

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA  
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES  
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING  
ARCHITECTURE AND GHANA'S PEACE ARCHITECTURE UNDER THE FOURTH  
REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION**

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
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## DECLARATION

I, Samson Confidence Agbelengor, hereby declare that this thesis, undertaken at the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of Ghana, Legon, is my original work conducted through academic research under the supervision of the undersigned. It has never been submitted by myself or any other individual to the University of Ghana or any other institution for the purpose of obtaining any degree. All specific quotations and references that contributed to the completion of the work have been duly acknowledged. However, I bear the responsibility for any minor, marginal, and major shortcomings that may be found in this thesis.

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

Following the United Nations (UN) declaration of *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, a notable description of ‘Peacebuilding’ by the UN included the concept of ‘Structures’: “action to identify and support ‘structures’ which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Similarly, academic contributions introduced the notion of ‘Architecture’ in the peacebuilding lexicon and another related metaphoric concept of ‘Infrastructures for Peace’ (I4P) as a fair representation of external and internal peacebuilding institutions. Yet, a comprehensive comparative approach is often missing in existing analysis. This study employed a global I4P approach within the UN's intergovernmental system and a national equivalent within Ghana's sovereign state system to examine the strengths, limitations, and remedies in peacebuilding processes in Ghana.

Relying on an interpretive philosophy, a qualitative inquiry strategy, and a comparative peacebuilding theory, key findings came to light. A nationally-mandated eminent-led institution defines the strength of Ghana's I4P. This provides a proactive approach to peacebuilding. However, this differs from the global I4P approach within the UN system, which has applications in post-conflict African projects, such as deepening the avoidance of a relapse into national civil war, armed national conflict, and mass civil violence. Conversely, based on the dynamics of different conflict cases in Ghana, overarching peacebuilding mechanisms have been facilitated through national and local I4P platforms, including limited peace education, inter-communal dialogues, trauma healing, chieftaincy succession plan, pre-election peace accords, during-election observation, and post-election dialogue towards the eradication of political vigilantism.

Nonetheless, the proactive work of eminent peace architects in Ghana is largely defined by relationship building among social and political conflict parties in the country. This defines a limited low-level dimension when compared to the UN's liberal dimension on achieving a broader and sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding project in Africa relative to addressing democracy, security, and development deficits. As a sustainable remedy, Ghana's I4P processes can be strengthened when local peacebuilding efforts are facilitated through a conscious hybrid partnership that addresses structural and developmental challenges. That will mean, collaboration with a broad set of developmental stakeholders at both local and international levels, including government, private, and business organisations, to channel development-oriented resources into areas that through empirical research have been deemed to serve as an easy and potential mobilising factor towards violence. Further research can concentrate on the crossing points between national I4P and other equivalent sub-regional and regional structures in Africa.



## DEDICATION

*To the believers around the world,  
Those who remain steadfast in the faith  
That some sweet day,  
Perfect peace will subdue the valleys,  
When time blends with eternity.*



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

*Only believe, for with God all things are possible.* In divine terms, I wish to thank my Lord Jesus Christ for His bountiful blessings, mercy, grace, and the good health He has given me throughout this doctoral journey. I can confidently state that my faith in the Holy Book, especially Mark 11:24, and constant prayer have been a vivid edification and vindication towards fulfilling this academic ambition.

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
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
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
## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
ATR	African Traditional Religion
AU	African Union
CDD-Ghana	Centre for Democratic Development-Ghana
CDR	Committee for the Defence of the Revolution
CEC	Committee of Eminent Chiefs
CHRAJ	Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
COG	Commonwealth Observer Group
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EC	Electoral Commission
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESR	Elections Situation Room
EU	European Union
FBOs	Faith-Based Organisations
GAFSCC	Armed Forces Command and Staff College
GARPC	Greater Accra Regional Peace Council

GPI	Global Peace Index
I4P	Infrastructure for Peace
IDEG	Institute of Democratic Governance
IEP	Institute for Economics & Peace
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEC	Interim National Electoral Commission
IPAC	Interparty Advisory Committee
IPDCs	Inter-Party Dialogue Committees
IPI	International Peace Institute
J-PERM	Joint Party Election Results Monitoring
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre
LECIAD	Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy
MOPA	Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
NCCE	National Commission for Civil Education
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NHOC	National House of Chiefs
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPC	National Peace Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council

NRPAC	Northern Region Peace Advisory Council
NRPC	Northern Regional Peace Council
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OC	Organisational Committee
PA	Peace Architecture
PBA	Peacebuilding Architecture
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PBSU	Peacebuilding Support Unit
PEPP	Presidential Election Peace Pact
PF	Peace Fund
PMCs	Peace Mediation Committees
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PP	Progress Party
PPNT	Permanent Peace Negotiating Team
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCCs	Regional Coordinating Councils
RPC	Regional Peace Council
REGSEC	Regional Security Council
SMC	Supreme Military Council
STAR	Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness
UCC	University of Cape Coast

UG	University of Ghana
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNIPSIL	UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNOISL	UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNOL	United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UP	United Party
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VRPC	Volta Regional Peace Council
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WC	Wuaku Commission
WFP	World Food Programme
WRPC	Western Regional Peace Council
WWiG	Who's Who in Ghana



## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background

‘Peacebuilding’ has been acknowledged as a significant approach and activity that contributes to preventing, managing, and resolving international and domestic conflicts. When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the United Nations (UN) led by the then-Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published a new document that declared *An Agenda for Peace*. Since the *Agenda’s* definition of peacebuilding as “action to identify and support ‘structures’ which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (UN, 1992, para. 21), the notion of ‘Structures’ has gained significant attention in peacebuilding discourse. However, scholars rarely highlighted the significance of the term in the definition. This notion gained another connotation with scholars incorporating it in the lexicon of peacebuilding as an architectural process. For instance, while using the term ‘Peacebuilding Architecture’, Reychler and Langer (2006) introduced an architectural metaphor into the peacebuilding field that endeavoured to depart from an amateur description of peacebuilding towards a professional process of constructive imagination and creativity in conflict analysis and a systematic design of plausible mechanisms to achieve specific targets. From an institutional perspective, Newman (2013) labeled a broad international peacebuilding architecture to include UN organs and agencies, national development agencies, regional organisations, international non-governmental organisations, and national actors. Similarly, in the works of Van Tongeren (2011, 2012), and Hopp-Nishanka (2013a), the term Infrastructures for Peace (I4P) has been highlighted as an interchangeable buzzword that refers to the building of standing capabilities or structures for peacebuilding and conflict prevention within countries.

The term UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) has therefore been described in the existing literature as the institutional activities of different organs, agencies, commissions, and missions in the UN system that provide direct and indirect contributions towards achieving their respective mandates, as well as the overarching goal of the UN (UN-PBSO, 2010; Van Tongeren et al., 2012; Hearn et al., 2014; Jenkins, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019) as stipulated in the 1945 UN Charter on the maintenance of international peace, security, and justice (UN, 1945). While international structures in the UN system have been related to an architectural or infrastructural peacebuilding principle at the global level (Reychler & Langer, 2006; Van Tongeren et al., 2012), for many scholars in this field, national and local structures are rather the most compelling description of the metaphor as it establishes the empowerment of infrastructures across all the levels of society, infrastructural empowerment of internal resources within that society to build longer-term peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997; Odendaal, 2010; Van Tongeren et al., 2012; Van Tongeren, 2011, 2012; Hopp-Nishanka, 2013a; Kovács, 2019). For example, scholars have identified Ghana's Peace Architecture (PA) as a formidable architectural and infrastructural development in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century that has contributed to making the country a beacon of peace and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa, together with other traditional democratic institutions (Odendaal, 2010; Van Tongeren, 2011; 2012; Kovács, 2019). This is evident by the passage of a legislative framework, namely the Eight Hundred and Eighteen (818) National Peace Council (NPC) 2011 Act of the Parliament of the Republic of Ghana (Republic of Ghana, 2011; NPC, 2013). As a test case of institutionalising local peacebuilding, the NPC's main mandate is to build internal mechanisms for achieving sustainable peace through conflict prevention, management, and resolution (Republic of Ghana, 2011).

At the global level, the UN has justified the importance of incorporating post-conflict peacebuilding activities in its own peace and security architecture towards a member country in a

post-conflict crisis (UN, 1996; Van Tongeren et al., 2012). First, the overriding criteria for selecting priority areas is political and requires addressing problems which if left unresolved could lead to the return of fighting. Second, while under normal circumstances, a development strategy should not discriminate among beneficiaries within a socio-economic enclave, preferential treatment is necessary as an immediate measure to mitigate the grievances of those who perpetrated violence or were affected by it. Third, the development of post-conflict societies should be carried out in a way that minimises the negative economic consequence: training, empowerment, technical cooperation, and credit to ensure the sustenance of peace (UN, 1996, p. 1).

Drawing on some civil war cases in West Africa, the escalation of conflict in Liberia in the 1990s until the early 2000s can be cited. At this point, the UN criteria of post-conflict peacebuilding justified external interventions in the Liberian Civil War. External interventions in particular were necessary after the failure of the warring parties to turn the war-torn country into a haven of stable peace. This led to anarchy, thousands of civilian casualties in Liberia, and humanitarian displacements beyond (Paris, 2004; von Gienanth et al., 2007; Essuman-Johnson, 2009; Bellamy, 2010; Harris, 2012). Hence, a multifaceted approach was deployed to enforce peace and security. They included the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its monitoring group called ECOMOG (now ECOWAS Standby Force), the UN Observer Mission in Liberia, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and other regional and international actors, including local civil society, women, and youth groups. These actors demonstrated their interventions through various mechanisms such as peace settlement, humanitarian, and development efforts, mediation, security enforcement, election monitoring, national reconciliation, and unity, strengthening of the rule of law, and support for security sector reform (Paris, 2004; von Gienanth et al., 2007; Essuman-Johnson, 2009).

By comparison, since Ghana transitioned from a dictatorial state in the 1980s to constitutional democratic rule under the Fourth Republican Constitution (1993-Date), a post-conflict crisis has not occurred under its Fourth Republican governance. What the country has experienced can be described as localised violence in some parts of the country such as the 1994/1995 Kunkumba-Nanumba communal war and the Dagbon chieftaincy crises in 2002 (Lartey & Danso, 2016). The absence of national conflict crises in Ghana includes an avowed record and determination to consolidate and sustain peace through the enforcement of various peacebuilding priorities and targets, such as the maintenance of law and order, upholding the rule of law, traditional authority, and alternative justice, legislation, human rights, electoral oversight, civic education, mediation, watchdog, and advocacy (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). However, there are still gaps lingering in Ghana's peacebuilding field. For example, some scholars have argued that some of the risk factors that plunged other countries like Liberia, Kenya, Cote D'Ivoire, and Burundi into the abyss of mass civil violence also exist in Ghana: weak state structures, fierce contest for political power that divides along ethnic and regional lines, small arms proliferation, vigilante groups, and the culture of impunity pronounced during electoral processes (Okyere, 2016). Is Ghana's PA premised on the UN PBA, or does it have a different focus based on the dynamics of internal conflict in the country?

## **1.2 Research Problem**

In the wake of existing works on UN peacebuilding, some studies on its institutional evolution from 1945 through to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century have categorised an 'old' and a 'new' peacebuilding architecture. Jenkins (2013) described most of the traditional organs and agencies of the UN formed in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (such as the UN Security Council, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the UNDP) as old

peacebuilding architectures which “still constitute the bulk of the ‘built environment’ around which UN efforts to consolidate peace take place” (Jenkins, 2013, p. 13). Van Tongeren et al. (2012) described the concerted effort made by the UN in 2006 within the element of its old peace and security architecture to develop an I4P at the global level. Hence, the form of global I4P in the UN system constitutes a tripartite structure: Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Van Tongeren et al. (2012) also highlighted the course of action of this global I4P as a peacebuilding architecture following the consensus definition of peacebuilding adopted by a 2007 policy committee of the Secretary-General: “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development” (Van Tongeren et al., 2012, p. 5).

This priority area has a foundation in the Agenda for Peace document (UN, 1992). For instance, the *Agenda* conceptualised different approaches to peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding (Galtung, 1976; UN, 1992), although it placed much emphasis on inter-state disputes and less on intra-state disputes (Ryan, 2013). More compelling, the *Agenda’s* definition of peacebuilding has generated different terms such as reconstruction, post-war recovery, rehabilitation, and post-conflict peacebuilding (Warnecke, 2018). This supports the UN’s I4P priorities by facilitating and mobilising resources to assist countries in peacebuilding efforts, and by collaborating with other UN bodies to ensure a coherent and effective approach to post-conflict peacebuilding in the global South (Van Tongeren et al., 2012; Cavalcante, 2019; UN, 2021).

In Ghana, an I4P framework was used to develop a peace architecture due in part to the failure of some State-led processes to prevent, manage or resolve certain inter-communal disputes leading to their eruption into localised violence under the Fourth Republican Constitution (1993-Present). For instance, Van Tongeren (2011) underscored how neglect by the central government in Northern Ghana partly contributed to the slaying of the King of Dagbon and other 40 elders in 2002. Tsikata and Seini (2004) and Van Tongeren (2011) have also noted a common thread in governments' use of official Commission of Inquiry, which is that either reports of the commission are not delivered or the recommendations are not implemented. Some chieftaincy and land-related disputes have also been protracted partly because they have been prolonged by cumbersome court processes and the lack of enforcement of court judgements in certain cases. For example, in the case of a notable intractable land dispute between two communities (Alavanyo and Nkonya), court decisions as an approach to resolving the conflict failed the test of enforcement partly due to fierce local resistance (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Van Tongeren, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011). In Ghana's Fourth Republic, some national and by-elections have also become a major source of dispute and localised violence. Ghana has also experienced two presidential election petitions in 2013 and 2021 which were litigated and resolved at the Supreme Court. Based on these conflict dynamics, Ghana's PA has operated to develop a consultative approach and act as a third-party convener to deepen the peacebuilding process of the country.

It is evident from the international dimension that a peacebuilding architecture within the UN's I4P prioritises post-conflict peacebuilding. What specific aspects of peacebuilding does Ghana's peace architecture prioritise? How relevant is an internal peacebuilding institution in a relatively stable African country in comparison to a system implemented by external institutions in a former state of instability in Africa? While the UN defines peacebuilding as a post-conflict mechanism, it

is not certain whether the definition corresponds with peacebuilding principles under Ghana's Fourth Republican Constitution. Given this context, the central focus of this study is to examine the strengths, limitations, and remedies in the practice of Ghana's PA compared to the UN PBA. Other plausible comparative case selections could have included the peace and security architectures in Africa such as within the AU and the ECOWAS. But, they do not fully justify the use of the term "external" in the current study. Hence, the comparative analysis is pursued within the framework of the UN PBA and Ghana's PA. This justifies the categorisation of external and internal I4P respectively. Some initial questions emerge from the central problem: how does an internal I4P compare to a global equivalence? Is the case of Ghana's I4P unique to its dynamics? What is the nature of the peacebuilding agenda in Ghana through an I4P framework? Can Ghana's I4P draw lessons from the UN's I4P? If yes, can the UN help us explain the strengths and limitations of Ghana's I4P and the remedies for improvement? What lessons can Ghana's I4P provide for Africa and the Global community?

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

Following the above, four substantive objectives can be pursued.

1. To analyse the structure of I4P in the UN system and the kind of intergovernmental agenda pursued in Africa.
2. To analyse the structure of Ghana's I4P and the nature of local peacebuilding mechanisms implemented in specific conflict situations within the country.
3. To compare the UN's I4P with Ghana's I4P, ascertaining the strengths and weaknesses of Ghana's approach.
4. To proffer policy remedies, research recommendations, and lessons for Ghana and beyond.

#### 1.4 Operational Description

The idea of ‘architecture’ as a peacebuilding metaphor has etymological origins. In Greek, *arkhitekton* which are two words *arkhi* and *tekon* indicate master and builder. In Latin, *architectus* also means ‘architect’. The French word *architecte*, which refers to a person who designs and constructs a structure was rather adopted into the English language. The Webster’s Dictionary therefore defines architecture as the art and science of planning and designing buildings and constructing structures, especially for habitation (Janetius, 2020).

According to Reychler and Langer (2006, pp. 5-6), the metaphor can be used to conduct a study on peacebuilding because it draws attention to the essence of identifying different dynamics of conflicts and the mechanisms for addressing them; it provides a methodology for comparatively analysing the peacebuilding process; it can help researchers highlight the vital role of peace architects. This study adopts the conceptual description of peacebuilding architecture as institutionally embedded in ‘Structures’, ‘Resources’, ‘Approaches’, and ‘Targets’ (Lederach, 1997, 2012; Reychler & Langer, 2006). In this context, architecture could be described as a prototype or a sub-structural blueprint in the design of peacebuilding. Infrastructure could then cover the superstructure in the practical implementation of peacebuilding. Despite the conceptual distinction, various related terms could be used interchangeably in the existing literature such as ‘Peace Architecture’ (Reychler, 2002; Reychler & Langer, 2006), ‘Peace Infrastructure’ (Unger & Lundström, 2013; Hopp-Nishanka, 2013a; Richmond, 2013; Kovács, 2019), ‘Peacebuilding Architecture’ (Odendaal, 2010), ‘Peacebuilding Infrastructure’ (Dress, 2005), ‘Local Peace Committees’ (Odendaal, 2010; Nganje, 2021), ‘National Peace and Dialogue Structures’ (Siebert, 2013), and ‘Infrastructures for Peace’ (I4P). For a conceptual distinction, the study uses the term Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) as a representation of a peacebuilding institution in the UN

system whereas the term Peace Architecture (PA) represents a peacebuilding institution in Ghana. However, since the term Infrastructures for Peace often abbreviated as I4P is a common term used by scholars to describe international, regional, sub-regional, national, and local peacebuilding architectures, I4P has been universally adopted in the study. This provides a conceptual comparative justification in the analysis of the UN PBA and Ghana's PA. In other words, the metaphor has been commonly adopted in the current study with a particular focus on a global I4P represented by the PBC, PBF and PBSO (Van Tongeren et al., 2012) and a national I4P in a sovereign state system institutionally represented by the NPC, Executive Secretariats, a Peace Fund (PF) and a Peacebuilding Support Unit (PBSU) (Republic of Ghana, 2011; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014).

The study also employs the concepts of Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, which represent a useful framework within the UN's own peace and security architecture. These concepts are used to examine the nature of local peacebuilding mechanisms in three selected conflict cases in Ghana; Alavanyo-Nkonya, Dagbon, and Election. The justification is that a peace architecture by all standards is a function of conflict which necessitates the facilitation of mechanisms for addressing conflict. Hence, analysing peacebuilding mechanisms through conflict cases deepens the infrastructural components embedded in peacebuilding practice. The conflict cases were chosen because they have historically and currently evolved into significant recurring conflicts in Ghana, attracting numerous state and non-state interventions, including I4P efforts under Ghana's Fourth Republican Constitution. Reports by the NPC (2020a, 2020b, 2020c) also indicate that Ghana's I4P has directly or indirectly been involved in the resolution process since its formation. This further justifies the grounds for examining the nature of peacebuilding mechanisms facilitated by the NPC.

The study also adopts the following concepts (Agenda for Peace, Liberal Peace, Low-Level, and Hybridity) in Peacebuilding Theory to examine the relevance of internal peacebuilding mechanisms for deepening Ghana's peacebuilding field. Using the initial internal conflict cases (Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute, Dagbon chieftaincy dispute, and Election disputes) as the main reference point is essential to resolving the underlying thesis on ascertaining the strength, limitations, and remedies in the practice of I4P in Ghana.

Finally, the study uses notable elements within the metaphoric characterisation of peacebuilding architecture (Structure, Resources, Approaches, and Targets) to compare a global and a national I4P institutional framework. The overarching comparative findings will be relevant for policy and research development in Ghana and Africa.

The term Fourth Republican Constitution as reflected in the research topic is also a description of Ghana's fourth democratic transition process on January 7<sup>th</sup>, 1993 which returned the country to constitutional democratic rule after three successful coup d'états truncated civilian governments in 1966, 1972, and 1981. This period will be described as the stable democracy era because it is Ghana's finest democratic dispensation since independence that has not been interrupted.

### **1.5 Chapter Disposition**

The study has been structured in seven main chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of the study under the following sections: Background, Research Problem, Objectives, Operational Description, Chapter Disposition, and Relevance. Chapter Two reviews the literature on peacebuilding in five areas to identify major gaps and the sections examined are as follows: Origin and Meaning of Peacebuilding, the Evolution of UN Peacebuilding, the Landscape of I4P, Ghana's PA, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Ghana. In Chapter Three, the study examines the theoretical

framework based on the Theory of Peacebuilding which will be useful in the formulation of research questions. Chapter Four presents the Research Design and Methods for executing the study. The chapter examines the following areas: Research Philosophy, Strategies of Inquiry, Case Selection, Data Collection and Analysis, Data Gathering Limitations, and Ethical Issues. Chapters Five and Six represent the empirical chapters based on Data Analysis, Research Findings Presentation, and Discussion. The final chapter under Summary of Findings, Conclusion, and Recommendations, will synthesise the study's findings, present a conclusion, and offer policy suggestions and recommendations for future research.

### **1.6 Relevance of the Study**

The comparative study has general relevance in terms of deepening our understanding of the priorities of I4P at the global and national levels. In Ghana, this helps us understand the nature of local peacebuilding mechanisms in a pluralist society for dealing with conflict. It also helps us ascertain their relevance within international standards. The implication is that since Ghana is not immune from conflict like other African countries, a study of an internal peacebuilding institution alongside an external equivalence explicates issues of peacebuilding strengths, limitations, and remedies, including the discourse on deepening local ownership of peace. In Ghana, the study also provides insight into the relevance of investing in I4P in a country that enjoys the accolade as a beacon of relative peace and stability in Africa and the extent to which I4P fits local cultural norms and conflict contexts. The findings also set relevant standards for the effective operation of I4P in Ghana and the model it sets for African and global I4P frameworks.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on Peacebuilding and identifies relevant gaps in the following broad study areas: Origin and Meaning of Peacebuilding; UN Peacebuilding; Infrastructures for Peace; Ghana's Peace Architecture; Conflict and Peacebuilding in Ghana.

#### 2.2 Studies on the Origin and Meaning of Peacebuilding

Several scholars (including Paris, 2004; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2012; Ryan, 2013) have traced the origin of peacebuilding from a Western perspective. Mac Ginty (2011) asserts that while the concept has dominant liberal origins, it lacks precise descriptive parameters. His assertion is affirmed by other academic proponents on its origin and meaning in theory and practice. Paris (2004) traced the origin of liberal peacebuilding to the 1900s during the First World War and the establishment of the League of Nations. He drew on the proposal of the Twenty-Eighth President of the United States (US) Woodrow Wilson. According to Paris (2004), Wilson famously asserted that liberalism was key to peace and security in international and domestic politics. Hence, Roland Paris specifically used the term *Wilsonianism* to describe Wilson's notion that liberal democratic principles foster lasting peace in war-torn states and societies.

In their studies, Tschirgi (2013), Ryan (2013), and Bercovitch (2009) traced the origin of peacebuilding to the UN's 1945 formation immediately after the Second World War (Tschirgi, 2013; Ryan, 2013; Bercovitch, 2009). For instance, as part of providing direction to state and non-state actors towards addressing post-war conflict, the 1945 UN Charter requested in Article 33, "the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,

mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (UN, 1945, p. 8). For Bercovitch (2009), three basic mechanisms could be drawn from the UN approach to the peaceful management of conflict stipulated in the Charter: “(a) direct negotiation among the conflicting parties; (b) various forms of mediation, good offices, and conciliation; and (c) binding methods of third-party intervention (e.g., arbitration and adjudication)” (Bercovitch, 2009, p. 340). Bercovitch’s outline is significant to the current research which seeks to identify local peacebuilding mechanisms and their nature and relevance in the context of a sovereign state. Since the Charter provides general peacebuilding mechanisms, the current study fills this gap by analysing specific mechanisms implemented by the UN PBA and Ghana’s PA.

Studies by Richmond (2012), Jenkins (2013), Paris (2004), and Essuman-Johnson (2009) trace the concept of peacebuilding to the 1990s when it was revived after the restraints brought about by the ideological rancour of rivalry among the so-called Superpowers ended. In this context, Tschirgi (2013), and Cavalcante (2019) identified two main schools of thought on approaches to peace. The first is an institutional origin which holds that peacebuilding is the brainchild of Boutros-Ghali’s landmark 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* (Cavalcante, 2019; Tschirgi, 2013). The second traces the academic origin of peacebuilding much earlier to the Nordic School of Peace Studies, and more specifically, the works of Johan Galtung in the 1970s, who is credited as one of the first scholars to introduce the tripartite approach to peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding. Boutros-Ghali later introduced other concepts like Preventive Diplomacy and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Galtung, 1969, 1976; David, 1999; Ryan, 2013; Jenkins, 2013; Tschirgi, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019).

Paris (2010), and Wanis-St. John (2013) also supported the 1990s origin of peacebuilding. They argued that this origin helped scholars appreciate the important role of Western liberalism in shaping the evolution of peacebuilding, particularly when the Cold War collapsed after the breakdown of the Soviet-Communist bloc. Cooper et al. (2011), in referring to the work of Francis Fukuyama, also noted that the end of the Cold War was a landmark period that showed that Western liberalism and its principles were more enduring for social, political, and economic transformation.

It can also be deduced from Aning and Danso (2016), and Cavalcante (2019) that the triumph of Western liberalism in the 1990s reflected the impact of the so-called “Third Wave of Democratisation” on the development of peacebuilding in the global South. This showed the tenuous prospects of democracy and market-oriented policies in several of the former communist states and authoritarian regimes around the world and in Africa that democratised. Similarly, studies by Boafo-Author (1999) showed that Ghana’s acceptance of Western liberalism in the late 1980s and the early 1990s was a pivotal period and cross-road for the peace and stability of the country. Specifically, the decision by the then-left-leaning military regime of Jerry John Rawlings under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), to accept free-market economic policies, and later succumb to constitutional democratic rule, partly contributed to the peace, stability, and security of the country in the period of an insurmountable global wave of democratisation.

In another vein, Tschirgi (2013), and Ryan (2013), have all noted that attempts to craft a universally accepted definition of the concept of peacebuilding have not been helpful. For instance, Campbell and Peterson (2013, p. 336) defined peacebuilding based on the universal framework of the *Agenda for Peace* that peacebuilding “seeks to strengthen systems, structures, and behaviours that will enable a war-torn country to sustain peace”. For Ryan (2013) such post-conflict definitions are

problematic because; first, conflict is ubiquitous, and a conflict-free society is hard to imagine; and second, the idea of restricting peacebuilding to the final stage in a progression of violent conflict provides a limited view of the discourse. However, while noting that peacebuilding is not a new concept, Ryan (2013), also admitted that the idea of post-conflict peacebuilding cannot be rejected. For example, while tracing the origin of peacebuilding to the post-World War Two era, he recognised the role of leading states like the US as a major post-war rebuilders of war-shattered Western Europe through economic recovery policies such as the Marshall Plan (Ryan, 2013).

Similarly, in Paris (2002, 2004), a connection was made between international peacebuilding and the role of leading states and international institutions, which was often built on a liberal peace orientation and skewed towards global North structures within the so-called international community. Studies by Paris (2001, 2004) and Newman (2013) also showed that the array of global actors who made liberal peacebuilding a prominent doctrine applied to the complex international structure of states. They include North American states like the US and Canada, European member states, supranational organisations like the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) as well as International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and a host of national development and relief agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Paris (2004), and Mac Ginty (2011) have described the various ways that leading actors in the international system dominate the international peacebuilding field. For example, the US, Britain, and France are three Western liberal states and permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto powers on international peace and security issues, while Russia and China who are the remaining permanent members are non-Western states, and largely promote non-liberal politics.

Studies also show that the two strongest IFIs that provide economic assistance mainly to global South countries (World Bank and IMF) have their programmes driven by the liberal peace doctrine such as good governance, market-oriented democratic, and economic policies. Another example that Mac Ginty (2011) cited is that whereas all UN member states have the right to shape the agenda of specialised agencies like the UNDP, much of the developmental and peacebuilding goals of the organisation reflected Western mores. Jenkins (2013), and Mac Ginty (2011) also noted that as active promoters of governance reforms in developing economies, North America and the EU have ostensibly used the UNDP to carry out this agenda.

The connection that Paris (2004), Mac Ginty (2011), and Jenkins (2013) make between international actors or liberal peacebuilders in general and how they shape liberal peace is instructive to this study. The thesis will seek to ascertain whether a liberal peacebuilding agenda is grounded in Ghana's I4P framework in comparison to the UN's I4P. The scholars also mainly focused on international peacebuilding. The seldom use of I4P to undertake a comparative analysis of International and Local Peacebuilding also constitutes the justification for this study.

In Paris (2002, 2004), liberal peacebuilding can also be connected to peacebuilding missions, which the UN has immensely used as a mechanism to create the potential haven for stable and durable peace in countries emerging from large-scale violence and civil war. Paris (2002), and Ryan (2013), also noted in one example that peacebuilding missions in the 1990s were not merely conflict management exercises, but a much larger phenomenon aimed at globalising domestic governance through the lens of liberal market democracy from the core to the periphery in the international system (Paris, 2002; Ryan, 2013). In Ryan's (2013) view, however, it also constitutes an evolving early warning mechanism in the UN system to further address the escalation of

conflict. Still, there are concerns about the extent to which such missions can promote peace in a domestic system without meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state — the latter which the UN traditionally abhors.

Newman (2013) in his study of international peacebuilding also claimed that almost all peacekeeping and peacebuilding agendas in the post-Cold War era were driven by an architectural process in the promotion of peace and security, development, humanitarian assistance, the strengthening of governance, and the rule of law. Paris (2002, 2004), and Newman (2013) further re-emphasised that the typical formula for the liberal peace used in war-shattered states in the 1990s focused on specific democratisation and marketisation principles: They include the drafting and ratification of national constitutions that protect civil and political rights, the right to free speech, free press and freedom of association, multiparty democracy, an independent electoral management body that administers free, fair, transparent and periodic elections, the development of independent democratic institutions and CSOs, free flow of goods and services across national borders, and the stimulation and growth of private enterprises (Paris, 2002, 2004; Newman, 2013).

This list is significant to this study in terms of the liberal peace values which can be used to ascertain the footprints of liberal peacebuilding in Ghana's consolidation of peace and democracy. However, the work of Paris in particular has some limitations compared to the current study on Ghana. Paris (2004) was restricted to post-conflict countries between 1989 and 1999 (Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia, Guatemala, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone). Lederach (2012) has critiqued the restricted application of peacebuilding to post-conflict projects, and suggested a dynamic application of peacebuilding "before, during, and after periods of violence". This latter is applied to an

infrastructural framework that creatively engages conflict situations over time with long-term and enduring mechanisms (Lederach, 2012, p. 9). Lederach's suggestion which was extended beyond a broad scope of peacebuilding has brought to the fore the importance of a narrow scope. Nonetheless, this thesis rather advances a major methodological gap in this literature by using a broad global I4P scope to examine a narrow Ghanaian I4P scope. The choice of Ghana is also significant because it represents a country that is not post-conflict in a national context, at least under the Fourth Republic. The next section reviews the literature on the evolution of UN peacebuilding to reflect one of the major comparative cases in this study.

### **2.3 Studies on UN Peacebuilding**

Several scholars have traced the evolution of peacebuilding to the 1990s in relation to the UN as an intergovernmental peacebuilding institution. Ryan (2013), Huéhenno (2002), Jenkins (2013), and Paris (2018) have examined the evolution of peacebuilding in the UN system highlighting its major policy documents such as *An Agenda for Peace*, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, *Agenda for Development*, *An Agenda for Democratisation*, and the *Brahimi Report*. In his analysis of the Agenda for Peace document, Ryan (2013) observed that although most scholars trace the origin of mainstream peacebuilding to the first *Agenda*, in the entire document of 85 paragraphs, only six paragraphs focused on the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, and the salient issues are also in fewer paragraphs (Ryan, 2013). One paragraph notes that when conflict erupts, UN peacemaking and peacekeeping come into full play. In cases of successful external peacebuilding penetration, only sustained and cooperative international actions devoted to dealing with physical and structural violence in a conflict zone can lead to the achievement of durable peace (UN, 1992, para. 57). One limitation is the failure of the *Agenda* to capture intra-state conflict in its analysis after the Cold War (Ryan, 2013; UN, 1992). In UN (1994), and Ryan (2013), the *Supplement* is

noted to have placed significant emphasis on preventive diplomacy, such as the importance of improving the interaction between national governments and conflict parties in the promotion of peace, improving country ownership of peace, preventing potential conflict, and healing wounds after their occurrence (UN, 1994; Ryan, 2013). Studies also show that a major challenge with achieving the goal of UN peacebuilding is when there is no coordinated mission or team on the ground, or when UN activities are perceived to contradict the national interest of UN members, particularly the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UN, 1994; Huéhenno, 2002; Ryan, 2013).

Studies by Ryan (2013) also revealed a distinction between the *Supplement* and the original *Agenda*. He noted that the *Supplement* focused on intra-state armed conflict within a single sovereign state, and other structural dimensions of peacebuilding (Ryan, 2013), which evolved with the establishment of peacebuilding offices in conflict zones, rather than directing peacebuilding from the headquarters in New York. For example, in November 1997, the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was established to assist the government in the consolidation of peace following multi-party elections in July 1997, and after years of civil war (UN, 2003; Ryan, 2013). UNOL (1997-2003) was followed by three other peacebuilding offices: the UN Peace-building office in Guinea Bissau in 1999; Central African Republic and Tajikistan in 2000 (Teran, 2007). Boutros-Ghali (1996), and Ryan (2013) have also described how the UN declarations moved further into the connections between peace, development, and democracy in peacebuilding. Their work showed that the UN in one sense recognised the controversial relations between the three concepts, particularly, the critique of Western liberal bias towards most peacebuilding activities. Nonetheless, to intensify international debate, the weaknesses of the original *Agenda* and the *Supplement* were further strengthened by *An Agenda for Development* and

*An Agenda for Democratisation* (Boutros-Ghali, 1996; Ryan, 2013). The *Agenda for Development* focused on boosting a global campaign for establishing new social, political, and judiciary institutions in developing democracies towards sustainable development (UN, 1994, para. 23-24). The *Agenda for Democratisation* presented a comprehensive approach grounded in free, fair, and transparent elections, the construction of a political culture of democracy, and the development of institutions within ongoing democratic practices (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, para. 124).

As reviewed earlier in Paris (2004), a liberal peacebuilding study of fourteen cases that experienced large-scale civil violence between 1989 and 1999, showed that liberal market democratic principles could foster durable domestic peace when institutional structures are in place. While affirming the significance of this assumption as a very good model of stability, he also revealed its real shortcomings (Paris, 2004, 2010; Menocal & Kilpatrick, 2005). He recognised that in some post-conflict states, efforts to hold quick sets of elections and initiate economic reforms did little to address the drivers of conflict and in some cases, served as a catalyst for renewed violence (Paris, 2004; 2010).

Referencing specific cases, Paris (2010) noted that in the process of resolving the Angolan civil war, the UN supervised post-war elections in 1992. However, the elections failed to achieve lasting peace as it provoked one of the warring factions to resume fighting. This was partly attributed to the non-existent institutionalised mechanism to resolve post-war election disputes, the low presence of international and local peacekeeping forces to uphold the elections, as well as the miniature relevance attached to disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of factional militant forces before the elections (Paris, 2010). Apart from the failures of the UN mission, another apparent reason according to Roland Paris is the lack of political will and commitment by

the warring parties themselves to pursue the path to peace. Paris specifically described the behaviour of Jonas Savimbi, a rebel and opposition leader as a lack of commitment to peace. For example, upon realising his failure to triumph in the elections, Savimbi returned to the position of an ardent *spoiler* of the peace process. The scholar also made another critical conclusion clear that the winner-takes-all electoral system employed in the 1992 elections in Angola was probably not appropriate for a deeply divided state emerging immediately from a civil war. The electoral system, it has been argued did not provide some incentive to the losing party to peacefully accept the outcome of the result. This generated further hostilities, mainly between the dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi factions. The murder of Savimbi in 2002 then removed the spoiler character and created a feasible pathway for the signing of a cease-fire agreement to end the conflict (Paris, 2004, 2002, 2010). Related to the current inquiry, the discourse of third-party mechanisms and the prospects of conflict-party commitments will be instrumental in the study of the relevance of local peacebuilding mechanisms within a conflict enclave in Ghana.

Studies by Paris (2004, 2010) also cited other African cases in the 1990s. He noted that unconditional freedom of expression and ethnic incitement on radio against the Tutsi minority was a driving factor in the orchestration of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In Liberia, despite relative successes chalked in the 1997 elections, the failure to address underlying patterns of conflict in Liberian society, generating a new round of hostility was also mentioned. They include the tendencies of political leaders like Charles Taylor to use security forces to hijack state institutions and suppress opposition for the personal enrichment of kinsmen and stalwarts (Paris, 2004, 2010). Among the main thrusts of his work is the proposal that peacebuilding must be viewed as a journey based on a controlled and gradualist approach to transforming war-shattered countries. He further proposed an approach for post-conflict peacebuilding in a deeply divided society: “wait until

conditions are ripe for elections, design electoral systems that reward moderation, promote good civil society, control hate speech, adopt conflict-reducing economic policies and rebuild effective state institutions” (Paris, 2004, p. 188).

In essence, peacebuilding is about the development of democratic institutions. This is significant because it exemplifies the plausible liberal footprints in the priority areas in the UN’s I4P framework. Studies show that countries like Sierra Leone and Burundi who constitute the first countries considered under the intergovernmental agenda of the PBC benefited from liberal approaches to peace. However, the overemphasis on liberal peace values as evident in Paris (2004) omits other non-liberal peacebuilding perspectives or local peacebuilding, a more reason why the adoption of a comparative approach in this study is relevant.

Paris (2018) has examined some critical recommendations to reform UN peacebuilding in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, such as the *2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peacebuilding Operations* (named after its chair *Brahimi Report*). The *Brahimi Report* provided a comprehensive self-diagnosis of the shortcomings of various UN peace operations (UN, 2000; Paris, 2018). According to Paris (2018) and others, the *Brahimi Report* made significant recommendations for a stronger financial and military peacebuilding capacity. The challenge they noted is the less attention paid to the needs and potentials of local people (Paris, 2018; Ryan, 2013; Jenkins, 2013; Zittel, 2002). Ryan (2013) has highlighted the significance of recommendations from the Brahimi report on the endorsement of the norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the UN system. The R2P expanded the concept of sovereignty to contain state control over internal affairs where the primary responsibility of the state included the protection of its citizens. But if a sovereign state fails or is unwilling to prevent genocide and other large-scale carnage, ethnic cleansing, and grave humanitarian violations, the responsibility shifts to the international community. According to Stephen Ryan, the R2P however,

was also less complementary to the practice of peacebuilding by local actors in conflict zones. In peculiar cases, the exit of international intervenors could be poorly managed. When further escalation is created, inadequate post-conflict reconstruction could make countries wrestle with the underlying problems that led to the original intervention (Ryan, 2013; UN/UNIPSIL, 2014).


Despite the criticisms, Newman (2013), and Hanhimaki (2008) have depicted the UN system as the most visible and politically high-profile intergovernmental process for building peace around the world. This is demonstrated by several development and humanitarian goals and governance programmes, and the global activities of different organs, specialised agencies, missions, commissions, and support offices. Jenkins (2013) specifically described several UN agencies that contribute to deepening the visibility of the UN. For example, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) monitors developments in countries at risk of sliding into conflict through regional agencies, organises and deploys peace mediators, and where necessary, supervises post-conflict elections through UN missions in post-conflict countries (Jenkins, 2013). Similarly, Jenkins (2013), and Cavalcante (2019) identified other perennial pillars like the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which manages several UN field missions in conflict-affected countries through development and humanitarian agencies of the UN like the UNDP, the United Nations Children Fund, the World Food Programme and other Secretariats (Jenkins, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019). For Jenkins (2013), the UN Security Council (UNSC) is also an old peacebuilding architecture of the UN since it is the primary custodian for the maintenance of international peace and security (Jenkins, 2013; UN, 1945). According to Jenkins (2013), and Newman (2013), the UNSC, DPA, DPKO, the UNDP, and other Specialised Agencies constitute an international architecture for peacebuilding because they constitute a bulk of the bureaucratic

and field environment for facilitating the consolidation of peace, stability, and security around the world.

However, other studies including Bellamy (2010), Jenkins (2013), Hearn et al. (2014), and Cavalcante (2019) all affirm the UN description of the PBC, PBSO, and the PBF, which was formed after a broad agreement by member states of the UN in a 2005 World Summit as the new element of the UN PBA. Newman (2013) described the UN PBA in conceptual terms as a comprehensive response to the challenges of UN liberal peacebuilding because it created a consolidated and permanent international institution of peacebuilding (Newman, 2013; Paris, 2004). Conversely, in Jenkins (2013), and Cavalcante (2019), an observation is further made that in practice, the UN PBA label may be misleading given that before its emergence, UN organs and agencies have functioned with a larger spectrum within its peacebuilding system in collaboration with international development agencies, regional organisations, and national actors. To avoid a conceptual quagmire, the UN PBA may be viewed as a novel element to the extent that it complements the existing international architecture of peacebuilding long driven by UN organs and agencies. The figure on the next page shows notable components of the typical 21st-century UN PBA based on the PBC, PBSO, and the PBF.



**Figure 1: Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture**



Source: (Constructed by Author based on A/RES/60/180, 2005; A/62/100, Corr. 1 and Add.1, 2021; Jenkins, 2013)

In the context of I4P, Van Tongeren et al. (2012, p. 5) made the analysis of the 21st-Century UN PBA more appealing by describing the tripartite institutions (PBC, PBF, PBSO) as the UN’s version of I4P at the global level. From their analysis, through political and technical assistance, the UN can also “support the building of structures and capacities that lie at the heart of I4P”. The next section reviews the literature on the landscape of a national I4P.

#### **2.4 Studies on National Infrastructures for Peace**

In his study of peacebuilding, Lederach (1997, 2012) described the term in the UN dimension as a top-down approach. He described a top-down approach as a form of traditional statist diplomacy which often functions with respective authoritative representatives as key to dealing with conflict.

A bottom-up approach is required to complement top-down systems using significant local elements. In his view on local peacebuilding, he argued that post-conflict peacebuilding as guided solely by liberal practices was not adequate. They include the launch and termination of UN peace missions, shuttle diplomacy by high-profile peace envoys, UN peacekeepers keeping warring parties from further escalation, NGOs providing humanitarian assistance, efforts to build CSOs, and the rule of law. Lederach's seminal proposal on the I4P model contrasted the Boutros Ghali-led *Agenda for Peace* in post-conflict phases (Lederach, 1997, 2012). Studies on I4P as a Model also propose key peacebuilding perspectives like long-term commitment, empowering local resources, peacebuilding pyramid, and de-bureaucratising I4P (Lederach, 1997, 2012; Kovács, 2019).

In existing studies, long-term commitment assumes that local peacebuilding and the sustenance of peace in practice is not an overnight business (Lederach, 1997; IPI, 2017; Kovács, 2019). A peacebuilding pyramid is also a component of top-level leadership at the peak of a political system (military, political, and religious actors with high-level visibility), grassroots leadership at the base (local chiefs, local leaders of NGOs, and community leaders), and middle-level leadership at the centre (respected leaders in various sectors- academia, peace practitioners, religious and ethnic leaders, and leaders of major CSOs) (Lederach, 1997; Kovács, 2019). In Lederach's judgement, the middle-level provides a potential structure for establishing national and local I4P. This can bridge the political control and resource constraints that may create a detachment between top-level and grassroots leadership (Lederach, 1997). This research takes a cue from Lederach's proposal and proceeds to ascertain how these levels of analysis fit Ghana's PA in the practice of I4P in the country.

Lederach (2012) also describes the institutionalisation of I4P as holding prospects and significant challenges. For the prospects, the model moves away from a narrow project outlook of post-conflict peacebuilding. It develops the capacity, roles, and functions of internal institutions to promptly address conflicts before possible escalation. However, the dangers may arise from the increase in bureaucratic rules, regulations, functions, and procedures. This may result in the lowering of the vision of generative interdependency owing to institutional competition with other bureaucracies. In other words, while professionalisation provides a more systematised framework towards the development of tools, instruments, and assessment mechanisms, the danger is that the over-formalisation of I4P, may stifle architectural creativity, and drift resources away from the core mandate of peace institutions as considerable flexibility is required for effective local peacebuilding (Lederach, 2012; Kovács, 2019).

In studies on the Evolving Landscape of I4P, Van Tongeren et al. (2012), and Kovács (2019), cited a February 2010 summit hosted by the UNDP in Naivasha, Kenya, with participants from representatives of government officials, CSOs, political parties, and UN representatives from 14 African countries. They came out with the following definition of I4P: “dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society” (Van Tongeren et al., 2012, p. 2; Kovács, 2019, pp. 125-126). Verzat (2014) also cited a meeting held in September 2013 in Accra by the UNDP, the AU Commission, and the ECOWAS Commission, including state, non-state, regional, and international actors which led to the signing of the Accra Declaration. Among other propositions, the declaration obligated Member States to establish I4P in the next three years. Internal state and non-state structures within Member States were also considered the key developers and sustainers of I4P (Verzat, 2014). From this review, I4P development has

significant roots in local peacebuilding. However, the global contributions and awareness of the overall development and practice show a rather overlapping discourse. This is because while its underlying conceptualisation may be grounded on a local turn of peacebuilding, the power-holder position of UN agencies like the UNDP in the development of the NPC in Ghana and its equivalent institutions in other global South countries has contributed to a consensus scholarly description of the I4P framework as hybrid peacebuilding rather than wholly local approach (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Verzat, 2014; Leeuwen et al., 2020).

In a seminal inquiry into I4P, Lederach (1997) also raised a critical question: “How do we create and support the change from violent crisis to a desired shared future”? (Lederach, 1997, p. 112). In his response, he described ‘people’ and ‘institutions’ as the two middle categories of inquiry of infrastructure for peacebuilding within an integrated framework (1997, p. 117). He further noted that due to the realities of social or political crisis, the existence of an infrastructure for peacebuilding can push us to develop the capacity of people and institutions to, “predict where significant violence erupt and to design the mechanisms for its prevention and constructive transformation at levels that are accessible to, and that broaden, local participation” (1997, p. 118). This inquiry by Lederach is instructive to the current research in terms of understanding the role of institutions and people in I4P, including the prospects and challenges of formal and informal I4P processes.

Studies by Wehr and Lederach (1991), Lederach (1997), Odendaal (2010), Unger and Lundström (2013), Mouly (2013), Hopp-Nishanka (2013a), and Kovács (2019) have also attested to the evidence of different I4P practical cases around the world. However, studies have also distinguished between top-down approaches and bottom-up practical cases. The top-down

approach to the establishment of I4P has been highlighted by Odendaal (2010), Hopp-Nishanka (2013a), and Kovács (2019). An early practical case includes the development of peace commissions in Nicaragua in the 1980s out of the Regional Esquipulas Peace Agreement (Esquipulas II) — a regional process of conflict resolution by Central American leaders to end armed conflict in four countries: Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. Mouly (2013), and Hopp-Nishanka (2013a) described the conflict resolution process as a top-level influence over the people, with strong regional and external assistance. However, the process also involved the warring parties and integrated consensus-building efforts among grassroots local peace commissions.

In addition to inclusion, other works have highlighted the role that marginalised inhabitants in Nicaragua played in responding to war in the 1980s. The mobilisers of insider mediation used non-violent means to engage the Sandinista regime and the Contra rebels. They included community leaders, NGOs and mediation by Protestants and Catholic representatives, in partnership with state-building efforts. External mediators also provided legitimacy, training, and resources, which fostered the formation of lasting institutional capacities for peace (Wehr & Lederach, 1991; Mouly, 2013; Hopp-Nishanka, 2013a; UNDP, 2014).

Several studies have also examined the emergence of I4P in Africa. The first frequently cited case is a top-down approach in South Africa. Local and regional peace committees within the borders of South Africa were a product of the signing of a National Peace Accord in 1991 between the main protagonists in the conflict, including the government, several political parties, liberation movements, and many other civil society actors. They also underscored the significant role that I4P played in containing violence during the historic Apartheid election of 1994 (Odendaal, 2010;

Van Tongeren, 2011, 2012; Kovács, 2019; Irene & Majekodunmi, 2017). However, contrary to the permanent notion of I4P, the South African case fell into disuse after the 1994 political transition, constrained in part by deep polarisation, and was ill-equipped to address the greater structural problem of inequalities caused by the Apartheid system (Nganje, 2021).

Another early development of I4P in Africa aside is in Kenya. Studies by Kovács (2019) indicate that the Kenyan approach began with a 1993 grassroots initiative in the Wajir district bordering Somalia and Ethiopia. This saw a group of women acting as insider mediators in the resolution of conflict between different clans. In their studies, Van Tongeren (2012) and Kovács (2019) proceeded to note that the initiative by the women brought on board educated members of the clans, and later led to the spread of the initiative to other districts of Kenya. Odendaal (2010) also added that the integration of the peace initiative brought the Government, NGOs, and Citizen Groups together to form a broader peace structure adopted as national policy for the management of electoral conflict and other non-political issues.

