

**AN ASSESSMENT OF GHANA'S CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS  
WEST AFRICAN INTEGRATION**

**BY**

**RICHARD KOMLA NYAMADOR  
(ID: 10214308)**

**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY  
OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  
REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF  
ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**LEGON**

**May 2016**

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**DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of Dr. Philip Attuquayefio. This work has never been submitted partially or wholly elsewhere for any award, that all sources used have been duly acknowledged.

.....

**Signature**

**RICHARD KOMLA NYAMADOR  
(Student)**


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**Signature**

**Dr. PHILIP ATTUQUAYEFIO  
(Supervisor)**

**Date.....**

**Date .....**



## **DEDICATION**


This work is dedicated to the Almighty.



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My sincere appreciation goes to my family and friends whose invaluable support in diverse forms encouraged me to go through the course.



## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACO	Aliens Compliance Order
ACP	African, Carribean and Pacific Group of States
ADB	African Development Bank
AEC	African Economic Community
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AGI	Association of Ghana Industries
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEAO	Communaute Economic de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
CET	Common External Tarriff
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPP	Convention People’s Party
EBID	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
EEC	European Economic Community
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FES	Friedrich –Ebert –Stiftung
IEPA	Interim Economic Partnership Agreement

LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NLC	National Liberation Council
NRC	National Redemption Party
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PP	Progress Party
REC	Regional Economic Community
SMC I	Supreme Military Council I
SMC II	Supreme Military Council II
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine
WACB	West African Central Bank
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WAMA	West African Monetary Agency
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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
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## ABSTRACT

After several efforts at forming a body that will seek to integrate the entire sub-region, ECOWAS was finally formed in 1975. However, after forty years of existence ECOWAS is still far from achieving its integrative agenda. ECOWAS is faced with the challenge of its leaders' perception and will bearing on the manner in which sub-regional policies and protocols are implemented. Thus there is the general perception that governments of West African countries have dealt with the issues of the sub-region with different emphasis. There is however very little research or comparative frameworks to serve as a measure to determine how various member countries have contributed to the sub-regions integration agenda. This case study research therefore sought to establish whether Ghana as an individual country has since her independence in 1957, contributed significantly towards the sub-regional integration agenda. The study showed that over the years, various Ghanaian governments have either been passive or active with the sub-regions integration agenda. The passive integration era for Ghana was as a result of domestic challenges. Ghana however became committed to the sub-regions integration drive in the early 1990's and has since assumed a leading role in integration scheme. Ghana has been at the forefront of economic, infrastructural and security developments. Ghana however needs to double its efforts at meeting the criteria for the sub-regions conversion to a single currency regime, as well as resolve its trade differences with Nigeria so as to serve a booster for the much craved for community common market.



## CHAPTER ONE

### RESEARCH DESIGN

#### 1.0 Introduction

Regional integration generally involves a somewhat complex web of cooperation between countries within a geographical area. It demands harmonisation of policies in sectors such as trade, investment, infrastructural development as well as fiscal and monetary policies of member states. The overall objective is essentially to ensure stability, economic growth and development within the integrating area.<sup>1</sup> The past fifty to sixty years has witnessed a tremendous leap towards regional economic cooperation and integration in the various regions of the world. This has much to do with the evolving nature of international economic relations and globalisation, since international relations experts believe that regional integration has the potential of encouraging development and economic cooperation.<sup>2</sup>

The vision of integration by African leaders led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 with the aim of promoting unity and solidarity amongst African Nations. One can argue that despite the challenges, OAU has relatively been able to pursue the vision of integration which entails rallying African countries towards a single vision for economic integration and development. Fortunately for the OAU, the United Nations Commission for Africa (UNCA) encouraged sub-regional integration in Africa that saw the formation of the East African Economic Community, in June 1967. The success of the East African Economic Commission motivated the UNCA to turn its attention to West Africa. The undercurrents of regional integration and the dictates of international economic relations made the formation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) a necessity.<sup>3</sup>

In May 1975, 15 West African States<sup>4</sup>, conscious of the overriding need to accelerate and encourage the economic and social development of their states so as to improve the living standards of their peoples, decided to create ECOWAS. West African countries are weakly integrated nationally, regionally and internationally. Ethnic and socio-political divisions are predominantly noteworthy in almost all these countries. These divisions are well pronounced in areas where there have been crises or war for which Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali are good examples. Additionally, West African countries are divided by a wide range of institutional, legal and infrastructural barriers, which create a sense of disconnectedness. This disconnectedness could better be described with the low levels of economic interaction among West African states as against the high interaction with other economies outside the region.<sup>5</sup>

At the international level, Africa and West Africa, in particular, is increasingly marginalized in the share of world markets, technology and consumer goods. Throughout Africa, the strong feeling of disconnectedness and marginalization keeps growing. The hope at independence, that the nation-state was going to be an agent of development at the national level, has become an illusion. The search, therefore, for a new form of an integrated community able to overcome some of the developmental challenges of today's changing world has become a matter of necessity. For West Africa, the focus of attention in this search for an integrated community has been ECOWAS. Apart from the well-known challenges of ECOWAS such as the lack of proper institutions, weak transport and communications infrastructure among others, new forms of problems initially unexpected have emerged. For instance, the inception and the growing strength of the West Africa Monetary and Economic Union (WAEMU or UEMOA) as a parallel West African integration group has caused a significant challenge in efforts at integrating West Africa. From the aforementioned, it can be argued clearly that regional integration in West Africa is seriously challenged.

## **1.1 Statement of the Research Problem**

West Africa's integration drive commenced long before, the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. For example, before Ghana's independence in 1957, there existed among the Anglophone West Africa states (Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone), several organisations that sought to integrate the Anglophone community.<sup>6</sup> Today, virtually all these organisations have been dissolved by individual Anglophone member states. This feeds the perceptions that over the years, governments of all West African countries including Ghana have dealt with the issue of sub-regional integration with different emphasis and effort arising from the personality and perceptions of the heads of state, the prevailing social, economic and political conditions in their respective countries.

Governments have either been active or passive in the drive towards integrating West Africa. That notwithstanding, despite the numerous literatures on West African integration, very little research has been conducted or published on individual countries contribution towards making the West African integration dream a reality. It is therefore important that a comparative framework is conducted or case studies, based on individual countries contributions to determine how different member countries embraced the regional integration drive or vice versa. To this end a case study on Ghana, an ECOWAS member state, is the focus of this research.

## **1.2 Research Questions**

The study will be guided by the following research questions:

- a. What are the major integration schemes instituted by ECOWAS since its formation and what has been Ghana's response at these ECOWAS schemes?

- b. Has Ghana, over the years, failed in achieving certain criteria required for any of the levels of integration and are there major challenges affecting Ghana's efforts at contributing towards that level of integration?
- c. Can it really be argued that, the levels of commitment towards sub-regional integrations by various Governments of Ghana have been so diverse?

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The paper analyses the ECOWAS structures and efforts at integrating West Africa since its inception in 1975, and contributions made by an individual member state. In my opinion, individual country efforts at integrating the region could have been forthcoming enough, however, only inadequately captured in the sub-regions integration literatures. The objectives of the research are as follows:

- Use Ghana as a case study to establish whether an individual country has contributed significantly to the integration drive in West Africa since her independence in 1957 and if so, how?
- Examine West Africa's integration structures since the formation of ECOWAS in 1975.
- To identify any challenges that could have affected Ghana's effort over the years at contributing to West African integration.
- Make suggestions and recommendations.

### **1.4 Scope of the Study**

The study looks at West African integration with focus on ECOWAS and how Ghana has contributed towards integrating the West African sub-region, with emphasis on the period after the formation of ECOWAS in 1975.

## **1.5 Significance of the Study**

Member states have in various means contributed to the current integrative status of West Africa. As mentioned earlier, since the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, there is no comparative framework for determining how individual countries have been forthright in ensuring that the ECOWAS integrative goals are achieved. Such outlines will serve as references for policy makers and the academia. Using Ghana as a case study, findings of this research seek to:

- Serve as contribution to knowledge, policy, practice and future research.
- Reckon why several pre-independence organisations that could easily have integrated West Africa at independence failed.
- Serve as a useful case study reference point with regards to Ghana's efforts at improving regional integration.
- Satisfy a requirement for the award of a Master of Arts (MA) Degree in International Affairs.

## **1.6 Hypothesis**

Despite the varying levels of contribution by various Ghanaian leaders towards integrating West Africa, thus, some being passive and others active Ghana has made a significant contribution towards integrating the West Africa sub-region.

## **1.7 Theoretical Framework**

This research is framed within the theoretical concepts of integration which includes neo-functionalism. Neo-functionalist theory of integration is relevant to this study because the whole idea of sub-regional integration under the ECOWAS framework suggests collaboration among a segment of the international community consisting of fifteen (15) countries with the intent of economic development, promoting inter trade and investment among others. Collaboration

among ECOWAS member states has led to the introduction of ECOWAS passport for all West African citizens so as to promote the free movement of people protocol. It is however important to mention that integration theory has been contested by the theory of realism, which views the international system as anarchical. The fact that international and intergovernmental institutions exist confirms the ability of states to integrate.

Notable proponents of Neo-functionalism include works by Ernst Haas, Leon Lindlesy and Joseph Nye. The major assumption underlying neo-functionalism is that no state is capable of maintaining its economic structures and capable of meeting the economic needs of its people, without cooperation with other countries.<sup>7</sup> There arises the need for states to make conscious effort to forge interdependent relations. This assumption accounts for the reasons why ECOWAS countries do cooperate with each other as well as with other non-members. Haas however, assumes that the decision to proceed with integration or to oppose it depends upon the gains or loss expectation by major groups within the units to be integrated. Central to neo-functionalism is the ‘pull effect’ phenomenon or what Nye calls the integrative potential which can generate the process mechanisms. Nye suggests that the neo-functionalist literature contains seven “process mechanisms” around which he re-conceptualizes and re-formulates the neo-functionalist theory. These process mechanisms are briefly enumerated as follows:

### ***1.7.1 Functional Linkage of Tasks, or the Concept of Spill-over***

According to Haas, regional integration flows from the process of spill over in which the integrating of an individual sector is built by aiming to achieve the process of integration in other sectors.<sup>8</sup> Example, the liberalization of trade within a customs union would lead to harmonisation of economic policies and eventually spillover into political areas and lead to the creation of some kind of political community.<sup>9</sup> The ECOWAS trade liberation scheme initiative

did not materialise, probably if it had, the sub-region's integration agenda would have realised a spill over. However, Nye argues that this mechanism has most often been misapplied, in his opinion, to include any sign of increased cooperation, arising, for example because of definite efforts by integrationist elites to encourage spill-over.

### ***1.7.2 Ideological-Identitive Appeal***

This is the establishment of a sense of identity that represents a powerful force in support of regional integration. Nye argues that “the stronger the sense of permanence and the greater the identitive appeal, the less willing are opposition groups to attack an integration scheme frontally.”<sup>10</sup> With the establishment of ECOWAS supranational institutions, there is the possibility of the sub-regions integration agenda catching up with the identitive appeal in future. It is said that under such conditions, members are more likely than otherwise to tolerate short-term losses, and businesses are more likely to invest in the expectation that they will benefit, on a continuing basis, from the presence of a large market.

### ***1.7.3 Involvement of External Actors in the Process***

Here, Nye points to the importance of external actors and their active involvement in his neo-functional model as a part of the process mechanism. It is also noted that the significance of outside governmental actors is relevant as catalysts of regional integrative schemes. Neo-functionalists like Haas and Nye argue that even if the international system is anarchical, states can do work together with the help of intergovernmental institutions. The existence of these institutions, like the ECOWAS structure confirms the ability of states to integrate.

#### **1.7.4 *Deliberate Linkages and Coalition Formation***

Looking at this heading, Nye focuses upon spill-over or what he terms accentuated spill-over, in which “problems are deliberately linked together into package deals, not because of technological necessity, but because of political and ideological projections and political feasibilities”.<sup>11</sup> Nye dwelled heavily upon the experiences of the European Union to point at efforts of politicians and international bureaucrats and interest groups to create coalitions based upon linked issues.

#### **1.7.5 *Rising Transactions***

This highlights the idea that integration is accompanied by an increase in transactions, including capital movement, trade, communications, and exchange of ideas and people. Political actors in regional integration scheme, faced with heavy demands upon common institutions resulting from an increasing volume of transactions, may choose to deal with them on a strictly national basis, or they may decide to strengthen the common institutions. An example of this is; the ECOWAS free movement of goods and persons protocol, which seeks to encourage transactions in the sub-region.

