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TOPIC:

POLITICAL FINANCING AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

BY

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DECLARATION

I, **SAAJIDA SHIRAZ**, hereby declare that, apart from the documentary and other sources of material duly referenced in this thesis, I am the author of this work. I also declare, that, no part of this thesis has ever been submitted by me or any other person to the University of Ghana or any other institution for the award of any degree. Whilst I have received guidance from my supervisors, I bear responsibility for any marginal and substantial errors which may be found in this work.

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my mother, Zuleiha Abukari. You sacrificed your dreams so I would not have to sacrifice mine. Thank you.

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I would also like to extend my thanks to the many individuals who participated in this study. Their contributions enriched the quality of the work and deepened the understanding of the relationship between Political financing and Political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, whose unwavering support and prayers sustained me throughout this journey. To my son Fareed Katari Hamza especially, thank you for your light.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CPC	Cocoa Purchasing Company
CPP	Convention Peoples Party
CRP	Committee for the Re-election of the President
CSR	Civil Society Representatives
EC	Electoral Commission
LP	Legal Practitioners
MP	Member of Parliament
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NLC	National Liberation Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
PA	Parliamentary Aspirants
PPERA	Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act
PR	Political Representatives
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council
PP	Progress Party
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UGFC	United Ghana Farmers Council (UGFC)

ABSTRACT

Whilst considerable research has been conducted on political financing and political corruption globally, gaps persist in the understanding of the nexus between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, particularly through the lens of rational choice institutionalism.

To fill this gap in the literature, this study employed a qualitative method of inquiry grounded in constructivist philosophies to:

1. Examine the link between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic;
2. Assess the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana's Fourth Republic;
3. Examine the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political finance corruption in Ghana; and
4. Suggest measures to abate political finance corruption in Ghana.

In tune with the assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, the study proceeded on the assumption that, political financing corruption in Ghana is a result of rational actors leveraging institutional weaknesses in pursuit of their self-serving preferences.

The study explored the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, and revealed limitations in existing laws and regulations addressing political financing corruption in Ghana.

Consistent with assumptions of rational choice institutionalist theory, the study demonstrated the inclination of rational political actors in Ghana to exploit these regulatory weaknesses to maximize their own utility.

The study demonstrates that, any reform targeted towards reducing political financing corruption needs to center the strengthening of the institutional framework on political financing to be effective.

CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

1.1 Study Background

"There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money; and I can't remember what the second one is" Mark Hanna.

Money has been a fixture in politics for centuries (Ohman, 2013a). It is important for the functioning and operation of competitive multi-party democracies and governments as it helps strengthen political parties and candidates, and provides opportunities to compete on more equal terms (Falguera et al., 2014; Office of Democracy & Governance, 2003).

It is needed by political parties to establish and maintain party offices and administrative structures; conduct policy research, mobilize supporters, and to communicate with members of the public in hopes of getting them to buy into their policy platforms (Ashiagbor, 2005; Mann, 2015; Office of Democracy & Governance, 2003b; Ohman, 2013a). It also buys access, favours, expertise, and services, all necessary for effective party activities (Williams, 2000). Money in sum determines the very basics of democracy (Mwangi, 2008). It reflects and shapes political competition, and is a conduit for political participation, as donations to election campaigns is a way of participating in the political process (Speck, 2013). All money in the political process, is what is referred to broadly as Political finance (Falguera et al., 2005). Although viewed as indispensable to the smooth conduct of political activity, the presence of money in politics is charged with undermining the democratic principles of inclusive participation and representation, and perverting democratic processes through the purchase of elective office and legislative favours (Milyo, 1999).

It can constrain competition, and give undue advantage to those in possession of high campaign capital; and subject politicians to the control and undue influence of those who donate to their causes - running the risk of the state being captured by big donors (Bryan & Baer, 2005).

It can also catalyse the penetration of illicit funds and criminal networks into politics; and facilitate exclusion as those who lack money have limited chances of winning office and getting meaningful representation (Ohman, 2016). Money in politics can corrode the quality of democratic actors, institutions, and processes by undermining the equality of the political playing field, facilitating corruption and policy capture, and delegitimizing the political system (Perdomo & Burcher, 2017).

Pastine & Pastine (2013) advance that, the need to raise money for politics weakens the link between the policy preferences and actions of politicians, and undermines the basic premise of representative democracy, which is that, people elect representatives to advocate for them and to prioritize their best interests. The pressure on political parties to raise funds strengthens the ability of wealthy interest groups who because of the financial support they provide are able to influence party behaviour (Department for International Development Governance Department, 2001). Money also has disempowering tendencies as it can give greater opportunities to a few well-funded individuals over the majority (Perdomo & Burcher, 2017). According to Pinto-Duschinsky (2002), the way in which political activity is funded can lead to severe inequalities as it may prevent citizens without private wealth from seeking representation; and makes political competition unfair as wealthy candidates or candidates backed by wealthy financiers may outspend their opponents.

Walecki (2003) also opines that, opaque political financing leads to the seeping into politics of funding from undesirable sources, the inappropriate influence of money over policy outcomes, and barriers to political participation for average citizens.

"Money slithers through every part of our political system, corrupting democracy and taking power away from the people" Elizabeth Warren.



Figure 1: Source - Money in Politics Handbook: A Guide to Increasing Transparency in Emerging Democracies

Norris (2017) notes political corruption as one of the most critical effects of the ubiquitous nature of money in politics. Political corruption occurs when politicians and public officials who are mandated to service the public good use their political power to sustain their status and wealth and/or make decisions in the benefit of private interests (Transparency International, 2014). Among others, political corruption includes undue policy-making influence, illicit political finance, favouritism in appointments and decisions, state capture, vote buying, election fraud, abuse of state resources during elections, and the abuse of immunities and other prerogatives. It takes the form of gross conflicts of interests, abuse of state resources, and the funding of political candidates by wealthy financiers with intentions of capturing them (Transparency International, 2014).

Political corruption, is often exacerbated by badly designed constitutions which over-concentrates power in the hands of a few political overlords (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2014); a system of secrecy and weak accountability (Transparency International, 2014); and, poorly enforced campaign finance regulations. It increases the costs of government business, leads to revenue leakages, distorts government decision making, and diminishes the resources available to service citizens demands for public goods and services (Amundsen, 1999). Whilst political corruption has several typologies, the point at which it intersects with political finance is what is referred to as political finance corruption (Walecki, 2003).

Corrupt political financing refers usually to one of the following: the unauthorized use of state resources for private political purposes; political donations that breach existing legal protocols on political financing; the use of money from a corrupt transaction to fund political activity; donations from discreditable sources; the appropriation of political funding for banned activities like vote buying, and, the receipt of political funding in return for the promise or exchange of unauthorized political favours (Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002).

It includes quid pro quo donations, where parties or candidates receive campaign resources in return for favourable treatment; the misuse of state and public administrative resources by candidates or parties for electoral purposes; and, the bribery of voters and election officials (Reed, 2005). The servicing of campaign debts in the form of granting political favours is also a commonly occurring type of political corruption (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003b). Candidates and parties are often held hostage by political donors' dependent on political favours to recoup their investments. Where politicians or parties prioritize the self-servicing interests of donors to the detriment of the ordinary citizenry, there is a corruption of democratic government and an erosion of public trust in representative government (Speck, 2013).

The exploitation of state resources for party purposes; hidden party funding streams, and influence peddling linked to political financing undermines the confidence and support of ordinary people in the democratic process.

This leads to a compromising of democratic ideals, and contributes significantly to the weakening of the democratic system (Prempeh & Asare, 2017). It ultimately has a deleterious effect on the legitimacy of political institutions, especially when corrupt political leaders consistently go unpunished (Transparency International, 2014), and on economic and social development at both the national and local level. It also perpetuates inequality (Gupta et al., 1998). Together with other forms of political corruption, political finance corruption undermines the democratic system and leads to political apathy and distrust among voters, the compromising of democratic ideals, and ultimately, the consolidation of authoritarian tendencies in the state (Walecki, 2003). It is important to guard against the effects of political finance corruption on the political system, as democracy cannot thrive when money corrupts the political process (International IDEA, 2019).

Corruption scandals, have affected countries in every region of the world, negatively impacting and delegitimizing democratic systems (Perdomo & Burcher, 2017). In the United States, a Trump associate, Lev Parnas, has been convicted of campaign finance crimes. Former Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, was barred from holding public office for five years and sentenced to nine years in jail for taking bribes of up to $260 million from businessman Ilan Shor to facilitate his take-over of one of the country's banks (Chadwick, 2015; Radio Liberty, 2016). Similar scandals have occurred in Korea, Argentina, South Africa, and the Philippines (Perdomo & Burcher, 2017).

The issue of political corruption is a bigger problem in Africa than it is in other parts of the world due to the relative newness of multiparty systems in Africa, the nature of political

economies which provide few avenues to wealth and influence outside of politics, and the cultural practices of patronage and gift giving. This ultimately threatens the political stability of many African nations; and serves to undermine the confidence of African citizens in the democratic system (Bryan & Baer, 2005). The absence of legitimate sources of political finance and the persistence of anti-democratic party activities such as vote buying has led to the persistence of corrupt political financing in developing countries (Department for International Development, 2001)

In Ghana, the issue of political financing has been discussed extensively by academics and civil society practitioners, as the role of money in politics and its impact on the character and quality of Ghanaian democracy and governance have become matters of growing interest and recurring debate (Prempeh & Asare, 2017). Political financing, or the absence of, is credited by many scholars, (Aikins, 2020; Ayee et al., 2007; Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018), to be responsible for the deterioration of democratic quality in Ghana. The significant rise of money in politics negatively impacts electoral integrity and governance, undermines multi-party representative democracy in Ghana, and breeds political corruption (Aikins, 2020; Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018). Presently, unlimited, undisclosed, and untraceable amounts of private money finance the country's political parties and campaigns, corrupts the entire electoral process, promotes exclusion, undermines internal party democracy, and overall threatens the character and health of Ghana's democracy and governance (Prempeh & Asare, 2017). Against this backdrop, this study seeks to delve into the topic of Political Financing and Political Corruption within Ghana's Fourth Republic. The primary objective of this research is to examine the intricate nexus between political financing and political corruption in Ghana. By conducting a contextualized analysis of political financing in Ghana and its associations with political

corruption, the study hopes to contribute empirical insights into the phenomenon of political financing corruption.

1.2 Problem Statement

In the 1950s, when Ghana was transitioning from a country under colonial rule to an independent sovereign nation-state, political money within this period was generated and appropriated not only to galvanize support for the independence agendas of the political parties at the time but also to determine the new leadership of the soon-to-be independent nation-state. (Apter, 1963; Austin, 1964; Ninsin, 2017; Owusu, 2009).

A significant portion of party funding within this period came from founding members of political parties. The United Gold Coast Convention for instance was funded by donations from its leading members like George Paa Grant, who donated cash and other materials to support party activities. Parties also received significant funding from Levantine merchants, major paramount chiefs, leaders of ethnic groups, and most significantly, key figures in professional and business groups (Chazan, 1983; Owusu, 2009).

According to (Owusu, 2009), the pay-offs to political financing were practically unlimited, and the group of men who were prepared to sacrifice money and time in service of party activities will inherit the earth with the electoral success of the parties they supported. Political financing corruption in Ghana was thus birthed, and will persist up to the Fourth Republic - despite several attempts by successive governments including the Progress Party (PP), the National Redemption Council (NRC), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) to stem the tide of corruption (Austin, 1964; Chazan, 1983; Ninsin, 2017).

The rising incidence of money in politics and its effect on the nature and quality of Ghanaian democracy and governance has become a topic of rising concern (Prempeh & Asare, 2017).

In January 2022, Former Roads Minister, Kwabena Owusu Aduomi, admitted to have paid 5000 cedis to each of the 600 delegates in the Ejisu constituency, totalling GHS 3 million, to secure his victory as parliamentary candidate (*I Paid 5k to Delegates, yet I Lost the Election; Politics Is Really Expensive – Former MP [Audio]*, 2022). It is interesting to note he lost the nomination despite this blatant case of vote buying. Similarly, the MCE nominee for Juaben in November 2021, was rejected again by assembly members in a vote that saw him secure only 10 votes out of the 26 total. This fell short of the mandated two-thirds majority he needed to confirm his appointment. The disappointed nominee, in anger requested for delegates to refund bribes he had paid to secure their votes (Joy News, 2021; Starr Fm, 2021).

In 2020, Corruption Watch uncovered that, aspirants for the NPP parliamentary race, had misappropriated state resources in service of their personal ambitions. Hajia Abibata Shani Mahama Zakaria, was noted to have taken advantage of her role as deputy MASLOC CEO, to distribute GHS1,000 of state money under the MASLOC loans to induce delegates to vote for her as parliamentary candidate for the NPP in the Yendi constituency. Her contender, who at the time was a serving officer of the Ghana COCOBOD, Alhaji Farouk Aliu Mahama, was also alleged to have shared 400 bottles of anti-snake sprays and 800 bags of fertilizers to delegates of the Yendi constituency amongst other supplies (*Corruption Watch Exposes How Aspirants Engaged in Vote Buying during NPP Primaries*, 2020). The NDC has admitted to engaging in similar political financing corruption practices. Baba Jamal of the NDC had this to say: "NPP is on the chopping board because they are in government and for that matter are more resourceful. In Akwatia, people gave flat screen televisions among others" (GhanaWeb, 2020).

In 2016, the former Special Prosecutor, Martin Amidu, accused then president Mahama of illegally smuggling an undisclosed amount of money into Ghana to fund his presidential campaign. The money, he alleged, had been transported via the controversial ford car gift

Mahama had received from Burkinabe contractor, Jibril Kanazoe in the run up to the 2012 election.

> "Mahama had just assumed office after Mills' death and he was going into elections unprepared financially. However, the President's friend and beneficiary of contracts when the President had just assumed office was ready to provide financial support. The only way funds could be unconstitutionally imported into Ghana from Burkina Faso was to be ingenious: through the Ford Expedition as the wrapper wrapping the many dollars needed for the Mahama campaign. No searches. No questions." (Amidu, 2016)

The subsequent receipt of several government contracts by the giver of the vehicle, including a contract to build a $650,000 outrageously priced Ghana Embassy fence wall in Burkina Faso, lent credence to this speculation (*Burkinabe Contractor Offers Controversial Gift to Prez Mahama - MyJoyOnline.Com*). These alleged incidences of political financing corruption, have taken place in the context of an institutional environment that seeks to regulate political financing and to proscribe political corruption - a puzzle this research seeks to unravel. The catalysing nature of political financing on political corruption in Ghana within prevailing institutional, legislative, and regulatory contexts will thus be the focus of this study.

Whilst considerable research has already been conducted on the broad topic of political financing (Ayee et al., 2007); the legislative frameworks for campaign financing and its shortfalls (Prempeh & Asare, 2017); the limitations of Ghana's campaign financing protocols on democratic quality (Ayee et al., 2007; Prempeh & Asare, 2017); and the effects of unregulated money in Ghanaian politics (Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018), the relationship between political financing and political corruption deserves more interrogation, as there remains a significant gap in our understanding of the intersecting phenomena of political financing corruption within the Ghanaian context, especially in relation to theory.

To fill this gap, this study, through a rational choice institutionalist assessment, contributes empirical perspectives to the subject of political financing and political corruption in Ghana. It assesses why political financing corruption persists in Ghana despite the existence of constraining institutions. By employing a unique multi-perspectivist approach that engages not only political practitioners and financiers but also key political finance stakeholders, such as the electoral commission, civil society practitioners, and the media, this qualitative exploration of the nexus between political financing and political corruption provides depth and nuance to how we understand political financing corruption in Ghana.

1.3 Research Objectives

Framed within a rational choice institutionalist perspective, the main goal of this research was to deepen understanding on the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana.

The study sought to attain the following specific objectives.

1. Examine the link between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic.
2. Assess the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana's Fourth Republic
3. Examine the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political finance corruption in Ghana
4. Suggest measures to abate political finance corruption in Ghana

1.4 Significance of Study

This study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic is significant in its ability to reduce corruption, promote good governance, inform policy, and contribute to academic knowledge.

Key aspects of significance include:

1. Theory Advancement: The study advances theory by exploring the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana through the theoretical lens of rational choice institutionalism. This approach tests the applicability of the theory's assumptions to the unique Ghanaian socio-political setting.
2. Literature Extension: Through its multi-perspectival and stakeholder approach to the study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana, the research serves as a valuable extension and complement to existing works and debates on the subject. It is useful for scholars interested in political financing, political corruption, or both.
3. Making Recommendations: The study, by assessing the relationship between political finance and political finance corruption in Ghana, generates insights into possible remedies for addressing the phenomenon. The presentation of catalytic factors of political financing corruption is significant in providing a roadmap for democracy practitioners interested in leading action to mitigate its effects in Ghana. It also contributes to the actualization of healthy political financing in Ghana through strategic political finance reform.

1.5 Scope and Delimitations

While this study traced the historical underpinnings of political financing and political corruption in Ghana, its primary focus was on Ghana's Fourth Republic. Consequently, cases cited for analytical purposes were confined to the Fourth Republican dispensation of Ghana. This limitation ensured a comprehensive examination of linkages between political financing and political corruption within a specific period, avoiding the influence of hazy historical recollections. Restricting the study to this time frame allowed the researcher to provide in-depth insights and perspectives on the negative effects of political finance corruption on democratic health in the present republic. The study also had an institutional focus, and for the

study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic, concentrated on the assessment of institutions, including legal frameworks and practices.

1.6 Organization of Study

This study has been organized into the following seven chapters

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 1 serves as the introduction to this study on Political Financing and Political Corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. It presents the background to the study, the statement of problem, research objectives, significance of study, and the scope and delimitations of the research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Chapter 2 presents a review of literature related to the topic of political financing and political corruption. This provides an important backdrop against which the case for the significance of the study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana is made.

Chapter 3: Conceptual and Theoretical Foundation

Chapter 3 details the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this research. It elucidates key concepts of the study, presents the state of theory, and makes a case for why rational choice institutionalism has been adopted as the theoretical foundation of this study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Chapter 4: Methodology

The methodology chapter presents the philosophical underpinnings, research design and rationale, approach to data collection, sources of data, sampling and sampling procedures, and

data analysis processes for this study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. It also discusses the ethical considerations and limitations of the study.

Chapter 5: Presentation of Findings and Data Analysis

Chapter 5 presents study findings on the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic; the institutional framework on political financing and political corruption in Ghana, the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing and political corruption mitigates political financing corruption in Ghana; and the ways in which political financing corruption in Ghana can be abated.

Chapter 6: Discussion of Findings

Chapters 6 deploys the rational choice institutionalist theory to examine the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, the institutional framework on political financing, and the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption in Ghana. This set the stage to assess how political financing corruption can be abated in Ghana.

Chapter 7: Summary of findings, Conclusion, and Recommendation

Chapter 7 presents the summary of the key findings on the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. It undertakes a theoretical assessment, details contributions to the field of study, presents recommendations, and concludes the study.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the literature reviewed in the study of topic of Political Financing and Political Corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. For this research, two broad strands of literature were reviewed.

1. General Literature on Political Financing. This strand of literature involved a review of previous works on political financing. The literature review, under the sub-section labelled General Literature on Political Financing consequently presents scholarly perceptions of the role of money in politics; and, unpacks conceptually and operationally the phenomenon of political finance/political financing. It discusses and explores perspectives proffered on the funding of political activity. The phenomenon of political corruption has also been explored in this strand. The intersection of political financing with political corruption, which gives birth to the field of political financing corruption, is examined from a scholarly standpoint. Political finance regulations, are also discussed, and the state of global political finance regulations are presented. The section ends with a contextual presentation of the state of global political finance corruption.
2. Political Financing in Ghana: This second strand of literature explores political financing and political corruption within the Ghanaian context. It presents a curated assessment of relevant works on political financing in Ghana, including scholarly works and policy papers on the monetization of Ghanaian politics, the cost of politics in Ghana, and the strengths and limitations of Ghana's legislative and constitutional frameworks/protocols on campaign financing and corruption in Ghana. The section

ends with an identification of the gap(s) in the literature on political financing in Ghana that this work seeks to fill.

2.2 General Literature Review on Political Financing

2.2.1 Money in Politics

A great part of the literature on political finance/financing starts off by emphasizing the role of money in politics and its implications for democratic quality. This is because, political finance at its most basic operationalization is money in politics. Money in politics, or political finance, is linked to key aspects of any modern society (Ohman, 2013). According to Ohman (2013), there is no part of the world where money does not matter in political decision-making processes. The increasing cost of politics has made money one of the most essential resources needed for the conduct of political activity (Biezen, 2003).

Biezen (2003) and Speck (2013) both advance that, the progressive increase in modern democratic costs is due to the increased use of cost intensive campaigning techniques and the professionalization of political parties. Political parties, they opine, require money to maintain their party organizations, rent offices, employ party personnel, conduct election campaigns, organize collective action, and communicate with the electorate (Biezen, 2003; Speck, 2013). Biezen (2003) describes these costs associated with political activity as the necessary and unavoidable costs of democracy. Speck (2013) conceptualizes money as a double-edged sword which in the realm of political participation both connects and biases; in the area of political competition enables and crowds out; and in policy making, influences and corrupts. He advances the argument that, money in politics may not necessarily be a threat to, but an opportunity for democracy, as money in the context of political participation serves as a conduit for individuals to engage with political parties, and a means for political parties to democratize active political involvement.

Money serves as a channel of political participation, influences politics, and reflects and shapes political competition (Speck, 2013). It buys access, favours, expertise, and goods and services - all of which are necessary for successful party activity (Williams, 2000). It can also be used to secure influence and mobilize support within politics (Mwangi, 2008; Williams, 2000). Without money in politics, competitive multi-party democracies could not function, nor could their governments operate (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003b). The misuse of money in politics however can create serious challenges for a political regime (Walecki, 2003). Mann (2015) posits that, every democracy struggles to reconcile the need for political money with the problems it presents, which may vary from conventional quid pro quo corruption or extortion to the perception or reality of excessive access to or influence over policymakers and government decisions.

Problems associated with money in politics develop as political parties and candidates struggle to raise sufficient funds to compete successfully in periods when campaign costs have risen dramatically and groups and individuals are increasingly seeking to influence election outcomes and policy decisions (Mann, 2015). Mann (2015) maintains that, the way political money is raised and spent, and the conflict of interest that arises when politicians receive contributions from donors who seek favourable legislative actions, special access, and/or influence can undermine the legitimacy of democratic politics and effective governance. Interest-driven money, according to Milyo (1999), perverts the democratic process in three ways: the purchase of legislative favours through campaign contributions; the purchase of elective office through the funding of campaign expenditures; and, the withdrawal of ordinary citizens from participation in the political process due to popular disgust with the dominant role of money.

According to Kevin Casas-Zamora (2008), money can endanger democracy in three fundamental ways: By impinging directly on political equality; unevenly distributing the

opportunity for direct political participation or policy influence, and by creating opportunities for quid pro quo arrangements between private donors and policy makers. The Office of Democracy and Governance (2003) similarly holds that, the presence of money in politics, as well as the broader system of political patronage prevalent in many countries, can lead to corruption, as elected and appointed officials frequently pay the political party for a place on the party list or a political appointment, with payback beginning the day after the election or appointment. It can lead also to large corporates or individuals dominating political decisions and wielding influence over political decisions to a degree commensurate with their political contributions.

Money in politics can also engender poor governance as elected officials who are more accountable to financiers than to constituents may prioritize paying back election favours over development; or sell political access, which will divert time spent with constituents to time spent with big donors. This, according to Office of Democracy and Governance (2003), can affect democratic equilibrium, hinder political competition, give undue advantage to those in possession of greater resources, and result in the absence of meaningful representation for those who cannot afford the escalating costs of competitive politics. It is also feared that, dirty money if it finds its way into politics, can warp the allegiance of elected leaders in favor of the political or illicit interests of the people who paid their election expenses. Some criminals may thus enter politics as a way to insulate themselves from prosecution (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003). Kevin Casas-Zamora (2008) and Perdomo & Burcher (2017) regard large sums of unregulated money in politics as one of the most critical threats to the resilience of representative institutions - as unequal access to political funding undermines political competition; serves as a conduit for political corruption and policy capture, and affects public trust in democratic systems.

Ohman (2013) also expresses concern that money can make politicians more responsive to contributors than voters. He argues that, money in politics can lead to wealthy interests gaining undue influence over the political system; corruption in public finances due to campaign contributions from businesses; abuse of state resources; illicit funding influencing politics; threat to sovereignty due to the influence of foreign funding; difficulty for new political forces to emerge; diminishing quality of government; and questionable legitimacy of elections stemming from vote buying and other corrupt electoral practices. Williams (2000) also inputs that, the need for money in politics can lead to the inability of political parties to pursue policies determined to be detrimental to the interests of its financiers, in effect prioritizing the needs of political financiers over voters. Mwangi (2008) in a similar vein posits that, the absence of financial resources prevents political party leaders and supporters from the democratic protection of their interests, as they are unable to obtain representation through political participation.

Political corruption, according to all these works, is a key effect of (unregulated) money in politics. According to Williams (2000), corruption is inextricably linked with party finance. Ashiagbor (2005) agrees. He iterates that, "where money plays such a determining factor in politics, public confidence in the political process is eroded and prospects for policies that will promote the interests of the most vulnerable members of society are reduced". Krumholz (2013) also posits that, the connection between political finance and corruption is clear, as conflicts of interest are bound to arise when private money fills the coffers of public servants. This, he inputs, increases opportunities for bribery, rent-seeking, and quid quo pro corruption.

Eme and Anyadike (2014) similarly argue that, the relationship between party financing and corruption is so critical that to ignore party funding is simply to open wide the door for corruption. In a study of party financing practices in 22 countries, Bryan & Baer (2005) identify

the root cause of corrupt political finance practices as "a too close relationship among businesses, political parties, and government".

Casas-Zamora et al., (2008) complementarily identify conditions that increase the likelihood of political corruption, which are, excessive competition for state resources among political factions and interest groups; severe poverty, which encourages vote-buying and makes it more difficult for the citizenry to participate in politics; apathy among voters, a lack of civic participation, and the absence of independent media; and, moneyed interests control of the state (state capture). Political corruption in relation to political finance manifests broadly in two broad ways. The first involves the improper and unlawful receipt and management of campaign funds by individuals or parties, and may include the appropriation of campaign or political funds for expenditures other than legitimate political activity (Transparency International, 2014). The second manifestation of political corruption develops as a direct effect of improper political financing. It occurs when a public official perverts the rules and norms of office to benefit themselves and or a third party who has incentivized said official to gain access to goods and services they will not obtain otherwise (Heywood, 2015; Transparency International, 2014).

Carlson and Walecki (2006) similarly identify the following as manifestations of political-finance related corruption: the abuse of state resources by ruling political parties; the receipt of political funding from private businesses which in turn benefit from large contracts; and the provision of financial support by wealthy donors with ties to organized crime or terroristic networks who may try to capture control of political parties or of legislative processes.

According to Reed (2005), the most commonly recognized form of political finance corruption is when private interests provide financial or other resources to parties or candidates in return for favourable treatment by elected representatives. When business interests dominate the

financing of parties and political candidates, they sometimes have demands in exchange for their donations which may be the award of government contracts, appointments to positions of power, or policy influence (Bryan & Baer, 2005).

Speck (2013) has a similar opinion. He believes campaign donors can secure access to costly government contracts, acquire advantageous terms on public loans, and receive other illicit favours from the government. According to Bryan & Baer (2005), political party related corruption poses one of the greatest threats to democratic and economic development worldwide, as corrupt election finance practices erode the trust and support of ordinary citizens in the political system, discourages political participation, and encourages cynicism about the prospects for reform. Corrupt election finance not only segregates the political elite from society, but it also weakens the concept of equality and democratic representation and fosters exclusion (Ashiagbor, 2005; K Casas-Zamora et al., 2008).

Walecki (2003) shares this critical view of the effects of corrupt political financing on democracy. In his opinion, political financing corruption compromises democratic values, and exacerbates political apathy and mistrust for authority among voters; and when combined with other kinds of political corruption, consolidates democratic capture.

2.2.2 Sources of Political Financing

Political parties get their funding from a multitude of places, and based on the nature of the laws and governments in place as well as the system in place, the sources vary from one nation to the other (Sule et al., 2019).

The literature, (Achu Check et al., 2019; Ayee et al., 2007; Biezen, 2003; Falguera et al., 2005; Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003a; Ohman, 2013a; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002; Prempeh & Asare, 2017), identifies two main sources of funding for political activity: public sources of funding, and, private sources of funding. The following types of public funding

have been identified by Office of Democracy and Governance (2003): money to parties; money to candidates; tax incentives; free or discounted broadcast media; and other subsidies. Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) similarly identifies direct public subsidies, and in-kind subsidies as typologies of public sources of political finance.

Public financing has been advanced as a political financing source/method that will promote transparency and accountability, and level the political playing field. Biezen (2003) makes a case for the public funding of political parties, arguing its necessity based on increasing political costs and decreasing revenues for political parties; the need to ensure equality of political competition; and the need to limit the role of private money in politics. Similarly, the Office of Democracy and Governance (2003) advances that, access to uncorrupted, legal political funding reduces the temptation for political parties, political candidates, and public servants to engage in corruption. Ohman (2013) also insists the provision of regulated public funding can mitigate the adverse influence of money in politics without limiting healthy dialogue and political competition.

The suggested kinds of public funding to political parties include, direct money to parties; money to candidates; tax incentives; and free or discounted broadcast media (Biezen, 2003). According to the International IDEA database for Political Finance, Globally, 63(34%) out of a sampled 179 countries in the world offer regular direct public funding to political parties. 49(27%) offer no public funding, 16(8.9%), offer public funding in relation to public finance, 45(25.1%) offer public political funding both regularly and in relation to campaigns, with no data available on 6(3.4%) countries.



Figure 2: Are there provisions for direct public funding to political parties?

Out of 180 countries, 123(68.3%) provide free or subsidized media access to political parties, whilst 42(23%) do not. There is no data on 15(8.3%) of countries.



Figure 3: Are there provisions for free or subsidized access to media for political parties?

Private financing, as a source of political financing, entails the resources raised by political parties and candidates from entities other than the state - to support political activity. According to Biezen (2003), private sources of funding may be internal or external to the party. The main traditional sources of internal party financing are membership fees, income from property, fundraising activities, revenue from party activities, festivals, occasional public collections, and other social events. (Biezen, 2003). Biezen (2003) refers to membership dues as normatively the most unproblematic form of party financing, because they are provided on a voluntary basis and unaccompanied by direct demands for policy or party influence. The problem of membership dues as a source of political financing is however due to the rapid decline in the number of party members and subsequently a reduction in funding emanating from membership dues/subscriptions (Biezen, 2003).

The inadequacy of membership dues as a source of private political financing has led to the increase of other forms of private financing, including donations from individuals. This type

of political financing has the risk of establishing inappropriate links between donated money and specific political decisions, as it can co-opt politicians and make them susceptible to the corrupting influence of donors (Aikins, 2020; Ayee et al., 2007; Biezen, 2003). This leads to the erosion of public confidence in the political system, ultimately delegitimizing democracy (Biezen, 2003). When it comes to the funding of political activity, Biezen, (2003) believes political parties should be intentional about striking a balance between the private and public funding of their political activities.

Whilst a heavy dependence on private contributions could skew the democratic process in favour of private interests, a disproportionate reliance on state funding on the other hand could devitalize the connection between political parties and their electorates (Biezen, 2003). On why anticorruption reforms fail in countries widely plagued by corruption, Persson et al., (2013) argue that, it is because they are based on a systemic mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. They reveal that, whilst anti-corruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption manifests instead as a collective action problem. Contrary to the assumptions of principal agent theory, they suggest principled principals willing to hold corrupt officials accountable are non-existent. The existence of actors willing to enforce corruption reform depends to a large extent on how many other individuals in the society are expected to be corrupt (Persson et al., 2013).

According to Persson et al., (2013), to the extent that corruption is the expected behaviour, the short-term benefits of corruption outweigh the costs, and monitoring devices and key instruments and punishment regimes in tune with principal agent anticorruption frameworks are expected to be largely ineffective in such contexts since there will be no incentive to enforce them.

2.2.3 Political Finance Regulation

Political finance regulation and reform is an important issue for democratic political systems (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo, 2007). It is typically undertaken to reduce corruption, and to promote equality of representation and of political participation (Strauss, 2016). Krumholz (2013) argues that, the effect of money in politics is heightened when politicians know they can operate without the scrutiny of an efficient watchdog system, as they may be more inclined towards the exploitation of the benefits of public office at the expense of the public good. The ability of money in politics to skew political competition, makes political finance management a necessity for ensuring credible and genuine elections and electoral campaigns (Ohman, 2013a).

Ohman (2013) asserts that, proper management ensures the country is governed effectively. According to Zon (2016), transparent and accountable political finance systems that strengthen the integrity of the democratic process are critical for emerging, consolidating, and established democracies. Biezen (2003) concurs, that the role of money in politics needs to be properly regulated due to its potentially distorting effect on the democratic process. The regulation of political finance is intended consequently to reduce the political leverage of special interest groups and increase public interest in electoral outcomes (Köppl-Turyna, 2014).

Hummel et al. (2019) argue that, political finance reform mitigates corruption by diminishing the significance of private money in politics and increasing the sanctions for corruption. In a study measuring political subsidies from 175 countries from 1900–2015, they conclude that, political finance regulations reduce corruption, even in countries where such reforms are unevenly implemented. Mann (2015) is less optimistic, believing the fungible nature of political money makes it possible for ambitious politicians to leverage on weaknesses in the regulatory environment and divert it to less accountable pathways. According to Dawood

(2006), debates over campaign finance reform are usually cast as a contention between the protection of freedom of speech, and the need to reduce political finance corruption.

Primo & Milyo (2006) also opine that, the public debate over campaign-finance reform necessitates an unfortunate trade-off between the liberal ideals of free speech and association on one side, and the democratic ideals of equal representation and participation on the other (Primo & Milyo, 2006; Milyo, 1999). The side of the divide who view political finance regulations as necessary to mitigate political corruption believe the democratic process must be protected from corrupt exchanges between political contributors and public office holders through regulations. The opposing school of thought believes political finance regulations violate the principles of free speech and of political participation expressed through donations towards political candidates or parties (Dawood, 2006; Milyo, 1999).

The United States Supreme Court holds the view that, it is permissible to regulate campaign finance for the purpose of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption (Cordis & Milyo, 2013). Many scholars have advanced the categorizations of political finance regulations deemed necessary to ameliorate the negative effects of money in politics. According to Speck (2013), current assessments of political finance regulations are focused on the regulation of finance flows, the provision of state subsidies to political competition, enforcing transparency requirements, and ensuring oversight. The mix of regulations that may be used to achieve these include bans and limits on funding and spending; public subsidies to political parties; state oversights, media, and enforcement; and, reporting and disclosure (Speck, 2013).

The Office of Democracy and Governance (2003) identifies contribution limits; contribution bans; spending limits; campaign time limits; public disclosure, and public financing as the combination of political finance regulations that may be used to mitigate the effects of unregulated money in politics. Mann (2015) similarly identifies public subsidies, contribution

limits, expenditure limits, public disclosure, regulation of campaign activity, enforcement and effectiveness as the tools that can be deployed to address the challenges associated with political money. Casas-Zamora (2008) proposes the regulation of political parties and candidates funding sources, political expenditure, financial transparency and sanctions and penalties as the way forward on political finance reform. International IDEA (2021) also identifies bans on limits on private income, public funding, regulations on spending, reporting, oversight, and sanctions as a mix of approaches typically used by countries to regulate campaign finance.

According to the International IDEA database on political finance, when it comes to bans and limits on private income, out of 180 countries globally, 124(68.9%) ban donations from foreign interests to political parties; and 103(57.5%) ban donations from foreign interests to candidates. It also states that, 129(71.7%) out of 180 countries globally ban corporate donations to political parties; and 129(72.1) ban corporate donations to candidates. 99(55%) and 102(57.0%) out of 179 countries ban donations from corporations with government contracts to political parties and individual candidates respectively. Of 180 countries, 99 (55.0%) ban anonymous donations to political parties, whilst 75(41.9%) of 179 countries ban anonymous donations to candidates (International IDEA, 2021).

Out of 180 countries, 104 (57.8%) do not limit the amount a donor can contribute to a political party during an election. 95 (53.1%) out of 179 countries do not limit the amount a donor can contribute to a candidate. 88 (48.9%) of 180 countries do not have limits on in kind donations to political parties, whilst 99 (55.3%) out of 179 of countries similarly do not have limits on in-kind donations to candidates (International IDEA, 2021). When it comes to public funding, 63 (35.2%) of countries offer regular public funding; 45 (25.1%) offer public funding both regularly and in relation to campaigns; and 16(8.9%) offer public funding only in relation to campaigns. This means globally, at least 124(69.25%) out of 179 countries offer some form of

public funding to political parties (International IDEA, 2021). With regards to regulations on spending; out of 180 countries; 166(92%) ban vote buying. Only 63 (35.0%) limit the amount of money a political party can spend. A higher number of countries out of 179, 82 (45.8%) also limit the amount a candidate can spend. 79 (43.9%) out of 180 countries have no limits on the amount of money third parties can spend on election campaign activity (International IDEA, 2021).

