


UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

**SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL
PROTECTION POLICIES IN GHANA.**



**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN
PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER
OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.**

JULY, 2017

DECLARATION

I do hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and effort and that it has not been submitted anywhere for any award. Where other sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged. I bear sole responsibility for any shortcomings.

Candidate's signature

.....

JUDE MARTEY

10234588

DATE



CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this thesis was supervised in accordance with procedures laid down by the University.

.....
DR. ABDUL-GAFARU ABDULAI
(SUPERVISOR)

.....
DATE



DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my dear wife Mrs. Doris Martey who has supported me from the very beginning of my study till date. I also dedicate this work to my lovely daughter Elsie Naa Dromo Martekie Martey who was born in the course of this study.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDD - Centre for Democratic Development

CLIC - Community Leap Implementation Committee

CSO - Civil Society Organisation

DFID - Department for International Development

DSW - Department of Social Welfare

DCE - District Chief Executives

DPO - District Planning Officer

FGD - Focus Group Discussions

GPRS I - Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy

GPRS II - Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy

GSFP - Ghana School Feeding Programme

GSOP - Ghana Social Opportunities Programme

GOG - Government of Ghana

ILO - International Labour Organization

LIPW - Labour Intensive Public Works

LEAP - Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty

MOU - Memorandum of Understanding

MOGCSP - Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection

MGNREGA - Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

MOESW - Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare

MOH - Ministry of Health

MLGRD – Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development

NGO - Non-Governmental Organizations

NHIS - National Health Insurance Scheme

NPP - New Patriotic Party

NSPS - National Social Protection Strategy

OVC - Orphaned and Vulnerable Children

PET - Public Expenditure Tracking

RBA - Rights-Based Approach

TAB – Transparency and Accountability Boards

UN - United Nations

USD – United States Dollars

UNICEF - United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

WB - World Bank

WDR - World Development Report

ABSTRACT

Accountability is an essential feature of good governance. Social Accountability has been advocated to enhance the sustainability of social protection programmes. This study sought to examine the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms in the implementation of social protection programmes in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly, Ghana. The study employed a qualitative data collection and handling technique based on a case study through the lens of an interpretive research paradigm. The study was driven by the rights-based approach to social protection. The World Bank's (2002) framework for assessing the level of participation in policy making was also adopted to assess beneficiary participation in the planning, implementation and evaluation stages of the programmes. Interviews and FGDs were the main source of primary data. Eighty-six (86) respondents were sampled for the study, sixty (60) for LEAP and twenty-six (26) for GSOP. The study documented a high level of citizens' participation in the GSOP programme but, a low level of citizens' participation in the LEAP programme. Enforcement of the tenets of social accountability was very effective in the GSOP programme as compared to the LEAP programme. The use of the transparency and accountability boards (TABs) in the operations of GSOP ensures answerability. Inadequate logistics continue to hamper the operations of both programmes at the district assembly level. The study concludes that Rights-Based Approach (RBA) to social protection provides the respite for the attainment of effective social accountability. When beneficiary rights are respected and they are given enough power to play an active role in the decision making process, greater levels of efficiency and effectiveness is ensured in the implementation of social protection programmes leading to empowerment of citizens, improved governance and development effectiveness.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter consists of the background of the study, the research problem, research objectives and questions, significance of the study, research limitations and delimitations, as well as the organization of the study.

1.1 Background of the study

The emergence of social protection as a popular tool for bridging living condition gaps in developing countries is undeniably a step in the right direction as developing countries strive to alleviate poverty. These social protection programmes have emerged in major policy frameworks aimed at assisting poor and vulnerable families to lighten the magnitude of poverty and to break inter-generational transmission of extreme poverty (Barrientos, 2011; Oduro, 2015).

The most dominant form of social protection has been the cash transfer scheme (Barrientos, 2011). Cash transfer programmes are aimed at supporting human capital as well as providing incentives for the deprived and the excluded groups so as to invest in their future in order to advance out of poverty. In this light, the Government of Ghana adopted a programme called Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) with the goal of decreasing social risk and to support vulnerable families to overcome cash barriers that constrain access to social services such as education and health (Center for Democratic Development (CDD) Ghana, 2016). The Ghana Social Opportunity Project (GSOP) is also a complementary programme in the same direction

which is aimed at providing short-term employment for the able bodied poor in various rural communities in Ghana.

Ghana's social protection policy has in the past focused mainly on financial support to employees as well as contributions of employers on social security schemes. The aim is to support a healthy life, safe retirement and a secured income at old age (CDD Ghana, 2016). These schemes have largely focused on employees in the formal sector leaving those in the informal sector especially the poor and vulnerable to traditional forms of social protection. According to Doh, Afranie and Bortei-Doku Aryeetey (2014), these traditional mechanisms have survived on the principles of reciprocity and mutual exchange, with the extended family system in Ghana being the backbone. However, in recent years, these traditional approaches have suffered some setbacks in the wake of rapid globalization, migration and urbanization.

According to Sabates-Wheeler, Abdul-Gafaru, Wilmink, de Groot and Spadafora (2017) Ghana's social protection strategy has undergone a tremendous transformation within the last ten (10) years with the introduction of some key social policy interventions as in the new contributory National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003, the national school feeding programme (2005), the capitation grants to expand free primary education (2005), and the flagship LEAP cash transfer programme (2008). The change is as a result of global pressures from donor agencies such as the World Bank and Department for International Development (DFID) but more importantly, due to internal politics in developing countries (Grebe, 2015).

As a cash transfer scheme, LEAP streamlines the distribution of cash benefits to the vulnerable in the Ghanaian society. The aim is to reduce short-term poverty and boost human development. LEAP started in 2008 as a pilot project in 21 districts with about 30,000 beneficiary households. The extent of coverage of the programme increased gradually in 2009 and 2010, and currently covers over 213,028 beneficiary households in 216 districts with an annual expenditure of approximately USD 20million (Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection [MGCSP], 2017; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2017; Handa, Park, Darko, Osei-Akoto, Davis, Diadone, 2013)

In spite of the progress made in the field of alleviating poverty, there is still the need for government and stakeholders to uphold best practices in the implementation of LEAP. The concept of social accountability is key in the sustainability of every social policy. GSOP also a social protection intervention, has reported impressive success stories which have been attributed to the effective deployment of social accountability mechanisms in the implementation of their programmes. These success stories are worth examining in an attempt to provide practical recommendations for the improvement of social accountability in the LEAP programme. According to the World Bank (2004), social accountability is an idea and a set of practices involving the direct participation of beneficiaries and stakeholders in policy implementation. It was first formally recommended for social protection programmes in the 2004 World Development Report, *“Making Services Work for Poor People”* (World Development Report, 2004, p.1). This report acknowledged the fact that lack of accountability mechanisms is the prime root of service delivery failures.

1.2 The Research Problem

At the heart of the issues on the list of developing countries is poverty alleviation. Issues of poverty alleviation are given topmost priority in the development of policies and programmes with most governments particularly in Africa working assiduously to eradicate poverty. In spite of all these efforts, little success seems to have been achieved in most governments' pursuit of delivering desired results. Several factors have been attributed to this slow pace in achieving desired results. Prominent among these factors is the lack of public accountability. This is particularly an indispensable component for improving the performance of state-sponsored development programmes for the less privileged (Sarker and Raman, 2015). Social protection policies like the Bolsa Familia of Brazil has proven the effectiveness of such interventions for tackling issues of poverty (CDD Ghana, 2016). In spite of such unique success stories from Brazil, renewed efforts by Governments, especially in the sub-Saharan region, through programmes and policies to eradicate poverty have not been similarly successful. The lack of rigorous accountability mechanisms within these programmes is projected to be a major factor leading to the failure of such social interventions (Boydell and Jill, 2014; Sarker and Rahman, 2015).

Accountability is an essential feature of good governance (Malena, Forster, and Singh, 2004). Accountability in general focuses on the role of citizens to hold actors accountable for their actions and inactions (Hickey and King, 2016). McGee and Gaventa (2011 p. 2) views the concept of accountability as *“The process of holding actors responsible for their actions...”*. Social accountability therefore denotes *“the efforts of citizens and civil society to collect and scrutinize relevant information and use this information to hold duty bearers (i.e., politicians, government*

officials, and/or service providers) to account for delivering promised services at the community level” (Boydell and Jill, 2014 p.1).

In recent years there has been several research into social protection programmes. Most of these studies tend to focus on the impact of social protection programmes on poverty alleviation, assessment of the implementation challenges of the programmes and a seemingly over concentration of research on the benefits of the programmes to beneficiaries and the number of people covered (Agbam and Dinbabo, 2014; Handa et al., 2013; Darko, 2011). These studies seem to have neglected the role of beneficiaries and other stakeholders in the implementation of social protection programmes. This is worth investigating particularly in view of the fact that, as redistributive policies, social protection programmes seek to readjust the allocation of wealth and rights from the haves, who do so reluctantly, to the have not's.

Holmes and Lwanga-Ntale (2012) have also acknowledged a number of research gaps in the literature in respect of social protection discourse which included the limited discussions on the potential roles of non-state actors in the implementation of social protection programmes. They also revealed that there seem to be very little literature on decentralized institutions' capacity to deliver and coordinate various organs in the implementation process. According to Malena et al. (2004), social accountability has the potential of inuring to four benefits; strengthening policy effectiveness, improving the quality of governance, empowering poor people within the policy process and ensuring government responsiveness. This is particularly essential in the campaign to alleviate poverty. The participation of the poor people or the institutions representing them in diverse poverty alleviation programs is an essential ingredient for improving their wellbeing (Malena et al., 2004).

Abbey, Odonkor and Boateng, (2014) observed in a study on the implementation of the LEAP programme that the inadequacy of a grievance and complaints mechanism and limited data on beneficiary feedback to drive evidenced-based programme improvements and design was one of the prime deficiency of the LEAP programme. *“Demand-side accountability, involving citizens assessing performance and holding service providers and public officials accountable, has been weak or ignored so far”* (Ibid).

Another study carried out by the CDD, Ghana in 2015/2016 revealed that LEAP lacked adequate channels for beneficiaries to express concerns or hold the State accountable when there are delays or inconsistencies in cash payments. About 8 out of 10 respondents in the survey conducted indicated that there are no ways to channel their concerns when there are delays in cash payments. 2 out of 10 respondents also indicated that they only report delays in payment to LEAP district coordinators. Handa et al (2013) also confirmed in their study that the implementation of LEAP has been inconsistent. For instance, for the 24- month evaluation period of their study, beneficiaries received only 20 months' worth of payments. Disbursements were regularized till May 2011 after which no payments were made for eight consecutive months. This was proceeded by a triple payment in February 2012 to settle the amount outstanding.

The intriguing questions underlying all these challenges are;

- Do beneficiaries have the avenue to hold duty-bearers accountable for the delays and/or irregularities in payments?
- Is it a matter of the cash transfers being perceived as a special favour and for that matter when they delay no one must be held accountable?

- How can beneficiaries hold the state accountable for any shortfalls identified in the implementation of the programme?
- How can citizens ascertain that the shortfall is not as a result of duty-bearers trying to syphon or misappropriate funds?
- To what extent do the state and citizens fulfil their part to the social contract in implementing the LEAP and for comparative purpose, the GSOP?
- What challenges do the state and citizens face with reference to effective social accountability in implementing the LEAP / GSOP?

Norton, Conway and Foster, (2001) noted that civil society organizations have very important roles to perform in the governance and accountability of a society's social protection scheme if it is to function comprehensibly and effectively. For this reason, they recommended that there was the need to involve civil society in campaigning and supporting a social accountability module in the LEAP programme delivery. This will plug the gaps of poor awareness and knowledge among beneficiaries and their communities, as well as to reform the vague grievance and complaints mechanism and weak beneficiary driven demand for accountability (Abbey et al., 2014). There is therefore increasing pressure for social protection interventions to be provided in ways that enable beneficiaries to exercise agency in holding providers to account for delivering social protection as a right rather than as a hand-out (Samuels, Jones and Malachowska, 2013). This calls for more responsive tools of social accountability to be embedded in the implementation of social protection programmes in Ghana (Hickey, 2011; Joshi & Houtzager, 2012).

This study investigated the level of participation of beneficiaries and the extent to which social accountability mechanisms are embedded in the policy and practice of the LEAP and GSOP

programmes. The study exposes the challenges faced by both the state and citizens to implement social accountability mechanisms successfully. The study focuses on the implementation of these programmes in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly of the Greater Accra region.

1.3 Research Objectives

The study examined the issue of social accountability within the confines of the LEAP and GSOP programmes. Specifically the study strived;

1. To find out the extent to which beneficiaries participate in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the social protection programmes.
2. To examine the effectiveness of social accountability in both the LEAP and GSOP programmes at the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly.
3. To examine the enabling and disabling factors in the fulfilment of the social contract between the state and citizens in both the LEAP and GSOP programmes at the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly.

1.4 Research Questions

To attain the goals of the study, the researcher answered the following questions;

1. To what extent do beneficiaries participate in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the social protection programmes?
2. How effective is social accountability in both the LEAP and GSOP programmes at the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly?

3. What are the enabling and disabling factors in the fulfilment of the social contract between the state and citizens in both the LEAP and GSOP programmes at the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study examines the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms deployed in the implementation of social protection programmes. The focus was on LEAP and GSOP in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly in the greater Accra Region of Ghana. The study was built on earlier works by Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017) which focused on, “the role of rights and accountability in the ‘making’ and ‘shaping’ of social protection”, to make further enquiries and recommendations. Although there has been a substantial improvement in the lives of beneficiaries of the programme according to the numerous impact assessments carried out by various researchers, not much has been researched about the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms deployed in the implementation of social protection programmes in Ghana. Effective social accountability mechanisms would result in an increase in the level of citizens’ “voice” and an enhanced participation of both citizens and civil society organizations. This will ensure an increased level of efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of social protection programmes. This is most likely to ensure that policy objectives are achieved within the stipulated period. For this reason, this study is deemed to be an informative piece of work, which makes substantial contribution to research, practice and policy in various proportions. This makes the study very relevant to different category of individuals as well as institutions.

In the first instance, the study fills the gap in research in respect of providing a detailed discussion on the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms and the role of all stakeholders involved in the implementation of social protection programmes by focusing on the micro level of analysis that is at the point where the programme is actually executed. The study provides the basis for future research into social protection policies as well as the application of social accountability mechanisms in other sectors of the economy. It also provides a reference point for other researchers in the field of public policy analysis and Public Administration in general.

In terms of practice both policy implementers and programme beneficiaries stand to benefit from this study. In the first place, policy implementers will come to terms with the enabling and disabling factors confronting the implementation of social accountability mechanisms within the programmes at the district and community levels. This is likely to influence their decision making in terms of creating much visible opportunities for both citizens and civil society organizations to help in tracking the various processes in the implementation phase of the programmes. This will help to minimize corruption. Citizens on the other hand stand to be well equipped to enable them better exercise their rights, alleviate apathy on their part and to promote an active participation in policy implementation at the community level. In effect, individuals and family's awareness of the policy would be very much improved. Most importantly, the comparison of two social protection programmes (LEAP & GSOP) implemented at the same district would provide practical recommendations which have been tried within the same context for the poorly performing programme.

Finally, in respect to policy formulation, this study attempts to set the stage for vigorous advocacy by civil right organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) with the aim of fine tuning areas of the policy implementation process that may be found to be ineffective and also sustain aspects of the process that seems to be effective in respect of social accountability. The new information that came up from this study will assist policy formulators in re-examining the existing policy programme in order to tighten loopholes which may be identified at the implementation stage of the programme. This is expected to increase the level of efficiency and effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms deployed in the implementation of the programmes.

1.6 Research Limitations and Delimitations

The study was constrained by a number of important factors. The study was limited to the qualitative research approach. This means that certain objective views were overlooked which to some extent narrows the findings from the research work and fails to capture some other perspectives of the study which might be easily captured by approaches like the quantitative approach and that of the mixed methods. Secondly, the study was limited to only the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly. For this reason, the findings of this study may not necessarily be generalized for all district assemblies in Ghana. The findings apply to the specific study area from this research. Some of the in-depth interviews that were conducted produced unreliable and inaccurate information. This is attributed to some level of bias on the part of respondents in their attempt to modify their response to suit what they perceive would be more acceptable to the researcher. This dispensation was further aggravated by the audio recordings of the interviews.

Similarly with the focus group discussion, CLIC focal persons were more vocal and dominated the discussions due to the reluctance of beneficiaries to contribute. The researcher tried to control this situation by encouraging the beneficiaries to contribute.

In addition, the researcher acknowledges the loss of valuable information through the translation processes involved specifically on interviews with beneficiaries who preferred to be interviewed in the local dialect. The translation of questions and responses from Ga Dangme to English was not easy. Other limitations that confronted the study include time and resources. However, despite these limitations, the study addressed the purpose of the research and resonated the necessary implications for future research and policy. These implications have been discussed in the sixth Chapter of this research work.

1.7 Chapter Outline

The study is organized as follows; there are six chapters in all. Chapter one deals with the background information about the emergence of issues in social accountability and that of social protection policies all over the world with emphasis on the case of Ghana. The research problem and purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the research, limitations to the study and how this study is organized.

Chapter two of the research identifies the existing literature on the topic. This is done specifically for Ghana, Africa and the world as a whole. In reviewing the literature on this topic, the concepts and terminologies used in this work were explained. The framework within which social accountability mechanisms can be operationalized in Ghana and the body of literature were adopted and used.

The third chapter is devoted to the methodology employed in the conduct of the study. This includes the research design, study area, study population, sampling techniques employed in selecting respondents for the study as well as sample size among others. The sources of data and how the data was analyzed and used for the study is discussed in details in this chapter. The ethical considerations for the study is also highlighted in this chapter.

The fourth chapter of the study deals with the presentation of data gathered from the field in respect of the LEAP programme. The chapter further provides a detailed analysis of the data gathered on LEAP and projects some relevant findings which sets the stage for a detailed discussion of the findings.

The fifth chapter of the study also deals with the presentation of data gathered from the field in respect of the GSOP programme. The chapter also provides a detailed analysis of the data gathered on GSOP and in the same way projects some relevant findings which sets the stage for a detailed discussion of the findings.

Finally, chapter six which is the last chapter of this study comprises of the summary, conclusion and recommendations to the state, citizens, public officials, civil society organizations and the field of public administration in general. This chapter determines whether the research questions have been answered adequately and whether the objectives have been met. Gaps found in this specific research area have also been outlined in this chapter to give room for future research. After the sixth chapter, references of the work and appendices follow in that order.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This section comprises of a review of literature on the concept of social accountability and its dimensions, approaches employed in various social accountability initiatives, the justification for social accountability, citizenship and active participation (planning, implementation and evaluation stages) in social protection programmes. A further look at the enabling and disabling factors for successful social accountability. The concept of social protection is worth taking a look at. An empirical view of effective social accountability mechanisms and a look at the level of active citizen participation in Ghana. The theoretical literature is presented to explain the theories that underpin the study and the subject matter in general.