#### **1.7.6 *Elite Socialization***

In this case, numerous examples of the increasing support for integration by elites who have actively participated in an integrative scheme abound. The extent to which national bureaucrats become participants in regional integration will determine the level of their socialization. This is deemed important because national bureaucrats are said to be wary of integration because of the possible loss of national control.

### **1.7.7 Regional Group Formation**

Regional integration is said to stimulate the creation, both formally and informally, of non-governmental groups or transitional associations. The new ECOWAS structure has various sub-bodies for the administration of several projects and proposals. This is a clear case of integration stimulating group formation.

## **1.8 Literature Review**

Much has been written on the subject of regional integration in West Africa, the focus albeit on challenges and prospects. One such effort is the collection edited by Real Lavergne<sup>12</sup>. Part one of the book lays emphasis on the theoretical and strategic approaches through which there could be effective regional integration in West Africa. The chapter warns of institutional crisis and advocates for new models and approaches to sub-regional integration. Professor Seth Kumi is of the view that, a typical example of institutional crisis could be the issue of admissibility and implementation of cases decided by the ECOWAS Community Court, as occurred in the *Yogogombaye v Senegal* case.<sup>13</sup> Part two of the book deals with the economic perspectives and, here, gives a clear picture of some vivid obstacles to effective regional integration. In part three the political dimensions of integration in West Africa is discussed. This collection, though very comprehensive and analytical in the various associated subject areas, still lacks the adequacy of conciseness where the problems and prospects of regional integration in West Africa are concerned. The collection failed to analyse omissions by individual member states that has over the years resulted in the West African regional integration drive being a mirage.

Ali Mansoor and Andreas Inotai<sup>14</sup> have a catalogue of problems and prospects of regional integration arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa. Their write up, also only identified general obstacles to West African regional integration just as several other authors. As usual, Mansoor and Inotai indicate that the major problematic area as far as regional integration in sub-Saharan

Africa is concerned is the lack of interest by African governments in Regional organisations. Prof S.K.B Asante agrees with the pair, when he also cites factors such as lack of commitment by African ruling class and lack of national institutions for managing the regional co-operation process as some obstacles to the integrative process.<sup>15</sup> Dr Yao Gebe<sup>16</sup> also agrees with Mansoor and Inotia when he mentions that individual decision makers or political leaders influence a country's foreign policy decision, based on their beliefs and perceptions. Antwi Danso supports this view as well. Danso, suggests that integration schemes in Africa is mostly by politicians, basically without the involvement of the ordinary citizens in the process.<sup>17</sup> These arguments buttress the views of Mansoor and Inotia on how decision making on regional integration rests solely with a few, thus the ruling class thereby affecting integration efforts. It is evident that there is the need for appraisal literature on member countries contributions. One is therefore of the view that Mansoor and Inotia could however have delved deeper into individual country specifics.

In his work "The Strategy of Regional Integration in Africa",<sup>18</sup> Prof SKB Asante is of the view that, the only viable strategy for optimal development of the people of Africa and the world as a whole is regional integration. Prof Asante also identified factors such as lack of commitment by African ruling class, lack of adequate and viable national institutions for managing the regional co-operation process, limited role of the private sector and interest groups in the integration process. He sees the market approach of integration adopted by Africans as inappropriate due to the non-existence of an industrial base in Africa.<sup>19</sup> To him, this market approach is only suitable for developed countries where infrastructure is already in place, thus making the market integration suitable for their purposes. Asante suggests that a realistic approach to economic integration in Africa must start with the recognition that African countries lack most of the prerequisites that are considered necessary for effective economic integration to take place. He suggest measures such as; the strengthening of national institutions, adoption of the production

approach to integration, strengthening of national integration structures and the active involvement of the private sector in the integration process.

Prof Asante is also of the view that trade liberalisation is an essential tool for economic growth in any regional grouping. He opines that, countries that participate in the trade liberalisation scheme turn to benefit from the elimination of trade barriers to its exports, which results in the development of interregional trade. According to him, the fear of loss of revenue from indirect taxes, lack of a uniform community system of customs and internal indirect taxes as well as restrictions among member countries, serve as obstacles for the smooth implementation of the trade liberalisation scheme in the West African sub-region. Prof Asante's views are not too different from most of the integration literature available. I side with his views on the trade liberalisation concept. However, it is worth mentioning that in December 1999, Ghana and Nigeria initiated the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), I am of the view that a comparative literature on the Ghana –Nigeria ETLS will add to knowledge.

Ernest Aryeetey and Abena Oduro, in carrying out an overview of regional integration, identified small economies as one of the problems that hamper Africa's ability to efficiently industrialise.<sup>20</sup> They argue that, unless non-tariff barriers to integration and discrimination against third parties are addressed, the expected benefits to regional integration will not materialise. According to them, in order for regional integration to become an effective development strategy, there is the need to develop an effective development strategy that ensures that all countries member countries receive some gains from integration. Aryeetey and Oduro attributed failures at integrating to the irrelevance of regional integration to most national governments.<sup>21</sup> Aryeetey and Oduro's work is very comprehensive and analytical, yet like most West African integration literature failed to make comparative analysis.

In a collection edited by The LECIAD and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation titled "Ghana in Search of Regional Integration Agenda",<sup>22</sup> some effort was made at discussing Ghana's

contributions and shortfalls at West African integration. Chapter one 'Overview of Ghana and Regional Integration, Past, Present and Future' with, Afua Boatemaa Yakohene gives a brief account of Ghana's contribution since independence in 1957. She mentions that Ghana's initial efforts at integrating with other countries in the region by its post- independence leaders were based on economic interest than political.<sup>23</sup> In chapter two, 'The executive and State Institutions as Primary Actors in Articulating Ghana's Integration Policies in West Africa', Alexander Frempong also lays emphasis on how the political ruling class at independence opposed efforts at integrating West Africa at Independence<sup>24</sup> Whiles Yao Gebe reflected on the roles of Ghana's Parliamentarians in the Community Parliament in the third chapter. Yao Gebe believes that Ghana's representatives at ECOWAS Parliament, despite limitations, are positively affecting processes of economic and political integration through the institutional and democratic channels at their disposal.<sup>25</sup> In chapter four, Antwi Danso is however of the view that integration schemes in Africa are mostly by politicians. Thus, the ordinary citizens are not usually part of the process. He argues that integration is effective and rigorous when the people being integrated in the various economies understand the ramifications.

Philip Attuquayefio buttresses Antwi Danso's assertion in chapter five when he mentions that using Ghana as a case study, the youth and youth organisations in Ghana currently play minimal role in the process of West African integration. Emmanuel Debrah identifies and examines the critical role political parties in Ghana have played towards the West African integration agenda in Chapter six. Debrah, discusses how post-independent political parties like the CPP, NDC and NPP have in one way or the contributed towards the existence of ECOWAS.

In chapters seven and eight Cletus Kossiba and Kingsley Ofei-Nkansah respectively discussed how the private sector and organised labour have also contributed towards integrating the sub-region. Linda Darkwah in chapter 9 enumerates how Ghana has since independence contributed towards regional integration via its educational institutions. Danquah is however of the view that

the integration agenda can be moved much forward using the educational institutions. E.Y Benneh ends the ten chapter document with the belief that International Organisations have a special role to play in complementing the integration agenda in West Africa. He cites European Unions partnership with West African countries to buttress his assertion. This collection presents an overview of Ghana's efforts at integrating West Africa. Unlike most other literature, Ghana was taken as a case study and various thematic issues were analysed. Though the collection covers several issues that relate Ghana to the regional integration scheme, the book is just a collection of essays with limited analysis on issues.

Though all the literatures afore-reviewed touch on regional integration, I am of the view that much has not been done on the subject of comparative or individual countries literatures the ECOWAS regional integration scheme. This study will therefore attempt to highlight that aspect of Ghana's economic and politico-military contributions towards integrating the West Africa.

## **1.9 Methodology and Sources of Data**

The research which is an assessment of Ghana's role or contribution to ECOWAS integration adopts a case study approach to specifically consider Ghana's influence on West African Integration since independence in 1957. The qualitative technique is employed in collecting and analysing data. The study relies on both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources of data is collected through the use of unstructured method to interview three (3) seasoned senior United Nations (UN) diplomats namely; Professor Seth Kumi, Mr Kofi De-Graft Johnson, Ms Carol Muede Mueke who have held various UN appointments in West African sub-region. Mr Bonaventure Adjavon, deputy head of the ECOWAS Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration was also interviewed. Additionally, three (3) seasoned retired West African senior military officers from Ghana, Nigeria and Gambia respectively, namely; Brigadier General Reindolf Agbemasu (rtd), Colonel Samuel Gbenoba (rtd) and Colonel

Chris Davies (rtd) who served in the ECOWAS-led Peacekeeping Missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were granted unstructured interviews. This method is appropriate for the study because it helps to draw empirical evidence in areas of uncertainty, as well as situations where research findings may take a long time to determine. Secondary sources of data were obtained from books, articles, journals, research and seminar papers from the Kofi Annan Peace Keeping Training Centre On-line Library, Balme Library, LECIAD Library as well as the website for ECOWAS and other internet sources.

### **1.10 Organisation of Study**

This work is divided into four main chapters. Chapter one is Research Design, which involves an introduction to the study, Statement of Problem, Objectives of the study, Scope of Study, Rationale of the Study, the Hypothesis, Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Sources of Data and finally the Organisation of the Study. Chapter two makes an assessment of the West Africa's regional integration schemes since its formation in 1975. Chapter three focuses on assessing Ghana's contribution to West African integration. Chapter four is the concluding part which encompasses the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations.

### **1.11 Limitations of Study**

One major limitation of this study has been the lack of time and finance to travel to the ECOWAS Secretariat for information on some topics. Another limitation has been my much reliance on journals, magazines, reports and seminar papers for information, which was due to the non-availability of enough books on ECOWAS, particularly with regards to the study.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Frempong, K.D.A. “The Executive and State Institutions as Primary Actors in Articulating Ghana’s Integration Policies in West Africa: Challenges and the Way Forward”. in Ghana in Search of Regional Integration Agenda. (Ghana: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009) pp.23-40.

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<sup>8</sup> Belete, M. and Belete, H. “Regional Economic Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects.” *Mizan Law Review*, Vol 8, No.2, 2004.

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<sup>12</sup> Lavergne,R. “Introduction: Reflexions on an agenda for Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa” in Lavergne R (ed) Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A multi-dimensional Perspective. (Asmara: Africa World Press, 1997). p. 6-23

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## CHAPTER TWO

### REVIEW OF WEST AFRICAN STATES' EFFORTS AT INTEGRATING

#### 2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, review of efforts at West African sub-regional integration is conducted. Mention is made briefly of a few of the regional groupings which run alongside or existed in West Africa before or after the inception of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS is the dominant integration arrangement in the whole of West Africa as it encompasses all fifteen countries. However, for the purpose of this chapter; ECOWAS has been cited as one of the sub-regional groupings. The chapter tapers down to ECOWAS as the most significant and dominant integration arrangement in West Africa, since other sub-regional groupings did not target integration of the entire sub-region.

#### 2.1 Historical Overview of West African Integration

With the coming of European colonialism to Africa, economic activities of many kinds: Trade, finance, administrative responsibilities, transport and communication network were organized on a regional basis, including the monetary unions. The Europeans, realising the benefits of regional integration to them, implemented strategies that encouraged integration. The colonial authorities bound occupied territories together<sup>1</sup> under one central administration merely for convenience. The creation of common services and common money issuing boards as well as adoption of common policies, proved useful in this context.<sup>2</sup> Among the Anglophone West Africa states, organisations such as the West Africa Currency Board, the West Africa Court of Appeal and the West Africa Cocoa Research Institute existed.<sup>3</sup>

African countries gained independence at a time when regional economic cooperation was popular among developing countries in other parts of the world. Added to a history of long-range economic contacts and regional economic organization during the colonial period, African countries brought to independence their own desires towards continental or regional unity.

Several loose political groupings began to emerge in the early 1960s. An advocate of Pan-African unity Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana initiated the political union experiment with Senegal and Mali and later with Guinea and Mali. The Monrovia and Brazzaville groups emerged as well, based primarily on the ideological orientations of member states. In 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created to include all African countries. The OAU was, in part, an expression of the desire for unity among Africans. After the formation of OAU, Monrovia and Brazzaville groups were dissolved, and no such sub-regional organizations based primarily on shared ideological orientation or political goals were established.

