


**CHALLENGES TO REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST
AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)**



**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA,
LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

LEGON

JULY 2018

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that except for the references to other people's work, which have been duly acknowledged, the study presented here was written by me, under the supervision of Dr. Ken Ahorsu. It is a record of my own research work and has not been previously presented in any form whatsoever.

.....

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Date.....

.....

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(Supervisor)

Date.....

DEDICATION

To the glory of God Almighty

This work is also dedicated to my dad Muddy, my mum Baby Maame and my beloved sister Anisa for their support throughout my academic life.

May God richly bless you all.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The task of completing this work has been very exacting and exciting. My utmost thanks go to God Almighty for his provision, protection and abundant grace throughout the cause of this study.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANAD:	Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defense
ASF:	African Standby Force
AU:	African Union
COMESA:	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CEMAC:	Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC:	East African Community
ECAS:	Economic Community of East African States
ECCAS:	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG:	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
GPA:	Global Political Agreement
KAIPTC:	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre
MAD:	Mutual Assistance and Defense
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
OPDS:	Organ on Politics, Defense and Security
PCS:	Peace and Security Council
PMAD:	Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense
SACU:	Southern African Customs Union
SADCC:	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SMC:	Standing Mediation Committee
UEMOA:	West Africa Economic and Monetary Union
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UN:	United Nations
WASU:	West African Students Union

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of Sub-regional groups in Africa Figure

2: ECOWAS Countries

Figure 3: SADC Countries

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	<i>i</i>
DEDICATION	<i>ii</i>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	<i>iii</i>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	<i>iv</i>
LIST OF FIGURES	<i>v</i>
TABLE OF CONTENTS	<i>vi</i>
ABSTRACT	<i>viii</i>
CHAPTER ONE	<i>1</i>
INTRODUCTION	<i>1</i>
1.0 Background to the Research Problem	1
1.1 Problem Statement	6
1.2 Research Objectives	7
1.3 Research Questions	8
1.4 Scope of the Study	8
1.5 Rationale of the Research	8
1.6 Theoretical Framework	9
1.7 Literature Review	15
1.8 Sources of Data and Methodology	27
1.9 Arrangement of Chapters	28
CHAPTER TWO	<i>32</i>
OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE AND SECURITY	<i>32</i>
2.0 Introduction	32
2.1 Regional Integration in Africa	32
2.2 Regional Security in Africa	34
2.3 Formation and Structure of ECOWAS	38
2.3.1 Objectives of ECOWAS	41
2.3.2 Structure of ECOWAS	42
2.4 Formation and Structure of SADC	43
2.4.1 Objectives of SADC	46
2.4.2 Structure of SADC	48
2.5 ECOWAS Approach to Peace and Security	49
2.6 SADC Approach to Peace and Security	51
2.7 Causes of Conflict in ECOWAS and SADC Regions	52
2.8 Conclusion	55
CHAPTER THREE	<i>60</i>

STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES OF ECOWAS AND SADC	60
3.0 Introduction	60
3.1 Sources of Strength: ECOWAS and SADC	60
3.2 Successes of ECOWAS and SADC in Regional Security Interventions	65
3.2.1 Successes of ECOWAS in Regional Security Interventions	66
3.2.2 Factors Contributing to the Success of ECOWAS in Regional Security Interventions	69
3.2.3 Successes of SADC in Regional Security Interventions	71
3.2.4 Factors contributing to the success of SADC in regional security interventions	74
3.3 Challenges Faced by ECOWAS and SADC in Regional Security Interventions	75
3.3.1 Challenges Faced by ECOWAS in Regional Security Interventions	76
3.3.2 Challenges Faced by SADC in Regional Security Interventions	80
3.4 Addressing the Challenges of Regional Security	82
3.5 Conclusions	85
CHAPTER FOUR	89
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	89
4.1 Summary of Findings	89
4.2 Conclusion	91
4.3 Recommendations	91
BIBLIOGRAPHY	93
Journal Articles	94
Official Documents and Reports	99
Research Papers and Presentations	100
Interviews	101
APPENDIX	103
INTERVIEW GUIDE	103

ABSTRACT

The study sought to find out the challenges to regional security cooperation in Africa with ECOWAS and SADC as case studies. The data used for this study was qualitative method of collecting and analyzing data. It found that there are both structural differences and ideological similarities between ECOWAS and SADC. Both ECOWAS and SADC were originally economic integration Organization; however, the contemporary nexus between security and development compelled them to adopt security roles. The two Organizations however differ in their approaches in managing threats to their sub-regions. ECOWAS was more predisposed to deploy its economic and political sanctions and military intervention mechanisms; while SADC is more given to using preventive diplomacy and conciliatory mechanisms to contain threats to the sub- region than deploying the threat of using military intervention. The difference is due to the type of colonialism member states of the two Organizations experienced. ECOWAS member states experienced a milder form of colonialism as compared to SADC, which had experienced more severe form of colonialism. The two regions experienced financial difficulties, lack of necessary political will, poor good governance, and corruption to varying degrees. SADC suffered lack of institutional capacity, lack of unity and nationalist rivalry while ECOWAS suffered from Anglophone and Francophone divide and volatility of conflicts. The study suggested greater collaboration between sub-regional Organizations to learn from each other's experiences and set up funds for managing security threats to ensure their independence.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the Research Problem

The concept of security is multifaceted and complex and has been in existence since the very first human interactions. Security is the second level in Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs, after the attainment of biological and physiological needs (air, food, shelter, warmth, sleep).¹ According to Maslow, it is important that humans gain security from various elements of nature, including other humans before aspiring towards other needs. Security has evolved to be of paramount necessity to the existence of individuals and the survival of societies and states. Even though the word “security” remains a contested concept, it flirts as an idea which identifies with “the absence of threats to acquired values and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”² Value, as used in this context relates to assets, norms, principles, traditions, practices, ideals and acquisition and extends to include everything that humans can be deprived of. With the formation and advancement of human societies, security, as used in this paper, is in the contexts of human security and national security.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its 1994 Human Development Report, propounded the concept of Human security with emphasis on human rights, safety from violence, and sustainable development.³ The UNDP aggregates human security into seven dimensions namely: “economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.”⁴ Whereas, the state-centric national security emphasizes the safety of a state against threats such as war, territorial disintegration, espionage and terrorism. It means the security of a state including its people, its economy, and the institutions in it is regarded as a responsibility of government.⁵ There is the need to ensure national security using

diplomacy, economic influence and political authority. To this end, states have formed alliances based on geographical contiguity and shared values, or other conditions; either on bilateral or multilateral arrangements to ensure national security, regional, and global security.

Africa's affair with regional development and security has gone beyond regional cooperation to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 to ensure the economic and political security of African States.⁶ Among others, the decision of the OAU not to intervene when a member state is in crises, which led to the loss of hundreds of lives in states like Rwanda and Burundi in the 1990s, called for the realignment of its objectives to form the African Union (AU) in 2001.⁷ There were, equally, sub-regional attempts at achieving cooperation which led to the formation of sub-regional blocs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (EAC). The AU places much emphasis on the development and role of sub-regional integration blocs in helping the AU in achieving its development and security goals. This study examines, comparatively, the challenges ECOWAS and SADC face in the performance of their security roles. Declining growth rates in West Africa, worsened by political instability propelled to collectively resolve the economic and political challenges through the establishment of the ECOWAS in 1975.⁸ The aim of ECOWAS was to promote intra-regional trade to boost growth in the region.⁹

In a stride to ensure or achieve regional economic security, measures to promote good governance and democracy have been put in place by the ECOWAS body to address both internal and external threats to its political security, as these have implications for the desired economic goals of the Organization. ECOWAS began as an economic co-operation agency and hardly any provision was

made for co-operation in political security matters. However, the sub-region's volatility has necessitated ECOWAS intervention to ensure a safe environment for favorable economic security. ECOWAS has established the Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defense (ANAD), and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense (PMAD) to curtail both external aggression as well as internal insurrections, inspired by socio-economic grievances or greed.¹⁰ It can be argued that both security structures have been less than effective owing to the lack of political commitment by member states.¹¹

The Liberian Civil War (1989-1997, 1999-2003), and the Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991-2002) saw ECOWAS transformed itself from an economic integration Organization to a security Organization.¹² ECOWAS now serves to remind West African states about the need for peace and security and seeks to resolve disputes before they become protracted civil wars. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) serves as the intervention force of the community and functions as the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and security. ECOWAS through its interventions to some extent also ensure political and economic security. The efforts of ECOWAS have not been without challenges. West Africa suffers intense polarization along Anglophone-Francophone divide. The existence of ECOWAS and the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) with similar objectives makes it difficult for the sub region to pursue a common goal.

According to Akinrinade, "the totally different concepts and experiences of colonialism have been reflected in post-colonial legacies and have affected the pattern of inter-state relations in the sub-region."¹³ Adeniji acknowledges that "the language barrier created by the pattern of colonialism and the perpetuation of the vertical link with the former imperial power at the expense of the horizontal link with neighboring states, discouraged much meaningful relations across the

Anglophone/Francophone divide.”¹⁴ These differences have also been complicated by the presence of mutual doubt and suspicion that member states hold for each other. The potential dominance of any country in a sub-regional co-operation mechanism has led to poor cooperation.

Comparatively, southern Africa has not made much progress economically either. In response to the slow growth levels, the SADC was established as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 to “promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance and durable peace and security among fifteen southern African member states.”¹⁵ In 1992, it was transformed into a development community. As a regional body, the SADC ensures collaboration, economic integration and technical cooperation among the fifteen (15) southern African states.¹⁶ It has seen the establishment of intra-trade policies that will ensure economic growth for member states.

SADC has taken active political measures in ensuring regional security. Cawthra and Van Nieuwkerk point out that “the Southern African region has extensive experience of external involvement in promoting violent conflict and other threats to its security.”¹⁷ The Southern African region has a strong political history ranging from the colonialism and apartheid, liberation struggles, civil and secessionist wars, election disputes, and others. It has been partially active by appointing mediators to work in conflict resolution. The SADC has undertaken peace efforts in Zimbabwe, Angola, and Lesotho, among others.¹⁸ The SADC has also realized the need for peace and security for successful economic integration and development to take place in the sub-region. In line with this, they agreed at the Gaborone summit in June 1996 to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS).¹⁹ OPDS is responsible for the promotion of peace and

security in the region.

Like ECOWAS, the SADC also faces challenges in its efforts to ensure regional security. All fifteen member states have been colonized in different ways and by various imperial structures leaving different legacies in terms of culture, language and political systems, complicating initiatives for peace and security. This is worsened by the fact that liberation struggles took different forms and as such created different perspectives about how to deal with issues faced by the state.

There exist in Africa, the situation where states are reluctant in giving some sovereignty to a regional institution in security cooperation to make effective decisions to achieve regional objectives. Anthony Leysens observes that the SADC faces a challenge with “decentralization” and “sovereignty”.²⁰ He opines that this position threatens the possibility of successful regional integration in the SADC region.²¹

To summarize, ECOWAS and SADC have been hit with many challenges and to some extent made some achievements towards achieving respective set of security objectives. Whilst the threats of terrorism, violence and conflicts in areas such as Mali, Nigeria and Togo continue to plague the West African sub-region, the Southern African region also battles protracted conflict and violence in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo. ECOWAS has had a formidable record in promoting peace in a, particularly turbulent region. The ECOMOG in particular has been able to intervene in violent conflicts in the region and carried out conflict management. Initiatives such as preventive diplomacy and mediation have also been employed by the ECOWAS. A recent example is how they handled the Gambian election dispute in 2016. Prior to this, ECOWAS intervened in conflicts in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote D’Ivoire. SADC has also achieved

great strides in its interventions in resolving conflicts. It has largely succeeded in the prevention of political violence in Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Lesotho from erupting into hostilities and violence.

1.1 Problem Statement

As stated earlier on, the AU Security Architecture relies heavily upon cooperation among its member states in the sub-regional Organizations for the maintenance of security across Africa. Several questions, however, emerge from the AU's decision to rely upon the cooperation among member states of sub-regional Organizations as building blocks of the AU Security Architecture. Besides, the paths to statehood of states differ markedly from region to region with ramifications for their respective contemporary political economies. Similarly, the profile of threats to the various regions while common to all may differ in terms of frequency, degree and intensity. All the above differences equally affect the degree and the extent to which member states cooperate to solve the security threats to their respective regions. However, beyond cooperation, other challenges mitigate against both Organizations efforts.

For example, ECOWAS is faced with challenges of funding and logistics; thus, hindering the provision of regional security in all sectors.²² Concerning profile of threats, terrorism, religious militancy, insurgency, and money-laundering are pronounced in West Africa with member states' economies only showing minimal growth²³ as most of ECOWAS states continue to underperform economically.²⁴

Economic growth among Southern African states are uneven.²⁵ South Africa remain the dominant economic power and the rest of the states in the SADC region show unequal economic growth.

Economic inequality accounts for the inability of SADC to achieve its set benchmarks and objectives for strengthening regional integration.²⁶ Some member states remain trapped in a democratic transition. South Africa's xenophobic ruse and DR Congo's ethnic wars continue to undermine the mandate of the SADC.²⁷

Though terrorism remains a threat as terrorist networks are spreading globally, terrorist threats are more pronounced in West Africa than in southern Africa. Colonialism was more intense in southern African, even apartheid, than West Africa. Apart from Angola and Mozambique, members of SADC are Anglophone, whereas in West Africa there are Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries. It is given these structural, cultural, political culture and historical antecedents that the study seeks to find out the challenges ECOWAS and SADC face in delivering upon their security mandates. Research on separate sub-regional Organizations in Africa are common; however, a comparative study of regional bodies is limited. This research seeks to explore the strengths of the various regional groups and draw lessons about the best way possible in handling security threats within the respective regions. It also seeks to find out how the normative tenets of the AU fare across the different regions.

1.2 Research Objectives

The main objective of this research is to do a comparative analysis of ECOWAS and SADC in conflict management and the promotion of peace and security in their sub-regions, specifically: to,

1. Examine the current state of the ECOWAS and SADC peace and security architecture relating to conflict management and prevention.
2. Assess the roles of ECOWAS and SADC in managing and preventing conflict based on

interventions in the respective sub-regions.

3. Identify the strengths, similarities, differences and challenges in their operations as peace and security Organizations.
4. Offer recommendations based upon findings.