When it comes to reporting, oversight, and sanctions on political finance, 137(76.1%) of 180 countries require political parties to report regularly on their finances; with political parties in 109 (60.6%) of 180 countries requiring political parties to report on their election campaign finances. 112 (62.2%) out of 180 countries require political parties to make information about their finance's public. 93(51.7%) of 180 countries also require political party and candidate reports to reveal the identity of donors (International IDEA, 2021). For political finance infractions, out of 180 countries researched, 148 countries offer fines as sanctions; 105 use prison as a deterrent, 46 offer forfeiture, and 58 offer loss of public funding for political parties engaged in political finance illegalities. 42 countries will deregister political parties who breach political finance regulations; 31 will take away the candidate's nomination; 22 will offer a loss of political rights, and 22 will offer a loss of elected office. 29 countries will suspend the political party, and 23 countries will suspend public funding (International IDEA, 2021).

Falguera et al., (2005) believe political finance regulations should involve a more holistic consideration of exigent issues such as the role of political parties and political candidates, and how the state can control these actors. They decry political finance regulations as frequently reactive to crisis situations, and opine a better approach may be necessary. According to Bryan & Baer (2005), the proper regulation of political finance depends on sophisticated and well-funded range of laws, enforcement regimes, and the political will to change. For political finance regulations to work, Speck (2013) opines it is important for enforcement to be done

right. This is problematic as there is a huge gap between political finance regulations and its enforcement. For the effective enforcement of political finance regulations, it is therefore necessary for the enforcing agency to possess a clear mandate and the ability to detect political finance violations and implement existing regulations (Ohman, 2013).

2.2.4 Political Finance and Political Corruption Across the World

Despite instituted measures to curb the excesses of political financing through legislations and regulation, corrupt political financing has found its way into politics, even in places determined to have wide ranging and well institutionalized laws on political corruption. Vote buying for instance is still a common occurrence in politics in many countries across the world.

In a study of party financing practices in 22 countries across the world, Bryan & Baer (2005), present vote buying, both as perception and as reported expenditure.



Figure 4: Vote buying perception vs reported expenditure (Bryan & Baer, 2005).

They identify the challenges to political parties for all parties in the study as: political party organization 31%, weak civil society 19%, ineffective legislative frameworks 12%, lack of group inclusion 4%, corruption 5%, abuse of state power 14%, lack of resources 12%. Only in 3% of cases did no challenge exist (Bryan & Baer, 2005). This goes to show that problems

related to political parties, especially issues of political financing and political corruption, are still very much critical issues in many parts of the world. The subsequent sections provide a global snapshot of political financing and political corruption across the globe.

United States

Money in politics is an issue everywhere around the world. The highly decentralized nature of parties and the relative autonomy of candidates has catalysed the rising cost of electoral campaigns, and subsequently of corruption in the United States (Williams, 2000). McSweeney (2000) describes the distinctive features of political financing in America as: parties raising and spending only a minority of campaign money; the supply of the bulk of political money by individuals and interest groups; the spending of majority of campaign money by candidates and interest groups; and, donation limits and disclosure rules by election finance law which have proved ineffective in mitigating costs or the influence of wealthy donors in political decision making.

Several laws have been instituted to limit the corrupting effects of money on politics in the United States (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003). These laws have been targeted towards barring politicians from forcing donations from dock workers and federal employees; limiting the flow of big money into US politics by banning direct financial contributions from corporations and interstate banks to federal candidates (Tillman Act of 1907); banning unions from making federal campaign contributions (Smith-Connally Act of 1943); extending the ban on union contributions to federal elections to include federal primary contributions (The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947) (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003b).

There is also a restriction on soft money contributions – money raised outside the federal campaign act by unions, corporations, or wealthy individuals in 2002 via the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003b). Despite the

existence of these regulations, the United States has recorded incidences of political financing corruption scandals within this period, with Watergate being the most memorable. The Watergate scandal (1972-1974) involved attempts by the Nixon presidency to minimize its involvement in political finance breaches and its subsequent cover-up antics.

In breach of federal law, some companies such as American Airlines and Goodyear had made contributions to the Committee for the Re-election of the President (CRP). Government milk subsidies also followed an agreement by Associated milk Producers to donate $2million dollars to the Nixon campaign, suggesting government's favor for campaign contributors. The CRP coerced donations from business organizations, with the implicit threat to retaliate in the absence of. Wealthy donors, despite their dubious credentials, were rewarded with government appointments - with the allocation of roles such as ambassadorship given out on auction.

An aspiring appointee is noted to have quipped: "*Isn't $250000 an awful amount of money for Costa Rica"*(McSweeney, 2000).

Presently, the basic legislative act that regulates federal election campaign finance in the U.S. is the Law on Federal Election Campaigns of 1972, which was amended in 1974 to provide for the creation of an independent Federal Election Commission. Other amendments were undertaken in 1979 to improve the reporting process and to magnify the role of political parties after the landmark "Buckley v. Valeo" decision in 1976, which ruled that preventing corruption or the appearance of it outweighed the limits on free expression that the restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures created. (Burke, 1997; McSweeney, 2000; Pinto-Duschinsky & Postnikov, 1999).

The law on Federal Election Campaigns, mandates the:

i. Publication of reports on income and costs related to the administration of federal election campaigns

ii. Bans and limitations of expenses related to the administration of federal elections

iii. State financing of election campaigns for the election of the US President

iv. The submission of periodic financial reports

v. Limits on donations for private persons, political committees, and political committees supporting several candidates

vi. Bans on donations from Corporations, trade unions, federal government contractors, and foreign citizens in favour of federal candidates

vii. The law allows for independent payments to be made by persons in support of candidates, with such persons mandated to report the sources of funds for such contributions. (Pinto-Duschinsky & Postnikov, 1999)

There is thus a fairly well-institutionalized system of control over funding of federal election campaigns in the United States. State and local level election campaigns are conducted in conformity with state law, with state variants to campaign financing regulations. Despite this, concerns about the rising cost of politics, and the risk of corruption in political financing remains a concern in the US as it does in Ghana. The following quote from US Senator, Elizabeth Warren, sums up the present state of money in US politics.

> "Money slithers through every part of our political system, corrupting democracy and taking power away from the people. Big companies and billionaires spend millions to push Congress to adopt or block legislation. If they fail, they turn to lobbying federal agencies that are issuing regulations. And if they fail yet again, they run to judges in the courts to block those regulations from taking effect" (Elizabeth Warren)

Britain

Whilst considerable measures have been instituted to regulate money in politics in Britain, and to prevent political financing corruption, political finance regulation in Britain, as compared to the United States is fairly unregulated (Fisher, 2000; Pinto-Duschinsky & Postnikov, 1999). The present political finance protocols as enshrined in the Political Parties, Elections and

Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) includes the following provisions related to political financing: restrictions on amount spent and donations individuals and groups are permitted to accept; determination of criteria and level of campaign assistance to designated groups; and reporting guidelines on political finance spending.

There are historical incidences of political finance corruption in Britain. Much of nineteenth century elections were marked by political corruption, with vote buying and bribery prevalent. This had exclusionary effects as only members of the aristocracy could afford to pursue political office (Fisher, 2000). The introduction of secret voting through the Ballot Act of 1872, and the increased voter population made vote buying a much more difficult endeavour. The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 outlawed bribery, and placed limits on local campaign spending, effectively limiting political corruption (Fisher, 2000). Driven by the need for political funding, both the Liberal and Conservative parties received funding from wealthy businessmen, in exchange for honours. The conservative party for instance actively solicited and accepted donations in return for titles for these businessmen who craved social acceptance and recognition. Even out of office from 1906, the conservative party still solicited for these sorts of donations with the understanding that they will repay with honours when back in office (Fisher, 2000).

This will set the stage for the Lloyd George Cash for Patronage scandal, where peerages were sold for up to £10,000 (todays equivalent of more than £400,000) and up to £40,000 for a baronetcy (Fisher, 2000; The Week, 2022). Incidences of political corruption in modern day British politics, have raised concerns that, political finance corruption may not be a thing of the past. A cash for honours scandal was encountered in 2006 under Tony Blair, where he was accused of nominating for peerages four businessmen who had lent a total of £5million to the party.

Political Financing in Africa

Political financing and corruption may represent a greater problem in Africa than in any other region of the world. Due to the relative newness of multiparty systems, political financing tends to be under-regulated in Africa, with fund-raising by parties and candidates generally a matter of unregulated self-help (Bryan & Baer, 2005; February, 2016). Incumbent African governments often leverage their offices to finance their political ambitions without much care for the political finance constraints that are entrenched in mature democracies. This has led to an increased spate of political finance corruption, which interferes with the resource allocation, economic stability, and income redistribution roles of government, and erodes citizen trust in government (Bryan & Baer, 2005; February, 2016). According to Bryan & Baer (2005),

> "Party finance in Africa is impacted by a number of political and social factors, including the post-colonial political history of most African countries; the cultural practices of patron- age and gift giving in many countries; political constituencies based on tribal, ethnic and regional interests, rather than on ideology; and weak political organizations".

Vote buying, abuse of office to serve private political interests, "god-fatherism", or patrimonial politics, outright bribery, and other manifestations of the political corruption often the result of political financing weaknesses, are critical issues that undermine democratic quality in Africa (Ayeni, 2019; Eme & Anyadike, 2014; Oji et al., 2014; Walecki, 2003). The following sections presents the state of political financing in some African countries.

Kenya

Mwangi (2008) describes political financing corruption as a key feature of politics in Kenya. The advent of multiparty democracy in the country he argues has opened the democratic space and intensified intra and inter-political party competition; subsequently increasing opportunities for corrupt political financing. From 1992, money has been an important factor

in defining politics and the nature of democracy in Kenya (Shulika et al., 2014). The legal framework bordering political financing in Kenya is the Political Parties Act of 2011, which mandates political parties to provide financial records of the party which show the sources of political party funds including membership dues, contributions from founding members, donations whether cash or in kind, income and expenditure transactions, and records of properties, assets and liabilities (Government of Kenya, 2012).

The act also provides for the constitution and administration of the Political Parties Fund, to be funded by not less than 0.3% of the national government revenue, plus contributions and donations from any other legal source (Government of Kenya, 2012). Political parties who receive more than 5% of the vote in the preceding elections, and have less than two-thirds of its members belonging to the same gender, are eligible to receive political funding in proportion to the number of votes received (Government of Kenya, 2012). Kenya, like many countries in Africa, has not been immune to issues of political financing corruption. The Anglo leasing mega scandals is most appropriate for illustrating the relationship between corrupt political financing and democracy in Kenya, and the negative effects of the pursuit and use of illegal campaign funds on democratic politics (Mwangi, 2008).

The Anglo-Leasing and Finance scandal, involved the generating of campaign funding through the abuse of procurement processes for lease finance or supplies credit meant to finance security and security-related projects. This entailed the granting of contracts for the supply of non-existent or highly inflated goods, with huge sums sometimes paid as commission or mobilization fees. Senior members in the Kibaki administration perpetuated this deal to raise funding for the political party activities leading up to the elections of 2007. The Anglo-Leasing transaction was meant to raise funds for both internal party elections, and the general election. A questionable US$55 million naval ship contract was pushed through, from which these politicians hoped to receive political funding. This deal, was considered an essential part of

resource mobilization for the party (Mwangi, 2008). The Anglo-leasing and finance scandal, shows how institutionalized political corruption can be, and how weaknesses in institutional checks and balances can sometimes be negatively leveraged to serve parochial political interests. This has deleterious effects on democratic quality and trust in government.

Nigeria

Political finance provisions in Nigeria is enshrined in section 221 of the 1999 constitution, and the Electoral Act of 2002, 2006, and 2010; and the Companies and Allied Matters Act (Eme & Anyadike, 2014; Ilo, 2004). The legal framework on political financing, requires each political party to submit its statement of assets and liabilities, and a detailed annual financial statement including an analysis of sources of funding. The constitution in section 225 provides as follows:

> "Every political party shall, at such times and in such manner as the Independent National Electoral Commission may require, submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a statement of its assets and liabilities".

It also determines who can make contributions to political parties, and what disciplinary measures should be instituted in instances of breaches of political finance regulations (Eme & Anyadike, 2014; Ilo, 2004). The absence of limits on how much a political party can contribute however has led to the hijacking of political parties by money bags who have succeeded in corrupting the entire electioneering process (Ilo, 2004).

According to Ilo (2004), political party financing in Nigeria, is effectively a business investment, returns payable upon the ascension to office of the sponsored candidate. Political financing corruption incidences have become so commonplace in Nigeria that, it is now a tolerable part of the political culture. Oji et al. (2014) links the increasing influence of 'godfatherism' in Nigerian politics to uncontrolled party financing. Egbujo (2015) decries the brand of exploitative politics dubbed "stomach infrastructure", which entails the distribution

of material goods to the people in exchange for their votes. This has insulated thieving politicians from accountability, as the people seem ready to forgive and vote for any corrupt politician willing to distribute gifts to the electorate from time to time.

To illustrate the pervasiveness of political financing challenges in Nigeria, below is a picture of a donation made by Senator Adeola to the Lagos senatorial district. The donation included 8 police patrol vehicles, 10 ambulances, 100 grinding machines, 100 inverter welding machines, 50 vulcanizer machines, 50 tricycles (Keke Marwa), 50 minibus (korope), 100 generators, a 100 hairdressing machines and hand dryers, several deep freezers, 100 sewing machines, several medical equipment and drugs, 10 incubator machines and 150 hospital beds (Williams, 2022)

Figure 5: Donations by Senator Adeola to Lagos Senatorial District: Picture credit – Tope Brown

2.3 Political Financing in Ghana

2.3.1 Background to Political financing and Political Corruption in Ghana

There are many works that cover the political history of Ghana. Seminal works that relate to political financing in Ghana include, Apter, (1963); Austin (1964); Chazan (1983); Manu (1991); Ninsin (2017); Owusu (2009); & Shillington (1992). According to Apter (1963) & Manu (1991), the formation of the first post war nationalist organization in the Gold Coast, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), was driven by elite dissatisfaction with the promulgated constitution by the colonial government, and more immediately by the economic exigencies of the time.

The UGCC sought to achieve by all legitimate and constitutional means, self-government within the shortest possible time. A more radical party, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), emerged in June 1949 to capitalize on this seeming indefiniteness of the UGCC. Its demand was self-government now (Austin, 1964; Manu, 1991). In the mid 1950's when Ghana was transitioning from colonialism to independent nationhood, as many as 8 political parties emerged (Ninsin, 2017; Owusu, 2009). The activities of these parties, effectively set in motion the process that will lead to the decolonization and eventual 1957 independence of the country Ghana, a multi-ethnic nation-state with its own constitution, flag and identity (Apter, 1963; Ninsin, 2005).

Political money within this period was generated and appropriated towards not only galvanizing support for the independence agendas of the political parties at the time, but to determine the new leadership of the soon to be independent nation-state of Ghana. To this end, it was used to open political offices, buy petrol for propaganda vans, hold rallies, and embark on campaign activity (Apter, 1963; Austin, 1964; Owusu, 2009). In addition to the costs of campaigning, political party expenditure included moneys to be paid by aspirants for political office (Apter, 1963; Austin, 1964).

According to Apter (1963), for a person to be eligible for election to the legislative assembly of 1951-1953, they had to deposit fifty pounds (£50) with the principal returning officer, an amount which was returned to the candidate if the candidate's nomination was withdrawn, there was no contested election, or if a candidate in a contested election obtained votes equivalent to not less than one-sixth of the total number of votes cast. Political financing, was thus very important to the success of these pre-independence parties. A significant portion of party funding within this period, came from founding members of political parties. The UGCC for instance was funded by donations from its leading members like George Paa Grant, who donated cash and other materials to support party activities (Apter, 1963; Austin, 1964).

Other sources of funding were, levies, proceeds of political social activities such as dances and football matches, voluntary subscriptions, appeals, donations, bequests, sale of paraphernalia approved by the national executive, admission fees of individual members and organizations, and monthly dues (Apter, 1963; Austin, 1964).

The CPP, which was still struggling to establish itself across the country depended on bands of young women and men who travelled into villages at their own expense to market the party (Austin, 1964). Little was raised through regular membership subscriptions. Members of the CPP had to pay two (2) shillings before they could be registered as members, and make a flat rate contribution to the Fighters fund – five (5) shillings for males and three (3) shillings for females. A charge of one shilling (1*s*) or six pennies (6*d*) was usually charged for attendance at rallies. There were constituency-unique variants to political financing for the CPP, as the Swedru wing for instance charged sixpence weekly as party dues, and a penny a meeting (Apter, 1963). A CPP harvest festival in December 1950 raised over £100 for the Nsawam branch of the party. In Bekwai, it was decided that on all enrolments, the out stations will forward 50% from their enrolment fee of 2*s* to feed the constituency headquarters. The constituency chapters were thus often better organized than the national unit, which sometimes

depended on bands of young women and men who travelled into villages at their own expense to market the party (Austin, 1964).

Voluntary contributions of 5 pounds per each branch were made to help build up the party. This was supplemented by donations from generous members, supporters, and sympathizers to total an amount of 70 pounds 10 shillings (Austin, 1964). The funding limitation was wrought by the inability of most of the early members to afford substantial contributions to the party. Nkrumah was noted to have lamented in 1952 that, "the finances of the party have not been too healthy of late" (Austin, 1964). From 1952 onwards, the party drew on more lucrative sources than the contributions of its members. A number of Levantine merchants offered political funding to the CPP. Armenian contractor, Aksor Kassardjian, told the Korsah commission that he had given in all £200 in separate sums of £100 each to the CPP (Austin, 1964).

Independent patrons, including major paramount chiefs, leaders of ethnic groups, and most significantly, key figures in professional and business groups, marked by their personal wealth or social influence, also contributed financially to the CPP. This led to a magnification of prominence and salience for these early political financiers (Chazan, 1983; Owusu, 2009).

According to Owusu (2009), the pay-offs to political financing were practically unlimited, and the group of men who were prepared to sacrifice money and time in service of party activities will inherit the earth with each electoral success of the CPP. One of the early members of the CPP in Swedru, EK Bensah for instance, who lent his car to the CPP for party activities and an entire floor of his two-story building to be used as the party's branch and subsequently regional elections will go on to serve as the parliamentary representative for Swedru for fifteen consecutive years staring from 1951 (Owusu, 2009).

Chazan (1983) traces the beginning of state-oriented patronage in Ghana to the early years of the Nkrumah government, where persons who had gained key positions in the CPP were seen as constituting effective channels for obtaining goods and services. These growth in corruption

and patronage, she opines, was facilitated by the structural weakness of the state apparatus and the peculiarities of leadership selection in Ghana, where personal ties with the leader was regarded as an appropriate mechanism for mobility. The CPP audaciously employed state power to build exclusive institutions that will restrict participation to the rank and file of CPP elites (Ninsin, 2017). At the dawn of independence, the CPP government established the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC) to compete with the existing colonial cocoa purchasing firms, as well as grant loans to cocoa farmers. The CPC directors were appointed from the central committee of the ruling party. The CPP further promoted the formation of a farmer's organization – the United Ghana Farmers Council (UGFC) as one of its organizational wings, which later became the sole organization for cocoa farmers in the country (Ninsin, 2017).

From the 1950's, the CPP established a symbiotic relationship with the CPC so that only members of the UGFC would qualify for loans from the organization. The establishment of these strategic institutions ensured the CPP was able to assert itself over the cocoa economy, and generate revenue for social development, party consolidation, and self-enrichment, as the UGFC became a fertile grazing ground for corrupt officials of the CPP (Ninsin, 2017).

The timber industry also became an avenue for massive political patronage and corruption, with the Ghana Timber Marketing Board and Ghana Timber Cooperative Union being established to monopolize the lucrative businesses in the industry (Ninsin, 2017). By the end of the 1960s, the broad outline of a complex multi-faceted patronage network had begun to take shape (Chazan, 1983). The CPP government had become synonymous with exclusionary politics, patronage, and corruption by the time of its overthrow (Ninsin, 2017). After the 1966 coup which toppled the Nkrumah led CPP government, remedial legislation was adopted to address the budding corruption in the young West African nation-state. This was accompanied by a series of commissions set up to investigate allegations of bribery and corruption (Ninsin, 2017). The Anim commission, appointed in 1970, was specifically charged with discovering

the cause-effect- cure nexus of Ghanaian corruption; the Jibowu commission was instituted in 1970 by the Busia government to investigate allegations of corruption in the operation of the cocoa purchasing company by the CPP. The Jibowu commission revealed sordid levels of corruption and financial malfeasance in the operations of these bodies (Ninsin, 2017).

The goal of these investigations and legislative remedies to stem the corruption tide proved abortive as not only was the will and means to end corruption absent, the people who were charged with eliminating corruption were themselves suspect (Ninsin, 2017; Vine, 1975). The National Liberation Council (NLC) continued the capture of state institutions; and corruption and political patronage continued to thrive (Austin, 1964; Chazan, 1983; Ninsin, 2017). Shillington (1992) describes the NLC period as a little more than a sharing of the spoils of power. Operation-feed-yourself gave impetus to elements within the dominant elites to embark on a land grabbing spree. Senior military police, security officers, members of the political and financial elite, top public servants and others of the administrative class took advantage of the state of policy to engage in various economic activities in the agricultural sector. They acquired large tracts of land especially in the northern regions, and in parts of Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti regions (Apter, 1963; Chazan, 1983; Ninsin, 2017).

The state policies of the first half of the 1970's enabled fractions of the dominant elites to stage aggressive entry into agriculture. During the post 1992 period, the disposition of the dominant elites to grab lands attained new heights, as they scrambled to invest in the real estate business. While the dominant elites themselves did not directly engage in cocoa production, they employed proxy institutions like the Cocoa Marketing Board that had been established (Apter, 1963; Chazan, 1983; Ninsin, 2017). Subsequently, the revolution in cocoa production coupled with gold production stimulated increase in foreign trade. The policy of excluding the contending factions from participating in the existing political and economic institutions were maintained through to the successor civilian government of the post 1969 elections (Apter,

1963; Chazan, 1983; Ninsin, 2017). The Progress Party (PP) dissolved exclusive economic institutions that had survived the regime change of 1966, or claimed to reform them to make them more inclusive, but in reality did nothing to stem the tide of political corruption. Successive military regimes, the National Redemption Council (NRC), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) unsuccessfully arrogated to themselves a political mandate to oust power corrupt and errant elites from power but were themselves bastions of corruption (Chazan, 1983; Ninsin, 2017).

The Fourth Republic was accompanied into being thus by prominent businessmen and trader entrepreneurs whose intermediary position rested on their status, wealth, and proximity to power. These people reflected the gap between state institutions, and local collectives (Chazan, 1983; Ninsin, 2017). They rose out of functional utility and were judged for such, and in the absence of institutional alternatives, the patronage networks themselves became remarkably resilient, setting the stage for the phenomenon of political corruption as it currently presents in Ghana (Chazan, 1983; Ninsin, 2017).

2.3.2 Money in Ghanaian Politics

Ghana's democracy which is touted as a leading example in Africa, has marked 8 successful presidential and parliamentary elections since the inception of the Fourth Republic. It currently has 275 members of parliament elected by plurality in single member constituencies. The president of Ghana is elected via a majority runoff system. A second round of elections is mandated in a situation where no candidate gets a 50% plus 1 majority (Brierley & Ofosu, 2014). Democratic gains however have not translated into expected dividends. The truncated growth in democratic values and development has led to the emergence of two unregulated duopolistic parties under the Fourth Republic (Aikins, 2020).

The electoral system of winner-takes-all politics since the 1992 constitution came into force has provided a powerful impetus for one of the other of the two major parties with variants of

Nkrumahist and Danquah Busia's parties, NDC and NPP, to control state power, entrench themselves on the architecture of governance of the country, and appropriate associated material resources to enhance their economic power and status (Morrison, 2004; Ninsin, 2017). Ninsin (2017) advances that, elections in Ghana have become a method for conferring "a veneer of democratic legitimacy on what the political elite regard as the proprietary right to power which is power to control the state, its bureaucratic apparatus, as well as the wealth and other assets of the nation". The monetization of politics, is credited by many scholars, Aikins (2020); Ayee et al., (2007); Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA (2018), to be responsible for the deterioration of democratic quality in Ghana. Monetization in politics occurs when money becomes the legal tender for attaining political office. (Institute for Democratic Governance, 2020).

The excessive increase in the cost of contesting for office, and the mobilization of votes based on a candidate's financial strength rather than their superior transformational agenda, negatively impacts electoral integrity and governance, undermines multi-party representative democracy in Ghana, and breeds political corruption (Aikins, 2020; Institute for Democratic Governance, 2020; Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018). The most encompassing work on the cost of politics is the Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA (2018) study on the cost of politics in Ghana which sought to provide perspective into political financing, and the cost dynamics of running for political office in Ghana. The unveiled costs of politics, were as insightful as they were troubling.

Political candidates at the time of the 2016 elections, to be able to secure their party primary nomination and serve as parliamentary candidate needed on average a sum of GH₵389,803, the USD equivalent rate of US$85,000 at the prevailing exchange rate then. This was the equivalent of almost two years' salary for members of parliament. Candidates who competed in both the 2012- and 2016-party primaries were estimated to have expended a cumulative

average of 275,743 Ghana cedis (GH₵), with GH₵121,609 believed to have been spent in 2012, and GH₵154,134 in 2016 (Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018).

As compared to the 2012 recorded highest expenditure of GH₵195,000 by a parliamentary candidate, the 2016 figure for highest cost of competing for primaries came in at GH₵345,000. The percentage increase of the cost of running for political office between 2012 and 2016 was 59% (Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018).

The table below shows the average cost of parliamentary primaries disaggregated by expenditure type and by year.



Figure 6: Source: Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA (2018)

The study uncovered geographical differences to the cost of politics, as candidates from municipal areas were recorded to have spent more than candidates from either the cities or the rural areas. It also uncovered gendered differences to the cost of politics, as men were determined to have better access to campaign funding (Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018).

The figure below will demonstrate.



Figure 7: Expenditure Variation by Gender. Source: Westminster Foundation for Democracy & CDD-GHANA (2018)

More recent estimates about the cost of politics have since emerged. The Institute for Democratic Governance (2020) estimates present-day costs of running for office as a parliamentarian to be $200,000 or 1 million GHS with only a fraction as legitimate campaign expenditure. It reports that, a candidate in the 2019 NDC parliamentary primaries spent a sum of GHS 300,000.00 to secure his victory (Institute for Democratic Governance, 2020).

According to a 2021 study by CDD-GHANA on understanding how dirty money fuels campaign financing in Ghana, the present cost of running for parliamentary office in Ghana is 4million GHS, the equivalent of $693,000 at an exchange rate of 5.77. GHC 2million of these sum they estimate is used for constituency nurturing, and the remaining GHC 2million as general campaign expenditure (CDD-Ghana, 2021). Previous studies on the cost of politics have been shy about putting a number to the cost of presidential elections. The (CDD-Ghana, 2021) study however believes that, for a candidate to have a viable shot at the presidency on the ticket of either the NDC or the NPP, they need to be able to raise and spend 575 million cedis, or a 100 million dollars (Exchange rate of 5.75). The CDD-Ghana (2021) study admits its methodological limitations, as it was carried out in 4 out of the 16 regions in Ghana. It is

believable however, if one considers the varying and extensive cost components of running a presidential campaign on the ticket of any of the large parties. Attah (2020) describes election campaigns in Ghana as a complex, complicated, and expensive undertaking in which the expenditure side of the balance sheet always outweighs the revenue side.

A typical budget, according to Attah (2020) would normally cover publicity (print, electronic media, outdoor advertising, social media), party paraphernalia (T-shirts, flags, scarves, etc.), security, logistics (feeding, transportation for travel and branded campaigning, accommodation, and ways and means – which includes paying respect to traditional rulers and other opinion leaders to things as cryptic as someone coming to request for funds to organize special prayers. Presidential campaigns are required to provide money for the production of state campaign materials, money for the provision of logistics for national campaign outreaches, to downright bribery. The constituencies of people they need to service include foot soldiers, polling agents, media, and party operatives (Attah, 2020).

Attah (2020) reports that, a sum of 4000000 was spent for the NDC presidential primaries. Individuals expected the presidential candidate to dole out money to fund their private activities. The presidential campaign received requests from people for cars and pickups, and other equipment and material they believed will be helpful to the presidential campaign.

Kennedy (2009), shares a similar story of how disenchanting running for politics can be. He was reportedly told by his friend Amo Asante that:

> "Arthur K, you have very brilliant ideas but those folks in Ghana do not care about ideas one bit. In the end, what will matter is money and even your relatives and friends will take money from someone else and abandon you in a moment".

According to Aikins (2020) & the Institute for Democratic Governance (2020), a key driver of monetization in Ghana is the delegate system for presidential and parliamentary elections

which serves as an incentive for bribery, as candidates need to raise monies to buy votes of delegates.

A similar view is espoused by Daddieh & Bob-Milliar (2012), who believe the democratization of party primaries and constituency candidature selection processes have led to parliamentary primaries becoming more highly contested, thus catalysing the rising high costs of politics.

The Institute for Democratic Governance (2020) identifies other drivers of monetization as: the burdensome nature of the frequent branch, constituency, regional and national level elections on political parties - who have been turned into election machines burdened with raising money to survive rather than development agents; and the emergence and persistence of two unregulated duopolistic parties which serve as a breeding ground for large scale vote buying and election expenditure.

According to CDD-Ghana (2021), the monetization of politics in Ghana is fuelled by misconceptions about the role of an MP as providers of development rather than as legislative representatives. This opinion was backed by respondent's prioritization of what they believed the role of an MP was. to lobby for developmental projects for the constituency; offer financial support to constituents; make laws; and provide social infrastructure. Kennedy (2009) also credits the rise in the cost of politics in Ghana to diminished volunteerism, as people want to be paid for everything they do for the party. He recalls an incident where a lady who approached him with a desire to campaign for the party in the lead up to the 2008 elections presented a GHS 10,000 budget for a two-day exercise.

According to the Institute for Democratic Governance (2020), monetization allows incompetent people with fat wallets to be voted into power whist leaving out competent people without the financial means, thereby depleting state institutions of the needed competencies required for effective functioning; and undermines democracy by promoting corruption and

reducing the role of honesty and integrity in politics. It also raises the cost of political campaigns to the point of excluding prospective political leaders, effectively suppressing minority parties and candidates, and hindering women and other marginalized groups who do not have the financial strength to compete in monetized elections (Institute for Democratic Governance, 2020). The monetization of politics, aside from its exclusionary effects, has led to disillusionment and a waning faith in politics. This disillusionment has been exacerbated by the changing relationship between constituents and their representatives, transforming it into one driven mainly by self-interest. It has also led to an exponential growth in corruption (Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018)

2.3.3 Political Financing in Ghana's Fourth Republic

The most pressing issue facing political parties in Ghana is inadequate funding (Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2005). Sakyi et al., (2015) identify institutional weakness, which manifests in the lack of transparency and accountability frameworks and inability to generate resources from party members as the greatest challenge to political parties in mobilizing financial resources for activities. (Gyampo, 2015) posits that, political financing is a major challenge for political parties in Ghana, as voluntary contributions are inadequate for running democratic political organizations, leading to a situation where political parties in Ghana, especially those out of power, find it difficult to finance their operations from such honest sources.

Similarly, Frimpong (2020) inputs that, although all Ghanaian political parties have difficulties in raising funds, the situation is better for incumbent parties than opposition parties. According to (Saffu, 2003), the primary explanation for this is the advantages of incumbency, which places the ruling party in a position to award contracts, grant other political favours, and illegally divert state funds to serve their own interests. Ninsin (2005) notes that, as a symptom

of the patrimonialism and corruption widespread in Ghanaian political culture, ruling political parties often exploit their incumbency and state resources at their disposal.

He advances that, incumbent power has control of state resources and can stuff its election war chest with slush funds obtained through graft and patronage; leverage procurement lapses to yield juicy financial rewards to party loyalists; and circumvent existing procurement processes to reward business groups, or individuals with close ties to the ruling party (Ninsin, 2017).Political elites thus strive hard to emerge victorious from the quadrennial elections to control the executive organ of the state as this enables them access to the cumulative wealth of the nation (Ninsin, 2017).

Sakyi & Agomor (2016) identify the following challenges to fund mobilization: Lack of transparency and accountability; weak organizational capacity to mobilize funds from ordinary members; ordinary members fear of political victimization; financially poor ordinary members. They cite institutional weaknesses, including corruption and lack of accountability as responsible for the failure of political parties to mobilize resources for political activities (Sakyi & Agomor, 2016). According to Ayee et al. (2007), the following are the existing sources of political financing in Ghana: donations from private individuals (68%), anonymous sources (59%), and fund raising (49%).

Ninsin (2005) identifies the sources of funding for political parties as 45% donations, 35% contributions by MPs, membership dues 15%, other sources 5%. The Ghana Center for Democratic Development (2005) identifies personal funds of party leaders (21%) and membership dues (15%) as the most popular sources of funds for political parties. Membership dues, which is identified as one of the principal sources of political party financing in Ghana, is however determined to be inadequate, as most of the population who identify with political

parties are not registered members, and do not pay membership dues (Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2005).

In Gyampo (2015), 88% of 260 respondents indicated they did not make political finance contributions because their financial positions did not make political party financing a priority for them, 7% believed political parties should be able to raise money without individual contributions, 5% believed their contributions will be a drop in the ocean. Some respondents also expressed their belief that, only donors who make substantial donations are recognized, so it will be pointless for them to donate to support such courses. Attah (2020) believes that, no Ghanaian political party could have survived on party membership fees to conduct elections from 1992, as party supporters pay mere lip service, but contribute negligibly when it comes to membership dues.

Sakyi & Agomor (2016) also find that, the sources of funding for political parties are from rich individuals of the party, party founding members, members of parliament, executive members of the party, overseas branch contributions, local businessmen/businesswomen, foreign businesses, ordinary members, and state/government funds. They believe the most prominent sources of funding for political activity to be from a few wealthy individuals, and that, political funding from foreigners is becoming a common and acceptable practice within political parties (Sakyi & Agomor, 2016). Sakyi et al., (2015) corroborate that, all Ghanaian political parties obtain funding from rich individuals, with some rich individuals funding more than one (1) party. Political parties in Ghana, also obtain funding from some foreigners, especially business men from the Lebanese, Chinese, and Indian communities (Sakyi et al., 2015). This is in breach of political finance regulations. When it comes to political finance regulations and the legislative regime on political financing in Ghana, the most detailed work on the subject can be found in Aning & Edu-Afful (2013); Ayee et al. (2007); Ninsin (2005); and, Prempeh &

Asare, 2017). The 1992 constitution of Ghana and the 2000 Political Parties Act however are the most instructive.

Prempeh & Asare (2017) present the legal framework governing political party financing in Ghana, including the gaps in the laws and its implementation, and the dangers and challenges arising from the current political party and campaign financing protocols in Ghana. According to Prempeh & Asare (2017), the key features of Ghana's political financing legal regime are enshrined in Article 55 of Ghana's 1992 Constitution and the 2000 Political Parties Act. Prempeh & Asare (2017) identify the following gaps in the legal regime bordering political funding in Ghana: there is no provision under current law for the direct public funding of political parties; there is ambiguity about whether corporate donations or donations from Ghanaian registered companies to political parties are permissible; and, no contribution and expenditure limits. Additionally, there is no law prohibiting certain uses of party funds, or the use of public funds by government officials for party or campaign activities; disclosure of donations per donor not required, and existing disclosure regulations are targeted at political parties and not individual candidates (Prempeh & Asare, 2017).

According to Prempeh & Asare (2017), the inadequacy of the legal regime for political party financing in Ghana is compounded by gaps in implementation. The criminal prohibition against vote buying is ignored by all parties and candidates; and undisclosed amounts of unregulated money continue to finance political activities in the country. This, they say, has huge implications for the democratic and governance health of the country, (Prempeh & Asare, 2017).

Ninsin (2005) similarly presents that, only Ghanaian citizens or firms, partnerships, or enterprises in which a Ghanaian owns at least 75% and is registered under the laws of Ghana

can contribute or make donations in cash or kind to a political party, and it is illegal for non-citizens to make contributions in cash or kind to a political party.

Ayee et al. (2007) also undertakes a curated assessment of the legal regime on political finance. In addition to detailing the basic stipulations of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the 2000 Political Parties Act which they determine to be the master source of all political party regulations in Ghana, they note requirements for political party financial reporting to the Electoral Commission (EC), which stipulates that within six months from 31 December of each year, political parties in Ghana shall furnish the EC with the state of its accounts, funding sources, donations whether in kind or in cash, membership dues paid, properties of the party and when it was acquired, and other particulars deemed necessary by the EC.

Aning & Edu-Afful, (2013) explore the legal and policy frameworks that regulate the behaviours of politicians and political parties, highlighting in the process, the existing political finance legislative policy and its limitations. They present the stipulation of the *The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* (1992) in Article 55(15) of the Constitution which mandates only citizens of Ghana or companies registered under the laws of Ghana with at least a 75% Ghanaian citizen capital ownership as eligible to contribute to political parties. They note, however, the reported breaches of this rule, as money from other countries has been reported to have infiltrated Ghanaian politics.