Regional cooperation among African governments thereafter became aligned primarily on achieving common economic objectives. West Africa made the first attempt at achieving collective self-reliance in November 1963 at Lagos. The conference was on industrial harmonization of the sub-region.<sup>4</sup> This was followed by conference on economic cooperation in October 1966 in Niamey. At a similar conference in Accra in April 1967, an agreement on a proposed Economic Community of West Africa was signed. In November 1967, Heads of State of four countries namely Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea met to form the organization of Senegalese River State. They proposed at this meeting to extend their cooperation to the entire West Africa. All these proposals did not materialise into the formation of a union. Geopolitically, the West African sub-region consist of fifteen (15) countries,<sup>5</sup> including eight (8)

former French colonies, five (5) British colonies, one (1) Portuguese, and one (1) Spanish.<sup>6</sup>

Recognised West African sub-regional groupings are discussed as follows:

### ***2.1.1 Senegal River States***

Following the 1967 Senegal River States meeting mentioned above, these states, driven by the idea of pan-African unity, realised that they could benefit more from the Senegal River by cooperating in its development than by proceeding individually. To this end, in 1972 these countries established the *Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Senegal* (OMVS), also known as *l'espace OMVS* or a space within which countries could cooperate. Decisions were based on the principles of equity, solidarity, and mutual support. OMVS has since jointly owned and operated two dams thereby increasing electricity and water availability to each OMVS member country. The Senegal basin countries have shown regional cooperation as an alternative to achieving joint economic development.

### ***2.1.2 The Economic Community of West Africa (WAEC or CEAO)***

The West Africa Economic Community (WAEC or CEAO), has acted on behalf of member countries to establish protocols since 1973. Membership of this grouping comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, and La Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The ultimate aim of this grouping is to foster the economic and social development of its member states; the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) within twelve years.

The introduction of a common tariff and statistical nomenclature, the simplification of the indirect tax system, and the adoption of a uniform customs duty of five percent (5%), were adopted as preparatory measures. The elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and specifically

quantitative restrictions upon intra-group trade, has not been fully attained. In the other fields of economic cooperation, notably agriculture and transport, fiscal harmonisation progress has been relatively impressive.

### **2.1.3 *The Mano River Union (MRU)***

The Mano River Union is an inter-governmental institution comprising of Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. The Union was established in 1973 between Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 1980, Guinea joined the Union. In April 2008, Cote d'Ivoire also joined the Union.<sup>7</sup> The objectives of Mano River Union (MRU) are to expand reciprocal trade by eliminating existing trade barriers, promote cooperation for the expansion of international trade, and create conditions favourable to expanding the production capacity of the area and to ensure a fair distribution of the benefits of economic cooperation.

The union was envisaged to be established in two phases. Phase one involved liberalizing mutual trade in goods of local origin by eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers, harmonizing tariff rates and fiscal incentives for freely traded goods, and adopting supportive cooperation measures for increasing the output of agricultural and manufactured goods of local origin. The second phase involved establishing common industries and other measures leading to accelerated economic growth and social progress of the member countries. By 1980 fewer than one hundred of the one thousand main customs headings remained to be harmonized. The recent Ebola pandemic that hit member states (except La Cote d'Ivoire) in 2014 has derailed the Unions achievements.

#### ***2.1.4 The Senegambia Confederation***

Senegambia Confederation was a loose union between Gambia and its neighbour Senegal in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. The confederation was founded on 1 February 1982. The Senegambia Confederation agreement of December 1981 provides for, among other things, the development of an economic union that has a simple customs union and a monetary union at the initial stages. This agreement was never implemented. In 1989, the President of Senegal acknowledged the standstill of the union and suspended the agreement, which was later confirmed by his Gambian counterpart.

#### ***2.1.5 West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or UEMOA)***

In late 1993, France and the leaders of the seven West African states comprising the West African Monetary Union signed the treaty establishing Economic and Monetary Union of West African States (WAEMU or UEMOA). This was a culmination of two separate arrangements, namely, the West African Monetary Union (WAMU or UMOA) and the Community of West African States (WAEC or CEAO) into a new entity, which in turn will be anchored extremely by France. WAEMU as an economic and monetary union comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

The agreement brought within a single framework the WAEC, which had attempted without success to remove barriers to trade and the WAMU, which supports a common central bank and currency (CFA) linked at a fixed rate to the French franc. The treaty's provisions include harmonization of legislation, regulations, procedures and multilateral monitoring of key economic indicators. The treaty provides for an explicit transfer of sovereignty over important areas of national jurisdiction, in particular fiscal policy. WAEMU has seen dramatic changes

and has been one of the most successful integration schemes in West Africa.<sup>8</sup> For example, tariffs have been reduced to zero as of January 2000.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, WAEMU countries have managed to relatively maintain stable, non-inflationary monetary policies, with the help of Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).

### ***2.1.6 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)***

Most of the aforementioned sub-regional groupings floundered in one way or the other because their focus was either narrow or there was no serious commitment from member countries to pursue their objectives. Credence was given to the meeting of the Heads of States of Nigeria and Togo who decided to revive the process of achieving economic cooperation in the entire sub-region. Subsequently, the Governments of the two countries agreed on a number of guiding principles.<sup>10</sup>

In 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was finally formed, among other things, to embolden, foster and hasten the economic and social development of member states in order to increase the living standards of their peoples. The treaty establishing the ECOWAS was signed in Lagos on May 28, 1975 and became effective in June 1975 when the required number of countries ratified it. Beyond economic integration, Article 27 of the ECOWAS Treaty also offers long-term objective of socially integrating West Africans through the establishment of a community citizenship that could be acquired automatically by nationals of all member states.

The fundamental principles of ECOWAS are: Equality and interdependence of member states, inter-state cooperation; solidarity and collective self-reliance, harmonization of policies and integration programmes. The rest are: Non-aggression between member states; maintenance of peace, stability and security, peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion and protection of human

rights; promotion and consolidation of democracy; and accountability, economic and social justice.<sup>11</sup> In order to promote its regional integration agenda, ECOWAS instituted a number of protocols that span a wide spectrum of areas of cooperation including economic, trade and industrial policy, free movement, right of residence and establishment, etc, among member states.<sup>12</sup>

Free movement of goods and people has been the ‘centre of gravity’ of ECOWAS regional integration process. Measures have since ECOWAS establishment been put in place at arriving at the main stages of integration, which includes a Free Trade Area (FTA), a Customs Union, a Common Market, Economic Union, Monetary Union. As at the end of the last quarter of 2015, not even an FTA has been established in line with these ECOWAS dreams, except a common passport scheme for its citizens. The eventual formation of ECOWAS was seen as one of the surest means of enhancing accelerated development of the entire sub-region. An attempt to analyse regional integration in West Africa would therefore focus on integration within the ECOWAS framework. There is the need to examine how successful ECOWAS has been in its integration agenda. To do this the ECOWAS institutions will be critically looked at. Security, Economic and Infrastructural initiatives since its formation in 1975 will be considered.

## **2.2 The ECOWAS Organisation**

To meet growing demand for accelerated integration in the sub-region, ECOWAS was restructured in 1997 so as to better adapt to new challenges and the international environment. Institutional structures put in place include; the Commission; the Community Parliament; the Community Court of Justice; and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID). The next few paragraphs seek to discuss these institutions.

### **2.2.1 The ECOWAS Commission**

The ECOWAS Commission is the main hub of all ECOWAS programmes, projects and activities and that it plays key roles in almost every aspect of ECOWAS affairs.<sup>13</sup> This ECOWAS administrative instrument was transformed from an Executive Secretariat into a Commission in 2007. Heads of States and Governments came to terms with the fact that restructuring ECOWAS, was going to enable better alignment with the international environment and bring about more equity, transparency and greater functionality in accordance with global best practices. Additionally, this would bring about effective integration and development, as the Commission will be in a better position to support ECOWAS member states to build their capacities for programme implementation.<sup>14</sup> With that new arrangement, the Commission replaced the Secretariat so as to play the primary role of facilitating, coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the Community's programmes.

The Commission has since been relatively successful in implementing the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of goods and persons and contributed to peace and security in West Africa. In addition to its administrative and political functions, the Commission generally serves as a facilitator of regional integration. The Commission however, had to initially deal with problems it inherited from the Secretariat, namely, ineffective coordination of policies, inadequate finance and inadequate skilled personnel. According to Asante, inadequacy of human capacity and lack of training are challenges currently affecting the Commission.<sup>15</sup>

### **2.2.2 The ECOWAS Parliament**

The Protocol establishing the ECOWAS Parliament, thus A/P2/8/94, was signed in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in August 1994.<sup>16</sup> The ECOWAS Parliament, also known as the Community Parliament, is a forum for dialogue, consultation and consensus for representatives of the people of West Africa.<sup>17</sup> The Protocol entered into force on 14th March, 2002. The Parliament is

composed of one hundred and fifteen (115) seats. Each Member State has a guaranteed minimum of five (5) seats. The remaining forty (40) seats are shared based on the population of member states.

The Community Parliament has since its inception provided for the structure, composition, competence and other matters relating to a community Parliament. The Parliament deliberates on matters concerning human rights, freedoms of citizens, energy, communication and infrastructural development. Apart from contributing to democracy, the Parliament provides a forum which would enable the people of the region to make their views on regional integration known. It is also to serve as liaison between the community and the community's decision-making authorities. The ECOWAS Parliament has, over the years, been able to carry out a series of seminars, training workshops, and working group initiatives to develop institutional mechanisms, individual and organizational capacities, institutional relationships and a strategic plan for conflict prevention and management.<sup>18</sup>

### ***2.2.3 The ECOWAS Community Court Of Justice***

The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is the judicial arm and principal legal organ of the organization. Its mandate establishing it came into effect in 1996. The Community Court is entrusted with the mandate to protect human rights and rule of law within the sub-region.<sup>19</sup> The court has also undergone some form of transformation to enable it meet new and emerging challenges in the region. In January 2005, the Community adopted the additional protocol to permit persons to bring suits against Member States. The court has admitted and ruled on a number of cases. However, the court is poor in implementing or enforcing of its decisions as well being relatively unknown to West Africans after ten years after the additional protocol was adopted.<sup>20</sup>

#### ***2.2.4 The ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID)***

ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) replaced the ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation as the financial arm of ECOWAS. It was established in December 1999 with its headquarters in Lome. EBID is composed of the ECOWAS Regional Investment Bank for financing private sector and the ECOWAS Regional Development Fund for financing the public sector. Over the years, the EBID has contributed to socio-economic development of member states by financing a number of projects. The bank since its establishment has assisted with ECOWAS in the construction of regional infrastructure and other development projects.

### **2.3 ECOWAS Security Initiatives**

#### ***2.3.1 Security Protocols***

The 1975 ECOWAS treaty made no provision for security cooperation. ECOWAS was originally chartered as a regional integration and cooperation grouping with customs union and common market as objectives. Domestic and external threats to security and regime survival however led to the signing of the 1978 and 1981 Protocols on Non-aggression and Mutual Assistance in Defence respectively. The inadequacy of the treaty was revealed when civil war erupted in Liberia in 1990. Though eventually an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established to restore peace, the sub-regional body had no authority to interfere in a member states internal conflict. ECOWAS intervened in conflict situations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire on ad hoc basis. A similar attempt by ECOWAS to deploy in Cote d'Ivoire in the aftermath of that country's 2010 presidential elections failed to reach a consensus. ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) however successfully deployed in Mali during the 2012 Tuareg Rebellion.

### **2.3.2 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework**

The 1993 Revised Treaty rectified the defect in the legal status of ECOMOG. Article 58 of the revised treaty entitled “Regional Security” commits the Community to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace and security in the sub-region. Again on 10 December 1999, a protocol relating to the mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution was enacted. ECOWAS having proven its capacity to successfully prevent and resolve conflicts adopted an ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) on 16 January 2008. ECPF serves as a guide to future initiatives at strengthening the human security architecture in the sub-region.