2.1 Conceptualizing social accountability

Social accountability has assumed a fundamental spot within inclusive liberal discourse focused on the accomplishment of poverty reduction through good governance (Hickey and King, 2016). According to Sarker and Raman (2015), social accountability is grounded on civic engagement in several ways. This is necessary for the fulfilment of public accountability under any condition. The idea of social accountability is to strengthen the avenue of citizens to hold implementers accountable for their decisions. Social accountability is expected to facilitate a progressive approach to development outcomes as in more proactive local government, uncovering

government failure and corruption, empowering marginalized groups, and ensuring that national and local governments respond to the concerns of the poor (Camargo and Jacobs, 2011). This concept is a derivative of the general world view of accountability.

According to Friis-Hansen and Cold-Ravnkilde (2013) accountability in general terms refers to a connection between two parties in which one is answerable to the other. Such a relationship may yield positive returns or otherwise. Moreover, it is a relationship between two key actors: *“the targets of accountability are the parties that are obliged to account for their actions and to face sanctions, that is, the duty bearers (institutions of public authority and public officials), while the seekers of accountability are those parties entitled to explanations or to impose punishments as rights-holders (citizens)”*. In fact, the direct participation of citizens is what distinguishes social accountability from other traditional forms of accountability (Malena et al., 2004 in Camargo and Jacobs, 2011 p. 8).

Several researchers have explained the concept of social accountability to represent different phenomenon in different spheres of life. However, the centrality of all these definitions is citizens holding actors accountable. McGee and Gaventa (2011, p. 2) views the concept as *“The process of holding actors responsible for their actions. More specifically, it is the concept that individuals, agencies and organizations (public, private and civil society) are held responsible for executing their powers according to a certain standard (whether set mutually or not)”*. Ringold, Dena, Holla, Koziol, and Srinivasan. (2012, p. 7) also view the concept as tools for influence, as they posit that it is *“A set of tools that citizens can use to influence the quality of service delivery by holding*

providers accountable". However, Joshi and Houtzager (2012) disagree with this view as they maintain that social accountability should be intellectualized as a means through which state–society interactions are transformed in progressive ways, rather than as a technocratic tool. Holland, Allyson, Emmanuel and Lucy (2009, p. 4) are also emphatic about the private sector having the opportunity to scrutinize the public sector in the delivery of their promises and therefore posit that "*The ability of citizens, civil society and the private sector to scrutinize public institutions and governments and to hold them to account*". Considering these explanations, social accountability can be conceptualized as the opportunity given to citizens and civil society organizations to gather and examine relevant facts and use the information to hold duty bearers (i.e., politicians, government officials, and/or service providers) to account for delivering promised services at the community level. It must be clarified however that, social accountability is not a specific type of accountability, but rather it is a particular approach for exacting accountability and the focus is not just monitoring activities (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006).

Camargo and Jacobs (2011) posit that social accountability encompasses at least three core principles: voice, enforceability and answerability. There seems to be a growing "*consensus in literature about the fact that, accountability involves both answerability, that is making power holders explain and give reasons for their actions, and enforcement, which implies ensuring that poor or immoral performance is punished in some way*" through the expression of the peoples' voice (Hickey & Mohan, 2008, p. 236).

Social accountability interventions are intended to equip citizens with enough power (voice) to confront policy implementers, for them to answer to relevant concerns with respect to lapses and allegations in the implementation process and also to face sanctions when they are found culpable. This means the state has a responsibility to answer to citizens' demands. This relationship between the state and its citizens is likely to result in a more cognizant, organized, and systematic interactions between citizens and the state, a much more effective service delivery and public sector performance and an increased or improved means to increase and aggregate the voice of the marginalized and vulnerable groups.

2.2 Dimensions of social accountability

According to Fox (2014) various researchers have viewed the concept of accountability from different dimensions. Mention is made of the vertical versus the horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability refers to the relationship between the state and non-state actors in which citizens and their associations play a direct role in holding duty-bearers to account (Mainwaring & Welna, 2003). Horizontal accountability interactions are the mutual oversight of institutional checks and balances that include public administration and reporting systems, audit institutions, and the judicial system for example district-level government officials being answerable to higher-level political institutions such as a central ministry or regulatory body (Friis-Hansen and Cold-Ravnkilde, 2013; O'Donnell, 1998). Thus, the former being a top down approach and the latter being a side by side approach.

Researchers have also extensively discussed the short route versus the long route of accountability. This has been couched out of the principal agent relationship (Fox, 2014). Long route accountability denotes the fact that citizens (principal) have delegated their authority to political representatives who govern through established bureaucracies. The citizens have the opportunity through the use of the ballot box, payment of taxes among other avenues to either support their policies or vote them out when the citizens are not satisfied. In the case of the short route, citizens have a direct influence on service providers through various oversight and voice mechanisms (Ibid). However, these approaches pay little attention to the potential contributions of other public “checks and balances” institutions, such as legislatures, the judicial system, audit institutions, ombudsman agencies, or public information access reforms. Thus, citizens or users of services may influence policy makers through the ballot box, taxes, and parliament legislation (long route) or influence service providers by client power, civil society organizations, and grievance committees (Fox, 2014).

Then again mention is made of the supply side versus the demand side of social accountability. This approach makes use of the market structures in discussing accountability and hence absorbs the necessary checks and balances in its regard. This refers to initiatives developed by governments (supply side) versus those ones pressured by citizens (demand side).

2.3 Approaches employed in various social accountability initiatives

Social accountability interventions take many forms. The context within which various tools are deployed by citizens, communities and civil society groups on one hand with the state on the other

hand plays a major role in determining the success or otherwise of the tools. Various interventions vary considerably in form and scope, spanning from hands-on mechanisms such as client charters and participatory budgeting to watchdog functions such as scorecards. These social accountability mechanisms can generally be categorized under three main headings namely, plans and policymaking, budgets and expenditures, delivery of services and goods and public oversight and oversight. Sirker and Cosic (2007) note however that these approaches are not mutually exclusive, and are often combined in a suite of complementary and interconnected activities. A few of the approaches have been highlighted in the discussion below.

Participatory budgeting represents the involvement, and consultation, of citizens in the budgeting cycle (McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006). It allows various stakeholders to participate directly in all stages of the budget life cycle namely: formulation stage, decision making stage and monitoring of budget execution stage. This is expected to increase citizens' voices in the budgeting process, increase transparency, and improve targeting of public spending (Boydell and Jill, 2014.). Goldfrank (2006) researched on the use of participatory budgeting in Brazil, where it was first used to successfully improve transparency, increase direct citizen participation, and redistribute financial resources.

Public expenditure tracking (PET) denotes the involvement of civil society in monitoring budget implementation by tracing flows of public resources for the delivery of public goods and services (Boydell and Jill, 2014). PET is a good investigative device to identify problems, such as leakages of funds or goods, or problems with service delivery, such as misappropriation of funds. In Uganda

a review of PET's of educational grants from central government to local schools by Sundet (2008) revealed impressive results. Eighty percent (80%) of funds transferred to schools from the central government were received which was hitherto not the case.

Citizen report cards represent a participatory means of soliciting user feedback on public service delivery. Boydell and Jill (2014) asserts that, reports cards are useful for assessing service delivery in view of improving quality, accessibility, and relevance of services, and reduce leakages and corruption. Ravindra (2004) noted that the adoption of citizen report cards to evaluate users' satisfaction with service delivery increased public awareness of the quality of services and stirred-up demands for much enhanced services in Bangalore.

Social audits another approach to social accountability, creates a platform for citizens, service users, or civil society organizations to collect and publicly share information on available resources allocated for service delivery and public works (Boydell and Jill, 2014). Community scorecards in a similar fashion, ensures some level of community-based monitoring. That is, by combining social audits and citizen report cards in a more coherent manner. Scorecards gather information on the demand side (user perspectives) and the supply side (service provider perspectives) of a particular service, and the report is reviewed by all parties in a stakeholder meeting to allow for immediate feedback and action plan development (Boydell and Jill, 2014). Dufils (2010) documents the use of this tool to identify blockages in programme implementation and the design of appropriate mechanism by including all stakeholders to resolve the problem in Madagascar.

Citizen charters projects rules and regulations to guide client and provider relationships as well as providing details on what standards a client can anticipate and claim (Boydell and Jill, 2014). The purpose of these charters is to increase the level of consciousness on the part of stakeholders about service standards and client entitlements, in order to uphold the expectations and standards agreed on by service providers.

Community committee system involve civil society and government teaming up in a more receptive posture in an institutionalized oversight body to improve the effectiveness of health, education, social protection among other systems. The committee system and its structures aim at ensuring community participation in decision-making (Boydell and Jill, 2014). Loewenson, Rene, Rusike, and Zulu (2004) in their study on the impact of Health Center Committees on service performance revealed among other issues that clinics with health committees on average, had more staff, higher budgetary allocations, greater drug availability, and better health statistics.

Information sharing or campaigns refer mainly to various initiatives by civil society organizations to ensure that both citizens and duty bearers are well informed about citizens' rights to services and quality performance standards. These campaigns are expected to increase consciousness of services and benefits, service provider performance, and efforts to tackle corruption head on (Boydell and Jill, 2014). In Uganda a newspaper campaign targeted corruption in public education and successfully minimized the misappropriation of public education funds which had a positive impact on enrollment and student performance (Reinikka and Svensson, 2011). Complaint mechanisms denote the provision of several formal channels as in the use of hotlines, through the

use of a suggestion box or an ombudsman to express grievances in respect of specific services and demand compensation. Maru (2010) has confirmed that in several instances, social accountability interventions have failed to yield desired results partly due to the inadequacy of formal complaint mechanisms and redress.

2.4 The Justification for social accountability

According to Malena et al., (2004) social accountability initiatives most often attempt to achieve three key results namely: development effectiveness, improved governance, and empowerment. Social accountability mechanisms are expected to improve the governance system in a dispensation where the traditional channels for accountability seems to be yielding minimal results and growing dissatisfaction of citizens with the level of output of government seems to be culminating into some political tension. This phenomenon compels citizens to think beyond avenues such as protest actions and the electoral process as a means to voice out their grievances.

Various social accountability mechanisms enable citizens to engage public servants and politicians in a more knowledgeable, constructive and systematic manner and improve the ability of ordinary citizens to access information and make their grievances heard. This is most likely to positively shape their capacity to demand accountability from government and its local representatives. Consequently, a greater opportunity for the implementation of positive change in governance is created deepening democracy (Sirker and Cosic, 2007; Arroyo and Sirker, 2005). Ringold et al. (2012) emphasizes the need for this theory of change to achieve this goal. In that, when citizens have access to information on their rights and the level of quality to expect from duty-bearers, have

access to avenues to use this information as a form of checks and balance on duty-bearers and the decision of policy makers, service delivery will be positively influenced.

Secondly Malena et al., (2004) posit that, Social accountability mechanisms are expected to impact positively on the effectiveness of various developmental programmes. The high level of apathy on the part of citizens at the local level is as a result of unresponsiveness of various government policies and poor service delivery by government officials in many developing nations. This poor situation stems from the fact that policy makers, service providers and citizens are often separated by conflicting interests, information asymmetries and lack of communication. An improved dialogue between these stakeholders, through social accountability mechanisms will ensure higher levels of transparency in policy making, and reinforce citizen voice to make demands. This can improve the effectiveness of service delivery and ensure a well-informed policy.

Finally, the level of empowerment social accountability initiatives can guarantee/enforce especially for poor people, can never be underrated. By increasing and aggregating the voice of the less privileged, providing them with necessary information on the exercise of their rights and entitlements, providing avenues for feedback processing among others, social accountability mechanisms will greatly enhance the voice of these less privileged and empower them to demand higher levels of accountability from the various government officials they interact with (Ibid).

McGee and Gaventa (2011) seems to agree with the ideas of Malena et al., (2004) as they also point out three expected outcomes from social accountability interventions. This they grouped

under; Democratic outcomes as in well informed citizens, an organized, and a systematic approach to the engagement between citizens and the state to ensure good governance. Developmental outcomes as in an increased level of quality in the delivery of service to local people and an improved public sector performance. Then again, empowerment outcomes as in increased or improved means to increase and aggregate the voice of the marginalized and vulnerable groups.

2.5 Citizenship and active participation in social protection

The foundation of any development programme is usually established at the decision making or the project planning stage where there is the most likelihood that a governing body would be constituted for decision making. If social accountability mechanisms would achieve intended purposes there is the need for social protection programmes to be rooted in the principles of participation and empowerment (Kilby, 2006; Andrews, 2014). More so, there seem to be a general agreement on the part of literature that accountability to beneficiaries is positively correlated with efficiency and effectiveness in development aid delivery (Wellens and Jegers, 2014; Ebrahim, 2005; Agyemang, Awumbila, Unerman, and O'Dwyer, 2009). However, Rahman (2014) has documented the low level of beneficiary participation at the Executive Board level where majority of the decision making is said to take place at the planning stage especially with NGOs and pro-poor programmes in general.

The level of effectiveness of pro-poor programmes largely depends on the level of participation of beneficiaries in the assessment of their needs, planning of the programme, implementation and most importantly monitoring and evaluation of the programmes (Flint and Natrup, 2014;

Tagarirofa and Chazovachii, 2013). This is particularly necessary because beneficiaries in themselves are mostly less powerful to make effective demands for accountability (Alex and Wilford, 2010). For that matter, beneficiaries must be provided with the necessary information about poverty alleviation programmes and their entitlements within the programme to enable them make effective demands for accountability (Haddad, Lindstrom and Pinto, 2010). This can be made possible to the people through series of meetings or public hearings, surveys, or a formal dialogue on project options. There is also the need for strengthened consultation with community members through the committee system (Rahman, 2014). In this regard there is the need for a more concerted approach towards the optimization of the use of Rights-Based Approach (RBA) to social protection to create the necessary invited spaces for beneficiaries to participate effectively (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2007). Boon, Bawole and Ahenkan, (2013) also support the idea that beneficiaries must be involved in the design and implementation of developmental programmes which are intended for their good.

The effective participation of beneficiaries in the design of social protection programmes will have a positive impact on the implementation of the programmes and subsequently its evaluation. Then again, community members strive to ensure the sustainability of development programmes when they are involved in various key decision making processes at the various stages of the programme as posited by Marks & Davis (2012). This ensures that beneficiaries do not abandon community-based facilities or programmes such as toilet facilities, markets stalls, boreholes, classroom blocks, and other community level projects, championed by the central government, as a results of little or no stakeholder or beneficiary participation in the identification of community problems (Boon et al., 2013).

At the programme implementation stage where most of the work is done, there is much involvement of citizens or beneficiaries in various activities. This may be in the form of community contributing labour as well as financial resources toward project implementation, and possibly in the maintenance of services or facilities (Arnstein, 1969). The active participation of beneficiaries at this level is very important to the course of social accountability since they have a better opportunity in this dispensation to have a firsthand information that would enable them better monitor the disbursement of public funds and also to exert greater control of local resources and development activities (Arnstein, 1969). This will also ensure that community based pro-poor programmes actually meets community members at the point of their needs, increase the level of sustainability of the programme and increase solidarity in the society (Boon et al., 2013). It must be noted however that, even though there seem to be a general consensus on the fact that high level of participation of beneficiaries in the implementation of pro-poor programmes will ensure a speedy and successful implementation of the programmes (Ofori, 2013; Chegus, 2013), there exist yet another school of thought which is of the view that beneficiary participation leads to waste of time, resources, and general delay in project delivery (Agyemang et al., 2009). Be that as it may, these consultations and engagements enhance project sustainability and ownership and would ensure that projects are not abandoned as mentioned earlier.

The programme evaluation stage ensures that beneficiaries have a say in the determination of whether pro-poor programmes have met their intended purpose. This involves monitoring and actually evaluating the programme mostly periodically or at the phasing out of the programme (Agyemang et al., 2009). As mentioned earlier, a successful evaluation of the programme would

be hinged on active participation of beneficiaries at the planning stage of the programme where the necessary key performance indicators would have been identified (Kanlisi and Aasoglenang, 2014). However in most development programmes after putting up the brilliant ideas and striving hard to implement them, monitoring and evaluation seems to be a daunting task which is left undone in most cases or at best haphazardly carried out (Tagarirofa and Chazovachii, 2013). The inability of beneficiaries to lay claims for accountability has been associated with the level of poverty and vulnerability of these beneficiaries, which prevents them from effectively engaging programme implementers for the fear of losing their benefits (Agyemang et al., 2009). This is further fuelled by the notion that social protection programmes are a favour instead of an obligation (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2017). There is the need for a more defined role of beneficiaries and its complement decision making powers at various stages of social protection programmes to help jettison such a notion (Burger, Dasgupta and Owens, 2015). It is thus clear that when beneficiaries are involved in the planning, implementation and evaluation of social protection programmes it will ensure a better management of scarce resources that will consequently aid the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

2.6 Enabling and disabling factors for successful social accountability

Malena et al. (2004) have argued that the mechanisms adopted by citizens as well as civil society organizations to stimulate the tenets of social accountability has been as a result of reactions to specific circumstances which makes the intervention tailored to that very situation and therefore not a proactively well-organized strategy which may or may not achieve result in a holistic view. The success or failure of such approaches may hinge on a number of factors. These they mentioned

as including political context and culture, access to information, the role of media, civil society capacity, state capacity, state-civil society synergy, and institutionalization (DFID, 2011; Hoffman, 2014).

Sarker and Hassan (2010) in their work on what factors may impact on the effectiveness of social accountability as they studied the cross-cultural evidence of social accountability in the developing world, seem to agree with the view of Malena et al. (2004) as they posit that various contextual factors may impact on the effectiveness of social accountability initiatives.

The factors that facilitated the success of social accountability initiatives in developing countries according to Sarker and Hassan (2010) included political commitment, democratic governance, and level of development of civil society organizations. They questioned the technical competence of civil society organizations to successfully hold civic forums and to carry out some important functions in successful social accountability programmes such as audits and how sustainable these programmes can be hinged on the spirit of volunteerism. Then again they were emphatic about the tendency of NGO's within the system not being able to play an oversight role due to their clientelistic tendencies.

The political context and culture of a particular region is most likely to affect the success or failure of its social accountability initiatives in the sense that a democratic political regime, multi-party system, guaranteed political and civil rights, legal protection for citizen participation, a culture of political transparency and probity are factors generally acclaimed to be favorable for social accountability initiatives to thrive (O'Neill, Tammie, Foresti, and Hudson, 2007; DFID 2011; Hoffman, 2014). The political will of successive governments can be exemplified in the

receptiveness of service providers and government appointees as well as politicians' attitude towards responding to citizens' request for an answer or solution to identified problems (Goldfrank, 2006; O'Neill et al., 2007). Also the legal system, institutional and socio-cultural factors may also have an impact on the success of social accountability initiatives (Malena et al., 2004). For instance, an NGO in Madhya Pradesh, Samaj Pragati Sahyog (SPS), which managed to promote higher levels of social accountability, greatly benefited from the support of a senior district official with the authority to impose sanctions upon corrupt junior officials (Chhotray, 2008 in Hickey & King, 2016).

