been removed during the twenty or thirty days of the voyage. The removal of their bodies would have loosened mine, and brought me some alleviation of suffering. But perhaps they would not have been removed, though dead. I prayed to God for my own death, and was falling into that stupor which is its happiest precursor for the human cargo. But I suddenly heard a cry of alarm, and the preparation of fire-arms, the vigorous attack, the short resistance overpowered in a few moments, but how long they appeared, while the contest was doubtful! What unspeakable joy in the victory! England had come over the waters to my succour, she placed me under her guardianship, and I have been since that time her free and happy subject.

“ Of my 900 companions during the miserable

forty-eight hours of our imprisonment, eighteen indeed died in that mortal agony, and so escaped the tenfold multiplication of its length, and the thousand-fold aggravation of its intensity. One leapt overboard. Eight hundred and eighty, however, were saved from death, that agony, and the consummation of all, Slavery. Is this history, and are histories like this, produced by Mr. Bandinel, our known friend and champion, as a complaint made on our behalf against the cruizer? Should it not rather be the subject of joy and thanksgiving, of practical encouragement not to be weary of well-doing, but persevere unto the end?"

He might say more; he might congratulate himself even on the overloading, which detained the slaver, and the increased burden which encumbered her sailing, and so perhaps enabled the *Cygnets* to overtake her. And all these cases produced by Mr. Bandinel, on earnest solicitation, as proof how the trade is *now* carried on, and of the aggravated suffering produced by the cruizers, are in truth most glorious examples of the inestimable benefits conferred by them. Strange perversion of reasoning! The cruizers are blamed, and the slavers find some palliation of their misconduct. What is the fact? The slaves are found in an inconceivable state of suffering, just about to commence their murderous voyage across the Atlantic, to end in a life of perpetual slavery.

The cruizer steps in, defeats the nefarious project, gives life, health, and freedom to hundreds of his fellow-creatures : and for this his country is reproached, and he taunted as an unfeeling wretch, who does but inflame the evil for which he provides the only possible remedy !

And here is another case, says Mr. Bandinel, a case of mutiny. 3,415. "The Kentucky had taken in a cargo of slaves at Inhambane:" the relation states that, "The next day, after the vessel crossed the bar on leaving Inhambane, the negroes rose upon the officers and crew; the majority of the men, all of whom were in irons, got their irons off, broke through the bulkhead, and likewise into the forecastle. Upon this, the captain armed the crew with cutlasses, and got all the muskets and pistols, and loaded them, and the crew were firing down amongst the slaves for half an hour or more. In the mean time deponent was nailing the hatches down, and used no musket or pistol; and there was no occasion, as the Brazilian sailors seemed to like the sport.

"In about half an hour they were subdued; and became quiet again; the slaves were then brought on deck, eight or ten at a time, and ironed afresh; they were all re-ironed that afternoon, and put below, excepting about seven who remained on deck; there were but eight or ten more or less wounded. On the next day they

were brought upon deck, two or three dozens at a time, all being well ironed, and tried by Captain Fonseca and officers: and within two or three days afterwards, *forty-six men and one woman were hung, and shot, and thrown overboard.* They were ironed or chained two together, and when hung, a rope was put round their necks, and they were drawn up to the yard-arm, clear of the sail. This did not kill them, but only choked or strangled them; they were then shot in the breast, and the bodies thrown overboard. If only one of two that were ironed together was to be hung, a rope was put round his neck, and he was drawn up clear of the deck, beside of the bulwarks, and *his leg laid across the rail, and chopped off, to save the irons and release him from his companion,* who at the same time lifted up his leg till the other's was chopped off, and he released. *The bleeding negro was then drawn up, shot in the breast, and thrown overboard. The legs of about one dozen were chopped off in this way. When the feet fell on deck, they were picked up by the Brazilian crew and thrown overboard, and sometimes at the body, while it still hung living, and all kinds of sport were made of the business."*

The honourable chairman shrinks from this hideous picture of atrocity, and sees that it cannot fall under this head of sins of the squadron. Mr. Hutt says, "That is rather an account of barbarism exercised *needlessly.*" "Yes, (the witness

answers,) a barbarism of this sort is not consequent on the present state of the Slave-trade in particular, but has accompanied all Slave-trade." But I wish it had occurred to the honourable chairman or the witness, to enter a little into the nature of that treatment which may be considered *necessary*, and also into the history of mutinies in slavers. They must occasionally occur; perhaps, aided by the prayers of all just men, they have sometimes succeeded. We have just seen the consequences of failure. They are obviously quite independent of the squadron. The cruelties might have been practised by English traders before Dolben's Act, or in defiance of it. The Brazilians so ready to inflict and boast of them are surely the last whom any humane man, without preconceived opinions, would choose to "leave to themselves" in the prosecution of their trade.

When asked how the trade is to be extinguished, Mr. Bandinel's answer, apparently dissuading from, or at least excluding, the use of the squadron, though he declined to do so in another, 3,282. "With regard to the Slave-trade in Africa, it must be extinguished by civilization, by commerce, by constant amicable communication, by Christianity, and by the introduction of all those mild virtues and those enlightened views, and those arts of peace, which the spirit of Christianity and the present state of civilization in the world will create and foster."

Civilization, commerce, amicable communication, where Slave-trade ravages the region! The mild virtues, the enlightened views, and the arts of peace, to be introduced by those sons of Mammon who have the heart to load a slaver! Christianity to be accepted by the ignorant at the hands of men professing its precepts, and growing rich by such habitual intercourse with their fellow creatures!

From Mr. Bandinel might naturally be expected the suggestion of some measure for mitigating the horrors of Slave-trading, in case we should be unable to suppress it. Instead of persisting in the "harsh and offensive" operations of the squadron, Dr. Cliffe and others propose that it should be legalized and carried on under a licence; and the slaves fenced round by negotiation with precautions against cruelty and ill-usage. But I will ask Mr. Bandinel, who seems to favour this scheme, what he, as a diplomatist, would think of a draft like the following, if placed in his hands by Lord Aberdeen or Lord Palmerston, to be formalised and filled up?

Treaty between the Queen of Great Britain and the Emperor of Brazil, reciting that it is expedient that sixty, seventy, or one hundred thousands of Africans of divers nations and languages should every year be seized in their own country to be exported by Brazilians, and consigned to slavery in Brazil, there to cultivate the land, and produce

sugar in such quantities, that the planter may grow rich on its produce, and the duties arising from its importation into England may yield a large revenue to the state, and the article may come cheap to English buyers: that it is however desirable that these Africans should be kidnapped and driven to the coast with all possible humanity, and that, when there, they should be loaded on board with the most prudent regard to their health and comfort: that therefore no more than five human beings should be shipped by the Brazilian trader for every three tons,* and that a space of five feet one inch should be reserved between the decks; with stipulation for providing food and water, and for dancing upon deck as well as their chains would permit.

But (1) as both the high contracting parties have the same object, there seems no pretence for conferring on England any claim to the power of enforcing it by treaty upon Brazil. (2) As that empire can only perform its part in such a treaty by municipal laws, must England be armed with the invidious privilege of supervising and controlling the execution of those laws? Free-trade and national independence seem equally opposed to such a provision. But (3) it escapes recollection that we have already a treaty, with still more cogent stipulations, which is notoriously and fla-

* These were the provisions of Sir W. Dolben's Act.

grantly violated, yet for strong reasons has never sought to be enforced.

Smuggling would certainly grow out of such a treaty. How to be dealt with? Is it intended to be suppressed by force? Then all the horrors imputed to the squadron must be renewed. Or must the smuggler pass without interruption? The profits will exceed thirty per cent; the needy and reckless adventurer will but multiply the evils to be prevented. I admit that these things are nothing in the view of such philosophers as are quite satisfied that the owner of negroes will be as kind to them as the farmer is to pigs, they therefore require no treaty, but like the honourable chairman, without doubt or reservation would leave the Slave-trade to itself.

Another reason for not relying on Brazil for any restriction of the Slave-trade, is the impotence of that government to enforce its own laws, even if they were well devised and sincerely intended. But the best answer to the proposal of legalizing and regulating, is that it proceeds on the assumption that the negro has no rights, but may be lawfully sold to slavery. This detestable falsehood, leading to the formal sanction of deliberate injustice in the first step, would deprive both parties of any ground for complaining, whatever amount of it should, less inexcusably, be committed in the further progress. In matters of rectitude

and honour, qui paulum a summo deflectit vergit ad imum. How such a proposal was received in other days, Mr. Bandinel's book informs us, (p. 90). The answer returned to it by Burke, Pitt, Fox, Lord Grenville, and Lord Grey, was clear, manly, and wise. The SLVAE-TRADE CAN NOT BE REGULATED, for THERE CAN BE NO REGULATION OF ROBBERY AND MURDER."

To return to the horrors said to be aggravated by our cruizers. I cannot deny that the negroes detained in barracoons for the next vessel, which is driven by the fear of our cruizers from the shore, may be sufferers from the detention. "You oblige us to cut their throats, say the Slave-traders, because we have not the means of feeding them. You thus caused the death of two thousand in the bay of Lagos." And this paragraph, never supported by direct testimony, goes all the rounds, and re-appears at stated times, like other apocryphal stories. The moral of the fable is truly impressive.—"You see what manner of men we are who drive this trade: therefore leave it to itself, that is, to us!"

The small sharp vessel employed on account of her swift sailing, is one of the imputed causes of aggravation, because of the necessity for closer packing. But the curtailment of the voyage is a real gain, and there is more ventilation in the single-decker. Who can pretend to say that the

good or evil preponderates from the mode of loading these sharp vessels? But when we are told that the squadron is responsible for the badness of the vessels employed in carrying the negroes across the Atlantic, we feel that we are trifled with. They are "crazy" vessels, which are "hardly sea-worthy;" such are preferred, for fear they should be taken. So these Brazilians risk their most valuable cargoes and their own lives at the same time, that the captor may be baulked, and find the ship he takes of no value! It is not pretended, however, that losses have ever happened from such a cause. And the only thing proved by the inferiority of the vessel, is either the poverty of the owner or his frugality. For all traders will avail themselves of the cheapest means that are safe, and even the rich merchant will not choose to be undersold by his needy competitor in trade.

Before there can be an approach to striking the balance so readily taken for granted, we must look to the other side of the account,—the numbers rescued by the cruizers from deportation and slavery. The returns show many hundred ships taken, and many myriads of human beings set free, and extreme discouragement of Slave-trading. To some credit on this score—we do not pretend to estimate the exact amount—they are unquestionably entitled. To do full justice, and

make our comparison perfect, it should be instituted, not between two different modes of securing and transporting the same number of Africans, but between the number that *has* been shipped and that which *would* have been, if no squadron had been on the watch. Sir Charles Hotham, in concurrence with a host of witnesses, declares his opinion that the whole western coast would be converted by the withdrawal of the squadron into a nest of pirates and Slave-traders. The traffic having relapsed into that state which in 1788 awakened the determined hostility of England, would flourish and prosper in numberless Brazilian hands.

But can anything be more absurd than to cast the blame of the horrors of this traffic from the actual perpetrators upon those who sincerely strive to prevent them by annihilating the traffic? Shall the assassin upbraid the inhuman surgeon who, by a painful operation heals the victim of his envenomed poniard? Shall the robber, asserting the right, if opposed, to maintain his robbery by murder, charge the latter crime on the minister of justice, who strives to suppress both? Shall the neighbour who lends his musket to the householder threatened with burglary, be assailed as the guilty cause of death ensuing from the burglar's fear of resistance, and consequent resort to violence? The officer or the friend may

in particular circumstances see reason to doubt whether his interference may not be imprudent, and threaten more disaster than the commission of some minor offence ; but shall the wrong-doer reproach him ? For the greatest of criminals, systematically persevering in his enormous crime, to maintain that you, who, with the needful force, contend against it, are guilty of the redoubled violence which he exerts, is surely unrivalled in folly as in the audacity, and can only be equalled by the concession that his argument is just.

Shall I be told that I am assuming my first proposition ? and must I undergo the mortification of proving that Africans are neither sheep nor swine, but have a right to be treated as brothers of the great family of mankind ? I will not believe the proof to be necessary for any one person in England ; and yet the total oblivion of this great truth, and indeed the contrary assumption, lie at the bottom of all that the Slave-traders and their allies contend for. They appeal to the principles of Free-trade, which cannot apply to this matter without the heinous hypothesis,—not only that man may be lawfully the property of man, but that he may be lawfully made so by violence, and that the possession of that property, so acquired, must be respected and left without disturbance,—it also seems without disgrace or censure.

The perversion of reasoning that must follow

from avowing immorality and injustice as the basis of a system of conduct marks all the discussions on this subject. You, in the late debate, justly objected to the constant use of the term *Slave-trade*, as familiarizing men's minds with an atrocious practice, under an innocent name. You lamented that in our discussions we adopted the popular designation, as keeping out of sight its true and scriptural name, MAN STEALING, descriptive of its real character. Some writer hereupon charges you with inconsistency, because in 1810 he says that you called it a commerce, and dropped the more appropriate designation. It is, however, undoubtedly a commerce, and must occasionally be considered under that aspect. But is it less a crime because it is a commerce? Is there no guilty commerce? On the contrary, it is only the more flagitious from its premeditation, and the more widely mischievous from its extent. We should not hesitate to inflict punishment and infamy on the wretch who could deliberately in a single instance, for some sordid purpose of his own, be guilty of stowing three human beings with the cruelty daily exercised, in the middle passage; but because hundreds of thousands may be yearly sacrificed to the cruel selfishness of trade — “all pity choaked by custom of fell deeds” — its very frequency is made its justification.

In the same spirit, reference is made to the

maxims of political economy, to prove that the Slave-trade cannot be put down. Smuggling, which yields a profit of thirty per cent, cannot be suppressed." Slave-trade is indeed a contraband trade, but it is a great deal more: it stands prominent and alone among all the trades that men ever followed, distinguished by audacious injustice, and by sufferings and horrors so intense and transcendent as to exhaust and defy all the powers of language to describe them. Experience proves the reluctance of the generality of men to assist in the enforcement of fiscal regulations; but when did the public side with the cruel oppressor against his menaced victim? The smuggler may pass his prohibited goods uninterrupted through the crowd. But the kidnapper, the crimp, or the gipsy, will find the whole world ready to take up arms against him. Often have I wished that the loaded slaver, as she weighs anchor for Brazil or Cuba, could be inspected by but half the casual passengers at any moment to be found in any great thoroughfare of London. The Slave-trade would not continue for a single year, after the knowledge thus acquired had been diffused by eye-witnesses through this country.

The maxim of political economy, however, that is supposed to rule this case is strangely contradicted by the fact—"Smuggling, which realizes a profit of thirty per cent., cannot be

put down by coercion"—for hitherto coercion has been tried, and succeeded. With a few exceptions, kept out of view with uncommon artifice and by means of excessive corruption, we may boast that the Slave-trade of England fell unresisting before the law, and, notwithstanding the enormous profit, has hitherto made no effort to recover. That of Brazil and Cuba will follow its fate if the coercion be adequate, and resolutely proclaimed, and applied in good earnest.

Nosaneman, who reflects on these things, can possibly doubt that it is lawful to exert force for so laudable an object. Whether or not the Slave-trader can be correctly said to fall within the definition of a *pirate*, in the dictionary of the laws of nations, is a question for learned legists to ventilate; but that Slave-trading is an unlawful pursuit, is perfectly clear. That the captured African might, at every stage, lawfully resist by force the violence done him; and that all other men may lawfully lend him their aid to escape from that bondage or overpower the oppressor, unless forbidden by the laws of their own country, or of the state in which the violence is exercised, cannot be denied. On what principle is the pirate declared by the law of nations a common enemy, and subject to death the moment he is taken? The principle that he assumes authority to invade with the powerful weapons he wields,—an armed ship, and an outlawed crew,—the owners of pro-

perty, wherever found on the high seas, without sanction from any law but the law of the strongest? As long as he is suffered to pursue his occupation, all the merchandize of the world, with the persons of those in possession of it, is at his mercy. The nations, in their own defence, were driven to enact the summary process of hanging him from the yard-arm.

But though the pirate goes forth on his adventure prepared to employ force even to bloodshed in furtherance of his designs, and murderous conflicts are always to be apprehended, the actual exertion of it possibly may not be needful for his purpose. It may be displayed in so overwhelming a form as to deter from all resistance, and he may secure his booty without a blow. Whereas the primary object of the Slave-trader is that very personal conflict,—armed assaults against man are the very business of his trade. All the successive operations that make up the process are direct outrages on the persons of men; the seizure, the detention, the transportation, the ultimate sale, are all invasions of the first principles of the law of nature, and in every one of them life is in imminent danger.

Until the invasion of men's property, in lifeless goods or herds of beasts, shall be adjudged by some peculiarly enlightened court of law at the Havannah or Rio, a higher offence than these outrages committed on our fellow men, without the

least pretence of right, but merely to gratify the sordid lust of unrighteous lucre, all men may lawfully interpose with such force as may be requisite to save the victim from the oppressor. It were a waste of breath to confute the proposition that one man may lawfully reduce another by violence to bondage, and that a third has no right by force to effect his deliverance. What if an Algerine pirate had ravaged the shores of France, and swept away the population of whole villages, burnt at his instigation, that he might obtain his human prey? Will it be doubted that England, as a civilized and Christian state, might have lawfully resisted the pirate and rescued the slaves—aye, though she happened to be at that moment in amity with the Dey of Algiers, and at war with her ancient rival?

The squadron, however, does not act for the purpose of punishing guilt, but for preventing crimes not completed. It acts as a police, not as a minister of retributive justice. That punishment should also be inflicted is no doubt in the highest degree desirable. But till that course is adopted, must there be no attempt at repression; is there any inconsistency between active prevention by police, and condign punishment by law? Or rather, may we ask, can the law be carried into execution without the constant aid of the police? How strange would be the recommendation of the

Committee, to proceed with the utmost severity against the culprits, but at the same time to withdraw the only existing means of apprehending them !

We have long perceived with regret the growing indifference to the iniquities of the Slave-trade, or rather the unwillingness to dwell on evils so revolting, which are always represented as too inveterate to be eradicated. We have lamented that public writers have indulged in the habitual disparagement of the negro race, and the decrying of every method devised for its protection ; still more deeply we deplore the Act of 1846, the exultation of the Government in the relief promised to the revenue, and the boon of cheap sugar to the consumer ; the vaunt of enormous profits alluring that numerous class who are in haste to be rich by any means. The trade has long been carried on by English capital ; the piratical joint-stock companies at Rio comprise many English subjects, and little is now wanting to revive the traffic in slaves by Englishmen residing at home, just as it existed in the ignominious period that preceded the year 1807. And it may be asked with reason why should not the merchants of England be permitted by their own laws to earn these shameful profits, as freely as the Brazilians whom England, for her own pecuniary gain, permits and encourages to do so ?

If the Brazilian Slave-trader, bidding defiance to England, France, America, and his own government, can thrive in his enterprises, his prosperous audacity will crowd those seas with pirates, menacing the legitimate trade of England and of the whole civilized world; those who trade in the spoliation of Africa will next prey on one another, and afterwards, in their thirst of plunder, on every vessel weaker than their own. Already the buccaneers have dared to fire on British ships of war. When a longer course of impunity shall have increased their courage and their power, we may be soon compelled to employ another squadron far more costly, to contend with evils much more extensive.

That such would be the effect of withdrawing the squadrons, is, from all the evidence printed, to my mind unquestionably clear. We know the effect produced at Brazil by its vigorous attacks and the belief that England could suppress the trade, and the opposite effect arising from her supposed change of system. If she by any public act should now confess that her efforts, according to Dr. Cliffe, have been irrational and must be discontinued as hopeless, we may guess what would be the rejoicings at Rio, from the illuminations at the Havannah when the Act of 1846 passed our legislature.

It seems to have been expected—I cannot con-

ceive for what reason—that you and I should be “meek and gentle” with such a man, when so much weight was assigned by others to his evidence, and the subject was brought before the House of Lords. Yet if we had merely been concerned with the past, with a view to deter our own countrymen from the sin and shame incurred by the avowed proceeding of that American citizen, I hope it was not unbecoming our character or our station to declare the impression made on our mind. But when his evidence appeared to be that on which reliance must mainly be placed, as furnishing grounds for a measure which threatens to entail perpetual and unutterable misery on mankind, for an indefinite diffusion of the worst crimes, for direct participation in them by England, with a view to revenue and low prices, but with the loss of national honour, and the demoralization and degradation of her people,—the silence of those who were convinced that such must be the consequences of trusting him, would have been the worst of treason to our country. Nor was any time to be lost in the attempt to counteract his evil counsel; every hour engenders new mischief while the Slave-trade is permitted to rage. At least 250 fresh victims are daily sacrificed. At least 60,000 in every year undergo the fate that awaited those rescued by the *Cygnet*. Here is more suffering

than in all our hospitals, more crime than in all our gaols. This is the TRADE to which our measure of 1846 gave stimulus and encouragement, and our next public Act is expected to proclaim free scope and perfect impunity.

I hope and trust that our proceedings may direct the public mind to a serious consideration of this the greatest of all questions. We shall then patiently endure the pelting of the storm that has assailed us, though its fury could hardly have been exceeded, if we had been gratifying a personal spite against Dr. Cliffe, or had been Slave-traders afraid of his competition. The echoes of this loud clamour repeated by the weekly press, and the provincial, have hardly subsided. With confidence we appeal from it to a just, enlightened, and reflecting people. To the press we say, "Strike, but hear!" to the people, "Read, but think! read the evidence, the questions, and the answers, read the comments we really made, read all the papers that hold us up to obloquy; but think upon these things, and judge for yourselves."

This appeal, however, would certainly not have been made, if ourselves alone had been concerned. Attacks from the press, the common fate of all public men, however unjust in their opinion, are best passed over by them for various reasons. One is, that they never know all that may be said by

all the papers, and an answer to one is taken as an implied admission that those unnoticed cannot be answered. A better reason is, that the public do not expect it, and will probably decide the controversy each man for himself, by the whole tenor of the life of the accused. The question of Slave-trade is sought to be diverted from its merits to the mere issue whether the opinion pronounced by us on Dr. Cliffe, his testimony, and his advice, has been too strongly expressed. Another circumstance of much graver character, induced me to speak of the Morning Chronicle in the House of Lords, and leads me again to mention it now.

A report prevailed, and was and is universally believed, that the Earl of Lincoln had recently become the purchaser of that paper, which was supposed to be under his lordship's control, and the periodical organ of the great party to which he belongs. His lordship was also an active member of Mr. Hutt's committee, and some of the unreported proceedings of that committee were stated in the paper of the 24th of August, in the course of the invectives showered on me for my observations on Dr. Cliffe's evidence. Arraigned on a charge not only of injustice and illiberality, but also of "calumny," I felt and expressed in the House of Lords on the 28th, some uneasiness at such an attack appearing to proceed from so eminent a person.

On the 30th, I was accused of a new offence, of which I will only say that it is created by an *ex post facto* law, of which I was ignorant, and which, as stated in the note below,* I do not very distinctly understand. I do not attempt any vindication from this charge of *Lèse Majesté* against what our friend Williams used to call "our

* "It is an established rule in this country—a rule which is adhered to, with few exceptions, by all the respectable part of society and of the press,—to ignore names and persons when newspapers are concerned. The editors and proprietors of newspapers are not public men; they have not the advantages, and they have a right to be free from the responsibilities, attending personal publicity; it is not the custom here, as in France, to make them, because they are connected with the press, ministers, or even notabilities; it is therefore not the custom, to defame their characters, or attack their persons. This may be a good rule or a bad one, but while it is recognised by every member of good society in the kingdom, we have a right to expect that it shall not be violated by a Lord Chief Justice in his place in Parliament. And when to this primary impropriety Lord Denman adds that of selecting a 'noble earl,' a 'still more important personage, and a member of the committee,' of whose connexion or non-connexion with this journal he knows, and can know, nothing; and when he makes those eminent individuals, upon this unsupported assumption, the target of his personalities, merely because in his passion he must strike somebody, and can think of no one else to strike, then we can only say, another pregnant proof is given that age is not always accompanied with gravity, nor talent by discretion, nor rank and station by good breeding and good taste."

Sovereign Lord the Press." But the leading article in the Morning Chronicle has the following sentence : "The whole and sole ground, be it remembered, of Lord Denman's ferocious attack on Dr. Cliffe—an attack which he renewed on Monday evening, in a style which showed that he had not listened in vain to 'his noble friend's' racy but rancid eloquence—consists in the fact of the gentleman in question having once been a Slave-trader, a man who bought and sold negroes. Now, without of course wishing to express any opinion in favour of the traffic in slaves, which we consider most demoralizing and pernicious, we will say, that to place the practice of it (above all, in a Brazilian,) in the same category with murder and robbery, is a proof either of the most stupid bigotry, or of the wildest and most wanton injustice. The institution of slavery, of which the buying and selling of slaves is a necessary part, is, after all, when viewed with reference to the general moral sentiments and usages of mankind, a *malum prohibitum*, rather than a *malum in se*. It was permissively sanctioned by the apostles, and recognised by the whole Christian church for centuries. As practised on the coast of Africa, it was considered no discredit by any section of public opinion in this country, until about eighty years ago. If Lord Denman be consistent, he is bound to apply his favourite epithets to the whole

community of merchants and planters connected with our Transatlantic colonies, during the last and previous centuries ; for, of course, as regards moral guilt, no distinction can be drawn between the man who is employed to procure slaves from the African coast, and the man who being employed in the correlative branch of the same business, buys the slaves from him, and either employs them himself, or re-sells them to another, as may best suit his purpose. Now, as Lord Denman must perfectly well know, public opinion is precisely in the same state (as regards the Slave-trade) in Brazil *now*, as it was in Great Britain and her possessions *then* ; and precisely the same degree of criminality attaches to it—that is, a criminality varying according to the amount of light possessed by each individual on the matter, and to his more or less vivid perception of the evils which flow from it.”

With every disposition to make allowance for the heat of leading articles, I call attention to this paragraph. I earnestly hope that no public man in England, of whatever degree, will advisedly admit this apology for Slave-trading. Evil practices may grow up gradually and imperceptibly under the shelter of ancient habit, in certain states of society, till the moral sense is blunted, and the perception of their enormity effaced. But the question of Slave-

trading has undergone eighty years of discussion, which led to the utter condemnation of the Slave-trade as impious, unchristian, and inhuman, by all the divines and philosophers of England, France, and America; the most illustrious statesmen of all countries have united in its reprobation, and the laws of all civilized countries have denounced it as one of the most flagrant crimes, to be visited by the severest punishment; the hideous particulars, the component parts of it, engendered by avarice and cruelty, have been laid bare to the view, and have excited the universal abhorrence of mankind. After public opinion has been so conclusively pronounced in favour of the first principles of morals, that a man of education, a gentleman by profession, should derive any excuse for offences against all these sanctions, and that men of rank and principle, aspiring to the guidance of the state, should be supposed to give any countenance to that excuse, because the culprit has migrated from the United States to Brazil, would be a most serious calamity. It would undo the effect of all the moral victories achieved by public opinion, teach us that no progress that has been made can ever be secure, and lead to utter despair of the social improvement of mankind.

I most sincerely believe the noble Lord to whom I alluded, or his still more distinguished

leader, will never be found to countenance in the smallest degree the apology set up; and for myself, it is right to add that this opinion was not reserved for the case of Dr. Cliffe, but however illiberal or unjust, it has been always entertained by me. In the debate on the Ashburton Treaty, (in 1842, I believe) while I denounced the active agents of the traffic as the worst of men, I excepted those baser miscreants, who in the enjoyment of opulence and luxury, bribe them, by enormous wages, to commit such monstrous outrages for their own sordid gain.

While I write, Mr. Hutt's letter is placed before me. His defence and praise of Dr. Cliffe, and his rebuke of me, I leave undisturbed. But "he thinks he understands the meaning of Lord Denman's bitter hostility to the committee,—hostility which I altogether disclaim." Mr. Hutt "does not think, however, that his (Lord D.'s) violence will do much to protect the system, in which he feels so keen an interest." This mysterious form of expression seems to import some insinuation of an interested motive for the course I have taken. If so, I wish, as a matter of curiosity, that Mr. Hutt had explained it. "The heart of man is deceitful above all things," but mine is deceitful above the hearts of all other men, if it has kept this secret motive from my knowledge. If, as I hope, Mr. Hutt's sentence

will bear another interpretation, let me however implore the readers who know my position, and have ever heard my name, to think for one moment of the thousand obvious personal motives which exclaim so loudly against my interference, as to have repeatedly made me pause, and shrink, and almost drop the pen from my hand. I speak not of the sacrifice of the golden vacation,—ubi et animus ex hoc forensi strepitu reficiatur, et aures convicio defessæ conquiescant,—the exchange of the hardly earned leisure of a happy home for the actual pain that arises from the contemplation of subjects so repulsive; but to enter on “the arena of a warfare” far bitterer than political, at an age which (as I am truly reminded) exempts from self-imposed labour, to provoke, “with grey hairs and bruise of many years,” unscrupulous attacks; to run the risk of disturbing the calm atmosphere of justice; to dwell on differences with old political friends; to proclaim dissent from the great statesman alluded to, whom for his latest measures when in power, I so sincerely admired,—great beyond the dreams of avarice must be the bribe that could tempt to this combination of hazard, strife, and annoyance; and if acquitted of interested motives, how deep, how strong, how overpowering must be that conviction which compels the performance of this task, as an indispensable duty, in the face of such consequences!

You, my friend, have the inestimable satisfaction of knowing that in this great cause your heart and mind have always been loyally enlisted. In your early manhood, at the very outset of your career of hostility against the time-protected abuses of the world, your first blow was aimed at this, the worst and greatest of them all. The numerous amendments of the law, however valuable, the improvements in the social condition of our country, effected by your enlightened public spirit, all yield in importance to that conquest over crime which you in 1807 effected in common with the greatest and best patriots, whose names adorn the annals of England. You have been foremost and most vigorous in every fight,—and they have been many,—with that sordid principle of lucre which had unhappily gained the ascendant, and now again makes frightful efforts to stifle the voice of honour, justice, and humanity.

The fruits of that mighty conquest appear to be in danger. The struggle must again be made, but alas, under discouragement overpowering except to energy and perseverance like your own. But aforetime* also the conscience of our country has seemed dead, when it was only sleeping, and required to be awakened. And something within me presages that this alarm will not be

* See Sir T. F. Buxton's Life, p. 142—426.

given in vain. I am confident that the sun will not set on your glorious and eventful day till you have seen the death-wound inflicted on this pestilence. France in the pursuit, and England in the enjoyment of constitutional liberty, shall soon be seen marching side by side in a generous rivalry to promote the freedom and happiness of mankind: Europe and America shall rejoice over the annihilation of the worst of crimes; and Africa, fulfilling perhaps a humbler destiny, shall cultivate in peace the arts of agriculture and commerce, and share with the great brotherhood of mankind the benefits of civilization, and the blessings of Christianity.

Ever Yours sincerely,

DENMAN.

POSTSCRIPT.

HAVE you seen the "Times" of the 13th instant? Its leading article on the Slave-trade is a sample of the treatment of the subject that has lately prevailed, and will reward a careful perusal.

The "Times" of the 12th, and other papers, had published some naval intelligence from the west coast of Africa. After cruising there eighteen months, the Devastation steamer had returned to England. "She is very fortunate in

taking many slavers. She is in the highest state of efficiency as regards her crew and discipline." During this short commission she was reported to have had three commanders, two having died from the effects of the climate. Other ships of the squadron are also said to have captured slavers: the *Dolphin* especially. But the last-named vessel, according to the report in the leading article, had decimated the unhappy cargo of slaves that fell into her hands, by firing 32-pounders at the hull.

The leading article takes no notice of the many captures made by the *Devastation*, which prove her to have well discharged her duty: no notice of the "efficiency of her crew and discipline," which proves their health to have been good. It adverts to no fact but the alleged deaths of two of her commanders from the effects of the climate; and, before the reader can recover from that shock, revives two statements of deaths occurring many years since in Fernando Po. It follows up that blow by an average of twenty-one years, exhibiting an awful per centage of deaths by sea and land in Africa, taken from a sanitary report by Dr. Bryson.

On this some comments appeared in the "*Morning Herald*" of the 15th, which throw so much doubt on the correctness of every one of the facts commented upon, and apparently on strong grounds, that no satisfactory conclusion can be

arrived at till that controversy is decided. As, however, the practical question relates to the present health and efficiency of the squadron, on which we have the favourable report, during some years, of its commander, Sir C. Hotham, exemplified in the condition of the *Devastation*, the presumptions that might arise from a remote period and a long average, (than which nothing can be more fallacious,) and the loss of life occasioned by imprudent attempts to form settlements many years ago on an uncleared coast, will go but a little way to contradict that gallant officer.

The Leading Article makes no mention of captures by the *Contest*, the *Dolphin*, and other vessels, except of that single one, (the *Pensamento*, I believe,) in which the slaves are said to have been *decimated* by the guns of the captor. This expression, of course, is not meant to be taken literally; yet much would depend on the exact return. But the Leading Article proceeds to make suppositions of what *might* have followed: a shot from the cruiser in the slaver's hull *might* at once sink her and all on board: "the crash of a single shot home *might be* followed by a long piercing yell which rose high into the air," and denoted that negroes were wounded in the hold. And these things are alluded to as if they not unfrequently occurred.

There is not the least reason to think that any

vessel was ever sunk by such a casualty, and there are very strong ones for believing that no British captor ever fired at the slaver's hull. Her object must always be to disable her prize with the least possible damage to her or her cargo. She will aim at the sails and rigging, to cripple her and prevent her escape; — possibly the Brazilian pirates, though no wound was inflicted, would set up the supposed loud yell, in order to deceive her into the belief that negroes were shot, and so deter her from firing again. But even if it should happen that some imprisoned and helpless captives received their death-wound; then arises the question, discussed in the foregoing letter, whether to the slave life or death is preferable, and the argument that that death is not imputable to the deliverer but to the gaoler. Take the analogy of those pirates of the Mediterranean, of whom we read in our youth: would not the husband and father fire into the Corsair, which was conveying his enslaved wife and daughters to the seraglio?

The Leading Article, throughout these distressing observations, indulges in a vein of pleasantry, beginning with an ironical congratulation to "the advocates of the blockading system;" as if the arrival of one commander out of three from that station was something like a miracle. The "friends of the African," "the friends of humanity," "the philanthropists," "the consideration which we so lavishly bestow upon the population

of Ashantee," "the disciples of Exeter Hall," are treated with sarcasm and derision. In this state of mind the same newspaper came to the consideration of the measure of 1846, uniformly complimenting the opponents of the Slave-trade and Slavery by the title of "saints and hypocrites." The interest of the negroes they generally have passed over in silence, and when they have deigned to recognise their existence, it was for the purpose of reminding England that Africa was a great way off, and that its natives have black skins. They spoke of the grievances of that race as "imaginary;" they even went further, and, after humorously designating them as "niggers," added the playful epithet of "hypothetical." It was well that the "hypothetical nigger" was not pronounced fabulous.

Such leading articles, darkening all the shades of the only side of the question on which they touch at all, servilely copied into other papers, treating it as already decided by all sensible men, and now and then repeating their leading points by way of memento, tend to stop any further inquiry into the proof on which the conclusion rests, and pass as faithful organs of deliberate public opinion. It is for the purpose of asking the people of England, if they are prepared to adopt, without examination, the conclusion assumed as theirs, that the present Letter has been written. Surely, such mighty interests are not so to be

disposed of. Pre-conceived opinions may be entertained on the part of influential journals, as well as by chairmen or members of parliamentary committees. Though pre-conceived, they may indeed be correct : to determine whether they are correct, I invite a scrutiny of the evidence.

The Leading Article closes with asking its readers a fair question :—"What they actually get for their money?" in keeping up the squadron on the coast.

"Do they get the stoppage of the traffic?"

In my opinion they gain much by what the *Devastation*, the *Dolphin*, the *Contest*, the *Styx*, and other vessels have accomplished, the stoppage of the traffic in all the captures made. Probably thousands have been thereby set free, the empty slaver has often been baulked of her prey, and the whole number of slaves is diminished by no trivial amount.

"Do they get a mitigation of the horrors attending it?"

They wholly prevent them wherever they deter from the adventure ; and where they intercept it, and defeat its final success, the mitigation is great and undeniable.

"Do they get a prospect of better success?"

Every capture improves that prospect ; every moment the squadron is at its post, and England perseveres in her determination to extinguish the trade, she strikes terror to the heart of the pirate,

and warns him to abstain from villany; teaches the native of Africa that he may till his ground and trade in the produce with more advantage than he can trade in his fellow-creatures; and makes it the interest of the planter to improve the condition of his negroes. The impression actually made on the trade holds out the fairest promise that it may be wholly suppressed.

The authority of the officers, nine-tenths of whom are said to despair of success, consulted, is in my mind the reverse of that stated in the Leading Article.

In a word, the object is THE FINAL EXTINCTION OF THE SLAVE-TRADE, which it is plain that nothing without direct physical force can suppress, while I think it equally clear that the squadron is competent to effect that noble purpose.

I do not dwell on the consequences of leaving the monster to itself; the toleration of crime abroad, the spread of it among ourselves, the abandonment of all the commerce of the world to the insolence of pirates, the perpetual desolation of Africa, the forfeiture of the pledged honour of England!

D.

September, 1848.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY G. J. PALMER, SAVOY STREET, STRAND.

THE
BRITISH SQUADRON
ON THE
COAST OF AFRICA.

BY
AN AMERICAN MISSIONARY.

With a Map.

PRICE SIXPENCE



CHART OF AFRICA

SHOWING THE STATE OF THE SLAVE TRADE

* Ascension.

(Reduced from that in the Lords Report 1850)

References.

On the Coast shaded Black, the Slave Trade formerly existed and has been put down mainly by the measures of G^t Britain.

(Liberia lies between the asterisks, its first founders were on the point of being destroyed by the Natives and were enabled to establish themselves only by the assistance of a detachment from a British Ship of War.)

On the Coast coloured Red, the Slave Trade has existed for a very long Period, and is still more or less carried on though to a greatly reduced extent.

The Black lines indicate places, at which the Slave Trade has been put down since 1839.

The Red lines indicate the Chief places which still export Slaves.

The dotted lines indicate places where the native Chiefs have engaged in Treaties with G^t Britain for the total abolition of the traffic which Treaties, it should be observed, enable the Squadron to land and destroy the Barracoons and Slave Factories if it ever should be renewed.

South of the Equator the Coast is entirely secured from all Slave Trade by the British Squadron.

Landry claimed by Portugal

Benguela

C. S. Martha

Lu. Fish R.

C. Negro

Nourres R.

C. Jay River

C. Frio

Walvisch R.

Angra Pequena

Orange R.

S. Helena

Salomon

Cap. Verde

THE
BRITISH SQUADRON

ON THE
COAST OF AFRICA.

BY
THE REV. J. LEIGHTON WILSON,
*AN AMERICAN MISSIONARY IN THE GABOON RIVER,
WEST COAST OF AFRICA.*

WITH NOTES
BY CAPTAIN H. D. TROTTER, R.N.

LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY;
SEELEY'S, HANOVER STREET, AND FLEET STREET;
BAIN, 1, HAYMARKET.

1851.

“The experience and observations of one who has lived on the coast of Africa nearly twenty years, who has watched the operations of the British Squadron all that time with the liveliest interest, and who is in no way trammelled by any party views that exist in England, may not be unacceptable, or entirely unavailing, in the present crisis.”

Vide page 5.

“In all these varied ways it does seem to us that the British Squadron has rendered important service to the cause of humanity. It has put down piracy on the African seas; has restored peace and tranquillity to a line of sea-coast of more than 2000 miles; has called into existence a large and flourishing commerce, and, at the same time, has thrown the shield of its protection over the cause of Christian missions, and all the varied agency that has been employed to promote the cause of humanity and civilization among the benighted inhabitants of this great continent. If these great objects are not worthy of British philanthropy, we know not where to find those that are.”

Vide page 26.

INTRODUCTION.

MR. LEIGHTON WILSON, a citizen of the United States, the Author of the following observations on the African Squadron, has been for many years residing at the Gaboon River, near the Equator, as a member of the American mission established in those parts. This gentleman has passed twenty years of his life upon the African Coast, and on learning that a Committee of the House of Commons had given an opinion in favour of withdrawing the British Squadron from the Coast of Africa, he drew up this paper in order to show by the unbiassed experience of one apart from English prejudices, what has been the real effect of the policy of England.

Mr. Wilson hoped that the honest testimony of a foreigner, and especially of a citizen of the United States, to the success of the British Squadron, might not be without effect in assisting to disabuse the public mind of this country as to the alleged failure of our repressive efforts and the impossibility of extinguishing the Slave Trade.

Mr. Wilson wrote this paper in April, 1850, and refers only to the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons. The Lords' Report was agreed to a few days before the MS. reached England, and the remarkable coincidence of the

results of this gentleman's experience with the conclusions of their Lordships, derived from the evidence before them, is worthy of the gravest consideration.

The British merchant, the British philanthropist, and above all, the British Christian ought to feel grateful to Mr. Wilson for drawing attention to this subject. Not only does the development of the vast resources of Africa, affecting the mercantile interests of the civilized world at large, and especially of England, depend upon the protection to legitimate commerce which is afforded by the African Squadron against the Slave-trader, who keeps the people at war, and the land consequently in a state of unproductiveness; but, as has been well said, the social and moral condition of a vast continent, and the diffusion of light and knowledge amongst the people of Africa are staked, to all human appearance, on the future conduct of this country in respect to the Slave Trade.

There can be no doubt that, every one desirous of learning the truth on this momentous question, will regard Mr. Wilson's paper as an invaluable means of authentic information, and it has therefore been re-published from the 'Colonial Magazine' in which it first appeared, with a few explanatory notes; some passages also have been printed in italics, but no other change has been made in the author's manuscript.

H. D. T.

LONDON,

January 31st, 1851.

THE BRITISH SQUADRON

ON THE

COAST OF AFRICA.

THERE is scarcely any topic of greater interest before the British public at the present time than the question of the continuance or withdrawal of the Squadron from the coast of Africa. The Committee appointed by Parliament* have reported in favour of its discontinuance; but the spirit with which the subject has since been discussed, both in and out of Parliament, shows that there is anything but unanimity of sentiment in relation to the Report. The public mind is fortunately awake to the importance of the subject; and whatever may be the final disposal of it, one thing is certain, the welfare of Africa is deeply involved. In view of this state of things, *the experience and observations of one who has lived on the coast of Africa nearly twenty years, who has watched the operations of the British Squadron all that time with the liveliest interest, and who is in no way trammelled by any party views that exist in England, may not be unacceptable, or entirely unavailing, in the present crisis.*

If it be true that the efforts of the Squadron to suppress the Slave Trade has been a failure; that no good or important object has been effected after so protracted a struggle with this monstrous evil, then it is but the dictate of common sense that it should be recalled, and, of course, the sooner the better.

* The Author was only in possession of the Report of the Select Committee of the *House of Commons*, and had not heard of its having afterwards been rejected by a large majority of the whole House.—H. D. T.

But, on the contrary, if the experiment has not proved to be a failure; if as much real good has been achieved as could reasonably have been expected under existing circumstances; and if the continuance of the same measures for a while longer (with such alterations and improvements, of course, as experience may suggest) promises to accomplish all that was anticipated by the originators of the enterprise, or could now reasonably be demanded by the friends of Africa, then the responsibility of those who advise its withdrawal is no trifling matter.