1.3 Research Questions

The questions the research seeks to answer are:

1. What are the structural differences and similarities, if any, of the origins of ECOWAS and SADC and how does this inform the peace and security architecture of the two sub-regional Organizations?
2. What are the strengths and challenges of ECOWAS and SADC in managing and preventing conflict based on interventions undertaken in member states?
3. What lessons can be learnt from each of the sub-regional Organizations?
4. How should ECOWAS and SADC states proceed with regional security cooperation?

1.4 Scope of the Study

The study covers the regional security architecture in West Africa and Southern Africa from 1990 to 2018. The study focused on the sub-regional cooperation efforts over the 28-year period.

1.5 Rationale of the Research

The study, among other things, critically examine in a comparative manner, ECOWAS and SADC mechanisms on conflict management and prevention to identify the areas where they fall short and make recommendations for institutional improvements to enable these Organizations better deal with current and future threats of conflict. It is the hope that this research will inform policy makers on the necessary action to take for sub-regional reform. Further, this research will make a modest

contribution to the discourse and literature on sub-regional Organizations and conflict management and prevention.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

(International) Cooperation Theory serves as the theoretical framework for the study.²⁸ Robert Keohane, Joseph M. Grieco, Peter Haas, Helen Milner, among others are proponents of the theory. There are many strands or theoretical schools of thought on cooperation. The study adopts, specifically, the institutionalist theory version of cooperation as a framework to explain the need, conditions, and processes under which sovereign rational and egoistic states in West Africa and Southern Africa found or realized enough interest to form ECOWAS and SADC as institution to collectively mitigate common security threats.²⁹ The choice of the neo-institutionalist approach to cooperation is plausible given the growth and convergence on normative values and security communities that characterized 21st Century, despite the infrequent aberrations of populism and nationalist bents.³⁰

According to Keohane, cooperation occurs “when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others through a process of policy coordination.”³¹ The two grand theories, realism and idealism, (and their offshoots) clarify cooperation in the international system. The two schools of thought agree, define and assume that the nature of the international system is anarchical. A state of nature that is devoid of a universally accepted rule on how sovereign states ought to behave; and, one without a sovereign or hierarchical leader that makes and enforces obligatory treaties. The absence of a universally accepted agreements that guide the conduct of states and the lack of a sovereign authority to make such agreements create openings for states to pursue their national interests unilaterally. Thereby, making it difficult for rational and egoistic states to naturally cooperate with each other.³² The cooperation paradigm largely concentrates on

the systemic level of analysis; via, the sources and constraints on cooperative conduct among states as a design and objective of the international system.³³ However, the realists, often through the conservative demonstration of the Game Theory of the Prisoner's Dilemma portray states as positional in character; "thus states prefer the relative achievements of jointly produced gains not advantage partners, and their concern about relative gains may constrain their willingness to cooperate."³⁴ Thus, realists often adopt the worst-case scenario and pessimism about security and cooperation.

Idealists and idealism's scion theories such as liberalism, and institutionalism are more optimistic in outlook about the possibility of security and cooperation.³⁵ Liberal institutionalists conceptualize states as rational egoists coexisting in a world in which arrangements cannot be hierarchically prescribed. And institutionalists only expect interstate cooperation to happen if states have substantial shared interest.³⁶ Just like realism, institutionalist theory is utilitarian and rationalistic.³⁷ Institutionalists, however, differ in several aspects from the realist standpoints on cooperation. One of the most significant of which concerns the realist predilection for empiricist and universalist approach to the study of social science without often specifying the conditions for the operation of its bleak depiction of world politics or qualifications about the situations under which they may be valid.³⁸

Institutionalism, in contrast, refers to when elites foresee self-centered paybacks from cooperation; cooperation is unlikely to occur nor the institutions that ease cooperation to develop. In other words, the institutionalist argues that propositions for cooperation apply when states can jointly benefit from cooperation. Governments only create such institutions when they are convinced that forgoing pursuit of individual self-interests is less rewarding than cooperation. It is only then that

institutionalist faith in institutions to afford information, cut operation costs, make pledges more trustworthy, create pivotal points for synchronization, and overall ease the cooperation of reciprocity becomes applicable. Thus, institutions can have impact and further promote absolute gains when state parties to cooperation foresee self-centered benefits from cooperation. It is from this perspective that Keohane and Martin argue that institutionalism subsumes realism.³⁹

Liberal institutionalism perceives institutions as entrenched in the certainties of power and interest. Thus, cooperative organizations as institutions can promote and maintain stability; and make important differences in concurrence with power realities. According to Keohane and Martin, institutions are important 'independently' only in the ordinary sense used in social science: controlling for the effects of power and interests, it matters where they exist. They also have interactive effect: meaning that their impact on outcomes varies, depending on the nature of power and interests.

In the extant literature, the preponderant view is that institutionalist theory assumes that international politics can be separated into two domains: international political economy and security; and that institutionalism mainly relates to the international political economy.⁴⁰ While some institutionalists have made this claim, the main understanding of the institutionalist literature is that though institutionalists have mostly focused on international political economy its precepts are equally applicable to security. Thus, neo-institutionalism does not focus solely on 'cheating,' since states of coordination, in which cheating is not a challenge but distributional issues are critical, are likewise vital. As such, is that institutionalist theory can be functional to both security and political economy matters.

It has often been noted that military-security issues display more of the characteristics associated

with anarchy than do political-economic ones. Charles Lipson, for instance, has recently observed that political economic relationships are typically more institutionalized than the military-security ones. This, however, does not mean that the analysis of these two sets of issues requires two separate analytical frameworks. Indeed, one of the major purposes of the present collection is to show how a single framework can throw light on both.⁴¹

Neo-institutionalist back the claim that there is no surgical investigative divide between economic and security issues; and that, institutionalist theory is highly relevant to security issues because it advocates the task of institutions in affording information. This argument is relevant to realist security urgings that regularly build its case on worst-case analysis. Realists hold that in an ambiguous and anarchistic world, states must think the worst, mostly about others' intents, when deciding on policy choices. Worst-case analysis infers flowing policies that do not make the most of expected utility for the sake of dodging dreadful results. The institutionalists, however, if we can obtain ample information, it may be conceivable to develop policies that more virtually enlarge utility. The logic of institutionalist theory is right applicable to security problems as realists theorize them.

Two issues are more significant the conditions under which relative gains are important; the role of institutions when distributional issues are significant-that when relative gains are at stake. The major lessons of the recent debate on relative gains is that their importance is conditional on factors such as the number of major actors in the system and whether military advantage favours offense or defence.⁴²

A major difference between realists and neo-institutionalist is their respective expected utility

gains from cooperation. The realist argues that since states are unequal in power endowment and efficiency, the gains that accrue to states from cooperation are relative. The institutionalist, however, hold the view that cooperation leads to absolute gains for member states because cooperation removes fear and cheating and maximizes gains. Contemporary research, however, by some realists and institutionalists argue that the relative-absolute gains divide is the result of the conventional rendition of the Prisoners Dilemma.⁴³ Institutionalists contend that it is vital to differentiate between two difficulties that states encounter when they desire to cooperate. They worry about the possibility of others to cheat, as in the prisoner's dilemma. But they are also confronted with the difficulty of harmonizing the actions on a particular "stable cooperative outcome" (solving the problem of multiple equilibria, in game theory terminology).⁴⁴ Normally several cooperative consequences exist. States may not settle on the what the favourite result is. And states may fail to attain the probable gains from cooperation.

Unless some synchronizing mechanism is present, state may not realise the potential gains from cooperation. Institutions do not provide the only likely coordinating machinery.⁴⁵ Institutionalists, however, argue that in more multifaceted settings involving several states, international institutions can step in to afford 'constructed focal points' that make specific cooperative outcomes outstanding.⁴⁶ Institutionalists argue that just as institutions can lessen fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to occur, so also, can they ease fears of uneven gains from cooperation. They argue that institutions afford treasured information, and information about distribution of gains from cooperation may be critically treasured if the relative gains judgement is correct. Institutions can ease cooperation by contributing to the solutions to solve distributional conflicts and by guaranteeing that gains are consistently allotted over time. This can be achieved by divulging information about the military actions, expenses and capabilities of alliance members.⁴⁷ They

argue that effective working of institutions rests on the process of reciprocity, both definite and diffuse.⁴⁸ Reciprocity entails sharing of information with one another; and so, need information on the worth of their exchanges. Thus, institutionalized reciprocity and distributional worries reflect the difficulties of cooperating in a system without centralized judge and why the requirement for dependable sources of information if states are to realize gains from cooperation.

Institutionalist theory theorizes institutions equally as independent and dependent variables. Institutions are created and alter as a result of human action. And the changes in expectations and process can wield weighty effects on state behaviour. According to Keohane and Martin, institutional theory has a “coherent account of both the creation of institutions and their effects on patterns of behaviour: institutions are created by states because of their anticipated effects on behaviour.”⁴⁹ The main critics of institutionalist remain realists⁵⁰ Realists assert that states allow institutions in as much as it serves their interests. Kegley and Raymond ask, “How can international institutions occasionally carve out enough autonomy to pursue their own agendas despite pressure to respond to the desires of their most powerful members?”⁵¹

The criticisms notwithstanding, the institutionalist version of cooperation remains very relevant to the study of the security cooperation among ECOWAS and SADC member states. The convergence of common interests of the member states is found in the common colonial origins of the member states. African states were arbitrarily carved into ‘nation-states’ often with the international boundaries often cutting across ethnic groups; thereby, separating towns and families into different states. Nevertheless, such groups continue to observe the same cultural, trade and linguistic empathies irrespective of the international boundaries that separate them. Most important, African states are not, in the main, primarily confronted with inter-state security threats

as the orthodox nation-states. The main security threats to states in Africa are internal security threats. The commonality of threats, common political and economic challenges, common people and common socio-cultural traits aid civil strife in one-member state to spill over into others. In effect, making them, according to Barry Buzan; security complexes.⁵²

Functional state weakness in Africa has often been defined as governance crisis. African states have been advised by anti-colonial elites, Pan-Africanists, African Diasporas, and in recent times by international Organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and the United Nations, as well as Africa's development partners to adopt cooperation through sub-regional and regional integration projects. Today's world is threatened by unwieldy transnational security threats that need the cooperation and collaboration of all states to contain them. Again, lessons from the post-Cold War civil wars that swept across brought vividly home Mark Duffield's concept of development-security nexus: that without development there can be no security and without peace and security, development is not possible.⁵³ Given these common grounds for cooperation, regional economic and security integration cooperation in Africa has been described as collective self-help.

1.7 Literature Review

Some scholarly works have been written in recent times on the topic under study. These works cover sub-regional cooperation in Africa, focusing on ECOWAS and SADC and the current security role they play. Some of these works are reviewed to indicate how they contribute essentially to this study and identify some gaps, which this study attempts to fill.

Regional integration in Africa has been regarded by many leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Thomas Sankara as Africa's option to develop politically and economically in the

advent of decolonization and independence. For a long time, states in Africa have sought to unite for the purposes of ensuring their development and improving their welfare. Lee defines regional integration or regionalism, as “the adoption of a regional project by a formal regional economic organization designed to enhance the political, economic, social, cultural, and security integration and/or cooperation of member states.”⁵⁴ African governments have progressively embraced regional integration as an important component of their development strategies. Considering this, various cooperative groups within the African region have been set up on the principles of regional integration. These communities include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Funmi Olofinakin and Jeremy Levitt in “Regional Security and the Challenges of Democratisation in Africa: the case of ECOWAS and SADC” examine the challenges that democratisation poses to regional collective security arrangements in Africa, with specific reference to ECOWAS and SADC. To begin, the authors place the context of their article in the immediate post-Cold War environment; they recognize the importance of transparency and accountability over the age-old state sovereignty ideology and the need for African leaders to re-examine regional security structures that were threatened by increasing intrastate conflicts.⁵⁵ Previously, during the Cold War, states – including African states - were more concerned with interstate than intrastate security matters. Issues like human security were trumped by preoccupations with state security and the principle of non-interference shaped security policy of countries. This way, many African leaders could not be held accountable for exploiting their populations. Nonetheless, by the end of the Cold War, African states began to re-structure their security frameworks as intrastate conflicts escalated and new conditionalities (democratization and good governance) for economic aid emerged⁵⁶

Olonisakin and Levitt explain that both ECOWAS and the SADC have and are taking steps, at varying degrees, to establish the necessary mechanisms to respond effectively to both intrastate and interstate conflict. In their view, African leaders have aggressively sought to strengthen their regional security structures while simultaneously attempting to democratise.⁵⁷ They add that, although they recognize that African regional Organizations will need to assume a greater role in tackling Africa's security problems, the challenges posed by on-going democratisation efforts have had a visible impact on the effectiveness of some regional Organizations. Whilst the inclination to democratise has influenced the establishment of new collective security structures, the superficial nature of the changes has prevented the gains at the structural level to be translated into meaningful practice on the ground.⁵⁸

They assert that as African states democratise, the sub regional and regional mechanisms to which they belong, will attain greater legitimacy and become more effective.⁵⁹ For example, in Southern Africa, democracy in South Africa resulted in the transformation of SADCC into the SADC and enhanced the politico-military and economic capacity of the community. Further, the establishment of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security in 1996 and its supplementary protocol in 1997 served as proof for its dedication towards democracy and sub-regional security through the development of a collective security capacity.⁶⁰ In contrast, they aver that West Africa was not as democratic as Southern Africa in the early and mid-1990s and only witnessed an effective collective security agenda when the region became highly democratized. In the early to mid-1990s, the region possessed peculiar characteristics that hindered the development of regional security. For instance, Nigeria was under the ruthless rule of an autocrat and some of ECOWAS' operations (i.e. ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone) were managed by non-democratic regimes. Yet still, they affirm that ECOWAS is more effective today because many West African states are no longer under authoritarian rule and democratization processes have therefore reduced intrastate

conflicts.⁶¹

Olanisakin and Levitt provide a historical analysis of the African arena in terms of the process of democratisation in African states and the African Peace and Security structure by focusing on SADC and ECOWAS initiatives. In addition, the writers assert the importance of regional organizations like ECOWAS and SADC as key players required for sub-regional and national security agendas, which are more meaningful and certain than inter-governmental efforts in attaining sustainable peace and security. Although this article is helpful, it leaves a gap in the literature, in terms of time, a gap this study strives to address. The study gives a more contemporary analysis of the African peace and security structure with particular focus on the regional communities in Southern and West Africa.