The potentials of a vibrant political party system and strong political oppositions can also play key roles within accountability dynamics. Political support from opposition parties can contribute to the success or failures of social accountability initiatives as evidenced by better performing community management committees in Midnapore, India, where the communist party was influential in mobilizing the poor (Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Veron, 2005 in Hickey and King, 2016)

Access to information is also considered a very important element in the success or failure of social accountability mechanisms. Citizens must have access to information about specific commitments and services as well as the processes by which decisions are made and most importantly, know their entitlements. This to a large extent, will ensure transparency (Ringold et al., 2012; Joshi, 2013; Hoffman, 2014). The quality and accessibility of vital documents and the accuracy of data provide the foundation for the actions that citizens, groups and civil society organizations can take in their quest to engage the government on very critical decisions. This presupposes that, having

accessed information, citizens must also have the capacity to use the acquired information in actionable ways (McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Joshi, 2013; Fox, 2014). Securing the right to information bill and addressing the lack of political will on the part of government to disclose vital information is the fundamental step to be taken by citizens in the realization of this vision (Malena et al., 2004).

The role of an active independent media in social accountability can never be over emphasized as it can be the channel of hope in carrying vital messages across the citizenry. The media can be a relevant educative tool in spreading the news and informing the general public. It can also serve as a monitoring tool on government performance as well as unearthing perceived ills in government (Ringold et al., 2012; McGee & Gaventa, 2010). They can however, muddy the waters due to their parochial interest to some extent. An independent media often advocated, can help promote accountability of the political system both at the local and national level. Their ability to create the platforms for public debate for local people to discuss their views and opinions on public issues is most evident in successful social accountability initiatives (Malena et al., 2004).

The level of civil society participation especially in terms of both voice and capacity is also an essential element in the success or failure of social accountability initiatives. There is the need for facilitated interface meetings between civil society and the public sector (Hoffman, 2014). How organized these civil society organizations are, speaks volumes about their capacity to act and react. The size and quality of membership, their technical and advocacy skills, their capacity to mobilize and effectively use media, their legitimacy and representativeness, and their level of

responsiveness and accountability to their own members resonates their potentials (Malena et al., 2004).

Hickey and King (2016) seem to agree with this view as they posit that the availability of credible and capable civil society allies and a history of effective grassroots mobilization and in particular the depth, extensiveness and character of the relationships amongst Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and between civil and political society plays a critical role in determining the success of social accountability initiatives. On the other hand, when CSOs tend to compete among themselves particularly in terms of accessing donor funds it can impact negatively on social accountability initiatives by diffracting collective action (Goldfrank, 2007).

A functioning public management system that is able to respond positively to citizens' demands is essential in successful social accountability initiatives. This denotes the states' capacity to provide adequate incentives as in appropriate sanctions to force service providers, government officials and politicians to respond and act upon request from citizens (Joshi, 2013; Fox, 2014). This also involves the ability of the state to produce records and accounts, the existence of conventional accountability mechanisms, effective devolution of authority under a well-organized decentralization framework and the availability of resources. The willingness and capacity on the part of the state to build partnerships and alliance, and a political or administrative culture that puts premium on values such as probity, accountability and equity are the defining moments (Joshi, 2013; O'Neill et al., 2007).

The level of disparities in educational echelons across the citizenry is a major pull or push factor for social accountability initiatives. Low levels of income coupled with low levels of education

have a direct relationship with citizen capabilities for participation especially in formal invited spaces. This phenomenon must be given special attention especially because accountability activities must necessarily combine a supply side that is service providers' capacity and receptiveness to respond and a demand side that is, access and use of information approach (Hoffman, 2014; Joshi, 2013). To curb this menace the provision of citizen education and capacity-building must be incorporated into various interventions (Campbell, Cornish, Gibbs and Scott, 2010).

2.7 The concept of social protection

Social protection has been a widely used technique across the world as well as in Africa to bridge the widening gap between the rich and the poor in liberalized economies. Munro (2008) viewed the concept of social protection in three basic perspectives that is as a tool of social risk management, a human right, and an expression of minimum basic need for citizens in our civilized world. According to him, social protection can be a tool to be used to reduce the dying consequences of poverty on the poor and vulnerable and rightly so because they have the right to be protected from such contingencies. These efforts to reduce the impact of poverty on the poor and vulnerable in society is particularly necessary for economic growth and development (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009).

The term social protection according to Abebrese (2012) includes the different measures and programmes which are introduced to achieve the aims of social security. Various states put up programmes which are expected to form the base of a secured and acceptable life. This implies

that social protection programmes are envisaged to carry citizens above the poverty line and must improve access to health care as well. This threshold may vary from region to region but should necessarily better the lots of the poor and vulnerable in society.

The International labour organization (ILO) conceptualizes the issue of social protection from the perspective of the RBA. This view conceived in 1948, recognizes the fact that social protection is a basic human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This was later reviewed to reflect a "secure decent work for women and men everywhere" which is expected to ensure some level of obligation on the part of the state and various international governance structures (ILO, 2010).

Ghana established its major National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) between 2005 and 2007, and launched a national social protection policy in June, 2016 as well (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2017). These policies unlike previous ones makes adequate provision for the poor and most vulnerable in the society. The table below provides a summary of Ghana's social security and social protection initiatives since independence.




Table 2.1 Summary of Ghana's social protection programmes since independence

Program/ Strategy/ Law	Date	Description
Social Security Act	1965	Provident Fund Scheme, lumpsum payment for old age, invalidity and survivor's benefits
Social Security Law	1991	Conversion of the Provident Fund Scheme to a Pension Scheme (SSNIT)
Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I)	2002-2005	Established in order to achieve the Millenium Development Goals of the UN
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)	2003	Introduction of a contribution scheme for the Health Insurance
Ghana School Feeding Program (GSFP)	2005	One hot meal a day for every schoolchild
Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II (GPRS II)	2006-2009	Focus on Ghana becoming a middle income country by 2015
National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS)	2007	Several Social Protection programs started under the strategy
Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)	2008	Social Cash Transfers and free health insurance membership for vulnerable people

Source: Abebrese (2012)

The NSPS, founded on the principle that every Ghanaian matters and is capable of contributing his or her quota to national development, is the government's master plan for alleviating poverty and bridging the wide disparity of living conditions between different parts of the country, reflecting the vision of creating an all-inclusive society through the provision of sustainable mechanisms for the protection of persons living in situations of extreme poverty, vulnerability and exclusion (Abebrese, 2012).

The key objective of the NSPS is to “deliver a well-coordinated, inter-sectorial social protection system enabling people to live in dignity through income support, livelihoods empowerment and improved access to systems of basic services” (Government of Ghana, 2015, p. 15). The NSPS was hinged on three main strategies; the establishment of a new social grant scheme to provide a basic and secure income for the most vulnerable households, better poverty targeting of existing

social protection programmes and a package of complementary inputs for beneficiaries of social protection programmes (Ibid, 2015). The NSPS also provided three basic areas of accountability in recognition of the need to promote active citizenship participation as a right of beneficiaries. These are; general accountability; social accountability, grievance handling and feedback; and financial accountability. The policy places huge emphasis on the critical role of social accountability within the social protection landscape by highlighting and promoting the differences between demand-side and supply-side of social accountability (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2017).

The creation of a government ministry (MGCSP) in 2013 with a vibrant human rights activist as the minister to handle issues of social protection has given a major boost to the way and manner in which social protection issues are handled in Ghana as the ministry has been tasked to ensure sufficient and sustainable resource availability for social protection. In effect the social protection landscape in recent times has achieved more than it has ever since independence. Additionally, the social protection bill in parliament when passed into law would go a long way to give legal backing to efforts made so far especially, in ensuring consistent provision for social protection in the national budget (Ibid).

2.8 An empirical view of effective social accountability initiatives

Scholars tend to agree that the intent to try to improve public sector performance by enhancing both citizen engagement and government responsiveness is at the heart of social accountability initiatives. This section of the study is devoted to exploring empirical literature that bother on social accountability in the design and implementation of social protection policies across the world.

Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017) did an assessment of the accountability mechanisms employed in various case studies in India and Brazil. They arrived at the conclusion that in the case of the Bolsa Familia, a right to social protection is clearly stipulated in the nation's constitution giving citizens a concrete basis to demand for accountability. With the Mahatma Ghandi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India however, it took the activism of citizens and some civil groups to push for the legal framework, which institutionalized the rights of citizens. This proves that there exist contextual differences in the mode of social protection adopted across the world. Whiles some programmes may have embedded in them avenues for social accountability, others will depend on civil organizations and other pressure groups to demand for the involvement of the voices of the grassroots in the implementation of social policies.

The mode or form of social protection is not the only source of variance in the practice of social accountability. Studies also prove that the effect of social protection is not always the same across board. According to Fox (2015), the rigorous implementation of social accountability schemes does not always result in the success story of state institutions or social policies. There have been instances where social accountability mechanisms had no or little significance on the implementation and delivery of public services.

For instance in India, Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani (2010) assessed the varying methods adopted in the provision of information about schooling outcomes to parents and village education committees in Uttar Pradesh. The provision of information was done with the aim of mobilizing parents to be involved in the affairs of public schools. However, findings

revealed that, availability of information on the status of education was not in itself sufficient to encourage stakeholder participation in public schools. The study found out that in most cases parents were not aware of the official participation channels available, neither was there a clear cause of action for meetings organized. These meeting sections were only informative rather than participatory, as there were no official channels or intention for the incorporation of the views of the parents as key stakeholders. This case proved not to be a good result of the application of social accountability initiatives, as the core aim of social accountability is not only to give a voice to the people, but also to grant them a pathway for influencing the implementation of policy.

Olken (2007) also attempted to evaluate anti-corruption interventions in village public works in Indonesia. His work seems to advance the claim that, official channels of accountability like top-down central audits, were more effective in tackling corruption as compared to community monitoring. The study actually proved that the top down approach of auditing resulted in a reduction of previously recorded leakages experience in the midst of social accountability initiatives. This finding is very critical, and reveals a weakness in social accountability, which is the fact that in the debate of the implementation of policy there are certain aspects that are very technical for the unskilled citizen to assess. For instance, there may be the need for the employment of professional auditors to audit the finances of public institutions as they have the required expertise. This proves that sometimes social accountability will best work when supplemented with top down accountability mechanisms.

Mansuri and Rao (2013) also did a meta-analysis of local development research and concluded that, local participation does not always work, there are numerous instances where the participation of citizens in the implementation of projects have made little or no significant impact at all on the success of programmes. They observed that top-down accountability measures were however inadequate in ensuring accountability, they therefore posit that local development initiatives are likely to work better if they integrate central oversight with social accountability strategies.

There have also been very good revelations on the contribution of social accountability to the success of policies and programmes. In India, Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) tested the Right to Information Act with a field experiment that compares different application strategies for food ration cards. Their results proved that bureaucrats ignored most ration card applicants, but those who also led information requests about the status of their application & district level processing times were consistently successful. This was because these bureaucrats feared that failure to comply with the Right to Information Act would affect the progress in their career.

In Brazil, Touchton and Wampler (2013) proved that participatory budgeting motivates authorities to provide services that meets the needs of otherwise underrepresented citizens and creates frequent citizen checks on promised actions. Their study revealed that the implementation of participatory budgeting resulted in a significant shift in the Brazilian Municipal spending priorities. Authorities were compelled after the implementation of Participatory Budgeting to allocate a larger share of funding to sanitation and health services (avg > 3% higher), which resulted in a decline in infant mortality rates.

In Uganda the findings of Rienikka & Svennson (2004, 2009) proved that the adoption of social accountability strategies in the form of the dissemination of important information to the grassroots, led to a significant reduction in the leakage of funds. Their findings substantiate the claim that top-down accounting measures must be complemented by bottom up approaches in ensuring accountability in the implementation of policies and programmes.

Again in Uganda, Björkman and Svennson (2009) studied a report card system designed to encourage grassroots participation, in order to avoid elite capture and facilitate periodic dialogue with health workers. The result from this study proved the effectiveness of Social Accountability. The study proved that Community discussion and assessment of service performance, and the facilitated direct negotiation of expected actions with service providers encouraged health service providers to improve performance. There was a 33 percent reduction in infant mortality in treatment communities, increased use of outpatient services (20%) and overall improvement of health treatment practices (immunization rates, waiting time, absenteeism).

2.9 The level of social accountability and active participation in Ghana.

Progress made so far, as to the level of social accountability in Ghana is worth discussing at this point. The discussion will make substantial reference to various rounds of the Afrobarometer surveys in an attempt to evaluate the level of social accountability especially in respect to social protection programmes in Ghana. The focus will be on two critical indicators, the level of citizens' engagement with duty-bearers and the extent to which citizens participate in local decision-making

processes. The analysis would be based on data from the most recent Afrobarometer survey (Round 6, 2014/2015).

The report show that majority of citizens in Ghana appreciate the need for a more concerted approach to the issue of social accountability. They largely agreed to the fact that citizens must always report to government officials when public service provision falls short of good quality. This presupposes that Ghanaian citizens know their rights and are well informed to some extent, as far as the expectations of an active citizen is concerned to ensure quality service delivery to the poor and vulnerable. However the survey reported weaker levels of active citizenship participation in the country (Round 6, 2014/2015). Citizens do not have a regular engagement with state-authorities as a result of lack of avenues for an effective state-society interaction.

According to Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017) 72 percent to 89 percent of Ghanaians have never interacted with their elected national and local representatives, an official at any government ministry/agency or an official of a political party since 2002. This serves a big challenge to the progress of social accountability in the country. A very important contributory factor to active citizenship is the extent to which citizens express interest in and have the capacity to hold their leaders accountable through associational activities and collaborative community action (Ibid, 2017).

Even though majority of afrobarometer respondents are willing to join a protest match when they get the opportunity, there have been actually very few of such protest matches embarked on by citizens since 2002. This indicates some level of weakness on the part of the average Ghanaian to lay claims to their rights. The unwillingness of the average Ghanaian to attend community

meetings coupled with their reluctance to raise issues concerning the developmental challenges of their communities is a huge setback to effective social accountability (Round 6, 2014/2015). This phenomenon can be reversed when ‘invited spaces’ are created by both the state and civil society organizations. Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017), highlighted three important factors contributing to the low level of citizenship participation in the country, namely a weak decentralized system of governance, the prevalence and deepening of patron-client relations associated with increased electoral competition; and a relatively weak civil society.

Even though Ghana’s decentralization programme has come of age, it is largely donor funded (Crawford & Abdulai, 2009). Besides, successive governments have mostly paid lip-service to its continuous development, with the president appointing over 30% of local assembly members including the District Chief Executives (DCEs). In this regard concerns of accountability is skewed towards the state at the expense of the society (Crawford, 2008). The situation is further compounded with hugely dysfunctional sub-district structures which are expected to be the immediate interface between the state and citizens. This notwithstanding there exist a window of hope in the New Patriotic Party (NPP) manifesto to strengthen the sub-district structures through capacity building and adequate resource allocation, as well ensure the direct election of DCEs within its first 24 months in office (NPP, 2016, p. 141).

Secondly, the political terrain in Ghana is such that, politicians look forward mostly to be endorsed by massive vote in the next elections despite the deepening democracy and electoral accountability. Politicians therefore, concentrate on narrow policies that seems to have immediate

results to increase their potential of winning elections instead of the bigger picture. They are likely to be more receptive to concerns emanating from their political strongholds in order to improve on the patron-client relationship rather than general issues of accountability (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; MacLean, 2014). This has a negative impact on gaining access to basic services such as education and other social amenities (Abdulai and Hickey, 2016) and has contributed significantly to decline in the exercise of active citizenship in Ghana.

Finally, the capacity of civil society organizations to lead the campaign towards a higher level of social accountability leaves much to be desired. They have not fully been integrated into plans for a comprehensive approach to social accountability component within the social protection dialogue. The policy agenda has been steered mainly by government leaving few spaces for civil society organizations. Their presence is mostly felt at the service delivery stage. According to Duho (2015) civil society organizations have played a partial role in demanding social protection as a right and in holding governments accountable for the implementation of social protection programmes. It is refreshing to note however that, this trend is beginning to change some civil society organizations are beginning to track the distribution of social protection expenditures (Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2017). The passage of the right to information law by parliament would positively enhance the potentials of civil society organizations to demanding accountability from government.

2.10 Theoretical Framework

This study is underpinned by the Rights-Based Approach (RBA) to development and by extension to social protection. In theorizing social protection programmes particularly in view of social accountability there is the need to identify and address the root cause of poverty and ensure capacity building through participation of beneficiaries. In doing so, much emphasis is being placed on the significance of policies and programmes implemented by government. These policies and programmes are intended to reduce the level of vulnerability, uphold the voice of citizens and also protect the rights of citizens especially, the poor and vulnerable in society as well as, ensuring the sustainability of social protection programmes. The state (duty-bearers) should be held accountable by citizens (rights-holders) for the creation of environments that support social and economic human rights (Kim and Bradley, 2007). RBA is deemed appropriate for this study in that the LEAP programme as well as the GSOP programme are both intended to guarantee and protect the basic rights of the poor and vulnerable in society.

Eberlie (2007) argue that participation can be considered effective only when it is rights-based, incorporated in the political environment of a given country and its ability to empower stakeholders. In assessing the level of citizen participation in the programmes under review reference would be made to the interpretations posited by the World Bank (2002). The World Bank (2002) submits that participation in policy making can vary along a spectrum, ranging upward from;

- Information-sharing
- Consultation

- Joint decision-making
- Initiation and control by stakeholders.

Information sharing alone is at the lowest ranks of citizens' participation and initiation and control by stakeholders is at the highest ranks of citizens' participation. It is envisaged by this study that high levels of citizens participation in social protection programmes coupled with respect for their rights will result in a much more empowered citizens which would ensure good governance and consequently a higher effectiveness of development as posited by Malena et al. (2004).

2.10.1 Rights-Based Approach to Development

The Rights-Based Approach to Development emerged in the early 1960s when theorist of both “Development” and “Rights” seemed to have found a reason to converge. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights greatly fueled this merger (Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall, 2004). The concept gained much prominence in the 1990s when prominent nonprofit development organizations such as the World Vision and Action Aid began to embrace social and economic rights and adopted what they called “Rights-Based” Approaches (Lindberg & Bryant, 2001; Offenheiser & Holcombe, 2003; Kim & Bradley, 2007). Then again, in 1995, a “development caucus” made up of development and humanitarian relief NGOs, “spearheaded a campaign for a rights-based approach” at the World Social Development Summit at Copenhagen which finally gave birth to the concept (Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall, 2004, p.10). RBA emphasizes on tackling the root causes of poverty to ensure the sustainability of social protection programmes.