In settling the question whether there has been a failure or not, we must inquire what was the object proposed by those who were instrumental, in the first instance, in getting a Squadron stationed on the coast, and the means by which they expected to effect that object.

Those who will take the pains to read what was written, as well as the speeches which were delivered in Parliament about the time referred to, will find that the question originally rested on a much narrower basis than it does at present. It did not then, as it has since, involved, the subject of emancipation in the West Indies, the question of free and slave-grown sugar, and various other minor topics which have grown out of these.

Whatever importance these collateral topics may possess in themselves, they had little or nothing to do with the plans of those who originated the undertaking under consideration. The main object of the enterprise was the relief of Africa. It was thought to be but an act of justice and humanity, on the part of Great Britain towards Africa, to put an end to a traffic which not only filled the latter country with

perpetual strife and bloodshed, but effectually closed every avenue to her improvement and civilisation. The share which the people of Great Britain had taken in promoting this nefarious trade made it obligatory upon her to do something to redress these wrongs; while her prominence among the great Christian nations of the earth made it entirely proper that she should be the pioneer in rescuing Africa from this terrible scourge.

It was not supposed that this traffic would be entirely and for ever broken up by the mere temporary restraints that could be imposed upon it by the presence of the Squadron; much less was it expected that the operations of the Squadron on the coast would exert any direct or efficient influence in promoting civilisation among the people whom they might shield from this evil. But it was hoped that, by keeping it in check for a time, Christianity and civilisation would have an opportunity to put forth their influence, and raise the aborigines to a position of improvement from which there could be no danger of relapsing into their former degradation. These were the views of the distinguished philanthropists who first enlisted the sympathies of the nation in the undertaking. And so long as public attention was confined to this simple original object, the expense of the enterprise was cheerfully borne, and there was no want of exultation at the success which from time to time crowned the efforts of the Squadron in this difficult and somewhat perilous service.

Having made these preliminary explanations, we are now prepared to show why this enterprise cannot be regarded as a failure. And the emotion which predominates in our minds, since taking up our pen

to write, is that of surprise that the results of this enterprise should be so little understood in England, and, above all, that so many of the officers of the Squadron, who have themselves been engaged in this service, should have no higher appreciation of their own success. The views of the latter, however, (those of them, at least, who have but little faith in the success of the enterprise), may be accounted for in part by the fact that they have seldom been stationed on the coast for a longer period than two years, and, of course, have not had the advantage, from personal observation, of comparing the present state of things on the coast with what it was fifteen or twenty years ago. Many, too, have been induced to renounce all confidence in the scheme, from the fact that they were placed in command of vessels that were utterly unfit for this kind of service, and were doomed, without any fault of their own, to find their most vigorous and praiseworthy efforts terminate only in disappointment.

Notwithstanding the objections from this source, we propose to show that the Squadron has been operating against the Slave Trade, directly and indirectly, in a most effectual way, and we rely upon facts to sustain us in this position, which can neither be gainsayed or denied.

Previous to the period when this traffic was declared to be illegal by the British Parliament and the Government of the United States, it was carried on very much in the same way as lawful trade is at the present time. Vessels which came out for slaves "ran the coast down" (to use the parlance of the country), touching at all the principal native settlements, and purchasing such slaves as were offered

for sale, until their cargoes were completed. In some cases whole cargoes were collected by kidnapping the natives who came off in their canoes to trade, and sometimes by capturing other slave-vessels that had completed their cargoes, and were ready to sail, but had not the means of self-defence. Besides, there were a few points along the coast occupied by the British, as well as other European Governments, intended to facilitate the same trade. In this way the whole coast, from Senegal to Benguela, was, less or more voluntarily or involuntarily, implicated in this trade. When the trade became illegal, however, it was banished from most of the European settlements; and the Spaniards, Portuguese, and others, who determined to persist in it, notwithstanding its illegality, had to adopt a new mode of operations. They could no longer perform their usual voyages along the coast without multiplying the chances of being seized as prizes, and having their property confiscated. It became necessary, therefore, to erect barracoons on those parts of the coast where slaves could be collected with the greatest ease and in the largest numbers; and at the appointed time the vessels returned and took away these slaves without being detained on the coast more than twenty-four hours, and in some cases only a single night. The points thus occupied at one time could not have been less than forty or fifty. The English have never had any treaties with the Spanish, Portuguese, or Brazilian Governments, that would authorize them to destroy these barracoons*. Hence they have been

* The destruction of barracoons and slave factories is a question with the native governments, and not with those of which

compelled to do what they could by guarding the coast and seizing slave-vessels in the vicinity of these barracoons. But as the number of the places occupied by the Slave-trade greatly exceeded the number of cruisers* employed to watch them, and were seldom less than fifty or a hundred miles apart, it will readily be seen that the cruisers had a difficult task to perform, and the frequent escape of slavers was inevitable. At the same time the profits of the trade were so great, that the escape of a single slaver would cover the loss of three captures.

Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, such have been the diligence and activity of the officers of the Squadron, that they have forced this trade out of more than three-fourths of the strongholds which it once occupied. Let any one open the map of Africa and ascertain the places where slaves are now collected and shipped, and compare the number with what it was twenty or twenty-five years ago, and it cannot result in anything short of profound surprise.

From Senegal, near the borders of the Great Desert, to Cape Lopez, a few miles south of the Equator, a distance coastwise of something like 2,500 miles,

these miscreant slave traders are the subjects, who, in every case, are violating their own laws, so far as they extend. In the several instances that have occurred of destroying factories, no complaint has been made by the government of the country to which the slave traders belonged. And as regards English courts, the foreign law prohibiting the Slave Trade would be an effectual bar to any legal proceedings. In Captain Denman's case, the Spanish law was known to exist prohibiting the Slave Trade as a crime, but the plaintiffs took measures to prevent evidence of the fact from being given.—H. D. T.

* Down to the year 1830, there never were more than six cruisers employed on the African coast.—H. D. T.

there is now, with the exception of three factories on what is called the Slave Coast, no trade in slaves whatever. In fact, the trade, with the exceptions just made, is now confined to what is called the Congo country, in which there are not more than eight or ten points where slaves are collected, and from which they are shipped†.* If we add to these the three above mentioned, we have, on the whole coast, not more than twelve or fourteen; whereas there were, even within the knowledge of the writer, nearly four times this number. We scarcely know how such results have been overlooked, and yet these are facts that cannot be denied. More than 2,000 miles of sea coast, and that forming the frontier of the best and fairest portions of the African continent, has been relieved from this unparalleled scourge; and perhaps more than 20,000,000 of human beings, interiorwards, have been restored to comparative peace and happiness by the operations of the squadron along the coast. And how has all

* See MAP. The Author refers to the Bight of Benin, along 200 miles of which some slave trade still exists; but this must also entirely cease from the moment the Commodore is able to have six or seven efficient cruizers constantly stationed there, each on a clearly defined district, and ordered to prevent the embarkation of slaves by inshore cruising.—H. D. T.

† It is possible that there is a little of this trade near the Rio Pongas and Bissao, to the north of Sierra Leone; but, if any at all, it is very insignificant.—AUTHOR.

Mr. Wilson, doubtless, had not seen the last report of the Mixed Commission Court at Sierra Leone, which states:—"Not a *single* cargo of slaves has been taken away from *any* part of the coast between Sierra Leone and Senegal in 1849." Appendix to "Lords' Report, 1850," p. 195. This tract of coast includes the places above specified.—H. D. T.

this been achieved? We reply, by a process in itself perfectly natural, and in exact accordance with the expectations of those who originated this enterprise. Take, as an illustration, the history of the Slave-trade in the Bight of Biafra. All who have investigated the subject know that the rivers Benin, Bonny, Brass, Calabar, and Cameroons were once the chief seats of this trade. It is through these rivers that the Niger discharges itself into the ocean; and as the factories near the mouths of these different branches had great facility of access to the heart of Africa, it is probable that the Slave-trade was carried on more vigorously here than anywhere else on the coast. But at present there is none of it. This part of the coast having been subjected for several successive years to a virtual blockade, not only did the Spaniards and Portuguese find themselves under the necessity of relinquishing it, but, at the same time, the natives saw that they could derive a larger and more certain profit from lawful commerce, and consequently turned their attention to the manufacture of palm-oil. The number of vessels now engaged in carrying on a lawful trade in these rivers is between forty and fifty; and so decided are the advantages reaped by the natives from this change in their commercial affairs, it is not believed that they would ever revert to it again, even if all outward restraints were taken away.

Now, while we do not expect the truth of these statements to be called into question, we anticipate that some exceptions will be taken as to the amount of real good that has been effected, as well as to the share of credit which we have assigned to the British Squadron in connection with the above-mentioned

results. It will be said, perhaps, that in forcing the Slave-trade out of so many of its strongholds, important aid has been derived from the English Colonies and the Liberian settlements; and that in relation to other parts of the coast, where no such aid has been available, although the Slave-trade has been shut up to fewer points, the only consequence is, that it is carried on more vigorously at these points, and that the number of slaves still exported is as great as it ever was.

In relation to the first of these objections we would remark, that while it is unquestionably true that important aid has been derived from these settlements in breaking up slave-factories in their immediate vicinity, it is equally true that they could have had no such aid, had it not been for the countenance and support which they received from the English and other men-of-war on the coast, and for the simple reason that none of these settlements, nor all of them together, have sufficient naval force to contend with a single armed slaver.* If they have in their power to destroy any barracoons that may be established in their immediate neighbourhood, by marching a land force against them, their enemies, if not intimidated by the presence of so many men-of-war, could at any time take ample revenge by destroying what little commerce they have, if they did not put in imminent peril the most promising settlements on the coast.

In relation to the other objection, that there has been no material diminution of the number of slaves

* Governor Roberts, of Liberia, was enabled to destroy the last remaining slave factory there by the assistance of the French Squadron, the English cruizers sent for the purpose having arrived too late.—H. D. T.

exported from the coast, we have more than our doubts. The time has been when tolerably accurate statistics might be collected on this subject, but we do not see how this can be done at present.* There is no one on the coast of Africa who can furnish anything like accurate information; and as most of the slaves which reach Brazil are smuggled into places where there is the least likelihood of their being detected, we doubt whether there is any one there that can furnish information upon which more reliance can be placed. *It is the policy of those engaged in this traffic to make an exaggerated impression, for they hope to put an end to the efforts of the squadron by convincing the English nation of the hopelessness of the undertaking.* Our own impression is, that the number of slaves exported has vastly diminished, perhaps in a ratio very nearly proportioned to the extent of sea-coast which it has lost. It is utterly incredible that the number of slaves now concentrated at a dozen

* The tables of Mr. Hutt's Committee are, however, worthy of notice; for, having been brought forward to prove the total inefficacy of our efforts, they may be fairly taken as not exaggerating the degree of success that has been accomplished. Those tables show that, for the five years ending with 1839, 65,000 slaves were landed annually in Brazil, and that since 1839, embracing a period of eight years, the average has been but 31,000. They show that, for fifteen years prior to 1835, the importation into Cuba was 40,000 a-year; that, with the first Equipment Treaty in that year, it fell to 29,000 for the next five years. That since 1839, when equipped vessels became subject to seizure everywhere, it has for eight years averaged only 6,000 per annum. Thus the power to seize equipped vessels, in spite of the notoriously defective class of cruisers employed, has been followed by a reduction in the number carried across the Atlantic, shown by the difference between 105,000 and 37,000, or, in other words, by *no less a diminution than nearly 68,000 in every year.*—H. D. T.

or fourteen points can be compared with what it was when the whole coast was taxed for this purpose; and it is equally improbable that the number of slave-vessels which escape now can be compared with what they were ten or twelve years ago, when there were fewer cruisers on the coast.* But even if this were not the case, still it must be obvious to every man of reflection that very great progress must have been made towards its entire extirpation, by reducing it to such narrow limits; *and any special symptoms of life and energy which it may put forth just now cannot, to the experienced eye, be regarded in any other light than the desperate struggles of a ruined cause.* A very large proportion of the country has already been delivered from its clutches, and, as will be shown in a subsequent part of this article, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for that trade to re-instate itself in places where it has once lost its power and influence.

The task of managing it, too, along a line of sea-coast of not more than three *hundred* miles must be easy compared with what it was when as many *thousand* miles of coast had to be guarded. Let a few improvements be adopted in the operations of the Squadron on the coast, and we see no good reason why this traffic may not be brought to a speedy and effectual end.

Thus far we have confined our remarks to the direct influence of the squadron in breaking up the Slave Trade.

We propose now to show that it has been operat-

* From 1819 to 1839 (twenty years) the British Squadron captured only 333 slave vessels: from 1839 to 1849 inclusive (eleven years), it captured SEVEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOUR slave-vessels. This vast increase in the number of captures, coupled with the great reduction in the amount of Slave Trade during the same period (as shown in the note to p. 14), demonstrates the powerful efficacy of the measures of this country.—H D. T.

ing still more efficiently in an indirect way; and under this head we would specify the influence it has exerted in promoting lawful commerce, the countenance and protection it has extended to the European settlements and the American Colonies* on the coast, and especially the indirect aid it has afforded to the cause of Christian missions. In these different ways the British Squadron has done more, perhaps, to emancipate Africa from the thralldom of the foreign Slave Trade, than by all other methods put together. Without this, all the prize-ships that have been taken, and all the treaties that have been formed, whether with the chiefs of Africa, or with the different Governments of Europe, would have been comparatively worthless. It should be borne in mind too, that all the indirect good secured in these various ways was distinctly anticipated, and did in fact constitute an essential part of the enterprise, as it existed in the minds of those who projected it.

Lawful commerce (and by this term we mean trade in the natural products of the country, in opposition to the Slave Trade,) owes its existence almost entirely to the presence and influence of the British Squadron. Previous to the period when a check was given to the Slave Trade, the lawful commerce of Western Africa consisted of small quantities of gold dust, ivory, and bees' wax, chiefly from the Gold Coast and Senegambia, and did not amount annually, it is pre-

* It is a remarkable fact that the Colonists of Liberia, soon after their first establishment in 1822, would have been driven into the sea by the hostile native tribes in the neighbourhood, had it not been for the support and protection of a British naval officer of the African squadron. See "Life of Ashmun," page 147, and "The New Republic," page 86. This last little work ought to be read by all who are interested in Liberia. It is about to be republished by Nisbet, of Berners-street, under the title of "Africa Redeemed: or the Means of her Relief Illustrated by the Growth and Prospects of Liberia."—H. D. T.

sumed, to more than 20,000%. The insignificance of this trade, however, did not arise from any poverty in the natural resources of the country at that time, for they were as considerable then as they are now; but to the influence of the Slave Trade. During the prevalence of this trade, the African seas were almost wholly given up to piracy. No vessels could carry on lawful trade without the constant liability of being plundered. If these vessels were armed for self-defence, as was attempted in some few cases, the expense was so great, that it consumed all the profits of the voyage.

Another thing that operated equally to the disadvantage of lawful trade was, the fact that the natives of the country were so much engrossed in furnishing victims for the Slave Trade, that they had neither the time nor the taste for the tamer pursuits of cutting dye-wood or manufacturing palm-oil. Indeed, the excitement connected with capturing and selling slaves was always more congenial to savage natures; and had it not been for the obstacles interposed by the presence of the British Squadron, we scarcely see how their attention could ever have been diverted from this to pursuits so different and so much less congenial to their natural tastes.

The presence of so many vessels of war has put an effectual stop to all piracy on the coast; and the impediments thrown in the way of the Slave Trade have left the great majority of the natives of the country no other alternative than to betake themselves to the peaceful pursuits of lawful commerce, or give up all intercourse with the civilised world. They chose the former, and we have the fruits of this choice in the unprecedented prosperity of their commerce.

We do not pretend to give precise statistics, but suppose it entirely safe to say that the annual exports from Western Africa to the present time, cannot be less than 2,000,000%.* whilst there is every reason to believe that it will double, if it does not treble, or even quadruple itself in the next twenty years, if it is only protected until it has struck its roots a little deeper in the soil of Africa.

We might bring together a large number of interesting facts to illustrate the very rapid growth of this trade, but must confine ourselves to a limited number of the simplest statements. The Island of Fernando Po, which is supposed to contain about 20,000 aboriginal inhabitants, had no lawful commerce whatever twenty or twenty-five years ago. A small quantity of palm-oil was made for domestic use, but not a gallon was exported. At present, however, as we have learned from good authority, more than 200 tons are annually exported; and judging from the rate of its increase for the two or three last years, it will double itself in the next five. We might mention other places along the coast, as Grand Cestos, Cape Lahou, Jack-a-Jacks, and all the rivers of the Bight of Biafra, where the growth of this trade has been much more rapid, but the particulars of which are not so well known as the case just mentioned. We might arrive at similar results by comparing the number of vessels now engaged in lawful commerce with what it was twenty-five or thirty years ago. Then there were not more than

* The imports from Africa into Great Britain alone, in 1849, amounted to £975,000; and I am told, from good authority, that the legal trade carried on by other nations (Dutch, French, American, and Portuguese), is at least to equal this.—H. D. T.

ten or twelve on the whole coast; at present, however, there are more than 200,* the aggregate tonnage of which greatly exceeds that of the Slave Trade in the days of its most uninterrupted prosperity.

Still, however, we do not attach so much importance to this trade, on account of its present value, as we do to what it is capable of becoming, and is likely to become, if the agency which called it into existence is not prematurely snatched away. There is no reason to doubt that palm-oil will, in a few years, become one of the largest branches of commerce in the whole world. It can be produced to an almost unlimited extent, and the demand for it hitherto has always been equal to the amount produced. Palm-oil, however, is only one of a great variety of other products of the country, equally as valuable and capable of quite as much augmentation.

In connexion with such commercial results, present, past, and prospective, we do not see how the importance of the Squadron on the coast of Africa can well be exaggerated. Regarded merely in a selfish point of view, England will be repaid (and that, perhaps, at no distant day) for every dollar she has expended upon this enterprise, not only in the market she will have created in Africa for her manufactures, but likewise in the immense amount of valuable products that will be brought to her own shores from that country. But if these results acquire importance in connexion with commercial enterprise, how must they appear when contemplated in the light of humanity! We cannot contemplate this sudden and wonderful development of commerce in any other light than as

* Sixty-one British palm-oil ships arrived in one single English port (Liverpool) in 1849.—H. D. T.

one of those efficient agencies employed by Providence, not only to raise up Africa from the lowest depths of savagism, but to place her on a footing of respectability with the most favoured nations of the earth. And if this be a sober inference from the improvement already taken place, who will grudge the price of her deliverance?

Another object of importance effected by the Squadron is the protection it has afforded to the various European and American settlements that have been formed along the coast. Of these, eight are English, seven are French, four belong to the Liberian Republic, two are Dutch, and one belongs to Denmark. Portugal has possession of most of the islands, but has only one settlement on the mainland. Of these settlements Sierra Leone and Liberia are the largest in point of population. The former receives its accessions from the slaves that are recaptured by the British squadron, and contains a population of 60,000 to 65,000. The latter receives its accessions by emigrations of free coloured people and emancipated slaves from the United States, and has a population of 5,000 or 6,000. Liberia has recently assumed the character of an independent Republic; whilst Sierra Leone, with a population nearly ten times as great, continues the relationship of a colony to Great Britain.

Most of the other settlements on the coast are little more than fortified stations, around which a number of traders have rallied for the purpose of carrying on trade with the aborigines. These settlements, though none of them have as yet acquired any very great commercial importance, are nevertheless so many nucleuses of civilization,

the influence of which is being every day more and more extended. There are some things connected with the management of these settlements, as well as the manner in which trade is conducted, that are very prejudicial to the improvement of the natives, and they ought to be corrected. Their influence, upon the whole, however, is good, and they are doubtless destined to perform an important part in promoting the civilization of the country generally.

Natives are drawn from a great distance in the interior to these settlements, for the purpose of exchanging the products of the country for the manufactures of Europe; whilst the traders themselves are employing a considerable number of coasting craft * for the purpose of extending their commerce along the coast as well as in the interior. At many of the settlements, too, the forms of law, as practised by civilized nations, are beginning to be introduced, so that the natives who frequent them will not only have all the stimulus to industry which commerce furnishes, but will become familiar with models of Government, upon which they may construct their own as the progress of society may require.

But these settlements, which promise so much for the future welfare of Africa, have always had, and

* Coasting vessels trade regularly between Sierra Leone and Badagry, a distance of 1200 miles, owned and navigated entirely by liberated Africans. This trade took its rise in 1842, when the liberated Africans of the Yoruba tribe, wishing to get back to their country, clubbed together, and bought up condemned slave-vessels for the purpose, the Government affording them no facilities for leaving the colony. One native owner, the sole proprietor of one of the vessels, granted to Mr. Townsend, the missionary, a passage, free of expense, to Badagry.—H. D. T.

still need, the protection of foreign Governments. There are few, if any of them, that could withstand the combinations of hostile natives that would be formed against them, especially when they were instigated and supported by Spanish and Portuguese slave traders. Foreign residents, all along the coast, are perfectly aware of this; and there is nothing that would be more heartily deprecated by them than the premature withdrawal of the Squadron. It is not supposed that they will always continue in this dependent condition. Some of them are comparatively new, and have not acquired sufficient maturity and strength to maintain their own rights, or to enforce the principles of justice and order among the tribes by whom they are surrounded. Others, though much older, sustain a new relationship to the aborigines, in consequence of having exchanged the trade in slaves for lawful commerce; and although the people generally are beginning to appreciate the advantages of this, there are, no doubt, evil-minded persons among them that would gladly unite in any hostile measures that might be set on foot as soon as the Squadron was withdrawn.

The time will doubtless come when they will need no such aid. But those who have allowed themselves to be persuaded that they have already acquired sufficient strength to protect themselves, or depend upon them to do anything effective in putting down the Slave-trade without the co-operation of the Squadron, will find out ere long that they have leaned upon a broken reed.

All that has been said in relation to the importance of the Squadron in developing the commercial resources of the country, and in promoting the cause

of civilization, may be applied with equal force to the countenance it has lent to the cause of missions. The writer is not aware that the officers of the Squadron have been in the habit of regarding any mission stations on the coast as under their special protection: but the mutual good feeling that has always existed between them and the missionaries; the readiness which they ever have manifested to repress all lawless violence; and especially the peace and quiet which they have restored to those parts of the coast where the missionaries are labouring, are favours and advantages more highly appreciated than the officers of the Squadron have any idea of.

At the same time it will readily be granted by all those who have reflected seriously on the subject, that Africa can never be restored to peace and happiness, or enjoy any high degree of internal prosperity, without the aid of Christianity. The highest degree of civilization and commercial prosperity, even if they could be attained without her assistance, would be but a doubtful boon. Christianity is capable of doing for her what no other agency ever can; and the missionary societies, both of England and America, have addressed themselves to the task of giving her the Gospel, with a degree of earnestness and energy which promises the most cheering results. The incipient stages of their efforts were not without difficulties and discouragements, arising chiefly from the insalubrity of the climate; but they have been continued long enough, and with sufficient success, to demonstrate the practicability of the undertaking. *To the south of Sierra Leone, and between that and the Equator, that part of the coast where the efforts of the Squadron to put down the Slave Trade have*

been most successful, there have been founded, in fifteen or sixteen years, as many as twelve independent mission, at the distance of 100 or 200 miles from each other, embracing three times that number of distinct stations along the coast, and a still greater number of out-stations interiorwards. Some of these stations are in the immediate neighbourhood of the European and American settlements above mentioned; but others, and the greater part of them, are far off from the abodes of civilization. The Gospel is stately preached to thousands and hundreds of thousands, not only along the frontier regions, but far in the interior. More than 10,000 youths are now receiving a Christian education in the schools connected with these missions, and will, ere long, be sent forth to spread the blessings of education and Christianity far and near among the benighted inhabitants of this land.*

At the same time, as many as a dozen different dialects have been studied and reduced to system, and as many printing-presses are industriously employed in printing books in these dialects for the thousands who have been already taught to read. All this varied agency has been put into operation in the last fifteen years; and as every step gained in this work prepares the way for more accelerated progress, it must be seen at once that Christian missions are destined to exert a vast influence over the future destinies of Africa; and they will therefore receive,

* The interesting Station of the Wesleyans at Coomassie, the capital of Ashantee, may be mentioned, as well as the Church Missionary Society's flourishing Station at Abbeokuta, which is in the heart of the slave-trading country, 50 miles inland from the Bight of Benin.—H. D. T.

as they certainly deserve, the countenance and support of every friend of humanity.

The line of policy marked out for most of these missions is, that while their main object will be to push their operations towards the central parts of the Continent, where it is supposed the climate will be more congenial to European constitutions, and where the population is greater and better organised, they must at the outset acquire a firm footing on the sea-coast, without which it will be impossible to maintain a line of communication with the interior, or keep up any intercourse with the civilized world.

As yet, the missionaries have done little more than possess themselves of the outposts; but, in accomplishing even this much, they feel themselves greatly indebted to what has been done by the Squadron, and they will feel the increased importance of this influence just in proportion as they approach those larger and more powerful kingdoms in the interior, where the agitations caused by the Slave Trade are more sensibly felt than even along the sea-coast.

So long as the African seas were given up to piracy and the Slave Trade, and the aborogines, in consequence, were kept in constant excitement and warfare, it was almost impossible either to have commenced or continued a missionary station on the coast. And the fact that there was none anywhere between Sierra Leone and the Cape of Good Hope previous to the year 1832, shows that it was regarded as impracticable. Christianity does not invoke the aid of the sword; but when she can be shielded from the violence of lawless men by the intervention of "the powers that be," or when the providence of God goes before and smooths down the waves of discord

and strife, she accepts it as a grateful boon, and discharges her duty with the greater alacrity and cheerfulness. And whilst the missionaries cherish the conviction that their strength and reliance is in the unseen arm, there is, nevertheless, no class of men on the coast of Africa who would regret the removal of the squadron with more heartfelt sorrow.

In all these varied ways it does seem to us that the British Squadron has rendered important service to the cause of humanity. It has put down piracy on the African seas; has restored peace and tranquillity to a line of sea-coast of more than 2000 miles; has called into existence a large and flourishing commerce, and, at the same time, has thrown the shield of its protection over the cause of Christian missions, and all the varied agency that has been employed to promote the cause of humanity and civilisation among the benighted inhabitants of this great continent. IF THESE GREAT OBJECTS ARE NOT WORTHY OF BRITISH PHILANTHROPY, WE KNOW NOT WHERE TO FIND THOSE THAT ARE.

The opinion has long been entertained by many sincere friends of Africa that, so long as the demand for slaves in Brazil is so great, it will be impossible to break up the Slave-trade by any forcible measures.

More recently, but from a different source, we have heard the opinion gravely expressed that the most certain and effectual way of breaking it up will be to let the Brazilians have unlimited access to the coast of Africa, and so glut their own markets that slaves will become comparatively valueless. We confess we have never heard this latter sentiment avowed without feelings of mingled astonishment and indignation, and have scarcely been able to refrain from

exclaiming Treason! as often as we have heard it uttered. What does it amount to when expressed in plain English? Something like this: that, after toiling so long for Africa, we have come to the conclusion that she is not worth contending for, and therefore deliver her over to the destroyer without condition or mercy.

Who can tell how many slaves it will take to glut the market of Brazil? The half of the population of the continent of Africa would scarcely be sufficient to supply the demand that would spring up under such circumstances. Treated as her slaves are, and as the Brazilians think it their interest to treat them, the time will never come when they will dispense with the necessity of fresh importations from the coast of Africa. But let her be forced to adopt a different line of policy in relation to the treatment of her slaves, and be made to rely upon the natural increase of those already in the country, and the time is not far distant when we may reasonably expect the Brazilians themselves to be utterly opposed to any further accessions to her slaves from the coast of Africa. There is in the southern parts of the United States a state of feeling, in relation to slavery, that we may expect to see in Brazil before the lapse of many years. However strenuous planters in the Southern States are in defending the institutions of slavery, it would be difficult to find an individual among them that would consent to receive a fresh cargo from the coast of Africa. And the thing which awakens more serious apprehensions in their minds about the stability of the institution than anything else is, the unparalleled increase of the slaves among them. This one thing makes it perfectly obvious to every man

*

of reflection, that it cannot be controlled for any considerable length of time to come; and the engrossing inquiry now is, What shall we do with our slaves? Let Brazil take the same care of her slaves, the result will be the same, and the inquiry will soon follow, not how we shall wring more slaves from the coast of Africa, but how we shall dispose of those we already have?

A great deal has been said about the expense of this enterprise, and the inseparable loss of life connected with it.

As a matter of expense, we have too little knowledge of financial affairs to speak with confidence; but there has always appeared to us much misapprehension, if not misrepresentation, on this subject. The people of Great Britain are scarcely divided in opinion in relation to the necessity of maintaining a naval as well as a military force in times of peace. Whatever speculations peace-men may entertain on the subject, we fancy it would be a difficult task to persuade the nation at large to abolish either their army or their navy in the present state of the world. And if a navy must be maintained in times of peace, where is the great additional expense of having a small section* of it stationed on the coast of Africa?

* A Return furnished to the Lords' Committee by the Accountant-General (Vide Appendix A. Report, 1850), shows the expense of the African Squadron, exclusive of stores, and wear and tear, to be £166,840 per annum. The additional expense for stores, and wear and tear, is between £60,000 and £70,000 more, making a total of about £230,000. It is admitted on all hands, that at least one-half of the force employed would be required for the protection of our commerce, if all repressive measures were to be abandoned.—H. D. T.

Some additional expense is incurred, it is true, in the way of prize-money, the support of a Court of Mixed Commission, and the temporary support of recaptive slaves, but nothing in comparison with the great objects which are accomplished by the enterprise. If the resources of Great Britain were really tasked by this comparatively small outlay, it would become a matter of just inquiry how far it should be continued; but so long as this is not the case, it will be difficult to point out any object more worthy of her care and patronage.

In relation to the exposure of life, it is admitted that much sickness has been endured and many lives lost, but this was in the earlier stages of the enterprise, when the officers of the squadron were inexperienced in relation to the best means of preserving the health and lives of their crews. The practice more recently adopted of employing Kroomen and other natives of the country to perform all that kind of labour which requires special exposure, has placed this enterprise on an entirely different footing, and made cruising along the coast of Africa nearly as safe as anywhere else. The fact is already known to the Board of Admiralty; and if the limits of this article would allow, we could prove from our own observations, not only in connexion with the operations of the squadron, but likewise in regard to trading-vessels, the justice and truth of this assumption. Commander Chamberlain, of her Britannic Majesty's brig *Britomart*, informed the writer that he had been cruising on the coast nearly two years without having lost a man, or having had, so far as he knew, a single case of African fever on board his vessel; the United States sloop of war, *Yorktown*, with a crew

of nearly 200 men, cruized on the coast two years without having lost a single man; and the writer was informed by Captain Bell, that he had never had a healthier crew in any part of the world. Facts of a similar character without number have come under the observation of the writer in connexion with trading-vessels. It has uniformly been observed, that where sleeping on shore has been avoided, and where temperance and cleanliness have been enforced, there has been little or no sickness that could be attributed to the climate. Since these and other measures for preserving health have been adopted on board of the cruisers, there has been little sickness, and still less mortality.*

If the Government of Great Britain would give efficiency to this enterprise, and bring the Slave Trade to a speedy termination, vessels of a better class should be designated to this service than those which have been stationed on the coast for a few years past. The writer pretends to no personal knowledge of the sailing qualities of vessels; but an article has recently appeared in the *London Times*, by one of the commanders who has been in the service, in which it is conclusively proved that a large number of the

* Sir Charles Hotham, the late Commander-in-chief of the station, stated, in his evidence before the Lords (May, 1849), that the annual mortality of the squadron had only been $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for the previous two years. The great mortality formerly was chiefly occasioned by the necessity of boat-service up the rivers, which has scarcely ever to be resorted to now, the Slave Trade having been driven from the rivers, excepting the Congo. The recent plan adopted by the Admiralty of relieving the Cruisers at the expiration of two instead of three years, has also, doubtless, conduced to the diminished mortality.—H. D. T.

vessels in the African service for a few years past have been of the poorer class, and utterly unfit for the kind of service in which they are engaged. None but the fastest sailers can be of any real use. Those employed by the Slave Traders are the fastest that can be procured; and to send in chase of them second or third-rate cruisers is but to subject the officers of the navy to disappointment and mortification. A small number of the fastest sailers would be more effective, and accomplish the undertaking with much more certainty. We do not pretend to define any particular length of time that it will be necessary to keep a squadron on the coast—this must of course be determined by circumstances; but for our own part we do not suppose that the period will be long before these exertions may be gradually diminished, until no further necessity will exist.

In conclusion, we would suggest also the importance of forming a larger number of military and commercial stations along the coast, like those of Cape Coast and Accra. They might be erected on a small and economical scale, and being garrisoned by black soldiers, as they ought to be, the expense of maintaining them would be comparatively small. These stations, whilst they would form important centres for the promotion of commerce and the spread of Christianity, might be rendered very efficient in putting down the Slave-trade. Treaties for this purpose might easily be formed with the African chiefs more immediately concerned; and if they were thrown open to the free trade of all nations, as the English settlements on the Gold Coast are at the present time, very little jealousy would be felt in relation to any new territory which Great Britain might

acquire for this purpose. The importance of such establishments is enhanced, too, by the necessity which is felt for consular agents to adjudicate differences between captains of trading-vessels and the chiefs of the country; and this necessity will increase just in proportion to the increase of lawful commerce.

Frederick Holland.

THE SLAVE TRADE,
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON,
AND
MR. HUTT'S COMMITTEE.

BY THE HON. CAPTAIN DENMAN, R. N.

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THE SLAVE TRADE

MR. BUTT'S COMMITTEE

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Report of the Committee on the Slave Trade, 1840.
The Slave Trade, considered in connection with the abolition
movement, by the Hon. George Thompson, M.P., and others.
The Report of the Slave Trade Committee of the House of Com-
mons, 1840 and 1841.

and its consequences to the West India Colonies, by
J. A. Smith, Esq., of the House of Commons, in 1840. Printed
by the Stationer, Court, St. Martin's.
The Slave Trade, by the Hon. G. Thompson, M.P., and
others, 1840 and 1841.

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THE SLAVE TRADE,
THE AFRICAN SQUADRON,
AND
MR. HUTT'S COMMITTEE.

- Report of the Lords' Committee on Slave Trade.* 1849.
The Niger Trade Considered in connexion with the African Blockade. By Sir George Stephen. Simpkin and Marshall.
Two Reports of the Slave Trade Committee of the House of Commons. 1848 and 1849.
Lord Denman's two Letters to Lord Brougham. Hatchard.
A Few Words on the Encouragement given to Slave Trade and Slavery, &c. By Stephen Cave, Esq. Murray.
The Case of our African Cruizers, &c. By the Rev. G. Smith. Hatchard and Son.
West Indian Interests, African Emigration and Slave Trade. By the Hon. Captain Denman. Bigg and Son.
The African Squadron. By Capt. Matson, R.N. Fourth edition. Ridgway.
Free Trade in Negroes. Ollivier.
The Cruizers; a Letter to the Marquis of Lansdowne, &c. By James Richardson.
Letter from Sir George Stephen to Sir E. F. Buxton on the Proposed Revival of the English Slave Trade. Simpkin and Marshall.
Analysis of Evidence before the Committees on the Slave Trade.
"Patriot" Newspaper.

ACCORDING to the promise in our August Number, we have devoted much attention to the question of the suppression of the slave trade, and the squadron on the coast of Africa—an inquiry of great difficulty, not only from the magnitude and importance

of the subject, but also from the studious care which has been taken to keep the facts and arguments urged in their behalf entirely out of the public view. The greater part of the pamphlets at the head of this article are totally unknown to the public in general, and yet, to any candid investigation, their consideration would be absolutely essential. The resolutions of the committee of the House of Lords have been also kept entirely out of sight, while those of the House of Commons have been reported and urged on the public attention, as bearing a character the very reverse of that which truly belongs to them. Who takes the trouble to wade through the blue-books, or even to notice the numbers on each side in the divisions on each resolution? For one who gives himself the pains to reckon even the latter with his own eyes, ten thousand take the leading article of the *Times* as if it were Gospel truth. Thus it is not the report of Mr. Hutt's committee which has so powerfully aided Mr. Hutt's own views, but it is the *Times'* account of that report; and as regards its true weight and value, as bearing on the question, two things could scarcely be more different, or even opposite.

For a long period, the *Times* has devoted itself to the bitterest hostility against the various measures of justice towards the negro, which have done honour to this country. The great and holy principles of *right* which dictated these measures have been utterly put out of sight, and we have had, instead, perpetual attempts to create envy of the condition of the emancipated negroes, by comparing it with that of our own working classes, and a constant strain of taunting ridicule at the folly which threw away the profits of slavery and the slave trade.

Our connexion with the colonies led us to observe, with the deepest interest, the course pursued by the *Times* on the Sugar Duties Bill of 1846. We have read, over and over again, its laboured statements of the cruel condition of the West Indian colonies, first deprived of slave labour by the ruthless stupidity of the Buxtons, the Clarksons, and the Wilberforces, (which would appear to be the act most hateful to the *Times*), and then cut off by the more congenial economists from the protection assured to them when their slaves were enfranchised, and without which, it was as well known then as now, they could not compete with slave-trading and slave growing countries. This dilemma has been repeated month after month, and year after year, in the columns of the *Times*; but we have looked in vain, amidst all its assurances of pity, for one single practical suggestion for the benefit of the sufferers.

For a short time, indeed, the *Times* encouraged the delusion that unlimited African Emigration was the remedy ; but this nostrum, already proved by Lord Sandon's committee of 1842 to be out of the question, received its *coup-de-grace* from Lord George Bentinck's committee in its report in 1848. That committee's opinion, that a 10s. protection could alone save the West Indies, received no support from the *Times*, which still continued harping on West Indian depression and African slave trade, in a succession of articles as unworthy of the "leading journal of Europe" in talent as in morality, and placing the British people, whose sentiments it professes to speak, in a most unenviable light before the civilised world.

At length, deprived, as the *Times* has so often told us, first of slavery, and then of protection, the colonies became awakened to the truth, viz., that their continued cultivation depends on the suppression of the slave trade. Put down the slave trade, they say, and we may yet prosper. Slavery we can compete with, but not with slavery perpetually recruited by fresh importations, where the slaves are forced, by the most appalling cruelties, to yield the largest possible amount of labour in the shortest possible time, and are maintained on the principle that it is "cheaper to import than to breed." This crime, say the colonists, has been denounced by the civilised world in congress—it is condemned by the laws of every state. Two states alone still give it a surreptitious sanction, though it is condemned even by their own municipal codes, and though they are both pledged to England, by the most solemn engagements, to put the traffic down. These are the rivals whose competition is destroying the colonies, and it is the stimulus of slave trade alone that gives them such an overwhelming advantage. Accordingly, public meetings assembled in the West Indies, unequalled in the number and respectability of the attendance, in the moderation and propriety of their language, in their singleness and honesty of purpose, and, we may safely add, in the reason and justice of their demand. The slaves had been enfranchised, the pledge of continued protection broken, but the pledge to suppress the slave trade remained, measures for the purpose were in operation, though with imperfect success. The perishing colonies stretch forth their hands, and implore the mother country to act with increased vigour. The slave trade, they say, will complete our ruin ; every slave voyage is a breach of treaty ; this monstrous pursuit at an end, and we can yet raise our heads and prosper ; leave it to itself, and we are lost. We implore you, then, as a duty of justice and mercy towards us—whose wrongs you

acknowledge—to enforce your compacts, and to suppress this horrid traffic.

We waited with anxiety for the notice the *Times* would give to this touching and powerful appeal. We find the following words:—

“Concurrently with the exercise of these tactics, another scheme of agitation was recently introduced. It was resolved, at large public meetings, to demand of Great Britain the performance of her compacts relative to the slave trade. It is unnecessary to state that the real purport of these resolutions was not enunciated in their expressed terms. The spirit in which they were carried was less that of philanthropy than *faction*; but it would be vain to deny that they were plausibly couched, and not unsoundly based. Our obligation to suppress slavery with the strong hand was the complement of our abrupt dealings with our colonies. Could we really have fulfilled it, the West Indians would have been placed once more on a fair footing with their commercial rivals. . . . None know better than the inhabitants of Jamaica that this failure was inevitable, and that the most desperate efforts have not been wanting on our part to order matters otherwise; but they choose to forget this fact, and to avail themselves of the letter of the compact to embarrass or convict. Nor are they without warrant for such proceeding. They can, undoubtedly, demand at our hands the fulfilment of terms, to enforce which would cost us in one year all that slave-grown sugar could save us in ten.”—*Times*, Aug. 10.

Yes, this is the reply of the sympathising *Times*, after all its friendly assurances: having pronounced *ex cathedra* against the squadron, on grounds so unsatisfactory that the meanest shifts must be resorted to to support the dictum, it now declares this touching and powerful appeal to be mere faction!

Small is the gratitude due to the “leading journal” on the part of the unhappy colonists. In their name, we ask, what are the remedies it would apply to the cruelty and injustice it has so perpetually denounced to the country? What is the nostrum it has so long shrunk from prescribing? It has refused to support renewed protection. The suppression of the slave trade is a request so absurd that nothing but faction could urge it. Is it, then, restored slave trade? or is there some other resource? or, while we confess and deplore our injustice, are we to refuse all redress? It is due to the colonies—to the public at large—to its own high pretensions, that after years of mysterious thunderings, the Oracle should speak forth; or shall we still be left in silence and Cimmerian gloom, until the difficulty is past, and

the ruin of the colonies a *fait accompli*? In common with thousands of expectants, we await the answer, which can scarcely be longer postponed. There may be some difficulty, however, in finding terms which will not shock what the *Times* probably considers the yet remaining delusion of that infatuated stupidity which shut out Englishmen from the gains of slavery and slave trading.

While the *Times* has thus left its real objects hitherto undeclared, the *Daily News* has at length stood forward the avowed advocate of slave trade, to be prosecuted as a duty to God and man, by England and the world at large! Yes, England has hitherto "laboured against the providential course of events." She is then of course, to repair the wrong by a proportionate activity in slave trading.

In the *Daily News* of September 10, we are first told that, "it must be admitted to have been amongst the designs of Providence, that a large proportion of the labouring classes of the new world, and at least those destined to cultivate its equatorial regions, should be supplied from the African continent. There alone is to be found a race capable of braving the sun of such regions, and of undergoing the labours of agricultural industry beneath it. We have heard and seen irresistible tides of emigration, but never was tide more irresistible than that which bears the negro from a land where labour is valueless to a land where it is of all value." Then we are informed that "we have been labouring during the last half century both against the natural and the providential course of events, in striving to stop altogether the negro emigration to America." If we had not interfered, it seems that "we should be spared the odium and the expense of struggling against nature, as well as against our best political friends and commercial connexions, in obedience to a most noble, indeed, but a most mistaken, policy of humanity." And our present difficulties and future prospects are disposed of thus:—"The ruined planters of our West Indian possessions taunt us with our fickleness and their ruin. We, no doubt, have wherewithal to answer these reproaches; but it is a dire and a bootless recrimination. Besides, to open the trade in labour to Brazil and Cuba, and limit it to Jamaica and Demerara, is adding the wrong of present injustice to that of past ignorance. We hear of schemes for licensing the trade to Rio and to the Havana. But this forms but half the difficulty, but a portion of the question. We have the labour question in our own colonies to settle at the same time that we negotiate its arrangements with Spain and with Brazil. We have been guilty, in the name of humanity,

of very great ignorance and very gross injustice. If we resolve to make amends, let it be done on all hands evenly, honestly, and sincerely."