Several studies on the three decades of I4P show that the framework is either within government ministries, institutionalised units, committees, councils, or secretariats (Wehr & Lederach, 1991; Lederach, 1997; Odendaal, 2010; Van Tongeren, 2011, 2012; Unger & Lundström, 2013; Richmond, 2013; Kovács, 2019). Examples include the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, Nepal (Odendaal, 2010; Kovács, 2019), the Ministry of Justice and Peace, Costa Rica (Van Tongeren, 2011, 2012), Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation, Solomon Island (Richmond, 2013), Local Peace Committees, Columbia; Office of the Peace Commissioner and Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process, Philippines; National Office of Dialogue and Sustainability, Peru (Van Tongeren, 2011, 2012), Committees for Inter-Community Relations, Former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia (Odendaal, 2010), Peace Secretariats, Sri Lanka (Hopp-Nishanka, 2013a), Peace and Peace Support Structures, Lebanon (Siebert, 2013), Social Cohesion Programme, Guyana; Department of Peacebuilding, Timor-Leste (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Van Tongeren, 2012), Local Peace Committees, Democratic Republic of Congo; Peace Committees, Uganda; Political Parties Registration Commission, Sierra Leone; and Peace Committees, South Sudan (Odendaal, 2010; Van Tongeren, 2012).

The studies on how I4P evolved in Nicaragua, South Africa, Kenya, and other places bring to the fore the different practical cases of I4P beyond Ghana. This research will take a cue from the above I4P cases to examine the extent to which informal and formal dynamics in developing Ghana's peace architecture have advanced in terms of successes, limitations, and remedies.

## **2.5 Studies on Ghana's Peace Architecture**

Verzat (2014), in his study of Ghana's PA, described it as an I4P with a national mandate (Verzat, 2014, p. 4). A 2011 World Bank report, described some factors that necessitated the formation of Ghana's PA. They included two major localised conflicts that occurred in Ghana, namely the Konkomba-Nanumba inter-communal war in 1994 and the Dagbon chieftaincy succession crisis in 2002 (World Bank, 2011). Jönsson (2007) recounted the severity of the Konkomba-Nanumba war between some rival ethnic groups in the north of the country. It killed more than 2000 people, destroyed about 441 villages and displaced in excess of 178,000 people.

On the above crises, Awinador-Kanyirige (2014) underscored the role of security enforcement through the imposition of a ceasefire to keep peace. Another mechanism is the role of mediation which was authorised through the Permanent Peace Negotiating Team (PPNT). He further argued that the case depicted the importance of a multi-layered approach to peacebuilding because civil

society-sponsored mediation was used to bridge the credibility gap of the state-led PPNT in the eyes of the conflict parties. An example is the role of an Inter-NGO Consortium comprising local and international actors (including the Christian Council Ghana, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision Ghana, Action Aid, and Oxfam International) and the invitation of the Nairobi Peace Initiative to mediate. Studies underscore the pivotal role of local and international civil societies in the building of peace in Northern Ghana. Another aspect of the multi-layered approach is the role of professional individuals like the then-Executive Director of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Emmanuel Bombande, a Northern Ghanaian from Bawku, along with an outsider mediator, Professor Hizkias Assefa, an Ethiopian national who also led mediation efforts (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014; Roepstorff & Bernhard, 2013).

Against this backdrop, Kumar and De la Haye (2012), Verzat (2014), and Kovács (2019) have described the landscape of Ghana's PA as a hybrid peacebuilding function. In a broader sense, Kumar and De la Haye (2012) identified three characteristics of hybridity in I4P. First, the role of international actors in equipping national and local actors with the skills and tools to manage their conflict and tensions; Second, technical expertise that is deployed by international actors to support the capacity of national and local actors in conflict prevention; Third, the I4P framework has oriented conflict prevention more in the global South (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012, pp. 14-15).

In another vein, Van Tongeren (2012) identified possible mechanisms for executing the mandate of a national I4P: peace committees; a national peacebuilding platform; conflict analysis and early warning and response system; a peacebuilding support unit; a bill on infrastructure for peace; involvement of insider mediators; traditional perspective on conflict resolution; promotion of a shared vision of society and a culture of peace; peace education; establishment, implementation

and monitoring I4P (Van Tongeren, 2012). This Table shows the functions of the NPC with respect to the practice of I4P in Ghana.

**Table 1: Functions of the National Peace Council**

<b>To achieve its object, the Council shall</b>	
<b>a)</b>	Harmonise and co-ordinate conflict prevention, management, resolution and build sustainable peace through network working and co-ordination;
<b>b)</b>	Strengthen capacities for conflict prevention, management, resolution and sustainable peace in the country including but not limited to chiefs, women, youth groups and community organisations;
<b>c)</b>	Increase awareness on the use of non-violence strategies to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and build sustainable peace in the country;
<b>d)</b>	Facilitate the amicable resolution of conflict through mediation and other processes including indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution and peace building;
<b>e)</b>	Promote understanding of the values of diversity, trust, tolerance, confidence building, negotiation, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation;
<b>f)</b>	Co-ordinate and supervise the work of the Regional and District Peace Councils;
<b>g)</b>	Facilitate the implementation of agreements and resolutions reached between parties in conflict;
<b>h)</b>	Make recommendations to the Government and other stakeholders on actions to promote trust and confidence between and among groups; and
<b>i)</b>	Perform any other function which is ancillary to its object.

Source: (Republic of Ghana, 2011, p. 4)


In the context of these functions, Kanza (2019) set criteria to demonstrate how they fit three pillar peacebuilding components: security, governing and social dimension for promoting national peace and stability (Kanza, 2019), and five broad sub-components as follows: “1) Structures for peacebuilding and the resolution of conflicts; 2) Institutionalizing a culture of peace; 3) Strengthening the media as a space for public conversations and debates on the salient issues of the day, so that all voices could be heard; 4) Prevention and control of small arms and light weapons, and promoting alternative livelihoods; 5) Building the capacity for national institutions to manage grievance and differences” (Kan-Dapaah 2006, as cited in Kanza, 2019, p. 13).

In Awinador-Kanyirige (2014), the structure of the NPC has been described as an architecture that epitomises a three-tier structure as shown in the Figure on the next page. This structure, according to the NPC Act, should be composed of National, Regional, And District Peace Councils, and each level should have a Board and a Secretariat. The national level should comprise a Governing Board that supervises and coordinates the jurisdiction of the regional and district levels in consultation with respective Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) and District Assemblies (Republic of Ghana, 2011; NPC, 2013; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). In terms of membership, the Governing Board consists of thirteen eminent persons appointed from diverse sectors among identifiable religious and professional groups in Ghana. They are expected to be Ghanaians with high moral standing and professional integrity. The board members hold office for a period of four years and are eligible for reappointment (Republic of Ghana, 2011; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014)

Official documents on Ghana's PC have shown that day-to-day administration is headed by an Executive Secretary who is appointed by the President through the Public Service Commission (NPC, 2013; Republic of Ghana, 1992). Ghana's Ministry of the Interior which is the Sector Ministry of the NPC is mandated to establish a Peacebuilding Support Unit to along with other functions, facilitate the cooperation of government ministries on behalf of the government and the Peace Council. It implements policy recommendations, manages an Early Warning and Analysis Unit, and provides advice to the sector ministry towards conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Republic of Ghana, 2011). The NPC is supposed to attract the following funding sources: a government consolidated fund and establish a Peace Fund to solicit voluntary domestic and international resources (Republic of Ghana, 2011; NPC, 2013; Verzat, 2014; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). These are institutional issues and do not account for issues of peacebuilding practice which

the current study focuses such as how the NPC develops, facilitates, and implements peacebuilding mechanisms, their successes, challenges, and improvements.

**Figure 2: Review of Ghana’s Three-Tier Peace Architecture**



Source: (Republic of Ghana, 2011; Kanza, 2019)

An overview of the existing literature shows significant studies on the structure and mandate of the NPC, its role in mediating internal disputes, and the extent of its contribution to the promotion of peaceful elections in Ghana. Odendaal (2010), Awinador-Kanyirige (2014), and Verzat (2014) have shown in their studies that the eminent structure of the NPC can mitigate election-related disputes in Ghana. Unger & Lundström (2013), Van Tongeren et al. (2012), Hopp-Nishanka (2013a), and Alidu & Braimah (2014) highlighted the third-party role of the NPC relative to

political and social disputes and the promotion of smooth political transitions after contentious elections. Kotia and Aubyn (2013), and Awinador-Kanyirige (2014) showed that the NPC faces functional challenges partly because of the lack of human, technical, and financial resources. In their study of Ghana's 2012 and 2020 elections, Alidu and Braimah (2014), and Agbelengor (2024) emphasised that the NPC has significant prospects in terms of its contribution to the promotion of peaceful elections in the country.

Despite this, a comprehensive comparative analysis in the context of I4P has been missing in the existing works. To fill this gap, the current study utilises a comparative approach to examine how Ghana's PA compares to the UN PBA in the context of the structure of the architecture, the nature and scope of resources, approaches to peace, and peacebuilding targets. Since the comparative approach is also country-specific on Ghana, the final section of this chapter reviews the literature on conflict and peacebuilding in Ghana under the Fourth Republican Constitution.

## **2.6 Studies on Conflict and Peacebuilding in Ghana**

Since peacebuilding is a function of conflict, the translation of peacebuilding concepts into practice is essential for addressing conflict. This section reviews the literature on three conflict cases in Ghana, their root causes, dynamics, successes, and limitations of local peacebuilding. Given the two underlying major comparative cases (UN PBA and Ghana's PA) in this study, other cases in Ghana's context are considered mini-cases for methodological analysis purposes: Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute as mini-case one; Dagbon intra-chieftaincy dispute as mini-case two; and Election disputes as mini-case three. The dynamics of mini-cases one and two require a literature review of a social conflict formation that predates Ghana's independence. However, the return of multiparty democratic elections in 1992 after the truncation of three republics by military coups in

the past, confines the review of mini-case three to the Fourth Republic. (Alidu & Braimah, 2014; Penu & Essaw, 2019). A review of mini cases one and two will focus on three main periods in the political history of Ghana: the pre-independence era, the mixed regime era, and the stable democracy era (Dixon, 1994; Crawford, 1998; Penu & Essaw, 2019). The ‘pre-independence era’ represents the colonial era before independence. The term ‘mixed regime era’ begins from independence in 1957 to the first coup in 1966. The subsequent mixed regimes continued from 1966 to 1992 when Ghana experienced a series of five military coup d’état interspersed with stints of civilian governments. The term ‘stable democracy era’ is another expression of the era under Ghana’s 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution which has been sustained to date (Alidu & Braimah, 2014; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

### **2.6.1 Alavanyo-Nkonya**

Tsikata and Seini (2004), Midodzi and Imoro (2011), Gariba (2015), Penu and Osei-Kufuor (2016), and Penu and Essaw (2019) have examined the Alavanyo and Nkonya land dispute between the Alavanyo, from the Ewe ethnic group in the Hohoe municipality of the Volta Region and the Nkonyas, from the Guan group currently located in the Biakoye district of the Oti region (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Midodzi & Imoro, 2011; Gariba, 2015; Penu & Osei-Kufuor, 2016; Penu & Essaw, 2019). Studies have shown that while the primary cause of the conflict is a controversial boundary dispute between the two communities, there are other underlying ethnic and economic conditions as well. The nature of the dispute and issues are summed as follows: boundary dispute, compelling court verdicts, ethnicity, land security problems, local and state politics, economic interest in commercial trees on the disputed land, autochthonous narrative between early settlers and latecomers (Bercovitch, 1992; Gariba, 2015; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

Other evidence also shows that the history of the conflict is not confined to the local level, but has been interwoven in subnational, national, and even global geopolitical discourses (Bercovitch, 1992; Penu & Essaw, 2019). This is also exemplified by a multiplicity of mediators (Gourlay & Ropers, 2012) who attempted several peace settlements, from the pre-independence era to the stable democracy era (Penu & Essaw, 2019). They include the colonial administration, successive national governments, the courts, national security services, RCCs, regional house of chiefs, mediation committees, CSOs, women groups, traditional authorities, and queen mothers, diaspora from the two communities, including community dialogue, livelihood, and support projects from the UNDP and other donor agencies (Gariba, 2015, p. 1; Abdallah & Amedzator, 2014, p. 28).

Some scholars have observed that over the decades, primary actors such as traditional authorities, elites, and youth groups have rather instrumentalised and polarised the situation. This led to the abuse of the moral economy of social exchanges between the two ethnic communities (Gariba, 2015; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012; Roepstorff & Bernhard, 2013). On the one hand, the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict is not one of the bloodier communal disputes in Ghana. Despite its low intensity, the length of history and the recurrence of communal violence, have made the conflict one of the most exhaustive and expensive (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Odendaal, 2010; Abdallah & Amedzator, 2014).

As historical evidence overwhelmingly shows, the nature of dispute and issues is a controversial piece of land that the two communities tussled over for decades in the then-colonial Volta Togoland (Tsikata & Seini, 2004), which came under German colonial territory as part of the German protectorate of Togo in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Following the defeat of Germany in the First World War, Britain readily accepted the mandate of the League of Nations over that territory, then part of

Western Togoland, with the hope of bringing together homogenous communities divided by Anglo-German boundaries between Western Togoland and the Gold Coast (Bening, 1983). In the specific case of the Alavanyo-Nkonya boundary dispute, an instrumental intervention by the German Empire has lasted throughout the history of the conflict (Gariba, 2015). In the 1900s, a notable intervention by the German colonial administration to deal with land encroachment led to the commissioning of a boundary map project. The project which was led and completed by the German cartographer, Hans Gruner in 1913, gained the popular name the Gruner map. The map indicated the boundaries of Alavanyo and Nkonya, including other communities like Akpafu, Gbi, and Santrokofi (Gariba, 2015; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

The design of a colonial boundary map for the area is a classic case of external intervention. The rationale can be described as an attempt to certify communal land issues using a formal geographical approach. However fragile the outcome was, it showed the preparedness of a colonial actor to address a distant local conflict (Gariba, 2015). Due to the political authority of the German colonial empire, the choice of Hans Gruner also reflected confidence in his professional expertise and knowledge of the Volta Togoland region (Bercovitch, 1992; Gariba, 2015). The colonial actors, nonetheless, were still outsiders. This intervention is different from internal indigenous interventions by customary traditional leadership (Bercovitch, 1992; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012; Gariba, 2015). Unsurprising, the Gruner map became a source of controversy under several failed local peacebuilding efforts throughout the history of the conflict (Gariba, 2015; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

The first recorded violent conflict took place ten years later in 1923 under British protectorate during preparations for the Empire Day celebration in honour of the British Queen and Empire

(Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Gariba, 2015; Penu & Osei-Kufuor, 2016; Penu & Essaw, 2019). According to Penu and Essaw (2019), since 1923, the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict further recorded other direct violent incidents (1983, 2003, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2017), and the conflict hardly succumbed to durable peace (Penu & Essaw, 2019, p. 93). In the specific recorded violent incident of 1923, studies have shown that the mediation of the conflict (Bercovitch, 1992; Tsikata & Seini, 2004), came from the effort of the customary institution, which showed the importance of insider mediators in colonial times (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Fisher, 2001; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

Existing studies also show that following the death of one Nkonya member after the 1923 clashes, the Nkonya chief imposed a traditional fine on the Alavanyos to atone for the loss of life instead of inciting a violent retaliation. While it is not clear whether the fine was paid, what Penu and Essaw (2019, p. 95) described as a customary institutional remedy, was an important early sign of pre-independence indigenous mediation, to water down the possibility of a violent escalation. It also activated local peacebuilding concepts such as reconciliation, justice in atoning for wrongdoings, and attempts by conflict parties themselves to mitigate local grievances (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Odendaal, 2010; Wehr & Lederach, 1991; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

Studies also show that significant conventional attempts at resolving the conflict dominated the mixed regime era. For example, the court system was an instrumental statutory institution with judicial dispute resolution prowess (Bercovitch, 1992; Tsikata & Seini, 2004). Litigation in court began in the pre-independence era, precisely in 1953, and ended in the mixed regime era around 1980, with public records showing four major court rulings in the mixed regime era: 1959, 1970, 1975, and 1980 (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Penu & Essaw, 2019). In these court rulings, the accuracy of the Gruner map was upheld as authentic in June 1959 by a High Court ruling, but the Alavanyos

later appealed the ruling. A Court of Appeal ruling in December 1970 ordered the Alavanyos to compensate tenancy to the Nkonyas, but the ruling was also appealed. In December 1975, another ruling from the Court upheld the 1970 ruling. Finally, a court ruling in 1980 ordered the quashing of a decision issued by the Stool Land Boundaries Commission to re-demarcate the boundaries. These court rulings which were largely in favour of the Nkonyas ended the legal battle in the mixed regime era (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Gariba, 2015; Penu & Osei-Kufuor, 2016; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

Studies by Moore (2014) show that the court system is largely characterised by professionalism, independence, impartiality, and objectivity (Moore, 2014). Court verdicts, however, in this specific conflict case, failed as a method of conflict resolution owing to their judgmental posture and evidence-based approach. That is to say, by using the Gruner map as the sole historical evidence, the court verdicts resulted in a zero-sum outcome (Midodzi & Imoro, 2011; Gariba, 2015) which did not conform to what Bose (1981) described as the Gandhian approach of promoting peace through the avoidance of win-lose outcomes where there is a manifestation of victors and defeators (Bose, 1981). This ruling largely favoured the Nkonyas because the geographical evidence from the Gruner map affirmed their historical narrative as the early settlers. However, the court verdicts did not end violence nor the resolution of the conflict, and neither was the court judgement implemented (Midodzi & Imoro, 2011; Gariba, 2015).

The stable democracy era experienced the highest peacebuilding efforts from the initiation of mediation processes to military-manned curfews, and surprisingly, the highest conflict escalation (Penu & Essaw, 2019). This is partly a dent to the liberal peace notion since the stable democracy era is also the era of constitutional rule and democratic stability in Ghana. This brings to the fore the critique of liberal peace which often holds the argument that there is no alternative to Western

liberalism with respect to social, political, and economic transformation that provides the best option for resolving conflict and building lasting peace (Cooper et al., 2011). At best, local peacebuilding is an attempt to complement liberal peace (Mac Ginty, 2011) with an agenda for peace assured by the exertions of locals themselves (Mazrui, 2018). In this case, while third parties played significant roles in the stable democracy era, several scholars have noted that the informal choices of the conflict parties, and relevant local actors were at the heart of the evolution of peace in times of violence (Penu & Osei-Kufuor, 2016; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

Some critical mediation strategies (Bercovitch, 1992) also included state funding and facilitating of mediation committees to advise the government on the best approach. The three main committees were the Acquah Committee in November 1992, the Mireku Committee in March 1995, and the Clergy-led Mediation Committee from 2004 onward. Another mediation strategy utilised Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (Abdallah & Amedzator, 2014; Gariba, 2015; Midodzi & Imoro, 2011). The PNDC military regime appointed the Acquah Committee in the 1980s to investigate the conflict and advise the government on a durable solution to peace between the two communities. Still, no hearing took place when the hostilities reemerged. Under the auspices of the District Chief Executives of Jasikan (former district of Nkonya) representing Nkonya, and Hohoe representing Alavanyo, the Mireku Committee was empowered to inquire into the conflict and offer solutions. The committee's approach also became evidence-based as it described the Gruner map as the sine qua non to lasting peace for the two communities. The committee further described past court rulings as not inclusive enough to promote peace, yet at the same time, the committee did not have the power to set aside their ruling. Although a report came out of the Mireku Committee, no implementation followed the report (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Gariba, 2015). The ADR approach also provided opportunities for conflict resolution through the direct initiation

of mechanisms by the conflict parties. The ADR mechanism, however, was also fraught with mistrust and suspicion from the two communities about the neutrality and objectivity of the ADR team. For example, the attempt to implement the court judgments attracted local resistance because it was considered to satisfy only one party (Midodzi & Imoro, 2011).

The challenges of adopting and implementing an effective peacebuilding mechanism were further deepened on the floor of Ghana's Parliament. In February 2003, political tension and intense debate arose between two Members of Parliament (MP) of both communities within the same opposition party of the National Democratic Congress (NDC): Dr. Kwabena Adjei then-MP for Biakoye, and Nathaniel Kwadzo Aduadjoe then-MP for Hohoe-North, when the former suggested that the conflict needed government intervention. Subsequently, Ghana's Parliament was briefed by the then-Volta Regional Minister Mr. Kwasi Owusu-Yeboah, who submitted that the Volta Regional Security Council (REGSEC) had a police-military peacekeeping presence in the Alavanyo-Nkonya area since September 2002 to maintain peace and order (Abdallah & Amedzrator, 2014; Gariba, 2015). Despite various third party institutional mechanisms, including the courts, Commissions of Inquiry, ADR, and the deployment of security forces in the area, localised violent incidents did not wane under the stable democratic era. This affected farming and other related economic activities in the area (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Midodzi & Imoro, 2011).

In terms of institutional peacebuilding efforts, studies have also shown that the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute did not lack other constructed architectures in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. They include the establishment of an Alavanyo-Nkonya peace architecture in 2004. This comprised three main local peacebuilders: religious leaders, traditional authorities, and lawyers (Abdallah & Amedzrator, 2014; Gariba, 2015). In detail, Abdallah & Amedzrator (2014) identified four main institutional

structures under the peace architecture as follows: Mediation Committee and Consultative Committee as the main structures, the Catholic Diocesan Peacebuilding Team in the Volta capital Ho, and the Community Peace Settlers as the supporting structures. Similarly, Abdallah and Amedzrator (2014), and Gariba (2015) have both described the facilitators of the local peace architecture to include the technical support of the Catholic Diocese, the assistance of the government through the Volta REGSEC, and collaboration with local traditional authorities, the people, women and the youth of both conflicting communities.

From the above, the formation of a Mediation Committee was a Clergy-led Committee comprising seven members and a secretary. The Consultative Committee comprised nine members from Alavanyo and Nkonya to attain unity of purpose between the two feuding communities. The other two structures were the Ho Diocesan Peacebuilding Team with six members, and the Community Peace Settlers which comprised four members. To build a broad array of actors for enhancing trust and optimism, citizens in the diaspora were included in the peacebuilding process. CSOs like the WANEP have also provided professional functions behind the scenes, such as technical training to the mediators and engaging directly in the mediation process (Abdallah & Amedzrator, 2014; Gariba, 2015).

Gariba (2015, p. 201) noted that as of 2012, the work of the Clergy-led Committee had emboldened and strengthened the bonds between the two communities. It also significantly improved human interaction, and communal socio-economic and agrarian activities between the communities. However, this process was also not immune from challenges. Indeed, some local actors within the conflict enclave, including youth representatives and elites from both communities began to accuse

the clergy-led approach of bias. Among the claims were the misuse of their leverage and the lack of recognition of a court verdict (Gariba, 2015).

The review of the literature on mini-case one shows enormous efforts to resolve a land dispute over decades of escalation. Nevertheless, it can also be observed that the commitment of the primary parties to achieving lasting peace also remained essential. For our purpose, the inauguration of the Regional Peace Council (RPC) in 2014 provided another layer of peacebuilding mechanism under the auspices of the NPC. This case will be used to analyse the nature and the relevance of the local peacebuilding mechanisms under the auspices of the respective local I4P.

### **2.6.2 Dagbon**

The Dagbon chieftaincy conflict is one example of Northern Ghana's intractable conflict between two feuding clans based on a traditional matter that got intertwined in local and national politics (Ladouceur, 1972; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Tonah, 2012; Ahorsu, 2014). It is also an imperative sub-national case that has been used to examine the evolution of conflict and peacebuilding in Ghana, and the essence of peace architecture (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Ahorsu, 2014; Hellmüller, 2018; Penu & Essaw, 2019). In demographic terms, the Dagbon people, often referred to as Dagombas, constitute the single largest ethnic group located in Northern Ghana. Yendi is the traditional capital, and the seat of the Yaa Naa, who is the king and overlord of Dagbon. Dagomba areas also include Tamale, which is the political and administrative capital of the Northern Region of Ghana. They speak Dagbani as a language, which is a subgroup of the Mole-Dagbani family of languages (Ladouceur, 1972; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah, et al., 2014).

The antecedent conditions regarding the nature, issues, and parties in the chieftaincy conflict centred on the Dagombas, which dates back to the pre-colonial era. The historical dynamics are

reflected in the trajectory of war and empire-building led by people who migrated to an area they now occupy as conquerors. They brought with them an internecine traditional system reflected in strong values, emotions, passions, and attachment to chieftaincy and kingship titles (Bercovitch, 1992; Tonah, 2012; Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah, et al., 2014). However, this traditional asset became a source of perennial succession crisis between the two main feuding clans, known as the two royal gates: Abudu and Andani (Ladouceur, 1972; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014).

Before the First World War, the Dagombas were partitioned between two colonial powers; Britain and Germany, but the Yaa Naa skin fell under the control of the latter respectively. However, after the war, the paramountcy of the Yaa Naa over all Dagbon was established under British indirect rule, who became important record keepers of the history and culture of Dagomba (Ladouceur, 1972; Staniland, 1975). The nature of the dispute and issues around the Abudu and Andani debacle has been over the kingship position of Yaa Naa, the overlord of the Dagbon kingdom in Yendi. The position is a critical, resourceful, and influential paramountcy, and according to Dagbon tradition, the Yaa Naa is the custodian of all lands in the Kingdom of Dagbon among the Dagomba people. He is also the apical head of authority who has the sole right to officiate the celebration of traditional and religious festivals such as Damba, Chimsi, Chugu, and Eid-ul Adha. He also appoints and superintends over sub-divisional chiefs and honorary chiefs: Karaga Lana, Mion Lana, and Savelugu Na – each of whom could be enskinned as Yaa Naa (Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014).

The Dagbon chieftaincy conflict has been surrounded by complexities, particularly with the varieties of methods adopted in history to resolve it. The cradle of the method follows from the

traditional consensus approach that was adopted but uncodified as the succession plan to replace the first Yaa Naa Yakubu I following his death in the late nineteenth century (Ladouceur, 1972; Debrah et al., 2014). His son Abudulai succeeded him as Abudulai I, and then his son Andani, known as Andani II followed after his brother's death. Following the death of Andani II in 1899, there has been in some measure alternation of succession between the descendants of the two brothers (Ladouceur, 1972; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Ahorsu, 2014).

The succession process, however, became a driver of conflict over several issues, most specifically, disagreement over the extent to which the rotation constituted another rule for determining succession, controversy over who had the right to select a successor, and disagreement over the particular customary activities in the selection and instalment processes. In 1948, for instance, the original four kingmakers or soothsayers of whom the selection of a successor rested, were expanded to an eleven-member committee, composed of divisional chiefs throughout the kingdom (Staniland, 1975; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Debrah et al., 2014). The British colonial administration legitimised this approach as a final attempt to bring lasting peace to the perennial succession crisis. Under the new system, some royal educated elites of Dagbon sought to downgrade soothsaying in their effort to influence the secularisation and bureaucratisation of the selection criteria of the Yaa Naa (Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014).

The literature indicates that the British colonial administration's overt external political influence in supporting the secularisation of the indigenous succession process was in direct opposition to the traditional rotational succession system inherent to Dagbon customs and traditions (Ladouceur, 1972; Staniland, 1975; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Tonah, 2012; Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014; Kanda, 2019). This intervention without recourse to a proper consensus from the two

feuding parties, coincided with the period of active pre-independence polarisation of politics in the Gold Coast. Hence, both Abudu and Andani elites sought a lasting alliance with the two main political traditions in Ghana: the right-leaning United Party (UP) and left-leaning Convention People's Party (CPP) respectively (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Tonah, 2012; Newman, 2013; Ahorsu, 2014).

By 1954, the adopted Committee System became a source of controversy as complaints emerged that the system was ultimately eliminating the Andani family from the contest of succession. This was exemplified by the failure of the selection committee to implement the rotational system when Yaa Naa Abudulai III from the Abudu family was selected to succeed his father Yaa Naa Mahama II. This fueled inter-royal and family conflict as the Andani family felt it was their turn to ascend to the throne (Ladouceur, 1972; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014). The Andani family felt marginalised by the outcome of the selection committee scheme, and to their displeasure, refused to recognise Yaa Naa Abudulai III. They also sought redress at the Dagbon State Council to no avail as their request contradicted the sacrosanct tradition that a Yaa Naa cannot be dethroned once enthroned (Ahorsu, 2014).

As the conflict evolved throughout the mixed regime era, successive civilian and military governments played significant roles in deepening state-led peacebuilding in Dagbon. Under the civilian government of the CPP (1957-1966), the Justice Opoku-Afari Commission was established to investigate the crisis. The recommendation of the Commission led to the passage of the 1960 Legislative Instrument No. 59, which restored the rotation system after the CPP had negotiated with the two parties that an Andani assumed the next enskinment. The opportunity for succession for the Andanis came to light when Yaa Naa Abdullai III died on September 14, 1967.

The problem, however, was that the opportunity came rather late under a new military regime — the National Liberation Council (NLC) (1966-1969) after its overthrow of the CPP government on 24<sup>th</sup> February 1966 (Tonah, 2012; Ahorsu, 2014; Penu & Essaw, 2019).

A tipping point in the mixed regime era occurred after 21<sup>st</sup> September 1968, the day the seventy-year-old Mion Lana Andani was enthroned as Yaa Naa Andani III using the rotation system. Tsikata and Seini (2004) described this era as the long road to regicide as a similar tragic event occurred in 2002. A sudden threat to peace followed with a claim by pro-Abudus within the selection committee system that they had actually chosen Gbonlana Mahamadu, another Abudu member as Yaa Naa, despite the family earlier enjoying two successions. In an attempt to settle the controversy, in mid-December 1968, the NLC government established the Mate-Kole Committee to inquire into the selection procedures. The Committee, however, had not completed its sitting when Yaa Naa Andani III suddenly died on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1969, and his eldest son Yakubu Andani was installed as Gbonlana on 21<sup>st</sup> March 1969 (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Tonah, 2012).

The report of the Committee was released in the Second Republic under the civilian regime of Kofi A. Busia (October 1969–January 1972) of the Progress Party (PP) that succeeded the NLC. Shocking to the Andanis, the report described the enskinment of Gbonlana Andani as contrary to Dagbon's custom, and therefore null and void. The report further recommended the enstoolment of Gbonlana Mahamadu from the Abudu gate. This recommendation which was accepted by the government, immediately sparked fighting in Yendi, following a forceful attempt by the government to use security forces to evict the Andani family from the Royal Gbewa palace. This tragic incident led to the murder of about thirty members of the Andani family, while at the same

time, the ruling government supported the enskinment of Gbonlana Mahamadu as Yaa Naa under heavy security protection (Ladouceur, 1972; Staniland, 1975; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Tonah, 2012).

The Busia government, however, did not live its full mandate following its overthrow on 13<sup>th</sup> January 1972 by the National Redemption Council (NRC) led by General Kutu Acheampong (the NRC later changed its name to the Supreme Military Council I, and later Supreme Military Council II under General Akufo after Acheampong was forced to resign). The NRC (January 1972- June 1979) was persuaded to establish another committee given the humiliation that the Andani Gate and their allies suffered under the Busia regime. Attempts at mediation by the army officers led to the establishment of the Ollenu Committee to ascertain the proper selection criteria that conform to Dagbon custom and tradition. At the end of the 1974 Ollenu Committee of Inquiry, the recommendations called for the recognition of Yaa Naa Andani III as the rightful king, the dethronement of Yaa Naa Mahamadu Abudulai IV, and the restoration of the rotation system. In endorsing these recommendations, the government supported the enskinment of Yaa Naa Yakubu Andani II of the Andani royal gate, and further passed a decree, NRCD 299, prohibiting any court from adjudicating the decisions, particularly in relation to the dethronement of Mahamadu Abudulai IV of the Abudu royal gate (Ladouceur, 1972; Staniland, 1975; Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Tonah, 2012; Ahorsu, 2014; Frempong, 2015).

While the Abudu clan refused to recognise Yaa Naa Yakubu Andani II as the overlord of Dagbon, his reign was sustained during the short period of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (June 1979–September 1979) after it overthrew the SMC II military government. Yaa Na Yakubu Andani II also survived under the civilian government of Dr. Hilla Limann (September 1979–December 1981), which was also overthrown on 31<sup>st</sup> December 1981 by the PNDC (Ayee, 2002; Ateng et al.,

2018). As successive governments changed between civilian and military regimes under the mixed regime era, the dispute also kept resurrecting. The mixed regime era ended with a major Supreme Court decision on December 17 1986 under the PNDC era (December 1981- January 1993). It affirmed the rotation system recommended by the Ollenu Committee and elevated it to the status of national law (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Penu & Essaw, 2019; Ayee, 2002). The conflict, however, was not resolved under the stable democracy era. The politicisation deepened when the NPP (a successor of the UP and PP party tradition), led by John Kufour won the 2000 general elections. In March 2002, renewed tensions and conflict between the two factions culminated in a second regicide, resulting in the murder of Yaa Naa Yakubu Andani II and approximately 40 of his subjects, as well as the destruction of around 36 houses. (Tsikata & Seini, 2004; Tonah, 2012; Ateng et al., 2018).

Studies by Tonah (2012), Ahorsu (2014), Debrah et al. (2014), Abdallah & Amedzrator (2014), and Kanda (2019) identified some major peacebuilding mechanisms under the stable democracy era: special police investigators, an independent Commission of Inquiry, the Courts, Committee of Eminent Chiefs, and an active mediation effort by CSOs (Tonah, 2012; Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014; Abdallah & Amedzrator, 2014; Kanda, 2019). The then-Chief Superintendent of Police, David Asante Apeatu, together with a ministerial delegation in an attempt to investigate the root cause of the murder of the Yaa Naa, conferred with the Yendi District Security Council, which led to meetings with members of the feuding parties (Ahorsu, 2014). The meeting with the feuding parties revealed the fact that the Abudus for years did not recognise the twenty-six years' reign of the Yaa Naa who was murdered because of accusations that he resisted a befitting burial for Yaa Naa Abudulai IV. The Apeatu-led interactions, however, did not yield any significant evidence or

report that would have been used to identify or prosecute the perpetrators of the second regicide (Ahorsu, 2014; Tsikata & Seini, 2004).

Another attempted peace effort was the establishment of the Wuaku Commission (WC) of Inquiry by the government of the NPP, in line with Article 278 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, whose terms of reference included inquiring into the root causes, victims, perpetrators, and making recommendations on the way forwards towards resolution (Republic of Ghana, 1992; Debrah et al., 2014). Evidence from the WC report as indicated by Tonah (2012) and others, was that the incident was an act of war following the cumulation of the poor management of past phases of the Dagbon dispute (Tonah, 2012; Ahorsu, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014). It also provided a roadmap for the burial of the murdered Yaa Naa and the enskinment of a new king (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). However, as further narrated by Debrah et al. (2014), dozens of individuals identified in the WC report as perpetrators of the heinous crime, who were put on trial by the government, were freed for lack of evidence. Given that neither the WC nor the Courts went far to reconcile the two feuding royal families, an alternative approach to peacebuilding towards a positive sum outcome became imperative (Bose, 1981; Debrah et al., 2014).

The Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC) approach remains a notable and constructive initiative in the history of the Dagbon conflict. Studies have shown that the CEC commenced without a proper executive instrument to provide legal backing for its work. It also lacked a proper secretariat or legal service for the mediators and the disputants (Debrah et al., 2014). In Tonah (2012), the CEC approach did not fit a wholesome peace architecture because of the high political stakes and the informalities that characterised its formation. As noted by Odendaal (2010), the selection of eminent chiefs, together with local peace and mediation committees, whose peace efforts are

formal and informal peace mechanisms, may not parallel a formalised peace architecture. The strength and weakness of informality only means that they are less indebted to political and government actors, and they are often composed of volunteers with a high level of personal interest in peace. While they may be more creative and flexible, those who wield political power could ignore them (Odendaal, 2010, p. 8).

In the case of the CEC mediation committee, studies by Debrah et al. (2014), Abdallah & Amedzrator (2014), and Ahorsu (2014) showed that, despite some of its informal elements, the attributes of the CEC members were an important transformer in the mobilisation of the two feuding parties. With the support of the UNDP and the state represented by the Ministry of Interior and Chieftaincy, the CEC contributed significantly to the achievements of major aspects of the roadmap to peace in Dagbon. Members of the CEC constituted by the government of President Kufour in 2003 was a thoughtful formation of a traditional peace mechanism drawn from the existing traditional peace infrastructure in Ghana's National House of Chiefs (Abdallah & Amedzrator, 2014; Ahorsu, 2014; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014). As a mediation process led by eminent traditional persons, the CEC approach provided alternative actors and mechanisms to the past conventional attempts at resolving the conflict that yielded little results. It was chaired by Asantehene Osei Tutu II- head of Ashanti kingdom, and supported by Nayiri Naa Bohugu Abdulai Mahami Sheriga- Paramount Chief of Napkaduri and overlord of the Mamprugu Traditional Area, and Yabonbwura Tuntumba Borsa Sulemana Japka I- the Paramount Chief of Damango and overlord of Gonja Traditional Area (Debrah et al., 2014; Abdallah & Amedzrator 2014).

Debrah et al. (2014) specifically noted that members of the CEC possessed exceptional attributes of peace mediation: academic and professional qualifications as well as an eminent traditional reputation in the chieftaincy institution in Ghana. This underscored how professional experience can be combined with traditional reputation, wisdom, and skills in a mediation process (Debrah et al., 2014; Mac Ginty, 2010). Further, unlike the failures of past conventional commissions, political decisions, and judicial processes, the CEC provided adequate impetus for achieving substantial aspects of the Dagbon Roadmap amid grievances and mistrust, such as face-to-face meeting between the two feuding parties, burial of the late Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, enskinment of a regent of Dagbon, performance of funerals of former chiefs (Debrah et al., 2014; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012).

Part of what is known is the cultural dynamics and mediation mechanisms employed by the CEC approach. In the study of the cultural dynamics towards local peacebuilding in Ghana, Ateng et al. (2018) argued that the collectivist culture of the Dagbon people rather than an individualistic culture was one of the grounds on which the CEC mediation processes progressed. More evidently, Abdallah & Amedzrator (2014), and Appiah-Thompson (2019) highlighted the role that African traditional religious and philosophical text as expressed in ethnic Asante concepts in Ghana played in the lubrication of the mediation processes in the Dagbon conflict. For example, under the instrumental leadership of the chief mediator of the CEC, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, interconnected Akan philosophical texts were employed to resolve the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict between the two feuding families. Appiah-Thompson (2019) identified Akan peace concepts as follows: the symbols *adwo* means “calmness, security, and peace”; *obi nka bi* literally means “no one should bite the other”; *funtummireku* means “two crocodiles with a common stomach”; *mpatapo* means “the knot of participation or reconciliation”; *ese ne tekyerema* means “cooperation, symbol and

peace”. The concept, *funtummireku*, for instance, provided a transformative orientation to the Abudus and Andanis to see themselves as belonging to the same ethnic group, namely Dagomba (Appiah-Thompson, 2019, pp. 6-22). Further, in theoretical terms, *adwo* combined with *funtummireku* also presented another logic of mediation, that the two families or royal gates should not be fighting and killing each other over kingship succession and self-interest. Their ultimate goal as a collectivist society is to cooperate to defend the integrity of their community and heritage against internal physical and structural violence, external difficulties or aggression, and depend on each other for security, social, economic, cultural, and emotional assistance (Appiah-Thompson, 2019; Ateng et al., 2018; UN, 2012).

Studies show that unlike past failed peace settlements, the Otumfuo-led mediation team chalked relative success in the resolution of the conflict, which raises the issue of the effectiveness of unofficial mediators compared to official or institutionalised mediators (Debrah et al., 2014; Appiah-Thompson, 2019; Abdallah & Amedzrator, 2014; Wamai, 2018). Moreover, as described by Ahorsu (2014, p. 114), local and international CSOs, such as faith-based organisations (FBOs), NGOs, community leaders and UN agencies, also played instrumental roles in the local peacebuilding processes. The contributions of these CSOs included grassroots interactions with the feuding parties, humanitarian assistance to victims of the crisis, training programmes for local leaders on conflict resolution and restorative justice and organising training for local leaders, local peacebuilding programmes, and the formation of peace committees made up of both Abudus and Andanis.

Besides, by combining the CEC approach with the role of FBOs, including the Ghana Catholic Bishops’ Conference, the Christian Council of Ghana, the Office of the National Chief Imam, and the Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic Council, the entire insider mediation actors highlight the

notion that peacebuilding is not an activity for one stakeholder (Ahorsu, 2014; Mubashir & Vimalarajah, 2016). According to Mubashir & Vimalarajah (2016), such an approach provides an opportunity to understand the significance of “tools and inspiration from multiple faiths, cultures, and traditions as well as non-religious (secular) and non-traditional concepts/values” in the process of conflict transformation (Mubashir & Vimalarajah, 2016, p. 3). Despite these elaborate efforts, this study has been extended beyond the CEC approach to ascertain the complementary role of the NPC since its regional framework was established in 2014. Similar to the first mini-case, this case will identify and analyse the nature and the relevance of key local peacebuilding mechanisms in Dagbon and its environs through the practical channel of I4P.

### **2.6.3 Elections**

Following Ghana’s return to competitive multiparty politics in 1992 after decades of experimenting with varying political forms (1957-1992), significant progress has been made in the consolidation of democracy under the Fourth Republic (Debrah, 2011; Aning & Danso, 2012; Graham et al., 2017). Numerous works on elections, the management of electoral violence, and the consolidation of democracy have examined the contributions of both state and non-state peacebuilders: including the EC, NCCE, NPC, Police, CSOs, local and foreign election observers, and development partners (Aning & Danso, 2012; Aning et al., 2016; Alidu & Braimah, 2014; Graham et al., 2017; Botchwey, 2018).

Since the inception of the Fourth Republic on January 7, 1993, Ghana’s political landscape has been dominated by the NDC and the NPP, which essentially makes Ghana a two-party state (Aubyn & Abdallah, 2013). The NDC under Jerry John Rawlings governed from 1993 to 2000 but their defeat in the 2000 elections brought the NPP to power under John Kufour from 2001 to 2008. The NPP also lost power in the 2008 elections to the NDC. The NDC also governed for two terms

from 2008 to 2016 under John Mills and John Mahama. The two personalities were due to the sudden demise of Mills in office on 24<sup>th</sup> July 2012. He was succeeded by Mahama who went on to win the 2012 election. However, power returned to the NPP after it won the 2016 election (Lartey & Danso, 2016; Ayee, 2017; Adams & Asante, 2020). The NPP also won the 2020 elections but the opposition NDC rejected the EC's declaration of the results as flawed and challenged the same in Ghana's Supreme Court in 2021 — a move which was similar to the election petition of 2013 after the opposition NPP had similarly rejected the outcome of the 2012 election. These are significant test cases for the country on how democratic options are explored to settle the political grievances of losing parties using court processes (Citi News, 2020).

The main objective of political parties in Ghana is to gain political power through elections either individually or collectively for the development of the country. However, due to the winner-takes-all approach that is rooted in Ghana's political system, ruling governments tend to have access to all state resources (Meissner, 2010; Danso & Edu-Afful, 2012). For this reason, elections in Ghana have created unhealthy competition, especially between the two main political parties who see each election as a *do-or-die* affair (Meissner, 2010; Aubyn & Abdallah, 2013). Elections have also been one of the major sources of tensions, grievances, and isolated violent encounters between die-hard followers of both parties (Meissner, 2010) and sometimes violent clashes between security forces and civilians (Ijon, 2020).

There is substantive work on elections and democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Jeffries and Thomas (1993), Boahen (1995), and Oquaye (1995) stimulated an early debate on Ghana's 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections. Their respective studies showed the active role of local and international actors in the inception of Ghana's democracy under the Fourth

Republic. They include the ruling PNDC/NDC party, the opposition NPP and other smaller political parties, and the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) that supervised and conducted the elections. Security services, CSOs, chiefs, and international observers like the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) and the Carter Center Ghana Election Mission were the other notable actors.

Due to the critical nature of Ghana's political transition processes, the professional role of the security services in maintaining peace and security during the transition elections could not be undermined. However, because the revolutionary structures of the PNDC military regime had not been disbanded in 1992, paramilitary actors such as the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) were rumoured to be working in the electoral processes in favour of the ruling government (Jeffries & Thomas, 1993, p. 341). Civil society actors were also instrumental in the democratic transition process, although two worldviews existed. On the one hand, a dominant voluntary association of security and civilian actors was promoted by the PNDC regime, which included actors like the CDR, the Forces Reserves Battalion, the 31<sup>st</sup> December Women's Movement, and other hardline pro-state press. On the other hand, organised churches represented by the Christian Council of Churches, private press, and other opposition-led voluntary associations were critical of the PNDC (Jeffries & Thomas, 1993, p. 341; Oquaye, 1995, pp. 263-264). Traditional chiefs such as the Asantehene also played a significant role as a mediator in the Ashanti Region. He brought various parties together to form a peace committee. This helped mitigate major tensions and violence in the region of an opposition stronghold (Jeffries & Thomas, 1993, p. 363).

As noted by Oquaye (1995), the role of international observers was also important in Ghana's 1992 post-dictatorial transition election. For instance, as an international election observer, the COG observed the entire electoral process and provided assessments. However, their election observation had key limitations, including dispatching less than 100 observers to observe about 18,000 polling stations and covering only 487 polling stations, mainly in Accra and the regional capitals (Oquaye, 1995, p. 273). Despite the limitations, the COG and other international observers were unambiguous in their verdict that while the 1992 elections had some electoral and democratic imperfections, it was largely "free and fair and free from fear" (Jeffries & Thomas, 1993, p. 331). The verdict was also essential in respect of the maintenance of post-electoral peace and security as it gave the elections some international seal of approval (Jeffries, 1998). The behaviour of the main opposition NPP was also significant for peace. For instance, they hotly disputed the results of the presidential election won by Jerry Rawlings with 58.3%, against 30.4% of the nearest rival Adu Boahen, and subsequently boycotted the parliamentary election (Jeffries & Thomas, 1993; Jeffries, 1998). However, the choice of a peaceful cause of action prompted by the publication of *The Stolen Verdict* to the Ghanaian electorates and the international community was essential for peace and prospective electoral and democratic reforms. The rejection of the November 1992 presidential election results and the boycotting of the December parliamentary elections marked the first electoral dispute under the Fourth Republic that was not settled in court (Boahen, 1995, pp. 279-280).

In the study of Ghana's return to civilian rule under a liberal democratic constitution, Ninsin (1993), and Gyimah-Boadi (1994), noted that although the country began to accommodate some elements of liberal democracy from 1992, such as the holding of free and competitive presidential and parliamentary elections, it did not automatically lead to democratic governance. This is because

key democratic actors such as CSOs remained weak after a decade of illiberal experiences under the PNDC (1982-1992) military regime. Ninsin (1993) also premised the prospects of positive democratic governance in Ghana on the strengthening of civil society, autonomous enough as democratic watchdogs over the activities of the state. Similarly, Gyimah-Boadi (1994), addressed the uncertainties of Ghana's fledgling political opening in the early 1990s in the context of sustaining and consolidating democratisation processes. They included the democratic responsibilities of citizens themselves, civil society, and non-interventionist external support.

In a post-mortem analysis of the successes of the 1996 elections, Jeffries (1998) described the establishment of the Interparty Advisory Committee (IPAC) in March 1994 by the EC (successor to INEC) as a significant electoral reform that showed the potential of Ghana as a democratic reformer within the international sphere, particularly as the post-dictatorial democratic experiment was only two years old (Jeffries, 1998, p. 197). The two-pronged role of IPAC as described by Jeffries (1998) and later Debrah (2011) included the building of government-opposition dialogue in the process of election management, and also getting political parties to establish compromise and build consensus in competitive national elections.

Accordingly, Debrah (2011) examined this subject in the study of the EC between 1992 and 2008. His work noted that while the primary members of IPAC included the EC and representatives of political parties, at some point other external actors, including donor observers, were sparingly involved, which contributed to its credibility. Through the institution of IPAC, a compromise was reached to change thumbprint voter identity cards to photo voter identity cards, which was fully completed in 2004. The opaque ballot boxes used in the 1992 elections were also replaced with transparent ballot boxes in the 1996 elections and subsequent elections. The cardboard voting

screens were introduced to prevent allegations of some voters concealing papers into opaque boxes (Debrah, 2011, pp. 37-38).

According to Abdulai and Crawford (2010), Alidu and Ame (2012), Gyampo and Asare (2015), and Graham et al. (2017), the successes chalked in democratisation processes in seven successive elections organised every four years in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 was the instrumentality of various state and non-state actors that could be viewed as minimalist democratic consolidation. Alidu and Ame (2012), for instance, described the successes in the management of elections by the EC and the participation of political parties as procedural democracy since it only met “the ‘minimal requirements’ needed for a state to become democratic” (Alidu & Ame, 2012, p. 111). Studies on the achievement of procedural democracy in Ghana (Alidu & Ame, 2012) which manifested in the first peaceful political turnover in 2001 (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Ayee, 2002), a second step forward in political turnover in 2009 (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009), and a third peaceful turnover of power and democratic consolidation in 2017 (Graham et al., 2017) are in part, based on the effective execution of fundamental provisions in the 1992 Constitution on elections (Republic of Ghana, 1992), together with the 1993 EC Act (Act 451) (Alidu, 2014 ).

For instance, Article 46 of the 1992 Constitution stipulates that “in the performance of its functions the Electoral Commission, shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority” (Republic of Ghana, 1992). The EC has also performed its functions as stipulated in the constitution. However, the issue of the compilation of the electoral register has been an Achilles Heel of Ghana’s democracy from 1992 till date, because of the perceived impact it has on the strengths, weaknesses, and voter base of the political parties. The functions, as stipulated in Article 45 are as follows: compiling an electoral register and revising the same periodically according to

law, demarcating electoral boundaries for national and local elections, conducting and supervising all public elections and referenda, facilitating public electoral education, undertaking programmes that advances the registration of voters among other functions that may be legislated (Republic of Ghana, 1992; Abdulai and Crawford, 2010).