Aning & Edu-Afful (2013) note that, political parties in Ghana in disregard of the requirements of political party regulations have constantly failed to present their audited yearly accounts to the EC. As at 2010, only one political party out of 14 since the inception of the Fourth Republic had submitted consistently their audited accounts. The EC, they observe, is unable to control political parties and enforce political party finance requirements.

2.3.4 The Regulation of Political Financing in Ghana

Many of the works on political financing in Ghana have sought to determine the ways in which the excesses of political financing should be curbed. The suggested measures often include the provision of state funding. Sakyi & Agomor (2016) identify five reasons put forth in support of the state funding of political activities: the need to limit individual and private money influence on democratic political process, need to pay volunteers and party officials to ensure the sustenance of political parties (high cost of politics), the need to level the political playing field, the desire to restrict the influence of private money on corruption, and, the rising cost of politics.

The absence of state subsidies for parties potentially contributes to a huge increase in the use of illicit efforts and attempts to raise campaign funds (Arthur, 2017). A study by Sakyi et al. (2016) however uncovers that, Ghanaians are divided on state political party funding, and support for state funding is stronger among elites and party executives than ordinary party affiliates. Sakyi & Agomor (2016) similarly uncover disagreement and ambivalence among Ghanaians when it comes to state funding, with those who oppose across the board state funding outnumbering those who support. They also find stronger support for state funding amongst smaller parties and among party leaders than ordinary members.

A study by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development seeking to gauge perceptions on party financing to monitor opinions on state political party funding uncovered low support for state funding, with significant opposition to raising taxes to support such an initiative. Only 29% of the study respondents were willing to contribute towards state political financing. Respondents also showed strong support for the absence of ceiling caps. 62% of respondents from that study also believed donations from foreign sources should be allowed (Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2005). In Ayee et al. (2007), 33 percent of respondents believe political parties should draw finance from public funds whilst 25% think parties' own sources

should be the major source of political funding. Only 16% of respondents believe membership dues should be the principal source of political financing.

In another study, 42% of respondents were in support of political party funding, with 38% against. 18% remained undecided (Sakyi & Agomor, 2016). In Gyampo (2015), a whopping 82% of respondents say no to state funding, 5% express indifference, and 13% support state funding. 11% of those who support state funding are of the view that, it would help produce quality leaders, level the playing field, and help political parties to do their work effectively. 30% of those who believe political parties should not be sponsored think funds should rather be used to alleviate economic hardship through the provision of developmental projects; 7% think it will worsen the economic plight of the citizenry by increasing their tax burden; a whopping 30% do not support public funding because they think politicians are corrupt.

They regard the public funding of political parties as an opportunity for politicians to steal more state money. They also believe that, public funding will lead to the proliferation of amorphous parties formed solely to receive financial gains from the state. 4% of respondents in this study are of the view that, serious political parties should be able to raise funds for their activities without needing state sponsorship. Public funding was dismissed as an attempt to empower mediocrity (Gyampo, 2015). Nam-Katoti et al., (2005) sought to ascertain the views of civil society and politicians regarding the need for state financing, and uncovered that, while party executives supported state political party financing, civil society leaned towards the belief that state political party funding could lead to more political corruption.

Arthur (2017) argues that, without some sort of equity through the provision of public funding and other subsidies, incumbent parties will continue to dominate the electoral process. Whilst recognizing push-backs against public funding from critics who argue that, the money to support political parties could be used to support the provision of essential public goods; or

that political parties could become dependent on government and not their members to run their operations, Arthur (2017) still recommends the public funding of political parties in Ghana as it believes it will ensure a level electoral playing field.

Sakyi et al. (2016) also makes the case to provide support for political parties to build their organizational capacity and subsequently their fund-raising ability. (Arthur, 2017) however cautions that, transparency and accountability is crucial to this process, and can be attained through the media and civil society organizations watchdog roles, which will compel political parties who receive public funding to disclose it, publish their expenditure and annual reports, and have their accounts audited by an independent company. Sakyi et al. (2016) also iterates the need for the EC to enforce legal protocols, and for a vibrant civil service to demand accountability and compliance with party funding laws. Gyampo (2015) argues that, the quest for state political party financing is outmoded at conception and governments nor Ghanaians seem committed to the proposal. He concludes, that until political parties work to reduce the perceptions of politicians as corrupt and encourage members to support them through the regular payment of dues, political parties will continue to function as weak election machines in Ghana.

2.3.5 Political Corruption in Ghana

Chêne (2010) provides an overview of corruption in Ghana. She notes that, whilst Ghana has achieved significant progress in terms of government effectiveness, corruption remains a significant issue in the country. She describes the legal framework on corruption as quite strong, but decries its implementation and enforcement. Chêne (2010) identifies the forms of corruption in Ghana as petty and bureaucratic corruption; political corruption, which includes opaque and corrupt political financing; and patronage networks. She unpacks the legal code and regulations on corruption in Ghana, and identifies its key elements as the criminalization of active and passive bribery, money laundering related offenses, public procurement breaches;

and the stipulation that some government officials and public office holders are required to declare their assets.

Corruption mitigation, Chêne (2010) observes, is hurdled by the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms, the absence of effective conflict of interest regulations; and the weak enforcement of the Whistleblower's act. On political party financing corruption, the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (2005) as part of the Africa Political Party Finance initiative project, tried to gauge public perception of the importance and role of political parties in a democracy; assess the importance of state financing; examine trends in political party financing and performance; explore opinions on the financial strengthening of political parties; and examine effects of various forms of party financing on political corruption.

The study advances that, the persistence of corruption in Ghana can be blamed on the pressure for political leaders to personally finance their parties rather than on problems in the broader political system. The study perceives of corruption less as a systemic issue, than an issue of individual misbehaviour and the personal habits and practices of politicians (Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2005). The impact of corrupt political financing on democratic quality, was found to be true in the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (2005) study, as a third of voters who admitted receiving money to vote said it influenced their behaviour. 68% of respondents also conceded that, donations influence political decisions.

The manifestations of political corruption were identified as unfair business practices, kickbacks, unmerited political appointments, and political extortion. The study uncovers a lack of transparency and accountability on the part of political parties and their activities when it comes to party finance (Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2005).

On intra party corruption, an overwhelming majority of 86.7% regarded corruption as deeply rooted within Ghanaian political parties in Ayee et al. (2007). A majority 82% again inputted

that, political corruption affects citizen's attitude to politics. Corruption was rated as a major problem facing all political parties in Ghana by up to 81% of respondents (Ayee et al., 2007).

The types of existing corruption were identified as kickbacks (31.1%), political appointments (18.5%), unfair business practices (17.5%), and awards of contracts 16.0%). They determined the non-transparency of political party finances, political patronage, and the lack of enforcement of political parties' law to be the main causes of political corruption (Ayee et al., 2007).

In this study, a total of 59.6% of respondents iterated their believe that campaign financing is directly tied to political corruption (Ayee et al., 2007). Sakyi and Agomor (2016) believe that, the corruption and lack of accountability that manifests because of institutional weaknesses is responsible for the failure of political parties to mobilize resources for political activities. Lack of transparency and accountability; weak organizational capacity to mobilize funds from ordinary members; ordinary members fear of political victimization; and, financially poor ordinary members, are identified as challenges to fund mobilization (Sakyi & Agomor 2016)

In Ayee et al. (2007), the study identifies holding political parties and candidates to account as a potential corruption fighting mechanism, with 90.1% of respondents inputting parties/politicians should disclose fully their sources of funding.

Arthur (2017) argues that, the lack of public funding for political parties could lead to a significant increase in the use of illegal means to raise campaign cash. Ninsin (2005) posits that, whilst political finance regulations are intended to ensure transparency and accountability in political party operations, as well as limit the influence of the wealthy on politics, voluntary contributions are inadequate for running a democratic political organization, leading to a situation where political parties in Ghana find it difficult to finance their operations from such honest sources. Graft and patronage have thus become institutionalized ways of gaining money

for political and individual use as individual political candidates feel the need to engage in corrupt practices to accumulate wealth to advance their political lives (Ninsin, 2005).

This has led to the situational rise of big money holders becoming key power brokers in politics, risking the turning of democratic politics into competition for wealth and power to serve a limited group of people rather than serve the public good (Ninsin, 2005). Gyampo (2015) warns that, if this situation persists, democratic politics will be turned into competition for wealth and power to serve a limited group of people rather than serve the public good. He concludes on the note that until politicians strive to reduce the perception of corruption against them and encourage their members to support them financially through the payment of monthly dues and special levies, political parties will continue to function as weak election machines in Ghana.

As a result of a constitutional provision that requires the majority of ministers of state to be appointed from parliament, ambitious politicians' resort to corrupt acts to get elected to parliament to increase their chances of securing a ministerial appointment (Institute for Democratic Governance, 2020).

According to Aning & Edu-Afful (2013), the opacity of campaign financing and the nonexistence of state political party support in Ghana have created opportunities for drug traffickers to participate in the governance process. The example of Eric Amoateng, the former-NPP Member of Parliament for Nkoransa North Constituency, who was arrested and imprisoned for trafficking 136 pounds of heroin with a street value of USD 5 million is cited.

Aning & Edu-Afful (2013) opine that, corruption, siphoning of state funds, and donor support for incumbent parties, accounts for the scenario where political parties are rich in power but broke in opposition.

Aikins (2020) extrapolates the Market for Lemons theory by George Akerlof to explain demand driven corruption in Ghana. He theorizes that, due to information asymmetry, delegates who

are unable to distinguish between good and bad politicians will rationally demand for some kind of insurance in the form of money or other material incentives, in case the candidate reneges on their promises to serve voters interests after elections. This, he inputs, raises the cost of electoral competitions to levels only corrupt politicians can afford.

On the supply side of corruption, Aikins (2020) uses a prisoners dilemma situation to show why politicians will be motivated to pay for bribes. He advances that, politicians in a quest to increase their chances of victory will engage in corrupt political financing as they cannot guarantee if their opponent is not doing same. The fear of their opponent corrupting their way into power thus serves as fuel for politicians to engage in political finance related corruption. The goals are either to win power through that, or to counter the effects of their opponents own corrupt acts thus re-levelling the political playing ground (Aikins, 2020).

On why anticorruption reforms fail in countries widely plagued by corruption, Persson et al., (2013) argue that, it is because they are based on a systemic mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. They reveal that, whilst anti-corruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption manifests instead as a collective action problem. Contrary to the assumptions of principal agent theory, they suggest principled principals willing to hold corrupt officials accountable are non-existent. The existence of actors willing to enforce corruption reform depends to a large extent on how many other individuals in the society are expected to be corrupt. According to Persson et al., (2013), to the extent that corruption is the expected behaviour, the short-term benefits of corruption outweigh the costs, and monitoring devices and key instruments and punishment regimes in tune with principal agent anticorruption frameworks are expected to be largely ineffective in such contexts since there will be no incentive to enforce them. It is therefore not surprising that, irrespective of a belief that money

in politics corrodes democratic quality, Ghanaians seem to be acquiescent to the role of money in politics.

In Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA (2018), 83% expressed support for the rewarding of loyal supporters for their electoral support during previous election by politicians. Up to 76% of respondents approved or strongly approved the provision of goods and services to individuals and communities as thanks for their political support. Cheeseman et al., (2016) similarly find that, Ghanaians are permissive to issues of political corruption. 43 percent of Ghanaians in their study, answered that, bribing voters was either "not wrong at all" or was "wrong but should not be punished." 76 percent of Ghanaians also felt that politicians should not be punished for directing development projects toward areas that support them.

The implications of this are wide ranging. The most damaging of this however is unchecked political financing corruption, the focus of this study.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a detailed review of the general literature on political financing and political corruption. There's scholarly consensus on the importance of money in politics. There's also general agreement about the potential effects of money in politics on democratic quality - as money in politics can delegitimize political office holders and institutions, diminish the quality of representation, exclude core constituencies from political participation due to their inability to raise political funding, and catalyse political corruption. It can make public office holders beholden to financiers and prioritize the servicing of their personal needs over that of the general citizenry. A global snapshot of political financing and political corruption manifestations is also shown. The proper financing of politics, is determined by scholars to be important for the mitigation of the excesses of political financing. A mix of recommendations, including disclosures, contribution and spending limits, public financing of political parties, is

advanced by scholars as the way forward to curb political finance corruption. Regulation enforcement is emphasized, and institutional failures to enforcing political financing regulatory regimes is cited as a factor that has heightened political financing corruption. This claim is probed in this study of political financing corruption in Ghana.

When it comes to political financing in Ghana, the chapter presents a summation of scholarly accounts of the background to political financing and political corruption in Ghana. It discusses the monetization of politics in Ghana, and its effects on democratic quality within the country context as presented by scholars. Political financing corruption has undermined democratic quality, by making the government susceptible to capture and policy influence by moneyed interests. It serves to further marginalize under represented constituencies of people like women, the youth, and the differently abled, as it plays to the advantage of the rich and powerful in society, consequently reinforcing inequality and social exclusion in Ghana. It diverts limited funds from government to less accountable pathways, and deprioritizes the provision of public goods. The section also presents the sources of political funding for political parties in Ghana as uncovered in studies on the subject, and discusses how the need for political funding is related to political corruption in Ghana. Scholarly recommendations on the mitigation of the democratic challenges associated with improper political financing, based on several study findings, have been presented.

Whilst considerable research has been done on the general topic of political financing, political corruption, and political finance corruption; and more context relevantly, political financing in Ghana, considerable gaps still exist in the depth of the knowledge of the causes and linkages of political financing to political corruption in the country, and the application of rational choice institutionalism to the study of political financing and political corruption in the Ghanaian context.

A rational choice institutionalist exploration of political financing and political financing in Ghana, will provide more nuance and bring more depth to our understanding of how our present regime of political financing in Ghana relates to political corruption. The study will differ from other similar works on the subject by its multi perspectival approach, and its focus on the intersecting rational choice motivations of the various actors with the prevailing institutional, legal, and regulatory regime. This will facilitate an understanding of the decision-making process of actors in relation to political financing.

CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conceptual and theoretical framework underpinning this research on political financing and political corruption in Ghana. The conceptual framework operationalizes and clarifies the terms used in this study, and the theoretical framework discusses the state of theory in relation to the subject, and presents the theoretical framework the study is grounded in. Research questions, based on theory, are also presented.

3.2 Conceptual Framework

For a study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic, the following underpinning concepts deserve further elucidation:

3.2.1 Political Finance / Political Financing

Political finance is a complicated phenomenon entwined in a variety of political and legal frameworks (Williams, 2000). Ornstein & Pope (1997) famously compare the task of navigating political finance to finding a route up the amazon. The difficulty in defining political finance according to Speck (2013) stems from the challenge of delineating clear boundaries – which includes determining the players and activities to cover, and which resources to account for within the local context. Many conceptualizations of the term political finance have thus been proffered by political science scholars, each at the very least operationalizing political finance as money for politics.

Falguera et al., (2014) refers to political finance simply as "all money in the political process." Ohman (2013) refers to Political Finance as the umbrella term used by scholars to describe the role of money in politics; and all funds generated and expended for political purposes. According to the International IDEA (2021), political finance "encompasses all financial flows to and from political parties and candidates, including formal and informal income and

expenditures, as well as financial and in-kind contributions." Pinto-Duschinsky (2001) defines political finance as "the use of money or the use of other material resources for political activities". Political finance, according to Speck (2013), "embodies the sources or means through which political activities are sponsored in a given country."

Poiré (2011) regards political finance as "the set of transactions through which politicians fund the non-governmental activities necessary to satisfy their career ambitions".

Political finance, according to Pinto-Duschinsky (2001), has two broad connotations.

i. Campaign funds, which is money used for electioneering;
ii. Party funds, which is money used for political party expenses.

Campaign finance, as an element of political finance, "refers to all funds raised and spent in order to promote candidates, political parties or policies in elections, referendums, initiatives, party activities and party organizations" (Open Election Data Initiative, 2020.). It refers to 'financial transactions to political parties or candidates, related to an electoral campaign which could include formal, financial, or in-kind donations or expenditures, (International IDEA (2021). Munro (2019) defines campaign finance as the "raising and spending of money intended to influence a political vote, such as the election of a candidate or a referendum".

According to Ohman (2013), the financing of public office election campaigns; the funding of political parties; the financing of organizations allied to political parties; the costs of political lobbying; media and party promotion expenses; costs of politically relevant litigation; and, the activities of elected officials and other politically-exposed persons, are all examples of campaign finance (Ohman, 2013).

Consequently, all monetary and in-kind contributions and expenditures collected by and incurred by candidates, their political parties or their supporters for electioneering is campaign finance (ACE Project, 2015).

Party finance, similarly rooted in political finance, refers to the funds raised by political parties to support themselves as organizations. It is "intended simply to denote the funds received and expended by political parties" (Williams, 2000). Ayee et al., (2007) explain it "as the way that political parties and individuals running for political office raise funds for election campaigns and for maintaining themselves as organisations". Falguera et al., (2014) uses the term Party Finance to describe "all party funds and expenditures, not only for election campaigns, but also for supporting the party's operational, educational, and regular voter-relations functions".

"Party finance refers to all party funds and expenditures, not only for election campaigns, but also for supporting the party's operational, educational and voter relations functions" (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003b). It is used to simply denote the funds received and expended by political parties (Williams, 2000). As can be seen from the definitions above, although the terms political finance, campaign finance, and party finance may be used interchangeably, the term used is often context dependent (Ohman, 2013a; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002).

In Party-centered-systems - often associated with the parliamentary systems of Western Europe, political money means party finance. In candidate-centered systems where the focus is less on political party activity and more on campaign fund-raising and spending by individual candidates, the term of choice is campaign finance rather than party finance (Mann, 2015). Political financing, the phenomenon under study in this thesis, is a more active term than the term political finance, which is operationalized as a noun in the above definitions. According to (Speck, 2013), "Political financing includes financial resources raised and spent by parties in the process of political competition.

Magolowondo et al. (2012) also define political financing as the process by which "financial resources or money is provided to political parties, in between or during elections periods, to cover different political activities such as electoral campaign costs and day to day functioning".

For the purpose of this research, political financing shall refer simply to the generation and appropriation of resources in support of political activity and in pursuit of political power.

3.2.2 Political Corruption

There are many conceptual disagreements within the field of political science over the phenomenon of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). "Most approaches ultimately rest on a distinction between some formal obligation to pursue the public good, and conduct which is construed as private regarding and which serves to undermine the public good." (Williams, 2000) .Corruption thus always involves a failure to conform to some pre-set standards (Heywood, 2015). Rose-Ackerman (2001) defines corruption simply as "the misuse of power for private gain". In the opinion of Philp (2018) "corruption occurs when the appropriate standard for conduct in the public realm is violated when people in public or judicial office act on motives and incentives that should be excluded from decision-making in such office". Nye, (1967) defines corruption as "behaviour which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding influence".

Political corruption, the focus of this study, is a type of corruption that "takes place when politicians and public officials who are entitled to make and enforce the laws use their political power to sustain their statues and wealth and/or make decisions in the benefit of private interests" (Transparency International 2014). It is understood as "conduct which subverts the declared purposes, principles and policies of political bodies in exchange for personal, private or particularistic advantage" (Williams 2000). It is often characterized by abuse of power and

misallocation of resources, and affects political decision making (Transparency International 2014).

According to Heidenheimer et al. (2019), political corruption refers to any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs. It exists where:

> "a public official (A), in violation of the trust placed in him by the public (B), and in a manner which harms the public interest, knowingly engages in conduct which exploits the office for clear personal and private gain in a way which runs contrary to the accepted rules and standards for the conduct of public office within the political culture so as to benefit a third party (C) by providing C with access to a good or service C would not otherwise obtain" Heidenheimer et al. (2019).

For this research, political corruption will refer to the intentional violation of the public trust by a public official, whom for personal and private gain acts in a manner harmful to the public interest and contrary to acceptable public service standards.

3.2.3 Political Financing Corruption

According to Walecki (2003), political finance and corruption are separate notions, but when their valences overlap, the zone of political corruption emerges. Political finance corruption arises when corruptly obtained money is used by politicians to fund their campaigns (Walecki, 2003). Corrupt political financing, according to Pinto-Duschinsky (2002), refers usually to one of the following: the unauthorized use of state resources for private political purposes; political donations that breach existing legal protocols on political financing; the use of money from a corrupt transaction to fund political activity; donations from discreditable sources; the appropriation of political funding for banned activities like vote buying, and, the receipt of political funding in return for the promise or exchange of unauthorized political favours.

Walecki (2003) conceives of corrupt political finance as a candidate or political party's involvement in inappropriate or unlawful activity for the benefit of a political party, interest

group, or individual candidate. Illegal expenditure including vote buying; funding from infamous sources; selling appointments, honours, or access to information; abuse of state resources; personal enrichment; demanding contributions from public servants; activities disobeying political finance regulations; political contributions for favours, contracts or policy change; forcing private sector to pay protection money; limiting access to funding for opposition parties are proffered as types of political finance related corruption (Walecki, 2003).

Reed (2005) identifies three forms in which corruption in relation to political finance manifests: Quid pro quo donations, where parties or candidates receive campaign resources in return for favourable treatment; the misuse of state and public administrative resources by candidates or parties for electoral purposes; and, the bribery of voters and election officials.



Figure 8: Types of Political Corruption and Political Financing Corruption

For this research, political financing corruption shall be operationalized as the receipt of money from donors with the expectation of providing some reward if in power; the appropriation of state resources in service of personal electoral goals; the expending of money for political purposes from opaque and illegal sources; and the indulging in illegal political expenditures like vote buying.

3.3 Theoretical Framework

Theorizing is the means by which the scientific goals to put into perspective world events, explain past occurrences, make future predictions, and create an understanding of how and why events occur are met (Turner, 1974). The theoretical framework is thus an important grounding base of any research undertaking (Alonso *et al.*, 2012; Given, 2012; Kivunja, 2018; Crawford, 2019). It serves as the structure for the study, and provides an anchor for the review of subject related literature, provides a methodological guide, and structures the analysis of the phenomenon under study (Grant and Osanloo, 2014).

Given (2012) defines it as "any empirical or quasi-empirical theory of social and/or psychological processes, at a variety of levels (e.g., grand, mid-range, and explanatory), that can be applied to the understanding of phenomena. At its most fundamental level, a theoretical foundation comprises of theory. A theory is a tentative conjecture about the causes of some phenomenon of interest (Kellstedt and Whitten, 2013). A theoretical framework is made up of theories presented by experts on a topic of interest, which then serves a blueprint for the analysis and interpretation of research findings (Kivunja, 2018).

It describes the state of art in a field of research, provides a synthesized presentation of concepts and theories, and helps the researcher to sharpen their research focus and make meaning of research data (Given, 2012; Keestra and Menken, 2016; Kivunja, 2018). This section presents the competing theoretical models that have been employed by various scholars to aid the understanding of the phenomena of political financing and political corruption. A state of theory which synthesizes competing theoretical explanations for the phenomena of political financing and political corruption is presented. The choice of theory in which this study is grounded, is leveraged to present tentative conjectures about political financing and political corruption in Ghana.

3.3.1 State of Theory

Many theories have been put forth on political financing and political corruption, and the intersectionality between the two broad phenomenon. These theories can be divided into two broad categories – rational choice theories, and institutionalist theories.

3.3.1.1 Rational Choice Theory of Political Financing.

Rational choice theories of political finance have become commonplace in the study of political participation, and of political financing (Rakner, 1996; Tam Cho, 2002). It is a relatively simple model of explanation based on the core principles of utility maximization, goal fulfilment, consistency, and rank ordering - with the individual as the unit of analysis (Petracea, 1991; Rakner, 1996). It is an approach used by social scientists to understand human behaviour (Green, 2002). Adam Smith is usually credited as the father of rational choice theory.

Rational choice theory as a method of political analysis operates within the boundaries of methodological individualism, a belief that everything about society has at its core its component individuals; and the concept of rationality itself, which holds that, rationality or the quest to be, is essential to the nature of human beings (Petracea, 1991). Rational choice theory states that, individuals use rational calculations to make rational choices and achieve outcomes that are aligned with their own personal objectives (Investopedia 2017). Political life is seen as organized by exchange among calculating self-interested actors (March & Olsen, 2006).

Rational choice theorists thus aim to explain a variety of human behaviours based on an abstract description of goals in terms of interests, utilities and preferences (Rakner, 1996). This quest to explain human behaviour is anchored on the bare premise that agents are rational, and that some self-seeking agent or group of agents, are maximizing utility (Green, 2002; Gintis, 2012).

Rational Choice theory has been extrapolated by many scholars to explain motivations for political financing, as it suggests simply that, political financing is a result of a rational thought-through utility maximizing endeavour.

Rational choice theories of corrupt political financing attribute political behaviour within the arena of political financing to the need of players to maximize their own utility based on their own rational ordering of the preferences that will best serve them. Among rational choice theorists, there are those who also cast political financing as a collective action problem (Hopkin, 2004; Bauhr, 2017); or a principal agent problem (Gama *et al.*, 2019). Collective action problems occur when members of a group, each pursuing their own self-interest, fail to work towards the attainment of a public good. This is because, public goods by their nature are nonexcludable, limiting incentive for people to contribute to its production, and leading to free rider problems. (Olson, 1965; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018).

Collective action theorists hold that corruption persists because, agents, perceiving other agents to be corrupt, see little sense in remaining honest as they are losing out. Their behaviours in given situations is based on their perception of how other actors will behave. If corrupt behaviour is the expected behaviour thus, then everyone should be expected to be corrupt (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013). Principal agent theories similarly base corruption analysis on the contextual interactions and relationships that exist within and outside public bodies (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). According to principal agent theorists, corruption is said to occur when public officials who have discretion over the provision and distribution of public services lack accountability (Marquette & Peiffer, 2018).

Corruption in relation to principal agent problems, occurs two ways: i. when political leaders (principals), lack the ability to effectively monitor lower ranked officials (agents); ii. when public officials (politicians and bureaucrats) - conceptualized to be agents in this scenario,

abuse their office and their management of public goods to service private needs in a way the public (principal) is unable to monitor adequately and to hold them accountable (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018).

The latter principal agent case scenario, more adequately explains political financing corruption, as the theory postulates that, politicians (agents), will leverage their offices and their supervision of public goods in service of their political ambitions, especially as the public (principals) have limited information and ways to determine fully the extent of their misconduct and to hold them to account for their behaviour. Marquette & Peiffer (2018) argue that, principal agent problems and collective action problems are not mutually exclusive, as the same factors that reduce the occurrence of principal agent problems can also foster collective action. It is therefore not rare to see rational choice theorizing of political financing corruption utilize both principal agent and collective action models of corruption.

Rational choice theories of political financing also include contribution models of political financing, which examine the motives for donor contributions towards political activity (Morton & Cameron, 1992). Models of political contributions have one thing in common: they involve a game between candidates, contributors, and voters. However, depending on assumptions about reward functions, strategy spaces, and, most importantly, knowledge, the character of this game changes considerably (Morton & Cameron, 1992). This is consistent with postulates of game theory. According to Cho (2002), political financing lends itself to setups of game theory, and is unsurprisingly often cast in cost-benefit terms, where the political financier can be viewed as a strategic actor with a limited pool of financial resources to distribute to candidates or parties strategically to gain political influence and favours from winning candidates.

Cho (2002) posits that, "the individual campaign contributor can be characterized as a strategic actor who distributes a limited pool of financial resources to candidates and/or political action committees (PACs) in a calculated manner to buy influence in the way of promises and eventual favours from victorious candidates". Ferguson (1995)'s theory of investment-oriented contribution also stipulates that, donors make contributions to political parties as investments, with hopes of maximizing their returns either through policy, or their control on the who gets what, when and how of state resources. Chamon & Kaplan (2013) also present a contributions model of political finance, dubbed the Iceberg model of campaign contributions, where political contributors leverage support from political candidates either through contributions to their campaigns, or the threat of contributing to opposing parties. (Bouton, Castanheira & Drazen, 2019) also present a theory of small campaign interests in which donors are not primary driven by consumption motivations, but by the need to affect electoral outcomes.

Poiré (2011), in tune with assumptions of rational choice theory also proffers a political theory of political finance, dubbed the ***Market for Political Finance theory***. The theory posits that:

1. Political finance is motivated by politicians' desire to fund the activities necessary to compete effectively for political power
2. Political finance demand is partly reliant on politicians' perception of the competitiveness of a given electoral contest
3. Political donations and contributions are motivated by a combination of consumption or expressive motives, as well as investment or self-interested ones (Poiré, 2011).

Political finance according to Poiré (2011) is not inherently corrupt, but is determined by configurations of this market for political finance such as wealth inequality, literacy level, media ownership, effectiveness of opposing campaigns, law enforcement capabilities, and ultimately, the political finance regime. A theory of political entrepreneurship where political entrepreneurs unethically acquire state resources in service of processes of production which

will not occur otherwise is also advanced by Mccaffrey and Salerno (2011). Consequently, Fiorina (2001) argues that, political behaviour rather than a product of psychological drives, childhood socialization, organizational norms, or other a-rational influences, is purposive.

Rational choice explanations of political action including political financing behaviours, have been criticised for being set in false assumptions, as it assumes all behaviour is self-seeking. This they argue flaws explanations or predictions given by the model (Koelble, 1995; Herfeld, 2022).

3.4.2 Institutionalist Theories of Political Financing

Institutionalism, the general approach to the study of political institutions is as old as the study of politics, and its founding fathers include Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes, James Madison (March & Olsen, 2006; Steinmo, 2018). Institutionalism, based on time periods, is typically classified as either early institutionalism, or new institutionalism. Early institutionalism, according to (Hadler, 2015), refers to approaches in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when scholars such as Thorsten Veblen or Max Weber were focused "on studying the development of larger formal institutions such as legal, economic, religious, and other societal systems".

It developed in opposition to the neoclassical view of individuals as rational economic actors (rational choice models of political behaviour), and the prevailing thought that some basic laws and assumptions were adequate for explaining human economic processes (Hadler, 2015). The behavioural revolution made its challenge to institutionalism from the late 1950s onwards leading to its loss of traction (Burnham *et al.*, 2014; Hadler, 2015).

Starting in the 1970's, institutionalism was revived with an analytical focus on how institutional structures, rules, norms, and cultures constrain the choices and actions of individuals when they are part of a political institution (Ishiyama and Breuning, 2014).

In this new institutionalism, the term institution was expanded to refer not only to formal institutions, but to emphasize the experience of an institutional world as an objective reality (Hadler, 2015). Bates (2017) credits Douglass North as the founder of the new institutionalism. New institutionalism has three broad strands: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism (Koelble, 1995; Hadler, 2015; Steinmo, 2015).

Rational choice institutionalists argue that "individuals and their strategic calculations ought to be the central concern of social science". Historical institutionalists posit that, preferences are formed by the institutional context within which they emerge, and rather than being fixed, are the product of the interaction of groups, interests, ideas, and institutional structures (Koelble, 1995), Sociological institutionalism argues that individual decisions are a product of the cultural, and organizational fields within which they find themselves; and emphasizes the role of culture, organizational identity, and society in the determination of individual interests (Koelble, 1995).

Institutionalist theories, summarily seeks to analyse human political behaviour within the context of existing institutions. March & Olsen (2006) define institutions as "a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances". According to Abrutyn & Turner (2011), institutions are "emergent, macro-level socio- cultural formations that constrain the operation of organizations, and vice versa".

Ferris & Tang (1993) also conceptualize institutions as "rules or humanly devised constraints that structure actions and interactions among individuals".

Institutions can be formal (constitutional rules), or informal (as in cultural norms), and scholars who place special emphasis on the role institutions play in structuring behaviour are referred

to as institutionalists (Steinmo, 2013, 2015, 2018). Institutionalists deals with broad presentations of political behaviour at the institutional level (Koelble, 1995; Hadler, 2015; Steinmo, 2015); and examine the ways in which institutions structure social and political behaviour; and posit that, policy, politics, and behaviour can be understood only in the context of the institutions in which they take place (Hadler, 2015; Steinmo, 2015). They also hold that, institutions serve to "fashion, enable, and constrain political actors as they act within a logic of appropriate action", effectively creating order and predictability (March & Olsen, 2006).

Institutionalist theories of political financing, by theoretical disposition, center institutions in analysis of political financing behaviours, and regard institutions as the foundation for all political behaviour (Steinmo, 2015). According to institutionalist theorists, political financing behaviours are influenced and can be understood only in the context of the institutions in which they take place.

3.3.1.2 Theoretical Grounding – Rational Choice Institutionalism

Whilst this study relates with the postulates and assumptions of the prevalent theories proffered to aid understanding of political financing behaviours, it finds theoretical grounding in the Rational Choice Institutionalist theory. This theory is determined as best suited to the study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana as it provides an intersection between the two broad theoretical schools of thought, i.e., Rational Choice Theory and Institutionalism.

According to Hall and Taylor (1996), rational choice institutionalism initially arose from the study of American congressional behaviour which was found to be paradoxical, as there was considerable stability among congressional actors, whom if assumptions of rational choice theory was to hold, will find it hard to pass bills. The answer was found in institutions, as it was argued congressional committees and rules of procedure provided structure and stable majorities for legislation (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

Rational choice institutionalism "attempts to apply micro-economic models of rationality to the analysis of the collective choices that are made in the political process (Pennington, 2009). As a theory, Rational Choice Institutionalism stemmed out of the need of its proponents to extend and modify the theoretical agenda and presumptions of rational choice theory (Rakner, 1996). To rational choice institutionalists, institutions are an intervening variable capable of influencing individual actions and behaviours, but not determining them (Koelble, 1995). It is a logical framework which regards individuals as self-interested utility maximisers acting within the strategic contexts of constraint imposing institutions (Kato, 1996).

3.3.2 Assumptions of Rational Choice Institutionalism

According to rational choice institutionalism, institutions matter and structure political outcomes, as rational political actors while still seeking to maximize their utility, will do so under the constraints of existing institutions (Pennington, 2009; Gingerich, 2013).

The key assumption of the rational choice institutionalism theory is that, Individuals "act as maximisers of benefits over costs, but the outcomes of these choices will be affected by the institutions that are present" (Pennington, 2009).

Hall and Taylor (1996) highlight the following as the four main assumptions of rational choice institutionalism.

1. That, relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes, and act in highly strategic and calculated manners to maximize the attainment of these preferences.
2. That, politics is a series of collective action dilemmas, where individuals acting to maximize the achievement of their own goals may produce sub-optimal collective outputs.
3. "That an actor's behaviour is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by the

actor's expectations about how others are likely to behave as well" (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

4. That, institutions are created to maximise the gains from cooperation for the actors affected by it.

Hall and Taylor (1996) advance that, rational choice theorists take a classic 'calculus approach' to the problem of explaining how institutions affect individual action - as they believe institutions structure such interactions by providing information and enforcement mechanisms that lead actors towards particular calculations and better social outcomes. They input that, it is the absence of institutional arrangements that would guarantee complementary behaviour by others that typically prevents the actors from taking a collectively-superior course of action. (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

For rational choice institutionalists thus, the creation of institutions revolves around voluntary agreement by the relevant actors; and survives mainly because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors than alternate institutional forms (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Rational choice institutionalism as a theory is novel in its ability to explore how self-interested human behaviour intersects with the effects and influences of institutions within a political space (Kato, 1996). In relation to political financing and political corruption, rational choice institutionalism inferentially holds that - within a political system, actors (voters, candidates, and campaign financiers) will act within the prevailing institutional contexts to maximize their benefits over costs.

It is considered best suited to the study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana as it helps explain the behaviour of actors (voters, political candidates, political financiers, and stakeholders) within the Ghanaian political system; and provides a framework within which to assess the persistence of political financing corruption despite its proscription by the regulatory regime in Ghana. Whilst considered appropriate for the study of political finance corruption

in Ghana, rational choice institutionalism is however limited by its focus and insistence on clean lines of analytical rigor, abstraction, and simplification (Shepsle, 2006).

3.4 Research Assumptions and Questions

In tune with assumptions of Rational Choice Institutionalism, this study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana assumes the following: "That, political financing corruption in Ghana is a result of rational actors leveraging institutional weaknesses in pursuit of their self-serving preferences". It also in turn assumes that, "political financing corruption can be mitigated by institutions".

3.4.1 Research Questions

Against this backdrop, this study seeks to find answers to the following key questions.

1. What is the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana?
2. What is the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana?
3. To what extent does the institutional framework on political financing mitigate political financing corruption in Ghana?
4. How can political financing corruption be abated in Ghana?

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter presents the conceptual framework for this research, and provides further elucidation of the concepts of political finance/financing, political corruption, and the intersecting phenomenon of political financing corruption. It also presents the competing theoretical models that have been employed by various scholars to aid the understanding of the phenomenon of political finance and political corruption, and details the theoretical approach the researcher undertakes to explain the phenomenon of political financing and political

corruption in Ghana. It makes the case for why the rational choice institutionalist model is the best suited framework for the study of political finance corruption in Ghana.

