UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

ASSESSEMENT OF GHANA'S DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT INITIATIVES FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Emmanuel Enos hereby declare that this research is entirely my own work conducted under the supervision of Professor Joseph Teye, Professor Stephen O. Kwankye and Dr. Delali Badasu. The submission of this thesis s for the award of a PhD degree in Migration Studies at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana. As far as I am aware, no part of this work has been published or submitted for another degree elsewhere. I further declare that excerpts and references from other sources have been duly acknowledged. In the collection of qualitative data, all the interviews conducted for the purpose of this research, have been cited correctly. Participants' work, proposals or quotes have been properly cited without attempting to make it my own.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my dear spouse, Mrs. Naomi Akita-Enos and our children. Mrs. Enos' sustained encouragement and sacrifices have been pivotal to the timely completion of this work. I am deeply appreciative of her unwavering support.

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ABSTRACT

Diaspora engagement initiatives, often in the form of policies and programmes, are geared towards fostering the necessary linkages with the diaspora community and extracting some obligations for the development of their countries of origin. Empirical evidence has shown that there is a growing interest in the migration literature on the need to examine the efficacy of these diaspora engagement initiatives for national development. Drawing on Gamlen's diaspora engagement typology and positioned in the USA, UK and Qatar, the study undertook an assessment of Ghana's diaspora engagement initiatives to enhance their participation in the economy. Specifically, it examined the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of Ghanaian diaspora in the study countries: described the major diaspora engagement initiatives implemented over the past three decades in Ghana; examined the experiences and views of the Ghanaian diaspora on governments' diaspora engagement initiatives as well as their participation in the diaspora programmes. The study relied on a mixed-method approach for its data collection. A total of 390 respondents were sampled. A questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews were conducted with respondents and institutional heads. One of the findings showed that just the extension of rights and privileges to the diaspora may not enhance diaspora participation in national development. lack of awareness of engagement policies and bilateral social security agreements between Ghana and the host countries, for instance, may continue to hinder diaspora engagement. The study concludes that while the Ghanaian diaspora engagement initiatives have had positive impact on national development in terms of remittances, investment, philanthropy and skills and knowledge transfer there are challenges in the implementation of these diaspora initiatives, including the symbolic nation building programmes and rights and privileges which inhibit active participation of the diaspora in the Ghanaian economy.

The study therefore recommends that attention should be paid to diaspora consultation, institutional funding, and effective implementation plan and stakeholder consultation.

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ACP	-	African Caribbean and Pacific
ACP-EU	-	African Caribbean and Pacific and European Union
AIR	-	African Union's Institute of Remittances
AU	-	African Union
CMS	-	Centre for Migration Studies
DAB	-	Diaspora Affairs Bureau
ECA	-	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
EU	-	European Union
FDI	-	Foreign Direct Investment
FGD	-	Focus Group Discussions
GCC	-	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCIM	-	Global Commission on International Migration
GDHS	-	Ghana Diaspora Celebration and Homecoming Summit
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GFMD	-	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GHS	-	Ghana Cedis
GIT	-	German Technical Cooperation
GIZ	-	German Society for International Cooperation
GNI	-	Gross National Income
GNP	-	Gross National Product
GSS	-	Ghana Statistical Service
GTA	-	Ghana Tourism Authourity
HCD-		United Nations High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development
HDI	-	Human Development Index
HTAs	-	Homecoming Associations
ICMPD	-	Centre for Diaspora Policy Development

IOM	-	International Organization for Migration
IRAC	-	Immigration Reform and Control Act
LMIC	-	Low- and Middle-Income Countries
LNG	-	Liquified Natural Gas
MDA	-	Millennium Development Goals
MFA&RI	-	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration
MIDA	-	Migration for Development in Africa
MIEUX	-	Migration EU Expertise
NACD	-	North American and Caribbean Diaspora
PANAFEST	-	Pan African Festival of Arts and Culture
PHD	-	Doctor of Philosophy
PPP	-	Purchasing Power Parity
PVOs	-	Private and Voluntary Organizations
QATARLUM	-	Qatar Aluminium Company
RAD	-	Rockefeller Foundation-Aspen Institute Diaspora Program
ROPAA	-	Representation of Peoples Amendment Act
SDGs	-	Sustainable Developmental Goals
STEM	-	Science, Technology, Engineers and Mathematics
TRQN II	-	Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals II
UAE	-	United Arab Emirates
UK	-	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	-	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	-	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
USA	-	United States of America
USAID	-	United Nations Agency for International Development

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

In spite of the common problems created by emigration such as shortage of labour, brain drain and declining productivity in areas of origin (Ajaero and Onokala, 2013), there is some evidence to show that international migration can positively contribute to economic development in both sending and receiving countries, if properly managed (Murrugarrat et al., 2011; Awumbila et al., 2014; Teye et al., 2017).

On the other hand, poor management of migration can lead to an erroneous perception of migrants being a security threat, or a threat to the cultural identity of host countries (Dumont, 2007; Fadayomi, 2010), or putting excessive pressure on the local job market. Also, migrants are sometimes accused of exacting pressure on social amenities and other public facilities of host countries, triggering undue competition for scarce resources (London School of Economics, 2007). Without doubt, emigration has historically been viewed as a "barometer of the success or failure of national economic development strategies" (Boyle and Kitchin 2016: 315). Accordingly, when a country loses its human capital through brain drain, it reflects a failure of the strategies being pursued by that country (Boyle and Kitchin, 2016).

Conversely, good migration governance can benefit the countries of origin, destination and the migrants themselves, including their families (Adepoju, 2010; Economic Commission for Africa, 2006; Siddiqui, 2005; Sriskandarajah, 2005). That many countries of origin – including many in Africa, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Egypt benefit immensely from remittance is beyond dispute (Kiiru, 2010; Dumont, 2007; Usher, 2005). Additionally, homelands can benefit from skills transfer (Dumont, 2007: Serut, 2006) and sometimes, political change (Usher, 2005). According to Ghai (2004), migrants and their

families can also benefit from higher incomes and access to better health care and education abroad.

Studies suggest that destination countries can potentially benefit from migration through supplementation of domestic labour, filling gaps of specialized skills and the bringing of fresh ideas, entrepreneurship, energy and determination (Adepoju, 2010; Dumont, 2007; Fadayomi, 2010). Indeed, there is now a growing list of studies on the important role played by the diaspora in the economic development of their countries (Newland, 2013; Teye et al., 2017; Dumont 2007; and Adepoju, 2010). Contributions of the diaspora impact positively on the economic development of their countries of origin or ancestry (Newland, 2013). Many of such countries have successfully transitioned from a regime of "brain drain" to "brain gain" or "brain circulation", especially in their health and education sectors (Teye et al., 2017). This has been achieved by mobilizing their diaspora experts for knowledge transfer to such critical sectors as health, education and information technology.

Countries are now developing policies and programmes that deal with migration issues and interests of people in the diaspora (Gamlen, 2006; Teye et al, 2017). The past decade has, therefore, witnessed the establishment of migrant institutions by governments to support migration and development initiatives (Agunias, 2009).

Diaspora engagement initiatives are policies and programmes developed at the global, regional and national levels to foster the necessary linkages with diaspora communities (Mangala, 2017). At the global level, there have been a number of initiatives, processes and fora aimed at maximizing the development impact of migration (Mangala, 2017). The establishment of the United Nations Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) in 2003 by the then Secretary General laid the foundation for the current round

of global consultations within the context of the United Nations High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HCD) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). These Global Forums have the mandate to address the complex nature of international migration which has become a transcendent aspect of globalization, affecting every multilateral institution (Newland, 2013).

In 2015, for the first time in its history, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution incorporating migration into its 2030 Agenda. That is, the UN Development Framework for its member states, popularly known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs consist of 17 goals and 169 targets to end poverty, protect the planet and promote peace and security (IOM, 2018). At least 10 of the 169 targets include references to migration, mobility or migrants (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015).

Again, in December 2018, the United Nations adopted an agreement on global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration- in Marrakech, Morocco. The global compact is the first inter-governmentally negotiated agreement to cover all aspects of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner. It is based on the following principles, among others; people-centered international cooperation, national sovereignty, sustainable development, human rights and gender sensitivity.

Some of its objectives are to collect and utilize accurate and processed data for evidence-based policies, minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country, provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration, ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation, enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration, facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work , address and reduce

vulnerabilities in migration, establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits (Global Compact for Migration, 2018a). The objectives are envisioned to better manage migration at local, national, regional and global levels (Global Compact for Migration, 2018b).

Apart from the multilateral migration governance system, diaspora engagement policies have also gained much traction among government policy makers, academics, migration communities and international organizations (Mensah et al., 2018). Unlike countries such as China, India, South Korea and the Philippines which have indeed, taken steps to develop policies to harness the development potential of their diaspora and achieve global competitiveness (Saxenian, 2002a; 2002b: Okoth, 2003; Davies, 2007), many African nations have been slow in appreciating and taking advantage of the benefits of diaspora contributions to national development beyond remittances (Davies, 2007). There is growing evidence that Africa is endowed with a sizeable expatriate African population with a potentially exploitable resource that can contribute immensely towards the development of the African continent (Davies, 2007).

A report by Ratha et al. (2011), suggests that in 2010, the remittances African diaspora sent to their homelands amounted to about US$ 40 billion. This was only about a fraction of their wealth, leaving an untapped potential in private financial flows (Terrazas, 2010). In 2016, remittance flows to Africa went up to USD 65 billion (AIR Report, 2016). The African Union, recognizing the development potential of the African diaspora, endorsed diaspora engagement as a strategic priority (African Diaspora Summit, 2012). It has anchored the diaspora engagement agenda within the provisions of its long-term development framework, Agenda 2063, and expressly declared in its Constitutive Act, Article 3 (9) that it shall “invite and encourage the full participation of the African

Diaspora as an important part of the African continent in the building of the African Union" (African Diaspora Summit, 2012).

In Ghana as in other African countries, the contribution of the diaspora to the country's development is increasingly being recognized (Awumbila and Teye, 2014). The Ghanaian diaspora has been consistent in sending remittances to the country (Bank of Ghana, 2008), while at the same time playing a major role in the socio-economic development of Ghana, through investment, knowledge transfer and promotion of tourism (Alhassan, 2015). Statistics from the Bank of Ghana on remittances flow to Ghana indicate an appreciable growth from US$449 million in 1999 to US$1.8 billion in 2008 (Bank of Ghana, 2009). In 2010, the figure increased to USD2.1 billion and then more than doubled to nearly US$5.0 billion in 2015 (Bank of Ghana, 2016). In 2017 and 2018, the remittances flow to Ghana were estimated to be US$ 3.56 billion and US$3.8 billion respectively (Bank of Ghana, 2019). These figures do not include remittances sent through informal channels that are also believed to be appreciable (Quartey, 2009; Arhinful et al., 2013; Teye, 2016). Page and Plaza (2006) have long argued that 73 per cent of total remittances in sub- Saharan Africa is not recorded.

Throughout Ghana's history, successive governments have adopted several programmes and legislative instruments to strengthen the country's relationship with its diaspora (Alhassan, 2010; Awumbila and Teye, 2014). More recently, such programmes and policies include the drafting of the Diaspora-Engagement Policy (yet to be finalized for adoption by Cabinet), and the establishment of the then Diaspora Affairs Bureau, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, in 2012 (MFA &RI, 2015) and the Diaspora Office in 2017, under the Office of the President Ghana (Diaspora Affairs, 2018). Currently, there is a Diaspora Affairs Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

Regional Integration coordinating with the Diaspora Affairs Office, Jubilee House (Diaspora Affairs, 2018).

This study is aimed at examining the strengths and weaknesses of the diaspora engagement policies and programmes of successive governments in Ghana from the perspectives of the Ghanaian diaspora for a better understanding of their effectiveness and impact on national development.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In recent years, there has been a heightened interest in the potential contribution of migrants and diasporas to the development in their countries of origin (Brown, 2013: Boyle and Kitchin, 2014). This has resulted in a growing interest in the formulation of policies by sending and receiving countries, such as Argentina, Armenia, China, Chile, El Savador, Ghana, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia as well as Australia, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand and Scotland respectively, to enhance diaspora participation in their economies (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014).

The concomitant surge in studies on the role of migrants in development is a manifestation of the complex nature of the relationship between migration and development. Undoubtedly, the renewed interest has generated a vast array of academic and policy literature (Delano and Gamlen, 2014; Gamlen, 2014; Boyle and Kitchin, 2014) as well as Conference initiatives and programmes including the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development and the Inter-governmental Global Forum on Migration and Development (Mangala, 2017). The new scholarship has shifted the paradigm to the consideration of a more positive relationship between migration and development than what existed in the 1970s and 1980s (de Haas, 2008; Bakewell, 2008; Bakewell, 2016).

Though the increased attention to the migration-development nexus has emphasized activities that can bolster the contribution of migration to development by receiving States, international organizations and development agencies (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014; Gamlen, 2014), less attention has been paid to the strategies by governments in countries of origin to enhance the contribution of migrants towards development. However, studies have shown that migrants can only contribute positively if homeland governments work with destination countries to protect their rights, provide consular protection and welfare services and obtain their social security benefits on their return to their countries (Gamlen, 2006: Ostergaard-Nielson, 2016). The focus of this study is therefore on the diaspora engagement policies and their implementation as perceived and experienced by the Ghanaian diaspora, using the Gamlen framework (2006) which is on diaspora-state engagement and outcomes.

Moreover, the bulk of the growing literature on migration has focused on emerging trends in diaspora and development policies, with few studies specifically evaluating the impact of government policies on diaspora-homeland interactions in order to gain a detailed insight into how they may influence diaspora engagement (Meulen, 2016). On the few studies where the impact of diaspora engagement policies on development has been examined, the sources of primary data collection have largely been from State officials, relegating the migrants themselves to the background (Meulen, 2016). This study seeks to contribute to the literature in this area by employing a research strategy which relies on a bottom-up approach to policy adoption and implementation. Thus, the present study pays special attention to the experiences, views and challenges of members of the Ghanaian diaspora vis- a-vis the implementation of Ghana's national diaspora initiatives over the years.

A critical look at the studies in Ghana on migration and development nexus suggests that many authors in the country have concentrated on areas such as remittances (Quartey, 2006, 2009, 2011: Ajaero and Onokala, 2013); labour migration (Baah Boateng and Baffour-Awuah, 2015: Baah Boateng and Ewusi, 2013); state and non-state engagement mechanism with the Ghanaian diaspora (Awumbilla and Teye, 2014); human mobility (Agyemang and Setrana, 2014); international migration and development in Ghana and West Africa (Manuh and Asante, 2005); and return migration (Mazzucato, 2007, Setrana, 2013), with few assessing the Ghanaian diaspora engagement mechanisms. Awumbilla and Teye (2014); Alhassan (2014); and Teye et al. (2017) are among the few authors that have assessed the Ghanaian diaspora engagement initiatives.

Notwithstanding the useful insights offered by the previous studies, most of them relied on secondary data or qualitative data. The present study seeks to complement the earlier studies by using a mixed-methods design to examine views of Ghanaians living abroad about the implementation of the diaspora engagement programmes.

In Ghana, despite the many engagement policies and programmes introduced by successive governments the country has achieved limited success in implementing sustainable diaspora programmes (Alhassan, 2010: Awumbila & Teye, 2014). Studies have also shown that the nature of Ghana's relationship with the diaspora is not adequately explored by researchers and government-led efforts have been inconsistent, unsustainable and not driven by a national policy consensus (Teye, et al., 2017).

The unsuccessful implementation of diaspora initiatives has therefore been attributed in part to the lack of a comprehensive, inclusive and well-structured diaspora engagement policy which will guide state institutions in their engagement with the diaspora (MFA&RI, Diaspora Policy, 2016). Until the development of the national diaspora

engagement policy, the country would continue to implement ad-hoc policies and programmes with no clear-cut strategies and attainable targets for an effective engagement (Teye, et al., 2017). This study seeks to fill this lacuna by presenting evidence-based findings and recommendations on a broad spectrum of diaspora activities for a successful policy implementation.

Though there are many studies on remittances in Ghana, since 2001, governments have been seized with efforts to solve some lingering challenges in the transfer market by providing the needed enabling framework to enhance transfer of money from the diaspora to Ghana. According to Quartey (2009), less than 50 per cent of remittances to Ghana is sent through formal channels. In filling this gap, the present study explores the perceptions, experiences and challenges of the diaspora regarding remittances, among other policies and programmes, to offer policy recommendations aimed at sanitizing the transfer market.

Other important challenges requiring in-depth exploration for solutions include how to harness the critical skills that the diaspora brings to the country, with the prevailing labour supply-demand gap of critical skills of professionals, technicians and associate professionals (Baah Boateng and Ewusi, 2013). Such diaspora engagement challenges can only adequately be addressed by directly engaging with diaspora to embed their own perspectives in any meaningful government-led endeavour. There is also the challenge of how to provide the diaspora with the opportunity to take part in governance of the country (Teye et al., 2017). These are all issues needing urgent research and the current study sought to fill these gaps in the literature.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of this study is to examine the experiences, views and challenges of Ghana's diaspora engagement initiatives in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the State of Qatar to shape the national discourse on diaspora's contribution in Ghana's development. The specific objectives are:

i. To examine the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of Ghanaian diaspora in the United States, the United Kingdom and the State of Qatar.
ii. To analyze the major diaspora engagement initiatives implemented over the past three decades in Ghana.
iii. To examine the experiences, views and challenges of the Ghanaian diaspora on governments' diaspora engagement initiatives.
iv. To make policy recommendations based on the findings of the study.

1.4 Research Questions

The study seeks to answer the following questions:

(i) What is the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the Ghanaian diaspora in the United States, the United Kingdom and the State of Qatar?

(ii) What are the major diaspora engagement initiatives implemented over the past three decades in Ghana?

(iii) What are the experiences, views and challenges of the Ghanaian diaspora on government's diaspora engagement initiatives?

(iv) What are the measures that can promote effective harnessing of the resources of the Ghanaian diaspora for national development?

1.5 Hypotheses

Three main hypotheses would be tested to firm up the empirical base of the study; and these are:

1.Null Hypothesis (H0): Marital status has no significant effect on migrant's participation in conferences and cultural events.

Alternate Hypothesis (H1): Marital status has significant effect on migrant's participation in conferences and cultural events.

2. Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant relationship between remittance transfers and migrant's citizenship.

Alternate Hypothesis (H1): There is a statistically significant relationship between remittance transfers and migrant's citizenship.

3. Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no statistically significant relationship between migrant's country of residence and sending of philanthropic goods.

Alternate Hypothesis (H1): There is a statistically significant relationship between migrant's country of residence and sending of philanthropic goods.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The findings from this study will provide insights for the formulation of strategies by the Government of Ghana to enhance the participation of the diaspora in the economy. Ghana is yet to adopt a diaspora policy document to guide its engagement with the diaspora and this study could assist the policy makers in their formulation of a comprehensive policy framework and implementation plan for national development. The study will provide

better understanding of the experiences, views and challenges of the Ghanaian diaspora and their formal and informal institutions for effective diaspora policy implementation. Finally, the study could serve as an important baseline document which other African policy makers could rely on to develop their own diaspora engagement policies.

1.7 Organization of the Study

The study is divided into eight chapters. Chapter one provides the background to the study. Chapter two reviews the relevant literature and discusses the conceptual framework of the study. Chapter three examines the key diaspora engagement policies and programmes in Ghana and provides background information on migration of Ghanaians to the three study sites – that is USA, UK and the State of Qatar, while Chapter four focuses attention on the methodology of the study. Chapter five evaluates the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the study population while chapter six examines the Ghanaian diaspora's participation in engagement programmes. The penultimate chapter analyzes the views, experiences and challenges of the Ghanaian diaspora on government's engagement initiatives. The concluding chapter (chapter eight) offers a summary of the major findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the literature review and conceptual framework for the study. It starts by discussing some conceptual perspectives on diaspora engagement initiatives and the contribution of diaspora transnational activities to development. It highlights the criteria for assessing diaspora engagement initiatives on national development. The chapter also discusses the theoretical framework for the study. In the process, the conceptual model and a critique of Gamlen's (2006) typology were highlighted.

2.2 Conceptual Perspectives on Diaspora Engagement Initiatives

2.2.1. Definition of Diaspora

As indicated by Cohen (2007), the word 'diaspora' is derived from the Greek preposition "dia" (across or over) and verb "speiro" or "seperien" (to sow or scatter). The ancient Greeks referred to diaspora as migration and colonization. Over the years, the term 'diaspora' has acquired different meanings to different groups of people. The term "diaspora" was originally used to describe the situation of Jews in exile (Cohen, 2007). In that context, for Jews, Africans, Palestinians and Armenians, at different times in their history, diaspora conveyed "a collective trauma, a banishment, where one dreamed about home, but lived in exile" (Cohen, 2007). More recently, the concept of diaspora (Adamson and Demetriou (2007:492) is "used in social sciences across different disciplines as a means of studying the relationship between territorially defined forms of political organization and control, and the articulation and mobilization of political identification".