### **2.3.3 ECOWAS Standby Force**

The African Union concept of African Standby Force (ASF) was proposed in 2003, citing ECOWAS-ECOMOG’s success in sub-regional interventions. A similar concept, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was also proposed in 2013. Both forces are intended to help African Union (AU) and member states rapidly intervene to protect civilians in the event of state collapse, insurgencies and widespread violence. The ASF is composed of five (5) regional brigades of 5000 troops each, namely; East African Brigade (East African Standby Force), South African Brigade (SADC Standby Force), Central African Brigade (FOMAC, Force Multinational d’Afrique Central), North African Brigade (North African Regional capability) and West African Brigade (ECOWAS Standby Force).<sup>21</sup>

ESF which is situated within a larger context of ASF was strategically placed in the components of the ECPF, so as to utilise its early warning and preventive diplomacy frameworks. ECOWAS has over the years identified three (3) Centres of Excellence in Nigeria, Ghana and Mali for training its Standby Force at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels respectively. ESF is

arguably the most established and advanced regional standby force in the ASF. ESF deployed in Mali in January 2013, to quell the December 2012 Tuareg rebellion. The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) commenced deployment in Mali on 17 January 2013. After UN Security Council Resolution 2085 authorised the African-led International Support Mission for a period of one year. By end of January 2013, troops from Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Senegal, and Burkina Faso had deployed about 1400 AFISMA troops. Other troops from other African countries including Ghana joined later.

## **2.4. ECOWAS Economic Initiatives**

### ***2.4.1 Intra-trade Relations***


Regional integration is seen as a probable means of leveraging comparative advantage within a common market for encouraging intra-trade, growth and development in the West African sub-region. In the last four decades ECOWAS has made relatively good progress in intra-trade relations, compared to other African Regional Economic Communities (RECs).<sup>22</sup> Africa as a whole trades very little with itself.<sup>23</sup> UNECA (2010) mentions that between 2000 and 2009 Africa sourced only 9 percent of its imports from African Countries, while 8 percent was sold to African countries.<sup>24</sup> Other developing regions such as America and Asia scored 22 percent and 50 percent respectively for intra-trade. In 2004, out of a total of USD 287,407 million worth of exports from Africa only USD 29,135 (10%) million was intra-Africa trade (See tables 2.1 and 2.2). Thus in 2004, West Africa exported USD 57,107 (20%) million worth of goods for which only 5.8 % was among ECOWAS member states and 3% was among non-ECOWAS member states. Within the same period African RECs intra-trade recorded 6.6% for East Africa, 1.0% Central Africa, 2.4 % for North Africa, 11.5% for Southern Africa. Though, West Africa performed better in intra-trade relations than Central and North Africa, there is so much room for West African intra-trade relations.

**Table 2.1: Intra-Africa Trade by Region in 2004**

Region	Intra-Region (USD million)	Other –Africa (USD million)	Rest of the World (USD million)	Total (USD million)
Central Africa	274	583	26,176	27,033
East Africa	1,980	1,879	26,151	30,009
North Africa	2,387	1,343	96,458	100,188
Southern Africa	8,394	7,162	57,512	73,069
West Africa	3,314	1,819	51,975	57,107
All	16,349	12,786	258,272	287,407

Source: UNDP 2011

**Figure 2.1 Graph of Intra-Africa Trade by Region in 2004**




Source: UNDP 2011

**Table 2.2 Share of Total Regional Exports in 2004**

Region	Intra-Region (%)	Other –Africa (%)	Rest of the World (%)	Total (%)
Central Africa	1.02	2.16	96.83	100
East Africa	6.60	6.26	87.14	100
North Africa	2.38	1.34	96.28	100
South Africa	11.49	9.80	78.71	100
West Africa	5.80	3.19	91.01	100

Source: UNDP 2011

**Figure 2.2 Graph Intra-Africa Trade by Region in 2004**



Source: UNDP 2011

### ***2.4.2 The Protocol on Free Movement of People, Goods and Services***

The Protocol of Free Movement of People, Goods and services was enacted in 1979 and came into force in 1981. Its goal was ostensibly to facilitate one of the most essential long term goals

of ECOWAS: The creation of a common market among its member states. The protocol conferred the status of community citizenship on the citizens of member states. The protocol abolished visas for Community citizens travelling within the region, whilst encouraging free movement of goods, services and labour. A regional code of conduct has been adopted to guarantee equal and fair treatment of community citizens wherever they reside and earn their living. An ECOWAS travel certificate has been adopted which is cheaper and easier to obtain than a national passport. In June 2000, ECOWAS passport was launched, Ghana adopted it in 2010.

The protocol has led to easy' movement within the region especially for citizens and goods, though those travelling by road still face serious obstacles, delays and even extortion in the hands of security agencies at various border posts and checkpoints. Thus there is half-hearted implementation and/or outright violation of the protocol by security agencies in some member countries, which constitute one of the major obstacles to effective regional economic integration in West Africa. Compared however to other African RECs, ECOWAS is arguably the most advanced in terms of liberalization of movement of persons, goods and services.

UNDP sponsored simulations on integration impacts indicates that African economies are more likely to benefit from more ambitious integration schemes. The study used the MIRAGE model to evaluate the impact of alternative scenarios on regional integration inside Africa.<sup>25</sup> The GTAP database on trade information for 2004 was used to calibrate the MIRAGE model and perform the simulations. The chosen yardstick for welfare is the assessment of compulsory variation proposed by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995)<sup>26</sup>. The impact of alternative scenario on welfare includes two main parts; where  $E$  is the monetary equivalent of the utility function, and  $y$  available income.

The measurement is as follows for the period t:

$$(y^* - y) - (E(p^*, u) - E(p, u))$$


Where p is the price system, u is utility and the star (\*) exponent the reform. The first term  $y^* - y$ , measures the gain or loss of revenue caused by the reform. The Second term measures the revenue needed after the reform to obtain the same level of utility as before. The simulation concludes that elimination of applied tariffs, reducing transportation cost and establishing a customs union will bring higher welfare benefits to West Africa and Central Africa. (see table 2.3). The question that needs to be addressed in the next chapter is what Ghana's policies and implementations are on the free movement protocol, though it was ratified by her parliament.

**Table 2.3: Impact of Welfare of Reducing Tariffs, Tariffs & Transport Cost and Establishing Customs Unions in African RECs.**

Sector	Tariffs		Tariffs & Transport Cost			Customs Union
	Continental	Regional	Continental	Regional	Tripartite	Regional
Central Africa	-0.216	0.012	0.339	0.097	0.119	0.097
East Africa	0.078	0.092	1.200	0.462	1.101	0.265
North Africa	0.125	0.059	0.647	0.397	-0.351	0.976
SACU	0.709	0.000	1.615	0.265	0.521	-0.004
West Africa	0.232	0.346	1.264	1.157	0.019	1.110

Source: UNDP 2011

**Figure 2.3 Graph of Impact of Welfare of Reducing Tariffs, Tariffs & Transport Cost and Establishing Customs Unions in African RECs**



Source: UNDP 2011

### **2.4.3 ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme, ETLS**

This is one critical project the sub-region has initiated with the aim to promote and consolidate economic integration in West Africa. The ETLS which came into effect in 1990 is involvedly intertwined with several other important goals such as the creation of a common market, a single monetary zone and free movement of people, goods and services, among others. More specifically, the ETLS is premised on the complete removal of all barriers to trade in the region; and the standardization of all custom duties and taxes of equivalent effect to enhance intra-union trade.

The following categories of goods were initially targeted under the ETLS scheme:

- Unprocessed goods especially livestock, fish and mineral products,

- Traditional handicraft wares and products, including handmade goods with or without the help of mechanical devices, fancy wares, small cabinet work, carpets, footwear, Industrial goods of Community Origin.

These items are subject to the following, under the trade liberalization scheme:

- Total exemption from import duties and taxes
- No quantitative restriction
- Non-payment of compensation for loss of revenue.

Stringent conditions are however to be satisfied by an importer/exporter to be able to benefit from the ETLS regime. They include:

- Goods must be of local origin in member states of ECOWAS,
- Goods must be identified/listed in the ETLS annex, and
- Goods must be accompanied by a certificate of origin and an ECOWAS export declaration form.<sup>27</sup>

The above listed requirements look easy to meet but in practice, it is much more difficult for prospective exporters to utilize the provisions of the ETLS. One of the most frustrating barriers is the reluctance of national governments directly and indirectly to ensure the full operation of the scheme. This is because most of these governments rely heavily on import duties and related taxes for their revenue. Besides that there is the usual bureaucracy and its attendant delays in obtaining approval. These and other frustrating challenges account for the considerably slow growth of intra-regional trade in the sub-region presently estimated at between 8 and 10 percent, compared to rates of 20 and 50% or more in America and Asia respectively.<sup>28</sup>

Another challenge to this is the fact that the relevant laws and provisions have not yet been fully harmonised by member states to achieve region-wide convergence. Not only that, some ECOWAS members, are suspicious that unscrupulous third parties external to the regional agreement could use their own nationals to dump cheap and sub-standards good on their markets, which would frustrate growth of local industries as well as evade tax. Another factor is that even after the mandatory documents have been obtained and the goods are loaded, trans-national drivers' experience long frustrating delays at border posts as corrupt immigration and customs officials try to extort money from them, hiding behind the cover and excuse of security barriers. Indications are that on the average an ECOWAS transnational driver will meet an average of four (4) border posts and other check points per one hundred kilometres. The good news however that is ECOWAS leaders all agreed to implement the CET system in January 2015. When this arrangement commences, member countries will pay uniform tariffs at all borders in the sub-region.<sup>29</sup>

#### ***2.4.4 The Common Monetary Zone***

The creation of a common monetary zone is one of the critical goals of regional integration in West Africa. ECOWAS does not at the moment have a single currency as it is characterized by two main monetary groups. On one side are eight Francophone states plus Guinea Bissau, which belong to the UEMOA, zone with the CFA as legal tender. On the other, are the remaining Anglophone ECOWAS members plus Guinea, with basically inconvertible national currencies. Consideration for monetary union has remained a major issue in ECOWAS discussions and negotiations since 1983. This demand resulted in the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) in 1994. However, not much success has been recorded in this sphere in spite of the many advantages that are associated with a common currency.

To expedite formation of the monetary union, The Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria signed a declaration for establishing a second monetary zone named West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ) in 2001. Although these five ECOWAS countries outside the CFA zone decided to create a single currency no convincing progress has been made in that direction, and the deadline has been shifted a couple of times. The 2015 deadline has also been shifted to 2020. Even so, there is no firm guarantee that the stringent convergence criteria for the amalgamation will be met. The convergence criteria include:

Primary Criteria:

1. Single – digit inflation by the end of each year.
2. A fiscal deficit of no more than 4% of GDP Gross external that can give import cover for a minimum of three months.
3. A central bank deficit-financing of no more than 10% of the previous year's tax revenue.
4. Gross external reserve that can give import cover for a minimum of three months.

Secondary Criteria:

1. Prohibition of new domestic default payment and liquidation of existing ones.
2. Tax revenue should be equal to or greater than 20% of the GDP.
3. Wage bill to tax revenue equal to or less 35%.
4. Public investment to tax revenue equal to or greater than 20%.
5. A stable exchange rate.
6. A positive real interest rate.<sup>30</sup>

Considerable progress has been made in preparation of policy frameworks and architecture for the WAMZ monetary union; however developments in the economic performance of member states have not been satisfactory. Member states have over the years not had the political will to adhere strictly to the fiscal discipline that is vital to the realisation of the common ECOWAS

currency the ECO. In 2000, only Gambia met the convergence criteria<sup>31</sup>, in 2006 only Gambia and Nigeria<sup>32</sup> and in 2013, only Nigeria met the criteria.<sup>33</sup>

#### ***2.4.5 Regional Infrastructural Networks***

- **Road Network** - The free and smooth movement of persons, goods and services depends on effective physical infrastructure. ECOWAS therefore made the development of regional infrastructural networks a priority. ECOWAS with the support of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) adopted a regional road programme, thus a fifteen (15) Nation, 4560 kilometre Trans-West African Coastal Highway to link coastal West African states.<sup>34</sup> A second phase involves the construction of highways that link the land-locked countries to the coast.
- **Joint Border Post** - ECOWAS with the support of European Union have initiated joint border post in the sub-region. One of such post was jointly commissioned between Ghana and Togo on 4 November 2014. A similar border post projects are ongoing at Seme (between Benin and Nigeria) and Malanville (between Benin and Niger).<sup>35</sup> The aim of the Joint Border Post Projects is to ensure faster movement of goods and services across both regions as a push towards integration.
- **Railway Sector** - In the Railways sub sector, detailed engineering studies of the Kaya-Dory-Niamey link connecting the Abidjan-Ouagadougou railway line to the Republic of Niger was initiated in 2010, and was expected to end by 31st December 2013. However due to unforeseen difficulties that hampered progress of the work of the Consultants, the Commission and its donor partners could not meet the timeline.<sup>36</sup>
- **Air Transport Sector** - The objective of the Air Transport sub-sector is to implement the Yamoussoukro Decision for air transport liberalization, strengthen aviation safety and security, enhance capacity building for the Civil Aviation Authorities within the region.<sup>37</sup>

Plans are far advanced to establish a private regional airline services, ECOAIR, as a regional airline.