We thank the *Daily News* for thus bringing the matter to a point. We see now fairly brought to light what has been the object in view, after all, of those who have set this movement going. Hundreds of thousands of excellent persons have been deceived, and led to believe the squadron has done pure harm. They conscientiously demand its withdrawal, because they have been persuaded it aggravates suffering, and has no other effect on the slave trade. The public and a large portion of the press have in short been fooled to the top of their bent, by a small, but compact body, whose object from the first has been a restoration of an unlimited slave trade, and at last the cloven foot appears.

If we reflect on the subject, we shall see that there is no single class whose money interests would be immediately advanced if the slave trade were put an end to. Interest and prejudice combine powerfully on the other side. First, there is an inordinate anxiety for increased exports to Brazil. An open slave trade would soon double the profits of the mines in which so much English capital is invested. English capital is also known to be largely laid out directly in slave trading transactions, as has been repeatedly stated in Parliament and elsewhere, and never denied or even questioned. Wherever the interests of the moment appear all on one side, it is pretty certain that the arguments on the other will have scarcely fair play; but that the interests of individuals may be very different from that of the country at large, is singularly exemplified in the question we are considering, for in Brazil the present money interest of every class would insure a vast increase of slave trade if England withdrew her squadron, although it is on all hands acknowledged it would be highly detrimental, and probably entirely destructive, to that country in the long run. So also with respect to England, a calm and full inquiry proves that, however numerous classes might profit by the opposite course, the true interest of the country imperatively demands perseverance in that policy against which an hostility so bitter and unscrupulous has been excited; for it has been proved beyond all doubt, that an open slave trade would drive all other commerce from the shores of Africa, while its suppression, as has been already shown in several parts, will be followed by a steady growth of lawful trade. Can there be a comparison in their true value to this country, of Africa, a howling wilderness, and Brazil unnaturally developed, but only by

receiving into its vitals the elements of certain and speedy destruction; or of a temporary check to the productive power of Brazil, which would at the same time insure an ultimate and prolonged condition of health and prosperity, while Africa, once relieved from the curse of slave trade, would every hour advance in the scale of civilization, and soon take its place amongst the most valuable commercial countries.

To the adverse money interests of the moment must be added the scarcely less powerful impulses of prejudice; the Peace Society rules paramount in the councils of the self-styled champions of the Negro, the Anti-Slavery Society.

These visionaries declare that, even in the tropics—in the West Indies, as compared with Brazil, free labour will beat slave trade and slave labour—that free labour will effect, first, the suppression of the slave trade, and then the abolition of slavery itself. They also contend that all attempts to suppress the slave trade by the application of force are wrong and reprehensible, and moral influences alone are justifiable. In the mean time they see the West Indies perishing in the struggle, though the price of a Negro in Brazil has been quadrupled, and the number introduced in the same degree diminished by the efforts of the squadron; though the women, being as one to ten to the men, no possible means exist by which the slave population can be maintained except by continual importations; and while they know that the ruthless system of “the largest amount of labour in the shortest time” wrings eighteen hours’ work out of the twenty-four from its victims, and consumes annually five per cent. of the whole number, they still adhere obstinately to their theories, and have given the whole weight of their title to the cause of perpetual slave trade. Their title is indeed their only weight, but still all-powerful when perverted to betray the interests of the Negro, who has no means of making his protest heard. To these various parties, by a strange perversity, the free traders have allied themselves—free trade—which is to unite all mankind in peace and amity—which now joins the Peace Society, and then talks of “crumpling up” Russia—which now talks of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market as the first duty of mankind, and then would frighten and abuse the capitalists who lend money to Austria. These men will talk of the rights of mankind in Hungary and Italy, yet, such is the magic in the colour of a skin, would apply to the purchase and sale of Negroes the principles of free trade, under which they assure us every sort of commerce will increase, as surely as two added to two

makes four ! From this assertion they have never swerved, and, abhorrent as it may be to call this hateful crime commerce, there cannot be a doubt of the truth of the axiom as applied to it, if the experiment should unhappily be tried. The result of these various causes is to place the subject before the public with only one side displayed to view. On scarcely any other have the people of England deeper reason to feel interest, or a stronger claim for the fullest and fairest information, for on no other has public opinion been brought to bear more powerfully or with a more direct and general responsibility, in establishing a great national course of action. Public opinion, in spite of the utmost efforts of the powerful interests on the other side, has obliged successive governments to carry all the various measures bearing on slave trade or slavery. Public opinion enforced the regulation of the English Colonial Slave Trade in 1788, its final abolition in 1807, and again the Emancipation Bill in 1834. Public opinion urged on an unwilling government all the efforts against the traffic at the Congress of Vienna ; which, in declaring it a crime against humanity and universal morality, spoke the sentiments of the people of England. The same power has dictated all the subsequent negotiations with foreign states : it compelled an unwilling ministry to adopt the existing system more than thirty years ago, and has ever since perpetually urged increased vigour and perseverance. But while the public treasure has been scattered broadcast, the public will has never been supported by any concentration of purpose, any energy or systematic action upon the part of any single government. Above all, there has been a total absence of union between the several departments, on the joint efforts of which success necessarily depends ; and the result has been imperfect, though far less so than might have been expected from the manner in which the struggle has been conducted. The partial failure, exaggerated by interest and prejudice, has now been made to appear not only a total failure of effecting the slightest good, but as having in all respects aggravated every evil ; and on a subject on which public opinion must be all-powerful, and where the right to know the truth, and the duty of each man to examine for himself, is so obvious, the combination we have described opposes peculiar difficulties to the honest inquirer. We have been much struck with the unfairness with which the question has been stated to the public, and step by step as we have proceeded in our investigations, our convictions have become the more firmly enlisted on what now appears to be the unpopular side. But what has finally confirmed our opinions in

favour, not of the present system (for the evidence proves the astonishing absence of all system), but in favour of maintaining the African squadron, to be henceforward employed for clearly-defined objects, steadily and consistently, has been the reports of Mr. Hutt's committee.

It will be remembered that, early in the session of '48, Mr Hutt moved for this committee in a speech in which he declared that the squadron had aggravated the sufferings, while it had wholly failed to effect the slightest diminution of the slave trade, and in which he emphatically declared his own mind to be made up to withdraw the squadron, and abandon the attempt—in his own words, “to leave the slave trade to itself.” The majority of the committee, at the outset of the inquiry, were undoubtedly of Mr. Hutt's way of thinking; but the reports record a perpetual decrease of that majority, until the final report, in 1849, when Mr. Hutt's resolutions were adopted for consideration *by his own casting vote*, and when nearly every resolution, as proposed severally to the committee, was carried in the same manner. Such is the result, after a prolonged inquiry, conducted of course, most favourably to Mr. Hutt's own views, in the selection of witnesses, and in the general line of examination. The committee was appointed to consider “the best means of suppressing the African slave trade”—it was entirely directed to Mr. Hutt's object of “leaving it to itself”—it was confined to the object of condemning the means actually in operation, without even a pretence of inquiring whether those means could be made more effectual, or whether any others could be devised. The total silence on this subject shows that the committee despaired of finding any substitute, and that the alternative of the present system would be slave trade perpetual and unlimited. This being the result of such an inquiry, the utmost weight it should have with the public is, the proof it affords that Mr. Hutt remains of the same opinion, but has failed to convince his committee. And yet this report has been put forward by the opponents of the squadron as if it settled the question for ever; and the public are invited to believe that, instead of Mr. Hutt's solitary voice, we hear the decision of a triumphant majority.

“If we had any inclination to magnify our own triumphs, we should point with considerable satisfaction to the second report of the select committee on the slave trade which we yesterday published. Many months have elapsed since we commenced our strictures upon the existing system of prevention, during which interval an inquiry, instituted with all the fairness,

and conducted with all the intelligence which the subject demanded, has been incessantly directed to the elucidation of those practical truths which should govern the policy of a practical people." After mentioning the concluding sentences of the report, condemnatory of attempts to repress the slave trade by force, the writer proceeds—"That these, and no other conclusions were, in point of fact, absolutely imperative upon those who had to decide upon the evidence before them, is what we conceive no person, except a certain noble antagonist of ours, would venture, after a careful perusal of the report in question, to gainsay or deny."—*Times*, July 7.

No hint is here given of a divided committee—no possible suspicion would arise of the true state of the case. We ask, is this honest, or is it likely that a cause, good in itself, and able to bear the light, would be supported by such advocacy?

In the discussion of a topic of immediate home interest, it would be superfluous to animadvert upon the ephemeral misrepresentations of the *Times*, or other newspapers. On such occasions the thunder of the press may indeed astonish the minds of the multitude; but all the attention and intelligence of society is instantly enlisted on the other side, mis-statements are exposed, and false reasonings detected, and the community is protected from any practically mischievous results. We may cite, as an instance, the hopeless war long waged by the leading journal against the New Poor-Law. The constant reader may have been melted by the eloquent appeals addressed to him day after day, but the rate-payer reflected, and was obdurate.

It is hardly necessary to observe that the present question is of a different class. It is apparently extraneous to the ordinary duties and occupations of the life of most men. Its patient investigation is, therefore, declined, as involving an unnecessary outlay of mental labour, and if the public business of the country requires that some resolution should be taken, the generality of men gratefully adopt the course of action suggested by any one who will relieve them from the trouble of reflecting and deciding. Should, moreover, the conclusion so attained be made to tally in appearance with any current theory, there is an additional inducement to adopt it, as a step in the right direction, without much forethought as to the ulterior result, or any inquiry as to the motives, of the adviser. At present it is the fashion to take a narrow mercantile view of questions involving the most important principles of politics, and even morals. Our generation is taught to complain that our fathers bequeathed us liberty and empire, burdened with a heavy mortgage, and that, in behalf of

the parsimony thus rendered indispensable in our impoverished condition, everything hitherto thought requisite to the power and character of a great nation should be sacrificed without regret, and without delay. The fatalist theory, too, of a certain section of political economists, contributes to reconcile the country to the dereliction of its duties, and the surrender of its inheritance. It is expensive, it may be dangerous, to retain colonies, says the mercantile politician; it is the necessary course of things, says the theorist, that the colonies should part company with the mother country. A precisely analogous line of argument is taken with respect to the slave trade. Political philosophy offers to relieve us from an uneasy sensation of shame when we descend to parley with pusillanimity and avarice. To that portion of the public mind which has become mean and enervated under such instruction, nothing could be more acceptable than for the *Times* to insinuate that the report of Mr. Hutt's committee resulted from the deliberate and unanimous conviction of fifteen intelligent and impartial inquirers.

Facts, however, cannot be talked away. The Blue Book before us attests that, on the question, whether Mr. Hutt's draft should be taken as the basis of their report, the committee divided, seven against seven; and then, on every one of his several resolutions against the squadron there was again an equal division—so that Mr. Hutt's opinions were carried by Mr. Hutt's vote.

The resolutions which show a larger majority were all, more or less, deprecatory of Mr. Hutt's views. Thus the fourth resolution proposed by the Chairman,—“Your Committee are, therefore, constrained to believe that no modification of the system now in force can effect the suppression of the slave trade, and they cannot undertake the responsibility of recommending the continuance of that system,”—was carried by his own casting vote; while Mr. Denison's amendment, added thereto, deprecating the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the squadron was carried without opposition: so also was Mr. Hutt's resolution about avowing unabated hostility to slave trade; and the last resolution, urging the duty of encouraging commerce and missionary labour, for the purpose of civilising and improving Africa, was carried by eleven to three. These form the only exceptions to the general rule that in the final report, the majority consisted of Mr. Hutt *solus*.

We earnestly entreat attention to the reports of this committee, and to the evidence on which they are professedly founded, for these will convince the most prejudiced that the

minority who so gallantly fought the battle in the committee had the *right* on their side, and that slight as must be the weight of reports thus carried, their intrinsic value is, if possible, even less worthy of influencing the judgment of parliament, or of the public.

The main grounds Mr. Hutt and those who think with him have striven to establish, and on which they demand that the squadron shall be recalled, and the slave trade henceforth left to itself are—first, that the squadron has produced an immense increase of suffering and mortality; secondly, That it has wholly failed, and must fail, to diminish the amount of the traffic.

In support of these propositions, the first resolution laid before the house at the close of the session of 1848, embodies a formal, elaborate, tabular statement, purporting to be an authentic history of the statistics of the slave trade from 1788 down to the year 1848. The third column professes to show the mortality on the passage across the Atlantic, for each year, on the whole number embarked from Africa; and from 1788 to 1815 this mortality is stated to amount to 14 per cent.

But in the year 1815 the first treaty for the suppression of the foreign slave trade, by means of a British force, was signed, and then the tables inform us the mortality instantly increased to 25 per cent.—a truly marvellous effect of putting pen to paper, *for no steps were taken to enforce this treaty for upwards of two years.* But let that pass. Parliament is informed by its committee that from the moment England interfered, 25 per cent. perished on the voyage, instead of 14 per cent., and these tables pretend thus to establish that the squadron has caused a vast increase of horrors.

These statistics form the very groundwork of the reports of the committee; they were presented to Parliament as the result of its inquiry in 1848, and when the committee met to agree to its final report, its first step was to approve and confirm the resolutions of the previous session by a majority of 8 to 5.

We give these tables *in extenso*, because without their assistance it will be almost impossible to convince the public of their real value, coming, as they do, in a form claiming the peculiar character of official authenticity. We are especially anxious that they should speak for themselves, as it is upon them that the conclusions of the committee adverse to the squadron are based.

Foreign Office Reports, and Bandinel's Abstract.

No. 1.—MEMORANDA of the Number of SLAVES computed to have been Exported and Imported Westward from Africa, from 1788 to 1840.

DATE.	Amount of Slaves Exported.	Average casualties during the Voyage.		Slaves Imported into Spanish Colonies.	Imported into Portuguese Colonies.	Imported into other Countries.	Total Amount of Slaves Imported.	Loss by Casualties (again stated).	TOTAL (as at first).
		Average Proportion.	Amount.						
In 1788 - - -	100,000	14 per cent.	14,000	25,000	18,000	44,000	86,000	14,000	100,000
1798 to 1805	85,000	14 "	12,000	15,000	20,000	38,000	73,000	12,000	85,000
1805 to 1810	85,000	14 "	12,000	15,000	25,000	33,000	73,000	12,000	85,000
1810 to 1815	93,000	14 "	13,000	30,000	30,000	20,000	80,000	13,000	93,000
1815 to 1817	106,600	25 "	26,600	32,000	31,000	17,000	80,000	26,600	106,600
1817 to 1819	106,600	25 "	26,600	34,000	34,000	12,000	80,000	26,600	106,600
1819 to 1825	103,000	25 "	25,800	39,000	37,000	Captured by Cruisers: 1,200	77,200	25,800	103,000
1825 to 1830	125,000	25 "	31,000	40,000	50,000	4,600	94,000	31,000	125,000
1830 to 1835	78,500	25 "	19,600	40,000	15,000	3,900	58,900	19,600	78,500
1835 to 1840	135,800	25 "	33,900	29,000	65,000	7,900	101,900	33,900	135,800

No. 2.—MEMORANDA of the Number of SLAVES computed to have been annually Exported and Imported Westward from Africa, from 1840—48.

DATE.	Amount of Slaves Exported.	Average casualties during the Voyage.		Slaves Imported into Spanish Colonies.	Imported into Brazil.	Captured by Cruisers.	Total Amount of Slaves Imported.	Loss by Casualties (again stated).	TOTAL (as at first).
		Average Proportion.	Amount.						
1840 - - -	64,114	25 per cent.	16,068	14,470	30,000	3,616	48,086	16,028	64,114
1841 - - -	45,097	25 "	11,274	11,857	16,000	5,966	33,823	11,274	45,097
1842 - - -	28,400	25 "	7,100	3,150	14,200	3,950	21,300	7,100	28,400
1843 - - -	55,062	25 "	13,765	8,000	30,500	2,797	41,297	13,765	55,062
1844 - - -	54,102	25 "	13,525	10,000	26,000	4,577	40,577	13,525	54,102
1845 - - -	36,758	25 "	9,189	1,250	22,700	3,519	27,569	9,189	36,758
1846 - - -	76,117	25 "	19,029	1,700	52,600	2,788	57,088	19,029	76,117
1847 - - -	84,356	25 "	21,089	1,500	57,800	3,967	63,267	21,089	84,356

But what if these authentic tables prove to be altogether unsupported? What if the evidence taken before this very committee should prove them to be wholly untrue, and opposite to the truth? Startling as the assertion may appear, we pledge ourselves to make it good.

Nothing can be more perfectly established than that the mortality of the voyage during the regulated slave trade of England was 14 per cent. That trade was abolished in 1807, and the traffic, in general, was left to itself until 1815; during this period the committee's table gives a mortality still of 14 per cent. But, as we said before, with the first treaty the mortality of the slaves exported from Africa, whether to Cuba or to Brazil, is stated to have instantly sprung up to 25 per cent., and this average is gravely applied to each year, from 1815 down to 1848.

For fifteen years from the commencement of the struggle the efforts of England consisted in sending five or six most unsuitable vessels to the coast of Africa, "to cruize for the suppression of the slave trade," and until the year 1824 the vessels were removed from the coast during the rainy season, several months of each year, when the ship-sloops, and gun-brigs went to some distant port, while the commodore returned to England, reporting an enormous and undiminished slave trade.

For the whole of this time all the treaties restricted the power of seizure to cases of vessels met with after their slaves were shipped, and every vessel, though obviously and avowedly a slaver, was perfectly safe until this final act was committed. Applying, then, to the tables for the alleged effect of these five vessels, armed with such powers against a commerce so enormous, it is on the very face of it absurd to attribute to them any such result; but if we extend our inquiry, we shall see that, as regards one-half of the slave trade (and this estimate is applied to the whole), such an effect was simply impossible, inasmuch as the slave trade of Brazil, was by express treaty, entirely protected from all question or interference from British cruizers; for not only were the powers above described limited by the treaty with Portugal to north latitude; but by distinct stipulations the unmolested continuance of the Brazilian slave trade, and the perfect freedom of Portuguese slave ships under every possible circumstance, south of the line, were guaranteed by provisions as distinct, stringent, and complete as those for the suppression of the traffic in north latitude were feeble and insufficient. No slave could be legally imported into Brazil except from the African colonies of Portugal, which all lay in south latitude; the great bulk of the Brazil slave trade was, therefore, absolutely

untouched, and incapable of being touched, by the British squadron. Not a cruizer was ever stationed south of the equator, and if occasionally Portuguese slave vessels came to the Bight of Benin for their cargoes, in order to evade the duties levied on slaves exported from the colonies of Portugal, this voluntary exposure to the risk of capture, which would arise as soon as slaves were thus shipped north of the equator, strikingly proves how trifling that risk was, and how utterly incapable such a force, acting under these restrictions, must have been to produce any effect whatever, *even on that part of the slave trade which it was nominally permitted to assail*. These facts are taken from the evidence printed by the committee, and if this were all, it would be enough to deprive its conclusions of all value; but what follows is yet more crushing.

In 1839 the squadron obtained the power to seize the equipped slave vessels of every slave-trading nation; and then, also, the protection of the Portuguese treaty, which had hitherto covered the slave trade of Brazil, was swept away, and, for the first time it became possible for British cruizers to assail the traffic south of the equator. It then (however untrue) ceased to be utterly absurd to suppose that the squadron might increase the ratio of mortality in the voyage across the ocean, and indeed as applied to the period *subsequent to 1839*, some evidence (though it was highly unsatisfactory and suspicious) was certainly given, accounting in some degree for the tables presented to Parliament by the committee in 1848. In April, 1849, however, the committee summoned before it Sir Charles Hotham, who had just returned from the command on the coast of Africa, and whose evidence has been cited as strongly supporting Mr. Hutt's opinions, though a careful consideration of his whole evidence will produce a very different conclusion. On this question of the increased mortality caused by the squadron, his statement is worthy of being extracted at length. He says, in answer to question 676, "I have proved that the mortality under the worst measures, which I consider are while the slaves are under our control, only amounts to nine per cent." "With Dr. Cliffe's evidence I have no concern; with respect to the evidence of the other officers, I trust they will pardon me, if I say they have no grounds for arriving at any thing approaching to a correct calculation. Only the commander-in-chief of a large squadron is competent to form a fair opinion, and he does that from returns from the Admiralty Court, checked again by returns from officers in charge of cruizers." Sir Charles Hotham then gives in an authentic return, which proves that of near 14,000 slaves captured during the two years and a-half of his command, *the mortality up to the*

date of adjudication was nine per cent.; and he estimates the mortality in those vessels that escape at five per cent. Sir E. Buxton asks, (question 680), "Considering as far as we are able to learn that under Sir Wm. Dolben's act," (under which the English slave trade was first regulated in 1788) "the mortality was 14 per cent., and that it is now only 5 per cent., do you imagine if the slave trade were allowed for a certain period, any great diminution in the mortality would take place?" Sir C. Hotham answers,—

"I anxiously hope that the slave trade may never be allowed; if you were to remove all restrictions and take your squadron entirely away, small speculators would spring up and undersell those who are now in the market; the slave trade would be greatly increased in its horrors, and it would be impossible to calculate the calamities which would ensue; besides this, pirates would abound, and in my opinion it would be impossible for a legitimate trader to conduct his operations upon that coast." We beg to remind our readers, parenthetically, that this is the evidence the *Times* pretends to find so absolutely conclusive against the African squadron!

Mr. Gladstone tries his hand at getting this awkward opinion qualified, we shall see how successfully. "Q. 688.—You have said the withdrawal of the squadron would lead to a great extension of the trade, to a great increase of suffering, and to horrors unexampled; do you think that opinion to be quite consistent with the one you are understood to have expressed before; that in the main, the supply of slaves was actually regulated by the demand in Brazil, if that be so, would it not follow that the supply of slaves would still be regulated by the demand in Brazil after the squadron was withdrawn?" Answer: "I apprehend the slave trade is now regulated by men of considerable capital, and that slaves are conveyed across with comparative ease and comfort; if you remove the restriction men of a less amount of capital—small speculators, would embark in the trade, and then I think the trade would greatly increase in horrors." To the next suggestion that if the slave trade was left to itself the Brazilian government would regulate it, and prevent its horrors, the reply is, that "the government of Brazil is wholly powerless." To the next cast, whether if the present system were abandoned, the government would still be powerless on the subject, the answer seems to have at last satisfied the inquirer. "*Not equally powerless certainly, but still powerless.*"

Here we have the undoubted fact established before the committee, that the mortality even on board captured slave ships on all hands admitted to be greater than in those that escape, is only 9 per cent.

Sir Charles Hotham's statement of the mortality in captured vessels is no matter of opinion, it is plain matter of fact entirely within the personal knowledge of the witness: it utterly destroys the very foundation of the arguments and statements by which public opinion had been worked upon, "to leave the slave trade to itself." This evidence was given on the 25th of April 1849, and while it was still ringing in their ears, a majority of 8 to 5 of Mr. Hutt's Committee deliberately confirm and repeat these fabulous statistics of 1848! these facts are not easily to be matched, and we trust they may be equally without precedent or imitation in the annals of Parliament.

We anticipate a natural doubt of the correctness of this statement, and have taken the trouble to go through the returns of every year from 1839 to 1848, and we find that the average annual mortality from all causes between capture and emancipation during the whole of that time is just $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., but this easy mode of satisfying themselves of the truth, was not resorted to by the committee, and the assurance that 25 per cent. have perished on the middle passage since 1815, subsequent to as well as before 1839, stands in judgment on the fidelity and trustworthiness of the committee, though in their report it is established upon incontrovertible evidence that the squadron has caused a great diminution of suffering and mortality even compared with the regulated slave trade of Great Britain! It may be necessary to observe that all evidence and experience proves that the mortality in our hands after capture is greater than when vessels escape, though we doubt whether the difference is so great as Sir Charles Hotham estimates it at; it is, however, undoubtedly less than 9 per cent.; but whatever it may be below even 14 per cent., must be, even by the showing of the committee, the direct effect of the squadron.

The statements of the committee are so extravagant that even Dr. Cliffe dreads the effect of their exposure on *his* cause, and before the Lords he ungratefully turns round on Mr. Hutt and his committee, and tells us how these statistics were compiled. After asserting that formerly Brazilian vessels carried a surgeon and a priest! he is asked if he has any present average of deaths. We give his reply at length. "Yes: I mention it from some papers which I drew up. Mr. Bandinel copied it into a lot of statistics which he has made; but he copied it erroneously, or I did not describe it sufficiently clear for him to comprehend." The public will now see the whole history. These authentic statistics took their birth from Dr. Cliffe! We think we need add no more to complete a case of the most flagrant carelessness—to use the mildest word—against Mr. Hutt and his majority.

But utterly as we repudiate the general evidence of this interested witness, it is obviously of great value wherever it contains an admission adverse to his own case. He states that, counting from the first capture of the Negroes in the interior to the period at which they are considered seasoned in Brazil—viz., two months after landing, the whole mortality in the slave trade amounts to 30 or 33 per cent. This mortality, in former times, has been estimated at above three-fourths, and the lowest computation placed it at one-half. So we have here, from another source, additional proof that the squadron has caused a great *decrease* of suffering and mortality in the slave trade.

We think we may safely leave our case here, but we would yet recommend one more authority on this point to public notice, in the shape of an extract from a despatch from Mr. Kennedy, judge of the slave court of Havannah, dated 20th December, 1848, and received at the Foreign Office 26th January 1849, and, therefore, probably in the hands of Mr. Hutt. It is printed in the Appendix to the Lords' Report. This despatch, had it stood alone, should, we think, have induced the committee to pause for further information in support "*of their lot of statistics,*" before they were formally repeated and confirmed in 1849.

"Another over-statement seems to me to be made respecting the miseries of the passage. There are, no doubt, cases of shocking mortality and misery; as also we hear of such in emigrant vessels to America—for instance, the *Virginus*, from Liverpool, where 158 out of 467 passengers died on the voyage, and the *Naomi*, which sustained a loss of 110 out of 334, embarked at the same port. I do not believe that such mortality has occurred on board any slave ship to this port during the last twelve years that I have known it, from the western coast of Africa, and of six cargoes I have seen, a very large majority of each appeared to have suffered no inconvenience whatever from the voyage; in the *Columbia*, which arrived here in July last, though only a miserable boat of 29 tons, we have evidence that only five were lost out of 155 embarked; and in the case of the *Jesus Maria*, a vessel of about 35 tons, British measurement, condemned here, there were only 26 lost out of 278 put on board, and of these several had jumped overboard; yet these were the cases in which we might have expected the greatest loss of life, as having been the most crowded, though they might be accidentally favourable in the other extreme. It is the interest of the parties to bring them over as well as possible, and there is no doubt that this has its effect. *It is much more probable that overflowing cargoes and concomitant misery would be found if a free trade in slaves were permitted, when the vessels would be*

filled without any possible restraint, and when the life and comfort of the slave would be of less consequence than now, when a full cargo can seldom be obtained."

Before quitting this branch of the subject, there is one fertile source of error which requires notice. In 1839, a new scale for admeasuring the tonnage of ships came into force, which, in order to encourage the building of better models, gave a great advantage to the finer description of vessels, as the mode of calculation reduced their nominal size far below their real capacity of stowage; and the dues which are, for the most part levied on the registered tonnage, thenceforth fell much more lightly on sharp vessels. The *Cowes yachts*, for instance, were thus, by a stroke of the pen, cut down to less than two thirds their former tonnage, in some cases to less than one half. The *Alarm*, Mr. Weld's famous yacht, by the old scale, 193 tons, was now registered as 95 tons.

By the same process, slave ships, when captured, become nominally half the size they would have been called previously, the bounties on tonnage due to the captors being paid by the new scale, to the great disadvantage of the cruizers. In two cases, the *Reglano* and *Vanguardia*, condemned in 1840, the surveyor happened to furnish the court with their tonnage by both scales. By the new scale, the *Reglano*, which had been seized with 350 slaves on board, measured 48 tons,—an unheard-of number to such a tonnage, looking to the old scale; but by the old scale, the burden was 116 tons; thus showing exactly the former average of three slaves to a ton. So, what appears at first sight a new era—in which near twice as many slaves to a ton were carried as before—was, in point of fact, merely an arbitrary change in the mode of admeasurement, expressly intended to give an advantage to a certain class of merchant vessels. Thus, also, the *Vanguardia*, a very old vessel, which would have been in previous years, if captured, considered 194 tons burden, was condemned in 1840 as of only 81! These are the only two cases in which, as far as we know, the tonnage of slave vessels has been given according to both scales.

It is now time to consider the question of the comparative extent of slave trade, and how far Mr. Hutt, the *Times*, and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society are borne out in their assertions that the Squadron has, in this respect, entirely failed to produce any good effect; but it is necessary to observe here, that the Anti-Slavery Society grounds its arguments on Mr. Hutt's "*lot of statistics.*"

To do justice to the subject, we should calculate the amount the trade would have grown to but for the efforts of England;

and even if we admitted for a moment the assertion of our opponents that its amount is now exactly what it was formerly, we might ask with triumph, why has it not, in common with every other trade, more than doubled itself? Every increase of the slave population of Cuba and Brazil, far from tending to diminish the slave trade, must inevitably give a fresh impulse to it, since of the slave population only ten per cent. are females, and only three per cent. are carried in the slave ship, as we are assured even by Dr. Cliffe. We have the following facts in Dr. Thompson's evidence, a witness opposed to the Squadron. He states before Mr. Hutt's committee (vide Q. 5129-30-31-32): "The number of births compared to the number of women is also remarkably small." "Indeed, the number born in Brazil is extremely small; it is a very rare thing to see a woman with a child." But even the highest known ratio of births, with such a disparity between the sexes, would go but a little way to keep up numbers, since we learn from the concurrent testimony of all persons acquainted either with Cuba or Brazil, that under the awful atrocities of this hideous system, there is an annual destruction of five per cent. of the whole slave population. We learn, also, from Mr. Bandinel's work on Slave Trade, (p. 65,) that in former times "the English imported annually at least one-sixteenth part of the existing negroes (in the colonies) to keep up the stock;" thus proving that at all times the combined curse of slavery and slave trade must produce the same consequences.

We know further, that vast tracts of the finest virgin soil in the world lie waste in Brazil, and that the Government anxiously seeks for persons to accept these as a free gift. What are the possible present means of cultivation, apart from a commensurate increase of slave trade? A glut of the slave markets in such a country is a contradiction in terms, when used as an argument that the slave trade left alone would thus cure itself, for this is obviously impossible even while the land already occupied continues to be cultivated. Mr. Bandinel himself (whose authority appears to have had so much weight with Mr. Hutt's Committee as an opponent to the Squadron,) published his elaborate work, just referred to, in 1842, when his forty years' official experience was fresh in his recollection, and with every document at his elbow; and he there states the following facts, as entirely the result of the Squadron (vide pages 286 and 287 of "Bandinel on the Slave Trade.") After proving his facts by numbers, he sums up his statements as follows:—

"So that the number of slaves imported into Cuba in 1840 was only half the number imported in 1838, and only about one-third the number

imported before the treaty of 1835 came into operation;" and as regards Brazil, "In 1839 the importation of slaves had diminished upwards of one-third since the preceding year, and in 1840 the number imported was only rather more than one-fourth part of those imported in 1839, and not one-sixth of the number imported in 1838.

The diminution in the importation of slaves, does not, however, arise from a slackening in the demand for them, for in Porto Rico a newly imported negro used to sell for 200 dollars; the price now is 450 dollars. In Cuba such negroes sold in 1821 for 100 dollars; the price now varies from 425 dollars to 480 dollars. In Brazil a newly imported negro used to sell for 100 milreis; the price is now 400 milreis."

These high prices are still fully maintained, while in Africa the price of a slave is seldom so high as 5*l.*, or about 20 dollars. Remove the Squadron, and the price in Brazil and Cuba infallibly must fall to what it was in 1821,—one-fourth of what it now is. But does any reasonable man suppose that less money will be spent in the purchase of labour than at present? if not, then nothing can be much more certain than that for one slave now landed, four victims will be consigned to the terrible living death of the slave vessel, and the plantation. By all the horrors of such a fate to millions yet unborn, we implore attention to these considerations, but, though they are so important in their bearing on the question, we have proofs so distinct of the fallacy of the assertion we are combating (which is, indeed, overthrown by the very tables on which it professes to be founded), that we will boldly accept battle on the narrow and unfair field chosen by our opponents. We undertake to prove, even by those very tables, which we have given at p. 15, that the Squadron has actually effected a great diminution of slave trade from the period when it attained its present powers, and that what is wanting of perfect success arises from causes so palpable, and so easy of remedy, that instead of justifying discouragement, the discriminating consideration of those very causes gives the best assurance of eventual triumph, by surely guiding our efforts to the best course of action, and teaching us to avoid the errors which have as yet prevented complete success.

But, before we return to these Tables, there is one acknowledged and undeniable fact worthy to be hailed with rejoicing by all who do not exult in the belief that the efforts of their country in a cause so righteous have utterly and miserably failed. In spite of temptation as great to each and all of them as to Brazil, every South American State has abstained from this lucrative crime, entirely owing to the efforts and example of Great Britain, who, by her steady maintenance of the righteous principles of religion and morality, and by her urgent persuasions and remonstrances, has thus saved millions of victims, and rescued those

States themselves from degradation and depravity, and also from the terrible eventual retribution which must sooner or later await every nation that resorts to this sin as a means of precocious and unnatural development.

If the Tables of the Committee were to be received at once without challenge they would refute the Report which is founded upon them, for they show from 1798, until first checked by the Squadron, a constant increase of the only slave trade that still exists, and from the moment the Squadron was enabled to act with effect, a diminution as marked.

The Tables inform us that in 1798, 15,000 slaves were imported into colonies of Spain, which then included several possessions since lost. In 1835, Spain possessed only Cuba and Porto Rico, into which 40,000 slaves were, according to these tables, imported. But in a note to his tables, not given by the Committee, Mr. Bandinel states that in 1798 only 6,000 slaves were imported into Cuba, so that the only existing Spanish slave trade in thirty-seven years, has multiplied itself by seven.

In 1798 we see it stated that 20,000 were imported into Portuguese colonies, consisting then of other possessions in the West besides Brazil. From 1835 to 1839 inclusive, the tables state that 65,000 per annum were imported into Brazil alone ! the process of increase having been gradual and progressive, except from 1830 to 1835, when the treaty with Great Britain declaring the trade piracy came into force, and for a time the slave dealers were supposed to be terrified from the prosecution of their crime. The increase, even according to the Tables, is much more than three-fold, or if we deduct 5,000 for the other Portuguese colonies, from the numbers in 1798, between four and five times as many were carried into Brazil in 1839 as there were forty years before, so that instead of the aggregate importation into Cuba and Brazil amounting to 21,000 as in 1798 (14,000 being devoted in that year to other Spanish and Portuguese colonies, and 38,000 to other countries), we have, in the year 1835, when both trades continued unchecked by the Squadron, an aggregate, by the Committee's own tables, of 105,000 !

The statements as regard Cuba, though we do not entirely concur in them, we do not intend to question ; but as regards the numbers said to be imported into Brazil in 1835, and the four following years we are compelled to notice a discrepancy in the authority whose calculations the Committee have made their own. Mr. Bandinel, in the work we have already quoted, states (at p. 287) "the total number of slaves supposed to be imported into Brazil in 1838 amounted to 94,000." The whole context proves that this was considered no extraordinary number compared with

former years, indeed the statement of decreasing slave trade which we have extracted takes this as the basis of the calculation, and 56,000 in 1839 is the number specified as proving that in that year "the importation of slaves had diminished upwards of one-third since the preceding year." Referring to Mr. Bandinel's evidence before Mr. Hutt's Committee, (Q. 3313,) he says, "the greatest number imported (into Brazil) in one year was 87,000. This occurred in 1837." These statements, though somewhat conflicting, agree better with each other than with the Tables, and justify us in stating our own firm conviction that the book was right and the Tables wrong, and that in 1835-36-37-38, respectively, at least 90,000 slaves were landed in Brazil, which, with 56,000 in 1839, gives an average of above 83,000, instead of 65,000—a number still short of one-sixteenth of the slave population, a proportion shown to have been necessary to keep up numbers in the British slave colonies formerly. It would appear then, that instead of an increase from 21,000 to 105,000, we should read for the year 1835, before Brazilian and Cuban slave trade were affected by the cruizers, that they numbered 134,000 victims landed on their respective shores, while probably near 10,000 more perished on the voyage. It will be observed that our grand total does not very largely exceed the Tables, which give 135,000, as the number exported from Africa for each of the five years in question, but reduce the number landed, by the extravagant proportion of 25 per cent. mortality; and it approximates closely to Sir Fowell Buxton's more correct estimate of 150,000.

We must now, at the risk of some repetition, show the circumstances under which the Spanish and Brazilian slave trade, respectively, became subject to the effective interruption of our cruizers. In 1835, the new treaty with Spain enabled the Squadron, for the first time, to seize equipped slave-ships, hitherto secure until after slaves were on board. We have read, in the extract from Mr. Bandinel's work (p. 492), the effect of this treaty; but, after the first blow was struck, the Spanish slave trade was carried on in Portuguese ships, which were secure from capture on account of equipment, under the following clause of the treaty with Portugal:—"Ships, on board which no slaves shall be found intended for purposes of traffic, shall not be detained on any account or pretence whatever." Thus screened, the slave trade of Cuba was rapidly springing up, and would have soon gone on increasing at the same ratio as before, but for the measure of 1839, by which equipped Portuguese vessels were rendered liable to seizure and condemnation.

As regards Brazil, we have already shown that, until 1839, the whole importation of slaves was protected from the English

cruizers, also by the use of Portuguese vessels. Eighteen hundred miles of the Brazilian coast lie in south latitude, and an ample supply of negroes can be obtained from the African shores lying in the same latitude. This slave-trade was protected by this article of the treaty with Portugal:—"No Portuguese merchantman, or slave-ship, shall, on any pretence whatever, be detained, which shall be found anywhere near the land, or on the high seas, south of the Equator." By this treaty Portugal was bound to abandon all slave trade not directed to her colony, Brazil; this clause was framed to cover the supply of this her colony; but, though Brazil became independent in 1824, yet Portugal still insisted, for fifteen years, on the letter of her treaty, though now defeating its whole spirit and intention. It was not only a breach of faith, forming a just *casus belli*, but it was a gross fraud, in the ordinary sense; for England had made large payments in return for the pledges given by Portugal. At length, finding all protests vain, the British Government, in 1839, ordered the seizure of all Portuguese slave-ships wherever met with, and whether with slaves on board, or only equipped; and this order was soon followed by an Act of Parliament, authorising the Vice Admiralty Courts to try and condemn such vessels. The power of suppressing the slave trade was now, for the first time, obtained by Great Britain; for the first time the traffic to Brazil could be touched; and in all quarters the vessels of every state, still implicated in the slave trade (each having armed Great Britain with the requisite authority, and the flag of Portugal being no longer available), became subject to capture, when met with equipped for the crime.

Referring to the Tables we see from 40,000 per ann. in the five years before 1835, the Spanish Slave Trade, sheltered by Portugal, decreased only to 29,000 in the five years ending in 1839, whereas the aggregate of the next eight years only exceeds by one fourth, the amount of a single year previous to 1835; and for the last three years of the eight the average is only 1,517! We see here the legitimate influence of the change in 1839.

As regards Brazil we read in Mr. Bandinel's work of 1842, that in 1838, 94,000 slaves were imported; in 1839, 56,000; and 14,244 he considers an overstatement for 1840. He says, "only 7,122 were imported into Rio (de Janeiro); and the diminution at the outports was even still more marked; for at Para, during the last half year of 1840 not one slave was imported. So that taking for the outports the same importation as for the capital, too much will probably be taken, and yet on this calculation only 14,244 were imported into Brazil during the year 1840." Turning to the Committee's Tables, supplied by Mr. Bandinel, we read with astonishment the statement that 30,000 slaves were landed in Brazil in 1840, and this without a syllable of explana-

tion ! We ask if it is possible not to prefer the statement we have quoted, but even adopting these obviously incorrect Tables, we have for the six years following the eventful 1839, an importation of 23,233 for each year against 65,000. This is no trifling reduction : but, applying the corrections we have proved to be so necessary for the five years ending in 1839, we have 83,000 instead of 65,000 ; and for the next six years, including 1845, but 20,600 ! It is also to be remarked that during these six years 378 slave ships were captured, which would otherwise have carried off 130,000 slaves, and that though the Committee declares, in a note to its report in 1848, that it was desirous to publish the whole number of captures since 1839 in one of its resolutions, yet when this report was received in 1849 and showed a total number of 594 captures from 1840 to 1848 inclusive, this desire expressed in 1848, *was not carried into effect in the Report of 1849, but the important fact was consigned to the obscurity of the appendix !*

It is true that an increase of imports to Brazil took place in 1846-7 and probably in 1848. But we are always dependent on the slave dealers themselves for accounts of the numbers, and though these may be generally trusted when there are no motives for concealing or exaggerating them, as soon as interest suggests deceit, we are utterly at fault ; witness the ridiculous notion shown in the tables that the alarm in 1830 was sufficient of itself to keep the imports down to 15,000 for five years—less than a fourth part of what would have been required only to maintain the numbers of the slave population. Do we suppose the cry of the last three or four years in this country did not reach those so strongly interested as the Brazilians ? How the heart of every slave dealer must have leaped for joy, to find the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society joining with the press to clamour against coercive measures, just as those measures were for the first time making havoc on their traffic ! Can we doubt that they instantly devoted themselves to exaggerate their success, and so play into the hands of their simple, unconscious dupes and interested accomplices, here ? We suggest these considerations to every thinking person ; for our own part, we are persuaded that the numbers latterly landed in Brazil have fallen far short of that which seems generally believed. But taking the Committee's Tables, it would seem that 52,600 were landed in Brazil in 1846, and 57,800 in 1847 : certainly a startling increase. But, can anything be more grossly unfair, than to take these two years and to sink the six preceding years ? or can we conceive a more flagrant breach of duty than for a Committee, appointed for such a purpose, failing to seek to discover whether any specific causes for a change so extraordinary existed, even by a

single question ; but equally without hesitation or inquiry, attributing it at once to the inherent impossibility of suppressing, or even materially reducing, slave trade by force ! The causes were repeatedly suggested to the Committee in answer to other questions ; but the subject was avoided. The causes are :—

1st. In 1845, for several months the cruisers abstained from capturing Brazilian slave ships, because the courts to adjudge them were broken up, the Government of Brazil having asserted the treaty to be at an end ; and the Act of Parliament treating this breach of faith in the same manner as that of Portugal in 1839, did not reach the coast for several months. This is established by the report of the Sierra Leone Commissioners for that year, in their annual despatch, dated Dec. 31, 1845 :—" With the exception of the *Adelaide*, detained on the 12th of Aug. and subsequently given up, no vessel furnished with Brazilian papers was taken by any of Her Majesty's cruisers, between the 23rd of July and the 22nd of October, in consequence of the expiration of the Convention of 1817, and the Act 8 and 9 Victoria, cap. 122, not having come into operation."

2nd. From Commodore Jones, (probably because he, for a time, was unable to capture these vessels,) leaving all the coast of the African Colonies of Portugal, five hundred miles in extent, to the sole charge of Portuguese cruisers. These causes combined to give a great impetus to the slave trade ; and when after the lapse of more than a twelvemonth the British cruisers were again stationed on this part of the coast, in a very few months a single vessel, the *Styx*, captured 26 slave ships !

3rd. The admission of slave-grown sugar in 1846, which, though not in itself able to maintain a successful and remunerative slave trade under ordinary circumstances, as proved in the case of Cuba, found a great impetus already given to the traffic of Brazil by the events of 1845, and as regards 1846, 1847, and 1848, a change in the mode of employing the Squadron in the highest degree favourable to slave trade.