In this context, diaspora is commonly defined as "migrants who maintain a strong attachment to their homeland" (Cohen, 1997: 515). Adamson and Demetriou (2007) expand this definition further to include the fact that the diaspora would usually exist as a social collectivity that spans across State borders. In his provision of different strands to the definition of diaspora, Cohen (1997:515) identifies common features of diaspora, including "a collective memory and myth about the homeland, its location, history and achievements".

Notwithstanding these common features, other scholars such as Barabantseva and Sutherland (2011) cautioned that diaspora should not be considered as homogenous actors since not all migrants belong to a diaspora. They explained that one would not find all migrants identifying and engaging with their country of origin. Rather than seeing them as a bounded entity, Brubaker (2005) proposes that society should view diaspora as an idiom, a stance and a claim as well as a category of practice for the purpose of analysis.

Choi (2003) asserts that the term diaspora could be understood in the context of three historical perspectives: original, classical and contemporary. He argues that in their coinage of the original term, the ancient Greeks likened it to conquest, migration and expanding colonization. Classical diaspora pertains to the practice of forceful ejection of people from their homelands to places of exile (example, Jews, early Christians, Palestinians and Africans). In respect of contemporary diaspora, the term assumes a much broader meaning and assists in enhancing our understanding of migrations, cultural differences and other intrinsic qualities in our contemporary global society (Choi 2003).

Historically, there have been two main perspectives from which the issue of diaspora has sprung up: the perspective of diaspora common features (Cohen, 1997, Safran, 1991) and typologies (Bruneau, 1995: Cohen, 1997). With regard to the list of diaspora common

features, Safran (1991) proposes a list of six core features that define diasporas: dispersion from multiple locations; retention of a vision of their original homeland; lack of full acceptance by their host society; regard for the homeland as their ultimate destination; commitment to uphold or restore their homeland and maintenance of a continued relationship with their homeland.

On typologies, Cohen (1997) groups diasporans in terms of motives for leaving the origin countries: refugee/victim diaspora include Jews, Africans, Americans, Palestinians, and Irish, who were forced to leave their homelands; labour or service diaspora such as Chinese, Indians and Japanese workers who left their countries for farming or construction; imperial or colonial diasporas who sprung out of colonial activities by European empires; trade or commerce diasporas who developed out of migration for trading activities and remained in a particular country based on trading agreements; and cultural diasporas who include people from other diasporas joining their cultures into a simple culture (Example, the people from the Caribbean).

In the African context, McGown, (1999) explains that 'diaspora' was often linked with the issue of slavery. Other Scholars such as Bonnet and Watson (1990); Conniff (1994); Harris (1993); Jalloh et al. (1997); and Segal (1995) had earlier also suggested that the original African diaspora arose from the dispersal of Africans as a result of the slave trade and described the diaspora as 'black diaspora'.

In contrast, Koser (2003) signaled a new African diaspora away from the catastrophic and involuntary dispersal in the form of slavery. The new African diaspora is generally defined as 'emigrants' and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry either on a temporary or permanent basis and yet maintain effective ties to their country of origin (Koser 2003).

On its part, the African Union (AU, 2005, cited in Bakewell, 2008: 5-27) defines the African diaspora as "People of African origin living outside the continent irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union". The African Union (2004) presented another definition of the African diaspora to include the geographical dispersal of peoples whose ancestors within historical memory, originally came from Africa but who are currently domiciled, or claim residence or citizenship, outside the continent of Africa. Given such complexities in the definition of the African diaspora, Butters (2000: 125-139) wrote that "Conceptualizations of diaspora must be able to accommodate the reality of multiple identities and phases of diasporization over time".

The movement of Africans within the continent and elsewhere has been engendered by some factors. One of the early factors was the incidence of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade (from 1520-1860) which forcibly removed millions of Africans from their homes especially in West Africa (Ankomah et al., 2012). More recently, Africans also had the occasion to migrate from the continent *en masse* to seek greener pastures in many parts of the world due to the economic downturn in the 1970s and 1980s (Ankomah et al., 2012). In addition, mass movements from the continent could be attributed to political instability, civil conflicts and natural disasters (Adepoju, 1998) which are still ongoing into the 21st century.

In spite of the long history of emigration of Ghanaians to various destination countries, the term 'diaspora' gained its currency in Ghana in the mid-1980s, when the Ghanaian emigrants in the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and The Netherlands started forming associations based on ethnic and religious affiliations (Anarfi et al., 2003). The initial aim of these associations was to protect themselves and mobilize resources for the development of their hometowns. As the group networks became

resonated with time, Ghanaians in other destination countries also formed various associations for mutual consular and economic support and development back home.

For a more structured, sustainable and proactive diaspora engagement effort, Ghana's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MFA&RI) upon the establishment of a nascent Diaspora Unit in 2012 which was later upgraded in 2014 into a fully-fledged Bureau, adopted the African Union definition of the diaspora to include all people of Ghanaian origin, ancestry and history living outside the country, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development and building of the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, 2012). Thus, this study employs the term 'diaspora' generally to highlight the diversity of the people with a sense of common identity and belonging to Ghana by virtue of their ancestry lines and willingness to contribute to the development and building of the country.

Diaspora engagement is defined as "a process by which the State, working with various governmental and non-governmental institutions, groups, and individuals, seeks to mobilize the goodwill and resources of its emigrants for national development, and implicitly for the mutual benefit of citizens in the homeland and in the diaspora" (Mensah et al 2018:3).

2.2.2 Development

The term development assumes different meanings depending on the specific scientific branch using it. The most common definition of 'development' is a change towards a positively specified goal (Newland 2013). According to Okoli (2003:15), "the western and classical concept of development is based on two amorphous concepts, namely, modernization and political development". Some of the earlier proponents of the

modernization concept include Almond and Powell (1966), Myrdal (1968), Parsons (1969), Whitaker (1970), Leonard et al. (1966), Rostow (1961), Seers (1977) and Todaro (1992). Modernization concept sees development as the upward movement of the entire social system. To these scholars, modernization involves increase in productivity, social and economic equalization, modern knowledge and policy systems that can engender favourable environment for growth.

The key criticism to their proposition has been their failure to acknowledge the importance of human factor in the concept of development. This apparent flaw in their definition was clarified by Mabogunje (1981), when he indicated that the key to development lies in the minds of humans in the institutions upon which their thinking finds expression and in the interplay of opportunities in ideas and institutions. Nnoli (1981) and Ake (1996) corroborate this viewpoint in their respective scholarships.

In more recent studies, the notion of 'development' has "evolved over time and like the term 'diaspora', many scholars have provided varied definitions and interpretations (Banks & Hulme, 2014). In an attempt to explain the interrelationship between economic growth or economic development and human development, Ranis (2004:3) argues that "greater freedom and capabilities improve economic performance and human development will have an important effect on growth. Similarly, to the extent that increased incomes will increase the range of choices and capabilities enjoyed by households and governments, economic growth will enhance human development". Brinkerhoff (2012) has posited that development is the process and capacities that improve peoples' and communities' assets and quality of life. In other words, the process should contribute to economic (material assets), political (good governance), or social development (for example, health, education and civic values) (Brinkerhoff, 2012).

It is worthy of note that whereas some scholars have focused on poverty reduction as a development outcome (Banks and Hulme, 2014), others such as Peet and Hartwick (2015) have relied on economic growth, which happens to be more conventional. The latter measure the development outcomes in gross national income (GNI) and per capita income terms. However, critics have observed that measuring countries' development with average per capita figures may be flawed as they divert attention from the reality of unequal income distribution within a country.

Development became synonymous with economic growth in the mid-twentieth century. However, the change in interpretation of development from the economic growth perspective came about during the 1970s and 1980s. Gross National Product (GNP) per capita as a measurement of development was now criticized and social indicators of development became a preferred option (Newland, 2013, Banks and Hulme, 2014).

This study did not attempt to engage in value- judgement of the various definitions. Rather, it has sought to explain what development is in a modest, coherent and concise manner as much as possible. In this study, a 'human development' perspective is adopted and development is thus defined as a process of improving the overall quality of life as well as the range of opportunities available. Eventually, the adopted definition takes into account the pursuant of all avenues to improve a person's opportunities which include improvement such as better health outcomes, wide access to education and social services, environmental sustainability, greater gender equality, political and human rights and poverty reduction (Nonnenmacher, 2010).

The primary focus of the study is not to measure poverty levels or rank human development index (HDI) and quality of life, but views development as human directed and sustained socio-economic and political transformation of one's self and the basic

structures of society from a relatively lower level in terms of quality and quantity to an appreciably improved form as proposed by Mabogunje (1981); Nnoli (1981); and Ake (1996).

2.2.3 Diaspora and Development

In the 1950s and 1960s, the literature on migration and development focused on migration in developing countries. Today, the scholarship has changed, emphasizing the relationship between migration and development in a holistic view (Bakewell, 2016). Migration was largely seen by development scholars as a negative consequence of underdevelopment. Brain drain, which refers to the loss of highly skilled workers in countries of origin was highlighted as one of the characteristics of international migration. A paradigm shift in this view occurred in the middle of the 1990s when scholars within different strands of disciplines postulated that previous assessment of impact of migration on development has "intended to be pessimistic" (Bakewell, 2016).

As a result of these new narratives, migrants are now viewed as part of the solution to underdevelopment rather than the problem themselves. There has been increased return of the diaspora to their homelands (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014; Brinkerhoff, 2012; Faist, 2008; Nyberg-Sorensen 2004). In response to these evolving realities, sending States have now at different levels, developed engagement initiatives to harness and tap into diasporas' proven abundant financial, social and human capital (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014; Délano and Gamlen, 2014; Gamlen, 2014).

According to Boyle and Kitchin (2014:18), a diaspora engagement initiative is a "formal and explicit policy initiative or series of policy initiatives enacted normally by a sending State, or its peoples, aimed at fortifying and developing relationships with expatriate communities, diasporic populations and foreign constituencies who share a special affinity". For the purpose of this study, this definition is recognized as suitable for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of successive Ghanaian governments'

diaspora engagement initiatives and how they impact on the contribution of Ghana's diaspora to the development of the country.

Diaspora engagement initiatives are influenced by five factors in their formulation, namely; the nature and history of the origin country's State institutions, the nature, scale, timing and geography of their diaspora, the incidence of prior and existing relationships with their diaspora, the capacity of domestic, private, public and community organizations and finally, a country's geopolitical strengths, weaknesses and challenges which may influence the design and implementation of their diaspora strategies (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014). The proponents of the above-mentioned discourse reveal that diaspora engagement initiatives may potentially be peculiar to specific countries formulating them with no real reason for any other nation to simply copy since these factors may vary from country to country. There seems to be no one-size-fits-all approach to this concept (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014).

However, the reason for engaging the diaspora could be the same for sending States, despite the varied diaspora engagement initiatives. As observed by Boyle and Kitchin (2014), Gamlen (2008) and Newland (2010), the overseas populations have resources and attachments which may accelerate economic growth and development in the homeland. It is within this context that, in recent decades, countries with large diaspora populations have increasingly institutionalized, formalized and structured their diaspora engagement efforts by constructing renewed connections through already existing transnational relations (Gamlen, 2014). The mode of these new formalized engagements is often through Ministries and Departments of Foreign Affairs or in connection with Ministries of Economy (Boyle and Kitchin, 2013). Gamlen (2006) calls it 'Emigration State'.

In other scholarly discussions, authors such as Gamlen (2008) attribute the reason for the formulation of diaspora engagement initiatives to two main factors; namely, State interest and State obligations.

Consequently, some governments, depending on their interest, would either view emigrants as citizens who are part of their homeland despite their settlement abroad or otherwise. When they are considered as part of the country of origin, they are seen as having equal claims to protection and citizenship rights (Baubock, 2008). To those who see them differently, they indicate that citizenship does not automatically translate into a responsibility for the State to provide services and grant rights to migrants (Baubock, 2008).

However, despite the good intentions of governments to engage with their diaspora communities, they could encounter internal constraints due to the over-valuation of diasporas' contribution and preferential treatment of the diaspora by governments as against the constituents residing in the country (Gamlen, 2008).

2.3 The Contribution of Diaspora Transnational Activities to Development

There is considerable evidence on the contribution of diaspora communities to both their homelands and the receiving States (Farrant et al., 2006). As indicated by Brinkerhoff (2012), there are various ways in which the individual diaspora or the collective may impact the socio-economic and political development of homelands. Brinkerhoff (2012) has identified five specific areas of diaspora contribution and impact, including remittances, philanthropy, skills transfer, business investments and advocacy. Aguinas and Newland (2012) emphasize that diaspora is increasingly being recognized as first movers in important sectors such as tourism and within development of human capital.

More recently, other scholars have proposed different analytical frameworks on how diasporas can impact development in their homelands from abroad.

Among them are Boyle and Kitchin (2014), who have also underscored six areas of developmental impact of diaspora, including donation, investment, knowledge networks, brain gain, markets and representation of States as Ambassadors abroad.

As donors, diaspora communities support their homeland through remittances (cash and in kind) and philanthropy (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014). Philanthropy is "the private and voluntary donation of resources for charitable and public good" (Hudson Institute, 2010). The Hudson Institute lists sources of these philanthropic donations to include private and voluntary organizations (PVOs), religious organizations, corporations, foundations, volunteer citizens and university and college alumni institutions (Hudson Institute, 2010). Johnson (2007), on his part, identifies two types of philanthropy, namely, diaspora associations and diaspora foundations.

The most tangible forms of diaspora contributions are remittances (Brinkerhoff, 2012) which are "private or person-to-person transfers from migrant workers to recipients in the worker's country of origin" (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014). There have been several efforts by many sending States to leverage financial remittance flows. Some of the methods used include: lowering transaction costs and increasing their security; extending transfer services to unbanked communities; encouraging collective remittances by providing migrant organizations with technical and organizational support, matching funds, marketing skills and other business services; stabilizing exchange rates; encouraging more productive uses of remittances; and improving the functioning of the market of remittance services (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014).

Adepoju (2007), USAID knowledge Service Centre (2008) and Terrazas (2011) describe migrants as a consistent source of financial flows to their countries of origin over the years. In his contribution to the remittances discourse, Addison (2004) notes that remittances impact on migrant sending economies through poverty alleviation, income distribution, investment growth, consumption and savings. Most research outcomes corroborate the fact that remittance flows not only make significant contribution to the welfare of the recipients but also to the economic progress of the country of origin (Carling, 2008; Ratha et al., 2011; Terrazas, 2011). Financial remittances can be an important source of income (Fadayomi, 2010), foreign exchange and contribute significantly towards the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many developing countries (Quartey, 2006a). Ratha et al., (2011) indicated that remittance inflows to Africa were approximately US$40 billion in 2010, which was about 2.6 percent of GDP. African Union's Institute of Remittances (AIR), located in Nairobi, Kenya, confirmed in a report that remittance inflows to Africa from its diaspora abroad amounted to US$65 billion in 2016 (AIR Report, 2016).

The findings of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and the European Union (EU) (ACP-EU) Migration Action meeting in 2019 show that there have been major changes in the migration -development nexus since the launch of ACP-EU Dialogue in 2010. Two notable developments have been the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in 2015 and the Global Compact for Migration (adopted in December 2018 in Marrakech) where migration featured prominently in the decisions (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019). The findings also show that estimates of the officially recorded remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) increased in 2017 by 8.5 percent compared to 2016, reaching US$ 466 billion. This amount represents more than three times the size of Official Development Assistance.

In addition, excluding China, remittance flows are also significantly larger than Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) (ACP-EU Migration Actions, 2019). Globally, remittance flows reportedly reached US$ 613 billion in 2018. In 2017, the top remittance receiving countries were India, China, the Philippines, Mexico and Nigeria (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019). The cost of sending money to LMICs remained as high as 71 percent in the first quarter of 2018, in contrast with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) target of reducing the transaction cost to less than three percent (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019).

In sub-Saharan Africa, remittance flows increased from US$34 billion in 2016 to US$38 billion in 2017 and were expected to grow even more in 2018 and 2019. Regrettably, sub-Saharan Africa remains the most expensive place in the world to send money to with an average cost of 9.4 percent, well above the world average in 2017 (ACP-EU, Migration Action, 2019). It is found above the SDG target, adopted in 2015 which requires countries to reduce their transaction costs of remittances to three percent by 2030 (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019).

Meanwhile, the largest remittance recipients in sub-Saharan Africa in 2017 include Nigeria-US$22 billion, Senegal-US$2.2 billion, Ghana-US$2.2 billion, Kenya-US$2 billion, Uganda-1.4 US billion, and Mali-US$1 billion (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019). In terms of the share of GDP, the following sub-Saharan countries top the list: Liberia-27 percent, Comoros-21 percent, The Gambia-21 percent, Lesotho-15 percent, Senegal-14 percent, and Cape Verde-13 percent (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019).

Even though the formal remittance inflows seem large when viewed as a share of GDP, exports and reserve, the total estimate recorded could be far more when the informal remittance inflows to LMICs are added. The non-inclusion of the informal remittances in

the calculation is due to the paucity of data (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019). As part of the findings, remittances on their own will not result in development especially if the conditions for the senders and the recipients are not conducive to development and if governments fail to provide basic services and functional social security, health and education systems.

Research has shown that remittances can have greater development impact if the recipients can spend them on higher education, the creation of self-employment opportunities and the improvement of local community infrastructure (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019). Also, it reports that the contribution of remittances towards recipients' well-being will be greater when the remittances are additional incomes rather than the amounts being the sole or primary source of income (ACP-EU Migration Action, 2019). It is also known that the development value of remittances depends on the conditions under which remittances are earned (ACP-EU Migration Actions, 2015).

Some critics have viewed remittances as hampering development rather than enhancing it, even though a large number of studies have also showed the direct opposite, arguing of a positive correlation (Newland, 2013). It has been observed that the large majority of the criticisms are laid at the macro-level. The reason is that remittances have been found scarcely to flow to the poorer countries. Opponents of the optimistic view of remittances have therefore averred that they can cause inflation, reinforce inequalities, and create dependency and 'Dutch disease' (Kleist and Vammen, 2012; Newland, 2013; Makina and Kanyenze, 2010).

A generally accepted view among critics of the migration-development nexus is that remittances are basically not intended for investments, but rather as social insurance to meet recipients' basic necessities. They argue that for one to be certain that economic

remittances have been used for investment purposes there should be the existence of strong institutions to support investment and also, one should be able to ascertain the source of extra income for consumption (Barajas, Chami, Fullenkamp, Gapen and Montiel 2009).

On investment, diasporas are more likely to invest in their homelands, even though others might consider the homelands to be high-risk economies (Brinkerhoff, 2012). Brinkerhoff (2012) further argues that diasporas investment in their homelands may be key to developing countries as their relatively weak institutions, political risks, or lower incomes may discourage the typical, non-diaspora foreign investor (Brinkerhoff, 2012, cited in: Riddle, Brinkerhoff and Nelson, 2008). According to Terrazas (2010), diasporas invest in capital markets and direct foreign investments by holding deposit accounts, securing remittance flows, buying diaspora bonds, supporting diaspora mutual funds and re-engineer capital markets in their homelands.

The diaspora has also been instrumental in building bridges between the sending and receiving countries in terms of linking the private and public sectors at home and abroad without residential relocation (Adepoju, 2007, Taylor & Filipski, 2011), promoting partnerships between local and foreign companies (Saxenian, 2002a: 2002b: 2005), offering business consultancy to foreign investors (Hugo, 2005, Usher, 2005) and partnering or establishing their own businesses in their countries of origin (Farrant et al., 2006). Adepoju (2007) cited the MIDA Project in Ghana to demonstrate how the project received support from Ghanaian health professionals in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The World Bank Development Report (2009) highlights how some of the early African students impacted development in their countries of origin after returning from further studies abroad. It attributed the establishment of University of Ghana to Kwegyir Aggrey, who after returning from the United States as a student, founded the first non-denominational school (World Bank, 2009). A study by de Haas and Vezzol

(2010) projects the investment of Moroccan migrants in land, housing, education, taxis, grocery stores, tourism and agriculture in their homeland.

As knowledge network agents, the diaspora communities are credited with activities that enhance the knowledge base of indigenous people in their homelands. Some migration scholarships indicate that they offer support to homeland public, private and community organizations to obtain accelerated global command and control capabilities (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). In other words, the diaspora are agents in the knowledge and expertise transfer to their homelands (Brinkerhoff, 2012). USAID Knowledge Services Centre (2008:4) maintained that "the diaspora represents a unique human resource that provides specific knowledge, experience and enthusiasm that can be organized productively to assist with a variety of development initiatives back home". The diasporas facilitate free flow of information, knowledge, ideas and values, both formally and informally, between the sending States and the receiving States as maintainers of strong linkages between the two countries (Hugo, 2005).