- **ECOMARINE Sector** - Specialized port terminal to be dedicated to coastal shipping services are to be established. Member states are to harmonize and update their shipping laws aimed at promoting the liberalization of maritime services between the countries. ECOWAS already has a coastal and marine resources management centre for monitoring coastal and marine resources in the sub-region. The centre is responsible for coordinating activities that utilise earth observation data from satellites to help manage fisheries resources and provide early warning information on the ocean for the benefit of artisanal fishers.
- **Telecommunication Sector** - In the field of telecommunications, an African infrastructural plan (PANAFTEL) was adopted by ECOWAS to develop a regional telecommunications network (INTELCOM I) in West Africa. This has established a system of telephone, telex, and telefax communications between all the fifteen capitals. INTELCOM II is being planned to modernize and expand the existing network and ensure its interconnectivity with the fast evolving super telecommunications highways.
- **West Africa Gas Pipe Line Project** - Another ECOWAS/NEPAD project is the West Africa Gas Pipeline. The Gas Pipeline aims at supplying clean affordable energy from Nigeria to Benin, Togo and Ghana for the economic growth of the ECOWAS sub-region.

## 2.5 ECOWAS Integration Challenges

There exist a number of factors that makes it difficult and sometimes impossible for West African states to implement the aims contained in the ECOWAS Treaty. Such difficulties and problems have been the basis of several researches and studies on ECOWAS. One would

therefore not belabour these challenges. The following, however, are an abridged version of the challenges:

- Inadequate infrastructure; road, railway, telecommunications, and other vital links for free movement of goods and persons
- There have also been vested desires for the preservation of the existing state of affairs and the persistence of semi-colonial ties, sometimes referred to as neo-colonialism, and lack of grassroots involvement that has denied the sub-region effective integration.
- Lack of Commitment for the Implementation of Protocols: - The many ECOWAS protocols provide a legal and institutional framework and form a basis for higher and deeper levels of regional economic, political and social integration in the sub-region. However one recognisable challenge is the implementation and enforcement of ECOWAS decisions and policies contained in the protocols at the national level; which clearly falls within the ambit of the national governments and their institutions.<sup>38</sup> Over the years, ECOWAS has had to grapple with the unwillingness of leaders to appreciate the underlying principle that full integration entails the cessation of part of their sovereignty to a supranational authority, resulting in the prevalence of non-enforceable protocols. Thus to a large extent, this unwillingness to share sovereignty accounts for the integration fatigue in the sub-region.<sup>39</sup>

## END NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Gambia, Gold Coast (Ghana), Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

<sup>2</sup> Aly, Ahmed A.H.M., *Economic Cooperation in Africa: In search of Direction*. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 1994). p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Frempong, K.D.A. "The Executive and State Institutions as Primary Actors in Articulating Ghana's Integration Policies in West Africa: Challenges and the Way Forward". in *Ghana in Search of Regional Integration Agenda*. (Ghana: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009) pp.23-40.

<sup>4</sup> Adedeji, A. "Towards Collective Self-Reliance in West Africa: ECOWAS and Beyond, in Hyden, G., *Regional Cooperation in Africa: problems and Prospects*. (Addis Ababa: African Association for Public Administration and Management, 1977). p.55.

<sup>5</sup> Initially they were 16, however Mauritania moved out in 2000.

<sup>6</sup> The Countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Coted'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

<sup>7</sup> Mano River Union available at [www.manoriverunion .int](http://www.manoriverunion.int). accessed 04/01/16.

<sup>8</sup> Korner, H. "The franc zone of West and Central Africa – A satellite system of European Monetary Union." (Hamburg: Inter-economics. Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, July/August 2002).

<sup>9</sup> Reflection on Africa's Historic and current Initiatives for Political and Economic Unity. (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), 2002). <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200203010736.html> accessed 03/02/2015.

<sup>10</sup> ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. *ECOWAS Information Brochure*. (Abuja:ECOWAS, 2002).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Benneh, Y. "Ghana and ECOWAS Protocols – The Problems of Integration", Paper presented at UNESCO/Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) National Seminar on Nation States and the Challenge of Integration in West Africa: The Case of Ghana, (Accra, November 2005).

<sup>13</sup> Asante, S.K.B. "Challenges and Opportunities of Regional Integration for Developing Economies. Issues in African Regional Integration." (Accra: Centre for Regional Integration in Africa(CRIA), GIMPA, 2012).

<sup>14</sup> [www.comm.ecowas.int/about.ecowas](http://www.comm.ecowas.int/about.ecowas). accessed 15/01/16.

<sup>15</sup> Asante S.K.B. op.cit.

<sup>16</sup> Boni Yao Gebe. "Setting the Regional Integration Agenda in West Africa: The role of Ghana's Elected Representatives." in *Ghana in Search of Regional Integration Agenda*. (Ghana: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009). pp.41-65.

<sup>17</sup> Bluwey K.G. A paper presented at a workshop organized jointly by the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and The National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) on Regionalism and Integration in West Africa: The Way Forward. (Accra: GoldenTulip, 20-21 December, 1999).

<sup>18</sup> Asante, S.K.B., (2012). op.cit.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Asante, S.K.B., (2012).op.cit.

<sup>21</sup> Jason W. Complements and Competitors? The African Standby Force, the African Capacity for immediate Response to Crises, and the Future of Rapid Reaction Forces in Africa. (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2015)

<sup>22</sup> Regional Integration and Human Development: A Pathway for Africa. UNDP,2011.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Sadoulet, E and A. de Janvry (1995). Quantitative Development Policy Analysis, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

<sup>27</sup> Central Bank of Nigeria, “ The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme” ETLIS, avail at <http://www.cenbank.org/monetarypolicy/ECOWAS/html> accessed 2 February 2016.

<sup>28</sup> UNDP op.cit.

<sup>29</sup> [www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sectors/trade](http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sectors/trade) access 2 February 2016.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Michel, R. Integration of West Africa, UW-L Journal of undergraduate Research Vol VII, 2004.

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.modernghana.com/news/194479/1/ecowas-single-currency-agenda.html> accessed 24 January 2015.

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.panapress.com/Nigeria---Only-Nigeria-has-met-convergence-criteria-for-ECOWAS-Single-Currency--12-920238-100-lang2-index.html> accessed 3 November 2015.

<sup>34</sup> Asante, S.K.B. ECOWAS Economic Integration: Challenges and Prospects. A paper presented at a workshop organized jointly by the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and The National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) on Regionalism and Integration in West Africa: TheWay Forward. (Golden Tulip, Accra. 20-21 December, 1999).

<sup>35</sup> [www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sectors/infrastructure](http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sectors/infrastructure). Accessed 02 February 2016.

<sup>36</sup> <http://ecoslate.github.io/ecowas-sectors/infrastructure/index.html>. accessed 11 September 2015.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Benneh, Yaw (2005) “Ghana and ECOWAS Protocols – The Problems of Integration”, Paper presented at UNESCO/Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) National Seminar on Nation States and the Challenge of Integration in West Africa: The Case of Ghana, (Accra, 8-9 November.2005)

<sup>39</sup> Asante, S.K.B. (1999).op.cit.

## CHAPTER THREE

### GHANA'S CONTRIBUTION TO WEST AFRICAN INTEGRATION

#### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter assesses Ghana's contributions towards integrating West Africa since she gained independence in 1957. However, serious works at integrating the entire sub-region only commenced after the successful formation of ECOWAS, the study therefore tapers down to the period after ECOWAS creation. Over the years successive Ghanaian governments have been either passive or active at the sub-regions efforts at achieving integration. Abass Bundu mentions that 'a leader's vision, personal aspirations, temperament, prejudices, force of personality, ideological persuasion, moral orientation and perception of regional issues tend to have a strong bearing on the manner in which regional integration policies are put into action.'<sup>1</sup> Rightly said, most often, the context of the prevailing social, economic, political conditions in Ghana and the sub-region have accounted for the levels at which various Ghanaian governments have supported the regional integration agenda. From the foregoing, the primacy of the role of the executive and related institutions in promoting regional integration cannot be overemphasized, hence the need to assess the significance of Ghana's contributions at integrating the Sub-region. Assessment of Ghana's contributions will be basically limited to the following areas:

- Ghana's Integration Initiatives.
- Ghana's Economic and Infrastructural Contributions.
- Ghana's Security Contributions.
- Ghana's Leadership Contributions.
- Ghana's Good Neighbourliness / National Interest Policy.

### 3.1 Ghana's Integration Initiatives

Ghana, then Gold Coast gained independence from the British in March 1957. She began life as part of the integrated British possessions in West Africa with its headquarters in Sierra Leone. The Integration of British territories within West Africa was spearheaded by a Ghanaian Lawyer, Joseph Ephraim Casely-Hayford in 1920.<sup>2</sup> It is believed that, Britain upon realising the colossal benefits of regional integration to them, implemented strategies that caused regional integration to gain some impetus in the pre-independence era through the establishment of a common currency and some common services in British colonies in West Africa.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, common agricultural research institutes were set up for cash crops such as cocoa, oil palm, timber and groundnuts. The four colonies (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra-Leone and Gambia) were also linked with a common airline company. These integration measures facilitated easy economic activities, though minimal compared to that of the French colonies which also encouraged political integration.

After Ghana's independence in 1957, the first president of Ghana, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, was very instrumental in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Ironically, however, the same man discontinued the colonial arrangements that targeted integrating West Africa. Dr Kwame Nkrumah did away with the West African Airways Company and the West African Common Currency among others that British established.<sup>4</sup> This could probably be misconstrued as though Nkrumah did not support the idea of a sub-regional integration. On the contrary Ghana's foreign policy under Nkrumah portrayed a vivid desire of Ghana to integrate with her immediate neighbours and the African continent at large.

Under Dr Kwame Nkrumah, on April 15, 1958, Ghana convened the conference of independent African states, so as to enable these independent states establish the necessary contacts. The conference was attended by Sudan, Egypt, Liberia, Libya, Morocco and Ghana. Again, in December 1958, with Ghana at the forefront, the All African Congress took place in Accra. The

agenda was based on the need for the total liberation of the African Continent from colonialism and the general development of Africa. The integration desire of Nkrumah was made manifest in Ghana's relations with Guinea, when Ghana gave financial aid to the later after her independence in October 1958. Following this Nkrumah had the impetus to push for the formation of the Ghana-Guinea Union on November 23, 1958, which Mali later joined to become the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. This Union had among other objectives, to bridge the Anglophone-Francophone divide in West Africa. Ghana was instrumental in the formation of the Casablanca Group, which stood for a more radical decolonisation and speedy unification of Africa. On May 25, 1963, Pan-Africanism was taken to another level on the Continent with the founding of the OAU, led by Ghana's Dr Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Ali Ben Bella of Algeria. Dr Kwame Nkrumah was determined to integrate the whole of Africa despite the apprehension by countries like Liberia and Nigeria. Coupled with that, Nkrumah's blatant disgust at his Francophone neighbours for being puppets of France their colonial master, derailed his relationship with the West African French colonies hence affecting any chance at fostering integration at the sub-regional level.

One thinks that Nkrumah could have built on the colonial sub-regional integration blocks he met at independence. After all, today as part of the integration attempts, ECOWAS is struggling to re-introduce a common currency. In pursuance of its regional concerns, the National Liberation Council military Government of Ghana that overthrew Nkrumah in 1966 signed a protocol of understanding with the military Government of Nigeria and the Governments of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Gambia in December 1966. The protocol was to enhance the pooling of resources for the reactivation of the West African Airways which was dissolved by Nkrumah in 1957. Apart from the cementing of a healthy integration relationship, nothing concrete resulted out of the protocol. This relationship was however marred with Ghana passing the Aliens Compliance Order (ACO) of 1969, that saw the expulsion of about one million West African citizens from Ghana.