Schutz Xavier Nathaly, in “The Security Integration in Southern Africa: SADC and OPDS,” analyzed the integration processes of security Organizations in southern Africa. Schutz asserted that traditional security theories are not always applicable in African affairs because its integration process is influenced by socio-political and historical factors.⁶² The apartheid regime in South Africa remains a historical connection between the countries of the region; and has aided in the integration process. The integration process originated from their fight against apartheid especially South Africa’s effort against destabilizing the frontline states. Schutz also evaluates the extent of security problems in southern Africa, claiming that, they exist both at the domestic level and between state relations.

A major challenge to security in southern Africa is the state’s stability and political control of state territory. Thus, by cooperating with others, states will be able to manage this problem effectively.

Schutz praised the SADC in handling security issues in member states like Madagascar. He claimed that there had been significant progress in the political and security issues in the Southern African region.⁶³ Schutz reported less on the challenges facing SADC and the role of other member states, focusing on the major role played by South Africa.

In “Appraising the efficacy of SADC in resolving the 2014 Lesotho Conflict: Progress and Prospects,” Vhumbunu Clayton assessed the effectiveness of SADC’s intervention to resolve the Lesotho crisis, the progress made and the prospects that helped restore peace and political stability.⁶⁴ Vhumbunu praised the idea of the SADCC, which aimed to advance the cause of liberating southern Africa and reducing its dependence on the apartheid South Africa. With its transformation into the SADC in 1992 and the further amendment of the SADC Treaty in 2001, key mechanisms were established to help the institution deliver on its mandate. These included the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and the troika on Defence, Politics and Security.⁶⁵

The Lesotho Crisis is traced to the 2012 National Assembly elections that resulted in a three-party coalition government, described as an uneasy coalition, involving Thabane’s All Basotho Convention (ABC), Deputy Prime Minister Metsing’s Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and the Basotho National Party. Then in 2014, political wrangling among the three parties resulted in the suspension of Parliament and the departure of the LCD from the coalition. By August 2015, the military attacked the police headquarters under intelligence-provided pretext of preventing the police from arming mass protesters. The military actions were recognized as an attempted *coup d’etat*.⁶⁶

According to Vhumbunu, at the advent of the Lesotho crisis, there was mounting pressure on Lesotho and the relevant actors to address the conflict, as numerous international organizations and the international community expressed concern and distaste over the alleged coup d'état. He describes the swiftness of the SADC's response to the conflict as commendable and symbolic of regional organizations' realization of the prerequisite of regional political stability for the achievement of regional economic development. SADC's response, included mediation, and facilitation talks to resolve the conflict.⁶⁷

Vhumbunu adds that, South Africa as a SADC member, proved commitment by providing refuge to the then-prime minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho, Thomas Motsoahae Thabane. In assessing the efficacy of SADC's intervention, he focuses on the results achieved. He asserts that the community responded with speed, smooth coordination and inclusivity, as the Troika meeting involved all stakeholders of the Lesotho coalition government. The achievements of the community's mediation include facilitating the safe return of the exiled ex-prime minister, Thabane, the re-opening of Lesotho's Parliament, agreement on the conduct of an early election and the urgent deployment of an Observer Team on Politics, Defence and Security.⁶⁸ In contrast, Thabane outlines the shortfalls as first, the failure of the organization to sustainably address the root causes of the conflict which are, the activities of the LDF and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) and in essence the fact that the community managed and mitigated the crisis but did not actually resolve it. This is primarily because the SADC strives to resolve conflicts through preventive diplomacy, negotiation, conciliation, good offices, adjudication, mediation or arbitration. This is to ensure that there are no casualties and also to maintain investor confidence in the community and generally to avoid violence.⁶⁹

Vhumbunu's article is significant to this study because it lays bare, the dynamics of the SADC, how its members act when the community's peace and security structure is under internal threat using an example of a conflict. He further recommends a shift from conflict management policy to conflict resolution with a transformational agenda policy. This is because the two phenomena differ, the former deals with controlling the means of pursuing the crisis whilst the latter entails the removal of the root causes of the conflict. However, Vhumbunu does not cover key challenges to regional cooperation, an area this study addresses through comparison and evaluation of two essential regional organizations on the continent.

Cheryl Hendricks and Takawira Musavengana write on the "Southern African Development Community's Regional Peace and Security Architecture" and describe the entity as an important establishment for the creation of peace and security in the region. They explain that as a regional institution centrally concerned with peace and security, SADC lays the foundations for the general norms and values that member states should adopt in their provision of security.⁵⁰ They were to foster regional integration and cooperation to jumpstart economic growth and development and acknowledge the existence of a civil society with the SADC, which strengthens engagement and policy enactment. Further, they identify the principles of SADC to include the "sovereign equality of all member states; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes."⁷⁰ The article is important because it helps to identify the challenges the SADC faces in a contemporary time setting and help the researcher understand from the very onset of the study the potential challenges that may still maintain today. Cheryl Hendricks and Takawira Musavengana cite corruption, capacity, the dynamic criminal environment, as major threats to SADC operations. They further

indicate inadequate attention to the governance of the security sector of member states, lack of coherence between the development of national integrated security strategies and regional security strategy, and insufficient human resource capacity, among other reasons, as issues affecting the SADC. They suggest a complete overhaul of the structure that oversees security for the SADC.⁷¹

Odobo, Samuel Osagie, Andekin, Amos Musa and Udegbunnam, Kinsley in “An Analysis of ECOWAS Institutional Framework for Conflict Management” trace the evolution of ECOWAS as an economic integration organization to include conflict resolution and peace agenda in response to mostly humanitarian crises facing the sub-region. They argued that in the original scheme of things, security did not count much in the design and objectives of ECOWAS. The lack of emphasis on security, they explain, was largely because of the Cold War *realpolitik* logic that forbade interference in the domestic affairs of member states. They argue that the end of the Cold War, the change in profile of threats from inter-state to intra-state violence, and a conducive international environment were the factors that precipitated ECOWAS’s change in its mandate to include the maintenance of security in the sub region.⁷²

Odobo *et al* trace the causes of conflicts in West Africa to the colonial era when artificial borders were created and state formation that held little regard for ethnic and cultural differences occurred. They peg the defining features of the region as corruption, poverty, underdevelopment, political instability, electoral violence, arms proliferation, military involvement in governance, drug trafficking, territorial disputes among others.⁷³ The writers explain that given the aforementioned characteristics, ECOWAS was bound to widen its mandate to address the region’s security challenges in addition to its economic development and aspirations. Thus, two legal instruments,

the Protocol on Non-aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981), that were meant to enable stability and peace in the sub-region were introduced. These two instruments, however, were inadequate to manage conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau in the 1990s.⁷⁴

Odobo *et al* state that these inadequacies led to the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (ECOWAS Mechanism), a framework that provides for regional intervention when political crises occur in member states. This was to promote consultation and inclusiveness of all stakeholders concerning the management of West Africa's security sector. The organs of the framework include the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Mediation and Security Council, the Executive Secretariat, Council of Elders, Defence and Security Commission, Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System, and ECOMOG.⁷⁵

Odobo *et al* further highlight that to strengthen the foundations of the sub-region's security framework, the Protocol A/sp/1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance begun to have legal force and effect in 2001 to establish the pre-conditions for achieving democracy and peace within the community. This was a supplement to the protocol establishing the mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and focused on the respect for human rights, the rule of law, good governance and free and fair credible elections. In addition, to address the delays in response to crisis, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was created in 2008 to identify possible conflict triggers and to ensure that conflicts are avoided in the first place and if they do, they do not reoccur or escalate into large-scale violence.⁷⁶

Additionally, the study highlighted the challenges such as poverty, lack of political will, the Anglophone-Francophone divide, and weak institutionalization that continue to weaken the security resolve of ECOWAS. In assessing the effectiveness of ECOWAS security regime, they conclude that ECOWAS has made remarkable gains in maintaining law and order in West Africa particularly because the mechanism it employs in handling conflicts is relatively comprehensive. Odobo *et al* cite the community's response to Togolese political events in 2005 that saw the unconstitutional ascension of Faure Eyadema. With a combination of sanctions and preventive diplomacy, Faure resigned in order for presidential elections to be held and hence ECOWAS helped to maintain stability.⁷⁷

The writers, however, suggest that much needs to be done in addressing poverty, rights violation, and election malpractices. They also call for more collaboration and political will to stem religious militancy in West Africa. The significance of this article is found in its thorough breakdown of the different components of West Africa's security and conflict management framework and even more, its appraisal of ECOWAS' framework. This study carries out a similar task but takes it a step further to conduct a comparative assessment of two key regional Organizations on the African continent.

Focusing on ECOWAS, the work of Gilles Olakounle Yabi titled "The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflicts" also offers more insight into the role the community plays in the security sector of the sub-region. He asserts that ECOWAS has demonstrated a real political will to positively influence political and security developments, citing Guinea and Guinea-Bissau interventions as examples. He further backs the claim that ECOWAS is clearly committed to peace

and security in West Africa, and the Commission's public condemnation of human rights violations perpetrated by the armed forces in conflict areas is commendable. However, he indicates that the will to act and defend the constitution is not enough to make a decisive contribution to the quest for lasting peace and security in, especially difficult situations. Therefore, he suggests that ECOWAS declarations be accompanied by a significant and immediate investment in terms of human and financial resources.⁷⁸

The paper carefully examines the role, actions and perception of ECOWAS, Guinea Bissau and other countries, during and after the Guinea Bissau affair. The biggest challenge he admonishes ECOWAS to be cautious of is that political, economic, social and demographic characteristics will continue to expose them in the coming years to potentially violent crises, but with varying degrees. Thus, ECOWAS member countries must work harder to inspire unity. He also cautions that ECOWAS has become very reactive to disturbing political and security developments within the community space, which can limit the sovereignty of member states.⁷⁹

Alexander Frempong examines ECOWAS transition from an economic organization into a sub-regional security organization in his paper, "The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): The Search for Peace and Democratic Governance."⁸⁰ The paper reviews ECOWAS' performance in past conflicts and how the organization manages conflict presently. According to Frempong, the absence of ECOWAS security related protocols when the organization was initially established indicates that ECOWAS major role was not to take on security but to ensure economic collaboration. This, however, changed with the emerging political crisis in the sub- region during the 1990s. He also discusses the Non-Aggression Protocol, which calls on member states to refrain

from acts of aggression towards each other and asked that they settle disputes in a peaceful way. This protocol, however, failed to address issues of threats coming from outside the community and within a member state. The limitations, therefore, led to the adoption of the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance Defence (PMAD)” in 1981, that provides for, among others, a response mechanism for external threats and issues of domestic conflict.⁸¹

Frempong also discusses the adoption of the Declaration of Political Principles in 1991, when members committed themselves to democratic principles, rule of law, respect for human rights etc. This led to the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993, which gave ECOWAS a supra-nationality status and assigned member states with the task of conflict prevention and settling of disputes. In 1999, the Community adopted the Protocol relating to the “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” to promote peace and security in the sub-region. To further complement the 1999 Mechanism and strengthen the democratic dispensation of the sub-region, the “2001 supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” was adopted to address issues of unconstitutional change of government, corruption etc.⁸²

Frempong explains that there are several factors that the Community must address despite the efforts by ECOWAS to manage crises in the sub-region. Frempong recommends that member states must unite to help reduce the occurrence of conflicts in the region, improve the living standards of their citizens, and respect their human rights. He also states that member states should not underestimate the importance of “principles and norms” and that ECOWAS must adopt some mechanisms for overseeing the peace-building segment in conflicts in which it intervenes.⁸³

The existing literature provides information on the sub-regional groups; ECOWAS and SADC concerning their structure and role that they play in Africa. This study therefore compares the challenges of ECOWAS and SADC to advice on how to mitigate these challenges and ensure better results of cooperation.

1.8 Sources of Data and Methodology

The data for the study relied on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources of data for the study included a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted with the cultural attaché of the South African High Commission, the Namibian High Commission, the Zimbabwean High Commission and the Nigerian High Commission. Information was sourced from them to solicit answers with regards to the security challenges that the SADC and ECOWAS organization face. Joyce Bawah Mogtari, special aide to former President John Mahama was also contacted. William Awinador-Kanyirige, former High Commissioner to Nigerian and former Permanent Representative to ECOWAS was also interviewed. Dr. Fiifi Edu-Afful, Dr. Festus Aubyn and Dr. Mustapha Abdallah, research fellows at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) were also contacted to obtain their expert knowledge on the security challenges that SADC and ECOWAS face as regional bodies. The above-named persons (including the cultural attachés) and researchers were consulted for their expert knowledge and work experience on African peace and security, peace operations, conflict management and election security makes them relevant for the study.

As an approach to undertaking a research study, qualitative methods are practical and explanatory and throws more light on a phenomenon. As such, the method expedited the explanations to the

challenges to regional security cooperation in respect of ECOWAS and SADC. The data collected from the interviews provided sufficient information needed to support the study. The data were analysed qualitatively in the form of descriptions, narrations and explanations while some verbatim statements from interviewees were also made. Sampling method for the study was done using purposive sampling method. Purposive sampling technique is the careful choice of informants due to the qualities they possess to provide the information that is vital to a study. Secondary data are used to compliment the primary data obtained. Secondary data for the study were sourced from legally acquired books, journal articles, websites, and reports related to the study.

1.9 Arrangement of Chapters

The research is arranged in four (4) chapters.

1. Chapter one (1) constitutes the introduction to the research
2. Chapter two (2) is an overview of the role of sub-regional organizations in peace and security
3. Chapter three (3) constitutes the comparative analysis of strengths and challenges of ECOWAS and SADC in achieving peace and security.
4. Chapter four (4) provides the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

ENDNOTES

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³⁶ Thus, institutionalist theory does not advocate the Wilsonian notion of ideal collective security; neither does institutionalism hold the ambitions of some critical theorists to transform the international relations. See Richard Ahley, "Poverty of Neorealism," *International Relations* Vol. 38, No. 2, (1984), pp. 225-286.

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⁴⁵ Stephen Krasner, for example has argued that coordination difficulties can be solved by the unilateral deployment of power by the most powerful state. See Stephen D. Krasner, *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 3, (1991), pp. 336-366.

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CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE AND SECURITY

2.0 Introduction

This chapter captures the role of sub-regional organizations in peace and security. It begins with an analysis of both ECOWAS and SADC, their objectives and achievements. It further elaborates on the profile of threats and other factors that affect the functioning of ECOWAS and SADC.