In the 1970s the concept of 'brain drain' dominated the literature, highlighting negative effects of international migration. By the 1990s, a convergence of opinion had shifted towards a more positive concept known as 'brain gain' (Piper, 2008) which involves the migration of highly educated and skilled people to their homelands either through physical returns or other transnational activities (IOM, 2013). By the early 2000s, the brain gain concept has been shifted to "brain circulation". Yun-Chung (2007) analyses the issue of brain circulation and maintains that in contrast to the one-way flow of either 'brain drain' or 'brain gain', from the point of view of the country of origin, brain circulation is seen as a two-way phenomenon, involving the circulation of skilled emigrants across borders. Many countries are now taking advantage of their existing pool of experts and professionals abroad by engaging with them to encourage brain incubation

or circulation (IOM, 2013). According to Boyle and Kitchin (2014), members of the diaspora may participate in permanent or less permanent movements to promote brain gain.

Diaspora serving as marketing agents, may play the role in two parts, both in the sending countries as tourists and as consumers in the receiving countries (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014). Boyle and Kitchin (2014) further report that visits from the diasporas to their homelands constitute a platform for the tourism market. Agunias and Newland (2012) identify areas of diaspora tourism to include medical tourism, business-related tourism, heritage tourism, exposure tours, education tourism, VIP tours and peak experience tours. The impact of diaspora tourism on local businesses and communities in terms of the usual high level of demand for labour-intensive or artisanal products cannot be over-emphasized (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). Other scholars such as Asiedu (2005) and Terrazas (2010) have remarked that migrants are important revenue earners for their countries and can also market their countries abroad and encourage tourists to visit their country.

As Ambassadors, diasporas can promote peace and security in their homelands and enhance the strategic, diplomatic and foreign policy objectives of their countries of origin (Boyle and Kitchin, 2014). Within their homelands, members of the diaspora communities can advocate political causes, contribute to the democratization process thereby; creating a more enabling environment for development (Brinkerhoff, 2012). As Ambassadors of their countries, diaspora community members can make important political contributions in their home countries. In 2009, the World Bank Development Report cites African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere and others who fought for the independence of their countries after returning from further education abroad as notable examples. According to Sheikh and Healy (2009), the

diaspora community members are well documented as conflict and peace-building agents who contribute to the maintenance of global peace.

Even though some scholars agree that members of the diaspora contribute to the development of their respective homeland economies (Agunias and Newland, 2012; Boyle and Kitchin, 2014; Newland, 2010), others such as Brinkerhoff (2012) look at the issue holistically and assert that the contributions of the diaspora to the homelands may not necessarily be positive at all times. Brinkerhoff (2012) cites conflict as one negative outcome that could result from such diaspora engagements with their homelands. He categorizes different conditions to which diasporas in general may interact with their homeland, as "conflict entrepreneurs", "competing interests" or "contributors to stability and development".

Meulen (2016:13-20) identifies three types of diaspora engagements that contribute to national development, including economic engagement, social engagement and political engagement. Meulen (2016) alludes to the fact that under economic engagement, diaspora economic impacts on the country of origin are mainly made through their financial contributions either from remittances or monies sent directly by migrants for private consumption. Hence, "remittances are one of the most visible and beneficial aspects through which international migration is reshaping the countries of origin" (Kapur, 2005: 355) and are now regarded as a more effective tool for income redistribution, poverty reduction and economic growth than huge development programmes or development aid. An example of when remittances became manifestly crucial was in 2007/2008 when they mitigated the economic devastation of many countries, specifically in Asia (Meulen, 2016).

Research has shown that "Philippine households with diaspora family members abroad did better in the years 1997/98 during the Asian financial crisis than those that had no members abroad" (Kapur 2005: 345). According to Adams and Page (2003:1), "on average a 10 percent increase in the share of international remittances in a country's GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty". Muelen (2016) cautions that though diaspora has the potential and can be used as development tools, as transnational actors they cannot be said to be responsible for development when often other factors are given equal consideration in their decisions to participate in the homeland economic space. Other economic engagements relate to direct investment in business, portfolio investment in emerging stock markets or government bonds and global trade and business ties (Ranvieg, 2009). Other manifestations of activities that fuel economic development in the sending country include travels to one's homeland, purchasing of property, sending of cargo and diaspora philanthropy (Muelen, 2016).

Social engagement has unique characteristics which resonate with economic engagement. As is the case with economic remittances, social engagement transcends and transforms borders and boundaries in diverse ways (Levitt and Khagram, 2007). These characteristics make the diaspora social remittance agents, thus, engaging with their homeland through social remittances. According to Levitt (1998), one of the leading scholars behind social remittance literature, social remittances are the norms, practices, identities and social capital of migrants. The transfer of migrants' skills, innovations and knowledge, including changes in taste, perceptions and attitudes to their homelands is facilitated by the global transformation of transportation and communication (Global Migration Group, 2010b: 3). Conferences, workshops, online discussions and other activities among diasporas can also enhance the transmission of social remittances to

sending states due to the diversity of norms, knowledge, beliefs, perceptions, identities and attitudes.

Levitt (2005: 2) came up with three types of social remittances to further clarify the terminology as follows: "normative structures (ideas, values and beliefs), systems of practice (delegation of tasks and responsibility at home, religious rituals and organizational practices) and social capital (status)". Other scholars such as Van-Maerssen et al., (2008: 173) and Armendariz and Crow (2009: 139) have stated that "foreign education, human capital and networks can transfer norms and ideas to diaspora homelands". They also note that migrants can engender social change by adapting to traditional customs and taboos and accepting different religions, political views and social orientations. The strength of social remittances lies in the cultural influence they engender in the homeland. The importance of culture could also be found in the "effect it has on the achievement of development goals, the policies developed to achieve them and the extent of achievement" (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011:2).

Political engagement refers to the participation of the diaspora in the politics of their homeland while living abroad. Brown (2013: 79) argues that "there has been renewed interest in the activities of the diaspora and transnational groups since the 1990s, particularly on how they act as steeped political agents to pursue international agenda in their countries of origin, destination and within the International community". Anderson (1991) puts it even more succinctly that diaspora engage in long-distance nationalism by their connection with their homelands and by being members of an imagined community. The decision to take part in the politics of one's country is dependent on personal factors and national policies and conditions in the home country. An enabling factor for diaspora's engagement in their homeland could be "how they perceive the homeland's foreign policy, thus, whether or not the policy is having the impact on the interest of the

people, the homeland's future or if it affects the interest of a specific community" (Shain and Barth, 2003:456). The present study will assess how the state policy of dual citizenship, investment opportunities and remittances, among others, affect the activities of the Ghanaian diaspora in their home country.

Undoubtedly, the growing interest among policy makers in devising engagement initiatives to effectively harness the diaspora resources while minimizing migration costs stems from the strong realization that diaspora community members are found as key actors in the relationship between migration and development (Pastore, 2006; Chapell and Laczko, 2011). As a result, researchers are now focusing on investigating the reason why some countries gain economic benefits from the transnational activities of migrants more than others (Taylor, 2006). This is a departure from the previous era where researchers concentrated their efforts on resolving the question of whether migration impacts development positively or negatively (Taylor, 2006).

As emphasized by de Hass (2009), there is insufficient data to assess the success of the involvement of the diaspora in national development. Given the focus of this study in assessing the success or otherwise of government's diaspora engagement initiatives in Ghana, it is hoped that a significant contribution would be made within the context of the limited data on the involvement of diaspora in Ghana's development.

2.4 Criteria for Assessing Diaspora Engagement Initiatives on National Development

Gamlen (2006) argues that governments' enactment of cohesive and coordinated policies, extension of rights and privileges and creation of institutions and mechanisms for migrants to connect with their countries of origin will produce positive impact.

However, some studies suggest that identifying the impact of any development programme, including diaspora engagement initiatives, remains a major challenge (Vezolli and Lacroix, 2010). Evaluating the impact of diaspora engagement initiatives could be more difficult especially if such initiatives have not undergone independent and rigorous evaluation to assess their impact on development (Vezolli and Lacroix, 2010). Vezolli and Lacroix (2010) note that much of these difficulties are due to the complex nature of diaspora engagement policies as they draw on the activities of a wide range of different actors, working with different levels of institutions and their operating procedures which may lack any formal development experience. Adding to these challenges is the fact that such diaspora engagement initiatives go beyond the world of objective planning or logical frameworks that are so widely used in development practice (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005).

Given these challenges, some institutions such as United Kingdom's Institute for Public Policy Research have come up with a mapping system, based on eight areas of development, that are considered to be affected by migration including, economy, education, health, gender, wider social areas (other than education, health and gender), governance, environmental sustainability and disaster relief to assess the impact of diaspora policies on development (Chappell and Sriskandarajah 2007, Chappell and Glennie, 2009). Critics argue that whilst the above -mentioned system provides a broad list of potential areas of policy impact, it does not offer guidance on how they can attribute specific change to explicit policies (Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2010). Indeed, a review of the literature has also revealed that some countries have attracted diaspora investments or participation in the local economy without any conscious efforts in diaspora engagement whilst others deliberately put in strategies to attract the diaspora community (Brinkerhoff, 2012).

Vezzoli and Lacroix (2010) have recommended that a fair assessment of the impact would therefore require examining the development strategies and to assess the reaction of the targeted diasporas to these policies. Drawing from this approach, the present study adopted the Gamlen's (2006) typology of diaspora engagement policies and examined the reaction of the study population to some selected government initiatives and the internal economies. Indeed, successful or unsuccessful diaspora engagement initiatives are based on the accounts given by the diaspora regarding how they view the implementation of the engagement initiatives (Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2010) or their assessment of the internal economies deployed by the State (Brinkerhoff, 2012).

As noted by de Hass (2009) the lack of sufficient research data and empirical evidence has undermined the effective measurement of the impact of diaspora engagement on national development. This study hopes to fill this gap by contributing to the body of literature on the subject-matter to facilitate easy assessment.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

A critical look at the literature reveals that the bulk of the extant research focuses on the perspective of the state, with only a handful of studies examining how key variables play out from the perspective of the migrants themselves. States use various policies and programmes to elicit the engagement of their diasporic population for national development. However, it bears noting that it is not only through formal policies of state that diasporic populations are connected to the homeland, but also through various transnational informal networks and civil society organizations (Sidel, 2007).

Thus, the role of immigrants' transnational connections to the homeland cannot be over-emphasized in any discussion of diaspora engagement (Basch et al., 1994). Accordingly, the next section examines the complex intersections between immigration transnationalism and diaspora engagement.

2.5.1 Transnational Approach as a Conceptual Model

A good understanding of transnationalism could serve as a foundation for developing a conceptual tool to examine States' policies and programmes and diaspora engagement back home. Vertovec (1999:1) describes the concept as "the multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation States".

Historically, the concept was considered as "the reverse of assimilation" (Lien 2006: 57). According to Vertovec (2009:3), "transnationalism describes a condition in which, despite great distances and the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and internal narratives they represent) relationships among people are still heightened globally." In the main, "transnationalism is a combination of civic-political memberships, economic involvements, social networks and cultural entities that link people and institutions in two or more nation states" (European Science Foundation, 2004:7).

Faist (2010) has sought to distinguish between diaspora approaches and transnational perspectives. He views diasporic approaches as focusing heavily on aspects of collective identity whilst "transnational approaches rely upon cross-border mobility, membership and citizenship and the compatibility or incompatibility of migrant integration and cultural dimensions" (Faist, 2010:13 & 21). Baubock and Faist (2010:13) define transnationalism as "the changing forms of cross-border mobility, membership and citizenship." Baubock and Faist (2010:13) explain further that "transnationalism offers a fact that helps us to understand the types of activities in which diaspora can engage, while diaspora studies essentially explain diasporic homeland connections".

Hence, "old dispersed diaspora has now become today's transnational communities, being sustained by a range of modes of social organization, mobility and communication"

(Vertovec, 2009:5). It is important to note that not all migration flows result in transnational ties and practice. Two major characteristics of transnationalism include the possibility of migrant network, through social networks, becoming less deepened, stunted or less institutionalized.

The reverse is also true; other migrant groups can continue to grow, either individually or in a group, within a shared identity and belonging towards their homeland (Vertovec, 2009). Levitt (2001) argues that membership in a transnational community is not defined by migration, but by a relationship with migrants. Thus, "many shared transnational spaces do, in fact, create a sense of common identity and shared experience, but in contrast to traditional definitions of diaspora, transnational identities tend to be more dynamic and not always tightly connected to a shared homeland, ethnic identity and/or other cultural signifiers" (Brown, 2013:71).

Another marked contrast between diaspora activities and transnational activities is that, whereas diaspora activities tend to have a multi-generational component in terms of collective identity, transnational activities relate to broader trans-border migration and the associated experiences of movement or working (Vertovec, 1999: Kastoryano, 2000).

The application of transnationalism to this research has two bifurcated advantages. First, it helps to explore the relationship between States and their diaspora population and enhancing one's understanding as to how diaspora engagement works outside the realm of the State. Transnationalism as a triangular social structure comprises of non-State actors such as the country origin, country of destination and the migrants themselves (Faist 2010: Gonzalez, 2013), and is used as an approach to de-emphasize the role of geography in the formation of identity and collectivity and to create new possibilities for membership across boundaries (Appadurai 1991; Hanners 1996 in Levitt, 2001:202).

Schiller and Levitt (1999) further clarify the triad structure of transnationalism as the political, economic, socio-cultural process which occurs beyond the borders of a particular State, including non-State actors that are affected by the policies and institutional arrangements associated with such States.

Similarly, Baubock (2003:701) observes that "transnationalism applies to human activities and social institutions that extend across national borders with States as bounded political entities whose borders are crossed by flows of people, money or information and covered by social networks, organizations or fields."

One recognizes that studying the State and its diaspora with the help of transnationalism concept crystalizes diverse issues, particularly "the ways in which individuals' interests are identified in relation to the political institutions that constrain or enable their actions" (Baubock & Faist, 2010:309). Transnationalism has had its fair share of criticism, including that the term is too broad, resulting in a lack of explanatory power (Levitt 2001:196) and "running the risk of becoming an empty conceptual vessel" (Smith & Guarnizo, 1998: 3-4).

Overall, the concept of transnationalism is applied to this research work due to its usefulness as a tool to analyse the reciprocal transnational relationship between State diaspora policies/programmes and diaspora engagement.

From existing studies that examine diaspora engagement policies from the perspective of the State, it would be expected to see those diasporas with legal rights (dual citizenship), voting right, investment opportunities and conducive environment for transfer of skills back home, for example, to participate more in the economies of their home countries. However, the study tests this assumption from the perspective of the migrants which has

allowed for a better understanding of the factors at play when deciding to engage back home.

2.6 Conceptual Framework

Gamlen's (2006) framework on diaspora engagement policies is adopted to guide the study. According to the framework, there are three broad categories of diaspora engagement policies and programmes. The first category relates to programmes which seek to build capacity by discursively producing state-centric diaspora communities and designing corresponding state institutions to deal with those communities. The second category is made up of strategies that aim to extend rights to the people in the diaspora. The third group of programmes represents those which seek to extract obligation from the diaspora, including measures intended to encourage people in the diaspora to transfer their skills, resources and remittances to their homelands (Gamlen, 2006).

2.6.1 Capacity Building

Diaspora engagement programmes for building capacity can be divided into two sub-groups. The first sub-group are programmes that promote symbolic nation building, with the second sub-group relating to institution-building programmes. These include establishing consular and consultative bodies, transnational networks and ministerial level agency (Gamlen, 2006).

Symbolic nation-building programmes refer to the adoption of inclusive rhetoric and symbols, conferences and cultural programmes to enhance members of diaspora community's relationship to their homeland. With respect to the symbolic nation-building policies, Gamlen (2006) suggests that some governments may engage in rhetorical gestures to include the diaspora within national population for sovereign

control (Teye et al., 2017). Teye et al. (2017) have reported on programmes Ghana has adopted over the years to enhance Ghanaian diaspora's sense of identity and belonging to the transnational community. They further observe that the Ghanaian Government has also, especially since 2001, made rhetorical gestures to include its diaspora within national populations (Teye et al., 2017). The researchers argued that in contrast, these recent rhetorical gestures did not characterize Ghana Government's pronouncements in the 1980s, which portrayed the then skilled professionals, especially doctors and nurses as unpatriotic people that have deserted the country for greener pasture elsewhere.

2.6.2 Mechanisms that extend rights to the diaspora

The second category of diaspora engagement policy as postulated by Gamlen relates to development of strategies to extend rights to the diaspora (Gamlen, 2006). According to Gamlen (2006), such measures or strategies include political incorporation, provision of civil and social services, as well as protecting rights of emigrants. Some of these measures implemented by the Ghana Government include the "Right of Abode" law, which allows persons of African descent to apply and be granted the right of stay in Ghana indefinitely (Alhassan, 2010).

Ghana has also passed a Dual Citizenship Act, 2002 to extend dual citizenship to naturalized Ghanaians living in other countries (Awumbila and Teye, 2014: Alhassan, 2010). This is an attempt to extend rights to Ghanaians in the diaspora and also enable Ghanaians to acquire citizenship of their host country without losing their Ghanaian citizenship (Citizenship Act, 2002). The Representation of People's Amendment Act (Act 699), passed in 2007, which seeks to incorporate Ghanaian diaspora into Ghana's political system is yet to be implemented (Alhassan, 2010). Provision of civil and social services of Ghanaians in the diaspora as well as the protection of the rights of Ghanaians are part

of the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. Unlike the Philippines, where the State manages the recruitment and protection of overseas workers (Gamlen, 2006), the Government of Ghana has no such labour export policy (Teye et al., 2017).

2.6.3 Policies for extracting obligations from the diaspora

Empirically, the main aim of governments for formulating diaspora engagement policies is to enhance the engagement strategies for promotion of development in their homelands (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). Many governments worldwide have designed policies with the view to extracting obligations from the diaspora (Teye et al., 2017). Some developed countries such as the United States of America and Switzerland have mandatory payment systems in place to levy taxes on their emigrants, while other countries such as the Philippines extract mandatory payments through less formal channels, including fees collected from emigrant workers recruited through State recruitment programmes (Gamlen, 2006).

In the case of Ghana, there are no policies in place to levy taxes on emigrants. However, a number of programmes have been developed by governments to attract the contributions of the diaspora for national development. This in a way translates into an indirect means to extract obligations from them as they leverage their participation in the economic activities of the country (Teye et al., 2017). Other means of extracting obligations from the diaspora include diaspora outreach programmes aimed at sensitizing them to invest in their country, the provision of enabling framework to enhance transfer of money, acquisition of loans from banks in Ghana by the diaspora for the purchase of their houses (Teye et al., 2017), issuance of foreign-currency-denominated bonds which provide investment avenues for Ghanaians in the diaspora, knowledge transfer initiatives

through the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme by the Ministry of Health and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) aimed at addressing the effects of brain drain and the resulting acute dearth of health professionals within the Health Sector (IOM, 2004).

The IOM's Migration and Development in Africa programme has been replaced by Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRON III). The TRQN III builds on the lessons learned and achievements of similar brain gain initiatives and MIDA Ghana Health Project. The programme facilitates short-term working visits by Ghanaian medical doctors and other health workers abroad as well as the opportunity to health professionals in Ghana to travel abroad for short-term internships and placements (Alhassan, 2010). The University of Ghana has also benefited through knowledge transfer programmes where Ghanaian professionals abroad visit to support academic teaching, research and learning (MFA&RI, 2016c).

2.6.3.1 Critique of Gamlen's Typology

Gamlen's (2006) typology on diaspora policy has strengths worth applauding, and remains a useful resource for researchers and policy makers. However, there are existing shortfalls and concerns about its effectiveness as a policy tool. For example, Gazso (2015) indicates that relations between diaspora and countries of origin are complex, variable and multidirectional, which make generalization of the relations extremely difficult. The Gamlen (2006) typology therefore, cannot be generalized that easily without distorting basic facts due to the complex, variable and multidirectional nature of the relations.

As highlighted from the analysis of International Migration Institute et al., (2010), it is not always the case that diaspora's contribution to the national economy is dependent

upon the efficacy of diaspora engagement policies. A case in point is "the huge diaspora investments in India which came about without specific government policy on remittances. Instead, they were the result of a favourable investment environment and economic growth, which leveraged the image of India as a good investment destination and, therefore, attracted Indian diaspora to invest" (International Migration Institute 2010: 45). The critique here is that "diaspora engagement policies might no longer be a necessity as migrants are likely to participate in an economy which is favourable and has the enabling conditions for investment" (International Migration Institute 2010: 45).