According to Piron and Watkins (2004) rights based approaches to development has been conceptualized by a number of researchers. For the purpose of this study the definition by the DFID in the Human Rights Target Strategic Paper would be of enormous benefit. They defined RBA as “*empowering people to take their own decisions rather than being the passive objects of choices made on their behalf*” (DFID, 2000, p.8). In this regard, RBA guarantees the active participation of citizens in the process of creating realistic opportunities for them to enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights (ACVIA, 2007), thus ensuring that these opportunities are not perceived as charity by duty bearers.

RBA aims at strengthening the capacity of duty bearers and empowering the rights holders to ensure effective interactions. This is particularly necessary because development and human rights protection have a symbiotic relationship and the two are mutually reinforcing. With this perspective, people are seen as active members of the political equation and not objects of pity, charity or the benevolent intervention of government programmes or passive choosers in the marketplace (Tumukwasibwe, 2010). For sustainable development, citizens must have access to credible information with which they can hold duty bearers responsible for their actions in an attempt to satisfy their needs; be they economic, social, cultural, civil or political (Appleyard, 2002). The protection of human rights and entitlements is crucial if Ghana will achieve the sustainable development goals and attain full middle income status.

Social protection is undoubtedly a right, as espoused in a number of declarations at the global and national levels. Most profound at the global level is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(1948), the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, 1979), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Millennium Declarations and the African Charter on Peoples and Human Rights. Ghana is a signatory to all these conventions.

At the national level, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana provides a framework intended to facilitate the protection and preservation of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Chapter five of the 1992 constitution of Ghana is emphatic on specific group of people whose rights society should protect. This includes women, children and persons with disabilities, the aged, and the sick. Further emphasis on the protection of rights is echoed from the directive principles of state policy (Constitution, 1992, chapter 6). This provides a range of political, economic, social, educational objectives among others that the nation should strive to achieve to guarantee the rights of its citizenry. Article 37(3) provides a link between rights and developments by recommending that ‘the state [be] guided by international human rights instruments which recognize and apply particular categories of basic human rights to development processes’. Further, Article 37(2a) of Chapter Six articulates the ‘rights of effective participation in development processes’ (Constitution, 1992). These constitutional provisions imply giving the poor and vulnerable their entitlement and the privilege to participate in the implementation of various social protection programmes and demand for accountability under the prevailing legal regime.

These rights and entitlements as well as the social contract between the state and its citizens provide an effective framework within which the provision of avenues for social accountability

within social protection programmes can be perceived as an obligation on the part of government and not just an informal communal support system. It also means that beneficiaries are active participants in the development process and not passive recipients. Furthermore, they must be duly consulted and their needs and views taken into consideration in any programme design and implementation meant to improve their situation.


2.10.2 Social Accountability and social protection: A conceptual Framework

The framework discussed below shows how social protection can be purposefully used as an interface between the state and the citizenry to enable the poor and vulnerable to better access their rights by holding duty bearers accountable for their actions. The role of the state in providing justice-based social protection upon which legitimate claims can be brought forth in order to improve the state-citizen relationship, cannot be over emphasized. This is shown in the top left corner of the diagram. The positioning of the state in this section of the diagram with the citizens at the bottom of the diagram describes the role of the state (duty-bearers) in providing legitimacy to social protection, through laws and policies which is expected to be welcomed with an effective demand from citizens (right holders). This reflects how justice-based social protection can affect the social contract between the state and citizens by providing an interface between the state and citizens, in a more receptive relationship that shapes citizens capacity to demand accountability on one hand and epitomizes the states commitment to deliver on its constitutional mandate on the other hand.

The right hand of the diagram depicts citizen's relationship with the state and its social protection programmes. The state is most likely to bequeath and espouse the social rights of citizens in


reference to the constitution, as a result of the establishment of an inclusive interface and a concrete social contract between the state and its citizens. This heightens the level of responsibility of the state to its citizens and ensures high levels of social accountability in the delivery of services. This creates avenues for citizens the ‘shapers and makers’ to participate in the decision making process as to what deliverables are key at a particular point in time for a specific group of citizens.

Figure 2. 1 Social protection as an interface between citizens and State



Source; Adopted from Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017)

The arrows in the conceptual framework illustrate the different avenues through which citizenship can be confirmed in relation to the state through the interface of social protection. Citizens as ‘makers and shapers’ outlines the active role citizens can play in the design and implementation of social protection programming. This two-way interaction has the potential to enable better policy design and governance, as well as empowering citizens and building trust and legitimacy. Interactions in the mid portion of the framework indicates the active engagement of the state and citizens as ‘users and choosers’ through the RBA to social protection. Once implementation is underway, citizens as active users monitor and assert their citizenship through social accountability mechanisms such as grievance mechanisms, social audits etc. While not involved in higher-level design discussions, citizens can make use of claimed spaces to voice their concerns with social protection mechanisms which through the interface of social protection can lead to more responsive public officials and reduce corruption.



CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This section hosts the philosophical supposition that guided the way and manner in which this study was conducted and the methodological approach that was employed to collect and analyze data on the problem under review. The study investigated the level of participation of beneficiaries in social protection programmes and the effectiveness of various social accountability mechanisms put in place in the LEAP programme as well as the GSOP programme and also critically analyzed the enabling and disabling factors for successful social accountability in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly with the intention to make relevant recommendations. For this reason, this chapter focused on the research paradigm, the research method, the study area profile, the target population, the sampling techniques, data collection instruments as well as the data collection process, the data analyses procedure, validation strategies and ethical considerations.

3.1 Research Paradigm

A paradigm in the view of Kuhn (1970) can be viewed as “*a set of beliefs, values and techniques which is shared by members of a scientific community, and which acts as a guide or map, dictating the kinds of problems scientists should address and the types of explanations that are acceptable to them*” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 75). In this regard scientists belonging to a particular paradigm are likely to use similar techniques based on their beliefs and values to investigate societal problems and are most likely to come up with similar explanations to the same phenomenon. These basic set of

beliefs are expected to guide the actions and inactions of researchers especially in the collection and analysis of their research data (Guba, 1990). Creswell (2012) also views the term as a kind of worldview that is supposed to shape the practice and conduct of research. He went further to identify four basic worldviews, in other words, philosophical assumptions that he believed most likely would shape the practice and conduct of a research. These he identified as positivism, constructivism/interpretive, advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism.

To a very large extent the research paradigm that guided the collection and analysis of data in this study was the constructivism/interpretive research paradigm. In this philosophical assumption or worldview, researchers develop “subjective meanings” or interpretations of their experiences and seek “understanding” of the world in which they “live and work” (Creswell, 2007). These meanings according to Creswell, Hanson, Plano and Morales, (2007) are diverse and multiple which challenges the researcher to make decisions on the complexity of views. The prime goal of constructivism/interpretive assumption is to allow the researcher to make decisions based on the participant’s views of the phenomenon (Creswell, 2012). The focal point of constructionist is the context in which people live and work in order to understand the historical and cultural settings of the participants and recognize that their own background shapes their interpretation. Positivism is premised on the assumption that there is one objective truth to be discovered. The proponents of constructionism however, opposes this in an argument that *“truth, or meanings comes into existence in our engagement with the realities of the world. Meaning is not discovered, but socially constructed”* (Crotty, 1998 p. 9). The constructionism/interpretive assumption fits very well into this study to the extent that it enabled the researcher to make meaning out of the interpretations given by the respondents interviewed for the purpose of the study. This was made possible by a

review of the cultural, socioeconomic as well as political landscape in which the people live and how these factors shape their perspectives on the subject matter.

3.2 Research Approach

The emphasis of constructionism/interpretive philosophical assumption on different understandings of research activities and the significance of cultural setting and the contextual underpinnings of this approach, lends itself more appropriately to a qualitative research approach. The qualitative research is deemed appropriate for this study in that the researcher is not seeking to establish a general or universal truth or to test a particular hypothesis but to construct meanings out of people's experiences in their natural and cultural setting. This supported the researcher in his quest to undertake an in-depth analysis on the extent of effectiveness, as well as the enabling and disabling factors of social accountability mechanisms deployed in the implementation of the LEAP and GSOP programmes. Denzin and Lincoln, (2005, p. 3) acknowledge this fact and summarize that *"Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them"*. Social accountability especially within the context of social protection is somehow perceived as complex and delicate since beneficiaries to a large extent view the cash transfer as a favour done to them because they have not worked for it. Accountability issues especially at the beneficiary level for this reason is at best overlooked.

It is against this background that the researcher interacted with the beneficiaries of LEAP and GSOP in their natural environment through face-to-face questions to be able to establish the extent to which duty bearers are held accountable to the various stakeholders at the community level.

According to Creswell (2007), qualitative study is employed by various researchers for different reasons. These are: the need to confront complex issues by allowing participants to tell their own stories, the need to identify variables that can be measured through the study of a group or population, and to empower participants to share their views, hear their voices, and reduce the power relations that often exist between the researcher and the participants. Other considerations are the need to appreciate the contextual underpinnings behind the approaches used by participants in the study to mitigate particular phenomenon. The prime emphasis here is not for generalization per se, but to interpret issues based on their historical and cultural settings. These characteristic features of a qualitative research vindicate the researcher's choice of qualitative method as a research approach that directed the conduct of this study. That notwithstanding, weakness of the qualitative research approach such as the possibility of respondents to try and give responses that they perceive would interest the researcher cannot be overruled.

3.3 Research Design

The research design most suitable for this kind of study is a case study. A case study allows the researcher to explore a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (observations, interviews, audio-visual materials, documents, and reports), and report a case description and case-based themes (Creswell, 2007). According to Yin (2009:16), a case study is “*an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident*”. Two key features of Yin's definition rationalizes the selection of a case study as appropriate for this research. Case study research emphasizes on depth which is important for this study as the researcher seeks to

find out the extent to which social accountability mechanisms deployed in the implementation of the LEAP and GSOP programmes are effective. As illuminated by Casley and Lury (1981, p. 62), “*depth is a key strength of a case study*”. Literature has not delved deeply into the impact of social accountability mechanisms in the implementation of social protection policies at the community level especially in Sub-Saharan region of Africa. Hence, in-depth study is required to make room for the exploration of the complex issues. Secondly, Yin’s emphasis on the significance of the context surrounding a case, and its impact on the participants makes the case study appropriate for this research as the settings of the participants was relevant for this study.

This notwithstanding, the main weakness of a case study research is the fact that findings from the study is not likely to be generalized, “*in that one case is not necessarily representative of a larger set of cases*” (Walsh, 2014, p. 39; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). Creswell (2007), also noted the fact that there is a challenge in establishing a boundary for a case or cases for study. Bearing these challenges in mind, the study investigated mainly, the effectiveness of various social accountability mechanisms put in place in the LEAP programme as well as the GSOP programme and also critically analyzed the enabling and disabling factors for successful social accountability in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly with the intention to make relevant recommendations for the poorly performing programme. The results were specific to the cultural and natural settings of the participants under the study.

3.4 The study area profile

The Shai-Osudoku District Assembly, situated in the southeastern part of Ghana, in the Greater Accra Region, was created by a Legislative Instrument (LI 2137) by the forth republican Parliament of Ghana. It is one of the few districts that has both LEAP and GSOP programmes being implemented in the district. The District was demarcated in June 2012 and carved out of the Dangme West District Assembly. Dodowa is the District Capital. The Shai-Osudoku District is located between Latitudes 5°54' and 6°05' and Longitudes 0°05' E and 0°20' W. The District is bordered in the North-West by Yilo and Manya Krobo Districts. It also shares boundaries with, Akwapim-North District on the West and Kpone Katamanso District on the South-West, with Ningo Prampram District on the East. The Central Tongu District occupies the North- Eastern boundary and shares boundary with seven kilometer (7km) stretch of the River Volta. The District has a total land area of about 968.36 square kilometers, representing 29.84% land space of the Greater Accra Region (Shai-Osudoku District Assembly Composite Budget, 2016). The District has one first class road which links Tema through Afiencya to Akosombo. There are six second class roads, one of them linking Adenta through Dodowa to Somanya. The district has about twenty-eight (28) feeder roads totaling three hundred and six kilometer (306km) long, linking various communities and farming areas as well as the major trunk roads.

The population of the District in 2013 was projected to be about fifty five thousand seven hundred and forty one (55,741). This comprises twenty seven thousand one hundred and forty six (27,146) males (representing 48.7%) and twenty eight thousand five hundred and ninety five (28,595) females (representing 51.3%). The District is predominantly rural, with about seventy six point four percent (76.4%) of the population living in rural areas. Per the 2010 population and housing

census report, only about twenty three point six percent (23.6%) of the population lives in semi-urban and urban areas. The district has an annual growth rate of two point one percent (2.1%) per annum. The most densely populated communities include; Dodowa and Asutsuare all of which fall within the 4th Order Settlement (less than 25,000 Population) other towns are Agomeda, Ayikuma, Osuwem, Kodiabe, Doryumu and others. A significant feature of the district is that most of the communities are of the population size of less than one thousand (1,000) and widely spread (Ghana Statistical Service Report, 2014). The Shai Osudoku District has one hundred and forty (140) schools. Fifty-one (51) of these are preschool institutions, whereas Fifty-two (52) are primary schools. For Junior High Schools, the total number of schools stand at thirty seven (37), whilst that of senior high schools is seven (7).

To improve the health delivery system in the District, a number of health facilities have been strategically established in the District to increase accessibility to health care facilities and services. There are twenty-eight (28) health facilities in the District. These comprises a District Government Hospital at Dodowa, ten (10) CHPS Zones located at Kordiabe, Doryumu, Sota, Mokomeshitamohé, Kadjanya, Asutsuare SDA, Volivo, Agbekotsekpo, Abuvienu and Adakope respectively and twelve (12) CHPS compounds at Ayikuma, Ayenya, Agomeda, Asutsuare junction (Lorlorvor), Osuwem, Tokpo, Agortor, Natriku, Kasunya, Chebitenya, Odumase and Dodowa Zongo. There are two (2) Health Centres at Asutsuare and Osuwem the District also has one (1) private Maternity Home at Dodowa as well as a Quasi-Government Clinic at Kordiabe. Again the District can boast of one ultra-modern District hospital with the capacity of 120 beds which is currently at completion stage. Some of the physical structures of health facilities in the

district need rehabilitation. Staff accommodation is inadequate in all the health facilities in the district (Shai-Osudoku District Assembly Composite Budget, 2016).

The vision of the Assembly is to transform Shai-Osudoku District from an economically deprived to a viable District where there are prospects for gainful employment. The mission of the Assembly therefore, is to create the enabling environment for the equitable provision of services for the total development of the district in collaboration with all Stakeholders (Ibid).

Agriculture is the mainstay of the District's economy employing about 65 per cent of the population with trading being the next largest employer. Mining (Quarrying), Building Construction Vehicle Repairs and Steel Works are also undertaken on a relatively small-scale as Non-Agricultural Economic Activities (Ibid).

3.5 Target and study population

This study sought to reveal reliable facts to enable the researcher come up with reasonable conclusion that reflects the reality on the ground. The target population for the study is all actors involved in the implementation of social protection at the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly as well as national implementing bodies of the two programmes under review (LEAP & GSOP). However, those who are directly involved in the implementation of social protection programmes in the district; CLIC focal persons, GSOP community facilitators and the beneficiary communities in which the LEAP and GSOP programmes have been rolled out are indispensable to the realization of the objectives for the study. The MGCSP, National Office of the LEAP secretariat, GSOP regional and national coordinating offices were contacted for the purposes of triangulation.

3.6 Sampling techniques and procedure

The techniques adopted by the researcher in the process of collecting the data were very important since the researcher dealt with a number poor and aged people most of whom were quite reluctant to respond to the researcher. The use of a variety of measures which allowed the researcher to conveniently reduce extra data collected by concentrating on a smaller group rather than a wider view of all possible cases or component as posited by Saunders (2011). Three sampling techniques were employed in this study. These are: Purposive, Convenience, and snowball sampling techniques.

Convenience sampling is a non-probability sampling technique which entails the selection of subjects due to their accessibility and/or closeness to the researcher (Creswell, 2007). This technique was employed based on the accessibility of respondents and the ease of communication as the use of the dangme language as a common means of communication between the researcher and the beneficiaries. In communities where the CLIC focal persons were not readily available the researcher employed the snowball sampling technique which is also a non-probability sampling technique as one beneficiary referred the researcher to another until the researcher was able to exhaust his expected respondents for the community.

With regard to the selection of respondents who were much knowledgeable in respect of the research subject matter, purposive sampling technique was employed. This enabled the researcher to have greater insight and a better appreciation of the enabling and disabling factors as far as effective social accountability is concerned specifically respondents from The MGCSP, The National head office of the LEAP secretariat, GSOP regional and national coordinating offices were purposively selected.

3.7 Sample size

In all eighty-six (86) respondents were sampled for the purpose of this study. The total sample size for LEAP respondents in this study included an official at The MGCSP, two (2) officials at the National head office of the LEAP secretariat, three officials at the district social welfare department, six (6) CLIC focal persons, and 48 (forty eight) beneficiaries who took part in the eight (8) FGDs organized in eight different beneficiary communities giving a total of sixty (60) LEAP respondents. That of GSOP respondents for this study included two (2) respondents at the GSOP national coordinating office, two (2) respondents at the regional coordinating office, four (4) officials at the District Assembly which included the District Planning Officer, the focal person for climate change, and client supervisors, three (3) committee members, two (2) community facilitators and thirteen (13) beneficiaries who took part in the two (2) FGDs organized in the respective communities giving a total of twenty six (26) GSOP respondents.

3.8 Data Collection Procedure/ sources of data

Both primary and secondary data were considered for the purpose of this work. The gathering of primary data was through a semi-structured interview guide matrix, focus group discussions as well as observations on the field. Semi-structured interview guide matrix was thought of as an appropriate means of guiding the researcher as to the kinds of questions that would ensure the achievement of the stated objectives for this research. This was complemented with a number of FGDs which were very insightful and touched base with the local people as far as primary data was concerned. Secondary data was largely drawn from scholarly articles, journals, relevant books, reports from reputable institutions such as the World Bank which correlated positively with the study. The internet was one major source of secondary data for the study.

3.9 Data gathering instruments for the study

The instruments that were deemed much appropriate for data collection in this research as mentioned earlier are face-to-face interviews and FGDs as well as basic observations on the field of data collection. These instruments afforded the respondent sampled the opportunity to express their opinions on the extent to which social accountability mechanisms deployed under the two programmes on review (LEAP and GSOP) are effective. Interviews are considered appropriate qualitative research data collection instruments (Myers & Newman 2007; Talmy 2010; Mann 2011) and deemed appropriate for this study as it is used to examine the experiences of people in their natural settings. The interviews were semi-structured and modified to suit the diversity of the respondents. Whilst interviews with staffs of the social welfare and district planning departments of Shai-Osudoku District Assembly, an official at The Ministry of gender and social protection, The National head office of the LEAP secretariat, GSOP regional and national coordinating offices were conducted in English, that of the beneficiary communities were conducted in the local language (Ga and Dangme). The interviews were recorded and notes were also taken alongside as recommended by Creswell (2013). The face-to-face interviews lasted for about 45-60 minutes each. The local language versions were transcribed personally and used for the analysis.