4th. The change of system from preventing the shipment of slaves, and closely watching the Slave Factories, to a return to the old plan of desultory cruising in the offing, in vogue before the power to capture equipped vessels existed.

As this last is a matter of vital moment, and requiring more attention than can be devoted to it at present, we must content ourselves with merely stating the fact, deferring until our next number, its full investigation. But for the causes specified, we have not the slightest doubt that the reduction of the Brazilian trade would have been as striking, and as utterly beyond the reach of the denial even of the slave dealers themselves, as that of Cuba.

With respect to Cuba, we read in the tables of the Committee that in 1845, 1350; in 1846, 1700; in 1847, 1500 slaves were landed; and from the return of Mr. Kennedy, (*vide* appendix to Lords Report, p. 94,) 1500 were also landed in 1848, which agrees with every other statement. He says, in his despatch, dated January 1st, 1849: "It appears to me, therefore, that if the trade be, as I consider it, in a depressed state, the cause of this depression must be sought elsewhere, than in the measures of the" (Spanish or local) "Government." He states if the slave trade were again set free, the planters could then get slaves at one-third or one-fourth of the present prices, and would take 20,000 or 25,000 annually for some years, and he adds, "The high price then is and must be a check to the trade, and this high price is owing to the blockade on the coast."

The Gallinas has long been the great depot of Cuba slave trade. Destroyed in 1840, it was partially restored in 1843, owing to the confidence inspired by the unfortunate publication, and indistinct language of the Queen's advocate's opinion in 1842. Since 1844, in the expectation of the immediate withdrawal of the Squadron, raised by the press in this country, enormous establishments have been maintained at a dead loss. In February in the present year, those factories were again destroyed in fulfilment of the treaty of 1840, and had Mr. Hutt thought fit to inquire into the extent of property there embarked in the slave trade, he would have discovered ample proof of the efficacy of the "blockade," on the only part of the coast where it has been carried out. The value of the goods was enormous, but by some utterly unaccountable oversight, Sir Charles Hotham did not enforce the principal provision of the former treaty, Art. 4. "King Siacca binds himself in the most solemn manner, that no white man shall ever for the future settle in his country for the purpose of slave-dealing." Near sixty such persons were in the country, and held, by Sir Charles Hotham's reports, near 3,000 slaves, and not only were the slave-dealers left in the country, but their unfortunate victims were left to perish! It appears by Sir C. Hotham's reply to the Lords' Committee (Q. 1893-94), that it was proposed he should exchange the goods in the factories for the slaves, which was properly declined; but the whole country was at his feet, and it would have been easy to accomplish their deliverance, by the slightest show of determination to effect this grand object. It appears, however, that Sir Charles entertained an over-sensitive fear lest the rescue of these unhappy wretches from misery worse than death, might be attributed to a desire to obtain prize money. It is deeply to be lamented that he was not aware that, under no existing Act of Parliament, would any such claim have accrued

from the liberation of these 3,000 unfortunates; that such an award could only be given by a special grant from Parliament; and that, therefore, this imputation, which, under any circumstances, Sir Charles Hotham could well afford to treat with contempt, was, after all, a mere shadow. As a further proof of the efficacy of blockade, not one of those victims was carried off up to October of this year, when, we rejoice to state, that by the ability, zeal, and energy of Capt. Dunlop, of the "Alert," their delivery has been at last accomplished, the white slave-dealers expelled, and, at length, the treaty of 1840 has been fully carried into force. The same accounts report the total extinction of the slave trade from Cape Verde to the Bight of Benin, an extent of near 1,500 miles of coast.

With such establishments maintained for the Cuba slave trade, having at one time 3,000 slaves ready for export, while only 1,500 slaves have, for several years past, been landed in the twelvemonth in that island, there can be no question of the efficacy of the system which, as we said before, has nowhere else been steadily acted on. We ask, why do not these facts appear in the Committee's report?

We must once more return to the "*lot of statistics*," for the benefit of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, as well as for Mr. Hutt and his seven supporters. Referring to the returns from 1798 to 1805, we find the whole number imported stated at 73,000, of which 15,000 are given to Spanish, 20,000 to Portuguese colonies, and 38,000 to other countries; for 1805 to 1810 we have the same general return, but 5,000 are taken from "other countries" and added to Portuguese colonies. But Mr. Bandinel's book, quoting the best, and indeed the only, authorities—for no new information can have been obtained on the subject—says that, from 1795 to 1805, the amount of the whole importation "*was computed at rather less than 100,000!*"

Can the Committee be ignorant of the fact that, in 1807, both Great Britain and the United States abolished their respective slave trades; that both these ceased before 1809 expired, and that, at the lowest estimate, they together amounted to 40,000? We ask with astonishment, how the column headed "other countries," from 1798 to 1810, can be reconciled with the cessation of this enormous portion of the traffic? Neither does the average given from 1810 to 1815 solve the difficulty; as for this period, 20,000 are given as the number imported into "other countries."

If the Anti-Slavery Society pretends that the whole amount of Slave Trade in 1846 and 1847, equalled that which existed just *after* the English and American Slave Trade ceased in 1807, they might perhaps be not very far from the truth, but to support

the proposition that the squadron has failed, and always must fail, on such a foundation, is obviously as unfair as it is absurd. The year 1835 is obviously the period at which the comparison should be made, when one of the only two existing Slave Trades was first struck—or 1839, when both fell within the reach of the Squadron. The most unfair of all periods to take as the basis of such a calculation is obviously when British Slave Trade was suddenly swept away. We would, however, advise the Society to reconsider conclusions founded on the "*lot of statistics.*"

If we go back to an earlier date we learn from M'Culloch's Commercial Dictionary in 1846, in the article "Slaves and Slave Trade," "between 1700 and 1786, 610,000 Africans were imported into Jamaica only; to which, adding the imports into the other islands and continental colonies, and those who died on the passage, the number carried from Africa will appear immense. The importations by other nations, particularly the French and Portuguese, were also very great." To a single island 70,000 slaves imported annually for 86 years, and this on the undoubted authority of Bryan Edwards!

We are justified not only in taking 73,000 as a great understatement for the period from 1798 to 1805, but even in regarding the statement of "rather less than 100,000" as probably much below the mark, but this, adding 14 per cent. mortality would give 114,000. We only beg the Anti-Slavery Society to specify the period at which an equal amount of Slave Trade in past times proves our efforts in recent times to be fruitless. We defy them to deny that the Squadron has produced an immense decrease of Slave Trade since 1839, or that the diminished success since 1845, has not arisen from causes palpable, notorious, and capable of remedy.

The efficacy of the Squadron after 1839 we find established by a totally independent authority, M'Culloch, who, in the edition of his Commercial Dictionary, published in 1846, (in which he carries his accounts of Brazil down to the middle or end of 1843,) states "but the exports (of sugar) have not increased during the last few years; and now that labour is becoming scarcer and dearer in consequence of the increasing difficulties thrown in the way of the importation of slaves, it is doubtful whether it can be maintained." This can only mean the British Squadron, for no one pretends any other check whatever existed.

A short summary of our previous statements of the number of slaves landed on the continent and islands of America at various periods may be useful; the deaths on the voyage and the numbers captured by cruizers being omitted from the calculations.

It is admitted that from 1795 to 1805 there was very little variation in the amount of slave trade; at this time every state possessing American colonies practised and encouraged the traffic, excepting Denmark alone, who, highly to her honour, had abolished it in 1792. The first period, therefore, we select is 1798.

DATE.	SPAIN.		PORTUGAL.		FRANCE, HOLLAND, and other Countries.	ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES.	Total number of slaves im- ported in 1798.
	Cuba, 6,000	Other Colonies, 9,000	Brazil, 15,000.	Other Colonies, 5,000.			
1798	15,000		20,000		25,000	40,000	100,000

This may be taken as the amount of slave trade down to 1807, when England and the United States passed laws against the traffic, and entirely abandoned it before the end of 1809. The calculation as regards these countries is probably much below the truth, being less than any contemporaneous estimate.

France abolished the trade in 1815, but did not affix penalties sufficiently severe to give effect to this prohibition until 1827: it is now near twenty years since an instance has occurred of a French vessel engaged in the slave trade.

Holland abolished the trade in 1814, and by the treaty of 1823, subjecting equipped vessels to capture by the British squadron, the Dutch slave trade was totally put down.

The slave trade of these several nations, amounting in 1798 to 65,000 per annum, has, therefore, entirely ceased for many years. That directed by Spain and Portugal to other colonies besides Cuba and Brazil, is also at an end. The slave trade for several years has been carried on solely to Cuba and Brazil; but until the British squadron was enabled to interpose an effectual check, by capturing equipped slave vessels, the importations to those parts alone exceeded the whole slave trade of the world in 1798, and had themselves increased sixfold between those dates.

No. of slaves landed in Cuba 1798--(Note to tables submitted to Commons' Committee by Mr. Bandinel,	6,000 .. 40,000	{	No. of slaves landed in Cuba before Equipment Treaty of 1835--(Committee's Tables.)
Ditto landed in Brazil in 1798, taking the Committee's tables, and deducting 5,000 from the Portuguese slave trade in that year for other colonies . . . , . . .			Number of slaves landed in Brazil in 1838, before 2nd & 3rd Vic., c. 73, came into force--(Vide Mr. Bandinel on slave trade, p. 287.)
	15,000 ... 94,000	{	
Total number of slaves landed in Cuba and Brazil in 1798	21,000 .. 134,000	{	Total number of slaves landed in Cuba & Brazil in 1835 and 1838 respectively.

Checked in 1835, the slave trade of Cuba was rapidly recovering itself under the flag of Portugal; thus the Act of 1839 was almost as important with respect to Cuba as to Brazil. In the words of Mr. Bandinel, p. 225, "that Act has accomplished the purpose intended by it; for its effect has been to sweep the sea almost entirely of slave traders under the Portuguese flag." Under no other flag could they escape the equipment articles without incurring still more serious dangers, and a large proportion of the 594 slave vessels captured since 1839, have been condemned in the appropriate character of piratical vessels "not belonging to any state or nation."

For the six years immediately succeeding this important measure we witness the following remarkable decrease of the slave trade:—

Average number of slaves imported into Cuba in each year from 1840 to 1845, both inclusive	8,138	{ Mean of numbers given by the Committee's tables.
Ditto ditto into Brazil	20,600	{ Ditto, with correction, at p. 499, 500, (<i>Col. Mag. Dec.</i>) applied to the year 1840.
Total annual number of slaves landed in Cuba and Brazil for six years, after 1839	28,738	{ Do. by Committee's tables, corrected as above.
Do.	24,469	Do. by Foreign office returns.

The Committee's tables for 1846 and 1847 show almost the complete extinction of the slave trade of Cuba, but a large increase on that of Brazil, compared with the above.

	CUBA.	BRAZIL.	
Mean of the years 1846, 47,	1,600	55,200	Mean of years 1846, 47.
Average prior to 1835	40,000	65,000	{ Average for 5 years, ending with 1839.
The Committee's own tables show, as regards Cuba, since 1835, a reduction of	38,400 p. ann.	9,800	{ Reduction, by Committee's own tables, in slave trade of Brazil.
With this our estimate agrees.		38,800	Do. by our estimate.

By our calculation, therefore, the amount of slave trade even in 1846 and 1847 was reduced, compared with 1835 and 1838, by 77,200 in each year.

Even Mr. Hutt's own tables show, in the years 1846 and 1847, compared with the same periods, (no correction whatever being applied), a reduction of 48,200 in each year!

For the six previous years, as compared with the slave trade of Cuba in 1835 and that of Brazil in 1838, our calculations show a reduction amounting to no less than 105,262 in each year.

For the same periods (no correction being applied) the Committee's tables show a reduction of no less than 73,629 in each year.

We leave our readers to choose between these figures ; but we are at a loss to understand how those, even of Mr. Hutt uncorrected, support the conclusions either of his own majority, or of the Anti-Slavery Society—viz., that the only limit of slave trade is the demand for slaves ; that the slave trade is larger than it ever was, and rages wholly unchecked by the squadron. Both declare the Sugar Bill of 1846 to be an additional stimulant that never before existed ; how then, we ask, is it that Mr. Hutt's own statement shows a *reduction* in the total annual amount of slave trade, compared with the periods when the squadron could not act with effect, of more than 48,000 ? Or, going back to the years 1835 and 1838, is it utterly unworthy of notice that, subsequent to those periods, the same tables uncorrected show that an aggregate of 538,174 victims have been saved from the horrors of the slave trade by prevention ? We have, we think, proved the amount of success to have been even yet more considerable, and shall now show first how it was attained up to 1846 ; and then for the following years why, though still keeping down the traffic to less than one half its former amount, our efforts have been less effective as regards the Slave Trade of Brazil.

When the Act of 1839 came into force the officers in command of the several cruizers, having for the most part long experience of the inefficacy of the former system, immediately recognised the advantage arising from the power to capture equipped slave ships, and adopted the measures necessary to give effect to this power. They knew by experience that, cruising at a distance from the shore, a large proportion of vessels must always escape with slaves ; as the result, therefore, of their own observation, the old system of distant cruising was very generally abandoned, and the vessels, for the most part, were thenceforth employed close to the shore.

The squadron was at this time too small to effect complete suppression, and a part of it (there being no orders on the subject) still adhered to the old plan, and cruized out of sight of the land ; but this partial adoption of the system of preventing the embarkation of slaves was aided by the partial adoption of other measures which struck at the root of the evil—viz., the destruction of the slave factories.

In November 1840 the slave factories at Gallinas, which had long exported at least 12,000 slaves in each year to Cuba, were destroyed. Eight different establishments existed of great extent, employing 60 white men, and at these one thousand tons of goods, exclusively destined to purchase slaves, had been landed during the previous nine months, to the certain knowledge of the officers employed in watching this depot. These depots

were rooted out in consequence of the slave-dealers of Gallinas having habitually bought and sold British subjects from Sierra Leone as slaves for export, and this blow was struck in virtue of a treaty with the native chiefs, under which the slave factors were expelled, and prohibited from returning, the slaves were given up, amounting to near 900, and the factories were rased to the ground. These measures were entirely approved by the Government, as was expressly recorded by the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Admiralty, and orders were sent out to act generally against the slave factories in the same manner.

Early in 1842, pursuant to these orders, Captain Matson was directed by the Commodore to destroy the factories of Ambriz and Cabenda, thus striking a blow as severe against the slave trade of Brazil as that of Cuba had received fifteen or eighteen months before. Had these measures been followed up, the force then on the coast would have been amply sufficient to put an end to the slave trade, *for without such depots it cannot be continued.*

Nothing can more remarkably show the amount of prejudice on this subject than the repeated statements (though ten times refuted) even of disinterested persons, as to the effect of the destruction of slave factories. These various reiterated assurances are entirely opposite to the fact. No loss of life has ever arisen amongst the crews of Her Majesty's ships thus employed, no bloodshed among the natives; the slave factories have neither been established at a distance inland, nor has the trade sprung up on new parts of the coast. We are still told it does harm rather than good, by driving away lawful commerce; though it has been proved, by the prolonged experience of a host of officers, that no shadow of lawful commerce had existed for a long course of years. It is true that Mr. Jackson, in his maiden speech, stated that he had himself known a cargo of produce shipped from Gallinas; but he forgot to add, or the reporter omitted, the essential fact—viz., *that it was 25 years before.*

As regards Ambriz and Cabenda, Captain Matson has recorded the delight with which the lawful traders witnessed the rooting out of their rivals, the truth being that in every part slave trade and innocent commerce are enemies and antagonists; in all its old haunts, wherever the former has not been banished by the squadron, it is preferred by the chiefs, and as long as there is a slave ship to supply, lawful trade is neglected and despised.

Still, however, we hear all these imaginary results of destroying the depots, and it has been even asserted that such measures are totally without any effect whatever on the slave trade itself. But the slightest consideration must satisfy any unprejudiced person of the tremendous actual losses they inflicted, to say

nothing of the prospects of enormous gains they destroyed! In proportion to the severity of the blow would be the anxiety to deny or conceal its effect. The terror it must have struck among the slave dealers of Cuba and Brazil, who had tens of thousands of capital similarly invested, can be no matter of doubt; but so powerfully did such motives operate, that the British Commissioners in Cuba and Brazil made no allusion to these proceedings, and appear not to have even known that they had taken place, until the intelligence had arrived from England! Dr. Cliffe himself, we might suppose, was entirely ignorant of these events, even when he tells the Sugar and Coffee Planting Committee of their effect on the slave trade of Brazil—vide answer to question 1490. “I once bought a little chap just like a dolly; he could not, from his teeth, have been more than six, perhaps not so much; he was too small to work: I gave 850 milreis for him.”

These facts may possibly suggest some doubts to the minds of those who have implicatedly trusted the slave dealers, when assured by them that the squadron is highly beneficial to their interests! We really expect soon to be told that the uprooting of slave factories, by the very losses inflicted, only encourages the inveterate spirit of gambling excited by the traffic, which (it has been asserted) would keep the hateful pursuit alive in the face of any penalties, and in spite of any losses!

Others, again, seem to suppose that a rise in the price of slaves, however great, would only give increased stimulus and enlarged profits to the slave dealer; but such an increase of price could arise only from proportionably aggravated losses and diminished numbers, and there must be plainly a limit to the price a Brazilian planter can give for a new slave. Unless we are to believe a similar insanity will induce him still to purchase slaves, though the price should far exceed the value of their labour, we must see that the slave trade was almost at an end when a boy of six years old cost 850 milreis!

But in August 1842, the fear of such sweeping measures was removed by the unfortunate publication of Lord Aberdeen's letter to the Admiralty, stating that the Queen's Advocate “could not take upon himself to advise that all the proceedings described as having taken place at Gallinas, New Cestos, and Seabar, are entirely justifiable;” that, under certain circumstances, (describing indeed the course actually pursued at Gallinas,) the Queen's Advocate was of opinion such measures would be lawful, but adding, “that if, in proceeding to destroy any factory, it should be found to contain merchandise, or other property, which there may be reason to suppose to belong to foreign traders, care should be taken not to include such property in the destruction

of the factories." This passage seemed to ensure perfect impunity to the Spanish and Brazilian slave dealers as "foreign traders," and was read in this sense alike by them, and by Her Majesty's officers.

The importance of this letter in the minds of the slave dealers, and their deep anxiety on the subject, may be conceived from the eagerness with which they seized upon it. A few days after its appearance in the Report of a Committee of the House of Commons, in August 1842, three actions were commenced against Captain Denman, in the names of the slave dealers of Gallinas and the Havanah, with damages laid at above 300,000*l.*, including a barefaced claim for the loss of 4,000 slaves!

The Commissioners at Sierra Leone report, in Dec. 1842, that "at Gallinas the slave trade, which had been paralysed for a time by the sweeping destruction of the slave factories and barracoons, is stated to have *partially* revived." Thus this opinion had already begun to produce its effect in Dec. 1842, and in Dec. 1843 the Commissioners report, "the Gallinas slave trading establishments have all been restored, and are in active operation."

As regards the Southern coast, Captains Butterfield and Matson state, in their evidence, how completely the slave trade in that quarter was laid prostrate, and that the slave dealers were actually returning to Brazil in despair, when, thus re-assured, they established themselves again, and commenced their operations anew.

Captain Matson says, in answer to Q. 1330, (*Vide Commons' Report*), "*Before I left the coast, in the beginning of 1843, the vessels were beginning to come over full of goods, and the very same men that had left the coast of Africa the year before I met returning from Brazil — men I was very well acquainted with, and who had relinquished the hope of carrying on the slave trade.*"

In 1845 the slave dealers at Gallinas were again detected dealing in British subjects. The Spaniard, who had branded the flesh of one of these victims with his mark, (one of the plaintiffs at the time in the pending action,) set the British Commodore at defiance, told the natives he would "be protected in London," and escaped with perfect impunity, inasmuch as his goods, found in the building where this outrage had been committed, were "carefully removed to a place of safety," (with which he probably bought more British subjects,) while the materials of the buildings (belonging to the native chiefs, and worth perhaps 50 dollars) were carried to a distance and burnt! Thus were the slave dealers encouraged, and the hands of British officers tied by this opinion: he who runs may read its consequences in these facts.

But the stimulating effect of this document was for a time neutralised by the increase of the squadron, and by orders from home to adopt the system of in shore cruising, in order to prevent the embarkation of slaves; wherever this system has been carried out its success has been remarkable, and wholly beyond question. *On the parts of the coast from whence Cuba derives her slaves it has been steadily acted upon; on the parts from whence Brazil is supplied it has never been carried out since the year 1845.* Accordingly, in the year 1846 and 1847 we find the slave trade of Cuba but 1,600 in each year, taking the mean; while that of Brazil reached a mean amount of 55,200!

The system of preventing the shipment of slaves, and keeping the squadron in shore, instead of cruising in the offing, had been adopted on the recommendation of Captains Denman and Matson, as was stated in the House of Commons on more than one occasion by Sir Robert Peel in 1844; and, subsequently, the same system was urged by Captains Trotter, Adams, Butterfield, and Sprigg, as well as by the French officers examined before the Duc de Broglie and Dr. Lushington.

Having learned that, on some parts of the coast at least, the old plan of cruising at a distance from the land had been resumed, Captain Denman stated the fact before Lord George Bentinck's Committee, and attributed the alleged increase of slave trade to this change.

To this evidence Sir Charles Hotham alludes in the following despatch:—

Penelope, in Elephant Bay, 17th August, 1848.

“SIR,—

1. “I request you will lay the accompanying letter from Commander Dixon, of Her Majesty's ship “Rapid,” before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

2. “After the opinion delivered by Captain Denman before the sugar and coffee Committee, that proper principles are not pursued by this squadron in their endeavours to suppress the slave trade, I feel that I am not needlessly troubling their lordships in requesting you to lay before the Board the opinion of an officer who for some time commanded the Sierra Leone division.

3. “Should it be necessary to pursue this subject any further, I can, without difficulty, procure sufficient evidence to overturn remarks which appear to have been made without due reflection.

4. “In the mean time I may add, that Commander Dixon's informants are the slave dealers themselves, and the neighbouring chiefs, who to obtain their annual stipend, are deeply interested in the suppression of the slave trade.

“I have, &c.,

(Signed)

“CHARLES HOTHAM,

“Commodore and Commander in Chief.

“The Secretary of the Admiralty.”

"Her Majesty's ship 'Rapid.'
"1st June, 1848.

"SIR,—

"I have the honour to inform you that, to the best of my belief, no vessel has escaped with slaves from the Gallinas or Seabar from the 1st of November, 1847, to the 12th of May, 1848.

"I have, &c.,

(Signed)

"EDWARD DIXON,

Commander, late Senior Officer,

"Sierra Leone Division."

"Commodore Sir Charles Hotham, K.C.B.,

"Commander in Chief."

But it appears that even in the northern division what the officers considered were "proper principles," were acted on, *not* by the Commodore's orders, and that on the South coast the very opposite course was pursued; but at present we must show the success of this system on the Northern coast and on the slave trade of Cuba.

In a despatch, dated December 5th 1848, (*vide* appendix to Commons Report 1849) Sir Charles Hotham says:—"The slave dealers at Gallinas, Seabar, and the North, formerly supplied the Havannah trade, during 1846 and 1847 few, if any, slaves were exported from those marts."

Sir C. Hotham states, in evidence before the lords, the following facts as to the means by which this result was attained; Q. 1883, "Does not the Gallinas trade almost exclusively go to Cuba?"—A. "I have always been informed so."—Q. 1884: "What mode of cruising was adopted by Commander Dixon, in charge of that station?"—A. "*He kept his vessel constantly cruising near the shore.*"

Q. "1885: *Was it entirely optional with him to do the one or the other, as he thought best?*"—A. "*Quite so.*"

Q. 1886: "Did the other divisional officers keep their ships cruising in shore?"—A. "I believe Commander Murray, who had been on that station eighteen months under my orders, has invariably done the same."

It is perfectly clear that, even on the Northern coast, the system, to carry out which the squadron had been increased, has been persevered in by mere accident; the officers who were in command having had a discretion left to them, which they ably turned to account; had Commander Murray not established this system, or had Commander Dixon not continued it, instead of 1,500 slaves per annum landed in Cuba, the result would have been an increase of slave trade, such as we have now to regret with respect to Brazil.

That the small amount of Cuba slave trade did not arise

from the cessation of demand, is proved by the fact that in 1843 all the slave factories were re-established by Cuba slave merchants, and were maintained at a vast expense down to February 1849, when they were destroyed by Sir Charles Hotham, as existing contrary to the Treaty of 1840. The great extent of these establishments, may be learned from Sir Charles Hotham's evidence (*vide* Lords' Report from Q. 1875 to Q. 1888). It is clear these factories were long maintained at a dead loss, in the hope of reaping a rich harvest when the withdrawal of the squadron took place, an event the slave dealers were taught by the English press to expect as certain and immediate.

Great however as was the success of this system on the North coast, Sir Charles Hotham still adhered to the opinion that the cruisers were most effective when stationed out of sight of land. He states that the other system is applicable only to the Northern coast; but Captains Matson, Adams, Butterfield, and Sprigg, who have the longest experience of the Southern coast, and who have actually in their own practice had means of testing the inefficiency of distant cruising, compared with operations in shore, have proved the reverse.

We have before stated that the African squadron was increased for the object of preventing the embarkation of slaves; but as regards Brazil, before this system could be fairly tried, viz.: towards the end of 1845, Brazilian slave vessels were allowed to pass unmolested, owing to the pretended lapse of the Treaty; and soon afterwards, when the Act supplying its place came into force, the English cruisers were withdrawn from several hundred miles of the African coast, comprising the Portuguese possessions, whence Brazil has always obtained more than half her slaves; and this district was left unguarded by British cruisers for upwards of twelve months.

In January, 1847, shortly after Sir C. Hotham assumed the command, the squadron was again replaced upon this coast, and the following extracts will show that a system was pursued diametrically opposite to the one, to fulfil which the squadron had been increased. Captain Lysaght states that he was cruising off Ambriz and Benguela about fourteen months, during which time he was ordered to cruise from 70 to 100 miles from the shore, *Vide* Lords' Report, Q. 4142. Captain Chads, who was one of the first officers stationed off Ambriz when the cruisers were replaced, and who captured twenty-six vessels in this quarter, does not state at what distance from the shore he was ordered to cruise; but he says (*Vide* Lords' Report, Q. 4057), "I had various orders from time to time; but whenever I was left to my own operations, which I frequently was, I

almost invariably cruized in shore; I found that to answer best. By cruizing in shore I did not take a single full vessel, but I captured a great many empty ones. *I considered that prevention was better than cure.*" (We recommend this to the attention of all those who have read Mr. Hutt's resolution of 1848, showing as a proof of failure, that only 4 per cent of the number of slaves landed across the Atlantic were captured, and who have not discovered in his appendix that 594 slave vessels, the great majority without slaves, were captured during the same time.)

Captain Sprigg, who had a long previous experience of this very coast, shows the "immense effect" produced by the small force employed in 1842, consisting of three vessels besides his own. These were commanded by officers of long African experience, Captains Matson, Butterfield, and Adams, to whose opinion we have already referred. In the Lords' Report, Answer 3656, Captain Sprigg describes the different measures pursued under Sir Charles Hotham's command. After showing the importance of being able to inspect the boats passing backwards and forwards along the coast, he says:—"Now in the former part of the time, it was the duty of the officers to acquire information, and they did acquire great information. When the subsequent orders came out of Commodore Hotham, to keep off the coast, they were so stringent, that although as an officer I had three years' experience on the coast at that time, the order tied me up as if I had none. It is also to be observed, that it was not only tying us up from obtaining information on shore, but it actually tied us up from communicating with the cruisers which were stationed next or near us. It was headed 'Confidential,' and by this means we were actually tied up from communicating so as to co-operate with officers who might come in sight of each other. 'Confidential.' Copy of sailing orders, by W. Edmonds, Esq., Commander of H.M.S. Heroine, and Senior officer of the Congo division. 'Mem. I am directed by Sir C. Hotham to inform the Commanders of the respective ships belonging to this division, that their sailing orders are to be considered by them strictly private and confidential;' so that in case of any senior officer asking me for this order, I was to tell him of this preamble, and withhold the order. '2. You will take up your station between the river Sette and Banda point, cruizing between those latitudes thirty miles off the land, until the 31st of August. Then cruise between the same latitudes sixty miles, till the 30th Sept.; then resume your former distance of thirty miles, and so alternately until you receive further directions, &c.'" Captain Sprigg adds: "This order continued in force for a period of eight or nine months. I met with three Commanders, and each officer said 'where are your

orders?' The answer was: 'mine are confidential.' &c. 'The consequence was, that instead of gaining information from each other, and assisting each other to intercept slavers, or planning any mutual efforts to bear upon a point, there could be no mutual aid or concert.'

Q. 3663. "Are the committee to understand that in your opinion the distance at which the cruisers were ordered to keep was fatal to the success of the blockade?" A. "I consider it decidedly so."

Sir Charles Hotham himself declares his opinion repeatedly in favour of distant cruising. Lords' Report, 2062. "Had you any means of ascertaining what their general plan of proceeding was in coming over from Brazil to the coast of Africa; when they near the coast what do they do?" A. "I believe that when they arrive at a certain distance, say 100 miles from their point, they send a boat on shore, communicate with the factors, and arrange the hour at which they will arrive; they arrive at the very hour, the wind being always at their command, and ship (their slaves). The greater part of our captures, as *I have been told by the dealers*, have been made during the time of their waiting off the coast. *They say* if they could arrange any system to prevent that, *they should not care a farthing for the blockade.*"

It is surprising that the British Commodore should thus trust to the slave dealers who had such an interest in deceiving him! This reads to us as the 'strongest proof' in favour of the blockade system. The chart given in the Lords' Report which shows the spot where each capture was made by Sir C. Hotham's own squadron, sufficiently marks the reasons why the slave dealer should desire the Commodore to entertain this opinion. The chart, in fact, shows that of 164 captures, only 37 were made 50 miles and upwards from the coast, and that, notwithstanding these orders, upwards of 80 vessels were taken within 20 miles of the shore.

This fact established, the reader will be not a little surprised at the reply to the next question, 2063. "Had, therefore, in your opinion, vessels cruising 70 miles from the land, as good a chance of catching more before they got their slaves on board, as if they were inshore?" A. "They had a better."

Q. 2064. "And could they as well prevent shipment?" A. "Yes."

It becomes necessary now to remark that Sir C. Hotham's opinions are formed upon the reports of others rather than upon his own actual observation.—*Vide* questions and answers from 1721 to 1730, inclusive, Lord's Report.

But unsatisfactory as must be opinions collected from the

conflicting reports of twenty or thirty different sources, under even the most favourable circumstances, Sir Charles Hotham states at 1752, 3, and 4, that he consulted no one who happened to be serving under his orders at the time, excepting Captain Mansell, whom he relieved from the temporary command. After stating his opinion to be in favour of keeping the cruisers out of sight of land, in order to frustrate the movements of the slave dealers, and prevent the position of the cruisers being known, he gives the following answer to question 895 (Commons' Report):—"Such, therefore, being the position of your ships, it was utterly impossible for you, or any captain under your command, to ascertain the precise position of the places where the slave dealers had established their factories?" *A.* "*We could form some conjectures of their movements in the Bight of Benin, but on no other part of the coast.*" Therefore, had Sir C. Hotham been anxious to avail himself to the utmost of the experience of others, the information collected wherever his own views were carried into effect, could have been of small value. And this answers one of Sir Charles Hotham's objections to Captain Denman's memorandum as to the best mode of proceeding (*vide p. 27, First Report of Mr. Hutt's Committee*) viz., that the depots of slave trade are *not* known; how can they be known to the squadron when cruising out of sight of land?

How little actual personal experience Sir Charles had obtained of the south coast, where his own views appear to have been most stringently enforced, appears in the following part of his evidence (*vide Lords' Report*).

Q. 1716. "To which of the slave stations on the south coast you have mentioned were you yourself able to give the most personal observation?" *A.* "I cannot say that I gave any one spot more personal observation than another; my duty did not consist in that: my duty consisted in superintending the whole station, instead of directing myself to any particular point; that task fell more on the shoulders of the captains under my orders, and to them I looked for the duty."

Q. 1717. "Then, in point of fact, it did not fall within your duty, as commanding the whole squadron, personally and actually, to observe, for any time, any of the principal slave posts yourself?"—*A.* "I cruised off them from time to time, when I had nothing else particularly to do. I did not confine my attention to any one post. *Still, if I did name a point, I should say Ambriz.*"

Q. 1718. "But you were not able, consistently with your other duties, to stay long enough before any one of the principal slave posts to be able, personally, and by your own actual presence, to satisfy yourself as to the carrying on of the slave trade?"—*A.* "In answer to that question, I may say I was long enough off Ambriz to be able to determine as to the trade being carried on to a very considerable extent. *Beyond that I can give the committee no particular information.*"

Q. 1719. "Do you happen to recollect how long you were able to stay actually off Ambriz in a posture of observation."—A. "Cruizing off about a month upon one occasion."

Q. 1720. "At what distance were you cruizing from the shore?"—A. "*I was generally, I think, forty or fifty miles from the shore.*"

Sir Charles Hotham (Lords' Report, Q. 1,690)—

Q. "Had you yourself any previous knowledge of Africa, before you undertook the command of that squadron on the African coast?"—A. "None whatever. I am almost ashamed to say that I had never even directed my attention to the subject; therefore, I came upon the coast as unprejudiced as any officer could be, except as far as I was actuated by the desire to do my duty, and please my employers."

It appears also by other parts of Sir Charles's evidence, that he had no instructions whatever as to the mode in which he was to employ his force, nor had he the advantage even of meeting the commodore he succeeded. Thus, a coast extending 3,000 miles, every part of which was equally unknown, the arrangement of a large squadron, and a duty of acknowledged difficulty, entirely new to him, were committed to Sir Charles Hotham, and with every thing to learn, he was thus left to grope his way in the dark towards the suppression of the slave trade. The various complicated duties of his command appear to have absorbed his attention, and he obviously had no means of forming opinions on his own actual observation. Sir Charles Hotham has attributed the former success of the squadron to the slave trade south of the line having been then "*in its infancy*;" but would it not be more just to say that the suppression of the slave trade was in its infancy when an officer, however talented, had such duties imposed upon him under such conditions? That England should succeed in the struggle while she thus conducts it, is simply impossible. Each new commodore is much in the same position as if he were the first officer ever employed on this service; and so long as officers are thus sent out, without either previous experience or *specific instructions*, the country is perpetually commencing the struggle *de novo* in the person of the new commodore, without a prospect of bringing it to a successful issue.

It has been absolutely necessary to show that the strong opinions expressed by Sir Charles Hotham are not founded on actual experience; had he been sent out *with orders to ascertain the places whence slaves were exported, and to devote his efforts to prevent the embarkation of slaves from them*, we have not a doubt of his success. As it was, no responsibility for the failure of this system can attach to those who recommended it. On the north coast, where (owing to the accidental circumstances detailed), it has been tried, it has perfectly succeeded. On the southern coast it has been entirely abandoned, and, although the

squadron still materially kept down the traffic, we have, in consequence, to regret a considerable increase in the slave trade of Brazil compared with the average of the six years following 1839.

Sir Charles Hotham has also specified some facts in support of his opinions. He estimates the coast on which the slave trade is actively pursued at 2,195 miles; but this is nearly twice the real extent of the slave trading coast, as proved by evidence before the Lords' Committee (*vide* question 2,128—4,460, evidence of Captains Matson and Denman), and on no other parts do the peculiar characteristics essential to success under present circumstances, exist. Sir Charles also states that lagoons and rivers run parallel with the sea, which "may be considered the railways of Africa; by them slaves are transported from point to point, and shipped, not at any fixed point, but according to the position of the cruiser," and that where these do not exist, the slaves are treated like post horses, and run from spot to spot; with his despatch of December 5th, 1848, stating these facts, he transmits a chart to establish them, printed in the appendix to Mr. Hutt's Committee, in which such a water communication close inside the beach is shown as extending all the way from Cape St. Paul to Loango, 1,300 miles—and again to the south a road is drawn as stretching to the south from Cabenda, between 400 and 500 miles; but the chart shows this road to run from 50 to 100 miles inland, and therefore it would not afford this supposed facility, even if it were an easy matter to drive about 400 or 500 ironed slaves like post horses. As regards the water communication, it is proved to have no existence for more than three-fourths of its supposed extent, viz., from the Quorra to Loango, by the concurrent testimony of several officers thoroughly acquainted with every part of this district. The only part where this lagoon really exists is along the Bight of Benin, where it can never be of the slightest use to the slave dealers in enabling them to ship a single slave, so long as the part of its shores alone available to the slave dealers (only 200 miles), is guarded by the constant presence of five active cruisers, ordered to keep close to the shore and prevent slave trade. It appears that latterly a discretion has been left to the commanding officer of that division, and Captain Hastings, of the "Cyclops" has ordered his vessels to keep always within six miles of the shore.

We have been most reluctant to enter into these errors of Sir Charles Hotham; but they are supported by his high reputation as an officer of acknowledged skill and ability, and should all his recommendations be adopted, they would involve, in our opinion, consequences so disastrous and deplorable, that we have no choice. Sir Charles Hotham's squadron was in a state of dis-

cipline that reflects high credit upon him; it is also to be admitted that it would have been desirable to have had for a time a greater number of vessels. He had, however, enough to watch all the principal slave depots, and had his squadron been generally thus employed he would have effectually checked the success of the slave dealers, and would have at least succeeded in keeping the slave trade of Brazil down to the average to which it was reduced during the six years after 1839, for most of the time, by a force scarcely half as large as his, and without steam vessels; as it was, appointed to the command under the disadvantages we have described, it was scarcely possible that any amount of talent, or of zeal could have taught him the best course of action, and destitute alike of previous knowledge and of specific instructions, no other result could be expected but failure. We have purposely abstained from referring to the plan Sir Charles Hotham suggested in his despatch of December 5th, as a substitute for the present measures, as the tenor of his evidence on this subject shows that it was made without sufficient consideration, especially, as in his various examinations Sir Charles Hotham declined to specify the period for which he would allow the trade of Brazil to continue, or to fill up any details of the scheme he sketched out.

The consideration of the question whether or not measures for the suppression of the slave trade shall be abandoned, would be obviously imperfect without a reference to the views of the British and foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which has long and loudly joined in the demand for the withdrawal of the squadron.

The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society was first founded in 1839, when the old society, having carried the abolition of the slave trade, and of slavery in the colonies, had ceased to take any active part as a body, though it never was dissolved. This new society, early in its history, condemned the use of force *in toto*, as a means of suppressing the slave trade. But it is equally undeniable that these views were not adopted by the late Sir Fowell Buxton; and that Lord Brougham, Lord Denman, Bishop Wilberforce, Dr. Lushington, Sir Robert Inglis, Sir Thomas Acland, Sir Edward Buxton, Mr. Evans, and many other of the staunchest and most distinguished friends of the cause entirely repudiate them.

We regard several of the persons who form the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society with sincere respect; still we have great doubts how far any body of men, however well meaning, are justified in holding this title while advocating views which are unreservedly condemned by those public men, who are generally regarded as the representatives of anti-slavery opinions. When the country is told that the

Anti-Slavery Society urges the removal of the squadron, these are the names suggested to every mind, and the great majority, who have not followed up the subject with attention, believe this to be the authoritative dictum of all these eminent men, instead of the opinion of a few persons in general wholly unknown to the public.

It is to be deplored that persons honestly devoted to such a cause should find themselves in a state of discord and opposition, but the Anti-Slavery Society's opinions are so perverted, as to be most powerfully aiding the interests of the slave dealer, and tending towards an unlimited and perpetuated slave trade; anxiously then as we would deprecate divisions, here there appears to be no option: but by every motive which urges so powerfully those who have thought long and deeply on the subject, it becomes imperative to combat opinions so fraught with mischief.

Deeply as the subject roots itself in the hearts of those who have been long devoted to it, some warmth of language is scarcely to be avoided in dealing with nominal friends who have thus been led astray so far, as to support the machinations of the enemy; but we would anxiously deprecate all angry feeling, and attempt to bring back a part at least of those who now support the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, by means of friendly argument and remonstrance.

The society has, moreover, in common with a portion of the press, and with the public at large, been in some degree misled by Mr. Hutt's Committee; an authority on which it would naturally place great reliance, and which has doubtless powerfully contributed to confirm its opinions. The Anti-Slavery Reporter of last May, referring to Mr. Bright's attack on the accuracy of the society as to the alleged increase of slave trade says:—"The honourable gentleman would have acted more fairly had he attacked *the Select Committee on the slave trade on whose authority its statements were made*. But neither the adroitness, nor the eloquence of the honourable gentleman can alter the facts of the case; they are patent to the eyes of all but those who are resolved not to see, or are so blinded by their theories that they will not see."

Mr. Bright was referring to an elaborate statement of the society, strongly urging the withdrawal of the squadron, and this was founded on Mr. Hutt's tables, the utter fallacy of which we have already exposed. If the society still refuses to reconsider its position, it will become justly obnoxious to the charge its organ makes against others, "of being resolved not to see," of being "so blinded by theories that they will not see."

In the document entitled "The Slave Trade and its Remedy"

all Mr. Hutt's resolutions of 1848 are recapitulated. The Society does not appear aware that they were opposed by all the members of the Committee connected with the anti-slavery cause, and who might have been supposed of some influence with the Society; viz., Sir R. Inglis, Sir E. Buxton, and Col. Thompson. There, however, stands a summary of the fabulous statistics as the basis of the Society's as well as the Committee's conclusions. The alleged small proportion of Negroes captured is prominently urged—the 594 vessels captured since 1839 unnoticed. The slave trade in 1846 and 1847, instead of being merely an increase, as compared with the six years previous, is put forward as if it were unexampled in amount at any former time. The slightest hint of the great success of those six years is omitted, and so are the palpable causes for this partial increase. The Anti-Slavery Society, like the rest of the world, has been deceived by the report of Mr. Hutt's Committee, and cannot be blamed for having trusted to a document apparently so authentic.

It appears also that the Society had been powerfully influenced by the belief, that while the cruizers only aggravated every evil, the mortality among the crews was also appalling to humanity. But Sir Charles Hotham, whose statements of facts within his own knowledge are wholly beyond question, distinctly informs both Committees that the mortality during the two years of his command was only $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.!—less than that in the fleet in the East or West Indies. He distinctly declares, that he considers the African station more healthy than the West Indies, and that vessels may be kept there two years, (the present term of service,) without any fear. (*Vide* Questions 732, 913, 914, Commons Report, 1849; Questions 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, Lords Report.) This change has arisen from the power of seizing equipped vessels, by which the slave trade has been driven from the rivers to the open coast, which is perfectly healthy; and the good discipline in which Sir Charles Hotham kept his squadron undoubtedly contributed to this result.

We think we have sufficiently proved here, and in former parts of these papers, how fallacious the grounds are on which the Anti-Slavery Society has been induced to demand the withdrawal of the squadron. It is time now to consider the remedy it proposes. The fundamental principle is this: "So long as slavery exists, slave trade will continue; and therefore the only way of putting down slave trade is to put down slavery itself."