2.1 Regional Integration in Africa

According to Ken Ahorsu,

Regional integration has been an enduring continental strategy of 'collective self-reliance' dabbled with by Africans to deaden the refractory colonial structural legacies of dependence and marginality African countries have been compelled by the limitations of population, low income, small domestic market, structural weaknesses, dependency, as well as common history and cultural ties to join both regional and continental cooperation schemes to reduce its economic vulnerability.¹

Drawing from the above, countries that are in the same geographical area, sharing common social, cultural, political, and historical affinities often harness their sense of neighbourliness to solve common socio-economic and political problems to strengthen their state capabilities globally. This sense of common affinities and interests lead to some form of cooperation. Regional integration is the formal institutionalization of this sense of neighbourliness and cooperation among states within a geopolitical region. Regional integration seeks to pull the resources and efforts of the states concerned towards addressing and promoting common interests in a wide range of fields

including, economic, social, cultural, political, military, and many more.²

Regional integration arrangements are viewed as a ‘mini United Nations’, with acceptable frameworks for mobilizing and harnessing efforts within various geopolitical regions. The UN Charter encourages regional organizations to take appropriate actions to maintain international peace and security.³ Regional and sub-regional organizations are to augment United Nations (UN) and other actors’ efforts to assist states with the implementation of its security guidelines. In contrast to international entities, regional and sub-regional organizations generally consist of states near each other with similar political, social, economic, cultural, and historic experiences.⁴ Therefore, regional and sub-regional organizations are a more appropriate venue for discussing national and regional security benefits.

As in other continents of the world, regional integration is a concept that has been embraced in Africa at the continental level (through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), later the AU, and at the sub-regional level through various sub-regional arrangements like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECAS), among others.⁵ These sub-regional organizations pursue a wide range of common regional objectives usually covering the economic, social, political, and importantly peace and security spheres.⁶ African countries have embraced regional integration as a critical component of their development strategies, primarily driven by the economic rationale of overcoming the constraint of small and fragmented economies working in isolation.⁷ African organizations like the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have been working towards deepening economic, social and political cooperation and integration in Africa.

Even after independence, colonial cross-border arrangements had existed to serve the regional integration agenda. Such arrangements included the African Financial Community (CFA) zone, which comprised the West African CFA franc and the Central African CFA franc. The West African CFA franc was ultimately integrated into the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in the territory of ECOWAS, while the Central African CFA franc was set to join the envisioned Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC) in the ECCAS region.⁸ Likewise, in Southern Africa, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) with its associated monetary union – the Common Monetary Area – is set to be integrated to the SADC constituency.⁹

As African countries continue to pursue economic growth, integration is a necessary requirement. For instance, for a common market to function effectively, member states must at least be at peace with each other; since wars and other forms of conflicts in Africa negatively affect transport networks, communications and other basic infrastructure.

2.2 Regional Security in Africa

Regional security is an approach that grasps security, which has come to imply such diverse meanings, from the perspective of a region consisting of multiple states, rather than that of a state.¹⁰ In today's international community, Africa is one of the regions where regional security as described above is most actively debated and challenged.

Africa's strong focus on the framework of regional security naturally lies within the interest of the international environment since the end of the Cold War. When the Berlin Conference (the conference that led to the colonial division of Africa by the European powers) was convened, it negatively affected the substantial independent inter-state relations within Africa.¹¹ This was partly because the African colonies, before independence, were not in a position to be actors in the regime of modern sovereign states. The newly emerged independent countries of Africa, as they were incorporated willingly or unwillingly into the global Cold War system, remained subordinate and marginal actors in the sense that, regardless of the external influence on their countries affairs, they were unable to exert any influence on international affairs.¹² Consequently, during the Cold War period, though African countries developed extensive bilateral and/or multilateral relations within the region, countries such as Angola and Congo suffered from proxy wars while others also continued to be tightly regulated by the East-West confrontation and by neo-colonial relations with France, one of the former colonial powers.¹³

However, the post Cold War brought about a dramatic change in Africa's international relations with regards to development and security.¹⁴ The Soviet Union collapsed, and Russia, its successor subsequently "withdrew" from Africa. Further, the United States and its allies like France gradually reduced their interventions in African conflicts.¹⁵ The UN, also learning from its "failures" in Somalia and Rwanda, became increasingly cautious about dispatching peacekeeping forces to conflicts in Africa.¹⁶ African countries began to develop regional international relations as relatively independent actors.

The regional security initiative began with the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 as a pan-African regional organization.¹⁷ One of the principles included in the OAU

Charter was, the “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.”¹⁸ In July 1990, immediately after the end of the Cold War, leaders of the OAU member states adopted the “Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World,” where they clearly expressed that African countries had the primary responsibility to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in Africa.¹⁹ This was followed by the OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government held in Cairo in June 1993, where the “Declaration on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution” (Cairo Declaration) was adopted, thereby establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR), a conflict response system unique to the OAU.²⁰

In November 1993, the Central Organ was established as the core organization of the MCPMR and the Peace Fund was set up to secure funding for the mechanism.²¹ Thereafter, the OAU became actively involved in the problems of conflicts in Africa through the MCPMR. As it turned out, however, the OAU hardly played any role in responding to conflicts in Africa except in those in Comoros and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Regional security initiatives taken by the OAU in the 1990s through the MCPMR were successful to some degree in the sense that they temporarily enhanced the expectancy toward the OAU as Africa’s cohesive power, by demonstrating its attitude to have “Africans themselves settle African conflicts” in and outside the region.²² In the end, however, they failed to achieve substantial results at the level of actual response to conflicts.

Given the situation, in July 2002, the OAU was officially transformed into the AU at the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government held in Durban.²³ This transition became a great turning point for revitalizing the OAU's regional security initiatives at a time when the earlier expectations,

nearly 10 years after the Cairo Declaration were failing. At the first AU summit held in July 2002, the members adopted the "Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union," based on which 15 countries were elected in March 2004 as the first member countries of the Peace and Security Council (PSC).²⁴

The PSC, which was formally inaugurated in May 2004, is a "permanent decision-making body for conflict prevention, management, and resolution" within the system of the AU and is expected to function as a core organ in the regional security initiatives of the AU.²⁵ To improve the AU's conflict response capability, there was the inauguration of an African Standby Forces (ASF) of 15,000 personnel consisting of five sub-regional brigades in North, West, East, Southern, and Central Africa by 2010, through cooperation with Africa's sub-regional organizations and with the USA and France.²⁶ This has since existed as Africa's major approach to regional security.

Figure 1 represents a map showing the various sub regional groups in sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 1: Map of Sub-regional groups in sub-Saharan Africa

Source:
www.geography.com

2.3 Formation and Structure of ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with its secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria, was established in 1975.²⁷ Figure 1 outlines the 15-member states of ECOWAS as the Republic of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (see figure 1) as well as demarcates some regional Organizations on the continent.²⁸ ECOWAS was primarily set up to promote sub-regional economic integration and development. Before its creation, the area known as West Africa was made up of an aggregation of states that had emerged from different colonial experiences and administrations, which largely defined the boundaries of the fifteen (15) states

located in the area. The idea of having a united West African body was proposed by the then Nigerian Head of State, Yakubu Gowon.²⁹ His idea was to achieve, collectively, self-sufficiency through the integration of the sixteen (16) West African countries into an economic block with a single market controlled by an economic and monetary union. All of the present ECOWAS countries joined as founding members except Cape Verde, which joined later in 1976.³⁰ Mauritania withdrew its membership in December 2000, with the government stating that the country wanted to focus on its membership in Arab Maghreb Union since ECOWAS does not protect the interests of Mauritania better.³¹ Niger and Guinea were suspended in 2009 after reported incidences of a coup d'état³² but became active again in the body in 2011 after both countries returned to civilian rule. Figure 2 below shows the members of the ECOWAS body.

***Figure 2: ECOWAS
Countries***

Source: ECOWAS Website (www.ecowas.int/member-states)

Member states of ECOWAS now make use of three official languages of colonial heritage (English, French and Portuguese). Eight (8) of the fifteen (15) member states are French-speaking,

five (5) are English-speaking and two (2) Portuguese-speaking.³³ Nonetheless, there are over a thousand existing local languages of the various ethnic groups found within West Africa. These languages include Hausa, Yoruba, Mandingo, Wolof, Akan, Denti, Ewe, and Fon. The region also has a population of over 300 million people tucked in a vast land of about 5.1 million square kilometres.³⁴

Experts who have undertaken studies regarding the Organization and regional integration in Africa as a whole have given a number of reasons for the formation of ECOWAS. These reasons justify the objectives of the community.

According to Dr. Fiiifi Edu-Afful, a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research, KAIPTC, ECOWAS was basically formed for:

*Economic integration and for member countries to come together to achieve economic integration. But times have changed; there are now security threats, trade threats etc. The original idea that influenced the formation of ECOWAS as an economic organization has now become more of a sub-regional security mechanism that is dealing with all the threats that confront the region.*³⁵

Thus, economic integration was a key issue in the formation of ECOWAS and the security role emerged afterwards to deal with the new threats of peace and security to the region. This is supported by claims that ECOWAS was formed primarily for economic integration, since member states may find it difficult to achieve much economic development, social progress etc. without regional support. According to Abdallah, individually, member states have weakness in terms of resources. When they pull these resources together, they will be able to achieve a lot; thus, serving the background of countries coming together to form ECOWAS to be able to achieve integration

and achieve economic development and social progress.³⁶ Abdallah also argues that there were many difficulties in terms of security challenges affecting West Africa, which were not envisaged at the time of the formation; the emergence of which affected the progress of ECOWAS.³⁷

The argument of economic cooperation being key in ECOWAS formation is shared by other experts. Dr. Festus Aubyn also claims that,

*The formation of ECOWAS from the beginning has been that of Economic cooperation. Looking at the ECOWAS treaty, the emphasis is on economic cooperation, peace and security. Individually, the member states could not achieve their own security and development so they had come together to form an economic bloc which can harness their varied resources to promote the growth of the region and at the same time develop individually as member states. Recently, peace and security has become very important because you cannot promote economic cooperation in the midst of instability.*³⁸

2.3.1 Objectives of ECOWAS

ECOWAS aims to promote cooperation and integration in economic, social and cultural activities, ultimately leading to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through the total integration of the national economies of member states.³⁹ It also aims to raise the living standards of its peoples, maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent. The main objective of ECOWAS is to promote co-operation and integration to create an economic and monetary union for encouraging economic growth and development in West Africa, through the suppression of customs duties and equivalent taxes, the establishment of a common external tariff, the harmonization of economic and financial policies and the creation of a monetary zone.⁴⁰

Besides trade and the benefit of the efficiencies of a regional market, the reason for the establishment of ECOWAS is also to promote political progress. More especially, for governments which have been installed due to majority votes of its electorates and the population in a democratic election, the community stresses on the democratically elected government to:

- Ensure that checks and balances are properly in place, thereby preventing the concentration of power in a particular political office.
- Ensure that the views of the people are properly addressed, somewhat ensuring that the government is installed to ensure socio-economic development.⁴¹

2.3.2 Structure of ECOWAS

The community consists of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Community Tribunal, the ECOWAS Parliament, the Executive Secretariat and Six Specialised Commissions. The Authority of Heads of State and Government of Member States is the supreme institution of the Community and is composed of Heads of State and/or Government of Member States.⁴² The Authority is responsible for the general direction and control of the Community and takes all measures to ensure its progressive development and the realization of its objectives.

The Council comprises the Minister in charge of ECOWAS Affairs and any other Minister of each Member State and is responsible for the functioning and development of the Community. The Treaty also provides for a Community Tribunal, whose composition and competence are determined by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. The Tribunal interprets the provisions of the Treaty and settles disputes between member states that are referred to it. As an

organization, the ECOWAS continues to undergo reform at certain points. An example is, the post of the financial controller being scrapped, while two positions of deputy executive secretaries have been created for economic co-operation and policy harmonisation respectively. The structuring of the Executive Secretariat was approved at the summit in December 1999.⁴³

The ECOWAS Summit of December 1999 agreed on a Protocol for the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace and Security. The Mechanism has a Council of Elders, and a Security and Mediation Council. The following Technical Commissions are established within the Economic Community of West African States:

1. Food and Agriculture
2. Industry, Science and Technology and Energy
3. Environment and Natural Resources
4. Transport, Communications and Tourism
5. Trade, Customs, Taxation, Statistics, Money and Payments
6. Political, Judicial and Legal Affairs, Regional Security and Immigration
7. Human Resources, Information, Social and Cultural Affairs
8. Administration and Finance Commission.”⁴⁴

The ECOWAS Parliament is situated in Abuja, Nigeria, and at present only acts in a consultative and advisory capacity.⁴⁵

2.4 Formation and Structure of SADC

Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional integration body that consists of Southern African countries. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was

established in 1992, succeeding the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was formed in 1980.⁴⁶ As of June 2006, it had fourteen (14) member states, and its secretariat is based in Gaborone, Botswana. The organization's primary aim is to achieve greater socio-economic cooperation and integration as well as political and security collaborations among its fifteen (15) member states.⁴⁷ As the name of SADCC implies, it was only a conference since 1980 until the Treaty was signed in Windhoek, Namibia, on 17th August 1992 and SADC was formally created.⁴⁸ After the signing of the Treaty, it ceased being a coordinated conference to being a development community. The members are outlined in figure 3 as mainly southern African countries, namely: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.⁴⁹

***Figure 3: SADC
Countries***

Source: SADC website (www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/)

The origins of SADC lie in the 1960s and 1970s, when the leaders of majority-ruled countries and national liberation movements coordinated their political, diplomatic and military struggles to bring an end to colonial and white-minority rule in southern Africa. The immediate forerunner of the political and security cooperation leg of today's SADC was the informal Front-Line States (FLS) grouping.⁵⁰

The original members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined after independence in 1990, followed by South Africa in 1994. The most recent members to join are Mauritius in 1995, and Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997. Before 1992, the SADCC's institutions were based on a Memorandum of Understanding (1981) between the member states and it was therefore not a Treaty-bound Organization.⁵¹ However, in 1990, the changing global political economy which stresses trade competitiveness, led to a shift in emphasis in SADCC's focus, from development cooperation to trade (and development) integration.⁵² This was the motive of the 1992 theme document "SADCC: Toward Economic Integration, and given effect by The Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community", signed on 17 August, 1992. The principles underlying the Treaty were co-ordination of member state policies to attain "sustainable development," sovereign equality of member states, solidarity, peace and security, human rights, democracy and rule of law, equity, balance and mutual benefit.⁵³

The reason for the formation of the SADC differs from that of ECOWAS and other sub-regional organizations. Scholars reveal that, the formation of the SADC was conceived during apartheid.