Another key provision in the Constitution is the periodic presidential and parliamentary elections which the EC has organised successfully every four years under the Fourth Republic (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; 2009; Ayee, 2002, 2017). Under Article 63 (3) of the 1992 Constitution, a candidate is also duly elected as president using a two-round electoral system. A winning candidate must obtain more than fifty percent of the total number of votes cast (Republic of Ghana, 1992; Gallagher, 2008; Alidu & Braimah, 2014). This constitutional provision led to two highly contested run-off elections in December 2000 and 2008, representing the first two political turnovers occurring in 2001 and 2009 respectively (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). A sitting president can also serve a maximum of two terms of four years if re-elected after the first term (altogether eight years), after which eligibility expires (Ayee, 2002). On the other hand, parliamentary elections employ the first-past-the-post electoral system, where a candidate wins with the majority of the votes cast (Ayee, 2002; Gallagher, 2008; Alidu & Braimah, 2014).

The EC also organises by-elections when parliamentary seats are vacant based on some conditions stipulated in the constitution, including a sitting legislator appointed as Speaker of the House, resignation, death, the conviction of a legislator, a legislator with dual citizenship, or a legislator who is debilitated and inept to perform legislative duties (Republic of Ghana, 1992; Ijon, 2020). A recent analysis shows that close to thirty-one by-elections held between 1993 and 2019 were triggered either by the death, resignation, or incarceration of a sitting legislator (Ijon, 2020).

Unfortunately, a number of these elections, notably, Chreponi and Atiwa in 2009, Talensi in 2015, and Ayawaso-West Wuogon in 2019, led to violence with clashes caused by political vigilante groups sympathetic to the NDC and NPP, and in some cases the abuse of election security monitoring groups by national security operatives as in the recent case of the 2019 Ayawaso-West Wuogon by-elections (Ijon, 2020; Gyampo et al., 2017).

A review of the works of Jeffries and Thomas (1993), Oquaye (1995), Jeffries (1998), Debrah (2011), Alidu (2014), and Debrah et al. (2019), have shown that the compilation of the electoral register by the EC remains one of the sources of electoral disputes. For instance, one of the reasons that the opposition NPP gave for boycotting the 1992 elections was the allegation that the register which was compiled in 1987 and used by INEC for the presidential elections was not credible (Jeffries & Thomas, 1993; Oquaye, 1995). Hence, the manifestation of the practical value of transparency in the process of compiling a new register and revising it periodically began in October 1995. These processes have improved vigilance and monitoring by political party agents at all registration centres. Subsequently, the electoral register is exhibited for eligible Ghanaian voters and the parties at registration centres to verify its accuracy and legitimacy (Jeffries, 1998; Debrah, 2011). Yet, a major controversy and highly politicised issue occurred when the Biometric Verification Device was introduced to deepen the legitimacy of the voter register before the 2012 elections. Surprisingly, this occasioned the rejection of the results of the 2012 elections by the opposition NPP, leading to an unprecedented election petition at the Supreme Court the following year (Alidu, 2014; Debrah et al., 2019).

Accordingly, Abdulai and Crawford (2010), and Adams and Asante (2020) examined the role of institutions and Ghana's judiciary system in particular in election-related conflict resolution,

arguing that it is a healthy development for Ghana's democratic consolidation if politicians are devoted to using the legal system to resolve election-related disputes than inciting their supporters to perpetrate violence. Adams and Asante (2020) argued that, while the use of the legal system to resolve post-election disputes has been more rampant with parliamentary elections dating back to the post-1996 election, the 2013 presidential election petition at the Supreme Court, was a major milestone in Ghana's democratic consolidation (Adams & Asante, 2020, pp. 7-10). To avoid the use of court adjudication mechanisms in electoral matters, other mechanisms that provide preventive mechanisms have been recommended, including I4P which is the focus of this study (Fisher, 2001). In the case of the 2013 election petition, the court ruling as was envisaged was a clear zero-sum outcome that confirmed the victory of the ruling NDC as reflected in the EC's election results and a defeated opposition NPP who challenged the results. Nonetheless, in the course of the election petition and the declaration of the final verdict, quiet diplomacy by third-party actors, such as governance CSOs and the NPC was instrumental in a pre-dialogue with the conflict parties to peacefully accept the outcome of the apex court ruling. Third-party actors are also critical in a case where a court verdict upholds an election petition of the losing party (Alidu & Braimah, 2014; Botchway, 2018).

Some existing works also show that although Ghana is a beacon of hope in terms of democratic stability in a rather fragile sub-region, the procedural advances of democracy through elections and political turnovers are inadequate (Aning & Danso, 2012; Aning & Danso, 2016; Graham et al., 2017). It is based on this substantial gap that several scholars have also delved into Ghana's democratic progress using a broader conceptual mechanism (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Alidu & Ame, 2012; Gyampo & Asare, 2015; Graham et al., 2017). The approach largely viewed as a maximalist yardstick is built on several approaches, including behavioural, attitudinal, and

constitutional dimensions of democratic consolidation posited by J.J. Linz and A. Stepan (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Alidu & Ame, 2012; Gyampo & Asare, 2015; Graham, et al., 2017). The conceptual premise is that, behaviourally, a democratic regime consolidates when no significant political actors would attempt to acquire political power through non-democratic means; attitudinally, when there is overwhelming vast support for democratic procedures and institutions; constitutionally, when all governmental and non-governmental actors alike, become subjected to the law and democratic institutional processes as well as habituated to the use of lawful means to resolve conflict (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Botchway, 2018).

A maximalist yardstick has also been a widely used mechanism to describe states that practice substantive democracy which in the words of Alidu and Ame (2012) and Graham et al. (2017), encompasses free, fair and transparent elections, upholding the rule of law, respect for and protection of individual rights and group liberties, the functioning of relevant democratic institutions and actors such as the executive, legislature and judiciary, free press and a vibrant civil society required to sustain the democratic process (Alidu & Ame, 2012; Graham et al., 2017). Studies also show that under the Fourth Republic, the initiatives of many governance CSOs have contributed significantly towards Ghana's democratic consolidation through election observation, advocacy, peacebuilding, civic engagement, and capacity building. For instance, the Network of Domestic Observers established by the Institute of Economic Affairs monitored the 1996 elections. The steering of the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers by the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD)-Ghana has monitored elections in Ghana since 2000. The formation of the Civic Forum Initiative by the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG), along with various CSOs has collaborated with the NPC to mitigate the heightened tensions which characterised the 2008 elections (Botchway, 2018).

Judging from the maximalist perspective, some scholars have also concluded that Ghana seems to have inched closer to democratic consolidation after three peaceful turnovers under the Fourth Republic (Graham et al., 2017). The successes notwithstanding, every national election and by-election, has triggered needless political tensions and trepidation, accompanied by localised violence involving mainly supporters of the two main political parties, the NDC and the NPP, and occasional abuse of state security (Aning & Danso, 2012; Ijon, 2020). The ramifications of these deficiencies on a larger scale are obvious, drawing on several cases in Africa, such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Cote D'Ivoire, where disputed electoral polls were accompanied by reportedly widespread mass killings, destruction of properties and communal displacements (Bob Milliar, 2014).

Accordingly, existing works have also emphasised the essence of the global framework on I4P in Ghana (Odendaal, 2010; Van Tongeren, 2011, 2012; Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Kotia & Aubyn, 2013; Kovács, 2019). Scholars like Odendaal (2010), Van Tongeren (2011, 2012), Hopp-Nishanka (2013a), and Verzat (2014) have gone as far as highlighting the constructive role played by Ghana's NPC in maintaining peaceful elections in Ghana. For example, in the closely contested election in 2008 which saw only 50,000 votes separating the winning NDC presidential candidate from the losing NPP presidential candidate, Ghana's peace architecture in the institutional composition of the NPC was noted to be instrumental in mediating a peaceful and smooth transfer of political power (Van Tongeren, 2011; Odendaal, 2010; Van Tongeren, 2011, 2012; Hopp-Nishanka, 2013a; Verzat, 2014). Studies by Alidu and Braimah (2014) and corroborated by Botchway (2018) also described the NPC as a peacebuilding institution that was instrumental in the management of the 2012 electoral conflict.

Existing works show the NPC's collaboration with governance CSOs like the IDEG which was instrumental in promoting pre-election peacebuilding, such as the landmark Kumasi Declaration on 27<sup>th</sup> November 2012, 10 days before the December 7, 2012 elections. This mechanism brought several stakeholders together including the NPC, the IDEG, the Asantehene-Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, Ghana's ex-presidents, Jerry Rawlings and John Kufour, the National House of Chiefs, and the then-Chief Justice Georgina Theodora Wood. Since the political parties represent potential conflict parties, the event also brought all the 2012 presidential candidates or their representatives to the event, and they signed a declaration denouncing violent conflict, impunity, and injustice in the coming election (Alidu & Braimah, 2014, pp. 180-181; Botchway, 2018, p. 11).

As Alidu and Braimah (2014) further noted, a near-fatal incident during the 2012 election period occurred on December 8, 2012. The then-opposition NPP alleged that the ruling NDC had brought STL, an Israeli Information Technology firm to intercept election results that were being faxed from the Regional Collation Centres of the EC's national collation strong room in Accra. This led to party leaders and supporters of the NPP storming the premises of the company in Accra. In the state of political trepidation, the timely intervention of the NPC helped to restrain the NPP leaders and supporters to allow the police to do their work, as the EC also came out to deny the allegation (Alidu & Braimah, 2014, pp. 182-183).

Post-election peacebuilding has also manifested in diverse ways, such as press briefings from then-Chairman of the NPC, Most Rev. Emmanuel Asante, admonishing the leadership of political parties on the need to allow the EC complete its constitutional mandate as the only body to declare election results as well as orienting Ghanaians and the media to act with restraint, patriotism and professionalism (Alidu & Braimah, 2014, p. 184). Botchwey (2018) also shows evidence of how

during the 2013 election petition to the Supreme Court, a Peace Summit and Secret Meetings were held between CSOs and leadership of the political parties on the need to maintain peace in the country after the ruling of the apex court (Botchway, 2018, p. 11).

Overall, the summary of elections and peacebuilding in Ghana shows substantive works in the following areas: post-dictatorial elections management and challenges and transition to democratic governance in Ghana (Ninsin, 1993; Jeffries & Thomas, 1993; Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; Boahen, 1995; Oquaye, 1995; Jeffries, 1998), electoral processes and political turnovers (Gyimah-Boadu, 2001; 2009; Ayee, 2002, 2017; Zounmenou, 2009), state and non-state actors in democratic consolidation (Arthur, 2010; Debrah, 2011; Gyampo & Asare, 2015; Botchwey, 2018), party vigilantism and democratic governance (Gyampo et al., 2017), electoral violence and management (Aning & Danso, 2012; Aning et al., 2016), I4P in the management of peaceful national elections (Alidu & Braimah, 2014; Shale, 2017; Agbelengor, 2024), by-elections and elections security (Ijon, 2020), the judiciary in post-election conflict resolution and democratic consolidation (Adams & Asante, 2020). Despite Ghana's experiences with electoral disputes, the country has managed to deepen its democratic consolidation due to institutional resilience from both state and non-state actors. Given that the mandate of the NPC has a national scope, this case will be used to examine the nature and relevance of election-related mechanisms through Ghana's I4P framework.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THEORY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Since peacebuilding is necessitated by conflict, different concepts can be theorised in the study of its processes as an architectural framework. The plausible theoretical considerations include Conflict Management, Resolution, and Transformation. Essentially, the management of conflict draws attention to the assumption that conflict and the propensity to violence that arises from the ingrained manifestation of incompatibilities of social values and interests, historical relationships, and power struggles, are inevitable. Hence, a realistic way of addressing conflict is either managing or containing it. In that regard, governmental and non-governmental actors with conventional power and resources may use inducement or force to pressure conflict parties to a manageable conflict settlement (Miall, 2004).

By contrast, the resolution of conflict assumes a critique of the power political view of conflict management. It argues that the latter has the likelihood of creating zero-sum outcomes which could further aggravate conflict formation. Hence, the resolution of conflict is an attempt to employ the services of skilled and influential third parties working unconventionally to end the symptoms of a conflict through building new thinking and new relationships between and among the conflict parties. They seek to explore the root causes of the conflict and identify creative solutions that would transcend into preventive, constructive, and positive-sum outcomes (Miall, 2004; Lederach, 2014).

The transformation of conflict also elicits the narrative that contemporary conflicts are complex, and require more than building new relationships towards win-win outcomes (Miall, 2004, p. 4).

The assumption moves away from quick-fixes to the deployment of long-term mechanisms, and activities in situations of protracted conflicts to affect behavioural change among conflict parties (Lederach, 1997, p. 78). While the concepts of conflict management, resolution, and transformation are embedded in the current study, they cannot be used as a whole to execute the comparative scope of the study which requires drawing on international and local institutional peacebuilding perspectives.

In recent times, the concept of peacebuilding has also developed into a major theory to encompass the interfaces between international and local dimensions, and other middle grounds (Lambourne & Herro, 2008). Since peacebuilding lacks a singular theory, this study adopts the following conceptual building blocks: Agenda for Peace, Liberal Peace, Low-Level Peacebuilding, and Hybridity (Galtung, 1976; Mac Ginty, 2011; Reychler & Langer, 2006). Overall, the conceptual building blocks have certain assumptions appropriate for analysing the nature and the relevance of an internal peacebuilding architectural process based on UN I4P perspectives.

### **3.2 Agenda for Peace**

Galtung (1976) conceptualised three approaches to peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding. According to Hanhimaki (2008), over a decade later, the expectations of many after the collapse of the Cold War was that the UN through the Security Council would finally reset its mandate and be a leader and guarantor of international peace and security (Hanhimaki, 2008, p. 23). Similarly, Boutros-Ghali, while considering an agenda that would deepen the international peace and security landscape described four major pillars: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (UN, 1992) to help the UN make significant progress in the execution of its mandate after the Cold War (Hanhimaki, 2008).

Preventive diplomacy is an important part of the UN's peacebuilding framework which is integrally related to peacemaking and peacekeeping and vice versa. It is an activity or action in peacebuilding discourse directed at preventing the rise of disputes between parties, preventing the escalation of existing disputes, and further limiting the intensity of conflict that occurs (UN, 1992). In essence, peacebuilding operations seek to prevent the recurrence of conflict in the first place and this premise is a type of preventive diplomacy (Paris, 2004).

Peacemaking has also been conceptualised in several ways. In some previous studies, it has been conceptualised as a conflict resolution approach that deploys the services of third parties (Galtung, 1976). Some conceptual definitions have also linked peacemaking to diplomatic efforts (which include external mediation efforts) intending to resolve lingering conflicts, specifically those that have the potential to escalate beyond fixed bounds (Jenkins, 2008). Peacemaking has several mechanisms in its soft power toolbox to resolve ongoing conflict by peaceful means, and the major ones include Dialogue, Negotiation, and Mediation. To a very large extent, this can also mean the authorisation of an international force to impose a settlement to a conflict (Paris, 2004).

Notwithstanding, Peacemaking can be distinguished from Peacekeeping which is mainly focused on the deployment of military forces to oversee the implementation of ceasefire agreements between warring parties and keep peace (Jenkins, 2008). As argued elsewhere, there are several instances where peacemaking and peace accords can be undermined. This includes a conflict situation where spoiler violence emerges from those unsuccessfully disarmed and demobilised (Williams, 2010).

Peacekeeping has been viewed exclusively in previous studies as a dissociative approach to peace. This is because it is an approach that tends to keep antagonists at bay from each other. In some

cases, there may be considerable consequences or punishment against those who transgress the buffer zone (Galtung, 1976). Peacekeeping design for others is specifically aimed at dealing with interstate conflict and not internal conflict in countries. In this case, the disputing states are assumed to have agreed to international assistance to help them keep peace and regain stability (Cilliers, 1999). However, that is not a complete picture as the concept can be viewed within the range of both the external and the internal. In other words, although the concept and its practice are dominated by intra-regional and international peacekeeping activities, intra-national peacekeeping is also an old phenomenon undertaken by states. States can intervene horizontally in a conflict between equals with no element of dominance or vertically between two unequals like the state intervening against striking workers (Galtung, 1976).

Peacekeeping has also come to denote many things from a tool in diplomacy to a security toolbox in the international system to address arrays of conflicts. Others have viewed it as an activity that has emerged to keep military personnel busy, or how hegemons in the international system control unstable situations (Jonah, 2018). Different generations of peacekeeping have also described the concept ranging from the implementation of ceasefires to multidimensional operations that seek to impose a liberal order within an unstable territory (Campbell, 2020).

The UN's foundational principle rejected the idea that the organisation should intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Eventually, an approach that keeps peace can be developed with the specific purpose of ensuring military presence within the borders of two warring states to avoid the escalation of hostilities (Hanhimaki, 2008). It is however convincing in practice that since peacekeeping activities were introduced after the formation of the UN in 1945 to resolve deficiencies in the security architecture of its Charter (Jonah, 2018), UN peacekeeping has become

one of the symbols of the UN in its role to maintain international peace and security through political missions and peacekeeping operations (Campbell, 2020) in some of the trouble spots of the world. The record of UN peacekeeping or peacekeeping in general is however not without problems that shatter the image of benevolence and neutrality of external peacekeepers. For example, even after the demise of the Cold War, the UN peacekeeping presence in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia could not stop the genocide and ethnic cleansing in the 1990s (Hanhimaki, 2008).

Another premise of peacebuilding is that it begins when fighting has stopped, which projects a post-conflict enterprise by definition (Paris, 2004). For instance, Boutros-Ghali in his conceptualisation of the Agenda for Peace introduced the term Post-Conflict Peacebuilding within the context of the immediate post-Cold War era. In his broad framework, he conceptualised the term as a purposeful action aimed at identifying, supporting, and building the capacity of peacebuilding structures to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid the recurrence of conflict. As related to other approaches, preventive diplomacy seeks to identify and tackle disputes at their latent stage before manifestation. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping are necessary to halt existing violence and ensure that peace that is attained is preserved. The success of these processes prevents the relapse of conflict among nations and people and strengthens post-conflict peacebuilding (UN, 1992).

The weakness of these international approaches to peace in the context of the current study is the post-conflict dynamics. This emphasis may not fit Ghana's national situation within the scope of the Fourth Republic. For the UN, the focus on a post-conflict enterprise has been necessitated by the challenge of finding the nexus between external intervention and respect for national

sovereignty (Lederach, 1997; Vericat & Hobrara, 2018). In other words, promoting peacebuilding when a conflict has not yet escalated may threaten national sovereignty (Paris, 2018; Jenkins, 2013). Despite its weaknesses, the agenda for peace is a peacebuilding manifesto with another layer of prevention that is not limited to the UN system. As some scholars have indicated, it can be used to explain peacebuilding processes at the intra-national level (Galtung, 1976). Its application in this study focuses on the extent to which international approaches to peace can be utilised in a local peacebuilding context.

### **3.3 Liberal Peace**

Much of the academic literature on peacebuilding theory has focused on a liberal framework. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Woodrow Wilson provided the basic assumption of liberal peace as a democratic peace model based on democratic values and market economic principles (Paris, 2004). For some observers, democratic tenets are important (such as free, fair, and transparent elections, political and civil rights, the rule of law, and independent judiciary) because they allow inhabitants of post-conflict countries to determine the selection of their governments and mechanisms for peacebuilding. Additionally, free market economic principles are important to create the conditions that would lead to long-term growth (Paris, 2018, p. 13).

One of the strengths of liberal peace in practice is its influence on the international system. The nature of such influence includes development assistance in many global South countries through leading states, international financial institutions, international NGOs as well as UN missions. However, there is a downside to this influence according to one sceptical view. Critics have argued that donor support is also influenced by the imposition of foreign values and principles on conflict-affected states. In Africa, this may translate into a revival of modern-day imperialism and economic colonialism. Some critics describe the parochial foreign interests that accompany

external intervention (Paris, 2010, 2018). Other assessments however dispute the equation of the liberal peace to modern imperialism and neocolonialism. Yet, such assessments also admit that liberal peacebuilding is not wholly altruistic. In other assertions, 21st-century peacebuilding missions at best translated into an updated French conception of ‘mission civilisatrice’ — the obligations of Western powers to improve the lives of former colonies through capacity building and good governance. (Paris, 2002).

Another concern that is raised when the notion of liberal peace is discussed is the extent to which liberal tenets like the conduct of elections produce durable peace. This leads to the identification of some missteps in liberal peace processes. For example, the competitive nature of elections and the consequence of capitalism in deeply divided and fragile societies can serve as a mobiliser of violence if the liberal principles are hastily implemented without addressing underlying institutional weaknesses. Therefore, if the UN fails to demilitarise warring factions in a post-civil war situation and only counts on the signing of peace accords, the success of mediation could be curtailed. In the conduct of elections in a deeply divided society, the losing factions in the election could remobilise in the use of violence to address grievances (David, 1999; Paris, 2000).

In response to this critique, other studies have argued that it is a mischaracterisation of peacebuilding to judge the failures of peacebuilding missions to its failure to create the conditions for self-sustaining peace. In other words, despite its shortcomings, the record since the 1990s also does not support claims that liberal peacebuilding has been counter-productive. Liberal proponents also argue that Africa and elsewhere have seen some improvements since the deployment of peacebuilding missions (Paris, 2010). This claim is however highly debatable. For instance,

scholars like Baregu (2011) have viewed some international peacebuilding efforts as an ambulance pursuit industry created for the benefit of the hegemons within the international system.

Other studies have also critiqued the aspects of liberal peacebuilding that concentrate on configuring the political economies of post-conflict states within market-oriented principles as the only way to build lasting peace in countries emerging from violent conflict. The argument is that this ignores the drawbacks of marketisation, such as gross inequalities and forms of global exploitation that indirectly undermine the achievement of positive peace. As such, the global North countries strive to consolidate their economic status while at the same time providing limited relief to contain revolts in fragile post-conflict states, as well as putting in place measures that deter migration to Western shores. The liberal peace in its broad economic sense also ignores the relevance of trade protection and social welfare which benefited developed economies in their initial stages of development (Cooper et al., 2011). Other studies have also sketched a brief challenge to the comforting notions for donors about the building of liberal peace without challenging the liberal notion of governance, economy, and social aspirations of people (Denskus, 2007).

One peculiar study enumerates liberal peace features and ramifications in a post-conflict context. Liberal peace produces ethnocentrism, and the reason is the dominant global North expectation. This is also because political and economic elites at the international and national level control the approaches to peace. It is security-centric in fragile regions, which has more to do with order and security than emancipation and diversity. It is also superficial in responding to the manifestation of conflict rather than addressing underlying structural causes. Liberal peacebuilding has also been described essentially as a technocratic task and rigid due to overly programmed peace agendas.

In essence, individual peace-support interventions are often governed by short-term budgets and political cycles, and this undermines the sustenance of peace. It is also argued that neo-liberal economic policies and interventions are privileged with less focus on the social ramifications. Another critical description is that it is illusional, in that, though it may involve many intervening activities, essential power relations, social divisions, and class groups may remain largely unchanged. It also fails to connect to cultural preferences or connect with local expectations (Mac Ginty, 2011). The technocratic turn of liberal peacebuilding has also been strongly linked to the UN system (Mac Ginty, 2012).

The strength of liberal peace is also widely known. For instance, while it is argued that elections in deeply divided states have a greater likelihood of exacerbating rather than moderating conflict, democratic votes are also a source of legitimising peace agreements and new governance arrangements, including political accountability that can contribute to long-lasting peace (Paris, 2018, 2004). The solution for some observers is that saving liberal peacebuilding from genuine crises is not to completely replace an approach that continues to dominate the peacebuilding discourse. It is rather important to find ways to reform its pitfalls within a broader liberal framework (Paris, 2010). Despite its limitations, the application of liberal peace in peacebuilding theory helps this study ascertain the structure of the UN PBA in the context of I4P as formulated in question one of this chapter.

### **3.4 Low-Level Peacebuilding**

In the context of this study, a low-level framework can be approached from a comparative perspective with a rigid distinction between Liberal/International Peacebuilding and Local/Indigenous Peacebuilding. The international perspective is based on top-down transmission chains where engagement with national elites is prioritised without grassroots inputs; It is

structured in technocratic terms; It banks on close-door deals, external personalities, ideas, and material resources; And it also prioritises the corporate culture of meeting deadlines over the building and deepening of relations. The local perspective explores a local turn of peacebuilding by utilising local attributes such as the reputation of respected eminent figures, public dimension, storytelling, and airing of grievances. A greater emphasis is also placed on building relationships, and the utilisation of local resources (Mac Ginty, 2011; Hellmüller, 2018).

In a number of its publications and reforms, the UN has attempted to bridge the gaps in liberal peace with the introduction of inclusion and legitimacy in its peacebuilding activities (Paris, 2018). For instance, in February 2001, the UN Security Council described peacebuilding as an approach aimed at “preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms” (S/PRST/2001/5, 2001, p. 1). The document went on to describe peacebuilding as an approach that requires (Lambourne & Herro, 2008) short and long-term actions “tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it” (S/PRST/2001/5, 2001, pp. 1-2). It also recognised the bigger picture of peacebuilding on upholding sustainable institutions and processes, and liberal democratic tenets (2001, p. 2). An inventory of UN capacity in peacebuilding issued in September 2006 also described various peacebuilding activities in four major categories: “security and public order; justice and reconciliation; governance and participation; socio-economic well-being” (Lambourne & Herro, 2008, p. 278).

Elsewhere, it has been observed that the inclusive approach to peacebuilding is too often limited to national-level peacebuilding in a host country while neglecting the local. The two levels of

criticism are that peacebuilding has overlooked the dynamics of social conflict at the grassroots, such as chieftaincy and local rights. It is also based on the failure to recognise the value of local communities in resolving their conflict (Paris, 2018). One notable remedy in the context of this study is the emphasis on an infrastructural peacebuilding framework. In the context of I4P, the relationship between peacebuilding and the outcome moves beyond quick-fixes by implementing long-term mechanisms and activities as a sustainable solution to protracted conflict (Lederach, 1997, p. 78). Also, in contrast to the post-conflict depiction of liberal peacebuilding, a low-level dimension of I4P develops an infrastructural approach that prioritises prevention as a first internal stage before applying peacebuilding during and after violent events when preemptive approaches are inadequate (Lederach, 2012).

There is however a caution against the characterisation of internal I4P objectives in external terms. Local I4P has been characterised as follows: First, it is based on a domestic framework and capacities, rather than an international or regional peacebuilding architecture. Second, it can be formed along conflict stages. This begins from the heights of violent conflicts to the stages where peace processes are implemented and monitored. Third, the elements of I4P are located at all peacebuilding tracks and constitute entry points for peacebuilding. Fourth, it involves stakeholders with institutional mandates, and those participating without a governing political role. Fifth, it can serve various peacebuilding functions, beginning with capacity building, advisory services, and internal consultation, then communication and mediation in the form of bridge-building with conflict parties. Finally, implementation, monitoring, and coordination of peace agreements will be successful when conflict parties are committed to enforcing the results of peace agreements (Hopp-Nishanka, 2013a, pp. 4-6).

Other suggestions on a low-level dimension to peacebuilding are that the relationship between peacebuilding approaches and the kind of sustainable outcome that is achieved hinges on mechanisms that stretch from the medium to the long term; an integrated framework capable of coordinating relevant multiple stakeholders to undertake peacebuilding activities and a process that regards local people as the greatest resource (Lederach, 1997; Githaiga, 2016). In a seminal work by Lederach (1997), this framework was built on some major concepts: structure, reconciliation, process, resources, and coordination. Peacebuilding structures constitute an entire affected conflict population and identify the role that each must play in dealing with a conflict situation: top-down, middle-level, and grassroots (Lederach, 1997, p. 38). Reconciliation builds mechanisms that engage the various sides of a conflict where human relationship is sustained towards a long-term solution (1997, p. 26). Process means conflict is never a static phenomenon, but dynamic. Hence, peacebuilding cannot be practised as an event. It is a process involving multiple interdependent roles, functions, and activities, which is vital for creating, transforming, and moving towards restructured relationships (1997, pp. 63-71). Coordination plays a key role in peace infrastructure such as the creation of clear channels between the different levels of the peacebuilding pyramid, creating resourceful groups, linking internal and external peacemakers by utilising a broad range of resources and initiatives (Lederach, 1997; Githaiga, 2016).

Resources are explained as the provision of funds and the establishment of mechanisms for peacebuilding. However, in low-level terms, “the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture”. (Lederach, 1997, p. 94). And that means at the basic level, local people must be seen by the international community as resources and not recipients. In this context, it is argued that the best peacebuilders to sustain peace are not external players but internal actors. This has been popularised in the concept of Insider-Partiality

and the notion that by their internal attributes within a collectivist conflict setting, some third parties enjoy the trust and confidence of one of the conflicting parties, but as a team, can provide balance and equity in peace processes. In this case, Partiality is not always a detrimental concept, but can also serve as a significant insider resource (Lederach, 1997).

However, some of the criticisms are that an insider-partial approach cannot be effective in all conflict situations due to the dynamics of societies which may differ between collectivism and individualism. An individualistic society will rather support an outsider-neutral approach anchored in a liberal lens. It assumes that a neutral and objective third party can effectively influence the behaviour of conflict parties, who, despite their conflicting interests, are committed to peace (Wehr & Lederach, 1991; Lederach, 1997; Elgström et al., 2003; Khadiagala, 2007; Mason, 2009; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012; Roepstorff & Bernhard, 2013; Moore, 2014).

In a similar vein, the term independent mediators has been drawn from Western cultures, which has been ascribed to third parties that have “developed traditions of independent and objective professional advice or assistance” (Moore, 2014, p. 40). This kind of relationship, and the interventions they provide, have been described as a liberal approach to mediation professionalism (Moore, 2014; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012). In other words, the detachment of mediators from disputants is heavily upheld (Wehr & Lederach, 1991), as an armoury for assuring the effectiveness of peacebuilding processes (Elgström et al., 2003). In conflict mediation, this is also narrowly linked to formal mediation activities in which the role of an impartial and neutral third party becomes the culture that guides the facilitation of direct negotiation. It also draws on the Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy, where codes of conduct and ethics are sustained through the exercise of legitimacy, authority, fairness, and impersonality (Wehr & Lederach, 1991).

Despite the critical view expressed, a low-level dimension of peacebuilding still has relevance which helps this research in three major ways. First, it is relevant for applying a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding within Ghana's non-Western society (Wehr & Lederach, 1991; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012; Roepstorff & Bernhard, 2013). The focus on the role of multiple actors and mechanisms in peacebuilding also relates to the shared responsibility that characterises Ghana's peacebuilding field. This means actors like the Police, Courts, House of Chiefs, EC, CHRAJ, NCCE, and CSOs, are also major stakeholders in building peace in Ghana (Aubyn & Abdallah, 2013; Githaiga, 2016; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). A low-level approach to peacebuilding is further anchored in the idea and practice of an architecture for peace in Ghana (Githaiga, 2016). This application to a theory of peacebuilding focuses on the structure of Ghana's PA in the context of I4P as outlined in question two.

### **3.5 Hybridity**

Hybridity as a concept has been discussed and theorised in various disciplines, including Sociology, State building, Organisational Studies, Governance, and Post-Colonial Studies. However, it has also gained significant currency in Peace and Conflict Studies in recent times (Mac Ginty, 2010; Brown, 2018; Hellmüller, 2018; Kent et al., 2018). Hybridity in some disciplines is a general conceptual tool for converging seemingly different, incompatible, and inharmonious world views, such as liberal and illiberal norms; formal and informal institutions of power and actors (Kent et al., 2018, pp. 1-2). In a hybrid peace thesis, one of the components is the outcome of the interaction between top-down and bottom-up approaches — between international and local level actors (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond & Mitchell, 2012).

Some studies have unpacked three main tasks in the concept and processes of hybridisation. The first is that it provides an avenue for a sophisticated critique of liberal peace. This is not a critique of an all-powerful international community and a feeble local agency. In other words, the enrollment of liberal peace is not without hindrance from local power structures and norms. Second, it appraises indigenous norms and local agencies to correct the errors of romanticising all things local, traditional, and indigenous. Third, it enables us to scrutinise the quality of peace being offered in the name of liberalism to ascertain ways to improve quality (Mac Ginty, 2011).

A hybrid approach to peacebuilding also includes shifting from efficiency to legitimacy, to the growing interest in state-society relations. A hybrid peacebuilding relationship also departs from the traditional liberal narrative of Western versus Non-Western, Donors versus Recipients, or International versus National/Local. It is, however, based on a full range of internal and external actors who negotiate multiple, and often competing agendas to promote enduring peacebuilding institutions (Tschirgi, 2015). In the full range of interaction between internal and external actors, the international community, must fundamentally see the local agency as resources for generating ideas and strategies, and not as recipients of external assistance under the cloak of dependency (Lederach, 1997; Tschirgi, 2015).

Other arguments are that the contemporary approach to peacebuilding by principal liberal peace agents like leading Western states, the UN system, IFIs and other international organisations, may be termed hybrid rather than liberal because cooperation is at the centre of the performance of complex multilateral agendas (Mac Ginty, 2011). A four-part model has been suggested in a hybrid framework as a process and a product of such interactions between, first, a compliance power of liberal peace agents, networks and structures on local agency; second, the ability of the former to

incentivise others to follow its wishes; third, the ability of local actors to resist, ignore, subvert and adapt liberal interventions; fourth, local actors providing alternatives or modifications to liberal peace (2011, pp. 77-78).

Similarly, other researchers have noted the hybrid collaboration that occurred between the UNDP, the DPA, and national governments in global South countries (like Ghana, Guyana, Bolivia, Ecuador-Colombia, Kenya, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, Kyrgyzstan, and Lesotho) in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century development of I4P. However, the justification for the collaboration was based on the distinction between countries whose fragile conditions necessitated international intervention based on R2P, and those who may have requested external support to consolidate peace and democratic gains (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012).

Mazrui's *Pax-Africana* introduced in 1967 also has some elements of hybridity. Yet, the spirit of the approach projected a Pan-African Agenda for Peace (Mazrui, 2018; Karbo, 2018). In Mazrui's own words, the conceptual specification of the term was the military aspect of continental jurisdiction, "to be assured by the exertions of Africans themselves" (Mazrui, 2018, p. 35). Further explanations are that the ambitious term was essentially a call for an agenda from the African perspective (Karbo, 2018). Other proponents, however, admitted that the *Pax-Africana* remains unsettled, the reason being that the question posed by Mazrui about five decades ago when the continent was not entirely decolonised, remains largely unanswered: "Who will keep the peace in Africa now that the colonial powers are departing?" (Adebajo, 2018, p. vii).

The establishment of regional and sub-regional peace and security architectures in Africa fairly depicts Mazrui's prediction (Karbo, 2018). Following the AU Constitutive Act which allowed

interventions by the regional body (Wamai, 2018), an impressive array of peace and security institutions was established. In 2002, the AU established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to address security challenges in the aftermath of the post-Cold War (Kuwali, 2018). As such, this was also supported by the AU interventionist regime which sought to address the problem of over-reliance on external actors. The 1994 Rwandan genocide, for example, brought to sharp focus the problem of paralysis, inaction, and the concentrated circles of interests that shaped the operation of the UN Security Council as a global political institution (Karbo, 2018; Kuwali, 2018). For some observers, the institutionalisation of peacebuilding structures in Africa is an optimistic action in the African interest to limit the over-reliance on external interventions (Karbo, 2018; Hellmüller, 2018).

The APSA is composed of five pillars: The Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund (Wamai, 2018; Kuwali, 2018). While this architecture is fairly in line with Mazrui's philosophy of *Pax-Africana*, APSA has faced significant challenges in the areas of logistics, finance, and the lack of political will to enforce peace and security on the continent. Studies show that the Peace Fund and the ASF, for example, have been functionally constrained by the reluctance of African countries to fulfil their annual financial obligations. In the case of the AU Mission in Somalia, APSA has often relied on liberal/international peace agents in the UN system and the EU. This projects an operational process of hybrid dependency (Wamai, 2018; Mac Ginty, 2011).

The 2008 Kenyan mediation process also provides an important lesson and dilemma for hybrid peacebuilding analysis in Africa. After 41 days of negotiations, the Annan-led Panel of Eminent African Personalities had brokered a power-sharing deal— the February 2008 National Accord

and Reconciliation Act, which ended the political and humanitarian crisis. For some liberal observers, based on the international reputation of Kofi Annan and the speed with which the crisis was resolved, the mediation process succeeded because of the norm of R2P led by Annan and Western actors (Wamai, 2018; Bercovitch, 1992). Kenyan observers, however, criticised this conclusion for failing to acknowledge the process as an African-led insider mediation because of the strong domestic movements that supported the Annan-led mediation process. They continued that the failure to recognise the success of an African-led insider mediation was also a blatant disregard for the role that the African identity of the Annan-led mediation team played in influencing the behaviour of the warring parties in Kenya— Kofi Annan as a Ghanaian diplomat, supported by the former President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania and the former first lady of Mozambique Graça Machel (Wamai, 2018; Smith, 2010; Bercovitch, 1992). Nevertheless, for others, the Kenyan mediation was a case of hybrid peacebuilding rather than a purely African solution (Wamai, 2018). This is because, despite the significance of the African identity of Annan and his team, the international community, including UN actors and Western diplomats contributed significantly behind the scenes (Wamai, 2018; Mac Ginty, 2011).

Mazrui's African Agenda for Peace (Mazrui, 2018; Karbo, 2018) is also reflected in West Africa (Okai et al., 2014; Verzat, 2014). For instance, events of the Liberia and Sierra Leone Civil Wars, saw the activation of peacebuilding mechanisms like Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation in the ECOWAS system to avert several potentially deadly conflicts in the sub-region. The first intervention was carried out by ECOMOG in Liberia. ECOWAS has since been a Sub-Regional insider mediator in the political and security crisis of member states, like, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Mali, and Togo. However, the depiction of such efforts as a wholly African-led approach has been questioned by other observers because of the involvement

of the international community through other human, material, and financial resources (Adebajo, 2018; Mazrui, 2018; Karbo, 2018; Okai et al., 2014).

For example, the long and complex mediation and peace processes in the Liberian civil war exemplified a multi-track mediation process. While this is in tune with hybridity, it has rarely been analysed in that manner (Abdallah & Okyere, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2011). At the local level, several individuals, inter-religious groups, and CSOs in Liberia were instrumental in bringing the warring rebel factions and the beleaguered government to the negotiating table. These efforts also fed into High-level mediation efforts spearheaded by the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee at different stages of the conflict. The active and collaborative process towards building peace involved international actors, like the UN, EU, Jimmy Carter's International Negotiation Network, the AU, and several Sub-Regional Heads of State and Governments. Hybridity has also been criticised in this context because the multi-track mediation process was not immune from the mistrust and duplicity of actors and warring factions. Some CSOs were perceived to be aligned with one party in the conflict, while significant mistrust and division among ECOWAS leaders also affected the overall success of the peace process (Abdallah & Okyere, 2014; Paris, 2004; Essuman-Johnson, 2009). Hybridity can further be seen in the role of Kofi Annan as the Secretary-General of the UN. It is argued that his identity as an African was one of the factors that cultivated a sense of synergy among the warring actors to participate in a peace conference in Ghana's capital Accra. This factor aided the peace process after years of mass civil violence (Abdallah & Okyere, 2014). In the case of the Sierra Leonean Civil War, apart from the role of local stakeholders, international carrot and sticks served as a crucial bargaining chip, causing the rebel faction led by Foday Sankoh, to at least, participate in peace talks despite their lack of commitment (Brewoo, 2014).

The explanation of hybridity also has some conceptual weaknesses. While it purports to depart from the forces of liberal peace, its attempt to combine two pure approaches, one International and Western and the other Indigenous and Non-Western in the production of a third is not clearly defined. In practice, those who control the resources of peacebuilding from the top are likely to determine the agenda with little or no input from the bottom. In this case, hybridity may still become top-down in practice like the liberal peace, and not the exploration of both vertical and horizontal interactions (Mac Ginty, 2011; Galtung, 1976). However, a hybrid framework to peacebuilding theory is important to this study for the following reasons. First, hybridity provides an applicable use of top-down and bottom-up approaches in the study of I4P in Ghana. Second, the hybrid component of Ghana's NPC includes the use of both indigenous and liberal mechanisms. Third, in terms of the promotion of peacebuilding in Ghana in the cases of elections and other social conflicts, the functions go beyond the work of the NPC. It includes local, governmental, non-governmental, and international actors. The concept of hybridity in this study focuses on the intersections between liberal and low-level dimensions of peacebuilding in the development and functioning of Ghana's PA.


To sum up, since this study seeks to situate the notions of Agenda for Peace, Liberal, Low-Level, and Hybridity in practice, other explanations could serve as a buffer in explaining the findings. A key element is the widely accepted conceptualisation of peace into negative and positive. Negative Peace is the absence of personal, direct, or physical violence, while Positive Peace is the absence of indirect or structural violence (Galtung, 1969). The definition of Negative Peace is limited as it does not capture the tendencies of a society towards stability and harmony. Further, the mere absence of violence or fear is not a prerequisite for stable, harmonious, and prosperous

societies. Positive Peace broadens the scope to include the transformation of attitudes, institutions, and structures in the development and sustenance of peaceful societies (IEP, 2019).

The concepts can also be applied to African religious, cultural, and philosophical dimensions of conflict and peace studies (Appiah-Thompson, 2019). Although several languages are spoken in Ghana, one literature cites a popular *Akan* context. For example, the *Akan* perspective on peace, as expressed in *asomodwe* is a combination of three words *aso-m-dwo[e]*, which means; serenity, calmness, and harmony. While this is an African perspective of peace, to a large extent, it goes beyond the narrow limits of the absence of violence or negative peace and expresses an aspect of positive peace. The term *aso-m-dwo[e]* in its broad sense goes as far as expressing human security tenets: “serenity in the country; an increase in the human and flock population; good health for both humans and animals; harmony in nature as well as among people; the banishment of all that causes strife” (Opoku, 2011, cited in Appiah-Thompson, 2019, p. 10). In the context of Large-N research, the Global Peace Index provides some impression on Ghana’s peacefulness in the world based on the indicators of safety and security, ongoing conflict, and militarisation. In 2021, Ghana was ranked 2nd in Sub-Saharan Africa among 44 other countries, and 38th in the world out of 163 countries (IEP, 2021). Ghana’s position dipped slightly in 2023. It came 4th (44) in Sub-Saharan Africa and 51<sup>st</sup> in the World out of over 160 countries in the GPI (IEP, 2023). Ghana’s position dipped further to 55<sup>th</sup> position in the global context in the 2024 index (IEP, 2024). This shows some prospects and limitations in the consolidation of peace in Ghana.

Against the backdrop of the theoretical analysis, the next page synthesises the different peacebuilding concepts into a single conceptual framework, while the assumptions contribute to the formation of research questions.

Figure 3: Constructing and Applying a Framework on Peacebuilding Theory



Source: (Constructed by author)

### 3.6 Research Questions

Based on the theoretical analysis discussed above, the following questions have been formulated:

- What is the structure and approach of the UN PBA in the context of I4P? (*Liberal Peace*)
- What is the structure and approach of Ghana's PA in the context of I4P? (*Low-Level*)
- What kind of intergovernmental priorities have influenced the UN PBA in its pursuit of I4P in Africa and how do these priorities compare to those of Ghana's PA, considering the strengths and the limitations of a national I4P? (*Agenda for Peace, Hybridity*)
- What remedies could improve Ghana's I4P policy and research discourse, and what overarching lessons can be drawn from the practice of I4P in Ghana?


## CHAPTER FOUR

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the research design and the methods deployed in the study. Overall, the study adopted a qualitative approach using a comparative study design. The chapter has been divided into the following sections: Research Philosophy, Strategy of Inquiry, Case Selection, Data Collection and Analysis, Data Gathering Limitations, and Ethical Issues. The immediate Figure also summarises the entire research design and methods process in three major phases.

**Figure 4: Overview of Inquiry Strategy in Three Phases**



Source: (Constructed by Author)

## 4.2 Research Philosophy

The evolution of the Social Sciences produced one of the crucial debates in modern academic scholarship (Montuschi, 2014). From the beginning of the debate, one comparative question was whether the Social Sciences can be as objective as the Natural Sciences. This is because Social Science Research Inquiry owes its existence to ‘constructed facts’ on human history, activity, culture, and belief, rather than ‘brute facts’ in the sense of activities that exist even without human existence and interruption (Montuschi, 2014; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). This comparative frame drove an overriding orientation that natural science focus on brute facts were the ‘better’ sciences, as the objectivity of social science inquiry and practice was viewed as lacking validity in methods and outcome of inquiry (Montuschi, 2014; Creswell, 2009). Based on the context above, the criteria for social science objectivity were narrowed to three main demands in a comparative form, namely: ontological demand which required that researchers grab only onto facts that are objects and real; epistemological demand which required the elimination of value judgements in descriptions and explanation; methodological demand which required the use of methods likely to produce true outcomes (Montuschi, 2014, pp. 124-125).

In political inquiry, a wide opposition to value-judgements has dominated classical political philosophy based on the debate on empirical verification in political methodology in line with the natural sciences. The evolution of political inquiry which is well-known as a behavioural revolution brought into focus the science of Positivism as an objective source of political research and methodology (Miller, 1972). While some scholars affirmed the importance of the interconnected demands of scientific objectivity (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018), others also argued that limiting the achievement of scientific objectivity in the social sciences to positivism was inappropriate (Creswell, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018).

For instance, while relying on natural science principles, positivism holds the view that in the generation of knowledge, objectivity is of the topmost priority. This can be achieved when the values of the researcher and that of the participant do not influence knowledge acquisition. In other words, to develop knowledge and absolute truth, and attain objectivity, there must be a separation between the research participant, the researcher, and their values (Park et al., 2020).

The positivist stance grounds objective data on the value-free development of prior theoretical assumptions and hypotheses. However, other philosophical worldviews have contrasted this perspective. For instance, the interpretive method of research adopted the view that the knowledge of social reality is rather socially constructed by humans and therefore cannot be detached from human values in its development. That is to say, social inquiry is developed through the interactions between the researcher and the different perceptions of various human subjects (Walsham, 1995).

In the conclusions of her work, Montuschi (2014) surmised that the comparison of a rigid divide between natural science and social science inquiry is ill-conceived, particularly as all scientific phenomena may not be wholly based on brute or constructed facts. She further argued that inquiry facts should rather be identified based on the description and the relevant empirical tool employed. Values in research inquiry are also not necessarily a distraction from objectivity, but they drive the adoption of objective decisions and theoretical justifications, and they are also open to rational and justifiable evaluations. Social science inquiry also takes into consideration the ways and manner methods are adopted, under what conditions, and the techniques for applying them to produce a real-life situation. (Montuschi, 2014, pp. 142-143). The requirement of a social phenomenon in

the study then drives the methodological choices of either qualitative, quantitative, or pragmatic plurality of methods (Creswell, 2009; Montuschi, 2014).

The current study adopted ‘Interpretivism’ as the guiding research philosophy (Creswell, 2009; Walsham, 1995). According to O’Reilly (2009, p. 119), interpretivism “refers to epistemologies, or theories about how we can gain knowledge of the world, which loosely rely on interpreting or understanding the meanings that humans attach to their actions”. Put in the context of the study, the study explored epistemologies or theories on peacebuilding about how we can gain knowledge on the concept of peacebuilding architecture in real-world situations by loosely relying on interpreting and understanding the various dimensions of a phenomenon through documentary sources and interview of researchers and practitioners (O’Reilly, 2009). The limitation of this philosophy is that the interpretation of research findings is subject to the values of the researcher (Montuschi, 2014). To address this limitation and deepen data validity, the researcher deployed data triangulation techniques to enhance validity using different data collection tools categorised under primary and secondary data.

### **4.3 Strategies of Inquiry**

In general, social science research is grounded in three main types of research designs: quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods, which are also driven by diverse philosophical worldviews (Creswell, 2009). Quantitative research is driven by a positivist philosophical worldview (Creswell, 2009). This approach is often employed to generate numerical or statistical data through large-scale survey research. It uses research instruments like close-ended questionnaires or structured interviews (Dawson, 2009). Qualitative research is a post-positivist research paradigm (Creswell, 2009) that seeks to explore and understand the participants’ categories of meaning regarding a social and human problem (Creswell, 2009; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). It is also

useful for studying a limited number of cases in-depth using textual data in naturalistic settings to meet local situations and the needs of stakeholders (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Mixed methods research has also been placed under a pragmatic philosophical worldview. This is because instead of focusing on specific research methods, it combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, approaches, and language in a single study (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Creswell, 2009).

This study employed a qualitative approach (Creswell, 2009; Munisi, 2017). As studies by Creswell (2009) have shown, there are several qualitative strategies for conducting an inquiry in the social sciences, such as Ethnography, Grounded Theory, Phenomenological Research, Narrative Research, and Case Studies (Creswell, 2009, p. 13). Ethnography is a lengthy strategy of inquiry into the actions and accounts of people in everyday contexts, rather than under conditions that the researcher creates (Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2011; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). It focuses on the study of a few cases that enable the gathering of data through a variety of sources, including documentary evidence, participant observation and informal conversation. Data analysis also takes an interpretive form on the meanings, functions, and impacts of social actions and institutional practices (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

Another qualitative approach is grounded theory which is based on general abstract concepts derived from social behaviour within a real-world context, rigorously compared with multiple data sources to arrive at conclusions that would create larger issues for further exploration (Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2011; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Phenomenological research provides a proper account of reality and objectivity through a reliance on the understanding and experiences of the world, particularly the subjective lived experiences of the human subjects under study (Creswell, 2009;

Zahavi, 2019). Narrative research is human-centred in that it captures and analyses life stories. Individuals are studied by researchers, and the individuals are also asked to provide stories about their lives. In the end, the two perspectives are synthesised in a collaborative narrative (Webster & Mertova, 2007; Creswell, 2009).