It outlines the broad assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, and based on this model, proffers tentative conjectures about political financing and political corruption in Ghana.

The research questions the study is seeking to answer are also enumerated.

CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

Methodology simply refers to the conduct of inquiry. Political science methodology is concerned with the processes and means and methods through which we obtain legitimate knowledge about the political world (Halperin & Heath, 2012). Halperin and Heath (2012) argue that, researchers cannot contribute to knowledge about something unless they adopt and defend a view of what is knowable about the social world, and the methods that enable us to uncover such knowledge. This chapter will thus detail the philosophical underpinnings of this research in addition to the methodological processes the researcher undertook to investigate the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. The methodological aspects of this chapter will include the research design, the sources of data collected, and the data analysis plan, the quality of the research, ethical considerations, and the limitations of this research

4.2 Philosophical Underpinnings

Every research is bordered by a set of basic beliefs and principles that guide action. These set of beliefs are referred to as research paradigms (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Halperin & Heath, 2012b). A research paradigm simply defined, is a philosophical framework that contains the values and beliefs on which research is based. There are two main philosophical components to research – ontology, and epistemology (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Halperin & Heath, 2012b). An ontology is "a philosophical belief system about the nature of social reality, including what we can learn about this reality and how we can do so" (Leavy, 2014).

Ontology is concerned with questions about the nature of the social world and the basic elements that make up this world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Leavy, 2014). Ontological

questions in relation to political science seeks to determine if the social world as we know it is fundamentally different from the natural world, and if knowledge about the world exists as an objective reality external to us, or is subjectively created by individuals (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Leavy, 2014).

Epistemology on the other hand is a "philosophical belief system about how research proceeds as an embodied activity, how one embodies the role of researcher, and the relationship between the researcher and research participants" (Leavy, 2014). Epistemology is concerned with what is knowable about the social world, and what forms of knowledge we should regard as legitimate truths about the social world (Halperin & Heath, 2012b). Ercan and Marsh (2016) contend that, the philosophical positions adopted by researchers inform what they study, how they study it, and what their knowledge of reality is. Philosophical assumptions are thus important to every research process, and is linked intrinsically to the central elements of political science enquiry (Halperin & Heath 2012).

The philosophical orientation of this researcher is constructivist. Constructivism contrasts with positivism, which is anchored in the belief that, reality is singular, and exists independently of individuals (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 2014; Norman K. Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Halperin & Heath, 2012). Foundational constructivism dates back to the 1920s, and can be found in the *Development of Children* research by Jean Piaget - the development psychologist and biologist (1896-1980), who posited that, children, similar to scientists, discover and construct knowledge about the world as they move through it (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 2014; Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Howell, 2015; Mills et al., 2012).

It is "a philosophical perspective that posits that knowledge is mediated by cognition and that humans construct meaning of their experiences and situations" (Mathison, 2011). According to Guba and Lincoln (2005), constructivism is derived from community consensus about what

is real, what is useful, and what has meaning. They advance that, social phenomenon consists of the meaning-making activities of groups and individuals around those phenomena - whose actions are subsequently shaped by the meaning generated. Constructivists summarily regard human beings as active agents who construct knowledge in contextually specific ways and in their own subjective and intersubjective realities (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 2014). They hold that, human beings are responsible for the development of knowledge, and that the understanding of knowledge is a result of a process of interpretivist construction by the individual (Howell, 2015).

Constructivism is ontologically relativist, which holds that, "all tenable statements about existence depend on a worldview, and no worldview is uniquely determined by empirical or sense data about the world" (Patton, 2002). Relativist ontology as it relates to constructivism views reality as locally constructed and based on the social interaction of groups or individuals who are changeable (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; Howell, 2015; Patton, 2002). Constructivism is epistemologically transactional/subjectivist, as the researcher and researched continually interact with each and influence each other. It is only through interactions with the phenomena under study, the participants in a study, and other aspects of the research contexts, that researchers can create reality and knowledge about the topics they study (Coghlan & Brydon-Miller, 2014; Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

Denicolo, Long, and Bradley-Cole (2021) explain a constructivists task as seeking to understand. Constructivist research is naturalistic, as it takes place in the settings in which a phenomenon (in this case political financing and political corruption) naturally occurs. As a research paradigm, constructivism's focus on understanding makes it more suited to the study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana. It is preferred over other philosophical orientations as it results in the balanced examination of the perspectives of all actors within the sphere of political financing and political corruption in Ghana.

4.3 Research Design and Rationale

For this study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana, a qualitative method of inquiry, which is focused on exploration, discovery, and deepening understanding has been utilized. Qualitative research is an umbrella term used to describe a range of research approaches which seek to explore, describe, explain, unpack, and deepen understanding of social phenomenon. It is usually contrasted with quantitative methods, which through the use of statistical methods, seeks to investigate and establish causal relationships between social phenomena (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2019; Ercan & Marsh, 2016).

Qualitative research is often naturalist and interpretivist, as it situates the phenomenon under study in the natural world; and interprets phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, 2018). It assumes that reality is nested in a real context that can only be captured through an interactive process between the researcher and the researched (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2019). This is consistent with constructivist philosophies of research.

Qualitative research focuses on depth rather than breadth, and seeks to acquire in-depth and detailed information from a smaller population of people rather than a large generalizable representative sample of an entire population (Ambert et al., 1995). It is philosophically and methodologically diverse, and qualitative researchers accordingly employ a wide range of research practices including case studies, ethnographical studies, phenomenology, grounded theory, historical and visual text reviews, and ethnographic studies; and is suited to promoting a deep understanding of a social setting or activity(Bloomberg & Volpe, 2019; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Leavy, 2014).

For this qualitative study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana, a case study approach is utilised. Case study research allows for a fuller exploration of the context, conditionalities, meanings and complexities of a case (Bickman & Brannen, 2022; Gerring,

2004). Case studies typically rely on interviews, observation, and document analysis to provide a deeper contextual understanding of cases (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). For the study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic, qualitative research methods were determined to be best suited, as the researcher's objective was among other things to explore, investigate, and deepen understanding on how political financing and political corruption play out in Ghana's politics; examine its potential ramifications; and, determine how its negative effects can be mitigated and averted.

It was judged as appropriate for the contextualized study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana as it enabled the researcher to uncover the nuances to political financing corruption a quantitative study will have overlooked. Qualitative methods were thus preferred to quantitative methods which can sometimes be statistically reductionist, and may fail to capture the full nuance of the phenomenon under study by reducing complicated concepts down to numbers.

4.4 Data Collection Approach

For the study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic, two data collection approaches—in-depth interviews and documentary analysis—were employed to help produce a more comprehensive set of findings. These approaches are characteristic of case study research and were deemed well-suited to the study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana, as the strengths of each approach were determined to significantly mitigate the methodological limitations of the other. For this study on Political Financing and Political Corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic, both primary and secondary sources of data were collected.

The use of documents in this research helped the researcher to uncover insights and gain a better understanding of the phenomenon under study. The use of interviews, a key method in

the collection of qualitative data for case study research, was instrumental in the uncovering of vital information about political financing and political corruption in Ghana. The semi-structured nature of the interviews provided a high degree of flexibility, and allowed the researcher to uncover new perspectives and constructions of political finance corruption from respondents. The interviews were semi-structured and in tune with constructivist epistemologies. Each interview lasted a minimum of 45 minutes, with an average duration of 1 hour and 15 minutes.

4.5 Sampling and Sampling Procedures

Sampling involves selecting cases from a broader population set in such a way that the subset is in some ways representative or illustrative of the broader set (O'Reilly, 2012). Sampling matters to the overall quality of a research undertaking (Flick, 2014). Samples are classified into probability and non-probability samples based on the chances of members of the population being included (O'Reilly, 2012). A sample in which members of a population have an equal or calculable chance of being included is referred to as a probability sample. A probability sample is regarded to be representation of the entire population, as it reflects the broad and relevant characteristics of the total population (O'Reilly, 2012).

Non-probability sampling methods on the other hand uses subjective methods to decide which elements to include in the sample, and does not entail known non-zero probabilities of selection (Battaglia, 2011). Probability samples are often used in quantitative studies. For qualitative studies in which the focus is more on understanding, enlightening, and unveiling interesting and unique information, non-probability sampling methods are often used (Oliver, 2011). Non-probability sampling is often divided into three categories: purposive sampling, convenience sampling, and quota sampling (Battaglia, 2011).

4.5.1 Selection of Interview Participants

For the selection of interview participants, purposive sampling, a form of non-probability sampling was used. Purposive sampling is the "deliberate seeking out of participants with particular characteristics, according to the needs of the developing analysis and emerging theory (Morse, 2011). It involves the selection of study participants based on a variety of criteria including the participants knowledge of the research issue, or their capacity or willingness to participate in the research (Oliver, 2011).

According to Battaglia (2011) the main objective of a purposive sample is the production of a non-random sample logically assumed to be representative of the population by using the researchers knowledge of the population. In purposeful sampling, members of the sample are selected not on a criterion of randomness, but on their direct relevance to answering the research problem (Bradley, 1993).

The advantage of purposive sampling is that the researcher can identify participants who are likely to provide data that are detailed and relevant to the research question" (Oliver, 2011).

A researcher who engages in purposive sampling thus sees sampling as a series of choices about who participates in a study (Given, 2012b). Purposive sampling has two typologies – nominated (snowball) sampling or theoretical sampling (Bryman & Liao, 2011; Morse, 2011).

In cases of snowball sampling, participants are nominated for the study by other participants. Theoretical sampling on the other hand involves the researcher deliberately seeking out participants with a certain kind of knowledge or expertise to provide information needed for the study as it proceeds (Morse, 2011). For this research, both theoretical and snowball sampling methods were used. The researcher identified initial participants based on the gaps in the information on political financing and political corruption she needed filled. Some additional participants were identified using snowball sampling methods.

4.5.2 Sampling Size

Qualitative studies, unlike quantitative research, do not start off with a predetermined sample size (Kuper et al., 2008). The depth of information is often the most important consideration in the selection of samples. In qualitative research, sampling stops when it attains saturation - a point in the research where a thorough understanding of the study phenomenon has been reached, and there is no new information being provided from additional respondents (Bradley, 1993; Kuper et al., 2008). This study was guided by qualitative sampling principles, and a sampling size was not predetermined. Sampling was stopped at a level judged by the researcher to be the point of saturation. A total of 37 interviews were in all conducted.

4.5.3 Selection of Documents

When it came to document selection, a preliminary search of documents that fell into the following categories was conducted – legal and regulatory framework for political financing in Ghana, legal and regulatory framework on political corruption, and electoral commission legislative instruments and announcements. The determination of inclusion and exclusion criterions was important to reducing irrelevant data collection and ensuring systematic document selection.

Inclusion Criteria: Documents included were deemed to advance knowledge and understanding about the regulatory framework on political financing and political corruption in Ghana. They were also limited by geography, as only documents relevant to Ghana were reviewed in this section. The over-arching inclusion criteria was relevance to research. Exclusion Criteria: Documents from discreditable sources were excluded from this study.

4.6 Background information of study participants

For the study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana, ten sitting Members of Parliament, all aspiring to become members of the Ninth Parliament of the Fourth Republic of

Ghana, were interviewed for this research. Additionally, four non-MP aspirants for parliamentary office in 2024 were interviewed. The study also involved interviews with 10 Political Financiers, 3 Party Executives, 3 Civil Society Leaders, and 2 Media Practitioners/ Analysts. Further interviews were conducted with 3 legal practitioners and 2 electoral commission affiliates. In total, 37 interviews were conducted.

The table and figure below show the details, number, and distribution of respondents.

4.6.1 Distribution of Respondents

Table 1: Interview Respondents

Category	Distribution
Members of Parliament	10
Parliamentary Aspirants	4
Political Financiers	10
Party Executives	3
Civil Society Leaders	3
Media Practitioners /Analysts	2
Legal Practitioners	3
Electoral Commission Affiliates	2
Total Number of Respondents	**37**



Figure 9: Distribution of Respondents

4.6.2. Gender Distribution of Respondents

Out of a total of 10 Members of Parliament interviewed for this research, 8 were male, and 2 were female. 1 out of the 4 non-MP aspirants for office identifies as female. Out of 10 financiers interviewed, only 1 was female. The remaining 9 were male. 3 political party executives were interviewed, with 2 being male and 1 female. Out of 3 civil society representatives, interviewed for this research, only 1 was female. Two media representatives were interviewed, all male. Three legal practitioners, all male, were also interviewed for this research. Two electoral commission affiliates were interviewed for this research, 1 male and 1 female. In all, out of a total of 37 respondents, 7 were female, and the remaining 30 were male.



Figure 10: Gender Representation of Respondents

Table 2: Coding of Interview Respondents

Category	Coding
Members of Parliament	MP 1 - 10
Parliamentary Aspirants	PA 1 - 3
Political Financiers	PF 1 - 10
Party Executives	PE 1 - 3
Civil Society Representatives	CSR 1 - 3
Media Practitioner /Representative	MR 1 - 2
Legal Practitioners	LP 1 - 3
Electoral Commission Affiliates	EC 1 - 2

4.7 Details of Documents Reviewed

In addition to the extensive literature review, a total of 9 primary documents were reviewed to provide better understanding of the institutional framework on political financing and political corruption in Ghana.

The following documents were reviewed:

Table 3: Documents Reviewed

1	The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, (1992)
2	The Political Parties Law (2000) Act 574
3	Representation of the People Law (1992) - PNDCL 284
4	The Criminal Offences Act (1960) Act 29
5	Published Returns of Registered Political Parties
6	Special Prosecutors Act (2017) Act 959
7	Public Elections Regulations, 2020 C.I. 127
8	Public Procurement Act 2003
9	District Assemblies Common Fund Act 1993 (ACT 445)

4.8 Data Analysis

For this study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic, data was analysed using content analysis. It is one of the most commonly used methods of analysing qualitative data where data gathered is analysed in relation to a series of questions posed by the researcher (Ercan & Marsh, 2016).

Initial coding categories, detailed below, were created based on the theoretical framework and research questions.

1. The relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana
2. The institutional framework on political financing in Ghana
3. Extent to which institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption in Ghana
4. How political financing corruption be abated in Ghana

The study also took inspiration from the Office of Democracy and Governance (2003), which proposes an all-encompassing strategy to enable appreciation of the dangers of money in politics in given country settings. The Office of Democracy and Governance (2003) framework, which is divided into six (6) broad analytical categories (uneven playing field, unequal access to office, co-opted politicians, tainted politics, key actors, legal framework and practices), proffers key questions on the risks of money in politics as the starting point to determining the nature and extent of the problem of political finance. It also provides a strategy to map out key actors and allies; and to define the legal regime bordering political finance and its practice in countries (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003). Suggested questions from this framework, utilized in this study, were instructive in understanding the nexus between political financing and political corruption in Ghana. The analytical themes proposed by this framework have therefore been explored as subthemes under the analytical categories in this study.

4.9 Quality of Research

Good research aspires to generate knowledge that is not only of interest to people, but is of good quality. A way to determine if research is of good quality is to measure the extent to which it is objective. The metrics for measuring (quantitative) research objectivity are reliability and validity (Kirk & Miller, 2011). Reliability measures the extent to which research results in the same findings whenever and however it is carried out. Validity on the other hand refers to the extent to which research results in the rights answer (Kirk & Miller, 2011).

Qualitative researchers have argued that the criteria for measuring the quality of research should differ for qualitative and quantitative research. Kirk and Miller (2011) posit that, the quantitative operationalization of the terms reliability and validity rarely seem appropriate to the way in which qualitative researchers conduct their work.

Accordingly, qualitative researchers prefer to use their own language to denote what quantitative researcher will refer to as reliability, validity, and objectivity (Yilmaz, 2013). They argue that, alternative sets of criteria should be used to evaluate the trustworthiness of qualitative research (Yilmaz, 2013). Patton (2002) proposes the following constructivist criteria for assessing qualitative data: acknowledgement of subjectivity, trustworthiness and authenticity, triangulation, reflexivity and praxis, particularity, enhanced and deepening understanding. The concepts of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability have been proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as alternatives to the quantitative research quality metrics of internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity. This according to Yilmaz (2013), is the gold standard for measuring the quality of qualitative research.

This study of political financing and political financing has been intentional about upholding the principles of quality research as espoused by different qualitative researchers, and the quality of this research will be measured by the extent to which it is credible, transferable, dependable, and confirmable. The researcher shall in addition to this engage in reflexivity, and present her positionality so any potential biases are taken into consideration.

Credibility

Credibility refers to the extent to which the participants involved in a study find the results of the study to be true or credible (Yilmaz, 2013). The study first involved a documentary review based on which semi-structured interviews were subsequently held to fill in the knowledge and information gaps. A summary of respondents' views was read to them at the end of the

interview, to ensure the researchers record of their submissions were a true reflection of their views on political financing in Ghana. This validation process was necessary to ensuring credibility.

Transferability

According to Yilmaz (2013), a study has transferability if its findings are transferable to other similar settings. This in qualitative research, he believes, can be achieved through a thick description of the setting, context, people, actions, and events. The quantitative equivalent of transferability is external validity. The study presents thick descriptions of the study setting and the context of political financing in Ghana; and presents actions and events that breach the political financing regulations of Ghana, or more seriously can be referred to as acts of political financing corruption. Although its focus is on expanding understanding of political financing and political corruption in Ghana, this research can be extrapolated to provide deepened understanding of political financing and political corruption in settings like Ghana.

Dependability

A qualitative study is said to be dependable if it has an audit trail – a known process of selecting, justifying, and applying research strategies, procedures, and methods clearly explained and evaluated by an auditor. (Yilmaz, 2013). As this is a thesis, the researcher presented and articulated the methodological process for this research and justified research strategies to a team of three independent supervisors, who probed and helped in the fine-tuning of what eventually became the final research design.

Confirmability

The study findings were based on the analysis of data collected, thereby rendering it confirmable. They were grounded in the data collected, and provided descriptions and logical explanations for the phenomenon of political finance corruption in Ghana.

Reflexivity

Reflexivity is a process of attaining self-awareness in research by researchers. It is a "researcher's ongoing critique and critical reflection of his or her own biases and assumptions and how these have influenced all stages of the research process", and is important for enhancing the quality of research (Durepos & Wiebe, 2022). This research was on the sensitive topic of political financing and political corruption in Ghana. As a principle, this researcher is opposed to corruption, and throughout this research was aware about not approaching this from a moralist stand point, as the objective was to understand and present the political financing and political corruption as it holds true in Ghana. I engaged frequently in a reflexive process, and centered myself as a recipient of constructed knowledge from respondents. The results of this study, is thus a presentation of the reality as was related to me, bar my own preconceptions and biased moralist standpoints**.**

4.10 Ethical Considerations

Ethics in relation to human participation is important for all kinds of social science research, and should matter to all political science researchers as political science research involves human subjects (Fujii, 2012; Given, 2012a; Roth, 2018).

When it comes to social science research, ethics is an ongoing responsibility, and not a task to be checked off on a research to-do list (Fujii, 2012). All research must thus be ethical and conducted with integrity (Carpenter, 2019). In recognition of the importance of research ethics to the quality and integrity of research, this study adhered strictly to the following principles

of ethical research: Informed consent: Participants were informed about the research objectives, and their decision to participate or not to participate was based on a full understanding of what the research was about.

Autonomous and Voluntary participation: Participants of this research took part in this research uncoerced, with the understanding that, they will not be paid for their participation in the study, neither will they incur any penalty or ill-will for their decision to not participate. Participants who had objections to participating in the study were thanked for their time and replaced with participants with similar backgrounds who were willing to participate. They were also informed of their right to withdraw at any given time with no consequence. Anonymity and confidentiality: In compliance with ethical principles of research, respondents were assured of anonymity and confidentiality. This was especially important, as political financing and political corruption is a sensitive topic. Data collected was treated with a high degree of sensitivity, and respondents were code named. Ethical Clearance: The researcher also sought and received ethical clearance from the University of Ghana in line with its standards for the conduct of ethical research.

4.11 Limitations of Research

This study's quest for methodological and ethical rigor entailed a full disclosure of research objectives to participants, running the risk of participants withholding information as to not admit to an illegality like political financing related corruption. The researcher hopes that, assurances of anonymity and confidentiality and expressions of commitments to other principles of ethical research were enough to assuage the fears of respondents, and that, opinions and answers proffered are a true reflection of political financing and political corruption in Ghana as constructed by the various respondents.

CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

This research seeks to contribute empirical perspectives to the subject of political financing and political corruption in Ghana. Using a rational choice institutionalist approach, the study assesses political financing and political corruption within the context of the prevailing institutional regime. In tune with assumptions of rational actor institutionalist theory, it centers individual actors in the analysis of political financing and political corruption behaviours. To attain its objective of deepening understanding on the persistence of political financing corruption in Ghana, this study presents the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, assesses the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana, examines the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates or fails to ameliorate political financing corruption in Ghana, and suggests measures to abate political financing corruption in Ghana.

This research, proceeding on the assumption that, the persistence of political financing corruption in Ghana is a result of rational actors leveraging institutional weaknesses in pursuit of their self-serving preferences, thus presented the following findings.

1. The relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana
2. The institutional framework on political financing in Ghana
3. The extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption in Ghana
4. How political financing corruption can be abated in Ghana

5.2 Presentation of Research Findings

The findings of this research, in consonance with research questions and the data analysis framework, are presented along the following broad themes:

i. The relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana

ii. The institutional framework on political financing in Ghana

iii. The extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption in Ghana

iv. How political financing corruption can be abated in Ghana

5.2.1 The relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana

This study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana, sought to unpack the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. It presents perspectives on the cost of politics in Ghana, drivers of the cost of politics, effects of rising cost of politics, and the effects of political financing corruption in Ghana.

5.2.1.1 Cost of Politics

As a background to the exploration of the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, the study sought to find out impressions about the present cost of politics in Ghana. There was consensus, that the costs of politics in Ghana was very high.

According to a respondent,

> "Politics in Ghana has become so costly that everything is about money. Our politics has become so monetized that, you may have the best message, you may have the best policies, you may be the most competent person in our scope, you may be the person to really change the lives of the people, but without riches you will not be able to implement your good ideas" PE 1.

Another respondent notes that, "The cost of politics in Ghana, is excessive and unsustainable and has huge implications on democratic accountability in our country" CSR 1. A respondent

observed that, “The cost of politics in Ghana is very high both in terms of what it costs to run an election and its comparative cost in relation with other countries. If you look at our numbers and our economy, we literally spend too much” LP1. Another respondent opines: “Politics in Ghana has become synonymous with moneycracy and not meritocracy. It is no more about merits. It is about who can pay the most. It is not about competence” MP 1.

To assess the reality of the high cost of politics in Ghana, the study sought to determine the weekly expenditures of parliamentary respondents, and based on the data collected, estimates the weekly expenditure of parliamentary aspirants as GHS 10300. This is represented graphically below.



Figure 11: Average weekly expenditures of members of parliament



Figure 12: Reported weekly expenditures of Members of Parliament

The highest reported weekly expense for a member of parliament in this study was GHS 25000, and the lowest reported weekly expenditure was 3000 cedis. This cost however, did not account for major project interventions, or other supplementary costs.



Figure 13: Estimated weekly MP expenditures

The study to put into perspective the cost of politics in Ghana, sought to match the weekly reported expenditures of members of parliament against their monthly incomes.

The gross salary of Ghanaian MPS is presently ¢28,017. Several deductions are made from this salary. As reported by MP 2, "from this salary, payments in service of MP's car loan will be deducted, rent will be deducted, driver's salary will be paid by the MP from it, fuel will be from it and the maintenance of the car from it". Another respondent answered: "At the end of the month, we have a car loan deduction over GHC 6500, and provident fund deduction of about Ghc1500. We also have to pay parliamentary party caucus regional caucus contributions. At the end of the month, my net salary is exactly 12000.62" - MP 5

The study sought to find out from parliamentary respondents what their expenditure items were outside of their statutory allocations from the District Assemblies Common Fund, GETFUND, and the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) fund for the developmental, educational, and health needs of constituents respectively.

A summary of what they expend their monies on weekly is listed below:

- Support towards constituency party activities
    - Transportation for executives
    - Allowances for executives
- Community Engagements
    - Weddings
    - Funerals
    - Naming Ceremonies
    - Community Parties
    - Youth group engagements

- Medical Expenses
- Personal Issues of Constituents
    - Support towards marriages
    - Construction support
    - Childcare support
    - Transportation support
    - Communications support
- Educational expenses
    - School allowances
    - Books

The study similarly sought to uncover the costs of running for political office in Ghana. PA – 1, provided the following breakdown of his estimated expenditures, in his quest to become a member of the ninth parliament of the Fourth Republic of Ghana in 2025.

PC 1's ESTIMATED COST OF RUNNING FOR OFFICE	
Description	**Cost**
Nurturing the Constituency (Average GHC 10,000 weekly) for about two years	240000
Branch meetings (Average GHC 1000 per branch for minimum of 6x) 144 branches.	864000
Ward or electoral area rallies (GHC 20,000 per ward for 12 wards) × 2.	480000
Nominations Ghc5000	5000
Filing Ghc40,000	40000
Rally for filing Ghc100,000	100000
Primary elections (Ghc2000,000) (inclusive T&T for delegates, food and drinks, transportation, security arrangements and elections systems etc).	2000000
Sundry expenses - Fuel, vehicles and vehicle maintenance, team management etc.	1000000

Constituency and Assembly elections	50000
Ways and means	50000
Campaign for main elections (Gh 2000,000)	2000000
Election day Ghc1000000 (Polling agents, feeding, transportation etc)	1000000
Total	**7829000**

Table 4: Election expenditure and projections for an aspirant

At the time of this interview was recorded, he had already spent a total of 5 million Ghana cedis in service of his parliamentary ambition. The study also sought to find out how much parliamentary aspirants had spent, in service of their bid for parliamentary office for the 2020 general election. Below is a graphic representation of their responses.

The reported average cost of running for parliamentary office in Ghana for 2020 as reported by 10 sitting members of parliament is **GHS 2650000.** This is represented in the figure below.



Figure 14: Costs of running for parliamentary elections - 2020



Figure 15: Estimated costs of running for parliamentary office in 2024

From a total of 10 respondents, the estimated average total cost of running for parliamentary office in Ghana for 2024 is calculated to be **GHS 4350000.**

The study sought to determine from parliamentary respondents and non-parliamentary respondents how they meet the high costs of politics in Ghana. A summary of sources of funding for politics in Ghana is presented below.



Figure 16: Sources of political financing in Ghana

Outside of their salaries, and committee sitting allowances, as well as donations from friends, family, financiers, or non-state developmental institutions, members of parliament in Ghana receive allocations from three statutory funds, namely the GETFUND, National Health Insurance Fund, and the Common Fund, to support their educational, health, and developmental initiatives in their constituencies respectively.

To set the background for how the financing of politics in Ghana relates to political corruption, especially quid pro quo political financing corruption, the study sought to determine from political financiers the estimated total of how much they had contributed towards election 2020 as political financiers. Their reported totals, are captured in the figure below. In this figure, GHS 10000000, is the highest reported total contribution by a contributor towards election 2020. The lowest total contribution reported by a financier in this study is GHS 1000000. The average reported amount spent for election 2020 by financiers in this study is GHS 3250000.



Figure 17: Reported financier contributions towards election 2020

5.2.1.2 Drivers of the Cost of Politics

The study sought to find out the drivers of the cost of politics. The intersecting factors identified as responsible for the rising cost of politics in Ghana are presented here below.

1. Changing voter expectations

Several respondents identified changing voter expectations as a driver of the cost of politics.

> "From the 1992 elections, the expectations of voters were not too high. Just sometimes wearing the T shirts of candidates was enough for them. Now in every election cycle, the incentives that are provided to delegates and voters keeps on rising to a point where they now receive vehicles and tv sets. This leads to the increasing cost of politics" CSR 2.

The shift in voter cost expectations from candidates according to another respondent can be attributed to "the socio-cultural and economic understanding by voters or delegates that, politicians or candidates when they get into office pick from the public purse, so it is important for them to also get their share" CSR 3.

"Our evolving understanding of the nature of political representation and what it must do for us as the represented people" was also cited by another respondent (CSR 1) as a reason for the change in voters' attitudes towards political candidates.

The study uncovered that, the shift in attitudes and expectations towards politicians was due to citizens "beginning to see politicians winning an election as a game of benefits, and thus trying to extract their part of it to the best of their ability" MR 1.

Similarly, it was revealed that, "the demonstrable culture of politician's willingness to buy, makes people feel the need to demand more for stuff. They feel cheated when others demand money from the politicians and get, so next time they will also want to benefit" CSR 2.

2. High Cost of Running for Office

Respondents, noted the expansive logistical requirements of running election campaigns in Ghana as a key factor in the high cost of politics.

> "Campaigning itself demands money. Whichever the constituency is, you will need money to engage in the campaign. Once you have a campaign team, that campaign team will not come and spend their money to support you. It is your responsibility to spend money to support the campaign team. If they are using vehicles you will have to spend money to fuel the vehicle. In some constituencies, people campaign on motorbikes. The acquisition and maintenance of the vehicles or even motorbikes are on you. All those things involve money" - MP 3.

This sentiment was shared by another responding member of parliament, who stated:

> "You will have to campaign, rallies involve money. You have to spend money to get canopies, you have to spend money to get furniture, you have to spend money to get PA systems and those who are going to man those systems. You have to get water for those participating to drink, and sometimes you have to spend money to give to people to buy fuel for their vehicles because they will volunteer to use their vehicles and their motorbikes to campaign for you and you have to provide the means by which they can do that. And in some instances, just after the election they will tell you that my motor broke down and you have to buy or maintain the existing motor bikes or vehicles. So, the spending of the money comes in various forms" - MP 4

Other aspects of campaign expenditure were identified by other respondents. MP 5 observes: "Another aspect of where money is needed has to do with publicity, you need to have posters, you need to have the paraphernalia and all those things involve money".

MP 10 similarly noted:

> Another aspect where candidates may spend money is communication or media exposure. You know the radio stations and the tv stations and the print media sees the political seasons as the seasons they can use to make money. political parties will come to them to run advert even as members of Parliament you will want to engage communities and the only way you can reach out to these communities is sometimes through the mass media, radios, and TVs.

Another respondent identified the following as the component costs of campaigning: He notes: "The organization of campaigns, posters, T shirts and providing refreshments for people who assist the political parties or candidates to go out and mobilize votes is another cost political parties incur" - MP 6.

Another Member of Parliament, in addition to the formal costs of campaigning, noted the need to service social cultural and traditional expectations of campaigning and running for political office in Ghana.

> "I contested in a rural constituency before, where the communities were so dispersed and you need to move from one community to another engaging traditional communities and traditional authorities. You will spend money because when you go to a chief's palace, you will have to give some money. That money is a tradition, it may not be that much but you have to give, there is a proverb that you do not come to a chief's palace without giving something, so you put your money and that money is to be placed on the skins/stools. You have to give money to the linguist, and in some instances the drum beaters. So even engaging traditional authorities involves money" – MP 7

Other costs associated with running for political office were identified to include political party and electoral commission registration and filing fees.

> "There are other registration costs required by the political parties and also by the Electoral commission of Ghana. Political parties filing fee is a major cost component, and also what we need to file to the EC. Some of these are major drivers of political costs for people and for political parties" MP 8.

> "Political campaigns involve the purchase of items, and giving cash donations to specific individuals which cost a lot. Again, we see a lot of candidates and political parties who have intentions to contest beginning to either organize health screening, providing some goods to communities or certain group of individuals in their various constituencies or in their various catchment points so they incur a lot of other social cost getting into elections …" MP 2.

> "Assuming a flagbearer has to cover all the 275 constituencies, the travel cost alone is so much and also the logistics in terms of means of transport, T-shirts, posters to each of the constituencies" - MP 4

The table below shows the filing fees pegged by the electoral commission from the inception of the Fourth Republic to date. These figures are not inflation adjusted.

Table 5: Electoral Commission Filing Fees (1992 - 2000)

Year	Presidential	Parliamentary
1992	GHS 500	GHS 20
1996	GHS 500	GHS 20
2000	GHS 500	GHS 20
2004	GHS 500	GHS 20
2008	GHS 5000	GHS 500
2012	GHS 10000	GHS 1000
2016	GHS 50000	GHS 10000
2020	GHS 100000	GHS 10000

To make the determination of whether there has been a real increase in filing fees charged by the EC, the table people detail both the charged and inflation adjusted filing fees. These are captioned in the table as "real". The figures were calculated using the worlddata.info inflation calculator for Ghana.

Real Values Adjusted for Inflation – up till January 2023

Table 6: Real Values - Calculated by Worlddata.info

Year	Presidential		Parliamentary	
1992	GHS 500	0.41	GHS 20	0.02
1996	GHS 500	1.98	GHS 20	0.08
2000	GHS 500	6.33	GHS 20	0.25

2004	GHS 500	28.43	GHS 20	1.14
2008	GHS 5000	521.09	GHS 500	52.11
2012	GHS 10000	1896.91	GHS 1000	189.69
2016	GHS 50000	17266.60	GHS 10000	3453.32
2020	GHS 100000	55770.52	GHS 10000	5577.05

The figure below shows the real values of both presidential and parliamentary filing fees from 1992 – 2020.



Figure 18: Real Values of Presidential and Parliamentary Electoral Commission Filing Fees

Real values of EC presidential filing fees from 1992-2000



Figure 19: Real values of presidential filing fees

Real values of EC parliamentary filing fees from 1992 - 2000



Figure 20: Real values of Electoral Commission parliamentary filing fees

As can be seen from the figures above, whilst there were minimal increases in real value for EC filing fees from 1992 – 2004, there is a marked increase in EC charges for candidates for both parliamentary and presidential offices in subsequent years.

Between 2004 to 2008 for example, there was a 1732.9% increase in the inflation adjusted charges. This can be seen in the figure below.



Figure 21: Percentage increase in real values of presidential filing fees

3. Nature of Electoral Competition in Ghana

The nature of electoral competition in Ghana was identified as a main driver of the cost of politics in Ghana. The selection process for party parliamentary and presidential candidates, was noted to be a key factor in the rising cost of politics.

> "We have two kinds of politics in Ghana. We have the internal politics and we have the national politics. In Ghana. You will first and foremost have to be accepted by your political party before you stand the chance to contest and stand for general election for the general citizenry to decide on your fate. And someway somehow, the internal party elections have become more expensive than the general election. Getting your own people to vote for you, is really sometimes even more expensive" – EC 1.

The study found that the changing nature of rules and processes related to the election of candidates in internal elections which has led to expanded electoral colleges is a factor driving the cost of politics in Ghana.

> "Ghanaian politics is becoming really expensive. Previously it used not to be like that. If I limit it to the NPP, previously representing people in terms of parliamentary primaries used to be done by chairmen of polling stations, and then they expanded it to five people from polling stations. Now, it is all party

> constituency executives. So, it is really expensive running any form of election in Ghana "– *PE 2*

> One of the key drivers of the cost of politics in Ghana is the delegates system that we have which restricts the number of people who will vote to elect somebody. This makes vote buying and bribery more prevalent at that level" – *MP 9*

> "Another respondent observed that: Party delegates and executives benefit immensely from vote buying that occurs in internal elections and also the flow of cash during general elections and they are not even accountable as to how they spend the money and what they spend the money on. So, if we want to address the rising cost of politics, I think we should focus on those in the grassroots who benefit from the current exploits …" - LP 2

Similar sentiments were shared by another respondent who noted:

> I think from my knowledge of the cost part of it is through internal elections and the kind of vote buying that we see during these internal contests, that drives almost half of the entire cost that one needs to incur in the entire electoral period … - *MP 1*

Several respondents noted the tolling financial nature of navigating political competition from the internal party level to the general level for both parliamentary and presidential aspirants.

> The increasing costs of politics in Ghana since the beginning of the Fourth Republic 1992 relates to how public candidates gets into office in Ghana. For a person running for parliament to be elected, they need to go through the entire cycle of political activities starting from the grassroots. Anybody who wants to run as an MP is also supposed to be interested in elections that goes further down to ward executives and polling station assistants, to ensure their people get into office at the lower levels and they also get into office at the National level. The attempt to choose the kind of delegates that will vote for them leads to increases in the cost of politics in Ghana - *CSR 2*.

The effect of the nature of candidate selection on the cost of politics was found to transcend selection processes for Members of Parliament to include presidential candidates.

