


UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES

AN ANALYSIS OF VOTE SELLING AND ITS IMPACT ON VOTING BEHAVIOUR
IN THE ASHAIMAN CONSTITUENCY



BY

EMMANUEL ADU APPIAH

(10506830)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own research work and I remain solely responsible for any shortcomings in this study. The research was carried out in the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, under the supervision of Dr. Ebenezer Ayesu. All relevant references cited in this work have been duly acknowledged. This work is not presented in full or in part to any other institution for examination.

Emmanuel Adu Appiah (10506830)

Student Name and ID

Signature

Date

Principal Supervisor

Dr. Ebenezer Ayesu

.....

Signature

Date

ABSTRACT

The thrust of this study was to analyze vote selling and its impact on voting behaviour in the Ashaiman constituency. Specifically, it sought to examine the reasons why voters sell their votes, explore how vote selling transactions are conducted and analyze the implications of vote selling for Ghana's democracy. The study adopted the qualitative approach within which the case study design was used. The population comprised all voters in the Ashaiman constituency. The targeted population numbered 136,989. Using purposive sampling 60 voters were selected. In the end 45 respondents were interviewed. From the study, it was found that voters sell their votes because after elections politicians fail to fulfill their campaign promises, low level of incomes and readiness of politicians to spend money on their campaign and their strong support for the party. It was also found that voters approach politicians through agents (local champions) who use it as a way of making money for themselves. They also appear in a form of organized groups and or on individual basis to make pledges for immediate reward in order to throw their support at the polls. The study again established that vote selling does influence voting behaviour since after receiving their packages most voters felt they had to hold their end of the bargain. Also, it was established that vote selling leads to larger public deficits and public sector inefficiencies and higher levels of corruption in government. It is recommended that a serious nationwide education is embarked on against vote selling by the EC, NCCE and IPAC especially in the run up to elections. Voters should also be educated on the core business of MPs in order to remove the burden of campaign promises from the shoulders of aspirants.

DEDICATION

This research work is dedicated to my wonderful parents Mr. Felix Kwame Appiah and Mrs. Margaret Asiedu Appiah and my friend Mr. Aliu Aminu.

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First and foremost, I would like to thank the Almighty God for granting me the opportunity, ability and wisdom to put this research work together and without whom this work would have never seen the light of day.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ANES= American National Electoral Studies
- ASHMA= Ashaiman Municipal Assembly
- CDD= Centre for Democratic Development
- CODEO= Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
- EC= Electoral Commission
- Freq.= Frequency
- GNA= Ghana News Agency
- GNAG= Ghana National Association of Garages
- IESS= Institute of Economic and Social Studies
- MCE= Municipal Chief Executive
- MPs= Members of Parliament
- MTDP= Medium Term Development Plan
- NCCE= National Commission for Civic Education
- NDC= National Democratic Congress
- NGOs= Non-Governmental Organizations
- NPP= New Patriotic Party
- Per.= Percentage
- PPP= Public Private Partnership
- PV= Participant Voter
- SSA= Sub Saharan Africa
- TB= Tuberculosis
- UNDP= United Nations Development Programme
- UK= United Kingdom
- U.S.= United States

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

In a path-breaking study on elections in emerging democracies with Ghana as a case study, Nugent, Jockers and Kohner (2009) establish that the view that Ghana's elections have been successful is "a convenient myth". They go ahead to identify "ethnic block voting"¹ and electoral fraud as playing significant, though far from exclusive responsibility. Some recent studies on African democratic election processes have also focused on vote buying and cash hand outs (Guardado & Wantchekon, 2017; Agomor & Adams, 2014). However, the incidence of vote selling by citizens which also play pivotal role during elections has not received much scholarly attention. Various scholars have provided different explanations for voting behaviour on the African continent resulting in the notion that some individuals have the ability to take control of the democratic electoral procedures of a nation. Pressure groups and petitioning are perceived as relevant elements to the appreciation of contemporary democratic dispensations. In this situation the statesmen and stateswomen incline to be self-confident that contests (Becker, 1983) and up-to-date voters (Grossman & Helpman, 1996) maintain the aftermath near to competence and not too subjective in favour of the dominant. Self-financed promotion of candidature is therefore the main observable factor of an effectively nonthreatening influencing procedure.

Interestingly, some researchers have argued that elections are mere ethnic roll calls or gatherings (Horowitz, 1985; Harding, 2013). Again, while some see ethnicity as a major determinant of voting behaviour (Fridy, 2006; Erdman, 2007; Bossuroy, 2009), others think that it does form part of the determinants but not the biggest (Arthur, 2009;

¹ The two major political parties New Patriotic Party (NPP) AND National Democratic Congress (NDC) enjoyed massive support leading to clear wins in their core regions Ashanti and Volta in the 2008 elections

Whitfield, 2009). Others posit that elections in Africa are hugely characterized by clientelism and neo patrimonialism (Lindberg, 2003; Young 2009). However, the selling of votes as the exchange of money or other material benefits for voters' support in upcoming elections has in its interpretation some overt commercial underpinnings (Vicente, 2007). In effect, vote selling in this study is defined as voters or citizens offering their vote in a form of pledges to politicians or their agents as individuals or in small groups for money and or other material goods in exchange for electoral support (Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009). Ferree, Gibson, Hoffman and Long (2009) note that the dominant approaches in explaining voting behaviour in most African countries are either Identity voting (Ferree & Horowitz, 2007) or Policy voting (Hetcher 1975; Bates 1981; 2003).

This trend towards the strengthening of democracy on the African continent provides a unique occasion to stimulate a comprehensive study on the demand side of elections which is vote selling as a precursor to voter behaviour. Vote buying practices is an indication of a vibrant violation of electoral impartiality that every election should exhibit (Carreras & Irepoglu, 2013). While there are certain arguments concerning the problems associated with the vote buying and selling of votes, there is some agreement that transactional electoral politics leads to a whole lot of challenges. For instance, buying of votes together with other kinds of clientelism undermine the typical answerability connection that is fundamental to democracy (Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt, Hawkins, Luna, Rosas, & Zechmeister, 2010; Carroll & Lyne, 2007; Stokes, 2005; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013). This resulted in Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004) definition of buying of votes as the presenting to voters and or citizens cash or small consumption goods by politicians, parties or agents in exchange for the vote of the receivers. In like manner, Finan and Schechter (2012) give their definition of vote buying as presented items to peculiar individuals or groups of individuals in the run up to an

election so that such individuals or groups will vote for them. Kramon (2009) defines it as the sharing of tangible or personal material aids with the anticipation that such individuals will give politicians political support. Due to the fact that this is normally reasonably a robust prerequisite in democratic countries, it is a necessary experimental question to pose whether efforts at vote buying are efficient in producing for politicians the votes they want.

Voting behaviour according to Bratton (2013) is a set of individual electoral happenings, which include involvement in political party campaigns, turnout at the polls (Agormor & Adams, 2015), and selecting who to vote for. Roth (2006) asserts that, a single model cannot explain voting behaviour due to its complexity. Therefore, three leading theoretical viewpoints have been expounded to deliberate on voting behaviour in the literature which include but not limited to Sociological theory (Lazarsfield, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; Lipset, 1959, 1960), Psychosocial (Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960) and the Rational Choice theory (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981, 2002; Key & Cummings, 1966).

Since 1993, Ghana's Fourth republic has had seven Parliaments and has witnessed the successful change of authority from one political party to the other in a peaceful atmosphere (Sithole, 2012). Ghana has made significant strides in institutionalizing multiparty system of democratic governance found within the structure and form of the 1992 Constitution. Undoubtedly, these noteworthy improvements in Ghana's democratization have been advertised as one of the political success stories on the whole of the African continent (Gyimah-Boadi 2008; Whitfield & Jones 2008; Ninsin, 1998). More so, Nugent *et al.*, (2009) note that peaceful and mostly transparent ending of Ghana's 2008 elections was to a enormous level due to the strong obligation and dynamic involvement of Ghana's media houses and civil society organizations, who observed and

made comments on the whole process of election with a high level of enthusiasm. Popular institutions, advocacy groups, religious and professional establishments and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created a remarkable stage for self-determining observation of the whole election process with the help of unconventional technology. Such technology were meant for periodic updates of both domestic and district results, corresponding vote tabulation using mobile phone text messages and resident radio stations. However, Mensah (2007) is of the view that the democratic improvement of Ghana is still very much a work in progress since some democratic discrepancies still persevere at all levels of governance.

A recent Afro barometer survey data was used to do an evaluation of the factors that determine voting for over 17,000 voting age individuals in ten Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2005) and they establish that factors involving several strategies help explain which kinds of people vote in African elections. Groups working to gather people to come round and vote also play an essential role in showing who actually votes in African elections. Some behaviours, like level of interest in political issues or discussions as well as the kind of exposure the person has, also have a bearing on individuals' choices of whether to vote. Within the demographic factors, age of voters constantly shows an affirmative connection with voting. Again, the socio- economic circumstances and the type of institutional functions are available determines whether one will vote or not. and socio-economic. Democratization is the modification to a more representative political regime. It may be the changeover from an undemocratic regime to full democracy, an evolution from a dictatorial political system to a semi-democracy or conversion from a semi-authoritarian political system to a democratic political system. Election observers declare that more than half of elections held on the African continent are largely free and fair. Voter turnout, moreover, was relatively high, averaging sixty-

four percent (Bratton, 1998). For instance, Bratton noted that in 14 cases, general elections marked the beginning of a peaceful transfer of power from one president to another (Bratton, 1998). The launching of private newspapers and the right of opposition to hold rallies all attest to the gains made under democratic regimes (Joseph, 1997).

Multi-party systems of representative governance are ascertaining to become a mixed basket of products across the length and breadth of Africa and not making Ghana an exception. Whereas elections are supposed to hold in place an enduring democracy, in some countries, elections have become a deficit to democracy itself (Ogbeidi, 2010). Their contention is that the level of superiority of an election comprises one of the precursors for intensifying democratic governance. According to Hayward (1987), Beetham (1994) and Parekh (1993), the conduct of elections should be done in conformity with the democratic environment that is all adult citizens are permitted to vote; the electoral competition is liberalized to enable political parties to compete; voters are given the chance to vote according to choice and the ballot papers are counted and the winner declared.

This study explores ways in which the attitude of vote selling contributes to weak implementation of policies and underdevelopment in the Ashaiman Constituency in the Greater Accra Region.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Ghana in the past two decades has made significant successes in democratic elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. A seventh of such elections were held in 2016 since the beginning of the fourth republic culminating with a return to civilian rule in 1993. Elections Ghana over the years have earned her widespread commendation thereby creating a sort of standard that should be maintained if not improved upon (Gyimah – Boadi & Prempeh,

2012). This may implies that the Africa of today is almost completely different from the one of thirty years ago when Horowitz (1985), described African elections as nothing more than ethnic roll calls (Agormor & Adams, 2015). The movement towards democratization in Ghana and Africa offers a fine opportunity to engage in a detailed study of what informs voter choices and its impact on democracy.

Elections by universal adult suffrage have and continue to be the means by which countries choose various leaders to form a representative government. For an election to be considered as credible, issues of national concern form the basis on which electorates vote to determine results of the election. However, elections in Ghana have always brought about among other things, discussions on issues of vote selling and buying and ethnic voting. Writings about elections in Ghana have somewhat not focused on voters offering to their vote to candidates in exchange for particularistic benefits or goods. Some have argued that elections are mere ethnic roll calls or gatherings (Horowitz, 1985; Harding, 2013). While some see ethnicity as a major determinant of voting behaviour (Fridy, 2006; Erdman, 2007; Bossuroy, 2009), others think that it does form part of the determinants but not the biggest (Arthur, 2009; Whitfield, 2009).

What has become a popular term in relation to election activities is vote buying understood as offering particular benefits to voters in exchange for their votes (Nichter, 2008). What this study therefore seeks to do is find out why voters in the Ashaiman constituency sell their vote, how the selling is done and its implications for Ghana's democracy. Since in the absence of a seller there is no buyer and vice versa, vote buying features in this study. In other words, there cannot be any fruitful discussion about vote selling without taking about vote buying.

1.3 Conceptual Framework

Drawing from the problem statement there is a lot of related literature concerning how voters' decisions are made, different from vote selling or buying of votes. Recent survey studies done by Olken and Pande (2011) using investigational and observational strategies prove that the behaviour of the voter is highly flexible, and so provision of the requisite information in the circumstance of elections can increase electoral answerability in emerging country democracies. The three main theoretical models to examine voting behaviour that are widely known in the text include: Sociological theory, also known as the Columbia School of Thought (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Lipset 1960), Psychosocial model, widely known as the Michigan School of Thought (Campbell et al. 1960) and the Rational Choice Theory (Downs 1957; Fiorina, 1981). The sociological theory indicates that long standing influences (social features) such as socio-economic factors, religion, and residence are important elements of voting behaviour (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944).

The conjecture is that most of people vote based on their unique political inclination. This theory, however, has a problem. The problem is that if the choice of a voter is always based only on stable sociological elements then results from elections would never change over a very long period of time. The Michigan School or the Psychosocial Mode complements to the Columbian Model since it does well in espousing how changes in electoral results happen. It stipulates a basis that brings together sociological and psychological elements to rationalize the various choices of voters. The psychological necessity denotes the need of persons belonging to or is captured as part of an identified group like a political party. The dominant idea forwarded by the Michigan School of thought is that of political connection or membership. In this instance, party association or relationship is roughly comprehended as a socio-psychological invention of family and social group relationship (Dalton, 2001). In other words, party connections shape the kind

of assessment done by voters on issues and how they expect parties to deal with problem solving (Erdmann, 2007).