There can be no doubt that if slavery was at an end, slave trade would cease; but that slavery may continue when the slave trade has ceased, is proved by the case of our own West India colonies from 1807 until 1834, and by the slave states of America, where slavery still continues, though the slave trade became

illegal also in 1807. We therefore deny the correctness of this dogma of the Society; but, even if it were admitted as true, we should entirely differ as to its practical application. It would be far more true to say, "Ignorance is the parent of crime," or, "Crime is incompatible with true Christianity." So far we agree, and join in urging the necessity of spreading Religion and Education; but we should be mad to dismiss the police, throw open the gaols, and trust our property and all we hold dear to the anticipated future effects of these influences. Where our own interests are concerned, there is no danger of running into such wild excesses in the practical application of even the most undoubted truths. But the unhappy Negro is the victim of the theories of his self-styled friends: he can enter no protest; and as the consequences will be remote from our own hearths, we shall probably endure them (vicariously) with infinite equanimity. There is an old proverb, "It is easy to bear the misfortunes of our friends."

As for this dogma of the Society, we answer, the slavery of foreign countries in general, we cannot assail; we deplore it; we may in our hearts condemn it as a sin—as an evil fraught with dangers to those countries which countenance it—but it is beyond our control.

On the other hand, the slave trade is already condemned by every state, though two countries yet countenance it. These are pledged to England to put it down. They have supplied England with the right, and she possesses the power, requisite. We know that slavery may and does exist where the slave trade has ceased, but we know moreover that it is this hideous traffic that gives the last bitterness to human existence, in this, its most wretched condition. When the slave trade is put down, the first step is made towards eventual freedom, and from that moment the condition of the slave improves, and ever must improve. The condition of a slave in our own colonies, and now in the United States of America, was and is, beyond all comparison, more tolerable than that of his wretched brethren in a Cuba plantation or in a Brazilian mine, where, urged by the perpetual lash, the largest amount of labour in the shortest possible time is the maxim, and the labourers are thus worked off to be replaced by fresh imports; in other words, by fresh outrages and horrors on the African continent, where, after all, the supreme misery of this scourge of mankind is inflicted. We urge these considerations as no palliation of slavery. We believe it to be a violation of every principle, by which we ourselves claim to be free—a blow aimed at the very foundation of human society; for what title to any mere external possession can hold good if the natural right of freedom is denied? The wretched pre-

tence, that slavery is sanctioned by Scripture, is the very climax of blasphemy and hypocrisy.

Still, we ask, where is our right, where is our power, to oblige other nations to set their slaves free? If we have not the power, the right will avail us little; but slavery in general being utterly unassailable by us (to say nothing of the obvious misstatement of fact involved in their proposition), we more than doubt the wisdom of putting forth such an axiom as the fundamental doctrine, governing the efforts of this Society.

At present the application is made to the slavery of Cuba and Brazil, on the ground that all the slaves landed in the one since 1820, in the other since 1830, have been introduced in violation of the treaties with Great Britain, which would probably include at least three-fourths of the slaves in those countries. As regards Cuba, possibly it would be within the power of the mother country to enforce the enfranchisement of the slaves, and when enfranchised, to protect the white population; but Cuba now sends a large revenue to Spain, which in such an event would cease. If, then, England made this demand in such terms as the case would require, Cuba would throw itself into the arms of the United States, and Spain would be glad to relinquish it to the Republic, and rejoice in at once baffling England, and shaking off a dependency about to be converted into a burden instead of a support; the only result would be a breach with the United States.

But in Brazil the Government is utterly powerless, therefore no dependence could be placed on its assurances; and even if it really wished to fulfil its pledges, no result could follow. The terms of the existing treaty are as strong as words can be, but they are mere words, and must remain so, since the great mass of the people are interested in the slave trade. The power, however, it imparts to England is all-sufficient, if it were carried out on the shores of Africa with energy, consistency and resolution. But suppose this demand to emancipate three-fourths of the slave population were made, the answer would be, that if agreed to, the white people would be placed in the utmost jeopardy, and the country would pass out of cultivation. There is no mother country or other external force to maintain order, and to set free a population recently landed from the shores of Africa, would be to renew the horrors and calamities of St. Domingo. The cessation of the African slave trade for some years is an indispensable preliminary to emancipation; and much as we abhor slavery, we should deplore such an event, as involving terrible sufferings and excesses at the moment, and as holding forth no promise of future improvement. For these reasons every white man in Brazil is bound by every motive of interest, and even by

the principle of self-preservation itself, to resist to the last a measure so fatal to him and all connected with him; and the Government would be manifestly powerless to enforce it.

We believe nothing but the conquest of the country could effect this object; but how does the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society propose to compass it? The remedy proposed by the society, the "Reporter" tells us, after one of its tirades against the squadron, "*is simple in its character,*" "*direct in its operation;*" it is also "*eminently practical in its character,*" and "*only needs to be supported by the weight of public opinion to be successful in its results.*" The *Reporter* then launches forth some energetic denunciations about Brazil and Spain "trampling under foot the most solemn treaties," "mocking the English Government," "treating with dishonour the people of this country," and after talking about "pressing home upon Brazil and Cuba with vigour," &c., "the plan suggested by the Anti-Slavery Committee" adds—"We do not ask even to succour oppressed humanity, or to ensure the fulfilment of treaties, that the Government should send armed vessels to Rio de Janeiro or Havana, and at the cannon's mouth demand the liberation of the slaves, and reparation for the indignities inflicted on our country; but we do ask that if the just rights of Great Britain are not conceded, and the African made free, that measures be taken to exclude the produce of those countries from the British markets, until such time as they consent to do justice and honourably fulfil their engagements." This is truly "roaring like any sucking dove"—"a most lame and impotent conclusion." But we forget the *Reporter* has told us it is "*eminently practical,*" and "*ONLY*" requires to be supported by public opinion to be effective! The suggestion of excluding all slave grown produce from our markets—is it truly extremely practical?—then we have not read the signs of the times aright. Yet we must admit the extreme *simplicity* of the *Reporter*, if not of his plan; but whether this proposition is the more practical, or the expectation that when it is carried into effect, Brazil will abolish slavery, is matter of doubt. It may be otherwise put thus—exclusion from our markets will press so severely on the Brazilians, that they *will destroy all future means of production to regain them!* We have, however, some reason to think, from experience of the past, that slavery and slave trade would still exist and continue, even if our markets were closed both to Brazil and Cuba, for down to the year 1846, when that deplorable measure was passed, they were hermetically sealed to those countries; yet, until the squadron could oppose an effectual check, the slave trade of Brazil grew from 15,000 to 94,000; that of Cuba from 6,000 to 40,000, in the year! Do these facts tempt us to join the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in demanding

the removal of the squadron, or encourage us to credit the assurance that to prohibit slave grown produce, would be to put down slavery and slave trade for ever? Is it possible that grave and thinking men, anxious to do right, can have had the simplicity to regard these measures as "eminently practical," and to sacrifice the perfectly efficacious mode of action at our command, for one so utterly unattainable, but which, if attained, would be absolutely fruitless of the effects anticipated. No one can doubt that such expectations can be entertained by those alone who are so "blinded by their theories that they will not see."

It has ever been an object of great moment with those who have calmly considered the question, that after the great measure of emancipation, the West Indian colonies should yet prosper and remain in cultivation; and especially with respect to this "eminently practical" remedy of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, it requires little consideration to convince us how important it is that the enfranchisement of the slave and the ruin of the planter should not be proved practically to be synonymous terms. It was essential that our colonies should hold out an example to the slave-holding world, tempting them to the same great tribute to justice through their interest, or at least not scaring them from its contemplation by a spectacle of ruin and misery. Moreover every generous mind (the battle once won) would regard with sorrow the evils which may have fallen on those who were placed by circumstances in the adverse ranks, and on whom, though the country at large was responsible, the brunt of the punishment fell. It was essential, we say, to raise up the stricken colonies, but unhappily the bitterness of the strife has outlived the actual conflict, and now the interests of the West India body and of the Negro race have become identical, both appear to suffer under the old law "*odisse quem læseris.*"

How can we suppose Brazil will voluntarily set free her slaves with our West Indian colonies prostrate and ruined? Referring however to a memorial, addressed by this Society to Lord John Russell, in 1846, it seems "That the committee earnestly trust Her Majesty's Government will recall the cruisers from the coast of Africa; and the committee would urgently recommend, that the funds which will be saved thereby, may be applied to the development of the resources—*of British India!*" as the only part of the world able to compete with slave labour. If the squadron should be withdrawn, this recommendation will be proved to be just as "eminently practical" as the rest of the views of this society, but the proposal equally violates justice to the West Indies, and sound policy as regards the object of giving freedom to the slaves of Brazil and Cuba. The very idea of competition on the part of our colonies is thus repudiated:

those colonies being however obviously in an infinitely better condition than Brazil could be if her slaves were suddenly set free. A third rival is thus to be stimulated to the utmost to swallow up the other two, for a successful competition with the slavery of Brazil, would be manifest destruction to her after her slaves are emancipated.

The only favourable symptom we can discover through the columns of the *Reporter* is the fact it has itself admitted, and the uneasiness it betrays at finding itself actually fighting side by side with the slave dealers. Having made the disagreeable discovery that they are all of one mind as regards the squadron, the *Reporter* of last September says :—

“In uniting with others in the belief the cruisers should be withdrawn, we distinctly disavow the objects and motives which seem to influence them. Many of them, we fear, care little whether the slave trade flourish or decay; nay, some of them we know advocate the renewal of slave trade by this country, in order that their commercial schemes and agricultural speculations might be advantaged thereby. We regret that by the force of circumstances we should be found in such company, or appear to give the slightest countenance to their sordid and inhuman projects. We repudiate their doctrines and their practices *in toto*. They would withdraw the squadron, and find no substitute for it. We would withdraw it, and find an efficient one.”

We doubt how far this disclaimer will absolve the society from the awful responsibility it is rushing upon with such obstinacy. So eager are its efforts, that a list appears in several *Reporters* showing forty or fifty country towns in which its emissaries have been employed in disseminating these fatal theories. Again, in the same article, the *Reporter* says :—

“We ask our friends to discriminate; to look at the subject in the light of facts; and not to condemn us because men of questionable character choose to place themselves in our company. There are some who call themselves free traders, that advocate the withdrawal of the squadron, because it interferes, say they, with the liberty of commerce. They overlook the moralities of the case. We are not of that class. There are merchants and manufacturers who demand the suppression of the squadron because it interferes with their commercial operations in Rio and Havana; but we are not of that class. There are West Indians who ask for the withdrawal of the squadron in order that the money saved thereby may be devoted to African emigration; but we are not of that class. Neither are we of the parties represented by the *Times* and the *Daily News*.”

The allusion to the slave dealers of Cuba and Brazil, masters, mates, merchants, and super-cargoes, is rather faint and indistinct; but there is no mincing the matter. These and the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society are all in the same boat, and a strangely compounded crew they appear. Mr^s Scoble takes the helm, and we look on with consternation, trust-

ing that they may be upset before their slave-trading enterprise be consummated; but right glad shall we be to help our misguided friends to reach land again, trusting we shall find them somewhat sobered by experience.

But while the oldest and most devoted friends of the anti-slavery cause have watched the proceedings of this Society with grief and alarm, the *Times* has been loud in praise of its proceedings, though, throughout, treating all notion of suppressing slavery or slave-trade as utter humbug. On the 30th of November last, it stated that in consequence of the statements of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society, the French Government had given notice to Great Britain of its intention to withdraw from the treaty of 1845; and next day appeared a flaming article, which did for once shed some new light on its readers. Hitherto we thought that pure harm in all respects was the only effect produced by the squadron; but on December 1st, the *Times* says:—"We confess we are inclined to hope that *if the slave trade were not checked by our cruizers*, THE EXCESS OF THE EVIL would rapidly work its own cure!" Thus we learn two new things in the teaching of the *Times*—first, that the squadron does check the slave trade; secondly, that if withdrawn, the evil would grow up to a great excess.

The constant reader who has hitherto placed implicit faith in the *Times* must have been rather staggered; but still, in spite of this admission, the *Times* confesses to a *hope* that this excess of the evil, (which it justly regards as certain,) *may* work its own cure; and farther on it says, "in five years." This is highly consolatory. *But why should it cure itself in five years, when, raging equally without limit or restriction, it failed to do so in two hundred years?* How can the slave trade cure itself, since it furnishes no inherent means for the maintenance of the number to which it swells the population? With the increase of such a population an increased number of victims is required to supply the annual waste of human life. We have already been told that in our own colonies, during unrestricted slave trade, an import amounting to one-sixteenth of the whole slave population was required in every year to keep up numbers.

But as for the pæans of the *Times*, on the supposed withdrawal of France from the treaty, and the anticipated excess of slave trade, they were as unfounded as the hope that such excess would, if it occurred, work its own cure. France had given no notice of the sort; and if she had, it was nothing to the purpose. No slave trade pollutes the flag of France; and until treated in its true character of piracy, France cannot interfere with the slave ships of Spain and Brazil, having engaged in no treaties for the purpose. If a cargo of slaves were found under the flag of France, the fact would be discovered by virtue of the right to visit to verify the flag by the papers, formally recognized as a

principle of maritime law in the treaty of 1845. The fraudulent assumption of the flag, and the forgery of the papers to baffle English cruizers, would be the necessary presumption, if such a case occurred. The vessel would be seized; and should it appear that she were *bonâ fide* French, she would be delivered over to the French authorities with a proper explanation: the master and crew, then, instead of getting *free* as Spaniards or Brazilians, would thus, by their own act and choice, be transferred to the galleys for life; such would be the *advantage* of assuming the flag of France.

With respect to the assistance the French squadron is able to afford, Sir Charles Hotham states, (*vide* Lords Report, 2074),—"They (the French) have not made a single capture during the period of my command; they were unable to interfere with any vessels except their own." It would be no impediment to the suppression of the slave trade if the French further reduced their squadron. It is only surprising that they maintained twenty-six vessels without making the proposal sooner. We hope, however, soon to see France enabled to take an active part in the struggle, and have reason to believe that many of her officers would show equal zeal and judgment in the service.

We do not know whether the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society has really endeavoured to influence the French Government in this matter, but we earnestly trust before taking any farther steps, it will re-consider these doctrines; and if its efforts are approaching their consummation in the withdrawal of the squadron, that it will seriously inquire, each member for himself, whether he has not acted on mistaken premises? whether the advocacy of the proposed remedy has made the slightest progress? whether the prohibition of slave grown produce is probable? whether the money saved from the squadron will go to grow sugar in the East? whether, if it does, the ruin of the West Indies, and the successful competition of the East, would operate to tempt Brazil to reduce herself to the condition of Jamaica, by emancipating her slaves? and, lastly, whether the various conflicting interests, which have united with the Society to remove the squadron (but one and all having formed opposite conclusions as to the result, and having opposite ultimate objects in view), do not of themselves afford valid ground for doubting whether a safe course has been thus far pursued?

But if the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society obstinately continue thus to sacrifice the interests of humanity to an obstinate adherence to their theories, it will then become an imperative duty on all who are attached to the cause, and who have maintained sound opinions, to regard this Society as irreclaimable, to class them, in spite of their protest, with the various parties with whom they would repudiate fellowship; it will then become a matter of consideration what measures shall

be taken to neutralize the effect of efforts so perverted, and to repair the mischief ere it is too late.

Earnestly deploring and condemning the Sugar Act of 1846, we should rejoice if we could effect its total repeal; but this we believe to be hopeless. But might not a powerful union be effected on the basis of arresting the sugar duties at their present point in the sliding scale, until the slave trade is suppressed? This would be a moderate claim as regards the West Indies, and none but the most violent and reckless of the free trade party would be disposed to refuse so scanty a measure of justice to the unfortunate colonies.

This horrid traffic may be put down in a few months, from the day on which England resolves to undertake the work in earnest, and grapples with it on the shores of Africa; but "a consistent and uniform course of proceeding,"—"a well considered system, complete in its arrangements, and carried into effect with judgment and perseverance," are obviously indispensable: we have shown how little these essential conditions of success have been observed.

With regard to the destruction of slave factories, the squadron is again free to act. The Queen's advocate did not intend to draw any distinction between the goods of the slave dealers and the building containing them. The opinion was intended to apply to the goods of "*legal*" traders, but the word "*legal*" was omitted; and, owing to this unlucky error, *for eight years the slave traders have been encouraged, and the hands of the British Commanders tied.*

The only true wisdom—the only real economy—compels us to persevere in the task we have undertaken. No foreign enemy—no treason at home—could strike a blow more serious in its ultimate effects on the well-being of England, than she would inflict on herself, if, wilfully blind to the truth, she should yield to the clamour of the slave trade interest, swelled by infatuated theorists, and withdraw the squadron from the coast of Africa.

The truth is not to be disguised—with that measure England abandons the cause; she leaves Africa to her fate, and that fate is "the excess of the evil," the slave trade recognised, unlimited, and perpetual.

FINIS.

THE
WEST-AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE:

SUGGESTIONS

FOR ITS GRADUAL EXTINCTION,

BY

A LATE SENIOR OFFICER OF THE WEST-AFRICAN
SQUADRON.

LONDON :

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P R E F A C E.

THE subject matter of the following pages was prepared three years ago, but circumstances delayed their publication until now. The writer has reason to believe that some of his suggestions have been anticipated; but he prefers leaving his remarks in their original form, with very slight modifications.

THE SLAVE-TRADE IN WESTERN AFRICA.

AMONGST the numerous transient events which temporarily occupy the attention of the English public, and exhibit the national character under various aspects, there is one object, of which the attainment has been for more than half a century the constant and unremitting endeavour of Great Britain, and which, by its disinterested philanthropy, has reflected great honour upon our country. This long-cherished desire, which still holds a prominent place in the mind of every Englishman, is the final abolition of that infamous traffic in human beings, which disgraces alike the nations concerned in it, and the age in which we live.

Although this result has not yet been attained, and formidable difficulties in the way still exist, the efforts of Great Britain have been rewarded by a very great diminution in the extent to which it was formerly carried on, and the determination of the people of England to persevere in their humane exertions remains as strong as ever.

The object which the writer has in view in the following pages is to bring forward, for consideration, the present state of the slave-trade on the West Coast of Africa, with some suggestions as to the measures which may be best calculated to bring about its total and final extinction; and as the progress of civilization will undoubtedly operate materially towards this end, it is necessary also to consider the means by which to promote the civilization of Africa, and encourage peaceful and industrial habits amongst her people.

Before entering, however, upon the present state of the slave-trade, let us first briefly glance at some features in its past history.

Up to the year 1850 the African slave-trade flour-

rished in all its vigour, though subject, like legal commerce, to temporary fluctuations ; large numbers of unhappy creatures being annually exported from the shores of Africa to supply the unceasing demand in the markets of Brazil and Cuba. In her zealous efforts to suppress this scandal to the civilized world, Great Britain had entered into treaties with every nation of Europe, as also with the United States, Brazil, and nearly every Government in America. These treaties, though differing in terms, bore directly upon the object England had in view, and had they been faithfully carried out, the slave-trade would not now be in existence.

By her treaties with Spain and Portugal, England pledged herself to pay large sums to these countries by way of indemnity for the losses they would sustain in the abolition of the slave-trade, to which measure they, on their part, bound themselves. The treaty with Portugal bore date 1815, that with Spain 1817; but it was not until 1836 that penal laws were enacted by Portugal against the slave-trade, which was, in 1842, declared piracy by that country. Spain, in 1835, solemnly pledged herself to enact penal laws within two months from the date of ratification; but the time expired, year after year passed away and no laws were passed; until in 1843, a remonstrance, couched in the strongest terms, was sent to the Spanish Government by Lord Aberdeen, then Foreign Secretary. Probably no despatch, addressed to a civilized nation, ever contained such well-merited reproach of faithlessness and duplicity as did this remarkable document, yet even this failed to induce the rulers of Spain to fulfil their engagements.

At length, in 1845, ten years after the date of the treaty, in which the stipulated interval was two months, penal laws were passed, and the slave-trade declared illegal by the Spanish Government; but to this day Spain has never declared it piracy, although repeatedly

urged to do so. How far she has attempted to carry these laws into effect is but too well known. The papers on this subject, laid before Parliament, show a continued persistence in the total disregard of her treaty engagements, by their systematic violation in the island of Cuba, sanctioned and encouraged by the Government at Madrid, Royalty itself not disdaining to participate in the infamous gains of the slave-dealers. And the annals of diplomacy can hardly contain such a tissue of prevarication and falsehood as that with which the Spanish authorities have invariably met the remonstrances of our Government.

On the separation of Brazil from the mother country, a treaty was concluded with Great Britain, bearing date 1826, by which the provisions of our treaty with Portugal were adopted, Brazil further pledging herself to abolish the slave-trade within three years, and to declare it piracy. But no legislation on the subject took place until 1831, in which year a law was passed, prohibiting the importation of slaves. Notwithstanding this law, and her treaty engagements, Brazil continued openly to carry on the slave-trade in all parts of the empire.

This state of matters continued until 1850, when instructions were sent out to our squadron on the South-American station, to seize slave-vessels wherever they might be found, as well in Brazilian waters as on the high seas, the practice hitherto having been confined to the latter only. In consequence of these directions many captures were made by our cruisers, some of them being effected under the very guns of the forts, and thus a severe blow was inflicted upon the operations of the slave-traders.

Meanwhile an abolition party had been gradually gaining ground in the empire, and, at the close of the year, having gained a majority in the legislature, stringent laws were passed, again prohibiting the slave-

trade, but this time organizing effectual means for its suppression, and containing penal clauses against all Brazilian subjects concerned in it. Since then Brazil has strictly enforced these laws, and has honourably fulfilled her engagements with Great Britain.

The foreign slave-trade may therefore be considered as finally extinct in this empire, and thus Cuba remains the sole market for the accursed traffic; and, from the geographical position of that island, in close proximity with the American Slave States, from the protection afforded by the flag of the United States, and the connivance of the Spanish authorities, such great facilities are here offered to the slave-trader for the prosecution of his inhuman schemes, that the suppression of this practice in Cuba seems as distant as ever.

Let us now turn our attention to the other side of the Atlantic, and, previously to considering the present state of affairs, take a retrospective glance at the course of events during the last twenty years.

Until 1840 the slave-trade had been carried on to its full extent along the greater part of the sea-board of Western Africa—from the river Gambia, in the north, to Little Fish Bay, in latitude 15° south—subject only to such slight checks as it received from the operations of our squadron; but, owing to the enormous demand for slaves in Brazil and Cuba, the presence of our cruisers served more as a necessity for the trader to pursue his schemes with greater cunning and secrecy, than as any real prevention of his plans.

The strongholds of this traffic were, the river Gallinas and its vicinity, the Bight of Benin, the river Congo and adjacent coasts, and the Portuguese colony of Angola, in which last-named locality it was carried on to an enormous extent. The City of St. Paul de Loanda, the capital of this province, in its ruins of former magnificence, bears witness at this day to the immense wealth derived from the slave-trade in this the most

ancient colony in Southern Africa. The resident traders accumulated vast riches, possessed large establishments, and lived in the greatest luxury.

At this time the legitimate commerce of West Africa was comparatively trifling in amount ; in many places entirely unknown, it was in others feebly striving for existence against the baneful influence of its barbarous rival.

The interior of the continent was devastated by cruel and bloody wars, carried on by one tribe against another, solely for the purpose of procuring captives for sale. The shores presented the melancholy spectacle of crowded barracoons, filled with unhappy wretches, who had been driven down in chains, hundreds of miles from the interior, under a burning sun. Then came the horrors of the embarkation, involving the drowning of many in the surf, or the more dreadful fate of being devoured by the voracious shark ; to which followed the oft-told tale of the middle passage, with its inconceivable sufferings ; and, to crown all, the terrible life of toil and privation awaiting the unhappy negro in the mines of Brazil, or the plantations of Cuba.

The number of miserable wretches thus torn from their homes, and shipped off from the shores of Africa, was enormous, the yearly average of those actually landed on the other side of the Atlantic amounting to no less than 85,000 ; but, making allowance for the frightful mortality on the voyage, we cannot estimate the number annually exported from the coast of Africa at less than 100,000, and probably it amounted to considerably more. Of these, by far the greatest number were shipped for Brazil, the remainder for the markets of Cuba and Porto Rico.

Hitherto the operations of our cruisers had been confined to a partial blockade of the coast, and the capturing of slave vessels, as opportunities offered ; but, as we have remarked, these operations were of little effect in checking the traffic. However, in 1840, a severe

blow was struck, by the destruction of the barracoons in the river Gallinas, and at all parts of the coast where they could be got at. Since then the operations of our squadron have extended to land as well as sea; and thus the slave-trade received its first real check.

When Brazil put into force her laws against the slave-trade in 1850, the effect became immediately apparent along the whole coast line, and a general diminution of the traffic ensued. But nowhere was this so remarkable as in Angola, where a complete stagnation took place; for, either from a want of sincerity on the part of Portugal in carrying out the laws she had previously enacted, or an inability to do so as long as a market was open in Brazil for the importation of negroes, the traffic, though declining, was still carried on to a very large extent in her African possessions up to this period. However, when the demand ceased in Brazil, the Portuguese Government commenced enforcing the penal laws against the slave-trade; and by the efforts of the colonial authorities the traffic became almost entirely extinguished.

At the close of 1851 took place the capture of Lagos by Admiral Bruce, when the usurper Kosoko was expelled, as well as the entire community of slave merchants established there under his protection; and on this place, hitherto the hotbed of the slave-trade in the Bight of Benin, now dawned a brighter era, to which we will refer presently.

Meanwhile a rapidly-increasing legitimate trade had sprung up in the great rivers of the Bight of Biafra, which, in conjunction with the operations of our cruisers, had annihilated the languishing remains of the slave-trade in that quarter.

Thus the commencement of the year 1854 saw the slave-trade of West Africa reduced to its lowest ebb. Brazil had wholly repudiated it; and some energetic measures pursued by an honest Captain-General of Cuba had temporarily checked the importation into that

island.* And now the breaking out of the war with Russia produced a remarkable effect upon the commerce of Africa, in consequence of the rise in the price of tallow from the stoppage of the Russian trade, causing a great demand for palm-oil as a substitute.

This trade in palm-oil, which had been for some time slowly, yet gradually, extending, now sprang up and developed itself to a prodigious extent, particularly in the Bights of Benin and Biafra. The benefits of legal commerce began now to be appreciated by the natives, more especially as the intoxicating excitement of the slave-trade had greatly subsided; and many of the slave-dealers, finding their former occupation gone, turned their barracoons into palm-oil factories, and embarked largely in the rising traffic.

This prosperous state of affairs lasted until the close of 1856, when rumours were circulated of an intended revival of the slave-trade in Cuba; and about this time vessels of a suspicious nature, under American colours, began to make their appearance at those parts of the coast where any inclination towards slave-trading practices was manifest.

Our squadron was at this time much smaller than it had been for many years previously, having been greatly reduced at the breaking out of the war; but the extent of coast necessary to guard had so greatly diminished, that as a close a watch could have been maintained now as before. But when, in 1857, the rumoured revival did actually take place in a very active manner, through deeply-laid and well-organized plans of the Havana slave merchants, the exertions of our cruisers were to a great extent paralyzed by the fact of nearly the whole of these operations being carried on under the United States flag.

In all the anti slave-trade treaties which Great Britain

* It is needless to remark that this humane individual did not long enjoy his place under the corrupt Government of Spain.

had concluded, excepting those with France and the United States, provisions were made authorizing her cruisers to detain and search all merchant vessels of the respective nations found within certain limits, for the purpose of ascertaining if they were engaged in the slave-trade. France and the United States had not, however, conceded to us this right ; but, instead thereof, they bound themselves to maintain certain squadrons upon the coast of Africa to co-operate with ours in suppressing the slave-trade.

The instructions issued to our commanders permitted them to *visit* both French and American vessels, but without detaining them, and only for the purpose of verifying their nationality by the examination of their papers. In the event of their proving their right to the flag they bore, no capture, detention, or search was permitted, under any circumstances, even though the vessel should be full of slaves.

The French squadron had, during the height of the slave-trade, co-operated with ours to the full extent of their powers ; and whatever amount of this traffic may have been then carried on in French vessels, their flag was no longer used as a cloak for this iniquitous practice.

But the case of the United States was very different. The treaty she had concluded with England merely bound her to maintain a force of eighty guns upon the coast of Africa, without any stipulation as to the number of vessels to be thus employed. It could hardly be expected that the United States Government would enter so fully into the spirit of an anti-slave-trade policy as to go beyond the letter of the treaty binding her thereto ; and the consequence was that her squadron usually consisted of, at most, four vessels, carrying between them the prescribed armament.

If, therefore, the commander of any of our cruisers wished to give notice to an American man-of-war of the presence and movements of a suspicious Yankee, in

order that the search, forbidden to him, might legally take place, it was almost hopeless ever to expect to fall in with one. And it is a fact, that, during a year which the writer of these pages spent on the West Coast of Africa, no United States cruiser ever once visited the ports of the Bight of Benin, although numbers of American vessels were continually trading there, many of them extremely suspicious in appearance, and not a few undoubted slavers.

When it is remembered likewise that many of the American officers belong to the slaveholding States, and that their sympathies are naturally hostile to the suppression of the slave-trade, it is easy to suppose that such a squadron was utterly insufficient to prevent the flagrant abuse of their flag, under the shelter of which the slave-trade has of late years been entirely carried on.*

Sailing under American colours, with papers perfectly genuine and correct, the slaver was, strictly speaking, exempt from search, as before mentioned; and if the instructions issued to our squadron had in all cases been literally carried out, hardly a capture would have been made. But since an experienced commander could generally form a tolerably correct guess as to the character of the vessel, it often happened that the American flag was quietly ignored, and a search ordered; and when, upon unmistakeable evidence of her illegal character coming to light, the commander boldly announced his intention of seizing her as a prize, the American flag and papers disappeared, and the vessel was then seized, as having no nationality.

* The United States Government has lately shown more earnestness in carrying out the suppression system. Their squadron has been reinforced, and has lately made several captures. It remains to be seen what may result from the disruption of the American Union, and the secession of the slaveholding States. It is evident that we must carefully watch any symptoms of a revival of the African slave-trade on the part of a Southern Confederacy.

The reason is simple. If an American citizen is convicted before a court of law of being engaged in the slave-trade, he is subject to a very severe sentence of solitary imprisonment ; but if a vessel is captured with no nationality, the crew escape all penalties, except the loss of their venture.

In this manner a number of slavers have been taken during the last four years ; and although many others escaped with their cargoes, and a large number of negroes were landed in Cuba, the losses sustained by the Havana slave merchants must have been very considerable.

There seems much reason to believe that, notwithstanding the sacred ægis of "the stars and stripes," had we remained on the same footing with regard to American vessels as we have before mentioned, the time had come when, by a slight additional effort, and the employment of other measures, to be hereafter considered, the slave-trade might have been again crushed, with greater probability of not reviving. The extinction of the traffic in many places, the surveillance exercised by our consular establishments, and the effects of an increasing licit commerce, all combined to aid our cruisers in their exertions, and made the guarding of the infected parts of the coast more easy and effectual. The gradual transformation of the squadron into steam-vessels had greatly lessened its difficulties ; whilst the more enlightened treatment of tropical fevers which medical science has adopted, and a stricter attention to sanatory precautions, had diminished the sickness and mortality of the crews so much, that the efficiency of the ships was rendered more complete.

But an almost fatal blow has been given to the operations of our cruisers, by the concession of the right of visiting vessels bearing the United States flag, even for the simple purpose of verifying their nationality ; and thus the fact of a vessel loaded with slaves hoisting this emblem of *liberty*, enables her to pass with perfect im-

munity through the midst of an English squadron, without having it in our power to ascertain the vessel's right to wear such flag. Such concession ought never to have been made, and it was only done from an over conscientious interpretation of a point of law.

On the revival of the slave-trade in 1857, it was, from various causes, confined almost entirely to two localities ; the Bight of Benin, and the river Congo, with its adjacent coasts.

Previous to 1851, the two principal slave-trading ports in the Bight of Benin were Lagos and Whydah ; the former being the residence of the notorious slave-dealing chief Kosoko, who, having usurped the rights of his relative the lawful chief, had driven him from his native place. Here also lived a number of Portuguese and Brazilian slave merchants, whose barracoons were supplied from all parts of the Yoruba and Benin countries ; the extensive natural system of water communication affording an easy means of transport from the interior. Lagos had, however, been taken by our squadron, Kosoko and the slave dealers expelled, the rightful chief restored, a Consul appointed, and legal commerce had developed itself ; the slave traffic having thus been perfectly extinguished in this port.

Whydah is the seaport of the kingdom of Dahomey, being governed by a viceroy of that monarch's. In olden days we possessed a fort here, which is still in existence, and acknowledged as our's by the king. Before the palm-oil trade sprang into full life, there was here but little legal commerce ; the revenue of the sable monarch being wholly derived from the slave-trade. Various interesting accounts have been published of visits to Abomey, the capital, and of the barbarous customs there practised ; of the wholesale sacrifices of human beings, to furnish skulls for ornamenting the palace walls ; of the army of Amazons ; and of the constant wars and raids against the neighbouring tribes, in order to procure captives for sale.

Whilst a wonderful change has come over Lagos, with its Missionary establishments, whose churches and schools are thronged with natives, and its increasing trade exercising a wholesome influence on the surrounding districts, Whydah has been less fortunate; for although the palm-oil trade has much increased here, as at other places, yet the export of slaves is still carried on, and during the last four years this part of the coast has been much frequented by slavers. And until the king of Dahomey can be induced to abandon the slave-trade, and prohibit it in his dominions, no amount of mere force will ever suppress it in this quarter, where it has been so long and successfully carried on.

There are very great natural facilities afforded to the slave-trader in the Bight of Benin. From the river Volta, near Cape St. Paul, in long. 1° east, an almost unbroken chain of lagoons extend eastward for 300 miles, until it meets the river Benin, which is the westernmost of many outlets forming the delta of the Niger. These lagoons lay parallel to the sea, the land forming the intervening space along this extent being extremely low, covered with jungle, and in some places only a few hundred yards wide. Only one permanent outlet exists, at Lagos: in the rainy season the overcharged waters of the lagoon find an escape at one or two other places, but these again close up when the rains are over, and are never passable for either boats or canoes. A narrow neck of land breaks the lagoon for a short distance at Whydah, but with this exception canoes can navigate the whole 300 miles; and thus slaves can be transported with the greatest facility to any given point at a very short notice, the intervening wooded belt of land making it impossible for the most vigilant cruiser to know any thing of these proceedings, especially as the constant heavy surf renders communication with the shore extremely difficult.

Thus this internal navigation along the coast line is of immense value to the slave-trader; and when the

commercial riches of Africa shall be more opened out, the vast importance of this natural water carriage will be as duly appreciated by the English merchant.

South of the Equator, we find the principal seat of the slave-trade to be the river Congo and its neighbouring coasts ; indeed, we may say that it is now confined to this locality.

But little is known of this noble stream, either of its capabilities as a means of access to the interior, or of the commercial resources of the countries bordering on its banks. That it will some day become of great importance to trade is certain, for it presents the advantage of being the only river of any size in Western Africa without a dangerous bar at its mouth, and it may be entered at all seasons by ships of any tonnage. It is navigable for a distance of 150 miles ; and although its shores towards the mouth are low, marshy, and unhealthy, there is every reason to believe that here, as in most other African rivers, the features of the country change entirely as you ascend the stream, becoming undulating and hilly, with a dry soil and comparatively healthy climate. The volume of water discharged by this magnificent river is very great ; the stream is so rapid, that, pouring out through a mouth three miles in width and of great depth, its influence is felt a long distance from the coast ; the writer himself having observed the discolouration of the sea from its outflow, at a distance of 300 miles from the mouth.

The Congo likewise presents great facilities to the slave-trader, as the low jungly shores within its mouth are intersected by innumerable creeks, affording a safe asylum in which he may fit out his vessel in security ; and thus the slave-trade has of late been carried on in these parts with more method and regularity than in the Bight of Benin.

Confident in the protection of the "stars and stripes," the vessel comes across the Atlantic under the American

flag, with orthodox papers, and a small cargo for disposal. One or two "passengers" of forbidding appearance will be on board, having amongst their baggage sundry heavy boxes carefully stowed away. It is needless to say these individuals are the slaving captain and the supercargo, while the contents of the boxes are specie for the purchase of slaves. If fallen in with by a "Britisher," he is quite safe from capture, as his papers are genuine, and his slave fittings entered in the manifest as part cargo. Besides, as he is exempt from search, or even visit, the obnoxious "Britisher" cannot know what may lie concealed beneath his closed hatches.

Thus he sails boldly into the Congo, passing close to the cruiser stationed at the mouth, who can do nothing beyond speculate upon the chance of catching him with his slaves on board. He now sails up to Punta da Lenha, disposes of his cargo, prepares his slave deck, and makes arrangements for the shipping of his slaves. Or, should he fear another visit from the cruiser, who might on this occasion find it convenient not to see the American flag, he will stow away his craft in some creek or other where he is perfectly hidden from sight.

When ready for sea, and his arrangements complete, he takes advantage of a dark night, quietly drops down with the stream, and is rapidly swept out past the cruiser by the strength of the current, with his sails furled to escape observation. By daylight in the morning he is out of sight in the offing, at the time appointed he stands in for the land, and at the pre-arranged spot he finds the slaves waiting, very few hours being necessary to embark them.

Sometimes the slaves are shipped in the Congo, but more generally either in the neighbourhood of the "Cabeça de Cobra," a place well known to our cruisers, some short distance to the southward; or at Kabenda, to the northward.

Such are the circumstances under which the slave-trade has been, and continues to be, successfully carried

on at this part of the coast ; the facilities to the trader being so great as to render it more than probable that, in days to come, it will be told, how that the last cargo of negroes exported from Africa for sale, was shipped in the river Congo.

Having thus reviewed the slave-trade in its past and present features, let us now consider what means may be adopted by our country to aid in bringing about its ultimate suppression.

In an undertaking so vast as this, too much reliance should not be placed upon any one single measure, but no means should be neglected, no method left untried, which could by any possibility contribute towards the desired result. And although the system of suppression by a naval force is undoubtedly chief in importance, without which all other measures would be useless ; yet no more effective and certain means can be adopted, than those which will tend to develope and encourage commercial pursuits, and at the same time promote Christianity and civilization among the African races.

We have already alluded to the remarkable development of the palm-oil trade, and the good effects resulting therefrom in turning the mind of the native to habits of industry. Although this oil, and other productions of a somewhat similar nature, may be obtained in greater or less quantity at most parts of the coast, the Bights of Benin and Biafra are the chief seats of this trade.

The late Mr. Campbell, Consul at Lagos, in an able report upon the state of trade in the Bight of Benin for 1856, shows 20,000 tons as the quantity of palm-oil exported ; while from the great rivers in the Bight of Biafra, it must have been double this amount at the very least. The tree from which this oil is obtained grows in such abundance in these regions, that this trade is capable of a still greater increase ; the only drawback against a further exportation in the Bight of Benin being the extreme difficulty of shipping the

produce, in consequence of the heavy surf continually rolling upon the beach, which sometimes stops communication with the shore for days, and even weeks together.

The extraordinary lagoon, or, more properly, chain of lagoons, which we have described as here existing, offers similar advantages to licit commerce, as a means of transport, as it does to the slave-trade; but hitherto little advantage has been taken of this great aqueous highway for purposes of commerce.

The outlet at Lagos has sufficient depth of water over the bar to permit the passage of vessels drawing nine feet; but as yet the only means of loading the vessels trading here is by conveying their cargoes over the bar in boats or canoes. Accidents frequently happen, and as these waters swarm with sharks there is little chance of escape from a most dreadful death, numbers of lives being thus lost annually. And as the bar is frequently impassable for boats, or even canoes, the process of loading is very slow, vessels frequently remaining months at anchor in the roads. Were small steamers, drawing seven or eight feet of water, employed for the purpose, it would be an immense benefit to the trade of this place: and the employment of such vessels upon the lagoon, for the purpose of collecting the produce and bringing it to Lagos for shipment, would contribute still more to the prosperity of this town, which will always be, from its position, and being the seaport of Abbeokuta, the principal seat of trade in the Bight of Benin.

We have seen that Whydah, the seaport of the Dahomey country, is the head-quarters of the slave-trade system on this part of the coast. The King of Dahomey has ever been, and still is, a determined slave-dealer; but he may be considered to be so as much from necessity as choice. Although despotic to a great degree, yet his despotism dare not encroach upon established customs and national interests; like other despots,

he is restrained by the prejudices and jealousies of his principal chiefs, if uncontrolled by the "*vox populi*." These chiefs derive large profits from the slave-trade; for although the king nominally receives the revenue arising therefrom, yet the caboceers, as they are called, claim the greater share of it, and would not countenance an abandonment of this source of wealth without some tangible compensation. The fierce and sanguinary character of the Dahomians likewise predisposes them in favour of the slave-trade, with its constant wars and excitement.

Yet, notwithstanding all these unpropitious circumstances, there is good ground for a hope of better things in this country. Various missions have been sent from our Government to the King of Dahomey with the view of inducing him to enter into engagements for the suppression of the slave-trade within his dominions. Our envoys have always been well received, and have generally found the monarch to be in himself not averse to the proposed measure; but he has always declared, that, inasmuch as the principal share of the profits arising from the slave-trade goes to his caboceers, so, without some such compensation as would indemnify these chiefs, and likewise afford him means to keep up his state, it would be impossible for him to enter into any such engagement.

The amount of compensation to satisfy this king and his chiefs would no doubt be considerable. Some years ago 40,000*l.* was named as a probable estimate by those conversant with the country; but most likely a smaller sum would now suffice, since the palm-oil trade has taken deeper root, and the advantages of licit commerce become more apparent.

It would not, however, be prudent to propose the immediate payment of any capital sum, for we could hardly expect such a barbarian to keep faith, when a civilized nation such as Spain fails in her solemn pledges. It would be more politic to stipulate the pay-

ment of a liberal annual subsidy, conditional upon the faithful carrying out of his engagements for the suppression of the slave-trade within his dominions.

In spite of our long-continued hostility to the slave-trading and barbarous practices of the King of Dahomey, he has shown himself not unfavourably disposed towards the English. He has, on several occasions, preferred requests for the reoccupation of our fort at Whydah, and for the establishment of a consul at that place, and has likewise expressed himself willing, and even desirous, to receive Christian Missions and schools in his country.

Now, these requests are precisely of that nature which, if acceded to, would operate directly towards the end England has in view. The establishment of a consul at Lagos has been attended with the happiest results, in the protection and encouragement of licit commerce, in counteracting the pernicious and subtle schemes of the slave-traders, and as a permanent means of communication with the chiefs of the interior tribes. Again, the success which has, under Divine Providence, attended the labours of the various Missionary establishments in West Africa, testifies to their inestimable value in the work of civilization ; and we thus see the benefits which must certainly follow when Christianity and commerce, joined hand in hand, are clearly brought within the understanding of the native.

The consulate at Lagos includes the whole Bight of Benin ; but there is ample employment for this official between Badagry and the river Benin ; and, owing to the difficulty of communicating with the shore for at least half the year, it is quite impossible for him to visit the ports west of Badagry except at rare intervals, which renders any thing like proper supervision out of the question.

The amount of British trade in the Bight of Benin quite calls for the appointment of an additional consul ; and the situation of Whydah makes it peculiarly de-

sirable as the locality for the consulate. We have already mentioned that a neck of land here divides the lagoon ; so that a consul resident at this place could at pleasure move east or west by lagoon, and thus exercise effectual supervision over this part of the coast, without the danger and uncertainty of landing and embarking through the surf.

Should the King of Dahomey be induced to relinquish the slave-trade by the payment of a subsidy, the consul at Whydah would have it in his power to see that this chief adhered to his engagements ; which a consul at Lagos, however able and zealous, could not possibly do effectually.