> The situation is no better for Presidents. If you consider that to run for MP in just a constituency you have to make sure that you pay money and get your people elected then think about it at the presidential level which is national - *CSR 3*

4. Cynicism and General Mistrust of Politicians

The study uncovered that, there was a general mistrust of citizens towards politicians, most of whom they believe are only in power to enrichen themselves. “The pathway to prosperity in Ghana is through politics. The fact is, to make money in Ghana, it is either you go into politics or you establish a church” – *MR 1*

The study also uncovered the general distrust of voters towards political candidates, whom they believe are accessible only when they want votes. The thoughts of the voters are that, when we vote for you, we do not see you anyway so let us take the money right now – *MR 2*

> “Delegates often feel excluded in governance. They are key participants at their level but they will be there and you will bring someone from Accra to make the Municipal / Metropolitan Chief Executive. They feel that, the only way they can get their share of the national cake is when they are going to select people” – CSR 1

Another respondent noted that,

> “The thinking of the electorate is that, the politicians are the same. The people are losing trust in the political elite. Whether NPP or NDC, the value is the same. They believe that, the only opportunity that you have as a voter to also get your pound of the flesh is when the politicians need your mandate. That is when you have to take advantage of them, for it is the only time they are vulnerable. Immediately you give them the mandate then the whole story changes. Now you call them you do not get them, you try to reach out to them and they may not pick their calls, and I do not blame them because sometimes they get overwhelmed” - PE 2

A similar sentiment was shared by another respondent who said:

> “Voters believe that, the only time they get to benefit from these politicians is during elections as after the election most of the things they say they will not see them again until the next election. They do not believe politicians necessarily do anything that tangibly impacts their lives so they see it as their only opportunity to demand and directly benefit from these political actors” – CSR 2.

Increased media spotlighting of the lives of politicians has also led citizens to the conclusion that they need to get their own share of the national cake.

A respondent noted:

> "Media coverage about the behaviour of public office holders has drawn citizens who voted to the understanding that, they have to pick the share of the cake that goes to these public office holders earlier on during the campaign so they won't be cheated when they come to power and become inaccessible" – MR 2.

Candidates distrust of elected officials, it was contended, was known to those officials who feel limited in their ability to address it.

> "People come to you, 'pay my fees, give me money for this', and if you do not have it, then wahala for you. Either they take it and vote for you or they take it and still not vote for you. This is a concerning matter but we cannot say it because we will lose votes from people" MP 2.

The observed lives of politicians - which was described as flamboyant, was also noted as reason for the general mistrust of politicians.

> "The flamboyant life of a politician is making the cost of politics in Ghana too high, because an electorate may know a candidate today to be using a KIA, Toyota, or something of that sought. Then, he comes to campaign for them that he wants to go to the legislature to better their lives. He is voted for, and within the next couple of months he is driving a V8, his children are travelling all over the world - so those who gave him the mandate will be demanding something in return the next time when he comes around" - PF 1.

The perks of political office, accessed legally and or illegally, has driven public mistrust about politicians and has contributed to the demand for politicians to share what they gain from politics by voters.

> "MPs start and are given rent allowances and they are given car loans to purchase cars of their choices. It has the effect of people saying, this man we voted for did not have anything, now he has got this he has got that… So, what are we expecting? The people will be expecting from you something you cannot be able to sustain, so I think that politicians themselves are making politics are expensive" – PF 2.

In addition to the other financial perks of political office, the benefits accruing to elected political office holders after the end of their tenure was observed by respondents to fuel negative sentiment about the intentions of politicians.

> "People have become conscious of the fact that, an MP at the end of every four years gets an Ex-gratia amount running to several thousand dollars every four years. An MP like Alban Bagbin, who until he recently became speaker has been an MP since 1993, every four years he takes the money (ex-gratia) which the public is aware of. In addition to the ex-gratia which is unfortunately backed by law, politicians also have income and contracts they engineer for their friends and financiers so the public has come to believe that these politicians when they get into office use public funds to amass wealth. The sentiment which prevails is that, these candidates when they win the election use public funds for their personal benefits. The demand for money by voters is done simply to ensure politicians pay their benefits forward "– *CSR 2.*

Another respondent observed: "I think there are a lot of expectations for making gains in political office. Ex gratia being number one. We also know these MP's and other people have quotas in some key appointments and even access to scholarships" - MR 1.

Even the set filing fees for running for political office by the Electoral Commission was said to be informed by their perception of how well to do politicians in Ghana are.

> "A respondent inputted: The Electoral Commissions fee for candidates gives a barometer of what cost elements we have, because the electoral commission fixes fees that appear to suggest that they themselves believe the politicians have and spend a lot of money and so they should be ready to spend on them as well" - LP 3.

5. Corruption

Corruption was noted to be a significant driver of the cost of politics in Ghana. When it comes to the high cost of politics, it is both a cause and effect.

A respondent noted, "the main driver of the cost of politics in Ghana is corruption. Pure and simple" – MP/R 1

Another respondent observed that,

> "… people see politicians flaunting corrupt political gains during elections and they are moved to demand more. Additionally, the politicians seem unafraid to meet the rising costs of politics because, they have either already gotten resources from corrupt political activities, or they are sure they will be able to recoup their investments through corrupt political means – CSR 3

5.2.1.3 Effects of Rising Cost of Politics

The study also sought to determine the effects of the high costs of politics. The high cost of politics the study observed, had implications for democratic quality, as it catalyses political corruption.

> "Political financing and political corruption are certainly loyal bed fellows. If you give, you expect to receive and then certainly it is a cycle that will have to continue, so the financier finances the politician to get political office, once they get political office, they even feel safer dealing with people who previously financed them. So that is where they are likely to channel the resources of their political office. The awarding of contracts for instance will largely be to those people they are familiar with who have financed them in the past and who are they are certain will continue to finance them…" - *CSR 1*

> "The cost of our politics has put politicians in a state where they have no option but to be corrupt. It is simply survival. And a prioritization of their self-interest. They know they are not in government and they want to come into power, which they cannot do without money. So, they accept donations in exchange for access, influence, appointments, and contracts. It is self-interest and survival" - MR 2

A respondent made this observation about the corrupting influence of money in politics.

> "We may want to give people the benefit of the doubt that they want to go into politics to serve, but then they realize that to be in public office, you need money to win an election, so at that point, it's whoever can give the person money and at a point they are not thinking about how to payback…" - CSR 2

Another noted: "At the point of deciding to run they are not very corrupt, but as they get into the game knowing that they have to gather resources to contest, they get corrupt" - CSR 1

Similar observations were shared by other respondents:

> "I think it is fair to say that the nature of politics in Ghana corrupts possible well-meaning people. Because they need money to stand for elections, they do not care where the money is coming from. They are not checking and nobody wants to check because you will lose the money if you do. So, once they get into office, they have to pay back and you know not all monies are to be paid back with money. Some have to be paid back in a derivative of money like contracts, some have to be paid back in a form of appointments.

> Anybody that has given money pass $100,000 dollars wants something in return so by the time they get into office, the public office holders are already indebted in many ways and now they need to pay back and they do not use their money, they use our money and our resources to do so. Even those who do not win elections still owe money that they are paying now" – CSR 1

> "If you find yourself in politics and you say you want to be the good guy, you will suffer dearly for it. The system is structured in such a way that you will have to push in a lot of resources. You need money to be relevant in politics. When you have political power, you can then retrieve whatever moneys you have invested" – CSR 2

> "It is easy for financiers to co-opt politicians because, they need money to campaign and he offers that money. As he is offering the 1 million dollars to you, he tells you he wants a specific contract when you are elected. At the time you need the money badly. You do not even care about the contract because you have not even won yet. When you win and he comes to remind you that the contract is due you will try every means to give it to him because you also want him to recoup his investments so he can fund your campaign again next time" – PE 3

On the practical manifestations of political financing corruption in Ghana, a respondent had this to say:

> "A road constructed from Airport to Dome for example involves several hundreds of kilometers and we know how much a kilometre of Asphalt or so costs to give out, so if we have a contractor that is seeking a contract and uses huge monies to support candidates to win an election and the person gets that contract which is inflated for a percentage of the money which is meant for the construction of the road to go into this person's pocket that is political corruption" – CSR 3.

The study identified the following ways in which political corruption in relation to political financing manifests in Ghana.



Figure 22: Manifestations of Political Financing Corruption in Ghana

1. *Abuse of Incumbency:*

> "We've done some work on abuse of incumbency before, during and after elections. Various forms of abuse happen, sometimes it is the government constructing more infrastructure projects before or sometimes during elections, you see presidents commissioning big stuffs around that time. We also see political parties using official vehicles that governments fuel and repairs when its damaged. These political parties take charge of these vehicles for their campaign activities. Sometimes, we have even formal buildings which are supposed to hold formal programs that political parties in power often use for free. In the past, even ruling administrations were using public transports, vehicles and they were refusing to pay for those ones. So, they abuse all these resources during and after elections" – CSR 2.

Abuse of office, skews the political playing field in favour of incumbent political parties.

> "It inures to the benefit of the incumbent seeking re-election or the political party that is obviously seeking re-election. Because the opposition parties are not in office, they do not have access to state resources. So, abuse of incumbency first inures to the incumbent that is seeking re-election, so it disadvantages the opposition, it creates uneven levels because state resources are being used by the incumbent to advance its agenda" – CSR 3

> "We have actually seen from the records the president for example during a year to the election, lining up activities or so-called commissioning events deliberately as a campaign tactic to increase his visibility at the expense of the opposition" – MR 1

> "First of all, any party that is seeking for re-election has access to state resources as well as access to resources from financiers. Ruling political parties have more access to money especially in the presidential election where the expectation is that the president is going to get re-elected. For example, we should expect that the NPP will spend more money in election 2024. In 2016, the incumbent Mahama spent more money because they had a feeling that they were going to win" – PE 2

About the effects of incumbency abuse on democratic quality, a respondent inputted that:

> "Elections are supposed to help us hold public officials accountable, and when public officials find it convenient to induce people to vote for them without thinking about what they did, in their time of office then it completely makes the issue about using elections to hold these public officials to account useless" – LP 3

2. *Vote buying*

Vote buying is another way political financing corruption manifests in Ghana.

> "Politicians find their ways to bribe people to mobilize people to vote for them and when they come to power because they now have to recoup whatever they had lost they are focused on that …" - MR 1

> "At any point getting to elections, we know people lack money but these political parties and candidates have a lot of resources at their disposal to feed into their ambitions in a form of vote buying. That is one way in which this political corruption occurs" – EC 1

The study sought to find out what the reasons for vote buying in Ghana are:

> "Vote buying is one of the ways political financing corruption manifests in Ghana. It is normal practice for politicians in Ghana to give material incentives to voters to procure their votes in any given election. This is because, voters are tired of lies. Because of this cynicism, they sell their votes to politicians during elections" – CSR 1

> "Politicians are unable to meet the expectations of their constituents. The only way for them to keep getting elected is if they buy votes. So, they often ignore developmental programs in favour of amassing cash to engage in vote buying during elections" – LP 1

3. *Money from discreditable sources*

The study uncovered concerns that, some of the monies the candidates get may not be coming from legal sources.

> "We have to think about where the money comes from and during and around the election. We have to ask ourselves where does the money come from?" – MR 1

> "We see people who are engaged in illicit activities also provide resources to these political parties and candidates so that when they come to power, they won't prosecute them and they will also secure their businesses" – LP 2

> "Recently in the NPP Congress for example, Asamoah Boateng was saying that, at the rate in which money was changing hands in politics, drug dealers may take over the country - MR 3

> "I recall an instance in 1998, where the former president Rawlings was giving $5million from the then president of Nigeria, Sani Abacha for the 2000 election, which went against the provision barring foreign interference in elections. The donation was not disclosed by the president, and it was only when investigations brought it to light that he said he took the money on behalf of the state, but we said no, that cannot be the case because the money was not transferred through the central bank, but was brought on a chattered flight quietly at night" – MR 2

According to one expert respondent, there are at least three (3) categories of political financiers

> 1. Financiers who are engaged in legitimate business, and provide political funding so that they will be given contracts.
>
> 2. Financiers who are engaged in illegitimate business; who provide monies so that they will continue with their illegitimate businesses.
>
> 3. Financiers who are engaged in illegitimate criminal business, who do not want anything in return other than protection. – CSR 3

The study thus sought to determine from political financiers, the nature of their businesses.

This is captured in the table below.

Table 7: Nature of Business of Financiers

Political Financier	Nature of Business
PF 1	Construction, Real Estate Executive
PF 2	Construction, Hotelier
PF 3	Business Person, Construction
PF 4	Construction, Shipping Agent
PF 5	Construction / Mining Agent
PF 6	Travel Agent / Construction
PF 7	Business Person / Construction
PF 8	Aviation Specialist / Construction
PF 9	Construction
PF 10	Construction / Imports and Exports

It is noteworthy that, all interviewed financiers, were affiliated with the construction industry.

4. *Quid pro quo arrangements*

The study uncovered the prevalence of quid pro quo arrangements when it comes to political financing in Ghana. "The practice is that, when you are looking for big donors, you put together a portfolio of contracts you they can award to people who give funding" – PR 2

> "… political financing has become one of the biggest investment opportunities for people. When its election time, the financiers go, "ok I will do this for you quid-pro-quo". This definitely overrides the national interest. It obviously overrides the interest of voters and of constituents" – CSR 1

> "Our current state of political financing even affects the appointments of the president. I can tell you on authority that, there are ministers sitting there who the president did not have a clue that he will make ministers but they gave him money and said I want this place" – CSR 3.

> "I know we have a documented case of an individual who gave the current president during the 2016 election $2million. What has this person gotten in return? The president nominated this person to the Council of State, and she has been given huge tax exemptions for her imports of fish and poultry from the harbours. She also sits on the board for the regulation of fishing activities. This person is therefore able to reduce the cost of her products and killing out other competitors. The exemptions that she gained really shows pursuit of private interest against public interest" - CSR 1.

> "A Nigerian guy said he led President Mills to some money bags in Nigeria. He used those monies for his campaign and when President Mills became president, he also facilitated the establishment of a certain bank by one of these Nigerian financiers …" – MR 3

Another respondent advanced that:

> "… Kennedy Agyapong was complaining that, party contractors were not getting contracts meanwhile, they funded the party. So, there is always an expectation that when you fund a political party and they come to power, you are given contracts to work."- PE 3

Procurement issues were also noted as catalytic to political financing corruption in Ghana.

> "It has been established that, part of what feeds into this political party financing corruption, are issues about even public procurement - where parties take advantage of the lapses in public procurement and then give enough room for their financiers to operate freely or conveniently so that they can in turn receive the kickbacks. When cost is increasing these parties are able to meet the costs because they find a way of abusing our public procurement to give resources back to their financiers" – PE 2

The study also uncovered that most government projects are pre-awarded to financiers in exchange for political funding due to quid pro quo arrangements.

> "The practice with presidential campaigns is that a lot of the candidates will have a list of a portfolio of projects. For instance, if they know that you are millionaire in the construction industry, they will have a portfolio of projects that they will tell you they are going to put under their manifesto so if you give them political funding and they win, they will award you." – PE 1

> "I am aware financiers go through the manifestos of political parties they intend to support and pre-finance political campaigns as a way to win those

> contracts. They will say, 'I see that the party wants to build this huge hospital and this huge overhead when it comes to power and I am interested so I will like to support the presidential campaign. So, a lot of these contracts are pre-awarded to financiers." - CSR 1

To guarantee political returns, the study found out that most politicians, fund both main political parties in Ghana. "Most financiers in Ghana give money to both sides to make sure that whoever wins they get something back. It is probably the number one reason behind our overinflated cost of projects and contracts in Ghana" - MR 1. The financiers have a way of determining how contributions should be made. for these financiers they do not just give money to one candidate, they split it among the candidates so that, head, he wins, tail, he wins - CSR 1

> "… we have a situation where a lot of the people whose businesses are tied to political corruption or political contracts are also developing a practice where they fund both sides as an insurance. Some of them either do not have business sense or they are arrogant so they go all out with one party, but the real business people like the Zoomlion's and co everybody goes there, so that is why you see that in the 2016 election a lot of the NPP party folks were threatening Zoomlion with jail when they come to power because they were not aware of the funding that was going through their candidate. After the election, when the vice president Bawumia made a public comment that the Zoomlion boss was going to go to jail, the following week, the president himself went to visit him (Zoomlion)" – *MR 2*

Another respondent similarly shared:

> "During the 2016 election, I am aware Zoomlion was funding multiple candidates. Candidate A people will come for a bag of money and candidate B will also come and take another bag of money so I was aware that he was investing in both parties, but the party people were not aware. They were always threatening him that when they come, he will go to jail. When the party came to power, Bawumia made a comment that he will soon go to jail, soon after that, the president personally went to visit the guy publicly, and said he was a very great business man and people are always jealous of successful people and he will even do greater things" - CSR 2

Funding both political parties, it was uncovered, was also considered necessary by financiers to protect themselves from political persecution. "Those who fund one side are targeted obviously when there's change of government, but the growing trend is where they've all learnt their lesson so they fund both sides during elections" – CSR 3

This was confirmed by a financier who said: “there are situations where you are not happy to give or even the quantum that you give may not make business sense but in order to sustain your businesses you may have to keep on giving. – PF 7

The study found true the assertion that most financiers fund multiple candidates, as out of 10 political financiers interviewed, 7 (70%) admitted to funding both parties. Only 3 (30%), stated they financed only one party. 2 out of the 7 financiers who admitted to funding both political parties said they distributed their financing evenly among the 2 main political parties, 2 distributed their contributions 60% to 40%, 3 distributed 70% to 30%, and the last said he gave 80% to 20%. Distribution was skewed along 2 considerations: party sympathy and consideration of which party was likely to win elections.

> “Sometimes you want to give more to such people for them to be able to recognize your donation. Because if they end up winning and you only gave a little it may not count for much. It is also obvious that those who have higher chances of winning tend to be the biggest spenders because expectations from them is high.” – PF 4

The figure below shows the disaggregation of parties funded by the political financiers in this study.



Figure 23: Disaggregation of Parties Funded by Financiers

To find out the extent to which elected officials service the needs of political financiers in quid pro quo arrangements, the study sought to find out from the financiers if they had received any favours from government as a result of their financing of political activities.

> "When you are fortunate and that party gets power, you are favored in many ways. Assuming ten of you qualify for a particular job and it is left with a matter of discretion to choose who should do the work because all of you have the same qualification, you might be favored because of the good you have done for the party in power" - PF 3.

> "There are specific preferences that will be given to you by way of appreciation. For instance, if there are limited payments to be made due to the scarcity of resources for payment, you can be picked as being perennial. You are entitled to it. Others might also equally be entitled to it but you will be giving that preference because of the nature of your relationship with that party" - PF 5.

Another financier reported: "personally, I have benefitted from contracts, political appointments and access to political authority" – PF 8

> "Political financing for me is an ongoing investment. At this point I have gotten back more than what I invested but as to whether I have gotten as much as I expected I will say no but it is an ongoing investment, which I still expect to cash in more down the road - PF 7

Out of the 10 respondents for this study who were political financiers, 7 respondents admitted they had benefitted from the award of contracts, some in clear breach of due process. They all admitted to have used their influence at one time or another to secure appointments for people. 4 had secured government scholarships for their patrons. All 10 financiers admitted their funding of political party had catalysed their access to the very highest wielders of political power. "Yes, I have benefitted from some of those contracts that is purely a result of political corruption because the contract was even awarded to me before the procurement process began" – *PF 5.*

5.2.1.4 Political Financing Corruption Effects

The servicing of financier needs was noted to have consequences for the well – being of the people.

> "It is certainly the case that political office holders or seekers understand that big donors have expectations, and they also make room to accommodate some of those expectations. Where the interest of the donors and the constituents' conflict, to a large extent, political office holders will do the bidding for political financiers" - *CSR 2*

> "I went to some community not long ago, the people complained to the coordinating director that their environment is highly insanitary but the man said he has spoken to Zoomlion and he can't also do much because the contracts are given by the parties and they bring their members to be employed so when these party members do not go out to work, there's little they can do to fix it" – *MR 3.*

> "So, you see how it works, Zoomlion gets contracts from the state, and when he gets or renews the contract, he has to employ party people as parts of the arrangements and when these party people come, he has to pay them, and there are some people Zoomlion pay who do not even go to work. This amounts to corruption and abuse of power" – CSR 1

Corrupt political financing, it was also uncovered compromises the ability of political representatives to respond to illegalities.

> "There was a Chief Executive officer who was found to have engaged in Galamsey. When the government decided to stop people from doing Galamsey, he was so furious that he came out and told us Ghanaians publicly that they used Galamsey money and others to fund the party so how dare we complain or challenge the fact that he is engaged in Galamsey. You can see a clear example that of someone who believes that, it does not matter the kind of activities he is engaging in, ones he used that to fund political parties or candidates he thinks it is right to accept what he does" – MR 1

According to CSR 1:

> "Political parties who are on our side who are also lamenting about the same issues, they are lamenting because they suffer a lot. They have to incur the cost and later find ways of recouping it through very painful means. Sometimes they could be engaged in corrupt acts and they can uncover

financiers engaged in corruption, but they have to close their eyes for some corrupt deals to pass as they cannot do anything about it. The fact that they funded them and brought them to power makes it very difficult for them to hold them to account."

5.2.2 Institutional Framework on Political Financing and Political Corruption in Ghana

5.2.2.1 Regulatory Framework on Political Financing in Ghana

The legal framework on political financing in Ghana is primarily enshrined in Chapter 7 article 55 of the 1992 constitution of Ghana and in the 2000 Political Parties Law Act 574. Regulations guiding political financing in Ghana, are also contained in other political financing enactments and practices stipulated by the Electoral Commission under constitutional instrument - in accordance with its legal mandate to make regulations for the effective performance of its functions under the Constitution or any other law (The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992; The Political Parties Law Act 574, 2000).



Figure 24: Legal and Regulatory Framework on Political Financing in Ghana

1. Constitution of Ghana

On the specific issue of political financing, the constitution addresses issues related to political finance contributions; political financing disclosures; and the public financing of political activity.

i. Contribution Limits: No contribution limits are specified in the constitution

ii. Contribution Bans: the constitution states in article 55(15) that, "Only a citizen of Ghana may make a contribution or donation to a political party registered in Ghana".

iii. Spending Limits: No spending limits are stipulated in the constitution

iv. Campaign Time Limits: The constitution does not stipulate time limits to campaigning. It however guarantees every candidate for election to Parliament the right to conduct his campaign freely and in accordance with law 55(13).

The Representation of the Peoples Law in section 37 also has the following proscriptions:

> *"During the hours when a poll is open on polling day, no person shall, within five hundred metres of any polling station, seek to influence, in whatever manner, any person to vote for any candidate or to ascertain for which candidate any voter intends to vote or has voted".*

v. Public Disclosure: In article 55(14) the constitution states its requirement for political parties to:

> "Declare to the public their revenues and assets and the sources of those revenues and assets"; and "publish to the public annually their audited accounts"

vi. Public Financing: Whilst no direct funding from the state to political parties exist, the constitution requires the state to:

> Provide fair opportunity to all political parties to present their programmes to the public by ensuring equal access to the state-owned media - in article *55(11).*

In 55(12), it states:

> "All presidential candidates shall be given the same amount of time and space on the state-owned media to present their programmes to the people".

2. The Political Parties Law Act 574, 2000:

Contribution Bans: The act iterates the constitutional provision that, "only a citizen may contribute in cash or in kind to the funds of a political party".

A citizen is defined for the purposes of this Act to include "a firm, partnership, or enterprise owned by a citizen or a company registered under the laws of the Republic at least seventy-five percent of whose capital is owned by a citizen".

The Act in section 24 forbids non-citizens from contributing, donating, or lending money to political parties, and prohibits political parties or its agents from demanding or accepting contributions or loans from non-citizens.

The Act goes on to state penalties for the contravention of the above sections in section 25.

> 25. (1) "Where any person contravenes section 23 or 24, in addition to any penalty that may be imposed under this Act, any amount whether in cash or in kind paid in contravention of the section shall be forfeited to the State and the amount shall be recovered from the political party as debt owed to the State. The political party or person in whose custody the amount is for the time being held shall pay it to the State".
>
> (2) A non-citizen found guilty of contravention of section 24 shall be deemed to be a prohibited immigrant and liable to deportation under the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160).

Disclosure: The act instructs every political party to within ninety days after the issue of its final certificate of registration submit a written declaration detailing its assets and expenditures to the Commission.

This declaration, it stipulates, shall include details of in cash or in-kind donations/contributions to the initial assets of the party, and the sources of funds and other assets of the political party, and other particulars the commission may demand in writing (The Political Parties Law Act 574, 2000).

Political Parties are similarly mandated to submit a declaration of assets, liabilities, and expenditure in relation to elections. In Section 14 of the Act, they are mandated to:

> "Within twenty-one days before a general election, submit to the Commission a statement of its assets and liabilities in such form as the Commission may direct; and within six months after a general or by-election in which it has participated, submit to the Commission a detailed statement in such form as the Commission may direct of all expenditure incurred for that election.

The Act also requires Political Parties in section 21 to: within six months from 31st December of each year, file with the Commission:

> "(a) return in the form specified by the Commission indicating: the state of its accounts, the sources of its funds, membership dues paid, contributions or donations in cash or kind, the properties of the party and time of acquisition, such other particulars as the Commission may reasonably require, and, (b) audited accounts of the party for the year".

i. Contribution, expenditure, and campaign time limits: Like the constitution, the Act is silent on contribution limits, expenditure limits, and campaign time limits.

3. Electoral Commission Regulations

The Electoral Commission is empowered to receive from every prospective political party a copy of its constitution and the names and addresses of its national officers. It is also obligated to ensure that, at least one founding member of the party is ordinarily resident or registered as a voter in each district of Ghana. Prospective parties also have to prove to the Electoral Commission that it has branches in all the regions of Ghana, and is organized in not less than two-thirds of the districts in each region. Additionally, the Electoral Commission is mandated to ensure that there are no ethnic, religious, regional, or sectional connotations to the party's name, emblem, colour, motto. Article 4(1) of the Political Parties Act additionally empowers the Electoral Commission to determine by constitutional instrument fees payable by prospective political parties for the purpose of its registration. In line with its mandate to make addition regulations to for the effective conduct of elections in the country, the Electoral

Commission of Ghana has enacted several public election regulations by constitutional instrument, the most recent being the Public Elections Regulations, 2020 C.I. 127. C.I. 127 instructs presidential and parliamentary candidates to deliver to the returning officer a statutory declaration stating that that candidate is qualified to be elected to the office they seek; four post-card size copies of a recent photograph; and, a deposit of an amount of money to be determined by the Commission.

Table 8: Summary of Legal Framework on Political Financing in Ghana

SUMMARY OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON POLITICAL FINANCING		
Contribution Limits	☒	There are no contribution limits
Contribution Bans	☒	Political Contributions are limited to citizens of Ghana, and to corporations with at least 75% Ghanaian citizen capital ownership.
Spending Limits	☐	There are no spending Limits
Campaign Time Limits	☐	There are no legal time limits to campaigning in Ghana
Public Disclosure	☒	The constitution requires political parties to submit declarations of their financial reports upon registration, annually, and after every election
Public Funding	☒	The constitution mandates the State to provide equal access to the state-owned media to present

		their programs. No cash financing is however offered.

5.2.2.2 Political Corruption Regulation

The legal framework on corruption and political corruption in Ghana is enshrined in the Criminal Offenses Act 1960, Representation of the People Law 1992, (PNDCL 284), the Public Procurement Act 2003, and the Special Prosecutors Act.

1. **The Criminal Offenses Act 1960**

The Criminal Offenses Act of Ghana – also known as the criminal code, is "An ACT to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal offences". It contains specific legal provisions to deal with criminal actions, including corruption.

The code operationalizes corruption in section 240 as:

> "The direct or indirect agreement of an officer, juror, or voter, to have his conduct influenced by the promise or prospect of a valuable consideration to be received, either by him or another person from any person whomsoever" (Criminal Offences Act, 1960).

The Criminal Offences Act (1960) in Section 239 (Corruption, etc. of and by Public Officer, or Juror) classifies corruption as a misdemeanour. It states:

> (1) Every public officer or juror who commits corruption, or wilful oppression, or extortion, in respect of the duties of his office, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
>
> (2) Whoever corrupts any person in respect of any duties as a public officer or juror shall be guilty of a misdemeanour (Criminal Offences Act, 1960).

The code explains further in section 241 that:

> "a person is guilty of corrupting a public officer, juror, or voter in respect of the duties of his office or in respect of his vote, if he endeavours directly or indirectly to influence the conduct of such public officer, juror, or voter in respect of the duties of his office or in respect of his vote, by the gift, promise, or prospect of any valuable consideration to be received by such public

> officer, juror, or voter, or by other person, from any person whomsoever" (Criminal Offences Act, 1960).

In section 242 under Special Explanation as to Corruption of and by Public Officer, etc., the Criminal Offences Act (1960) states that:

> "It is immaterial, for the purposes of section 240 or 241, that the person respecting whose conduct the endeavour, agreement, or offer therein mentioned is made is not yet at the time of the making of such endeavour, agreement, or offer, such a public officer, juror, or voter, if the endeavour, agreement, or offer is made in the expectation that he will or may become or act as such officer, juror, or voter."

Section 146 of the criminal code also finds punitive the dishonest receipt of property obtained by offence. It states: "whoever dishonestly receives any property which he knows to have been obtained or appropriated by any offence punishable under this Chapter shall be liable to the same punishment as if he had committed that offence". This makes the knowing receipt of the proceeds of crime, for politics or any other venture, an offence under the laws of Ghana.

The Criminal Offences Act (1960) also addresses the conduct of Public Officers after the conduct of their Job. In section 244 under Acceptance of Bribe by Public Officer, etc., After Doing Act, it states:

> "If, after a person has done any act as a public officer, juror, or voter, he secretly accepts, or agrees or offers secretly to accept for himself or for any other person, any valuable consideration on account of such act, he shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been guilty of corruption, within the meaning of this Chapter, in respect of that act before the doing thereof" (Criminal Offences Act, 1960).

In a similar vein, Section 245 (Promise of bribe to Public Officer, etc. After act Done) of the code states:

> "If, after a public officer, juror, or voter has done any act as such officer, juror, or voter, any other person secretly agrees or offers to give to or procure for him or any other person any valuable consideration on account of such act, the person so agreeing or offering shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been guilty of having, before the doing of such act,

> corrupted such public officer, juror, or voter, in respect of such act" (Criminal Offences Act, 1960).

Section 247 of the Criminal Offences Act (1960) charges with extortion a public officer who:

> "… under colour of his office, demands or obtains from any person, whether for purposes or for himself or any other person any money or valuable consideration which he knows that he is not lawfully authorized to demand or obtain, or at a time at which he knows that he is not lawfully authorized to demand obtain the same".

On Accepting or Giving Bribe to Influence Public Officer or Juror, Section 252 states:

> (1) "Whoever accepts, or agrees or offers to accept any valuable consideration, under pretence or colour of having unduly influenced, or of agreeing or being able so to influence, any person in respect of his functions as a public officer or juror, is guilty of a misdemeanour"
>
> (2) "Whoever gives, or agrees or offers to give to any public officer any valuable consideration for the grant to himself or to any other person of any benefit or advantage or for the exercise of influence in favour of himself or any other person is' guilty of a misdemeanour".

In respect of election related corruption, intimidation and personation, Section 256 of the Criminal code similarly stipulates the following penalty:

> "Whoever is guilty of corruption, intimidation, or personation in respect of a public election, shall be guilty of misdemeanour, and shall, during seven years from the date of his conviction, be incapable of voting at any public election and of holding the public office in respect of which the election was held, or any public office of the same nature (Criminal Offences Act, 1960).

This is consistent with the constitutional provision as contained in article 94 that:

> "A person shall not be qualified to be a member of Parliament if he has been found by the report of a commission or a committee of inquiry to be incompetent to hold public office or is a person in respect of whom a commission or committee of inquiry has found that while being a public officer he acquired assets unlawfully or defrauded the State or misused or abused his office, or wilfully acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the State, and the findings have not been set aside on appeal or judicial review".

The Political Parties Law Act 574 (2000) backs this up in section 4(1) when it makes a person ineligible to be elected or appointed to any public office, or to serve as a principal office holder of a political party if any competent authority (Commission or Committee of Enquiry, the

National Investigations Committee or the Office of Revenue Commissioner) has found him guilty of acquiring any assets unlawfully, defrauding the state, or the misuse/abuse of office in a way that is inimical to the interest of the state.

The Criminal Offences Act (1960) in Act 29 Section 179A, deals with the offense of causing financial loss to the state. It criminalizes actions including embezzlement, fraud, and other forms of corruption, that may affect public funds or lead to a financial loss to the government. It states:

> (1) Any person who by a wilful act or omission causes loss, damage, or injury to the property of any-body or any agency of the State commits an offence.
>
> (2) Any person who in the course of any transaction or business with a public body or any agency State intentionally causes damage or loss whether economic or otherwise to the body or agency commits an offence.
>
> (3) Any person through whose wilful, malicious, or fraudulent action or omission— (a) the State incurs a financial loss; or
>
> (b) the security of the State is endangered, commits an offence. (Criminal Offences Act, 1960).

2. **Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663):**

The Public Procurement Act sets guidelines and regulations for public procurement processes in Ghana. The Act aims to ensure transparency and fairness in government procurement to prevent financial losses. Causing financial loss to the state can occur through fraudulent practices in public procurement, such as bid rigging, bribery, and favouritism.

3. **The Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284', 1992)**

The Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284' (1992), made in pursuance of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1981, entails provisions on constituencies for parliamentary elections, qualification of voters and members of parliament, election petitions and other legal proceedings, and election offences. Under

election offences, the law has specific provisions seeking to mitigate election related corruption.

Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284 (1992) in section 33 (bribery) instructs:

> A person commits the offence of bribery:
>
> a. if that person directly or acting through another person, (i) gives money or obtains an office for a vote in order to induce the voter to vote or refrain from voting, or (ii) corruptly does an act on account of a voter having voted or refrained from voting, or (iii)makes a gift or provides something of value to a voter to induce the voter to vote in a certain way or to obtain the election of a candidate, or
>
> (b) if that person advances or pays money or causes money to be paid to or for the use of a person with the intent that the money or part of it shall be expended in bribery at an election, or knowingly pays money or causes money to be paid to a person in discharge or repayment of money wholly or in part expended in bribery at an election, or
>
> (c) if before or during an election that person directly or indirectly, or through another person acting on that person's behalf, receives, agrees, or contracts for money, gift, a loan or valuable consideration or an office, place or employment for that person or for another person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from voting, or
>
> (d) if after an election that person directly or through another person receives money or valuable consideration on account of a person having voted or refrained from voting or having induced another person to vote or to refrain from voting (Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284, 1992)

Giving money in these clauses is operationalized to include giving, lending, agreeing to give or lend, offering, promising, and promising to procure or to endeavour to procure money or valuable considerations [6]. Procuring office is also defined to include: "giving, procuring, agreeing to give or procure, offering, promising and promising to procure or to endeavour to procure an office, place or employment" (Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284, 1992)

The offence of treating, where a person,

> "corruptly or through another person, before, during or after an election gives or provides or pays wholly or in part the expenses of giving or providing meat, drink, entertainment or provision to or for any person, (i) for the

> purpose of corruptly influencing that other person or another person to vote or refrain from voting, or (ii) on account of that other person or another person having voted or refrained from voting or being about to vote or refrain from voting, or (b) corruptly accepts or takes meat, drink, entertainment or provision offered in the circumstances and for the purposes mentioned in paragraph" is also cited as an offence in the ('Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284', 1992).

The law also proscribes undue influence in section 35. Undue influence according to the ('Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284', 1992) occurs if a person -

> (a) directly or indirectly or through another person acting on that person's behalf, (i) makes use of or threatens to make use of force, violence, or restraint, or (ii) inflicts or threatens to inflict on another person a temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss, in order to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain from voting, or on account of that person having voted or refrained from voting, or
>
> (b) by abduction, duress, or a fraudulent method that person impedes or prevents the free exercise of the franchise of a voter.

For the offence of bribery, treating, or undue influence, Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284 (1992) prescribes "a fine not exceeding five hundred penalty units or a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or both the fine and the imprisonment". Persons convicted of these offences are also "disqualified for a period of five years after the date of the expiration of the term of imprisonment, from being registered as a voter or voting at a public election voting (Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284, 1992).

4. Special Prosecutors Act 959

The Office of the Special Prosecutor Act is An Act passed on the 2nd of January 2018 to:

> "Establish the Office of the Special Prosecutor as a specialized agency to investigate specific cases of alleged or suspected corruption and corruption-related offences involving public officers and politically exposed persons in the private sector involved in the commission of alleged or suspected corruption and corruption related offences, prosecute these offences on the authority of the attorney general and provide for related matters."

The office of the special Prosecutor is set up to:

> a. Investigate and prosecute specific cases of alleged or suspected corruption and corruption-related offences

b. Recover the proceeds of corruption and corruption-related offences

c. Take steps to prevent corruption

The office to achieve these objectives is mandated to investigate and prosecute specific cases of alleged or suspected corruption and corruption-related offences under the Public Procurement Act, 2003, (Act 663); investigate and prosecute suspected corruption or corruption related cases involving persons in the private sector, public office and politically exposed persons who may be involved in the commission of the alleged act under the Criminal Offences Act, 1960, (Act 29) and under any other relevant law; recover and manage the proceeds of corruption; coordinate with other relevant authorities in the course of investigation which including disseminating information gathered during investigations to authorities considered appropriate; receive and investigate complaints from a person on corruption related matters from persons, parliament, the Auditor General's office, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Economic and Organized Crime Office, and any other public body.