A lot of experiential scholarships have been used to back these different theoretical standpoints. The inference therefore is that voting behaviour is very complicated and that no single standard is thorough in itself (Roth 1998). De Vries, Van der Brug, Van Egmond & Van der Eijk, (2011) in backing this idea, maintain that one of the most powerful conclusions of the literature on voting behaviour is the understanding that the clearness of the local institutional circumstances have controls over the connection existing between perceptions about the current economic situations and the choices of voters. For instance, Erdmann (2007) in studying Zambia reports that ethnicity is relevant for voter orientation and much more for party attachment. The survey findings show that results indicate that ethnicity or ethno-political identity is relevant but it is not the only element that determines outcomes of elections in Zambia. Erdmann (2007) ends by writing that ethnicity forms the basis for social cleavage for voting behaviour and the creation and establishment of political parties and also, politicians are more likely to send resources meant for nationwide purposes both public and private to places where their co-ethnics reside.

However, in researching about the people of Uganda, Conroy-Krutz (2013) demonstrate that sharing of resources and ethnicity are reduced to a near zero level of importance as and when people gain more and more information about politics. He posits that in such circumstances, it is suicidal and highly retrogressive for parties to engage in distributing resources for purposes of gaining political points. This conclusion is in line with Dendere's (2013) opinion that the African people as they are today are very distinctive from what was portrayed as tribal by Horowitz (1985) 33 years ago. In the same manner, Andrews and Inman (2009), use the 2005 Round three (3) Afro barometer survey of

seven African countries as a basis measured elections as free and fair and go ahead to report that while ethnicities influence choice of vote on the African continent, reflective assessments of economic performance of governments are similarly essential. Erdmann (2007) also notes that the importance attached to ethnicity for the creation and organization of political party structures and voter orientation is not something that exists across the length and breadth Africa.

Based on some previous results from a lot of African countries, Camp (2010) advises that ethnic alignments should not be thrown out as a causal factor of a choice of vote however, the manner in which it is assessed or observed must be given a proper look. To support Andrews and Inman (2009) research, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) report that ‘clientelistic and ethnically influenced voting are trivial characteristics of the Ghanaian voters. Lindberg and Morrison find that voters’ behaviour of always evaluating is closely connected to the real or anticipated performance of the candidates and not statesmen and women (politicians) or governments’ capacity to make available private and community goods to people living in their constituencies. Dendere (2013) in an enquiry of the people of Zimbabwe contests the generally conventional idea that African elections are simple “ethnic censuses” portraying that citizens make their voting decision with policy and economic inclinations as a basis. Thus, institutions, economic conditions, and personality shape political preferences. In an associated scholarship of electoral competition in Ghana in the 1990s, Perre and Mesemple-Somps (2011) show that communal transfers appear ridiculous as the incumbent government devotes more resources and development projects in opponent constituencies (specifically, in areas where supporters of the leading opposition party are very vibrant) to prevent political tension initiating in such constituencies. Moreover, they discover indications that the prominent National Democratic Congress (NDC) (then in opposition) constituencies that get very high votes

for the NDC got a lot of financial assistance or resources through some unexplained channels at the beginning of New Patriotic Party (NPP) regime after the year 2000 elections; a time the NDC had lost power through the elections. However, in a contemporary analysis of Ghanaian elections, Harding (2013) using data from the 2004 and 2008 elections as a basis, posits that when the delivery of public goods are provided (in this situation public roads) can be linked to political action, then it is likely to be influenced by electoral following specifically in the low development areas. This does not come as surprise as current academic enquiries (Bossuroy, 2011; Kopřil & Varvažovská, 2011; Dendere, 2013) do show that voters in rural areas are very different in terms of their capacity to understand democracy, policy inclinations, access to autonomous media and information about opponent political parties, all of which have a bearing on support favour or against the incumbent government. Seven consecutive democratic elections have been held in Ghana since 1992 representing the lengthiest ever era in its record over which we can assess patterns of voting. It is therefore anticipated that this study will help in creating a better comprehension of electoral politics in the Republic of Ghana.

1.3.1 The Concept of Vote Selling

There are a few writers who mention vote selling in passing but also in reference to vote buying. Thus, such writers mention vote selling only when they want to mention or talk about vote buying. Hicken et al, (2016) did a study on temptation in vote selling from a field experiment in the Philippines and their main objective was to see how effective two common anti-vote-selling campaigns would work against or reduce vote buying in the area. Schaffer (2002) in writing about what vote buying is, mentions vote selling when citing Hoppen (1996) who wrote about English voters in the 1830s selling their vote as a birth right. He also cites Ibanez (1996) who posits that vote buying and selling can not be

any longer as an economic operation involving those selling their freedom and those buying such freedom with the aspiration of reaping the benefit of their investments when they win power. Jensen and Justesen (2014) in their work on poverty and vote buying in Africa in advancing their argument cite Aidt and Jensen (2012) who note that the availability of a sizeable group of voters who are poor has an effect on the projections of increasing and maintaining markets for buying and selling votes at election time. It is clear that most scholars are interested in vote buying and view vote selling as somewhat similar to vote buying hence not meriting any real assessment.

The concept of vote selling is somewhat not popular when it comes to electoral issues or malpractices and voting behaviour. Most scholars have paid attention to vote selling and have given different meanings. Brusco et al, (2004) define the buying of votes as the offering to voters of money or petty consumable goods by political parties whether they are the incumbent or opposition, in return for the receiver's vote. Kramon (2009) defines it as the sharing of particularistic or personal material profits with the anticipation of political support from voters. There is also the argument of whether indeed politicians who offer particularistic or private material benefits to voters in exchange for their vote or support actually buy votes or turnout. Stokes (2005) did a study in Argentina in a bid to find out how political machines² operate a perverse accountability³ in elections using their deep insertion into voters' social networks to try to circumvent the secret ballot and infer individuals' vote. Her observation is that indeed political machines are able to monitor votes of individuals who have been handed particularistic benefits and are mostly income earners by way of defying the secret ballot. Nitcher (2008) however defers from

² These are clientelistic political parties operating and contesting in elections in the area of study according to Stokes (2005).

³ This is parties' influence of how people vote by threatening to punish them for voting for another part after they have received particularistic benefits from the vote buying parties.

Stokes' (2005) argument. He posits that political parties buying votes is nothing more than 'turnout buying'. Such political parties are simply rewarding their very own supporters for showing or to show up at the polls on election day and cast their vote. Again, he argues that while Stokes' vote buying model predicts that parties target moderate opposition party supporters, a model of turnout buying predicts that they target strong supporters of the party. Finan and Schechter (2012) define buying of votes as offered goodies to specific individuals prior to an election in return for the votes of such individuals. It is also a certain form of political clientelism, which is the express exchange at the individual and personal level of payments and material goods by political stall walks and or their agents in return for electoral backing by voters (Stokes, 2007a; Hicken, 2011; Linos, 2013; Robinson & Verdier, 2013).

Several interpretations or connotations can be adduced from the above narratives. For instance, the politician, who in this case is the buyer of vote and makes an initial offer for voters to respond, often influences the circumstances that result in vote buying. In other words, citizens are offered money or items in exchange for their vote. Information about the situation where voters make the initial offer of their votes in exchange for particularistic material benefits is quite scanty.

1.3.2 Reasons Why Citizens Sell Their Vote

Ashraf (2018) reports that in State elections in India, voters who sell their vote comprise those who believe their votes will neither empower them nor enhance their living conditions. In effect, their only tangible gain from democracy is to monetize their franchise which is arguably the most rational choice in their deplorable economic condition. She continues that selling votes is very easy since all that is required is going

to the polling booth. Low wages coupled with high levels of unemployment especially for unskilled labour seems to fuel vote selling (Ashraf, 2018).

In a report released in the Philippines in April 2007 by the Social Weather Station (SWS), one out of every two voters does not see anything wrong with accepting money offered by candidates and that accepting offered money does not automatically imply they will cast their vote for the candidate. The survey report again finds that those living in undeveloped areas were more likely to accept money as compared to those who live in towns and cities thereby showing that the key reason for the selling of votes is poverty (Essays, UK, 2013). Continuing with the report, the survey found that those living in or under the poverty bracket are mostly jobless individuals and they offer their votes in exchange for money because i) they need it; ii) it is an occasion to get back the money embezzled by politicians from the people; iii) dignity and pride gained from not selling their vote can not create food and money for them (Essays, UK, 2013).

Various reasons are given for why citizens would make a demand for something in the form of either money or any personal benefit before voting for the candidate or party in question. A survey conducted in Bulgaria in 2011 in the run up to her presidential and local elections came out with several findings in answering the question of why citizens would sell their vote. It was stated that poverty is a major reason and that if candidates win, their financiers might influence them. Respondents also made it clear that these days, everything costs money and also their situation in terms of economic status remains the same notwithstanding whom you cast your vote for (Kovatcheva, 2011).

Probably the most appropriate response to this question when researching on vote selling or buying in any part of Ghana is in the study done by Lindberg (2003) about whether election campaigns feed neo-patrimonialism in Africa or prevent it. In this study he uses

Members of Parliament (MPs) as respondents. He concludes that, indeed election campaigns do fuel patron client politics in terms of weak accountability to the citizenry and other officers in government, high expectations of corruption, influencing actions and decisions of government institutions for private benefit and along side inadequate time and resources to attend to state responsibilities. This is because during election campaigns, contesting MPs can't help but succumb to various demands from citizens or voters who in one way or the other pledge their support to them. In all, respondents believed that it is, to borrow from the title, their (citizens' or voters') 'time to chop'⁴

Vote selling just like all other forms of electoral malpractices have got dire consequences on how well democratic dispensations could be consolidated. Several arguments have been given against allowing vote selling to prevail. One usual argument is that, if vote-buying were given the laxity to continue, election victories would constantly be attained by the richest candidate, rather than the individual with the finest guidelines for development and also it would lead to the marginalisation of the poor and destitute in society, because they would be most probable individuals to sell their votes and thus they would lose their political voice (Taylor, 2012). It is also argued that vote buying and selling renders citizens toothless in demanding accountability from politicians probably because they (politicians) have already paid for their positions and also due to the fact that they were not elected based on their accountability (Francis, 2016). There are other scholars who agree that vote-buying and other forms of clientelism undermines the standard answerability affiliation that is fundamental to democracy (Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt *et al.*, 2010; Carroll & Lyne, 2007; Stokes, 2005; Stokes *et al.*, 2013).

⁴ A term used by Lindberg (2003) meaning a time for citizens to demand and gain personal or particularistic benefits from their Members of Parliament (MPs).

1.4 Objectives of the Study

On a wider scope, this study aims to examine the effect of vote selling on voting behaviour in the Ashaiman Constituency. The specific objectives are:

1. To examine the reasons why voters sell their votes
2. To explore how vote selling transaction are conducted.
3. To examine the influence of vote selling on voting behaviour
4. To analyse the implications of vote selling for Ghana's democracy.

1.5 Research Questions

The following are the questions that this research intends to answer:

1. Why do voters sell their vote?
2. How is the vote selling transaction conducted?
3. To what extent does vote selling influence voting behaviour of voters?
4. What is the impact of vote selling on Ghana's democracy?

1.6 Research Methodology

1.6.1 Research Design

This study used the qualitative approach to research data collection and analysis in a single study (Creswell, Clark, Gutman & Hanson, 2003) to producing new information involving either simultaneous or sequential adoption of two groups of methods to follow a route of investigation. Kuranchie (2014) refers to a research design as a peculiar strategy a researcher depends on or uses in gathering, analysing and reporting research. Qualitative research, according to Amoah and Eshun (2014), is a kind of research that tries to intensify people's appreciation of why things are the way they are in the social

world and the reasons behind actions and inactions of people. The design for this study will be case study method. A case study is a form of qualitative research that arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena (Ofori & Dampson, 2011). Also, Gall and Borg (2007) cited in Kusi (2012) mentioned that a case study is an in depth study of one or more occurrences of a phenomenon in its real life situation that reflect or project the perspective of people involved in the issue. Studying an issue like vote selling and its influence on voting behaviour would need in depth understanding of the issues, opinion of respondents, down play biases and subjective responses and possibly display the needed level of empathy for proper understanding.

1.6.2 Population

Population, in simple terms, refers to individuals, subjects or events that are of interest to the researcher. In other words, “population is the total members of a defined group of people, objects, places or events chosen due to the fact that they are important to a researcher’s investigation (Amoah & Eshun, 2014). The targeted population for this study constituted all voters in the study area which is Ashaiman Constituency was 136,989. The researcher worked with an assumed number of 60 voters.

1.6.3 Sample and Sampling Procedure

Sample size determination for qualitative research has varied approaches. However, some scholars on the determination of appropriate sample size for qualitative study have proposed varied approaches. For example, Glaser and Strauss (1971) proposes the concept of saturation as very relevant in determining sample size for qualitative study. Saturation here implies a situation where data obtained from any additional respondent or sample will not provide any new information to what has already been obtained from

research participants. Other scholars (Morse, 1994; Creswell, 1998) have also suggested between 25 and 30 respondents for phenomenological and ethnographic studies while Mason (2010) and Charmaz (2006) recommend the need for researchers to consider availability of resources, time and study objectives in determining the appropriate sample size for qualitative study. To this end, it was prudent that the researcher used an appropriate sample size to represent each category of the study population.