Ghana's relation with her neighbours was re-established following a military coup in 1972 that reversed the ACO. Subsequently, Ghana adopted the Regional Cooperation Policy, which led to Ghana ratifying the formation of ECOWAS in 1975. It is important to concede that, the drive for the establishment of ECOWAS was led by the Heads of State of Nigeria and Togo. The Ghanaian Head of State at the time, General Kutu Acheampong did not play a very active part in the process, because his government was so engrossed with domestic issues. According to Professor Seth Kumi, Ghanaian leaders were quite passive at the drive for establishing ECOWAS.

### **3.2 Ghana's Economic and Infrastructural Contributions**

The next few paragraphs will discuss Ghana's contributions towards the sub-regional integration agenda in the areas of Economic and infrastructural or initiatives.

#### ***3.2.1 Ghana-Nigeria Fast Track Initiative (FTI)***

The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) scheme has been in existence since 1979, it was expanded in 1990 to include other directives. In 1999, Ghana and Nigeria adopted the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) to accelerate the ETLS common market integration objective. In March 2000 the Ghana-Nigeria initiative was broadened to include Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Togo. Under the FTI the following programmes were to be covered:

- Enhancement of ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS);
- The establishment of a Second ECOWAS Monetary Zone;
- A borderless zone;
- Infrastructural development;
- Private sector development and collaboration and investment promotion.

To achieve the afore-mentioned programmes, the following measures were proposed: Elimination of rigid border formalities and modernisation of border procedures through the digitalisation of

passports and the use of passport reading machines, 90 day period of stay for ECOWAS citizens; and removal of numerous road blocks and security check points on the international highways to reduce delays, checks on harassment and extortion. By May 2005, the ECOWAS passport had come into force, with Ghana commencing the use of machine readable passports in 2009, and the use of ECOWAS passports in 2011.

### ***3.2.2 Adjustment of Ghana's Tariff System***

Import tariff remains Ghana's main trade policy instrument, accounting for an average of over 60% of revenue generated from international trade. International trade revenue remains an important source of government tax revenue in Ghana, accounting for 25% on average, whilst import taxes alone have contributed not less than 70% of total trade tax revenue since 1990. However, despite Ghana's heavy reliance on international trade revenue, she accepted a liberalized trade regime in 1989. To this end, goods from ECOWAS member states have attracted duty-free rates since 1996. Under the ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme established in 1990, Ghana initially provided preferential tariff reductions of 20% on imports of a few goods from some countries that had the community status. Products from member states that qualified for preferential treatment attracted rates of 8%, 16% and 20%, whilst similar items from other countries attracted duty rates of 10%, 20% and 25%, respectively.

At the forty- fifth ECOWAS Ordinary Summit held on 10 July 2014, member states resolved to have the ECOWAS-CET in effectively implemented by 1 January 2015. In compliance with this resolution, Ghana's Parliament has passed the ECOWAS five band Common External Tariffs (CET) awaiting final approval by the President.<sup>5</sup> Expectations are that the CET will be implemented in 2016. The CET will consist of the following five bands:

- Zero duty on essential social goods such as veterinary drugs;
- Five percent duty on imported foods of primary necessity, raw materials and specific inputs;
- Ten (10) percent duty on intermediate goods;
- Twenty (20) percent duty on finished goods (final consumption goods);
- Thirty-five (35) percent on goods in certain sectors that the government seeks to protect such as poultry and rice.<sup>6</sup>

### **3.2.3 Monetary Union Agenda**

On 20 April 2000, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone signed a declaration on the creation of a second monetary zone, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). In November 2000, ECOWAS Convergence Council analysed the progress of the six (6) economies vis-à-vis the primary and secondary criteria afore-mentioned in Chapter 2. In this analysis, as at November 2000 only the Gambia met all four (4) criteria. Nigeria met three (3) and Ghana failed to meet any of the four criteria. In Feb 2002 the Treaty of Accra was signed to promote a single West African market and increasing integration by replacing national currencies with a single West African currency to be known as ECO. Primary and secondary criteria for the ECOWAS single currency agenda was discussed in Chapter 2. Ghana has since 2000 not completely met the criteria. A small country like Gambia however, has met these criteria in several assessments. Ghana's failure to meet the single criteria is not as a result of lack of interest by her leaders in the introducing single currency system. However, Ghanaian governments would have to put in more measures in order to meet these criteria.

### **3.2.4 Economic Partnership Agreement**

The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) was once well celebrated as a new form of partnership between the European Union (EU), Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). It however

became fraught with disagreement which culminated in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. The reason for the disagreement was the fear among ACP countries including Ghana that the EPA foretells long term welfare loss to ACP countries since it is unsupportive of their overall developmental aspirations. Though in 2007, Ghana signed an interim EPA agreement, it still spearheaded negotiations.

At the forty-fifth Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of States and Governments of the ECOWAS, convened in Ghana, Accra on 10 July 2014, under the Chairmanship of ECOWAS Chairman, President John Mahama of Ghana, a consensual agreement was endorsed taking due account of technical concerns earlier raised by member states, ending a decade long market access disagreement. At the end of that session, Heads of States and governments had no option than to pay tribute to the Ghanaian President and then ECOWAS Chairman, His Excellency John Mahama for his unflinching support in deepening the regional integration process and his commitment to the sub-region.<sup>7</sup>

### ***3.2.5 Trading in Ghanaian Markets***

In line with the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of goods and services several non-Ghanaian West African citizens are currently doing whole sale and retail business in Ghanaian markets in Ghana. This arrangement however has since the 1960's being fraught with tension especially between Ghana and Nigeria. This accounted for the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order (ACO) passed by the Busia Government. A similar move was staged by Nigeria in 1983 when she expelled about one million Ghanaians from Nigeria. It is interesting to note that in spite of ECOWAS treaties and agreements, Nigerian authorities have placed a ban on certain items especially from Ghana. Ghanaian investors and manufacturers have complained on the ban placed on the importation of some of their products in to that country. Ghana was deeply disturbed by the tall

list of trade prohibitions including textiles, poultry, rice and processed goods from Ghana even though all these products have been registered under the ETLs and signed under the protocol on ECOWAS Trade Liberalization.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore in 2005, President Olusegun Obasanjo placed a ban on ninety six Ghanaian items (ranging from textiles, garments, starch, to plastics, etc.), it was stated that this decision was taken in the interest of West Africa. Speaking at the London School of Economics, Africa Summit in London in April 2014, President Dramani Mahama stated that:

“I believe that Nigeria has a certain kind of responsibility in West Africa, because it is the largest economy and the most populous country and Nigeria has nothing to fear from Ghana in terms of competition. Nigeria has nothing to fear from Cote D’Ivoire in terms of competition Nigeria has nothing to fear from Benin or Togo or Niger in terms of competition and yet year in, year out, there is a prohibition list.”<sup>9</sup>

On the part of Ghana, the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC) Laws Act 478 1994, lists a number of enterprises which are reserved for Ghanaian citizens as: “The sale of anything whatsoever in a market, petty trading, hawking or selling from a kiosk; operation of taxi service and car hire service; all aspects of pool betting business and lotteries, except football pools; and operation of beauty salons and barber shops.<sup>10</sup> The law does, however, provide pardon in the application of the schedule under section 19 (3). The law says a trader who is not a citizen must have an investment of foreign capital or its equivalent in goods worth at least US\$300,000 by way of equity capital and must also employ at least 10 citizens.<sup>11</sup> It was based on this law that so many Nigerian businesses were locked by Ghanaian security agents in 2012. The law was relaxed after the intervention of the Nigerian government and ECOWAS Parliament.

It is regrettable that Nigeria and Ghana, who played a unique and major role in the formation of ECOWAS and who should be responsible for ensuring its functionality, are the paramount violators of the market integration protocols as listed in the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS). It is important to mention that, since 2000, the governments of Presidents John

Kufuor, Mills and Mahama have all put in measures at helping the sub-region meet the common market integration agenda. This is evident with the proliferation of Nigerian banks, real estate and telecommunication companies in Ghana, yet same cannot be said of Nigeria.

### ***3.2.6 Inter-State Road Network and Transportation Support***

- **Inter-state Roads.** The Lagos-Dakar Corridor, also called the Trans-Coastal West African Highway, is one of the nine trans-African highways proposed by the African Development Bank to promote land transport in Africa.<sup>12</sup> The main importance of the Highway is that it provides the most direct road connection between the capitals of the countries namely: Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, La Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Gambia and Senegal along its route. It also provides the starting points for the roads leading from the ports to the landlocked countries in the hinterland namely: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The highway covers a total of 4,010 km of which about 550km<sup>13</sup> passes through Ghana. A large part of the Millennium Challenge Account of about six million United States (US) dollars won by the President Kufuor Administration from the United States government was committed towards improving a stretch of this road. Studies<sup>14</sup> indicate that Ghana has a high Road Transport Quality Index (Qi) compared to most of the transit Countries along the highway. Ghana's high road quality index along its stretch of the transit highway shows Ghana's readiness to support West African integration and growth.<sup>15</sup> Ghana is currently in agreement with four other countries along the route (Nigeria, Benin, Togo and La Cote d'Ivoire) to convert the route to a 6-Lane dual-carriage Highway from Côte d'Ivoire through Ghana to Nigeria.<sup>16</sup> In his state of the nation's address delivered on 25 February 2016, the President John Mahama said his National Democratic Congress Party (NDC) government has constructed roads in the past three years that has helped position Ghana as a country with the most engineered and best roads in West Africa.

- **Visa on Arrival.** Ghana has since December 2015, introduced visa on arrival system for visitor and business people who travel at short notice from countries where Ghana has no mission or consulate. The policy authorises visas to be granted on arrival at the airport or other entry points. In President John Mahama's speech at Ghana's 59 Independence celebrations, he announced that the country will begin to offer visas on arrival to all 54 African Union member states starting from July 2016.<sup>17</sup>
- **Joint Border Post.** Presidents of Ghana and Togo jointly commissioned the Noepe Joint Border Post (JBP) between Ghana and Togo on the 3 November 2014. The joint border project is part of the ECOWAS protocols on road transport and transit facilitation that seeks to support competitiveness and efficiency along the main transportation corridors of West Africa with the view to improving intra-regional trade and free movement of people.<sup>18</sup> Similar projects are expected at Noe/Elubo for Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire and at Paga/Dakola for Ghana and Burkina Faso.
- **ECOWAS Marine Project.** Transport In line with the ECOMARINE dream and as a means of managing the environment, ECOWAS has so far commissioned six Regional Centres of Excellence, named ECOWAS Coastal and Marine Resources Management Centres. Ghana currently hosts one of these centres on behalf of the sub-region, which was commissioned at the University of Ghana in August 2014.

### **3.3 Ghana's Sub-Regional Security Contribution**

#### ***3.3.1 Military Interventions***

Realising that without a stable domestic political environment, sub-regional integration could not thrive; Ghana under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government led by President John Rawlings, supported the initiative for ECOWAS to intervene in Liberia (1990-1999). Ghana was a member (together with Nigeria, Gambia, Mali and Togo) of the Standing

Mediation Committee (SMC) tasked to find solution to the crisis. Ghana played a leading role in the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and apart from Nigeria, made the largest contribution in terms of peacekeepers, logistics and funds. Ghana under the National Democratic Congress (NDC) governments (led at different times by Presidents John Rawlings, John Mills and John Mahama), and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by President John Kufuor have at different times supported ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone (1998-2000), Guinea Bissau (1998 -1999), Mali (1997), and Cote d'Ivoire (2003). Specifically, Ghana under President John Kufuor's two terms (2000-2008) in office as President of Ghana and Chairman of ECOWAS intervene in a several capacities in managing conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire, Togo and Guinea Bissau.