The current study employed a case study approach, which is a strategy of inquiry used to collect detailed information to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a complex phenomenon as it exists in a real-world context. As an established research design, case studies are used extensively in a wide variety of disciplines, particularly in the social sciences (Creswell, 2009; Crowe, et al., 2011). Several types of case studies have been developed for conducting social science research, which is nonetheless subject to debates, perspectives, and propositions (Bennett, 2004; Munisi, 2017). In the political science discipline, the type of case studies and how to select cases remain a relevant part of any political inquiry as it attracts two major forms: large-N and small-N studies. A large-N study appeals more toward quantitative designs and uses random sampling to seek representativeness and optimal generalisation. The use of a qualitative case study design in this research means that case studies and case selection focused on small-N research that followed the use of a purposive logic in the sampling processes and other data triangulation techniques to select the study participants (Leuffen, 2007).

#### **4.4 Case Selection and Justification**

The use of a case study approach to conduct social science research is not limited to political science. It is also grounded in other social science disciplines like sociology, history, and to a certain degree economics (Rohlfing, 2012). In political science, the selection of cases remains a subject of debate. In the same discipline, scholars have developed different typologies for case

study research. While this study identified some of the typologies, more emphasis was given to those relevant to the current research process (Munisi, 2017).

#### **4.4.1 Major Cases**

Gerring (2017) has categorised case selection strategies and criteria under three major areas: descriptive, causal, and omnibus. A descriptive case can either be typical or diverse. A causal case is categorised under exploratory, estimating, and diagnostic. He categorised omnibus cases under intrinsic importance, case independence, within-case evidence, logistics, and representativeness (Gerring, 2017). The different variations in the cases also support small-N research rather than large-N. The small-N requires the management of a small number of cases while the large-N deals with big data that can be fairly representative of the population (Munisi, 2017).

There are four levels to the selection of the suitable case for this study: causal, exploratory, most-different design, and independence. The first broad perspective situated the study under a causal case selection strategy. A study under this criterion is concerned with identifying and explaining the research problem (dependent variable or estimated causal effect) relying on different variables (causal factor(s) or independent variables) (Gerring, 2017). For our purpose, the main research problem ascertained the peacebuilding priorities that Ghana's I4P pursues in the management of peace in the country. The study addressed this problem through a comparative analysis of the strengths, limitations, and remedies in the practice of I4P in Ghana through an external I4P lens.

By identifying and explaining the research problem, the second level adopted an exploratory research design which is the causal factor(s) of theoretical interest for explaining the research problem or estimated causal effect (Gerring, 2017). In terms of what the exploratory aspect means to the research, the study used the literature review and the theory and draws on four exploratory variables to find empirical answers to the research problem. The operational description of

architecture in peacebuilding discourse aided the comparative methodology in four areas: Peacebuilding Structures, Peacebuilding Resources, Peacebuilding Approaches, and Peacebuilding Targets (Reychler & Langer, 2006).

The third level used a most-different case strategy (Gerring, 2017). The most-different systems design is one of the most important proposals used in research on comparative analysis (Meckstroth, 1975). In most-different designs, cases vary widely in terms of background factors as potential causes, while they also share a common outcome. A conceptual element represents the comparative cases which is I4P within the UN and Ghana's system. However, the UN and Ghana vary significantly because of certain background factors that differentiate the two entities. For instance, the UN is an intergovernmental international organisation. The world body is also not a population site for violent conflict and civil war formation. However, as an international institution that serves as a potential international guarantor of peace, it can impact conflict societies positively or negatively based on its mandate to promote international peace and security. Ghana on the other hand is a sovereign state with different features such as population, national government, and territory. Ghana, like any other country, is not immune from conflict. Hence, it is a potential population site of violent conflict and civil war formation. Despite the difference, both entities still share a common background factor in terms of an architectural institutional process. This is characterised by a global and national I4P framework and a potential outcome of building sustainable peace in practice.

#### **4.4.2. Mini Cases**

It is also important to state that a single technique is not always deployed in case study research. While the first three levels stated above deal with the research criteria and the major comparative approach, a fourth level was adopted as case independence to narrow the data analysis and

discussion of findings under Ghana's Fourth Republican Constitution. Case independence can shed light on a research question, but the chosen cases should, ideally, be independent of each other as well as any major case(s) in the research population (Gerring, 2017).


Hence, to answer sub-questions related to the nature and relevance of local peacebuilding mechanisms in Ghana, the researcher selected three conflict cases under the Fourth Republican Constitution. They were examined using a case-independent strategy because of their differences in history, location, conflict dynamics, and the evolution of peacebuilding processes.

The Alavanyo-Nkonya land conflict which dates back to pre-independence Ghana, allowed the researcher to ascertain how a protracted inter-communal conflict has evolved, the impact and challenges associated with past mechanisms, and how recent mechanisms from Ghana's PA converge or depart from the past. Some of the sub-questions that justified the selection of this conflict case were as follows: factors that prolonged the local conflict and its recurrence; the current status of the conflict and efforts to achieve peace; local participation and its significance; the involvement of local actors; the role of the NPC and what it has done differently from the past; prospects for sustaining the peace in the area.

The resolution of the Dagbon chieftaincy succession dispute did not directly involve the Peace Council. However, the case remains relevant for examining whether past approaches form part of Ghana's PA. Another area is the nature and relevance of ongoing-NPC facilitated mechanisms. Other sub-questions were as follows: dynamics of the social conflict; the relationship between the Regional Peace Council and Regional Security Council (REGSEC); the current state of peace; major threats to peace; contributions of the Peace Council and the mechanisms deployed; how mechanisms are being implemented; the stakeholders involved; the prospects for sustaining peace.

Elections and related contestations could affect an entire country when electoral disputes escalate into mass civil violence. Similarly, peaceful national elections also impact peace nationally. By examining local peacebuilding mechanisms, the study seeks to ascertain their nature and relevance for peaceful elections through the I4P platform. This case helped the researcher gather data based on the following sub-questions: factors necessitating the formation of the NPC; constructive contributions the NPC has made and the challenges; the role of consensus-building mechanisms; the significance of NPC members and I4P mechanisms for promoting peaceful elections, relevance and the prospects for sustaining peace. The present Figure describes how the case selection processes were operationalised.

**Figure 5: Operationalising Case Selection Process**



Source: (Constructed by author based on Gerring, 2017)

#### 4.5 Data Collection and Analysis

In the data collection stage of the study, two main strategies were employed to collect data on the major and mini cases. The first strategy used data sources such as UN reports and news, scholarly

books, peer-reviewed journals, and other unpublished materials from the NPC. The second strategy used semi-structured interviews, field transcripts, and field journals generated from the semi-structured interviews. In the specific context of the UN, the study relied mostly on documentary sources on the UN. This was supplemented by interviews with international agencies within the broad UN system working on peace and development issues in Ghana and Africa. The domestic study participants were selected from state and non-state actors undertaking various peacebuilding activities in the country.

#### **4.5.1 Selection Criteria and Tools for Study Participants**

The selection of study participants in social science research is largely based on the determination of inclusive and exclusive criteria. The execution of the inclusive criteria also relies on two main sampling techniques: probability and non-probability. In a quantitative research design, probability sampling techniques such as simple random, systematic, stratified, and cluster sampling are more appropriate because the possibilities for answering the research questions and achieving the objectives require the estimation of a sample that is statistically representative of a target population. Hence, the data collection is possible with a pre-determined and calculated sample size (Saunders et al., 2016). Qualitative research design, on the other hand, provides a range of sampling techniques such as purposive, quota, snowball, and convenience sampling. This sampling technique can be dictated by the research questions, objectives, theory, and the general strategy of inquiry (Saunders et al., 2016; Yin, 2011, 2018).

This study employed a purposive sampling technique to execute the inclusive criteria. The use of purposive logic to select study participants was meant to have those study participants whose participation in the study was likely to yield the most relevant and plentiful data (Leuffen, 2007; Yin, 2011; Saunders et al., 2016). In addition, a snowball sampling frame was used to select data

collection units through a strategy that followed the lead of the earlier purposely selected interviewees, to select additional participants who could produce more relevant data. The snowball sampling was not based on convenience but rather purposeful. For instance, snowballing was used because prospective study participants were determined to provide additional information that was relevant to the study (Yin, 2011). The data collection process deployed a data saturation technique to guide the sampling frame of the study. This meant that the number of study participants who participated in the study was determined by the level of data saturation reached, where the researcher concluded that enough information had been collected to replicate the study (Fusch & Ness, 2015).

To ensure that adequate data is collected in line with the assertion that peacebuilding in Ghana is a shared functional responsibility (Aubyn & Abdallah, 2013) (the maintenance of law and order, upholding the rule of law, traditional authority and alternative justice, legislation, human rights, electoral oversight, civic education, mediation, watchdog and advocacy) (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014), the study participants who participated in the study were drawn from six main institutional categories as follows:

- i. National and Regional Peace Council — study participants in this category were selected because they are members of the NPC both at the level of the eminent representatives and the secretariat. The study participants also had both practical and research experience on the operations of the NPC in the general peacebuilding field of Ghana as well as the specific context of one or more of the mini cases.
- ii. Public Sector — Study participants who were selected from this category were public officials whose mandate and activities are based on the promotion of peace, security, and

the consolidation of democracy in Ghana. While the officials were not selected based on any direct relations with the NPC, their mandate was expected to have a direct or indirect impact on peacebuilding in Ghana. The study participants were also selected because of their practical knowledge or experiences with respect to either of the mini-cases.

- iii. Civil Society Organisations — This category was used to select study participants for the field interview because the officials in the respective CSOs understood the concept and practice of peacebuilding in general and the work of the NPC in particular. The respective CSOs were also selected because of their extensive work on peacebuilding in Ghana as well as having direct working relationships and collaboration with the NPC. The participation of the study participants was also based on their knowledge of all the mini-cases in terms of research experience or practice.
- iv. Academia — This category was used to select academic study participants from institutions where they have directly conducted research on peacebuilding in Ghana as well as Africa. Their participation in the study was also based on their knowledge of the dynamics of conflict in Ghana in general and the mini-cases in particular. Another selective criterion was based on the direct or indirect relationship some of them may have had working with the NPC.
- v. Political and Local Actors — This category was used to select study participants who have either former or current political portfolios. The criteria included those who can be categorised as members of political parties or had held some political positions in the past as well as those who have had experiences working with the NPC. And that also meant that the study participants could provide vital information on peacebuilding in Ghana in the

context of the mini-cases. Local actors focused on study participants with lived experiences on either of the mini-cases as well as the activities of the NPC at the local level.

- vi. International Actors — This category was used to select study participants from UN agencies in Ghana who have had experiences working on peacebuilding on the continent and in Ghana in particular. These study participants were also selected because of their ability to provide insider knowledge on the UN peacebuilding landscape.

Semi-structured interviews are one of the dominant modes of interviewing in qualitative research. It provided the researcher with the opportunity to use open-ended questions that allow the study participants to provide in-depth answers from their perspective, and not those that the researcher has pre-defined (Yin, 2011). The semi-structured interviews which were carried out between February 5 and July 8, 2021, used three interview tools: face-to-face, telephone interview, and online interview based on the various preferences of the study participants. After attaining the official consent of the study participants, an audio recording device was used to record an interview process which lasted approximately between 30 and 90 minutes for each study participant. The recordings were transcribed and supported by field journals written alongside the interview process. The primary data was also complemented by secondary data which included published books, peer-reviewed journals, and other online data sources. The secondary sourced data was also critical because it was used to draft the desk-based phase. It also provided the researcher with knowledge of how existing literature compared to primary data.

Based on the six categories of study participants, a total of 43 persons participated in the study which cuts across 9 out of the 16 regions of the country: National and Regional Peace Council Members and Administrative Officers (13), Public Sector (6), Political and Local Actors (5), Civil

Society Organisations (6), Academia (9), International Actors (4). Overall, the purpose of selecting the study participants as listed in the Table below was based on their lived experiences, academic research expertise, practical knowledge, and lived experiences of the major and/or mini cases.

**Table 2: List of Study Participants and Institutional Representation**

Categories	NPC	Public Sector	CSOs	Academia	Political and Local Actors	International Actors
Institutional Representation	Council Members	EC	WANEP	KAIPTC	Former and current Political Actors	UNESCO
	Executive Secretaries	Court	CDD	UCC		World Bank
	Peacebuilding Officers	Police		UG	Local Chief	
		MOPA		GAFSC	Former Assembly Members	
	NCCE					
	CHRAJ					
<b>Total: 43</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>

#### 4.5.2 Thematic Data Analysis

The analysis of qualitative data does not follow a one-size-fits-all process, but the process is neither undisciplined (Yin, 2011). Overall, the analysis and interpretation strategy used a thematic analysis within a process of case independence. A thematic approach generally is a method for data analysis based on a systematic identification, and organisation of data which provides insight into patterns of meanings that cut across a data set identifying, organising, and offering insight into patterns of meaning across a data set. For our purpose, this method was used because it allowed the researcher to see and make sense of individual responses and experiences using a theoretical framework grounded in peacebuilding (Braun & Clarke, 2012).

Key steps fairly guided the data analysis process of this study. One important aspect of thematic analysis is the compilation and coding of the transcripts generated from the field data. The coding

process was based on the use of both inductive and deductive approaches. By combining the two approaches, the former relied on the field data to generate the coding frame from the transcript using the NVIVO qualitative software, whereas the latter relied on desk research to determine codes for the transcripts. The coding processes were then followed by the analysis, interpretation, and conclusion stages. In the process, the coded data was reassembled into themes in the context of the mini-cases and the research questions attached to each. The final stage was the analysis of the themes and their interpretation which was executed within the context of the theoretical framework and the research questions. These processes that were undertaken were not a one-size-fits-all approach. The process included some nuances and flexibility in the sense that they could go back and forth between the thematic data, and the transcripts, including a memo on each interviewee that the researcher generated during the coding process (Yin, 2011).

#### **4.6 Data Gathering Limitations and Remedies**

Just like any social inquiry, this research faced some challenges in the data collection processes. For instance, in some of the phone and online interviews that were audio recorded, there were blank spots on the tape and the missing link could not be filled with the original thoughts of the study participants. Second, the attempt by the researcher to interview at least the two major political parties in Ghana to balance political views on local peacebuilding in the particular case of elections was not realised. The researcher was also not successful in his attempt to interview critical UN agencies like the UNDP who are major stakeholders in the work of the NPC from its inception. In terms of contacting some of the study participants for follow-up interviews, not all the targeted study participants could be reached for the second time.

Despite the challenges, the researcher adopted some triangulating militating remedies. The researcher used secondary data to complement the context of the blank spot on the tape.

Academic research responses and media reports were used to balance the political views. The study used online UN reports and published books on the UN to complement the international perspective. Further interviews were conducted with other study participants to fill the margins on inadequate follow-up interviews.


Ideally, the study should have also covered more cases to provide a more informed generalisation, but this was not feasible because of constraints in time, location, and resources. The limitation notwithstanding, in-depth data was collected from the three study sites and they were transcribed, scientifically analysed, and synthesised with secondary data. To ensure that the research findings were valid, data was collected from study participants who have lived experiences, research, and practical knowledge of the study sites in the context of peacebuilding in Ghana.

#### **4.7 Ethical Issues**

Based on the study cases, some of the research sites represented a potential conflict environment and therefore data collection created some ethical challenges, risks, and opportunities for the researcher and the study participants (Clark-Kazak, 2017; Campbell, 2017). The ethical dilemmas are more critical and may include the challenge of obtaining truly informed consent, how to maintain confidentiality and data security, how to weigh the risks and benefits of the research, security of the researcher and emotional impact of the study, obligations to report the findings to the research subjects (Campbell, 2017). In other words, research questions were likely to affect the physical, social, and psychological well-being of the study participants, including physical harm, embarrassment, marginalisation, and even insecurity. Hence, steps were taken to avoid any risk to the study participants and the researcher. The researcher took the primary responsibility to protect the study participants and explicitly stated their voluntary participation by filling out a consent form before the study began. The researcher adequately explained unambiguously the

relevance of the study, the procedures to follow and the potential benefits and likely risks to participants and the society. The study also explained to the study participants their right to withdraw from the study at any time as well as their right to refuse to answer any question they deem sensitive and harmful, and that there was no consequence for their actions. At all times, the study respected the confidentiality and anonymity of the study participants and the information they provided. Finally, the study ensured adequate participation and cooperation with all research quality assurance reviews (UG, 2013; Campbell, 2017).

There were also some health considerations following the outbreak of the severe acute coronavirus 2 infections caused by the deadly coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in 2019 (Zu et al., 2020). Hence, the researcher applied all essential COVID-19 safety protocols such as social distancing, handwashing, the use of sanitiser, and mandatory face masks to ensure the health and safety of the researcher and the participants. As much as possible, data collection considerations also utilised some preferred mediums of communication by the study participants such as telephone interviews and other online interactions such as Zoom, and Email interactions to avoid physical contact where necessary (Zu et al., 2020; Braimah, 2020).



## **CHAPTER FIVE:**

### **DATA ANALYSIS**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the data using scholarly, documentary, and field interview data sources. The analysis was devoted to three major areas. The first part focuses on the first major case in the context of the UN PBA. The second part examines the second major case with a focus on Ghana's PA. The third part chronologically examines the three mini-cases in the context of the nature of community, regional, and national peacebuilding mechanisms within a single country respectively.

#### **5.2 Evolution of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture**

There is an explicit opinion that the establishment of international organisations for the purpose of building and sustaining peace in the world is a twentieth-century phenomenon. This often dates back to the formation of the League of Nations immediately after the First World War. However, the late nineteenth century already witnessed the general establishment of several international organisations for dealing with specific global issues. For instance, the International Telecommunication Union (1865), and the Universal Postal Union (1874) (Hanhimaki, 2008; Paris, 2004) which was formed to regulate international communications predate the League of Nations. Today, they are both part of the UN system (Lyall, 2016; Hanhimaki, 2008). Another international organisation is the Permanent Court of Arbitration (a predecessor of the UN's International Court of Justice), which began its work in 1902 as a mechanism for settling international disputes between countries. However, following the worst killing spree and the human casualties of almost twenty million lives caused by the First World War (1914-1918), the

imperative idea of the League of Nations was outlined by US President Woodrow Wilson (Hanhimaki, 2008). Paris (2004) confirmed that the foundation of *Wilsonianism* in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century contributed to the 20th-century evolution of liberal peacebuilding. The major test case was whether the post-war idea on the premise of liberalism could effectively translate into building and keeping international and domestic peace and security in the next decades (Paris, 2004).

The League of Nations was officially established on January 10, 1920. It had the mandate of spearheading international cooperation and maintaining peace and security. Just like its successor, the UN, the League, as part of its attributes was guided by the premise of Collective Security. This concept which was engendered by the unprecedented ramifications of the First World War, also drove the League to prioritise the overarching goal of preventing another state aggression that would lead to another world war (Britannica, T Editors of Encyclopedia, 2020a, 2020b; Van Ginneken, 2006). The other key dimension in the realm of global conflict prevention is the premise that an international organisation that is given the mandate to settle disputes before they escalate into large-scale military conflict appears to be the answer (Hanhimaki, 2008). However, in the record of the League, not much was achieved to prevent another world war. There were, however, few efforts to fulfil its mandate. For instance, the establishment of the supposed mandate system partly laid the foundation for addressing the dominance of European imperial rule. In some cases, the natives in parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East gained enlightenment towards their self-government and independence. That notwithstanding, it utterly failed to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War (1939-1945). It was formally disbanded on April 19, 1946. Along the same lines, the Charter of the UN was signed in San Francisco on June 16<sup>th</sup>, 1945, and the new body officially came into existence on October 24, 1945 (Britannica, T Editors of Encyclopedia, 2020a, 2020b; Hanhimaki, 2008). Based on its Charter, the purpose of the UN was to correct the

deficiencies of the League of Nations, maintain international peace, security, and justice, and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. However, it also found itself operating under the ideological rancour of the Superpowers in a Cold War that lasted over four decades and largely became a major limitation to UN peacebuilding efforts (UN, 1945; Latif, 2000).

During the Cold War, the UN was occupied by the security mandate of peacekeeping rather than peacebuilding. It was typically involved in the deployment of light-armed military forces. They provided a neutral buffer zone between former combatants, and in rare cases, peacekeeping troops served as ceasefire observers in domestic countries (Paris, 2004, 2018). Unlike the League, since 1945, the UN has survived and remains the main intergovernmental peacebuilding architecture that uses a multifunctional approach to set up major regulatory institutions in the international system for maintaining and establishing peace, security, and justice (Hatto, 2013).

In general, peacebuilding is an operational concept guided by doctrine, structures, and response capacities. Yet, the Cold War era restricted a wider operational agenda towards the transformation of international conflict resolution (Jenkins, 2013; Karns, 2012). As the concept entered the mainstream discourse after the Cold War, the UN report on *An Agenda for Peace* in particular directed the use of diverse international structures and initiatives in resolving armed national conflict and post-conflict situations (Ryan, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019). The UN report laid the foundation for *An Agenda for Peace* as follows:

The ... report ... will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peace-building - action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples (UN, 1992 para. 21).

In this seminal document, Boutros-Ghali also proposed the revival of the responsibilities and responses of the UN and the international community in dealing with contemporary conflicts.

At any point in time, there must be diverse mechanisms and functions in the international system to resolve conflict and sustain peace (Lederach, 1997).

In retrospect, the post-conflict application of peacebuilding relayed two major backgrounds that informed the drafting of the new *Agenda for Peace*. First, the role that the UN played in the process of decolonisation at the end of the Second World War significantly increased the number of independent countries that then became members of the UN. One daunting example is Namibia where the UN was involved in a decolonisation effort that led to its independence from South Africa in 1990. The world body deployed the UN Transition Assistance Group in 1989 to monitor the conduct of local police and disarm former fighters while assisting in the conduct of elections and the drafting of a new constitution (Karns, 2012; Steinert & Grimm, 2015; Paris, 2018).

Second, in Central America, conflicts caused by the intervention of the Superpowers as well as Cuba, including factors like authoritarian rule, injustice, human rights abuse, and poverty, saw the UN intervening through the deployment of large-scale peace implementation missions in support of regional and national peace structures (Karns, 2012, pp. 63-64; Jenkins, 2013, p. 19). The role of the UN in the mid-and late 1980s contributed towards the search for peaceful means to end conflict in that region (Karns, 2012, p. 67). In Nicaragua for example, UN funding and staffing of its Central American Mission and its peacekeeping contingent, as well as its third-party presence played an invaluable role in disarming and reintegrating Nicaraguan insurgents and contributing to the peaceful transfer of power in Nicaragua in 1990 (Wehr & Lederach, 1991).

At the Cold War's expiration, the UN further began to launch new missions, some of which focused on reconstructing countries emerging from civil war with political, economic, and social foundations of liberalism — a role much more intrusive than traditional peacekeeping (Paris,

2018). As part of the transformation, the Superpower negotiation strategies during the Cold War era also extended to a wider peacebuilding agenda which the UN described in 1992 within four distinct operational concepts: Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Babbitt, 2009; Jenkins, 2013; UN, 1992). Another transformation is the increasing role of nongovernmental actors in the field of international and local conflict and as third parties in the resolution of social and political disputes. A further trend is the growing emphasis on human security and state security which creates both tensions and opportunities between governmental and non-governmental actors (Babbitt, 2009; Jenkins, 2013).

The brief discussion above also shows that the expiration of the Cold War depleted the ideological rancour that had often restrained peacebuilding (Jenkins, 2013; Paris, 2004; Essuman-Johnson, 2009) while transforming the field of international conflict resolution, and the wider peacebuilding agenda in the UN system (Babbitt, 2009). However, there were also major contributions to the development of the concept of peacebuilding after the 1992 Agenda for Peace policy report (UN, 2000).

But for this context, the so-called Brahimi Report released in 2000 had, among other factors, pointed out that UN peace missions failed in areas like Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia in the 1990s because they were deployed in a conflict environment where resources to enforce peace were inadequate. Put another way, from the start, there were no in-built resilient structures capable of preventing conflict in these countries from escalating in the first place. Hence, in the outbreak and the heightening of the war, the UN with inadequate resources could not produce a miraculous cure (Hanhimaki, 2008). The report adopted the view of peacebuilding in post-conflict terms which is “undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundation of peace and provide the tools

for building on those foundations something that is more than just absence of war” (UN, 2000, p.

3). One documentary source also described key preventive aspects of the Brahimi report:

The Brahimi Report also drew a clear distinction between peacekeepers and peacebuilders, pointing out that the two groups needed to work closely together if sustainable peace were to be forged. To improve the situation, the report went on to list ... recommendations for UN peace operations. Among these were the need for preventive action, clear and credible mandates for the missions, added funding and logistical support, and an improved public information capacity (Hanhimaki, 2008, p. 87).

Likewise, the following year in 2001, the UN Security Council described peacebuilding as a short to long-term approach which when well-planned and coordinated can significantly prevent the escalation of conflict. The Council went further to outline an encompassing peacebuilding paradigm achieved based on a combination of political, developmental, humanitarian, and human rights programmes and mechanisms (S/PRST/2001/5, 2001). Since then, there have been several calls (Paris, 2018) for a holistic vision in the context of peacebuilding, “along the arc leading from prevention..., through peacemaking and peacekeeping, and on to post-conflict recovery and reconstruction” (UN, 2015, p. 8).

Despite these expansive statements, the UN did not significantly depart from the post-conflict application of peacebuilding (Paris, 2018; Lederach, 2012) even after an institutional reform package in 2005 endorsed the new UN PBA (Hearn et al., 2014; UN, 2007; Jenkins, 2013; Van Tongeren et al., 2012). For example, as confirmed by UN resolutions, the mandate of the PBC which was endorsed by the UN General Assembly resolution 60/180 in December 2005 and the UN Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005) and 1646 (2005), was limited to the deployment of institutional peacebuilding mechanisms composed of a Commission, a Support Office and a Fund for post-conflict peacebuilding (A/RES/60/180, 2005; Jenkins, 2013; A/62/100, Corr. 1 and Add.1, 2021). A UN report further indicated:

*The Commission is a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace, ... the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat, from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Commission ... and establish a multiyear standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments, with the objective of ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery [emphasis added] (A/RES/60/180, 2005, pp. 1-5).*

As indicated in the report above, the post-conflict application of peacebuilding remains central to the work of the PBC, PBF, and PBSO (Lederach, 2012; Cavalcante, 2019). An account of the activities of the PBF further confirmed this peacebuilding approach:

The UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the organization's financial instrument of first resort to sustain peace in countries or situations at risk or affected by violent conflict. The PBF may invest with UN entities, governments, regional organisations, multilateral banks, national multi-donor trust funds or civil society organizations. From 2006 to 2020, the PBF has allocated nearly \$1.47 billion to 62 recipient countries. Since its inception, 60 member states contributed to the Fund, and 42 have made commitments and pledges for the present 2020-2024 Investment Plan. The Fund works across pillars and supports integrated UN responses to fill critical gaps; respond quickly and with flexibility to peacebuilding opportunities; and catalyze processes and resources in a risk-tolerant fashion (UN-PBF, 2021).

Although the underlying conception around I4P is based on the development of internal structures for long-term peacebuilding, in their studies on the Evolving Landscape of I4P, Van Tongeren et al. (2012) also described the structural composition and the architectural focus of the PBC, PBSO, and the PBF as a validation of the attempt by the UN to develop a global I4P which seeks to utilise external priorities to support internal structures.

It is also worth pointing out that the UN has made concerted efforts within its own peace and security architecture to develop I4P at the global level. In 2006, it established the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF. ...involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development (Van Tongeren et al., 2012, p. 5).


Hence, with an apparent focus on post-conflict peacebuilding in the UN's I4P landscape, the selection of key post-conflict countries within the intergovernmental agenda of the PBC, in particular, was not surprising. In other words, since the PBC sought to experiment and support post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa, within this global I4P, Burundi and Sierra Leone became the first African countries under the PBC agenda. They were selected based on post-conflict criteria

describing countries devastated by national armed conflict and civil war between the expiration of the Cold War in the 1990s through the mid-2000s. These countries did not receive much international media attention at the time because widespread violence had receded at a point in the mid-2000s. They became the first post-conflict countries in Africa to be selected under the Country Specific Configuration (CSC) of the PBC in its nascent state in 2006. The countries in question also consented to the PBC's agenda "designed to help post-conflict nations avert a relapse into bloodshed" (UN News, 2006; Jenkins, 2013). From the Figure on the next page, the architectural composition of the UN's I4P as displayed in the blue area functions within existing traditional institutions in the UN system. The notable traditional categories include the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, and other international stakeholders. This signifies the role of collective responsibility in promoting international peacebuilding (Jenkins, 2013; Cavalcante, 2019).

Although not exhaustive, the Figure also shows a structural representation of the architecture of the UN system. This further confirms that the UN's I4P at the global level (PBC, PBSO and PBF) (Van Tongeren et al., 2012) is a new element within the broader architecture (Organs, Specialised Agencies, Commissions, and Missions), which collectively contribute to international peace, security, and justice. This also lends credence to a liberal peace discourse based on the role that technocracy, administrative and bureaucratic processes, and rigidity can play in influencing the work of the UN at its Headquarters in New York before they are impacted on operational field missions across the world (Britannica, T Editors of Encyclopedia, 2020a, 2020b). Within this liberal international arrangement, the development of the global I4P is further legitimised by an Organisational Committee whose 31 members are selected from the following institutional framework of the UN to serve a two-year renewable mandate to support the post-conflict

peacebuilding priority of the PBC. They include the Security Council (7) — 5 permanent members and the selection of 2 other members, General Assembly (7), the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (7), top contributors to UN budget and voluntary contributions (5), groups who are top contributors to military personnel and civilian police in UN missions (5) (Cavalcante, 2019).

**Figure 6: A Broader UN Peacebuilding Architecture**



Source: (Author’s construction based on Cavalcante, 2019, p. 222; Jenkins, 2013, pp. 12-13; Van Tongeren et al., 2012, p. 5)

To operationalise post-conflict peacebuilding in the UN PBA, the CSC Table on the next page shows the nature of the PBC agenda in six post-conflict countries in Africa. At the level of both theory and practice, the priority areas in the PBC agenda as indicated in the Table, are also partly a response to the recurring deficits in liberal peacebuilding that failed in the past to avoid a relapse into armed national conflict and mass civil violence (Cavalcante, 2015, 2019). In essence, the composite three-tier institutions in the global I4P development by the UN are grounded on the premise that seeks to support national-level political processes in conflict-affected countries and include interested parties and institutions based on country consent (UN-PBC, 2021; Paris, 2018).

**Table 3: Essential Information on the Peacebuilding Commission’s Agenda for Country-Specific-Configuration in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

CSC	In the PBC Agenda	Priority Areas
Burundi	Since 13 July 2006	Priority areas: promotion of good governance; strengthening of the rule of law; reform of the security sector; and community recovery
Sierra Leone	Since 13 July 2006	youth unemployment and empowerment; consolidation of democracy and good governance; restoration of justice and security sector reform; capacity-building, underscored in its broadest sense; and development of the energy sector
Guinea-Bissau	Since 19 December 2007	elections and institutional support to the electoral commission; measures to jump-start the economy; security and defence sector reform; strengthening of the justice sector, the rule of law and combat against drug trafficking; public administration reform; and social issues critical to peacebuilding
Central African Republic	Since 12 June 2008	security sector reform, which included disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; governance and the rule of law; and the creation of development poles
Liberia	Since 16 September 2010	strengthening of the rule of law; support for security sector reform; and promotion of national reconciliation
Guinea	Since 23 February 2011	national reconciliation and unity; security and defence sector reforms; and youth and women’s employment policy

Source: (Cavalcante, 2015, p. 2, 2019, p. 262)

The premise above was upheld partly because of the perceived uneasiness among the member states that the UN PBA taking on a conflict-preventive role may threaten national sovereignty (Paris, 2018; Jenkins, 2013). However, it is also important to submit that the UN PBA is not altogether an interventionist strategy (Autesserre, 2010) because it is supposed to “provide political accompaniment and advocacy to conflict-affected countries with their consent” (UN-PBC, 2021 para. 1), which can be geared towards deepening inclusion and legitimacy in the host nation (Paris, 2018). This is not surprising, since, for instance, despite the international setting of the World Bank, it also identifies “inclusive enough pacts for change” at the national, sub-national, and local levels (World Bank, 2011, p. 120) as a key component for state-building in its 2011 Report (World Bank, 2011; Paris, 2018). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which were endorsed by Member States of the UN in 2015 also identify inclusion as an ingredient for promoting sustainable peace. This is about Goal Number 16 of the SDGs: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for

sustainable development, ... and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (UN-SDGs, 2021).

However, peacebuilding agencies have often been criticised for limiting their scope to national-level processes while neglecting peacebuilding at the local level (Paris, 2018). This critique against peacebuilding agencies, diplomats, and UN staff alike, can be divided into two major elements: first, they often have little knowledge of the kinds of local conflict dynamics, such as land rights conflict, resource conflict, chieftaincy conflict, and political power dynamics motivating the escalation of conflict; the second is their failure to recognise the value of local inputs in the field of peacebuilding as a bottom-up solution to violence (Paris, 2018; Autesserre, 2010). As described in one documentary source:

*In Africa, there are [emphasis added] grassroots rivalries over land, resources, and political power motivated by widespread violence. However, a dominant peacebuilding culture shaped the intervention strategy in a way that precluded action on local conflicts, ultimately dooming the international efforts to end ... conflict since ... most international actors interpreted continued fighting as the consequence of national and regional tensions alone. Diplomats and United Nations staff viewed intervention at the macro level as their only legitimate responsibility (Autesserre, 2010, p. ii).*

Another view recognised the significant currency of the post-conflict peacebuilding proposal in the Agenda for Peace and its influence on the launch of the UN PBA. However, the argument was further made that “peacebuilding is more than post-accord reconstruction” (Lederach, 1997, p. 21). Lederach (2012) distinguished between peacebuilding driven by the UN Agenda for Peace and National I4P.

*...in contrast to former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s depiction of peacebuilding having application in the post-accord phase, I argued that peacebuilding unfolded before, during and after periods of violence and required infrastructures to creatively engage over time (Lederach, 2012, p. 9).*

By interpretation, the priority of the UN PBA within a global I4P is a revival of Boutros-Ghali’s depiction of peacebuilding as activities that are applied to societies emerging from a war-shattered

situation and are in the process of reconstruction (Lederach, 2012, p. 9). On the contrary, a nationally-driven I4P does not revive internal peacebuilding structures, but it is equally an attempt to revive preventive approaches in peacebuilding discourses against potential conflict formation (2012). In other words, apart from post-conflict peacebuilding that drives the UN PBA, there is a preventive dimension of peacebuilding that can be addressed by using several domestic mechanisms (Interview 31, 2021). This preventive approach does not raise concerns of sovereignty dilemma because it is nationally owned. It also does not limit the ability of local peacebuilders to fully understand the social and political conflict dynamics (Paris, 2018; Jenkins, 2013). The UN PBA is rather based on the foundational premise that conflict parties have been brought together to agree to a ceasefire or a peace pact. Hence, peacebuilders are intervening with mechanisms that would prevent a relapse into the abyss of violence (Okyere, 2016; Interview 31, 2021).


The CSC Table further validates the description of countries that are benefiting from external peacebuilding programmes because of their post-conflict situation. Does Ghana's PA depart from the post-conflict dimension of peacebuilding? Is a preventive approach to peacebuilding a feature of I4P development in Ghana? If so, How? The next section analyses the data on the development of peacebuilding and I4P in Ghana under the Fourth Republic, with a particular focus on the evolution of the NPC from an informal era (2006-2011) to a formal era under law (2011- date).

### **5.3 Formation and Development of Ghana's Peace Architecture**

Based on the NPC law (2011, Act 818), Ghana's PA has a formal mandate to facilitate and develop mechanisms for dealing with conflict in the country (Republic of Ghana, 2011). However, the establishment of a statutory peacebuilding institution did not imply that other older state and non-state institutions prior to the NPC did not contribute to the resolution of conflict in the country. Both Figures 7 and 8 in the subsequent paragraphs demonstrate that the entirety of the national

peace architecture of the country is a broader structure which includes the direct peacebuilding mandate of the NPC (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). In other words, the complementary role of different state and non-state institutions also contributes to the consolidation of peace, security, and democracy in Ghana (Kanza, 2019). This confirms the notion of shared responsibility in hybrid peacebuilding where the interplay of liberal and low-level elements characterises Ghana’s entire national peace architecture (Aubyn & Abdallah, 2013; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2011).

**Figure 7: Institutionalising Shared Responsibility in Stakeholder Peacebuilding**



Source: (Constructed by author based on Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014)


For instance, according to the Executive Secretary of the NPC, George Amoh, the NPC was established informally in 2006 (Interview 43, 2021). That was about 13 years after Ghana’s return to constitutional democratic rule in 1993. The 13-year period of constitutional rule witnessed the formalisation of other institutions whose development predates the NPC. They include the traditional governance mandate of the House of Chiefs and the adjudication mandate of the judiciary system. Both are key stakeholders in conflict resolution (Interview 37, 2021). In the area of mainstream governance, the 1992 Constitution has led to the creation of independent constitutional bodies like the CHRAJ that perform its mandate in three areas: anti-corruption,

ombudsman, and human rights: investigating complaints of alleged violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, alleged abuse of public office and mediation of social disputes (Interview 8, 2021). The 1992 Constitution also activated the creation of the NCCE. Their functions include civic education, and awareness creation on the principles and objectives of the 1992 Constitution, promoting the values of tolerance, and peaceful coexistence among citizens. They are also key stakeholders in mediation and inter-party dialogues which contributes to peacebuilding. CSOs perform research, advocacy, and watchdogging roles within the non-state sector space (Interview 8, 2021). The security enforcement approach by the police and the military maintains peace and security against internal and external disorder. The Ghana Police Service specifically performs its mandate through major measures: detection of crime, apprehension of criminals, prosecution, protecting life and property and maintaining law and order (Interview 18, 2021).

From the left and grey side of the next Figure below, the study observed that since the inception of Ghana's Fourth Republic, the presence of governing, security, and social entities represented a form of peace architecture (Kanza, 2019). However, a concerted approach to peacebuilding through an I4P framework became necessary with complementary tools and mechanisms for addressing various dynamics of conflicts, amicably, peacefully and towards sustainability (Interview 31, 2021; Marfo & Musah, 2018). For instance, whether it is perception or real, security enforcement may be viewed by a conflict community as partial and supporting the government of the day. In some cases, communities may have some grievances against the government or the deployment of local peacekeepers. Another point is the weakness of Commissions of Inquiry under the Fourth Republican Constitution (Interview 33, 2021). Although it is backed by law under Article 178 of the 1992 Constitution for investigating matters of public interest (Republic of Ghana,

1992), the challenge is that in most of the commissions such as the 2004 Wuaku Commission on the Dagbon conflict and the 2019 Emile Short Commission on investigating political vigilantism (Interview 33, 2021), the government that established the commission seldom garnered the political will to enforce its recommendations (Van Tongeren, 2011).

**Figure 8: A Broader Ghanaian National Peace Architecture**



Source: (Author’s construction based on Republic of Ghana, 2011; Awinador Kanyirige, 2014; Kanza, 2019)

In the context of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict, a peacebuilding practitioner described the conditions that drove the smooth formalisation of Ghana’s peace infrastructure.

The Dagbon conflict aided the formation of Ghana’s infrastructure for peace partly because the government was also complicit and paralysed in handling the chieftaincy dispute. Hence, the debate in Parliament regarding the formation of infrastructure for peace became harmonious and nonpartisan; a consensus-building process became much easier without obstacles, precisely because the government of the day wanted a peace infrastructure with a national character (Interview 33, May 17<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

The import of this finding is that the NPC was established for good reasons, particularly around a season when major state actor roles were not effective in addressing all conflict cases at the local level, such as using security, commission, litigation, and adjudication approaches. With the emergence of Ghana's I4P, the increasing activation of mechanisms such as dialogue, mediation, reconciliation, and peace education became necessary for win-win outcomes (Interview 33, 2021). The I4P approach also provided prospects for an early warning intervention which is essential to prevent a conflict from occurring in the first place (Interview 9, 2021). The significance of the NPC within Ghana's peacebuilding field has also been described by a Regional Peace Council official in the Ashanti Region.

Ghana's peace architecture provides an early proactive approach to addressing conflict, and that is what many people don't see. This is contrary to a fire service approach in resolving conflict by the security and other public institutions where they largely act to maintain law and order and keep peace after violence rather than preventing its occurrence in the first place. If well-resourced, Ghana's I4P is an important early warning system that can help deepen the preventive aspect of peacebuilding to avoid the manifestation of conflict in the first place (Interview 9, March 8<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

The findings above show the proactive and preventive dimensions of peacebuilding through an I4P platform. It also indicates a displeasure at the misrepresentation of the formation of Ghana's I4P. However, to provide an accurate description of the NPC, it is important to take into account the evolution of I4P in Ghana from an informal to a formal era. This brings to the fore major conflict formation and violent escalation cases such as the 1994-1995 inter-communal war as well as the 2002 Dagbon chieftaincy conflict (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). It also brings to the limelight post-conflict peacebuilding events that transpired in the northern part of Ghana with state and non-state actors playing different and significant roles. Put another way, the enormity of the peacebuilding activities to address these conflicts contributed to the expansion of a sub-national idea into a national I4P (Interview 13, 2021).

The specific sub-national idea that emerged as an early development of informal I4P in the 2000s to address conflicts in northern Ghana was the Northern Regional Advocacy Council. The UNDP played a significant role in providing funding for it through WANEP and other stakeholders in areas of capacity building and operations under the ambit of the Northern RCC. From the evolution, this body was eventually transformed into the Northern Regional Advisory Council. The framework was then replicated into a national architecture across all the regions of the country, which eventually led to the formalisation of the NPC (Interview 13, 2021).

Other perspectives on the development of a national I4P in Ghana have noted that since the civil society sector played an instrumental role in the sub-national peacebuilding efforts in the northern part of Ghana, its evolution that led to the formation of the NPC created a new institutional approach to peacebuilding. However, the entity became a statutory peace institution in order to be legitimate and sustainable. Despite this, in terms of its modus operandi, the composition of such an institution in carrying out mediation and dialogue in addressing social, communal and political conflicts, needed to be composed of credible men and women who are respected, but at the same time were not seen as a wholly functional governmental body (Interview 33, 2021).

The nature of such an institution was expressed in the context of Ghana's general conflict dynamics. The view was that since the dynamic nature of conflict in Ghana includes both objective and subjective issues, it was necessary to ensure that a new approach that will be deployed was free from the perception of partiality that engulfs successive governments in terms of their alleged support of one community or group against the other. For example, between the Abudus and Andanis in the Dagbon conflict, the NPP and the NDC were perceived to be sympathisers of supporting either faction respectively. Hence, an infrastructure that was both independent of

government and impartial was crucial. Similarly, in the formation process, significant clarity was needed on the type of institutional establishment. This necessitated substantial inclusivity and collective consultation before forming such an infrastructure that would act as a constructive convener of mediation and dialogue. This was the reason why the consultation processes that contributed to the formation of Ghana's NPC constituted the backbone of a national I4P whose membership is derived from the various eminent constituencies of the country (Interview 33, 2021).

That said, another equally important perspective is the evolution of the NPC and its operationalisation between the informal era from 2006 and the formal era from 2011. According to a peacebuilding practitioner who contributed to the establishment of Ghana's I4P from the civil society sector, a substantive distinction can be made between the informal era and the formal era. He argued that while the creation of Ghana's I4P was not formalised into law at the inception, under the leadership of its first board chairman, the eminent Cardinal Appiah Turkson, the calibre of the eminent persons and the convening power of the informal I4P was much higher and the institution much respected than later periods led by Rev. Prof. Emmanuel Asante and now Rev. Dr. Ernest Adu-Gyamfi. For example, the then-chairman Cardinal Turkson understood the essence of receiving the input of experts and listening to good advice from professional peacebuilding practitioners. That council as well as the personality of the then-board chairman himself was monumental as he was perceived in the public sphere as someone beyond the partisan political divide. Hence, with this attribute in place, the informal NPC was able to convene meetings, in which both the ruling government and the opposition party representatives actively participated, and even at the heat of their political campaigns during the 2008 election and run-off. The building of consensus in the informal era set the stage for a supportive formalisation by successive governments (2011-Date) who saw the importance of such an institution. However, since the NPC

was formalised in 2011, the country has organised peaceful elections, but in a different circumstance in 2012, 2016, and 2020 (Interview 33, 2021).

The informal era was not without its challenges. For example, during that time, political parties sought to control the timing and circumstances of their interactions with the Peace Council. As a result, some meetings were held as early as 2:00 am. Despite this, the NPC managed to build consent and trust among the parties. Recognising this difficulty, the informal council utilised internal back channels, such as Yaw Asamoah Boateng of the NPP and Totobi Kwakye of the NDC, who maintained 24-hour communication lines. This arrangement provided significant leverage to prevent the parties from boycotting the NPC's calls. A peacebuilding practitioner remarked, "That is to further explain that we cannot underrate the mediator in the practice of I4P and their ability to cultivate consent". Despite this, in the context of Ghana's winner-takes-all politics, political parties can also undermine election-related I4P processes during electioneering seasons as they could prioritise their quest to capture political power above the national interest, and later accuse the mediator as the reason why they wish not to participate in the processes of peacebuilding (Interview 33, 2021). A study participant from academia further critiqued the governmental role in the functioning of the NPC.

If it is the state that is still appointing some of the members of the Peace Council, then it is similar to the state appointing boards, appointing the Chief Executives. That is the same way the Executive Secretary of the National Peace Council is also appointed. My issue is that where is the independence of the NPC? They even depend on the state for their budget. Hence, if you open your mouth too wide, the state can also deprive you of your survival (Interview 39, June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

On the contrary, an official of the NPC as stated below also intimated that some of the criticism of the work of the Peace Council is due to the lack of understanding of its mandate. For instance, while the Peace Council is mandated to use several peacebuilding mechanisms to bring an

amicable solution to a conflict, including mediation, some assume a judgemental role for the council which automatically undermines its role as a mediator (Interview 32, 2021).

Most often when conflict issues emerge, then people will say oh! Peace Council why are you not saying this or talking in a particular way? As a mediator, you should not be condemning one side and later on have to engage. You should be able to listen to both sides and then draw your conclusion and provide avenues for mutual resolution of issues. This is our approach. An example is the 2020 election debacles. We were criticised for issuing a statement calling for calm and asking aggrieved political parties to seek legal redress in court rather than settling their cases on the streets with their supporters which had the potential of inflaming passion. We based this recommendation on the agreed process in place when the parties signed the peace pact, also witnessed by the chief justice and the willingness of the court to help adjudicate election petitions where necessary (Interview 32, May 13<sup>th</sup> 2021).

Another study participant took a different view and argued that it is this kind of recommendation that affects the utility of constructive change of the I4P. The capacity of peacebuilding delivery from the current administration may have eroded due to its inability to meet the expectations of Ghanaians. For example, during the 2020 election stalemate, there was high expectation that different institutions perform their mandates to calm tensions and build peace. But the Peace Council's efforts to perform its mandate went below the bar when it joined the public chorus in telling the NDC to go to court. One will understand if the Chief Justice does that since that is what the courts are supposed to do. However, the mandate of the Peace Council is to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict that will promote a win-win outcome. Therefore, it does not lie in its bosom to recommend an institution with a zero-sum orientation to a major political stakeholder who is disputing the election. This is one example that epitomises the weaknesses of the current personnel of the Peace Council which can also be a test case for distinguishing between the prospects of the institution and those who are managing it (Interview 33, 2021).

Another opinion expressed is the challenge associated with the functional unit of the Peace Council which is peculiar to the national level. For instance, the Executive Secretariat (refer to Figures 2 and 8) is supposed to be the think tank, professional unit or powerhouse of the Peace Council in

terms of the capacity of the secretariat to undertake research and provide important information that will guide the eminent council or board. But too often, the board seems to be doing the job of the secretariat. That is to say, instead of the secretariat becoming the professional body that facilitates and validates the activities of the board, the board has rather become the practitioner while the secretariat can best be described as the clearing house. A peacebuilding practitioner stated: “We may ascribe good reasons to this weakness, because the Executive Secretary is essentially an employee of the Ministry of the Interior which is headed by an appointee of the President” (Interview 33, 2021). The following example substantiates the above claim based on the functional unit of the Northern RPC.

The northern region gives you a very good functional example. Father Thaddeus and his staff as the secretariat of the Northern Regional Peace Council feed into the board, and the board is led by Archbishop Philip Naameh. In the northern region, there is serious work going on, and so you don't hear Archbishop Philip Naameh say anything if it did not emanate from the secretariat, including if he has to read a speech, it is formulated in the secretariat. That is what our National Secretariat should be doing, and not that the board chair is in a function, the media rush to him, and he begins talking; there was no thinking behind it, there was no strategy, but after he has finished talking, he then realises that he probably should not have said some of the things he said. You cannot work in conflict like that (Interview 33, May, 17<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

In response to this, one study participant detailed that while the relationship between the secretariat and the board/council is an important one, the assertion that critiques its functions at the national level is untenable in practice. The reason is that the visibility of the work of the board of the NPC at the national level is driven by the public interest in some of the issues it resolves. However, the backroom administrative operations of the secretariat at the technical level in support of the board to implement the mandate cannot be overemphasised. The same phenomenon is replicated in the region. The difference is that the regional secretariats (refer to Table 6) deal with regional issues which do not have a national character. Hence, their councils may not be publicly heard as the national board. The fact of the matter is that the NPC is composed of a secretariat (refer to Table 4) and a governing board at the national level whose attributes are replicated at the regional level.