The Special Prosecutors Office is additionally mandated within thirty days of the conclusion of the prosecution of each case or confiscation of property under this Act submit a written report on the outcome of the case to the attorney general; publish on a half yearly basis the list of corruption cases investigated and prosecuted by the Office, the number of convictions, cases pending, and acquittals in respect of the cases prosecuted under paragraph (a) and the value of proceeds recovered.

Table 9: Summary of Political Financing Corruption Regulations

SUMMARY OF POLITICAL FINANCING CORRUPTION REGULATIONS	
Vote buying	Bribery, treatment, and the exertion of undue influence in relation to elections is an offence in Ghana
Abuse of Incumbency	The constitution prohibits the abuse of office for personal gains, including electoral gains.
Quid Pro Quo arrangements	Any person who agrees to give on account of his receipt of valuable consideration from an individual, is guilty of corruption under the law.
Money from discreditable sources	A person who takes receipt of financial material known to have been obtained by any punishable offence is liable to the same punishment as if he committed that offence.

5.2.3 Extent to which institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption in Ghana

Despite numerous legislative stipulations protecting against political financing breaches and political corruption in Ghana, political corruption, as uncovered by this research, seems to be on the ascendancy.

The research thus sought to uncover why political financing corruption in Ghana persists despite the existence of punitive and deterrent mechanisms.

The way in which political financing regulations are enforced in Ghana was explored.

> "In 2014 we had a discussion on corruption and in looking at the kind of amounts of money the country was losing, what came to the fore for us was that, the whole problem came from the financing of political parties which is not transparent. And even though we have tried several times to structure it

> does not yield any result because the actors are not bold enough to confront it" – CSR 3

The actors involved in politics, political financing, and political financing corruption mitigation, have been accused of being unmotivated when it comes to political financing regulation enforcement and compliance.

5.2.3.1 The Electoral Commission (EC)

The electoral commission of Ghana has been criticised for the poor enforcement of political financing regulations in Ghana. Several perspectives were proffered by respondents as reasons for the EC's failure to properly enforce political financing regulations. "The EC has the right under the law to commission audits of these political parties' accounts, so it's not just a matter of capacity it appears it's also a matter of wilful negligence"– LP 3. According to CSR 2. "It's wilful negligence, the commission you will say focuses on election administration which also comes with big procurement benefits".

> "The EC does not have the capacity to assess even the accounts that these political parties have given them. They also do not have the capacity to even think through how to breakdown the information for these political parties to assess in a way that can mean something or that can tell us what is happening" – CSR 3.

> "The Electoral commission right from the beginning has focused on election administration than political party management. In other parts of the world, they have one body to manage political parties and a different body to manage elections, so whiles the EC has done a very good job in managing elections, they have failed to regulate political parties and conducts within these political parties" – CSR 1

> "The EC is afraid to properly regulate these political parties because in managing these political parties, they will probably create enemies rather than getting more resources for themselves. That is why I think the commission has not showed strong interest in regulating these political parties and doing things to address the cost that political parties incur or even the transparency – MR 1

> "The EC which is the regulating authority has not done a good job. The basic legal requirement of political financing regulation is submission of audited accounts by political parties which is supposed to be enforced by EC. I think the implementation is nothing but a charade because clearly either parties do not submit at the timelines required and they do so with impunity or even when they do it is obvious that whatever they put in there as either the cost of their activities over a particular political season or their income for the same season are clearly not the case. They are often overly understated and not the true reflection of party accounts" – CSR 2.

The research uncovered that, the publication of the state of political party accounting to the commission was done only to meet a court order, rather than its original legal mandate.

> "We took the EC to court because we went to them to give us the minimum in the constitution because they are the custodians to that. The constitution and the political parties act are asking the EC to instruct political parties to drop their statement of accounts within 6 months after the general election. So far what we managed to do when we went to court, was to get them to release it, but it does not contain any actual details. When you look at it, it does not say anything" – CSR 3.

5.2.3.2 Political Parties

The opacity of political parties when it comes to political party financing reporting is a noted limitation to the proper regulation of political financing corruption in Ghana. Political parties, in the instances where they submit reports, attribute the greatest part of their financing to membership dues. The reality of how they get funding for their activities is however different.

> "… because this political parties find it convenient to use other means to mobilize resources, they don't pay much attention to membership dues, it appears to be a formality and when you have a larger proportion of your population who subscribe to one political party or the other and are not willing to invest or pay a token to help, what does it mean to all of us? it's in a way a vote of no confidence in the credibility of these political parties" – MR 2

According to CSR 2:

> "The biggest problem we face is the parties themselves not even compiling the sources of funding. So even though they know it, it is unofficial, but I am talking about officially recording so that we could see. Because of this, there is no transparency. So, they will tell you it came from members but they can

> never put a name of a member who gives the contributions or but their funding is always attributed to members."

A political party executive confirms this allegation: All political parties do this. We get creative with our reporting. If financiers knew we were divulging their identities, they will give considerably less. Disclosing the real sources of funding will open a whole can of worms - PE 3

The belief that financiers will give less if they know their contributions are public record, was collaborated by financiers in this study. "If I knew that whatever I give will be public record I will certainly reduce drastically how much I give" – PF 9. "The disclosure of financier contributions will open financiers up to a lot of problems. I give discreetly to all political parties because I do not want to be targeted. That objective will not be met if my contributions were publicized" – PF 10

5.2.3.3 Limitations of the Present Legal Framework

The study uncovered limitations in the present legal framework on political financing.

One of the many loopholes when it comes to political party financing regulation is the exclusion of internal party elections.

> "Internal elections cost almost as much as general elections so people invest a lot over there, but because there are no obvious provisions for the state to intervene in these internal elections regarding vote buying issues and the rest, people continue to do that. The state has never at any point decided to take it up and even ensure that these parties are not doing vote buying and stuffs" – LP 3

> "Vote buying is a bit contentious when it comes to internal elections. When it comes to national elections, it is very clear where when one engages in vote buying, the law may take its cause, which is something we have not seen. But when it comes to internal party elections, the law is not specific on that, so it is usually left to the discretion of the various political parties" – LP 1

> "When it comes to issues of political corruption like vote buying in internal elections, we do experience these political parties come out and make a statement to the effect, that if someone engages in vote buying, they will be sanctioned or punished by the political parties. You do not see that coming on the side of the state because it appears that the state does not have any backing to go into the internal affairs of this political parties and ensure that they do not engage in any undemocratic practices" – CSR 1.

The disclosure of sources of political funding, limited only to political parties, is problematic. Limitations of disclosure was also seen as problematic. "Only political parties are mandated to disclose the sources of their funding. This is problematic as the majority of financiers give directly to candidates and their agents to maximize their chances of reaping from their investment" - CSR 2

The legislative instruments that stipulate that, about two thirds of ministers of state should be nominated from parliament was also found to be problematic for political corruption mitigation. A respondent noted that, political corruption remains unchecked due to "the legislative and executive instruments that we have, where about two-third or so of MP's are also ministers. This leads to the ineffectiveness of parliament because they cannot hold the executive to account". LP 1

The expectation that one will become a minister if elected MP was also seen to fuel political financing corruption. "There's an expectation of you becoming a minister when you are an MP, where you get access to those resources to satisfy whatever cost that you incurred. So, there are various degrees and steps to some of these issues …" - MR 1

The legislative framework on political financing was as not expansive enough. "Our political financing regulations are not binding enough. Why do you think the parties have not complied?" - LP 1. CSR 2 asks, "can we foresee the rejecting of an NPP candidate because the party has not complied with political financing rules? You can imagine how the supporters will rise".

5.2.4 Abating political financing corruption in Ghana.

This study sought to uncover from respondents the ways in which political financing corruption can be mitigated.

There were several suggestions for legislative reform:

> "We need to legislate it and put in a regulatory framework with punitive measures embedded in them to discourage financiers from giving to politicians in quid-pro-quo arrangements" – LP 1

> "The best way to minimize political financing corruption is not really punishing people who give but it is very important to put in provisions that makes the disclosure of information about those giving making compulsory" – CSR 2

The promotion of the payment of membership dues, was advanced as one of the ways to mitigate political financing corruption.

> "I believe NDC, NPP both may account for about 2 million memberships. If they were taken 10 cedis a month from their members, wont they have enough to finance. These are all the things. They claim they take it but how effective is it? You should make it easy for a person to pay for you and they should make it interesting for the person to wants to pay" – MR 2

Setting contribution thresholds was also pushed forth as a way to ameliorate political financing corruption. "We have to think about contribution amounts and set a threshold. We need to determine how much an individual can contribute to a party or a campaign. The current law does not even talk about how a candidate should fund the campaign – LP 2

There were also suggestions for deeper engagements with political actors:

> "We need to engage party delegates and executives who are major beneficiaries of the current political corruption scheme or regime that we have. They benefit immensely from vote buying that occurs in internal elections and also the flow of cash during general elections and they are not even accountable as to how they spend the money and what they spend the money on, so if we want to be successful in this case I think we should focus

> on those in the grassroots who benefit from the current exploits to have some buy-in with them because if we don't do that they'll put pressure on the national government or their political parties and it will be like the vigilantism act, you'll have an act but they won't buy it" – PE 2

> "Those who are benefitting from the current exploits are the party faithful and the executives. We just need to get down to see how they also feel about this issue and determine whether they want some reforms and what kind of reforms they want" – CSR 3

There were observations of increasing momentum targeted towards political financing reform, with politicians themselves participating actively.

> "Currently, it appears both sides, the ruling and the largest opposition party have some interest towards some reform, we have not only heard parliamentarians from both sides complaining about the increasing cost which gives a lot of burden to them. We have heard some of them say publicly that they are not father Christmas so when they spend, they need to get the money back. It is clear that they are in distress. The majority leader and the current speaker of parliament have been some of the people who have spoken about the need for reform" – CSR 1

> CSR 2 – "There are politicians who have shown an active interest in political financing reform because as they keep on saying to us, the cost of politics has become unsustainable. They cannot sustain it. Every election the bar is raised and it becomes normalized, so they say they cannot keep up."

> "Politicians are moving towards political financing because they see some of these doors as revolving doors, today they are out, tomorrow they are in. They believe that there could come a time they may not have the resources and some other opponent has it" – CSR 2

> "Some of the politicians have seen that this was not the way things were in the past and therefore they cannot continue. Majority of them who have shown interest political finance reform are doing so because they are victims" – CSR 3

The study sought to find out from respondents if the state financing of political parties was an effective way to mitigate political financing in Ghana. The following answers were recorded:

> LP 3 – "If the state does not have any stake in these political party organizations, then what moral authority does the state have to intervene and regulate? So, the basis of public funding of political parties is a way of giving

> moral justification for state intervention and regulation of internal activities, conducts and practices of these political parties, and to reform those ones to be consistent with standard democratic practices and rules."

State funding of political parties, it was advanced, needed to be done in tandem with more transparency and the enforcement of standardized political financial reporting guidelines.

> CSR 3 – "The fact that the state provides resources to political parties and candidates does not in any way guarantee people not engaging in corrupt activities to fund their political ambitions. That established, it means that if we want to fund these political parties then we must put in place measures to ensure that they don't do certain things that they used to do if we are funding these political parties, we need to make sure that once we are providing certain funding for them, we can take advantage of that and ensure how and where they take money, what amount of money they can take, who they can take these monies from, how they can treat the receipt of monies giving to them, where they can put the monies to, access to that information if you want, so that it will be more transparent. These are ways to ensure that these political parties desist from corruption."

The suggestions for state financing of political parties, was not universally accepted by respondents.

> "I do not think so. Yes, there may be some minimum threshold for the state to finance, for instance the state provides some minimum number of vehicles to political parties that have complied with certain basic or minimum rules but beyond that you cannot saddle the state a full burden of the cost of political party activities" – LP 2

5.3 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter presented the findings of the study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. It presented research findings on the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana; the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana; the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing serves as a check on political financing corruption in Ghana; and the amelioration of political financing corruption in Ghana. In exploring the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, the research uncovered the belief that, politics in Ghana is believed to be very costly, and is driven more by money than merit, policy priorities, democratic experience,

or personal character. The study identified changing voter expectations, costs of running for office, nature of electoral competition, cynicism and general mistrust of politicians, and political corruption as drivers of the high cost of politics in Ghana.

Political corruption, was noted to be both a driver and an effect of the high cost of politics in Ghana. As an effect, it was found to affect negatively the provision of public goods and services and to guaranteeing quality for money when it comes to the execution of government projects. The study also established that, the nature of political financing in Ghana compromises the ability of political representatives to respond to illegalities. The manifestations of political financing corruption in Ghana were identified as: abuse of incumbency in serve of personal political needs, the material inducements of voters, the receipt of donations in exchange for favours or the promise of, and finally, the receipt of political funding from discreditable or criminal sources.

The chapter also presented the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana. It presented the legal framework on political financing in Ghana, as contained in the 1992 constitution of Ghana, and in the 2000 Political Parties Law Act 574. It also detailed additional regulations determined by the Electoral Commission under Constitutional Instruments.

A summary of the legal framework on political financing in Ghana is that, there are no contribution limits or contribution bans. Political contributions are however limited to citizens of Ghana, and to corporations with at least 75% Ghanaian citizen capital ownership. The constitution requires political parties to submit declarations of their financial reports upon registration, annually, and after every election. When it comes to the public funding of political activity, the constitution mandates the State to provide equal access to the state-owned media to present their programs. No cash financing is however offered.

As this study was interested in the intersection between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, it examined corruption regulations bordering on political financing. The study uncovered the existence of regulations dealing extensively with political financing corruption. A summary of this is that, vote buying, including the bribery, treatment, and exertion of undue influence on voters in a public election is an offence in Ghana. The abuse of office for personal benefit, including electoral gains is also prohibited by the laws of Ghana. When it comes to quid pro quo arrangements, a person is considered guilty of corruption under the law if they agree to give valuable consideration to any individual on account of the receipt of political financing contributions. The criminal code also finds punitive the knowing receipt of money from discreditable sources.

The study, sought to find answers to the puzzle of why political financing corruption in Ghana was perceived to be on the ascendancy, despite the existing institutions set up to mitigate it. The following challenges were uncovered:

1. Improper enforcement of political financing and political corruption regulations: it was observed that, the main regulatory body when it comes to political financing, was grappling with issues of capacity, self-interest, fear of political players, and sheer inertia.
2. Limitations of the present institutional framework, which does not include contribution limits, and does not mandate individual candidates to disclose their funding sources, was also seen as a challenge.

The research validated the assumptions of the rational choice institutionalist model in this context. It revealed that political candidates, financiers, voters, and the regulatory body exploit institutional weaknesses in the enforcement of political financing regulations to further their self-serving interests.

Finally, the study sought to determine the way forward on the amelioration of political financing corruption in Ghana. Legislative reform to fix lapses in present framework; and, public education and engagement were proposed.

CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

6.1 Introduction

This study seeks to explore the topic of political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic from a rational choice institutionalist perspective. The objective(s) of this research is to explore political financing and political corruption in Ghana; assess the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana; and examine how it constrains the behaviour of rational actors within the political system. Through a contextualized assessment of political financing in Ghana and its linkages to political corruption, the study will contribute empirical perspectives to the subject of political finance corruption in Ghana.

The study, sought to find answers to the puzzle of why political financing corruption in Ghana is on the ascendancy, despite the existence of institutions mandated to constrain it. The following questions were posed:

1. What is the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana?
2. What is the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana?
3. To what extent does the institutional framework on political financing mitigate political financing corruption in Ghana?
4. How can political financing corruption be abated in Ghana?

To provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of political financing corruption within the context of the prevailing institutional regime in Ghana, the study employed a unique multi-perspectivist approach that engaged key political finance stakeholders like members of parliament, party executives, political financiers, legal, media, and civil society practitioners, financiers, and representatives of the electoral commission of Ghana. It also entailed an extensive documentary review.

This chapter will analyse and discuss in detail the findings of this study as presented in Chapter 5. The research findings will be examined against previous literature on the subject. The chapter will also assess the theoretical framework underpinning this research, and present a determination of whether the assumptions of the rational choice institutionalist model of political science hold up when it comes to political financing, political corruption, and the synthesized phenomena of political financing corruption within the Ghanaian setting.

6.2 Presentation of theoretical framework

The theoretical approach underpinning this research is rational choice institutionalism. The key assumption of the rational choice institutionalist theory is that, individuals act as maximisers of benefits over costs, but the outcomes of these choices will be affected by the institutions that are present (Pennington, 2009). According to Hall and Taylor (1996), rational choice theorists take a classic 'calculus approach' to the problem of explaining how institutions affect individual action, as they believe institutions structure such interactions by providing information and enforcement mechanisms that lead actors towards particular calculations and better social outcomes.

For rational choice institutionalists thus, the creation of institutions revolves around voluntary agreement by the relevant actors; and survives mainly because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors than alternate institutional forms (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

The main assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, as highlighted by Hall and Taylor (1996) are as follows:

1. That, relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes, and act in highly strategic and calculated manners to maximize the attainment of these preferences.

2. That, politics is a series of collective action dilemmas, where individuals acting to maximize the achievement of their own goals may produce sub-optimal collective outputs.
3. That an actor's behaviour is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by the actor's expectations about how others are likely to behave as well (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
4. That, institutions are created to maximise the gains from cooperation for the actors affected by it.

In the opinion of Hall and Taylor (1996), it is the absence of institutional arrangements that would guarantee complimentary behaviour by others that typically prevents the actors from taking a collectively-superior course of action. In relation to a study of political financing corruption behaviours in Ghana, a rational choice institutionalist approach will entail an examination of the actions of rational political actors within the constraints of prevailing institutions. Where institutions are strong, the expectation is that actors will behave well and will follow the rules that will ultimately mitigate against political financing corruption. Where institutions are inadequate, and proscriptive rules and structures on political financing are inadequate or not well enforced, the expectation is that rational actors will take advantage of institutional loopholes or laxity in the enforcement of regulations for self-seeking goals.

Actors do this because they want to maximize their own benefits over others. Their actions are affected by the thought that, other actors acting rationally, will also work to take advantage of these institutional weaknesses. This leads to a series of collective action issues which will may catalyse political financing corruption in Ghana.

6.3 Presentation of Analytical Framework

The approach to analysis for this research was deductive. To answer research questions more intuitively, initial coding categories under broad themes seeking to address research questions were set out as follows:

1. The relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana
2. The institutional framework on political financing in Ghana
3. Extent to which institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption in Ghana
4. How political financing corruption be abated in Ghana

Research data is thus presented and analysed here in tune with the analytical framework of the study.

6.4 The relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana

One of the key objectives of this study, was to provide a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. To this end, the study sought to assess more nuancedly the opinions of the cost of politics in Ghana, drivers of the cost of politics, effects of the rising costs of politics, manifestations of political financing corruption, and the effects of political financing corruption. It also sought to put a figure to the cost of politics in Ghana by estimating the average cost of expenditures weekly for members of parliament in this study, the cost of running for parliamentary office in 2020, and the projected cost of parliamentary campaigns for 2024.

In this study, there was unanimous acceptance of the assertion that politics in Ghana is very high, as all 37 respondents averred to this. The perception of politics in Ghana as very high, is consistent with prior literature on the subject, as Aikins, 2020; CDD-Ghana, 2021; Institute for Democratic Governance, 2020; Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA, 2018

are all studies which have bemoaned the increasingly high costs of politics in Ghana. This study, based on documentary reviews, and responses from study participants, identified the drivers of politics as: changing voter expectations, expansive costs of running for political office, nature of electoral competition in Ghana, cynicism and general mistrust of politicians, and political corruption. This is also supported by findings from the previous literature on the subject.

Aikins (2020) and Daddieh & Bob-Milliar (2012) for instance, both cite the changing nature of political competition reflected by a shift towards more delegate-centric methods of candidate selection as a driver of the high cost of politics in Ghana. The Institute for Democratic Governance (2020) in a similar vein posits that, the resultant frequent and burdensome branch, constituency, regional, and national elections political parties and candidates have to endure, has catalysed the costs of politics in Ghana.

In this study, a respondent, notes that*:*

> "One of the key drivers of the cost of politics is the delegates system that we have, which restricts the number of people who will vote to elect somebody. Because of the limited number of people who go to elect somebody, it is more open to bribery. If it is 500 people, even a 1000 people, they will still bribe them". PA - 3

Another respondent observes that:

> "The kind of politics we practice in Ghana is that, you will first and foremost have to be accepted by your political party before you stand the chance to contest and stand for general election for the generality of the people to decide on your fate. This increases the cost of politics in Ghana." PR - 3

The expensive nature of internal party elections which contributes to the ballooning cost of politics in Ghana was also observed by respondent MP 6:

> "Internal party elections have become more expensive than the general election. Because getting your people to vote for you is really sometimes even more expensive. The thinking of the electorate is that the politicians are the same. That, those sugar-coated words will come to you when they want

> your votes, but they cannot make life better for you. So consistently people are losing trust in the political elite."

PR – 3 provides some context on how expensive internal party elections in Ghana have become:

> "In the just ended NPP national election, take the minimum amount that you heard me value inducements to delegates, which is 1500 cedis per delegates and they are almost 6000 delegates. If you do the math, you will get close to 9 million Ghana Cedis, and that is just the election day cost. Some paid double. So, you ask yourself, if to become the national general secretary of the party and you are paying 18milion, how will you pay for this cost?"

The study's finding too that, changing voter expectations in Ghana is a driver of the cost of politics in Ghana is in congruence with Kennedy (2009), who also credits the rising cost of politics in Ghana to diminished volunteerism, as people now want to be paid for everything they do for party.

It is also in tune with the literature's recognition of the increasingly professionalization of politics and the need to properly remunerate political service workers as a catalytic factor in relation to the rising cost of politics.

LP 2 states*:*

> "From the inception of the Fourth Republic, candidates or voters' expectations were quite limited. Things as simple as wearing your T-shirt were enough. The situation is now different. The incentives provided to delegates for their votes keep on rising. Now, you find that delegates are offered vehicles, TV sets, and more. So, the cost keeps increasing."

The component costs of politics are extensive, with a respondent noting:

> You have to do so much, especially if you are a new candidate because you are not known that much. So, you need to do a lot of billboards, visibility campaigns because a lot of the time, sometimes people get fascinated that you are visible. Anywhere you pass, here you see the person's image, and it shows the person is serious. It means business. He has some realistic chances of winning to the extent that he is being seen everywhere. So that also comes with some cost element. *AP - 3*

CSR 1 opines that:

> "Politics in Ghana is overly expensive and is driven by the expectations or the demands of the party grassroots people; lofty promises made by politicians or political office seekers; the absence of a robust legal framework that makes political financing very open and transparent and hardly any consequence for either receiving from politicians or giving to politicians."

The increased demand on politicians by voters for financial incentives, it was observed by respondents, feeds directly into political corruption in Ghana. MP 3 notes:

> "If you demand so much from politicians, you are asking the politicians to be corrupt. You should come and see the long queues at our offices. This one comes, my sons school fees, this one comes, my wife is sick. They will even call you if their wives give birth."

MR 2 bemoans the effect of this heightened expectations on political corruption, and observes:

> "I don't know how we may be able to conscientize the electorate to understand that, once you are taking these things from them, don't expect angels to be in the political class because they have to make the money back from somewhere"

Cynicism and general mistrust of politicians, as identified by this study as a driver of the rising cost of politics in Ghana, is cited also as a driving factor when it comes to the ballooning cost of politics in Ghana by Ayee et al. (2007); CDD-Ghana (2021); and Westminster Foundation for Democracy; CDD-GHANA (2018).

In this study, it was advanced that, citizens regard politicians suspiciously as they are often seen as becoming affluent soon after coming into office. They believe that: The pathway to prosperity in Ghana is through politics". And that to "make money in Ghana, it is either you go into politics or you establish a church" – MR 1. The rationalization of citizens which has led to the increasing cost of politics, is that, they need to get their share, as politicians are going into office to benefit. This sentiment is articulated by MR 2, who says: "The thoughts of the voters are that, when we vote for you, we do not see you anyway so let us take the money right now – MR 2.

It is further echoed by MP 5 who says,

> "Once you are associated with politics, the assumption is that you have money, especially so when you are in the ruling elite. If your party is in government, then it is as though the entire Bank of Ghana is with you, so you should be able to take care of them. So, everyone demands a lot from you. So, so, so much. These are also contributing factors to the cost of the political campaign."

PE 2 similarly observes how citizens cynicism about all politicians contributes to the increasing cost of politics in Ghana. She notes:

> "The thinking of the electorate is that, the politicians are the same. The people are losing trust in the political elite. Whether NPP or NDC, the value is the same. They believe that, the only opportunity that you have as a voter to also get your pound of the flesh is when the politicians need your mandate. That is when you have to take advantage of them, for it is the only time they are vulnerable. Immediately you give them the mandate then the whole story changes. Now you call them you do not get them, you try to reach out to them and they may not pick their calls, and I do not blame them because sometimes they get overwhelmed."

In this study, corruption is also cited as a key driver of the high cost of politics. This finding is consistent with the literature on the subject of political financing in Ghana, as [9–12] all hold similar views.

> "The cost of our politics has put politicians in a state where they have no option but to be corrupt. It is simply survival. And a prioritization of their self-interest. They know they are not in government and they want to come into power, which they cannot do without money. So, they accept donations in exchange for access, influence, appointments, and contracts. It is self-interest and survival." CSR 1.

To contextualize the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, the study sought for and presented estimates on the cost of politics in Ghana. The study estimates the cost of running for parliamentary office in 2024 as GHS 4350000. This is similar to the CDD-Ghana (2021) projection of 4000000 as the present cost of running for parliamentary office in Ghana.

Responding members of parliament in this study identified the following as their recurring expenditure items: support towards constituency party activities, community engagements, medical expenses, personal issues of constituents, educational expenses.

The finding that, the average weekly expenditure of parliamentary members in this study outside of their statutory allocations is GHS 10300 is very concerning, especially considering the revelation that out of their monthly gross salary GHS 28017, MP's net about GHS12000 after the numerous deductions, including for car loans, provident fund, and caucus contributions. The question then arises, how are MPs able to fund the difference in income versus expenditures?

MP 8 noted: "Society's expectations of our incomes are much higher than our reality. The expectations motivate the requests they make of us and one's ability to meet them makes him/her a good or bad politician". "It is difficult. That is why politicians cannot but be corrupt. We survive on good will. Good will that is usually dependent on the potential to repay with opportunities in government"- MP 4

Outside of personal resources, donations from family and friends, and possible support from non-state organizations, political financiers were identified as the other major source of political financing for respondents in this study.

> "This means all monies expended in support of political party activity in Ghana, is privately sourced. The terms of these private financing sourcing arrangements, remain unknown, and its potential effect on political corruption great." LP 1

Political financiers in this study, reportedly contributed an average of GHS 3250000 towards politics in the run up to election 2020. The highest political financing contribution reported for election 2020 for this study by a financier is GHS 10000000.

MP 1 inputs:

> "Sometimes either you go to them, or they come look for you. And they may or may not be in your party. So sometimes you have businessman that supports both parties. You know business is all about taking risk. If you are not ready to risk, then forget it. They take risk so they support candidate A, candidate B and what have you so that whoever wins, he would have lost here and gained here. But some are businessmen go just in a particular

> political establishment. So, if that establishment is in power, they gain but if they lose election then they lose. And so that is how that one also plays. And then they make the biggest contributions. Yes, they make the biggest contribution with expectation of reward, and that is the source of corruption."

For additional perspective, PR 1 advances:

> "All the investment they make is because they anticipate something in return. Because politics is not a religion, is just something you do and get a reward. So, whatever you do and that is why every contribution somebody makes to a political party he will want it to be recorded. Either they bring the media to cover or if they are more discreet, they get something evidential to put it down so that one day when they are going to lobby for contract, for positions, they can use these records and say I have done for the party. So, if you give me this contract kuraa is not a big deal because I have worked for it. I have invested so much."

PR 2 also notes*:*

> "During the last general elections, somebody gave us over 100 pickups, and somebody donated a Land cruiser. They were businessmen. As for them, once you win, they need the very big contracts. They need to make up the recoups they invested in your politics".

This in his opinion is how political financing corruption is heightened.

> "Financiers come and say, I would like to support the presidential campaign and donate to the campaign. Can you help me have access? People want me to help them have access to the candidate so that they can pretty much influence people" - PR 2

MP 3 laments*:*

> "No investment comes free of charge, no father Christmas in politics, not at all. Every investment somebody makes the person anticipates that he will get something in return. Probable much more than he has invested. That is really the thinking behind every contribution that people make to support the political parties. You see why we can never fight corruption?"

Political corruption is seen in this study as both a cause of and an effect of the high cost of politics in Ghana, as it not only drives the increasing cost of politics, but is also a result of the high costs of politics. This leads to a vicious self-reinforcing cycle.

Several forms of political financing corruption as an effect of the high cost of politics in Ghana were identified in this study.

I. Abuse of incumbency: From interview data, it was gleaned that, ruling political parties, often leverage the perks of public office to service private political interests and ambitions. In this study, MR 2 notes:

> "The cost of our politics has put politicians in a state where they have no option but to be corrupt. It is simply survival. And a prioritization of their self-interest. They know they are not in government and they want to come into power, which they cannot do without money. So, they accept donations in exchange for access, influence, appointments, and contracts. It is self-interest and survival."

In the literature, Ninsin (2017) & Saffu (2003) both note how ruling governments can exploit incumbency to stuff its electoral war chests in anticipation of meeting high political expenditures. Also, in consistence with previous literature, CDD-Ghana (2021), also notes how incumbency is often abused in service of personal political ambitions in Ghana.

> "You can clearly see how incumbency is abused in Ghana. When they go to commission government projects, what transpires, the conversations, the presentations they make alone, though they are purely government projects, they will rather use that for political capital" - MR 2

A similar observation is made by MP 7:

> "The government project, let us say a minister of state has done this, when they go to commission because it when, we are building up to elections, it will turn into a political thing. So even if the previous government has contributed to the project or they are even the one initiated that project, nobody will even mention it so it will be like, 'this government cares about you that is why we have done everything for you. The other government is so insensitive'. So as for the abuse of the incumbency, it is all over."

According to MR 1:

> "They use the vehicles too with the taxpayers' money and all of that. They use the security forces too to defend them. For instance, they are going around with the police, and then the opposition party does not get that

> opportunity. Then the state media too, because the heads are appointed by the government, the state media favours the NPP more."

II. Vote buying: This is one of the prevalent forms of political financing corruption in Ghana. Contrary to legal proscriptions on vote buying, "politicians find their ways to bribe people to mobilize people to vote for them." MR 1. They also directly advance financial incentives to voters to secure their support.

> "At any point getting to elections, we know people lack money but these political parties and candidates have a lot of resources at their disposal to feed into their ambitions in a form of vote buying. That is one way in which this political corruption occurs" – EC 1.

Corruption Watch Ghana, in (2020), presented findings that showed a prevalence of vote buying in the lead up to election 2020 and during. During elections in Ghana, voters have come to expect some form of incentive in order to vote for an electoral candidate. Politicians are also aware, that their victory or loss at the polls may to a large extent depend on how much they are able to mobilize for voters during elections.

III. Money from discreditable sources: the CDD-Ghana 2021 exploratory study on understanding how dirty money fuels campaign financing in Ghana, presents extensive proof on the fact that the high cost of politics in Ghana has led to the seepage of unregulated monies, a lot of it from discreditable sources, into our politics. In this study, there was widespread concern from respondents about this phenomenon, a direct effect of the high cost of politics in Ghana. "We see people who are engaged in illicit activities also provide resources to these political parties and candidates so that when they come to power, they won't prosecute them and they will also secure their businesses." – MR 1.

In this study, whilst all financiers self-identified as legitimate business persons, 70% of financiers who responded to this study confirmed they had at one point or the other benefitted from arrangements which were a direct reward of their funding of political activity.

A significant percentage, also confirmed, they had funded political activity to avoid persecution and scrutiny. An absence of deep scrutiny into the affairs of financiers means we have no real idea where their sources of monies used for political activity come from. In addition to the seepage of political finance from possible illicit sources in to our politics, moneys from foreign interests who are proscribed from contributing to the funding of political activity in Ghana have permeated our politics. CSR 3 observes:

> "One point I want to talk about is how it creates room for foreign interests to infiltrate and undermine the citizens and national interest. It has led to a situation where foreign financiers come and offer huge sums of money in exchange for things that candidates know are not in the national interest."

MP 9 similarly observes,

> "Yes, we have foreign business people coming in to support. Unfortunately, we do not scrutinize them. What is important is that you are desperate. You need the money, you need to get the mandate of the people, and it is practically impossible for you to get the mandate if you do not pay so much. If you do not invest, you will not get the power, so when the person comes to you, you are desperate. So, the person may come with his own terms and conditions, but you need the money badly, so you will take it. They do not do so much background checks. Some engage in money laundering, or some engage in whatever, they do not care."

MR 1 additionally notes:

> "You find even foreigners who have the guts to participate in our political activities. In the last election and the previous elections, you find actors and

> actresses from different parts of this country participating in our electoral process and I think that is another area not much is being done. To what extent are these foreign artistes, media men, and musicians allowed to engage in our political discourse? How do we check the abuse of power for purposes of political gain particularly?"

IV. Quid pro quo arrangements: The study's finding that, the high cost of politics in Ghana has led to the upsurge of quid pro quo arrangements as a manifestation of political corruption is also consistent with the literature on the subject, especially as contained in CDD-Ghana (2021). The discovery is that, political parties pre-auction potential contracts to financiers in exchange for political funding. "The practice is that, when you are looking for big donors, you put together a portfolio of contracts they can award to people who give funding" – PE 2.

The below statement from PE 1 validates this observation.

> "The practice with presidential campaigns is that a lot of the candidates will have a list of a portfolio of projects. For instance, if they know that you are millionaire in the construction industry, they will have a portfolio of projects that they will tell you they are going to put under their manifesto so if you give them political funding and they win, they will award you."

CSR 1 also notes:

> "I am aware financiers go through the manifestos of political parties they intend to support and pre-finance political campaigns as a way to win those contracts. They will say, 'I see that the party wants to build this huge hospital and this huge overhead when it comes to power and I am interested so I will like to support the presidential campaign. So, a lot of these contracts are pre-awarded to financiers."

CSR 3 inputs that:

> "A lot of these contracts are pre-awarded to financiers, and some financiers want the project to proceed quickly, so they will give money to both sides. Just like in Ghana, where we have a two-party system, they have to make the same donation to both sides just to make sure that whoever wins, they get favor. This is probably the number one reason behind our overinflated cost of projects and contracts in Ghana."

PF 3 presents one form in which this quid pro quo political financing corruption manifests:

> "We normally have to give back portions of contract sums to political officials. The typical percentage is 10%. This often bloats the cost of a contract. It is an add on but of course there may be some level of compromise of quality because once you have already shared some of the booty with them, you expect that they will not be too strict when it comes to evaluating the project quality."

CSR 3 makes a similar observation:

> "You have a lot of contracts that are deliberately escalated and all of that because of some of these things. Because, assuming somebody came to give you say 100 pickups, 12 land cruisers, such a person if you won the election and he comes for contracts, will you now want to subject that to competition? No, you will not do that. So, what you will do is reward them for their efforts, Unfortunately, our law also gives them that space and they are exploiting it. So, they take advantage of it." In this study, a financier notes: I have benefitted from some of those contracts that is purely as a result of political corruption because the contract is even awarded before the process begin."

Quid pro quo arrangements in relation to political financing corruption, extends beyond the procurement of government contracts to include the selection of ministers, as financiers get to buy their sit at the table with the money they give out as political funding. "I can tell you on authority that, there are ministers sitting there who the president didn't have a clue that he will make ministers but they gave him money and said I want this place" CSR 3. Financiers also give political funding to be able to be able to continue with their illegitimate businesses, or to be protected from investigations. "There are situations where you are not happy to give or even the quantum that you give may not make business sense but in order to sustain your businesses you may have to keep on giving" PF 9.

Political Financing Corruption Effects

Political financing corruption has several effects, and in this study, the following were uncovered: disregard for public interest, co-opted officials, deterioration of democratic quality. Disregard for public interest: The public interest was recorded to be subject to disregard in instances where politicians had to choose between that and their private interest. It was noted that, "where the interest of the donors and the constituents' conflict, to a large extent, political office holders will do the bidding for political financiers" - CSR 2. The discovery of instances where political parties and candidates auction contracts to financiers, also leads to a situation where the citizenry do not get value for money, as political contractors often engage in shoddy work. Contracts are also highly inflated to account for the monies political financiers advance to political parties.

Co-opted officials: Politicians often become beholden to political financiers when they take political funding from them. They are co-opted into doing their bidding, often with disregard to the welfare of the average citizenry, and sometimes out of tune with the national interest.

> "… they can uncover financiers engaged in corruption, but they have to close their eyes for some corrupt deals to pass as they cannot do anything about it. The fact that they funded them and brought them to power makes it very difficult for them to hold them to account" - CSR 1.