3.10 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Focus group discussion refers to a group of people engaged at the same time in a kind of discussion which is aimed at recording their attitudes and opinions about a service, issue, concept, idea or product (Marczark and Sewell, 2005). It is usually made up of about six (6) to ten (10) people who are led by a skilled moderator to discuss a given theme. It is advisable not to have a large group to avoid the tendency of some participants being spectators.

Ten (10) FGDs were organized in the study communities eight (8) for LEAP respondents and two (2) for GSOP respondents. This was because there was only one GSOP project ongoing in the district at the time of the research for that matter the researcher formed two groups out of the beneficiaries on site for the FGDs. Beneficiaries with their CLIC focal persons were used for the FGDs. Participants in the discussions were at liberty to interact with other participants in the group while the researcher played the role of the moderator who asked questions, listened, observed and managed the groups with the help of a research assistant who was briefed on the rules for the engagement before-hand. Hence, useful information was provided about the extent of participation of beneficiaries in the implementation of the programmes. The FGDs were conducted in local language (Ga Dangme) and lasted for an hour each. The discussions were tape recorded and notes were also taken alongside. The recorded versions were transcribed personally and used for the analysis.

The purpose of the FGDs was for triangulation in order to gain substantial intuition into the information obtained from the interview schedules. For this reason, the themes that were identified in the various interviews formed the very bases for the FGDs.

3.11 Interviews

It was necessary to interview some principal actors both on the side of policy making and policy implementation. Experienced respondents in the field of social protection at the ministry and the various implementing bodies were identified and interviewed. Various committee members who represent the beneficiaries were also selected and interviewed. These interviews lasted for about 40-50 minutes. Simple rules were adopted and used but this was communicated to the respondents prior to the interview for example, breaks were allowed when the need arises. All the respondents

were interviewed in their offices but, CLIC focal members were interviewed in their homes. The interviews were audio recorded and field notes constantly taken by the researcher during the interviews. Verbal consent was sought from the participants before the interviews were conducted.

3.12 Validating strategies

A number of research works have identified some forms of validation measures that can be employed in an attempt to ensure the credibility and reliability of a study (Creswell and Millar, 2000). This research employed triangulation as a means of ensuring the credibility and reliability of the data presented. This was done by comparing responses from the district assembly level with that of the national level as well as responses from beneficiaries. This helped the researcher to attain a better understanding of the themes emanating from the discussions.

3.13 Data Coding

The data gathered were coded manually. The process of coding demanded listening carefully to the various recordings to be able to extract the various thematic issues which had a direct relationship with the objectives of the study. In doing so there was the need to constantly compare to ascertain the level of accuracy and consistency in the application of data coding principles. There was also the need to check data transcription several times to eliminate mistakes in the coding process (Gibbs, 2008).

3.14 Data management and analysis

The data collected was analyzed qualitatively. Recordings from the interview sessions as well as FGDs were transcribed and analyzed. The content analysis and interpretation of data became the analysis regime that guided the researcher. The new themes that emerged from the various interviews and FGDs were carefully analyzed and interpreted bearing in mind the research questions which must be answered. This enabled the researcher to arrive at some logical deductions and conclusions (Miles and Huberman, 2013). Sub-themes were also identified in the main themes until the point where no new themes were identified by the researcher that is at the point of saturation (Morse, 1995). The primary data was used to confirm or contradict the literature on the effectiveness of social protection mechanisms. The classification of the data collected was in accordance with the themes on the interview guide.

3.15 Ethical Consideration

Safeguarding the rights of respondents as well as the credibility of the research findings in the conduct of social research such as this study is very critical. Then again it was very important to establish high level of trust and confidence with research respondents. In this vein the anonymity and confidentiality of all respondents was withheld. The procedures involved in the research and how data would be presented were carefully explained to the respondents (Creswell, 2013). The researcher obtained an introductory letter from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management, University of Ghana Business School, Legon to the organizations from which data was collected. For that matter, the purpose of the study was made clear to the respondents prior to the interviews. Respondents participated out of their own free will. Respondents were assured that the information given by them would be treated with a high sense

of confidentiality and their identity would not be disclosed under any circumstance. The researcher took the necessary precautions to ensure that all participants felt safe, secured and comfortable throughout the period of the study.

3.16 Field Experience

Conducting the research was very exciting as the researcher interacted with respondents in a very cordial atmosphere. However, this did not come without some challenges. Bureaucratic bottlenecks and unavailability of some respondents were top among these challenges. Even though the researcher submitted an introductory letter from the University of Ghana Business School to the various organizations selected for the study, it took a long time for the researcher to secure the necessary authorization to begin the interviews even with that long delay respondents kept postponing the scheduled appointments. Some respondents had to pause midway in the interview to continue another day due to their heavy schedule especially those at the top level management. Secondly some respondents refused to take part in the interview after reading through the interview guide and rather redirected the researcher to those they believe could provide appropriate answers to the questions. Then again some respondents were not comfortable with being tape recorded citing various reasons. However, after persuasions by the researcher some of them agreed.

Another challenge was constant interruption of the interview process by colleagues who requested the respondents to attend to urgent official duties. In such cases the interview process had to be put on hold to be continued when the respondent had completed the work. One major difficulty was transcribing the interviews especially the FGDs and other interviews that were held in the

local language since some of them were quite lengthy. That notwithstanding, respondents were generally cooperative and supportive throughout the process.



CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION; THE CASE OF LEAP

4. 0 Introduction

This chapter presents a detailed analyses and discussions of the findings as pertains in the data gathered from the field work. The discussions are organized along the objectives of the study as well as the themes emerging from interactions with respondents. This includes participation of citizens in the planning, implementation and evaluation stages of the LEAP programme in the district. A critical analysis of the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms embedded within the programme and the enabling and disabling factors in the fulfilment of social contract between the state and citizens in the LEAP programme.

4. 1 A brief overview of the LEAP programme

The LEAP programme is a flagship social intervention programme launched in 2008, in line with the NSPS which was launched in 2007. As a social cash transfer programme, the LEAP provides bi-monthly cash transfer to households living below the national extreme poverty line and a free health insurance through the NHIS. The LEAP is currently administered by the MGCSP and managed by the LEAP Secretariat in partnership with the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) (GOG, 2016). The breakdown of the LEAP payments as per the review in 2015 is as follows: one member household receives GH¢ 64.00. Households with two (2) eligible members receive GH¢76.00. Households with three eligible beneficiaries GH¢88.00 and finally, households with four (4) eligible beneficiaries or more receive GH¢ 106.00 (Appiah, 2015).

The policy document of LEAP creates an avenue for active citizen participation from three basic approaches; beneficiary forums, community leap implementation committees (CLICs), and grievance mechanisms.

The CLIC comprises of traditional leaders, district assembly members, representatives of teachers and nurses, religious leaders, and NGO representatives. The strength and weaknesses of these approaches are worth noting. The involvement of community leaders through the establishment of CLICs in the implementation and monitoring activities of the LEAP programme was a step in the right direction in view of promoting social accountability through citizen participation. This ensues an effective feedback channel between beneficiaries and the DSW (Jones et al., 2009). CLIC members were tasked to compile complaints and appeals, as well as to identify the most vulnerable households in their communities (GOG, 2007).

According to Oduro (2015) the CLICs have done a very good job over the period as far as facilitating the participation of previously excluded local folks in the decision-making process at the local level is concerned. They have also increased local participation. Beneficiaries for the above mentioned reasons, have become more active participants in the implementation of the LEAP programme. However, the voluntary nature of membership of the CLICs and the continuous requests from CLIC members for remuneration has been its undoing. This has questioned the sustainability of such a brilliant idea. According to Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017), many CLIC members have abandoned their responsibilities due to the lack of remuneration, while others have tried to extort money from LEAP beneficiaries during payments. The state in the wake of these

challenges have had to resume the duties of these CLICs further pushing away the active participation of citizens.

4. 2 Participation of beneficiaries at the planning stage of the programme.

The information gathered on the field in respect of participation of beneficiaries at the planning stage of the LEAP programme can best be grouped under needs assessment, information sharing, deliberative meetings and community committees as discussed below;

4.2.1 Environmental scanning / Needs assessment

In an environment where poverty is predominant there is the need for poverty alleviation programmes to effectively target the appropriate beneficiaries in order to yield positive results. In this regard, there is the need for an effective assessment of the target group of beneficiaries. It was revealed through interviews with CLIC focal persons and FGDs with beneficiaries that they were invited and briefed about expected developmental progress that the LEAP programme would offer their communities, at the inception of the programme. CLIC focal members played a significant role in getting the message through to the target beneficiaries. Assembly men were involved in the process of selecting potential beneficiaries from their respective communities for the purpose of registration. However, they were not involved in the decision as to what specific kind of social intervention programmes would best suit their needs. When community members meet and decide on their needs in order to get the assembly to take action on their behalf, they are more eager to protect the programmes and to ensure the sustainability of the programme through adherence to rules and regulations as posited by Marks & Davis, (2012). This information was captured in an interview with one of the focal members:

“I was called to the office those days when I was the assemblyman for my electoral area and told to go round and write down the names of extremely poor people in my electoral area. I was given some guidelines as the widows, the aged, orphans and the physically challenged people in my area. I wrote down the names but it took a long time before the people came to register them” (Interview with CLIC focal person, 2017).

CLIC focal members in such situations do not see the intervention as their own and to strive towards its sustainability, but rather the cash transfer is viewed as a gift instead of a right as posited by Sabates-Wheeler et al., (2017) ;Samuels et al., (2013).

4.2.2 Information sharing

It was evident from the responses from CLIC members and FGDs that information sharing at the planning stage was heavily one-sided on the part of duty-bearers with focal members only collating the names of potential beneficiaries and submitting the list to the DSW for further action. They only knew that help was coming their way but had no idea of the goals and objectives of the programme not to talk of making inputs. This does not support effective social accountability, as posited by Haddad et al., (2010). It impacts negatively on subsequent stages of the programme because information is a very important component which would facilitate high levels of transparency, participation, efficiency and effective social accountability at the planning stage. It is thus clear that the duty bearers at this level maintained full control over decision making power. However, the director of DSW at the district level made it clear that the goals and objectives of the programme were communicated to beneficiaries at the very first meeting convened at the community. For that matter, it was important for the researcher to find out from the beneficiaries the extent to which relevant information was released to the citizens. Beneficiaries confirmed that:

“In the first meeting they had with us they told us that the cash transfer was from government with the support of some white people to help us. They told us about some of the things we are not supposed to do as beneficiaries” (FGDs, 2017).

From the response of the beneficiaries it was clear that even though the goals and objectives of the programme were formulated without much input from them. These goals and objectives were duly communicated to them at the inception of the programme. However, beneficiaries were not bothered about such issues. They had no reason to question these objectives. This position of beneficiaries is largely driven by the perception that beneficiaries risk being dropped out of the programme or lose their place to others if they try to question the duty bearers. This is an affront to the tenets of participation at the grass root level. From the beneficiaries at the FGDs;

“If you are there and someone wants to give you money free without any work why question the objectives of the person” (FGDs, 2017).

4.2.3 Deliberative meetings

Drawing from the various interviews and FGDs, it was quite clear that there were several meetings organised with beneficiaries, potential CLIC members at the time and the chiefs and opinion leaders to introduce them to the programme at the planning stage. Both male and female were combined for the meetings. The interviews further revealed that the goals and objectives as in the conditionality as well as community selection issues were discussed extensively but beneficiary input did not go beyond the meeting point as the meetings were meant to mostly inform them about the programme and not for them to make suggestions aimed at shaping the policy goals and objectives. This is in line with the World Bank’s (2002) view of just informing beneficiaries on programmes as a poor participation mechanism. This view was arrived at by the researcher as

beneficiaries were unable to point out features of the policy that were shaped by their contributions in meetings since the programme is viewed as a favour.

4.2.4 Role of community committees.

One effective means of ensuring participation and the effectiveness of social accountability especially at the planning stage of such a programme is the committee system. The formation of the CLIC at the inception of the programme was imperative to the success of the programme. The committee was made up of members with various professional background (Health workers, teachers, assemblymen, farmers, traders etc.). The membership being drawn from the community ensured sustainability. At least, if some members drop out there would be some few committed members which is exactly what is prevailing on the grounds at the moment. The CLICs have been subjected to a one man show as a results of inadequate funding of their meetings and the fact that request from the CLIC members to be given some allowance has fallen on deaf ears. This has resulted in a high level of apathy in CLIC members. This confirms the findings of Sabates-Wheeler et al., (2017). However, this does not rule out the important role played by such committees at this stage of the programme. The mandate of the committees at this level was to explain further the goals and objectives of the LEAP programme to their respective community members. CLIC members provided a link between the beneficiary communities and the duty bearers.

“We went round from house to house to share the information given to us by the people from the office to the potential beneficiaries in our respective communities but sometimes they asked us questions we could not answer. In such situations we noted them and asked the office people” (interview with CLIC member, 2017).

This indicates the enormous contributions of the committee at this stage of the programme. However, their inability to answer questions could have been reduced if they were part of the agenda setting process. It was evident from the data gathered that CLIC members and beneficiaries in general were not aware of their rights to question the duty bearers at this level. One of the focal members remarked:

“We did not know that we had the right to question their motive for such an idea. More so, we needed such an intervention and it was such a brilliant idea. Now that you have told us next time when they come to share the money we would ask them questions” (FGDs, 2017).

Beneficiary involvement in the initial phase of the programme can best be compared to the information-sharing level of the World Bank’s (2002) framework for assessing the level of participation in policy making. In that, the motive of duty bearers was not to engage the beneficiaries in the planning but to inform them about plans made for them. The committees which actually represented the beneficiaries at this stage did not have much information to be able to demand accountability from duty bearers.

4. 3 Participation of beneficiaries at the implementation level

The information gathered on the field in respect of participation of beneficiaries at the implementation level can best be grouped under the following activities; mobilizing the area, organising and conveying of beneficiaries to the venue, disbursement of cash and complaint management as discussed below.

4.3.1 Mobilization of the area for disbursement of funds

The interaction with the CLIC members revealed that they were much involved at this level than any other, even though they were not required to make any substantial financial inputs. They played a major role in organising the area demarcated for the disbursement as in arranging for chairs and tables to be used by the officials as well as the aged since the disbursement will usually take a little longer time to be completed. One of the CLIC focal members remarked:

“We have some chairs around so when they call me that they are coming I try to get some more to augment what we have here. Most of the time when I incur any cost in doing so I tell the office people and they give me the money to pay” (interview with CLIC focal member, 2017)

This supports the argument that involving community members is an efficient means of ensuring community participation. Then again, it was cost effective for the CLIC members to handle such grounds work since duty bearers would have ended up spending more than necessary if they had taken that task upon themselves. In effect, duty bearers turn to involve beneficiaries more when it suits them but not as a matter of rights.

4.3.2 Organising and conveying beneficiaries to the venue

According to the CLIC members, there are two main payment points in Shai-Osudoku District Assembly. For that matter, when it is time for payment all beneficiaries from adjoining villages come together at these two payment points. This arrangement is due to the poor nature of the linking roads to the adjoining villages. The CLIC members in an interaction with the researcher narrated their side of the story.

“When they call me that they would come on a certain day I will first go to the information center for them to make an announcement that the people are coming. I also go to the villages and inform them that the next payment is coming on at such a date. On the day of payment we sometimes hire a taxi to convey those in the villages to the payment points” (FGDs, 2017).

In deciding to create two payment points in the district, the beneficiaries were not involved in the decision making. It was evident from interaction with the beneficiaries that this arrangement does not favour those from the village as they come to meet long winding queue and they sometimes go through some form of ordeal before they get paid. Officials fail to protect the rights of the beneficiaries as enshrined in the constitution hence they disregard the tenets of the RBA to social protection.

4.3.3 Disbursement of funds

Beneficiaries only had to wait for their turn and when their names are mentioned they go for their money. They play a minimal role at this point of implementing the programme. However, in some cases, CLIC focal members helped beneficiaries to check whether they have been given the correct amount. That was when they realised that the bank was retaining some part of their money without their permission. This is a complete disregard to the rights of the beneficiaries and consequently a disregard to the RBA to social protection.

“When they collect their money they come to me to help them check the amount and be sure of what they have received. I realised that sometimes the money is less by one or two Ghana cedis when I confronted the bankers they told me it is because they have run short of change, but later we got to know that the bankers were retaining some of the money in

their account as savings for the people but they did not tell them about it” (interview with a CLIC focal person, 2017).

Beneficiaries have been advised to save part of their transfer for any eventualities in the future. However, the bankers needed the consent of the beneficiaries in an attempt to save part of their transfers for them even when beneficiaries have consented to opening an account with them. This is in line with the RBA to social protection.

4.3.4 Complaint management

Most of the beneficiaries lodge their complaints through the CLIC members who sometimes are able to resolve the minor ones but the ones beyond their control they forward it to the DSW. The District director of the DSW confirmed that CLIC focal members play a major role in communicating challenges faced by beneficiaries to the directorate. The directorate also handles the problems within their power and those that are beyond their control, they forward to appropriate quarters. A CLIC focal person intimated that;

“When they go to the NHIS secretariat to register or renew their cards without a written cover note from the DSW, in most cases at the first instance they are refused. But when they come to me I lead them to the DSW office then the director would give them a note to be taken to the NHIS secretariat and the problem is solved for them” (interview with a CLIC focal person, 2017).

It is thus evident that the beneficiary communities play a major role at the implementation stage which could still be compared to the information-sharing and consultation level of the World Bank’s (2002) framework for assessing the level of participation in policy making. This is so because, one can argue that the high level of involvement at this stage is mostly at the lower ranks

on the hierarchy of power instead of higher decision making authority and that if duty bearers could have played these roles themselves they might not have bothered to involve the beneficiaries. In that case, their involvement would be perceived as a necessity instead of a deliberate attempt to encourage the participation of beneficiary communities in social protection programmes in order to enhance their capacity to demand accountability from duty-bearers.

4. 4 Participation of beneficiaries at the programme evaluation level.

The information gathered on the field in respect of participation of beneficiaries at the programme evaluation level shows how community members can participate in the assessment of the achievements of the programme as against set goals and standards. This can best be grouped under these two activities; stakeholders review and monitoring and evaluation teams.