And they all work in unison to fulfil the mandate of the council. For instance, in Ghana’s capital Accra, the Greater Accra Regional Peace Council (GARPC), is fully constituted by a board and secretariat that is distinct from the NPC headquartered in the same region (Interview 35, 2021). For example, according to its 2020 report, with the support of the NPC, the GARPC before the 2020 election organised capacity building to increase the voices of women and youth in conflict prevention and consensus-building in Prampram in the Ada East Constituency. Two other communities, Ashaiman and Nima considered hotspots also benefited from a two-day training programme where selected youth groups were oriented on the need for non-violent elections and peaceful co-existence. While these mechanisms were undertaken in the Greater Accra Region, they are still distinct from the national-level activities of the NPC such as the signing of a peace pact (NPC, 2020b). However, no one hears of them partly because they deal with grassroots matters that are not national, and so naturally the work of the NPC overshadows them and the country at large (Interview 35, 2021).

**Table 4: Staff at the National Peace Council, Head Office as of 2020**

No.	Directorates	Total Number of Staff	Remarks
1	Head of Institution (Administrative)	1	Ag. Executive Secretary
2	Capacity Development and Outreach (CD&O)	3	Director CD&O, Programmes Manager (2)
3	Conflict Management and Resolution (CMR)	2	Deputy Director CMR, Programmes Manager
4	Research, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)	3	Deputy Director M&E Principal Programmes Manager (1) Programmes Manager (1)
5	Finance & Accounts	2	Accountant (2)
6	Administration & Human Resource (Adm. & HR)	9	Adm. & HR (2), PR Unit (2), IT (1) Drivers (3) Janitor (1)
Total number of staff		<b>20</b>	

Source: (NPC, 2020a, p. 13)

Another critical concern raised in the field interview is the possibility of governmental control of the NPC since its formalisation is located under the sector Ministry of the Interior headed by the

Interior Minister who is a political appointee of the President of Ghana. In response to this concern, the current Executive Secretary of the NPC, George Amoh, responded based on his lived experiences.

One thing that probably distinguishes the Peace Council of Ghana is the fact that since I came here, we have had about four ministers in the Ministry of Interior but none of them has attempted to manipulate the Peace Council, it hasn't happened. But I think the fact is that the Board members are distinguished individuals whom you find very difficult as a minister to sway to your side. It is very difficult and that is one key thing I think any country that is trying to develop a peace infrastructure as we have should take note (Conference Presentation, June 21, 2021).

Other views were expressed on the dividends that have emerged from the formalisation of the NPC compared to the informal era. In the informal era, budgetary allocation was a key problem. Since there was no law governing its activities, the government did not have any legal obligation to release funds. And when funds are even released, there are no rules governing accountability. The informal system was not sustainable because, in that state, it was just like religious and traditional leaders coming together to form an ad hoc system to address a conflict situation. And people who feel that this is not a legitimate institution would have been legitimate in their feelings and not fully cooperate with the council. Another problem with the informal system had to do with the recruitment and payment of staff. For example, under the informal Regional Peace Advisory Councils, there was only one peace promotion officer in each region who was paid stipends from the UNDP instead of the government (Interview 37, 2021). According to Verzat (2014), the Ministry of the Interior appointed peace promotion officers to advise all lower-level structures. The field evidence therefore suggested that formalisation regularises the administration of the NPC in terms of what it can do under its mandate, within the available resources, and what it cannot do. The system is also more sustainable because of a ratified legal framework that places an obligation on any government that comes to power to support the NPC as a statutory body according to the existing laws (Interview 37, 2021).

Despite the significant points raised on the usefulness of a formalised I4P, the argument on formalisation is rather complex than simple. For example, while the NPC receives its annual budgetary allocation through the Interior Ministry (Interview 7, 2021), the Ministry also operates through nine other strategic agency services that could typically affect equitable financial allocations as shown in the table below: the police, prisons, fire service, immigration, narcotic control, disaster management, gaming, small arms and light weapons and refugees (Ministry of the Interior, 2024b).

**Table 5: Budgetary Allocation for Ten Agencies under the Interior Ministry**

Institutional agencies under the Interior Ministry		Total Budgetary allocation	
		2019 (GHC)	2021 (GHC)
1	Ghana Police Service	1,408,105,820	2,062,906,603
2	Ghana Prisons Service	274,015,849	329,929,484
3	Ghana National Fire Service	349,030,014	422,690,900
4	Ghana Immigration Service	191,058,547	357,960,797
5	Narcotic Control Board	33,811,797	40,822,870
6	National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons	2,656,355	2,274,407
7	National Disaster Management Organisation	124,716,912	133,863,685
8	Ghana Refugee Board	2,131,676	1,571,400
9	Gaming Board	10,240,296	11,020,097
<b>10</b>	<b>National Peace Council</b>	<b>3,310,000</b>	<b>3,831,330</b>

Source: (Republic of Ghana, 2019, pp. 90-91; 2021, pp. 1-2)

According to the 2011 legal framework of the NPC, “allowances and any remuneration payable to members of the Board of the National, Regional and District Peace Councils shall be determined by the Minister for the Interior in consultation with the Minister responsible for Finance” (Republic of Ghana, 2011, p. 9). The immediate Table above also depicts the general annual budgetary allocation to the ten agencies under the Interior Ministry determined in consultation with the Finance Ministry. As highlighted in the Table, the NPC is the agency with one of the least budgetary allocations. This budget covers expenses such as compensation of employees, goods and services and capex (Republic of Ghana, 2019, 2021). A 2020 report of the NPC also indicated that the annual allocation of GH 1,400,000.00 which covered compensation and goods and services

was not adequate for its work at the national, regional and district levels (NPC, 2020b, p. 26). This funding gap shows the necessity of funding the activities of the NPC through other means. One of the strengths of the NPC Act in the context of flexible public financial management is that the provision in the law allows the NPC to solicit funds from a multiplicity of sources, including government, contributions from local and international organisations, monies solicited from projects, gifts, contributions and other legitimate sources (Republic of Ghana, 2011).

Besides, the 2020 NPC report acknowledged the usefulness of development partnerships in filling the funding gaps. For example, the report indicated that additional technical, financial, and logistical support have been received from partners which included the UNDP, the Danish International Development Agency, United Nations Offices for West Africa and the Sahel, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. Other collaborations with local and international organisations such as WANEP, CDD-Ghana, IDEG, and NORSAAC/STAR-Ghana Foundation have been utilised in the implementation of election-related programmes (NPC, 2020b). Citing the Ghana Investment Promotion Council, Van Tongeren (2011) also describes how the expectation of violence had depressed investments before the December 7, 2008 polls. However, direct foreign investment jumped 90% between mid-2008 and mid-2009. The dominant variable to this growth is the peaceful national polls in December 2008. The NPC during this period is reported in the existing literature to have received approximately 2 million US dollars in financial support from the UNDP, which played a crucial role in terms of internal mediation role to avert an expected post-electoral turbulence frequent in sub-Saharan Africa (Van Tongeren, 2011).

Funding is therefore needed to bring the members together to address issues such as aiding the technical work of the secretariat and facilitating and implementing mechanisms through the good

offices of the eminent council. The funding of the activities of the NPC is therefore not limited to the state and, hence the support it has gained from international actors like the UNDP and CSOs (Interview 32, 2021). For example, in an August 2024 report by the US Embassy in Ghana, the US through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives provided 75,000 dollars which aided the renovation of the office of the Upper East Regional Peace Council (UERPC) which comprised three offices, a reception area, a storage room, a kitchen and a conference facility (US Embassy Ghana, 2024).

From the fieldwork, a study participant from academia described a general lack of proper office space for the NPC in some regions, which has been concerning since its formation. He argued that even though the NPC at the regional level is supposed to be a non-partisan body in both ideal and real terms, it is also a state institution that sometimes may be perceived in a bad light if partisan state structures engulf its activities such as the location of their office in the region within state edifices (Interview 39, 2021).

Institutions that revolve around the state or are embedded in state structures are mostly challenged when it comes to issues of independence and acting without fear or favour. And that is the situation with the Peace Council at the sub-national level in terms of their location in state infrastructure. Peace council offices as much as possible should be outside the confines of the state. Some people have downplayed this but for me, I think it is very important. The mere presence of Peace Council officers in the state edifices reinforces the notion that it is an extension of the state (Interview 39, June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

In light of this, the Executive Secretary of the UERPC Ali Anankpieng described the new office space in the Upper East Region as a physical infrastructure that would significantly support their work. He stated, “Now we have a conference room to facilitate meetings and sensitive discussions without disruptions. We also have privacy and a secure working area” (US Embassy Ghana, 2024).

Another important evidence is in the area of institutional authority such as the relationship between the RPC and the political-security arrangement within the sub-national REGSEC which draws its

mandate from a separate Security and Intelligence Agencies Law. According to the NPC Act, one of the critical functions of the RPC is to “offer advice to the RCC and the REGSEC in relation to conflict prevention, management, resolution, and building sustainable peace in the region” (Republic of Ghana, 2011, p. 7).

On the above subject, field evidence from the Executive Secretary of the Western Regional Peace Council (WRPC) showed that although there is no specific provision in the NPC Act requiring the RPC to be members of the REGSEC, in the Western region, the Executive Secretary is a technical officer of the WRPC, and there has a membership role in the REGSEC. This implies that there is no meeting of REGSEC that a member of the WRPC is not invited. In such meetings, the regional executive secretary in the Western Region gets the opportunity to advise the security arrangement chaired by the Regional Minister in the region on some of the peace-related issues. In some cases, issues are referred to the WRPC to handle. This is confirmed by a report of the NPC where such representation within the WRPC made the Executive Secretary a participant in the resolution of conflict and security issues in the region. An example is the resolution of a dispute between two religious factions, the Regional Chief Imam and his supporters on one hand and the Sekondi Zongo Chief and his supporters on the other hand (NPC, 2020b).

It was further observed that the membership role that the WRPC enjoys in the REGSEC is not the same in all the regions. In the Western Region, the importance of such membership also includes the ability of the RPC to offer proper advice to the REGSEC. The WRPC's role provides another dimension to addressing conflict. Whereas traditional security arrangements like the police deal with crime-related issues, the WRPC uses a win-win approach to address conflicts. From the perspective of the WRPC, despite the lacuna in the law on membership, the practice in the Western

Region has been possible through lobbying at the regional ministerial level on the essence of having the WRPC on the REGSEC to offer constructive advice (Interview 10, 2021).

The Executive Secretary of the Northern Regional Peace Council (NRPC), also attested to the importance of making an official of the NRPC a member of the REGSEC based on his experiences working with the NPC from its inception in the northern region.

I have worked since 2004 in this region before even the Act was passed. That was a time when we had the regional minister who would even invite me into a meeting of the sub-national chief executives, then I would point it out, and tell the district chief executive at the time to watch out; this is what is emerging in your district. Hence, it depends on how open the regional ministers are, and who are the head or chairmen of the Regional Security Council. I had that membership footing as it exists in the Western Region some years back except that to be honest, these few years that have passed, though our regional ministers still have cordial relations with the council, but an invitation to REGSEC meetings has not been forthcoming (Interview 12, March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

From the evidence, although the NRPC is not a mandatory member of the REGSEC compared to the WRPC, other experiences in the Northern Region show a constructive relationship between the NRPC and REGSEC. In one instance, an official of the NRPC intimated the important role they have played in contributing to the mitigation of conflict in a hotspot area called Kpatinga. Due to challenges often caused by chieftaincy issues, engagement with relevant stakeholders preceded the efforts to perform the funeral of a late chief before the Yaa-Naa enskins a new chief. The NRPC was invited to a meeting of the Municipal Security Council in Gushiegu where Kpatinga is administratively located, to attend a meeting of the security councils and offer advice. Hence, despite the lack of mandatory membership in the REGSEC, the Executive Secretary of the NRPC used this opportunity to provide perspectives on how to work with the stakeholders to maintain peace in Kpatinga. Another collaborative meeting at the regional level which included the Municipal Chief Executive in the REGSEC, also involved the participation of the Executive Secretary of the NRPC, the Police Commander, and a representative from the National Intelligence Bureau in the region. Such dialogues are essential to maintain peace in Kpatinga and other areas

in Northern Ghana since chieftaincy and other land-related violence have been notable occurrences in the past (Interview 12, 2021). For example, a 2020 NPC report confirmed violent conflicts in three communities (Kpatinga, Karaga and Yond Dakpemyili) that led to the destruction of properties, farmlands, and lives. Hence, the technical support of the NRPC to the REGSEC, DIASEC and other traditional authorities has contributed to the management of land and chieftaincy disputes within the northern regional enclaves, including response to early warning reports to prevent the eruption of tension into violence (NPC, 2020b). The shared responsibility in peacebuilding further necessitated the renewal of curfew hours imposed on Kpatinga and its environs by the Interior Ministry upon the advice of the Northern REGSEC from 12:00 midnight to 4.00 am which took effect on Friday, 19 July 2024 (Ministry of the Interior, 2024c).

On the same membership dilemma, the Executive Secretary of the Upper East Regional Peace Council (UERPC) Ali Anankpieng, in explaining the experiences in his region, supported the status quo as a legal provision that safeguards the independence of the RPC from the political image of the REGSEC.

We are not members of the REGSEC. But it depends on the style of the region. I hear in the Western Region, the executive secretary often participates in REGSEC meetings. In our region, it is when the input of the council is needed then we are invited and we like it that way. Yes, because you know, if you look at REGSEC- it is more political, and to maintain your independence as a council, you need to be seen to be outside the state system in your strategies. And we like the way our region is treating us. They respect our mandate, so when they need our support, they invite us, and we have done that with them (Interview 40, June 9<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

Likewise, the Executive Secretary of the Upper West Regional Peace Council (UWRPC) Emmanuel Danyomah affirmed the absence of a provision in the NPC 2011 (Act 818) regarding the automatic membership of the Regional Peace Council in the REGSEC. He argued that since the Act states that the Regional Peace Council is supposed to advise the REGSEC and the RCC, to that extent, the UWRPC undertakes regular engagements with them and reports on issues in the

region under its mandate. He, however, raised concerns about the precedent in the Western Region where the membership of the WRPC in REGSEC meetings has been regularised. His reason was based on the political structure of the REGSEC, such as the political appointment of the Regional Minister by the President. Hence, if we excessively mingle the two structures, the RPC may lose its apolitical records among the populace or conflict parties who may have problems with the government control of REGSEC and the RCC (Interview 40, 2021). Despite the above concerns, most of the evidence gathered supported the deepening of the relationship between the NPC in the Regions, the REGSEC, and the RCC. This is important because the NPC in the region executes its functional mandate. This includes early warning activities and diplomatic engagements to offer constructive advice to the REGSEC.

Other challenges noted are evident in the work of the NPC. Among these is the underutilisation of indigenous conflict resolution methods which a Committee of Eminent Chiefs utilised in the resolution of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict (Interview 39, 2021). This observation lends credence to the existing knowledge of the hybrid structure of the NPC. Yet, in practice, the technical and financial assistance from donor agencies may impact the use of dialogue and mediation efforts attuned to individualist Westernised societies, despite the availability of effective indigenous methods that could complement the peaceful transformation of conflicts (Abdallah & Amedzrator, 2014; Wehr & Lederach, 1991). Ideally, the NPC's work should result in win-win outcomes, but some efforts have led to win-lose outcomes due to the approaches employed. This raises questions not only about their use of dialogue but also about who facilitates it. (Interview 39, 2021). However, a shred of hybrid evidence also suggests that having highly respected eminent persons in the NPC provides one step to peacebuilding success. Another significant step is building the capacity of indigenous peacebuilders to be able to garner some level of experience in dealing

with contentious peacebuilding processes towards a win-win outcome (Interview 39, 2021; Interview 4, 2021).

**Table 6: Staff at the Regional Peace Council as of 2020**

<b>Regional Peace Council</b>	<b>Number of Staff</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
Greater Accra Regional Peace Council	3	Senior Programmes Manager (1), Senior Admin. Manager (1), Programmes Manager (1)
Volta Regional Peace Council	3	Regional Executive Secretary (1), Senior Programmes Manager (1) Admin, Manager (1)
Ashanti Regional Peace Council	4	Regional Executive Secretary (1), Programmes Manager (2), Admin. Manager (1)
Central Regional Peace Council	3	Ag. Regional Executive Secretary (1), Programmes Manager (1), Admin. Manager (1)
Eastern Regional Peace Council	3	Deputy Director (1), Programmes Manager (1), Admin. Manager (1)
Bono Regional Peace Council	3	Regional Executive Secretary (1), Programmes Manager (1), Stenographer Secretary (1)
Western Regional Peace Council	4	Regional Executive Secretary (1), Programmes Manager (1), Admin Manager (2)
Northern Regional Peace Council	3	Regional Executive Secretary (1), Principal Programmes Manager (1), Admin Manager (1)
Upper East Regional Peace Council	3	Regional Executive Secretary (1), Programmes Manager (1), Stenographer Secretary (1)
Upper West Regional Peace Council	2	Regional Executive Secretary (1), Programmes Manager (1)
Savannah Regional Peace Council	2	Ag. Regional Executive Secretary (1), Principal Programmes Manager (1)
Ahafo Regional Peace Council	2	Ag. Regional Executive Secretary (1), Programmes Manager (1)

Source: (NPC, 2020a, p. 14)

Overall, the essence of formalising a peace architecture in Ghana is based on its capacity to use non-violent approaches in the resolution of conflict and to work towards achieving a positive-sum outcome. However, this goal requires sustained engagement and dialogue. It is also significant to differentiate between the good and productive intentions that led to the formation of the NPC, and its ability and capacity to address various localised conflict dynamics in the country. That is to say, if scholars and practitioners need to draw fully on the original intentions of Ghana's peace architecture, then it is also important that the current NPC function with the intellectual capacity and the wherewithal to depart from the temptation of political partisanship and acts with a

substantial level of independence that does not make it another eminent extension of the government of the day (Interview 33, 2021).

#### **5.4 Conflict Dynamics and the Implementation of Peacebuilding Mechanisms in Ghana**

Having examined the informal and formal discourse on the formation and development of Ghana's PA, this section analyses the data on the nature of internal peacebuilding mechanisms and the plausible I4P evidence. The analysis in this section ascertains the evidence associated with the prevention, security enforcement, third-party mediation, and the local avoidance of a relapse into conflict in Ghana. These approaches reflect the UN agenda for peace modalities on preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding. Their adoption in a local context reflects hybridity around the overlaps between international and local peacebuilding. The sections below are pursued in the context of the three mini cases under Ghana's Fourth Republican Constitution which are Alavanyo-Nkonya, Dagbon, and Elections.

##### **5.4.1 Land Dispute and Peacebuilding**

To recap mini-case one, the conflict which originally began in the 1920s between Alavanyo Kpemi and Nkonya Tayi, prolonged for decades with intermittent localised violence. Yet, the ninety-decade period also benefited from various interventions such as traditional clemency, cartographic evidence, court judgements, and commissions of inquiries, including ADR, mediation and local peacekeeping.

Based on existing works, a dichotomy can be made between some of the past interventions, such as mediation and the court processes. It was argued that in a deeply divided conflict, temporary peace may be achieved when the court rules, but local resistance may escalate the situation over time (Paris, 2004; Mac Ginty, 2011). Mediation was an essential conflict resolution mechanism

due in part to the often unyielding interest and position of the primary parties. In other words, when two parties have an interest in something, they take their position — and once nobody agrees, it will not bring about peace. The courts may rule that a party has won based on evidence but conflict becomes intractable because several resolution mechanisms fail to mend the grievances of the parties. When people take positions, and the resolution mechanism advances a zero-sum outcome, the onus projection is violence (Moore, 2014). Hence, to build peace, one of the ways is to develop mechanisms whose outcome makes everybody appear to have won in the spirit of building consensus. One interviewee suggested that,

the traditional processes of trying to bring the people together, such as the Alavanyo-Nkonya people drinking from the same cup of calabash, and feeling that they are together and that nobody has lost or won, is something that will help sustain or build the peace (Interview 24, 2021).

Other analyses show that the decades of conflict have not been just about land, but the economic opportunities of the land. It has been asserted that although the land is bare, it may contain some resources which fuel competitive ownership (Interview 24, 2021). Similarly, some of the factors that have led to the recurrence of the conflict bordered on pure criminality and had nothing to do with the substantive issue. In this context, some people took advantage of their grievances and took revenge for the loss of a tribe or family member who may have been killed in the past. They often partake in the activity of ambushing and killing other innocent persons as a form of mitigating their grievances through violent retaliation. Other conflict dynamics also show that the disputed land is a forest reserve and has significant trees that can be used for timber. Hence, people may defile regional security restrictions to the area and engage in lumbering activities as a source of economic gains for individuals and groups from both sides (Interview 38, 2021).

The notion of conflict entrepreneurship has also been suggested as a notable phenomenon in the conflict enclave where other elitist groups may sponsor commercial lumbering by using committed

youth groups in exchange for a financial token. It is further suggested that the existence of such actors often results in local opposition to the restrictions in the forest reserve. This is confirmed by an anthropological account which observed that some people are perceived to benefit from the disputed area in part because the land is a fertile ground for the production of wood, timber, bamboo, cocoa, plantain, and other crops (Klutsey, 2016). Other suggestions were that there was a lack of education in the area on the negative effect of conflict on the traditional governance system and development, including structural issues like poverty. As intimated by some participants, "...the irony is that some of the youth population may not even know the size of the land they are fighting over or even why they are fighting" (Interview 42, 2021; Interview 25, 2021).

Further analysis of the fieldwork reveals another structural issue. It was suggested that beneath the substantive land issue are factors such as recognition to enjoy the privileges and resources in the community as well as a sense of belonging because of the feelings of marginalisation. This may also be located under injustice in the society or the lack of social justice. While it is suggested that relative peace has been achieved, other structural problems like marginalisation, exclusion, injustice, malnutrition and discrimination, also show a significant gap in the area of achieving sustainable or positive peace (Interview 1, 2021). The next subsection provides research findings on local peacebuilding mechanisms and the evidence on regional I4P in the area.

#### **5.4.1.1 Local Peacebuilding Mechanisms in Alavanyo-Nkonya**

From the data results, since the formal inauguration of the Volta Regional Peace Council (VRPC) on 21<sup>st</sup> July 2014 in the Volta Regional capital Ho (Klutsey, 2015), three major mechanisms as part of implementing its sub-national mandate have included peace education, inter-communal dialogue committee, and a trauma healing programme. As confirmed by the 2020 NPC report, the VRPC's role in monitoring the Alavanyo and Nkonya communities led to the development of a

three-year conflict transformation plan aimed at sustaining peace (NPC, 2020b). The rationale was to mend the broken relationship and enemy image creation between the two communities following years of suspicion and recurring localised violence (Interview 5, 2021). The Executive Secretary of the VRPC David Esinu Normanyo stated:

Any peacebuilding intervention would have been unwise to use the approaches of the past such as adversarial court judgements. Three major activities have been undertaken in that regard; one, peace education to equip people, empower people, to be able to address issues that arise non-violently. Two, inter-communal dialogue platform. One is a permanent one, the other one is periodically bringing together members of the community to share their experiences. Then, the third major activity has been trauma healing (Interview 5, February 18<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

A study participant from academia described the premise of peace education as follows:

The underlying theory for peace education is that conflict is inevitable, conflict happens in society. Yet, how do we use nonviolence to resolve conflict? A major driving force behind peace education is to educate purposefully to build peace in communities (Interview 39, June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

In the context of this case, the evidence shows a form of peace education that sought to build the capacity of the people and empower them in a way that they could resolve their differences using non-violent measures. Due to the lack of capacity to undertake a broad peace education in the entire conflict enclave, a manageable approach was devised that targeted a type of leadership that confirmed Lederach's notion of middle-level leadership characteristics in I4P activities (Lederach, 1997). They included assembly members, opinion leaders, and local chiefs in both communities who were engaged in various workshops to learn various non-violent approaches to building and sustaining peace. The rationale behind this approach was meant to help such actors return to their communities, and serve as peace ambassadors. They would also share that knowledge and influence on the grassroots towards inter-communal peacefulness and co-existence. In terms of facilitating this approach, external facilitators were initiated through the VRPC platform to teach various leaders about peace-related topics. In practice, the leaders of the two communities worked in teams and made presentations on the topics assigned to them. In the course of the workshops,

the leaders of both communities were placed in a group to engage in group work on peace. This rationale was to help empower them on how to apply the skills of non-violence instead of applying the violent behaviours of the past (Interview 5, 2021).

An analysis of the view of a traditional ruler from the conflict enclave indicated that the implementation of the mechanisms by the VRPC has contributed to the calmness in the area in the past few years. As a chief with a female portfolio, her argument further shows that the ongoing peace education under VRPC-facilitated programmes has also had a positive impact alongside the presence of a police-military force permanently stationed to keep peace in the area through the imposition and the renewal of curfews by the Interior Ministry. For instance, the security interventions alone were found to be challenging due in part to the lack of proper information and local intelligence for effective action. Hence, peace education have had other potentials in terms of providing the youth and other identifiable traditional vigilante groups with the capacity to monitor and quickly report security threats for prompt redress. The actions of some persons that cause local violence often take the form of light weapon usage and small arms proliferation. While the police-military force is mandated by law, security enforcement in the form of shootings could also cause violence (Interview 42, 2021). Nonetheless, another purpose of security enforcement to keep peace in the area similarly fits the notion of shared responsibility within Ghana's broad peace architecture (refer to Figures 7 and 8) (Aubyn & Abdallah, 2013).

In the implementation of peace education, the investigation identified a concern regarding the mode of communication considering that both communities are accustomed to different languages. To address this concern, a VRPC official noted that English was largely used as the common language for communicating and contextualising the issues. Despite this concern, a VRPC official intimated that the use of English did not face much opposition: "The language of communication

has always been English, and that is the reason why it is targeted at middle-level leaders of the two-conflict enclave”. Despite the importance of indigenous mechanisms in conflict resolution, in this context, the use of an indigenous language was rather projected as conflictual. For instance, the Alavanyos are indigenously *Ewes* and therefore they understand the *Ewe* language. The Nkonyas are Guans but can speak and understand both *Ewe* and *Akan*, although they are more comfortable speaking the latter respectively. With this concern, it was important to use a language of communication that projects some attributes of neutrality. Hence, the use of English which is the official language spoken in Ghana (Interview 5, 2021). From an existing scholarly perspective, the use of English as a major mode of communication often raises critique about Western language domination of peacebuilding in a non-Western society (Wehr & Lederach, 1991). However, the hybrid dimension of I4P provides a remedial explanation of a local peacebuilding approach that explores both modern and indigenous mechanisms (Kumar & Haye, 2012). In that sense, the relative peacebuilding application also strengthens the argument about the essence of applying I4P through a dynamic cultural lens on a case basis (Van Tongeren et al., 2012).

In another vein, a VRPC official recounted the role played by the declaration of ceasefire initiatives and commitments to peace by members of the two communities and the extent to which it contributed to the maintenance of peace in the area. He stated, “There was a ceasefire initiative by the two communities in 2015 in Kpando which sought to renew the commitment of the parties to peace as enshrined in the initial police-military security enforcement since the early 2000s”. This piece of evidence described the objective of the initiative which revolved around the commitment not to engage in violence as the military and police deployment continued to secure the buffer zone (Interview 5, 2021). The role of such ceasefire initiatives is also confirmed by a June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017 media report, where the youth of both Alavanyo and Nkonya represented by their leaders, in a

meeting involving the Volta Regional Security Council in Ho agreed to end the hostilities and co-exist peacefully (GhanaWeb, 2017).

The field data also shows a regularly reinstated curfew has been implemented to prevent anyone from bringing weapons to the area, which could lead to violent incidents. On May 19 2024, the Ministry of the Interior by a periodic Executive Instrument renewed the curfew on Alavanyo and Nkonya Townships, including their environs in the Oti Region of the country from 6:00 pm to 6:00 am. The Ministry further stated the commitment of the government to enforce the ban imposed on all persons in the two communities from possessing any small arms and light weapons, ammunition and other offensive materials and the consequence of such breaches which included arrests and prosecution (Ministry of the Interior, 2024a).

However, the general evidence on this subject raised a concern about the impact of the supposed curfew on the ground and the police-military presence. A former Assembly Member for Nkonya Ntsumuru noted:

Yes, the curfew is supposed to be in place but, on the ground, we don't seem to observe it to the fullest. The military and then the police don't appear to implement it to the fullest, but it is on paper to exist but it is often not observed. There is a base for the police and the military for both Alavanyo and Nkonya, so they move around from time to time in the various communities, they patrol the areas from time to time (Interview 38, June 8<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

This opinion was similarly shared by a former Assembly Member on the Alavanyo side. The assertion was that while there seems to be relative peace, the results cannot be solely explained by the enforcement of the curfew by the government but by the recent commitment of the people to peace. He recounted his experience with the imposition of past curfews:

Formerly the curfew was very severe but now they say we should wake up at 5 a.m. and sleep in the evening at 8 o'clock. Is it a curfew? But formerly when you will go to the farm you wake up about 6.30-7.00 am and come back at 3.00 pm and sleep at 6.00 pm. But even when the curfew was in force, there was still conflict. But now there is no conflict, because of our commitments, and not just the government. (Interview 36, June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

The study found other two major mechanisms as a two-fold inter-communal dialogue platform. This includes a permanent Alavanyo-Nkonya inter-communal dialogue committee, or insider-peacebuilding committee, established by the VRPC. This committee, comprising members from both communities, met regularly to address issues and threats they face. The second is a periodic national and international event, such as the International Day of Peace, celebrated globally on the 21st of September every year (Interview 5, 2021). In its report, the NPC described the role of insider mediation at Alavanyo and Nkonya to consolidate peace in the communities. The report also confirmed the celebration of an annual International Day of Peace originally established by the UN resolution in 1981 to build a culture of peace globally. In the 2017 celebration of the International Day of Peace in Ho, on the theme, “Together for peace, respect, dignity and safety for all”, the Chairman of the VRPC Reverend Monsignor Anthony Korno, described how the resurgence of the conflict may cause many to question the relevance of the Peace Council (Modern Ghana, 2017). The weakness can be explained by the lack of inclusion in the periodic event as well as the workshops which did not involve the entire community. Similar to the modus operandi of peace education, the Chiefs, elders, opinion leaders and youth leaders from both communities were the major participants. The limitation is also based on the sole reliance on the middle-level actors to convey to the grassroots. However, the possibility of intercommunal engagements also meant that despite their historical hostilities, it is still possible for both communities to interact, collaborate, share meals, live in harmony, and build new friendships (Interview 5, 2021). More broadly, in collaboration with the UNDP and the Ghana Journalist Association, the 2020 annual celebration which was the theme “Shaping Peace Together”, focused on the youth through education and public awareness on issues related to peace (NPC, 2020b).

Another mechanism under the scope of trauma healing is also another programme whose focus is on persons victimised by violence, including those who have been injured and those who have lost loved ones. This program specifically targets these individuals and aims to help them heal the trauma associated with losing a family member or sustaining injuries due to the conflict (Interview 5, 2021). A 2017 media publication by Modern Ghana described the nature of this mechanism. In the report, the Chairman of the VRPC confirmed the initiative of the VRPC termed “Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Programme” as a focus on the victims of the conflict. He further proposed the establishment of a Children’s camp to support children given the possibility of some children picking up guerrilla tactics in the course of the conflict (Modern Ghana, 2017).

The role of traditional governance leadership in conflict resolution is also reflected in this case. However, their capacity to attract general local admiration and acceptance does not automatically translate into indigenous peacebuilding success. In the context of the impact of middle-level and grassroots leadership (Lederach, 1997), a paramount Queen of the Nkonya Traditional Area, Nana Otubia II, shared her experience of encountering strong opposition from certain opinion leaders in her initial support for the Peace Council facilitated processes.

Despite the challenges I faced, including gender bias, the strong support of my paramouncy was important in our assistance to the Peace Council. We provided logistical support such as organising meeting venues and mobilising youth and opinion leaders. Opposition also arose from some people I will describe as conflict entrepreneurs. Despite the initial challenges, the opposition diminished gradually. Traditional authorities began offering support by providing suitable venues for meetings and mobilising youth and opinion leaders. This has enabled the Peace Council to conduct sessions on peace education, counselling, and trauma healing within the community (Interview 42, July 10<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

The presence of conflict entrepreneurs in the area has not been underestimated. For instance, in a September 27, 2017 media publication, the Volta Regional Minister Archibald Yao Letsa is quoted to have cautioned individuals and organisations who deliberately profit as conflict entrepreneurs from the unfortunate to reconsider their actions. The Chairperson of the VRPC is also reported to

have termed other groups as “warmongers who badmouthed the situation”, and fuel violence, contributing to the derailing of development in the area (Modern Ghana, 2017).

Another piece of evidence on the work of the VRPC strongly supports the notion of shared responsibility in peacebuilding. In other words, the various mechanisms should be viewed within a broader partnership role which includes engagement between the chiefs of the two areas and the regional house of chiefs, REGSEC, and most significantly the community dialogue and workshops facilitated by the VRPC in areas of conflict analysis and communal early warning (Interview 38, 2021). Despite this, other concerns from the evidence include the VRPC membership in particular the ethnic origin of the facilitators be they *Ewes* or *Guans* in a deeply divided society is an often overlooked issue (Paris, 2004). From the evidence, the eminent characteristics of Ghana’s I4P played a significant role in limiting this perception. In addition, the awareness of these issues helps create better third-party behaviour to further suppress such perceptions (Bercovitch, 1991). Another factor that strengthens this evidence is the approach of the VRPC which departed from the use of mediation and negotiation on the substantive land ownership debacle that often resulted in issues of interest, tensions and accusations of bias among the community members (Interview 5, 2021; Interview 38, 2021).

A recurrent question that emerged from the fieldwork is that although the conflict has not seen the major violence that occurred in the past, the kind of peace that has been achieved from these I4P measures remains questionable. For instance, a study participant from academia, while commending the relevance of the mechanisms and activities implemented so far, described what has been achieved in the context of negative peace. For instance, “the structural issues are still lingering, the Gruner map is still under contention, and has not been resolved though, in the current situation, the people have decided to avoid the use of violence to resolve their broken relationship”.

The role of the police-military force in the two communities has also been described as a good intention that may lack some purpose. The presence of such a force could affect economic development in the area in terms of inter-communal economic relations. Similarly, it was observed that although the Peace Council has been at the forefront of facilitating processes of relationship building, the forbidden activities including illegal lumbering may have not stopped. More so, the evidence shows that peacebuilders focused on this conflict cannot also neglect the concerns regarding the capacity of some of the conflict enclaves to manufacture local arms through subtle blacksmithing and craftsmanship (Interview 39, 2021).

We can further deduce from the analysis that the VRPC's work does not address the structural issues. Once peacebuilding does not resolve structural issues, there is always a greater likelihood of a relapse into conflict. The current situation which one study participant described as a 'wait-and-see' approach will require more strategic and continued engagement. The inter-communal dialogue platform which has been established may have contributed to negative peace. However, this approach can best be described as conflict management and not resolution or transformation. This is because the fault lines may still be lingering. The enemy imaging and inter-communal mistrust may have not been entirely addressed. Other analyses propose testing the inter-communal formal education to ascertain whether members from either community can peacefully attend school in the other community in the short-medium-long term. Conflict behaviours may change due to the presence of the military and some of the NPC dialogue efforts. However, behavioural change should be seen as an automatic transcending into actual attitude in order to certify the graduation of peacemaking towards peacebuilding and conflict transformation (Interview 39, 2021).

Sustainable peace in the area depends not only on external third-party interventions but also significantly on the local community's commitment to peace. External actors, like the Peace Council, can facilitate the process, but the core solution lies in the people's willingness to end conflict and work towards peace (Interview 36, 2021). Additionally, stakeholders emphasised the importance of peace education, suggesting it be integrated into the educational system to equip future generations with conflict resolution skills and prevent manipulation by spoilers. However, resource constraints hinder the implementation of such programmes by the VRPC, and the NPC could help fill this gap by promoting peace education and related skills (Interview 5, 2021; Interview 39, 2021). Trauma healing was also recommended to include social trauma healing, addressing the needs of those traumatised by violence to reintegrate them into a peaceful society (Interview 5, 2021; Interview 36, 2021). Lastly, the study found the permanent insider peacebuilding committee unsustainable due to funding issues. It was suggested that the VRPC needs to organise regular activities to maintain and deepen harmony between communities, as lapses in these activities could lead to a resurgence of violence (Interview 5, 2021; Interview 42, 2021).

#### **5.4.1.2 Community Peacebuilding**

From the previous evidence on peace education, inter-communal dialogue committees, and trauma healing programmes in mini-case one, the analysis below focused on the nature of the mechanisms from the agenda for peace conceptualisation of conflict prevention (preventive diplomacy), intranational security enforcement (peacekeeping), relationship building (peacemaking), and the avoidance of a relapse into conflict (post-conflict peacebuilding).

Regarding the evolution and development of peacebuilding, there is a dominant school of thought that suggests that the design of UN peacekeeping is specifically aimed at addressing inter-state

conflict rather than a country-level conflict (Cilliers, 1999; Hanhimaki, 2008). This perspective excludes the description of internally-driven peace enforcement activities to keep antagonistic parties as peacekeeping. This also suggests the absence of peacekeeping in Ghana under the Fourth Republican Constitution (Okyere, 2016). However, the popularity of this assertion which looks at the broad picture, does not factor in the analysis of horizontal and vertical intervention considerations in terms of intra-national peacekeeping. Drawing on Galtung (1976), in mini-case one, there is evidence of intra-national peacekeeping where the state has intervened horizontally between two equal communities using joint police-military security enforcement.

A local peacekeeping force constituting the military and the police has been in place since the early 2000s to enforce curfew in the area. This measure sought to deter people from wielding weapons and perpetrating violence. Similar to UN peacekeeping that was originally designed for inter-state affairs to avoid the escalation of hostilities between warring states (Hanhimaki, 2008), the local security architecture in this case also ensured the enforcement of peace and security, and the creation of a buffer zone between the two communities on the disputed land.

In the history of local peacekeeping in Alavanyo-Nkonya, the fieldwork suggested that some semblance of peace was achieved due to such security enforcement. However, this partly contrasts existing works which identified isolated violent cases between the early 2000s and around 2017 (2012, 2013, 2015 and 2017) (Penu & Essaw, 2019). Although in inter-governmental terms, the traditional principle of UN peacekeeping opposes the idea of intervening in the internal affairs of a country, there are other justifications for peacekeeping in the UN system which include the principle of R2P. In the context of mini-case one, the obligation to enforce sub-national security through joint police-military enforcement is also in line with the local responsibility to protect a

part of the country that has consistently failed to maintain its peace (Hanhimaki, 2008). Hence, local peace structures are also essential to provide constructive partnership through peacebuilding as a complement to peacekeeping. Local peace structures, including traditional authorities and opinion leaders, are also important stakeholders in local intelligence gathering (Roepstorff & Bernhard, 2013).

In the UN framework, a base that houses UN forces is an integral part of peacekeeping and security enforcement in a conflict-prone situation (Hanhimaki, 2008). This factor also makes the security presence in Alavanyo-Nkonya an example of intra-national peacekeeping due to the evidence of the presence of a local base. A major challenge to peacekeeping activities around the world is also similar to this case. The consequence of military restrictions or curfews could negatively affect economic activities and development. While the sub-national peacekeeping enforces security to keep peace, this approach cannot be used to build peace that deepens inter-communal dialogue and socio-economic relations. Based on the security enforcement limitations, peacemaking can be identified as a useful complementary mechanism to bring constructive change (Lederach, 2014).

The emphasis on third-party roles and the extent to which they succeed or fail in a peacekeeping, peacemaking or peacebuilding process cannot be overemphasised (Wehr & Lederach, 1991; Elgström et al., 2003; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012; Roepstorff & Bernhard, 2013; Moore, 2014). For instance, in the context of international peacebuilding, the special interests of third parties have also been highlighted. In some cases, UN agencies and other international organisations have been described as ‘ambulance chasers’, who benefit from a global commercial enterprise with a network of humanitarian supplies around conflict zones. For example, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, or the Red Cross, are perceived as third parties with

the best humanitarian intentions, they could act in a way to prolong conflict instead of preventing and ending conflict. There have been reported instances in the Great Lake Region of refugees neglected or discouraged from repatriating or forced to repatriate based on the availability of resources. Similarly, the competing interest within the UN system, particularly among the five permanent members, also tends to procrastinate the deployment of a viable peacekeeping mission or peacemaking envoys (Baregu, 2011). From this line of thinking, a protracted local conflict like the Alavanyo-Nkonya case may also create avenues for state and non-state-funded peacebuilding mechanisms, including per diem for local peacebuilders and funds to organise programmes while the communities suffer due to the protraction.

The situational focus on the VRPC's work also reinforces the underlying assumption of post-conflict peacebuilding at the local level according to which a peaceful settlement is supported by structures and mechanisms to avoid the reemergence of violence. This is evident by the attempt made through peace education, inter-communal dialogue committees and trauma healing to avoid a relapse into local conflict in Alavanyo-Nkonya. A similar case at the macro-level is the priority area of the global I4P approach within the new UN PBA, aimed at prioritising sustainable peacebuilding in post-conflict countries (Aning & Lartey, 2010; Bellamy, 2010; Jenkins, 2013; Hearn et al., 2014; Cavalcante, 2019).

On the other hand, the premise of the VRPC's work can also be related to preventive diplomacy with the understanding that local peacebuilding mechanisms can help prevent the recurrence, escalation, and intensity of conflict in the Alavanyo-Nkonya enclaves. For instance, peace education which is one of the mechanisms is both a preventive and post-conflict approach to peacebuilding. Broadly, it is an essential teaching and value-driven process. It involves learning

about the challenges of achieving peace, how to develop non-violent skills, and transform attitudes that promote peace (Harris, 2004). People are the greatest resource for effective peace education. It is through a people-centred approach that peaceful relationships and structures are created (Navarro-Castro & Nario-Galace, 2010).

As highlighted below, an integral part of peace education is also based on the premise of some universal values. For instance, those values enshrined in the UN Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace are fundamental in the practice of peace (Brenes-Castro, 2004). Since these values and principles are likely to have diverse manners of expression in different cultures, the best approach to peace education is a process of inter-cultural dialogue and a consensus-seeking process. The aspirations to live peacefully and sustain relations are also universal, and, in all people, no matter the diversity, individuals and groups will be found seeking ways to realise this aspiration (Brenes-Castro, 2004; Schilling, 2012).

For instance, in 1999, the UN was instrumental in further using its global platform to improve initiatives on peacebuilding and peace education. The UN General Assembly declared a decade Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, which outlines some universal values and principles for promoting sustainable peace: such as adherence to the right to life, liberty, freedom of expression, respect of fundamental human rights, democratic participation, commitment to peaceful settlement of conflict, efforts aimed at creating the conditions for peace practice and its consolidation, pluralism and cultural diversity (A/RES/53/243, 1999). Under this framework, an enormous focus was placed on peace education as an approach to the practice of peacebuilding (Boulding, 2001; Harris, 2004; Brenes-Castro, 2004). Some suggestions have been made on how to build a culture of peace. They include, first, intensive focus on the role of minorities and women

in peace processes; second, mobilising public peace processes to change the human mentality that upholds peace and security through power over others; and third, intensifying special peace programmes through peace education towards transformation (Boulding, 2001).

Contrary to this macro explanation, however, the VRPC's peace education mechanism was not based on the use of a formally structured approach to transform actors in the conflict enclave. The approach utilised target middle-level leadership within the conflict enclave and used an inter-communal soft training workshop platform to help the actors learn the various non-violent mechanisms for analysing conflict and addressing the same (Lederach, 1997). Despite its limitation, the strength of the mechanism is the development of non-violent skills through a series of workshops facilitated by the VRPC, working closely with FBOs, the RCC, and the district assemblies of Hohoe and Biakoye to transform attitudes, understand conflict and pursue peace (Harris, 2004). The people-centered dimension of the mechanism targeted local traditional leaders, opinion, and youth groups to engage the grassroots (Navarro-Castro & Nario-Galace, 2010). This corroborated the notion of vertical peacebuilding interaction between peacebuilders and selected stakeholders and subsequently horizontal interaction between the stakeholders and their grassroots (Galtung, 1976).

In summary, the VRPC mechanisms have contributed to peacebuilding at the local level. Historically adversarial communities have begun to accept inter-communal dialogue committees. This is crucial for preventing a relapse into localised violence. The progress is also bolstered by a trauma healing programme that employs a preferential treatment approach to provide counselling and support to those directly or indirectly affected by the conflict (UN, 1996). Furthermore, peace education and a permanent inter-communal dialogue platform serve as preventive measures. These

initiatives enable local peacebuilders to engage regularly, transcending their differences to create local early warning systems and peace ambassadors. These could avert future threats to peace, mitigate the escalation of existing inter-communal rivalries, and maintain peace through sustained engagements (Brenes-Castro, 2004; Schilling, 2012). However, their limited scope does not include a comprehensive empowerment and developmental programme for youth. Despite the benefit of relationship-building workshops, they also fall short of fostering a deeper culture of peace. Significant issues remain unresolved, such as the lingering land dispute, the contested Gruner map, and the incomplete achievement of inter-communal harmony. Integrating peace education into the formal educational system can instill universal values and principles that promote sustainable peace, helping younger generations avoid the pitfalls of conflict exploitation seen in previous generations. To deepen sustainable peace, these mechanisms must involve multiple stakeholders, including the civic education role of the NCCE and the developmental roles of other governmental and non-governmental actors. Table 7 below, depicts the strengths, limitations, and remedies underlying the local peacebuilding mechanisms under mini-case one.

**Table 7: Community Peacebuilding Mechanisms**

<b>Local peacebuilding mechanisms</b>	<b>Framing Agenda for Peace</b>	<b>Nature of mechanism</b>	<b>Goal/ Prospect of Mechanisms</b>	<b>Limitation/ remedies</b>
Intra-national peacekeeping	Peacekeeping	Buffer zone between the two communities	Enforcement of peace and security	Affects socio-economic and inter-communal relations/ local intelligence required to enforce peace
Peace education	Preventive diplomacy	Inter-communal soft training workshop platform	Development of non-violent skills	Ignores formal aspect of peace education which is important for transforming conflict in the long-term
Intercommunal dialogue committee	Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking	Permanent and periodic insider peacebuilding programmes	Deepen inter-communal friendship and establish local peace ambassadors	Engagements currently inactive
Trauma healing	Post-conflict peacebuilding	Preferential treatment for victims	To mitigate the grievances of the traumatised	Not broad enough to address social trauma healing

Source: (Fieldwork, 2021)

## 5.4.2 Chieftaincy Dispute and Peacebuilding

To recap mini-case two, in the Dagbon chieftaincy succession conflict, successive governments deployed several mechanisms in the process of resolution, such as commissions of inquiry, the courts, the security approach, and the traditional approach led by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs (CEC) under the Chairmanship of Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011; Ahorsu, 2014). This section examines the nature of other mechanisms deployed within the Dagbon enclaves in northern Ghana and the role of the Northern Regional Peace Council (NRPC).

### 5.4.2.1 Local Peacebuilding Mechanisms in Dagbon and its Environs

Of all the approaches to peace in the Dagbon conflict, the traditional approach by the CEC remains the most effective as it contributed to building consensus among the parties and paving the way for the performance of the funeral rites of two previous Yaa-Naa's and the subsequent enskinment of Yaa-Naa Abubakari Mahama II (Allotey, 2019). One of the sub-questions was to ascertain whether the enskinment of a new Yaa-Naa provides some prospects. A participant from the civil society sector expressed this view:

It is sustainable once we have been able to install the chief, which we could not do in the past because the contentious issues were still lingering. But now, we have been able to install the new overlord of Dagbon. It has been observed that he has also demonstrated a commitment to the peace agreement over there in terms of working with other gates and other related issues. Although there might still be challenges here and there, at the end of the day, the fact that we have been able to install a chief means that we have been able to fill that vacuum which has been in existence for so many years. And that for me is a positive step forward. The most important thing is our ability to sustain peace in the Dagbon environs (Interview 2, February 5<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

In the view of another civil society study participant, the enskinment of a new chief is not enough to sustain peace in Dagbon because peacebuilding is a process and not an event. The participant stated the following:

...we are made to believe that because the chiefs have agreed to install a new overlord then that is all. No! There may be some simmering tensions that we need to identify and work at. This goes to underscore the fact that peacebuilding is not an event, it is a process and a sustained process. (Interview 7, February 17<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

Similarly, another research fellow in academia described the importance of an option for sustaining peace in Dagbon that goes beyond mediation in the following quotation.

Mediation has managed the conflict to an extent. However, the sustainability of the mediation of the conflict should be dependent on addressing the underlying grievances. Sometimes, mediation is used first to make room for peace to prevail. You know the mediation process led to the successful burial of the Yaa-Naas and the performance of their funerals. The mediation set out the modalities for doing that. Now, if there are grievances in terms of succession, they need to address that before the new Yaa-Na dies, so, that before he dies, there are clear succession procedures. And that will then make the process sustainable, otherwise, it can escalate again (Interview 24, April 26<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

Another participant from the civil society organisation based in Northern Ghana provided an informative view on the dynamics of the significant resources that surround the Yaa-Naa chieftom in the Dagomba ethnic group in northern Ghana.