Brinkerhoff (2012) explains the importance of an enabling environment by describing the actions or measures governments can take to maximize diaspora contribution to the development of the sending states. He argues that the enabling roles of government include mandating, facilitating, resources, partnering and endorsing.

According to Gamlen (2006), the two main reasons for which origin countries formulate policies to reach out and extend rights and services to their diasporas are "State interests "and "State obligations". Some critics of Gamlen's typology also argue that implementation of his framework is seldom smooth-sailing and their effectiveness is also contestable. This is because there are inherent frequently encountered internal constraints by States in their efforts to engage the diaspora. Some of these internal constraints are engendered by an extant tension and suspicion between the non-migrant citizens and migrant counterparts, which hamper smooth implementation of diaspora policies. The suspicion is that migrants receive preferential treatment from the government due to an over-rated recognition and premium placed on their contribution. This perception generates tension between the migrants and non- migrants (Gamlen, 2008). There is also the challenge about the exact amount of resources to deploy by governments to strengthen diaspora related institutions (capacity building) in order not to limit the share of resources

for the non-migrants who may also be having huge resource constraints (Waldinger, 2009). This challenge could even be worse if migrants are perceived as having abandoned their country and are considered even richer than their counterpart non-migrant citizens (Agunias, 2009, Waldinger, 2009).

Furthermore, though governments would like to extend rights and services, reach out and extract obligations from their diaspora population in order to stimulate their engagement with their homelands, they can only influence but not control the diaspora for successful outcomes of their policies (International Migration Institute et al., 2010). The Mexican case provides a striking example where in spite of active engagement of the Mexican Government with its diaspora population in the United States of America, there is very little it could do to resolve the precarious status of its undocumented migrants in that country (Waldinger, 2009). The implementation of consular protection and welfare services policy of a sending State in a host country could be challenging, in that the sending State should be able to play a balancing act and act cautiously in order not to flout host country's national laws in its determination to provide the needed services (Waldinger, 2009, Agunias, 2009, Gamlen, 2008).

Apart from the internal (national) and external (International) constraints, the third area of challenge in the implementation of successful diaspora engagement policy pertains to the restriction of emigrants' exit freedom from the origin country (Gamlen, 2008) which could lead to the potential of permanent severing of relations by migrants with their homelands.

This review of the literature has also revealed that it is not only through formal policies of State that diasporic populations are connected to the homeland, but also through various transnational informal networks and civil society organizations (Sidel, 2007). This

observation contradicts the diaspora policy framework of Gamlen (2006), which suggests that the level of migrants' connection to their homeland is influenced largely by the successful implementation of State's diaspora engagement policies. Given these challenges, a good understanding of migrants' perspectives and characteristics could go a long way to enhance the success of diaspora engagement policy (International Migration Institute, 2010).

2.6.3.2 Basis for the Application of Gamlen's Diaspora Engagement Typology

Despite the critique of Gamlen's (2006) theory and the existence of different typologies of diaspora policies, the study relies on the Gamlen's conceptual framework for the following reasons:

(i) Many researchers have adopted Gamlen's (2006) framework in their recent research work. Notable among them are Brinkerhoff (2012), International Migration Institute et al. (2010), Soltesz (2016), Teye et al. (2017), Sorona Toma (2017), Olokoya Ogen (2017), Reilly et al. (2017), Kinuthia et al. (2013) and Hanafi and Hites (2017). For instance, International Migration Institute et al. (2010) adopted Gamlen's (2006) typology to examine diaspora engagement policies of Ghana, India and Serbia. Some notable findings were that migrants' remittances could be driven by migrants' own interest, needs and their families, irrespective of government's strategies or policies. The study also recommended that the Ghanaian government should concentrate its efforts in promoting and sustaining the current economic growth in order to stimulate the trust of its diaspora before investing in diaspora engagement policies. Mangala (2017) edited studies on diaspora engagement policies of ten selected countries in Africa, including Ghana. The ten case studies were

authored by different scholars, with the adoption of Gamlen's (2006) policy framework as their guide. Teye et al. (2017) authored the study on Ghana.

(ii) A critical look at the criticisms of Gamlen's (2006) theory reveals that the concerns expressed were mostly about the theory's effectiveness as a policy tool. However, it is a generally accepted that for a policy to succeed especially in the area of a complex migration phenomenon, within different sectors and actors, there will be the need to apply a mix of policy tools. For this reason, Brinkerhoff (2012) argues that States should first promote an enabling environment for a successful implementation of a diaspora policy.

(iii) Some of the criticisms of Gamlen's diaspora policy framework tend to emphasize the need for improving the internal economies of States as a first step before engaging the diaspora (International Migration Institute, 2010). However, such criticisms do not suggest in any way that Gamlen's (2006) diaspora policy framework is irrelevant as a policy tool. It only highlights the condition under which engagement policies, as proposed by Gamlen, would be successful.

(iv) One key aspect of Gamlen's typology is the rejection of the political theorists' argument which seeks to suggest that home-State's governance cannot be transnationalized (Baubouck, 2003a, 2005, Koslowski, 2014). On the contrary, the typology shows that States appear to "follow a social contractarian logic that emigrants' acceptance of home-states benefits constitutes a kind of consent to be governed" (Gamlen, 2006). According to Gamlen (2006), it appears that logically home-States can extract obligation from their diaspora since they accept benefits from them. However, since the question of legitimacy is a theoretical one Gamlen suggests that further research works on all the three components (that make up the typology) should

be done to assess the relations between States and emigrants and their impacts ascertained by the emigrants themselves (Gamlen, 2006). This position by Gamlen reflects the primary objective of this study, which is to assess not only the relationship between the Ghanaian diaspora and their homeland but the impact of the existing diaspora engagement initiatives, from the perspectives of the diasporas themselves.

(v) Having reviewed the relevant literature on the conceptual perspectives regarding the diaspora engagement initiatives, particularly as they relate to Ghana, one can draw important links between the conceptual framework as put forward by Gamlen (2006) and the present study. It has been established from the review of the three different categories that the engagement policies of the country could be identified with the tripartite Gamlen, (2006) typology. In other words, Ghana's diaspora engagement policies are consistent with the framework. The next section, therefore, explains how the framework was used to investigate the reaction of the diaspora to the Government's engagement policies as well as their strengths and weaknesses.

2.6.3.3 Application of The Gamlen's (2006) Typology

The adoption of the Gamlen (2006) conceptual framework helped the researcher to assess and select his objectives, develop realistic and relevant research questions, select appropriate methods and identify the variables for the testing of the hypotheses. As a theoretical framework for the study, the researcher relied on it to prepare his interview guide and survey questionnaire, using the framework's four main components, that is 'symbolic nation building initiatives", "institutional capacity building initiatives", "measures to extend rights" and "measures to extract obligations" for the data collection

and analysis. These were preceded by questions regarding the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the study population.

In the main, independent variables such as remittances, investment, transfer of knowledge, philanthropic initiatives, social protection, voting rights, social security portability, dual citizenship, hometown associations, cooperation among diaspora-related institutions, clearance of goods, passport acquisition/renewal and attendance at national day and cultural events were identified, under the conceptual framework, for measuring the hypothesis.

As Figure 2.1 shows, emigrants' satisfaction with government policies will depend on certain factors as listed under the three different categories and four components. Since the categories or factors are not exclusive of each other, whether a category will be effective, satisfying or not will depend on more than one of these categories. Thus, for a successful or unsuccessful diaspora engagement policy, the Ghanaian diaspora must evaluate their own satisfaction with these initiatives in the engagement process. The variables that are to be tested for confirmation or otherwise of the hypothesis are identified under the four framework components.

Figure 2.1: Diaspora Engagement: Key Components and their Linkages



Source: Adopted from Gamlen's (2006) Typology

CHAPTER THREE

GHANA'S DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT INITIATIVES IN PERSPECTIVE

3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the implementation of diaspora engagement initiatives in Ghana. To put the discussion in context, it discusses the mapping of the Ghanaian diaspora and reviews the historical evolution of Ghanaian diaspora engagement policies since the 1990s. The penultimate section examines the challenges of diaspora engagement policies and programmes. It then discusses the Ghanaian migration to the three study countries.

3.2 Mapping the Ghanaian Diaspora

There have been various estimates of Ghanaians living outside by researchers and institutions. For instance, the Ghana Statistical Service (2013) provided an estimate of 250, 624 as Ghanaians living outside the country for 6 or more months. The estimate was based on the 2010 National Population and Housing Census. Twum-Baah (2005) had reported that 1.5 million Ghanaians were living outside the country.

The Ghana Statistical Service's estimates were thought to be woefully inadequate because the data on migrants were obtained from household members. Some of the information provided by these family members were found to be unreliable (Awumbila et al., 2014). According to the IOM (2015), the number of Ghanaians abroad ranges between 1.5 million and 3 million and are found in more than 33 countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, reports a total of 311,836 Ghanaians living abroad and 268 associations were registered by 42 out of 54 missions abroad in 2015 (MFA and RI, 2015). In the face of these inconsistencies and inaccuracies regarding the

number of Ghanaian emigrants, it appears that data provided by receiving countries and Ghana's Missions abroad are more reliable (Teye et al., 2017). There are a large number of irregular migrants who may not be accounted for.

Awumbila et al., (2014) report that Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire are the major destination countries of Ghanaian emigrants within the Ecowas region. Nigeria receives 54 percent of the Ghanaian population in the region, with Cote d'Ivoire having 32 percent (see Table 4.1). Common official language, strong economic conditions and colonial legacy may explain the attraction of Ghanaians to Nigeria.

As shown on Table 3.2, the United States of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK) are the most popular receiving countries of Ghanaian emigrants, outside Africa (Agyemang and Setrana, 2014). An estimated 149,596 Ghanaian emigrants were in the United States of America and 81,917 were in the United Kingdom in 2013. Common language, relatively favourable economic policies, similar educational systems, social networks and colonial ties may reflect the large number of Ghanaians in these destination countries (Quartey 2009: UNDP, 2013).

Table 3.1: Estimated Number of Ghanaian Emigrants in ECOWAS Countries (2013)

Destination Country	Number of Ghanaian Emigrants	Percentage
Benin	6,472	1.86
Burkina Faso	2,579	0.74
Cape Verde	67	0.02
Côte d'Ivoire	111,001	31.94
Gambia	-	-
Guinea	1,314	0.38
Guinea Bissau	-	-
Liberia	6,744	1.94
Mali	-	-
Niger	2,599	0.75
Nigeria	186,015	53.53
Senegal	-	-
Sierra Leone	1,280	0.37
Togo	29,416	8.47
Total Emigrants in these countries	**347,487**	100

Source: Awumbila et al. (2014)

Table 3.2: Estimated number of Ghanaians residing in Non-African countries (2013)

COUNTRY	TOTAL NUMBER OF GHANAIANS
Australia	4572
Austria	2211
Belgium	3226
Canada	22211
Demark	1844
France	6710
Finland	1139
Germany	23719
Italy	52914
Ireland	1265
Japan	1891
Norway	2035
Netherlands	14175
Spain	15533
Sweden	2318
Switzerland	2733
United Kingdom	81917
United States of America	149596

Source: Agyemang and Setrana, 2014

3.3 Historical Evolution of Ghana's Diaspora Engagement Policies Since the 1990s

Ghana has not developed a comprehensive diaspora policy, although successfully it launched its Migration Policy document in 2016. Notwithstanding the lack of a detailed diaspora engagement framework, diaspora engagement programmes and policies have been key characteristics of the country's state-diaspora relations since its independence in 1957 (Manuh and Asante, 2005:297).

In his quest to unite Africa, the first President of Ghana, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah undertook several important diaspora engagement steps to harness the resources of the Ghanaian diaspora, including all the people of African descent. One such initiative was the organization of the independent African States and the All-African People's Conferences in 1958, under the broad framework vision of African Unity (Manuh and Asante, 2005). There was however a long period of inaction by successive governments, in terms of diaspora engagement in Ghana, after the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, as no significant diaspora engagement programmes were actively implemented (Mazzucato, 2007).

Despite the long period of lull in any sustainable diaspora engagement policies in Ghana, especially after the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, many North American and Caribbean Diasporas (NACD) continued to visit Ghana. The following are some of the reasons that accounted for this development:

i. Many of them cannot trace their ancestry to a particular country in Africa and prefer to adopt Ghana as their homeland (Essien, 2008; Hasty, 2002).
ii. The pivotal role played by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Marcus Garvey in Pan-Africanization and the establishment of the African Union as well as the call for Blacks to go back to Africa respectively, have motivated Blacks with African heritage to return to their homeland (Essien, 2008).

iii. The burial of eminent Pan-Africanists, like W.E.B DuBois and George Padmore, in Ghana has made the burial sites sacred and pilgrimage ground for many Blacks and Pan-Africanists around the world (Mensah, 2009).

iv. Ghana is well known for its important historical heritage and cultural sites, which serve as stimulus to many Blacks and foreigners to the country. Examples are artifacts related to the Slave trade (Bruner, 1996); stations of the Slave route located in various regions of the country. Also, the coast of Ghana has over 30 castles, including three (3) World Heritage Forts: Cape Coast Castle, Elmina Castle and Fort St. Jago. According to Klintings (2007), the forts/castles are important memorial landmarks of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade.

v. The lingua franca of Ghana, which is English language, facilitates communication (Ankomah et al., 2012).

vi. The relative political stability of Ghana especially after the introduction of the 4th Constitutional Republic, serves as a frequent attraction to foreigners (Essien, 2008).

vii. Some of African-American and Caribbean diasporas undertake trips to Ghana purely on philanthropic and humanitarian reasons. For instance, they help construct schools, provide educational materials and provide health care services (Essien, 2008).

On the return of Ghanaian diaspora population to their homeland, various reasons may persuade them to do so. Orozco (2005) notes that 63 percent of Ghanaians in the United States return to Ghana at least once a year or more.

Some of the returnees would like to visit friends and relatives left behind, set up businesses and construct houses towards their permanent return (Asiedu, 2005), to pay back to society for their education back home by undertaking some development

activities and to receive recognition for their professional achievements (Ammassari, 2004).

From the 1990s and after 2001, the engagement of the Ghanaian diaspora gained momentum under the leadership of President Jerry John Rawlings and largely under President John Agyekum Kufuor. (Teye et al., 2017). Several diaspora engagement programmes and policies have been implemented by the State, with non-State actors also playing active roles in enhancing State-diaspora relations in Ghana (Awumbila and Teye, 2014). Emancipation Day, PANAFEST, Home Coming Summit, the Joseph Project and the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) initiatives have been examples of the programmes implemented by the State to boost the existing relationship with the Ghanaian diaspora population (Awumbila and Teye, 2014). The Representation of People's Amendment Act (Act 699) was also passed as a crucial step towards the achievement of political integration consistent with the objective of working towards a broader engagement policy (Alhassan, 2010; 59). The following are the details of these programmes aimed at engaging the Ghanaian diaspora:

Emancipation Day and Pan African Festival: In collaboration with the Ministry of Tourism, the Government of Ghana has been organizing the "Emancipation Day", which has been held in Ghana since 1998, and the "Pan African Festival of Arts and Culture" (PANAFEST) to promote tourism and the State's engagement with both African and Ghanaian diaspora (Alhassan, 2010: 60). In addition, the programmes are aimed at stimulating the sense of identity and belonging of the people of African descent towards leveraging socio-economic contributions in African countries, especially Ghana (Alhassan, 2010).

Rights of Abode Law and Home Coming Summits, 2001, 2017 and 2019: The offer of Right of Abode, which was granted in the 1990s to North America and Caribbean

diaspora (Black Africans) to attract them to return to Ghana, only became law in 2000. The aim of the Right of Abode Law was also to allow the black Africans the opportunity to apply and stay in Ghana indefinitely (Alhassan, 2010). However, the law partially fulfilled this objective when the then government allowed them permanent residence status only after 7 years of residence in Ghana (Ankomah et al., 2012).

The first "Home Coming Summit", 2001, which focused on the theme, "Harnessing the Global Ghanaian Resource Potential for Accelerated National Development" was hosted by the Ghana Government in Accra in 2001 to encourage the Ghanaian diaspora population to transfer their skills and resources for the development of the nation (Manuh and Asante, 2005). The Summit gained tangible success especially as the foundation for the enactment of relevant laws for citizenship and voting rights as well as the creation of the Non-Resident Ghanaian Secretariat in 2003, under the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre. The Secretariat was established to deal with political, economic and governance issues relating to the Ghanaian diaspora, as part of the five-point action plan agreed upon during the Summit (Manuh & Asante, 2005). However, even though the non-resident Ghanaian Secretariat was established to implement recommendations of the Summit as contained in the five-point action plan, dearth of data and poor funding stalled the implementation plan (Badasu 2013; Teye et al., 2017).

The second Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit was held in 2017, under the theme: "Development, Opportunity, Value: Welcome Home".

The summit provided the needed platform for networking and continued dialogue to keep the momentum of a vibrant engagement process. It agreed to hold the event once every two years (Diaspora Affairs office, 2017).

However, the summit had some organizational challenges regarding registration of participants, conduct of the plenary sessions and the choice of an appropriate theme. There was also a post-summit report of lack of adequate agenda and consultation with the diaspora (Diaspora Affairs Office 2017). These challenges are critical to the quality and successful implementation of the conclusions of the summit, since the participants (especially, the diasporas) are important stakeholders in the implementation of the decisions. The Diaspora Affairs Office should be guided by these assessments by participants in order to avoid their re-occurrence in subsequent summit.

The Ghana Diaspora Celebration and Homecoming Summit (CDHS) 2019 was held in July 2019 as part of the activities marking a year-long celebration of the diaspora dubbed, the "Year of Return, Ghana 2019". "The Year of Return, Ghana, 2019" is a landmark national diaspora project targeting the African-American and diaspora market to mark 400 years of the first enslaved African arriving in Ghana. The Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture through Ghana Tourism Authourity (GTA) is responsible for the implementation of this project which was rolled out in January, 2019. The major stakeholders of this project are the Diaspora Affairs at the Office of the President, the Panafest Foundation and the Adinkra Group of USA (Ghana Tourism Authourity, 2019).

Some of the activities earmarked for the year-long celebration, apart from the Homecoming Summit, 2019 includes African festivals, the Pan-African Student Summit, Panafest, Emancipation Day, healing concert, investment forum, film festivals, lecture series, world tourism day and creative art shows (Ghana Tourism Authourity, 2019).

The significance of "The Year of Return, 2019" is to make Ghana the focus of the return of millions of African descendants to their African roots. The return marks long-years of marginalization of the African-Americans and the desire to trace their ancestry and identity. Also, the project affirms the recognition of Ghana as a beacon of hope for

African people living in the continent and in the diaspora (Ghana Tourism Authority, 2019).

The bane of homecoming summits in the country has been implementation challenges. This could be one of the reasons Ghana has had only three homecoming summits since 2001. The decision in 2017 to hold bi-annual diaspora summits is a step in the right direction, particularly to keep up the momentum and the level of confidence it desires from the Ghanaian diaspora.

The Joseph Project: In advancement of the engagement programmes before it, the 'Joseph Project' was rolled out in 2007 during Ghana's 50th Independence Anniversary. The Project brought together Ghanaian diaspora and other Africans with the view to enhancing resource mobilization from the diaspora for the development of the country. Key achievements of the Project include tourism and investment promotion through the return visits of the diaspora population to Ghana. It also promoted the learning of Ghanaian culture by the diaspora through cultural performances and education (Teye et al, 2017).

The Citizenship Act of 2000 (Act 591): A Dual Citizenship Act was passed in 2002, following the initial passage of Act 591 in 2000, for the purpose of granting dual citizenship status to naturalized Ghanaians living in other countries (Awumbila and Teye, 2014). The Act allows naturalized Ghanaians to become citizens of a host country without losing their Ghanaian citizenship. The objective is to protect the rights of the Ghanaian diaspora while boosting their participation in the democratic, economic and political processes. It was also established to leverage their sense of identity and patriotism as well as the cultural heritage of the country.

By 2009, that is, within seven years of its implementation, 5903 Ghanaian emigrants had been registered as dual citizens (Quartey, 2009). As a testament to the popularity of this legislative instrument, about 2.9 per cent of Ghana's population was recorded to have dual citizenship as at 2010 Ghana Population and Housing Census (GSS, 2013). According to The Ministry of Interior (2019), from January 2007 to June 2019, the total number of dual citizenship applications issued was 29,836.

The process of acquisition has been made as convenient as possible at the Ministry of Interior; the sector Ministry responsible for the implementation of the Act. Some of the needed supporting documents are valid birth certificate of the parents and that of the applicant, naturalization certificate (if the citizenship was obtained through naturalization), cover letter from one's school or employer (Abota, 2015). Following completion of the process the applicant can personally receive the signed dual citizenship card (signed by the Minister of Interior) or provide a power of Attorney to a friend or relative to pick it up on his/her behalf. Also, applicants who live abroad could route their application through the closest Ghanaian Embassy for processing and collection through the same Embassy or through postage (MFA&RI, Consular Report 2015).