For this particular study, the researcher adopted purposive sampling technique in selecting voters who have knowledge about or have been involved in vote selling. Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling strategy (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2006) sometimes used in qualitative research. In using this sampling strategy, the researcher would always have the target population in mind but then involve whoever is available or convenient in his/her study (Kusi, 2012). According to Amoah and Eshun (2014) purposive sampling is a kind of sampling that deals with drawing the sample from the part of the population, which is close to hand, in other words, available and convenient. In this kind of sampling the investigator simply selects the sample from those that he/she has easy access to. This sampling strategy was adopted because of time and labour constraints. This sampling technique was used to sample voters who will be available in the study area and willing to participate in the study.

1.6.4 Research Instruments

Instruments that were used for this study were semi-structured interviews. As one of the common tools used in gathering data in qualitative studies; O'Leary (2004) posits that it is very flexible with a defined questioning plan and follows a conversation interview style. The reason for using structured interviews was a) to allow participants express themselves at length while preventing them from unnecessary rambling (Kusi, 2012) and

b) to give the researcher opportunity to make necessary probes or follow ups for in depth understanding.

1.6.5 Data Collection Procedure

Different procedures were used in the collection of information for this study. In using the semi-structured interviews, the procedure was to approach an individual deemed to be a voter and then establish rapport with such individual. If in the process of establishing rapport with the respondent he/she was ready to go through the interview, it was conducted. In effect, the researcher carried a tape recording device and a field note book/pad. If the respondent was not ready at that particular moment, the researcher either tried to schedule a meeting day, time and venue convenient for the respondent for the interview to come off moved on to another potential respondent. Of course, in this instance also, the afore mentioned gadgets were used. The tape recorder was however used with permission from the respondents to record his/her responses and the note pad as a backup. The duration for each interview was estimated to last for a maximum of 40 minutes.

1.6.6 Data Analysis Method

After all data had been collected through the semi-interviews they were analysed qualitatively using descriptive statistics and thematic data analysis approach. According to Kusi (2012), thematic data analysis needs the researcher to organize the data, put himself into it, code the data and transcribe them. In effect, the researcher organized all data gathered in the interviews to help him identify consistencies and inconsistencies. It also helped in understanding the individual variables and issues emanating from the field research

Organizing data was done with careful consideration of confidentiality and anonymity of respondents since participants were afraid of being recorded secretly. This approach was partly to prevent misrepresentation of the views and ideas as expressed by respondents. Transcription was done after organizing the data. This had to do with playing, listening and writing down field recordings or notes into text data (Creswell et al, 2003). Efforts were made at careful transcription so as to bring about clarity and reduce voluminous data. After this, generation of themes followed. This was carried out by identifying various themes in the reviewed literature so as to find out the ones that agree with the predetermined themes. Coding of the data was the next thing to continue. Creswell (2005) cited in Kusi (2012) defines coding as labels or numbers a researcher adopts to describe or identify images and process of segmenting and labeling text to create descriptions. Coding was done by putting identified text segments in brackets and assigning a code made up of letters and numbers. This gave a precise meaning to text segments. Serial numbers were given to interviewees such as PV01 – PV60 (P – Participant, V – Voter).

1.6.7 Ethical Considerations

Ethics is a very important aspect of every research, be it qualitative or quantitative. It must, therefore be taken seriously in conducting a research of this nature. In order to ensure that this study falls in line with ethical standards, official approval was sought from the School of Graduate Studies, University of Ghana, Legon.

Official permission was also sought from all individuals who participated in this research. All respondents were duly informed to assure them that any information they provide would be treated with a high level of anonymity and confidentiality. Also, measures were taken to ensure that respondents participate in the study voluntarily. The work will be

subjected to peer review after the first external supervision and approval to validate the findings.

1.7 Significance of the Study

Importance of properly organized and incident free elections cannot be over emphasized. In democracy, political campaigns and the electoral process is the most widely accepted way of electing parties and individuals to manage their countries and fill various public offices respectively. In effect, elections have to be organized in a manner that would prevent electoral malpractices.

This study aimed at contributing to the existing studies on vote selling and voting behaviour of electorates in Ghana. This study will serve as a source of useful information to electoral administrators; particularly the Electoral Commission of Ghana (ECG) and other agencies or institutions interested in electoral issues such as Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) Ghana, and National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE). Such information will help in devising more effective strategies to campaign against and deal with offenders of electoral processes.

To electorates and politicians, this research will serve as a guide to policy makers on the need to devise strategies to curb the trend of vote selling and curtail its future repercussions. This study will also serve as a blueprint for future researchers who will endeavour to conduct investigations into vote selling and voting behaviour in other parts of Ghana and even other countries. It will also give political parties a fair idea about how voters sell their votes and determine the acts of manipulation embedded in the process.

This research intends to make an enquiry into the effect of vote selling on voting behaviour in the Ashaiman Constituency of the Greater Accra region. It will focus on

reasons why voters sell or offer their votes in the form of pledges or promises to certain parties or candidates in exchange for money, items or goods. Since there are different ideas concerning how vote selling transactions are conducted, this study intends to find out how it is actually done. Also, it will look at how vote selling influences voting behaviour.

1.8 Organization of the Study

This study is organised into five chapters and this introductory chapter highlighted vote selling and how it influences voting behaviour. The chapter further outlined the research problem, research questions and objectives. It also clarified the terms and concepts as applied in the study. The next chapter is the literature review where the various theories about vote selling are espoused. The incidence of vote selling varies from one democratic regime to the other and therefore its argument is placed in a context in order to measure the variables.

Chapter three discusses the background of the Ashaiman Constituency which details out the profile and justification of the study area. The fourth chapter presents the analysis of the research and discusses the findings from the fieldwork in the light of the theoretical and conceptual framework presented in the literature review. Chapter five concludes the study by summarizing the main points of this thesis as well as recommendations for future research.

1.9 Operational Definition of Terms

Vote selling: A process whereby voters receive cash from vote buyers or intermediaries in exchange for their votes (Vincente and Wantchekon, 2009).

Vote buying: A process whereby individuals or political parties pay cash to voters to purchase their votes (Owen, 2013).

Vote sellers: Individuals who show a willingness to sell votes or receive cash from vote buyers or intermediaries in exchange for their votes (Vincente and Wantchekon, 2009).

Vote buyers: Individuals, mainly party agents and candidates for public office who offer and make cash payments to voters to purchase their votes (Owen, 2013).

Voting behaviour: The set of personal electoral activities, including participation in electoral campaigns, turnout at the polls, and choosing for whom to vote (Bratton 2013).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Recent upsurge for electoral victory in democratic elections birthed the tendency of vote selling in many parts of the world. This phenomenon stretches from the era of the Roman Republic (Yakobson, 1995), through to the 19th century Britain and the United States of America (O'Leary, 1962; Anderson & Tollison, 1990). The contemporary electoral administrations such as the Argentina Sao Tome, Principe, and Philippines and in most African countries are not immune to this syndrome (Schaeffer, 2008; Stokes, 2006; Brusco et al., 2004; Vicente, 2008; Bratton, 2008).

Therefore, this tradition has been conventional in politics which made vote buying to be predominant in Africa's electoral administrations. The supply of farming boots, t-shirts, handkerchiefs, fertilizer, cutlasses, food, small amounts of cash, clothing, medicine and other gifts (Brusco et al, 2004) is usual and to different levels principal campaign strategy. Survey data from 18 African nations discover that many, numbering up to 45 percent of voters in different nations are given enticements in exchange for their vote (Kramon, 2009). Notwithstanding its resolve, there is very small theoretical convergence agreement in terms of theories concerning the connection that exists between vote buying to voting behaviour, especially taking into consideration the use of the secret ballot and intentional voting. This chapter seeks to deeper comprehension of the political economy and psychology of individual vote selling choices, approaches to explaining voting behaviour, theoretical framework of vote selling, channels of vote selling, understanding the efficiency of anti-vote-selling campaigns? The study will further highlight the conjectural and experimental analyses of transactional electoral politics, and vote-selling in particular. The study will address the exposition that does vote buying influence the

political behaviour of potential voters?

Vote buying and vote-selling are persistent phenomena in many emerging democracies. While there is some deliberation about the concerns of the buying and selling of votes, there is an accord that transactional electoral politics comes with it a whole lot of challenges. For instance, buying of votes and other forms of clientelism can destabilize or even setback the normal responsibility relationship that is fundamental to democracy (Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Lyne, 2007; Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al., 2013). Vote buying also impedes the improvement of and conviction in the political establishments essential for democratic advancement and consolidation (Desposato, 2007; Graziano, 1973; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Lyne, 2007; Stokes, 2005). In one way, buying of votes disrupts the life of democratic elections which should help build programmatic connections between parties while on the other hand, it generates a destabilization between parties (incumbents) that have access to quantifiable resources and those (opposition groups without access to such resources (Carreras & Irepoglu, 2013). More so, vote-buying and other kinds of clientelism are connected with larger community deficits and public sector inadequacies (Hicken & Simmons, 2008; Keefer, 2006), and sophisticated levels of corruption (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Keefer, 2007).

Maybe the biggest method in voting analysis, moving toward a tight method, has been the rational choice model which come with two key standpoints; thus, evaluative and non-evaluative standpoints (Lindberg & Morison, 2008). While the evaluative voting idea is based on voters' conclusion of the functioning of parties or representatives on guidelines or nationwide public goods, clientelistic voting based on private affective ties of sponsorship, family, clan, and ethnic sensitivities drives non-evaluative perspective.

When there is a guarantee or implied consensus about private favours or goodies to be exchanged in return for political faithfulness then a clientelistic connection is created. In the words of Lindberg and Morrison (2008), public properties such as schools, roads, and electricity for the community can be argued in terms of pork barrel politics.

Renewed calls to bring down the supply of votes obtainable for acquisition are common worldwide. Voter-focused advocacy against selling of votes tend to go in two different directions. The first kind of campaign encourages voters to eschew taking vote buying monies or items at all. Voters may be told to give assurances or pen down pledges to simply shun taking money from politicians or their proxies in the run up to elections. A second collective methodology seeks to sabotage vote buying by emboldening voters to take the money and items being offered, but nonetheless vote their integrity (Hicken et al, 2016). The Uganda panel of the Afro-barometer survey discovers that ethnicity has a substantial, autonomous influence on choice of vote controlling for other candidate features, such as program or functioning (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah Boadi, 2004).

Researchers have argued that while clientelism works predominantly well for sitting parties or governments, vote buying appears to be more operational for opponents. They also note strong progressive influence of vote buying on levels of electoral participation/turnout. Vote buying in Sao Tome and Principe, expressed as the exchange of money for votes prior to elections, has been a widespread phenomenon in that country. In fact, it was stated to have amplified intensely after the late-1990s' oil sighting (Vicente, 2009). Again, Vicente (2007) describes the results of the Sao Tome and Principe vote buying experimentations. Vicente (2007) shows that the anti-vote-buying campaigns are effective in terms of thinning the occurrence of vote buying, but mostly in terms of weakening its impact on voting choices. This is coherent with the message of the promotion that emphasized the need to vote in conscience. The cases of clientelistic and

vote-buying petitions, although largely convincing, are not homogeneously effective, even amongst poor voters in low economic growth settings. The use and effects of clientelism and vote buying can be handled or reduced with civic crusades around elections. Our main policy recommendation then goes in the way of local responsibility interventions bundling development with voter education.

2.2 Approaches to Explaining Voting Behaviour

2.2.1 Identity or Expressive Voting

Indication from the voting model and straight forward test of voters' expectations about forthcoming goodies, show that voters anticipate targeted commodities from co-ethnic politicians. The normative repercussions of these conclusions are varied. On one hand, they show that anticipations of proper long term functioning of governments, parties or candidates, as autonomous from real functioning, are contributing significantly to voting. On the other hand, it looks as if that these anticipations may be centered on real designs of provision: co-ethnicity does not give any significant advantage to a candidate who has no previous history, and Easterners seem to have never learned (or unlearned) to connect ethnicity with improvement or advancement. In the long run, it seems that co-ethnicity may not have any real advantage on an aspirant unless it also carries some advantage on voters (Carlson, 2010).

Carlson (2010) used a voting model investigation in Uganda to examine the fundamental justification for ethnic voting. She finds proof that voters expect more forthcoming commodities or resources from a co-ethnic presidential candidate. Most amazingly, she establishes that co-ethnicity is important to voters in a situation where the candidate has

evidence or history of prior provisions of goods and comparably, that history is relevant best when the aspirant is co-ethnic. Additionally, those kinds of voters who are most likely to get access to ethnic sponsorship are the ones who are most likely to vote along ethnic lines. She confirmed this conclusion, by telling participants to make forecasts about the potential performance of co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic candidates. It was revealed that respondents expect more future resources from co-ethnics than from non-co-ethnic candidates. The Uganda panel of the Afrobarometer survey again establishes that ethnicity has a substantial, autonomous influence on vote decision controlling for other candidate features, such as policy or performance. (Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah Boadi, 2004).