Ghana's military contribution in Liberia during the conflict is curled from a write up by Natalie E Brown of US Department of State in 1999, entitled: ECOWAS and the Liberia Experience: Peacekeeping and Self Preservation. Brown writes:

“Ghana was forthright than the other ECOWAS nations about its participation in the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation. Ghana provided a safe-haven to the large community of Liberians who fled the violence, but maintained that ECOMOG was primarily about member states, not Liberia and regional security. ...Ghana provided troops to ECOMOG, because it considered itself an Island of stability in a tumultuous and unpredictable area and believed it could assist in restoring stability. Ghana brought political impartiality and extensive peacekeeping experience to the regional endeavour. Unlike Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, Ghana did not have a political stake in the outcome of the Liberian civil war. President Jerry John Rawlings believed Ghana could be an honest broker in negotiating a peaceful settlement and would serve as a counter-balance to Nigeria. ...In contrast, Ghana's military was exceptionally qualified for the ECOMOG security and humanitarian mission as two-thirds of Ghana's 7500 strong military is regularly deployed to international peacekeeping operations. Ghanaian soldiers have participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1978, where they honed their peacekeeping skills. ECOWAS valued Ghana's expertise and assigned a Ghanaian, General Arnold Quainoo, as the first ECOMOG commander. His tenure was brief due to unease between the Ghanaian and Nigerians and his passive approach to the conflict. A series of assertive Nigerians replaced him. Even under aggressive Nigerian leadership, the Ghanaian training served them well. The Ghanaian Government reported only twenty-five peacekeepers killed between October 1990 and April 1996...”<sup>19</sup>

Ghana was instrumental in promoting all the Liberian peace accords and in fact hosted the Akosombo and Accra conferences in 1994. Rawlings' two-term tenure as ECOWAS chairman in

the 1994-1996 greatly facilitated the return to peace in Liberia in 1997. Ghana also contributed in terms of personnel and logistics to the 1997 Liberian election. The chairman of Ghana's Electoral Commission, Dr. Afari-Gyan, for example, was appointed the Chief Technical Advisor to the Interim Electoral Commission of Liberia, while the Ghana government supplied public address systems and indelible ink.<sup>20</sup>

### ***3.3.2 Military Training***

Ghana Armed Forces has since 2006 contributed troops for several ECOWAS joint exercises including Exercise 'DEGGO XXVII 2007' in Senegal, Exercise 'JIGUI 2008' in Mali, Exercise 'JIGUI II 2009' in Burkina Faso, Exercise 'COHESION 2010' in Benin and Exercise JIGUI III 2011. In terms of military training support to other countries, Ghana continues to train military officers from all the various sub-regional militaries in its prestigious military colleges in various aspects of warfare, command and staff duties. It is interesting to note that the current President of the Gambia, assumed his appointment as Head of State shortly after he completed his Infantry Platoon Commanders Course in Ghana. Ghana was instrumental in the re-building of the Sierra Leonean military after that country's civil war. Ghana currently has officers supporting the rebuilding of the Liberian military.

### ***3.3.3 Support for Fight against Boko Haram and Ebola***

Nigeria's security forces and ECOWAS have since 2009 struggled to contain the terrorist insurgency group Boko Haram that mostly operate in the North Eastern part of Nigeria. As at June 2014, the terrorist group had spread its activities to neighbouring Chad and Cameroon. Around the same time, in June 2014, West Africa was hit by the Ebola pandemic, affecting three major countries; Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Liberia. All this was happening at the time that the Chairmanship of ECOWAS was on President of Ghana. Ghana therefore had to support her ECOWAS colleagues handle the Boko Haram and the Ebola challenges.

President John Mahama as ECOWAS Chairman made several attempts at getting the regional body to intervene in the defeat of the Boko Haram terrorist group. He called several meetings of heads of states over this issue. President Mahama is on record to have proposed the setting up of a multi-national force to fight Islamist militant group, Boko Haram. To be able to achieve this, President Mahama requested that African Union (AU) holds a special session on terrorism in order to enable West African leaders to seek authority to create the multi-national force to help combat the operations of Boko Haram. ECOWAS Heads of States since then began meeting periodically to re-strategize to help Nigeria fight the Islamist group and protect citizens.

President Mahama selflessly carried his proposal to Europe where he had talks with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, soliciting for logistical and financial support. Within Africa, he went as far as inviting President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea and President Dennis Sassou-N'Guesso of Congo, both members of Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) for discussions on Boko Haram.<sup>21</sup>

The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first-ever UN emergency health mission, was established in Accra, Ghana on September, 19, 2014. This was after President Mahama announced at the 69th UN General Assembly in New York, USA, his readiness to make Accra the hub for the UN's efforts in the fight against Ebola. UNMEER, coordinated UN agencies in the fight against the disease, to the three most affected countries namely; Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. In December 2014, Ghana contributed 42 Ghanaian volunteer health workers to these three Ebola hit country. When the epidemic struck, many countries in the region closed their borders with these worst-affected countries. Flights to these affected countries were suspended, thereby resulting in the supply routes for health care workers and supplies being

choked until Ghana intervened. The Ghana government during the outbreak also donated some food and relief items to the countries worst affected by the deadly virus.

President Mahama, took steps to caution the world against abandoning the three countries when he personally visited these countries at the peak of the crisis. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, he said, " Ebola is not just a Liberian problem, Ebola is not a Sierra Leonean or a Guinean problem; it is not just a West African problem, Ebola is a problem of the world because it is a disease that knows no boundaries."<sup>22</sup> On 14 January 2016, The United Nations (UN) Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, commended President John Dramani Mahama and the people of Ghana for the role they played in ending the Ebola virus disease in West Africa.<sup>23</sup>

### **3.4 ECOWAS Leadership Roles**

From the foregoing, various Ghanaian leaders were not committed to the ideals of ECOWAS for various reasons. It was only during the PNDC rule that Ghana's interest in the Sub-region's integration was rekindled. The PNDC era coincided with the period of instability in West Africa hence the need for Ghana to participate in efforts aimed at managing the security challenge. Coincidentally, President John Rawlings was nominated twice as ECOWAS Chairman from 1994-1996. Ghana therefore had to play leading role in restoring peace to Liberia. President Rawlings therefore hosted several conferences in Akosombo and Accra in 1994, which facilitated the return to peace in Liberia. This gesture was continued by his successor New Patriotic Party government led by President John Agyekum Kufuor. President Kufuor continued with Ghana's support in Liberia and Sierra Leone. He was also twice nominated ECOWAS Chairman from 2003 to 2005. President Kufuor became so involved with the Liberian peace process that from June- August 2003 he held the Comprehensive Peace Accord on Liberia which saw to the signing of a lasting peace agreement. Liberia's transition to peace therefore coincided with President Kufuor's two terms as ECOWAS Chairman. The ECOWAS supportive role was also continued by the

successor National Democratic Congress Government under the leadership of Presidents John Atta Mills and John Mahama. Though in 2010, Ghana refused to support ECOWAS to intervene militarily in Cote d'Ivoire. Once again between March 2014 and March 2015, President John Mahama was elected ECOWAS Chairman where he was at the fore front of fighting the Boko Haram and Ebola virus crises that hit the Sub-region in 2014..

In 2002, the New Patriotic Party government sponsored Dr Mohammed Ibn Chambas to become the ECOWAS Executive Secretary. He served from 2002-2006. When the Secretariat became a Commission in 2007, Dr Ibn Chambas became its first President serving from January 2007 to February 2010. The baton of office was then handed over to Ghana's Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, who also served from February 2010 to March 2012. Both Presidents were instrumental in the resolution of conflicts in the sub-region during the tenure of office.

### **3.5 Ghana's Good Neighbourliness / National Interest Policy**

The Ghanaian Constitution gives a clear indication of what Ghana's national interest should be in the realm of international relations. It presupposed that all national endeavours in the area of foreign policy should go a long way to satisfy the provisions of Article 40 of the 1992 Constitution which include: The establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order; and promotion of respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

Bearing in mind the lessons of the past, especially during the Nkrumah years, the policy of "good neighbourliness" has been crafted to promote a climate of peace and stability in the sub-region by building mutual trust and confidence between the President and his counterparts in the sub-region and beyond. This serves as the basis for addressing common challenges to development across national frontiers. This policy has created a platform for exchanging views and collective

strategies to promote good governance and democracy and combat common threats such as drug and child trafficking, proliferation of small arms, money laundering, amongst others. At the same time, it provides the atmosphere needed to execute common socio-economic projects, through the instrumentality of joint commissions for cooperation. It is in this belief that President John Kufuor visited Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Mali soon after assuming office in 2001. At the time of coming into office in 2000, President Kufuor met a country that had strained relations with its neighbours. Ghana and Burkina- Faso had tensions over the assassination of Capt Thomas Sankara Head of State of that country and a friend to President Rawlings. Ghana and Togo had security tensions, as a result of that both countries traded accusations of coups attempts on each other's governments. More so there were allegations that Togo's opposition elements lived in Ghana. Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire had long unsettled security and diplomatic tensions. President Kufuor therefore had the task of breaching these gaps in the interest of Ghana's good neighbourliness policy.

Successor Presidents John Atta Mills and John Dramani Mahama continued with the camaraderie that had been established over the period. It was perhaps the fear of undoing the good harmony established by President Kufuor, that President John Mills refused to be part of a military solution to the post-election crisis in Cote d'Ivoire in 2010. President Mills is quoted as having said there was the need for Ghana to mind her own business, known in the Ghanaian parlance as the 'di wu fie asem'. This was after President Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede defeat when the international community mentioned that he had lost the 2010 elections. One option suggested by ECOWAS was to use military force to get the President Elect Allassanne Quatarra into office as the legitimate president. To this end the Committee of ECOWAS military chiefs met to consider military intervention. Nevertheless, the contemplated military action faced challenges, because Ghana refused to contribute troops to the ECOWAS sub-regional force on the grounds that the

Ghanaian military was engaged in many peacekeeping operations around the world, including Côte d'Ivoire.

The refusal of Ghana to participate halted the military intervention. This goes to buttress the fact that though the Ghanaian military is very small, its professionalism and expertise has always been valued in ECOWAS missions. The Ghanaian government's abstinence from this intervention however re-opened old wounds between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, as there are the speculations that President Mills supported the continuous stay in power of his friend and colleague President Laurent Gbagbo. It is however, important to mention that, even the United Nations was lukewarm towards the use of military intervention to remove Laurent Gbagbo. Under the UN Charter, the UN must authorize any such action taken by a regional arrangement. With regards to the ECOWAS considered military action in Côte d'Ivoire, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, is quoted as having mentioned that; "We are not part of any military operation or option prepared by ECOWAS; it's purely ECOWAS decision".<sup>24</sup> The UN contradiction might have sent signals to the ECOWAS countries which were already preparing to contribute troops to the mission to be more wary of their actions.

It is therefore erroneous that ECOWAS failure to intervene militarily in Cote d'Ivoire is solely blamed on President Atta Mills NDC government's refusal to contribute troops to the force. Rather, the Côte d'Ivoire crisis demonstrated the incompetence of African leaders in the use of diplomacy. First, the crises exposed the cracks within the African Union/ ECOWAS members hence its failure to mount a united front when it was required. Whilst the AU generally concurred with the position of ECOWAS that President Laurent Gbagbo be removed from power by any means including the use of force, some individual AU member states took divergent positions.

For example, within ECOWAS, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Nigeria endorsed the use of force.<sup>25</sup> On the other side, Gambia recognized the legality of Laurent Gbagbo's re-election and opposed any form of military intervention.<sup>26</sup> Liberia and Mali also expressed concern over the consequences of military intervention, and its effect on the Mano River Union (MRU) and UEMOA. In far Eastern Africa, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni also called for an investigation of the election process and rejected the validity of international recognition of President Allassanne Ouattara and its dismissal of President Laurent Gbagbo's claim to have won the elections, whilst Angola came out strongly to support the government of President Laurent Gbagbo.<sup>27</sup> South Africa, one of the early mediators in the dispute was of the view that the poll discrepancies marred the vote and so mediation between the parties was the solution.<sup>28</sup> The South African stance was just similar to the views of President John Mills's National Democratic Congress which unfortunately degenerated into the '*di wu fie asem*' dictum.

One would have thought President Allassanne Ouattara eventually capturing power by use of force would have resolved the matter, and returned Ghana and her neighbour to the rapport established by President Kuffuor. Subsequently, a territorial maritime dispute between Ghana and La Côte d'Ivoire immediately arose when President Quatarra assumed office in 2010. This led to the formation of Boundary Demarcation Commissions in the two countries under the auspices of ECOWAS to jointly mediate and define the maritime boundary between the two countries. In a move to protect the territorial integrity of Ghana and avoid a diplomatic row, the Government of Ghana initiated arbitration proceedings under UNCLOS 1982, "seeking a declaration that it has not encroached on Côte d'Ivoire's territorial waters in the exploration of oil". The action at the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) followed the failure of negotiations between the two countries and the continued receipt of threatening letters by oil companies operating in the Ghanaian Oil field from La Côte d'Ivoire. There are assertions that France is behind the claims of

its former colony and that the incumbent Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara, initiated the territorial dispute as retaliation for Ghana's alleged support for his rival, Laurent Gbagbo, following the disputed presidential election.<sup>2930</sup>

One encouraging development however is that, Ghana in her bid to resolve the boundary dispute, demonstrates her confidence in the ECOWAS establishment to which she has contributed since its inception by approaching it as first resort. This gesture signifies a remarkable achievement for ECOWAS though the matter was not resolved at that forum. It is important to mention that this is not the first time Ghana has had to take a tough stance on a neighbour. In February 2005, Togo's long serving President died, the military moved in, suspended the constitution and appointed Faure Essozima Gnassingbe, son of the late president as new head of state. Ghana's President John Kufuor who had then just handed over as ECOWAS Chair joined his colleagues in lashing at Faure Gnassingbe to resign. They labelled the succession a military coup d'état. The Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, was unequivocal in expressing ECOWAS's opposition to the coup d'état. The entire ECOWAS leadership called for the constitutional order to be re-established. In line with Ghana's policy on good neighbourliness, President John Mahama also visited several of Ghana's neighbouring countries after he assumed office at the death of President John Evans Atta Mills in 2012.