According to Abota (2015), since the enactment of the Act, it has provided the needed opportunity to promote investment in Ghana, allow dual citizens who can travel to Ghana, during national elections, to exercise their franchise, promote more foreign direct investment and support entrepreneurial initiatives.

An amount of 120 US dollars (GHS 600) is currently being paid for the whole process. However, some diasporas have expressed concern about the fee being charged. They claim the application is exorbitant, especially where it entails husband and wife and some children who are over 18 years (Abota, 2015).

Again, the citizenship Act presents an inherent challenge to the diaspora, which has attracted official protests from some Ghanaian diaspora associations abroad such as UK and Canada. The lacuna in the Act is that Article 16, section 2 excludes Ghanaians with dual citizenship from holding certain public offices particularly the diplomatic, security and political offices. The following are some of the positions dual citizens are not allowed to hold: Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court, Ambassador or High Commissioner, Secretary to the Cabinet, Chief of Defense Staff or any Service Chief, Inspector General of Police, Commissioner, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, Commissioner General of Immigration, Commissioner of Value Added Tax Service, Director General of Prisons Service, Chief of Fire Officer, Chief Director of a Ministry, the rank of a Colonel in the Army or its equivalent in the other security services and; any other public office that the Minister may by legislative instrument pass.

In addition, though the Citizenship Act of 2000, Act 59 section 16(1) confers to a greater extent all the privileges accorded to Ghanaian citizens, Chapter 10, Article 194 Clause 2(a) of the Constitution indicates that "a person shall not be qualified to be a member of Parliament if he owes allegiance to a country other than Ghana" (Asuama, 2008: 1).

However, the Ghanaian diasporas hold the view that the above -mentioned exclusions and administrative burdens are unconstitutional. This view has been upheld by the Supreme Court ruling in June 2012 which explained that the 1992 Constitution did not exclude them from any public office holding. The enactment of Act 527 repealing Article 8(1) of the Constitution was, therefore, pronounced as unlawful. The judges even questioned why the dual citizens are made to purchase cards to identify them as Ghanaians.

The Representation of People's Amendment Act (Act 699): Though this legislation was first introduced in Parliament in June 2005, it was not until February, 2006 that the

bill was passed. The rather long delay in its passage was caused by the controversy surrounding its introduction (not its principle) mainly on the uncertainty regarding the transparency of its implementation (Alhassan, 2010). As a result of the controversy, the Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs of Parliament had to undertake extensive consultation by organizing a public hearing in Ghana, some West African countries and also in Europe (Awumbila and Teye, 2014: 8; Alhassan, 2010). Based on a favourable report from the Committee, the Bill, which recognizes the right of the Ghanaian diaspora to vote in public elections was passed in 2007.

Since its passage, the Electoral Commission is yet to implement the legislation. Resource constraints, lack of political will, ambiguity in terms of interpretation of the Act are among the reasons why the Act has not been implemented since its passage over a decade ago (MFA & RI, 2017).

In a suit No. HR/0003/2017 filed by some Ghanaian citizens resident abroad, in 2017, against the Electoral Commission and the Attorney General, the parties brought application for the enforcement of their fundamental human rights by the Court to meaningfully participate in the governance and political life of their country. They contended that the non-compliance of Act 699 is a breach of their fundamental rights. The breaches relate to their inability to register as voters, to be issued voters identity cards and to vote in public elections and referenda (High Court Judgement, 2017). In its defense, the Electoral Commission referred to the following challenges which have impeded its operationalization of the Act: huge financial costs to the State; the requirement of "careful planning and methodical execution"; the placing of "officials in the various and diverse countries in which many Ghanaians find themselves and designating a place as "registration centre"; the inconvenience to Ghana embassies if any were to be used as registration or voting centres; the procurement of visas for the "officials to be present to

monitor such registration and subsequent voting"; and "the legal effect of committing an electoral offence in the jurisdictions where the registration and voting are carried out" (High Court Judgement, 2017).

At the end of proceedings, the court ordered that the applicants were entitled under Act 699 to be registered and to vote in public elections and the non-compliance of Act 699 was a breach of applicants' fundamental rights. An Order of mandamus was, therefore, directed at the Electoral Commission "to ensure full compliance/operationalization of Act 699 within 12 calendar months starting from 1st January, 2018, by coordinating the drafting of the constitutional instrument which would spell out the modalities for its implementation. When the instrument is passed into law by Parliament, the Electoral Commission should dutifully ensure that the applicants and other similarly circumstanced Ghanaians are registered to vote in the 2020 national elections and other elections thereafter" (High Court Judgement, 2017).

Recognizing the lacuna in Act (699) in terms of the constitutional independence of the Commission, the Court agreed that it had no jurisdiction to compel the Commission to act in a way, form or manner that is not prescribed by the relevant law, i.e., Act 699. This was basically the reason why the Court compelled the Electoral Commission to comply with the provisions of Act 699 by ensuring the passage of constitutional instrument to provide for modalities for the implementation of the Act (High Court Judgement, 2017).

Establishment of Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB): The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MFA & RI), in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ghana, the German Technical Cooperation (GIT) and the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS) at the University of Ghana, established the Diaspora Support Unit, to strengthen Ghana's engagement with its diaspora population. During the inauguration of this Unit, MFA & RI in collaboration with IOM organized a colloquium

on the theme "Linking the Ghanaian Diaspora to the Development of Ghana" in August, 2012. The colloquium assembled some diaspora associations and individuals from Italy, The Netherlands, Germany and the United States of America among others, and other stakeholders in Ghana. The conference resulted in the birth of the Unit and a website for the Ghanaian diaspora (MFA & RI, 2015a). The Diaspora Unit was later upgraded into a fully-fledged bureau called Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB) with the mandate to serve as a national platform for effective diaspora engagement (Korbieh, 2014). The main purpose of its establishment was to promote a more structured and constructive engagement between Ghana and its diaspora population, by enhancing the capacity of the diaspora to effectively participate in Ghana's development. In the process, the diaspora population would be empowered to channel their remittances to foster entrepreneurship, support innovations in the priority sectors of their homeland, fill the gaps on knowledge and skills and lead the scientific and technical networks in Ghana (MFA & RI, 2016).

As a strategy to enhance the diaspora engagement process of the country, the Diaspora Affairs Bureau established diaspora desk offices in all the 54 Diplomatic Missions and three (3) Consulate General Offices abroad. The diaspora desk officers serve as an interface between the diaspora population and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration for a more constructive and sustainable diaspora engagement process (MFA & RI, 2016). In its determination to provide a framework within which the Ghanaian diaspora could be collectively engaged in political, social, economic and cultural discourse towards effective integration of their contributions in the economy, through a transparent process devoid of suspicion and mistrust and mutually beneficial arrangement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration coordinated the formulation of a draft diaspora engagement policy, with a team of consultants from the

Centre for Migration Studies in 2016 (MFA & RI, 2016, b). The draft Diaspora Engagement Policy is yet to be adopted by cabinet (MFA & RI, 2016).

Workshop on Diaspora Capital and Development of Diaspora Engagement Policy:

The first ever workshop on "Diaspora Policy" was organized by Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Regional Integration in collaboration with the International Centre for Diaspora Policy Development (ICMPD) in Accra from 18th to 22nd August, 2014 to leverage the capacities of partner countries and regional organizations to comprehensively address all areas of migration and development. Sponsored by the European Union (EU), through its Migration EU Expertise (MIEUX) Initiative, the programme was implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development. In attendance were members of the Diaspora Affairs Stakeholder Committee, comprising 14 representatives from the Ministries, Civil Society, Private Sector and the Financial Institutions. In addition, other relevant international organizations in the country such as IOM and GIZ joined the participants. Even though the main thrust of the workshop was to develop the capacities of the partner countries and regional organizations, the workshop also focused on collating inputs from participants for the development of a national diaspora engagement policy, which had become a priority agenda of the MFA & RI, with the Centre for Migration Studies as the lead academic institution contracted to formulate the policy in the following year, 2015 (MFA & RI, 2015b).

Workshop on Institutional Capacity Needs for Development: This is one of the important workshops organized by the MFA & RI, in collaboration with the EU, ICMPD, IOM and GIZ at Ada, in November 2014. The overarching aim of the workshop was to

identify the human resource needs of critical institutions, which have been bedeviled with acute shortage of manpower at all levels such as the health and education ministries.

In furtherance of this objective, MFA & RI, with financial support from the EU Mieux project, GIZ, ICMPD and IOM organized the workshop to collate some data, in a form of matrix to address the lingering manpower challenges of these ministries. To sustain the initiative, MFA & RI was tasked with the responsibility of regularly updating the human resource data, with the active support of the relevant Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The crucial significance of the initiative was that it would assist with improving the paucity of data at the Ministries as well as enhancing transfer of knowledge from the Ghana diaspora into the critically needed sectors. In addition, with a well-managed programme of such importance, economic integration of return Ghanaian emigrants would be greatly enhanced (MFA & RI, 2016).

Capacity Building Training Session for Desk Officers in Brussels in September, 2015: In an unprecedented effort to sharpen the professional skills of the diaspora desk officers abroad to perform their duties efficiently, MFA & RI, through the Diaspora Affairs Bureau, in collaboration with the EU, MIEUX Project, ICMPD and GIZ organized a three-day capacity building training session in Brussels, Belgium in September, 2015. In addition to three officials from the Diaspora Affairs Bureau, who joined participants from Accra, a pool of 15 Diaspora Desk Officers were assembled in Brussels, from various Ghanaian Missions in Europe.

At the end of the three-day sessions, participants were awarded certificates in professional diaspora engagement mechanisms. The significance of the training session could not be overstated as participants benefited tremendously from topics spanning from "how to engage the diaspora", "tools to use", "diaspora engagement policies" and "best practices in diaspora engagement" among others (MFA, 2017d).

Diaspora Knowledge Networks: In addition to the institutional needs workshop undertaken by MFA & RI, some public and international institutions such as Ministry of Health and IOM have organized the "Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA)". MIDA was a capacity building programme, which helped to mobilize competencies acquired by African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa's development. In Ghana, the adoption of this programme by the Ministry of Health was to strengthen the institutional capacities of government to achieve its development goals through the transfer of relevant skills, financial and other resources from its diaspora population (IOM, 2014). The programme eventually gave in to the introduction of a new programme by IOM called "Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals" (TRQN). This programme has facilitated the physical return of workers to their country of origin. IOM also arranges virtual return assignments, in which participants work via internet or video conferencing (IOM, 2014).

Establishment of the Diaspora Affairs Office (Office of the President): In February 2O17 the Government of Ghana established the Diaspora Affairs Office at the Presidency (Jubilee House), headed by a Director. The establishment of the office at the Presidency emphasizes the importance government attaches to the contributions of the Ghanaian diaspora to the economy (Diaspora Affairs Office, 2018: 1-3).

The office, in collaboration with MFA & RI, Ghanaian Missions and Associations abroad, relevant State Institutions, International Organizations and NGOs "seeks to promote the interest of the Ghanaians in the diaspora and explore more meaningful ways the diaspora could contribute to Ghana's socio-economic development for mutual benefit" (Diaspora Affairs Office, 2018: 1-3).

The main objectives of the office are to maintain a comprehensive database of Ghanaians in the diaspora for easy identification, location and deployment of their skills and

expertise for national development; promote youth engagement policies to enable second and third generation Ghanaians in the diaspora to develop in their Ghanaian heritage; explore most attractive and cost-efficient means to encourage investment and capital inflow from the diaspora and transform remittances into sustainable development finance; lobby for legal instruments and programmes that extend rights and privileges to the Ghanaian diaspora and strengthen homeland-diaspora engagement by organizing seminars, conferences such as a bi-annual home coming summit (Diaspora Affairs Office, 2018: 1-3).

To achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the office has put together the following programmes and activities, among others, for 2018-2019: develop a website, comprehensive database of Ghanaians in the diaspora and a diaspora magazine as an information sharing tool; engage the diaspora community to solicit their views for an effective diaspora engagement policy; offer advice sessions to address individual concerns from business setup, land registration, queries about dual citizenship and offer institutional support for individual initiatives and projects; lobby and advocate for the removal of employment restrictions on dual citizens; organize trade and investment fair-matching, linking and facilitating diaspora ideas and concepts to Government initiatives; provide opportunity for businesses to reach out to the diaspora community with innovative financial products such as pension schemes, savings and investments and engage second generation diaspora citizens through diaspora National Service Scheme (Diaspora Affairs Office, 2018: 1-3).

Informal Institutional Initiatives and Interactions: Interactions by the homeland with the Ghanaian diaspora are not only formal. One major feature of the relationship has also been the deployment of less formal programmes organized by political parties, churches and chiefs, through traditional ceremonies (i.e., festivals). The proliferation of external

political party branches found in many destination countries, fueled by the introduction of the 1992 Constitution, provides the necessary platforms for a constructive engagement with the diaspora. The main political parties in Ghana namely, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) have established overseas branches across the globe. These external party branches, through their various policy implementation processes, contribute capital and other resources to the country's development (Awumbila and Teye, 2014).

With regard to the Ghanaian churches, some of them have established branches in other countries to engage the diaspora. For example, The Church of Pentecost, Apostolic Church of Ghana, the Light House Church, Royal House Church and the Assemblies of God Church are among those with branches across the globe. There are frequent interactions among the church members and their homeland churches, with some visiting home to attend conferences and conventions. Annual traditional festivals, which are usually organized by traditional authorities and ethnic groups, also provide excellent attraction for the Ghanaian diaspora to visit and interact with their homeland. During major festivals in Ghana, such as Aboakyir of Winneba, Fetu Afahye of the Ogua Traditional Area, Homowo of the Ga, Odwira of the Akuapem Traditional Area, Hogbetsotso of Anlo Traditional Area, members of Diaspora Hometown Associations visit their homeland, -Ghana, to attend the celebrations. In many cases, they come along with financial contributions for development projects in their communities (Teye et al., 2017).

Traditionally, most developing countries have often embarked on marketing outreach programmes aimed at showcasing the country's attractions abroad for trading and investment purposes. These deliberate engagements abroad often result in visitations and

expenditures by foreigners and diaspora population to these countries of origin (Ankomah et al., 2012).

As highlighted by Ankomah et al. (2012), Ghana has developed a distinct strategy to target its intended market. These strategies include policies, special invitations, conferring of traditional titles and citizenship through naturalization, free land offers, and advocacy of pan-Africanism. These strategies have stimulated the Ghanaian diasporas' sense of belonging and identity to become active cultural brokers, marketers, willing ambassadors abroad and important stakeholders in the country's economic development abroad (Ankomah et al., 2012). This unique Ghanaian diaspora market is dominated by blacks living in North America, the Caribbean and Ghanaian immigrants in Europe and North America as well as other places of the world (Ankomah et al., 2012).

3.4 Challenges of Ghana's Diaspora Engagement Policies and Programmes

Ankomah et al. (2012) categorize the potential problems and challenges into four main areas; political, global, economic and social environment:

3.4.1. Political Environment

The political environment of Ghana has been characterized by unfulfilled or partially fulfilled pronouncements and promises to the Ghanaian diaspora in the quest by governments to attract them. For instance, the offer of citizenship to North America and Caribbean diaspora (Black Africans) in the 1990s to attract them to return to Ghana was partially fulfilled in 2000 when the then government allowed them permanent residence status only after 7 years of residence in Ghana, through the Right of Abode Legislation. ROPAA, which was passed to allow Ghanaian diaspora to vote during general elections is yet to be implemented. While the Citizenship Act, 2002, allows dual citizens the right to

context parliamentary seats among other privileges, the Constitution disqualifies them from holding any seats in Parliament (Ankomah et al., 2009). The first Homecoming Summit, held in 2001, with all the initial wide publicity and fan-fare was beset with implementation pitfalls leading to the disillusionment of the diaspora (Ankomah et al., 2012).

There is a long-held belief among many Ghanaians and members of the diaspora that in Ghana there is a deficiency in continuity regarding government policies, due to change in governments (Ankomah & Crompton, 1990). For example, different regimes in Ghana are known for their unexplained changes to the existing names and diaspora- related functions of State institutions. Such actions by governments have created doubts in the minds of the Ghanaian diaspora regarding the commitment of the country to the diaspora engagement agenda (Ankomah et al., 2012).

3.4.2 The Global Environment

The efforts of African governments to stimulate the desired level of diaspora involvement in the development of their countries are hampered by the negative image of the African continent in Western countries (Ankomah & Crompton, 1990). This negative image is compounded in the Western media and Hollywood movies, like the "Last King of Scotland", "blood diamonds", "Black Hawk Down" and "Hotel Rwanda". In all these movies the African is portrayed as a savage, uncivilized and even sub-human. The Western news media also portrays the African continent and by extension, Ghana as a place of mass poverty, disease, war and uneducated people. In the case of Ghana, the inability to embark on effective branding and information dissemination seems to have worsened the situation (Ankomah & Crompton, 1990). For a successful engagement of

the Ghanaian diaspora, governments need to leverage their information dissemination strategies to reverse the negative image.

3.4.3. The Economic Environment

Inadequate funding has been one of the challenges of the diaspora engagement policies and programmes of the country. According to Appiah (2009), the country has not devoted enough resources for marketing in its quest to attract the diaspora to invest back home. As a result of the inadequate funding, the archaeological and cultural resources of the country such as the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade artifacts and relics are not being managed properly (Kankpeyeng & DeCorse, 2004). There are still some bottlenecks in the business establishment process in Ghana, culminating in long periods of registration of businesses as compared to some countries in the Western World.

Inadequate infrastructure, such as roads, domestic airlines, lack of constant electricity supply and inadequate health care services hamper the attraction of the desired number of the diaspora population to the country for national development (World Bank Group, 2009; Banful, 2006).)

3.4.3.1 The Social Environment

The social issues confronting the diaspora engagement strategies could be further categorized into ownership, use, and interpretation of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade castles as well as the friction between Ghanaians and their North America and Caribbean counterparts. On ownership, there is confusion about who owns the trans-Atlantic artifacts (Kreamer, 2007). While the North American and Caribbean Diasporas (NACD) see the castles as tombs belonging to their ancestors making them rightful heirs, Ghanaians see themselves as rightful custodians and the United Nations regard them as global property owned by humanity. The UN funds the renovations and repair works of

these world heritage sites and artifacts (Bruner,1996; Kreamer,2007). Regarding the usage of artifacts, while the black African diaspora (North American and Caribbean diaspora) view these artifacts as sacred places for pilgrimage, given its history, and disapprove the charging of any commercial fees for purposes of accessibility (Bruner, 1996), Ghanaians on the other hand, view the use for these historical relics as useful for tourism development and poverty alleviations. The UN considers them as part of its World Slave Route Project connected to West Africa (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2004). However, the North American and Caribbean Diaspora (NACD) hold the opinion that the use of these relics for tourism amounts to desecration (Kreamer, 2007).

Interpretation of the relics also presents some degree of conflict. The Ghanaians have accused NACD of parochially interpreting the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade relics. For instance, while Ghanaians interpret them to reflect the 500 years of the country's economic and political interaction with European counterparts and the struggle for independence and freedom from colonial domination (Kreamer, 2007), the NACD wants the history of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade of which their ancestors were sold and subjected to all kinds of brutality and subjugation to be told without distortion. They want the human tragedy inherent in the period to be exposed. Meanwhile, the UN interprets the tragedy as part of a larger history of the world (Kreamer, 2007).

3.5 Ghanaian Migration to the United States of America

The exodus of Africans from both their country of birth and elsewhere has gained scholarly attention leading to some researchers such as Gordon (1998), describing the new African emigration trajectory as "new diaspora". Gordon (1998) opines that there is a growing spotlight on African emigration, particularly to the United States of America

underpinned by five major factors, including: globalization and integration of the world economy; economic and political development failures in Africa; immigration and refugee policies in Europe and the United States of America; anglophone background; and historic ties of sending countries to the United States of America (Gordon, 1998).

Though Africans have traditionally migrated to the countries of their colonial powers such as France, Britain and Portugal, from the early 1970s, emigration towards these countries stalled due to tighter migration controls and economic challenges. African migrants therefore, turned their attention towards the United States, with students who had also studied in the United States and normally would have returned to help build their nations, as was the case in the past, decided to stay back and work due to the economic hardships in their countries of origin (Gordon, 1998).

Consequently, contemporary African migration to the United States has rapidly increased. It is estimated that while between 1961 and 1971 only about 46, 000 African migrants arrived in the United States, from 1980 to 1990, the African migrants to the United States were five times the previous decade's figure (Konadu-Agyeman and Takyi, 2006). One of the striking features of the new growing immigration phenomenon in the United States is the enormity of the numbers that have been contributed to the composite immigrant population in the country by the new African immigrants (Hatton and Williamson, 2003).