4.4.1 Stakeholders review

This is an effective means of involving all stakeholders in reviewing the success of the programme. From the various interviews and FGDs it was realised that there were no officially organised stakeholder reviews of the LEAP programme at the district. The District LEAP director reiterated the fact that stakeholder review forums have been minimal, if anything at all it has been externally organized, as intimated earlier by Tagarirofa and Chazovachii (2013). Even though formal means of review were not held external evaluators came to assess the programme. A CLIC member mentioned;

“I was there one day when some white men came here with some of the officers I am familiar with. They asked my people and myself about how the cash transfer was helping to alleviate poverty in our community” (interview with CLIC focal person, 2017).

It was evident that there were no avenues created for participation of beneficiary communities in the review of the programme and beneficiaries would rather not question duty bearers for any reason.

4.4.2 Monitoring and evaluation teams

Per the evidence gathered from the field there was no effort made for the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation team, not to talk about the role of CLIC focal persons on such a committee. The district director of DSW did not see that as necessary since everything was going on smoothly.

“Most of the beneficiaries are aged and do not have the education and the requisite skills needed for such kind of task. Moreover, we are carrying out our duties as expected of us”
(interview with the District LEAP implementation officer, 2017).

Beneficiary involvement at this important phase of the programme can be compared to the information-sharing level of the World Bank’s (2002) framework for assessing the level of participation in policy making. The committees which actually represented the beneficiaries at this stage did not have much information to be able to demand accountability from duty bearers.

4. 5 Effectiveness of social accountability within the programme

The three core principles posited by Camargo and Jacobs (2011) for effective social accountability that is; voice, enforceability and answerability were examined within the LEAP programme in an attempt to analyse the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms put in place in the implementation of the programme.

4.5.1 The level of ‘Voice’ within the programme

From the various interviews with CLIC focal members and the FGDs with beneficiaries it was obvious that beneficiaries were involved at the various stages of the programme. Even though there were beneficiary forums which were held on pay days as mentioned by the District Director of the DSW, these beneficiary forums have indeed only served the purpose of informing the people instead of creating an open platform for citizens to hold duty bearers accountable (Sabates-Wheeler R. et al., 2017).

“It is true that when they come to share the money they advise us on how to manage the money and they warn us that if we collect the money and we do not send our children to school they will not give us the money again. But the people they will always make us wait for them for a long time. Before they come are already tired so we just listen to what they have to say and after that they sharer the money and we go home. We only pray that our names would not be missing in the list” (FGDs, 2017).

Then again, the researcher observed from the FGDs that, on paydays the beneficiaries had to wait for long hours before the bankers arrived. Coupled with this long wait was the fact that the beneficiaries were in expectation of their money and so they had divided attention during these forums as they quickly forgot about what was said earlier before the sharing of the money.

There were indeed few opportunities for beneficiaries to actually make inputs to the implementation of the programme. Beneficiaries in this regard found it difficult to actually identify these few spaces and utilize them. CLIC members confirmed their role in compiling complaints and appeals and identifying the most vulnerable households in their communities but had no say

in the final selection of the beneficiaries which is due to the use of the proxy means test as the targeting mechanism for the programme. The community opinion leaders had no say in the final selection of the beneficiaries. From the point of view of an informant, there were beneficiaries who were impersonating as widows but had never married before. There were beneficiaries who were registered as orphans and are now more than twenty years and are working but they are still benefiting from the programme. The reason why community members are not complaining about this phenomenon is the fact that the cash transfers are considered as a gift rather than as of rights so beneficiaries did not see their rights to complain or provide officials with these pieces of information to help them address such flaws in the programme. They are rather grateful to the government for selecting them as posited by Samuels et al., (2013).

The District Director of Social Welfare Department explained later that they had a difficulty in deleting such names of orphans who had outlived their time on the programme, as an attempt to delete a single name ends up deleting others which causes inconveniences to the beneficiaries.

“We have reported to the LEAP secretariat for them to delete names of deceased persons and those who have relocated to far away towns as well as orphans who are now above the age brackets but, whenever they try deleting the names we record so many abnormalities when we go for the next payment” (interview with the District Director of social welfare, 2017).

However, an active voice of beneficiaries at the selection point would have minimized the margin of such inclusion and exclusion errors. At the implementation stage it was evident that beneficiaries did not have much confidence in the case management system provided by the policy

because, a number of complaints as in the payment system, quality of service and other complaints made have not yet been resolved. They now feel comfortable channeling their grievances through their respective CLIC focal members who then carry them on to the assembly.

“I often visit the beneficiaries at home and when they express their grievances about the programme to me I call the director and inform her but they mostly tell us to exercise patience but we don’t hear anything more” (Interview with a CLIC focal person, 2017).

Indeed, the excessive delays in processing claims made have reduced citizens’ confidence in the system. This confirms the findings of Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017). The situation is even worse at the evaluation level of the programme since there seem to be very little activity going on at that level. With the little effort from the supply side of government that is few spaces for voice to ensure effective social accountability within the operations of the LEAP programme, demand side accountability seems to be on a downward trend due to beneficiaries’ inability to exercise their rights. This phenomenon does not support the RBA to social protection.

4.5.2 Enforceability of social accountability

With the current logistics challenge of the social welfare department it was much evident that the issue of enforcement is a major problem. The assembly lacked computers, internet facility and cabinets to keep their files safe. There was no dedicated hotlines for beneficiaries to call. The CLIC focal members could only reach the director of social welfare on a personal line. There was no dedicated staff to respond to complaints from citizens for that matter, the feedback channels created within the programme were rendered nonexistent. The low level of technology usage in the grievance redress mechanisms hampers the ability of staff to respond to the complaints made to them and makes it more difficult for the various authorities to enforce the tenets of social

accountability at the local level. The high level of centralization of the operations of the LEAP programme worsens the situation.

4.5.3 Answerability to stakeholders

Once the director of the DSW who is in charge of the LEAP at the district level has admitted the fact that they are not to give out information in respect of actual payments made to beneficiaries without permission from the national secretariat, it defeats the whole purpose of social accountability, in that the information which will empower citizens to make demands is not made readily available to citizens in general. The directorate exercises some level of discretionary powers as to who to release what kind of information to. In effect, even though the LEAP has created some spaces for state-society interactions, opportunities for active citizenship and bottom-up approaches to social accountability within the programme are feeble.

4. 6 The enabling and disabling factors of social accountability within the programme.

The third objective for the study sought to ascertain the various factors that favour effective social accountability mechanisms in the district as well as those factors that pose a challenge to effective social accountability mechanisms within the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly. The themes for the discussion have been identified as political context, Citizens' awareness of social accountability mechanisms, access to information, role of the media, level of decentralization, state-civil society synergy, role of community committee and institutionalization of social accountability mechanisms. This was thought of to be in line with the literature on the subject matter as posited by Malena et al. (2004).

4.6.1 Political context

Political commitment as mentioned earlier by Sarker and Hassan (2010) is a major component in the discourse of the political context. This is evident in the pull or push factors confronting effective implementation of social accountability mechanisms. An official at the ministry had this to say on the commitment on the part of government;

“The national social protection strategy in itself provides for issues of accountability which includes social accountability. In recent times the ministry is piloting various ICT based social accountability mechanisms to help ensure that the ministry is achieving its objectives on the field” (interview with an official at the MGCSP, 2017).

This is a clear indication that the state is committed to its mandate of providing a justice-based social protection upon which legitimate claims can be brought forth in order to improve the state-citizen relationship. However, responses from CLIC focal members and beneficiaries indicate that they are not aware of various channels created by the ministry to ensure effective social accountability. Besides, Shai-Osudoku district Assembly was not one of the districts where these I.C.T. based social accountability mechanisms are being piloted. Beneficiaries are more comfortable reporting challenges they encounter in the programme to their CLIC focal persons. The inability of staff of the district DSW to visit beneficiaries due to inadequate logistics and means of transport is blamed for the current dispensation.

4.6.2 Citizens’ awareness of social accountability mechanisms

Responses from the district social welfare department indicates that much effort has been put in educating beneficiaries about the LEAP programme.

“Whenever we go to the community to make payments we spend some time to sensitize the beneficiaries about the programme especially on conditionality, the rights of the beneficiaries as provided for by the programme and how to manage with the money till the next payment” (interview with the District director of DSW, 2017).

Beneficiaries during the FGDs, were able to outline the various conditions given to them by the DSW which confirms that indeed there were sensitization exercises. However, responses from beneficiaries indicate that even though these sensitization exercises are conducted on payment periods, beneficiaries are not aware of their rights to hold programme implementers accountable in relation to their entitlements.

“In fact since we have not worked for anybody to be receiving this payment we are appreciative of whatever we get. We are not aware of the fact that we have the right to question the officials about how much we should get” (FGDs, 2017).

This shows beneficiaries’ level of ignorance of their rights to question duty bearers whether the amounts they received were actually what they were entitled to.

4.6.3 Access to information

Access to information on the amount allocated to beneficiaries of the LEAP programme in the district, as well as actual payments made to beneficiaries, has been poor. To withhold such valuable information from citizens is a bane to effective social accountability in that, citizens need such information to enable them track public expenditure. The district director of the DSW intimated that;

“We are not allowed to give out information about payments made to beneficiaries to any one without permission from the national secretariat” (interview with the District Director of DSW, 2017).

The ability of beneficiaries to have access to credible information, especially about the processes involved in decision making as well as having adequate information about their entitlements, is very important as far as the success or failure of social accountability is concerned as indicated earlier in the literature (Malena et al., 2004; McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Ringold et al., 2012). However, responses from the beneficiaries indicate that they were only interested in their entitlements and did not bother themselves with having access to information with which they can hold duty bearers accountable for their actions. According to the Director of the DSW the beneficiaries are not interested in such matters. This to a large extent, is a drawback to the tenets of effective social accountability.

4.6.4 The role of the media

The role of the media and their independence as emphasized earlier by Malena et al., (2004); McGee & Gaventa, (2010); Ringold et al. (2012) was much evident on the field. Interactions with the CLIC members as well as the Director of DSW supported that assertion. The media play a vital role in conveying messages as to when the next payment will be done. CLIC members were in agreement with the fact that the information center at the district contributes significantly in terms of disseminating information concerning the LEAP programme to the people. They sometimes come around to interview beneficiaries during payment periods and hold talks about the

conditionality on radio. According to the Director of DSW, the media is always welcomed at their programmes. However, they are selective as to which programmes and venues to attend.

“When we invite the media to cover sensitization programmes at the payment centers here in the district capital (Dodowa) they are very much willing to come but, when we invite them to the rural areas they are reluctant to show up. They complain about the poor nature of the roads leading to some of these adjoining villages” (interview with the District Director of DSW, 2017).

A CLIC focal person in one of these villages confirmed the fact that due to the poor nature of the roads leading to the villages, even the social welfare officers hardly visit them. The media is unable to extend their coverage of sensitization programmes to the villages as they tend to show up at those ones held at the district capital Dodowa and tend to ignore those ones at the adjoining villages. In this regard, their monitoring and performance measurement capabilities are not felt in these villages.

4.6.5 The level of decentralization within the programme

Even though the officials at the district office claimed to have the capacity to handle the registration of beneficiaries which was a major cause of grievances from the beneficiaries, they were not in charge. There exists that unwillingness on the part of the national secretariat to cede power to the district level to handle important functions such as registering the beneficiaries at the district level.

“There is the likelihood that when registration is done at the district level officials will take advantage of the system. Uniformity in the criteria for selection may be lost along the line.

The proxy means test at the national secretariat ensures some level of consistency in the selection process” (Interview with an official at the LEAP national secretariat, 2017).

The centralised nature of decision making in the LEAP programme does not support effective social accountability. When beneficiaries report problems to the district office and the officials there are unable to provide adequate solutions to their problems they lose confidence in the grievance redress system. When asked to rate in percentage terms the percentage of problems they are able to resolve at the district level the response was;

“We are able to resolve only about 30% of the problems we encounter on the field at the district level this is because the programme is centralised so most of the problems must be reported to the central body” (interview with the District Director of DSW, 2017).

In effect officials at the Shai-Osudoku district claim to have the capacity in terms of staff, even though the same cannot be said about resources, they lack the authority to respond to about 70% of the grievances of the beneficiaries due to the over centralisation of the programme.

4.6.6 State-civil society synergy

There has been a number of state-civil society interactions to discuss issues of the sustainability of the various social protection programmes and most importantly to harmonize the various targeting mechanisms employed by various social protection programmes. There were facilitated interface meetings between civil society and public sector as recommended by Hoffman (2014). This is evident at the level of operations. According to the district director of social welfare department;

“When the national secretariat organises stakeholder forums we attend and in most cases civil society organisations who attend make a lot of contributions which help us to streamline our operations. We also try to correct some misconceptions they bring up

concerning our work. Recently there was an NGO from Accra that came and did some research work and came up with some recommendations which confirmed some problems we had reported to the national secretariat (interview with the director of DSW, 2017).

This shows some level of goodwill between civil society and the state. However, these interactions have been at the national level. Respondents largely agreed with the fact that, these interactions must be replicated at the district assembly level. There must be more invited spaces for civil society including religious bodies to do much more to ensure the effectiveness of social accountability within the programme. This is in agreement with the view of Norton et al. (2001).

4.6.7 Institutionalization of social accountability mechanisms

To a very large extent the concept of social accountability is yet to be institutionalized within the LEAP programme. With CLIC members expecting to be paid before participating effectively in the implementation of the programme, even though minimal spaces have been created. This phenomenon takes their attention off their role in ensuring the effectiveness of social accountability within the district. At the DSW in the district, the researcher had to explain what social accountability meant to the officers at the district before they were able to contribute meaningfully towards the realisation of the objectives of the study. This shows that the tenets of social accountability at the district level is yet to be institutionalised.


4.6.8 The role of community committees

Interviews with CLIC focal persons revealed that committees were established at the inception of the LEAP programme of which, they were members. These community based committees contributed significantly in articulating the grievances of beneficiaries which enhanced social

accountability. The existence of the committees enabled citizens to express their grievances and also demand accountability from duty bearers. However, interviews with CLIC focal persons revealed that the committees have virtually collapsed because the committee members have left the committees due to lack of remuneration. According to one of the CLIC focal persons;

“Most of the people we started this work with have stopped. They say they don’t have time and after our meetings there is no money for members. They would rather go and work on their farms, but for me when I see the old people I ask myself that if I don’t help them who will” (interview with a CLIC focal person, 2017).

The committees as purported by Oduro (2015) have been instrumental in facilitating the participation of previously excluded local folks in the decision-making process at the local level. However, the collapse of the committees at the community level reduces the opportunities for citizens to participate and be able to hold duty bearers accountable for their actions.



CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION; THE CASE OF GSOP

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a detailed analyses and discussions of the findings as pertains in the data gathered from the field work in respect of the GSOP programme. The discussions are organized along the objectives of the study as well as the themes emerging from interactions with respondents. This includes participation of citizens in the planning, implementation and evaluation stages of the GSOP programme in the district, a critical analysis of the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms embedded within the programme and the enabling and disabling factors in the fulfilment of social contract between the state and beneficiaries of the GSOP programme.

5.1 A brief overview of the GSOP programme

The GSOP was initially a five year International Development Assistance (IDA) and a Government of Ghana funded project under the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. It was launched in 2008 with the objective to increase access to employment and cash earning opportunities for the rural poor. The project seeks to improve targeting of social protection programmes and provide income support to poor households through support for the LEAP Grants and the Labour Intensive Public Work (LIPW) infrastructure in targeted districts (MLGRD, 2016). The LIPW component aims to provide short term employment to the very poor

in rural areas who find it difficult to meet their household expenditure particularly during the agricultural off-season. The programme focuses on these thematic areas;

- Construction of feeder roads
- Small earth dams and dugouts in rural areas
- Climate change interventions
- Social infrastructure sub-projects
- Irrigation projects

5.2 Participation of beneficiaries at the planning stage of the programme.

The information gathered on the field in respect of participation of beneficiaries at the planning stage of the GSOP programme can best be grouped under needs assessment, information sharing, deliberative meetings and community committees as discussed below;

5.2.1 Environmental scanning / Needs assessment

Data gathered on the field through interviews and FGDs in the course of analysing the needs of the people in respect of the GSOP sub projects revealed that projects that were embarked on by the programme were selected based on the demands of the citizens. According to the District Planning Officer, these projects have been earmarked in the assembly's plans and the GSOP programme only facilitated the implementation of the projects, which is in line with the RBA. This implies that, the GSOP programme does not impose projects on the assembly but helps the assembly to achieve its plans in respect of providing developmental projects to the people, which makes their projects demand-driven as prescribed by Flint and Natrup (2014). The national coordinator had this to say;

“Per our implementation plans, we insist that sub-projects are selected from the districts’ medium term plans in order to ensure that the projects meet the needs and priorities of the people. We still go back to the beneficiary communities to validate the sub-projects. That is, to find out that this is what the community really need. This we call project appraisal. We also advise that if there is any contract to be signed the signing should be done at the community for the people to own the project” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

The assembly in earmarking these project needs, involve the relevant stakeholders in some consultative forum, to decide on the project needs of the assembly, based on applications forwarded earlier on by various communities to the assembly. These project needs are arranged on a scale of preference. This means beneficiary communities are involved which is in line with the RBA to social protection. However, the GSOP programme also has its own specifications, which is to make use of LIPW for their projects. For that matter, not all project needs of the assembly will fit directly into the plans of the programme.

“When we go to the assembly we ask for their project needs and we sit down with them to select the projects that fits into the structure of the GSOP programme, according to the order of priority of the assembly and we work hand in hand with the assemblies throughout the project. We are much interested in the project needs of the people because we want the people to own the project and thereby ensure its sustainability” (interview with the Greater Accra coordinating officer, 2017).

This view was confirmed by the District Planning Officer (DPO) as he commented that:

“All the projects funded by the GSOP programme were projects the assembly had planned for, based on the demands of the various communities but then these projects were yet to see the light of day due to inadequate funding. It is a huge relief for GSOP to come through to assist us in that direction” (interview with District Planning Officer, 2017).

Beneficiaries in this regard strive to remove all impediments to ensure the successful completion of the project since the project meets the needs of the people.

5.2.2 Information sharing

At the project planning stage access to information is very critical since it determines to a large extent the commencement of the project on schedule. Transparency and participation is greatly enhanced by effective information sharing at the planning stage of the programme. Response from the officials at the assembly was that the objectives of the GSOP programme were communicated to them and more importantly they were engaged in shaping up these objectives as in the choice of project that would better serve the needs of the people. With the assembly satisfied with the selection of the projects, the beneficiary communities were then informed about the programme and the category of people who qualified for the programme through a number of sensitization exercises and capacity building workshops organised by the coordinating office for both assembly staff who would be involved in the implementation of the programme as well as community facilitators and beneficiaries. Potential client officers were also educated on the criteria for selection of beneficiaries.