Malebang confirms that the SADC was originally formed with a mandate to reduce economic dependence on the apartheid regime in South Africa.⁵⁴ Abdallah explains that

It started as a frontline state whose objective was political liberation. It was later transformed to SADC in 1992 to include economic integration same as ECOWAS to become united for economic prosperity, achieve equality, all these are some of the reasons that actually informed the transformation of SADCC to SADC. The transformed SADC also continued with the fight against apartheid that was affecting South Africa that was a big country and also to achieve economic integration, development, equality by pulling resources together.⁵⁵

Between 1960 and 1970, leaders of southern African states and national liberation movements coordinated their political, diplomatic and military struggles to bring an end to colonial and white rule in southern Africa.⁵⁶ Achieving this required a collaborative effort by neighbouring countries. Thus, the formation of the SADC was motivated by the desire to achieve economic growth and development as well as peace and security of the people of Southern Africa.

2.4.1 Objectives of SADC

Article 5 of the SADC Treaty sets out the objectives as to:

- “Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- Evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
- Promote and defend peace and security;
- Promote self-sustaining development based on collective self-reliance, and the inter-dependence of member states;
- Achieve complementarities between national and regional strategies and programmes;
- Promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the

region;

- Achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and
- Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region”.⁵⁷

To achieve these objectives, Article 22 (1) of the Treaty makes provision for the conclusion of a number of protocols to “spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for cooperation and integration.”⁵⁸ Protocols are approved by the Summit and recommended by the Council (of Ministers) and must be ratified by the representatives (Parliaments) of all the member states before they take effect.⁵⁹ The following areas of cooperation are identified in Article 21(3):

- “food security, land and agriculture;
- infrastructure and services;
- industry, trade, investment and finance;
- human resources, development, science and technology;
- natural resources and environment;
- social welfare, information and culture; and
- politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security”⁶⁰

To date, several protocols have been recommended and accepted by the Summit of SADC: Transport, Communications and Meteorology; Shared Watercourse System Protocol; Energy, Trade, Illicit Drug Trafficking, Education and Training, and the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC. The June 1996 Summit in Gaborone (Botswana), also recommended the institutionalisation of a separate SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and

Security.⁶¹

2.4.2 Structure of SADC

On 14 August 2001, the 1992 SADC treaty was revised. This led to a change in the structure, policies and measures of SADC. To achieve its objectives, the organization was subdivided into eight (8) bodies. The structure comprises the Summit, which is a meeting of Heads of State or Government, the Council of Ministers, Tribunal, SADC National Committees (SNCs), and the Secretariat.⁶²

The Heads of State or Government (the Summit) is “the supreme policy-making institution of SADC.”⁶⁹The chair and vice-chair are elected from the member-states for an agreed period of time (three years). Decisions are made by consensus and are binding. The Council of Ministers consists of one minister from each member state (usually the minister responsible for economics or finance) and meets once a year. The chair and vice-chair of the Council are appointed by the chair and vice-chair of SADC, respectively. The Council is, inter alia, responsible for defining and allocating sectors of co-operation, approving policies, strategies and work programmes of SADC, and overseeing the implementation of SADC policies and its programmes.⁶³

The Secretariat is the chief executive institution of SADC. It implements decisions made by the Summit and the Council and is responsible for the strategic planning and management of SADC programmes, financial and general administration. The Secretariat is headed by the Executive Secretary, who undertakes consultation and coordination with member states and governments and other institutions, promotes cooperation with other organizations, and is responsible for diplomatic and other representations of SADC. The Standing Committee of Officials consists of

one permanent public official from each member state (ideally from finance or economic planning). It meets at least once a year and is responsible to the Council, to which it gives technical advice. Other sub-units exist to enable the efficient functioning of the SADC. ⁶⁴

2.5 ECOWAS Approach to Peace and Security

ECOWAS was primarily established to promote sub-regional economic integration and development. Sub-regional security issues were of secondary importance. However, shortly after it was formed, ECOWAS realized that it could not fulfill its developmental objectives amidst intrastate and interstate instability and insecurity. Widespread conflict and instability in the sub-region in the 1990s and early 2000s led the leaders in the West African sub-region to come to the realisation that it is difficult to attain economic prosperity in the absence of peace and security. Political instability remains a threat to West Africa, necessitating the need for ECOWAS to establish a security presence for businesses to thrive. This caused ECOWAS to establish a security framework, necessary to contain present and future threats. ECOWAS thus became concerned with peace and regional security since they are necessary factors in the socio-economic development of the member states.

The Authority of Heads of State and Government adopted a non-aggression protocol in 1978, a Mutual Assistance Defence Protocol in 1981 and a Declaration of Political Principles in July 1991 to act as a peacebuilding guideline. ⁶⁵ The need to add a defence protocol to the ECOWAS Treaty became imperative in the 1970s when two ECOWAS states, Guinea and Benin became victims of external aggression in November 1970 (Guinea experienced an attempted invasion by Portuguese mercenaries) and in January 1977 (Benin became the target of another failed mercenary attack).⁶⁶

The 1970s also saw the frequent attempts at military coups in West Africa. The Organization's gradual movement into security started in 1978 when ECOWAS adopted the Non-Aggression Treaty (also known as Non-Aggression Protocol) which called on member states to '...refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression' against each other.⁶⁷

The Mutual Assistance and Defense (MAD) Protocol in 1981 was signed as an improvement on the Non-Aggression Protocol to safeguard peace and security in the sub-region. The MAD Protocol in contrast to that of the preceding Protocol on Non-Aggression provided for collective security when an armed attack against a member state occurs with the potential to undermine peace and security across West Africa. The Treaty provides three conditions under which an armed attack is considered a threat to the sub-region:

- Internal armed conflict within a member state;
- Conflict between member-states; and
- External threats to the sub-region originating from without.⁶⁸

Eventually, MAD was undermined by several factors including the lack of concrete institutional arrangement under the ECOWAS Treaty for defence or deterrence.⁶⁹ In 1989, ECOWAS faced a critical challenge in security when the Liberian conflict escalated. ECOWAS was forced to devise a security mechanism to control the growing conflict which was causing massive casualties. In May 1990, ECOWAS established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) charged with the responsibility of finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Following weeks of unproductive talks with various faction leaders in July 1990, the SMC took the bold step of establishing and deploying the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) despite the bitter opposition from then rebel leader Charles Taylor and some West African leaders.⁷⁰ ECOMOG has been

involved in intervening in conflicts in Sierra Leone in 1993, Guinea Bissau in 1998, Cote d'Ivoire in 2002 and Liberia in 2003.⁷¹ With its presence, it To varying degrees of success, ECOMOG missions also engaged in peacebuilding efforts, including implementing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, security sector reform and organizing elections.⁷²

The most important security protocol adopted so far is the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security signed in December 1999.⁷³ As its name implies, this mechanism seeks to strengthen the sub-region's conflict prevention, management and resolution capacity, as well as build effective peacekeeping, humanitarian support and peacebuilding capabilities. It also addresses cross-border crime, which is becoming a major problem for the sub-region. In a bid to realise these ambitious aims, the ECOWAS Security Mechanism (as it is popularly known) establishes several institutions, arms and strategies, which include the Mediation and Security Council, an early warning system, and a standby force.⁷⁴

2.6 SADC Approach to Peace and Security

Southern Africa's need to contain the military threat from dividing South Africa was key in the establishment of the SADC. The SADC agreed in November 1994 to inaugurate its own peacekeeping force and in June 1996, to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SADC Organ).⁷⁵ The formulation of a security policy of a regional character was pursued by the Secretariat between 1992 and 1994.⁷⁶ In 1993, the Secretariat drew up a document- the Framework and Strategy Document, which advocated the development of a new security order. A Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security was organized and attended in Windhoek in July 1994.⁷⁷ It was at this workshop that the proposal for the establishment of a SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Co-operation was suggested. Also, with the signing and

ratification of the SADC Declaration and Treaty in 1992, member states were obliged to legally participate and implement SADC protocols.⁷⁸

In August 2001, with a view to providing a regional security mechanism with a legal basis through the SADC Organ, the member countries signed the “Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.”⁷⁹ In 2003, the “Strategic Initiative Plan for the Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation” (SIPO), a summary of the five-year action guidelines for the above protocol, was submitted by the Secretariat.⁸⁰ However, the strongest approach that SADC has made to ensuring peace and security in the sub-region is the establishment of the Organ for Politics Defence and Security which is situated under the SADC Summit. The organ is the SADC’s main mechanism regarding peace and security issues, equivalent to UN’s Security Council or AU’s Peace and Security Council.

Unlike the West African sub-region, Southern Africa was more concerned with the military aspects of security from the start. According to Olonisakin and Levitt, sub-regional security cooperation began with the establishment of the Front-Line States (FLS) in 1974 which initially included Tanzania and Zambia but later expanded to include Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe.⁸¹ They contended that democratisation was secondary to the attainment of black rule in the sub-region, which would not have been possible had the white settler’s oligarchic regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa continued to broaden their sphere of influence.⁸² It was, therefore, the goal of the FLS to prevent this from happening.

2.7 Causes of Conflict in ECOWAS and SADC Regions

The period before and after independence on the African continent have witnessed a number of

conflicts, which have threatened the peace and security in the region. African regional organizations, which have been formed some years after independence, have played an increasingly more active role in the cases of peace and security. Grasa and Mateos note that:

*The “persistence of armed violence in certain phases of the African postcolonial state, the regression of socio-economic indicators, or the poor democratic quality of many of these new states have often been judged from a standpoint invoking strictly endogenous factors such as the misbehaviour of African political elites, the impact of widespread corruption or the inability of African societies to adapt to the context of globalization”.*⁸³

Armed conflicts have periodically featured on the African scene after independence. Lindemann observes that since the 1960s, about 24 of sub-Saharan African countries have been involved in a form of armed conflict.⁸⁴ Since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts have occurred in Angola, Algeria, Zaire (now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Nigeria, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea-Ethiopia and Guinea-Bissau for various reasons.⁸⁵ Particularly for West Africa, the roots of conflicts have been linked to several complex factors. Obi identifies in his article ‘Conflict and Peace in West Africa,’ that:

*The roots of conflict in West Africa are much deeper and complex and are embedded in the interplay of historical factors, socio-economic crisis, legacies of authoritarianism and the politics of exclusion, international forces, and local struggles*⁹⁷

The causes of the conflicts in West Africa are broad and interconnected. The probable causes are often economic inequalities, bad governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization, human rights violations, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and religious militancy.⁸⁶ These

reasons continue to act as catalysts for major conflicts and sometimes, are the sources of the major conflicts.

Fiiifi Edu-Afful explains that “there are issues of governance and that has fueled all this unconstitutional change of government in West African countries.”⁸⁷ He alludes to the frequent political instability and its resulting conflicts to poor governance. He also points to ethnic marginalization where some ethnic groups feel impoverished or marginalized, and resort to violent means to make their case. He argues that economic marginalization has led to discontent among the masses, causing them to feel disenchanting with the existing condition, leading to violence.⁸⁸

Abdallah also explains that there are multiple causes of conflict in the ECOWAS region, which could emanate from politics, socio-economic issues, and governance challenges.⁸⁹ On the subject of politics, he notes that majority of the coups that took place in West Africa were because of bad governance and corruption. Abdallah points to disgruntlement by civilians because of increasing unemployment and poverty as a reason for conflict.⁹⁰

Festus Aubyn also identifies bad governance among other factors including ethnicity, marginalization, bad resource management (resource here means minerals), unemployment and poverty, transnational crimes (drug trafficking, issues of violent extremism), and state failure and weakness.⁹¹ Aubyn adds further that even though the causes of conflict can be generalized in the entire region, there are country-specific issues. That is the cause of conflict in Nigeria maybe different from that of Ghana, though the same issue of governance may be the root cause.⁹² Within the SADC, human rights abuse, immigration and economic inequalities are usually reasons for conflicts. Abdallah argues that, relatively, SADC countries are incited to violence for political

reasons more than economic reasons.⁹³

There is also the case of inequality between various ethnic groups, which has been a foremost cause of conflict in Southern Africa. For instance, different forms of discrimination motivate South Africa's ethnic conflict and racism.⁹⁴ Often, economic, social and political inequality among groups increases the prospects of violent conflict. Some ethnic or political groups monopolize political power and benefits. The unequal access to power has perpetuated a lack of access to resources and revenue.⁹⁵ This has played a key role in sustaining inequalities which often leads to conflict. Also, the collapse of state institutions has caused internal and regional conflict. Often, this collapse is as a result of recurrent happenings characterised by state failure, raging corruption and mismanagement of resources. As seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the combination of the institutional failure and ethnic violence has created a self-sustaining and factional violence.⁹⁶

For most of ECOWAS and SADC, the causes of conflicts have been inequality, state failure and collapse, economic decline and economic shocks, historical factors, natural resources, unemployment and lack education, ethnic abuses, availability of arms and regional conflicts.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has examined regional integration, regional security, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). This was to provide the context within which ECOWAS and SADC exist and what influences the challenges they face. The narratives explain that the causes of conflicts have linked violence with issues such

as identity (ethnic, religious, cultural), the scarcity or the abundance of natural resources, the extreme fragility and sometimes the collapse of the postcolonial African State, or the prevailing economic underdevelopment in many of these contexts. By understanding the structure and objectives of the two Organizations, it will help understand the nature of the challenges they face and the differences in their activities.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER THREE

STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES OF ECOWAS AND SADC

3.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the strengths and challenges of ECOWAS and SADC in regional cooperation. The chapter makes an in-depth assessment of the sources and dynamics of power within the two organizations, as well as how they contribute to success in regional security interventions. It also examines the challenges faced by these organizations plus how they make efforts towards regional security. As such, the chapter responds to the study's objective of identifying the strengths, similarities, differences and challenges faced by the two organizations in their operations as peace and security organizations.