Meanwhile, before the Africans started migrating to the United States in their numbers in the 1980s, Western Europe was a dominant migration source in the United States. About 710,000 immigrants mainly from Western Europe were received in the United States almost 50 years after the country's independence in 1776 (Arthur, 2016). The spate of admission of immigrants into the United States soared in the 1990s when it admitted two immigrants per minute (Arthur, 2016).

However, it must be noted that peoples of African descent have had a long history of emigration (voluntary and involuntary) to the Northern American countries through the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. It is on record that about 10 to 20 million Africans were forcefully transported to North and South America, giving rise to a description of origin of black African diaspora in North and South America as well as the Caribbean (Konadu-Agyemang et al., 2016).

The Slave Trade lasted for about three hundred years, with Africans labouring as workers in the agricultural plantations and mines (Takougang, 1995). Following the abolition of the Slave Trade in the nineteenth century, few Africans emigrated to the United States; only 31, 000 Africans emigrated to the country from 1900 to 1950 (Gordon, 1998). In a study of the African diaspora in the United States and Europe (The Ghanaian Experience), Arthur (2016) enumerated some factors to explain the surge in African migration in the United States from the 1980s. According to him, United States immigration laws became favourable in the 1980s to the educated elite from Africa, resulting in an influx of educated and skilled immigrants to the country. Also, the Refugee Act of 1980 allowed many Africans to flee from political and economic instability, including Somalia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Sudan and seek asylum status in the United States (Arthur, 2016).

Other factors outlined by Arthur (2016) on the increased African emigration to the United States include the following: the granting of scholarships by American Institutions to African students, after World War II and decolonization of many African countries, to study in the United States. The students were to come back to help with nation building and establish the nascent civil service institutions; growing interest of America in the mining and agricultural resources in Africa which engendered more training of African students in the United States; and Africa assumed important position on the political

agenda of United States during the cold war era aimed at containing the global communism between the East and West. The plan was to have these newly trained African elites to return home and help cement strong bonds of cooperation between the African continent and the United States.

Accordingly, African migration to the US soared between 1981-1990 and 1991-2000, with the number of legal immigrants admitted into the country within these decades doubling from 176,893 to 354,939. In 2000, the total number of African immigrants in the United States reached about 701,000 people (US Census, 2000).

Following an analysis of 2015 United States Census data, a group of researchers known as "Partnership for New American Economy Research", (2018) arrived at the conclusion that African immigrants in the United States have made meaningful contributions to several vital sectors of the United States economy. The key findings were as follows:

African immigrant households contribute billions of dollars to the United States economy through their spending and tax payments. They argued that African immigrants earned US$ 55.1 billion in 2015. Their households paid US$ 10.1 billion in State and local taxes, leaving them with an estimated spending power of more than US$ 40.3 billion that year. African immigrants have higher levels of education than the overall United States population, with emphasis on Science, Technology, Engineers and Mathematics. In detail, it was found that about 40 percent of African immigrants have at least a bachelor's degree-making those 30 percent more likely to achieve a higher level of education than the overall United States population. Of the group, about one in three, or 33.4 percent have STEM degrees, becoming more and more competitive in the labour market. The report also indicated that there is a large share of African immigrants working in the health care sector, a sector facing high demand for healthcare staff. The report further

explained that the number of open health care positions in the United States economy far exceeded the number of unemployed workers with experience in the field (Arthur, 2016).

Another study by Anderson (2017) indicates that by 2015 African immigrants in the United States had reached about 2.1 million, a substantial increase from 1970 when the United States had only 70,000 African immigrants (USA Census, 2000). As stressed by Anderson (2017), the growth in immigration becomes even more crystalized when one takes a critical look at the numbers of recently arrived immigrants. Africans enjoy the record of having the fastest growth rate, from 2000 to 2013, increasing by 41% during that period (Anderson, 2017).

In terms of demographic distribution of African immigrants, Anderson (2017) observed that they are more likely to settle in the South (39%) or the Northwest (25%) than in the Midwest (18%) or West (17%), while the largest numbers of African immigrants are found in Texas, New York, California, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Virginia, with about 100,000 foreign born Africans in each of the above- mentioned cities (Anderson, 2017).

The sub-Saharan African population also seems to double every decade between 1980 and 2010 and increased by 29 percent over the following five years. In 2015, 1.7 million sub-Saharan Africans lived in the United States, accounting for a small but growing share (i.e. 4 percent) of the 43.3 million immigrants in the United States (Anderson, 2017). The figure (i.e.1.7 million) represents 83 per cent of the 2.1 immigration from Africa (US Census Bureau 2006, 2010 and American Community Survey, 2015).

In 2015, about 80 percent of sub-Saharan Africans were from Eastern and Western Africa, with Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa as the top five sending countries. As Table 3.3 shows, these five countries together account for more than 54 percent of all sub-Saharan Africans in the United States.

From 2000 to 2015, remittances received by sub-Saharan African countries through formal channels rose nearly ten-fold, peaking at US$35 billion in 2015. Remittances accounted for about three percent of overall Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in the region. It has been recorded that some of the economies in the sub-Saharan Region depend more on remittances than others: for instance, remittances accounted for 31 percent GDP in Liberia, 22 percent in The Gambia, 1.8 percent in Lesotho, 1.4 percent in Senegal and 12 percent in Cape Verde as compared to just 0.01 percent in Angola and 0.3 percent in South Africa (World Bank Prospects Group, 2013).

Table 3.3 Estimated Populations of Sub-Saharan African Countries in the United States of America (2015)

Region/Country	Number	Percent (%)
Sub-Saharan African Total	1,716,000	100.0
Eastern Africa	613,000	35.7
Ethiopia	229,000	13.3
Kenya	130,000	7.6
Somalia	89,000	5.2
Eritrea	39,000	2.3
Other Eastern Africa	126,000	7.3
Middle Africa	129,000	7.5
Cameroon	51,000	3.0
Other Middle Africa	77,000	4.5
Southern Africa	99,000	5.8

South Africa	94,000	5.5
Other Southern Africa	5,000	0.3
Western Africa	766,000	44.6
Nigeria	324,000	18.9
Ghana	156,000	9.1
Liberia	79,000	4.6
Cabo Verde	43,000	2.5
Sierra Leone	42,000	2.5
Other Western Africa	122,000	7.1
African.e.c	110,000	6.4

Source: United States Bureau 2006, 2010 and American Community Survey, 2015

Ghanaian migration to the United States began during the 1950s and 1960s, within the period of the Civil Rights Movement and anti-Imperialism protest. This was the period of Ghana's independence struggle to the attainment of independence. It also marks the period when American human rights intellectuals and activists touted Ghana as an epitome of black achievement. While early migrants were mostly students who had the intention of returning home eventually to use their high education and skills in support of the country's development, those who migrated in the 1980s and 1990s mainly focused on business opportunities (Walker, 2011).

A specific year of remarkable Ghanaian emigration to the United States could be traced to 1965 when the latter enacted a landmark legislation, Hart Celler Act of 1965. Before the passage of this Act, the then prevailing American Immigration Policy, which had lingered on since the 1920s, had imposed an excessively restrictive national origins quota system hindering prospective immigrants from non-European regions to apply for visas to enter the country (Arthur, 2016). The abolition of this Act opened the long-shut door to

Ghanaians to take advantage of the vast opportunity granted by the Act. Anarfi et al., (2003) write that the initial emigration of Ghanaians to the West started in 1965. The four clusters on account of "the historical development of emigration from Ghana", according to Anarfi et al (2003) include the following: a period of minimal emigration (precolonial period mid 1960s); a period of initial emigration (starting in 1965); a period of large-scale emigration (from 1980s);and a period of intensification and diasporisation of Ghanaians (from 1990s onwards).

According to Anarfi et al (2003), by the 1980s, North America had become increasingly popular for Ghanaians as a destination region. Therefore, from 1986 to 2001, 49,703 Ghanaians immigrated to the United States. By 2001, 104,000 Ghanaians were living in the United States, while 114,335 settled in Canada (Anarfi & Kwankye, 2003).

Per the findings of Arthur (2008) and (2016), Ghanaian immigrants constitute an important part of the total number of Africans who migrated to the United States, with their numbers ranking among the top five continental African immigrants in the United States. From 1990-2000 about 40,104 Ghanaians were admitted as legal residents. They were usually admitted under the "lottery" or Diversity Programme as permanent residents. The qualification to the residence status varies, with some as immediate relatives (spouses, children and parents) of American citizens, others under family-sponsored preferences as well as political refugees and asylum seekers (Arthur, 2008; 2016).

The third preference provision in immigration law which allows foreigners with exceptional skills to apply for employer sponsorship in order to obtain permanent or legal residence status has also benefitted some skillful Ghanaians. There are others who have also benefited from the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, popularly

referred to as the Simpson-Mazzoli Act for their personal and collective development gains.

Some of the educated Ghanaian immigrants who have benefited from this Act have had the opportunity to facilitate the immigration of their equally well-educated and skilled relatives to the country (Arthur, 2008; 2016). The majority of the Ghanaian immigrants arrived in the United States around 2000, believed to be the second most recently settled population in the 15 group Rockefeller Foundation–Aspen Institute Diaspora Program (RAD) analysis (after Ethiopia) (Migration Policy Institute, 2015).

Immigrant population from Ghana is vastly distributed across the United States, with the largest number in New York State followed by Virginia, New Jersey and Maryland. About 35,000 Ghanaian immigrants lived in New York Metropolitan Area, while Washington DC and its adjoining communities had 15,000 Ghana born residents (Migration Policy Institute, 2015).

In the area of education, Ghanaian diaspora in the United States have educational achievement similar to the general population, with 18 percent of them, from 25 years and older, having bachelor degrees as their highest qualification, nearly the same proportion as the general United States population. Migration Policy Institute (2015) indicates that 12 percent of Ghanaian diaspora members have master's degree, PHD or an advanced professional degree, compared to 11 percent of the general United States population (Migration Policy Institute, 2015).

According to the World Bank Prospect Group (2013), remittances to Ghana in 2012 totaled US$151 million which represented 0.4 percent of the country's US$40.7 billion GDP. Out of the US$151 million, the Ghanaian diaspora in the United States transferred about US$33 million in remittances to Ghana in that year, making the US-based population the largest source of remittance inflow to the country.

As is the case with many Ghanaian diaspora populations, the Ghanaian diaspora population in the United States have formed several groups and associations such as professionals, former school mates, ethnic and hometown-based associations. These associations provide that crucial interface between them and their homeland. They also provide the vehicles for the necessary social service interventions in their homeland from where the associations originate. The associations further provide the requisite platforms for dissemination of crucial information about opportunities in their homelands.

The work of Awumbila and Teye (2014) shows that the Asanteman Association of the United States, particularly the New York branch, is the oldest of all the Ghanaian immigrant ethnic based associations in the country. It was formed in 1982 with the central aim of projecting the image and cultural heritage of the Asante ethnic group, serving as a vehicle for enhancing and sustaining the ethnic identity of their Asante members, promoting their welfare and nurturing and strengthening friendship and understanding among Asantes and others (Awumbila & Teye, 2014).

Moreover, the association has been embarking on vital developmental projects, particularly in Kumasi, with some of the Asante chiefs visiting their associations abroad, at the associations' expense (Awumbilla and Teye, 2014). In a similar vein, Alhassan (2010) noted that traditional authorities also play a role in forging close ties between the country and the diaspora, with some of the Ghanaian chiefs, including the Asantehene, paying several visits to the associations in the United States and elsewhere to encourage and deepen diaspora homeland investment as well as healthy bilateral ties between the host nations and Ghana.

An ethnographic study by Mante (2010), revealed that Ghanaians in the US face a number of cultural and racial challenges including the following: daily embarrassment and interpersonal racism faced by some Ghanaian immigrants due to different accent in

speaking the English language; beside language barriers, adjustment to seasonal changes and taste of American food especially for the new immigrants; and the individualistic culture as compared to the communal form of living in Ghana , with its associated stress level within the American society as compared to the communal nature of the Ghanaian society.

3.6 Ghanaian Migration to the State of Qatar

The State of Qatar is a country located in Western Asia, specifically on a small Qatar peninsula, straddling the northeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Qatar shares a land border with only Saudi Arabia, with the Persian Gulf surrounding it. Qatar has a constitutional monarchical system of government, ruled by the Al Thani Royal family. Before the discovery of oil in the 1950s, the country was known for pearl hunting and sea trade (Qatar, 2015). Qatar is famous for being the third largest natural gas reserves country in the world; it is in the process becoming one of the richest countries on per capita basis. The United Nations estimates its 2019 population to be 2,743,901 (UNCTAD, 2019).

In terms of ethnic composition, Qatar (Arab) nationals make up about 11 percent of the total population of the country, followed by other Arab (13 %), Indian (24 %), Nepali (16 %), Filipino (11 %) and Bangladesh and Sri Lankan (5 %). Some 88.4 percent of the population with the Qatari nationals represents 11.6 percent of the population. Also, the country is heavily male, i.e., 74.91 percent male and 25.9 percent female (UNCTAD, 2019). Qatar's total land area takes the form of a peninsular spurting off from the coast of Saudi Arabia estimated at 11,586 square km. It has 563 km of coastline and shares 87 km of boundary with Saudi Arabia (UNCTAD, 2019).

The country was originally ruled by the Sheiks of Bahrain. The eastern Arabian coast called the Trucial Coast experienced trading rules imposed by the Portuguese, to be

followed by the British. In 1867, the British installed Muhamid Bin Thani, head of a leading Qatari family as the region's ruler, following a break-out of war between the rulers of Bahrain and the people of Qatar peninsular. The Al Thani family has since ruled the Qatar peninsular and they are believed to have arrived in Qatar in the middle of the 18th Century (CIA, 2015). Qatar obtained its independence from the British in 1971 and refused to join the other trucial States which formed the United Arab Emirates. Qatari culture plays a huge role in the country, particularly tribal and family connections.

Currently, Qatar is considered as a very wealthy State owing to its enormous oil and natural gas revenues (World Bank, 2014). Almost all of its gas reserves are contained in an offshore gas field called the North Field, which is the largest single natural gas deposit in the world. The development of the hydro carbon sector has catapulted the country to new heights economically, making it the richest country in the world, with GDP per capital estimated at US$124,500 in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms in 2017 (Qatar Economic Insight, 2018). The proven reserves of Qatar gas make it the third-largest in the world, reaching 7000 km^3. The economy was boosted in 1991 by Qatar's completion of the US$ 1.5 billion phase of North Field Gas Development. It started exporting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to Japan in 1996 (Gulf Times, 2019).

Mindful of the associated challenges in terms of over-reliance on Oil and Gas Industry and total neglect of the manufacturing sector (i.e. Dutch Disease), Qatar has sought to diversify its resources by setting up some heavy industrial projects in Umm Said. These industrial projects include steel plant, a refinery with 50,000 barrels (8,000m^3) a day capacity, a fertilizer plant for urea and ammonia and a petrochemical plant (Gulf Times, 2019).

Despite scathing tales of African migrants' abuses, countries of the Arabian Gulf, including the GCC States continue to be the preferred choice of destination for African

migrants in recent times (Atong et al., 2018). Recent research findings have identified two main reasons for the growing phenomenon, namely, economic and immigration restrictions in Europe and North Africa, which had historically been the focus of African emigrants. There are indications that African migrant workers now prefer GCC countries as migration destination due to, among other things, their high per capita incomes (Omar, 2015; Pelican and Tatah, 2009).

The huge number of immigrants that make up the total population and workforce of the GCC countries crystalizes the centrality of migration to these countries. From 2000, the population of migrants in the GCC countries started to show steady increase. For example, in 2000 migrant population averaged 47 percent of the total population in the GCC countries. By 2015 and 2017, the average has increased to about 60 percent of the total population (Atong et al., 2018). The World Economic Report (2018) estimates that currently except for Saudi Arabia and Oman, foreign nationals make up the majority of the population in GCC countries that is 88 percent in the United Arab Emirates, 76 percent in Qatar and 74 percent in Kuwait. Although empirical data for these stories of abuse remain scanty, there are some truth to the fact that African immigrant, including Ghanaians, endure considerable racial abuse in the region (Atong et al., 2018).

These abuses have led to a labour migration ban to the GCC countries by Ghanaian authorities. Most of these reported cases have been against Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Studies indicate that the majority of the Ghanaians who migrate to the GCC countries are young, unskilled, less educated and increasingly female (Atong et al., 2018). Women are girls are attracted to the region due to the prominence of the domestic services sector in the GCC. However, in Qatar, the domestic services are not as crucial in terms of number of employees, compared to sectors such as construction, security and health care. It could be one of the reasons why Qatar has not been in the news media, as

other GCC countries, for reported abuse cases of domestic workers in the country (Atong et al., 2018).

Between the 1990s and 2017, the major sending African countries have been Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, with Nigeria, South Sudan and Eritrea following closely (UNDESA, 2018). According to Awumbila et al., (2014), Nigeria is the largest migrant-sending country from the West African Region to the GCC countries. Recent literature has shown that Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have also been fecund sources of emigration to the GCC countries (Atong et al., 2018).

In a recent exercise by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Diaspora Affairs Unit in (February, 2019) to compile a comprehensive data on Ghanaians abroad in countries where Ghana Missions are established, it was revealed that there were about 1,000 and 5,752 Ghanaian immigrants in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), respectively (MFA & RI, 2019). However, in Qatar, the official number of Ghanaians reported by the host Ministry of Interior is 8,000 (Ministry of Interior, Qatar, 2018). The Ghana Mission in Doha, Qatar was first inaugurated in May, 2018 and is determined to register as many Ghanaians as possible to develop a reliable and quality database of Ghanaians for effective diaspora planning (Ghana Embassy Report, Doha (a), 2019).

The Government of Ghana has signed Manpower and Labour Agreement with Qatar to formalize the recruitment of Ghanaians into the employment sector of the economy. The signing ceremony marked the climax of a two-day State visit to Qatar by the President of Ghana from 12th to 13th November, 2018 (Manpower and Labour Agreement, 2018). Aside from the signing of this agreement, nine agreements have been signed between the two countries to galvanize the bilateral economic cooperation to the desired level for the mutual benefit of the two countries (Ghana Embassy Report, Doha (b), 2019).

It is the hope of the two countries that the Labour Agreement will promote safe migration, fair recruitment, prevention of exploitation and human trafficking, bolster consular assistance being offered by the Ghana Mission in Doha and enhance the protection of the human and labour rights of migrant workers (Ghana Mission, Doha (c), 2019). The overarching expectation is that these Agreements will deepen the existing cordial relationship between the two countries for their mutual benefit (Ghana Mission, Doha (d), 2019).

Qatar has become a preferred choice of destination for most Ghanaian labour migrants, because of many favourable factors. Firstly, though the Ghana Mission in Doha was only officially opened in May, 2018, the welfare and consular issues of Ghanaian immigrants in Qatar were handled expertly by the Ghana Mission in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Concurrent accreditation of Ghana Mission in Riyadh to Qatar was a diplomatic arrangement put in place by the Ghana Government to ensure a continued friendly relationship with the State of Qatar and to offer the needed protection to Ghanaian immigrants in the country (Ghana Mission, Doha (d), 2018). It is expected that the formal opening of the Mission and the signing of bilateral Agreement on manpower and Labour will have positive effect on the number of Ghanaians coming to Qatar for employment (Manpower and Labour Agreement, 2018).

Many Ghanaian professionals such as medical doctors, engineers, academics, pilots, laboratory technicians, quantity surveyors, nurses, and many more from the academia, medical field, construction, industry, agriculture, various industries, education and aviation from United Kingdom, United States of America and some European countries who are holding dual citizenship have been flocking to Qatar for employment due to the higher salary scale being enjoyed as compared to their counterparts, with the same qualification who come to Qatar directly from Ghana (Ghana Embassy, Doha (d), 2019).

Thirdly, the strict supervision of Qatari recruitment agencies in Doha, together with their partner recruitment agencies abroad by the host Ministry of Manpower, Employment and Labour Agency controls the exploitation of would-be workers to Qatar. Per the Labour regulations of Qatar, no foreign recruitment agency can directly deal with Qatari recruitment companies without seeking the approval of the Manpower and Labour Ministry of Qatar (Manpower and Labour Agreement, 2018).

Contrary to reports of exploitations, violations of migrant' rights, and even to the points of deaths, which led to the ban of labour migrations to the GCC countries by Ghana, Uganda and Ethiopia, Qatar has remained a more secure, friendly and incident-free in terms of migrant rights violation, abuses and exploitations. For instance, in other Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, a report in 2017 indicated that about 800 irregular Ghanaian migrants had turned themselves in for deportation back home at the Ghana Embassy in Riyadh due to harsh living conditions and abuses. In a similar report, in February, 2018, about 500 Ghanaians were said to be stranded in Dubai in the UAE (Omar Al-Ubaydli, 2015).