It was also observed by a respondent of this study that,

> "It is easy for financiers to co-opt politicians because, they need money to campaign and he offers that money. As he is offering the 1 million dollars to you, he tells you he wants a specific contract when you are elected. At the time you need the money badly. You do not even care about the contract because you have not even won yet. When you win and he comes to remind you that the contract is due you will try every means to give it to him because you also want him to recoup his investments so he can fund your campaign again next time" – PE 3

CSR 2 states:

> "We have a documented case of an individual who gave the current president $2 million during the 2016 election. What has this person gotten in return? The president nominated this person to the Council of State and, and she has been given huge tax exemptions for her imports of fish and poultry from the harbours. She sits on the board for the regulation of fishing activities and has huge tax exemptions. So, this person is able to reduce the cost of her products and eliminate other competitors in the market. In this case, the prohibitions that public office holders face, where decisions should not be arbitrary or capricious, are violated. The exemptions that she gained really show the pursuit of private interest against public interest. It gives a state of representation that does not enable these public office holders, who have been captured by these money bags, to make decisions that will inure to the best interest of the people."

Deterioration of democratic quality: the high cost of politics has made political office available for purchase to the highest bidder. This has led to a deterioration in democratic quality, as not only a marked decline in the quality of candidates for elective office, but also a deterioration in institutional enforcements and in policy created.

> Due to the high cost of politics, the nature of people who get elected is questionable. As long as the person has money and can buy votes, their motivation is different. So, the people who actually have the brains, the right motivation to make change are sitting on the sidelines because they have been excluded in politics - *LP 1*.

CSR 2 advances that,

> Political parties are the bed rocks of multi-party democracy and therefore once their activities are questionable when it comes to political financing, it impacts directly on the political system that you have and perhaps the governance system.

In sum, the presentation of opinions on the cost of politics, projections on the cost of politics, and the assessment of the drivers of the cost of politics, plus a detailing of the effects creates the backdrop to assess the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana.

This study explored the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, and with findings from this research, showed how the need of politicians to service voter expectations and meet the attendant high cost of politics in Ghana leads to a reliance on self-interested political financiers who give political funding with expectations of some reward.

CSR 1 buttresses this conclusion with this statement:

> "Political financing and political corruption are certainly loyal bed fellows. If you give, you expect to receive and then certainly it is a cycle that will have to continue, so the financier finances the politician to get political office, once they get political office, they even feel safer dealing with people who previously financed them. So that is where they are likely to channel the resources of their political office. The awarding of contracts for instance will largely be to those people they are familiar with who have financed them in the past and who are they are certain will continue to finance them."

MR – 2 observes similarly that,

> "The politicians know 100% they have to pay back these investments. And that is why it is difficult to eliminate that corruption from our political parties. It is difficult because the truth of the matter is that the political parties do not charm money and their members cannot themselves finance the kind of political campaigns we run in this country. So, if you are saying the political parties themselves should go and look for resources to finance their campaign, they cannot get it. They cannot! Their members are not in position to support. So, they will definitely have to take from these businessmen."

On the relationship between political financing and political corruption, this study thus concludes that, the need to meet the high cost of politics in Ghana contributes to rational political actors indulging in less than appropriate and ethically questionable political actions in service of their self-interest. This finding is consistent with theory, and with previous research on the subject.

6.5 The institutional framework on political financing in Ghana

The study presented both the legal framework on political financing, and the framework on political corruption in Ghana. These together comprise the institutional structures and rules governing political financing corruption in Ghana. The legal and regulatory framework on political financing in Ghana is derived from the Chapter 7 article 55 of the 1992 constitution of Ghana, the 2000 Political Parties Law Act 574, and Electoral Commission regulations.

The summary of the institutional framework on political financing is that: there are no contribution limits in Ghana, only citizens of Ghana can contribute towards political activities, there are no spending limits when it comes to political expenditure, there are no stipulated time limits to campaigning, political parties are required to publicly disclosure their revenues, assets, and sources of funding, and aside the provision of equal access to state-owned media by political parties to present their programs, no other form of public support is available to political parties or candidates for office.

The absence of contribution limits in Ghana when it comes to political party financing leaves political actors open to capture by financiers. The higher the amount of money a financier gives to a candidate, the more that candidate becomes susceptible to co-optation by the giver of said funding. This makes political financing corruption difficult to regulate, as there is no set threshold below which we know our politicians will not be subject to the influence of financiers.

CSR 1 advocates that:

> "We have to think about contribution amounts and set a threshold for how much an individual can contribute to a party and a campaign. These aspects are different. The political party act that we have right now only speaks to the funding of a political party; it does not address the financing of a campaign. Therefore, there might be a need to include provisions for political and campaign financing in the Political Parties Act, as the current law does not even specify how a candidate should fund the campaign."

CSR 3 is a little cynical. Presenting in this statement the limitations and practicalities of such an action, he says:

> "The sad aspect of it is that the monies they give, sometimes they do it privately, so how do you put those limits? The person goes to give the money cash to the candidate; you will not be able to. I do not think there has ever been anybody or any group who says that we are giving this money to any politician, except that we put in punitive measures that if you do and you are caught. If the punishment is punitive enough, maybe that could regulate the conduct of people who finance political parties."

Because politicians believe electoral success is positively correlated to electoral spending, political parties and political candidates explore every avenue to be able to raise and spend towards victory at the polls, the absence of spending limits catalyses the ballooning cost of politics in Ghana. This heightens political corruption as moneys from discreditable sources may creep into politics due to the need to fund the cost of politics in Ghana.

> "Yes! I think that there is no law in Ghana, or there has actually not been a regulated framework on expenditure in terms of political financing. No political party is capped in terms the amount of money they can spend in national elections, neither are individual candidates capped. In my constituency, I spend what I think I need to spend to get a victory. You do your best and see the outcome" - MP 4

Also commenting on the challenges of enforcement when it comes to political financing, LP 2 advances:

> "How do you determine the spending limits? And what are the criteria? Someone can spend, let us say, five hundred thousand Ghana cedis on paraphernalia, while someone may not spend even fifty thousand Ghana cedis on paraphernalia or posters. So, if you say that okay, depending on the size of the electoral area. Because if you take a constituency like Tamale Central or even Tamale South, compared to a constituency like Bongo, it is too small, so they may not need more, except that if you want to look at it in percentage terms. How do you even arrive at that? That is the only difficulty I think may arise if you want to do that."

MP 6 also wondered how this may practically be enforced:

> "If you say that no one should spend more than two hundred thousand Ghana cedis, take a constituency like Salaga South, maybe two hundred thousand Ghana cedis may be more than enough for that constituency. If you take a

> constituency like Tamale Central, one million or five hundred thousand Ghana cedis may not be enough to do ABC. So, I think that these are some of the things, except that the state that we are going to give everybody a minimum of this number of tickets, we are going to finance the rallies of every candidate, whether presidential or parliamentary, this number of rallies. It does not matter the size of the rallies, and then beyond that, whatever you do, that could help to reduce the money that either parliamentary or presidential candidate uses."

Addressing the potential challenges to enforcing both contribution and spending limits in relation to political finance in Ghana, EC 2 quips:

> "But if you say that there should be limits, how do you determine that? After all, the monies are not given publicly; they are given privately. Except that we say that no party should bring billboards up to this number, maybe within this radius, within these four kilometers, do not do this number of billboards or nobody should do billboards of this size. Because the bigger the billboards, the higher the cost, or we decide to say that an advert on TV or radio, no political party should run more than five adverts within a month. I mean, all those things, I think that if you do that, it will help."

Additionally, disclosure requirements for political financing are limited only to political parties who are required to disclose their revenue, assets, and sources of funding to the Electoral Commission. Because of a history of non-existent auditing of the accounts of the finances of political parties by the EC, they tend to be lax in meeting the legal disclosure requirements, and to get creative with their accounting when they do. The limitation of disclosure of resources to political parties also leaves room for candidates who indulge in corrupt political financing practices to remain undiscovered.

CSR 1 inputs that:

> "The lack of consequences for not just political parties and politicians but also state officials who fail to perform their duty to enforce the rules should be addressed. If the constitution states that political parties should file a disclosure and report within six months, there should be a consequence for whichever state agency or fixture is responsible for that and fails in this enforcement. Currently, there is no consequence for them not complying or enforcing that constitutional obligation. So, I think there should be a consequence for state officials and agencies that fail in their duty to enforce those reporting and disclosure provisions."

Criticizing the scope of disclosure regulations, LP 1 notes*:*

> "… the scope of those captured under the obligation to report is too narrow. There is a need to expand the scope of those who are to disclose to include candidates, to include campaigns and their affiliates. There are a lot of groups that may not necessarily be part of the campaigns, but they work for and are like private or sub-agents under the party, like loyal ladies and friends of Mahama. So, I think the reporting should cover all those affiliates of candidates and parties.

There are also stipulations when it comes to those who can contribute to political party activity in Ghana. The legal framework on political financing excludes foreigners from contributing towards political party activity. Where donors are corporate, the company must have a minimum 70% Ghanaian citizen ownership to qualify to provide political funding.

In theory, this guards against foreign interference in Ghana's electoral processes, but the absence of disclosures for candidates makes it difficult to track the extent to which foreign funding seeps into Ghanaian politics. Finally, there is no direct political funding support from government to political parties or candidates in Ghana. "Political parties in Ghana do not receive direct funding from the state in support of political activity. The only indirect financing support they receive is in the form of equal coverage from state owned media" - EC 1.

In relation to political financing corruption more specifically, vote buying, abuse of incumbency, quid pro quo arrangements, and the receipt of money for political activity from discreditable sources are prohibited. Bribery, treatment, and the exertion of undue influence in relation to elections is an offence in Ghana, and the constitution also prohibits the abuse of office for personal gains. A person is also found to be guilty of corruption under the law if he agrees to give favours on account of his receipt of valuable consideration from any individual. It also subjects those who knowingly take receipt of financing from punishable offences to the same punishment as those who have committed the original crime. The legal framework on corruption and political corruption in Ghana is enshrined in the Criminal Offenses Act 1960, Representation of the People Law 1992, (PNDCL 284), the Public Procurement Act 2003, and the Special Prosecutors Act.

Whilst political financing corruption regulations in Ghana are quite extensive, there is some laxity in enforcement which can make political corruption fester. In every election cycle recorded in the Fourth Republic of Ghana for instance, there have been noted incidences of vote buying which often go unpunished.

LP 1 notes the effects of vote buying in Ghana, saying:

> "Elections are supposed to help us hold public officials accountable, and when public officials find it convenient to induce people to vote for them without thinking about what they did in their time of office, then it completely makes the issue about using elections to hold these public officials to account useless."

Criminal sanctions for vote buyers are not explicitly outlined in the Political Parties Act, as the Electoral Commission lacks criminal jurisdiction. Due to this gap, vote buying has been addressed separately and criminalized in the criminal code. However, the legislation dealing with vote buying as an infringement, limits this criminalization to public elections to the exclusion of internal party elections.

LP 3 shares that,

> "Vote buying is a contentious issue, because when it comes to internal party elections, which are not categorized as public elections, the law lacks specificity. In these cases, the responsibility falls on the discretion of individual political parties. While some parties publicly announce their intent to sanction or punish individuals involved in vote buying during internal elections, there is a noticeable absence of state intervention. The state often lacks the authority to intervene in the internal affairs of political parties and prevent undemocratic and politically financing corruption practices like vote buying."

CSR 1 also notes that,

> "There are no explicit provisions empowering the state to intervene in internal elections regarding issues like vote buying. Despite the prevalence of such practices, the response is primarily limited to statements by political parties, lacking effective enforcement. Even when Civil Society Organizations and others provide evidence of vote buying, parties often deny or ignore the allegations. Surprisingly, the state has not taken decisive action

> to address and prevent vote buying within political parties, leaving a gap in ensuring electoral integrity and transparency."

Incumbency abuse has also become normalized in Ghana, and even opposition politicians are passive about it because they recognize their tendency to engage in same when they have political power.

CLR 3 argues that,

> "Legislation should be enforced which should make it a bit more difficult for a ruling party to abuse political office in the area of financing. But at the same time, we will have to recognize that the closer you are to the kitty or to state resources, the more likely that you will be the biggest beneficiary. If you are in a position to award contracts, even when we legislate, it will not completely erode your chances of getting or receiving more political financing support to those you awarded the contracts to."

LP 1 notes,

> "Even before they lift the ban for campaigning the incumbent in commissioning projects but they tell you they are not campaigning. That, government machinery must move when we know really that it is campaigning. Projects that are supposed to be executed particularly at the local government level, they do them with the tax payer's money but they do them in credit to themselves and their political party."

> "Various forms of incumbency abuse happen in Ghana. Sometimes it is the government constructing more infrastructure projects before or sometimes during elections. You see presidents commissioning big stuffs around that time, and political parties using official vehicles that governments fuels and repairs when it is damaged for their campaign activities. Sometimes we have even formal buildings which are supposed to hold formal programs that political parties in power often use for free. In the past, even ruling administrations were using public transports, vehicles and they were refusing to pay for those ones. So, they abuse all these resources during and after elections." PR – 2

MP 3 also notes:

> "The abuse of incumbency is evident as those in power utilize government projects during commissioning for political gain. Despite these projects possibly being initiated by previous administrations, the focus shifts towards presenting them as current government achievements, while downplaying the contributions of the previous administration. This manipulation of

> government initiatives for political advantage is a notable aspect of the abuse of incumbency that takes place here in Ghana."

The abuse of incumbency skews the political playing field in favour of the ruling political party.

As is noted by MR – 1,

> "Incumbency Abuse inures to the benefit of the political party that is obviously seeking re-election. Because the opposition party are not in office, they do not have access to the state resources. This disadvantages the opposition, and it creates uneven levels because state resources are being used by the incumbent to advance its agenda."

In this study, MP 5 2 shares that,

> "In our meetings, particularly during cabinet sessions like the one in Abuasi, we engaged in a political session where regional chairmen of parties discussed their constituencies' pressing needs based on potential voter impact. This needs assessment influences project allocation and government policies, often prioritizing decisions that are politically expedient for garnering votes rather than strictly based on merit. The allocation of government projects becomes driven by political considerations, impacting the overall direction of government policies, which are shaped by the quest for political popularity rather than the national interest."

LP 3 states:

> "There is also no direct, express legal provision that expressly bars public officials from using state resources for campaigns. So, you see a lot of public officials using government cars for their campaign activities. We know it is unethical, but there is no specific law that can be used to hold these people to account."

Whilst the law proscribes to quid pro quo political financing arrangements, there are some enforcement limitations which breeds this as a practice in Ghana.

> "If you recall, Kennedy Agyepong was complaining that the party's contractors were not getting contracts, meanwhile, they funded the party. So, there is always an expectation that when you fund a political party and they come to power you are given the contracts to work. And many party chairmen are contractors and you may wonder why and they are big financiers of their political parties and that is where they get their contracts from. And there is always a situation that something goes and something comes and that is how they operate our political systems." CSR 2

MP 8 also notes:

> "It has been established that part of what feeds into political party financing is related to issues in public procurement. Parties take advantage of lapses in public procurement, creating opportunities for their financiers to operate freely. This allows them to receive kickbacks, enabling the parties to meet increasing costs by abusing public procurement processes. This is how political financing corruption occurs."

An example was set by MR 1*:*

> "Zoomlion gets contracts from the state, and when he gets or renews the contract, he has to employ party people as parts of the arrangements and when this party people come, he has to pay them. There are some people Zoomlion pays who do not even go to work. So, that is one way in which these political gets their money from quid pro quo arrangements."

Finally, the receipt of money for political activity from discreditable sources is prohibited in Ghana according to the criminal code. However, "people engaged in illicit activities also contribute resources to political parties and candidates, aiming to avoid prosecution and secure their businesses once those parties come to power" CSR 2

6.6 The extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption in Ghana

From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, the extent to which political financing corruption is mitigated, will largely depend on how rational political actors act within those institutional constraints. This statement by CSR 3 sums up why this dysfunctionality may be functional:

> "Right now, it is a little functional because it works such that everybody wants something. Delegates want something, voters get something, politicians get something, and financiers get something. So, there is no real motivation for anybody to change the system, because it will lead to disequilibrium."

Whilst the institutional framework bordering political financing in Ghana is quite extensive, the laxity in the enforcement of political financing and political corruption regulations has led

to a situation where rational actors are taking strategic advantage of the institutional weaknesses to advance their self-seeking goals.

In analysing the extent to which the institutional framework mitigates political financing in Ghana, this study presents and assesses the behaviours of actors within the constraints of political financing institutions.

Political financing regulators in this context refer to the institutions mandated to enforce political financing regulations in Ghana. The primary regulator when it comes to political financing regulations in Ghana is the Electoral Commission of Ghana. The electoral commission of Ghana has been criticised for the poor enforcement of political financing regulations in Ghana. This failure, the study uncovered, is due to the following:

Inadequate capacity: The EC has limited capacity when it comes to securing compliance from political parties in relation to political financing regulation compliance. As a result, it is unable to properly interrogate the accounts of political parties in Ghana.

> "The EC does not have the capacity to assess even the accounts that these political parties have given them. They also do not have the capacity to even think through how to breakdown the information for these political parties to assess in a way that can mean something or that can tell us what is happening – CSR 3"

Wilful negligence: As the EC is legally mandated to audit accounts of political parties, to fail to do this and blame it on a lack of capacity is a blatant shirking of responsibility, and is simply wilful negligence. "The EC has the right under the law to commission audits of these political parties' accounts, so it is not just a matter of capacity it appears it is also a matter of wilful negligence - LP 3. CSR 2 says: "It is wilful negligence. The commission you will say focuses on election administration which also comes with big procurement benefits "

> "The EC which is the regulating authority has not done a good job. The basic legal requirement of political financing regulation is submission of audited accounts by political parties which is supposed to be enforced by EC. I think the implementation is nothing but a charade because clearly either parties do not submit at the timelines required and they do so with impunity or even when they do it is obvious that whatever they put in there as either the cost of their activities over a particular political season or their income for the same season are clearly not the case. They are often overly understated and not the true reflection of party accounts" – LP 2.

Focus on election administration rather than political management: The Electoral Commission of Ghana is primarily focused on election administration to the detriment of other core responsibilities such as political party administration.

> "The Electoral commission right from the beginning has focused on election administration than political party management. In other parts of the world, they have one body to manage political parties and a different body to manage elections, so whiles the EC has done a very good job in managing elections, they have failed to regulate political parties and conducts within these political parties" – CSR 1

Responding to why political financing regulation enforcement is poor, EC 1 states: "The reality is that if were to properly enforce political party financing regulations in Ghana, there will be no political parties. So sometimes we look the other way."

Fear of Political retribution: The constitution still gives the president of Ghana appointive powers when it comes to commissioners of the Electoral commission.

> "The EC is afraid to properly regulate these political parties because in managing these political parties, they will probably create enemies rather than getting more resources for themselves. That is why I think the commission has not showed strong interest in regulating these political parties and doing things to address the cost that political parties incur or even the transparency" – LP 1

In reference to why regulating authorities are afraid to crack the whip when it comes to political financing infringements, CSR 1 observes:

> "They know that if you do not play along then the appointed authority may sack you. Because they will say you are not helping the party people and all that so you are compelled to play along. And that is the biggest source of corruption. And until we are able to deal with this, I do not think we can fight corruption".

Political actors, operate within the institutional regime where the EC which is mandated to enforce political financing compliance often falls short. The resulting behaviours, will thus take into account the punitive actions or lack of that they are likely to encounter from regulators if they continue to pursue their own self-interest. Where these measures are not deterrent enough, there will be limited motivation to comply.

Candidates for political office are primary actors when it comes to political financing and political corruption in Ghana. They are the key recipients of political funding from financiers. To ascend to political office, they need the support of voters. To be able to run for office, they need to comply with stipulations from political regulators, in this case the Electoral commission of Ghana. Where they fall short, institutions with the power to step in to enforce compliance may be called upon. Depending on the reality of their political financing behaviours, candidates may either be the potential beneficiaries of advocacy efforts targeted at mitigating political financing corruption, or the targets of activist efforts.



RATIONAL CHOICE CALCULATIONS

The decisions of a political aspirant in relation to political financing, depends to a large extent on their rational calculus of which sets of decisions are most likely to benefit them. Political candidates, from a rational choice institutionalist perspective are expected to make the decisions that best magnifies their personal gain at limited cost within the prevailing institutional constraints.

Vote buying

In this study, it was uncovered that, against political financing and political corruption regulations, political aspirants still engage in vote buying. Vote buying, or material inducements for votes goes against several political financing regulations.

It breaches section 33 of the Representation of the Peoples Amendment Law -PNDCL 284, which states that:

A person commits the offence of bribery:

i. if that person directly or acting through another person, (i) gives money or obtains an office for a vote in order to induce the voter to vote or refrain from voting, or (ii) corruptly does an act on account of a voter having voted or refrained from voting, or (iii)makes a gift or provides something of value to a voter to induce the voter to vote in a certain way or to obtain the election of a candidate, or

ii. if that person advances or pays money or causes money to be paid to or for the use of a person with the intent that the money or part of it shall be expended in bribery at an election, or knowingly pays money or causes money to be paid to a person in discharge or repayment of money wholly or in part expended in bribery at an election, or

iii. if before or during an election that person directly or indirectly, or through another person acting on that person's behalf, receives, agrees or contracts for money, gift, a loan or valuable consideration or an office, place or employment for that person or for another person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from voting,

iv. if after an election that person directly or through another person receives money or valuable consideration on account of a person having voted or refrained from voting or having induced another person to vote or to refrain from voting. [6]

The offence of treating is also cited as an offence in the ('Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284', 1992). This is where a person:

> "corruptly or through another person, before, during or after an election gives or provides or pays wholly or in part the expenses of giving or providing meat, drink, entertainment or provision to or for any person, (i) for the purpose of corruptly influencing that other person or another person to vote or refrain from voting, or (ii) on account of that other person or another person having voted or refrained from voting or being about to vote or refrain from voting, or (b) corruptly accepts or takes meat, drink, entertainment or provision offered in the circumstances and for the purposes mentioned in paragraph."

For the offence of bribery, treating, or undue influence, the Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284', (1992) prescribes "a fine not exceeding five hundred penalty units or a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or both the fine and the imprisonment". Persons convicted of these offences are also "disqualified for a period of five years after the date of the expiration of the term of imprisonment, from being registered as a voter or voting at a public

election ('Representation of the People Law - PNDCL 284', 1992) Aspirants for political office however flout these directives as it difficult to establish what qualifies as financial inducements targeted towards securing votes: To determine if political financing corruption in the form of vote buying has occurred, one should be able to determine what giver motivations are.

The Ghanaian culture of gift giving makes it difficult to classify each receipt of resources by voters as bribery to induce electoral support. The institutional lapses thus in determining what counts as bribery, and what counts as gift giving is thus taken advantage of by political aspirants in service of their political ambitions.Additionally, the legal framework on political financing in Ghana does not require individual political aspirants to make financial disclosures to the Electoral commission. Whilst the framework requires political parties to submit statements of accounts, it does not ask same of aspirants for political office themselves. The lack of scrutiny for the expenses of aspirants thus leaves room for them to get away with political corruption in the form of vote buying, as there is no formal record of the moneys expended to induce voters to support their bid for office.

> "Because political financing in Ghana is opaque, if a person does not come out to say they have contributed or if the opposing party does not know, it is unlikely they will somehow get to know. So, if there is no record of it, it is like it did not happen." PA 1

To serve as deterrent to political actors who may be interested in vote buying, the Criminal Offences Act in section 41 – Penalty and Incapacity for Corrupt and Illegal practices, prescribes a fine not exceeding ¢1million or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or both to persons convicted of the offence of personation, bribery, treating, or undue influence.

Such convicted persons, shall also be disqualified from being registered as a voter or voting at a public election for a period of five years after the date of the expiration of his term of imprisonment.

The question to pose here is: To what extent these disciplinary prescriptions constrain the vote buying tendencies of political aspirants within the Ghanaian political system? In reality not very much, as vote buying seems to be on the ascendancy in Ghana. In the recent 2023 Assin North bye-election in Ghana, both the NDC and NPP were notably accused of engaging in vote buying. There were open admissions by voters that they had received financial inducements for their support towards political candidates. No disciplinary measures were instituted after this election as no vote buyer faced the disciplinary actions prescribed above.

This may also be due to the legal stipulations under section 42 of the Criminal Offences Act which states that:

> No person shall be prosecuted for an offence under this Law without the consent in writing of the Attorney-General, except that this section shall not prevent a person being:
>
> (a) charged with such an offence; or
>
> (b) arrested with or without warrant in respect of the offence; or
>
> (c) remanded on bail or in custody in respect of the offence,
>
> without the consent of the Attorney-General.

The additional provision puts at the discretion of the Attorney General the decision to prosecute persons charged with voter inducements.

As strategic political actors within lax constraining Ghanaian institutions, political aspirants faced with the choice to buy votes and maximize their chances of a victory, or to contest fairly and risk losing, are likely going to engage in the former.

> "On some level, all political aspirants have to engage in some form of vote buying. It is either that or they lose. It is almost impossible to win elections without some sort of material incentivizing" - MP 9

> "… you may have the best policies, you may be the most competent person in our scope, you may be the person to really change the lives of the people,

but without riches you will not be able to implement your good ideas" - PE 1.

In tune with rational choice institutionalist assumptions, they also do this because they imagine other players are doing same, and that they can get away with it.

Abuse of Incumbency

To ensure longevity in political office, wielders of political power often abuse their incumbency status for personal electoral gain. They use it to convince voters to vote for them; financiers to keep funding their political activity; and to muzzle political financing regulators and political corruption enforcers.

There are several motivations for political actors to engage in political financing corruption:

i. Prisoners' dilemma Situations: Most political actors, in a position of incumbency, are likely to abuse it in service of their personal political and financial gains. This is because of the assumption that, rational political actors in same/similar positions will likely do so. This fits one of the postulates of rational choice institutionalism by Hall and Taylor (1996), which holds, that, an actor's behaviour is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by the actor's expectations about how others are likely to behave as well. It is also in consonance with the assumption that, politics is a series of collective action dilemmas, where individuals acting to maximize the achievement of their own goals may produce sub-optimal collective outputs (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

ii. Institutional laxity: Even with several legal provisions that proscribe political financing corruption in the form of abuse of state resources, a laxity in the enforcement of rules and regulations regarding this form of political financing corruption, is significant in rational political actors still seeking to engage in this form of political corruption. Rational choice institutionalist theorists hold that, institutions are created to maximise

the gains from cooperation for the actors affected by it. Where institutions are inadequate or improperly enforced, the expectation is that rational actors will defer to their own interest rather than the collective interest.

iii. Utility Maximization: The primary objective of any rational political actor, is utility maximization. To this end, political actors will leverage any advantages of incumbency they can get away with to maximise their gains in tune with rational choice institutionalist assumptions that, relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes, and act in highly strategic and calculated manners to maximize the attainment of these preferences.

Quid pro Quo Arrangements

This study uncovered admissions of quid quo pro political financing agreements. Political actors, in exchange for political financing concessions often mortgage public resources to service financier needs. They peddle influence, access to power, political appointments, and contracts to political financiers in exchange for direct kick back or political financing support. On the part of political financiers, because they are utility maximisers in the grand scheme of political financing, the inclination is to offer political financing in exchange for some reward.

> "Political agents are not often in position to finance all their activities by themselves so certainly other people who understand the importance of the game of politics, just push in to support in exchange for favours" - PF 3

These quid pro quo arrangements, goes against several legislative stipulations, including the law on causing loss, damage or injury to state property. In Section 179A of the Criminal Offences Act, it is stipulated:

i. Any person who by a wilful act or omission causes loss, damage or injury to the property of any-body or any agency of the State commits an offence.

ii. Any person who in the course of any transaction or business with a public body or any agency State intentionally causes damage or loss whether economic or otherwise to the body or agency commits an offence.

iii. Any person through whose wilful, malicious or fraudulent action or omission— the State incurs a financial loss; or the security of the State is endangered, commits an offence.

Quid pro quo political financing arrangements bloats the costs of contracts and compromises the quality of public goods provision.

> "It bloats the cost of a contract. There may be some level of compromise of quality because once you have already shared some of the booty with them, you expect that they will not be too strict when it comes to evaluating the project quality" - PF 5.

Similar to the abuse of incumbency, political actors in Ghana engage in quid pro quo political financing corruption as strategic rational actors because of their desire to maximize their own utility. Their actions although constrained by prevailing institutions, persist because of lax enforcements. A majority of financiers (70%) in this study conceded to having benefitted from quid pro quo financing agreements.

Money from discreditable sources

Most politicians are inclined to receive monies from political financiers without regard to their sources of income. This again is in tune with postulates of rational choice institutionalism, where rational political actors take receipt of this funding support to maximise their utility and increase their chances of attaining or maintaining political power; or imagine that other contenders are receiving same and it will be jeopardizing to their self -interest for them not to receive same. Money from discreditable sources thus have seeped into the funding of political activity in Ghana. Whilst all financiers in this study self-identified as legitimate business persons, a majority of them concurred that they had benefitted from government activities as a result of their financing of political activity.

This has loop back effects because, funding political activity with money from contracts gained from quid pro quo political financing arrangements, qualifies as proceeds from political

corruption. This contravenes several legal codes, as Section 146 of the Criminal Offences Act (1960) also finds punitive the dishonest receipt of property obtained by offence.

It states: “whoever dishonestly receives any property which he knows to have been obtained or appropriated by any offence punishable under this Chapter shall be liable to the same punishment as if he had committed that offence” (Criminal Offences Act, 1960).

This makes the knowing receipt of the proceeds of crime, for politics or any other venture, an offence under the laws of Ghana. Political financiers also use political financing to whitewash their monies. They fund political activity with monies from unclear sources, and leverage their access to power to legitimize their business, and to avoid prosecution. As utility maximisers, political financing has thus become a medium of survival and for business growth for them. They are shielded by the institutional regime against exposure, as the framework does not demand for them to disclose their identities or for their identities to be disclosed. It also does not ask for the amounts contributed to be disclosed, nor for the sources of their incomes to be made public record.

The reality of political financing corruption is that, actors are caught in a vicious self-reinforcing cycle they are themselves victims of. Political candidates are complaining about the expensive nature of politics and how it leaves them open to co-optation from political financiers. Political financiers are complaining about being forced to give to political candidates to secure protection for themselves and their businesses, and to get priority in a business environment they otherwise will not succeed in. Voters are complaining about the poor provision of public goods, also a result of political financing corruption.

Whilst civil society is criticizing regulatory institutions for their failure to enforce political financing regulations, these institutions are complaining about their inability to enforce

regulations due to its overtly political connotations and implications for a growing democracy like Ghana.

6.7 How political financing corruption can be abated in Ghana

The above assessment of the relationship between political financing and political corruption, the institutional framework on political financing, and the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption, sets the stage to explore how political financing corruption can be abated. To this end, this study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana, sought to determine the ways in which political financing corruption in Ghana can be mitigated.

i. State Financing of Political Parties

Previous research on the topic, including Sakyi & Agomor (2016), Arthur (2017), Sakyi et al. (2016) , Ghana Center for Democratic Development, (2005) and Ayee et al. (2007), all identify the state funding of political parties, as a measure to abate political financing corruption in Ghana. There are varying degrees of support however for state support for political parties in these works. This is true too for this study on political financing and political.

> "I think that one of the surest ways we can reduce political financing corruption is when there's state intervention. There is some political party financing that the state can do. If you look at publicity, state media—if the state decides that they are going to take the responsibility of financing the publicity of all the political parties, that will help" – PE 3

> "If the state does not have any stake in these political party organizations, what moral authority does the state have to intervene and regulate? The public funding of political parties serves as a way of providing moral justification for state intervention and regulation of internal activities, conduct, and practices of these political parties" - MP 1

There were strong articulations of dissent against the public funding of political parties.

LP 1 argues:

> “I am strongly against the public financing of political parties. Those in favor of public funding argue that if all parties are allocated resources, it will refocus elections to policy. I disagree for two main reasons: Firstly, I believe that participation is crucial, and citizens' contributions are a way to engage in the political process, so they should directly fund their party. Secondly, I think it will just become another means for political parties to loot the public purse. As soon as something like this is in place, they will connive, and start looting our state resources, increasing it every time and finding different means to steal public funds and share them among themselves.”

CSR 3 also shares:

> “I am a bit apprehensive, and I feel one of the key reasons for this apprehension is the fact that the system as we are running today is not open enough, and that only happens when you are running a very robust system. But as it stands, look at the political class; they evade taxes easily. With that in mind, won't that be another avenue for the executives stealing monies or will not that be the avenue of the legislature making certain demands from the national purses?”

Some respondents were more neutral about the state financing of political activity, choosing to argue for some limited public funding for political activity.

> "There may be some minimum threshold for the state to finance politics. For instance, the state can provide a minimum number of vehicles to political parties that have complied with certain basic or minimum rules, but beyond that, you cannot saddle the state with the full burden of the cost of political party activities."

Some other cynical opinions on state political financing in Ghana was fielded.

> "For state funding, I will say that it will not make any difference because, firstly, the state is not in the position to provide the kind of money even an individual member of a party needs to run an election." PR 2

> "State funding is not realistic because it is too costly. This country has numerous conflicting demands and limited resources to address overwhelming needs. Sharing these resources with political parties, especially given the continuous formation of new parties (over 50 at the moment), becomes impractical. The sheer number of parties raises questions about which ones to support and which ones not to” CSR 3

LP 2 also states:

> “The challenge lies in determining a feasible formula for distribution and effective regulation. Moreover, the essence of state funding is to minimize

> corruption, but it is unlikely to achieve this goal in this context. No amount of money will be sufficient for any political party, making it an unrealistic and unattainable solution. Realistically, state funding will not cure the problem we aim to address, as every law and policy should have a mission it targets. In this case, if the policy cannot effectively deter corruption, it might as well not be considered."

Some respondents presented conditions under which the state funding of political activity will be tolerable.

> LP 1 "The fact that the state provides resources to political parties and candidates does not in any way guarantee people not engaging in corrupt activities to fund their political ambitions. That being established, it means that if we want to fund these political parties, then we must put in place measures to ensure that they don't engage in certain practices that have been common."

> "If we are funding these political parties, we need to make sure that once we provide certain funding, we can regulate how and where they acquire money, the amounts they can receive, who can contribute, how they handle the receipt of funds, where they allocate the funds, and how transparency is maintained in these processes." MR 1

The efficacy of state funding as an ameliorating tool for political financing depends to a large extent on several intersecting factors, including how enforcing institutions hold political parties to account for political financing breaches. Institutional reform was thus proposed as the starting point for the mitigation of political financing corruption in Ghana.

ii. Institutional reform

The main challenge to political financing corruption as identified in this study, is institutional inadequacy and a laxity in enforcement of political financing and political corruption regulations. This institutional weakness, in tune with assumptions of the rational choice

institutionalist theory, is leveraged by rational political actors to maximize their own utility, even if it comes at a cost to the general well-being of the Ghanaian populace.

They will continue to do this as long as they believe that they can get away with these infringements persist. Institutional reform, as a suggested measure to address political financing corruption, is advanced in the literature on the subject, including in Ayee et al. (2007), Sakyi & Agomor, (2016), Nam-Katoti et al., (2005), and Arthur (2017).

In this study, several opinions were proffered on the institutional reforms that need to be undertaken to reduce political financing corruption in Ghana.

Some suggestions were preventive whilst others were punitive.

LP 1 advances that*:*

> "We need to legislate and put punitive measures embedded in our regulatory framework to discourage financiers from giving to politicians in quid-pro-quo arrangements.

Improving disclosure regulation and enforcement was advanced.

> "The best way to minimize political financing corruption is not really punishing people who give but it is very important to put in provisions that makes the disclosure of information about those giving compulsory" – CSR 2

Setting contribution thresholds was also pushed forth as a way to ameliorate political financing corruption

> "We have to think about contribution amounts and set a threshold. We need to determine how much an individual can contribute to a party or a campaign. The current law does not even talk about how a candidate should fund the campaign" – LP 2

There were some push backs on instituting spending limits as a way to reduce political financing corruption.

> "The reason why I am against the cap on how much a political party or a candidate should spend is the fact that the ruling government may use that to limit or suppress the activities of the opposition. If they benefit from state resources, it would increase the risk of the incumbent exploiting public resources for their campaign." MP 10

There were suggestions for institutional reform that addressed the selection of the leadership of security and regulatory agencies.

> "What we should do, first and foremost, is to look at the security and regulatory agencies and how they are appointed. We have to start tackling it from the constitution. Because of how they are appointed, those at the top who are supposed to enforce the laws are largely people that you can see are somewhat political." CSR 3

LP 1

> "Another challenge is that, dealing with individuals who could potentially ascend to power and control the criminal justice system, every operative within the system is conscious of their dealings. The application of basic jurisprudence and criminal procedures is not likely to work. When dealing with a president or a member of parliament who can easily become the minister for the interior overseeing the Ghana police service, those within the system would be very cautious in their interactions. This contrasts with dealing with someone suspected of a less significant crime. That's why the application of criminal jurisprudence to political processes like this is tricky."