The most certain means, therefore, which we could adopt for the extinction of the slave-trade in Dahomey, and various adjoining districts, which are tributary to that chief, would be—

To enter into an engagement with the King of Dahomey for the suppression of the slave-trade, by payment of an annual subsidy, or otherwise.

To establish a consulate at Whydah.

To enter into commercial treaties with the King of Dahomey, and all the sea-coast tribes of the Bight of Benin, for the furtherance and protection of lawful trade ; the want of such treaties being much felt by those trading here, there being no understanding whatever with the chiefs upon commercial matters, except at Lagos.

And lastly, though not least, the introduction of Christian Missions into the Dahomey country.

To these measures should be added the exploration and survey of the lagoons between the rivers Volta and Benin, for as yet they are but little known, though of such vast importance to trade. The Volta itself has never been examined ; yet, from its being the boundary between the important countries of Ashantee and Dahomey, its exploration could not fail to present a ready means of communication with the interior of both

these nations. And although a bar at the mouth presents difficulties in the way of its navigation by sailing-vessels, there is nothing to prevent steamers of light draught navigating this river, which was in former times much frequented by slavers.

We have dwelt much upon the palm-oil trade as being hitherto the chief export of West Africa; but there is another and far more important article of commerce, the trade in which is as yet in its earliest infancy, but which cannot fail to spring up into rapid growth upon the slightest encouragement, and from which such happy results would speedily follow, as would change the entire aspect of the state of this continent. We refer, of course, to cotton, which, indigenous to the soil, grows wild in almost every part of the interior. The cultivation of this staple for export is now the great desideratum of our manufacturers, who are anxiously looking for other sources of the supply of this necessary article, considering that the state of affairs in the Cotton States of America is so extremely precarious and menacing; and not less do our philanthropists desire the development of the cotton-trade in Africa, as a certain means of extending civilization, and checking the slave-trade.

It is evident that the growth of the cotton-trade will have an immense effect upon the slave-traffic. From the necessity of employing labour for the cultivation of this plant, it will encourage industrial habits amongst the native chiefs, by showing them the advantages they would gain in turning the labour of their fellow-countrymen to account in the cultivation of their own soil, instead of selling them to the slave-dealer for labour in other lands.

We must not suppose that the taste for kidnapping and selling each other is inherent in the native; it has arisen simply from the fact of licit commerce being until late years comparatively unknown; so that the sole means by which, at first, he could possess the

coveted articles of luxury offered to his view by the trader, who cared for no dealings save those in slaves, was by the barter of his fellow-creatures.

With few exceptions, the chiefs have expressed themselves perfectly willing to give up this abominable practice, provided only they found the means of otherwise obtaining the profits derived from this source; and, as a proof of the growing indifference on their part towards the slave-trade, it may be observed, that on several occasions during the recent revival the supercargoes were unable to procure slaves in the Bight of Benin, from the fact of the resident traders finding it more profitable to employ the negroes in the palm-oil trade, than to part with them on the terms offered; the vessels being thus compelled to go elsewhere to seek their freight.

From this it is clear, that, in proportion as licit commerce extends, so will the disinclination to return to slave-trading pursuits become deeper rooted in the mind of the chiefs; and if the palm-oil trade has produced such an effect, still more so will the cotton-trade, when once firmly established. For while the palm-oil tree grows in wild luxuriance in the jungle, requiring absolutely no cultivation, and the preparation of the oil is effected in the most simple manner; the cotton-plant, on the other hand, although likewise found in great abundance in a wild state, requires careful cultivation to produce the finer sorts required by our manufacturers; and no inconsiderable amount of skill and labour is further required to prepare the cotton for exportation; thereby affording ample employment for the whole population in the prosecution of this important trade.

As yet, Lagos is the only place from whence raw cotton may be said to have become an article of export. In 1856 the quantity shipped was 33,495 lbs., all which was grown and prepared in the vicinity of Abbeokuta by some of the chiefs of that city, and in 1860 the amount exported had increased to 2000 bales.

The drawbacks at present attending the extension of the cotton-trade there established, are, the want of proper machinery for cleaning and preparing the cotton for export, and the interruptions caused by the frequent alarms from incursions, and threatened incursions, of other tribes, particularly their hereditary enemy Dahomey, who annually engages in wars, to procure captives for sale, and skulls to ornament his palace walls. This demonstrates yet more strongly the necessity for coming to some arrangement with this troublesome chief, by which a more favourable state of matters may be brought about in Abbeokuta, as well as his own country.

Another drawback exists in the difficulty and risk of shipping the cotton through the surf, it being so extremely liable to damage from wet. Here is another point to be urged in favour of the employment of small steamers, as before alluded to.

We will now quote some extracts from a report of the late Mr. Campbell's, dated March 1857. This gentleman, who was for some time consul at Lagos, had previously resided many years in various parts of West Africa, and, from his ability and long acquaintance with the political and commercial condition of the interior, was well qualified to form a correct estimate of these matters—

“The whole of the countries in the western interior of Africa do, and have for very many generations, cultivated the cotton-plant, and have clothed, and do still clothe, themselves with its product. Many of these countries, such as Bambarra, manufacture thousands of heavy cotton cloths, which are sold in other parts; and many of them find their way to the towns on the sea-coast, where they are purchased for domestic purposes, on account of their strength and durability, and their permanency of colour, from an excellent native indigo dye, which no number of washings will fade.”

As regards these cotton cloths, it is a curious and interesting fact that they are exported in large numbers to Brazil, whether, from their peculiar excellencies

as above mentioned, or from their being prized by the negroes as familiar tokens of their much-loved native land.

Again, quoting Mr. Campbell—

“It is from those countries, having easy access to the sea-coast by rivers falling into the lagoons running along the Bight of Benin, that we have the best prospects of obtaining a supply of cotton. We have not to persuade the people of these countries into undertaking any thing new to them—all that is required is, to be prepared to purchase from them the surplus cotton they do not require for their own use, and, by paying them a fair price for it, encourage them to extend its cultivation; and by introducing the lighter, and to them infinitely cheaper, fabrics of Manchester, lead to their being used, even on economical considerations. We should be prepared to supply to the chiefs, and others who cultivate largely, machines for rapidly cleaning the cotton from the seed, as such men would soon perceive the advantages of obtaining the higher price for the cleaned cotton. This must be attended to, and therefore necessitates the employment of a moderate capital. The chiefs and leading men of Abbeokuta, who have extended the cultivation of cotton as an article of commerce, are in vain applying for cleaning-machines, for which they are prepared to pay the value in cotton on receipt of them.”

Here, then, is an encouraging prospect as to the probabilities of the African cotton supply; and in the critical juncture in which the cotton-growing districts of America are now placed, it is impossible to over-estimate the importance of developing a cotton-trade with West Africa. The supply from Australia and India involves a long and expensive voyage through the stormy regions of the Southern Ocean; while here is an unlimited amount of the raw material, comparatively close at hand, only waiting energy, enterprise, and encouragement, to become, within a very few years, a formidable rival to the slave-holding States of America.

Turning now our attention to the best method of dealing with the slave-trade south of the line, we shall

find matters very different from those we have been considering. We have shown that the principal seat of the traffic, if not the only one, on this part of the coast, is the river Congo and its neighbourhood, the river itself affording great facilities to the slaver, and being difficult to guard effectually under the present system.

Comparatively little is known of the interior of this part of the continent. There are here no powerful kingdoms, such as Dahomey and Ashantee, but the population is divided into numberless independent petty tribes, owing allegiance to no sovereign chief. The slaves are obtained in a totally different manner to that in the Bight of Benin. There being no organized armies at the command of sanguinary despots, to overrun the country in pursuit of captives, the slaves are seldom prisoners-of-war, but are generally domestic slaves—either pledges held for debt, or criminal offenders. Children are in all cases slaves to their parents; and these sell their offspring to the foreigner, or, when pressed by poverty and want, dispose of them to their more wealthy neighbours.

It is evident that a general retail system, such as this, must be far more difficult to eradicate than that pursued wholesale by powerful chiefs, who might be gained over by persuasion, or force, to substitute licit commerce for this practice. We also find here fewer openings for a healthy legal trade than on the more northern parts of the coast.

The climate of the south coast generally is much less humid than that north of the line: the soil is light and sandy, and severe droughts are prevalent. This is unfavourable to the growth of the palm-oil tree, which requires rich soil and much moisture; and therefore but little of this commodity is procurable, except in the Congo, the low alluvial shores at the mouth of that river producing the oil in considerable quantities.

With the exception of the Congo, the rivers are small and unnavigable, presenting no means of communicating with the interior, so that the whole of the produce is carried to the coast on the heads or shoulders of the natives.

The exports from the coasts adjacent to the Congo consist of gum, ivory, beeswax, and dye-woods; but these only to a small extent. The cotton-plant is found here in abundance, as throughout Western Africa; but as yet none has been exported from these districts. The slave-trade is undoubtedly the chief business of the Congo country, legal commerce being in a kind of intermittent state, depending upon the briskness or the depression of its inhuman rival, as the two cannot thrive together.

The natural facilities for the furtherance of legal trade, so markedly prominent in the Bight of Benin, are here wanting; and therefore we cannot look with the same confidence to the checking of the slave-trade by the growth of licit commerce, at least not until the African cotton-trade shall have become fairly established, when, doubtless, the demand for this staple will extend in time along the whole seaboard where it may be procurable. But, on the other hand, our cruisers possess advantages here which they do not find in the Bights—in the general salubrity of the climate, and the facility of landing at all parts of the coast, by which the commanders are enabled to obtain information of the operations of the slave-dealers.

Anti slave-trade treaties have been concluded with the chiefs of almost the entire coast line from Cape Lopez to the Portuguese possessions; and we should be fully justified in constraining these chiefs to a faithful observance of their treaties, for the execution of which they have in many instances received presents, by way of reward and indemnification. For it has frequently happened that, after great trouble had been experienced in inducing the chiefs to conclude a treaty, and some

expense incurred in the customary presents, the stipulations have been infringed, by the resumption of slave-trading practices ; at first cautiously and indirectly, till, emboldened by success, and by the apathy shown by England in not enforcing the observance of the treaty she took so much pains to obtain, the chiefs have in some cases returned openly to their former pursuits, looking upon the treaty as a mere formal proceeding, the stipulations of which were never really intended to be carried out.

This has certainly not been the case in every instance ; but it is greatly to be wished that no infraction of treaty on the part of the chiefs had ever been permitted to pass unpunished. And when such treaties are negociated, they should be clearly placed before the natives as positive obligations, of which the slightest infraction would be followed by certain punishment, but their steady fulfilment productive of some real and tangible benefit, either by subsidy or otherwise.

The best and most effectual means of rooting out the evil in the Congo, would be the constant scouring of its shores and creeks by vessels of light draught. But here a serious difficulty presents itself, in the unhealthiness of these marshy creeks at the lower part of the river, which causes a stay in their locality so certainly productive of sickness, that the station orders are positive against vessels going inside the Congo, except to water, and then only for the shortest possible time.

Now, this brings us to a question of great importance with regard to the navigation of the internal waters of West Africa, which is, the great advantages that would result from the more extended employment of natives in our squadron on this station.

The Kroomen are the only Africans at present employed on board our men-of-war ; but, although they are invaluable as labourers and boatmen, they are not calculated for the duties required of the more

intelligent seaman, and are never trained to the use of arms. They are employed on all ordinary work involving exposure to the sun or wet, such as coaling, watering, provisioning, cutting wood, boat duty, &c.; and the comparative healthiness of our cruisers is mainly due to the employment of these men on such duties, avoiding the necessity of exposing the white men to the burning rays of the sun, or the malaria of the jungle-covered shores.

The Kroomen, however, having been destitute of the advantages of Mission schools, &c., are perfectly ignorant, many of them scarcely speaking a word of English, and are, moreover, singularly unintelligent; and as they do not leave their native country till they arrive at years of manhood, they cannot then acquire the skill and knowledge of the sailor, which is only attainable in early years.

But in the thickly-populated colony of Sierra Leone there may be found any number of sharp intelligent boys, willing and anxious to serve in a man-of-war; and many of them, educated in the Mission schools, would be found not at all inferior to the generality of our English lads in religious and secular education.

Now, if each ship of our African squadron were to enter a certain number of these boys upon the continuous service system, we should have, in a very short time, a most valuable contingent of highly-trained and educated Christian native seamen, who could be employed on the service of rivers and lagoons, which would be injurious, if not fatal, to European constitutions. And amongst the better classes of Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, many intelligent young men might be found, fit to undergo the necessary training for becoming engineers and subordinate officers in the vessels employed on such inland service; so that such vessels might be both manned and officered by natives, requiring only the employment of white men on special occasions, if at all.

No one can deny that the operations of our African squadron would be rendered infinitely more effectual, if, by the adoption of this system, we could employ our vessels wherever most desirable, without being fettered by the fear of sickness and mortality, as at present; and immense results would speedily follow the employment of a few gunboats in the river Congo and the lagoons of Benin. The latter would thus be opened up to commerce, and the slave-trade there existing would be at once paralyzed, if not annihilated; while the scouring of the Congo creeks by one or two of these active little vessels would soon clear out the slavers from that river.

We thus see, that, in consequence of legal commerce not being here so deeply rooted and extensive as in the Bights, while the subdivision of the people into so many petty tribes renders a practical supervision by civil authorities next to impossible, we must for the present look to our squadron alone for suppressing the slave-trade in these parts; but it is also clear that the efficiency of the squadron might be enormously increased by the means we have just pointed out.

We have shown the slave-trade to be next to extinct in the colony of Angola, yet, when considering the future of Western Africa, we must not omit this important province.

When Portugal adopted the Abolition policy, it operated at first greatly to impoverish her African colonies, and caused the ruin of all parties concerned in the slave-trade. But although there were not implanted here such seeds of commerce as would immediately upon the stoppage of the slave-trade spring up into luxuriant growth, like the palm-oil trade of the more northern parts, yet there was a germ in embryo, which, slowly developing itself, has at length expanded into a ramified and healthy trade, in spite of the retarding effects of heavy Customs' duties.

The exports from Angola consist of gum, ivory,

copper ore, hides, beeswax, the orchilla weed, coffee, ground-nut oil, and palm-oil in a small quantity. In 1857 about 10,000 lbs. of cotton was exported, being the first shipment made from this colony; but as the cotton-plant is here likewise grown in great abundance throughout the interior, this trade is capable of development to almost any extent. And here is another locality worthy of the attention of the Cotton Supply Association.

The commercial capabilities of this province are evident from the rapidly-increasing list of exports, notwithstanding the almost prohibitory nature of import duties, and the heavy charges laid also upon the exports. This vexatious system, which has been relaxed in the mother country so greatly to her advantage, is persevered in to the fullest extent in this colony; the consequence being that mercantile enterprise is cramped, and the progress of civilization greatly retarded.

Were these restrictive laws repealed, the benefits thereby resulting would be widely felt throughout Southern Africa; for the antiquity of this colony, and its situation on the continent with regard to Mozambique, causes the influence of European occupation to be experienced by every native tribe, from the Atlantic seaboard to the shores of the Indian Ocean.

We shall here give some paragraphs from an interesting report sent to the Foreign Office by Mr. Gabriel, Slave-trade Commissioner at St. Paul de Loanda; who, from his ability, energy, and long residence in this colony, has acquired a most intimate and extensive acquaintance with the present state of its affairs, and is most competent to judge of its future prospects—

“It is gratifying to observe, that, despite all the vexatious restrictions which are laid upon the commerce of this province, the legitimate trade of Loanda has augmented within the last few years nearly in the same ratio as the traffic in human beings has been suppressed; and I have every reason to believe that the local authorities here are becoming every day

more convinced that the faithful execution of the engagements contracted by Portugal for the suppression of the slave-trade cannot fail to produce the most favourable effects upon the commerce and civilization of her African possessions. . . . I am able to assure your Lordship that it is within my own experience when the proportion of the slave-trade to the other trade of this province was fully nine-tenths of the whole; when this port alone annually exported from 15,000 to 18,000 slaves, chiefly to the Brazils, and the only lawful produce shipped here was a small quantity of ivory and beeswax. You will, I am sure, acknowledge that it affords a pleasing and conclusive proof of the success which has attended the measures adopted by Great Britain for the suppression of the slave-trade. . . . Although the various evils which were produced and fostered by the slave-trade yet operate as a serious obstacle to the advancement of civilization in this country, and its partial continuance still exercises a baneful influence on the honest industry and commerce of the province, there can be no doubt but that this colony might speedily become of great commercial importance, if the Government of the mother country could be induced to provide for its real prosperity by adopting a more liberal commercial system. The various trammels now laid upon lawful trade here are most objectionable in principle and mischievous in practice. Their only effect is to paralyze and crush foreign commerce; and until the regulations under which the trade of this province are at present conducted are materially modified, foreigners will not enter into it."

It is hardly surprising, that during the recent revival of the slave-trade sundry transactions of this character took place in Angola, but, to the credit of the Portuguese Government and the colonial authorities, it was owing to their vigilance and exertions that the accursed system did not again strike a deep root.

Let us now briefly glance at the more northern parts of the coast, which we have not yet had under consideration.

For many years there has been no slave-trade carried on to the northward of the Gambia; but between this river and Sierra Leone, a great number of minor streams discharge into the sea, in most of which it has been

at times carried on ; but it is now confined to the neighbourhood of the rivers Nunez and Ponga, and only there to a limited extent. There is a very small amount of legal trade in these rivers, the exports consisting of ground-nut oil and hard woods. They are easily guarded by one or two cruisers, and the slave-trade could not be carried on here to any extent as long as the African squadron is maintained. But it could be kept perfectly extinct, had we small vessels with native crews to scour these unhealthy streams.

The slave-trade in the river Gallinas, and the neighbouring coasts, is now extinct, although this place was formerly notorious as one of the principal seats of the traffic. From here to Cape Palmas and Cape Three Points, no foreign slave-trade has been for many years carried on, while a considerable licit commerce flourishes along this coast, to which happy result the establishment of the American colony of free blacks, now the Republic of Liberia, has mainly contributed ; and from Cape Three Points, eastward, to the river Volta, our colony of the Gold Coast, with its active commerce, prevents any resumption of slave-dealing practices thereabouts.

In thus concluding our examination of the West Coast of Africa, we find two districts where the slave-trade prevails—the Bight of Benin and the Congo country. In the former we find a rapidly-increasing legitimate commerce, which has already done wonders for the amelioration of this part of the continent ; we find also great natural advantages for the rapid development of the cotton-trade, which will go far to accomplish two great results—the extinction of slave-trading, and the establishment of a permanent and almost unlimited supply of the raw material for our manufactories. In the latter district, although there are not the same natural means for extinguishing the slave-trade, yet we find greater facilities for the operations of our cruisers, with the means of rendering their exertions still more effective by the employment of native

seamen ; and if the United States Government will continue to use active measures to check the flagrant abuse of its flag, and thus act up to the spirit of the treaty she made with Great Britain to this effect, we may reasonably expect that the slave-trade will, year by year, diminish in extent, provided England does not in any way relax her exertions.

But we are compelled to acknowledge that it is in vain to hope for an absolute extinction of the slave-traffic until Spain can be induced to fulfil her treaty obligations, and, by putting into operation her already-existing laws, prevent the importation of slaves into her West-Indian possessions ; for, as long as a market remains open, and the enormous profits derivable from a successful voyage hold out this stimulus to human cupidity, so long will there always be found an abundance of daring and unscrupulous men, willing to encounter any risks for the chance of winning an occasional stake.

It is therefore imperative upon our Government to continue its utmost efforts to induce Spain to follow the humane course which the remainder of the civilized world has adopted ; and should this unhappy country still persist in setting at defiance the obligations by which she is bound, it should be the duty of the Great Powers of Europe to compel her to put her laws into execution, and to abide by those engagements into which she has solemnly entered.

In the session of 1858 a motion was brought forward in the House of Commons by Mr. Hutt, to the effect, " That it was expedient to discontinue the practice of authorizing Her Majesty's ships to visit and search vessels under foreign flags, with a view of suppressing the traffic in slaves ;" in other words, to do away with our African squadron. After a long debate, the motion was, happily, negatived by the large majority of 223 to 24, which unmistakably shows the opinion in the country upon that head.

We cannot think it possible that any one with a

personal knowledge of the state of affairs on the African coast would advocate such a measure. Experienced naval officers who have served on this station are strongly of opinion that the withdrawal of the squadron would be a fatal blow to the commerce and civilization of this part of the great continent.

The consequences of such a course would be disastrous in the extreme. The slave-trader would pursue his inhuman schemes wherever he pleased, with the most perfect impunity; and not only would the smouldering embers of this traffic be rekindled along the coast line, but such a flame would be raised throughout the interior, as would quickly parch up and destroy whatever of industrial pursuits and peaceful habits had become implanted in the natives by commercial intercourse with the civilized world.

The resident Europeans, no longer protected and encouraged by the presence of a squadron, ever ready to redress their grievances against the often offending natives, would speedily find their trade destroyed, and themselves driven from the country, by the machinations of the slave-traders. The interior would be devastated by the cruel and bloody wars that would everywhere be carried on to supply the human market. The good seed sown by Christian Missions of all denominations would be swept away, the result of years of earnest labour and untiring zeal would be annihilated, and the Missions themselves would probably have to be broken up.

At this moment the presence of a squadron on the African coast is more than ever necessary, and its good influence is more widely felt as legitimate commerce expands. But there is little doubt that were such measures adopted as we have pointed out, for the protection and development of legal trade, a progressive reduction might be made in the strength of the squadron. For example: the establishment of a consul at Whydah, and the entering into commercial treaties with the chiefs in the Bight of Benin, would alone reduce the

number of cruisers necessary for this part of the station; and if the King of Dahomey could be gained over by a liberal subsidy to abandon the slave-trade, a still further reduction might here take place.

It will thus be seen that the additional expenses involved in the suggestions which we have made, would be met by the diminished expense of the squadron; whilst such measures would be productive of more effectual results than those now in force. In fact, we do not propose an increase of expenditure under the head of "Slave-trade," but we point out means by which the present expenditure may be turned to a better account.

It would be highly advantageous if our consuls in West Africa were invested with magisterial powers, as is the case in other parts of the world, where the standard of civilization is low, and where there does not exist any properly administered code of laws for the maintenance of order and justice.

The absence of all moral restraint, the temptations to dishonest and unfair dealing which exist in trading with ignorant natives, and the pernicious influences of the slave-trade, have all contributed to produce a very loose standard of moral character amongst the mercantile agents established on certain parts of this coast. There are, no doubt, many honourable exceptions to this rule; but officers of long experience on the station have testified to the frequent scandals, caused by the want of principle, and disregard of honesty, shown by many of the resident traders, and to the mischievous effects produced thereby upon the mind of the natives, by encouraging them in dishonest practices, and by debasing in their eyes the character of the English merchant.

Should a native have cause of complaint against an Englishman, he has no means of redress. If he appeals to his chief, the latter dare not presume to interfere with the white man; while, on the other hand, complaints are being constantly made by the agents against offending natives, and a requisition sent to the senior

officer, "to protect British interests," *i.e.* to redress the agents' grievance, real or imaginary, *vi et armis*.

The consuls should be authorized to hold courts for the investigation of complaints and the trial of offenders. These courts should be constituted upon the principle of the "Naval Courts," which, by recent Acts of Parliament, are empowered to be held for the trial of masters and crews of merchant-vessels. They have been productive of much good in checking irregularities and redressing grievances amongst both classes, and, consequently, maintaining order and discipline in the mercantile marine; and there seems no reason why similar tribunals should not be established for the maintenance of order and justice amongst those of Her Majesty's subjects trading on shore, who claim her protection, and are amenable to no laws.

It is much to be desired that greater advantage were taken of the intelligence of the natives, and, at the same time, a powerful incentive offered to educational acquirements, by an extended employment of the more intelligent among them in various situations, whether under Government, in mercantile houses, or Missionary Associations, although in these last this laudable practice obtains already to a considerable extent. To those conversant with Africa it is well known that intelligence of a high order, and even considerable intellectual ability, may be met with amongst the natives.

A remarkable instance of this is exemplified in the case of the Rev. Samuel Crowther, one of the clergymen attached to the Church Missionary Society, now resident Missionary at Lagos. This gentleman is a native of Yoruba; and, when a boy, was captured in a slave-vessel by one of our cruisers, and brought to Sierra Leone. Here he received the rudiments of education, and was employed as a lay agent of the Church Missionary Society. He was then sent to England, completed his education, and was ordained a clergyman of the Church of England. The Society then sent him out as a Missionary to his native country; and he has

been ever since attached to the Yoruba Mission, where his earnest unassuming zeal, inflexible integrity, and simple pious character, have won for him the respect and esteem of both native and European, and have produced the happiest results in regard to his work. He possesses an extensive acquaintance with the native languages, and has translated great portions of the Holy Scriptures into his mother tongue.

Although Mr. Crowther's is certainly a remarkable case, it may be reasonably presumed that other natives are to be found possessing an equal amount of intelligence and intellect.

We will close our subject with a few remarks upon the system of domestic slavery prevalent throughout Western Africa, and upon the recent scheme of free emigration attempted and abandoned by France.

Domestic slavery is no doubt dependent to a great extent upon the foreign slave-trade: but this state of servitude must not be viewed in the same light as that barbarous system, which tears the unhappy negro from his family and his home, and, after subjecting him to the most dreadful sufferings, lands him on a distant shore to be bought and sold like the beasts of the earth. It should rather be considered as a species of serfdom, or slavery of the soil, which was in former times the custom of our own country, and is only now being abolished in Russia. The native African, knowing no other polity, and experiencing no hardship from the prevailing system, is contented and happy, seeking no change of lot. And until many years have passed away, and the wave of civilization has rolled deeper over the continent of Africa, it would not only be impossible to eradicate this practice, but mischievous to attempt it, as it would only engender bitter and hostile feelings amongst the natives.

As regards the free emigration of negroes to the trans-Atlantic colonies, we have only to observe, that, since the system of compulsory servitude has been for so many generations the sole manner in which the

labour of the African negro has ever been employed out of his own country, it is quite impossible, in the existing state of things, while the slave-trade is being still carried on to a considerable extent, to make the native understand that voluntary emigration is any thing but another name for the slave-trade ; which was, indeed, actually the case in the late instance of the French scheme. Not until after the slave-trade shall have become finally extinct, will he be induced to believe otherwise ; and we must therefore be content in doing all in our power to encourage the African in turning his labour to account, by the cultivation of his native soil.

In dwelling upon the importance of using every means to develope and encourage agricultural and commercial pursuits, as one of the chief measures for extinguishing the slave-trade and civilizing this country, we must not overlook that far nobler aim—the propagation of Christianity.

While we look upon England as the centre and focus of the mercantile system of the world—while we consider opening out the commercial treasures of an unexplored country to be the prerogative of Anglo-Saxon energy and enterprise—not less should we regard our happy country as the fount from whence the pure stream of Christianity is destined to flow forth upon the whole earth, and the preaching of the Gospel to the heathen as a sacred duty imposed upon the people of England, in return for the peculiar privileges which we enjoy.

Nor must this be looked upon as foreign to our purpose, or beyond the province of those whose object is simply the extinction of slavery and the development of commerce. Intimately connected are the propagation of Christianity and the advance of civilization ; it is beyond dispute that the result of Missionary labour is to induce peaceful and industrial habits among the natives ; and if no other good were derived from the Missionary establishments, the education diffused by their schools would alone render them invaluable.

It is therefore the duty of the Government to afford every possible aid and encouragement to those several Societies whose Missionaries are labouring amongst the benighted heathen; and it is equally the duty of each individual Englishman to further, to the utmost of his means, these Christian and philanthropic Institutions.

Our task is now ended: we have shown that the West-African slave-trade, though much narrowed in limits, is by no means extinct, and can never become so while markets remain open—that the elements of an unlimited and very valuable commerce exist throughout the whole interior of this part of Africa—that several obvious and practicable methods of developing this commerce present themselves to the consideration of our Government—that the operations of our squadron may be made yet more effectual—and that only by a judicious combination of various measures, each in itself antagonistic to the slave-trade, can we hope for ultimate success.

That this great result may speedily be accomplished, must be the wish of every true Englishman. Philanthropy is a prominent feature in our national character; and the unwearied perseverance which Great Britain has long exhibited, in her endeavour to abolish the traffic in human flesh and blood, shows that her philanthropy, unlike that of our trans-Atlantic brethren, extends to the unfortunate and persecuted coloured race.

For more than half a century England has been, to her everlasting honour, zealously labouring in the noblest work ever undertaken by a nation. Let her, then, still persevere in her sacred duty—let her continue the same earnest endeavours for the amelioration of the lot of persecuted and benighted Africa—let the blessings of Christianity and the benefits of civilization be promoted to the utmost throughout this vast continent, and “Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God.”

REMARKS

ON

THE AFRICAN SQUADRON.

BY

J. S. MANSFIELD,

OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER.

LONDON:

JAMES RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY;

JAMES BAIN, 1, HAYMARKET.

1851.

REMARKS

REMARKS OF THE AFRICAN SQUADRON

1811

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REMARKS ON THE AFRICAN SQUADRON.

Alleged Inefficiency of the Squadron on the Coast of Africa.

OF the arguments for a change in the policy hitherto pursued by Great Britain with reference to the Slave Trade, by far the most important is the allegation that the preventive measures hitherto adopted have proved wholly inefficient in practice. This assertion is sometimes put forward with some qualifications, as—that the squadron on the coast of Africa may have caused a rise of prices of slaves in Cuba and Brazil, and nothing more—but in substance it remains the same—our efforts have been in vain, and, if we assume certain principles, said to be established in smuggling trades, to be analogous with those which govern the Slave Trade, must ever prove ineffectual. The practical question, then, resolves itself into an examination of the evidence by which the failure of our preventive measures is said to be established. If it be found by the balance of testimony that the squadron has been futile and inefficient, it is clear either that new repressive means must be devised, or the object wholly abandoned. If, on the other hand, it appears that the squadron has been generally effective, and that the degree in which it has failed of complete success can fairly be accounted for by causes which have been, or may be, made to cease to operate henceforward, the case for a discontinuance of the national policy falls to the ground.

In either case, the argument drawn from the supposed analogy above-mentioned, may be neglected, as in the former it is superfluous to investigate it, and in the latter it is manifest from the facts themselves that the analogy has no existence.

In an illicit trade such as that in question, there can, of course, be no return corresponding in authenticity and arithmetical accuracy with those of legitimate traffic. It is, therefore, not possible to bring forward any precise evidence of the yearly imports of slaves to Cuba or Brazil, in reply to the vague assertions, under which the indefinite swells into the infinite. Certain loose calculations, however, partly compiled from the accounts of the slave-traders themselves, and partly from less suspicious sources, have been adopted by the opponents of the Squadron as an approximation to the real truth of the matter, sufficiently precise for all practical purposes. They were, it is true, somewhat discredited by a witness named Dr. Cliffe, who, as it appeared before the Committee of the House of Lords, had supplied some materials for their compilation; and it will be necessary for us hereafter to revert to them to show their inaccuracy upon another point. But, on the whole, with respect to the efficiency of the Squadron, we have no option but to take them as the only evidence in a positive form that has been adduced against the preventive measures hitherto pursued, and further, if we take them as they stand, and show that even *they* fail to establish the case against the Squadron, it will at least be requisite to call for other evidence, if it be necessary still to entertain the reconsideration of the national policy.

The calculations in question are, as might be expected, in a tabular form. They appear in the report of Mr. Hutt's Committee in the year 1848. As they

are thus easily accessible it is unnecessary to reproduce them at full length, and the few quotations we shall make may be readily verified.

In the first place, these tables show, and it is, indeed, an indisputable fact, that until the Squadron came effectively into operation the increase of the Slave Trade advanced with frightful rapidity. In 1805, the gross export of slaves to all countries is stated at 85,000 ; in 1815, though, in the interval, the Slave Trade of England and the United States was abolished, together forming at least one-half of the whole traffic, yet the amount had sprung up to 93,000 ; in 1817, it is stated at 106,600 ; and, in 1836, had reached 135,800. The Slave Trades of all civilized nations, except Cuba and Brazil, had ceased in the later years, so that the proportional increase in the importations of these two countries is very much greater than would appear from the gross numbers given. To exemplify this, it may be observed, that in the first year mentioned it is calculated that Cuba took only 6,000 and Brazil 15,000 slaves. In the later years cited, these imports had grown to 40,000 and 65,000 respectively ; (the latter is a great understatement.) Thus, these tables show that the state of the Slave Trade, unchecked by the Squadron, was one of large, rapid, and continuous development.

In 1835 a new treaty with Spain allowed the seizure of slave vessels, before, as well as after shipping Slaves ; in 1839, an Act of Parliament was passed enabling the squadron to seize Portuguese vessels also, equipped for the Slave Trade ; the developement above-mentioned, ceased altogether from those dates respectively. The gross number of slaves exported in the subsequent years, viz. from 1840 to 1847, ranges, from 28,400 to 84,356. Taking even the latter number, we find a

diminution of upwards of 51,000 slaves exported in the year, as compared with 1836, and notwithstanding this glaring fact, notwithstanding the progressive development of every legal trade in this septennial period, notwithstanding the impulse given to Brazilian and Cuban cultivation, by the recent admission of its produce to the English market, we are called upon to negative the efficiency of the squadron altogether, though no other influence prejudicial to the Slave-Trade can be adduced to account for this singular mercantile phenomenon. If we go more into the details afforded by those very tables, we meet with the astounding fact that the Cuban Slave Trade may be almost said to be extinguished. The number of its victims had sunk to 1500, and the coast from which it drew its supplies, the west coast of Africa, north of the Equator, has, with the exception of three hundred miles in the Bight of Benin, been completely closed against its exigencies. That this has been happily accomplished is not denied, nay, it appears upon the face of the tabular statement put forward by those who would discontinue the squadron on the ground of its inefficiency; but strange to say, the principal means by which this result has been brought about are impugned when it is proposed to recur to them in future operations.

When naval officers have perseveringly cruised close to the shore, they have had far greater success in making captures, and it has been shown to demonstration that if the Slave barracoons on the coast are destroyed the illicit trade becomes next to impossible.

The tables fully admit this fact, by their statement of the diminished amount of the trade, during the five years when these measures were, to a considerable extent, in operation.

Total number of Slaves imported into Cuba and Brazil.

1840		44,470
1841		27,857
1842		17,350
1843		38,500
1844		36,000
1845		24,050

Vide Report, Committee of the House of Commons, 1848.

But the system of distant cruising was again, for a certain time, practised, and though the destruction of barracoons is no longer declared illegal, it is still insisted on, that it is comparatively useless, in spite of the complete success which attended it at Gallinas, at the time of Captain Denman's attack in 1840; and also on the South Coast, when the system was resorted to by Captains Matson and Butterfield in subsequent years. It would be beyond the purpose of these remarks, to go farther into detail upon the modes of operation hitherto adopted by the squadron, or proposed to be adopted by it for the future. Treaties with, and small subsidies to native chiefs, the destruction of barracoons when possible, and vigilant in-shore cruising,* have brought about the

* It may appear a little rash for a landsman to express so confident an opinion on what may be deemed a naval question, but the subject has been thoroughly investigated by the Lords' Committee, and the perusal of the evidence must carry conviction to any dispassionate inquirer. Their lordships state in their report :—"Thus
 " the best system has at no period been acted upon by the whole
 " force employed : and the want of clearly defined objects, and
 " consistency in the mode of action, combined with an insufficient
 " numerical force, composed of vessels not suited to the service,
 " fully accounts for the degree of failure we have encountered. It
 " appears by the concurrent testimony of all the naval witnesses,
 " with, perhaps, a single exception, that in-shore cruising, directed
 " to prevent the shipment of slaves, is the most effective mode
 " of employing the squadron."

favourable results already specified. Vessels, in particular steam screw-ships, of comparatively small tonnage, and, therefore, more generally available against fast-sailing slavers in light winds, are, it is said, in preparation for the service on the African coast. Orders have been recently issued to cruize for slavers on the Brazilian coast, and have already produced, as we shall presently show, the most striking results. Brazil and Spain are solemnly bound to this country to put down this nefarious trade; England is now, it seems, resolved to enforce the fulfilment of these treaties. It is not reasonable to suppose, that these measures will fail of their object, judging from what has been shown to have taken place since 1839, when fewer and less efficient means were in operation; but it may be difficult to meet the Protean objections that are made to the present system. If prices of slaves are low in Brazil, it is confidently said that the squadron does nothing; if they are high that it is a law in commerce, that a certain amount of possible profit sets all risk at defiance, and the trade will flourish in spite of the squadron. If many slavers are captured the trade must be enormous to sustain such losses, and yet exist; if none have sailed from the African coast, and there are, consequently, no captures, it is easy to suppose that they have escaped notice, and that slave trading ingenuity invariably eludes the vigilance of cruisers. In short, though 594 captures have been made between the years 1840 and 1848, though the Cuban slave trade is almost annihilated, though the Brazilian slave trade, when vigorously attacked in 1840, numbered, according to Mr. Bandinel, only 14,000 victims, instead of 94,000 at which he estimated it in 1838, though Mr. M'Culloch, writing in 1840, contemplated the probability of sugar cultivation ceasing in Brazil,

for want of imported slaves, the objection is still made, that the squadron has been, and ever must be inefficient.

But there has been an increase of slaves imported into Brazil during the two years 1846 and 1847. The tables above referred to state the numbers as 52,600 and 57,800, those imported in 1845 being rated at 22,700 only. Now, though the tables in question are by no means entitled to a prompt acquiescence in their accuracy, and have been above cited only to prove that the opponents of the squadron have, on their own showing, made out a case destructive of their own theories, it is very probable that there has been a considerable increase in the trade during those two years. Such an increase, however, is easily accounted for. In 1845, the Mixed Courts for trial of Brazilian slave-traders were broken up, and before the Act of Parliament was passed, authorizing the cruizers to capture such vessels, the southern coast was left altogether unwatched—it being of course useless to capture a vessel, for the condemnation of which there was no provision. In the next place, the English market was opened to slave-grown sugar in 1846, and thereby some impulse was added to the Slave Trade—an element certainly not to be neglected in the calculation of operating causes, but, we must at the same time remember, peculiarly liable to be over-estimated. In the third place, the system of destroying barracoons was suspended, in consequence of the ambiguity of Sir John Dodson's opinion upon the legality of destroying goods destined for the Slave Trade, and found in barracoons; and during the same period, the old system of cruizing in the open sea, on the chance of falling in with slavers on their passage, was resumed in those quarters of the African coast whence Brazil has always obtained the bulk of her slaves. Three of these

causes have now ceased to operate against the success of the preventive measures. The admission of slave-grown sugar to British markets remains; but when we remember that already the difference between the price of a slave in Africa and in Brazil has been as £3 or £5 to £60 or £80, it is clear that an additional incentive from augmented profit in a successful venture, can hardly stimulate the slave trader to greater exertions than he has hitherto made. Before the question of the efficiency of the squadron is dismissed, it may be well to remark that the high prices of slaves in Cuba and Brazil, though asserted to be a proof that it is impossible to suppress the Trade, are in fact the most legitimate evidence that much, very much, has been effected towards doing so. The characteristics of a *flourishing trade* are larger aggregate profits and diminished individual profits in proportion to the increase of capital employed in it—capital of course coming in more freely as *risks* diminish. With the slave trade it is exactly the reverse. When most lose, the profits of a few may be enormous, but the aggregate trade will be at a low ebb. The last cargo of slaves landed in Brazil will probably be disposed of at an unprecedented profit.

These considerations appear to have been strangely overlooked in the House of Commons, when Mr. Hutt, after declaring himself the most strenuous opponent of every measure for the purpose, was named Chairman of the Committee appointed to consider "the best means Great Britain can adopt for the final extinction of the Slave Trade." In his memorable speech, the Hon. Chairman exclaims :* "There was a smuggling trade that realized 2000 per cent. profit, and did they think that naval officers, and men-of-war could put it down." Does

* *Vide* Hansard, February 22, 1848.

not 2000 per cent. profit represent an enormous diminution of human victims, and a comparative degree of peace and security to Africa? Does it not represent an amount of failure, loss, and discouragement to the great mass of speculators. A little more vigour, and yet larger gains, much more, and the trade is put down—their amount is after to a certain point the test of our success. Can Mr. Hutt be simple enough to suppose that (besides its grievous wickedness) there is any inherent or peculiar property in slave trading, which can account for so singular a violation of the ordinary laws which govern mercantile transactions. Surely little unprejudiced reflection is required to show that 2000 per cent. profit indicates a near approach to complete suppression.

Mortality in the Squadron.

Upon the subject of the loss of life in the naval force employed against the Slave Trade, the recent investigation before both Houses of Parliament, has thrown all the light that can be desired. Up to that time it was generally believed to be the most fatal service upon which seamen could be employed; and the failure of the Niger expedition, of the attempt to colonize Fernando Po, and the frightful mortality at Sierra Leone, in times past, went far to increase the pestilential reputation of everything connected with the west coast of Africa. The most recent evidence upon the subject has fortunately dispelled all alarm as far as the squadron is concerned. The land and the rivers no doubt are fatal to European life under certain circumstances, but the Slave Trade has been expelled from the rivers, and the shortest distance from the coast secures a climate perfectly safe and salubrious. The duties of the squadron rarely require exposure to the fatal malaria, and by the care of the

officers in command, it has been brought about that the mortality on board ship does not exceed one and a-half per cent.—a lower rate than that prevailing in the squadrons on the West Indian, East Indian, China, and Mediterranean stations, and very far below that of the troops in those quarters.

Sufferings of Slaves alleged to be increased on the Middle Passage by the operation of the Squadron.

Not satisfied with the assertion of the inefficiency of the squadron, an assertion based, as has been seen, upon the data above examined, the opponents of the squadron have endeavoured to prove also, that the sufferings of the slaves embarked from Africa have been fearfully increased by the preventive measures. It was of course desirable to maintain this position, as increased sufferings to increased numbers would complete their case in favour of a prompt discontinuance of the present system, and none of the arguments they have urged have had a more powerful effect on the public mind. It is, therefore, highly important to examine the grounds upon which the assertion is made. First and foremost, as on the assumption that the amount of the Slave Trade is still increasing, we are called on to accept the tabular statement in the report of Mr. Hutt's committee, but in this case it will be the more necessary to examine its trustworthiness, as it is at all events consistent with the allegations it is intended to support. In fact, from the year 1815, when the first treaties were signed for the suppression of the Slave Trade, to the last year comprised in the list, these tables show an increase of mortality among the slaves exported to the amount of eleven per cent. The deaths before that date being stated at fourteen, and after it at twenty-five per cent.

Now, in the first place, this statement appears wholly absurd, when we recollect the nature of the check put upon the trade by Great Britain during the first fifteen years of her antagonism. Five or six most unserviceable vessels were all that were sent to the Coast of Africa as a preventive squadron; for many years, they retired from their cruize during the rainy season, and the whole of the Brazilian trade south of the Line was absolutely secured by treaty from all molestation by them. Occasionally, indeed, Portuguese vessels, destined for Brazil, came to take in their living cargo in the Bight of Benin, to escape the duties levied on them in the Portuguese settlements—so trivial was the risk of capture even on those points, with the miserable means then at the disposal of our naval officers. The assertion, therefore, of a generally increased mortality in slave ships, when the preventive measures affected but one part of the trade very slightly, and the far greater part *not at all*, is sufficient of itself to discredit the tables in question. There is, however, positive evidence that establishes, beyond the very possibility of doubt or cavil, the very reverse of these *trustworthy* assertions. It is not disputed that the mortality among the slaves, when captured on the passage, is always considerably greater than when they are landed, without interruption, in Brazil. If, therefore, it can be shown that the mortality in captured ships is less than that alleged by the tables, *a fortiori* it is also less in the vessels which escape. Sir C. Hotham's evidence is, therefore, decisive of the question of fact, for that officer proves in his evidence from official returns, that the mortality in captured ships, so far from having risen to 25 per cent., has actually fallen to nine per cent.—a proportion less by five per cent. than that given for vessels which pursued their course unmolested before 1815.