To ensure effective guarantees for migrant workers in the country, Qatar has adopted another law (Law 21) in 2015 to strengthen the existing Permanent Constitution, enacted in 2004 to govern the entry, exit, and residency of foreign workers. The law makes it mandatory for employment agencies to provide written contracts for employees before their formal engagement. The contract agreement should spell out in details the salary, nature of work and length of contract. This law was further strengthened in 2017 with the passage of Domestic Workers Law to give more protection to that category of workers and to abolish the galling Exit Permit.

Under law 21, domestic workers enjoy a maximum of 10-hour workday, a weekly rest day, three weeks of annual leave, and end-of-service payment and health care benefits (Atong et al., 2018). Until 4th September, 2018, one of the controversial laws confronting all categories of foreign workers, with the exception of Diplomats in Qatar was the exit permit. Before September, 2018, most categories of workers were to obtain exit permit before they could travel abroad or to their homelands. The new law seeks to abolish it completely. However, local staff of Diplomatic Missions, for instance are not yet covered by this new law, making it still mandatory to request for exit permit before exiting from the country. The amendment of the relevant laws as effected through the amendment of two main laws; Law No. 13 was adopted to amend provisions of Law 21 of 2015 and Law no. 1 of 2017 (Atong et al., 2018).

3.7 Ghanaian Migration to the United Kingdom

As a result of unfavourable economic conditions in Ghana and strict conditionalities enforced by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Anarfi and Kwankye, 2003) between the 1980s and 1990s, Ghanaians viewed migration as a critical livelihood strategy (Wong, 2013; Acheampong, 2000). The pattern of Ghanaian emigration, therefore, has shifted beyond the African continent to the Americas (Arthur, 2008) and Europe (Mazzucato, 2011; Vasta and Kandilige, 2010), with United Kingdom becoming a major destination country for Ghanaians who immigrate to Europe (Kandilige, 2012). In the United Kingdom, Boroughs such as Lambeth, Newham, Hackney, Haringey, Lewisham, South Wark, Croydon and Brent have large concentration of Ghanaian residents. Birmingham, Milton Keynes and Manchester are popular residential locations for smaller populations of Ghanaians (COMPAS, 2004).

In 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of Ghana recorded 46,046 registered Ghanaian immigrants in the United Kingdom (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, 2008), with unofficial estimation of 300,000 to 500,000 immigrants. Similarly, in the same year, the United Kingdom Labour Force Survey also recorded 43,246 male and 42,024 female Ghanaian immigrants, totaling 85,270.

Ghanaian residents in the United Kingdom are both impelled and voluntary/economic migrants, with many of the impelled migrants making the journey to the United Kingdom during the military regime in the early 1980s. As expected, during the beginning of the 4th Republic, most of the Ghanaian migrant associations formed around the 1980s showed active interest in the then on-going political process at home. In the process, many of them became external branches of opposition political parties and assisted new arrivals to process asylum applications as well as provide general welfare services to political refugees. A typical example of such an Association is the Ghana Welfare Association founded in the late 1970s (Kandilige, 2017).

The origin of the Ghanaian economic immigrants in the United Kingdom could therefore be traced to the early 1970s and 1980s when as a result of unstable and insecure military regimes, coupled with unprecedented economic crisis, fiscal and monetary mismanagement, widespread corruption as well as a general state of economic hopelessness, many Ghanaians had to leave Ghana, which was once described as "Ghana's other export" after cocoa and gold (Gagakuma, 1984). According to Addison (2004), the outward migration from Ghana continued through the 1990s and 2000s, despite the positive drive towards economic recovery (Addison, 2004).

With the advent of the Fourth Republic in the 1990s, the economy of Ghana took a positive turn culminating in a growing trend of liberalization in the various sectors,

especially the telecommunication and financial sectors. Wong (2013) therefore, observed that more Ghanaian students and young professionals who had previously emigrated began to realize career and entrepreneurial opportunities back home. The discovery of oil in 2007, the establishment of related industries and the need for local content which was anchored in Ghana's legal system, served as stimulus for a considerable number of Ghanaian emigrants to return home to help build their country, with their newly acquired skills and knowledge, especially from the United Kingdom. Such return migrants are considered by some researchers as central within the Ghanaian emigrant network system (Kandilige, 2017).

According to Anarfi et al. (2003) as well as Quartey (2009), the Ghanaian population in the United Kingdom could be described under both temporary and permanent migration categories over several decades. Ghanaian emigrants are well known for their formation of hometown associations wherever they find themselves. Over the years, these associations have served as vessels of socialization and identity formation in the host countries (Kandilige, 2017). In the United Kingdom, several of such associations exist including professional groupings, religious groups, ethnic-based groups, hometown associations, etc. Within the general umbrella of professional associations, there are some specific associations such as Physician Association, Dentistry Association, Nurses Association, Lawyers Association, Engineers and many more (Ghana High Commission, 2019). Ethnic and hometown associations abroad have had their long history in Ghana. In Ghana, it is not uncommon to find such associations in urban centres with their roots from the rural areas (Kandilige, 2017). The primary objective of such associations is to undertake self-help activities and welfare of members as well as the development of their hometowns (Castles et al., 2014, Kandilige 2012, Mercer et al., 2009).

Studies conducted by the UK Office for national statistics (2013) show that there were 98,000 Ghanaians living in the UK in 2013. Table 3.4 shows the top five destination countries for Ghanaians in the EU, from 1990 to 2013.

As Table 3.4 indicates, UK is the top destination country for Ghanaian migrants to the five EU Countries. Colonial ties, English language, UK as a major destination for Ghanaian students and professionals and an increase in the second-generation account for the large numbers of Ghanaian immigration in the UK.

According to Ong'ayo (2016), most Ghanaians in the UK are not captured in the census records, since some are irregular immigrants who cannot be documented. Ong'ayo (2016) further notes that some studies have cited estimates in 2016, from the Ghana High Commission which suggest that there were about 1.5 million Ghanaians registered as UK students (Ong'ayo 2016).

Another study by Kraler and Kofman (2009), observes that the main motives for Ghanaian migration to the UK could be the need for work, family reunion, studies and asylum. The authors have emphasized that the major motive in the 1990s was asylum. As a result of Ghana's political stability over time, the issue of asylum lost attraction to would-be applicants (Kraler and Kofman, 2009).

3.4: Top five destination countries for Ghanaians in the EU: (1990-2013)

Year	UK	Italy	Germany	Netherlands	Spain	Total
1990	32,336	25,093	16,892	5,935	310	80,566
2000	58,572	34,369	32,477	15,609	2,541	143,568
2013	98,000	48,661	35,525	20,829	14,561	217,576

SOURCE: UN DESA (2013): Office of National Statistics, Netherlands, (2015).

On the level of education, within Europe, Ghanaians in UK, Germany and The Netherlands remain the most educated, with majority (62%) having gone through secondary education. Ong'ayo (2016) reveals that, within the EU, UK has the most educated Ghanaian immigrants followed by Germany and The Netherlands. The Akans (Asante, Fante, Akwapim, Akyem, Akwamu, Ahanta, Bono, Nzema and Kwahu), Ga-Adangbe, (Ga, Adangbe, Ada and Krobo), Ewe and Gur (Guruma, Grusi and Mole Dangbani) constitute the main ethnic groups among the Ghanaian immigrants in the United Kingdom (Ong'ayo, 2016).

However, in terms of the size and demographic composition, ethnic groups from the Southern part of Ghana such as Ashanti, Volta, Eastern, Cape Coast, Brong Ahafo and Greater Accra regions are found to be over- represented in contrast with the northern and north-eastern regions (Ong'ayo, 2016).

In terms of areas of settlement of Ghanaian immigrants in the UK, a study shows that majority of Ghanaians lived in Greater London, particularly in Tottenham (the Broad Water Farm Estate), Seven Sisters, Hackney, Enfield, Daltson, Brixton and Lewisham (International Organisation for Migration, 2009). A census carried out by the UK authorities in 2011, also shows that out of the total population of residents in London,

Ghanaians account for 0.3 percent. Table 3.5 presents the general geographic distribution of the Ghanaian population in the UK by region.

Table 3.5: Geographic distribution of Ghanaian population in the UK by region

Region	Population
UK	41,195
London	25,736
South East	4,397
East	3,288
West Midlands	2,046
North West	1,600
East Midlands	1,454
Yorkshire and the Humber	1,429

Source: UK office for National Statistics (2013)

The Office of National Statistics UK (2013) further explains that Ghanaians account for 0.4 percent of the three million inhabitants of Central London. In contemporary times, Ghanaian communities have extended to locations outside London such as Enfield (0.6 % of 312, 466 inhabitants), Croydon (1% of 372,759 Inhabitants), Milton Keynes (0.5% of 248,821 inhabitants), Watford (0.4% of 90,301 inhabitants), Telford and Wrekin UA (0.2% of 166,641 inhabitants), Birmingham (0.1% of 1,073,045 inhabitants) and Coventry (0.1% of 316,960 inhabitants) (The Office of National Statistics UK, 2013).

Van Hear et al. (2004) note that there were 100 Ghanaian associations in the UK from 2004 to 2005. The associations are now conservatively estimated at 200, consisting of umbrella organizations, charities, voluntary organizations, hometown associations, churches, NGOs, media houses and business.

Ghana Union, an association of 50 Ghanaian Community groups, voluntary groups and individuals, is one of the main umbrella organizations (Van Hear et al., 2004). Examples of hometown associations include Ga Dangwe UK, Nzema Association, Asante Town Club, Kassena-Nankana Development League, London. There are other development

NGOs related to Ghanaian immigration such as GUBA Foundation, Noble Friends, Akwaaba UK, Ghanaian Londoners Network, Afro Pulp and Mefiri Ghana (Ong'ayo, 2016). The associations include media houses such as Hot Digital FM, London, Osibisa Radio London; WBLS, Amansan FM, Ahomka Radio UK, Kasapa Power FM, Ghana Today and Joy FM (Ong'ayo, 2016).

In terms of education level, Ghanaians in the United Kingdom could be distinctly set apart from their counterparts elsewhere. The high level of capacity they build in the United Kingdom is reflected in the categories of senders of remittances to Ghana. It is recorded that about half of remittance senders in United Kingdom have a college degree (Orozco, 2005).

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology employed in this study by describing the methods used, processes of data collection, research instruments, and justification of study sites, sampling technique, data analysis and ethical issues related to this study. It also highlights the challenges encountered in the research process and positionality of the researcher.

4.2 Justification of Study Sites

The target population for the study was drawn from the Ghanaian diaspora in the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK) and the State of Qatar. The selection of USA and UK was informed by the fact that the Ghanaian diaspora in the two countries are geographically representative of the general Ghanaian diaspora population in both North America and Europe (Awumbila & Teye, 2014). In terms of volume, the available literature shows that the Ghanaian immigrant stock in USA is the largest, followed by UK (Agyemang & Setrana, 2014). Apart from the fact that the Ghanaian diaspora in USA and UK may represent Ghanaians in the North American and European continents, given their large demographic size, both nations have had long history of Ghanaian immigration (Awumbila and Teye, 2014).

Qatar has been selected to represent the Gulf region which has become a preferred choice of destination for many Ghanaian migrants in recent times. With the highest level of per-capita income in the world (World Bank, 2014; IOM, 2018), Qatar attracts diverse economic migrants from all over the world, including Ghanaians IOM (2018). Ghana has also had a long history of relationship with the country. Another factor that serve as a

major attraction to economic migrants who travel from Ghana to Qatar is the relative peace, security and effective implementation of migration laws which are largely seen as friendly to foreign residents (Atong et al., 2018: Manpower and Labour Agreement, 2018).

4.3 Research Design

A mixed methods research-design, which entails a combination of both quantitative and qualitative research methods, was adopted for this study. Given the respective strengths and weaknesses of dichotomous methods (Kendall, 2007: Azorin, 2011), methodological triangulation was considered a better option to optimize the strength of each technique (Flick, 2006).

The qualitative method is known for flexibility, and effective in providing deeper insights into specific phenomena (Winchester, 2005). Some of the specific benefits of using qualitative methods include the production of comprehensive description of participants' feelings, opinions and experiences (Densin and Lincoln, 1998). As argued by Atieno (2009), a study that is aimed at eliciting perceptions, experiences from participants and the meaning they put on them as well as how they interpret what they experience, the researcher needs qualitative method. Qualitative method will thus allow for discovery and bring forth the perceptions and the complexity of their interpretations.

Beyond these advantages, Atieno (2009) notes that the findings of qualitative method cannot be extended to wider populations with the same degree of certainty that quantitative analyses can. This is because generalization is never the intent given the fact that the sample sizes for qualitative methods tend to be small. Indeed, qualitative work is not nomothetic but essentially ideographic. On the other hand, while a quantitative approach allows for generalization, predictions and comparison (Holland and Campbell,

2005), its own limitations include failing to ascertain deeper underlying meaning and explanations (Bouwer, Belguin, Sanders and der Beigh, 2005).

Some researchers have criticized the effectiveness of combining the two different data collection techniques, due to the differences in their epistemological backgrounds (Teye, 2008). Yet, others have justified the combination of the methods by criticizing the individualistic view which tends to portray the qualitative method, as being 'subjective' and 'ungeneralizable', and the quantitative method as 'objective' and 'generalizable' and value free (Philps, 1998; Winchester, 2005; Hollard and Campbell, 2005).

In support of the triangulation method, they have argued that though the two methods represent different epistemological backgrounds, both are scientific and equally relevant for different purposes (Hollard and Campbell 2005). Authors like Sechrist and Sidani (1995) and Sharan (2002) affirm that they can be combined where appropriate. Carvalho and White (1997) suggest four reasons for using triangulation: namely, enriching the outputs of the two techniques by explaining different aspects of issues that may come up; refuting-thus where one set of options refutes a hypothesis generated by another set of options; confirming-where one set of options confirms a hypothesis generated by another set of options and explaining;- where one set of options sheds light on unexpected findings derived from another set of options.

It has also been argued that triangulation can help minimize several types of biases encountered in research such as measurement bias, sampling bias and procedural bias (Calvalho and White, 1997). Further, it has been proposed that triangulation is not aimed merely at validation but at deepening and widening one's understanding (Rahman Yeasmin, 2012).

The use of triangulation method has produced mixed views among researchers. Some researchers such as Olsen (2004) view the method as useful in the provision of deeper understanding of the study phenomenon. Others like Smith and Kleine (1986) have also argued that it is used to improve the study accuracy, thus providing validity measures.

On the other hand, an assessment of the triangulation method has revealed certain drawbacks such as the possibility of producing unsatisfactory outcome, should the researcher be found unfocused theoretically or conceptually (Rahman and Yeasmin, 2012). Still others have opined that 'triangulation' may be useful for some types of research but are unsuitable for others. Inherent constraints such as time and costs can prevent its full and effective use (Rahman and Yeasmin, 2012).

Despite these apparent shortcomings, the strengths and prominence of the approach in productive research make their use worthwhile. 'Triangulation' highlights qualitative methods to their deserved centrality and also, provides the evidence that quantitative methods can and should be employed in complementary manner (Rahman and Yeasmin, 2012).

As the subject area is multi-dimensional, the use of single method approach would have been inadequate to address the range of multidimensional and multi-siting issues that constitute this research (Creswell, 2009). As shown by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), the strengths of 'triangulation' methods over single methods are inherent in its methodological pluralism or eclecticism, usually engendering quality research outcomes. Hence, the basis for combining both qualitative and quantitative methods in this research is to provide a deeper understanding of the diaspora policy initiatives. This is facilitated by the detailed attention paid to particularities and circumstances (Gazso, 2015).

While quantitative techniques were useful in obtaining the relevant data through web survey, qualitative methods such as interviews and observations were useful in analyzing perceptions, experiences and concerns of participants. They also helped the researcher to understand the complexities, conflicts, negotiations, multi-realities and the meaning of phenomenon such as diaspora policy initiatives (Flick, 2006).

For instance, through the use of interviews and observation, the researcher had deeper understanding of challenges confronting not only the Ghanaian diaspora population in the research sites but also, some of the diaspora-related institutions such as the Diaspora unit and Diaspora Affairs office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the Presidency respectively.

4.4 Data Sources

The data gathered and used for the study were from both secondary and primary sources.

4.4.1 Secondary Data Sources

The secondary data were sourced from relevant documents such as speeches, diaspora policy documents, migration database and administrative reports of some public institutions of Ghana, including Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ministry of Interior, Statistical Services, Diaspora Affairs as well as Ghana Missions abroad. In addition, the researcher also reviewed other relevant documents such as official publications, books, journals, recordings and project works. Most of these documents were accessed from the databases of internet academic sites such as Jstor, Google scholar and Google search.

4.4.2 Primary Data Sources

The primary data for the study were garnered using questionnaires via web survey, in-depth interviews and observations. These tools were very useful in collecting both quantitative and qualitative data for the assessment of Ghana's diaspora engagement initiatives for national development.

4.4.2.1 Web Survey

As indicated by Couper (2000), web survey is considered to be fast, convenient and easy to reach the target population, especially if the study is spread across different continents (Couper, 2000). Thus, for this study area spanning the United States of America, UK and the State of Qatar, web survey was considered as effective means to reach the target population.

The primary technique for collecting the quantitative web survey data was a questionnaire, containing questions of different formats: multiple choice, asking for which option or options apply and seeking dichotomous answers like "yes" or "no". The questionnaire consisted of fifty-seven (57) questions, organized into four (4) main sections: the first section focused on the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. The second was related to government initiatives on symbolic nation building and capacity building, the third section identified measures that extend rights to the diaspora and the fourth dealt with initiatives that extract obligations from the diaspora.

Kinuthia (2013) has described web survey as a new method of data collection that makes use of the internet due to advancement in technology. The internet has been found to be an appropriate research site for embarking on a study on transnationalism and diaspora (Kissau and Hunger, 2010) and is being increasingly used for research across disciplines. Web survey has gained currency in modern day research, with some of the earlier

proponents of this technique such as Couper (2000) and Couper et al. (2005), indicating that internet surveys are likely to replace the traditional survey methods in the nearest future. However, a major potential limitation could be the issue of accessibility in certain environments where the lack of computer knowledge and connectivity would hamper the use of this innovative method. There could also be others with the necessary computer knowledge and skills but will have no access to the computer as a research tool.

The study uploaded the survey questionnaire onto the internet and created a web link for easy accessibility. The link to the survey was provided as: http://siranks.wufoo.com/forms/survey-questionnaire-1/. The link was sent to Ghana Missions abroad in New York and, Washington, the Ghana High Commission in London and the State of Qatar for administering. Overall, 390 valid completed responses were received from the three study countries. The valid completed responses from the USA, UK and the State of Qatar were 180, 130 and 80 respectively. One operational advantage of the use of this internet survey link was the instant feedback received by the researcher once the survey questionnaires were filled and submitted online.

4.4.2.1.1 Sampling Technique

To ensure fair representation of the diaspora communities in the USA, UK and Qatar, the various embassies and high commission of Ghana in the host countries were contacted for a registered list of Ghanaians living in those countries. The list provided may not reflect the entire population of Ghanaians living in these countries since not every Ghanaian living abroad has registered with the missions. The contact information of the diaspora, including their emails were obtained from the diplomatic missions. The list comprised of the following estimated list of registered Ghanaian diaspora with the Ghanaian missions: USA (6000), UK (3200) and Qatar (1000). However, some of the contact details of the people in the sample frame could not be retrieved. In some cases, the numbers were

retrieved but their contact numbers or emails were either not going through or they never responded to emails sent them about the study. Given the challenges associated with web surveys and also the limited time and budgetary constraints, a total of 500 respondents were selected from the list. This included 220 respondents from the USA, 180 from the UK and 100 from Qatar. However, a total of 390 completed questionnaires were received: USA (180), UK (130) and Qatar (80).

4.4.2.2 Data Collection Process

Following a review of the relevant literature, research instruments bearing on survey questionnaires and in-depth interview guide were prepared. To test the efficacy and relevance of these instruments, a fifteen-test questionnaire was sent to Ghanaian migrants in the US, UK and Qatar for pre-testing, through Ghana Missions abroad. Out of the fifteen questionnaires sent, only 9 completed questionnaires were received and this helped in shaping the questions, especially those on the diaspora engagement initiatives.

The second stage of data collection was the distribution of the survey questionnaire. As noted, the distribution was done by the help of Ghana Diplomatic Missions in the study sites and the contact details of selected respondents obtained from the Ghanaian diplomatic missions. The next stage of the data collection was the conduct of in-depth interviews, which were done through telephone, skype and direct face-to-face interviews. All the face-to-face interviews were conducted in Qatar and phone and skype interviews were conducted with respondents from the UK and the USA as the researcher could not travel to those countries. The data collection was done within a six-months period-from June to December 2018.