Expanding the legal and regulatory framework on political financing to cover internal elections was also advanced:

> "To expand the legal framework on political financing in Ghana, addressing existing loopholes is crucial. One significant gap is observed in internal elections, where the costs are approaching those of general elections. Despite substantial investments, there are no specific provisions for state intervention in these internal elections, particularly regarding issues like vote buying. Although political parties make statements condemning such practices, there is a lack of enforcement. Civil Society Organizations and other entities have demonstrated instances of vote buying and excessive spending, but parties often deny or ignore these concerns. The state has not taken proactive measures to ensure that parties refrain from engaging in vote buying and related activities, highlighting the need for comprehensive legal provisions and enforcement mechanisms in the political financing framework." LP 2

Suggestions on how to address gendered challenges to political financing was also proposed.

> "In some places, like Kenya, where the state provides a level of funding to parties, they have proactive policies intended to provide inclusiveness. The state and its bodies stipulate that a party with about 60% minority groups, including women, youth, and the disabled, will receive a specific amount of money. Though such policies are crucial, it is imperative to examine the current constitution. For instance, the provision that more than 50% of ministers must come from parliament is a step in the right direction. However, to ensure adherence to these provisions, it's crucial that high-level laws should mandate a certain percentage that all parties must meet, guaranteeing representation by the youth, women, and persons with disabilities." – LP 3

For any reform targeted towards reducing political financing corruption to be effective, the institutional framework on political financing needs to be strengthened. Stronger institutions will limit the ability of political actors to prioritize their utility maximization over the general welfare of the people. This will include enforcing institutions taking their regulatory role more seriously and holding political parties and political candidates to account for political financing regulation breaches.

iii. Engagements and Sensitization

To minimize political financing corruption in Ghana, suggestions were made for engagements with actors.

> "We need to engage party delegates and executives who are major beneficiaries of the current political corruption scheme or regime that we have. In terms of costs of politics and drivers of the cost of politics, they benefit immensely from the vote buying that occurs in internal elections and also the flow of cash during general elections and they are not even accountable as to how they spend the money and what they spend the money on. So, if we want to be successful in this case, I think we should focus on those in the grassroots who benefit from the current exploits to have some buy in with them." PE 2

> "Those who are benefitting from the current exploits are the party faithful and the executives. We just need to get down to see how they also feel about this issue and determine whether they want some reforms and what kind of reforms they want" – CSR 3

Improving normative political financing methods was also encouraged.

> "I believe NDC, NPP both may account for about 2 million memberships. If they were taken 10 cedis a month from their members, wont they have enough to finance. These are all the things. They claim they take it but how effective is it? You should make it easy for a person to pay for you and they should make it interesting for the person to wants to pay" – MR 2

ACTOR MAPPING

There were observations of increasing momentum targeted towards political financing reform, with politicians themselves participating actively.

> "Currently however, it appears both sides, the ruling and the largest opposition party have some interest towards some reform, we have not only heard parliamentarians from both sides complaining about the increasing cost which gives a lot of burden to them and which some have said publicly that they are not father Christmas so when they spend they need to get the money, and it's clear that they are in distress but they don't want that, so now, the majority leader and the current speaker of parliament have been some of the people who have spoken about this excessive cost." - CSR 3

CSR 1:

> "The current chairman of the constitutional legal affairs of parliament (Anim Addo) has expressed interest in taking on board any reforms, we've had Sosu, MP for Madina who has participated in almost all the stakeholder convergence we've done and he's part of the committee that we established, he's also expressed interest in maybe taking on board any private members bill that comes to parliament, we've had Aseidu Nketiah the general secretary of the NDC and we've had the campaign manager of the NPP representing both sides to have participated and expressed commitment to what we are doing".

There are also many civil society organizations working for political financing reform in Ghana. Those identified in this study are:

i. Institute of Economic Affairs – **IEA**
ii. Ghana Integrity Initiative – **GII**
iii. Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition **(GACC)**
iv. Star Ghana Foundation
v. Institute for Democratic Governance - **IDEG**

vi. Citizen Ghana Movement

In sum, several strategies for political finance reform were explored with the intended aim to reduce political financing corruption in Ghana in this study. This included presenting perspectives on state funding political financing, institutional reform, and education and sensitization. The session on how political financing corruption can be abated ends with an identification of some individual actors and civil society organizations working towards political financing reform.

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has engaged deeply with findings of this study, assessing them in light of the rational choice institutionalist theory, the theoretical model the research is grounded in. It has presented the findings of this research in relation to theory, and concluded that, the need to meet the high cost of politics in Ghana contributes to rational political actors engaging in actions proscribed by the institutional regime in service of their own interest.

The limitations in existing laws or regulations on the mitigation of political financing corruption in Ghana makes it possible for rational political actors to leverage the weaknesses of the regulatory regime to service the maximization of their own utility. This catalyses political corruption in Ghana. They will continue to do this as long as their believe that they can get away with these infringements.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This study on political financing and political corruption sought to deepen our understanding of political financing and political corruption in Ghana. Approached from a rational choice institutionalist perspective, the study proceeded under the assumption that: "Political financing corruption in Ghana is a result of rational actors leveraging institutional weaknesses in pursuit of their self-serving preferences".

The study sought to achieve the following objectives:

1. Examine the link between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic.
2. Assess the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana's Fourth Republic
3. Examine the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political finance corruption in Ghana.
4. Suggest measures to abate political finance corruption in Ghana.

In tune with the objectives of this research, the following questions were posed:

1. What is the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana?
2. What is the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana?
3. To what extent does the institutional framework on political financing mitigate political financing corruption in Ghana?
4. How can political financing corruption be abated in Ghana?

Against this backdrop, this research sought to explore the nexus between political financing and political corruption in Ghana, assess the institutional framework on political financing in

Ghana and how it constrains the behaviour of rational actors within the political system, and finally, make recommendations to mitigate the phenomenon of political financing corruption in Ghana. The study sought to address the gaps in the literature on the knowledge of the causes and linkages of political financing to political corruption in the country, and explore the boundaries of theory through the application of rational choice institutionalism to the study of political financing and political corruption in the Ghanaian context.

The result is a more layered and nuanced understanding of the strategic actions and choice of rational political actors in relation to political financing and political corruption. The final chapter of this study, thus presents a summary of the key findings of this study, and a determination of its theoretical relevance. A determination of whether the assumptions of this study hold up will be made in this section, and answers to research questions will be provided in summary. The study will end with a provision of recommendations targeted towards addressing political financing in Ghana, and suggested directions for future research.

7.2 Summary of Key Findings

The following are the most significant findings from this study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

7.2.1 Relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana

There was unanimous acceptance among respondents in this study that the cost of politics in Ghana is too high. Drivers of the increasing cost of politics in Ghana were identified as changing voter expectations, expansive costs of running for political office, the nature of electoral competition in Ghana, cynicism, and general mistrust of politicians, and political corruption.

Voters' expectations of what politics should do for them have changed, and they now want to be compensated for anything related to politics. The cost of politics in Ghana is also driven by voters' cynicism and general mistrust of politicians. Because of citizens' general mistrust of politicians, they demand their share of the cake before politicians ascend to power.The nature of electoral competition in Ghana, characterized by the shift towards more delegate-centric methods of candidate selection, is also a driver of the cost of politics in Ghana.

In this study, corruption is seen as both a cause and effect of the high cost of politics, as it not only drives the increasing cost of politics but is also a result of the high cost of politics. Politicians feel the need to purchase votes to ensure their political survival and eligibility, and voters sell their votes for money. Political financiers who give money in support of political activity also do these with some expectations of reward for their donations. The study estimates GHS 2,650,000 as the cost of running for parliamentary office in Ghana for the 2020 election. It also estimates the projected cost of running for parliamentary office in 2024 as GHS 4,350,000.

From a gross salary of GHS 28,017, the net salary of members of parliament in this study was found to be about GHS 12,000 after deductions. Responding MPs in this study average GHS 10,300 weekly on constituency expenditures outside their statutory allocations. This shows a clear deficit between the incomes of MPs and their expenditures. Personal resources, donations from family and friends, possible support from non-state organizations, and donations from political financiers were identified as the major sources of political financing for respondents in this study. For this study, it was found that all money reportedly expended in support of political party activity in Ghana is privately sourced.

Political financiers in this study reported a contribution average of GHS 325,000 in the run-up to and for the 2020 election. The highest reported political financing contribution for the 2020

election is GHS 10,000,000.Incumbency abuse, vote buying, money from discreditable sources, and quid pro quo political financing were the forms of political financing corruption identified as the effects of the need to meet the high cost of politics in Ghana. In relation to the abuse of incumbency, ruling political parties were reported to be leveraging the perks of public office to service private political interests and ambitions. Vote buying was seen as a prevalent form of political financing corruption in Ghana, as material incentives for votes were reported.

Money from discreditable sources was found to have seeped into our politics. The absence of deep scrutiny into the affairs of political financiers means we have no real idea where their sources of money used for political activity come from.

Money also seeps in from foreign interests who are proscribed from contributing to the funding of political activity in Ghana, and it has permeated our politics. Seventy percent of financiers who responded to this study confirmed they had at one point or another benefited from arrangements that were a direct reward for their funding of political activity. This typifies quid pro quo political corruption. The public interest was recorded to be subject to disregard in instances where politicians had to choose between that and their private interest, with politicians prioritizing financier interests over that of the citizenry. The reported instances of contract auctioning also leads to instances where Ghanaians do not get value for money, especially as contracts tend to be inflated to account for the money politicians receive as advances from political parties.

According to findings from this study, politicians often become beholden to political financiers when they take political funding from them. They are co-opted into doing their bidding, often with disregard to the welfare of the average citizenry, and sometimes out of tune with the national interest.

7.2.2 Institutional framework on political financing corruption

The institutional framework on political financing in Ghana finds its anchoring in Chapter 7, Article 55 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the 2000 Political Parties Law Act 574.

There are no contribution limits in Ghana; only citizens of Ghana can contribute towards political activities. There are no spending limits when it comes to political expenditure, and there are no stipulated time limits for campaigning. Political parties are required to publicly disclose their revenues, assets, and sources of funding. However, no direct form of public support is available to political parties or candidates for office. The state is only mandated to provide political parties with equal access to state-owned platforms to present their programs.

The absence of spending limits means there is no cap on how much political parties or candidates can expend in pursuit of political power. No contribution caps mean political financiers can contribute as much as they want towards political activity without scrutiny. Disclosure requirements are limited to political parties, as political candidates are not required to disclose their revenue, assets, and sources of funding to the Electoral Commission. Due to a history of non-existent auditing of the accounts of the finances of political parties by the EC, political parties tend to be lax in meeting the legal disclosure requirements and get creative with their accounting when they do.

The limitation of disclosure of revenue, assets, and sources of funding to political parties also leaves room for candidates who indulge in corrupt political financing practices to remain undiscovered. The legal framework on corruption and political corruption in Ghana is enshrined in the Criminal Offenses Act 1960, Representation of the People Law 1992 (PNDCL 284), the Public Procurement Act 2003, and the Special Prosecutors Act.

Political financing corruption regulation prohibits vote-buying, abuse of incumbency, quid pro quo arrangements, and the receipt of money from discreditable sources that are the

characteristic effects of the high cost of politics in Ghana. Criminal sanctions for vote buyers are not explicitly outlined in the Political Parties Act, as the Electoral Commission lacks criminal jurisdiction. Due to this gap, vote-buying has been addressed separately and criminalized in the criminal code. The legislation dealing with vote-buying as an infringement, however, limits this criminalization to public elections, excluding internal party elections.

A person is found to be guilty of corruption under the law if they agree to give favours on account of receiving valuable consideration from any individual. The abuse of office for personal gains is also prohibited.

7.2.3 Extent to which institutional framework on political financing mitigates political financing corruption

Political financing actors are identified in this study as candidates, financiers, voters, activists, and regulators. Candidates refer to aspirants for political office; Financiers refer to those who provide political funding, in cash, kind, or both; Voters are those that elect candidates for office; Activists are a diverse group of organizations and individuals who work to mitigate political financing effects through advocacy; Regulators refer to the institutions legally mandated to enforce political financing rules; The primary regulator when it comes to political financing and political corruption is the Electoral Commission of Ghana.

The study identifies the following as challenges the electoral commission faces when it comes to political financing regulation: inadequate capacity, wilful negligence, focus on election administration rather than political management; fear of political retribution. The study finds that, against political financing and political corruption regulations, candidates still engage in vote buying in breach of section 33 of the Representation of the People's Amendment Law (PNDCL 284). Money from discreditable sources has seeped into the funding of political

activity in Ghana. This contravenes several legal codes, as Section 146 of the criminal code finds punitive the dishonest receipt of property obtained by offense.

Political actors in Ghana engage in quid pro quo political financing corruption as strategic rational actors because of their desire to maximize their utility. Their actions, although constrained by prevailing institutions, persist because of lax enforcements. Most financiers in this study conceded to having benefited from quid pro quo financing agreements. Quid pro quo political financing arrangements go against several legislative stipulations, including section 179A of the Criminal Offences Act. However, this study uncovered admissions of quid quo pro political financing agreements. Political actors, in exchange for political financing concessions, are reported in this study to mortgage public resources to service financier needs. They peddle influence, access to power, political appointments, and contracts to political financiers in exchange for a direct kickback or political financing support. Against rules on the abuse of incumbency, wielders of political power in this study are reported to abuse their incumbency status to convince voters to vote for them; financiers to keep funding their political activity; and to muzzle political financing regulators and political corruption enforcers.

7.2.4 How political financing corruption can be abated in Ghana

This study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana sought to determine the ways in which political financing corruption in Ghana can be mitigated. There are varying degrees of support for state support for political parties in this study on political financing and politics. The efficacy of state funding as an ameliorating tool for political financing depends largely on several intersecting factors, including how enforcing institutions hold political parties to account for political financing breaches. Institutional reform was proposed as the starting point for the mitigation of political financing corruption in Ghana in this study. Several

opinions were proffered on the institutional reforms that need to be undertaken to reduce political financing corruption in Ghana.

The summary of this is that punitive measures need to be embedded in our political financing regulatory framework to discourage financiers from giving to politicians in quid-pro-quo arrangements. We also have to improve disclosure regulation and enforcement, and set contribution thresholds. The selection of the leadership of security and regulatory agencies to make them more independent and freer from political persecution should also be addressed. Finally, the legal and regulatory framework on political financing needs to be expanded to cover internal elections.

To minimize political financing corruption in Ghana, suggestions were made for engagements with delegates to educate them about the effects of engaging in political financing corruption behaviours. Encouraging democratic participation, which can lead to improvements in normative political financing methods like membership dues payments, was also encouraged.

7.3 Theoretical Assessment

This study was grounded in the rational choice institutionalist theory. According to Hall and Taylor (1996), it's main assumptions are:

i. That, relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or tastes, and act in highly strategic and calculated manners to maximize the attainment of these preferences.
ii. That, politics is a series of collective action dilemmas, where individuals acting to maximize the achievement of their own goals may produce sub-optimal collective outputs.
iii. That an actor's behaviour is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by the

actor's expectations about how others are likely to behave as well (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

iv. That, institutions are created to maximise the gains from cooperation for the actors affected by it.

This study thus proceeded with the thought that, "Political financing corruption in Ghana is a result of rational actors leveraging institutional weaknesses in pursuit of their self-serving preferences". True to the postulates of rational choice institutionalism, rational political actors are seen to engage in self-seeking and utility maximizing behaviours which catalyses political corruption in Ghana. They leverage the advantages of incumbency they can get away with to maximise their political gains, and engage in political financing corruption behaviours because of the assumption that, rational political actors in same/similar positions will likely do so. Additionally, they are also inclined to take advantage of the laxity in the enforcement of rules and regulations regarding political financing corruption to service their own interest rather than the collective interest. The study finds the assumptions of the rational choice institutionalist theory, to be relevant for the assessment of political financing corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

7.4 Contributions to the Field

This study of political financing and political corruption in Ghana provides valuable insights and perspectives to the field of political science; and to our knowledge of political financing and political corruption in Ghana. It contributes to the field of knowledge by providing a systemic framework to examine the actions of rational political actors, institutional rules, regulations, and norms, and how that affects the nexus between political financing and political corruption in Ghana.

The theoretical approach of this study, which centers individual behaviours within prevailing institutional contexts in Ghana, provides a better understanding of why political actors make the decisions they do when it comes to political financing and political corruption. It also helps in our understanding of how institutional constrains can influence the strategic choices of rational political actors. By allowing for a thorough examination of the legal and regulatory framework on political financing works, the study provides valuable inputs on how institutions can either encourage or discourage political corruption behaviours.

The study based on a thorough analysis of individual and institutional behaviour has also contributed to the body of knowledge by proffering recommendations on mitigating political financing corruption in Ghana grounded in research. By exploring the decision-making processes of strategic political actors and identifying institutional incentives to political financing corruption behaviours, the study has been able to provide suggestions that will enhance the legislative and institutional framework on political financing in Ghana.

The study has also led the way on the application of game theory models of politics to the study of political behaviours and strategic interactions in Ghana. The application of game theory models like rational choice institutionalism, which helps to identify possible decision-making choices, will provide a more nuanced understanding of the field.

7.5 Limitations

This study on political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic faced a few limitations.

A thorough institutional analysis of political financing and political corruption in Ghana was challenged by the opacity of institutions and institutional actors, as admitting to engaging in political financing corruption behaviours was in essence they admitting to crimes. To mitigate this challenge, the study had to rely heavily on respondents within said institutions under strict

assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, and compliance with ethical standards of research. Tendency to be overly generalist: This study, under the assumption of homogeneity of the various political actors, may be challenged by its attempt to generalize rational choices and behaviours across all actors.

7.6 Conclusion

This rational choice institutionalist assessment of political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic was undertaken to examine the link between political financing and political corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic, assess the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana's Fourth Republic, examine the extent to which the institutional framework on political financing mitigates political finance corruption in Ghana, and suggest measures to abate political finance corruption in Ghana - the ultimate goal being deepen our understanding of political financing and political corruption in Ghana.

The study employed a qualitative method of inquiry, which is focused on exploration, discovery, and deepening understanding. The philosophical orientation of this researcher is constructivist. Based on the findings of this research, the study presented answers to the following research questions:

1. What is the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana?

2. What is the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana?

3. To what extent does the institutional framework on political financing mitigate political financing corruption in Ghana?

4. How can political financing corruption be abated in Ghana?

The Relationship Between Political Financing and Political Corruption in Ghana

This study explored the relationship between political financing and political corruption in Ghana. It was uncovered that, politicians need to service voter expectations and meet the attendant high cost of politics in Ghana leads to a reliance on self-interested political financiers who give political funding with expectations of some reward.

The Institutional Framework on Political Financing Corruption in Ghana

The summary of the institutional framework on political financing corruption is that vote buying, abuse of incumbency, quid pro quo arrangements, and the receipt of money from discreditable sources are prohibited. This study shows however, that there are limitations to existing laws or regulations when it comes to the mitigation of political financing corruption in Ghana.

The Extent to Which Institutional Framework on Political Financing Mitigates Political Financing Corruption in Ghana

This study shows there are limitations to existing laws or regulations when it comes to the mitigation of political financing corruption in Ghana. Rational political actors in tune with postulations of rational choice institutionalism leverage the weaknesses of these regulatory regimes to service the maximization of their utility. This catalyses political corruption in Ghana.

How Political Financing Corruption Can Be Abated in Ghana

In tune with assumptions of the rational choice institutionalist theory, the main challenge to political financing corruption as identified in this study is institutional inadequacy and a laxity in the enforcement of political financing and political corruption regulations. This institutional weakness is leveraged by rational political actors to maximize their utility, even if it comes at

a cost to the general well-being of the Ghanaian populace. They will continue to do this as long as they believe that they can get away with these infringements persist. For any reform targeted towards reducing political financing corruption to be effective, the institutional framework on political financing needs to be strengthened.

Stronger institutions will limit the ability of political actors to prioritize their utility maximization over the general welfare of the people. This will include enforcing institutions taking their regulatory role more seriously and holding political parties and political candidates to account for political financing regulation breaches.

7.7 Recommendations

This study provides actionable suggestions for policymakers and practitioners working towards political financing reform in Ghana. The recommendations are tailored towards enhancing the institutional framework on political financing and political corruption in Ghana; promoting political financing corruption advocacy, and providing directions for future research

7.7.1 Enhancing the Institutional Framework on Political Financing and Political Corruption in Ghana.

The following recommendations are proposed to enhance the institutional framework on political financing in Ghana:

1. Expand legislation to mandate political financing disclosures from political parties, candidates, and from financiers: The present legal framework only requires political parties to submit audited financial statements to the Electoral Commission. To mitigate political financing corruption, it is necessary to demand disclosures not just from political parties, but also from candidates and donors. Measures should be implemented to ensure that all campaign donations and expenditures are publicly disclosed and easily

accessible to the public. This will make it harder for public office wielders to engage in quid pro quo arrangements, and for political financiers to hold public officers' captive – thus reducing the risk of corruption.

2. Include Contribution Limits in Legal Framework: The legal framework on political financing also needs to include a set threshold for political campaign financing donations. The current practice where donors are not limited in how much they can contribute towards political activity makes political office seekers susceptible to capture. It is important thus to enforce a legal framework that sets strict limits on campaign contributions.
3. Set Expenditure Limits: There should be a threshold for political parties and candidates seeking political office. Expenditure limits shift the focus from unbridled political spending for votes to actual policy conversations. It will protect the sanctity of our politics, and ensure equality of representation.
4. Revisit Public Funding of Political Parties: There is presently no direct state support for political activities in Ghana. The public funding of political parties is normatively still one of the ways in which political financing corruption can be checked. In fixing the limitations of the existing institutional framework on political financing, it is important to explore public funding for political parties in Ghana, to work towards how it can progressively be implemented to curb political financing corruption.
5. Enforce Political Financing Regulations: Political financing and political corruption monitoring and enforcement mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure that political parties and candidates comply with existing rules. It is only when political actors believe there will be consequences for their indulgence in political financing corruption activities will they be deterred. As long as there is laxity in the enforcement of political

financing regulations however, rational political actors will continue to pursue their self-serving needs.

6. Hold Regulators Accountable for Political Financing Enforcement: Existing regulations bordering on political financing and political financing corruption should not be regarded as suggestions for enforcing agencies to on their discretion ignore or enforce. There should be punitive measures for agencies who elect to look the other way on political financing infractions. Political actors should trust, that rules related to political financing corruption will be strictly enforced, otherwise, there will be not incentive to comply.
7. Independent Oversight and Reporting: The establishment of an independent body responsible for overseeing political financing, investigating violations, and ensuring compliance with the law is recommended. This means the political party regulatory mandate of the Electoral Commission should be decoupled from its election management role, and ceded to an independent oversight body. This delineation will also streamline the functions and responsibilities of political financing regulators in Ghana.
8. Verify Legitimacy of Campaign Funding: there should be a legal requirement that mandates individuals and entities providing campaign funding to verify the legitimacy of their sources of money. This should be a part of the legal framework, ensuring that the funding does not originate from prohibited activities. Such strict standards will guard against the infiltration of money from illegitimate sources into the politics of Ghana. It will also make our politicians less vulnerable to capture from criminally minded individuals. This also effectively limits the way political financing is leveraged to white-wash money from discreditable sources.

9. Establish a Clear Framework for Reporting Political Financing Infractions: Political financing corruption practices, have become so widespread that, political actors engage in it brazenly without fear of repercussion. The institutional framework on political financing should provide a platform for the reporting of political financing infractions. This will encourage compliance and mitigate political financing corruption, as political actors will be afraid of being reported. Encouraging whistle-blowers to come forward with information about corrupt political financing practices will be deterrent.
10. Existence of Political Will to Combat Political Financing Corruption: Incumbency abuse in service of personal political ambition(s), is one of the ways in which political financing corruption manifests in Ghana. For political financing corruption to be mitigated, there needs to be a demonstrable commitment from government to desist from political financing infringements, and to ensure enforcing institutions are free to exercise their mandates without free of political persecution.

7.7.2 Promoting Political Financing Advocacy

To mitigate political financing corruption, political financing corruption advocacy should be enhanced. The following recommendations are proposed to help in the attainment of that objective.

1. Leverage Civil Society Efforts to Promote Public Understanding of The Effects of Political Financing Corruption: Political Financing and its attendant effects, including political corruption, has been identified as a challenge to effective democratic governance in Ghana. As a result, there are organised civil society efforts towards ameliorating the effects of improper political financing in Ghana. This can be leveraged to promote public understanding of the effects of political financing corruption.

2. Educate the Public about the Importance of Transparent and Accountable Political Financing: Citizens of Ghana need to be educated about the importance of proper political financing practices. To this end, public awareness campaigns are needed to encourage citizens to decry political financing corruption practices like vote buying, abuse of incumbency, quid pro quo arrangements, and the receipt of money from illegal sources. The campaigns should also encourage them to report any suspected political financing infraction.
3. Encourage the Payment of Membership Dues: Membership dues and small donations towards political activity, should be encouraged as it is political participation. The more broad-based support for political parties and candidates is, the less susceptible political parties and candidates will be to capture from large donors. Small contributions are less likely to lead to undue influence and are more transparent, and should be encouraged to guard against the co-optation of public office holders.
4. Promote Bipartisan Political Financing Mitigation Efforts: Political parties should be encouraged to work together on political finance reform. Bipartisan efforts can lead to more comprehensive and effective reforms, as well as greater public trust. There is a growing concern among political parties and candidates that, they are themselves victims of the growing spate of money in politics in Ghana. There is no inclination for change however because of the inherent collective action issues. For political financing corruption to be mitigated thus, reform efforts need to transcend partisanship. Bipartisan Political Financing efforts should thus be promoted and encouraged.

7.7.3 Directions for Future Research

While this study has contributed to knowledge in the field of political science and has filled a previous gap in the literature on political financing and political corruption in Ghana, there are

some areas that are still inadequately explored within the field more broadly and in relation to the subject more specifically.

These are suggested here as future research directions.

1. An exploration of the relationship between political expenditure and electoral victory in Ghana.
2. Comparative studies of Ghana's political financing policies and practices with those of other countries from a rational choice institutionalist approach.
3. Longitudinal studies that assess how political financing and political corruption reform affect the behaviours of political actors over time.
4. A qualitative study of presidential election financing in Ghana.
5. An examination of the gendered dynamics of political financing and political corruption in Ghana.
6. An examination of the potential of public political financing to mitigate political corruption in Ghana.
7. A detailed study of the internal funding structures of political parties in Ghana.
8. An examination of the funding sources of political financiers.
9. A more detailed study on how political financial practices influence voter behaviour and electoral outcomes in Ghana.
10. An examination of Digital Campaign Financing and its implications for political corruption in Ghana.

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APPENDICES

1. Ethical Clearance

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)
P. O. Box LG 74, Legon, Accra, Ghana

My Ref. No…ECH 082/ 22-23

January 19, 2023

Saajida Shiraz
Department of Political Science
University of Ghana
Legon.

ETHICAL CLEARANCE
(ECH 082/ 22-23)

The Ethics Committee for the Humanities (ECH) conducted a full board review and approved your protocol titled:

POLITICAL FINANCING AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR**: MS. SAAJIDA SHIRAZ**

Please note that the final review report must be submitted to the Committee at the completion of the study. Your research records may be audited at any time during or after the implementation. Any modification of this research project must be submitted to ECH for review and approval prior to implementation.

Please report all serious adverse events related to this study to ECH within seven (7) days verbally and in writing within fourteen (14) days.

This certificate is valid till January 18, 2024. You are required to submit annual reports for continuing review.

Please accept my congratulations.

Yours Sincerely,

Professor C. Charles Mate-Kole
ECH Chair

Cc: Professor Abeeku Essuman Johnson, Department of Political Science, UG

Tel: +233-303933866 Email: ech@ug.edu.gh

2. Interview Guide

TOPIC: POLITICAL FINANCING AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC.

Introduction

Greetings. Thanks for agreeing to take time out of your busy schedule to participate in this research. As detailed on the consent form, I am exploring the topic of Political Financing and Political Corruption in Ghana's Fourth Republic. As part of this research, I am talking to a select group of political practitioners/key stakeholders/ and political financiers. Will it be ok if I record this interview? It is mainly for transcription and analysis purposes. I could just take notes if you will prefer that instead.

Political Representatives/Aspirants:

1. Background Information

i. How long have you been into politics?

ii. Were you a member of the last parliament?

2. Political Financing

i. What is your impression about the cost of politics in Ghana?

ii. What will you say are the main drivers of costs for political candidates?

3. Sources of Funding

i. What will you describe as the sources of funding for political activity?

- For political parties
- For candidates

ii. What is the largest individual cash donation you've ever received as a politician?

iii. What do you think is the largest in-kind donation you have ever received from a donor?

4. Legal Framework on Political Financing

i. What is your understanding/knowledge of the legal and regulatory framework for political finance in Ghana?

ii. Is the legal framework for political financing expansive enough?

iii. How will you assess the enforcement of political financing regulations in the country?

iv. Do you think we should put a cap on the amount of money any contributor can donate to a political party

v. Do you think we should have spending limits or limit the amount of money any candidate can spend on a campaign/in service of constituents?

vi. Do you think foreigners should be allowed to make contributions to political activity?

vii. When does campaigning begin for you? Do you believe we should have set campaign times?

5. Political Expenditure

i. List items that political parties spend their money on?

ii. List items that candidates spend their money on

iii. How much do you typically spend per week on constituent demands outside of statutory allocations?

iv. What is the nature of demands you field from constituents?

v. What will you say is the most common demand for assistance from constituents?

vi. How much will you say you used for your last political campaign?

vii. Will you be kind enough to provide a breakdown

6. Political Corruption

i. Do you think the receipt of large donations from political financiers compromises the ability of political representatives to act in the interest of their constituents?

ii. Have you ever been asked for a favor from people who have contributed towards your campaign?

iii. What is the nature of favours you have had to grant for people who have donated to your campaign?

iv. What do you think of the assertion that incumbent politicians misuse state resources to cover their campaign expenses?

v. Are illegal funds believed to be a common source of political financing for candidates or parties?

vi. Is there evidence that elected officials use their positions to benefit criminal interests?

vii. Do public officials divert revenues from publicly owned enterprises for personal or political party gain?

viii. Do elected or appointed officials engage in corruption as a way to earn- back what they spent to be elected or appointed?

ix. Do people seek office as a way of gaining immunity from prosecution?

x. Are lower-level government employees required to join the ruling political party, or contribute part of their monthly salary?

xi. Is good governance undermined substantially by elected officials providing public sector jobs to donors as a way of repaying their campaign debts?

7. Justification for still engaging in Politics despite high costs

i. Considering the high costs of politics, do you think politics in Ghana is worth pursuing?

ii. How do you justify wanting to run for office when the money needed to attain the seat often outweighs the remuneration members of parliament receive?

iii. If it does not make economic sense, why do you still run?

iv. How are you able to make up the difference in costs of running for office, satisfying constituency demands, and your remuneration.

8. Problem statement and Solution

i. What will you say are the biggest political financing challenges we face as a country?

ii. How do you propose we deal with that?

Party Executives:

1. Background Information

a. How long have you been a party representative/executive?

2. Political Financing

a. What is your impression about the cost of politics in Ghana?

b. What will you say are the main drivers of costs for political candidates?

3. Sources of Funding

a. What will you describe as the sources of funding for political activity?

i. For political parties

ii. For candidates

b. What is the largest individual cash donation your party is known to have received?

c. What is the largest corporate cash donation your party is known to have received?

d. What is the largest in-kind donation you have ever received from an individual donor?

e. What is the largest in-kind donation you have ever received from a corporate donor?

4. Legal Framework on Political Financing

a. What is your understanding/knowledge of the legal and regulatory framework for political finance in Ghana?

b. Is the legal framework for political financing expansive enough in your opinion?

c. How will you assess the enforcement of political financing regulations in the country?

d. Do you think we should put a cap on the amount of money any contributor can donate to a political party?

e. Do you think we should have spending limits or limit the amount of money any candidate can spend on a campaign/in service of constituents?

f. Do you think foreigners should be allowed to make contributions to political activity?

g. When does campaigning begin for you? Do you believe we should have set campaign times?

5. Political Expenditure

a. List items that political parties spend their money on a day-to-day basis?

b. List items that political parties spend their money during election campaigns?

c. How much will you say you was used by the party for the last political campaign?

d. Will you be kind enough to provide a breakdown of the big expenditure items

6. Political Corruption

a. Do you think the receipt of large donations from political financiers compromises the ability of political representatives to act in the interest of their constituents?

b. What does the party need to do in return for the people who donate to political campaigns?

c. What is the nature of favours you have had to grant for people who have donated towards party activities?

d. What do you think of the abuse of incumbency by ruling political parties?

i. What are the evidences or examples of elected and appointed officials misusing state resources to cover their party or campaign expenses you know of?

ii. What are the uses of state resources for political activities we could ignore?

iii. Do you think we should just accept the fact that, politicians use state resources to campaign, or you think we should change that?

e. Are illegal funds believed to be a common source of political financing for candidates or parties?

i. Is there evidence that elected officials use their positions to benefit criminal interests?

f. Do elect or appointed officials engage in corruption as a way to earn- back what they spent to be elected or appointed?

g. Do people seek office as a way of gaining immunity from prosecution?

h. Are lower-level government employees required to join the ruling political party, or contribute part of their monthly salary?

i. Does the party keep a book of party they need to reward based on their financial contribution?

j. Is good governance undermined substantially by elected officials providing public sector jobs to donors as a way of repaying their campaign donations

Problem statement and Solution

k. What will you say are the biggest political financing challenges we face as a country?

l. How do you propose we deal with that?

Financiers:

1. Background Information

i. What is your nature of business?

ii. How long have you been a political financier?

iii. What is the story behind you wanting to finance political party activity?

i. Are you the one who identifies candidates you want to donate to, or do you receive solicitations to donate?

iv. Why do you feel the need to contribute towards political campaigns?

v. What typically informs your decision to donate or not to donate?

2. Political Financing

i. Do you typically donate in cash or kind towards political activity?

ii. Do you typically give to political parties or candidates?

iii. Do you typically contribute towards the political activity of the party you belong to, or to different parties?

i. Explain your motivation …

ii. Percentage share of giving

iv. If you have given money to a political party, who within the party did you give the money to

v. What is the highest amount of money, you have ever given to a political candidate?

vi. What is the highest amount of money you have given to a political party?

vii. What is the sum total of money you have contributed towards political activity?

i. in the last election

ii. In total since you became a financier

viii. What in-kind items have you given

3. Political Rewards

i. What do you expect as reward, when you donate to a political campaign?

ii. Has being a political financier helped your business in any way?

i. If no, why do you still continue to donate

ii. If yes, you how?

iii. What are the rewards to being a political party financier? i

4. Political Corruption

i. Have you because you are a political financier, gotten a job for someone?

ii. Have you, as a political financier, gotten some contracts?

iii. Do you think priority should be given to political financiers when it comes to the distribution of contracts or jobs?

iv. Have you ever sought appointment to any office personally, as a result of you being a financier?

v. Have you met any president (current or former) of Ghana?

vi. Do you think donating to political parties compromises the ability of political actors to act independently?

5. Regulation of Political Financing

i. Do you think there should be a cap on the amount of money you can contribute to a party?

ii. Do you think the amount you donate should be disclosed in the financial records of political parties, or you prefer anonymity?

iii. Do you think the state should fund political parties instead of financiers?

Key Stakeholders:

- Representatives of the Electoral Commission.

Is the mandate clear?

- Does the commission actually exercise the authorities defined in its mandate, i.e., enforce the campaign and political party finance laws? If not, why not?
- Does the commission have ultimate authority, or are there courts for appeal and adjudication?
- Are financial and other resources sufficient to carry out all the assigned functions?
- Are there outside influences that inhibit the commission's exercise of its authorities

Disclosure (disclosure provides the foundation for understanding the extent of the inequalities and exclusion, and for upholding and enforcing other controls that might offset inequalities (e.g. contribution and spending limits, subsidies).

- CIVIL SOCIETY

a. Which NGOs and civil society organizations are already mobilizing around political finance reform?

b. Which NGOs and civil society organizations have related agendas that could easily expand to include political finance reform?

c. Is national or local political finance reform on the agenda at universities or other institutions? If so, who are the leading experts in the field, and what are their specific interests?

d. Are there any civil society coalitions already formed to advocate for political finance reform? If not, are there opportunities for coalition building?

e. Are there any watchdog organizations or coalitions already functioning?

f. Are these advocacy and watchdog groups acting independently, or are they part of other coalitions?

- Media

i. the media free and independent of government?

ii. Which media institutions, broadcasters, or reporters have demonstrated their interest in money in politics? How?

iii. Which media institutions, broadcasters, or reporters have demonstrated their interest in related issues? How?

iv. Have media ever joined political reform coalitions?

v. What level of interest has the media shown in investigative reporting on campaign and political party finance?

vi. Have media ever published political finance scandals?

vii. How likely is it that activist media focusing on money in politics reform will suffer harassment from the government.

- Reform-Minded Parties and Politicians

i. Which politicians or parties are already advocating for money in politics reform, and which ones might be prone to do so?

ii. What are the incentives those politicians or parties see in reform? For example, is it more votes? More popularity? Better balance of power?

iii. Are there links between pro-reform parties and elected leaders with other reform advocates?

iv. How strongly anti-reform are ruling parties and elected leaders?

v. Are politicians or parties that support reform likely to suffer any kind of abuse or harassment?