So much for the *fact*. In the opinion of the same witness, the mortality on board vessels which escape is only five per cent. Even assuming that the deaths on board vessels which escape to be as high as nine per cent., then the average loss of life in vessels that pursued their course unmolested before 1815 (14 per cent.), *was more than half as much again as* that which is now incurred, under what Sir Charles Hotham calls "the worst circumstances." Thus it is as fairly established as any point can be, that there is actually a very large diminution in the mortality as well as in the amount of the Slave Trade, and this is distinctly proved by Sir C. Hotham and other witnesses to be the direct effect of the squadron. The squadron has caused speed in shipping, and in former days a vessel loitered about while her cargo was gradually being made up. The squadron necessitates the employment of fast sailers, and when the Slave Trade was unmolested, ordinary ships were employed in it with no greater speed than possessed by those in other branches of commerce, with which capacity is at least as valuable as any other quality. There may be, perhaps, no difference in the actual suffering of a slave in the hold of a fast or slow sailer, but in the latter case it is obvious that the duration of the suffering *must* be shortened. As to the crowding of the slaves, an affliction that caused the slave-carrying Act to be passed before 1790, it is idle to suppose that any principle beyond a desire to carry as many slaves as possible should influence it. The evidence of Mr. R. Stokes (p. 242, Lords Report, 1849) establishes beyond a doubt, that the crowding could not, and therefore has not been increased; though the well-known alteration of the English system of measuring would make it appear upon paper that more slaves to the tonnage are now taken than was the case formerly.

The state of feeling in Brazil.

Another point that has recently been much insisted upon in controversy, regarding our preventive measures, is the reluctance of the Brazilian Government, and of the Brazilian people, to co-operate, or even keep good faith with us in any matter connected with the importation of negroes to that country. It is assumed that a proud nationality, smarting from the indignity sustained in 1845 at the hands of the English Parliament, baffles the efforts of Great Britain; that the Brazilians, contrary to their better feelings, are thus stimulated to carry on the Slave Trade in violation of the national faith solemnly pledged—on the point of honour! A reference to the evidence of Mr. Ousely, formerly Chargé d’Affaires at Rio, and Captain Skipwith, before the Lords’ Committee of 1850, gives a very different view of the matter. The Slave-Trade is in the hands of the Portuguese, to whom the Brazilians bear an inveterate hatred, but who, by their constituting the greater portion of the monied class, have long held the Government in a state of abject subserviency. According to Mr. Ousely there is a considerable party now who sympathize with the policy of England, and occasionally go so far as to reproach the apparently dilatory measures which have been hitherto taken. Indeed, so far from adopting the despondent view that has recently been in vogue in this country, Brazilians, in conversation with that gentleman, have said, “You are not in earnest about it; if England chose to put down the Slave-Trade she could do so;” and upon the occasion of a slave insurrection, “We should be very glad to see you exert your power more vigorously,” (p. 29, Lords’ Report, 1850). Commander Skipwith (p. 47, *ibid.*) reports still

more decidedly as to the sentiments of a large and growing party in that country. So far from being indignant, they have been delighted with the capture of slavers on the Brazilian coast, and have upon the notification of them, repaired to Mr. Hudson, the British Minister, urging him to cruise more vigorously than ever.

The evidence of the two gentlemen last mentioned received further corroboration of a most important character, from Mr. Hesketh, the Consul at Rio Janeiro. The anti-slave trade party, he declares, is considerably on the increase; and its importance at Rio may be estimated from the fact, that three newspapers advocate its principles. The price of a slave had, at the date of his letter (March 1850), increased from 32*l.* to 54*l.* in consequence of the captures on the coast, which he alleges, are heard of with pleasure by the national party, the Brazilians, as instances of discomfiture of the alien population, the Portuguese, towards whom they entertain the strongest social and political antipathy.

Recent accounts from Rio de Janeiro afford the strongest possible confirmation of these plain statements of practical men, and set the "point of honour" theory at rest for ever. Pledged to treat the Slave Trade as piracy, and to abolish it for ever, by the Convention with England of 1826, the Brazilian Government had continued down to the year 1850, to foster and encourage the crime. In 1850, Great Britain having been thus long empowered by this convention to treat them as pirates, at length ordered the slavers to be seized in their depôts in the ports of Brazil. Collisions took place, attended with loss of life, and what was the result? The measures were popular with the Brazilian people; the Government is said to have entered into an agreement with the British Minister, as to the circumstances under

which slave vessels should be henceforth seized, and at once brought in and passed a law, declaring them pirates. To those who believe that, *because* the profits on a successful voyage are 2000 (probably now they are 4000) per cent., our efforts can never produce any sensible effect, except to multiply the victims, and aggravate the sufferings, we offer the following opinion of one who is well able to form a judgment, a member of that government which up to the date of these vigorous measures, had supported the slave dealers.

“The *Rio Journal of Commerce*, of the 16th of July, contains the statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chamber of Deputies on the preceding day, regarding the slave-trade question, and also the destruction of the fort of Paranaguay by the ‘Cormorant.’ The minister referred to the various delays that had hitherto attended all attempts at negotiation with the British Government, and expressed a hope that the time was approaching when the propositions of Brazil would meet with attention. Without entering, however, into the various practical grievances of which the country had to complain, he would ask the House to look at the subject in a larger way, and to consider whether, when a power, like Great Britain had shown her determination to suppress the slave trade, and had succeeded in enlisting other nations in the undertaking, it would be possible much longer for Cuba and Brazil alone to carry it on. He believed not. England had made treaties with several of the principal chiefs on the African coast where the trade was conducted, and the spirit of civilization would not rest until it had completed its work.”—*Times*, Sept. 13, 1850.

Stranger still is our more recent intelligence. It would appear from the following extract from the

"Times," of Nov. 27th, that a revulsion of feeling has taken place, not only in the Brazilian people but also in the Brazilian Government, from which we may anticipate that that Power from henceforth will be reckoned among our warmest supporters, instead of among our most inveterate antagonists, in our attempts to suppress the Slave Trade.

"The Brazilian war-steamer 'Urania,' entered yesterday from a cruise, bringing on board 208 African slaves and the crew of the brig 'Rolha,' all captured at Macahé. On the same day the celebrated slave-merchant, Joaquim Pinto da Fonseca, had been arrested and placed in close confinement, it being discovered that he was the owner of the brig 'Rolha,' captured by the Brazilian war-steamer, 'Urania.' There had been another capture by a Brazilian steamer-of-war, off St. Catherine's, of a brig, with 120 slaves on board."—Extract from the "Journal do Commercio" of October 8. *Times*, Nov. 27, 1850.

Destruction of Barracoons.

Returning again to the causes which have interrupted the effective operations of our naval officers, the most serious impediment must be traced to an unfortunate misunderstanding relative to an opinion of the Queen's Advocate, who referring to the proceedings of Captain Denman at Gallinas, observed, that in the event of "any goods of foreign merchants" being found in slave factories, it would be clearly illegal to include them in the general destruction. The immediate result of this was, that both slave traders, and the officers of the squadron, applied the admonition to the only goods which, in the experience of either, were ever found in slave factories, viz., the goods

brought by the slave-traders to barter for slaves. This error unfortunately remained uncorrected from the year 1842, when the opinion was given, till the beginning of 1848, in the latter end of which, a letter from Captain Denman, as to the correct interpretation of the phrase in the opinion, elicited from the distinguished civilian an explanation to the effect that "the foreign traders," implied other persons than those engaged in the nefarious slave-traffic. As soon as this was notified, the destruction of barracoons was renewed with fresh vigour. Sir C. Hotham and Captain Dunlop finally demolished the establishment at Gallinas, which had been rebuilt on the strength of the Queen's advocates supposed opinion, and the latter gave a passage to the discomfited traders, who were glad to escape from the neighbourhood of the native chiefs, whose favour they had no longer the means of conciliating.

It is hardly necessary to say much upon the necessity of the existence of the slave factories (or barracoons as they are called) to a prosperous state of the slave trade. The object of their erection is obvious enough. The cruiser is ever on the watch ; a moment of accidental absence is the golden opportunity for the slave-ship ; it is indispensable that the cargo should be shipped in a few hours, and the only method of effecting this is by having it ready on a spot close to the shore. This exigency is forced upon the slave traders by the presence of the squadron ; in former times a ship could sail from point to point without molestation, and take up slaves where she found them. The depôt of goods on the same spot to exchange them for slaves when the opportunity offers, is what cannot now be dispensed with. When, therefore, a barracoon is discovered, and with its contents destroyed, a double purpose is served. The

means of obtaining slaves and those of carrying them off are annihilated at a blow. The building, it is true, might be replaced by one built farther inland, but it would no longer answer its purpose, and would be almost certain to be instantly plundered by the surrounding natives.

Expense of the Squadron.

In the meantime the costliness of the national exertions is supposed to weigh heavily upon the tax-payers. The Mediterranean and other Squadrons on service are passed by, and untold expenditure, it is supposed, may be saved by a retrenchment of that on the African coast. The expense of the squadron, however, is the not very alarming sum of £166,840 10s., and, in any case, it is admitted on all hands that a large proportion of this outlay must be still disbursed to protect trade against piracy, if the preventive service were to be abolished forthwith. Upon this point there is no difference of opinion. The remainder of the expenses, which swell the charges, it is said, to nearly half a million, consist of bounties paid for captures, and for the different agencies and Vice-Admiralty Courts maintained along the coast. After all, the total is insignificant, unless it be shown that our efforts are in truth useless. A *proved waste* of expenditure, it is freely admitted, should be put an end to. It is hoped that the foregoing examination of the Evidence recently taken before both Houses of Parliament will be found to negative the hypothesis that such is the case with respect to this branch of the national policy. In conclusion, it should be remarked that in no instance has the most zealous advocate of the Squadron proposed that one tittle of fresh expense should be

incurred. It is true that the armament has long been miserably adapted to meet the requisitions it has had to meet. Inferior slow vessels have been sent to the coast when fast sailers were wanted ; large and unnecessarily costly ships have been sent when small ones would have been far more efficient ; and even when, late in the day, steam-ships were supplied, they were often the refuse of the Service that were dedicated to the cause of humanity. A smaller class and increased number of cruizers has been loudly called for, and, as has been before observed, is now in a state of preparation*, a new and more powerful course of action has been entered on ; the doubtful and hesitating report of Mr. Hutt's Committee has produced the conclusive inquiry of a Committee of the House of Lords, terminating in the unanimous and powerful report, which urges the certainty of eventual success if former errors be avoided or remedied. If these recommendations should be vigorously followed out, and if redoubled energy in every department of antagonism to the unholy traffic shall ultimately prove to be the result of the inquiry first set on foot with the

* Since writing the above I am told I was premature in stating that small vessels were in preparation for this service. It is for the Custom House, I now learn, that such a class is preparing as would be adapted for the coast of Africa, namely, a screw vessel of 300 tons, and 60-horse power. It is to be hoped that this is an earnest of what the Government intends to do for the service of the coast of Africa. The evidence of naval officers proves that it would be a great saving of expense to the country if a proper class of screw vessels were to be built at once, to replace the more expensive and less efficient class of steamers now employed. Captain Halstead's evidence before the Lords' Committee is quite conclusive on this point, not to speak of the valuable opinion of Admiral the Hon. George Elliot, who formerly commanded the Squadron, and is confessedly one of the most successful of our naval architects.

opposite intention, humanity may, in a short time, have cause to be thankful that the policy of Great Britain has been called in question, and that the expediency of persevering in her righteous efforts have been denied for a season.

THE
BRITISH SQUADRON

ON THE
COAST OF AFRICA.

BY THE REV. J. LEIGHTON WILSON,

OF THE AMERICAN MISSION ESTABLISHED IN THE GABOON RIVER,

“The experience and observations of one who has lived on the coast of Africa nearly twenty years, who has watched the operations of the British Squadron all that time with the liveliest interest, and who is in no way trammelled by any party views that exist in England, may not be unacceptable, or entirely unavailing, in the present crisis.”

“In all these varied ways it does seem to us that the British Squadron has rendered important service to the cause of humanity. It has put down piracy on the African seas; has restored peace and tranquillity to a line of sea-coast of more than 2000 miles; has called into existence a large and flourishing commerce, and, at the same time, has thrown the shield of its protection over the cause of Christian missions, and all the varied agency that has been employed to promote the cause of humanity and civilization among the benighted inhabitants of this great continent. If these great objects are not worthy of British philanthropy, we know not where to find those that are.”

LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.

1850.

BRITISH SQUADRON

COAST OF AFRICA

BY THE REV. J. LEITCHTON WILSON

OF THE AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS AND FOREIGN MISSIONARIES

"The expedition and observation of one who has lived on the coast of Africa nearly twenty years, who has watched the operations of the British Squadron all that time with the liveliest interest, and who is in no way transpired by any party who is that exist in England, may not be unacceptable or entirely unavailing in the present crisis."

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LONDON:
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INTRODUCTION.

THE Author of the following observations on the African Squadron, a citizen of the United States, has been for many years residing at the Gaboon River, near the Equator, as a member of the American mission established in those parts. This gentleman has passed twenty years of his life upon the African Coast, and on learning that a Committee of the House of Commons had given an opinion in favour of withdrawing the British Squadron from the Coast of Africa, he drew up this paper in order to show by the unbiassed experience of one apart from English prejudices, what has been the real effect of the policy of England.

Mr. Leighton Wilson hoped that the honest testimony of a foreigner, and especially of a citizen of the United States, to the success of the British Squadron, might not be without effect in assisting to disabuse the public mind of this country as to the alleged failure of our repressive efforts.

There can be no doubt that, by every one desirous of learning the truth of this momentous question, Mr. Wilson's paper will be regarded as an invaluable means of authentic information, and it has therefore been re-published from the 'Colonial Magazine' in which it first appeared, with a few explanatory notes; some passages also have been printed in italics, but no other change has been made in the author's manuscript.

Mr. Wilson wrote this paper in April, 1850, and refers only to the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons. The Lords' Report was agreed to a few days before it reached England, and the remarkable coincidence of the results of this gentleman's experience, with the conclusions of their Lordships derived from the evidence before them, is worthy of the gravest consideration.

THE AFRICAN SQUADRON.

THERE is scarcely any topic of greater interest before the British public at the present time than the question of the continuance or withdrawal of the Squadron from the coast of Africa. The Committee appointed by Parliament have reported in favour of its discontinuance; but the spirit with which the subject has since been discussed, both in and out of Parliament, shows that there is anything but unanimity of sentiment in relation to the Report. The public mind is fortunately awake to the importance of the subject; and whatever may be the final disposal of it, one thing is certain, the welfare of Africa is deeply involved. In view of this state of things, *the experience and observations of one who has lived on the coast of Africa nearly twenty years, who has watched the operations of the British Squadron all that time with the liveliest interest, and who is in no way trammelled by any party views that exist in England, may not be unacceptable, or entirely unavailing, in the present crisis.*

If it be true that the efforts of the Squadron to suppress the Slave Trade has been a failure; that no good or important object has been effected after so protracted a struggle with this monstrous evil, then it is but the dictate of common sense that it should be recalled, and, of course, the sooner the better.

But, on the contrary, if the experiment has not proved to be a failure; if as much real good has been achieved as could reasonably have been expected under existing circumstances; and if the continuance of the same measures for a while longer (with such alterations and improvements, of course, as experience may suggest) promises to accomplish all that was anticipated by the originators of the enterprise, or could now reasonably be demanded by the friends of Africa, then the responsibility of those who advise its withdrawal is no trifling matter.

In settling the question whether there has been a failure or not, we must inquire what was the object proposed by those who were instrumental, in the first instance, in getting a Squadron stationed on the coast, and the means by which they expected to effect that object.

Those who will take the pains to read what was written, as well as the speeches which were delivered in Parliament about the time referred to, will find that the question originally rested on a much narrower basis than it does at present. It did not then, as it has since, involved, the subject of emancipation in the West Indies, the question of free and slave-grown sugar, and various other minor topics which have grown out of these.

Whatever importance these collateral topics may possess in themselves, they had little or nothing to do with the plans of those who originated the undertaking under consideration. The main object of the enterprise was the relief of Africa. It was thought to be but an act of justice and humanity, on the part of Great Britain towards Africa, to put an end to a traffic which not only filled the latter country with

perpetual strife and bloodshed, but effectually closed every avenue to her improvement and civilisation. The share which the people of Great Britain had taken in promoting this nefarious trade made it obligatory upon her to do something to redress these wrongs; while her prominence among the great Christian nations of the earth made it entirely proper that she should be the pioneer in rescuing Africa from this terrible scourge.

It was not supposed that this traffic would be entirely and for ever broken up by the mere temporary restraints that could be imposed upon it by the presence of the Squadron; much less was it expected that the operations of the Squadron on the coast would exert any direct or efficient influence in promoting civilisation among the people whom they might shield from this evil. But it was hoped that, by keeping it in check for a time, Christianity and civilisation would have an opportunity to put forth their influence, and raise the aborigines to a position of improvement from which there could be no danger of relapsing into their former degradation. These were the views of the distinguished philanthropists who first enlisted the sympathies of the nation in the undertaking. And so long as public attention was confined to this simple original object, the expense of the enterprise was cheerfully borne, and there was no want of exultation at the success which from time to time crowned the efforts of the Squadron in this difficult and somewhat perilous service.

Having made these preliminary explanations, we are now prepared to show why this enterprise cannot be regarded as a failure. And the emotion which predominates in our minds, since taking up our pen

to write, is that of surprise that the results of this enterprise should be so little understood in England, and, above all, that so many of the officers of the Squadron, who have themselves been engaged in this service, should have no higher appreciation of their own success. The views of the latter, however, (those of them, at least, who have but little faith in the success of the enterprise), may be accounted for in part by the fact that they have seldom been stationed on the coast for a longer period than two years, and, of course, have not had the advantage, from personal observation, of comparing the present state of things on the coast with what it was fifteen or twenty years ago. Many, too, have been induced to renounce all confidence in the scheme, from the fact that they were placed in command of vessels that were utterly unfit for this kind of service, and were doomed, without any fault of their own, to find their most vigorous and praiseworthy efforts terminate only in disappointment.

Notwithstanding the objections from this source, we propose to show that the Squadron has been operating against the Slave Trade, directly and indirectly, in a most effectual way, and we rely upon facts to sustain us in this position, which can neither be gainsayed or denied.

Previous to the period when this traffic was declared to be illegal by the British Parliament and the Government of the United States, it was carried on very much in the same way as lawful trade is at the present time. Vessels which came out for slaves "ran the coast down" (to use the parlance of the country), touching at all the principal native settlements, and purchasing such slaves as were offered

for sale, until their cargoes were completed. In some cases whole cargoes were collected by kidnapping the natives who came off in their canoes to trade, and sometimes by capturing other slave-vessels that had completed their cargoes, and were ready to sail, but had not the means of self-defence. Besides, there were a few points along the coast occupied by the British, as well as other European Governments, intended to facilitate the same trade. In this way the whole coast, from Senegal to Benguela, was, less or more voluntarily or involuntarily, implicated in this trade. When the trade became illegal, however, it was banished from most of the European settlements; and the Spaniards, Portuguese, and others, who determined to persist in it, notwithstanding its illegality, had to adopt a new mode of operations. They could no longer perform their usual voyages along the coast without multiplying the chances of being seized as prizes, and having their property confiscated. It became necessary, therefore, to erect barracoons on those parts of the coast where slaves could be collected with the greatest ease and in the largest numbers; and at the appointed time the vessels returned and took away these slaves without being detained on the coast more than twenty-four hours, and in some cases only a single night. The points thus occupied at one time could not have been less than forty or fifty. The English have never had any treaties with the Spanish, Portuguese, or Brazilian Governments, that would authorize them to destroy these barracoons*. Hence they have been

* This right to destroy barracoons and slave factories is a question with the native governments, and not with those of which

compelled to do what they could by guarding the coast and seizing slave-vessels in the vicinity of these barracoons. But as the number of the places occupied by the Slave-trade greatly exceeded the number of cruisers* employed to watch them, and were seldom less than fifty or a hundred miles apart, it will readily be seen that the cruisers had a difficult task to perform, and the frequent escape of slavers was inevitable. At the same time the profits of the trade were so great, that the escape of a single slaver would cover the loss of three captures.

Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, such have been the diligence and activity of the officers of the Squadron, that they have forced this trade out of more than three-fourths of the strongholds which it once occupied. Let any one open the map of Africa and ascertain the places where slaves are now collected and shipped, and compare the number with what it was twenty or twenty-five years ago, and it cannot result in anything short of profound surprise.

From Senegal, near the borders of the Great Desert, to Cape Lopez, a few miles south of the Equator, a distance coastwise of something like 2,500 miles,

these miscreant slave traders are the subjects, who, in every case, are violating their own laws, so far as they extend. In the several instances that have occurred of destroying factories, no complaint has been made by the government of the country to which the slave traders belonged. And as regards English courts, the law prohibiting the Slave Trade would be an effectual bar to any legal proceedings. In Captain Denman's case, the Spanish law was known to exist prohibiting the Slave Trade as a crime, and the plaintiffs took measures to prevent evidence of the fact from being given.

* Down to the year 1830, there never were more than six cruisers employed on the African coast at one time.

there is now, with the exception of three factories on what is called the Slave Coast*, no trade in slaves whatever. In fact, the trade, with the exceptions just made, is now confined to what is called the Congo country, in which there are not more than eight or ten points where slaves are collected, and from which they are shipped†. If we add to these the three above mentioned, we have, on the whole coast, not more than twelve or fourteen; whereas there were, even within the knowledge of the writer, nearly four times this number. We scarcely know how such results have been overlooked, and yet these are facts that cannot be denied. More than 2,000 miles of sea coast, and that forming the frontier of the best and fairest portions of the African continent, has been relieved from this unparalleled scourge; and perhaps more than 20,000,000 of human beings, interiorwards, have been restored to comparative peace and happiness by the operations of the squadron along the coast. And how has all

* This refers to the Bight of Benin, along 250 miles of which some slave trade still exists, but which must also entirely cease from the moment the Commodore can spare six or seven cruizers to be constantly stationed there, each on a clearly defined district, and ordered to prevent the embarkation of slaves by in-shore cruising.

† It is possible that there is a little of this trade near the Rio Pongos and Bissaos, to the north of Sierra Leone; but, if any at all, it is very insignificant.

[The doubt here expressed by Mr. Wilson is set at rest by the following extract from the last report of the Mixed Commission Court at Sierra Leone:—"Not a *single* cargo of slaves has been taken away from *any* part of the coast between Sierra Leone and Senegal in 1849." Appendix to "Lords' Report, 1850," p. 195. This tract of coast includes the places above specified.—ED. of 1st Edition.]

this been achieved? We reply, by a process in itself perfectly natural, and in exact accordance with the expectations of those who originated this enterprise. Take, as an illustration, the history of the Slave-trade in the Bight of Biafra. All who have investigated the subject know that the rivers Benin, Bonny, Brass, Calabar, and Cameroons were once the chief seats of this trade. It is through these rivers that the Niger discharges itself into the ocean; and as the factories near the mouths of these different branches had great facility of access to the heart of Africa, it is probable that the Slave-trade was carried on more vigorously here than anywhere else on the coast. But at present there is none of it. This part of the coast having been subjected for several successive years to a virtual blockade, not only did the Spaniards and Portuguese find themselves under the necessity of relinquishing it, but, at the same time, the natives saw that they could derive a larger and more certain profit from lawful commerce, and consequently turned their attention to the manufacture of palm-oil. The number of vessels now engaged in carrying on a lawful trade in these rivers is between forty and fifty; and so decided are the advantages reaped by the natives from this change in their commercial affairs, it is not believed that they would ever revert to it again, even if all outward restraints were taken away.

Now, while we do not expect the truth of these statements to be called into question, we anticipate that some exceptions will be taken as to the amount of real good that has been effected, as well as to the share of credit which we have assigned to the British Squadron in connection with the above-mentioned

results. It will be said, perhaps, that in forcing the Slave-trade out of so many of its strongholds, important aid has been derived from the English Colonies and the Liberian settlements; and that in relation to other parts of the coast, where no such aid has been available, although the Slave-trade has been shut up to fewer points, the only consequence is, that it is carried on more vigorously at these points, and that the number of slaves still exported is as great as it ever was.

In relation to the first of these objections we would remark, that while it is unquestionably true that important aid has been derived from these settlements in breaking up slave-factories in their immediate vicinity, it is equally true that they could have had no such aid, had it not been for the countenance and support which they received from the English and other men-of-war on the coast, and for the simple reason that none of these settlements, nor all of them together, have sufficient naval force to contend with a single armed slaver.* If they have in their power to destroy any barracoons that may be established in their immediate neighbourhood, by marching a land force against them, their enemies, if not intimidated by the presence of so many men-of-war, could at any time take ample revenge by destroying what little commerce they have, if they did not put in imminent peril the most promising settlements on the coast.

In relation to the other objection, that there has been no material diminution of the number of slaves

* Governor Roberts, of Liberia, was enabled to destroy the last remaining slave factory there by similar means.

exported from the coast, we have more than our doubts. The time has been when tolerably accurate statistics might be collected on this subject, but we do not see how this can be done at present.* There is no one on the coast of Africa who can furnish anything like accurate information; and as most of the slaves which reach Brazil are smuggled into places where there is the least likelihood of their being detected, we doubt whether there is any one there that can furnish information upon which more reliance can be placed. *It is the policy of those engaged in this traffic to make an exaggerated impression, for they hope to put an end to the efforts of the squadron by convincing the English nation of the hopelessness of the undertaking.* Our own impression is, that the number of slaves exported has vastly diminished, perhaps in a ratio very nearly proportioned to the extent of sea-coast which it has lost. It is utterly incredible that the number of slaves now concentrated at a dozen

* The tables of Mr. Hutt's Committee are, however, worthy of notice; for, having been brought forward to prove the total inefficacy of our efforts, they may be fairly taken as not exaggerating the degree of success that has been accomplished. Those tables show that, for the five years ending with 1839, 65,000 slaves were landed annually in Brazil, and that after 1839, for eight years, the average has been but 31,000. They show that, for fifteen years prior to 1835, the importation into Cuba was 40,000 a-year; that, with the first Equipment Treaty in that year, it fell to 29,000 for the next five years. That since 1839, when equipped vessels became subject to seizure everywhere, it has for eight years averaged only 6,000 per annum. Thus the power to seize equipped vessels, in spite of the notoriously defective class of cruizers employed, has been followed by a reduction in the number carried across the Atlantic, shown by the difference between 105,000 and 37,000, or, in other words, by no less than nearly 68,000 in every year.

or fourteen points can be compared with what it was when the whole coast was taxed for this purpose; and it is equally improbable that the number of slave-vessels which escape now can be compared with what they were ten or twelve years ago, when there were fewer cruisers on the coast.* But even if this were not the case, still it must be obvious to every man of reflection that very great progress must have been made towards its entire extirpation, by reducing it to such narrow limits; *and any special symptoms of life and energy which it may put forth just now cannot, to the experienced eye, be regarded in any other light than the desperate struggles of a ruined cause.* A very large proportion of the country has already been delivered from its clutches, and, as will be shown in a subsequent part of this article, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for that trade to re-instate itself in places where it has once lost its power and influence.

The task of managing it, too, along a line of sea-coast of not more than three hundred miles must be easy compared with what it was when as many thousand miles of coast had to be guarded. Let a few improvements be adopted in the operations of the Squadron on the coast, and we see no good reason why this traffic may not be brought to a speedy and effectual end.

Thus far we have confined our remarks to the direct influence of the squadron in breaking up the Slave Trade.

We propose now to show that it has been operat-

* Down to 1839 *three hundred and thirty-three* vessels were captured: since 1839, down to 1849 inclusive, there have been *seven hundred and forty-four* captures.

ing still more efficiently in an indirect way; and under this head we would specify the influence it has exerted in promoting lawful commerce, the countenance and protection it has extended to the European settlements and the American Colonies* on the coast, and especially the indirect aid it has afforded to the cause of Christian missions. In these different ways the British Squadron has done more, perhaps, to emancipate Africa from the thralldom of the foreign Slave Trade, than by all other methods put together. Without this, all the prize-ships that have been taken, and all the treaties that have been formed, whether with the chiefs of Africa, or with the different Governments of Europe, would have been comparatively worthless. It should be borne in mind too, that all the indirect good secured in these various ways was distinctly anticipated, and did in fact constitute an essential part of the enterprise, as it existed in the minds of those who projected it.

Lawful commerce (and by this term we mean trade in the natural products of the country, in opposition to the Slave Trade,) owes its existence almost entirely to the presence and influence of the British Squadron. Previous to the period when a check was given to the Slave Trade, the lawful commerce of Western Africa consisted of small quantities of gold dust, ivory, and bees' wax, chiefly from the Gold Coast and Senegambia, and did not amount annually, it is pre-

* It is a remarkable fact that the Colonists of Liberia, soon after their first establishment in 1822, would have been driven into the sea by the hostile native tribes in the neighbourhood, had it not been for the support and protection of a British naval officer of the African squadron. See Appendix A.

sumed, to more than 20,000*l*. The insignificance of this trade, however, did not arise from any poverty in the natural resources of the country at that time, for they were as considerable then as they are now; but to the influence of the Slave Trade. During the prevalence of this trade, the African seas were almost wholly given up to piracy. No vessels could carry on lawful trade without the constant liability of being plundered. If these vessels were armed for self-defence, as was attempted in some few cases, the expense was so great, that it consumed all the profits of the voyage.

Another thing that operated equally to the disadvantage of lawful trade was, the fact that the natives of the country were so much engrossed in furnishing victims for the Slave Trade, that they had neither the time nor the taste for the tamer pursuits of cutting dye-wood or manufacturing palm-oil. Indeed, the excitement connected with capturing and selling slaves was alway more congenial to savage natures; and had it not been for the obstacles interposed by the presence of the British Squadron, we scarcely see how their attention could ever have been diverted from this to pursuits so different and so much less congenial to their natural tastes.

The presence of so many vessels of war has put an effectual stop to all piracy on the coast; and the impediments thrown in the way of the Slave Trade have left the great majority of the natives of the country no other alternative than to betake themselves to the peaceful pursuits of lawful commerce, or give up all intercourse with the civilised world. They chose the former, and we have the fruits of this choice in the unprecedented prosperity of their commerce.

We do not pretend to give precise statistics, but suppose it entirely safe to say that the annual exports from Western Africa to the present time, cannot be less than 2,000,000*l.*;* whilst there is every reason to believe that it will double, if it does not treble, or even quadruple itself in the next twenty years, if it is only protected until it has struck its roots a little deeper in the soil of Africa.

We might bring together a large number of interesting facts to illustrate the very rapid growth of this trade, but must confine ourselves to a limited number of the simplest statements. The Island of Fernando Po, which is supposed to contain about 20,000 aboriginal inhabitants, had no lawful commerce whatever twenty or twenty-five years ago. A small quantity of palm-oil was made for domestic use, but not a gallon was exported. At present, however, as we have learned from good authority, more than 200 tons are annually exported; and judging from the rate of its increase for the two or three last years, it will double itself in the next five. We might mention other places along the coast, as Grand Cestos, Cape Lahou, Jack-a-Jacks, and all the rivers of the Bight of Biafra, where the growth of this trade has been much more rapid, but the particulars of which are not so well known as the case just mentioned. We might arrive at similar results by comparing the number of vessels now engaged in lawful commerce with what it was twenty-five or thirty years ago. Then there were not more than

ten or twelve on the whole coast; at present, however, there are more than 200, the aggregate tonnage of which greatly exceeds that of the Slave Trade in the days of its most uninterrupted prosperity.

Still, however, we do not attach so much importance to this trade, on account of its present value, as we do to what it is capable of becoming, and is likely to become, if the agency which called it into existence is not prematurely snatched away. There is no reason to doubt that palm-oil will, in a few years, become one of the largest branches of commerce in the whole world. It can be produced to an almost unlimited extent, and the demand for it hitherto has always been equal to the amount produced. Palm-oil, however, is only one of a great variety of other products of the country, equally as valuable and capable of quite as much augmentation.

In connexion with such commercial results, present, past, and prospective, we do not see how the importance of the Squadron on the coast of Africa can well be exaggerated. Regarded merely in a selfish point of view, England will be repaid (and that, perhaps, at no distant day) for every dollar she has expended upon this enterprise, not only in the market she will have created in Africa for her manufactures, but likewise in the immense amount of valuable products that will be brought to her own shores from that country. But if these results acquire importance in connexion with commercial enterprise, how must they appear when contemplated in the light of humanity! We cannot contemplate this sudden and wonderful development of commerce in any other light than as one of those efficient agencies employed by Providence, not only to raise up Africa from the lowest depths of

savagism, but to place her on a footing of respectability with the most favoured nations of the earth. And if this be a sober inference from the improvement already taken place, who will begrudge the price of her deliverance?

Another object of importance effected by the Squadron is the protection it has afforded to the various European and American settlements that have been formed along the coast. Of these, eight are English, seven are French, four belong to the Liberian Republic, two are Dutch, and one belongs to Denmark. Portugal has possession of most of the islands, but has only one settlement on the mainland. Of these settlements Sierra Leone and Liberia are the largest in point of population. The former receives its accessions from the slaves that are recaptured by the British squadron, and contains a population of 60,000 to 65,000. The latter receives its accessions by emigrations of free coloured people and emancipated slaves from the United States, and has a population of 5,000 or 6,000. Liberia has recently assumed the character of an independent Republic; whilst Sierra Leone, with a population nearly ten times as great, continues the relationship of a colony to Great Britain.

Most of the other settlements on the coast are little more than fortified stations, around which a number of traders have rallied for the purpose of carrying on trade with the aborigines. These settlements, though none of them have as yet acquired any very great commercial importance, are nevertheless so many nucleuses of civilization, the influence of which is being every day more and more extended. There are some things connected

with the management of these settlements, as well as the manner in which trade is conducted, that are very prejudicial to the improvement of the natives, and they ought to be corrected. Their influence, upon the whole, however, is good, and they are doubtless destined to perform an important part in promoting the civilization of the country generally.

Natives are drawn from a great distance in the interior to these settlements, for the purpose of exchanging the products of the country for the manufactures of Europe; whilst the traders themselves are employing a considerable number of coasting craft * for the purpose of extending their commerce along the coast as well as in the interior. At many of the settlements, too, the forms of law, as practised by civilized nations, are beginning to be introduced, so that the natives who frequent them will not only have all the stimulus to industry which commerce furnishes, but will become familiar with models of Government, upon which they may construct their own as the progress of society may require.

But these settlements, which promise so much for the future welfare of Africa, have always had, and still need, the protection of foreign Governments.

* Coasting vessels trade regularly between Sierra Leone and Badagry, a distance of 1200 miles, owned and navigated entirely by liberated Africans. This trade took its rise in 1842, when the liberated Africans of the Yoruba tribe, wishing to get back to their country, clubbed together, and bought up condemned slave-vessels for the purpose, the Government affording them no facilities for leaving the colony. It is worthy of record that the native owners granted Mr. Townsend, the missionary, a passage, free of expense, to Badagry.

There are few, if any of them, that could withstand the combinations of hostile natives that would be formed against them, especially when they were instigated and supported by Spanish and Portuguese slave traders. Foreign residents, all along the coast, are perfectly aware of this; and there is nothing that would be more heartily deprecated by them than the premature withdrawal of the Squadron. It is not supposed that they will always continue in this dependent condition. Some of them are comparatively new, and have not acquired sufficient maturity and strength to maintain their own rights, or to enforce the principles of justice and order among the tribes by whom they are surrounded. Others, though much older, sustain a new relationship to the aborigines, in consequence of having exchanged the trade in slaves for lawful commerce; and although the people generally are beginning to appreciate the advantages of this, there are, no doubt, evil-minded persons among them that would gladly unite in any hostile measures that might be set on foot as soon as the Squadron was withdrawn.

The time will doubtless come when they will need no such aid. But those who have allowed themselves to be persuaded that they have already acquired sufficient strength to protect themselves, or depend upon them to do anything effective in putting down the Slave-trade without the co-operation of the Squadron, will find out ere long that they have leaned upon a broken reed. ✓

All that has been said in relation to the importance of the Squadron in developing the commercial resources of the country, and in promoting the cause of civilization, may be applied with equal force to

the countenance it has lent to the cause of missions. The writer is not aware that the officers of the Squadron have been in the habit of regarding any mission stations on the coast as under their special protection: but the mutual good feeling that has always existed between them and the missionaries; the readiness which they ever have manifested to repress all lawless violence; and especially the peace and quiet which they have restored to those parts of the coast where the missionaries are labouring, are favours and advantages more highly appreciated than the officers of the Squadron have any idea of.

At the same time it will readily be granted by all those who have reflected seriously on the subject, that Africa can never be restored to peace and happiness, or enjoy any high degree of internal prosperity, without the aid of Christianity. The highest degree of civilization and commercial prosperity, even if they could be attained without her assistance, would be but a doubtful boon. Christianity is capable of doing for her what no other agency ever can; and the missionary societies, both of England and America, have addressed themselves to the task of giving her the Gospel, with a degree of earnestness and energy which promises the most cheering results. The incipient stages of their efforts were not without difficulties and discouragements, arising chiefly from the insalubrity of the climate; but they have been continued long enough, and with sufficient success, to demonstrate the practicability of the undertaking. *To the south of Sierra Leone, and between that and the Equator, that part of the coast where the efforts of the Squadron to put down the Slave Trade have been most successful, there have been founded, in*

fifteen or sixteen years, as many as twelve independent mission, at the distance of 100 or 200 miles from each other, embracing three times that number of distinct stations along the coast, and a still greater number of out-stations interiorwards. Some of these stations are in the immediate neighbourhood of the European and American settlements above mentioned; but others, and the greater part of them, are far off from the abodes of civilization. The Gospel is statedly preached to thousands and hundreds of thousands, not only along the frontier regions, but far in the interior. More than 10,000 youths are now receiving a Christian education in the schools connected with these missions, and will, ere long, be sent forth to spread the blessings of education and Christianity far and near among the benighted inhabitants of this land.*

At the same time, as many as a dozen different dialects have been studied and reduced to system, and as many printing-presses are industriously employed in printing books in these dialects for the thousands who have been already taught to read. All this varied agency has been put into operation in the last fifteen years; and as every step gained in this work prepares the way for more accelerated progress, it must be seen at once that Christian missions are destined to exert a vast influence over the future destinies of Africa; and they will therefore receive,

* The Wesleyan Station at Abomey, the capital of Ashantee, may be mentioned, but more particularly the Church Missionary Society's Station at Abbukutu, which is in the heart of the slave-trading country, 50 miles inland from the Bight of Benin. See Appendix B.

as they certainly deserve, the countenance and support of every friend of humanity.

The line of policy marked out for most of these missions is, that while their main object will be to push their operations towards the central parts of the Continent, where it is supposed the climate will be more congenial to European constitutions, and where the population is greater and better organised, they must at the outset acquire a firm footing on the sea-coast, without which it will be impossible to maintain a line of communication with the interior, or keep up any intercourse with the civilized world.

As yet, the missionaries have done little more than possess themselves of the outposts; but, in accomplishing even this much, they feel themselves greatly indebted to what has been done by the Squadron, and they will feel the increased importance of this influence just in proportion as they approach those larger and more powerful kingdoms in the interior, where the agitations caused by the Slave Trade are more sensibly felt than even along the sea-coast.

So long as the African seas were given up to piracy and the Slave Trade, and the aborigines, in consequence, were kept in constant excitement and warfare, it was almost impossible either to have commenced or continued a missionary station on the coast. And the fact that there was none anywhere between Sierra Leone and the Cape of Good Hope previous to the year 1832, shows that it was regarded as impracticable. Christianity does not invoke the aid of the sword; but when she can be shielded from the violence of lawless men by the intervention of "the powers that be," or when the providence of God goes before and smooths down the waves of discord,

and strife, she accepts it as a grateful boon, and discharges her duty with the greater alacrity and cheerfulness. And whilst the missionaries cherish the conviction that their strength and reliance is in the unseen arm, there is, nevertheless, no class of men on the coast of Africa who would regret the removal of the squadron with more heartfelt sorrow.

In all these varied ways it does seem to us that the British Squadron has rendered important service to the cause of humanity. It has put down piracy on the African seas; has restored peace and tranquillity to a line of sea-coast of more than 2000 miles; has called into existence a large and flourishing commerce, and, at the same time, has thrown the shield of its protection over the cause of Christian missions, and all the varied agency that has been employed to promote the cause of humanity and civilisation among the benighted inhabitants of this great continent. IF THESE GREAT OBJECTS ARE NOT WORTHY OF BRITISH PHILANTHROPY, WE KNOW NOT WHERE TO FIND THOSE THAT ARE.

The opinion has long been entertained by many sincere friends of Africa that, so long as the demand for slaves in Brazil is so great, it will be impossible to break up the Slave-trade by any forcible measures.

More recently, but from a different source, we have heard the opinion gravely expressed that the most certain and effectual way of breaking it up will be to let the Brazilians have unlimited access to the coast of Africa, and so glut their own markets that slaves will become comparatively valueless. We confess we have never heard this latter sentiment avowed without feelings of mingled astonishment and indig-

nation, and have scarcely been able to refrain from exclaiming Treason! as often as we have heard it uttered. What does it amount to when expressed in plain English? Something like this: that, after toiling so long for Africa, we have come to the conclusion that she is not worth contending for, and therefore deliver her over to the destroyer without condition or mercy.

Who can tell how many slaves it will take to glut the market of Brazil? The half of the population of the continent of Africa would scarcely be sufficient to supply the demand that would spring up under such circumstances. Treated as her slaves are, and as the Brazilians think it their interest to treat them, the time will never come when they will dispense with the necessity of fresh importations from the coast of Africa. But let her be forced to adopt a different line of policy in relation to the treatment of her slaves, and be made to rely upon the natural increase of those already in the country, and the time is not far distant when we may reasonably expect the Brazilians themselves to be utterly opposed to any further accessions to her slaves from the coast of Africa. There is in the southern parts of the United States a state of feeling, in relation to slavery, that we may expect to see in Brazil before the lapse of many years. However strenuous planters in the Southern States are in defending the institutions of slavery, it would be difficult to find an individual among them that would consent to receive a fresh cargo from the coast of Africa. And the thing which awakens more serious apprehensions in their minds about the stability of the institution than anything else is, the unparalleled increase of the slaves among them. This

one thing makes it perfectly obvious to every man of reflection, that it cannot be controlled for any considerable length of time to come; and the engrossing inquiry now is, What shall we do with our slaves? Let Brazil take the same care of her slaves, the result will be the same, and the inquiry will soon follow, not how we shall wring more slaves from the coast of Africa, but how we shall dispose of those we already have?

A great deal has been said about the expense of this enterprise, and the inseparable loss of life connected with it.