Unfortunately for some of the chieftoms, like in the upper region, chiefs don't own lands. But for the northern region, the king of Dagbon is the overall custodian of the lands, and so anything on land lease, he becomes the final authority, and is not for nothing. You have to pay something. So they see all these economic benefits coming, and hence the scramble or the anxiety to become a chief is very high. Those are some of the dynamics that are contributing to the tensions that we have seen as far as chieftaincy is concerned, and of course, land is critical. When it comes to chieftaincy, you do not become a chief over an empty space, you need to have control over something, and in this case, land is a major resource (Interview 13, May 13<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

This view is also contained in the 1930 Dagbon Constitution formulated in colonial times under British rule as cited by Staniland (1975) that the ownership of land and adjudication of land cases were under the traditional authority of the Yaa Naa (Staniland, 1975). In terms of peacebuilding efforts, evidence from an interview with the NRPC intimated that since a peaceful Dagbon is central to peace in the northern region, the NRPC similarly set out to work assiduously in collaboration with the Dagbon Traditional Council towards researching and reviewing the 1930 Constitution on key succession issues: issues of regency, who is qualified to be a chief, and other succession processes in order to formulate a succession plan that can fit the modern era (Interview 12, 2021). Staniland (1975) also identified the same point and noted that the challenge to the 1930 Constitution was based on three vital issues: “who was qualified to become king; who was responsible for selecting the king; and how power was distributed within the kingdom” (Staniland,

1975, p. 106). The import of the review from the NRPC has been influenced by the core issue of succession that is embedded in history. Given this, a new traditional constitutional development has been described as an important prospect that could provide a clear guideline whenever there is a vacancy on the throne in the future (Interview 12, 2021). This initiative has also been justified by the lacuna in the Dagbon succession architecture which has not yet gained the status of formalisation although a new Yaa-Naa has been installed. Hence, the rationale behind the review of the 1930 Constitution as driven by the NRPC and supported by other local and international stakeholders revolves around formalising a succession plan for the Dagbon state (Interview 13, 2021).

The depth of knowledge among CSOs based in Tamale on the Dagbon issue was also found to be remarkable. A participant from that sector provided a brief account of the emergence of the initiative and some of the stakeholders and funding agencies involved.

For the Dagbon, the constitution is as old as anything, 1930. We have long been engaging stakeholders on the sustainable prospects for Dagbon. It was during some of those engagements that the idea came of the review of the constitution, an Oxfam-sponsored programme. We started the discussion with the Northern Regional Peace Council, and eventually, the council adopted it. The current funding for the project is coming from USAID, but the National Peace Council through the Northern Regional Peace Council is facilitating it. But it is an arrangement centered on agricultural governance resilience and empowerment. We have other actors like Care International part of the Agric project (Interview 13, March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

The NRPC also emphasised an important issue that has emerged from the current review of the Dagbon 1930 Constitution which is the place of grandsons, whether they are also qualified to occupy certain skins in the traditional governance system. In this context, the assertion was that the traditional constitutional review process would address all these critical issues in the spirit of consensus. A participant explained,

...if we agree that grandsons are not qualified for any skin, then in that case, they will not aspire to any skin. If there is no certified document supporting any of such provisions, then once a father dies as a royal, everyone will come and say they have the right to ascend to the throne (Interview 13, 2021).

Remarking on the prospects of peace in Dagbon, a participant from UNESCO Ghana referred to some traditional governance stability in Ghana. Key to his view was how the Ashanti Kingdom can serve as a reference point to Dagbon. He noted,

Examples can be found in Kumasi where land belongs to Otumfuo. That is one person. They have even gone ahead and put everything together. It is computerised so that there are no issues. As in Accra for example, you can sell land to people several times and it creates problems among families. And with Kumasi, the lines of succession also are clearly defined and it makes it easier. Hence, if those kinds of lessons can be learnt and taken up to the north, for example. You would remember that when the Andanis and the Abudus were having these problems, the Otumfuo chaired a committee of eminent chiefs to mediate for peace to prevail. That is another area that you would want to look at as to what happened and how things worked out and a new king was enskinned leading to the current relative peace that we are having (Interview 20, March 24, 2021).

Likewise, while confirming knowledge of the work of the Peace Council in Dagbon, one peacebuilding practitioner described the ongoing Dagbon succession plan as an important qualitative process that seeks to produce a document towards institutionalising a traditional system of governance. His view suggested that dealing with issues such as chieftaincy location, the definition of a chief, and qualification for succession would serve as a reference point for bringing finality to the continuing problem of succession. The participant also mentioned the significance of the Dagbon State Council as a key stakeholder in the process which would help deepen legitimacy and provide some prospects for sustainability in Dagbon when it comes to chieftaincy issues. This would ease the process of inclusivity in endorsement when completed. However, the findings revealed a major challenge of in-depth analysis of a project that is ongoing and not completed. Nonetheless, the preliminary prospects as drawn from this participant was that since most chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana, and particularly in the northern part of the country border on succession, it could also serve as a springboard to other areas of the country where succession to paramountcy have been a source of disputes and violence (Interview 33, 2021).

When asked about the prospects of the ongoing NRPC mechanism, a more critical view was expressed by participants from academia with knowledge of the issue. One participant remarked

that the Dagbon Constitution and the succession plan are a long overdue process. Even if both parties may be involved in the process, the signing of the document may be a completely different matter. For all you know, others may be re-interpreting it in other ways, and some processes would have to be instituted to deepen consensus among the parties (Interview 39, 2021).

Similarly, a civil society participant from WANEP Ghana in Tamale also shared his knowledge on the ongoing process by remarking as follows:

As I indicated, the 1930 constitution of the Dagbon has an indigenous input into it. But even with that constitution, others think otherwise as to whether to regard it as a constitution and for them, they even say there has never been a constitution. But, to the extent that we have the current Dagbon traditional council which comprises all the divides agrees to use this document as their basis before a new constitution, it is significant. That means that there is that acknowledgement of that document — the existence of it and now to use as the basis for their review (Interview 13, March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

Some of the critical views from the findings also raised other concerns when it comes to relative peace in Dagbon. An example was cited in the context of traditional ceremonies which described a scenario where despite the current stability that has been restored, during annual festivals, the Abudus were likely to go to the Regent who are sub-divisional chiefs from their side whereas the Andanis were likely to go to the substantive New Yaa Naa. In other words, certain traditional stakeholders may have other interests that oppose the current Yaa Naa nominee. This finding implied that despite the significant level of understanding in the enskinment of a new Yaa-Naa and the relative peace that seems to have been achieved, the event of peacebuilding in Dagbon cannot be equated to a completed peacebuilding process. The emphasis was that peacebuilding required more local resilience towards conflict transformation, beyond the current scope of peacemaking. In other words, peacebuilding in Dagbon should be aimed at transforming the consciousness of the primary parties to make them fully committed to any process facilitated by third parties like the NPC and CSOs (Interview 39, 2021).

From the findings, the role of third parties was also viewed as significant, but their strategy as implied should be geared towards creating awareness through peace education that targeted behavioural and attitudinal change in the primary parties. This overtime can help bring the needed transformation. It was also suggested that peace education could take several forms including peace messaging that could help communities learn and be educated on peace-related issues, the propagation of peace sermons from the religious sectors, workshops, capacity-building programmes that teach skills on conflict analysis, and the appropriate measures for addressing conflict non-violently. By implication, the journey of peacebuilding towards sustainability cannot be based on just one intervention. Further to that context, peacebuilding should be society-led where the NRPC engages more with civil society and limits the sole use of governmental structures which could be blemished by partisan politics (Interview 39, 2021).

In the context of the relationship between the NRPC and FBOs in northern Ghana, the findings of the study ascertained the usefulness of the eminent attributes as implemented using the NPC Act. For example, it was observed that since the composition of some of the NRPC members included key religious groups, this deepened the facilitation of some projects from FBOs who have key members in the NRPC. An example was cited in respect of the Archbishop of Tamale, Most Reverend Philip Naameh, who is the President of the Catholic Bishops Conference, and also chairs the NRPC. Secondly, the current Executive Secretary of the NRPC Father Thaddeus Kuusah is also a Catholic Bishop who plays a dual role as a member of the Catholic Diocese in Tamale, and as head of the secretariat of the NRPC. As an example, this was implied as a dividend to the NRPC because, with that linkage, the Executive Secretariat was able to ease gatekeeping in terms of how the NRPC could feasibly facilitate resource opportunities through the Catholic Relief Services in

the region for capacity building programmes for the NRPC and support peacebuilding efforts (Interview 12, 2021).

Findings from the NRPC also relayed the significance of these dual attributes. For example, before the 2020 election, the NRPC described initiatives such as Inter-Youth Dialogue Committees that engaged not only political actors in the region and political youth groups but also youth groups in development-oriented activities. By facilitating this initiative under the auspices of the Catholic Church, participants were guided to design activities on their own that they felt could contribute to peaceful elections. This example was used to justify the significance of the dual attributes of some of the members of the NRPC. The Executive Secretary in particular uses his executive role in the NRPC and priestly role in the Catholic Church in Tamale as two structures in local peacebuilding. Similarly, with funding from the church, other activities were undertaken through peace matches and radio advocacy. The emphasis on this finding implied that once youth groups are working together, they can influence their peers on the need for nonviolence (Interview 12, 2021). It can also be suggested from this finding that since religious actors play a critical role in the operationalisation of I4P, the coordination between the Peace Council and the religious community in the northern region remains indispensable for the practice of peacebuilding in the region (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). In other areas, a report from the NPC described the formation of District Peace Committees at the Kpandai and Salaga local government jurisdictions which served as local peace committees to address potential threats to peaceful elections in the communities (NPC, 2020b).

The notion of shared responsibility in peacebuilding is also reflected in the findings in the context of Northern Ghana. For instance, the NRPC described other initiatives beyond the circles of the

NRPC where the Catholic Church partnered with the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and from 2016 undertook what was termed a Youth Life Project (Interview 12, 2021). As corroborated by the 2021 annual report by the CRS, between 2020 and 2021, 250 youth received technical and vocational training in their various fields of life skills interests while 520 youth also benefited from professional development training to complement the life skills. What the CRS described as the Youth LIFE 2.0 Project also provided an enabling and supportive environment that ensured that the vulnerable in society were supported, including out-of-school urban and peri-urban youth. (CRS, 2022). Some of the scope of the vulnerability that the project sought to address was described in the interview data. They included taking people from the streets, the pavilions and other idle places, and providing them with skills training for six months. These people were further engaged by various service providers. They were provided with some starter packs from the CRS to commence their businesses, enhancing the professionalism of the youth (Interview 12, 2021). The project had the end means of providing opportunities to these people for their social development and economic growth (CRS, 2022). In the context of peacebuilding, local developmental activities like skills training, economic opportunities, and youth empowerment remain a crucial structural dimension to the prevention of conflict, particularly among the youth population who are noted to be vulnerable to exploitation in political vigilantism and other violent activities (Gyampo et al., 2017). The finding suggests that structural initiatives can contribute to the sustenance of peace when they help reduce unemployment in areas that have a potential mobilising factor towards violence (Interview 12, 2021; Interview 33, 2021).

The finding in the context of Dagbon and its environs was also corroborated by October 1, 2018, to September 30, 2019 report on Feed the Future Northern Ghana Governance Activity. The report described how a number of structural interventions such as conflict mitigation and

prevention mechanisms and activities, contributed to strengthening responsive governance towards improving agriculture development in Ghana (USAID, 2018-2019). The finding showed that during the time of the enskinment of the Yaa-Naa, there were tensions and pockets of violence in areas like Chereponi (Interview 12, 2021). For example, since 2018, the Chokosis (also called Anufors) and the Konkomba ethnic groups in the Chereponi District, experienced conflict over land rights escalating into violent clashes, which had a devastating effect on lives and property. With USAID funding, the Northern Ghana Governance Activity under the technical support of the NRPC followed through with a programme called the Rapid Response Initiative (RRI) following the enskinment of the Yaa-Naa. The aim was to proactively engage the stakeholders, including traditional authorities at the level of sustainability by focusing on restoring peace and security in the Dagbon Traditional Area and Chereponi and Saboba Districts (USAID, 2018-2019; Interview 12, 2021). The report indicated that a consortium of actors with the collaboration of the NRPC and the traditional leaders, played a key role in the implementation of the RRI. The process was able to yield a successful outcome such as the resolution of eight chieftaincy disputes, the performance of the funeral rites of past sub-chiefs, and the enskinment of their successors. Another vivid example was the renewal of cordial relationships and the cementing of newfound peace between the Anufor and Konkomba chiefs and elders in Chereponi following the joint performance of land purification rites. The renewal of the cordial relationship between the two ethnic groups contributed to a smooth farming season in 2019 that was free from attacks and reprisals from either side of the divide. By implication, emphasis on the RRI described another way a consortium of partners has provided a structural dimension to the sustenance of peace in Dagbon and its environs (USAID, 2018-2019).

On the same subject, the findings implied a core function for the RRI as a mechanism driven by diplomacy engagement. Accordingly, an official from the NRPC remarked,

In its basic sense, this means that at every point in time, the NRPC and its stakeholders can have the funds to buy fuel and move to a community to engage communities in places where factions have emerged and tensions have erupted because of differences on a certain social, ethnic or cultural issue (Interview 12, March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

These findings also suggest that dialogue plays a significant role in the RRI. Dialogue can minimise tensions that erupt and find solutions before an escalation into violence (Lederach, 2012). Other suggestions included the application of the RRI in other regions in the work of the NPC. In that context, the finding highlighted the effectiveness of the NPC when there are peace committees constantly on the ground. This enhanced the early warning capacity of the NRPC because it tends to create permanent structures on the ground that can quickly pick signals of events that threaten peace and immediately report to the mandated authorities for prompt action. This explanation was contained in an interview response from the Executive Secretary of the NRPC who described a scenario where information on the ground quickly reached his office in Nantom in March 2021 and the positive implication.

A situation of social tension related to chieftaincy quickly reached the Executive Secretary of the NRPC as a result of monitors on the ground who were acting in place of what a District Peace Council should have done if it was operational. The information was then relayed to the Regional Police Commander — a member of REGSEC, who assured the NRPC that the command would take action. Hence, sustained engagement with the stakeholders is an important mechanism for achieving sustainable peace because of the substantive process dimension of peacebuilding. These things are being said to underscore the usefulness of the NPC, and the importance of resourcing it to continue such constant engagements (Interview 12, 2021, March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

By way of overview, the findings above demonstrate the extent to which Ghana's PA has implemented its mandate of facilitating and developing mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and helping to build sustainable peace (Republic of Ghana, 2011). By conflict prevention towards sustainable peace, the overarching spirit behind the mandate of the NPC is to facilitate and develop mechanisms that ensure that conflict does not escalate into

violence in the first place. This is done through capacity building for other institutions and actors at the local level to institute an early warning system in place that will serve as monitors on the ground to detect threats to peace. In other words, peace mediators or monitors as formed in the district are people who are trained on fundamental issues of peacebuilding. However, because of funding and other logistical challenges, it is sometimes not possible to sustain these committees. Hence, some are formed on an ad hoc basis, and others are also volunteers, who may still serve as watchdog in the communities when the period expires. This is a critical effort to help the NPC detect conflict at its latent level and take measures to address it to avoid escalation (Interview 32, 2021).

#### **5.4.2.2 Regional Peacebuilding**

The preceding sub-section presented the findings on local peacebuilding mechanisms within the Dagbon and its environs which include an ongoing succession plan, rapid response initiative, and youth empowerment programmes. This sub-section examines the extent to which these mechanisms reflect various areas of agenda for peace as identified by the UN at the intergovernmental level.

From the literature, Ghana does not epitomise a post-conflict country on a national scale. This is because the country has not experienced armed national conflict or national civil war since it reinstated constitutional democratic governance in 1993 (UN, 1992). However, the case of mini-case two also suggests that Ghana has also not been immune from localised violent chieftaincy conflict in the period. Hence, in the context of mini-case two, the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding at the regional level can be applied to the country. This implies the various peacebuilding mechanisms were necessitated by conflict like Dagbon which escalated into violence in 2002 after creating over a decade of tension in parts of northern Ghana.

By comparison, although the UN's overriding criteria in its I4P development focuses on post-conflict countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi, the formation of the Dagbon chieftaincy crises and the prospective remedies after the second regicide also reveals elements of post-conflict peacebuilding at the sub-national level (UN, 1996). The concept of peacemaking which is used to resolve ongoing conflict through mediation and other non-violent strategies facilitated by a third party also explains the Dagbon situation (Paris, 2004).

The major success story began with the CEC indigenous mediation approach which backs up peacemaking processes. The amicable settlement between the two royal families led to the selection and enskinment of a new Yaa-Naa and the return to relative peace in Dagbon (WWiG, 2021). The approach reflected the significance of conflict transformation that utilises mechanisms that are not alien to the traditions of conflict parties. The outcome of this significant theme through constructive dialogue between the conflict parties contributed to the processes that led to the implementation of the Dagbon roadmap (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011; Abdallah & Amedzrator, 2014; Debrah et al., 2014; Lederach, 2014). In other words, peacemaking in Dagbon after 2002 was targeted at resolving a lingering conflict that had the potential of escalating beyond bounds (Paris, 2004).

Based on the above explanation, the rationale of the Dagbon chieftaincy succession plan (an ongoing project at the time of this research) reinforces the existence of post-conflict peacebuilding in the context of a regional conflict in Ghana. The substantive rationale behind this initial effort is that although a new Yaa Naa has been enskinned since the selection processes have not transpired without controversy and conflict in the past, the 1930 Constitution is not an absolute document.

It should be reviewed based on consensus building by the major parties to institutionalise a succession process without ambiguities (Tsikata & Seini, 2004).

The emphasis above supports the argument of Lederach that transforming conflict requires a long-term process aimed at dealing with destructive structures and deepening legitimacy (Lederach, 2014). This further substantiates the overarching mandate of the NPC on building sustainable peace in practice in the country (Republic of Ghana, 2011). Hence, the full length of peacebuilding in Dagbon proffers conscious efforts that build more resilience through active civil society participation towards conflict transformation — that moves away from quick-fixes to the deployment of long-term mechanisms and activities in situations of protracted conflict which is also anchored in the UN sustainable peace goals (Lederach, 1997; Paris, 2018). By way of context, despite the sub-national nature of mini-case two, the dynamics of peacebuilding efforts in Dagbon lend credence to peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding when measures facilitated by third parties, including peace education and peace messaging, are geared towards transforming the perception, attitudes and the actions of the primary parties that undermine peace. The general import of the other mechanisms within the environs of Dagbon which includes the RRI, Inter-Youth Dialogue Committee, and the Youth Life Project also broadens the full length of stakeholder peacebuilding in the areas of facilitating development initiatives and programmes based on the transformation of structural violence. Table 8 supplements the data analysis with a tabular description of the strengths, limitations, and peacebuilding remedies in the context of mini-case two.

**Table 8: Regional Peacebuilding Mechanisms in Dagbon and its Environs**

<b>Local peacebuilding mechanisms</b>	<b>Framing Agenda for Peace</b>	<b>Nature of mechanism</b>	<b>Goal/ prospect of mechanism</b>	<b>Limitations/ Remedies</b>
Chieftaincy Succession Plan	Post-conflict peacebuilding	Identify and resolve problems to permanently prevent a regicide in the future	Institutionalize traditional succession	Requires significant consensus building for parties to agree to sign when completed for implementation in the future
Rapid Response Initiative	Preventive diplomacy	Diplomacy engagement	Minimize tensions that erupt and find solutions	Reliance on external funding like USAID may undermine local ownership and sustenance of peacebuilding
Youth life project	Preventive diplomacy	Engage political actors and youth groups	Influence youth groups on the need for nonviolence	Initiatives from FBOs are not always sustainable
Inter-youth dialogue committee	Preventive diplomacy	Life skill and professional training for youth	Empowerment to prevent youth from becoming victims of violent perpetration by spoilers and conflict entrepreneurs	Society-led initiatives can face significant funding challenges  But provides an avenue for the NPC to collaborate with FBOs to facilitate sustainable development activities.

Source: (Fieldwork, 2021)

### 5.4.3 Elections and Peacebuilding

For over three decades, Ghana has been regarded as a bastion of democracy in Africa. The resilience in institutional terms can be attributed to a number of factors, including the law-and-order from the security agencies, the rule of law from the courts and alternative justice from the traditional governance system, the independence of the EC and other independent statutory governance institutions like the NCCE and CHRAJ and a robust civil society sector (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). Despite this, other factors cause tensions and threats of violence (WANEP, 2017). In the context of elections, they could be summed as follows: the abuse of the winner-takes-all system, political marginalisation, the lack of understanding of the electoral processes, trust

deficit among various stakeholders, long-standing social and cultural conflicts, a slim margin of victory, bad media reportage, the abuse of national security, and structural violence in the society (Fieldwork, 2021). Hence, elections in particular which are a key indicator for describing the progress of democratic governance in Ghana have their unique significance, limitations, and remedies. In mini-case three, the findings on elections have been presented within the framework of I4P.

#### **5.4.3.1 National Peacebuilding Mechanisms for Peaceful Elections**

From returning to multiparty democratic rule in the early 1990s to the current era (1992-2020), Ghana has conducted eight successive elections. This has consolidated the interest in elections as indispensable to democracy in the country (WANEP, 2017, 2020). The country has also experienced three successful turnovers of political power (2001, 2009, and 2017) from one party to the other (Graham et al., 2017). A 2016 report by the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) on the Second High-Level Meeting of National Leaders, noted that despite the successful and peaceful political turnover in Ghana, elections under Ghana's Fourth Republican Constitution epitomise periods of turbulence and violent threats that extend to the post-election period. This also uncovers the extent to which a highly polarised and partisan environment can pose a great challenge to dialogue and mediation across institutions, political parties, and the public (IDEG, 2016). The research findings identified the peacebuilding mechanisms and the role of Ghana's I4P in the promotion of peaceful elections in the country: Direct Interventions; Election Observation; Presidential Peace Pact and Consensus Building.

In no chronological order, the first mechanism identified as Direction Intervention was implemented after a by-election violence in the country. The findings revealed a significant direct intervention which was a peacebuilding dialogue process that led to the propagation of the

Roadmap and Code of Conduct for the eradication of political vigilantism as well as the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act to curb the menace of political vigilantism and other electoral malpractices (Interview 7, 2021). As a background, following the electoral violence that ensued during a by-election at the Ayawaso West Wuogon Electoral Area on January 31<sup>st</sup>, 2019, the President of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, directed the two major political parties, the NPP and the NDC to participate in a direct dialogue and find ways of eliminating political vigilantism in Ghana. However, the dialogue process was rather executed by the NPC acting as the main third-party mediator. A report of the NPC showed that under months of intensive dialogue and mediation processes and pursuant to the final commitment of the parties to disband the menace for political purposes, prohibit its ownership, hiring, and utilisation by political parties and cooperate with the relevant state agencies to pursue an agenda of total eradication, the NPC designed a Roadmap and Code of Conduct for the Eradication of Political Vigilantism in Ghana (NPC, 2020a). Prior to that, the President took steps that led to the passage of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999) in Parliament “to disband vigilante groups; including political party vigilante group and land guards; to proscribe acts of vigilantism in the country and to provide for related matters” (Republic of Ghana, 2020, p. 1).

The view of study participants from the court and academics have described the significance of enforcing the law on the eradication of political vigilantism to the letter:

When you enforce the law, it means we will make it less productive for people to engage in it; because the punitive measures of the Vigilantism Law Act 999 are very stringent. The law itself is very dangerous — if I say dangerous, it is a very effective law that can deal with all manner of issues. It deals with three categories of people one, those who are allowing themselves to be mobilised, two, those who profit from the act, and three, those who use the services of the act. When we talk about a developing country, we are talking about enactment and enforcement. We should know that sometimes we need the political will to enforce. (Fieldwork, 2021).

The study found an in-depth account of the NPC's peacebuilding dialogue processes which led to the formulation of the document on the Roadmap and Code of Conduct. According to a report, the NPC engaged three external technical teams and 10 technical support teams (NPC, 2020a). An interview with a member of the external technical team suggested that while the NPC has a functional secretariat with technical expertise, the high-level nature of the mediation and dialogue processes necessitated the use of professionals and academics outside the council to complement the work of the secretariat. This was meant to bring a different perspective and expertise towards addressing a particular conflict or issue (Interview 39, 2021). This can also be interpreted as outsiders with the technical know-how and their professional ability to provide a supportive and collaborative contribution to insiders to help shape the process of peacebuilding. With respect to the processes involved in the formulation of the Vigilantism Road-Map and Code of Conduct (Refer to Appendix I), the interview further suggested that the decision to include the consultants from outside was based on the decision and funding resolve of the UNDP. Conforming to the terms and conditions, the external technical experts undertook the preparatory work by providing the historical background and analysis as well as tracking themes for dealing with the political vigilantism problem (Interview 39, 2021). The invitation of technical experts was a strategic approach that supports the notion of outsider-neutral attributes of objectivity and neutrality in the process of liberal peace (Wehr & Lederach, 1991).

A participant from academia also mentioned other import of the Roadmap and Conduct of Conduct which was meant to check the immediate actions and behaviour of the political parties to discourage them from drawing on the services of vigilante groups. However, since there were structural issues that could not be addressed immediately, the Roadmap was structured into about 22 strategic short-term, medium-term, and long-term activities (NPC, 2020a; Interview 39, 2021).

For example, the activity which obliged political parties to take the necessary steps to ensure that their members refrain from organised activities that contribute to political vigilantism was categorised under the short-term phase. The activity which placed an obligation on both government and CSOs to contribute to the creation of alternative economic activities and employment opportunities for the youth who engage in political vigilantism as a source of income in order to reduce their vulnerability to political manipulation was classified within the medium-term to long-term (NPC, 2020a, pp. 20-24). A notable theme from this finding is the structural nature of the roadmap. The shared responsibility in peacebuilding was reflected in the intervention efforts which included other agencies like the NCCE, the Police, the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Media Houses and Owners, the Media Commission, CSOs, and the developmental prowess of the Government at large (Interview 39, 2021; Republic of Ghana, 2020). However, a contrary view was expressed to this observation by an official from the NPC whose view implied that the classification to eradicate political vigilantism in the short-medium-long term was not necessarily about institutional involvement. The interpretation was that whether the activity involved reducing violence using a short-term approach or resolving the core issues of a conflict on a long-term basis, the facilitating mandate of the NPC should be involved (Interview 40, 2021).

Field interviews as well as reports on the implementation of the Roadmap, Code of Conduct, and Act showed that the NPC used both governmental and non-governmental funding support to undertake different peace education programmes across the country to contribute to a peaceful election in 2020. Through its regional offices, awareness creation programmes were implemented using the medium of workshops, community forums, and the media. More specifically, it was found that direct interventions towards the 2020 election were facilitated to educate political actors,

youth, and organised groups on the content of the Vigilantism Act; the ramifications, and the punishments that come with engaging in political vigilantism; how they must conduct themselves during the 2020 elections. (NPC 2020b, 2020; Interview 32, 2021).

The research findings from the Volta and Oti regions revealed that the Regional Peace Council conducted workshops with political party leaders in significant hotspot constituencies before the 2020 elections. The purpose of these workshops was to educate them on the risks of engaging in political vigilantism and to emphasise the serious consequences stipulated by the Act for anyone who breaks the law (Interview 5, 2021). The Executive Secretary of the Ashanti Regional Peace Council Emmanuel Amoah, described some of the criteria for selecting hotspot regions in the Ashanti Region. His response intimated that since the region is overwhelmingly an NPP stronghold, the swing constituencies were selected as the potential hotspots such as Asawase and Ejura Sekyere. Other criteria included those areas that have underlying land or chieftaincy conflict. The finding emphasised that a preventive approach to peacebuilding was a major drive to implementing the Roadmap, Code of Conduct, and Act for Eradicating Vigilantism. This was demonstrated by the direct engagement with political party members on the potential areas for recruiting vigilante groups and using the vigilante eradication documents to sensitise the stakeholders. Another preventive mechanism was the ad hoc peace mediation committees in some of the constituencies which provided useful information to the Regional Peace Councils on potential threats. The ability of the NPC and its regional offices to use their good offices to analyse and relay such information to the appropriate agencies like the police or EC for action was also interpreted in the context of prevention (Interview 9, 2021). Similar activities were undertaken in other regions through public education on the radio and religious places on the vigilantism issue, especially the apprehensive penalties associated with violating the law, the training of peace ambassadors who helped in

gathering information as quickly as possible to augment the lack of full functional District Peace Councils (Interview 14, 2021; Interview 10, 2021). According to the NPC, these measures which were implemented across the various constituencies helped to keep the canker of vigilantism at bay during the 2020 elections for the first time (Interview 32, 2021).


A civil society participant with knowledge of direct intervention detailed a lengthy example,

In the 2020 elections, we worked basically with youth in electoral hotspots like Asawase, Akwatia, Tano South, and Ejura Sekyere Odumase. We designed what we call a ball game just like the ludo that you play but it is designed to explain the vigilantism law. We brought the youth of NDC/NPP leadership to one hotel for three days where they played the games. But when you play and it hits where there is a snake, you pick the card and it explains to you. When you play and it hits where there is a stone, you pick the card, which says you go to the National Peace Council. When you commit a violent offence using a stone or any offensive weapon, you are tantamount to going to prison between 15 to 20 years. When you play the ludo and it hits a stone you pick the card and it tells you what the law says. We used the games to explain the vigilantism law and other electoral laws to them, the dos and don'ts, and the offences. These are some of the things we call direct interventions (Interview 7, March 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2021).

The above findings indicate that stakeholder peacebuilding is important in the execution of the mandate of the NPC. Other notable areas of direct interventions in the form of stakeholder peacebuilding to promote peaceful elections in Ghana were also found in field interviews and reports. For example, an interview with a civil society participant indicated that before the 2020 election, CDD-Ghana, in collaboration with the NPC, established ad hoc peace mediation committees (PMCs) across the country. As part of this modus operandi, the mechanism was used to detect latent conflict signals which were swiftly reported to the NPC. The NPC then engaged with the enforcement stakeholders such as the EC and the Police for timely intervention to prevent escalation (Interview 7, 2021). According to a report by the NPC, the NPC/CDD-Ghana PMCs were established in 16 selected constituencies/districts in the country under the project “Community Capacity for Conflict Management at District Level” (NPC, 2020, p. 16).

The immediate Figure shows the scope of the PMC in the areas of selection criteria, selected constituencies, responsibilities, and cumulative reach.

**Figure 9: A Scope of Peace Mediation Committees during the 2020 Elections**



Source: (NPC, 2020c, 2020d, pp. 29-31; CDD Ghana, 2023, pp. 10)

A 2020 annual report by the CDD-Ghana also corroborated the findings on the PMCs in the context of the collaboration between civil society and the NPC to promote direct interventions.

CDD Ghana and the NPC set up Peace Mediation Committees (PMCs) in 16 violent-prone districts ahead of the 2020 elections. The 16 constituted PMCs consisted of five members each, were to fill in the gaps in districts where the NPC had no district offices, this is primarily because the council only had four district offices out of the 260 districts at the time of implementing this intervention. The PMCs carried out several community-level activities in their respective districts over the course of four months- October 2020 to January 2021 (CDD-Ghana, 2023, p. 10).

Despite the significance of the PMCs, other interpretations of its prospects have shown that its ad hoc has caused a huge gap since its termination after the 2020 election. These actors who would have served as local peace committees would have enhanced direct interventions and established permanent early warning systems. The initiative failed because the NPC was not in the financial

position to sustain funding for PMCs permanently. With the creation of six additional regions, the NPC has been able to establish Regional Peace Councils in about fifteen out of the sixteen regions at the time of the research. While this is a significant improvement, it does not meet the provision set out in the NPC Act which indicates a decentralised I4P in both the regions and the districts.

Overall, the findings on direct interventions suggest that the elimination of vigilantism also requires significant local participation to be inclusive and effective. Further, regarding the prospects of the above mechanism within the context of periodic elections in Ghana, it is suggested that the failure to facilitate sustainable consensus building among the political parties on their continuous commitment to eradicating the menace would further recycle the problem. These prospects are similar to the other mechanisms examined in this area of the study.

The findings identified Election Observation as the second major mechanism that was implemented during the period of elections. This mechanism is technically described in operational terms as the Election Situation Room (ESR) which was spearheaded by WANEP in collaboration with the NPC and other state and non-state stakeholders. The ESR is a multifaceted situation analysis platform within WANEP's broader project in West Africa to mitigate election violence using the National Level Early Warning Systems with funding from the EU. ESR implementation observes, reports, and analyses information collected on the field on the day of an election. It is fundamentally similar to a traditional election observation mission. However, the difference is the component of preventive action to facilitate responses to violent threats, voter corruption, and the abuse of human rights during the conduct of a peaceful presidential and parliamentary election (WANEP, 2017, 2020). The research results affirmed the nature of the prevention dimension as a mechanism executed during a national election event. For instance, in functional terms, during the

2020 election, the ESR was used to observe the electoral field that is connected to situation rooms across the country. The observation fed issues and threats on the ground to the situation rooms. The ESR was fit for both electoral registration and exhibition of voter registers, as well as elections itself. The issues collected were analysed and forwarded to the appropriate agencies for verification and prompt action (Interview 32, 2021).

A study participant from the WANEP confirmed the longstanding inception of the ESR with the NPC over a decade ago. The participant noted, “Regarding direct engagement, some of the mechanisms include the situation engagement, WANEP did it with the NPC in 2012” (Interview 13, March 13th, 2021). According to a field report by the WANEP (2013), the situation room concept leveraged the experiences of civil society’s contribution to peaceful elections in several West African countries. In Ghana’s 2012 election, in particular, the WANEP was at the forefront of what was termed the “Joint Party Election Results Monitoring” (J-PERM) Situation Room. This included the provision of software for data collection by the Catholic University College of Ghana from the designated official Polling Agents of the Political Parties. Results were then displayed in the J-PERM Situation Room, ably represented by political party monitors. Under the J-PERM framework, WANEP in collaboration with the Civic Forum Initiative and the Peace Council engaged in behind-the-scenes mediation on disputed results raised by the opposition NPP party at the time. This initiative was regarded as a significant contribution to Ghana’s electoral process, reinforcing the democratic culture of the country (WANEP, 2013, pp. 5-6).

Other findings describing the continuation of the situation room concept in subsequent national elections and the nature of the collaboration were detailed by another WANEP official,

In 2016, we worked together, and we had what we call a “national election responses working group”. Then we had the regional election working responses group and early warning responses group. In that election, we established an election situation room in Accra, and we also had two regional election situation rooms, one was in Kumasi, and another one was in Tamale. We had joint debriefings, so after the opening of the election, there was a briefing on some of the issues. We were briefed on different issues by the field observers and we analysed them in our situation room. Throughout the electioneering process, we helped the NPC to carry that role of taking our findings and engaging the electoral managers (Fieldwork, 2021).

The validity of the 2016 ESR was also confirmed by a former council member of the NPC who provided some details in respect of the 2016 ESR. More specifically, the study participant recalled the deployment of about 750 people to the field, equipping them with phones and other necessary tools, and connecting them to the situation rooms. These field agents gathered information based on specific variables provided, such as the arrival time of ballot papers, the opening time of polling stations, the start time of voting, and any incidents or disputes. The field agents quickly sent this information to the receiving room, which was linked to all 750 agents nationwide. The receiving room processed the information and then passed it on to the processing room, which had a dedicated team working on it. Finally, the information was sent to the decision room, where only Peace Council board members were present with the assistance of some partners (Interview 3, 2021).

The findings from the interview of other WANEP officials highlighted a recurring theme in all the ESRs in 2012, 2016, and 2020 which is the role of stakeholder peacebuilding in the respective implementations. However, the findings on the 2020 election also showed an expanded ESR from two to three: one in Kumasi, one in the Volta Region, and one specifically in Tamale in the northern region (Interview 11, 2021). To provide further details, an ESR report on the December 7, 2020 elections also disclosed that the WANEP and the NPC deployed 350 observers in 168 prioritised hotspots, which was supplemented by another deployment by the NCCE which covered 2,341 polling stations, all in the 275 constituencies across 16 regions of the country. The 2020 ESR had

four operational sections: Data Gathering, Analysis, Decision, and Communication. To support response action within the regions, the ESR had a central coordinating location in Accra (Movenpick Ambassador Hotel), which was supplemented by three other Satellite Situation Rooms: The *Middle Cluster* in Kumasi (Miklin Hotel), the *Northern Cluster* in Tamale (Mariam Hotel) and the *Southern Cluster* in Ho (African Hill Hotel). At the Central ESR Decision Room, for example, 17 Eminent Persons were drawn from the NPC, supported by officials from WANEP, NCCE, STAR-Ghana Foundation, the EC, and the IDEG, who utilised their good offices and employed preventive diplomacy to resolve identified threats and mitigated their impact (WANEP, 2020). The recurring theme of stakeholder participation in peacebuilding that involved the NPC was interpreted as a justification for the clear mandate as Ghana's statutory peace institution and its representatives in the region. In addition, since the NPC is challenged by a lack of a decentralised peacebuilding presence, the technical expertise, funding, or machinery of other actors was used to make their functions realistic (Interview 4, 2021). This finding demonstrates that the practice of I4P in the context of elections significantly derives some strength from other peacebuilding stakeholders.

A report by the WANEP indicated that through the four operational sections of the 2020 ESR in particular, some isolated incidents were identified. These issues required the Eminent Persons to use their good offices to engage the relevant stakeholders. They included the verification machine failures in selected areas, unaccounted ballot paper, voting stopped temporarily due to bad weather, power outages affecting the counting of ballots, attempted snatching of ballots, reported gunshots, physical and verbal abuse among voters in queues, and around polling stations, disruption of the voting process by knife-wielding strong muscular men, voter impersonation, allegations of printing of ballots, and reported gunshots. Some of the reported incidents were found not to be true while

others were verified and dealt with by the appropriate mandated agencies. As part of their mandate, the NPC members in the decision room together with their stakeholders were directly involved in using their good offices to engage the relevant stakeholders particularly the EC and the Police. They made recommendations on the way forward and demanded assurances of prompt actions if the reports were verified to be true (WANEP, 2020).

Within the above context, a study participant from academia described Ghana as a test case in terms of the contributions of peace structures like the Peace Council towards peaceful elections in Africa. He observed that in other parts of Africa, elections often lead to significant violence, as seen in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010. He further argued that the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire occurred because they lacked a peace structure like Ghana's Peace Council—there was no institution to bring parties together for dialogue. Similarly, Kenya experienced serious post-election violence in 2007. Many countries do not have a body like Ghana's Peace Council to facilitate mediation and dialogue, which is why they descend into violence. In Ghana's 2012 election, the country faced similar issues to those in Côte d'Ivoire. However, the presence of the Peace Council made a crucial difference. The Peace Council engaged the parties through several consensus-building platforms, including the presidential peace accord. Other mechanisms such as the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), contributed to the mediation of conflict and dousing of tensions, as well as guiding prospective processes in the courts. The same was evident in 2020, where institutions like the Peace Council and election observers worked behind the scenes to lower tensions and facilitate dialogue. In contrast, countries like Côte d'Ivoire lacked a credible institution trusted by all parties, leading to violence. This necessitates the proper management of various consensus-building mechanisms as earlier indicated to consolidate peace and democracy and serve as a model for other African countries (Interview 31, 2021).

The third mechanism could generally be characterised using different terms: Presidential Peace Pact, Peace Accord, or Peace Commitment. Since its formalisation in 2011, the NPC together with other stakeholders has used the idea of a Peace Pact as a mechanism implemented a few days before the conduct of the 2012, 2016, and 2020. These activities were facilitated in a High-level meeting of National Leaders which led to a public signing ceremony by leaders of political parties (NPC, 2020a). The Presidential Election Peace Pact (PEPP) is an innovation of the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG). It was first introduced and experimented in 2012 in partnership with the NPC and the National House of Chiefs (NHOC). The IDEG described it as:

a mechanism to commit leaders of political parties to fostering peaceful conduct by their followers and sympathizers before, during and after presidential and parliamentary elections, and to bind them to adopt judicial adjudication should there be disputes over official presidential election results (IDEG, 2020a).

According to the IDEG, a governance civil society in Ghana, the Election 2012 PEPP, which was themed, *Electoral Violence, Impunity and Injustice* brought eight political parties who were contesting the elections to commit themselves to the maintenance of the rule of law throughout the electoral process. Their commitments were timely because even though the leading opposition party candidate disputed the result of the election, the party sought redress in the Supreme Court which eventually triggered some electoral reforms. In 2016, the Peace Pact which was themed, *Strengthening Ghana's Democratic Stability, Peace and National Unity*, was also a partnership between the IDEG, the NPC, and the NHOC. While there was no presidential election dispute in the 2016 elections and the losing candidate graciously accepted defeat, the process went to reaffirm the 2012 commitment of the parties. Their commitment to peace was another way to strengthen the public trust that in the event of a dispute, the court system will still be a source for seeking redress, and also ensuring that party supporters avoid the use of violence in resolving their grievances. However, the IDEG further indicated that following a by-election violent incident that

occurred in the bid up to the 2020 elections as a result of political vigilante activities, the facilitators of the pact which included the IDEG, the NPC, and the Office of the National Chief Imam, implemented another peace pact in 2020 themed, *Eradicating Electoral Violence in Ghana's Democracy: the Role of Political Leadership*. The PEPP was signed by the Presidential candidates of the two major political parties, NPP led by the President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo and the Former President John Dramani Mahama due to their parties' direct association with the menace of political vigilantism (IDEG, 2020a, 2020b).

Several views have been expressed on the practical relevance of peace accords within Ghana's peacebuilding field. Two study participants interpreted the mechanism as a useful process in an electoral process, particularly the moral aspect of it. From their position, the two major political parties in Ghana, the NDC and the NPP, have a huge following in the country. Therefore, what they say and do means a lot as far as the stability of the country is concerned. Hence, the public signing of such a document sends some signal to their members that they are committed to peace, and to that extent, it is relevant. It was also viewed as a public exercise that brings important statesmen, stateswomen, and stakeholders together, including the NPC, Chiefs, CSOs, other religious leaders, and international actors. Hence, the moral aspect was also regarded as significant as it can question the morality of political parties. In summary, the findings challenge sceptics of the mechanism by suggesting that those who doubt its significance should consider its potential addition to Ghana's democratic resilience without causing any harm (Interview 13, 2021; Interview 25, 2021).

The findings revealed other similar agreements that noted that PEPPs are important moral gestures that the NPC and its partners have used to ease tensions in the country among political actors relying on their commitment to peace and for their supporters to follow suit. However, the

usefulness of the PEPP was also laid on other factors, particularly the role of facilitators to ensure compliance which was regarded as a lacuna in Ghana's perspective (Interview 28, 2021; Interview 32, 2021). The interpretation of this finding was that the impact of the accords was not just about the signing ceremony. An active post-accord period by the facilitators was also essential. In other words, the facilitators like the NPC and CSOs and also the international community could serve as active moral guarantors as well as establish a joint monitoring team to monitor and evaluate the actions of the parties and draw their attention to what they have signed (Interview 28, 2021). Another interpretation from a study participant from academia stated that CSOs could play a crucial role in enforcing peace accords by using moral suasion. Although a peace accord is just a sheet of paper containing signatures of political party leaders, CSOs can hold signatories accountable by publicly reminding them of their commitments to non-violence, fair elections, and resolving disputes through due process. By leveraging media and public platforms, CSOs can pressure signatories to adhere to their promises, thus giving the peace accords more enforceability. (Interview 35, 2021).

In a similar context, another participant from academia was cautiously optimistic about the significance of peace accords. He further quizzed,

Can it positively change the behaviour of citizens or party supporters who may have witnessed the signing events? Based on its symbolism, the hugging, and warm memories, probably the people who have seen these events and are planning to perpetrate violence may think otherwise. But, there is no empirical research to find out how it shapes the behaviour of citizens, or how many people even view such programmes (Interview 39, June 15<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

The concerns about its effectiveness also came from another peacebuilding practitioner who indicated that while the accords are supposed to play an important role in Ghana's peacebuilding, unfortunately, the signing may not mean anything. He further implied that the notion that the signing of a peace pact by top leadership signs will automatically translate into peace at the bottom

is not always certain because the top may not have control over the bottom. The alternative proposal that was suggested was a bottom-up approach where the Regional Peace Councils and their partners rather facilitate such accords among the local political actors at the regional level (Interview 33, 2021).

In a notable finding from an academic researcher, the significance of peace accords should rest on the confidence that political parties have in the electoral processes. The participant noted,

Apart from what the Peace Council does, it also depends upon the confidence you have in the electoral system that is if the independent electoral commission can demonstrate trustworthiness. For example, if a party lost in 2016 by a wide margin, why won't they respect a future peace accord? It is when the electoral process, including the registration processes, is suspected to be shrouded in some secrecy, then a peace accord means nothing. When there are clear violations in terms of the rigging of the elections, violence perpetrated on civilians, and marginalisation of certain groups to prevent them from voting, then you do not expect such peace accords to be effective. The electoral processes also matter. (Interview 24, April 26<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

The import of this finding is that the electoral processes should be seen to be fair to all the parties before their commitments to peace. The submission above opens a related subject on other mechanisms that have been crucial before the conduct of elections in Ghana. The research results found two main mechanisms in the context of consensus building: the EC-led Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), and the NCCE-led Inter-Party District Committees (IPDCs).

The general findings were that consensus building is at the heart of peacebuilding, particularly at the heart of mediation, dialogue, and the extent to which third parties find a common ground to work with primary parties in a situation (Interview 4, 2021). By interpretation, people need to come to a compromise and establish a common ground rather than using an adversarial process like the court system which may produce a zero-sum determination (Interview 27, 2021). Described differently, if it becomes a norm to resolve social or political disputes through the legal processes, mistrust in the legal system may lead to the escalation of grievances (Interview 31, 2021). However, the emphasis on consensus building in practice also implied that in reality,

primary parties should not be expected to agree to a 50-50 outcome before commencing a contentious process. An underlying rule of consensus as intimated was that facilitators must first have the confidence of the people and facilitate a process where the parties find some common ground to work with even if the process is not necessarily even. Consensus is about working towards an agreement, with parties making some concessions based on fair and transparent facilitated processes (Interview 4, 2021).

In the context of elections, a study participant from Ghana's EC interpreted the effective mandate of the election management body as a distinction between consensus and control. His first point was buttressed by Article 46 of Ghana's 1992 Constitution, which implied that the EC cannot be controlled by anybody or institution. Hence, if the building of consensus is going to compromise the integrity of the electoral process, the EC cannot be part of that consensus. This is because the buck stops with the EC in terms of organising free, fair and transparent elections. Another point was that the EC should be the body making the decision on the compilation of a voter register based on its discretion on whether a current voter register is faulty or not. Hence, the EC cannot be controlled by the parties to undertake substantial issues based on the interest of the parties. By implication, the participant also criticised the universal use of consensus building in election management which if not checked may extend to the control of the electoral timetable for the electoral process, or even decisions about the declaration of the results of a national election. The relative use of consensus building was rather suggested through the medium of IPAC, such as dealing with administrative issues on the number of polling stations or polling agents for deployment at each polling station (Interview 23, 2021).

In another vein, a study participant from the academic field rather provided a broader explanation. He noted that since elections are highly contentious issues about the acquisition of political power, its management should not rely solely on the election management body. Institutions like the EC, the Police, the NHOC, the Courts, the NPC, the NCCE, and CSOs need to be credible and involved to help restrain the behaviour of political parties. By implication, whether Ghana or any country can have stability, peace, security, and violence-free elections, there must be institutional effectiveness, and then issues of consensus will come along as a complement (Interview 27, 2021).

The participant further noted,

The EC has a responsibility to manage, organise, and ensure that elections are held peacefully and the results declared. Hence, anything that the EC deems necessary to ensure this outcome, the EC is mandated to do that. But I think the problem comes when people have credibility issues where the EC is perceived as biased based on some of its actions and inactions. That is why other stakeholders are important in promoting institutional effectiveness in election-related peacebuilding (Interview 27, May 5<sup>th</sup>, 2021).

A more critical view was found in the findings which critiqued the emphasis on a consensus and control dichotomy. It re-emphasised the important place of consensus building in an electoral process. Consensus building for one peacebuilding practitioner is a bedrock of peaceful elections. It is a mechanism for reducing tensions because it is in one sense grounded in transparency. The election management body can draw on the principle of consultation in its management of the elections and relations with the political parties. The participant referenced the IPAC system which provides a major stakeholder platform for dialogue and disagreement to reach a common platform. CSOs and academia on the sidelines could also advocate and make suggestions on what may be best for the country. Ultimately, the argument for the sacrosanct independence of the EC is not grounded in the spirit of the law. This creates the perception of institutional autocracy rather than its capacity to foster consensus among stakeholders, the latter of which aligns with the spirit of the law (Interview 33, 2021).

A challenge with the IPAC mechanism is the merely advisory attribute without legal backing. While it seems to play a crucial role in national consensus-building, some study participants highlighted the potential benefits of formalising the IPAC in the legal regime of the country. However, other field interpretations quizzed that making the IPAC a body backed by law may likely necessitate amending the Constitution or the EC Act through legislative action. (Interview 21, 2021; Interview 22, 2021). For instance, a rigid provision in Article 51 of the 1992 Constitution explicitly stated how the EC should undertake its functions:

The Electoral Commission shall, by constitutional instrument, make regulations for the effective performance of its functions under this Constitution or any other law, and in particular, for the registration of voters, the conduct of public elections and referenda, including provision for voting by proxy (Republic of Ghana, 1992).