Dowd and Dreissen (2008) note reductions in superiority of state power as ethnicity becomes more intensely connected with vote. The longest-standing premises on ethnically aligned voting is that voters would want their co-ethnics due to ethnic pride, or for what Chandra (2004) refers to as the psychic benefits of having someone just like themselves occupying a particular office or position. This was the anticipation of academics in the first days of African democracy who foretold that elections in Africa and other varied places would turn out to be ethnic roll calls (Horowitz, 1985). Ethnic sponsorship, in which the leaders' co-ethnics receive a unequal share of state assets, is a common hope in the literature (Berman, Dickson & Kymlicka, 2004; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Horowitz, 1985) and one that is still very much active and well in Uganda. Researchers and journalists argue that President Museveni created the whole of his cabinet from his home province (Green, 2010; Habati, 2010; Musoke & Olupot, 2010) and that the Western provinces eat more than others (Rubongoya, 2007).

2.2.2 Policy Voting

Bratton (2004) noted that campaign indiscretions are targeted at the rural poor and the effects are resolute. These effects are as follows: violence decreases turnout; and vote buying augments partisan loyalty. But, perhaps because most citizens speak against campaign maneuvering as wrong, compliance with the wishes of politicians is not assured. Defection from intimidations and agreements is more widespread than compliance, especially where voters are cross-pressured from both sides of the partisan divide. Support from the voting replication and straight test of voters' expectations about future commodities discloses that voters anticipate targeted commodities from co-ethnic candidates. The normative consequences of these findings are varied. On one hand, they indicate that beliefs of future performance, as autonomous from real performance, are adding significantly to voting. On the other hand, it seems these anticipations may be founded on genuine patterns of provision: co-ethnicity does not give any real advantage to a politician who does not hold a previous history, and politicians who seem to have never learned (or unlearned) to connect ethnicity with development. In the long run, it looks as if co-ethnicity may not carry any advantage on a candidate unless it also gives an advantage on voters.

Recently, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) reveal that Kenyans who are most committed to their ethnic identity are the ones most likely to vote along ethnic lines. Ugandans vote retrospectively, supporting politicians who have performed well during their tenure. Confirmation of retrospective voting has been found in countries across the globe (Fiorina, 1987, Lohmann, Brady & Rivers, 1997, Besley & Burgess, 2001, Kousser, 2004). Although each of them have limitations, there are also a variety of findings that expose evidence of retrospective voting on the African continent (Ferree, 2004; Ferree &

Horowitz, 2007; Hoffman, Gibson, Ferree & Long, 2007; Bratton et al., 2004; Lindberg & Morrison, 2008). These studies show that voters in Africa notwithstanding their ethnicity use the candidate's performance as a bases for their vote decisions.

In a connected research, Blaydes (2006) argues that voter's in Egypt go to the polls or turnout simply because they expect physical remunerations. Chen and Zhong (2008) are of the vier that in China individuals who identify most strictly with the current government or party in power are most likely to vote, and Shi (1999) discovers that voter in China's elections vote because of a yearning to penalize fraudulent officials. Bratton (1999) finds that, in Zambia, political involvement is determined by institutional connections between individuals and the state. Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) find credence for this argument and argue that persons with higher levels of linkages to political parties are most likely to vote. I contribute to this literature and illustrate the mobilizing impact of vote selling in this study.

Voting behaviour is a set of personal electoral activities, including participation in electoral campaigns, turnout at the polls, and choosing for whom to vote (Bratton 2013). Democratic citizenship is defined here as participation in popular collective action and engagement with political leaders and institutions, including between elections and within a rule of law (Bratton, 2013). This broad notion of citizenship goes well beyond the formal attributes of legal citizenship such as birth, marriage, or naturalization that entitle an individual to hold a passport or national identity card. Rather, it refers to a political understanding of citizenship based on civic engagement and participation. It is consistent with the contrasts made in the literature between citizens, on the one hand, and parochials who are disengaged from the political system and subjects who passively defer to authority on the other (Almond & Verba, 1963; Mamdani 1996). Citizens are also

distinguished from clients, understood as those who simply seek patronage rather than a role in political decision making (Fox 1994; Bratton 2008).

If survey respondents are unwilling to report a pure ethnic preference, analyses will end up underestimating the impact of co-ethnicity in predicting voter choice. For example, recent findings that presidential performance is a more important predictor of vote choice than is ethnicity (Bratton & Kimenyi, 2008), may simply reflect the fact that retrospective voting is a more socially acceptable reason to prefer a candidate than is his ethnicity. Additionally, the common findings that ethnicity is not correlated to electoral outcomes in some African countries, such as Senegal or Burkina Faso (Bratton et al, 2004; Posner, 2004; Basedau & Stroh, 2009; Huber, 2012) is potentially a finding about the sensitivity of reporting an ethnic vote, rather than about true voter preferences.

2.2.3 Governance Performance

Pooling across all countries, it appears that receiving an electoral handout increased the likelihood of turning out to vote by about 4.5%, as shown in the first row (“All countries”). Yet this effect is far from uniform across all cases while some countries exhibit a large positive and statistically significant coefficient (Uganda, Mali, Kenya, and Botswana). Based on these findings, one would conclude that there is some evidence that handouts exert a positive effect on mobilization and on the vote share of certain parties. In contrast, Nichter (2008) as well as Stokes et al., (2013) argue that passive supporters are most likely to be targeted as well.

Nichter (2008) and Stokes (2005) find that the level of support or partisanship will influence the odds of being targeted with a hand out. The concern with accounting empirically for partisanship is that it is often only measured post-treatment and thus

strongly correlated with vote choice. The same is true of other outcomes considered important in the vote-buying literature, such as attitudes toward democracy and citizenship (Carlin & Moseley, 2015). In terms of economic variables, it is generally hypothesized that individuals with fewer economic resources are likely to be targeted since their votes are cheaper to purchase (Nichter, 2008; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005; Brusco et al., 2004; Kramon, 2009). Stokes (2005) argues that those weakly opposed are most likely to be approached by political machines to ensure their support.

However two causes of potential bias might be driving these results. The first is that it is important to use matching to weight more heavily explanations that were truly treated and not overemphasize the influence of the treatment. The second is that as previewed in the case of Benin, in some cases district-level characteristics influence the observed effect and should be included in the estimation. The results, in their easiest description, endorse previous studies on voting in African and support the premise that voting decisions, even in ethnically diverse communities, it is for the most part retrospective. These findings indicate that while both co-ethnicity and performance carry an advantage to a political contender, performance is more essential. These discoveries endorse the guesses that voters will vote based on performance. What is good about these findings is that voters, even those who vote ethnically, are holding their elites responsible for performance rather than basing solely on ethnic cues.

Reported voting behaviours or vote intentions serve as the dependent variable in studies on the effects of a range of theoretically important independent variables: actual and perceived government performance (Ferree & Horowitz, 2007; Hoffman et al., 2007; Gutierrez-Romero, 2010; Bratton et al., 2011). These data have also been used to predict the winners of elections and to estimate the percentage of official vote share determined by fraud (Long & Gibson, 2009). However, despite their widespread use, few studies

have been done on the reliability of survey responses for measuring actual vote preferences in African countries. Others have looked at vote buying or intimidation (Kramon, 2009; Bratton, 2008). The most visible proponents of “anti-tribalism” are politicians and the media, whose attitudes may be quite disconnected from the general public. African presidents routinely call for inclusivity in politics, but evidence suggests this is largely a strategy to court the votes of the ethnic opposition (Keefer, 2010; Young, 2009; Lindberg & Weghorst, 2010). Calls to avoid tribalism also dominate newspaper editorials. Recent headlines read, “Tribalism and Ethnicity Could Plunge Ghana into Anarchy” (Kunateh, 2009). Tribalism has no Place in Namibia (Jochem, 2007) and Ugandan Trade Minister, Fires Salvo on Tribalism, Calls Perpetrators Stupid and sees Tribalism, a barrier to Progressive Democratic Dialogue” (Odunze, 2013).

2.3 Theories of vote selling/buying

Voting behaviour according to Bratton (2013) is a set of personal electoral activities, including participation in electoral campaigns, turnout at the polls, and choosing for whom to vote. Roth (2006) asserts that, a single model cannot explain voting behaviour due to its complexity. Therefore, three main theoretical perspectives have been used to explain voting behaviour in the literature which include but not limited to Sociological theory (Converse, 1944; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Lipset, 1959, 1960), Psychosocial (Campbell et al., 1960) and the Rational Choice perspective (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981, 2002; Key & Cummings, 1966). The sociological model, often identified as School of Columbia, with the main reference in Applied Bureau of Social Research of Columbia University, whose work begins with the publication of the book *The People’s Choice* (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944) and focuses on the influences of social factors. The psychosocial

model also identified as School of Michigan, which has its major reference in the work of Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) —The American Voter — and assumes that party identification is the main factor behind the behaviour of voters. The rational choice theory, also referred to as a model of economic voting, or even as School of Rochester, whose landmark work is the work of Anthony Downs (1957) — An Economic Theory of Democracy — and that puts emphasis on variables such as rationality, choice, uncertainty and information. To enhance the study, a detailed analysis is espoused to understand individual vote choices in democratic elections laying emphasis on the respective theories.

The theoretical assumptions of the sociological model of voting behaviour are defined in three essential works: The People's Choice (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944), Voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954) and Personal Influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). The research conducted by Lazarsfeld et al., (1944) at Ohio State (Erie County), using questionnaire as a technique of investigation for the first time in the study of a United States (U.S.) Presidential election which opposed Franklin Roosevelt to Wendell Willkie in 1940, cuts away from the type of methodological approach that hitherto characterized the study of voting behaviour (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). Paul Lazarsfeld, whose previous interests had focused on the study of the psychological mechanisms involved in the processes of choice and in the effects of publicity, advertising and mass media on consumer behaviour had two main objectives: to study the effects of exposure to the media, that is, to know how voters arrive at their decisions and the role of media in this process; and to test a new methodology of successive interviews with a panel of subjects and a control group (Rossi, 1964). The study, whose report was published under the title "The People's Choice" (Lazarsfeld et al 1944) begins by characterizing the supporters of the two main political parties in the U.S. using a panel of 600 subjects who were

interviewed seven times over the seven months of campaign, to then identify the voters who changed their position during the campaign period, comparing three groups: those who decided their vote before beginning the campaign, those whose decision was taken during the party convention and those that decided their vote only at an advanced stage of the campaign.

The central hypothesis of Lazarsfeld et al (1944) was that the act of voting is an individual act, affected mainly by the personality of the voter and his exposure to the media. The results, however, contradict the main thesis, suggesting that the effect of the media in electoral decision was minimal and that the decisive influence was the social groups to which they belonged. In the final two chapters of his book — “The Political homogeneity of Social Groups” and “The Nature of Personal Influence” — the focus is exactly on the theoretical elaboration of these conclusions, which are presented as revealed by new research; the significance of this area of political behaviour was highlighted by the study but further investigation is necessary to establish it more firmly (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944).

The psychosocial model has its origin in studies conducted by the Survey Research Centre at the University of Michigan during the 1948 U.S. presidential elections, its results analysed by Campbell and Kahn (1952) in “The People Elect a President”; the elections of 1952’s report was presented by Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954) in “The Voter Decides”; and elections in 1956, where results, combined with those obtained in previous investigations, have led to the book “The American Voter”, written by Campbell, Converse Miller and Stokes (1960). These works mark the beginning of a long series of studies conducted by the Survey Research Centre and more recently by the Centre of Political Studies at the University of Michigan, which extend to the present day,

although currently falling under American National Electoral Studies (ANES), investigations that involve a greater variety of institutions, maintaining, however, the initial theoretical basis. The questionnaires and databases of these investigations are references in most election studies conducted in the United States of America.

The theoretical background for an economic explanation of voting behaviour has been submitted by Anthony Downs (1957) work on “An Economic Theory of Democracy. This theory is commonly referred to as rational choice theory. This is an attempt to explain electoral behaviour taking as its starting point the work done within the political economy by Kenneth Arrow (1951, 1986) that relate economic parameters resources, goods and technology with a political outcome or choice. The premise is simple: if the assumptions of rational choice are able to explain the market, then they can explain the political functioning. It establishes a direct analogy between consumers and voters and between enterprises and political parties. If companies seek to maximize profits and consumers act to maximize the utility, we can, then, theorize in the sense that voters seek to maximize the utility of their vote as the parties act to maximize electoral gains obtained from their political proposals.

The central argument is that parties in democratic politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy. So as, to attain their private ends, they formulate whatever policies they believe will gain the most votes, just as entrepreneurs produce whatever products they believe will gain the most profits for the same reason. In order to examine the implications of this thesis, we have assumed that citizens behave rationally in politics. This premise is itself a second major hypothesis (Downs, 1957: 295-296).

The operation of the model is based on three fundamental premises: (1) all decisions those that are made by voters and political parties are rationally guided by self-interest

and enforced in accordance with the principle of maximization of action's utility; (2) the democratic political system implies a level of consistency that supports predictions about the consequences of decisions made by voters and political parties and government are responsible and trustworthy, which makes it possible to make predictions about the consequences that result from different choices, and (3) the democratic system assumes despite the consistency stated in the previous point a level of uncertainty, sufficiently important to allow different options.