3.1 Sources of Strength: ECOWAS and SADC

Regional security cooperative groups are as strong as the collaborative effort by their member states. ECOWAS regulations are binding on ECOWAS states and their strengths come from putting together the capabilities and connections of the members in the region. There are policies that guide the political economy of states and the international system. There is also a semblance of normative convergence or consensus on issues such as politics, economics, development, human rights, gender and security despite occasional divergence. As such, the norms and values that guide the operation of most intergovernmental organizations, international institutions, civil society organizations, and regional integration projects appear to be the same. Therefore, it is often the case that regulations binding ECOWAS neighbours are bound by AU and UN regulations. Again, divergence from these principles, such as unconstitutional change of government is not only punishable by ECOWAS but by the AU and UN as well.¹ Similarly,

SADC regulations are strong and binding, if SADC members are collectively consenting and abiding by them. Otherwise, regional security cooperation remains as weak as the individual national efforts.² Different factors contribute to the success of ECOWAS and SADC. These factors rely on the dynamics of the institutions. Within the organization, member states balance the weaknesses of other member states with their strengths. Instruments of diplomacy, logistics, human and natural resources and military capabilities available to regional organizations are paramount in their effective functioning.

Regional organizations have capitalized on the dynamics of their region to function as a security body. For ECOWAS, various factors have been at play in ensuring regional security. West Africa's ethnic groups consist of a large number of groups closely knit within an empire or splinter groups which dissociated from a major group.³ Besides the small ethnic groups, others like the Akans, Hausa, Ewe, Yoruba, etc., expand across national borders. The Ashanti Empire, for instance stretched from present day Ashanti Region in Ghana, into immediate parts of present day Cote d'Ivoire.⁴ The Yoruba Kingdom reaches into Benin from Nigeria and the Ewes can be found in Ghana, Togo and Benin. This is because pre-colonial African ethnic identities were relatively fluid, penetrable, intersecting, and complex.⁵ However, the 1884-85 Berlin Conference led to the division of ethnic groups across borderlines to form colonial nation states.⁶ These divisions, created artificial boundaries in border towns, separating kinsmen. This came along with artificial barriers to trade which hitherto, carried on uninterrupted by national trade barriers.⁷ The formation of ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization helped to eliminate these barriers to trade with the erection of free trade within the sub-region and free movement of goods and services.⁸

Again, in the quest for independence from the colonial agency, most of West Africa presented a united front by aiding neighbor countries in the liberation struggle. Anti-colonialism was fought from a sub-regional perspective, which included unions, student groups and political associations. For instance, the West African Students Union (WASU), formed from the unity of students in secondary and colleges in West Africa, developed as a protest movement in the fight for independence.⁹ The anti-colonial ideas propagated by the movement attracted many West African students to join the Union.¹⁰ The WASU leadership consisted of important colonial figures like Nigeria's Ladipo Solanke (first secretary), Kusimo Soluade, Olatunde Vincent (first treasurer), Ekundayo Williams, M. A. Sorinola Siffre, and B. J. Farreira; Dr. J. B. Danquah from the Gold Coast (first Vice-President); Sierra Leone's Otto Oyekan-During and Gambia's W. Davidson Carrol (first President) and Kushida Roberts.¹¹ This union created strong ties among member countries, serving as a form of support group in the quest for independence. The colonial divide between Anglophone and Francophone countries also acted as a catalyst in the formation of the ECOWAS.¹² Francophone countries thought along a uniform line as did Anglophone countries and therefore, were able to support themselves easily. The common interests helped in the sense that, getting one leader from each Francophone, Anglophone and the sole Lusophone country will convince the others to follow suit in the making of a major decision. This set-up, which indicates a divide in ECOWAS, served positively in the quest for independence and inconsequent affairs of ECOWAS.¹³

In terms of resources, the cultural attaché at the Nigerian High Commission in Ghana exemplifies that Ghana, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire have a wealth of resources which supports the ECOWAS mechanism. He also identifies Nigeria's military strength as a significant human resource when it

comes to leading military actions in the region. According to him, Ghana on other hand excels in using its diplomatic strength to enhance the plans and activities of the ECOWAS.¹⁴ Festus Aubyn also explains that Nigeria has economic, military and political power, which has made it relevant when there is conflict within the sub-region. He adds that Nigeria is a major source of finance to ECOWAS making it a very important member.¹⁵ Aubyn also sees significant strength in ECOWAS institutions, stating that:

ECOWAS has about 3 institutions of excellence: Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Centre in Ghana, International Defense College in Nigeria and Peacekeeping School in Mali. These are three schools that train troops and security personnel in the sub-region. Within the ECOWAS region, these institutions help to intervene in some of the conflicts when it comes to mediation.¹⁶

The strength of ECOWAS in dealing with security was demonstrated in the structures and the protocols of ECOWAS. To rise to the challenge of security, ECOWAS acted on the 1999 conflict resolution protocol where in December 1999, ECOWAS leaders met in Lome, Togo and signed the Protocol establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.¹⁷ The mechanism was adopted to reinforce the ECOWAS capacity to resolve sub-regional conflicts. The 1999 Mechanism represented an archetypal shift in ECOWAS approach to conflict management and was seen as a resolve to change the noninterfering status quo that previously existed.¹⁸ The mechanism was a laid-out structure for peace and security intervention and ECOWAS' commitment to ensuring peace was demonstrated when it was recognized as the first regional bloc to intervene in a foreign country despite international law prohibiting interference in sovereign states. The protocol allows ECOWAS to take decisions and implement policies on issues of conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security.¹⁹ The protocol also allowed for the creation

of supporting organs like the Commission of Defence and Security, the Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to tackle issues of security.²⁰

Another diplomatic strength of ECOWAS is that member states are unanimous and resolute regarding democratic norms and standards.²¹ Given the fragility within the region, democracy is a necessary concept to hold in order to ensure peace. In this regard, almost all the member states, have shown the unanimity and resoluteness when ECOWAS has condemned and applied sanctions for the violations of the regional protocols. This was upheld when three countries (Guinea, Niger and Cote d'Ivoire) of the fifteen countries were suspended. ECOWAS condemned former President Laurent Gbagbo's insistence on power and threw support behind the current President Alassane Ouattara during the Ivorian post-election crisis.²² When military personnel took charge of power in Niger and Guinea, member states were united in insisting on a return of power to the democratically elected government.²³

A peculiar source of strength to ECOWAS is the existence of common security threats across the region. Conflicts and political instability in the region have similar causal factors and trends which press the organization to hold a lead role in peace and security matters.²⁴ Ambassador Kanyirige comments that individual nations have realized that the nature of these problems spread beyond borders and as such, they need to cooperate with neighbours to ensure effective solutions. For instance, Ghana will likely suffer from instability in neighbouring countries if insurgents take advantage of the porous borders and illicit trade that assists the flow of arms and money.²⁵ It is therefore in Ghana's best interest that these countries remain politically stable. Thus, common security concerns have become a force of regional integration.²⁶

Comparatively, the SADC and its member countries derive their strength from similar ideals and as Arday indicates, SADC operates a centralized system within the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone which makes it directly involved in the decision making, coordination and monitoring of the member states.²⁷ This reduces bureaucracy and allows for a quick response to peace and security issues. The SADC is further strengthened by long standing historical, social and cultural links among the people of southern Africa. Initially, a common enemy, apartheid, united the SADC. Consequently, it is now united by a common goal: the overall improvement of the countries of Southern Africa. To this end, the SADC is strengthened by a unity of purpose, which has bound member states from the formation of the organization to present. Another notable strength of SADC lies in its preference to diplomacy over military interventions.²⁸ The SADC often resorts to dialogue, peace talks and other preventive diplomacy measures in conflict resolution. Furthermore, South Africa's economic power remains a source of strength for the SADC. South Africa, as a regional leader, has been able to exercise military power as well as diplomatic experience in conflict resolution to the SADC.²⁹

3.2 Successes of ECOWAS and SADC in Regional Security Interventions

There is no doubt that the ECOWAS and SADC have achieved impressive results in peace and security within the region. Even though ECOWAS was formed with the main purpose of achieving economic development in the West African region, it has in recent times been successful in providing security. The numerous conflicts and civil wars that have occurred and the role the Organization has played have shown that it has stepped up to fill the bigger boots.³⁰ Similarly, the SADC has also been occupied with efforts to manage and resolve the conflict in the region and has made significant achievements in that regard. The SADC and its member states

have established a peace and security architecture that has been deemed as mature by stakeholders and external observers.³¹

3.2.1 Successes of ECOWAS in Regional Security Interventions

In recent times, ECOWAS has reacted resolutely and unanimously to the crises in Guinea, Niger and Côte d'Ivoire. This is not the first foray of the organization into regional security affairs. The cultural attaché at the Nigerian High Commission in Ghana comments that military and preventive diplomacy interventions have been undertaken by ECOWAS in various member countries, to ensure regional peace. Military interventions have been exercised through the use of ECOMOG and preventive diplomacy has been done through mediators sent to negotiate peace treaties in times of upheavals. ECOWAS has had to deal with situations in Liberia, Senegal, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire among others. Furthermore, ECOWAS has also employed sanctions at certain times, to show it has an active strong hand.³²

The conflicts in Liberia and subsequently Sierra Leone posed a new challenge to ECOWAS because of the resulting humanitarian casualties that occurred in the two countries and the international concerns it created. This meant that ECOWAS could not remain dormant in the state of affairs of its members. Charles Taylor led a rebellion against Liberian president Samuel Doe in 1989. By 1990, it was a full-blown conflict in Liberia between the pro-Doe Armed Forces of Liberia and pro-Taylor National Patriotic Front of Liberia.³³ In some months, Charles Taylor controlled most of Liberia with the support of some African leaders. Other factors emerged in the conflict, protracting it and leading to the loss of lives of thousands of people. ECOWAS was swift in putting together military units (ECOMOG) to intervene in the conflict for the first time

in the region to bring the situation under control.³⁴ This was the first time a regional Organization like ECOWAS intervened in a major conflict without prior authorization by the UN Security Council (UNSC). The Liberian conflict was devastating in terms of the loss of lives and atrocities committed which attracted the attention of the international community, especially the US.³⁵ The first ECOMOG forces deployed to Liberia consisted of four thousand (4000) troops: from Nigeria (1,700), Ghana (800), Guinea (500), Sierra-Leone (350) and Gambia (105).³⁶

Reports indicate that the decision to deploy ECOMOG created tension between the Anglophone and Francophone countries in ECOWAS, with some of the Francophone countries supporting Taylor's ascension, while others cautioned against the nature of intervention in a sovereign land. Nigeria provided the majority of the military support and funding for the ECOMOG deployment. Baring the political dialogue surrounding the intervention, ECOMOG was successful in repelling aggression attacks by the parties involved, ensuring ceasefire monitoring, and becoming a peace enforcement force. By 1993, ECOWAS had successfully brokered between factions to allow for general elections. Although the performance of ECOMOG and ECOWAS as a whole in Liberia has been critiqued by scholars, the return of Liberia to civil governance signal a milestone for ECOWAS.

In 1997, another coup d'état happened in Sierra Leone when the armed forces overthrew the elected president. Nigeria led an ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone to maintain peace during the upheaval despite the initial caution by other ECOWAS member states on the needless use of force. Unlike in Liberia, the Sierra Leone situation proved too difficult to be managed by force and ECOWAS resorted to peace talks to reach a temporary agreement.

ECOWAS again intervened in Guinea-Bissau in a case of increased hostility between government factions and rebel dissents. However, unlike in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS was unable to reach a successful end in Guinea-Bissau owing to a number of factors including the lack of support from member countries. ECOWAS became active again in Guinea Bissau during a mutiny in 2004, providing a grant of US\$ 500,000 to cover part of arrears in salary payments to soldiers.³⁷ Following a new outbreak of violence in Côte d'Ivoire in September 2002, ECOWAS deployed troops to halt the fighting and assist in the stabilization of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire. With the support from international organizations and France, ECOMOG enjoyed significant achievements in Côte d'Ivoire including restoring the broken dialogue between the belligerent parties (e.g., war prisoners were released, and a joint D.D.R implementation plan was developed), opening the trade and humanitarian corridors, implementing medical assistance to affected populations, etc.³⁸

In both Guinea and Guinea Bissau, ECOWAS demonstrated a real commitment to use the established protocols to influence political and security developments.³⁹ ECOWAS appointed special representatives, dispatched fact-finding and mediation missions and led a number of missions, even at the height of crises experienced in the region to maintain constant and constructive relations with heads of state. ECOWAS was firm in public statements on human rights violations by security and defense forces of member states and applied strict sanctions in case of breach of the constitutional order.⁴⁰

The success of ECOWAS in ensuring regional security is that it has demonstrated capacity in managing conflicts. Apart from being the first organization on the continent to undertake a major

peacekeeping mission with the deployment of troops in Liberia in 1990, ECOWAS was also the first sub-regional organization to cooperate with the UN in meeting the challenges of the post-Cold war conflicts.⁴¹ The organization also assisted other regional Organizations in developing a practical security management tool. Thus, ECOWAS, through military peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau has intervened with varying degrees of success in conflict management. ECOWAS also used mediation and diplomacy in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau and in recent times, Togo. ECOWAS has also been successful in using mediation efforts and special envoys in the Gambia and Cote d'Ivoire.⁴² The ECOWAS body also achieved success by initiating and maintaining a dialogue with political parties involved in conflicts to ensure peace during the period. The organization played active roles in sending envoys to monitor transitional elections in West Africa. There have also been attempts by ECOWAS to examine substitutes to current political developments and to communicate timely suggestions.

3.2.2 Factors Contributing to the Success of ECOWAS in Regional Security Interventions

There have been factors that have contributed to the successes of ECOWAS interventions. The cultural attaché at the Nigerian High Commission mentions that, despite these successes achieved by the ECOWAS, some challenges continue to hamper its security objectives. The ECOWAS mediation talks and peacekeeping interventions in conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Guinea Bissau were deemed successful in cases like that of Gambia and failures in others such as the Boko Haram incident with Nigeria.⁴³ However, if one considers the civil war interventions, the interesting question is not only why ECOWAS succeeded but also what factors accounted for the successes of ECOWAS.⁴⁴

Fiiifi Edu-Afful also alludes that proximity is a major factor in ECOWAS regional operations. He formulates the hypothesis that:

*Imagine having to send troops from Germany to resolve a conflict in Sierra Leone or Liberia. They can't understand the cultural perspectives of these countries because all the West African countries share some similar cultural practices which make us understand ourselves better. The case is the same with France, equally unable to understand the cultural practice of the indigenes in the countries it often undertakes peacekeeping.*⁴⁵

Edu-Afful also adds that the different approaches that ECOWAS have employed over time, from military to diplomacy, as well as various levels of mediation, have ensured that ECOWAS has options in dealing with threats.⁴⁶ This dynamism also implies a level of preparedness by the organization and its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. This is observed in the cases of Liberia, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire where mediation failed, necessitating military intervention. Conversely, military intervention in Sierra Leone failed to achieve the best result, leading to ECOWAS resorting to peace talks.