The constitutional challenge notwithstanding, it can be implied from the findings that in a democracy, all the practices cannot be legitimised. Certain practices are laws and others may be based on a body of conventions. The assertion from other views was that even if it was impossible to make conventions like IPAC a legal process, the onus lay on the stakeholders in Ghana's electoral administration to utilise the value of such a convention to deepen the democratic gains of the country since it has played a major role in the initiation of certain major electoral reform in the country under the Fourth Republican Constitution (Interview 21, 2021; Interview, 22, 2021).

Although the NPC does not have mandatory jurisdiction over the facilitation of the IPAC, the study wanted to also ascertain whether the NPC should have a role to play in the consensus-building processes on possible contentious electoral matters. The view of one study participant indicated that since the broad mandate of the NPC borders on the facilitation of mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution, and building sustainable peace, the council has oversight responsibility over every process that involves the peace of the country. It was suggested that the NPC could serve in an advisory capacity to the EC, and the political parties on consensus building

(Interview 22, 2021; Republic of Ghana, 2011). However, a contrary view was expressed from the perspective that eminent personalities in an electoral process have some limitations. The interpretation was that, unlike traditional, religious, and other social conflict resolution processes where chiefs, faith-based leaders, and other eminent persons can use their high respect in the society and good offices as leverage, one participant noted, “Election is a tension business which is built on transparent democratic processes and consensus and these go beyond eminent respect”. Therefore, to enhance its neutrality and effectively fulfil its core mandate, the NPC should maintain a limited involvement in the IPAC system, which primarily serves as a platform for the EC and political parties. Instead, the observer status granted to the NPC, CSOs, and other stakeholders should be strengthened (Interview 7, 2021).

While the EC-led IPAC is a national-level mechanism, the research results found the NCCE-led IPDCs as a sub-national mechanism for building consensus in Ghana’s electoral processes. The NCCE is a constitutionally created and independent state body according to Article 231 of the 1992 Constitution with the mandate to promote civic education and awareness in the country to deepen patriotism among citizens. The NCCE has a major strength based on its structural arrangement, which is based on its independent governance statutory structure where it reports only to Parliament. It is not under any Ministry, and hence, does not report to the Executive. As part of the execution of its mandate, the NCCE also has a thematic component that focuses on civic education based on democratic values such as tolerance, and peaceful coexistence. Similarly, other mechanisms under civic education also contribute to conflict management and peacebuilding (Interview 6, 2021).

Specifically, the research results showed that the IPDCs, which is a brainchild of the NCCE, provided a peacebuilding mechanism that drew its membership from all registered political parties, members of the NPC, and other FBOs in the regions and districts of the country. The IPDCs provided a platform to address mostly lingering pre-election disputes and tensions that could lead to violence during elections at the regional level and constituencies. It provided a source of moral influence on the activities of political parties and youth groups at the grassroots, such as workshops that educate the youth and party supporters on the laws governing demonstrations, and the code of conduct for political parties signed at the national level (Interview 6, 2021; Interview 40, 2021).

The Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the NCCE (2020), for example, confirmed that the IPDCs was able to facilitate a programme in 2019 that brought together representatives of all the registered Political Parties, CSOs, Media Practitioners, Independent Governance Institutions, FBOs, Persons with Disabilities, Traditional Authorities, Members of the Security Services, Trade Associations, Women and Youth Groups and other Identifiable Groups. In the context of elections, the IPDCs sensitised the participants on issues that had the potential of generating conflict and tensions during elections such as vote buying, tribal politics, politics of insults, defacing of posters of political opponents, biased media reportage, and campaign violence (NCCE, 2020, p. 89).

A study participant from the Regional Peace Council also confirmed that apart from the peacebuilding mandate of the NPC in the regions, the IPDCs also performed three main peacebuilding activities at the regional level and constituencies: early warning, conflict resolution and public education. For instance, due to its multi-stakeholder composition, when violence arose out of a situation, the police were put on the alert while the IPDCs engaged the actors to reduce the tensions. In the case of clarity on electoral rules or processes before the 2020 election, the EC

was alerted, and depending on the specific situation, an educational forum was organised for a specific group or public education on the radio and other viable media outlets. An issue that involves political party actors is also addressed through direct engagement that utilises the good offices of the political statesmen and women within the membership of the IPDCs for resolution. One scenario noted that, if one party complains about its political posters being torn or removed, both the offending party and the party that filed the complaint would be brought together to find an amicable solution (Interview 40, 2021).

However, the structural arrangement of the NCCE was found as a challenge to the organisation. It was suggested that this had the likelihood of affecting the sustainability of the IPDCs. For instance, since the NCCE reports only to parliament and not any executive body, the spending power of the country which is in the hands of the President, may create a situation where the executive would naturally send resources to areas where they have control (Interview 6, 2021). For example, the NCCE's (2020) Twenty-Sixth Annual Report 2019 on IPDCs showed that after the 2016 elections, the IPDCs were inactive. It was only reactivated in 2019 partly due to the support the NCCE received from the UNDP (NCCE, 2020). A participant described possible scenarios where politicians in power may want to react to the perceived negative impact of the activities of independent statutory bodies on their political manipulating activities during elections. Hence, independent state bodies like the NCCE whose mandate is based on the creation of awareness may be deliberately under-resourced. For instance, budgetary issues at the executive level are normally approved through cabinet meetings, and since the NCCE is not under any ministry, the options for lobbying at the executive level may be limited (Interview 6, 2021). Lastly, the appointment of the leadership of the NCCE by the President just like other state institutions like the EC and CHRAJ, was found to create some political perceptions that can affect the image

of the body in their dealings with the public. In the context of the NCCE, however, there has been a counter-balance of leadership. It was observed by a study participant from the NCCE that the political appointment to the NCCE sometimes overlaps the administration of the two major political parties, and that can neutralise the public perception (Interview 6, 2021). Nonetheless, the enhancement of the professional outlook of the NCCE among the staff to uphold the independence, impartiality and non-partisan attributes of the body cannot be taken lightly (Interview 6, 2021; Interview 8, 2021).

#### **5.4.3.2 National Peacebuilding**

The preceding sub-section provided findings on local peacebuilding mechanisms and their prospects for peaceful elections in Ghana under the categories of peace pacts and consensus building, election observation, and direct interventions. This sub-section proceeds to ascertain the dynamics of these mechanisms through the lens of the agenda for peace concepts.

The first theoretical consideration regarding the functioning of Ghana's PA for peaceful elections in the country is preventive diplomacy. This consideration first introduced by the UN in the mainstream nomenclature of peacebuilding in 1992 reflects the NPC's primary mandate on preventing the rise of electoral disputes or conflicts in the first place through peace intervention and peace coordination (Republic of Ghana, 2011). Several aspects of preventive diplomacy are embedded in the work of the NPC in the area of elections (Brenes-Castro, 2004). An example of preventive diplomacy is the implementation of the presidential peace pact and the two consensus-building mechanisms which provide moral suasion and formal direct engagements with political parties before the conduct of an election. A preventive approach is also found in the Roadmap, Code of Conduct, and Act for eradicating political vigilantism in Ghana during the 2020 elections. The preventive component of the mechanism was the use of the regional offices of the NPC in

addition to the establishment of ad hoc peace mediation committees. This early warning system was deployed to engage youth groups sympathetic to the NPP and the NDC, especially in constituencies prone to election-related violence. The rationale of dissuading political vigilante activities before the 2020 elections is a significant character of preventive diplomacy. This lends credence to the notion that having an early warning system on the ground, using direct peace education, and engaging political actors and youth groups could help transform violent behaviours (Lederach, 2014).

Similarly, the NCCE-led IPDCs within Ghana's stakeholder peacebuilding paradigm also explain the concept of preventive diplomacy because of the decentralised capacity that the NCCE has across the country to engage the relevant multi-stakeholders on elections in the area of early warning, conflict resolution, and public education. In essence, since electoral disagreements are inevitable during elections, having a multi-stakeholder system on the ground that gathers information for the electoral enforcement agencies is instrumental. However, the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy during elections is also dependent on the effectiveness of the enforcement agencies. Such collaborations could help prevent latent electoral disputes by ensuring that existing disputes do not escalate into electoral violence as well as further limiting the intensity of electoral violence when they occur (UN, 1992). The study suggests that the success of preventive action in peacebuilding contributes to the avoidance of a post-conflict national situation as evident in other African countries where electoral disputes have escalated into mass civil violence and high-intensity conflict, such as Kenya and La Côte d'Ivoire (Bob Milliar, 2014). As Okyere (2016) admonished, the significance of strengthening resilient factors in Ghana cannot be overemphasised. This is because the country has similar risk factors that have led to the abyss of mass civil violence in other African countries, such as weak democratic structures, ethnic cleavages connected to

partisan politics, youth radicalisation, and political vigilantism, the proliferation of small-arms and light weapons, and the culture of impunity pronounced during elections (Okyere, 2016).

From the findings, the collaboration between the WANEP, the NPC, and other peacebuilding stakeholders to design and implement an election observation system with elements of conflict resolution also confirms the significance of widening an I4P platform to promote preventive diplomacy. For example, in the context of the ESR implementation processes, the observers who were sent on the ground were able to provide reports on the election exercise, malpractices, skirmishes, disagreements, and general challenges in the electoral processes. The analysis stage of the ESR was important because it helped to create a professional process of election observation rather than a political process. Finally, the use of the good offices of the NPC to promptly relay the information (that may border on voter corruption, violent threats, and human rights abuses in the process of the presidential and parliament elections) to the election management and security enforcement actors was also significant. However, its effectiveness can be evaluated through the implementation of the recommendation after verification without fear or favour. This supports the assumption of preventive diplomacy which focuses on undertaking all necessary non-violent measures to prevent the escalation of existing disputes, but also measures that could contribute to limiting the intensity of potential conflict situations (UN, 1992).

The concept of peacemaking also parallels the role of consensus-building in Ghanaian elections as evident by the IPAC system. Peacemaking in this context assumes that elections, an activity in which political parties engage to gain political power and govern on behalf of the people, are inherently associated with conflict. As a major tenet of democracy, it offers political parties the opportunity to campaign competitively based on their political manifestos. In Ghana, since the

competitive nature of elections generates a polarised environment, the IPAC system has been a significant peacemaking convention since 1994 (Jeffries, 1998). The IPAC offers a conflict resolution platform for deliberation and dialogue between the EC and the political parties to gain common ground on contentious electoral matters (Galtung, 1976). This can help create opportunities for compromise during competitive processes, preventing electoral disputes from escalating to court cases that lead to zero-sum outcomes and deepening electoral grievances. During election seasons, CSOs and academia also play crucial roles in advocacy and oversight, offering valuable suggestions based on best practices to support peacemaking efforts.

This validates the literature on consensus building based on the notion that a unified community of interests is thought to transcend social and political divisions, with individual or factional interests being subsumed by the pursuit of the common good. This idea which has classical roots has resurgence in subsequent centuries (Vasilev, 2015). For instance, the notion of the general will, derived from Rousseau's philosophical judgment, described the Western body politic as a moral being that contains a will geared towards the preservation of the welfare of the whole (Das, 2001, p. 293). Consensus in this context was fashioned to meet the challenges of representative governments by functioning as a bridge between individual and collective action (Vasilev, 2015). However, the findings also reflect the assertion that a commitment to a common goal could not be self-imposed but achieved through electoral fairness, trust building, and freedom (Briggs et al., 2005). Other studies on modern democracy have also argued that consensus enhances democracy because it provides prospects for transforming differences into a unified community of interest. The threats associated with dissent are contained for the sake of the common good of society (Vasilev, 2015).

From a critical perspective however, a cursory interpretation of the findings through the lens of the work by Vasilev (2015) shows that developing democracies should not fail to recognise the realities in terms of the uneasy alliance between competing political interests within consensus-building strategies and the authority of the election management body to effectively undertake its mandate. Hence, peacemaking gestures in the forms of the IPAC, IPDCs, and the PEPP strategies in the form of diplomacy demonstrate the significance of managing the uneasy alliance between competitive elections and consensus-building in Ghana. However, their collective challenges as suggested include the lack of significant monitoring mechanisms and the legal backing to deepen peacebuilding enforcement (Lederach, 1997; Paris, 2004). For a tabular description, Table 9 provides an outline of the nature of the mechanisms, significance, limitations, and remedies of the local peacebuilding mechanisms in the context of elections.


**Table 9: National Election Peacebuilding Mechanisms**

Local peacebuilding mechanisms	Framing Agenda for Peace	Nature of mechanism	Goal/ Prospect of Mechanism	Limitations/ remedies
Direct intervention	Preventive diplomacy	Roadmap, Code of Conduct and Act for Eradicating Political Vigilantism	Engaging political actors and youth groups through sensitisation and public education to change violent behaviours	Does not address the structural components requiring medium to long-term measures
Election observation	Preventive diplomacy	ESR as an Early Warning Mechanism	Mitigate election violence	Lack of enforcement commitment makes the ESR ineffective
Peace commitments	Peacemaking	Moral suasion based on the commitment of top-level political leadership	Ease lingering political tensions towards peaceful elections	No significant monitoring mechanism. Lacks legal backing; Commitments not binding.
Consensus building	Peacemaking	Common dialogue platform	Compromise in a competitive exercise	Advisory and decisions not binding

Source: (Fieldwork, 2021)

## 5.5 Conclusion

The findings have shown that the UN's agenda for peace approach provides different local replications in Ghana in the context of the land, chieftaincy, and electoral-related cases. However, the functioning of an architecture for building peace may be shaped by other factors. Hence, the UN PBA establishes the building resilience against conflict and its potential recurrence whereas Ghana's PA establishes a proactive approach. In terms of all the mini cases, the mechanisms affirm the stakeholder peacebuilding paradigm of shared responsibility where guarantors of peace ensure that the country does not escalate into violence that would similarly affect them. Hence, depending on the dynamics of different conflicts, a broad range of local peacebuilding mechanisms can be facilitated using security enforcement, inter-communal dialogues, and establishing early warning systems. Overall, the behaviour of potential conflict parties and their commitment to peace are also essential to facilitate effective mechanisms.




## CHAPTER SIX

### RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

#### 6.1 Introduction

From the inception of the current thesis up to this point, the preceding chapters have addressed the following areas: introduction, literature review, theoretical framework, research design and methods, and data analysis. This chapter discusses the research findings with a focus on the central question in this thesis: What are the major strengths, limitations, and remedies associated with the practice of Ghana’s peace architecture in the context of the UN equivalence?

**Figure 10: Empirical Framework on the Comparative Peacebuilding Mechanisms**



Source: (Constructed by author based on findings)

Based on the data analysis in the preceding chapter, the empirical framework above shows the framing of the UN's agenda for peace within local peacebuilding mechanisms in the three mini-cases in Ghana. The framing of low-level peacebuilding also fits the institutional composition of Ghana's PA while that of liberal peace explains the UN PBA. However, the Ghanaian context demonstrates significant elements of hybridity which require elements of both liberal and low-level peacebuilding to bring significant constructive change processes in Ghana's peacebuilding discourse. Against this backdrop, the comparative components for discussing the research findings have been structured in two major areas based on the findings of the study as follows: post-conflict peacebuilding (UN I4P), and proactive peacebuilding (Ghana's I4P).

## **6.2 Post-Conflict Peacebuilding**

The early use of desk research to identify post-conflict peacebuilding as a major priority of the UN PBA agreed with the data analysis phase of the study which clearly distinguished between the agendas of the UN PBA from Ghana's PA. This distinction is contained in Lederach's (2012) description of a contrast between the agenda for peace depiction of peacebuilding in post-accord phases. This is a weak application of peacebuilding compared to national and local infrastructures requiring the application of peacebuilding before, during, and after periods of violence (Lederach, 2012). For instance, it was discovered that the most basic concern of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) following its formation in 2005/6 was to ensure that countries that have emerged from civil wars were equipped with the capacity that avoid a relapse into conflict (Almqvist, 2005). This corroborates the foremost description of post-conflict peacebuilding as authored by Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992 in the UN's eminent agenda for peace manifesto (UN, 1992). By interpretation, the UN recognise that the mere signing of peace agreements is not adequate but peace agreements must be seen to last. Hence, the purpose of the PBC as the main

intergovernmental body of the UN PBA is defined by the UN's approach to peacebuilding in the sense of external intervention which includes the realisation of sustained political and financial commitments from the international community. In addition, the PBC is based on the consideration of the social, political, and economic conditions of a country that impede peace agreements (Almqvist, 2005). Putting it differently, as the UN considers post-conflict peacebuilding, public institutions that have failed must be strengthened through international financial assistance and guidance as a means of consolidating political and economic reforms in state-building efforts (Almqvist, 2005; Paris, 2010).

Documentary findings on the evolution of international peacebuilding in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century provided a notable comparative historical background that placed the UN PBA in a progressive context. For instance, an analysis of a big-picture discourse disclosed that the formation of major intergovernmental organisations such as the League of Nations and the UN, was for the most part triggered by global post-war dynamics. However, in comparison, the findings suggested that part of the reasons why the League of Nations collapsed and the UN survived was based on the ability of the UN to develop and facilitate largely acceptable global mechanisms for the maintenance of international peace, security and justice. For instance, despite the influence of the *Wilsonian* liberal peace phenomenon from the US on the forming of the League of Nations, the deficits of liberal international cooperation partly translated into the failure of the League. In other words, although the works of Woodrow Wilson were instrumental in the formation of the League, the US while emerging as a significant leading state was not committed to the League, which rendered it ineffectual. The failures compounded by other radical nationalist and military expansionist factors in Germany, Italy, and Japan contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War fought between 1939 and 1945. Other failures to establish enduring international cooperation in the League of

Nations were revealed by the fact that it did not command significant global respect from some of the great powers like Germany who joined briefly in 1926 only to exit after the Nazis came to power in 1933. Italy's membership was also dismissive after it attacked and occupied Ethiopia, one of the African members of the League of Nations (Hanhimaki, 2008; Nye & Welch, 2017).

By comparison, the understanding of other documents suggested that the formation of the UN in 1945 was also within the same liberal peace benchmark on international cooperation (Hanhimaki, 2008). Hence, the scope of the UN was broad. It beyond simply avoiding the failures of the League and preventing the relapsing of the world into another war. It also included providing a common platform among member states for the promotion and deepening of international cooperation and building a multifunctional set of structures and major regulatory institutions in the international system that would shape and sustain international peace, security, and justice (Hatto, 2013).

In the 21st-century context, the analysis of UN peacebuilding from the perspective of a global I4P revealed the development of an external peacebuilding architecture established to strengthen national capacities at all the levels of the special needs of countries that have experienced armed national conflict or civil war (Van Tongeren et al., 2012; Cavalcante, 2019). From the findings, the priority areas in the PBC agenda (Refer to Table 3) are also in tune with the broad notion of liberal peace which is anchored on the fostering of lasting peace through democratisation and market-oriented principles. For instance, the interpretation shows that the significant priority areas aimed to address reconciliation, democracy, security, and development challenges in the selected post-conflict African countries (Cavalcante, 2015; Paris, 2004, 2018). The agenda also reveals structural peacebuilding components which cannot be explained solely with the achievement of negative peace or the absence of physical violence. A notable example in the Sierra Leonean PBC priority

areas after the civil war combines both negative and positive peace indicators (Galtung, 1969): “youth unemployment and empowerment; consolidation of democracy and good governance; restoration of justice and security sector reform; capacity-building, ... development of the energy sector” (Cavalcante, 2015, p. 2).

From the findings, the UN’s engagement with the countries under the PBC agenda predates the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This reinforces the I4P notion on the evolving landscape of peacebuilding where the dynamics of conflict and necessitate for developing peacebuilding mechanisms are considered a process rather than an event (Van Tongeren et al., 2012). For instance, in the case of Sierra Leone, the political instability, including a one-party state and series of military coups that had weakened the country and resulted in a civil war between the early 1990s and 2000s, led to the establishment of several peacekeeping missions in the height of the war. In 1999, for example, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established (PBC/2/SIL/CRP.1, 2006). After it had completed most of its assignment from the Security Council, UNAMSIL retired its mandate in Sierra Leone in December 2005. After the expiration of UNAMSIL, continued support for long-term security and development in Sierra Leone changed the focus of the UN from peacekeeping to peacebuilding when the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNOISL) was formed in January 2006 (SC/8487, 2005; PBC/2/SIL/CRP.1, 2006; UN/UNIPSIL, 2021). In August 2008, a resolution by the UN subsequently led to the establishment of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPISIL) which continued its mandate until 31 March 2014 and transferred its responsibilities to the UN country team in Sierra Leone under approximately 19 UN agencies (UN/UNIPSIL, 2021; UN/ UNIPSIL, 2014).

The account of post-conflict peacebuilding success or failure in the recipient six countries on the PBC agenda also expresses a relative impact of its liberal peace tenets. For instance, as observed by Hearn et al. (2014), in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Burundi, combined engagements contributed to the consolidation of peace in those countries, whereas in the cases of Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic, military coup and some form of deterioration was the case, such as the military and rebel toppling of civilian governments contributed to the deterioration and the relapsing situations in post-conflict countries. Such implications therefore mandate the replacement of a peacebuilding office with a military peacekeeping operation whose mandate would include protecting civilians and establishing security.

Another critical limitation associated with the post-conflict orientation of a global I4P is the concern of national sovereignty. The basic problem is that although the mandate of the UN makes the body an overseer of international peace and security, how to deal with conflicts between or within states without offending the national sovereignty of member states remains a quandary (Hanhimaki, 2008; Warnecke, 2018). This substantiates Mac Ginty's (2011) notion of hybridity where liberal peace agents from outside are obligated to respect the national sovereignty concerns of recipient countries concerns which translates into upholding the voice, the right, and the ownership of peace by persons directly or indirectly affected by the process of peacebuilding.

The findings could also be implied in previous East African conflict mediation literature where the capacity of local resistance, modification, and alternations similarly back up a hybrid discourse. For example, the outcome of Arap Moi's mediation of Uganda's civil war in 1985, showed that the warring parties, including Yoweri Museveni, were only buying time to strengthen their political interest. Tanzania's mediation of Rwanda's civil war (1992-1993) also failed to prevent the 1994

Rwandan genocide. The Arusha mediation process towards addressing Burundi's civil war (1996-2003) which Julius Nyerere led, also faced enormous difficulties, such as the challenge of distinguishing between Nyerere's perceived impartiality, legitimacy, and depth of knowledge of the conflict, and Tanzania's geopolitical behaviour on sanction, evasion, and providing territorial access to rebel factions. Yet, relative success was chalked from Nelson Mandela's role, who built on the foundation laid by Julius Nyerere in the Arusha Accord. Despite its professional profile in Eastern Africa, previous mediation by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development during Sudan's civil war was also not immune from accusations of bias from the warring parties, including setbacks stemming from regional alliances with Khartoum and the Southern factions (Khadiagala, 2007; Wamai, 2018).

Some scholars have also identified two contradictory realities in a recent study on the UN's challenges as an external mediator in the post-Gaddafi Libya conflict. While many Libyans have been sceptical about foreign interventions due to their colonial past and decades of anti-imperialist rhetoric, they were receptive to UN assistance. However, Libyans also determined that this assistance should be a light-footprint peacemaking mission rather than a peacekeeping force that could undermine Libya's sovereignty (Vericat & Hobrara, 2018). In that sense, the effectiveness of the UN's external peacebuilding role is necessitated by a consultative process with local agencies in Libya. The role of local agency in peacebuilding, therefore, supports the insider-partial assertion in the discourse of internal I4P based on the attributes of insider knowledge over the dynamics of the conflict, the behaviour of the conflict parties, and the nature of mechanisms the locals deem as acceptable remedies (Lederach, 1997; Vericat & Hobrara, 2018; Van Tongeren et al., 2012).

In the context of the current thesis, while the global I4P strengthened national capacities and assistance to the countries selected under the PBC agenda in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century (Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea) after the immediate end of hostilities, the assistance receded before the sustenance of peace. One important liberal peace is the rigidity and the bureaucratic tendencies in the early stages of the PBC. The particular case is the deliberations at the Security Council and the concern of member states that post-conflict African countries like Sierra Leone and Burundi should become the first to be selected for consideration by the PBC through the organisation of country-specific meetings (PBC/2/SIL/CRP.1, 2006, p. 1).

However, in the designing of the New York-based PBC strategies, the voices of the people on the field, including high-level authorities from the recipient countries were involved (Cavalcante, 2019). Cavalcante (2019) cited this process as follows,

The first formal meeting of the CSCs for the first two countries in the PBC agenda, Sierra Leone and Burundi, took place separately on 12 and 13 October 2006 respectively [*emphasis added*] ... counted with the participation, via videoconference, of high-level authorities from the governments of Sierra Leone and Burundi, who provided comprehensive overviews detailing specific measures undertaken by national authorities as well as their own readings of the most pressing challenges ahead for each country (Cavalcante, 2019, p. 253).

By interpretation, the intergovernmental advisory role of the PBC affirms what Mac Ginty (2011) described as the existence of top-down, technocracy, bureaucracy, and rigidity in international/liberal peacebuilding despite its short-term interventionist nature. While the strength of the UN PBA was found to range between liberal peace operations and sustainable development assistance, the import of the findings on post-conflict peacebuilding also implied that external peacebuilding progresses alongside national and local government and non-governmental involvements who are the major stakeholder peacebuilders in their respective countries.

### 6.3 Proactive Peacebuilding

Conversely, as a major case in this study, the focus of Ghana's PA under the Fourth Republican Constitution was predominantly based on proactive peacebuilding which is a major strength. For instance, from the findings, Ghana operationalised the NPC in 2006, not on the experiences of a full-blown national conflict like the PBC-listed countries. Proactive peacebuilding is therefore defined as the attempt to provide the NPC with the needed resources to promote violent prevention in the country as much as possible. The prospect is to avoid a post-conflict national situation where resources that should be used for development purposes would have to be channelled into a capital-intensive post-conflict project (Lederach, 2012). As asserted by Lederach (2012) "Conflict does not end with an accord. Violence prevention requires strategy and sustained engagement" (2012, p. 9). By this account, a well-conceived and supported NPC plays a major role in conflict transformation through the development of infrastructures that creatively engage on a long-term basis (Lederach, 1997, 2012). To contextualize this discussion, the three mini-cases provide a reference point for ascertaining the relevance of local peacebuilding mechanisms, and how they help Ghana's PA promote proactive peacebuilding.

The findings of mini-case one showed that the dynamics of the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict exceeded the old narrative of a land dispute between the two communities. However, the localised violent encounters that occurred over the years included factors such as misinformation, impatience and intolerance among some of the conflict parties and the youth. More destructive in the context of local resistance was the alleged presence of persons with conflict entrepreneurial interests. The interests stemmed from the alleged feeling that the resolution processes could affect the benefits that some people derived from illegal lumbering economic activities in the disputed

areas. Another issue was the norm of revenge, particularly persons seeking violent reparations for losing loved ones during the conflict years.

From the findings, the intra-national peacekeeping presence in Alavanyo-Nkonya can be characterised as an element of liberal peace from the arena of security enforcement. This agrees with Mac Ginty's (2011) characterisation of liberal peace as a security-centric approach to addressing conflict in a situation of fragility (Mac Ginty, 2011). The notion of security enforcement also supports a top-down logic for fostering peace in a conflict situation. Yet, the finding also suggests that the lack of commitment to peace has some negative influence on the effectiveness of security enforcement when it is undermined by the behaviour of conflict parties (Adell, 2013). This is similar to the Liberian civil war where the failure of the warring parties to turn the war-torn country to a condition of stable peace necessitated external intervention by the ECOMOG under an ECOWAS obligation of R2P (Paris, 2004; von Gienanth et al., 2007; Essuman-Johnson, 2009; Bellamy, 2010; Harris, 2012).

The notions of hybridity and to a certain extent low-level peacebuilding also showed a surprising proactive interpretation. For instance, too often, the existing studies on hybrid peace have been based on the interaction between international/liberal compliance powers such as the UN and other leading Western states and the networking structures associated with local agencies (Mac Ginty, 2011). Using this line of thinking, the interpretation of the findings shows that the UN's stakeholder peacebuilding role is external to Ghana, whereas the NPC's attributes represent the full arena of internal stakeholder peacebuilding (Wehr & Lederach, 1991). Despite this distinction, the research findings suggest that Ghana's NPC and its associated Regional Peace Councils are also external to local dynamics which led to proactive engagements with stakeholders within the

conflict enclave. In the particular context of mini-cases one, two and three, the approach of the VRPC, the NRPC and the NPC is strengthened by their engagements with local actors such as chiefs, traditional councils, assembly members, opinion leaders, representatives of youth groups, political party leaderships in the process of facilitating and implementing their respective local, regional and national peacebuilding mechanisms.

The findings also support other existing works on outsider-insider dichotomy and connections in peacebuilding. For instance, according to Mason (2009, p. 4) the terms ‘Insiders’ and ‘Outsiders’ are also relative and may only make sense in a practical comparison. Gourlay and Ropers (2012, p. 92) also add that, in practice, the difference is not always clear-cut, since peacebuilders can have multiple identities and allegiance. For instance, regarding the resolution of conflict in Africa, the AU and ECOWAS in their regional and sub-regional capacities on the continent, are more insider-partials than the UN. In the West African context, ECOWAS is also more insider-partial than the AU. In a national context in Ghana, the NPC is also more insider-partial than the AU and ECOWAS in terms of local stakeholder peacebuilding (Khadiagala, 2007; Roepstorff & Bernhard, 2013; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012). In the same vein, in the context of local land and chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana, eminent traditional chiefs, assembly members, and other opinion leaders and youth groups at the grassroots may understand the dynamics of the situation than the NPC and its regional actors. A shred of empirical evidence is the CEC approach that successfully brought some relative finality to the Dagbon chieftaincy impasse. Scholars also argue that such an approach understood the use of traditional African diplomacy such as customs, norms, traditional ethics and African philosophical proverbs in transforming local conflicts better than other formal stakeholder peacebuilders at the national and international levels (Debrah et al., 2014; Appiah-Thompson, 2019).

Despite the proactive factors that describe the strength of Ghana's PA, in the case of mini-case one, there are limitations to the relevance of the mechanisms. For instance, while relative peace was stated to have been achieved in the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute, the mechanisms (peace education, inter-communal dialogue committee, and trauma healing) deployed through the VRPC platform to mend the broken relationship and transform the enemy imagery within the conflict enclave can best be described as negative peace rather than positive peace. The kind of peace that has been achieved is negative because the structural land controversy under intra-peacekeeping enforcement remains unresolved. By interpreting the findings, it can be asserted that the Gruner map which provided the basis for several court judgements in the past in favour of one side is still technically under latent contestation. In other words, the fault lines and the mistrust between the two communities have not been vanquished. This explains the frequent renewal of the curfew in the area by the Interior Ministry. This also means that despite the perceived change in attitude in the last few years partly due to the relevance of the local peacebuilding mechanisms, or the presence of the military, the attitudinal change may not have transcended into behavioural change. The current situation can further be interpreted as a 'wait-and-see' peacemaking influence with sustainable peacebuilding potentials. The remedy from the findings suggests that the NPC can improve the sustenance of peace in community peacebuilding contexts through factors such as utilising a broader scope of peace education to deepen and sustain the engagements at the middle-level leadership and the grassroots. This could provide a substantive period of transformation of behaviour and attitudes at the inter-communal level.

In mini case two, the implication of the findings in the stable democracy era shows that liberal democratic processes such as the Wuaku Commission of Inquiry and the courts were not sufficient to bring significant constructive change in the resolution of the conflict (Lederach, 2014).

Yet, these approaches were still instrumental in laying the foundation for the implementation of other state and non-state processes which led to the implementation of the Dagbon roadmap and the enskinment of a new Yaa Naa (WWiG, 2021). One area of relevance is security-centric peacebuilding which was essential for dealing with isolated local violent resistance in the enskinment processes (Mac Ginty, 2011; Alhassan & Duodo, 2019). For instance, although the government of President Kufour (2001-2008) failed to prevent the second regicide in 2002, it was under the same administration that the CEC approach was used to support indigenous mediation and its resultant constructive change. Further, although the subsequent NDC administrations led by President John Evans Atta Mills (2009-2012) and John Mahama (2012-2016) failed in their efforts to arrest and prosecute alleged perpetrators of the second regicide, President Mahama's administration, succeeded in reconstructing some of the houses of the custodians of Dagbon destroyed during then 2002 conflict (Alhassan & Duodo, 2019). This lends credence to the context of hybridity where the state uses infrastructure development as the basis to mitigate existing grievances at the local level. Another form of hybrid peace is the role that successive governments including President Nana Akufo Addo (2017-2024) played in providing direct support and security to the process that led to the implementation of the CEC roadmap to peace; the performance of the final funeral rites of Yaa Naa Mahamadu Abdulai as well as Yaa Naa Yakubu Andani II, and the enskinment of Yaa Naa Abubakari Mahama II (Alhassan & Duodo, 2019).

It is apparent that, unlike the Alavanyo-Nkonya case which saw the direct involvement of the NPC at the regional level, in the case of Dagbon, the process of peacebuilding had to do with the utilisation of an informal traditional peace architecture. The CEC approach also supports the notion of low-level peacebuilding which involves the utilisation of reputable and respected traditional figures led by Otumfour Osei Tutu II. Despite the lack of direct involvement of the NPC in the

CEC process, the process of peacebuilding in Dagbon still reinforces the assertion by some scholars, such as Meissner (2010), Awinador-Kanyirige (2014), and Aubyn and Abdallah (2013) that the process of peacebuilding is not accomplished by a single individual or institution. It is rather a shared responsibility of different stakeholders of which the NPC plays a complementary role as Ghana's statutory peace architecture within the context of a national I4P.

In another vein, the notion of shared responsibility in resolving the Dagbon conflict could be interpreted as a combination of Liberal and Indigenous compliance strategies by successive governments in an attempt to incentivise the local agency to follow the peace processes (Mac Ginty, 2011). This led to the enskinment of a new Yaa Naa after more than a decade of vacancy (Allotey, 2019). For example, media reports indicate that the traditional processes to elect a new Yaa Naa were not immune from isolated local resistance to the peace processes. Some of the local resistance led to pockets of violence, reported shootings, deaths, and attacks on the Gbewa palace. To address the peace and security threats, the state-led security-centric approach uses the law and order mandate of the police to monitor such threats and enforce compliance. Another broader aspect of the enforcement of the security-centric approach was the imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew by the Ministry of the Interior (Alhassan & Duodo, 2019; Mac Ginty, 2011). This also shows that in the process of local peacebuilding, security enforcement can be used to contain violence in the short to medium term. This can create an enabling environment for local peacebuilders, including the NPC to enforce their mechanisms.

The ongoing Dagbon succession plan is also another finding that supports the notion of shared responsibility and hybrid interaction between the Peace Council, the Dagbon State Council and other local and international stakeholders. By interpretation, the precedence suggests a state-

society dialogue and negotiation to institutionalise a constitution with the prospects of settling future succession controversies in the event of a vacancy. The premise suggests that while a relative level of understanding has led to the implementation of the Dagbon roadmap (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011; Debrah, 2014), the aftermath of successful conflict mediation is also very important, where processes and structures should be put in place to build peace and address the potential risk of local resistance (Mac Ginty, 2011).

Finally, the RRI and the youth empowerment projects from the NRPC and FBOs in northern Ghana also buttress an aspect of shared responsibility in the process of peacebuilding. For instance, the RRI as a mechanism within the NRPC platform deepens the significance of an early warning system to identify local threats and liaise with the enforcement agencies to deal with them. The youth empowerment projects also deepen proactive peacebuilding in the form of empowering political groups and the youth to act as peace architects while gaining life skill training. Overall, the findings can be interpreted that in terms of strengthening the processes of peacebuilding in Dagbon and its environs, it was not prudent for purely political actors in government to lead the process due in part to past local experiences of mistrust. This context further reinforces a hybrid approach to peacebuilding where third parties through the participation of the NPC, CSOs and other FBOs create awareness by undertaking transformative and permanent early warning systems, broader peace education, and vocational skills training. This description is an ideal remedy because the RRI, youth empowerment, and the ongoing succession plan exist in a limited form.

Elections in Ghana under the Fourth Republic have been closely contested between the two major political parties, the NPC and the NPP, where voters are mobilised around their political traditions (Whitfield, 2009). The threats posed by elections as a result of the tensions and violence that erupt

in every electoral cycle in Ghana is a key limitation to the liberal peace that democratisation automatically fosters lasting peace (Paris, 2004). For instance, one critical risk factor is the abuse of the winner-takes-all system which favours the ruling party and their supporters to the detriment of the opposition. It could also create other risk factors like trust deficits, especially from the opposition towards the EC and the Police, tensions that occur as a result of the slim margin of victory, abuse of national security, and sensational media reportage during elections. One strength of the liberal peace in the context of Ghana is the resilience of democratic and traditional governance institutions. In the context of peacebuilding, the factors include consistent engagement in dialogue, consensus building, the fostering of development that meets basic needs, civil education, and advocacy that helps maximise popular participation on issues that affect social lives.

In terms of direct interventions, the implementation of the Roadmap, Code of Conduct and Act after the Ayawaso-West Wuogon by-election violence supports Lederach's (2012) notion of using I4P to address issues that emerge after periods of violence. By implication, this is a weak component of I4P from the perspective that the post-by-election violence undermined the proactive mandate of the NPC. In other words, I4P cannot be the sole mechanism for applying peacebuilding before and during periods of violence. However, the import of the mechanisms that emerged after the by-election violence was also useful in terms of the hybrid conception. For instance, the NPC facilitating role supports Mac Ginty's (2011) conception of compliance power over political actors and youth groups at the sub-national level through sensitisation and advocacy workshops to prevent them from engaging in acts of vigilantism during the 2020 elections (Mac Ginty, 2011; Lederach, 2012). This approach also strengthens local peacebuilding from the perspective of

limiting the tensions associated with the negatives of competitive elections where political parties' quest for power could plausibly turn into a mobiliser of violence (David, 1999; Okyere, 2016).

The interpretation of the significance of the entire Roadmap and the Code of Conduct for Eradicating Political Vigilantism (Refer to Appendix I), also shows that the document created a horizontal interaction between the NPC and several other stakeholders. This horizontal interaction which Galtung (1976) described as institutional equals with no clear dominance further explains the respective role of different institutions in helping the NPC facilitate the implementation of the short-term, medium-term, and long-term goals. This includes liberal policy remedies (such as enhancing the professionalism of law enforcement agencies, peace education, strengthening media integrity, local arms control and management, security of tenure for the Inspector General of Police, addressing youth unemployment and improving economic well-being, development of vocational and technical skills and training, etc.) that strengthens the discourse on sustainable peace within the core mandate of the NPC (NPC, 2020a; Lederach, 2014). By implication, the findings institutionalise shared responsibility in recommending remedies for the eradication of the menace of political vigilantism (Aubyn & Abdallah, 2013). Hence, the mandate of the NPC to facilitate and develop mechanisms (NPC, 2011) creates a robust I4P platform to address the menace with the support of Political Parties, Law Enforcement Agencies like the Attorney General and the Police, the NCCE, CSOs, Religious Organisations, EC, Media Houses, National Media Commission, and the Ghana Journalist Association, the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Government, and the Private Sector (NPC, 2020a).

Similarly, the election observation mechanism through the ESR depicts a horizontal interaction between the WANEP, the NPC, and other relevant state and non-state actors. The uniqueness of

this mechanism is the peacebuilding component which is different from the traditional election observation that simply focuses on issuing post-election reports on the extent to which an election was free, fair, and transparent. While the multi-stakeholder hybrid platform in the ESR is similar to traditional election observation in terms of the scope of actors and the nature of field observation, the NPC's use of its good offices in the course of the election supports Lederach's (2012) notion of using I4P during a potential conflict event to avert an escalating post-conflict outcome. However, this approach still has some limitations. For instance, it has been argued elsewhere that respected eminent personalities are not sufficient attributes for enforcing compliance in a competitive electoral exercise (Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011; Hellmüller, 2018).

By interpretation, politics and elections in the liberal sense are inherently a high-stakes activity that requires other democratic tenets such as due process, transparency, and consensus-building to be effective rather than mere outward respect from eminent personalities. As cited in the case of the CEC approach, in traditional and religious governance systems, chiefs and other religious leaders who command a large following could use their reverential attributes to resolve a conflict within their circles. However, competitive electoral politics requires the building of efficient and effective institutions beyond respected attributes. In the context of hybridity, the compliance power of peace accords that may effectively incentivise top-level political leadership is an art of hybrid moral suasion. However, since national and by-elections in Ghana are often characterised by isolated violence, the dimensions of the interest of political parties to resist, ignore, subvert, or devise various means to capture political power cannot be overemphasised (Mac Ginty, 2011).

Both the IPAC and the IPDCs also fit the hybrid description of horizontal and vertical interaction. For instance, in the case of the IPAC, the convention to achieve consensus creates a horizontal

compliance platform for political parties to deliberate with the EC on electoral policies. On the other hand, a case of a vertical platform is also made in the context of the independent mandate of the EC and the umpire of the process. This suggests that since the IPAC system is not based on the legal regime of the country, its recommendations may not be binding on the EC whose constitutional mandate in Article 46 says it “shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority”. (Republic of Ghana, 1992).

Despite this provision, to promote a healthy electoral democracy, the independence of the EC should be exercised in the context of its ability to establish trust, consensus, and transparency in the electoral process. Another similar explanation suggests that although the EC-led IPAC at the national level is a largely advisory role, it provides a common dialogue platform that can be used to mitigate electoral tensions when parties build consensus on key electoral issues with the EC going into an election. Similarly, while the NCCE-led IPDCs are not binding sub-national initiatives on political parties, their commitment to peace creates a multi-stakeholder platform for promoting election-related early warning, conflict resolution, and public education.

Other perspectives on the discussion imply that to work towards sustaining peace at the national level, institutions established to shape the rational behaviour of citizens and actors should be seen as working at an optimal level. For example, when security agencies are perceived as acting in favour of the ruling government during elections, the opposition will feel marginalised. If the feelings of political parties and the populace, in general, are that court rulings consistently favour only one side of the political divide, the aggrieved parties, be they political or social, may resort to other measures such as vigilantism and the perpetration of violence. This also applies to the electoral processes of the country which should be truly free, fair, and transparent. Active

consensus building on contentious issues can build back confidence in the electoral processes. The election management body must also be diligent in the execution of its mandate by avoiding anomalies that could further deepen the mistrust. State institutions are also not expected to function as effectively when they are not resourced with the needed funding to carry out their programmes.

At the national level, the sustenance of peace in Ghana should also include the ability of the country to deal with structural problems such as the high rate of youth unemployment, which leads to poverty, and can serve as an easy mobilising factor towards violence. By interpretation, these structural problems in themselves may not necessarily lead to violence. However, violence can be instigated by social injustices and economic disparities, particularly when individuals experience marginalization or neglect within society. This occurs when they perceive an inequitable distribution of national resources, including recruitment into public service and national security sectors, the provision of social amenities, infrastructure development, and political partisanship in the award of scholarships and educational opportunities.

#### **6.4 Comparing the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and Ghana's Peace Architecture**

Based on the comparative discussion of the findings above, the strength of Ghana's PA has been established in the context of proactive peacebuilding compared to the post-conflict peacebuilding focus of the 21st-century element of the UN PBA. However, drawing on Galtung (1969), the mechanisms associated with the National Peace Council in particular also suggest a negative peace outcome of building relationships and reconciliation through eminent persons compared to the negative and positive peace priorities of the Peacebuilding Commission aimed to address reconciliation, democracy, security, and development challenges in the selected post-conflict African countries (Galtung, 1969; IEP, 2019). Against this backdrop, the final section answers an institutional question: How does the global institution of the UN PBA compare to the national

institution of Ghana’s PA? Based on the previous operational description of the metaphoric notion of architecture in peacebuilding discourse, this section adopts four relevant concepts: structures, resources, approaches, and targets (Reychler & Langer, 2006; Lederach, 1997).

Peacebuilding is driven by structures that denote the systems, institutions, laws, and regulations that contribute to addressing latent and manifest conflicts to sustain peace. These structures function properly when there are adequate resources in the form of financing and material resources, including traditional and modern traditions and technology. Based on the nature and the dynamics of each conflict situation, approaches to peacebuilding delve into the strategies and the mechanisms deployed at different levels to prevent, manage, resolve, and transform conflict. Finally, since peacebuilding is not an amateur process, it must be targeted toward the achievement of realistic outcomes and objectives (Lederach, 1997; Reychler & Langer, 2006; Odendaal, 2010; Kent et al., 2018). To empirically amplify the description of the concepts, the present Table shows a comparative perspective on the major cases.

**Table 10: Comparative Perspective on Major Cases**

<b>Benchmarks</b>	<b>UN Peacebuilding Architecture</b>	<b>Ghana’s Peace Architecture</b>
<b>Structures</b>	PBC, PBSO, PBF	NPC, Secretariats, PBSU, PF
	External Institution	Internal Institution
	Top-down Engagement with National Elites	Local Peace Committees
<b>Resources</b>	Peacebuilding Fund	Peace Fund
<b>Approaches</b>	Post-Conflict Peacebuilding	Proactive Peacebuilding
	Dealing with Authoritative and Political Actors	Engaging both Authoritative Actors and Grassroots
<b>Targets</b>	Using technocrats to help address the Special Needs of Post-Conflict countries	Building Relationships and Reconciliation through Eminent Persons
	Priority Areas relative to Democracy, Security, and Development Deficits	Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, and Building Sustainable Peace in the country

Source: (Fieldwork, 2021)

On peacebuilding structures, the structure of a 21<sup>st</sup> Century global I4P in the UN PBA is the embodiment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) (Van Tongeren et al., 2012). Created as the main intergovernmental body, the PBC which is supported by the PBSO and the PBF, has prioritised post-conflict peacebuilding in selected African countries. It has provided peacebuilding support to prevent a slide into mass civil violence. In the context of liberal peace, the PBC, PBSO, and the PBF represent an institutionally formalised UN PBA within a bureaucratic UN system. They were established by a global legal framework through rigid resolution processes that led to the passage of UN General Assembly resolution 60/180 in December 2005 and UN Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005) and 1646 (2005) (A/RES/60/180, 2005; Jenkins, 2013; A/62/100, Corr. 1 and Add.1, 2021).

The structural context of the national I4P in Ghana was governed by formalised national laws. For instance, the outcome of Ghana's PA under the legislative framework of Parliament under NPC 2011 (Act 818) established the National Peace Council (NPC), the Regional and District Peace Councils, and their respective Executive Secretariats which serve as the think-tank, the powerhouse or the administrative backbone to the NPC. Within the functioning of the NPC are clear categories of institutional formalities by the Peacebuilding Support Unit (PBSU) and a Peace Fund (PF) (Republic of Ghana, 2011). Under these structures, the NPC facilitates proactive peacebuilding through conflict prevention, management, resolution, and the building of sustainable peace in the country (Republic of Ghana, 2011).

By comparison, although the UN PBA and Ghana's PA are different in terms of their external and internal institutionalization, it is also certain that both structures represent formal architectures for building peace. The component of peacebuilding resources also unveils other institutional dimensions in Ghana's PA that could be premised on the UN PBA. For instance, the PBF is a multi-year standing fund for post-conflict peacebuilding that fills gaps in the longer-term funding of UN peacebuilding in the context of a global I4P (Van Tongeren et al., 2012). The funding comes from the voluntary contributions of member states, other international organisations, and IFIs. It ensures the release of resources that are required to undertake peacebuilding activities (A/RES/60/180, 2005). The PBSO was established in the UN Secretariat and staffed with qualified experts to support the work of the PBC and provide advice, administer the PBF, and coordinate UN strategy of peacebuilding and policy learning in a global I4P perspective (A/RES/60/180, 2005; Aning & Lartey, 2010; Bellamy, 2010; Jenkins, 2013; Hearn et al., 2014; Van Tongeren et al., 2012).

By comparison, in Section 20 of the NPC Act, a PF in the Ghanaian context represents a resource dimension aimed at providing funds for the activities of the NPC with voluntary contributions coming from the government, local private, public, and international organisations, foreign governments, monies realised from projects, gifts and contributions from other sources (Republic of Ghana, 2011). For example, after 10 years of its formal operation, on October 15<sup>th</sup>, 2021, the PF was launched by the NPC in Accra, which was pegged on the theme, "Promoting National Peace and Cohesion through a Sustainable Peace Fund". This was against the backdrop of the challenges the NPC had faced since its establishment (Yalley, 2021). Interpreting the speech of a Board Chairman of the NPC at the launching event, it was apparent that although the NPC had

contributed significantly to the maintenance of peace and stability in Ghana, one major challenge to meeting realistic targets of facilitating mechanisms for building sustainable peace in the country is the inadequate of funding and resources (Yalley, 2021; Republic of Ghana, 2011). Other views suggested that during the informal era, the members of the first Board chaired by Cardinal Appiah Turkson did not receive any allowance or packages at the end of their tenure. Similarly, in the formal era, it has been implied that allowances to the NPC were irregular and not proportional to the workload of the council. For instance, in emergencies, the NPC could lack the funds to undertake proactive peacebuilding. The resource challenges also include the office accommodation which the council needs urgently to meet the description of the workload, its reputation, and its image. Hence, the PF could be premised on the PBF where voluntary contributions from different funding sources supplement conventional funding capacity to enable the effective manifestation of proactive peacebuilding (Yalley, 2021).