The point to highlight is that the relevant determinants of vote choice are the intrinsic valuations and the expected punishment if caught, but not necessarily the size of the payment given by party. The reason for this is that for one-time interactions, payments are given regardless of the action taken. This is the case in many African countries where party machines are either absent or short-lived. The rational choice model of voting behaviour implies (Downs, 1957; Riker & Ordeshook, 1967) they (voters) should, in the framework of secret ballot and voluntary voting, be well off receiving the bribe or gift but staying at home on election day. In this study, it is established that citizens clearly regard vote buying and electoral violence as infractions of public morality. Most ordinary people resist efforts of political elites to illegally influence voter behaviour. But some individuals especially society's poorest and most vulnerable members have little choice except to comply. Faced with irregular carrots or sticks during the course of an election campaign, their only other viable option is to feign compliance while refusing in practice. This strategy which is called defection, is a commonplace weapon of the weak (Scott, 1985).

The evidence available proposes that vote buying and political intimidation are unproductive campaign tools. In normal terms, people who are paid or threatened during the election campaign are actually less likely to turn out to vote on the election day. Threats of violence lead to an especially drastic reduction in voter turnout. Moreover,

while voters may be ready to cast their ballots for parties whose candidates have broken electoral laws, many would have expressed such support anyway, that is, without extra legal incentives or punishments. Most importantly, many who enter vote-buying agreements say they will ultimately defect, that is, by taking the money but voting as they please. Defection is especially likely when voters are cross-pressured from both sides of a partisan divide or when exposed to both vote buying and violence. One particularly interesting result, that deserves further exploration, is that vote buying behaviour is determined collectively. People are most likely to defect if they think that others will do so too, thus availing themselves of the protections provided by collective action. But if collective action also shapes norms that is, people justify wrongful behaviour for themselves because everyone else is doing it – then campaign irregularities can corrode the quality of democratic citizenship.

In the Afro-barometer Round 5 surveys, the question was asked, how likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in this country? The answer across 34 African countries in 2011/2013 was that 81% of respondents report it either not at all likely or not very likely, while only 19% found it somewhat likely or very likely. In addition, the lack of compulsory voting may render vote-buying a less effective strategy in the African context, as suggested by Gans Morse et al., (2014). But is it possible to achieve complete vote-buying transactions in settings with repeated interactions.

In an investigational study undertaken in Benin, Wantchekon (2003) discovers evidence that voters are more receptive to rhetoric that he defines as clientelistic rather than general. In an enquiry about Ghana, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) indicate that voters assess candidates based on their policy directions instead of on ethnic or clientelist bases. Similarly, Young (2009) finds no indication that clientelism has increased the votes of

sitting MPs in Kenya and Zambia. Bratton's (2008) study of Nigeria shows that contact with vote buying reduces the possibility that an individual will show up at the polls to vote. His argument is that buying of votes and electoral violence create disappointment amongst the electorate leading them to exit the political process. On the contrary, in a randomized field experiment in Principe Sao Tome, Vicente (2008) establishes that vote buying expands voter turnout by “energizing” potential voters.

A second group of empirical studies instead relies on experimental frameworks to establish causal effect of cash handouts on voting behaviour (Banerjee, Kumar & Su, 2011; Vicente, 2014; Kramon, 2016). However, natural experiments on the topic are scarce, and experimental designs that directly randomize cash handouts to influence voting behaviour may raise ethical concerns. Due to these constraints, field experiments typically randomize some aspect of the voting-decision process rather than the direct distribution of electoral handouts. Yet studies on vote buying often rely on two implicit assumptions. The first is that brokers or party operatives are able to correctly identify voters' political inclination through their social networks or personal interactions. However, this task is actually very difficult to fulfill, and brokers may be no better than a coin toss in correctly detecting co-partisans (Schneider, 2016). In addition, correctly targeting voters is even harder during campaigns, when political inclinations are fluid, further reducing the precision of targeted efforts (Greene, 2016).

The second assumption is that those targeted with handouts behave in a way that would not have happened otherwise. As shown in Uganda (Conroy-Krutz & Logan, 2012), Mexico (Simpser, 2012), Taiwan (Wang & Kurzman, 2007), and Nigeria (Bratton, 2008), the mere presence of handouts is not sufficient to argue that electoral outcomes were changed. For example, Vicente (2014) randomizes the distribution of anti-corruption (anti-vote-buying). Similarly, Kramon (2016) randomly provides voters with information

on whether a given politician engages in vote buying to assess subsequent electoral support. However, such approaches introduce an additional layer of complexity (individual perceptions of the negativity of vote-buying, effectiveness of information campaigns) that makes a straightforward interpretation of its electoral impact on behaviour difficult.

Finally, a third group of empirical studies departs from the traditional explanations for why parties distribute electoral handouts to explore alternative accounts. One set of explanations put forward focuses on enhancing credibility (Schaffer, 2002; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008) or commitment to future redistribution (Kramon, 2016). According to these studies, handouts by politicians need not have an effect on the specific targeted voter but rather should signal to the entire population the credibility of their campaign promises (Banegas, 2002; Nugent, 2007; Schaffer & Schedler, 2007). Extending this logic, even if voters do not directly receive money, they need only be aware of the vote-buying activities as credible proof of the politicians' good intentions. For instance, Kramon (2016) finds that spreading information that randomly attributes vote-buying activities to politicians actually bolsters electoral support for them, even if voters have not benefited directly. Although we do not directly investigate this question, our theoretical framework provides some reasons for why politicians might provide handouts even if these fail to actually purchase votes. For instance, political parties might still find it in their interest to distribute handouts, particularly in the presence of other parties doing the same thing (Chauchard, 2016).

2.4 Channels of vote selling

Generally, vote buying constitutes a form of appeasement of the population that is not conditional on policy. If vote buying is the main source of ‘politicians’ accountability’, and if it is effective in driving the electorate, policies will necessarily favour the rich elite. This implication may be especially problematic in countries where rent-seeking policies are pervasive, and significant oil revenues are expected in the future. It is well known that the natural resource curse feeds itself on poor political institutions. Taking thoughts from the text on turnout and clientelism, the argument is that vote buying of votes is likely to have an effect on an individual’s personal voting choice through three different channels. These channels include a personal level supervising and punishment instrument, a community level supervising and punishment instrument, and a credibility-signaling instrument (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008; Robinson & Verdier, 2002). Vote buying is a kind of clientelism; the supply of personal or private material remunerations with the anticipation of political support, a form of political enlistment usual to many poor countries, as well as some rich ones. Instead of attracting voters who have in mind some ideological or programmatic appeals, many political parties use the delivery of private material benefits (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Researchers come to a consensus that pervasive clientelism and vote buying may have negative effects.

Vote buying and clientelism are claimed to bring about the under delivery of community goods (Robinson & Verdier, 2002), to harm the economy (Baland and Robinson, 2007), to construct incentives for politicians to promote underdevelopment (Stokes, 2007a), and to destabilize political impartiality and democracy (Stokes, 2007b). In an investigational study done in Benin, Wantchekon (2003) discovers that voters are more receptive to rhetoric that he describes as clientelistic instead of common. Lindberg and Morrison

(2008) study of Ghana establishes, on the contrary that voters appraise politicians based on their policy directions rather than on ethnic or clientelism grounds. Comparably, Young (2009) finds does not find any evidence that clientelism has increased the number of votes for sitting MPs in Kenya and Zambia. Bratton's (2008) enquiry of Nigeria finds that experience of vote buying reduces the probability of an individual vote. His argument is that vote buying and electoral violence create discouragement among electorates leading them to disassociate themselves completely from the political process. On the contrary, in a randomized field experiment in Sao Tome and Principe, Vicente (2008) discovers, that vote buying expands voter turnout by “energizing” potential voters.

Pedro (2008) observed a significant effect of the campaign on perceptions of vote buying, which constitutes the exogenous variation used to identify effects on voting behaviour. They revealed what characterize determinants of vote buying (more frequent in swing and rural locations), and noted that vote buying energizes the electorate by increasing turnout. Crucially, we capture real effects on candidates' relative performance, by identifying the challenger to be driving more votes through vote buying (after the treatment), which is consistent with the timeline of events (late challenger candidacy). Interested observers are however becoming more alerted to the weaknesses of democratic processes in developing countries. There (developing countries), competition may be curtailed by credit constraints, and the demand for information may be undermined by voters' lack of education. Vote buying, as a specific form of campaign spending (not associated with meaningful political messages), tends to flourish in these environments, as if it were a substitute for political accountability. Vote buying may therefore be a symptom of poor democratic practice. This would be particularly so if vote buying really is effective in driving the electorate.

Vicente (2007) shows that if one is interested in increasing electoral competition or counteracting the incumbent's clientelistic advantage, cash-for-votes before the election may help. In addition, vote buying seems to be increasing voter turnout in Sao Tome and Principe. The experiment in Sao Tome and Principe showed that specific and directed voter education can be highly effective in changing voters' electoral behaviour. Even if one cannot easily convince poverty-ridden voters not to accept cash before the election, one can still persuasively argue in favour of money-free voting decisions. That was clearly driving most of the voting changes in the Sao Tome and Principe setting. Moreover, less educated (like in Benin) and poorer voters seem to be the centre of action for vote buying. This observation reinforces the idea that voter education bundled together with local development interventions may be a very focused and effective way to counteract vote-buying- and clientelism-based politics.

Berelson et al., (1954) found only a small number of party changers during the campaign and thus concluded that the campaign primarily served to reinforce already existing political predispositions. Moreover, these political predispositions were found to be determined by stable socio-demographic characteristics, religious denomination, and place of residence. Their often-cited conclusion was thus: "A man thinks, politically, as he is, socially." It is tempting to read the study as suggesting some kind of social-determinism. Therefore, when recalling our theoretical literature review, we see that there is clearly a need to understand our main empirical finding in the context of a stylized model of political competition where incumbents benefit more from clientelism, while challengers are very effective with vote buying. The distinction, itself, between these two vote-selling concepts is only broached in Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky, (2008).

In terms of theoretical models, the literature on vote buying has mostly focused on

conditions under which bribes may sustain cooperation in repeated-interaction settings. One assumption underpinning this analysis is that parties are able to monitor vote choices (Stokes, 2005) or at least observe turnout (Nichter, 2008). Under these conditions, there exists a bribe level that will satisfy the voter and guarantee that s/he votes in favour of the distributing candidate. Relying on this framework, we relax the monitoring assumption consistent with a lack of political machines across sub-Saharan Africa (Van de Walle, 2007; Bratton, 2008) and increase the number of actors distributing hand outs during an election.

2.5 Empirical Evidence Associated with Vote Selling

Agomor and Adams (2014) conducted a study on the determinants of voting behaviour in Ghana. This study was conducted on the back of different ideas about what voters use as a basis for casting their vote in favour of one candidate against the other. These scholars sought to answer questions such as what makes voters in Ghana decide? Is it evaluative rationales such as characteristics and accomplishments of candidates, performance of government, and policy platforms of parties or non-evaluative factors such as political affiliation, ethnic or family ties? Touching upon another classic distinction in studies of voting behaviour, the question is whether voters vote retrospectively to “throw the rascals out,” or vote prospectively, on the basis of promises?” (Agomor & Adams, 2014:1) The research focused on the determinants of voting using the rational choice model. Their methodology was a representative nationwide sample survey. First stage of sampling involved all 10 regions and in each, one-tenth of such districts chosen using an amalgamation of non-probability and probability sampling strategies.

Purposive sampling was used to select a district in the regional capitals of all ten regions

to give proper representation of all major ethnics in that region. Random sampling technique was used to select districts outside regional capitals. Agomor and Adams (2014) conclude that in relation to up and coming democratic dispensations this study reinforces the rational choice perspectives, non-evaluative factors like gender, ethnicity, religious affinity and gifts from candidates or party, still exist but does not form the basis for voter choices. Hence, they concluded that in Ghana voting behaviour is mostly directed by evaluative factors like health, education and policies about employment of political parties. This study by Agomor and Adams is different from this current study in the sense that, this current one looks at vote selling and its influence on voting behaviour in democratic elections, it also focuses on a single constituency in the Greater Accra region, again it uses the case study method of the qualitative research approach.

In figure 2.1, Adam and Agomor 2014 illustrate that comparison of the ranking of the factors and analysing the individual intricacies during elections, provide more information the emerging trends. For example, only 14 respondents indicated that getting gifts from candidates influence their voter decision and 27 respondents indicated ethnic background were the most important when they ranked the factors together. However, when they were asked to discuss the factors individually, the responses were very different; on the issue of gifts, the figure increased from 14 to 651 respondents, 1,009 for campaign message, 1,032 for education, 932 for health policy, and 918 for employment provision. Overall, rating the factors individually and collectively suggests that voting behaviour is mediated by many complex and dynamic factors.

What is clear from the findings of the study is that the vote choice is not always rational, sometimes the sociological, and in certain cases the psychosocial factors dominate. The question is which factors dominate when? Further research is needed to clarify this. The findings of the study indicate that Ghanaian voters use multiple cues as

well as their own complex social and ideological identities in deciding who to vote for, which is supportive of the instrumentalist view that both performance evaluations and ethnicity contribute to voter decision making.