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<sup>15</sup> The Qi was determined using the following:

$Q_i = R_i^{a1} G_i^{a2} C_i^{a3}$ ;  $R_i$  = Percentage of paved roads in country i,  $G_i$  = Is the GDP per capital of the country I, as capacity to maintain roads,  $C_i$  = World Bank Country Country Policy and Institutional Capacity (CPIA) index for transparency and corruption in country i.

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
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## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter gives summary of the research findings within the study, a conclusion and finally makes some recommendations to the work which sought to examine Ghana's contributions at integrating the Sub-region. This study was based on premise that despite the varying levels of contribution by various Ghanaian leaders towards integrating West Africa, thus, some being passive and others active, Ghana has made a significant contribution towards integrating the West Africa sub-region.

#### **4.1 Summary of Findings**

The study revealed the following findings:

- West African countries are weakly integrated nationally, regionally and internationally. Ethnic and socio-political divisions are predominantly noteworthy in almost all the West African countries. Additionally, West African countries are divided by a wide range of institutional, legal and infrastructural barriers, which create a sense of disconnectedness. This disconnectedness could better be described with the low levels of economic interaction among West African states as against the high interaction with other economies outside the region. At the international level, Africa and West Africa in

particular is increasingly marginalized in the share of world markets, technology and consumer goods. The hope at independence, that the nation-state was going to be an agent of development at the national level, has become an illusion, whilst it has also become obvious that regional integration in West Africa is seriously challenged.

- The coming of European colonialism to West Africa brought economic activities of many kinds. Administrative responsibilities including monetary unions were organised. Thus regional integration was encouraged back then. West Africa for instance had a common money currency board, amongst others. Though regional cooperation among African government at independence was aligned primarily at achieving common economic objectives, the leaders made an error in dissolving the colonial integrative institutions they inherited, especially the common currency relation.
- The study reveals that, the Senegal basin countries have shown regional cooperation as an alternative to achieving joint economic development, in addition to the orthodox integration method adopted by ECOWAS. The Senegal basin can be compared to the Volta Rivers that runs between Burkina Faso and Ghana. Both countries could have jointly developed that water resource based on the principle of equity, instead of the individually damming the river, that has resulted in serious economic setbacks especially to Ghana, which relies heavily on that water body for its energy requirement.
- The restructuring of ECOWAS from Secretariat to Commission has brought several achievements to the Sub-region. Notable amongst them are the effective maintenance of

peace and security, the establishment of institutional structures such as Community Parliament, the Community Court of Justice, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) amongst others. These arrangements have led to the effective and timely resolution of disputes and the handling of infrastructural developments jointly. Such joint infrastructural developments include the trans-coastal highway, joint borders all aimed at facilitating intra-regional transportation and trade. The Gas project from Nigeria through Benin, Togo, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire is also a good example.

- Despite these achievements however, the study shows that ECOWAS is saddled with challenges that are preventing it from achieving its objectives. These challenges include; lack of political will and commitments by its heads of states and institutions, slow commitments at effecting the trade liberalisation protocols and schemes collectively agreed upon, poor intra-trade relations, poor intra-road network as well as political uncertainty and instability.
- The study shows that, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president encouraged Africa's economic and political integration targeting both the Anglophone and the Francophone divide. This he began with the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. However, President Nkrumah's actions did not directly encourage sub-regional integration as he was responsible for dissolution of the colonial integrative organisations and institutions that should have been the foundation of West African integration. Dr Nkrumah pulling Ghana out of the use of West African Common Pound Currency Board could be argued as a major setback for the sub-regions integration agenda. Another exposé is that though

Dr Nkrumah sought to encourage integration, his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government did not have good relations with Ghana's immediate neighbours so as to enable him spearhead integration in the sub-region.

- The National Liberation Council (NLC) military government that overthrew Dr Nkrumah made efforts at re-establishing some of the colonial arrangements, which were dissolved by Dr Nkrumah such as the joint airlines amongst others. These efforts however only restored good neighbourliness and nothing more.
- The Progress Party (PP) government led by Dr Abrefa Busia which took over from the NLC government, made very little efforts at sub-regional integration. The introduction of the Aliens Compliance Order (ACO) that saw the repatriation of several non-Ghanaian West Africans rather undid the good neighbourliness success chalked by the NLC government. This has since been a bane in Ghana's relationship with Nigeria.
- The National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) governments under General Kutu Acheampong ratified Ghana's membership in ECOWAS, yet the government did not play a very active part in the formation process. The Subsequent Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under Flt Lt Rawlings and the People National Convention (PNC) under President Hilla Limann's governments also were passive at the sub-regional integration agenda.

- Ghanaian Governments became active in sub-regional integration only in the 1990's, under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government of Flt Lt John Rawlings, when the sub-region became engulfed with conflicts and Ghana needed to be actively involved in negotiations, deployment of military resources and logistics to the affected countries. Successive NDC I/II/III and NPP governments under Presidents John Rawlings, John Kufuor, John Mills and John Mahama continued with the active sub-regional integration agenda started in the 1990's.
- Ghana has since 1994 held various leadership roles namely; ECOWAS Chairmen held twice each by Presidents John Rawlings and John Kufuor and once by President John Mahama. All Chairmen played key roles that ensured the stability of the sub-region. Ghana has only on two occasions held the appointment of ECOWAS Presidents. In all these instances, Ghana gave committed leadership that resulted in remarkable economic and infrastructural progress as well as assured security.
- Ghana under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government led by President John Rawlings supported the initiative for ECOWAS to intervene in Liberia (1990-1999). Ghana played leading role in the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and apart from Nigeria, made the largest contribution in terms of peacekeepers, logistics and funds. Ghana under the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party governments have at different times supported ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone (1998-2000), Guinea Bissau (1998 -1999), Mali (1997), Cote d'Ivoire (2003).

- In 2010, the NDC government under President John Mills refused to contribute troops to ECOWAS so as to use force to install Ivorian President Elect Allasanne Quatarra. President Mills was subsequently blamed for his refusing to help resolve a neighbouring country's problem due to his "di wu fie asem" rhetoric. The study shows that, not only Ghana was against the use of force in resolving the crisis. The UN, some ECOWAS and AU countries also openly objected to the use of force. Thus ECOWAS/AU failed to mount a united front. Again from the study, indications are that, Ghana's objection to military intervention reversed the fortunes of good neighbourliness chalked by predecessor President Kufuor with Cote d'Ivoire. This could be responsible for the current Ghana-Cote d'Ivoire boundary dispute.
- In terms of economic cooperation, Ghana offers good interstate road and port facilities to ensure free movement of goods and persons. In 1999, Ghana and Nigeria adopted the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) to accelerate the ETLS common market integration objective. Ghana currently issues the ECOWAS biometric passport as enshrined in the ETLS directives. Ghana has made necessary adjustments to its import tariff systems so as to meet the ETLS directives. Ghana's Parliament has passed the ECOWAS five band Common External Tariffs (CET), with expectations it will be implemented in 2016.
- Ghana however, over the years did not meet most of the primary and secondary convergence criteria for single currency. Sadly enough even a small country like Gambia has met these criteria on several occasions. The study shows that very little effort has been put in over the years by successive governments to meet the criteria, though some of

the factors are as a result of market forces and natural occurrences, which are beyond the control of governments, however Ghana needs to be more commitment in this aspect.

- The study also shows that some of the Ghanaian laws contradict the ECOWAS protocol on Free Movement of Goods and services. One of such laws is the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC) Laws Act 478 1994 that prevents non-Ghanaians from certain business. Enforcement of this law seems to be violation of the market integration protocol to which Ghana is signatory. That notwithstanding, successive Ghanaian governments have been more committed to ensuring a common market than their Nigerian counterparts.
- When in 2014, the Ebola pandemic and Boko Haram menace threatened the security of the sub-region, Ghana with President John Mahama as ECOWAS Chairman, played good leadership roles at managing the crises.
- The Ghanaian Constitution gives a clear indication of what Ghana's national interest should be in the international realm. The policy of "good neighbourliness" is well crafted to promote a climate of peace and stability in the sub-region. President John Kufuor made so much effort at ensuring healthy relations with neighbouring countries. When Ghana's territorial maritime dispute with Côte d'Ivoire commenced, Ghana referred the matter to ECOWAS. It was only when this option was exhausted that Ghana initiated arbitration proceedings under UNCLOS 1982, "seeking a declaration that she has not encroached on Côte d'Ivoire's territorial waters in the exploration of oil." This action is

an encouraging development for the entire ECOWAS as it shows Ghana's confidence in ECOWAS establishment.

## **4.2 Conclusions**

It is gathered from the study that efforts at setting up a body to integrate the entire sub-region commenced in the late 1960s. The British during their colonial rule in West Africa implemented strategies such as common currency and common service within the British colonies in West Africa, upon which the foundation of integration could have been established after independence. The minimal drive for integration among the post-independence leaders coupled with avoidable mistakes by those who foresaw the benefits of integration led to the disintegration of the colonial integrative legacies.

Ghana's Dr Nkrumah was very instrumental in African integration, yet his efforts at integrating the sub-region were so minimal. He was mainly responsible for the dissolution of the colonial West African single currency and services boards. A system ECOWAS has been struggling to re-establish for the past three decades. Subsequent Ghanaian governments toned down on the anti-West African integration posture, however, domestic and economic conditions did not permit dedicated commitment to the sub-regional integration drive even after the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975.

Ghanaian governments have since the early 1990s been very active at encouraging measures that will lead to the full integration of the sub-region. Ghana has been supportive and forceful in several laid down economic, security directives by ECOWAS. Ghana however, as a result of

several factors, some beyond its control have not been able to meet the criteria for single currency over the years, meanwhile there is so much hope.

The study concludes that, despite the passive moments by some Ghanaian governments at pushing the sub-regional integration drive, Ghana has since the 1990s contributed significantly at integrating the sub-region.

### **4.3 Recommendations**

Despite Ghana's immense contributions at integrating the sub-region, the following recommendations are hereby made:

- Ghanaian governments would have to double its efforts at meeting the single currency criteria in support of the sub-regional the integration agenda.
  
- The problem of Anglophone and Francophone divide in the sub-region seems intractable; hence the continued existence of the threat posed by UEMOA to the growth of ECOWAS. It is however recommended that, Ghana champions the call for a common ground to be found between Anglophone West Africa and their Francophone counterparts on the need to complement rather than outdo each other especially in the area of single currency usage and common market. This can commence by Ghana being ready to declare its readiness to reduce its independence on macroeconomic policy, whilst consciously introducing deflationary fiscal and monetary policies all aimed at a liberalised and harmonised economic environment in the entire sub-region.

- Ghana must resolve its trade differences with Nigeria by authorities of both countries entertaining openness and pledging their support to flexibility of labour and goods market, since both countries have the biggest economies in the sub-region in order to foster the growth of the integration agenda, as well as serve as encouragement to the relatively smaller economies.
- Ghana and Nigeria must re-introduce the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) as it did in the late 1990's, whilst encouraging other West African leaders to give much attention to the objectives of economic integration if not political.
- Ghana should consider suggesting to countries through which the Volta River passes the need to emulate the Senegal River cooperation formula at developing the Volta River and other international water bodies for equitable joint economic benefit.
- West African scholars in the field of integration and political science must be encouraged by their education; foreign affairs and regional integration ministries to research into this area of study, concentrating on comparative frameworks in order to regularly remind member countries of their obligation to contribute meaningfully to the growth of the sub-regions integration agenda.

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