As a matter of expense, we have too little knowledge of financial affairs to speak with confidence; but there has always appeared to us much misapprehension, if not misrepresentation, on this subject. The people of Great Britain are scarcely divided in opinion in relation to the necessity of maintaining a naval as well as a military force in times of peace. Whatever speculations peace-men may entertain on the subject, we fancy it would be a difficult task to persuade the nation at large to abolish either their army or their navy in the present state of the world. And if a navy must be maintained in times of peace, where is the great additional expense of having a small section* of it stationed on the coast of Africa? Some additional expense is incurred, it is true, in the way of prize-money, the support of a Court of Mixed Commission, and the temporary support of recaptive slaves, but nothing in comparison with the

* A return in the Lords' Report shows the expense of maintaining the African Squadron to be £166,000. This is exclusive of head money, and the expense of the Mixed Commission Courts.

great objects which are accomplished by the enterprise. If the resources of Great Britain were really tasked by this comparatively small outlay, it would become a matter of just inquiry how far it should be continued; but so long as this is not the case, it will be difficult to point out any object more worthy of her care and patronage.

In relation to the exposure of life, it is admitted that much sickness has been endured and many lives lost, but this was in the earlier stages of the enterprise, when the officers of the squadron were inexperienced in relation to the best means of preserving the health and lives of their crews. The practice more recently adopted of employing kroomen and other natives of the country to perform all that kind of labour which requires special exposure, has placed this enterprise on an entirely different footing, and made cruising along the coast of Africa nearly as safe as anywhere else. The fact is already known to the Board of Admiralty; and if the limits of this article would allow, we could prove from your own observations, not only in connexion with the operations of the squadron, but likewise that of trading-vessels, the justice and truth of this assumption. Commander Chamberlain, of her Britannic Majesty's brig *Britomart*, informed the writer that he had been cruising on the coast nearly two years without having lost a man, or having had, so far as he knew, a single case of African fever on board his vessel; the United States sloop of war, *Yorktown*, with a crew of nearly 200 men, cruized on the coast two years without having lost a single man; and the writer was informed by Captain Bell, that he had never had a healthier crew in any part of the world. Facts of a

similar character without number have come under the observation of the writer in connexion with trading-vessels. It has uniformly been observed, that where sleeping on shore has been avoided, and where temperance and cleanliness have been enforced, there has been little or no sickness that could be attributed to the climate. Since these and other measures for preserving health have been adopted on board of the cruisers, there has been little sickness, and still less mortality.

If the Government of Great Britain would give efficiency to this enterprise, and bring the Slave Trade to a speedy termination, vessels of a better class should be designated to this service than those which have been stationed on the coast for a few years past. The writer pretends to no personal knowledge of the sailing qualities of vessels; but an article has recently appeared in the *London Times*, by one of the commanders who has been in the service, in which it is conclusively proved that a large number of the vessels in the African service for a few years past have been of the poorer class, and utterly unfit for the kind of service in which they are engaged. None but the fastest sailers can be of any real use. Those employed by the Slave Traders are the fastest that can be procured; and to send in chase of them second or third-rate cruisers is but to subject the officers of the navy to disappointment and mortification. A small number of the fastest sailers would be more effective, and accomplish the undertaking with much more certainty. We do not pretend to define any particular length of time that it will be necessary to keep a squadron on the coast—this must of course be determined by circumstances; but for our own

part we do not suppose that the period will be long before these exertions may be gradually diminished, until no further necessity will exist.

In conclusion, we would suggest also the importance of forming a larger number of military and commercial stations along the coast, like those of Cape Coast and Accra. They might be erected on a small and economical scale, and being garrisoned by black soldiers, as they ought to be, the expense of maintaining them would be comparatively small. These stations, whilst they would form important centres for the promotion of commerce and the spread of Christianity, might be rendered very efficient in putting down the Slave-trade. Treaties for this purpose might easily be formed with the African chiefs more immediately concerned ; and if they were thrown open to the free trade of all nations, as the English settlements on the Gold Coast are at the present time, very little jealousy would be felt in relation to any new territory which Great Britain might acquire for this purpose. The importance of such establishments is enhanced, too, by the necessity which is felt for consular agents to adjudicate differences between captains of trading-vessels and the chiefs of the country ; and this necessity will increase just in proportion to the increase of lawful commerce.

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REGULATED SLAVE TRADE.

FROM THE EVIDENCE OF ROBERT STOKES, ESQ.,

GIVEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE

HOUSE OF LORDS, IN 1849,

With a plate showing the Stowage of a British Slave Ship,

DURING THE REGULATED SLAVE TRADE.

“True humanity consists not in a squeamish ear; it consists not in starting or shrinking at tales such as these, but in a disposition of heart to relieve misery. True humanity appertains rather to the mind than to the nerves, and prompts men to use real and active endeavours to execute the measures which it suggests.”—Fox’s *Speech on the Slave Trade*, April 2, 1792.

SECOND EDITION.

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1851.

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PREFACE.

THE following evidence of Mr. Stokes*, a gentleman who has the longest and fullest practical knowledge of all the facts connected with the English Slave Trade of former times, has been reprinted from the Report of the Lords' Committee [1849], as it affords, from the most authentic sources, a true picture of what the Slave Trade was when carried on by Englishmen, both as regards the period antecedent to 1788, when it was wholly unrestricted,—when the interest of those concerned was the only security for the good treatment of the slaves; and, secondly, as regards the period after 1788, when it was regulated by Acts of Parliament.

It may be asked, Why enter on the question of regulating the Slave Trade, when for half a century England has declared it Piracy, and thirty-five years

* Author of a pamphlet entitled "*The Foreign Slave Trade : account of its present state, and of the laws and treaties relating thereto,*" &c.—Hatchard and Son, 1837; and of "*A Memoir of the life of Z. Macaulay, as connected with the Abolition of Slavery and of the Slave Trade*"—Hatchard and Son, 1837. In early life Mr. Stokes was confidentially employed by the Original "*London Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade,*" and continued in uninterrupted intercourse with its leading members (Wilberforce, Clarkson, Granville Sharp, Zachary Macaulay, Sir Fowell Buxton, &c.) to the period of their deaths, and subsequently has enjoyed the confidence of their successors to the present period.

have elapsed since the whole civilized world, with one voice, declared it to be a great crime? The reply is, that for the existing measures of repression one single substitute has been proposed; namely, *that England should, for an undefined period, sanction the Slave Trade of Brazil under certain regulations, and that British functionaries should be stationed at the slave marts, to superintend the traffic.* Nor can this proposal be treated as altogether unworthy of serious notice, since it has been referred to with approbation by Mr. Gladstone, in his place in Parliament.

There is also an impression abroad by which many persons reconcile to themselves the notion of leaving the Slave Trade to itself, namely, that self-interest will render the traffic humane. If so, why was it regulated in 1788?—But the unanswerable testimony here reprinted proves not only that a slave trade left to itself involves the most terrible suffering to which human beings can be subjected; but that *the Regulated Slave Trade of Great Britain* was, in spite of every effort of Parliament, and of *provisions effectively carried out*, still a course of suffering and misery, inferior only to the same pursuit unrestricted.

Let those who talk of leaving the Slave Trade to itself, under the idea that Brazil would regulate the traffic, remember that any material improvement in the condition of the slave on the voyage, can only be accomplished by regulations which would involve increased expenses, and diminished profits. There must then ever be a strong temptation to disregard such provisions, which could, therefore, only

be rendered effective by stringent laws rigidly enforced ; but how can we anticipate such a state of things in the Slave Trade of Brazil ? From every quarter we have one unanimous declaration—*“The Government of Brazil is absolutely powerless.”* Dreadful then, as even a Regulated Slave Trade must ever be, let no man pretend that such is the measure of wretchedness to which the unhappy African would be condemned. No ; if the squadron were withdrawn, the Slave Trade must rage unrestricted and without limit. With Mr. Stokes evidence before our eyes, it is mere hypocrisy to pretend that any mitigation would arise from motives of self-interest, or that the Brazilian trade would be less terrible than that carried on by Englishmen before any restrictions were in force ; that different motives would operate or different results be produced.

The country, however, has not only proof of what unlimited Slave Trade was, and always must be ; but it has proof, equally unanswerable, *of the mitigation of horror and mortality effected by the measures of repression which it is now sought to abandon, compared even with that endured in the Regulated Slave Trade ;* measures, which though from obvious and remediable causes not yet crowned with complete success, have, nevertheless, saved hundreds of thousands from the horrors of the Slave Trade, and which if directed henceforth by the experience of the past, will soon compass the end which is still dear to the hearts of Englishmen.

Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Hook, and Mr. Rendall, in

their despatches*, show how utterly erroneous are the assertions of an increased mortality in the traffic. The average mortality in the regulated slave trade of England is admitted by the tables in the Report of Mr. Hutt's Committee, *to have been 14 per cent.*; whereas, Sir Charles Hotham, on whose evidence Mr. Hutt lays so much stress, *proves by official documents*, that even in captured vessels, when the want of experience in their treatment causes some increase of mortality in the slaves, *the average loss is now only 9 per cent.*!

This reduced mortality, moreover, he distinctly attributes to its true cause, namely, the effect produced by the British squadron. He says that the slaves are now carried "*with comparative ease and comfort*;" that if the squadron were removed, the Slave Trade would be greatly increased in its horrors, and "*it would be impossible to calculate the calamities which would ensue*;" and that, without providing a substitute for the present system, "*leaving out of account the negroes' suffering, he would not abandon it, because he is unwilling to see his country descend from the high position which it has hitherto held in the eyes of the world*†."

To many persons it may appear startling that the mortality in the present contraband trade should be so much less than that which existed even in the English regulated Slave Trade; but to any one who inves-

* Appended to Lords' Report, pp. 89, 203, 204.

† See Sir C. Hotham's Evidence, Commons' 1st Report for 1849. Q. 670, 678, 679, 680, 854.

tigates the subject the causes will be clear, and the plan of the ship "Brookes," supplied by Mr. Stokes, will greatly assist the inquiry.

First.—The slave ships, formerly, whether in the unrestricted or in the regulated trade, were ordinary merchant vessels, of very dull sailing qualities.

Secondly.—They formed their own factories on reaching the coast, purchased their own slaves, and, owing to the competition, were often many months collecting their cargoes; and during that time a large proportion of the human cargo was kept on board, confined in the hold.

Thirdly.—The slaves being stowed on several tiers or decks one below the other, as shown in Mr. Stokes' plan, the want of ventilation, rendered the atmosphere, especially of the lowest and principal deck, in the last degree fœtid and unwholesome.

Under present circumstances, on the other hand, permanent slave factories for collecting the cargoes, and keeping them ready for shipping at any moment, are absolutely indispensable. In the barracoons, the slaves are in much the same condition as *when at rest* on a sugar plantation, and the slave dealer is interested in keeping them in perfect health. The moment the slave-vessel appears, the slaves are shipped, and in an hour or two she is undersail on the return voyage.* The fastest sail-

* The principal foundation for the assertion that now the slaves are more crowded than formerly, is explained in the following extracts from Captain Denman's pamphlet on Mr. Hutt's Committee:—"There is one fertile source of error which requires notice. In 1839, a new scale for admeasuring the tonnage of ships came into force, which, in order to encourage the building of better

ing-vessels in the world are now employed in the trade, so that the voyage only lasts about half as long as formerly, and the previous confinement on board is

models, gave a great advantage to the finer description of vessels, as the mode of calculation reduced their nominal size far below their real capacity of stowage; and the dues which are, for the most part, levied on the registered tonnage, thenceforth fell much more lightly on sharp vessels. The Cowes' yachts, for instance, were thus, by a stroke of the pen, cut down to less than two-thirds their former tonnage, in some cases to less than one-half. The "Alarm," Mr. Weld's famous yacht, by the old scale, 193 tons, was now registered as 95 tons.

"By the same process, slave ships, when captured, became nominally half the size they would have been called previously, the bounty on tonnage due to the captors being paid by the new scale, to the great disadvantage of the cruizers. In two cases, the "Reglano" and "Vanguardia," condemned in 1840, the surveyor happened to furnish the court with their tonnage by both scales. By the new scale, the "Reglano," which had been seized with 350 slaves on board, measured 48 tons,—an unheard-of number to such a tonnage, looking to the old scale; but by the old scale, the burden was 116 tons; thus showing exactly the former average of three slaves to a ton. So, what appears at first sight a new era—in which near twice as many slaves to a ton were carried as before—was, in point of fact, merely an arbitrary change in the mode of admeasurement, expressly intended to give an advantage to a certain class of merchant vessels. Thus, also, the "Vanguardia," a very old vessel, which would have been in previous years, if captured, considered 194 tons burden, was condemned in 1840 as of only 81! These are the only two cases in which, as far as we know, the tonnage of slave vessels has been given according to both scales.

A yet greater cause of error in comparing the crowding of slave vessels at present and in former times, is explained as follows. Referring to the English Regulated Slave Trade, Sir Fowell Buxton says, in his work on the Slave Trade, p. 132:—"I am informed that the slavers which have been brought to this country and remeasured, have been proved to be of much less tonnage than that stated in their papers: for instance, the 'Napoleon,' said to be 71 tons, was found to be only 31; the 'William Allen,' said to be 350 tons, was found to be only 134 tons."

entirely prevented. The models best adapted for fast sailing admit of only one deck or tier, and these being close to capacious hatchways, the slaves breathe a far purer air than could ever penetrate to the holds of such vessels as were used formerly, and would be used again if the slave trade were thrown open.

That the measures in force have very greatly diminished the traffic, and have in the diminished traffic greatly mitigated the suffering, are facts open to every one who cares to make the investigation.

This evidence, however, only refers to the question of comparative suffering; let the facts recorded by Mr. Stokes, remind the people of England of *the inevitable horror of all slave trade*. Nor let their eyes be fixed solely on the middle passage, which is but a short chapter in this terrible history of wrong and suffering. No regulation can reach the interior of Africa, where, if the Slave Trade is thrown open, men will be hunted like wild beasts to supply an unlimited and perpetual demand on the coast. No regulation can be extended to the mines and plantations of Brazil, where the misery of the slave increases precisely as his value falls, and the difficulty of replacing him is diminished. If there be one man who would deliberately resign his fellows to such a fate, persuading himself that Brazil could mitigate the middle passage by regulations, let him remember the language addressed to Parliament by Fox, and afterwards recognised as an eternal truth by the nation:—"THERE CAN BE NO REGULATION OF ROBBERY AND MURDER."

EVIDENCE

OF ROBERT STOKES, Esq., BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE
OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1849.

THE LORD BISHOP OF OXFORD IN THE CHAIR.

ROBERT STOKES, ESQUIRE, IS CALLED IN, AND
EXAMINED, AS FOLLOWS :—

2750. HAS your attention been long called to the state of the African Slave Trade ?

For many years ; from the year 1800.

2751. HAVE you made yourself master of what is to be learnt from the reports concerning its state at different times during that period ?

To a very considerable extent.

2752. ARE you aware that it is stated that the effect of the cruisers posted by England upon the coast of Africa has been to lead to the crowding of the slave vessels, and so to increase the suffering of the slaves ?

I have understood that that has been generally reported.

2753. ARE you able to give the Committee any facts which would throw light upon the truth or falsehood of that assertion ?

Yes ; to show that the state of crowding prior to the abolition of the Slave Trade by Great Britain was quite equal to anything that we have heard of since.

2754. Would not that go to establish that the crowding was not the result of cruisers being stationed upon the coast, but the natural course of the traffic itself?

Certainly ; I think decidedly so.

2755. Will you put the Committee in possession of any facts to which you are able to speak, which show that the crowding was as great as it now is at the time when no cruisers were stationed upon the coast?

I will do so. Understanding that it was probable I should be called to give evidence before this Committee upon that point, I have looked over the evidence which was given in former years before this House, and before the House of Commons also ; and I have made a few short extracts, showing the state of the slave-vessels at an early period, previously to 1792 ; they are not very numerous ; I have merely given them as a sample. I will state the source from which I have derived this information ; it has been from the evidence given at the bar of the House of Commons in 1792. This evidence was very voluminous, filling, when printed, three folio volumes ; and it being deemed probable that only very few Members of Parliament would be found who would wade through the whole of it, it was thought desirable by Mr. Wilberforce and his friends that an abstract of it should be prepared, especially with a view to the convenience of such Members. This abridgment was accordingly executed by William Burgh, Esquire, of York ; Thomas

Babington, Esquire, late M.P. for Leicester ; the Reverend Thomas Gisborne, of Yoxall Lodge, and one or two others ; and that no misrepresentation of any person's testimony might be made, Matthew Montague, Esquire, M.P., and the Honourable E. J. Elliott, M.P., undertook to examine the abridgment with the original text, and to strike out or correct whatever they thought to be erroneous, and to insert whatever they thought to have been omitted. This having been done, the abstract was then printed, and Mr. Wilberforce presented it to the House of Commons as a faithful abridgment of the whole evidence, and it was received as such under the guarantee of Mr. Montague and Mr. Elliott. Similar extracts, exhibiting the enormous cruelties, over-crowding, &c., practised in this traffic before it was abolished by England, might be multiplied to almost any extent from the evidence given before the Privy Council in 1788, a Committee of the House of Commons in 1789, at the bar of the House of Lords in 1792, &c. &c. ; but I have confined myself to that taken before a Committee of the whole House of Commons in 1792, as it enables me to use the words of the abridgment, the correctness of which is guaranteed, as before stated, and as they serve well as an example of the mass which might be produced.

The same was read, as follows :—

Mr. Knox has been a Surgeon in the Slave Trade, and subsequently between seven and eight

years Commander of an African slave ship, Most generally, he said, the slaves in his ship had room to lie on their backs; sometimes not. In his last voyage, as Surgeon in the "Tartar" 1781-2, the slaves wanted room. Of his 602 negroes, few, except upon deck, had the breadth of their backs; believes the tonnage to have been from 130 to 150 tons. In another voyage they were pretty much in the same situation. The vessel was 106 or 108 tons register; the slaves 450, whites 45.

Isaac Wilson, a surgeon in the Navy, made a voyage to Africa in the "Elizabeth," John Smith, from London, 370 tons; sailed 10th May, 1788; returned 6th December, 1789; took on board 602 slaves; all confined at night between decks (a few women excepted); lost 155; primary cause of death in two-thirds melancholy; no other fatal disorder. Had an hospital, but the sick slaves lay on the bare planks, which, by the motion of the vessel, caused excoriations from the prominent parts of the body. Slaves much crowded below; generally took off his shoes before going down, and was very cautious lest he should tread upon the slaves. Three other vessels, belonging to the same house, the "Elizabeth," Wallis, brought 450 slaves, and buried above 200 before her arrival in the River Plate. The "Favourite" bought 468 in Africa; mortality, 73. The "Elizabeth," Marshall, bought 546; mortality, 158.

Dr. Thomas Trotter made a voyage as Surgeon of the "Brookes*," from Liverpool to the West

* The plate at the end of the pamphlet shows the stowage

Coast in 1783, when she carried 600 slaves [see page 17]; was ten months on the coast; says slaves in the passage are so crowded below, that it is impossible to walk through them without treading on them. Those who are out of irons are locked spoonways (in the technical phrase) to one another. It is the first mate's duty to see them stowed this way every morning; those who do not get quickly into their places are compelled by the cat. In this situation, when the ship had much motion, they were often miserably bruised. In the passage, when the scuttles must be shut, the gratings are not sufficient for airing the rooms; he never himself could breathe freely, unless immediately under the hatchway. Never saw ventilators used in these ships; a windsail was often tried on the coast, but he remembers none used in the passage. Has seen the slaves drawing their breath with all those laborious and anxious efforts for life which are observed in expiring animals subjected by experiment to foul air, or in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump; has also seen them when the tarpaulings have inadvertently been thrown over the gratings, attempting to heave them up, crying out, "Kickeraboo! kickeraboo!" *i. e.*, "We are dying." On removing the tarpauling and gratings, they would fly to the hatchways with all the signs of terror and dread of suffocation; many whom he saw on board this ship; not in the year 1783, when she stowed 609 slaves, but subsequently to the passing of Sir W. Dolben's Act, when she was restricted to 454.

has been in a dying state have recovered by being brought thither, or on the deck; others were irrecoverably lost by suffocation, having had no previous signs of indisposition.

James Morley, Gunner of the "Medway," made six voyages to Africa, the first in 1760, the last in 1776; says,—When there has been a full purchase, the slaves are closely stowed, but when a short purchase, and they have had mortality, they have more room. He has been employed in a full ship in stowing them as close as he possibly could. In most ships he has been in, the men were in irons all the passage; in full ships he has seen them in great perspirations, especially when rains obliged them to keep the gratings long covered; he has wiped them, and seen them wiped in perspirations so violent as to give reason to think, if they had been long kept so close, suffocation must have ensued, but this he never found. He has seen them under great difficulty of breathing; the women particularly often get upon the beams, where the gratings are raised with banisters, about four feet above the combings, to give air, but they are generally driven down, because they take the air from the rest. He has known rice held in the mouths of sea-sick slaves until they were almost strangled; he has seen the surgeon's mates force the pannikin between their teeth, and throw the medicine over them, so that not half of it went into their mouths, the poor wretches wallowing in their blood or excrements, hardly having life, and this

with blows of the cat, d—ing them for sulky black ——. He declares he has known the doctor's mate report a slave dead, and have him thrown overboard, when he has seen him struggle in the water; no one could imagine why, only to get clear of the trouble.

Sir George Young, Captain in the Royal Navy, has made four voyages to Africa, in 1767, 1768, 1771, 1772; has been several times on board slave ships; they were all in a state of cleanliness, as clean as their situation, with the number of men confined on board, would admit of. He attempted to go down the fore hatchway of one of them, but was deterred by the stench, which was intolerable, though there were then only 300 on board, and waited for 200 more. The men slaves were all chained, which he considered as a necessary precaution, as there were not quite 20 seamen on board at the time.

Henry Ellison, Gunner of Her Majesty's Ship "Resistance," has been employed in the African trade; thinks his first voyage was in 1759; remained in the trade till 1770. He has seen slaves faint away in ships from heat and stench. They were always much crowded; had two tier of people on one deck, one on a platform. They were much crowded in the "Nightingale," a small Snow about 170 tons; purchased 270 slaves; 30 boys messed and slept in the long-boat all the middle passage; no room below. The "Briton," 230 or 240 tons; much crowded; purchased 375 slaves. Thinks only buried six or

seven in the "Nightingale;" were remarkably healthy. They buried near 200 in the "Briton;" last man brought on board had the small-pox. Doctor told Mr. Wilson it was the small-pox, who would not believe it, but said he would keep him, as he was a fine man; it soon broke out amongst the slaves; he has seen the platform one continued scab. Hauled up eight or ten slaves dead of a morning; the flesh and skin peeled off their wrists when taken hold of, many entirely mortified. They buried in the "Nightingale's" second voyage about 150, chiefly of fevers and flux.

Mr. Claxton sailed in the "Garland," Captain Forbes, for Africa, 1788, as Surgeon's Mate, and there, on the Bonny Coast, commenced Surgeon to the "Young Hero" brig, Captain Molyneaux. They had 250 slaves, of whom 132 died, chiefly of the flux; so crowded that they could only lie on their sides; if they did otherwise, it created quarrels among them; they were stowed so close that he could not go among them with his shoes without danger of hurting them. This crowded state aggravated their sufferings when ill, and tended to increase the disorder; it was impossible to treat them with the necessary accommodations. The steerage and boy's room insufficient to receive the sick, so greatly did the disorder prevail; they were, therefore, obliged to place together those that were and those that were not diseased, and, in consequence, the disease and mortality spread more and more; the Captain treated them with more tenderness than he has heard was usual, but the men were not humane.

Some of the diseased were obliged to be kept on deck, with a sail spread for them to lie on ; this, in a little time, became nearly covered with blood and mucus, which involuntarily issued from them, and therefore the sailors, who had the disagreeable task of cleaning the sail, grew angry with the slaves, and used to beat them inhumanly with their hands or with a cat ; the slaves, in consequence, grew fearful of committing this involuntary action, and when they perceived they had done it, would immediately creep to the tubs, and there sit straining with such violence as to produce a *prolapsus ani*, which could not be cured. The same punishments were inflicted, for the same cause, on those who were not quite so ill. Slaves whose flux was accompanied with scurvy, and such œdematous swellings of the legs as made it pain to move at all, were made to dance, as they call it, and whipped with a cat if they were reluctant. The slaves, both when ill and well, were frequently forced to eat against their inclinations ; were whipped with a cat if they refused. They used other means still worse and too nauseous to mention. The parts on which their shackles are fastened are often excoriated by the violent exercise they are forced to take, and of this they made many grievous complaints to him. Fell in with the "Hero," Wilson, which had lost, he thinks, 360 slaves by death ; he is certain more than half of her cargo ; learnt this from the surgeon ; they had died mostly of the small-pox ; surgeon also told him that when removed from one place to another, they left marks of their skin and blood upon the deck

and that it was the most horrid sight he had ever seen.

Alexander Falconbridge, Surgeon, made four voyages to Africa 1780 to 1787 ; says,—When employed in stowing slaves, made the most of the room, and wedged them in ; they had not so much room as a man in his coffin, either in length or breadth ; impossible for them to turn or shift with any degree of ease ; had often occasion to go from one side of their rooms to the other ; always took off his shoes, but could not avoid pinching them ; has the marks on his feet where they bit and scratched him. In every voyage when the ship was full, they complained of heat and want of air. Confinement in this situation so injurious, that he has known them go down apparently in good health at night, and found dead in the morning. The surgeon goes below the first thing every morning ; was never among them ten minutes, but his shirt was wet as if dipped in water. The “*Alexander*,” coming out of Bonny, got aground on the bar ; was detained there six or seven days with a great swell and heavy rain ; air-ports obliged to be shut, and part of gratings on weather side covered ; almost all the men slaves taken ill with the flux ; last time he went down, so hot, he took off his shirt ; more than twenty had fainted or were fainting ; got several hauled upon deck ; two or three died, and most of the rest before they reached the West Indies ; was down about fifteen minutes, and made so ill that he could not get up without help ; was taken of a dysentery and disabled from doing duty the rest of the passage. A place in every

ship for sick slaves ; no accommodation for them ; they lie on the bare planks ; has seen frequently the prominent part of the bones of the emaciated about shoulder-blade and knees, bare. If plaster or bandage applied, they generally removed them. Most prevalent disorders in negro ships are fevers and dysenteries ; the consequence of numbers being ill of the latter, extremely noxious ; cannot conceive any situation so dreadful and disgusting. In the “ Alexander,” the deck was covered with blood and mucus ; resembled a slaughter-house ; the stench and foul air were intolerable ; from being down a short time in the “ Alexander,” is persuaded a night’s confinement in that situation would have destroyed him ; thinks, as the tradesmen stand many of these inconveniences, cannot be prevented. Slaves shackled together frequently quarrel, he believes, in all slave ships. In each department are three or four tubs ; slaves at a distance find it difficult to get over other slaves to them ; sometimes if one wants, his companion refuses to go ; if relaxed, one exonerates, while disputing over their neighbours ; this causes great disturbance. In the “ Alexander” has known two or three instances of a dead and living slave found in the morning shackled together.

Mr. Stokes. I have prepared, also, a faithful abstract of the Evidence produced on cross-examination at the bar of the House of Commons in 1792, from the witnesses brought forward by the slave-trading party, in opposition to Sir William Dolben’s Bill for regulating the carrying of slaves,

then before the House. No witnesses were brought by the Abolitionists. Every slave, whatever his size might be, was found to have only five feet and six inches in length, and sixteen inches in breadth to lie in. The floor was covered with bodies stowed or packed according to this allowance; but between the floor and deck, or ceiling, were often platforms, or broad shelves in the midway,* which were covered with bodies also. The height from the floor to the ceiling, within which space the bodies on the floor and those on the platform lay, [two tiers of human beings], seldom exceeded five feet eight inches, and in some cases it did not exceed four feet. The men were chained two and two together by their hands and feet, and were chained, also, by means of ring bolts, which were fastened to the deck. They were confined in this manner at least while they remained on the coast, which was from six weeks to six months, as it might happen. Their allowance consisted of one pint of water a day to each person, and they were fed twice a day with yams and horse-beans. After meals they jumped up in their irons for exercise. This was so necessary for their health, that they were whipped if they refused to do it, and this jumping was termed dancing. They were usually fifteen or sixteen hours below deck out of the twenty-four. In rainy weather they could not be brought

* That is, in the midway as to height, between the floor of the deck and the beams, these platforms or shelves projected horizontally from the ship's sides.—See plan, figs. 1, 3, 4, 5.

up for two or three days together. If the ship was full, their situation was then distressing; they drew their breath with anxious and laborious efforts, and some died of suffocation.

It is asserted by the advocates for the withdrawal of all restrictions on the Slave Trade, that it is called for on the ground of humanity, as, were the trade left entirely open, the self-interest of the slave-trader would be a sufficient guarantee for the merciful treatment of his victims; that it was not so in respect of Englishmen in former times, the foregoing extracts from the evidence will clearly show. Mr. Clarkson, in his "History of the Abolition of the Slave Trade," says, that in his first interview with Mr. Pitt, he (Mr. Pitt) seemed to entertain this opinion, and on this ground appeared to doubt some of the statements made by the advocates of abolition. But Mr. Pitt's speeches in Parliament will show how thoroughly he was subsequently convinced that this his first impression was groundless. The advocates for the withdrawal of the cruisers also say, that such a measure would save the loss of life which now takes place by the long detention of the slaves in barracoons, from want of food and from ill-treatment, in the case of the place of embarkation being watched by a cruiser, and by their being put on board in haste when an opportunity of doing so occurs. But the evidence laid before Parliament prior to the abolition of the Slave Trade will show that it was then no uncommon occurrence for slave vessels to remain on the coast for months collecting

their cargoes, and that during this period their victims were either confined on shore, or on board ship, where they were always chained together, and that it was not till they left the coast that the women were in most instances released from their fetters. The Returns show that a large portion of the deaths which occurred took place on the coast, that is, during the period of detention prior to the commencement of their voyage to the West Indies. I am decidedly of opinion that the sufferings of the slaves were far greater, and the deaths much more numerous from their detention on shipboard, while the cargo was collecting, than has been the case since the establishment of the cruisers has led to their detention in barracons.* But even before they fell into the hands of the white trader, they were subject to long detention, and suffered from want of food to that degree which made the African, dearly as it is abundantly proved

* The correctness of this opinion is fully confirmed by the Evidence laid by the late Mr. Bandinel before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1848. He states, that Mr. Thomas Edred, who made three Slave voyages before the passing of the Slave Carrying Act, informed the Committee of Privy Council by which he was examined in 1788-9, that he estimated the loss of life in the first voyage at 50 per per cent., and in the latter two at 20 per cent. each; but that he did not attribute these losses from being overcrowded, "but from the vessels being long on the Coast."

Mr. Robert Norris, in his examination before the same Committee, after stating his losses, said "that they (the slaves) died on the coast more than at sea."

Mr. Archibald Dalzell, who made four voyages, after reporting his losses by death, imputed them, not to overloading, "but to their being kept long on the coast."—Vide Appendix to 2nd Report of Parliamentary Committee, Sess. 1848, pp. 295—6.

he loved liberty, prefer slavery to death. The evidence of Mr. Joseph Fayer, who was examined at the bar of the House of Lords on the 25th of May, 1792, who was employed in the African Slave Trade for twenty years as mate and master, will show this to have been the fact. In the year 1788, the ship "Brookes" (the slaver in which Dr. Trotter made his first voyage) was examined and measured by Captain Parry of the Royal Navy who was sent by Government to Liverpool (where she was then lying) to make a Report for the House of Commons of the state of the slave ships lying there. His report mentions the names of the different slave-vessels he visited, and their respective dimensions as taken by him. The first on the list of (I think) 15 or 16, is the "Brookes," the dimensions of which will be found in the plan of that vessel.

DIMENSIONS OF THE SHIP "BROOKES."

Illustrating the Stowage of the British Slave Ship "Brookes" under the Slave-Carrying Regulation Act.

	feet	in.
Length of the lower deck, inside, (gratings and bulk-heads included,) LL, fig. 2	100	0
Breadth of beam on the lower deck, inside, BB, fig. 2	25	4
Depth of hold, from ceiling to ceiling, fig. 1	10	0
Height on lower-deck, between decks, <i>i.e.</i> from deck to deck	*5	8

* In this height of 5ft. 8in. between the decks, it must be understood that there are, close to the ship's side, two tiers of men—one tier *upon* the shelf or platform, and the other on the deck, *under* the platform, as seen by the plan, figs. 1, 3, 4 and 5. See, also, note page 12.

						feet	in
Length of the men's room on the lower deck						46	0
Breadth of ditto						25	4
Breadth of the shelves or platforms round the lower deck						6	0
Length of the boys' room						13	9
Breadth of ditto						25	0
Length of women's room						28	6
Breadth of ditto						23	6
Length of the gun-room, in which the tiller works,						10	6
Breadth of ditto						12	0
Length of the quarter-deck or poop						33	6
Breadth of ditto						19	6
Length of the cabin						14	0
Height of ditto						6	2
Length of the half-deck,* or half the space under the poop, immediately before the captain's cabin						16	6
Height of ditto						†6	2
Breadth of the shelves or platforms under the poop						6	0

Mr. Stokes. Let it now be supposed that every man slave is to be allowed six $\frac{1}{2}$ feet by one foot four inches for room, every woman five feet ten by one foot four, every boy five feet by one foot two, and every girl four feet six by one foot; it will follow that the annexed Plan of a slave vessel will be precisely the representation of the ship "Brookes," and the exact number of persons, neither more nor less, than could be stowed in the different rooms of it upon these data. These, if counted will

* The after part of this half-deck contained female slaves, and the other portion of it was, by Act of Parliament, to be appropriated to the crew of the ship. See figs. 6 and 7.

† Vide note on preceding page.

‡ Or six inches less than often allowed. See page 12.

be found to amount to 451. Now, if it be considered that the ship "Brookes" was of 320 tons, and that she was allowed to carry, by Act of Parliament, 454 slaves, it is evident that, if three more could be wedged among the number represented in the Plan, this Plan would contain precisely the number which the Act directs; and if it should be further considered that there ought to be in each apartment in the Plan one or more tubs, as well as stanchions, to support the platforms and decks, for which no deduction has been made, in order to give every possible advantage in stowing, then the above Plan may be considered as giving a very favourable representation of the stowing of the negroes, even after the passing of the Slave-Carrying Regulation Act*. The Plan, therefore, abundantly proves that the stowage of these poor people, as well as the consequences of it, must have been as described by the evidence; for if, when

* The situation of the slaves must have been dreadful, even under the Parliamentary regulations, for their bodies not only touched each other, but many of them had not room to sit upright; for when every deduction has been made, the height above the platform and below it, fig. 1, is, in the "Brookes," but two feet seven inches. The average height in nine other vessels, measured by Captain Parrey, was only five feet two inches, or two feet seven inches in each tier, *minus* the thickness of the platform, (which would reduce it, we may suppose, to two feet five inches); and in the "Venus" and "Kitty," the slaves had less than two feet above or below the platform. The slaves immediately under the beams must have been in a still more dreadful situation, as is seen by the Plan in fig. 1, where these beams are represented by shaded squares.

451 slaves are put into the different rooms of the "Brookes," the floors are not only covered with bodies, but these bodies actually touch each other, what must have been their situation when 600 were stowed in them at the time alluded to by Dr. Trotter, who belonged to this ship, and 609, by the confession of the slave merchants, in a subsequent voyage! Then, with respect to the loss of life: From papers laid on the Table of the House of Lords in 1799, it appears that in the year 1791 (three years after the passing of the Slave-Carrying Act), of 15,754 slaves carried from the coast of Africa, 1378 died during the middle passage, the average length of which was 51 days, making a mortality of $8\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. in that time, or of $62\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum, a rate of mortality which would depopulate the earth in a year and seven months. The amount of the mortality in 1792 was, however still more enormous: of 31,554 slaves carried from Africa, no fewer than 5413 died in the passage, making somewhat more than 17 per cent. in 51 days. Had the voyage been prolonged, and the slaves continued to die in the same proportion, the whole number would have been swept away in about ten months.

2756. Then the Committee are to understand that you gather from these extracts, *that the crowding of the slave-vessels before the institution of the cruising system was as great as it is at present?*

Quite as great.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE evidence of Mr. Stokes before the Lords' Committee, may be very properly followed by the parts of their Lordships report in 1850, which relate to the same subjects :—

Referring to the allegation, That the existing Squadron increases the sufferings of the transported African, their Lordships observe :—" Even if this had been established, we do not conceive that it would have been a sufficient reason for withdrawing the Squadron, since the sufferings of the transported Africans, fearful as they are, is the least evil of a system which fills the populous Continent of Africa with intestine war, insecurity, and bloodshed. But, further, we cannot conclude, from the evidence before us, that these sufferings are increased by the presence of the British Squadron, when compared with the horrors of the middle passage, *even under the regulated trade*. The presence of the Squadron has led to the employment of faster transports ; it has greatly increased the value of the living cargo ; and the withdrawal of the Cruisers would, in the judgment of some, even of the witnesses most favourable to such a course, lead to the employment of a worse class of vessels than those now used in the trade."

With respect to the preposterous notion that Great Britain should superintend and regulate the Slave Trade of Brazil, their Lordships state :—

" That to withdraw the Cruisers in part, and to

“administer a regulated Slave Trade (as has been suggested), would be impossible of execution, no material saving of the cost of the present system, and utterly at variance with every past profession of Great Britain on this subject since she abolished the British Slave Trade.”

Mr. Stokes' evidence consisted of only a small portion of the authentic proofs in his possession, of the horrors of the Slave Trade, whether regulated or unrestricted, and showing that there has been no aggravation of suffering caused by the cruising Squadron.

It will be probably agreed that no further evidence on this subject was required; but in explanation of some exaggerated statements of the present mortality, founded on single and exceptional cases, it may be worth while to observe that, in a paper furnished by Mr. Bandinel to Mr. Hutt's Committee, the following proportions of deaths are shown to have occurred in voyages during the English Slave Trade.

50 per cent.

20

”

20

”

30

”

33

”

25

”

30

”

50

”

Still, Mr. Bandinel calculates the *average* loss at only 13 per cent., as well after as before the traffic was regulated by Act of Parliament, a measure which Mr.

Bandinel evidently regards as having had no practical effect in reducing the mortality of the middle passage.

An impression is, however, abroad, which has received some countenance from a tale of fiction in a popular periodical,* that slave traders are in the habit of throwing overboard their slaves in order to avoid seizure by the British Squadron. An instance occurred in the River Bonny some twenty years ago, at which time, unless slaves were actually on board, the vessel could not be condemned; but slave vessels have now, for a long course of years, been liable to seizure whether slaves are on board or not, and any one of various internal fittings, and equipments of which such a vessel cannot divest herself, is now sufficient to warrant her capture and insure her condemnation. Thus, no motive now exists for similar atrocities as a means of escaping capture.

It may be useful to add that shortly after these murders were committed by the slave dealers in the Bonny, a constant watch of that river was maintained by the English cruizers; the last twelve slave vessels that sailed from it were successively captured; and at length the slave dealers abandoned their factories in despair. Twenty thousand tons of British shipping are now employed in the Bonny trade†, and are freighted annually with the fruits of native industry; while for ten years no slave vessel has ever entered the river!

* Household Words.

† Vide the Report of the Lords' Committee.

As regards one instance (which is not the only one) of slaves being thrown overboard to escape capture, Mr. Stokes has supplied the following facts, showing that the practice existed long before the Slave Trade was treated as a crime, when it arose from motives which still operate, and with which repressive measures had, as they can have now, no possible concern.

“ March 9, 1783. Gustavus Vasa called on me with an account of 132 negroes being thrown alive into the sea, from on board an English slave-ship.

“ The circumstances of this case could not fail to excite a deep interest. The master of a slave-ship trading from Africa to Jamaica, and having 440 slaves on board, had thought fit, on a pretext that he might be distressed on his voyage for want of water, to lessen the consumption of it in the vessel, *by throwing overboard 132 of the most sickly among the slaves*. On his return to England, the owners of the ship claimed from the insurers the full value of those drowned slaves, on the ground that there was an absolute necessity for throwing them into the sea, in order to save the remaining crew, and the ship itself. The underwriters contested the existence of the alleged necessity ; or, if it had existed, attributed to the ignorance and improper conduct of the master of the vessel. This contest of pecuniary interest brought to light a scene of horrid brutality which had been acted during the execution of a detestable plot. Upon the trial* it appeared that the ship *Zong*, Luke Colling-

* The case was tried in the Court of King's Bench before Lord Chief Justice Mansfield.

wood, master, sailed from the island of St. Thomas, on the coast of Africa, September 6, 1781, with 440 slaves and fourteen whites on board, for Jamaica, and that in the November following she fell in with that island ; but, instead of proceeding to some port, the master, mistaking, as he alleges, Jamaica for Hispaniola, ran her to leeward. Sickness and mortality had by this time taken place on board the crowded vessel ; so that, between the time of leaving the coast of Africa and the 29th of November, sixty slaves and seven white people had died ; and a great number of the surviving slaves were then sick and not likely to live. On that day the master of the ship called together a few of the officers, and stated to them that, if the sick slaves died a natural death, the loss would fall on the owners of the ship ; *but, if they were thrown alive into the sea, on any sufficient pretext of necessity for the safety of the ship, it would be the loss of the underwriters*, alleging, at the same time, that it would be less cruel to throw sick wretches into the sea, than to suffer them to linger out a few days under the disorder with which they were afflicted.

“ To this inhuman proposal the mate, James Kelsal, at first objected ; but Collingwood at length prevailed on the crew to listen it. *He then chose out from the cargo 132 slaves, and brought them on deck, all or most of whom were sickly, and not likely to recover, and he ordered the crew by turns to throw them into the sea.* ‘ A parcel ’ of them were accordingly thrown overboard, and, on counting over the remainder the

morning, it appeared that the number so drowned had been fifty-four. He then *ordered another parcel to be thrown over*, which, on a second counting on the succeeding day, was proved to have amounted to forty-two.


*"On the third day the remaining thirty-six were brought on deck, and, as these now resisted the cruel purpose of their masters, the arms of twenty-six were fettered with irons, and the savage crew proceeded with the diabolical work, casting them down to join their comrades of the former days. Outraged misery could endure no longer, the ten last victims sprang disdainfully from the grasp of their tyrants, defied their power, and, leaping into the sea, felt a momentary triumph in the embrace of death."**

* "Memoirs of Granville Sharpe," edited by Prince Hoare. London, 1820, pp. 236—238.



WITH THE


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SLAVE SHIP BROOKES UNDER THE SLAVE TRADE

of 1788.

Fig 1.
Final Section.




ions, Water &c.

ate the beams of the Ship.

Shelf or Platform of the
L Lower Deck.

THE STOWAGE OF 292 SLAVES ON SHELVES AS SHEWN IN FIGURE 1 & FIGURE 5.



ON SIDES OF THE LOWER DECK BY MEANS OF PLATFORMS OR SHELVES
AND BELOW THEM HAVE ONLY A HEIGHT OF 2 FEET 7 INCHES
FAR LESS UNDER THE BEAMS. See Fig 1.





Fig 6.

Lower tier of Slaves under the Poop.




Captains
Cabin.

appropriated
to the
Crew.

Fig 7.

Shelf tier of Slaves under the Poop.



Captains
Cabin.

appropriated to
the
Crew.

REGULATED SLAVES

Act of 17




Fig 1.
LongitudinalPLAN OF LOWER DECK WITH THE
130 OF THESE BEING STOWED UNDER THE SHELVES

Fig 2

PLAN SHEWING THE STOWAGE OF 130 ADDITIONAL SLAVES ROUND THE WINGS OR SIDES
(IN THE MANNER OF GALLERIES IN A CHURCH) THE SLAVES STOWED ON THE SHELVES
BETWEEN THE BEAMS AND FARFig 3.
Cross Section
amidships