Figure 2.1 Most important factor that influence Voters' Choice

Factors	Frequency	Percent
Personality of the candidate	203	9.9
Ethnic background of the candidate	27	1.3
Sex of the candidate	16	8
Educational background of the candidate	85	4.2
Human relation of the candidate	321	15.7
Regional background of the candidate	9	0.4
Religious affiliation of the candidate	20	1.0
Political experience of the candidate	81	4.0
Campaign message	425	20.8
Standard of living	61	3.0
Candidate can provide employment	123	6.0
Candidate can fight corruption	97	4.8
Educational policy	264	12.9
Health policy	61	3.0
Gifts from candidates or party	14	0.7
Candidate can develop my locality	61	3.0
The performance of the ruling party	174	8.5
Total	2042	100.0

Source: Adapted from Agomor and Adams (2014).

An interesting study by Kramon (2009) on vote-buying and political behaviour: estimating and explaining vote-buying's effect on turnout. It is an afrobarometer study conducted in Kenya. The study was conducted to find out "if the privacy of the vote is protected and politicians cannot ensure that targeted citizens vote for them, why does vote-buying occur in many democracies around the world" (Kramon, 2009: 2) and also the relationship that exist between vote-buying and the behaviour of voters. In other words, the study sought to throw more light on the effect of vote buying on personal level voter turnout in Kenya. The survey method of the quantitative approach of research was adopted. In this, a nationally representative sample, as is done in afrobarometer studies, was used resulting in 1,278 individuals asked to respond to several questions in relation the issues under study. Kramon (2009) concludes that in "pre-election material benefits, in the form of vote-buying, are central to understanding why people vote in Kenya", there is robust statistical "support for the notion that vote-buying influences an individual's decision to vote, and that Kenyans who have been approached by a vote buyer are about 14 percentage points more likely to vote than those who have not" (Kramon, 2009: 24). This current study however, focuses on vote selling and its implications on democratic elections. The settings for both studies differ. Also, Kramon (2009) used a nationally representative sample while this current study adopts a case study method.

Another related study to this current one is the one done by Jensen and Justesen (2014) on poverty and vote buying using survey based evidence from Africa. They conducted this study with a bid to analyze the sources of vote buying in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), they focused on the impact of poverty on vote buying at the individual and country level. They sought to answer questions like, who do parties target during their vote buying campaigns to buy votes from and why? Jensen and Justesen (2014) used data from Afrobarometer survey which serves as a high quality source of relevant information on attitudes and

experiences of voters with democracy in Africa (Bratton et al., 2005; Bratton, 2008; Justesen, 2011; Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2012). The data were collected based on stratified random sampling procedure, leading to generating a largely representative sample of adult individuals in all countries (Bratton et al., 2005). The sample size was 1200 except for three countries that are highly fractionalized, namely Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda where the sample size was 2400. Questionnaires consisting of standardized set of questions were used to make the data comparable across all countries and interviews were conducted face-to-face, in the local language, and by people outside the local community to ensure anonymity and objectivity of respondents.

Jensen and Justesen (2014) conclude that, indeed there are strong linkages between poverty and vote buying. Also, the micro-economic conditions within which citizens find themselves have huge consequences on the extent to which African voters are targeted for vote buying. This kind of effect seems to increase depending on how competitive an election is. Again, they concluded that poverty makes vote buying perhaps one of the more common political tools adopted by politicians during elections. This current study however differs from Jensen and Justesen's (2014) work in the sense that their focus was on low economic status people that politicians target for buying of votes. But this study wants to find out the influence of vote selling on democratic elections with focus also on voting behaviour.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ASHAIMAN CONSTITUENCY

3.1 Introduction

Ghana's efforts to restructure the political system as precursor to the return to constitutional and democratic rule, was the opening of the political system to make way for decentralised political units in the country. With the opening up of the political system, new actors including socially and politically marginalized groups were given spaces in the state. The need for citizen participation in politics and decision making in Ghana however, dates back to independence when the first president made this a reality through Parliament. According to Merrifield (2003) socio economic and demographic characteristics of the electorate such as age, gender, economic status, type of locality (rural or urban) and occupational and educational background play an important role in voters deciding to participate in election.

Ghosh (2006) also reports that voter turnout is affected by heterogeneity in demographic and socioeconomic compositions of the voter within a constituency. He added that voter turnout appears to be negatively correlated with the socio economic characteristics of districts and that even though such correlations are weak; they are statistically significant except for per capita income. Hence there is the need to discuss the settings of the area this study seeks to examine – the Greater Accra Region, with emphasizes on Ashaiman Constituency.

This chapter traces the history of the Ashaiman people with particular emphasis on those aspects that are relevant to this study and their economic activities, Industry and service, education and health, and agricultural production, markets in Ashaiman, relations between indigenes and subjugated tribes and roles of chiefs and religious leaders in

democratic elections. Elections are a practical means of safeguarding the methodical procedure of leadership chain and change. It is an apparatus of political power and legitimisation, which stands as a sign of popular authority and the manifestation of the social accord between the government and obligations of the people. It is the seed of political responsibility and a process of safeguarding reciprocity and exchange between governors and the people or citizens (Adejumobi, 2000). In like manner, Chaligha (1997) appreciates elections as validated instruments through which individual citizens and political parties demonstrate an active participation and or involvement in politics, and make key choices regarding the destiny of their society for development. It is based on these that elections are seen to be relevant for consolidating democracy and development. Heywood (2002) perceives election as a scheme for filling public offices through choices made by a designated body of people; the electorate.

The Ashaiman Constituency like all other constituencies in Ghana requires full participation of its entire people in its quest to promote democracy, good governance and development. Thus the consistent complaint of low voter turnouts in National Elections every four years suggests a lack of interest in the system and a reluctance to participate in the governance of the constituency. This could eventually defeat the noble reasons for the creation of the decentralization concept. The Ashaiman Constituency has a high population density and a fast emerging city because of its proximity to Tema, an industrial hub. According to City Population (2012), Ashaiman and Tema have population densities (in Km²) of 1643.5 and 1822.7 respectively. The population densities do not differ much and this explains why Ashaima's Municipal Assemblies vision is to become a modern 24-hour City, that will attract investments, reduce unemployment and other social vices and promote tourism, by the year 2025 (The Composite Budget of Ashaiman Municipal Assembly For the 2016 Fiscal Year, 2016). In

Ashaiman Constituency they suffer from poor sanitation, poor drainage, diseases, stench and haphazard siting of infrastructure that other unplanned urban locales in Accra suffer from. As one of the suburbs of Greater Accra, Ashaiman falls within Latitude 5° 42' North and Longitude 0° 01' west. The Constituency has a land area of about 45km² and is located about four kilometers to the North of Tema and about 30km from Accra which is the National Capital. Ashaiman Municipal shares boundaries on the North and East with Kpone Katamanso District Assembly, on the South with the Tema Township, and on the West with Adjei Kojo Township.

3.2 Background on Ashaiman and It's History

Historically, the town Ashaiman, is said to have been founded by Nii Ashai in the 17th century after he moved from Tema. He named it Ashaiman meaning Ashai's town. His two brothers, Nii Amu and Nii Oko, settled in adjoining towns now called Mantseman and Moniomanye, respectively. Nii Tetteh Amui II is now the head of Ashaiman. Ashaiman grew as other migrants from the Dangme West District, precisely the Ada area, came to settle in the town and were followed subsequently by other ethnic groups including the Ewes and Northerners (Nunoo, 2008). The construction of the Tema harbour and the railway line in the 1950s, contributed to the movement of people to the area in search of work and for comparatively less expensive accommodation as compared to Accra and Tema (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). As Ashaiman expanded, communities such as Lebanon, Middle East, Jericho and Bethlehem that derived their names because soldiers, who returned from peacekeeping duties in these countries, settled there, and Zongo Laka sprang up. Currently about 50 different ethnic groups from all the 10 regions of Ghana and other African countries reside in Ashaiman, each with its ethnic chief (Nunoo, 2008). The major ethnic groups include Ga-Damgbe, Ewe, Guans, Hausa,

Dagomba, Asante, Fante, among others. The Municipality is dominated by Christians, followed by the Moslems and the traditionalist constituting the smallest proportion (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014).

The proportion of Ghanaians by birth in the municipality is 93.2 percent and the non-Ghanaian population in the municipality is 2.3 percent. The population of Ashaiman Municipality, according to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, is 190,972 representing 4.8 percent of the region's total population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). According to the 2010 population and housing census, 91.6% are estimated to be economically active, thus employed and the rest unemployed. Kinds of workers in the area include public sector (government workers), semi-public, farmers, NGOs and other international organizations, service and sales workers and others. Other residents are also engaged in the agriculture sector (i.e. crop farming, livestock and poultry and fishing), small scale manufacturing and processing, quarrying and construction.

There is an Irrigation Scheme with a reservoir that allows for irrigation farming in Ashaiman. The farmers have organized themselves into Co-operative Societies which are registered under the Department of Co-operatives. There are about 800 livestock and crop farmers in the Municipality. Each farmer has a land holding of between 0.4 and 2 Hectares. The scheme has a modern rice-milling machine with a destoner. Quality milled rice is produced and patronage of the scheme's rice (Perfume) is high. In essence, farmers in the area produce crops such as rice, maize, okra, onions and other vegetables.

3.3 Industrial Services and Employment Creation

There are a number of manufacturing activities in Ashaiman that provide employment opportunities for the people. These are large, medium and small scale in nature. The activities cover textile industries (e.g. Kente Weaving, Tie and Die), production of

agricultural inputs and block making machines (e.g. Homaku Engineering) as well as small scale aluminium industries that produce cooking utensils. Ashaiman has two main markets; the central market and the Nii Annang Adjor market. The Assembly has initiated plans to put up about five (5) multi storey market complexes at various locations within the Municipality under Public Private Partnership (PPP). The Nii Annang Adjor market has a decent toilet and urinal facility. The markets in the Municipality have all kinds of commodities for sale.


Ashaiman Municipality is served with a number of services. These include banking, transport, telecommunication, and electricity and tourism services. There are Fourteen (14) financial institutions, about ten (10) fuel services station in the Municipality. The only tourism potentials in Ashaiman are the multi-traditional dances that are often performed during festivals and ceremonial occasions. There are a number of decent hotels, guesthouses and restaurants for the hospitality industry. Ashaiman is connected to the national electricity grid. Estimates as at 2014 showed that almost every household in Ashaiman had access to electricity. The Municipality is served with a good layout of roads with engineered drains. The roads are however not tarred. The major dual-carriage road in Ashaiman is currently under construction while some of the access (minor) roads are being provided with drains. Various forms of transport including private vehicles, commercial private minibuses, public buses, motorbikes, tricycles, bicycles and other modes of transport can be found in the Municipality.

There are a number of industrial activities in Ashaiman that provide employment and skills training for the people, especially the youth and these are large, medium and small-scale in nature. Ashaiman has a formidable Garages Association under the Ghana National Association of Garages (GNAG) with over 400 artisans and 950

apprentices. Largely, election as a kind of political involvement is an important tool in the achievement of democracy. Election is viewed as an instrument through which citizens get an occasion to decide and affect their destiny through a political process. It forms one of the important ways through which people can contribute in decisions that affect their lives and hold their elected governments accountable for results (United Nations Development Programme-UNDP, 2004).

Furthermore, a “Free and Fair” election should imply open and equal access to the electoral procedure and to ballots, an autonomous electoral commission, which possesses the confidence of all political parties involved, well trained electoral workers who abide by appropriate codes of professionalism, a voter’s list that is trustworthy, and freedom from any partial influence from coercive bodies like the army and the police. This calls a total absence of deception and bullying and that the votes are transformed fairly into legislative seats in a clear manner and in harmony with the law (Freedman, 2004). Generally, the degree at which an election is considered free and fair is an illustrative factor for the level voter turnout.

Figure 3.1 Administrative Boundary Map of Ashaiman Constituency



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Source: Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), (2014)

3.4 Reasons for Participating in Democratic Elections

A report from a conference on electoral processes, liberation movements and democratic change in Africa, organized by the Institute of Economic and Social Studies (IESS) on the 9th of November, 2010 stated that free elections are one of the main forms of political participation of citizens in democratic regimes and that they are the mechanisms through which citizens can express their judgment on the way government takes care of their interest, deciding on who will represent them and who will govern. Thus, it is the legitimacy of the political power itself that is at stake in elections: the higher being the participation, the greater will be the legitimacy. On the contrary, a rising abstention erodes the activity and legitimacy of elected governments. This is why voter turnout is commonly considered an indicator of the vitality of democracy and is a major concern for political actors in democratic regimes.

In 1957, Anthony Downs introduced the model of voter participation that many continue to use in various forms to this day. He observed that citizens vote for whatever party they believe will provide them with the highest utility income from government action. Stated simply, citizens vote when the benefits of voting exceed their perceived costs. Most Americans place a high value on voting, yet the 'costs' are often high. Katosh and Traugott (1982) stated that adding convenience factors could significantly change the equation to get citizens to vote. Numerous studies have reinforced this idea that the 'costs' involved with going to the polls remain one of the largest detriments to increasing turnout. Ricker and Ordershook (1968) listed five major forms of gratification that people receive for voting; complying with the social obligations to vote, affirming one's allegiance to the political system, affirming a partisan preference (also referred to as expressive voting or voting for a candidate to express support, not to achieve any

outcome), affirming one's importance to the political system and for those who find politics interesting and entertaining, researching and making a decision. Fowler & Cam, (2007) in an experiment involving altruism using a dictator game came out with the findings that concern for the wellbeing of others is a major factor in predicting turnout and political participation. Apart from the use of an implicit approach which describes voter turnout in terms of demographic, social, economic, cultural, and other factors, a second group of studies examines voter turnout from a rational choice perspective, the rational-choice perspective assumes that individual will make their decisions whether to vote by comparing the expected benefits of voting with its costs.