“We went for a training programme and we were educated about the GSOP programme as in the kind of projects that fit into their programme and the category of people we should select to benefit from the programme” (interview with a community facilitator, 2017)

In this situation all stakeholders have access to the much needed information in order to hold duty-bearers accountable for their actions and inactions, which promotes effective social accountability and is in line with the RBA to social protection. Information about financial entitlements of beneficiaries were also disclosed during various sensitization forums. The use of Transparency and Accountability Boards (TABs), which displays every information about the sub-projects, including the name of the contractor, cost of the project and a hotline for citizens to make calls for more information (see appendix B) is in line with the RBA to social protection. The release of timely information to all stakeholders at the planning level ensures adequate participation hence transparency, efficiency and the tenets of social accountability are greatly improved, as posited by Haddad et al., (2010).

5.2.3 Deliberative meetings / Development of an action plan

From the interviews with the beneficiaries, national coordinator and the DPO it was evident that beneficiaries were involved in the development of an action plan for the programme, even though the beneficiaries lacked the kind of technical abilities for the exercise;

“The beneficiary communities were involved in the action plan. They made very good contributions, even though they were mostly made up of uneducated or at best low level of education” (interview with the DPO, 2017).

The FGD conducted with beneficiaries also confirmed that;

“We got a message from the community facilitator that the request we placed at the assembly in respect of the road at abunya would be constructed very soon by the GSOP people and they would pay those of us who do not have jobs in the community to do the work ourselves” (FGDs, 2017).

According to the national coordinator;

“In coming up with the work programme, beneficiaries are allowed to input into the design. There is also provision made for beneficiaries to have a say in the work duration, the start and finish time. This is because these beneficiaries are poor, vulnerable and predominantly farmers we would not want to impose too much on them. They are allowed to schedule convenient time with the contractor” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

This implies that beneficiaries’ interest was held paramount in the formulation of the action plan as posited by Boon et al., (2013). This is in agreement with the DFID’s view on the RBA to social protection. However, technical issues involved in the project were discussed without beneficiaries.

5.2.4 Formation of committees

The committee system as mentioned earlier on by Rahman (2014) as an effective way of ensuring participation in community based programme implementation was very much utilised at the planning stage of the programme. GSOP programmes encourage community committee system in the planning and implementation of their programmes. The membership of these committees were drawn from a cross-section of the community comprising of representatives from the chiefs palace, artisans, farmers and traders. The mandate of the committee as revealed by the interview with the DPO was to help in beneficiary selection. The committee members served as the major link between the assembly and the community in respect of communication as far as the GSOP programme was concerned.

“We directed the opinion leaders in the community to form their own committee members as part of our strategy for community entry. We spelt out their responsibilities to them

clearly when the committee members were introduced to us” (interview with the DPO, 2017).

This assertion was confirmed by a community facilitator who responded that;

“We formed the committees ourselves. The assembly tasked us (committee members) to help in getting the people available for registration and when the time comes for work we would help to get the people well informed, but unfortunately we are not paid much, even though we help the assembly a lot” (FGDs, 2017).

Committee members were empowered to ask questions as and when they deem fit. On the field of work they were allowed to ask the contractor relevant questions. According to the national coordinator;

“Since we want the community to own the project we allow the committee members to interact with the contractor on site. However any complaints from the committee members should be routed through the communication channels provided. Not even the national coordinator has the right to stop the contractor without going through that process” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

Beneficiaries’ involvement in the planning phase of the GSOP programme reveals some degree of consultation and joint decision-making level of the World Bank’s (2002) framework for assessing the level of participation in policy making. This allows the have-nots to hear and to have a voice. However, the right to decide is determined by power holders. There is also that collaborative effort between citizens and the state. There was evidence that various responsibilities were shared between citizens and duty bearers. The committees which actually represented the beneficiaries at

this stage had much information to be able to demand accountability from duty bearers. This is in line with the RBA to social protection.

5.3 Participation of beneficiaries at the programme implementation stage

The information gathered on the field in respect of participation of beneficiaries at the implementation stage can best be grouped under the following activities; provision of labour, management of beneficiaries at site, payment of beneficiaries and complaint management.

5.3.1 Provision of labour

Through the various interviews and FGDs it was clear that community members formed the core group of workers in respect of physical labour. This is in line with the specifications of the programme that is only the able bodied poor who can do some level of work, but are unemployed, qualify to work on the GSOP programme. As intimated by the Regional Coordinating Officer;

“Our daily wage which is perked between the national daily minimum wage and the agricultural minimum wage ensures that only the poor who do not have alternative means of livelihood are selected within the community. This ensures some level of self-targeting” (interview with the Regional Coordinating Officer, 2017)

According to the national coordinator;

“In cases where the projects were oversubscribed we employed a third level of community based targeting where a three member committee is constituted to vet the list and to decide who should be given priority over who” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

Community facilitators also confirmed that;

“We make sure we select only the poor from the community to benefit from the programme” (interview with a community facilitator, 2017).

This is in line with the DFID’s view on the RBA to social protection. In that, beneficiaries were empowered to take their own decisions. In the case of Shai-Osudoku district where the beneficiaries are predominantly farmers the programme was heavily subscribed during the off-farming seasons, where the people usually had very little to do on their farms. In this respect the programme actually provided an alternative source of livelihood for a number of community members. This was to a large extent an efficient avenue for participation.

5.3.2 Management of beneficiaries at site

Management of beneficiaries at the site was basically in the hands of the community facilitators and the beneficiaries themselves. Contractors only assigned the days’ task. Beneficiaries were involved in their management as time keepers, some also took care of the babies for the nursing mothers to be able to work. The community facilitator took the days attendance. Misconducts were to be reported through the channels of communication created within the programme. According to the national coordinator,

“The project is meant for the poor and vulnerable in the community, so we ensure that contractors have no right to sack any worker from the site otherwise, they would only use the strong men to achieve their task. If a contractor thinks somebody is not conducting him or herself well, the contractor must activate the grievance redress systems to resolve the problem” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

5.3.3 Payment of beneficiaries

Beneficiary participation in their payments is such that community facilitators and the community implementation team are responsible for liaising with the rural banks and organising the workers for payment to be effected when the time is due. The community facilitators prosee their daily attendance sheet and send it to the assembly's officials to key them into the MIS database for onward submission to the regional coordinating office. According to the regional coordinating officer;

“Since the beneficiaries prepare the daily attendance sheet themselves they make sure that the names on the sheet are the names of those who actually came to work. In some instances the chiefs and other opinion leaders had wanted to add names of their well-wishers but the beneficiaries fought against any names of persons they did not see working at the site, whose name was on the list” (interview with the Greater Accra regional coordinator, 2017).

The community facilitators and the community implementation team members are supposed to mobilise the beneficiaries on the day of payment, most importantly they must know the respective entitlements of each worker, so that in the event that a beneficiary is short changed they can come to the aid of such a person. This shows how well the beneficiaries are involved and the impact on effective social accountability.

5.3.4 Complaints management

The complaints management procedure is such that there is a three member committee at the community level. This committee is made up of a representative from the chief's palace, women

representative and one member from the work force. They receive the complaints directly and try to resolve those that can be resolved at the community level depending on the magnitude and scale of the complaint. Those that cannot be resolved at the community level are passed on to the assembly. Aside that, hotlines have been activated in all the regional offices. Beneficiaries can call and make their complaints and it is expected that within a specified period, their concerns would be addressed. According to the beneficiaries,

“We have been given that hotline to call when we have a problem but most of the time we express our concerns to the community facilitator and he sometimes explains things to us”
(FGDs, 2017).

Beneficiaries preferred to report any problem to community facilitators instead of the use of the hotlines because, they did not have enough money to purchase mobile phone talk time to make such calls. However, community facilitators confirmed that the hotlines are active. It was interesting to note that the regional coordinator sometimes calls the community facilitators on site for update on progress of work. This implies that the needed participatory spaces have been provided to a large extent in line with the RBA to social protection, but beneficiaries are yet to take full advantage of the various spaces provided for them. Beneficiaries' involvement in the implementation phase of the GSOP programme reveals lesser degrees of just consultations and a high degree of joint decision-making level of the World Bank's (2002) framework for assessing the level of participation in policy making.

5.4 Participation of beneficiaries at the programme evaluation stage

The information gathered on the field in respect of participation of beneficiaries at the programme evaluation stage shows how community members can participate in the assessment of the

achievements of the programme us against set goals and standards. This can best be grouped under these two activities; stakeholders review and monitoring and evaluation teams.

5.4.1 Stakeholders review

This as mentioned earlier is an effective means of involving all stakeholders in reviewing the success of the programme. The system employed by the GSOP programme is indeed participatory as mentioned by the national coordinator. The various interviews and FGDs also confirmed the participatory nature of the monitoring and evaluation system employed by the GSOP programme.

“Our monitoring is the participatory monitoring type, where beneficiaries can monitor and report. The assembly can also monitor and report, but this is routed through the channels. When you find something wrong, you can report through the assembly” (Interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

Beneficiaries attested to the fact that there was a continuous review of the projects, which was participatory enough. The process was practically on the field and it was not a one-time event. There were no officially organised event for the purpose of stakeholder review. Beneficiaries had the right to question duty bearers on expectations in terms of delivery of service. Responses from the FGDs show that they made use of this opportunity. This is in line with RBA to social protection. However, this process was controlled by programme implementers to avoid individuals slowing down work for their parochial interest.

5.4.2 Monitoring and evaluation teams

Per the evidence gathered from the field there was a clear indication of the presence of a facility management team set up in every community. The team is responsible for the management of the

project. The facility management team has a direct responsibility for the asset. For those projects that require high level maintenance, the GSOP programme has beneficiary agreements as in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the community. This indicates clearly what everybody's stake is, to avoid any conflict or grievances. This supports the RBA to social protection.

“When we execute works the community must take the site over. The contractor must hand the asset over to the community, so the community members are the ones who own the asset. They are given some basic training as to how to maintain the asset to ensure that they derive full benefit from it and before we take delivery of an asset the community would have to sign off and also indicate that they are in agreement that the work has been executed to their satisfaction” (Interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

Beneficiaries' involvement in the evaluation phase of the GSOP programme again reveals lesser degrees of just consultations and a high degree of joint decision-making level of the World Bank's (2002) framework for assessing the level of participation in policy making.

5.5 Effectiveness of social accountability within the programme

The three core principles posited by Camargo and Jacobs (2011) for effective social accountability that is; voice, enforceability and answerability were examined once again, but within the GSOP programme in an attempt to analyse the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms put in place in the implementation of the programme.

5.5.1 The level of ‘Voice’ within the programme

From the various interviews with community facilitators it was evident that the GSOP programme has created a lot of avenues for beneficiaries to have a say in the successful implementation of the programme. At the programme planning level beneficiary communities have a say in the choice of projects that would best suit their needs. They were given information about the whole programme. The committees that were formed at the inception of the programme, had a lot of space and the necessary power to operate to the extent that when the programme was heavily subscribed the committee members had the final say as to who deserves the right of first place. Beneficiaries also had a say in determining the time periods for work. The fact that the contractors had no right to send a worker out of site without going through the appropriate grievance channels ensured that beneficiaries on site were protected from inconsistent application of rules and regulations. This ensured that beneficiaries’ rights were protected.

At the programme implementation stage beneficiaries had a say in their management as minor grievances were expected to be resolved on site. According to the regional coordinator,

“We expect that as much as possible the community facilitators would be able to resolve minor issues on site. Those that are beyond them, mostly payment issues are reported to the assembly and they also report those ones that are beyond them to us” (interview with the regional coordinator, 2017).

Since community facilitators were in charge of the daily attendance sheets they knew the beneficiaries who had worked on site and what they were due for that matter they were empowered to make the appropriate claims in an event where a beneficiary was short-changed. Various complaints with payments led to the introduction of the e-zwich payment system which has

reduced human influence in the payments. This is contrary to the view of Barrett (2008) that, grievance redress mechanisms make limited contributions to the effectiveness and efficiency of such programmes. The national coordinator remarked;

“We want the assembly and the community members to actually own the project that we construct within the respective communities and to commit themselves to the sustainability of these projects so we are very much interested in participatory monitoring and evaluation of the projects. When the contractors are done, we do a proper handing over of the project to the assembly” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

The high level of voice in the implementation and the protection of the rights of beneficiaries ensured that demand side social accountability mechanisms put in place within the programme were effective.

5.5.2 Enforceability of social accountability

To a very large extent, the tenets of social accountability is enforced by the regional coordinating office. In that, the dedicated hotlines to the regional office is very active and there is a dedicated staff to respond to complaints from beneficiaries. Proactive measures have been put in place from the supply side of accountability to respond to the demand side of accountability as in the voice of the beneficiaries. According to the regional coordinator;

“I frequently call for an update of the number of calls that come in through the hotlines and I ask questions about how their complaints have been resolved. My staff on the hotline also makes frequent calls to the community facilitators to find out what is actually happening on the field” (interview with the regional coordinator, 2017).

Even though some sites are very difficult to reach on phone there is effort made to maintain a constant communication with each and every GSOP site. To a large extent the supply side of accountability is well positioned to respond to the demands.

5.5.3 Answerability to stakeholders

The introduction of TABs ensure that all relevant information about the contract is made available to all stakeholders. The regional coordinator intimated that;

“We put our payment report on the TABs for people to see that someone is not impersonating another person Information on how much the project is supposed to cost, how much labour component thus the percentage that is supposed to go to wages, it shows when the contract starts and is supposed to finish. We put our numbers on these boards for participants who are not satisfied in one way or the other to call for their grievances to be resolved” (interview with the regional coordinator, 2017).

The regional coordinator agreed that social accountability mechanisms within their operations continue to evolve and improve. It is rather unfortunate that the banks they deal with turn to have poor customer relations and do not treat the beneficiaries well, due to the fact that the beneficiaries are poor people. The high level of decentralization in the system also ensures that relevant information to enable all stakeholders, from the top ranks to the lower ranks to make effective demands on duty bearers are made available. This ensures both vertical and horizontal responsiveness of social accountability mechanisms within the system.

5.6 Enabling and disabling factors.

The third objective for the study sought to ascertain the various factors that favour effective social accountability mechanisms in the district as well as those factors that pose a challenge to effective social accountability mechanisms put in place by GSOP programme implementers, within the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly. The themes for the discussion have been identified as political context, culture and educational background of the people, access to information, role of the media, state capacity and level of decentralization, state-civil society synergy, the role of community committee and institutionalization of social accountability mechanisms. This was thought of to be in line with the literature on the subject matter as posited by Malena et al. (2004).

5.6.1 Political context

According to the national coordinator there is a high level of commitment on the part of government to social protection even though financial commitment is yet to be fully quantified. The programme makes use of the staff at the assembly who are paid by the government. This is by far a huge financial let off for the programme and is considered as governments' contribution towards ensuring the sustainability of social protection programmes in Ghana.

“We enjoy much support at the assembly level. The officials at the assembly level do a lot of work on this project as in monitoring and supervision. If we are to pay them from the donor fund it would be difficult for us. Government has shown much commitment even with the implementation of the national social protection policy and the labour intensive public works policy, once there are these policies, which is owned and housed within the ministry,

one can say that there is an indication for commitment” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

Respondents intimated that the project is a World Bank funded project and that adequate funding have been made available. One difficulty has to do with political influence on the selection of contractors for the project. According to the regional coordinator;

“Political influence on the selection of contractors is a major challenge. Though we go through the procurement process you find out that people have their own way of going round the process and in the end we find ourselves with contractors who are extremely difficult to work with” (interview with the regional coordinator, 2017)

These contractors are mostly unwilling to disclose contract information for political reasons. This situation impedes effective social accountability in the programme.

5.6.2 The culture and educational background of the people

Even though the beneficiaries are said to be people with low educational background, it was impressive how they carried themselves in the FGDs and the opinions expressed by them. This proved that even though they lacked technical abilities in the specific activities they were engaged in at site, they had more information about some of the environmental factors that would either ensure an effective delivery of services or hamper the successful completion of the projects. It was thus clear that their participation in the programme, especially at the decision making process was very instructive, since they solved certain misunderstandings within a short time. This implies that the culture and educational background of the people per say, does not prevent them from holding

duty bearers accountable, but the availability of invited spaces for the beneficiaries to be able to hold duty bearers accountable makes the difference.

5.6.3 Access to information

It was evident on the field through interactions with the beneficiaries and officials that information pertaining to the project was kept right at their door step. The national coordinator had this to say;

“We are all waiting for the passage of the right to information bill. However, as a project we make sure that we do full disclosure, but that is not legally binding. We sign contracts in the community, we have the TAB that is expected to display every relevant information about the project in the community” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

Beneficiaries confirmed this in the FGDs held;

“As for the assembly they have put a lot of information on that board, we know from the board, the contractor’s name and which company is doing the work. We can also see the hotlines on the board. Some of the workers tried the hotline when our money was not coming, they responded and told us to exercise patience. They have even given us some space on the board for us to paste our announcements” (FGDs, 2017).

The provision of these information on the TAB supports effective social accountability and is in line with the RBA to social protection.

5.6.4 The role of the media

According to the regional coordinator the media has not been involved in their activities in the past. This he attributed to their inability to display their achievements and to create the enabling

spaces for them to get involved with the activities of the GSOP programme but that is beginning to change. In recent times, they have involved the media a lot.

“In fact last year, the national coordinating office commissioned an exposé. The regional coordinating offices were in attendance to highlight some of our achievements and gradually the media is getting interested in our activities. With our website that have been developed we are using different mediums to communicate what we are doing to the rest of the world. I have also seen a number of articles in the daily graphics as well” (interview with the regional coordinator, 2017).

This indicates an improvement in the involvement of the media as in the publication of articles on the success and challenges of the programme, which to a large extent will ensure that the tenets of social accountability is made effective in the operations of the GSOP programme.

5.6.5 State capacity and level of decentralization

Even though the programme did not have physical presence by way of an office, the DPO and other co-opted assembly staff who worked on the GSOP subprojects received some amount of training and have been well equipped to carry out their duties. Decentralization is appreciably at a high level in the programme, which supports social accountability. Processes and procedures are carried out by community members and they only report those few issues they are unable to handle at the community level to the assembly staff they interacted with. Selection of beneficiaries is fully done at the community level. Daily attendance is recorded by the project implementing committee and sent to the assembly to be keyed into the MIS database for processing. In effect, it was basically issues of financing of the projects and payment of beneficiaries that was largely managed both at the national and regional coordination offices of the GSOP programme.

5.6.6 State-civil society synergy

Even though respondents were able to identify various roles that can be played by civil society organisations to support the efforts of government in promoting social accountability, it was admissible that the GSOP programme would have to do a lot more than it is doing currently in respect of engaging civil society organisations in their operations. According to the regional coordinator,

“For now as I sit here CSOs, that is an area we have to improve. I remember one group came from Tswifo Atimokwa, they wanted to know what they can also do to help but the area they were targeting we had already completed the sub-project. That is an area we have to improve, probably in the monitoring and evaluation they might be able to see things that we might not see” (interview with the regional coordinator, 2017).