Joyce Bawah Mogtari buttresses the argument that ECOWAS is very quick to react to some of these conflicts. She explains that this is timely in order for the conflicts not to escalate. She states that:

*They are very proactive; they also have the urgency and are forthright in dealing squarely with the challenges we face. ECOWAS has been largely applauded for its swiftness in handling the Liberia conflict.*⁴⁷

Another major factor for the success of ECOWAS interventions is the presence of institutions and mechanisms, including the protocols, which guide in conflict resolution. Joyce Mogtari explains that these protocols allow ECOWAS to identify the threats before they escalate into conflicts due to the experiences they have had over time.⁴⁸ Abdallah supports this by claiming that, ECOWAS has developed better mechanisms compared to other sub-regional bodies. He states that:

The mechanisms, for instance, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance spells out issues of democracy and elections. They contain processes to be used when there are election disputes. ECOWAS supports countries with election disputes because that is one of the major causes of conflicts in West Africa. An instance is Cote d'Ivoire in 2010. The Early Warning System of ECOWAS which is in all the fifteen member states identify problems which allow ECOWAS to intervene swiftly.⁴⁹

Abdallah adds that external organizations and partners are also helpful in terms of funding and support to ECOWAS. Within ECOWAS, not all member states are in a strong position to supply funding and logistics in event of intervention and aid. ECOWAS has thus relied on funding and resources from the regional Nigeria and umbrella organizations like the African Union and United Nations Partner unions like the European Union have also been of help to ECOWAS.⁵⁰

Festus Aubyn notes that the presence of UN and AU mechanisms have been essential to ECOWAS. He makes the observation that ECOWAS mechanisms draw from the UN at the global level. Thus, ECOWAS often has the political backing of the AU and UN as well as necessary support before intervening in a conflict. Aubyn mentions the key role of civil society organizations including the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the media, the traditional and religious leaders in achieving results.⁵¹ Aubyn also asserts the presence of political will and the leadership of Nigeria as additional factors in the successes of ECOWAS.⁵²

3.2.3 Successes of SADC in Regional Security Interventions

Southern Africa is arguably the most stable region in Africa with higher levels of human development than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.⁵³ Yet, the region has not been immune to challenges of peace and security. The cultural attaché at the Zimbabwean High Commission mentions that insecurities such as armed conflicts, political crises, democracy and governance

deficits have heightened the state and human insecurities in southern Africa. Like ECOWAS, the SADC has had to work to attain regional security in Southern Africa.⁵⁴

In 1996, the DRC emerged in a conflict infamously named as “Africa’s first world war”.⁵⁵ The conflict in the DRC was a complex situation, connecting political, economic, institutional, and social and security factors. The DRC is a country noted for its vast amount of resources including tin, cobalt, coltan, tin, copper, diamonds and gold. This made the country susceptible to conflicts, which involved local actors; the government and armed groups, as well as external actors; neighbouring countries, members of the international community and multinational corporations (MNCs).⁵⁶ The conflict was devastating and necessitated help from the SADC to intervene. In 1998, the SADC interceded in the DRC using a combination of military intervention and negotiation.

The military intervention, authorised by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (SADC Troika) was from three SADC countries – Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe (as the chair) – under the auspices of the SADC Allied Forces.⁵⁷ The then president of the DRC, Laurent Kabila, sought the aid of the SADC to overcome territorial aggression by Uganda and Rwanda, who had invaded the country. Despite the commotion about the legalities, funding, logistics of the intervention, the SADC forces intervened successfully to quell the aggression by Rwanda and Uganda.⁵⁸ In that moment, the SADC was successful in maintaining the state of affairs in DRC. The objective of the intervention was to hold off Rwandan and Ugandan aggression, to secure the DRC territory, and to protect civilians. The SADC was able to maintain the objective in helping the DRC to regain its authority and sovereignty. The involvement of the

SADC Allied Forces debatably was settled with the signing of the Lusaka Agreement in 1999.⁵⁹ The SADC was also influential in the DRC through mediation and preventive diplomacy efforts in the country in subsequent conflicts. The SADC, through leaders of member states, has facilitated negotiations to end the frequent conflicts in the DRC. The efforts of the SADC have at various times “provided for the cessation of hostilities; the withdrawal of foreign groups; disarming, demobilising and reintegrating of combatants; and the re-establishment of government administration”.⁶⁰

The DRC was further plunged into post-election hostilities in 2006, which also required SADC intervention. Again, the SADC was successful in securing a peace deal between the rebels and the government. The success of the SADC in DRC is measured in that, the peace-making efforts somewhat led to the decrease in some direct forms of violence and the end of conflicts.⁶¹ In 2009, Madagascar also experienced a coup, which replaced President Marc Ravalomanana with Andry Rajoelina. The SADC was quick to denounce the coup and suspend Madagascar from the organization.⁶² The SADC also sent former Mozambican president Joaquim Alberto Chissano as the mediator and established an international contact unit to work as a medium for dialogue among all the parties. Eventually, an agreement was signed by relevant parties in September 2011, with the SADC ensuring successful elections afterwards.⁶³

The SADC was also influential in the drive for a power-sharing situation in Zimbabwe following the political crisis as a result of the disputed presidential election in March 2008.⁶⁴ The SADC engaged in mediation efforts, alongside the AU that resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the creation of a power-sharing government involving

Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party as president and Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party as prime minister.⁶⁵

The SADC also achieved tremendous success in Lesotho, when in 2014, a coup d'état was attempted against the then-prime minister of the Kingdom, Thomas Motsoahae Thabane forcing him to flee and seek refuge in South Africa.⁶⁶ Lesotho has a history of conflicts in 1998 and 2007, which facilitated SADC interventions in the quest for peace and political stability.⁶⁷ Subsequent mediation by SADC resulted in key political stakeholders signing an agreement seeking to contain the crisis by calling for early elections in 2015.⁶⁸ The SADC mediation process was successful in “facilitating the safe return of exiled ex-prime minister Thabane; the reopening of the Lesotho Parliament; agreement on the conduct of an early election; and the urgent deployment of an Observer Team on Politics, Defence and Security”.⁶⁹

3.2.4 Factors contributing to the success of SADC in regional security interventions

The SADC has made commendable strides in maintaining peace and security in the region. These successes are because of the factors discussed below. The cultural attaché at the Namibian High Commission mentions that a higher level of development and availability of financial resource as well as the use of quiet diplomacy, as some of the reasons why the SADC is often successful in security interventions.⁷⁰ According to him, comparatively, the SADC region is more developed than the ECOWAS making their contributions to the SADC very significant. He asserts that South Africa’s contribution to SADC makes the organization better resourced to handle security issues.⁷¹

Quiet diplomacy, which has been employed greatly by the SADC, is key in establishing results for the SADC. The SADC has often been observed to use the policy of quiet diplomacy towards regional leaders.⁷² This was applied in the case of Zimbabwe's Mugabe and was severely criticised by external observers. Nonetheless, the SADC through South Africa pursued this diplomacy diligently on the basis that quiet diplomacy is neither exceptional nor based on ideological triggers, but rather follows the tradition and goals of foreign policy. Despite failing to bring about a solution sometimes, it often minimizes the potential risk of a deeper crisis as was evident in Zimbabwe. SADC has often used quiet diplomacy towards DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho to achieve impressive results.⁷³ The organization turned down the request from the prime minister of Lesotho to use military intervention when he was overthrown.⁷⁴

The SADC mediation instruments, especially the SADC Troika on Defence, Politics and security, made up of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa has been key to regional stability in times of crises. The organization's conflict resolution instruments often strive to bring an end to the developing conflicts peacefully within and between member states through negotiation, preventive diplomacy, adjudication, conciliation, good offices and arbitration.⁷⁵ Finally, the SADC has often demonstrated political will and commitment by leaders of member states in tackling security issues and this has served well for the organization and the region as a whole.

3.3 Challenges Faced by ECOWAS and SADC in Regional Security Interventions

The importance of regional security cooperation and integration as a means for ensuring regional security was evident with the security challenges that emerged in member states of the SADC and ECOWAS. ECOWAS and SADC have had to step up at various times to encounter the challenges

of security. However, regional security interventions have not always been successful and ECOWAS as well as SADC have encountered failures in some respects. These failures are often the manifestation of challenges that faces the two organizations in their function of regional security.

3.3.1 Challenges Faced by ECOWAS in Regional Security Interventions

ECOWAS has adopted various progressive regional protocols to prevent crises and to adhere to principles of democracy and good governance. The weaknesses of ECOWAS have been revealed in these crises and the challenges of regional security integration in West Africa are of great importance. A major challenge confronting ECOWAS is lack of effective instruments in the absence of military intervention. ECOWAS relies upon military intervention and mediation talks to resolve differences in member states. ECOWAS was limited in Sierra Leone when military intervention failed to yield submission by the warring factions. Again, diplomatic instruments for effective political and economic sanctions (e.g. freezing private bank accounts and loans, placing limits on travel for members and others) are effectively employed by other countries like the US, UK, France and Germany, and international organizations like the EU.⁷⁶ ECOWAS lacks the non-military resources to intervene on any substantial scale to restore a democratic structure.

The ECOWAS Standby Force is largely military, even though it has been set up for more than military interventions. Kanyirige agrees with this point and further mentions that, “one of the challenges has to do with the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) not being better developed. The ESF is supposed to have a number of components that is, military, police and civilian components.”⁷⁷

When clear warning signals of conflicts are spotted, the response is often delayed and adhering to

the principle of non-interference in internal matters of the state, reduces the instruments of intervention for ECOWAS. When ECOWAS focuses more on the use of legitimate force, it faces the danger of a loss in its integrity due to its supposedly ‘empty threat’. Thus, ECOWAS needs comprehensive instruments to be a strong regional force.⁷⁸

Secondly, ECOWAS is often faced with a challenge of financial and logistical support to tackle security issues. This has hampered ECOWAS’ response to problems and most times, without international support, successful intervention cannot be achieved. This casts a negative light on ECOWAS’ independence. ECOWAS constantly needs financial, material and logistical aid, which are not always provided by member states. Thus, the organization has to rely on external stakeholders to function effectively. According to Kanyirige,

Intervention has to do with a lot of logistics and ECOWAS’ challenge has come from the lack of logistics in terms of aircraft, equipment, and all those gadgets the military needs. The problem of resources and funds is very evident since member countries do not often make their full contributions to the organization.⁷⁹

Edu-Afful supports the issue of logistics within ECOWAS, stating that,

Peacekeeping is a very expensive venture. ECOWAS had to depend on Britain to airlift their troops from Ghana and Nigeria to resolve the Gambia crisis. We are very deficient when it comes to logistical basis because we have very small economies which will not be able to support or fund the organizations.⁸⁰

Aubyn also indicates that the lack of resources, both financial and logistical within ECOWAS is a significant challenge. ECOWAS security initiatives continue to be hampered by insufficient funding which is further exacerbated by lack of financial support for ECOMOG’s operations. This was largely evident at the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the lack of

funds delayed the mission until Nigeria bore a great share of the cost. Deployment of ECOMOG is often constrained by financial and logistical difficulties. The financial challenges of ECOWAS depict the organization's inability to fund its operations, and therefore, its subsequent dependence on external funding. In effect, depending on external organizations and countries for funding makes ECOWAS a dependent organization, which can be influenced by donors with secondary intentions for the organizations.

In addition to this, ECOWAS faces a problem with unity and institutional weakness, which is exploited by external influence. The weakness in ECOWAS is furthered by the Anglophone and Francophone divide with the majority of the member states being former subjects of France. This has interfered in their sovereignty at various times. According to Aubyn,

The Anglophone and Francophone divide is also a factor. The Francophone countries are more tied to France and listen to them more than ECOWAS ... therefore ECOWAS operations are impeded by influences of external powers like France. In Mali, ECOWAS was preparing to intervene but Mali invited France to intervene.⁸¹

The different administration perspectives have been the primary basis for diplomacy among the countries of West Africa as well as their colonial powers. Senegal was advised by France against intervention in Guinea-Bissau when ECOWAS had vetoed the decision.⁸² The thorn in unity affects the strength of the ECOWAS machinery especially when ECOWAS and the colonial countries differ on the course of action to take pertaining to a particular issue. Furthermore, France keeps military bases and holds defence provisions for French intervention in case of internal and peripheral threats, undermining the need for ECOWAS security by former French colonies. These peculiarities have affected ECOWAS' competence in achieving its goal of political, and security competence. Another indication of institutional weakness is ECOWAS' inability to enforce regulations on member states. The lack of strong institutions within member states and ECOWAS

itself, has led to poor coordination within ECOWAS, weak political will and capacities, allegations of corruption and abuse among ECOMOG troops. ECOWAS is composed of a number of weak states, which makes effective administration of control difficult. The institutional structure of ECOWAS is also weak because of the limited authority available to the organization.⁸³

Another major challenge to ECOWAS is the region's volatility to conflicts. West Africa remains a volatile area, triggered by conflicts from elections, ethnic and territorial disputes, religious differences and economic inequality.⁸⁴ With many periodic elections being undertaken regularly, the region sits on a time bomb every time elections are held. There is hardly any election without violence. Also, the proliferation of ethnic groups has led to a level of triggers, inciting violence every now and then. Also, the peculiarity of West African socio-economic difficulties with poverty and inequality, high unemployment and corruption present more severe dimension of transnational criminal activities.

The sub-region's massive ungoverned spaces like Northern Nigeria and those around the porous borders present a fruitful ground for international terrorist organizations such as Al' Qaeda and Al' Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to succeed in their actions. In recent time, religious terrorism has also been a challenge to ECOWAS. Religious militant group Boko Haram has connections with Al' Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab in Somalia and operational bases in Niger, Chad and Cameroon.⁸⁵ The growth of jihadist insurgency also remains a challenge to ECOWAS with the porosity of the West African borders serving as an aiding factor of the activities of these rebel groups and criminal networks throughout the region.