Aldrich (1993) notes almost all scholars agree with the notion that preference determines political behaviour. By reintegrating politics and economics under a common paradigm and deductive structure, rational choice theory explains how those individual preferences determine behaviour. From the rational-choice prospective voter turnout is a collective action problem in which citizens are asked to sacrifice time and transportation expenses on behalf of a public good, the elected government. The most widely used rational choice model of voter turnout is the calculus-of-voting model developed by Ricker and Ordeshook (1968) which incorporates insights from Down's 1957 classic economic theory of democracy. The calculus-of-voting model consists of a theoretical framework used by a rational voter with preference to decide whether to vote or abstain. Green and Shapiro (1994) indicated that one advantage of the rational-choice perspective over competing explanatory approaches is its ability to estimate the marginal impacts of various factors on voter turnout.

3.5 Markets in Ashaiman

Like other communities, Ashaiman has two main markets; the central market and the Nii Annang Adjor market. In 2016, there was an inauguration by the Ashaiman Municipal Assembly as part of its agenda to facilitate what it describes as local economic development within the municipality and regeneration of the town to build a new market complex. This new market complex is a three-storey building and constructed under a Public Private Partnership agreement between the assembly and the traders. It consists of 72 stores. Under the agreement, the beneficiaries will occupy the facility for 20 years after which ownership would revert to the municipal assembly, but the beneficiaries could continue to operate the stores if they so wish and pay rent to the assembly (Glover, 2016). The two markets mentioned above have all kinds of commodities for sale ranging from vegetables, cereals, oils, tubers, spices, fish and meat products to charcoal. The Nii Annang Adjor market has a decent toilet facility. It was reported in 2017 that Traders in the Ashaiman main market have threatened to demonstrate against the Ashiaman Municipal Assembly (ASHMA) over poor conditions in the market. Their displeasure was concerning bad nature of the floor which was not paved hence creating mud. This makes it difficult for buyers to visit their sheds to buy. Sections of the market women went further to express their due to the fact that they pay a daily levy of 50 Ghana pesewas but were not seeing any real solution to the problem (GNA, 2017).

3.6 Relations between Indigenes and Subjugated Tribes

Ashaiman Constituency is inhabited by several ethnic groups as has already been mentioned but the major ones include Ga-Damgbe, Ewe, Guans, Hausa, Dagomba, Asante, Fante, among others. However, the ethnic group that seems to be prominent or

standout not in terms numbers but in matters concerning political decisions is the Ga-Dangme people. In 2017 a Ga-Dangme Movement in Ashaiman cautioned government against attempts to appoint a non Ga-Dagme as the next Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) for the area under discussion. This was on the back drop of a rumour that one Albert Okyere, an Akan was likely to be chosen for the position. The group's argument was that there are many Ga-Dangme indigenes in Ashaiman who's roles in the ruling government equally qualify to handle the position of MCE (Ansah, 2017). In March the same year, the Ga-Dangme Movement teamed up with the Divisional Council of Ashaiman to reiterate their appeal for the position of MCE to be given to a Ga-Dagme indigene (GNA, 2017)

3.7 Roles of chiefs and religious leaders in democratic elections

Chiefs and religious leaders form part of the stakeholders in Ashaiman. They serve as advisors and coordinate with government and non-government officials in bring both tangible and intangible development. According to the GNA (2012) reported that the then MCE, Numo Adinortey Addison called on the committee in charge of up coming District Level Elections to be well participated by the youth and also religious leaders to advise their members. All these were said in the presence of the Imam who was the Chairman of the Committee who pledged his commitment to the MCE's plea. Similarly, Chiefs formed an integral part of the Division Council and Ga-Dangme movement that appealed to the government of appointment of an indigene to occupy the position (GNA, 2017).

Also, chiefs and Islamic leaders join to support various efforts by social groups to help their communities. An instance is the educational programme embarked on by The Family Health Foundation in their bid to fight against Tuberculosis (TB) in Ashaiman and Nsawam. It was reported that Traditional and Community Leaders comprising; The Chief

of Ashaiman; Nii Ashai, The chief of the Moslem community, the Ewe community, market queens among others helped to mobilize people for screening of suspected TB patients and subsequent education of the general public on the issue.

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to deepen our understanding of the political economy and psychology of individual vote selling decisions. Does the impact of promises differ by type of promise and might some types of promises actually increase the incidence of vote selling? The temptations to sell or buy votes in democratic elections and its potential inimical effects has caught attention of governments, NGOs, and international donors to direct resources towards combating vote buying and vote selling. Some strategies focus on the demand side of the equation making it more difficult for politicians (or vote buyers) to offer money in exchange for a vote. However, such strategies often fall victim to poor implementation and enforcement. As a result, a major focus of anti-vote buying efforts has been on vote sellers. Whether organized by governmental election commissions, or by concerned NGOs, campaigns to reduce the supply of votes available for purchase are common worldwide. Voter-focused campaigns against vote selling tend to fall into two categories.

The first type of campaign urges voters to avoid taking vote buying payments at all. Voters may be asked to make promises or sign pledges to simply eschew taking money from politicians or their agents prior to elections. A second common approach seeks to subvert vote buying by encouraging voters to take the money being offered, but nonetheless vote their conscience. Motivated by both the negative consequences of transactional electoral politics, and by the prevalence of anti-vote-selling efforts. Existing research has established, via natural experiments in a variety of contexts, that electoral malpractices have material influence on election outcomes (Golden & Tiwari, 2009;

Acemoglu, Robinson & Santos, 2009; Baland & Robinson, 2008; Golden, Kramon & Ofosu, 2014). On the specific topic of vote selling, research has shown it to be more prevalent among poor voters (Scott, 1969; Stokes, 2005; Blaydes, 2006; Bratton, 2008), and that parties, candidates and brokers are often strategic regarding which populations they target for vote-buying (Stokes *et al.*, 2013).

This chapter therefore comprises details of the results analyzed from the responses obtained from respondents. It is divided into two sections, namely analysis of demographic information, age range of respondents, areas of residence of voters, occupations of voters, income range of voters and number of times voter has voted. The data were presented using descriptive statistics and thematic analysis.

4.2 Demographic Information

This section of the chapter deals with background of the participants of the study. It comprises variables such as gender, age range, occupation, level of income and number of times voted in national elections.

Table 4.1 Gender of Voters

Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Male	33	73
Female	12	27
Total	45	100

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.1 majority (33) of respondents representing 73% were males while 12 representing 27% were females. Although majority of the respondents were males with

females being minority, it did not have any negative influence on the findings of this study since this research did not focus on gender dimensions of vote selling and its influence on voting behaviour.

Table 4.2 Age Range of Voters

Age Range	Frequency	Percentage
21-30	8	18
31-40	18	40
41-50	12	26
51-60	3	7
Any other age	4	9
Total	45	100

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.2 majority (18) of the respondents fell within 31-40 years representing 40%, 41-50 years formed 26%, 21-30 years comprised 18%, any other ages formed 9% and 51-60 years formed 7%. The findings from Table 4.2 show that majority of the participants were between 31-40 years. This would have an influence on the study because it is possible that they have voted in most of Ghana's national elections since the beginning of the fourth republic (1992).

Table 4.3 Area of Residence of Voters

Residence	Frequency	Percentage
Valco Flat	18	40
Lebanon	12	27
Tulaku	6	13
Zongo	4	9
Lashibi	5	11
Total	45	100

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.3 Eighteen (18) representing 40% reside at Valco Flat main town, 12 representing 27% live at Lebanon, 6 representing 13% live at Tulaku, 4 representing 9% live at Zongo and 5 representing 11% reside at Lashibi. These findings have an influence on the study because all respondents have voted or witnessed voting in national elections in the area of study hence giving them credence to express views about voting or election issue

Table 4.4 Occupations of Voters

Occupation	Frequency	Percentage
Motor Bike Riders	3	7
Shop Keepers	9	20
Truck Pushers	3	7
Drivers	5	11
Market Traders	7	15
Chemical Sellers	4	9
Lotto Agents	4	9
Teachers	2	4
Unemployed	5	11
Any other	3	7
Total	45	100

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.4, Nine (9) respondents representing 20% are shop keepers, 7 respondents representing 15% are market traders, 5 representing 11% are drivers and unemployed separately, 3 representing 7% are motor bike riders, truck pushers and any other occupations, 4 representing 9% are chemical sellers and lotto agents and 2 representing 4% are teachers.

Majority of the respondents are shop keepers from the findings in Table 4.4. This finding would not have an influence on this study because knowledge of or participation in voting or elections do not require any specific criteria of occupation.

Table 4.5 Range of Income of Voters

Income Range (GH¢)	Frequency	Percentage
0 - 300	19	42
301 - 600	9	20
601 - 900	7	16
901 - 1200	5	11
1201 - 1500	4	9
Above 1500	1	2
Total	45	100

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.5 Nineteen (19) respondents representing 42% have an income range of GH¢0-300, 9 representing 20% earn between GH¢301-600, 7 representing 16% earn between GH¢600-900, 5 representing 11% earn between GH¢901-1200, 4 representing 9% earn between GH¢1201-1500 and 1 respondent earn above GH¢1500. This finding has an influence on the study because majority of the respondents earn below GH¢500. Also, such earners are more likely to pay attention to various political issues before casting their vote.

Table 4. 6 Number of Times Voter Has Voted

Number of Times Voted	Frequency	Percentage
Never	1	2
One	2	4
Two	4	9
Three	3	6
Four	9	20
Five	9	20
Six	8	17
Seven	10	22
Total	45	100

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.6 Ten (10) respondents representing 22% have voted in all seven national elections since 1992, 9 representing 20% have voted four times and five times in national elections, 8 representing 17% have voted six times, 4 representing 9% have voted twice, 3 representing 6% have voted thrice, 2 representing 4% have voted only once and 1 respondent representing 2% had never voted in any national election.

Majority of the respondents have voted in most national elections since the beginning of the fourth republic (1992) from the findings in Table 4.6. This finding has an influence on the study in the sense that persons who have voted several times in national elections have adequate knowledge about issues relating to elections or voting before, during and after.

4.3 Main Data

The purpose of this study was to analyze vote selling and its impact on democratic elections. It sought to examine the reasons why voters sell their votes, how vote selling transactions are done, its influence on voting behaviour and its implications for Ghana's democratic dispensation.

4.3.1 Reasons for Vote Selling

Table 4.7 Experience in Vote Selling

Vote Selling Experience	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	15	33
No	30	67
Total	45	100

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.7 Thirty (30) respondents representing 67% had never engaged in vote selling but 15 representing 33% affirmed that they had been involved in vote selling before.

The findings show that majority of respondents have never engaged in vote selling. This does not influence the study because there is a substantial percentage of respondents who have engaged in vote selling before. Also, non-participation in vote selling does not imply lack of knowledge about it.

As part of interviews with voters, they were asked to give reasons why they engaged in selling of votes in exchange for money and or other items. Responses bordered on issues

like low level of income, unfulfilled campaign promises, readiness of politicians to spend on campaigns and others. These are some of their responses:

“When these politicians come to beg us for us to vote for them to win power, they go and sit in parliament and enjoy their money. We don’t see them anymore, they don’t even come here. And so when I realized this I decided to always collect money from them before I vote”. (PV24)

“I think people sell their vote because there is no money in the system. There are so many youth who don’t have work to do and so when it is come to elections they gather themselves together and go and see the politicians. They tell them (politicians) that they can help them win and so they should give them something”. (PV18)

“Before the voting day, I was still in school in Cape Coast University. I just couldn’t travel and come home to cast my vote using my own money. I informed one of my friends back here. He is somebody I knew was close to the politicians. I told him that I had gathered some colleagues in the school who are ready to vote for any of the candidates that was willing to pay our transportation in and out. Eventually, it worked and he sent us hundred cedis each and we came”. (PV30)

One respondent stated that she sells her vote because she is a supporter of the party. She said,

“ I love my party very much. Because of that I take part in almost every campaign in this area. So before we go to the polling station to vote, I can’t go home empty handed. I have to go home with something; I have three children to cater for so I have to demand something for my efforts before I vote. It is not easy to get what you want from these politicians when elections are past”. (PV35)

The findings suggest that a major reason among others for vote selling is absence of politicians when in power and unfulfilled campaign promises. This in line with what some scholars argue as vote buying and other forms of clientelism leading to weakening of standard accountability to the people in democracy (Hicken, 2011; Kitschelt *et al.*, 2010; Lyne, 2007; Stokes, 2005; Stokes *et al.*, 2013). The findings also confirm that in some cases, vote buying may actually be turnout buying (Nitcher, 2008).