This does not support effective social accountability because, these CSOs are closer to the beneficiaries and can help in diverse ways. They can help beneficiaries to better identify invited spaces and also boost their confidence to better articulate their voices in demanding accountability from duty bearers.

5.6.7 Institutionalization of social accountability mechanisms

Social accountability in the GSOP programme is well institutionalized. With a number of reported results of social accountability mechanisms put in place, on the website of the project, officials on the project seem to be much abreast with the tenets of social accountability. Beneficiaries on the other hand have been supplied with practically all the needed information to be used in holding duty bearers accountable for their actions. According to the national coordinator,

“Social accountability within our operations is one of our top most priorities. This is because we want the assembly and the community to own the projects after we have handed over to them” (interview with the national coordinator, 2017).

5.6.8 The role of community committee

Responses from committee members in the GSOP programme indicate that they have been empowered to make effective demands for accountability from duty bearers. As mentioned earlier, committee members are deeply involved in the registration and the management of the beneficiaries on site and even liaising with the rural banks when it comes to payment of beneficiaries.

“One of my duties as a community facilitator is to record the daily attendance of beneficiaries to work, so I am able to calculate what each beneficiary is entitled to. When payments made to beneficiaries do not tally with my records I confront the bankers to seek clarification” (Interview with a community facilitator, 2017).

It is even more refreshing to note that even when the programme is oversubscribed another committee is instituted to actually select those who must be given the first chance to benefit, which supports the tenets of the RBA to social protection. In some instances a shift system is employed and used by the community members themselves. This makes the committee well empowered and confidence in the procedure is boosted, which provides a fertile grounds for beneficiaries to demand and actually exercise their rights. This confirms earlier findings of Oduro (2015).

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

The main focus of the study was to examine the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms deployed in the implementation of social protection programmes, specifically in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly of Ghana. In doing so, there was the need to examine the level of participation of all stakeholders especially beneficiaries. There was also the need to take a critical look at the enabling and disabling environment within which these social accountability mechanisms are deployed.

After such a comprehensive analysis of the findings of the study this chapter presents the summary of the study in a comparative manner. The theoretical contributions of the study, conclusions based on the findings, recommendations for academia and policy makers, implications of the study, and areas for future research follow in that order.

6.1 Summary of Findings

This section summarizes the findings of the study according to the key themes. It presents a comparative analysis of the implementation of social accountability mechanism within the LEAP and GSOP programmes.

6.1.1 The level of participation of citizens in both programmes

Evidence from the various interviews and focus group discussions pointed to the fact that, at the planning stage of the programmes, beneficiaries were involved in the dissemination of information about the programmes. They were also involved in identifying the target beneficiaries and communities for the programme. GSOP beneficiaries had the opportunity to select projects that met their needs and played a major role in selecting beneficiaries for the projects. On the other hand, LEAP beneficiaries had to wait for final selection from the national secretariat after the initial registration process. This gave rise to several inconsistencies in the selection. According to the beneficiaries, there were some beneficiaries who have been registered as widows but were never married in the first place. Some aged who were registered earlier are yet to benefit. The GSOP programme made provision to factor beneficiary concerns made at various community meetings into the planning of the programme. However, the same cannot be said about the LEAP programme, where beneficiaries were not motivated to make any input. Community committees operating in the GSOP programme had much more work to do than committees operating within the LEAP programme, which had in fact collapsed.

At the programme implementation stage, both CLIC focal members and GSOP community facilitators were actively involved in the organization of the payment centers as they made arrangements for chairs and tables to be used in the process. They kept their respective ‘followers’ well informed. CLIC focal members often conveyed the aged who cannot make their way easily to the payment centers with taxis for which reasons, they need some financial support. Both LEAP and GSOP beneficiaries complained about the service delivery of the banks. The banks made several attempts to retain part of their benefits in a savings account without the permission of the

beneficiaries. Committee members in both programmes played a major role in resolving such issues. However, the reluctance of the assembly officials to comment on these issues is quite intriguing. Their position on the matter was that the bank is in business to make profit. This situation makes it difficult for the poor people to actually demand their rights from duty-bearers. GSOP beneficiaries have access to a reliable hotline readily available and active to respond to complaints. For LEAP beneficiaries, the only visible channel to lodge their grievances was through the CLIC focal members to the Director of the DSW in the district. This does not promote effective social accountability. Again, the researcher observed from the interactions with beneficiaries that GSOP community facilitators are able to handle majority of grievances with the help of committee members and opinion leaders at the community level than CLIC focal members who would always refer the grievances to the district social welfare office for appropriate directions. This situation is as a result of the collapse of the CLIC.

At the programme evaluation stage it was evident that beneficiaries did not have much invited spaces to participate in the monitoring and evaluation of the LEAP programme, as there were no stakeholder review programmes at the district level. GSOP on the other hand employed a participatory monitoring approach, where all stakeholders could monitor work on site and report through laid down channels. With the help of the TABs which indicated the starting and expected completion period for the GSOP sub-projects, stakeholders could easily tell when a project is unduly delayed and contact appropriate quarters for answers.

6.1.2 Effectiveness of social accountability within the two programmes

The level of voice of beneficiaries was one of the indicators used by the researcher to evaluate the effectiveness of social accountability within the programmes in the district, in line with the view of Camargo and Jacobs (2011). It was evident that, the sensitization exercises that were organized for LEAP beneficiaries on paydays did not satisfy the basic requirements for effective social accountability. Beneficiaries were not provided with the necessary information with which they could hold duty-bearers accountable. On paydays, beneficiaries were mostly tired after a long wait for the bankers to arrive and so they were not much interested in the sensitization sessions. They only listened attentively to rules and regulations from programme implementers.

There were indeed few spaces created for beneficiaries in the LEAP programme to air their views and make effective demands for social accountability as compared to the GSOP programme. It was also clear that enforcement of the tenets of social accountability was very effective in the GSOP programme as compared to the LEAP programme. This was made possible by the use of dedicated hotlines at the national and regional coordinating offices with committed and motivated staff to respond to calls from stakeholders. Even though LEAP officials at the assembly do well to send their report to the national secretariat and copy the assembly, beneficiaries are not previewed to the contents of these reports since they are not entitled to a copy. The use of the TABs in the operations of GSOP makes answerability, on the part of duty bearers to citizens, promising and this eliminates speculations in the media.

6.1.3 Enabling and disabling factors of the two programmes

Respondents agreed to the fact that there was a high level of commitment on the part of government to ensure the sustainability of social accountability within the implementation of social protection programmes. However, governments' commitment to social accountability within the LEAP programme is low as compared to that of the GSOP programme. That notwithstanding, government has made quite remarkable commitment to social protection. From the interviews, political influence on the selection of beneficiaries was minimal. However, there is a huge political influence in the selection of contractors for the GSOP projects. Even though the culture and the educational level of the people puts them in a very poor position to make effective demands for accountability, GSOP beneficiaries are making more instructive impact in the implementation of the programme than that of LEAP beneficiaries.

This underscores the fact that low level of education in itself is not a burrier for the success of social accountability mechanisms per say, but the visibility of the invited spaces and respect of the rights of the beneficiaries ensures that the citizens can participate actively. The inability of parliament to successfully pass the rights to information bill is negatively affecting effective social accountability at the local level. Officials at the local level are reluctant to release information for fear of losing their jobs. Respondents agreed to the fact that the passage of the bill will provide a legal barking for them to release adequate information promptly to promote social accountability. That notwithstanding, the GSOP programme does full disclosure, with contracts being signed at the community and all project information provided on the TABs.

The presence of the media can be felt, as they do well to cover various social activities under the programmes and inform beneficiaries on the date for next payment. The level of decentralization in the operations of the LEAP programme is indeed low. Officials at the assembly did not have the power to select beneficiaries. They could only deal with minor problems that arise in the district. They were more or less support staff with very little discretionary powers. Financial decision making was largely done at the LEAP secretariat. However, the level of decentralization in the operations of GSOP is high. Inadequate logistics continue to hamper the operations of both programmes at the assembly level.

Civil society involvement in social protection programmes at the assembly level has not been encouraging. They were mostly focusing on their own programmes and paid little attention to what the assembly was doing because, they themselves have not been accountable to the assembly so they lacked the moral rights to demand accountability from duty bearers. The concept of social accountability is well institutionalized in the GSOP programme than in the LEAP programme. The committee system was yielding much more results in regards to social accountability in the GSOP programme than in the LEAP programme. This is because GSOP community facilitators are well motivated to participate, with the little allowance they get. However, CLIC members do not have any allowance therefore they prefer going to work on their farms than to sacrifice their time to work for the LEAP programme.

6.2 Theoretical Contribution

This study was underpinned by the RBA to social protection to determine the level of effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms, in view of the prevailing enabling and disabling factors confronting the implementation of social accountability mechanisms within social protection programmes in Ghana. The focus was on the LEAP and GSOP programmes in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly. As espoused earlier by Kim & Bradley (2007) the state (duty-bearers) must be held accountable by citizens (rights-holders) for the creation of an environment that promotes respect for the social and economic rights of all citizens. It was evident that, beneficiaries of the GSOP programme were empowered to take their own decisions. However, beneficiaries had little knowledge of invited spaces and were not empowered to make effective use of the few invited spaces made available for them in the LEAP programme. The posture of LEAP in this regard opposes effective social accountability especially, in view of the RBA to social protection as endorsed by the DFID.

The study also employed the World Bank's (2002) framework for assessing the level of participation in policy making, to measure the level of citizens' participation in social protection programmes. This ensured realistic conclusions. It was rather unfortunate that participation in the LEAP programme from planning through implementation to the evaluation stage was averagely compared to the information-sharing and consultation level of the World Bank's (2002) framework. This suggests that the level of citizens' participation in the LEAP programme is very low and needs improvement. However, participation in the GSOP programme was averagely comparable to lesser degrees of just consultations and a high degree of joint decision-making level of the World Bank's (2002) framework. This implies that citizens are very much involved in the

implementation of the GSOP programme. Evidence from the GSOP programme indicate that RBA to social protection provides a conducive framework for the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms.

6.3 Conclusion

The findings from the study show that, community committees were much more involved at the implementation of the programmes than at the planning and the evaluation stages of both programmes. However, the collapse of CLIC membership is a setback to the effectiveness of social accountability within the LEAP programme. The study was guided by a conceptual framework which explains the variables necessary for the effectiveness of social accountability in social protection programmes.

The study also revealed that the RBA to social protection provides the respite towards the attainment of effective social accountability within social protection programmes. When beneficiary rights are respected and they are given enough power to play an active role in the decision making process, greater levels of efficiency and effectiveness is ensured in the implementation of social protection programmes. It was noted that even though beneficiaries of the LEAP programme were not consulted as to the best way to help them inch out of poverty, the programme has been largely beneficial and they are extremely grateful for such an intervention. However, beneficiaries could have played much enhanced role in helping programme implementers to reduce the level of inclusion and exclusion errors.

Government has shown much commitment to social protection by means of policy making and the provision of resources directly and indirectly to the implementation of social protection programmes. The role of the media as well as civil society organisations is particularly indispensable in the attainment of effective social accountability. Finally, the use of TABs and a dedicated hotline in the GSOP programme to promote social accountability has ensured greater levels of enforceability and answerability in the programme.

6.4 Implications of the Study

This study has revealed the low level of participation in the LEAP programme in Ghana. The findings of the study have also documented the fact that CLICs have collapsed due to inadequate remuneration of CLIC members by programme implementers. This confirms the assertion of Sabates-Wheeler et al., (2017). There is therefore the need for a more concerted effort on the part of policy implementers (duty-bearers) to improve the level of citizen engagement and most specifically to improve upon both demand side and supply side accountability. This can be made possible by creating more invited spaces for citizens. This will ensure that social accountability is made effective in the implementation of social protection programmes. CLIC focal members must be well motivated to drive the course of effective social accountability, since beneficiaries depend largely on them for the necessary information.

Government must show more commitment to decentralization. District Assembly officials must be empowered to take absolute control of the administration of their localities in a collaborative arrangement with opinion leaders in the various local communities. This will encourage local

participation in policy implementation. In much the same way parliament must expedite actions on the passage of the Right to Information Bill. The findings from the study tend to suggest that social accountability mechanisms, when deployed effectively in the implementation of social protection programmes, will ensure that citizens are empowered to make effective demands for accountability from duty bearers. This leads to an improvement in the system of governance and consequently effective development as posited by Malena et al. (2004).

6.5 Recommendations

This study was commenced on the premise that effective deployment of social accountability mechanisms will result in the successful implementation of social protection programmes in Ghana. Per the findings of the study, beneficiaries are involved in the implementation of social protection programmes in Ghana. However, there is yet much more room for an improved collaborative effort between the state and the citizens. These recommendations have been proposed to ensure the improvement and sustainability of social accountability within the implementation of social protection programmes;

- The political will on the part of government to commit adequate state resources to the programme to guarantee the regularity and sustainability of cash transfer, must be regularised. This will help the beneficiaries to better plan to invest part of the money towards more sustainable economic empowerment.
- The level of Decentralisation in the implementation of the LEAP programme must be improved to afford the district implementation team much more power in the selection of beneficiaries and the implementation of the programme. This will ensure the swift

resolution of majority of the problems at the district level. This is very important because, these officials have a better understanding of the environment within which they operate.

- The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana must expedite action on the passage of the right to information bill. This will form the legal bases on which citizens can make effective demands on duty-bearers for credible and timeous information to steer the wheels of effective social accountability.
- There is the need for skill training in the form of an alternative livelihood training and basic financial management training for beneficiaries. There were some LEAP beneficiaries who could work to earn a living but were unemployed. This skill training will help them break the cycle of poverty and better manage their benefits.
- There is also the need for some form of orientation for the banks that handle the payment of the beneficiaries to ensure an improved customer relations between beneficiaries and the bankers. This will have a positive impact on the self-esteem of these vulnerable beneficiaries and increase their self confidence in making effective demands for their entitlements.
- CLIC focal persons in the LEAP programme should be given some allowance to motivate them to better discharge their duties just as GSOP community facilitators are motivated to do well. The committee must be given a little more power to support programme implementers especially in the area of selection of beneficiaries. This will reduce the errors of inclusion and exclusion.
- There is the need for some form of capacity building of assembly members especially in respect of monitoring and evaluation of the various social protection programmes. The assembly members must pay much attention to monitoring and evaluation.

- There is the need for a clean-up of the register for LEAP beneficiaries to get rid of deceased beneficiaries, beneficiaries who have relocated to stay with their relatives in long distant towns and villages as well as orphans who are now adults and can work to fend for themselves.

6.6 Areas for Further Research

There were some important issues that were not discussed as part of this study, due to the limited time available for the study, even though these issues were very important. From the interactions with respondents it was evident that civil society organisations have a major role to play in promoting social accountability in the implementation of social protection programmes since they are closer to the people and are much interested in channeling the course of respect for human rights. A study into the role of various civil society organisations in promoting social accountability to ensure a successful implementation of social protection programmes is worth looking at. Then again, it was realised that beneficiaries mostly belonged to one church or the other and quite a number of them are Muslims. There is therefore the need to study the role of religious bodies in the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms in the implementation of social protection programmes. A quantitative look at the issues raised in this study is worth exploring to present an objective view of the issues discussed in this study for comparative purpose.

The study can be replicated in other sectors of the economy as in the effective application of social accountability mechanisms in the health sector, education sector, agricultural sector and others. Finally, there is the need for this study to be replicated at the national level since this study focused on stakeholders at the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly.

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE MATRIX

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA BUSINESS SCHOOL, LEGON
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND HEALTH SERVICE
MANAGEMENT

RESPONDENTS	MAIN QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS
LEAP Programme coordinators/ GSOP Programme coordinators	To what extent do beneficiaries participate in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the social protection programmes?	1. Are citizens/stakeholders involved in the planning, implementation and evaluation of LEAP/GSOP? i. 'upstream' actions (development of policy and regulation) and ii. 'downstream' actions (accountability efforts to ensure the implementation of said policy) 2. In what ways are citizens involved in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the LEAP/GSOP 3. Is it necessary for citizens/stakeholders to be involved in the planning and implementation of social protection programmes? Why? 4. What avenues exist for citizens to hold officials accountable for their actions?
	What are the enabling and disabling factors in the fulfilment of the social contract between the state and citizens in both the LEAP and GSOP programmes at the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly?	1. To what extent is the state committed to social protection? 2. What is the budgetary allocation for social protection programmes this year? 3. Are there legal regulations that promotes citizens access to information? 4. What mechanisms are in place to respond to citizen's requests and grievances?

		5. Do you have the capacity, in terms of staff, resources and authority, to respond to citizens' request? 6. Are there incentives and sanctions to force officials to respond to citizens requests? 7. How well do you engage with civil society organizations in the implementation of the LEAP/GSOP 8. How responsive is the media to invitations to cover forums of social accountability? 9. To what extent is social accountability institutionalized in your operations? 10. What are the challenges you face in operationalizing social accountability mechanisms at the district?
	How effective is social accountability in both the LEAP and GSOP programmes at the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly?	1. What measures have been put in place to make social accountability mechanisms effective at the district level? 2. Any motivation or sanctions for officials in this regard? 3. To what extent has citizen's demand for accountability influenced policy outcomes? 4. Can citizen's participation in the budgetary process yield positively to improving social accountability within the programmes? 5. How can citizens be better engaged in tracking public expenditure on the programmes? 6. In what ways can social accountability within the LEAP/GSOP be improved?

APPENDIX B: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD (TAB)

 GHANA SOCIAL OPPORTUNITIES PROJECT (GSOP) LIPW COMMUNITY TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD 			
Project Title:		REHABILITATION OF MOKOMESHITAMOR JNC - ABONYA FEEDER ROAD (2.2km)	
Name of community:		SHAI OSUDOKU	
Contract Sum:	207,921.37	Total Amt due Labour :	71,146.77
Start Date:	15 TH MARCH 2016		Notice: 122,441,39 926139 SECOND PAYMENT: 8330.64 THIRD PAYMENT: 10243.97 4 TH PAYMENT: 12572.00 5 TH PAYMENT: 10353.00 TOTAL: 46080.00
End Date:	15 TH SEPTEMBER 2016		
Mode of Execution (Contract / CIP):		If Contract, name of Firm:	M/S DURAYS ENG. COMPANY LTD.
Total Number of workers Required:	150	Total projected Person Days:	11,858
Expenditure to Date:	GH¢ 88,150.00	Total Amt. Paid to Contractor:	GH¢ 60,344.00
		Total Amt. Paid to Labour:	GH¢ 17,592.39
Number of payments made to labour:	FIVE TIMES	Date of Last Payment :	15 TH DECEMBER 2016
Amt. Paid out as Wages during Last Payment:	GH¢ 6,552.00	Unclaimed Wages:	
Next Payment:	FEB. 2017	Labour Requirement:	66
Telephone Numbers:		GSOP NCO: 0504-529540	GSOP ARCO: 0503-551489

10TH DASH