In terms of peacebuilding approaches, the term PBSO in the UN system is also closely related to the PBSU located in the national I4P in Ghana. In the case of the Ghanaian context, the grounds of formal institutionalisation are found in Section 27 of the NPC Act. It states that inside the Ministry of the Interior is a Peacebuilding Support Unit which has the mandate to serve as a liaison between the NPC and the government institutions to facilitate the implementation of recommendations of the Peace Council, manage early warning and analysis unit, and also serve as advisor to the Regional Minister on issues of conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Republic of Ghana, 2011; Verzat, 2014). In the overall structural analysis, it can be implied that the three-tier structure of Ghana's PA which includes national and sub-national Peace Councils, executive secretariats, PBSU, and the PF are formal structures like those of the tripartite PBC, PBSO, and PBF.

However, as earlier stated, the other institutional distinctions are not ambiguous. For instance, the PBC, PBF, and PBSO whose headquarters is in New York represent the ultimate embodiment of the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding in the UN's global I4P, at least in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The centre of its operation which is from New York and the ultimate interaction with the national governments confirms a liberal peace phenomenon which Mac Ginty (2011) described as an approach based on top-down transmission chains where engagement with national elites is prioritised with little or no grassroots inputs (Mac Ginty, 2011). Cavalcante (2019) also affirmed that the process that led to the formation of the PBC, PBSO, and the PBF was influenced by the liberal democratic framework which banked on a technocratic imprint, and that creates some difficulty in terms of modifying the underlying meaning(s) of peacebuilding (Cavalcante, 2019). Defined by technocracy, the process is prone to close-door deals and the corporate culture of meeting deadlines with less emphasis on building and deepening relationships in the post-conflict enclave (Mac Ginty, 2011; Hellmüller, 2018). This liberal premise can also be explained by the seminal work of John Wehr and John Lederach in 1991. They described international peacebuilding stakeholders like the UN in the context of outsider-neutral mediators whose functions are grounded in the attribute of externality to a conflict setting and neutrality in terms of third parties who avoid internal commitment or connection with the conflict zone (Wehr & Lederach, 1991, p. 86).

On the contrary, the NPC and its approach to proactive peacebuilding could be viewed in relative terms as the embodiment and the empowerment of local resources such as the development of multistakeholder local peace committees across all levels of society, specifically local areas prone to conflict. The proactive dimension serves as an early warning mechanism for reconciling warring parties and bringing together the social strata of relevant local peacebuilders (Lederach, 1997; IPI,

2017; Kovács, 2019). In addition, the process of peacebuilding utilises the reputation of respected local figures due in part to the significant place of traditional and religious governance in Ghanaian society, which still upholds religious authorities, chiefs, queen mothers, and other eminent personalities as a guarantor of peace and a contributor to democratic governance. As an internal statutory structure, it prioritises the attributes of eminent representatives within the council who are appointed from the Christian, Muslim, traditional, chieftaincy and professional groups within the circles of Ghana's apolitical demographic constituencies (Mac Ginty, 2011; Hellmüller, 2018). Ghana's PA identifies the role that each must play in dealing with a conflict situation at the national level, regions and the grassroots (Lederach, 1997). This supports Lederach's (1997) notion of I4P which suggested a departure from the UN approach to traditional statist diplomacy which normally banks on authoritative and political representatives as key to dealing with conflict. The justification is that local people and their culture are the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term (Lederach, 1997). In theoretical terms, the functioning of Ghana's I4P also confirms the concept of insider-partial mediation, which Wehr and Lederach (1991) and others conceptualised as an additional mediator role that may exist in more indigenous, collectivist, and non-liberal context (Wehr & Lederach, 1991). In other words, unlike the outsider-neutral attributes of the UN PBA, the cultural resources of Ghana's PA can demonstrate insider attributes such as internality, trusted relationship, interconnectedness and intimate knowledge (Wehr & Lederach, 1991; Lederach, 1997; Elgström et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2003; Khadiagala, 2007; Mason, 2009; Gourlay & Ropers, 2012; Roepstorff & Bernhard, 2013).

On peacebuilding targets, the outcome of the PBC agenda (refer to Table 3) shows broader peacebuilding targets aimed at dealing with both direct violence and structural violence issues (Otobo, 2018; Galtung, 1969). It was also determined by the conflict dynamics that characterised

the specific CSCs under Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia, etc. Therefore, these deficits and priorities defined how the PBC targeted post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in the context of the following priority areas: national reconciliation and unity, the promotion of good governance, strengthening of the rule of law, and the combat against drug trafficking, restoration of justice and security sector reform, community recovery, addressing youth unemployment and promoting women empowerment policy, elections and institutional support to the electoral commission, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, capacity building for national and local institutions, and the development of the energy sector (Cavalcante, 2015).

In Ghana, the proactive object of the NPC is also targeted at the building of sustainable peace in the country. The NPC supports security issues in the country through the advice it provides to REGSEC and the RCCs as stipulated in Section 11 of the NPC Act (Republic of Ghana, 2011). Although Ghana's peace architecture is not driven by a post-conflict national discourse, the various mechanisms found in the findings in relation to the three mini-cases (Alavanyo-Nkonya, Dagbon and Elections) confirm that the dynamics of a specific local conflict situation in Ghana determines the kind of priority areas that will be implemented such as peace education, insider peacebuilding committee engagement, trauma healing, chieftaincy succession plan, early warning and grassroots monitoring, youth initiatives, direct intervention, election observation, peace commitments, inter-party advisory committees and inter-party dialogue committees.

In another vein, according to the Act that legitimised Ghana's PA, the functions include facilitating "the amicable resolution of conflict through mediation... including indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding" (Republic of Ghana, 2011, p. 4). Although the UN PBA may have structures like peacebuilding missions on the ground, as indicated previously in the case

of Sierra Leone, Ghana's PA is more ingrained in internal structures and the conception of insider-partiality (Wehr & Lederach, 1991). In other words, a national I4P has a better capacity for relationship-building based on a proactive peacebuilding perspective (Paris, 2018). However, the UN PBA also has a developmental component that projects a better approach toward achieving the broad conception of sustainable peace or positive peace (Galtung, 1969). For instance, while some of the priority areas in the PBC focus on dealing with development-related issues like youth unemployment, the combat against drug trafficking, and the development of the energy sector (Cavalcante, 2015), that of the NPC in the context of the three mini-cases could be largely described as peacebuilding through relationship building and reconciliation. The findings did not establish a development-oriented pursuit in the mechanisms directly driven by the NPC platform where both democratic and development targets are relevant for fostering lasting peace (Paris, 2004). The study therefore concludes by introducing the term 'Developmental Peacebuilding' in the lexicon of peacebuilding and the I4P discourse. Developmental peacebuilding could be a significant approach to building sustainable peace beyond reconciliation and relationship building— facilitating and developing mechanisms in collaboration with state and non-state actors that can contribute to the mitigation of poverty, marginalisation, low socio-economic conditions and exclusion — in areas where through empirical research has been empirically determined as a potential and easy mobiliser towards violence.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that the UN PBA and Ghana's PA have areas of divergence and convergence. For instance, in the context of a global I4P, the application of post-conflict peacebuilding in selected post-conflict countries in Africa is different from the application of proactive peacebuilding in Ghana through a national I4P platform. While the conception of post-

conflict also distinguishes the structure of the global I4P from the national I4P, the former which has structures like the PBC, PBSO, and PBF could be premised on the latter's Council and Secretariat, Support Unit, and Fund respectively. However, the UN PBA was generally found to be different from Ghana's PA in terms of global top-down and technocratic structures in recipient countries on an impermanent basis compared to the use of permanent local peace committees to revive local ownership of peace respectively. Although some of Ghana's PA mechanisms are premised on the UN PBA, the strategies for building relationships and reconciliation in the Ghanaian context which aids the work of the NPC suggest a limited application of peacebuilding. This provides a complementary justification based on the concept of developmental peacebuilding derived from PBC's strategies in Africa around addressing reconciliation, democracy, security, and development deficits.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 7.1 Introduction

From the inception of this study, the introductory chapter provided a general background that included the problem statement, objectives, operational description, chapter disposition, and relevance of the study. This was followed by a detailed chapter that reviewed the relevant literature and identified significant gaps. The theory chapter was then used to develop the theoretical framework and formulate research questions. The study also designated a chapter for the strategy of inquiry where the research methods and design were presented. These four chapters which represented the entire desk research aided two significant empirical chapters under data analysis and discussion of research findings. This final chapter summarises the research findings, presents the conclusion, and recommendations for policy and further studies.

#### 7.2 Summary of Findings

The research was carried out to achieve the following major objectives: first, to analyse the structure of I4P in the UN system and the kind of intergovernmental agenda pursued in Africa; second, to analyse the structure of I4P in Ghana and the nature of local peacebuilding mechanisms implemented in specific conflict situations within the country; and third, to compare the UN's I4P with Ghana's I4P, ascertaining the strength and weakness with Ghana's approach.

The key findings in the first major case show that the UN's I4P which includes the PBC, PBSO, and PBF, is anchored in a post-conflict peacebuilding discourse. This is not a new phenomenon since it dates back to the 1990s when the UN's *Agenda for Peace* reform framework had a similar theme in the early conceptualisation of post-Cold War peacebuilding. However, the new UN

peacebuilding architecture has a practical target for countries that have emerged from mass civil violence in the aftermath of the Cold War to prevent a return to violence. As the main intergovernmental body of the UN PBA, the analysis of the PBC shows a broad set of agendas in six post-conflict African countries: Sierra Leone, Burundi, Liberia, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea. International peacebuilding in this context could be categorised under different dimensions of reconciliation, democracy, security, and development issues in the respective countries.

By contrast, in the second major case, the I4P framework which establishes Ghana's PA has not been originally designed to apply peacebuilding in the post-conflict context. For pragmatic reasons, since the country has not experienced a full-blown war, the architecture establishes a foundation that builds and sustains peace in order to prevent post-conflict ramifications on a national scale. This is unambiguous in the mandate of the NPC: facilitate and develop mechanisms that would lead to the prevention of conflict, its management, resolution, and building sustainable peace in the country. Unlike the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda of a global I4P in the UN system, the I4P in the Ghanaian perspective replicates the application of peacebuilding before, during and after violence. This highlights the significance of applying I4P in a country whether the context is post-conflict or not.

Although the establishment of the NPC as Ghana's peace architecture defines a unique I4P structure for the country, peacebuilding practice under the Fourth Republican Constitution cannot be limited to the mandate of the NPC. This emphasises the role of shared responsibility in peacebuilding in Ghana since the return to constitutional democratic rule in 1993 where different state and non-state institutions play different complementary roles. However, it was still essential

to bridge a major lacuna in terms of developing a consultative I4P approach, an impartial mediator, and a third-party convener who will be fully committed to the practice of peacebuilding and contribute to a positive-sum political and social environment. Taken as a whole, since the NPC has operated both informally and formally under a legal regime, the two eras capture the ability to use both informal and formal mechanisms and activities designed for specific conflict contexts. Yet, its inability to sustain certain peacebuilding engagements negatively affects the achievement of the full length of a positive-sum outcome.

The key findings in the second objective revealed significant information in the context of how local peacebuilding mechanisms mirror vital international peacebuilding mechanisms in the UN system.

In mini case one, the study highlights the importance of intra-national peacekeeping when an intractable local conflict has the potential for escalation. Local peacekeeping in this context which took the form of police-military joint security enforcement serves as a buffer zone on a disputed land between two communities. From the observation, this serves as a deterrence to encroachment and the perpetration of further violence. However, this mechanism is not adequate to resolve the broken relationship between the conflict parties that would improve inter-communal and socio-economic relations. Hence, other dimensions of peacebuilding in Alavanyo-Nkonya including preventive diplomacy and peacemaking highlight the importance of third-party inter-communal dialogue, the use of peace education, and trauma healing programmes in enhancing the formal commitment of the parties to peace, reinforcing compliance with existing curfew and preventing a relapse into the abyss of inter-communal violence and revenge. The significance of the mechanism is based on some deviation from the past interventions by the commission of

inquiry approach, the courts, and formal mediation, including security enforcement. This also highlights the extent to which building and transforming relationships and reconciliation can contribute to sustainable peace in practice. However, the outcome of the I4P-led mechanisms is also limited by the lack of emphasis on adequately addressing structural issues that borders on the root causes of the conflict. This emphasises the thesis that local peacebuilding mechanisms should not be limited to the achievement of negative peace, but the achievement of positive peace should be prioritised through sustained engagement alongside the advancement of socioeconomic development.

In mini case two, the key findings indicate the significance of peacebuilding after a sub-national violent encounter where the history of a notable traditional governance leadership in northern Ghana experienced two regicides in the Second Republic and the Fourth Republics. While several mechanisms such as security enforcement, commissions of inquiries, and the courts produced limited success, a chieftaincy-led approach provided the most significant constructive change. This reflected the significance of indigenous peacemaking in the implementation of the Dagbon roadmap and the enskinment of a new Yaa Naa after over a decade of vacancy. Such peacemaking processes were targeted at resolving a lingering chieftaincy conflict that has the potential to escalate beyond bounds.

In the context of I4P, the concept of preventive diplomacy also reflects the stakeholder processes involved in reviewing the 1930 Dagbon Constitution. Although a new Yaa Naa has been enskinned using the rotation system in the Constitution, the substantive prospects of the project regarding the institutionalisation of a traditional succession process into modern times could have potential over the transformation of the controversies that created past succession crises. The full length of

peacebuilding in Dagbon and its environs is also grounded in the enhancement of sustained peace education at the grassroots in order to help transform attitudes and deepen consensus around the succession plan to help limit further disputes in the implementation stage when the document is completed. The NRPC-led RRI and youth empowerment programmes led by FBOs which reflect a significant approach to building sustainable peace are still not all-encompassing like a national civil society-led early warning system or a state-led development approach. Hence, limits to local peacebuilding within the activities of the NRPC as well as other Regional Peace Councils across the country highlight the significance of shared responsibility in the Ghanaian peacebuilding field.

In mini case three, the NPC utilises a preventive diplomacy approach in the area of direct interventions such as the Roadmap, Rode of Conduct, and Act for eradicating political vigilantism during the 2020 elections and election observation through the ESR system. The channel of implementation through the Regional Peace Councils in collaboration with CSOs and ad hoc peace mediation committees, the selection criteria in hotspot areas of violence, and the targets on sensitising and educating political groups and the youth, collectively underlines the essence of transforming conflict by discouraging the perpetration of acts of political vigilantism during elections. This premise and outcome are also similar to the ESR system which utilises election observation as an approach to early warning and conflict resolution during the conduct of elections.

Other peacemaking processes like the IPAC system and peace accords also highlight the crucial role of consensus building in election-related peacebuilding. Their significance is anchored in the liberal premise of elections which is naturally inherent in competition. In Ghana, this is fueled by the abuse of the winner-takes-all system where excessive competition tends to drive tensions and


leads to isolated violence. Hence, having platforms that can promote formal dialogue and commitment to peace by political parties cannot be overemphasised.

From the study, the theory of peacebuilding also revealed some surprising findings on the relevance of local peacebuilding mechanisms with respect to the three mini cases that could not be overlooked. For instance, in mini case one, the failure of the intra-national peacekeeping force to prevent many instances of violence in a democratic environment compared to the mixed regime era shows that the mere era of democratic consolidation does not bring peace. Yet, the era of stable democracy is relevant to the extent that it has provided the environment for establishing an architecture for peace to complement past resolution mechanisms. The footprints of hybridity are also a bedrock of I4P mechanisms since the Regional Peace Council in charge of the Volta and the Oti regions was able to identify and utilise middle-level leadership as an eminent conveyor belt to grassroots peacebuilding. Despite this relevance, the sustenance of peace necessitates the broadening of the scope of peace education, reviving the permanency of inter-communal dialogue committees, and promoting social trauma healing for both victims and alleged perpetrators of violence, and their relations.


Similarly, in mini case two, rather than contributing to the promotion of peace, some state-led democratic structures contributed to fueling the two fatal regicides under the parliamentary democracy in the Second Republic and quasi-presidential democracy in the Fourth Republic. Yet, the success of the Dagbon succession plan still requires the use of democratic tenets such as broad inclusion and participation of relevant stakeholders within and beyond the Dagbon State Council. Further, peacebuilding in Dagbon and its environs also highlights substance rather than rhetoric. This relevance of deepening consensus among the parties towards the completion and

implementation of the project, as well as the sustenance of youth initiatives and structural projects by state and non-state actors beyond electoral seasons.

In the context of mini case three, the nature of statutory compliance power of I4P to incentivise the public, party supporters and youth groups through sensitisation and public education on the dangers and consequences of political vigilantism highlights the relevance of constructive change processes in election-related peacebuilding. However, the medium to long-term mechanism in the eradication of political vigilantism also provides a high spot on the significant gaps that would be filled when the mandate of other state and non-state mandates are included in the process of implementation. In the implementation of the ESR and the peace accords, the good offices of the NPC remain relevant because of the eminent role of the NPC members in the Ghanaian society. However, the effectiveness of such eminent good offices should be evaluated through the lens of the adversarial nature of elections and the essence of maintaining transparency and consensus building through electoral management beyond mere eminent respect. This final Figure summaries major findings on I4P mechanisms undertaken directly by the NPC under the mini cases.



**Figure 11: Summary of Direct I4P Mechanisms under the Three Mini Cases**



Source: (Fieldwork, 2021)

To answer the main comparative objective in the study, the key findings show that Ghana’s PA—which encompasses a National Council, Regional Councils and Secretariats, a Support Unit, and a Fund—mirrors formalised I4P structure as the tripartite structures in the UN system which includes a Commission, Support Office, and a Fund. However, while Ghana’s PA could be used to prioritise the role of local actors in deepening local ownership of peace, the UN PBA reflects a top-down and technocratic approach to peacebuilding, designed to likely neglect grassroots input. However, in the priorities of both architectures, conflict is the underlying function of peacebuilding. Despite this similarity, another related distinction suggests that while the UN PBA priority areas focus on addressing structural problems and development issues on sustainable peace, Ghana’s PA, for the most part, prioritises reconciliation and building relationships. This highlights a pitfall in terms of the lack of utility on the part of Ghana’s I4P and the significance of addressing this lacuna by facilitating mechanisms that would contribute to a developmental function of sustainable peace.

### 7.3 Conclusion

This study analysed the practice of I4P in Ghana in terms of its strength, limitations and remedies based on a reflection of an external equivalent in the UN system. The data analysis and discussion chapters have brought to light findings relevant to policy and research in peacebuilding. The findings of the study provide the basis for making the following conclusion:

The study used a comparative qualitative methodology, which began with the selection of two major cases justified by the most-different case selection design. Using this strategy, the UN was selected as a major case that is different from Ghana in several ways, including the element of intergovernmental organisation and an external actor in situations of peacebuilding interventions. Ghana on the other hand is a sovereign state with a population, a national government, and a country characterised by local conflict and internal peacebuilding processes. However, the institutionalisation of I4P in both the UN and Ghana have a common background factor which is the ability to develop mechanisms for promoting peacebuilding in a conflict situation. At the Ghanaian level, the study used an independent case strategy to examine local peacebuilding mechanisms in the context of three mini-conflict cases (Alavanyo-Nkonya, Dagbon, Elections). The study developed a framework using various concepts within a broader theory of peacebuilding which were applied in the data analysis and discussion chapters.

In the case of the Alavanyo-Nkonya land dispute, the data analysis revealed although the peacebuilding mechanisms identified in the study (intra-national peacekeeping, peace education, inter-communal dialogue committees, trauma healing chieftaincy succession plan, rapid response initiative, youth empowerment programmes, direct intervention, election observation, peace accord, and consensus building) were local, their different premise still mirrored the features of

international peacebuilding within the UN system of agenda for peace (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and preventive diplomacy). However, the implementation of such mechanisms was dependent on the dynamics of the conflict situation, including the nature of the local context. For instance, while intra-national peacekeeping has some features of international peacekeeping, it reflects a state-led approach with the attributes of permanency that cannot be replaced by international peacebuilding that maintains temporary attributes. However, both approaches also reflect a security-centric dimension of liberal peacekeeping. The limitation of this approach in the local context is the lack of focus on building inter-communal relationships. Hence, peace education, intercommunal dialogue, and trauma healing have demonstrated that Ghana's I4P can be used to mend the broken relationships that are often created from an intractable conflict in a divided inter-communal society.

In the case of Dagbon, while after regicide peacebuilding demonstrates the extent to which a relatively stable democratic country can still fail to prevent conflict at the sub-national level, the various I4P mechanisms can be projected as a useful proactive mechanism to prevent a relapse into a third regicide in the future. This highlights a major functioning reasoning where following the enskinment of a new Yaa Naa, the I4P mechanism at the regional level has been used as a tool to institutionalise chieftaincy succession issues which is a bedrock of most traditional governance issues in the country.

In the case of elections, both preventive diplomacy and peacemaking mirrors the practice of I4P mechanisms in the promotion of peaceful elections, deepening the resilient factors of the country, and preventing mass civil violence. This is reflective of the peacebuilding mechanisms (direct intervention, election observation, peace accords, and consensus building) that have elements of

constructive change but require generally shared responsibility, including electoral transparency, due process, and the democratic commitments of political parties to be effective.

Overall, the main comparative analysis establishes that in the context of formal institutional peacebuilding, an intergovernmental entity, and a sovereign state have common background factors which are the existence of a national and a global I4P frameworks that exist as a function of conflict respectively. However, the development priority areas in the UN perspective are a stronger peacebuilding target compared to the Ghanaian perspective on the pursuit of reconciliation and relationship building. Nonetheless, the approach to post-conflict peacebuilding in the UN dimension is weaker compared to the largely proactive approach in the Ghanaian perspective under the Fourth Republican Constitution where peacebuilding has been applied before, during, and after periods of violence as evident by the various mechanisms in the three mini-conflict cases. However, since the legal I4P mandate of Ghana's peacebuilding institution is grounded in the ultimate target of achieving sustainable peace, other priorities must be adopted to examine peacebuilding approaches beyond reconciliation and relationships. Using the UN perspective as the premise, the Ghanaian perspective can further facilitate and develop mechanisms that appeal to development agencies at the local, national, and international levels to support structural issues like poverty, unemployment, health problems, disaster management, and other social infrastructure deficits, particularly in areas where local empirical research has been used to determine as an easy mobiliser toward violence.

In sum, previous studies have examined the development of I4P in Africa and beyond. This study advances the comparative understanding of peacebuilding using global and national peacebuilding institutions. The study contributes to knowledge by introducing a conceptual framework that

synthesises various conceptual building blocks within a largely scattered theory of peacebuilding. Both theoretical and empirical dimensions also advance existing understanding of international and local infrastructural approaches to peace. A comprehensive focus on the Ghanaian context also contributes to the existing theory of conflict transformation. Particularly, by introducing the concepts of proactive and developmental peacebuilding into the lexicon of I4P, a more comprehensive dimension has been introduced in the original application of peacebuilding before, during, and after violence that ensures the ultimate practice of sustainable peace. In methodological terms, the study also enhances a comparative peacebuilding methodology by employing both global and national peacebuilding frameworks in the context of Africa. The evidence finally affirms that I4P will facilitate constructive change when peacebuilding involves the shared responsibility of different stakeholders.

#### **7.4 Recommendations**

Against the background of the key research findings and the conclusion presented, the following are the policy recommendations towards peacebuilding practice in Ghana, and for further research.

##### **7.4.1 Recommendations for a Stronger Early Warning System**

By comparing Ghana's PA with the democracy, security, and development priority areas in the UN PBA, peacebuilding in its broad sense is not only in the area of elections where political parties participate every four years as well as during by-elections. In this breadth, there are other social and cultural conflict issues at the local level that have the potential of manifesting into violence. Hence, it is recommended that the NPC strengthen its relationship with both state and non-state actors at the local level in order to build the partnership for stronger and permanent early warning systems to quickly respond to threats through their good offices. In particular, The NPC could establish a peacebuilding system and lease with the security committees at the sub-national level

to feed the system with data on NGOs working on peace, youth empowerment, and other programmes that are related to the promotion of peace. This can help fill the lacuna associated with decentralising I4P in practice. This is realistic and may not require significant resources since CSOs across the country are already obligated to register at each district social welfare before they can operate. Hence, having a database on the list of NGOs and FBOs and what they do in each district can be used by the NPC to undertake collaborative projects and build practical early warning systems on the ground. This is one way the NPC can detect the kind of interventions that are going on at each point in time across the country and avoid the duplication of peacebuilding activities. This measure could also spread the monitoring and evaluation tentacles of the NPC in terms of the facilitation of peace programmes across the country.

#### **7.4.2 Recommendations on the Operationalisation of District Peace Councils**

Ghana's PA is unique in terms of the utilisation of multistakeholder local peace committees to promote local ownership and deepen grassroots peacebuilding. This is different from the UN PBA which is premised on a top-down and technocratic process of peacebuilding. That notwithstanding, in practice, Ghana's PA in the area of operationalising permanent local peace committees at all levels of society has not yet been realised. For instance, District Peace Councils as noted in the Act are crucial as they allow the Regional Peace Councils to have a permanent early warning structure in all the districts. However, the District-Level I4P is not yet operational due to significant challenges, particularly the financial strain it would place on the NPC to establish a secretariat in all 261 districts, along with appointing 13 council members for each district. As a remedy, the District Peace Councils could also be funded at the district assembly level if there is political commitment to the mobilisation of local revenue. The NPC can also respond to cost through the creativity that emerges from operationalising the I4P framework. It is recommended that as a first

stage, the NPC should establish at least District Peace Council secretariats with support from the local governance structure in all the districts, and then allow the council members in the region to have oversight responsibility over them. Funding cannot be an excuse in all situations at the expense of quality and durable peace.

### **7.4.3 Legislative Instrument Recommendations**

Unlike the UN PBA which banks on authoritative actors at the national level to execute security and development priority areas, Ghana's PA relies on eminent personalities to build relationships. However, since peace is related to security, it is recommended that the membership of the Regional Peace Councils in REGSEC and the RCCs should not be at the discretion of the Regional Minister. Legislative steps should be taken to make the NPC permanent members of both regional authorities without compromising their independence. That will enable I4P at the sub-national level to function effectively and deepen a formal advisory role in both REGSEC and the RCCs. This can be done through the passage of a Legislative Instrument by Parliament to complement the Act which can give the NPC a more concrete advisory authority to perform.

### **7.4.4 Fiscal Peacebuilding Recommendations**

Ghana's PA is premised on the UN PBA in terms of the Peace Fund whose establishment receives voluntary contributions from multi-sectoral sources to promote peacebuilding activities. From the study, while the NPC is a state institution and its activities, including remuneration for the secretariat and allowances for the council members, are borne by the state, to execute some of its programmes, the council has relied on external support, including donor assistance. This study recommends the establishment of a prudent financial administrative system such as a fund manager to manage the Peace Fund that was launched in October 2021, 10 years after the formalisation of

the NPC in 2011. The fund should be used for undertaking emergencies and threats to peace in the country, while other sources of funding such as budgetary allocation facilitate primary projects.

#### **7.4.5 Recommendations for Enhancing Grassroots Peacebuilding**

While the UN PBA is a function of post-conflict peacebuilding in external structural terms, it does not ignore the role that national governments play in the facilitation of its priority areas. However, Ghana's PA has more insider attributes than the UN PBA and should not ignore the role of the grassroots. To deepen grassroots peacebuilding, it is recommended that the NPC facilitate continuous training and retraining of its members and other related institutions, including sustaining public education on nonviolent responses to conflict. This is also one way that will deepen the sustenance of peace.

#### **7.4.6 Developmental Recommendations**

The priority areas in the UN PBA provide an important standard to Ghana's PA, such as how I4P could be used to drive developmental peacebuilding and not just reconciliation and relationship building. Hence, drawing on this standard, institutions like the NPC can further drive developmental change if they relook at their facilitation mandate from a broader perspective. That should include collaborating with both local and international development partners, including private and business organisations in order to channel resources into areas that have been identified through empirical research as a potential hotbed of conflict and violence.

#### **7.4.7 Recommendations on Peace Coordination**

In the UN PBA, the PBC plays an important intergovernmental role in respect of coordinating with several UN agencies and agencies outside the UN to facilitate its priority areas and the performance of its agenda. Similarly, in the case of Ghana's PA, the NPC has a significant prospect of peace coordination with every institution working on peace matters in Ghana. It is recommended that the

NPC deepens and possibly formalise its peace coordination networks when it comes to the activities of national institutions related to peace, such as the State Security Agencies, the EC, the NCCE, CHRAJ, the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons, CSOs and the Media, including the design of High-School syllabus and University course outlines tailored on peace education issues.

#### **7.4.8 Recommendations to Electoral, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice Actors**

The UN PBA in a broader global sense includes an old architecture such as the UN Security Council, and several other UN organs and agencies who directly and indirectly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Similarly, the operationalisation of Ghana's PA in a broader national sense is a shared responsibility of different stakeholders including the NPC as the main statutory peace institution. Hence, some of the biggest contributors to Ghana's peacebuilding are the law enforcement and criminal justice system. When they fail and people lose confidence in them, they resort to other means of solving conflicts including violence. It is recommended that the EC, the Police, and the courts deepen professionalism in law enforcement and the criminal justice system through sustained training of members under the principle of the rule of law, fairness, and good governance. In that regard, when trust is established in these democratic institutions and supported by the significant tolerance in the country, people who feel aggrieved can have confidence in the system to settle their grievances non-violently and according to the law.


#### **7.4.9 Recommendations to External Actors**

The comparative study also affirmed the importance of the relative application of I4P based on the conflict dynamics and the cultural context of a country. Hence, Ghana's PA can serve as a model for research and policy-making on peacebuilding in Africa. However, in supporting the application

of I4P, UN agencies like the UNDP and other national governments should develop a framework that fits the conflict dynamics and the cultural orientation of the recipient country rather than simply replicating exactly what has worked for Ghana.

#### **7.4.10 Recommendations for Further Research**

This research has revealed the importance of peacebuilding institutions, particularly I4P using a comparative methodology. This has demonstrated that the capacity and the utility of a national I4P as a facilitator towards structural and developmental change is as important as their capacity to build relationships that directly contribute to conflict prevention, management, and resolution. In the Ghanaian context, further research should examine the interfaces between the I4P approach and the traditional governance, security enforcement, adjudication, and commission of inquiry approaches to the resolution of conflict in Ghana. Other studies could deploy mixed methods research on the impact of I4P-led mechanisms, such as presidential peace accords, inter-communal dialogue committees, and rapid response initiatives. Finally, looking at the big picture in the African context, future works could ascertain the areas of convergence and divergence between peace and security architectures in Ghana, including sub-regional and regional ones, such as the ECOWAS and AU peace and security architectures.



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
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	encourage them to engage in reportage devoid of partisanship and sensationalism.								Ghana Journalist Association
	The NCSALW should educate and sensitize the public and provide information on the dangers of small arms and light weapons in order to discourage their production, trade and use.								The National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCSALW)
	The <b>NCSALW</b> should undertake an in-depth study of arms control and management in the country to provide relevant data on small arms and light weapons to the government.								NCSALW
	The NCSALW should facilitate the process of amending all relevant laws to accommodate current national demands.								NCSALW
	Ensure that the NCCE is very well resourced to enable it to (a) formulate, implement and oversee programmes intended to inculcate in the citizens of Ghana awareness of their civic responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and obligations especially with respect to politically related violence; (b) to facilitate public dialogues and create spaces and opportunities in which people can engage and share perspectives on the eradication of politically related violence.								Government





## 2.0 Code of Conduct


### 2.1 Introduction

This Code of Conduct, designed by the National Peace Council (NPC), is one of the key deliverables of the dialogue between the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), and other stakeholders, aimed at eradicating political vigilantism in Ghana. This Code, which represents a consensus between the two parties that vigilantism is inimical to Ghana's democratic system and must be eradicated, should be read as part of the strategic plan for the eradication of vigilantism, titled, *the Roadmap to Eradicating Political Vigilantism in Ghana*.

Pursuant to two earlier communiqués issued by the National Peace Council (NPC) on the 9<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> of April 2019 respectively, and signed by the NDC and NPP, the NDC and NPP undertook to: (1) disband vigilante groups operating within or for political purposes; (2) prohibit the ownership, hiring, or utilization of such groups by the political parties or members thereof; and (3) cooperate with state agencies and stakeholders in the total eradication of such groups or incidents of vigilantism in the country.

In furtherance of the above objectives, the NDC and NPP agree to a set of general guidelines and standards of behaviour against political vigilantism. They agree that:

1. Parties will publicly denounce any acts of vigilantism, especially where the perpetrators are affiliated or associated with or connected or related to their party.
2. Following the passage of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999), the parties will engage the leadership of known vigilante groups operating within their parties or for political purposes, and encourage them to disband such groups;
3. No party, party member, or candidate for an election will form, operate, support or fund any vigilante group or their activities;
4. Parties will discourage the ownership, hiring, or utilization of such groups, or their services by their political parties or members thereof;



5. The parties will provide timely, accurate and objective information regarding acts of vigilantism to the police, especially when such information is requested by the police;
6. Parties will not take any initiative in contravention of the law, for the release of any person who is caught armed, or any person who offends the law on elections, electoral campaigns, or commits a governance related offence and is arrested by the police;
7. In furtherance of the provisions of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999), parties will include in their respective codes of conduct, a firm statement prohibiting the formation of vigilante groups, and clearly indicate the sanctions that will be applied to any member who forms, funds, supports or utilizes the services of vigilante groups;
8. Parties will act in good faith, as well as maintain honesty and integrity in their dealings with stakeholders and security agencies, towards the total eradication of vigilantism;
9. The Code of Conduct will be reviewed periodically, at least, once every four years of its implementation, or upon identification by the parties of any major defects during implementation;
10. Parties will educate their members on the requirements of the “Roadmap to Eradicating Political Vigilantism in Ghana,” as well as this Code of Conduct.

## **2.2 Enforcement of Code of Conduct**

The parties agree to commit resources, personnel, and time to the enforcement of the Code of Conduct. The parties agree to work within the structures proposed below, and through other lawful means to ensure enforcement of this Code of Conduct.

1. At the national level, the NPC, in collaboration with civil society stakeholders, will receive and address complaints of breaches of the Code and may meet the leadership of the NDC and NPP as and when necessary in furtherance of this mandate.
2. At the regional and district levels, the Inter-Party Dialogue Committees will work with the NPC to receive and address complaints of breaches of the Code;
3. The parties shall be responsible for the enforcement of the Code of Conduct;

4. Violations of the Code of Conduct shall first be reported to the proposed committees for redress;
5. The proposed Committees shall also monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct by the parties;
6. Notwithstanding the above suggestions (1 to 5), all criminal offences must be reported to the Ghana Police Service.



## APPENDIX II



# UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

## ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)

P. O. Box LG 74, Legon, Accra, Ghana

My Ref. No...ECH 157/ 19-20 ...

October 23, 2020

Samson Confidence Agbelengor  
Department of Political Science  
University of Ghana  
Legon

### ETHICAL CLEARANCE (ECH 157/ 19-20)

The protocol title below has been reviewed and approved by the ECH Committee.

**TITLE OF PROTOCOL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE BUILDING ARCHITECTURE AND THE GHANAIAN PEACE ARCHITECTURE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION.**

**PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: SAMSON CONFIDENCE AGBELENGOR**

Please note that the final review report must be submitted to the Committee at the completion of the study. Your research records may be audited at any time during or after the implementation. Any modification of this research project must be submitted to ECH for review and approval prior to implementation.

Please report all serious adverse events related to this study to ECH within seven (7) days verbally and in writing within fourteen (14) days.

This certificate is valid till October 22, 2021. You are to submit annual reports for continuing review.

Please accept my congratulations.

Yours Sincerely,

**Professor C. Charles Mate-Kole**  
ECH Chair

Cc: Prof. Abeeku Essuman-Johnson, Department of Political Sciences, UG  
Dr. Nana-Lindsay Kuffiehor, Department of Political Science, UG  
Dr. Seidu Mahama Alida, Department of Political Science, UG

Tel: +233-303633866

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## APPENDIX III

### SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS

#### Section A: National Level

##### General Perspective

1. What is the major cause(s) of social and political conflict and their potential manifestation into localized violence in Ghana under the fourth republican constitution?
2. Explain how these factors compare to some of the factors that have led to mass civil violence in other African countries?
3. What are some of the factors that explain the relative peace and democratic stability in Ghana compared to other African countries?
4. How would you describe the contributions of official Commissions of Inquiry and the Superior Courts in addressing political and social disputes in Ghana?

##### Institutionalising the Ghanaian Peacebuilding Field

5. How would you describe the kind of factors that necessitated the formation of a peace architecture in Ghana and the national peace council in particular?
6. How would you describe the role of official Commissions of Inquiry and the Court system, regarding the resolution of political and social disputes and conflicts in Ghana?
7. In your perspective, how does Commissions of Inquiry, as well as the Court system, compare to the work of the NPC?
8. Do you think the establishment of the NPC has brought a constructive change in the Ghanaian peacebuilding field? Please explain?
9. What is your view on the potentials of the NPC regarding the resolution of election-related disputes and other social conflicts in Ghana?
10. Do you think the court system are still able to bring some constructive change in the way to deal with myriad of challenges affecting the conduct of elections, and other social issues like land or chieftaincy disputes in the country? Explain your answer?

### **The Role of Consensus Building**

11. What is your view on the role that consensus building plays in Ghana within a competitive electoral process?
12. Do you think consensus building is possible in reality in an environment of multi-party politics in Ghana? If yes, why do you think so?
13. Can you describe your view on the impact of consensus building on credible and transparent elections in Ghana?
14. Do you think the calibre of eminent personalities in the NPC can provide a significant national platform for consensus building on divisive issues in Ghana? If yes, please explain why you think so?
15. What do you think about the prospects of facilitating consensus building through the channel of the NPC?
16. Describe the contribution of the interparty advisory committee towards building consensus especially in the conduct of elections in Ghana?

### **Building and Sustaining Peace in Practice**

17. How would you describe the relevance of one or more of the mechanisms and activities for consolidating peace and stability in Ghana (*e.g., peace accords, roadmap and code of conducts to eradicate political vigilantism, Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019, public education, mediation among others*)?
18. What do you think about the effectiveness of peace accords or agreements designed by NPC and other stakeholders to build peace before, during, and after elections in Ghana?
19. Do you think we can draw some positive outcomes from the commitment of primary party leaders to such accords? Please Explain?

### **Challenges and Prospects**

20. What would you describe as the greatest challenges that faces the operationalization of a peace architecture in Ghana? What would you recommend as effective remedies?
21. In your perspective, what would you describe as a better approach to addressing the factors that causes electoral and social violent encounters in Ghana?

### **Concluding Remarks**

22. Is there anything you would like to add up as a contribution?
23. Is there anyone you would recommend that I should meet to discuss this topic or any document you think can be helpful to this work?

## Section B: Sub-National Level

1. What is the major cause(s) of political tensions during elections, and other social conflict in Ghana in general and your region in particular?
2. Do you think the establishment of the NPC, and the regional peace council in particular, has brought a constructive change in the Ghanaian peacebuilding field that can effectively address the problems you have enumerated? If yes, can you describe it?
3. What is the relationship between the regional peace council and the regional security council in your region?
4. What has been the state of peace in your region at least within the last 12 months or more?
5. Describe the major threats to peace in your region?
6. What contributions has the regional peace council made towards addressing the threats to peace in your region?
7. What major initiative(s) did the regional peace council facilitate and implement before, during and after the 2020 election? (e.g., *election observation, peace, roadmap and code of conducts to eradicate political vigilantism, public education, mediation*)
8. How and in what ways were the initiative(s) implemented? What were the objectives? Were the objectives fully achieved? If not, do you know why?
9. Do you know how the initiative(s) was funded? How do you finance your operations in general in the region? Do you have enough budget to carry out your activities? Why?
10. Were other stakeholders involved in the formulation and implementation of the said peace initiative(s)? How? At what stage(s) did they get involved? Why?
11. Is there something different or better you think could have been done as part of the pursuit of the said initiatives(s) that was not done? Why?
12. What is your view on the role that consensus building plays in Ghana in respect of the performance of the mandate of the NPC?
13. Describe the relevance of the eminent personalities in the NPC as far as the performance of your mandate in the region is concern?
14. What are your greatest strengths and general challenges?
15. What are the remedies to address the challenges you have enumerated in your perspective?

16. What would you describe as a better approach to addressing conflict and sustaining peace in Ghana, and your region in particular?
17. Is there anything you would like to add up as a contribution?
18. Is there anyone you would recommend that I should meet to discuss this topic or any document you think can be helpful to this work?

### Section C

1. Describe the factors that has prolonged the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict for several decades?
2. Can you describe some of the factors that led to the recurrence of the conflict in the past?
3. How would you describe the current status of the conflict, and the efforts that has been made to achieve relative peace?
4. Describe how you have participated in the resolution of the conflict?
5. Do you think the peace processes you participated in, has had a significant impact on the current relative peace enjoyed in the communities? If yes, why do you think so?
6. Can you identify the kind of actors that have equally participated in the resolution of the conflict?
7. What do you think was done differently in the resolution of the conflict that was not done in the past?
8. Are you aware of any role that the regional peace council has played in the resolution of the conflict? Can you please describe it?
9. Has the resolution of the conflict also involved actors and institutions from outside the region? If yes, can you describe the role they played?
10. As it currently stands, do you think the relative peace enjoyed as far as the over ninety-year-old conflict is concern is sustainable?
11. What factors do you think could ignite violence, and what can the members of the two communities do to prevent the recurrence of violence?
12. What would you describe as a better approach to permanently resolve the conflict?
13. Is there anyone you would recommend that can also help answer these questions?

**Section D: International Level**

1. What do you think constitute a major cause of political tensions and/or social grievances that manifest into isolated violent encounters in Ghana?
2. Describe whether or not you think the Ghanaian experience is different from some of the factors that have led to mass civil violence in other African countries?
3. How do you see Ghana today in the context of peace and stability in Africa?
4. Do you think Ghana is prone to election-related disputes that can lead to mass civil violence if more is not done to curb the menace you have enumerated?
5. Describe whether or not you think the kind of peace and stability enjoyed currently in Ghana is sustainable?
6. What can be done to deepen the consolidation and sustenance of peace and stability in Ghana?

**International agenda in local setting**

7. What kind of agenda do you pursue in Ghana that contributes to the facilitation of peace and stability?
8. Will this agenda be significantly different from what you facilitate in other conflict zones in Africa?
9. What laws or international protocols serve as a guide to the pursuit of your agenda?
10. Why has Ghana been a beneficiary of this agenda over the years?
11. What does a peaceful and stable country like Ghana mean for your agenda in Africa in general?


**How initiatives of international actors provide acceptable remedies to local grievances and disputes**

12. Can you describe any of your past and/or recent initiative(s) and/or programme(s) that was targeted at supporting Ghana's quest to build and consolidate peace and stability?
13. Can you describe whether or not you have pursued some initiative(s) and/or programme(s) in areas in Ghana prone to longstanding local conflicts?
14. What kind of initiative(s) and/or programme(s) did you undertake in these areas?

15. Can you elaborate whether or not the said area(s) or communities directly benefited from your supports?
16. What kind of local stakeholders have participated in the implementation of your programme(s) to promote peace and stability in Ghana?
17. How and in what ways were the programme(s) implemented in Ghana?
18. What were the objectives? Were they fully achieved? If not, do you know why?
19. Have you evaluated possible impact? If so, can you describe it?
20. Is there something different or better you think could have been done as part of the pursuit of your programme(s) to promote peace and stability in Ghana that was not done? Why?
21. Can you describe whether or not your collaboration with local stakeholders in the pursuit of your programme(s) has been effective?
22. If yes, do you have any practical experience to share on this?

**Concluding Remarks**

23. What do you think Ghana possesses as its strengths in terms of peace and stability in Africa?
24. What would you describe as the challenges to the consolidation and sustenance of peace and stability in Ghana?
25. What are the remedies to addressing these challenges you have enumerated?
26. Is there anything you would like to add up as a contribution?
27. Is there anyone you would recommend that I should meet to discuss this topic or any document you think can be helpful to this work?



**APPENDIX IV:**

**BREAKDOWN OF FIELD INTERVIEWS**

<b>No.</b>	<b>Date of Interview</b>	<b>Type of Interview</b>	<b>Interviewee/Conference</b>	<b>Institutional Representation</b>
1	5th February 2021	Phone	Dr. Festus Kofi Aubyn	Regional Coordinator Research and Capacity Building, WANEP
2	5th February 2021	Phone	Mr. Baffour Osei Frimpong	Regional Researcher of conflict analyst in chief and security, WANEP
3	7th February 2021	Face-to-face	Osofo Kofi Atabuatsi	Former council member of NPC representing African Traditional Religion
4	17 <sup>th</sup> February 2021	Phone	Mr. Vincent Azumah	Head of Monitoring and Evaluation, WANEP
5	18 <sup>th</sup> February 2021	Phone	Mr. David Normanyo	Regional Executive, Regional Peace Council responsible for Volta and Oti regions
6	23 <sup>rd</sup> February 2021	Phone	Dr. Imrana Mohammed	Director of Programmes at NCCE Head Office
7	2 <sup>nd</sup> March 2021	Face-to-face	Mr. Paul Nana Kwabena Abroampah_	Senior Programmes Officer, CDD Ghana
8	3 <sup>rd</sup> March 2021	Face-to-face	Mr. Alexander Osei	Senior Principal Investigator-Anti-Corruption, CHRAJ
9	8th March 2021	Face-to-face	Rev Emanuel Amoah	Executive Secretary Ashanti Regional Peace Council
10	12 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Phone	Mr. Damien Ensowaye	Executive Secretary, Western Regional Peace Council
11	12 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Phone	Mr. Samassy Soare	Early Warning Officer (WANEP)
12	13 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Phone	Father Thaddeus Kuusah	Executive Secretary, Northern Regional Peace Council
13	13 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Phone	Mr. Albert Yelyang	National Coordinator for WANEP in Tamale

14	19 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Phone	Mr Charles Ohene Amoh	Executive Secretary for Central Regional Peace Council
15	19 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Phone	Mr. Kojo Impraim	Deputy Director Research Monitoring & Evaluation NPC Head Office
16	22 <sup>nd</sup> March 2021	Online via Microsoft Teams	Mr. Furquan Ahmad Saleem	Lead Public Sector Specialist & Governance Coordinator for World Bank, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone
17	22 <sup>nd</sup> March 2021	Online via Microsoft Teams	Mr. Tatsuya Iwasaki	World Bank, Ghana
18	22 <sup>nd</sup> March 2021	Face-to-face	Chief Supt. Jerome Kanjog	Ghana Police Service, Head Office
19	24 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Online via Microsoft Teams	Mr. Diallo Abdourahamane	Country Director for UNESCO, Ghana
20	24 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Online via Microsoft Teams	Mr. Carl Ampah	National Programme Officer, Culture - UNESCO Ghana
21	25 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Face-to-face	Mr. Johnson Asiedu Nketia	General Secretary, NDC
22	26 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	Face-to-face	Dr. Abdul- Jalilu Ateku	Academia- Department of Political Science, UG Legon
23	April 26 <sup>th</sup> 2021	Face-to-face	Mr. Alex Poku Akubia	Acting Director for Research, EC
24	26 <sup>th</sup> April 2021	Face-to-face	Mr. Mustapha Abdallah	Senior Research Fellow, FAAR-KAIPTC
25	27 <sup>th</sup> April 2021	Phone	Dr. Afua Yakohene	Research Fellow, LECIAD and Council Member of Greater Accra Peace Council
26	4 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Face-to-face	Dr. Evans Aggrey-Darkoh	Chief Director, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs
27	5 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Face-to-face	Dr. Kwaku Danso	Research Fellow, FAAR-KAIPTC
28	6 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Face-to-face	Mrs. Serwah Allotey Pappoe	Research Fellow, FAAR-KAIPTC

29	7 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Face-to-face	Justice Sir Dennis Adjei	Appeal's Court Judge, Judicial Service Ghana
30	12 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Face-to-face	Brigadier General Albert Dahwoso	Armed Forces Command and Staff College
31	12 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Face-to-face	Mr. Ernest Lartey	Head, Peace and Security Programme FAAR-KAIPTC
32	13 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Phone	Mr. Frank Wilson Bodza	Deputy Director, Conflict Management and Resolution, NPC Head Office
33	17 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Zoom	Mr. Emmanuel Bombande	UN Mediator and Peacebuilding Practitioner
34	19 <sup>th</sup> May 2021	Face-to-face	Alhaji Khuzaima Mohammed Osman	Greater Accra Regional Council Member
35	1 <sup>st</sup> June 2021	Face-to-face	Mr. Frank Okyere	Peace Support Operations, FAAR- KAIPTC
36	6 <sup>th</sup> June 2021	Face-to-face	Mr. Raymond Tsokor	Former Assembly Member for Alavanyo Agome Dzemedzegbedzi Electoral Area
37	7 <sup>th</sup> June 2021	Phone	Mr. Suallah Abdallah	Executive Secretary of Bono and Bono East Regional Peace Council
38	8 <sup>th</sup> June 2021	Phone	Mr. Theophilus Aganu	Former Assembly member for Nkonya Ntsumuru and a member of the insider peace building committee
39	15 <sup>th</sup> and 18 <sup>th</sup> June 2021	Phone	Dr. Patrick Osei Kufour	Senior Research Fellow Department of Peace Studies, University of Cape Coast
40	19 <sup>th</sup> June 2021	Phone	Mr. Ali Anankpeing	Executive Secretary Upper East Regional Peace Council
41	19 <sup>th</sup> June 2021	Phone	Mr. Emmanuel Danyomah	Executive Secretary

				Upper West Regional Peace Council
42	8 <sup>th</sup> July 2021	Phone	Nana Otubia II	Paramount Queen of Nkonya Traditional Area
43	16 <sup>th</sup> July 2021	Zoom Conference Presentation on the Prevention of Atrocity Crime	Mr George Amoh	Executive Secretary, National Peace Council Head Office