4.3.2 How Vote Selling Transactions are conducted

As part of the focal points of this study, respondents were asked about how vote selling transactions are conducted. Responses revealed that voters go to the homes of politicians, speak to their agents among others. These are some of their responses to the interview:

“When we are getting near the election day, I go to his house and tell him, Honourable, I have some guys who are ready to help you win so give me something to share for them so that they will be motivated to vote for you. Because he trusts me, he gives me a lump sum and then I will give small small to the guys and I will pocket the rest”. (PV38)

“When we are getting near the election, I gather a handful of people I know I can convince and then I we go to the honourable’s house very early in the morning and wait for him. When he finally comes we tell him about our support for him and ask him to give us something so that we will vote for him”. (PV27)

“What I have heard is that on the evening before election day or early in the morning of the election day, people will trace the whereabouts of the candidates in order to make their offer of votes in exchange for money or any items. They usually move in groups”. (PV19)

These findings suggest that voters conduct vote selling transactions through agents of candidates, organized groups and personal meetings. Again, the findings agree with Lindberg (2003) because the impression created by respondents in the study suggest that they are entitled to goodies from politicians thus confirming the caption, “its our time to chop”.

4.3.3 Influence of Vote Selling on Voting Behaviour

Table 4.8 Voter Turnout at Polls

Influence of Vote	YES		NO		TOTAL	
Selling on Voting Behaviour	Freq.	Per (%)	Freq.	Per (%)	Freq.	Per (%)
Do you turn up at the polling station after selling your vote?	15	100	0	0	15	100
Did the vote you sold influence your choice of candidate?	14	94	1	6	15	100

Key: Freq. = Frequency, Per (%) = Percentage

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.8, all respondents representing 100% affirmed that they went to the polls to vote after selling their vote. For these respondents who showed up at the polling station to vote, 14 representing 94% said selling their vote did influence their choice of candidates hence they voted for the candidate they sold their vote to. One (1) respondent however said that it did not influence his choice of vote.

From the findings in Table 4.8, majority of voters would go to their various polling stations to vote after selling their vote. Also, majority of those who show up at the polling

station to cast their vote after selling their vote are influenced by the fact that they have sold their vote already hence leading them to honour their end of the transaction.

A follow up question in the interview was posed to respondents. They were asked why they voted for a particular candidate after the vote selling transaction. Their responses touched on obligation to honour promise to candidate, right to vote, hope of better performance and others. These are some of their responses:

“So long as I had collected money from his people, I decided to vote for him”. (PV 11)

“I came back home from school to vote because he agreed to pay for my transportation and so I had to vote for him”. (PV30)

“I went to the polling station to vote for the candidate I took money from. I voted for him because I was able to pay some of my children’s fees. He has helped me so I also helped him”. (PV42)

“Although I had collected something from one candidate through his people, I thought a different candidate would do better in government than him and so I voted for the different candidate”. (PV21)

The findings suggest that most voters would be influenced by vote selling due to a willingness to keep to their end of the transaction between themselves and politicians. Also, this finding supports the argument that vote buying is effective in influencing

people’s choice of candidate in elections (Vicente, 2007) and also energizes the electorate to vote thereby increasing turnout at the polls (Collier & Vicente, 2008). On the contrary, the notion that politicians have a way of checking if indeed voters have voted in the way they pledged did not feature in the findings.

4.3.4 Implications of Vote Selling for Ghana’s Democracy

Table 4.9 Effects of Vote Selling on Ghana’s Democracy

Effects of Vote Selling	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	40	89
No	5	11
Total	45	100

Source: Field Work, 2018

From Table 4.9 forty (40) respondents representing 89% affirmed that vote selling has a negative effect on Ghana’s democracy while 5 representing 11% responded that vote selling has no effect on democracy.

In order to follow up on the effects of vote selling on Ghana’s democratic dispensation, respondents were asked about the kind of effect they think vote selling has or will have on democracy. It was revealed that vote selling leads to unfulfilled campaign promises, absence at the constituency, bad leadership, corruption among others. These are some of the responses to the interview:

“Because these politicians spend a lot of money before people vote for them, when they come to power, they do anything possible to get their

money back so if it is a contract for road they get, they will use about half of the full amount to do it and after a few years the road will develop pot holes”. (PV29)

“Vote selling leads to corrupt leaders. The reason why am saying this is that most of these politicians borrow money from people and banks and so when they come to power they will use any means possible to get their money back to repay their debts”. (PV 05)

“If we have politicians who are so eager to win power by willingly giving money to voters to vote for them, then it is likely that once they win the elections they will misbehave. Meanwhile there are other good candidates who will lose elections because they were not ready to pay money to voters”. (PV18)

“After they have made their big promises and paid money to win elections, they now think they have us in their pocket⁵ and so most of them choose not to honour those promises. They use their power to gather more money for themselves, family members and even grand children”. PV37

From the findings, it is clear that vote selling has negative effects on Ghana’s democracy in terms of larger public deficits and public sector inefficiencies (Hicken & Simmons, 2008; Keefer, 2006, 2007), and higher levels of corruption (Kitschelt Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Keefer, 2007). The findings also confirm that indeed elections in

⁵ A term meaning one has paid off another and so exercises total control or influence over that person.

Ghana are not always determined only by ethnic block voting and swing voters; under hand dealings through vote buying and selling (contrary to the somewhat beautiful picture painted by both domestic and international election observers) are also significant factors (Nugent et al, 2009). Also, citizens who agree to have been in vote-buying exchanges enjoy immediate consequences. Instances are amassing material goods during the transaction, strengthening relationships with influential or generous neighbours and community leaders, and avoiding reprimands by powerful political machines (Gonzalez, Jonge & Nickerson, 2014). In other words, people who choose to cooperate with powerful political machines or parties in the vote buying transaction can avoid punishments such as denial of jobs in employment sectors where those political machines are influential (Kwarisima, 2016).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This study sought to analyse vote selling and its impact on democratic elections in the Ashaiman Constituency. Ghana's 2016 elections has been hailed by national and international observers as a model for Africa. This perception has prevailed despite persistent concerns about 'ethnic block voting' and electoral fraud. Electoral malpractice and vote rigging along ethnic lines in Ghana's virtual two-party system could regain a decisive importance as a 'third force' which could tip the balance in future, possibly coming to represent an even more important factor than the smaller opposition parties. In an attempt to achieve this aim, certain objectives were developed to guide the study Nugent *et al.*, (2009). The objectives were; (a) to examine the reasons why voters sell their votes; (b) to explore how vote selling transactions are conducted; (c) to examine the influence of vote selling on voting behaviour; and (d) to analyse the implications of vote selling for Ghana's democracy.

5.2 Summary of Major Findings

Consecutive democratic elections in Ghana in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016 resulted in three peaceful change of power between the major political parties (in 2000, 2008 and 2016) as well as in continuing enhancements in the performance of its formal institutions, notably the Electoral Commission of Ghana (ECG), the judiciary and security forces. The qualitative results of this study are robust and substantively strong. Individuals who have been approached by a vote-buyer are about 15 percentage points more likely to vote than those who were not approached, suggesting that in Ghana, pre-

election resource transfers are an important driver of voter turnout. I also find evidence that the least educated citizens are those whose decision to vote is most influenced by selling their vote, while I estimate that vote selling has no effect on the likelihood that a highly educated person will vote. These results suggest that education and learning might mediate the impact of vote selling on individual behaviour which falls in line with the study conducted by Bratton (2013).

Their study revealed that voters sell their votes because of failure of politicians to fulfill their campaign promises, low level of income, readiness of politicians to spend money on campaigns and their strong support for the party. The study also explored how vote selling transactions are conducted. From the study, it was established that voters approach politicians in their homes, voters approach agents of politicians; they organize themselves to meet politicians and agents mediating between other voters and politicians. The study again established that vote selling does influence voting behaviour since 15 respondents confirmed that they did make a pledge to receive handouts or material gifts before going to the polls to vote. Although the 15 respondents representing 33% are in the minority and 30 respondents representing 67% replied no, there is an element of vote selling which is emerging in the democratic space. This implies that elections in Ghana are evolving to a point where vote markets will be established for open transactions. These respondents further explained that after receiving the money or gift they voted for those candidates.

This study therefore falls in line with the study conducted by Agomor and Adams (2014) into democratic politics and voting behavior in Ghana. They note that a comparison of the ranking of the factors and analysing the factors independently provided a lot more intelligence about the factors. For example, only 14 respondents indicated that getting

gifts from candidates and 27 respondents indicated ethnic background were the most important when they ranked the factors together. However, when they were asked to discuss the factors individually, the responses were very different; on the issue of gifts, the figure increased from 14 to 651 respondents, 1,009 for campaign message, 1,032 for education, 932 for health policy, and 918 for employment provision.

Overall, rating the factors individually and collectively suggests that voting behaviour is mediated by many complex and dynamic factors (Goodman and Murray, 2007). A further analysis of the voting patterns of card and non-card bearing members also indicates that over 80% of card-holding members and about 70% of non-card holding members voted for the same party over the study period. This is relevant in light of the fact that 57% of respondents reported that they do identify with a political party. Also a change from the respondents who collected gift from 14 to 605 vindicates the findings of this research that there are incidence of vote selling in the Ashaiman Constituency.

More so, Nugenet *et al.*, (2009) note that irrespective of the disappointing experiences in the recent past with rigged elections in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, the bloody ethnic clashes in the aftermath of the Kenyan elections, and coups in Guinea and Mauretania, international observers naturally displayed an interest in looking for a contrasting successful example of free and fair elections. Their overall evaluation of the Ghanaian election 2008 reflected these subliminal considerations. Overriding concerns about political stability in the sub-region and conflict prevention, in view of the volatile political situation in neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, may have enhanced this predilection. This study sought to analyze the implications of vote selling for Ghana's democracy. The study found that vote selling leads to unfulfilled campaign promises,

wrong or non performing politicians elected and high levels of corruption in government due to the need to recoup campaign costs.

5.3 Conclusion

Nugenet *et al.*, (2009) study establish that Ghana's process of democratization is more advanced than in many other countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Already in the past, swing voting was in general significant enough to produce changes of government. In addition, it has become more difficult for individuals and political parties to cheat in Ghana's elections despite persistent voting irregularities and widespread abuse of incumbency. Nevertheless, neglected or unrecognized electoral fraud and a history of impunity – underwritten by 'ethnicity' in already volatile constituencies and regions of decisive importance for the general outcome of the polls - could encourage large scale electoral fraud in future elections. This poses a threat and destabilizing factor in Ghana's democratization process.

This study, concludes that the major reason why people sell their vote is to get all the money or items they can get from politicians before they (politicians) become scarce; thus refuse to honor their campaign promises. This study also concludes that vote selling transactions are conducted through agents of politicians who use it as a way of making money for themselves. Apart from this strategy, some voters organize themselves to meet politicians for sale of votes and others do so individually. It can be concluded that vote selling influences voting behaviour. It motivates voters to go to polling stations and vote for candidates they sold their vote to as a way of honouring the contract.

This study therefore concludes that vote selling has dire consequences on the democratic dispensation of Ghana. The major ones are unfulfilled campaign promises, and corrupt leadership. In general, development will be retarded with vote selling going on.

5.4 Recommendations

This study recommends that a serious public education is embarked on by the EC, NCCE and all other stakeholders concerning electoral rules across the length and breadth of the country with special attention to vote selling and vote buying. This should be intensified in the run up to every election. By consensus, the Inter Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) could agree for their various political parties to campaign against vote selling and vote buying during their campaigns. Again, an effort should be made to let constituents/voters understand that the core business of MPs is to legislate rather than embark on development projects in their constituencies. This would help take off the burden of making campaign promises that aspirants know not how to fulfill in the run up to elections.

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APPENDIX 1

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR VOTERS

Dear Respondent,

Request To Complete Questionnaire or Answer the Oral Interview

I am a graduate student of the Institute of African Studies in the University of Ghana, Legon. I am presently carrying out a research on “An Analysis of Voting Selling and its Impact on Democratic Elections in the Ashaiman Constituency”.

You are requested to kindly help by participating in this oral interview as honest as possible. Your responses will be useful in this research, treated as confidential and will be used only for the purpose of the research. No attempt will be made to disclose any information given. Please be as accurate as possible to enable the researcher get valid information.

Thank you for your cooperation

Section A: Demographic Information

1. Kindly tell me your age
2. Which area of Ashaiman do you live?
3. Please tell me what you do for a living
4. What is the range of your earnings in a month?
5. How many times have you participated in national elections in Ghana?

Section B: Reasons Why Voters Sell Their Vote

6. Have you ever offered to vote for any politician in exchange for money or any other item(s)?
7. Kindly tell me more about it

8. Please, are there any other reasons you would want to add?

Section C: How Vote Selling Transactions Are Conducted

9. Please tell me, how did the whole procedure of vote selling happen?

10. Kindly explain to me how the people you sold your vote to ensure that you voted for them.

11. Please, is there any thing else you would want to add

Section D: Influence of Vote Selling on Voting Behaviour

12. Did you go to the polling station to vote on the Election Day after receiving the money or item(s)?

13. If yes, please tell me why

14. When you got to the voting center, kindly tell me how you voted?

15. Kindly tell me the reasons why you voted for the one you voted.

16. Please, are there any other reasons you want to add?

Section E: Implications of Vote Selling for Ghana's Democracy

17. Do you believe that people selling their vote is a good practice?

18. Please explain further.

19. What effects do you think this practice has on Ghana's democracy?

20. Kindly explain further.

21. Please is there anything else you would want to add?