Finally, ECOWAS faces a major challenge in the form of independence because of external

influences and pressures on the administration. As indicated earlier, there is the pull of pressure from foreign countries on ECOWAS member states. That notwithstanding, ECOWAS' continuous reliance on funds and aid from donor organizations, the UN, AU and the EU means that it is often restricted in terms of independence and organizational democracy. According to Abdallah, the inability of ECOWAS to raise its own funds makes it susceptible to influence. He expresses that this even affects ECOWAS security interventions, in some conditions:

The interest of partners is also a contributing factor because if the partners that support ECOWAS are not interested in a particular country that ECOWAS wants to go and intervene the organization will not be in a position to help.eg. If ECOWAS wants to go into Mali but the partners are not interested they will be dragging their feet, they will only support where their interest is.⁸⁶

Nonetheless, ECOWAS also faces a challenge of accountability within itself. According to Sperling, the enormous external financial and material support given to the ECOWAS Commission is not subject to any democratic authority within ECOWAS and the ECOWAS budget remains an internal knowledge.⁸⁷ Thus, ECOWAS lacks transparency and internal control, which makes it easy for superpowers and large organizations to influence ECOWAS proceedings.

3.3.2 Challenges Faced by SADC in Regional Security Interventions

The SADC has been faced with some challenges, which have negatively affected the functioning of the organization. From the onset, the SADC was formed to reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa in the southern region. However, after the fall of apartheid, South Africa was welcomed to join the organization and many fear it has taken the place of superior power within the organization. Besides dealing with the growing strength of South Africa, the SADC also faces

challenges in varied forms.

First, the SADC is riddled with a lack of institutional capacity.⁸⁸ The DRC war continues to be waged in different phases and the SADC has achieved not much success, despite various interventions. This implies that that SADC machinery for peacebuilding falls short of expectations. It is observed in Zimbabwe where the SADC was unable to sanction the unconstitutional removal of President Mugabe. The SADC organ is often undermined by the super countries in the region: South Africa and Zimbabwe. Even more so, the organization is unable to issue sanctions when xenophobic attacks, which are frequent in the southern region, occur. The SADC organ has paid little attention to the governance of the security sector of its member states. Furthermore, the region is characterized by some weak economies, underdevelopment as well as weak administrative capacity, which weakens the effectiveness of SADC's security capacity.

Secondly, the SADC lacks adequate infrastructure, financial and technical resources. The SADC has two main sources of finance; contributions from its member states and funding from its international partners. Just like the problem with ECOWAS, the cultural attaché at the Zimbabwean High Commission explains that the SADC body faces similar issues as the ECOWAS when it comes to funding operations. He continues that SADC is highly dependent on donor funds although it funds some of its activities on its own.⁸⁹ He makes the statement that;

Although member states are required to make annual contributions towards SADC, the contributions are insufficient to meet the costs of security within the SADC and the gaps are covered by donors. This leaves a risk of donors advancing their own agendas in SADC through conditions attached to aid.⁹⁰

Also, even though Southern Africa is one of Africa's most prosperous regions, inequality levels

are high. SADC countries have inadequate resources available and are also faced with huge problems of poverty, health and education related complications. It is therefore very expensive for the region to establish and maintain a strong, centralized regional security institution.

In addition to the above challenges, the SADC faces a problem of unity and nationalist rivalry.⁹¹ Within the SADC, the pursuit of national interests has been a major obstacle to regional security integration. SADC member states pursue policies that foster their interests at the expense of other members, contradicting the spirit of unity and co-operation. The level of nationalism in the SADC is so intense that, it undermines Pan Africanism, and has further led to xenophobic attacks. Member states are more preoccupied with attaining national goals than the common goals of the SADC. Nathan argues that this is because member states are politically weak and do not trust each other nor have shared values.⁹²

3.4 Addressing the Challenges of Regional Security

In view of the challenges confronting ECOWAS and SADC in regional security, there are measures, which can be taken to address the challenges. Abdallah suggests that West African states must develop their economies to become robust, in order to address issues of economic development, growth, corruption, marginalization, inequality and infrastructure. Abdallah cites poor socio-economic status of ECOWAS as a catalyst for security issues and at the same time, a hindrance to peace and security efforts.⁹³ According to him, member states must comply with ECOWAS conventions because they are sovereign countries, ECOWAS is limited in its reach, and interference.⁹⁴ Abdallah suggests adherence to the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which is made up of 15 components of preventing conflict comprising:

Preventive diplomacy, democracy and political governance, human rights and rule of law, media, cross-border initiatives, youth empowerment etc. If implemented will be able to address all our challenges in West Africa. But most member states are not implementing it and some are not even aware of such a framework. An example was in Liberia, where we conducted an interview with the Deputy Minister of Youth, he was not even aware such a document existed.⁹⁵

Aubyn also contends that ECOWAS can achieve more through strong integration and cooperation and pursuing a common interest rather than the individual interest. According to him

Our interest should be supreme with our relations with external actors. In terms of resources, there is a lot within the sub-region. The corruption cases and the amount of money government and public officials are spending; if all these monies are put together the region will have more than enough to support our peace efforts.⁹⁶

To address the problem of funding, it will be in line to require member states to meet their financial commitment to the organization. Although countries have been unable to achieve a high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to enable them to pay their contribution, it still remains incumbent on each of the members to contribute the one-half of the ratio of both their GDP and Per Capita Income. In addition to this, ECOWAS must diversify its funding sources to generate funds from other means to support its operations. ECOWAS can levy special taxes on the movement of goods and services or on multinational businesses to raise more income. Generally, West Africa is making remarkable progress in economic growth and development, democratization and regional cooperation. This progress has been marked by an increase in violence and conflict as well as drug trafficking, radicalism and other emerging threats. To address it, ECOWAS must improve its capacity for handling threats by strengthening the various

ECOWAS institutions. Development aid needs to be concentrated in lagging regions and on addressing perceptions of inequity in accessing opportunities. Focusing investments where conditions are best risks exacerbating tensions. Cross-border economic exchanges and collaboration may be useful. ECOWAS must play an arbitrary role in addressing cross border ethnic grievances.

To reduce the conflicts over extractives, ECOWAS must encourage its member states to regulate the extractive industry and ensure the gains are evenly distributed in developmental projects. States in the ECOWAS region must work together to address the rampant corruption across their countries. A very significant responsibility of ECOWAS is to invest in education and training, to reduce the mass employment of the youth in sub-Saharan Africa. Significant investments in basic and technical education will increase the size of the trained labour force and improve livelihoods for youth.

The SADC region must also take appropriate steps in addressing the challenges of regional security. Attaining the SADC objectives rests on the political will of leaders, the involvement of the masses, and a combination of astute social-economic and political institutional engineering. There is also a need for a dialogue between the civil society Organizations and the governments to arrive at a mutual reinforcement and trust.

Secondly, the SADC must address economic concerns to influence security efforts and this is confirmed by the South African cultural attaché that State governments should create conditions for the local industries to flourish.⁹⁷ This can be done by instituting laws and rules to regulate

and give incentives to corporate businesses, while in its turn the businesses generate growth and create viable employment opportunities. There is the need for a fundamental change in the development strategy and transformation of SADC economies from being just producers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured goods and services into dynamic and industrially diversified economies.⁹⁸

Also, southern African states must improve their position and performance to reduce the excessive dependence on South Africa within the SADC. Other States which together form the SADC, must strive to increase their governance and participation in SADC development projects that are geared towards ensuring that the region is solidified in its security dispensations, most especially security issues in DRC and Zimbabwe.⁹⁹ This will ensure balance in representation and prevent South Africa's overbearing interference in SADC affairs. The SADC must also adopt a proper security strategy to usher the DRC to a period of prolonged peace. The SADC must protect the DRC against external agencies and individuals that seek to profit from instability in the country.

3.5 Conclusions

ECOWAS and SADC derive their strengths from a number of sources which include their institutional capacity, abilities of member states and their political will. These factors have accounted for successes in their regional security efforts. ECOWAS has carried out security interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire to varying degrees of success. The SADC has also intervened in DRC, Lesotho and Zimbabwe to maintain regional peace. However, both ECOWAS and SADC have faced resource, institutional, managerial and leadership challenges which have hindered smooth progression of affairs.

ENDNOTES

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⁸⁹ Interview with the Cultural Attaché at the Zimbabwean High Commission in Accra on 17 May 2019.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Nathan, Laurie. "The absence of common values and failure of common security in Southern Africa, 1992-2003." (2004).

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Interview with Mustapha Abdallah.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Interview with Festus Aubyn.

⁹⁷ Interview with the South African cultural attaché at the South African High Commission in Accra on 15 May 2019.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Interview with the Cultural Attaché at the Namibian High Commission in Accra on 17 May 2019.

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Summary of Findings

The study found that there are both structural differences and ideological similarities between ECOWAS and SADC. For ECOWAS, the initial approach by member states was to form an organization for economic cooperation within the region. This was essentially to enhance trade and economic development. However, the Liberian crisis engendered the need for security development nexus that forced them to take on a much larger security role. This led to regional security becoming a top priority area for West African states. Since then, they have spent the last 28 years, dealing with various forms of violence.

The SADC, on the other hand, was formed to replace the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), an organization formed to advance the cause of national political liberation in Southern Africa, contain the destabilisation of the frontline states and to reduce dependence particularly on the then apartheid era South Africa. However, after the collapse of apartheid South Africa, the SADC's primary objective was centered on the achievement of economic integration for its member states and ensuring development and regional integration. In doing this, the SADC has had to ensure political stability in its volatile region, thrusting it into a position of security management. Thus, both ECOWAS and the SADC are similar in that, they were formed for economic cooperation but have evolved to take on security mandates to allow for the pursuit of economic goals.

In terms of institutions, frameworks and mode of functioning, ECOWAS and the SADC differ in some aspects. ECOWAS security architecture hinged on the 1999 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution Peacekeeping and Security and the 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. These two (2) Protocols are largely used in managing emerging structural, transnational and constitutional conflicts.

SADC's security architecture is centred on instruments such as the SADC Treaty, Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (PPDSC), SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (SPGGDE) and SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards for Election in the SADC Region (SPF Norms). In essence, however, the SADC security mechanism is aimed more at maintaining the status quo and stability through preventive diplomacy and reconciliation.

Second, the study found that the security architecture of the two sub-regional Organizations is largely informed by their historical origins. ECOWAS member states, whether Anglophone, Francophone or Lusophone, has comparatively experienced a milder form of colonialism and still have a close relationship with their former colonial masters. As such ECOWAS is more amenable to the deployment of sanctions and military intervention in their member states. Southern Africa because of the severity of apartheid or colonialism and its effects, the states are fiercely independent and jealously protect their freedom for that reason they are more amenable to diplomatic pressure than intervention as a solution. These account for the difference in the approach to peace and instability in the two sub-regions.

In ECOWAS, the number of mini-states, the strengths and capabilities of the member states such as Ghana, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria to some extent are equal. As such once there is a consensus between the four members, economic and political sanctions and military intervention can be deployed to manage security and governance crisis in their member countries.

As such, whenever, there is a consensus among these four states, intervention becomes feasible. However, in SADC, South Africa is the 'bigger' power, therefore despite SADC's headquarters been in Gaborone, Botswana, the rest of the member states look up to South Africa in times of crisis. The study also found out that the lack of financial resources is one of the major weaknesses of ECOWAS and SADC managing security threats in their sub-regions.

4.2 Conclusion

The historical origins of state formation in the sub-region have largely influenced the aims, goals and objectives of the various sub-regional Organizations. The history equally influences their choice of policies in managing instability and security threats in the sub-region. While ECOWAS is more intrusive in the internal affairs of its member states, SADC appears to be diplomatic and conciliatory in nature when addressing threats to Southern Africa's stability. That, despite the difference in the intensity of threats that confront the two regions, transnational security threats are common to all states in the world.

4.3 Recommendations

From the findings, it became obvious that the purpose and approach of the two Organizations differ from each other. ECOWAS is much more ready to use its economic and political sanctions as well as a military intervention when there is a threat or instability in West Africa.

SADC, on the other hand, is more diplomatic and conciliatory given their past colonial experience. However, given the fact that the world is threatened by transnational and normative security threats, there is the need for the two regional Organizations to fine tune their security mechanisms to incorporate international best practices. This is very important if they are to champion and protect their citizens' security and human rights.

From the findings, it has become obvious that one of the main challenges of regional Organization in the promotion of peace is the lack of financial resources. This has made the two Organizations to largely rely on their development partners and international Organizations to fund their peace operations. The absence of financial strength has often resulted in undue external influences and the lack of ownership of their own programmes. There is the need for SADC and ECOWAS to assume a greater financial and philosophical control of their operations. ECOWAS has taken the lead by instituting the ECOWAS Peace Fund, it is advisable at SADC collaborates with ECOWAS to improve upon remuneration generation for the Peace Fund. SADC should learn from the finance generating experiences of the ECOWAS.

The work calls for more collaborations from ECOWAS and SADC. The two Organizations already meet at AU conferences and workshops. However, it appears that, essentially, the Gulf of Guinea has somehow conjoined the fate of the two sub-regions; and the transitional security threats therein are common to both. It will, therefore, be very productive if the two sub-regional Organizations cooperate and manage security threats.

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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Regional Integration is a very essential tool for ensuring regional security. What are some of the reasons that motivated the formation of ECOWAS and the SADC?
2. What is the primary subjects of conflict in ECOWAS and SADC regions? What are contributing factors and how do they affect ECOWAS and SADC?
3. What are the primary sources and means of power (physical, military, spiritual, personal ability and skills, identity, social capital) of the ECOWAS and SADC and how do they use these resources in conflict?
4. Has ECOWAS (SADC) lived the expectations to which it was formed?
5. What is ECOWAS' (SADC) major mechanism for ensuring peace and security in West Africa (East Africa)?
6. What are the intended outcomes and metrics of success for ECOWAS' (SADC) security mechanisms? Who defines those?
7. Effective peace operations have been attributed to the ECOWAS and SADC In your experience, can you name specific experiences?
8. What other factors contribute to the outcome of ECOWAS/SADC operations?
9. What factors are impediments to the success of ECOWAS/SADC operations? What would be the most effective way to overcome those impediments?
10. What are the challenges facing ECOWAS (SADC)?
11. Are there any other intervention programs addressing these barriers and/or threats?
12. Have interventions (peacekeeping, political, humanitarian, development) by other third party actors affected ECOWAS and SADC in any way? If so, which ones and how?