4.4.3.1 In-Depth Interviews

To provide more qualitative data to enhance depth of analysis (Teye 2012), individual in-depth interviews were carried out. In-depth interviews are mostly useful in exploring the opinions and attitudes of respondents. In the process, their motivation, concerns and challenges regarding their participation in transnational activities are usually brought to the fore.

Twenty in-depth interviews were conducted, 10 in the State of Qatar, 6 in the USA and 4 in UK. It was also envisaged that the interviews would not go beyond 60 minutes in order to elicit the avid attention of respondents. Interview guide was developed on the basis of the structure of the survey questionnaire and administered to the 20 respondents. The 20 respondents were obtained from different categories of Ghanaian workers, that is professionals, semi- professionals and unskilled immigrants. The 10 interviewees from Qatar were mostly unskilled immigrants, with no computer knowledge, who were purposively sampled to reduce the possible elitist bias associated with the use of web survey. Apart from the 20 interviews, two key senior officials of diaspora-related departments were also interviewed, at diaspora affairs offices of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the presidency respectively. A key informant is a person who is considered to have some depth of knowledge regarding the research problem and who is willing to talk (Gaynes & Brown 2015, Lux LJ. et al., 2015). The aim was to gain an insight knowledge into the activities and the challenges of the two departments.

4.4.3.2 Observation

As indicated by Cook (2008), observation is a research methodology by which rich account of the phenomenon being studied is produced. The observation method was applied to complement data collected through web surveys and in-depth interviews

(Creswell, 2009). The unique advantage of the method is to help a researcher capture speculations, feelings, problems, ideas, impressions and prejudices that may have eluded the researcher during the surveys, in-depth interviews and FGDs (see Creswell, 2009). As both an active and passive participant in diverse social activities (Malumfashi, 2006), the researcher's observation covered the whole stages of the research work. For US and UK, the researcher's observation methods involved watching of news and other diaspora related discussions on satellite TV which had Ghanaian TV Stations, You Tube and other media outlets as channels. Participant observations within diaspora town hall meetings, association meetings, dinners, receptions and other Ghanaian social functions such as funerals, naming ceremonies and weddings were employed in Qatar.

4.5 Data Analysis

The quantitative data collected using the semi-structured questionnaire were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20. The data were manually coded and keyed into SPSS and summary results of key variables were generated in the form of frequencies and percentages. Some of the variables analysed using descriptive statistics included socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and their migration history, the various diaspora engagement initiatives and the challenges confronting these initiatives. Largely, the analyses were performed vis-à-vis the three countries selected – viz. USA, UK and Qatar. The findings were presented in the form of tables, bar graphs and pie charts. Given the fact that most of the variables under consideration were nominal or ordinal in terms of its scale of measurement, the chi-square test (χ^2) of significance was mostly used to test for the relationship between the variables. In consonance with the point earlier stated and against the backdrop that some of the outcome variables were nominal, the binary logistic regression analysis was sometimes

conducted to predict respondents' level of participation and awareness of government's diaspora engagement initiatives such as cultural and homecoming events and conferences.

The qualitative data from the in-depth interviews were transcribed, read through thoroughly and subjected to thematic analysis based on the issues the study sought to examine.

4.6 Ethical Consideration

Ethical consideration forms a major element in research (Kumar, 2019). They are important in every stage of the research work, namely, the identification of the research problem, the process of data collection, data analyses and interpretation as well as writing and dissemination of the research report (Creswell, 2009). It was ensured that, the rights and well-being of study participants were always protected, before, during and after the research. To do this, consent was sought from participants by ensuring that they were fully enlightened about the purpose of the study, the risks (if any) and the benefits. For instance, their consent was sought to record the interviews through audio and video recording devices. They were made aware about publishing of the interviews. Respondents were also made aware about the optional nature of their participation. For participants who wanted to remain anonymous, pseudo names were used in the notes and tape recording. Confidentiality and privacy of respondents was assured by hiding their identity. The use of web survey further helped to enhance confidentiality, privacy and anonymity since participants had to fill the questionnaire on line without leaving any trace of identification like name, email, WhatsApp or other addresses.

4.7 Positionality

As a long-serving Foreign Service Officer, working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, the researcher has had the privilege of working at both the Headquarters (Accra) and Ghana's diplomatic missions abroad. Working closely with Ghanaians in the diaspora has heightened his interest in studying the diaspora engagement policies of past governments in Ghana, with the view to proffering appropriate recommendations to enhance a structured form of engagement for the development of the country.

The researcher's positionality as a Foreign Service Officer therefore, can affect the research work in two ways. Firstly, at a personal level, working with the Ghanaian migrants through their associations abroad could enhance the researcher's understanding of the various concerns and behaviors. In the same way, as a Senior Foreign Service Officer/career diplomat, the researcher could identify with most of the members of staff of the diplomatic missions, especially the diaspora desk officers/consular officers and the leaders of the diaspora associations to facilitate the data collection.

From the point of view of the Ghanaian immigrants, it also facilitated their participation in the data collection exercise when they learnt about the researcher's status as a Foreign Service Officer. Serving Foreign Service Officers in diplomatic missions are considered as members of the Ghanaian associations. The members would, therefore, normally see it as a duty to support the exercise.

The down-side of all these advantages could be the risk of being too familiar with some of the issues that might come up during the study, thereby downplaying useful information in the process. In other words, there could be the risk of including information that may be considered as important or relevant, leaving out familiar but

crucial information. To avoid this, information considered as familiar and seemingly irrelevant during the research process was well documented without engaging in selective recording of notes. Overall, the researcher's position as a serving Foreign Service Officer did not, in any way, negatively affect the quality of the findings of the study.

4.8 Challenges Encountered in the Research Process

Challenges are a common phenomenon experienced in social research and could be encountered at any stage of the research process (Rimando, et al.,2015). The nature of the research challenge depends on the type of research method being used at any particular time. However, the negative effect of this could be minimized through the simultaneous use of diverse models of data collection (Terrel, 2012).

Generally, obtaining information from members of the diaspora on their migration profile is considered challenging due to the sensitive nature of the information. The challenges are greater if the information is being sought from the irregular or overstayed migrant for fear that their personal information could be divulged to third parties (Legard et al., 2003). In this present research work, since the main source of the administration of the survey questionnaires was the Ghanaian diplomatic missions, the majority of participants were initially uncomfortable about giving personal information. The missions had to constantly re-assure them through their associations that the information was strictly for academic purpose and that the researcher would maintain a high level of confidentiality and privacy. The same assurance was given to participants by the researcher during the interviews.

Participants also eased up in sharing personal information when they learnt of the researcher's background as a Foreign Service Officer. Particularly, his pivotal role in

providing relief services to vulnerable Ghanaian immigrants in Libya, during the 2011 Libyan civil war crisis, which saw to the safe evacuation of 20,000 stranded Ghanaian immigrants in that country to Ghana.

Other challenges encountered included apathy among some respondents. Some respondents were also experiencing 'research fatigue' from previous studies conducted by other researchers and Ghana Government officials. Some complained that over the years, they had been requested to complete survey questionnaires relating to diaspora issues with no improvements in the engagement policies of governments. They wanted assurances that this study was any different from the previous ones in which they had participated. Similar observations have been reported by Schmeet (2010), who argued that the apathy of respondents over the years has always been the biggest challenge to researchers. Most respondents later accepted to participate under the understanding that, it was for academic purposes which would also serve as base reference for other researchers and policy framers.

Investigators such as Couper (2000) and Couper et al. (2005) emphasize that some of the challenges relating to data quality in research work are attributable to web surveys. They argue that web survey is usually beset with coverage, non-response and sampling errors. Couper (2000) further argues that web surveys are accessible by people with internet access, leaving out those who do not have. Data collection by the use of web survey may lead to coverage error where the target population may not match the population frame. Another challenge is that web surveys are said to have lower response rates than most of the other surveys. Non-response error usually contributes to sampling error where not all members of the population are measured (Couper et al., 2005). However, Kinuthia (2013) presents an opposing view. He argues that there are large numbers of the diaspora who use the internet. The researcher sought to minimize this effect by simultaneously using

diverse modes of data collection (Terell, 2012) such as Facebook, WhatsApp, SMS messaging and emails in order to give respondents a wide range of choice. Again, the researcher used five months for data collection to allow time for response.

As a Foreign Service Officer with long years of experience serving abroad and being a migrant himself, the researcher encountered the risk of being too familiar with some of the issues under study, thereby downplaying useful information in the process. That is, the risk of only including information that may be considered as important or interesting, leaving out familiar but crucial information. To avoid this, information considered as familiar and seemingly irrelevant during the research process was well documented without engaging in selective recording of notes.

Furthermore, there was a challenge of incomplete filling of questionnaires. Many respondents in the initial stages submitted partly-filled questionnaires. To resolve this, the number of questions was reduced from 68 to 57 with optional answers provided to all the questions. Additionally, the questions for both the interviews and web survey were made more direct and succinct to avoid ambiguity in their interpretation. Rimando et al. (2015) affirm that lengthy questions or interviews create discomfort for respondents, which may lead them to provide inappropriate or incomplete responses.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GHANAIAN DIASPORA AND THEIR MIGRATION EXPERIENCE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is on the socio-demographic characteristics of the diaspora who participated in the study, their reasons for migrating from Ghana and the migration experiences regarding the achievement of their goals. The first section presents an analysis of the background characteristics of the respondents including, sex, age, marital status, level of education, occupation and number of dependents. The second section discusses the reasons why they migrated and their migration experiences.

5.2 Country of Residence of Respondents

In all, 390 Diasporas were selected for the study from the USA, UK and Qatar. Out of the 390 respondents sampled, 180 were resident in USA, representing 46.2 per cent, 130 in the UK, representing 33.3 per cent and 80 in Qatar, representing 20.5 per cent (See Figure 5. 1). This shows that a higher percentage of migrants were selected from the USA, in view of the higher number of Ghanaians living within the country than in the others.

Figure 5.1: Country of Residence



Source: Fieldwork Data, 2018

5.3 Age-Sex Characteristics

Out of the 390 respondents, 74.1 percent were males and 25.9 percent were females (see Table 5.1). This shows that the majority of the respondents selected were males. Historically, both men and women in Ghana have been mobile (Reed et al., 2010), with some studies in the past suggesting that more males than females migrated from Ghana (Lattof et al., 2018). Recent statistics and results of some micro studies, however, indicate that more females than males are in some migration streams, especially those seeking low-skilled employment, domestic assistants and nurses (Lattof et al., 2018, Anarfi and Adjei, 2009). The selection of Qatar as a study site may also explain the huge variation between the number of males and females in the study. For instance, the results in Table 5.1 show that 75 percent of respondents selected were males and 25 percent were females.

Table 5.1: Age-Sex characteristics of respondents by country of residence

	Country of residence			Total	
	Qatar	UK	USA	N	Percentage
Sex					
Female	25.0	19.2	31.1	101	**25.9**
Male	75.0	80.8	68.9	289	**74.1**
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	390	100.0
Age					
Below 30 years	36.3	4.6	5.0	44	**11.3**
30yrs-39yrs	63.8	15.4	18.9	105	**26.9**
40yrs-49yrs	0.0	33.8	50.0	134	**34.4**
50 years & above	0.0	46.2	26.1	107	**27.4**
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	390	100.0

Source: Fieldwork Data, 2018

Comparatively, the results further indicate that, in terms of the total number of females who participated in the study, there were more of them from the USA (31.1%) than from the UK (19.2%) and Qatar (25%).

A review of the literature on the study population in all the three countries shows that whereas some Ghanaian female migrants engage in low-skilled employments in the USA and UK, the employment situation for women in Qatar is different. According to Atong et al. (2018), women and girls are attracted to the GCC countries due to the prominence of employment in the domestic services sector. However, in Qatar, the low-skilled

employments are mainly in construction and other male-dominated fields, thus limiting employment opportunities for African female migrants (Atong et al., 2018).

The respondents' ages range from 19 years to 66 years, with a mean age of 43 years, suggesting that the respondents sampled were fairly old (See Table 5.1). The highest percentage was recorded for ages 40-49 years who form a little over a third (34.4%), while those below 30 years constitute the lowest percentage (11.3%). More than half (61.3%) of the participants were in the 30-49 years age group. In Qatar, for example, a higher percentage of the respondents were within the ages of 30-39 years (63.8%) and none of the respondents was above 39 years, at the time of the survey (see Table 5.1). Additionally, while 46.2 percent of the respondents sampled from the UK were 50 years and above, 50 percent of those in the USA were within the ages of 40-49 years. Generally, emigration from Ghana has been characterized by both young and middle-aged persons. However, the finding that more of the participants (61.3%) were within the age group of 30-49 years confirms IOM's World Migration Report statistics which indicate that the ages of international migrants from the North are different from that of the South. Thus, whereas those in the North are mostly between 25 and 49 years, most of the international migrants in the South are in their 20s (1OM, 2013).

5.4 Marital Status

The majority, approximately 60 percent of the participants are married. Single and separated participants form 39 percent and 1.3 percent respectively (See Figure 5.2). Since the mean age of participants is 43 years, it is not surprising that the majority of participants were married. The results further show that, a higher percentage of the respondents who are from the USA (71.7%) were married compared to 53.8 percent and 46.9 percent in Qatar and the UK respectively. However, even though no respondent was

co-habiting or reported to be divorced, it seems that some divorced female participants interviewed had held back the true information on their marital status due to cultural reasons. They later confided in the researcher that they were divorced but would not want people to know. For instance, Amerley, a divorced migrant, intimated that declaring one's divorced and co-habiting status would attract stigmatization among the Ghanaian residents as it is highly abhorred in the Ghanaian society. As a result, such participants stated that they are single and have been treated as such in the classification. The same cultural reasons may explain the limited number of separated participants.

Table 5.2: Respondents' marital status by country of residence

Country of residence	Marital Status			Total	
	Married	Single	Separated	Percentage	N
Qatar	53.8	46.3	0.0	100.0	80
UK	46.9	49.2	3.8	100.0	130
USA	71.7	28.3	0.0	100.0	180
Total	59.7	39.0	1.3	100.0	390

Source: Fieldwork Data, 2018

5. 5 Educational Status

The educational status of the respondents is high. As Table 5.3 shows, the percentage share of the total number of participants in the study with diploma, graduate and post-graduate certificates is 67 percent. This means almost 7 out of every 10 participants have a higher education certificate. Those with doctorate degrees constituted 7.2 percent. Skill migration has been documented to be characteristic of the migration streams from Ghana

going to some countries in Europe and the United States as well as Qatar, in recent times (Migration Policy Institute, 2015, Arthur 2016 and Ong'ayo, 2016).

Table 5.3: Respondents' level of education

Level of Education	Number	Percentage
No Education	74	19.0
JHS/Middle school	12	3.1
SSS	26	6.7
Voc/Tec/Comm.	17	4.4
Diploma/Post-Secondary	48	12.3
Bachelor	83	21.3
Masters	102	26.2
Doctorate	28	7.2
Total	390	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2018

Specifically, in the USA, Migration Policy Institute (2015) presents that, in the area of education, the Ghanaian diaspora have an achievement similar to that of the US general population, with 18 percent having bachelor's degrees, 12 percent with master's degree certificates compared to an average of 11 percent of the US population. Available literature shows that UK presents a similar picture. For instance, Ong'ayo (2016) argues that within the EU, UK has the highest number of educated Ghanaians. Research has shown that education can play an important part in the level of remittances sent by migrants. For instance, Orozco (2005) presents that about half of remittance senders in the UK have a college degree. The new stream of labour migration by Ghanaian dual citizens from Europe and the US to Qatar may explain the extant high number of skilled participants in the study (Ghana Embassy, Doha, (d) 2019). The present study confirms the findings of these studies on education.

Conversely, Table 5.3 also shows that almost two out of every ten (19%) have no formal education. Such migrants may have no skills and may seek employment in the construction, security, hospitality, domestic services or the retail services sectors. Some

studies on Ghanaian migrants conducted by Anarfi and Adjei (2009), Atong et al. (2016) and Lattof et al. (2018) have confirmed that such low-level employment opportunities exist in the study sites.

5.6 Occupation

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show migrants' current occupational status and dependents at their homeland respectively. From Table 5.4, while it can be observed that respondents are economically active in the study sites (94.6%) are in various streams of employment, with only (2.6%) and (2.8%) as unemployed and students respectively, it is also noticeable that despite the high educational level (See Table 5.3), over a third (35.2%) of all respondents were engaged in menial jobs.

Table 5.4 Respondents' Occupation

Occupation	Number	Percentage
Unemployed	10	2.6
Student	11	2.8
Teaching	30	7.7
Civil Servant	34	8.7
Artisan	40	10.3
Public servant	52	13.3
Self employed	100	25.6
Shop Attendants/Sales Personnel	97	24.9
Others (banker, nurse, accountant, pensioner, housewife, Domestic Assistant)	16	4.1
Total	**390**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork, 2018

The low employment status becomes even more acute when this finding is juxtaposed with some of the qualitative reports from the participants. Qualitative findings reveal that the percentage share of respondents in self-employment (26%) should have been part of the figure of those in the menial job sector (totaling over 60%) as many self-employed

Ghanaians in the study sites work within the low-skilled employment sectors. During a phone in-depth interview with Frank, a Ghanaian living in the USA, this is what he said:

> "Finding the right kind of employment with our Ghanaian degree certificates in the USA is very challenging. Even though I have been in the US for the past five years, I have never been able to secure a decent skilled job. I have therefore tried to survive by doing my own job in the informal sector, by distributing newspapers into customers post boxes, selling of train tickets at the train stations and acting as tour guides for travelling companies during summer. My brother, sometimes I do all the three jobs on the same day. As you can see, even though I am self-employed it's still in the menial job market" (Frank, 25th September, 2018: New York, USA).

Additionally, an in-depth interview with Adamu, a self-employed Ghanaian in Qatar revealed the following:

> "Although I am a computer scientist by profession from a private tertiary institution in Ghana, I was recruited by my first company in Qatar as a security officer. I was very happy to work with that company even though I did not get the original salary as promised, I still considered what I was receiving in Qatar as far higher than what I was earning in Ghana. Master, somewhere along the line, I lost this job and since I had no "sponsor', I had to find another job fast in order not to be deported by the Qatari authorities. You know in Qatar, for one to be legally resident, a Qatari citizen or company should 'sponsor' you as a worker. I got a new sponsor and therefore ended up as his shop attendant. As a graduate, I find this title demeaning and so, like most of us Ghanaians in this shop business with similar qualifications, we prefer to be referred to as self-employed rather than shop attendants" (Adamu, 12th November 2018: Doha, Qatar).

The findings from the qualitative data further indicate that even though respondents' occupation in their countries of residence did not match the kind of qualification they possessed, they preferred the menial jobs to the 'white-colour jobs' because they could make more money by doing different jobs every day, sometimes including weekends. Besides, the formal labour market in the western world is increasingly becoming restrictive due to some unfavourable immigration policies, thereby making it extremely difficult for most immigrants to access the labour market (Anderson et al., 2006; Clark and Drinkwater, 2007). Many of the respondents from the USA, UK and Qatar alluded to

the huge burden on their shoulders back home which compelled them to take up job offers far lower than what would be commensurate with their qualifications. They simply want to be able to take care of their dependents left behind. These findings are consistent with the report by International Organization for Migration (2009), which profiles Ghanaian migrants as mainly menial or industrial workers. Recent research findings by Centre for Economic Performance (2012) on the UK labour market confirm the findings of this study. The study by the Centre showed that though immigrants in UK are highly educated, there are more migrants working in less-skilled jobs than normal, considering their high qualifications. Migration literature describes such situations as 'brain waste' (Oyelere, 2007).

Table 5.5 further shows that majority of the respondents (82.8%) have dependents in Ghana while 17.2 percent do not have any dependents in Ghana. Of the number that had dependents in Ghana, there were more who were 18 years and above (86.4%) relative to those below 18 years (70.6%). Various migration literature has shown that migrants remit money to their homeland for different reasons. Prominent among the factors are altruism, self-interest, investment, loan repayment and for the upkeep of family members left behind, including children (Quartey 2006, 2011; Teye, 2016; Teye et al., 2017). The finding of 83 percent of dependents below 18 years (1-3 dependents) suggests that the respondents have strong reason to leverage their engagements with their home country. These engagements could be in the form of remittances, return visits, investments and transfer of knowledge.

Table 5.5 Respondents' dependents back home

Dependents in home country	N	Percentage
There are dependents	323	82.8
there are no dependents	67	17.2
Number of dependents below 18 years		
1-3 dependents	190	83.3
4-7 dependents	38	16.7
Total	228	100
Number of dependents 18 years & Above		
1-3 dependents	225	80.6
4-7 dependents	54	19.4
Total	279	100

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

5.7 Period of Stay and Residential Characteristics

As shown in Figure 5.2, the majority (61%) of the respondents had been in the diaspora from 1 to 10 years and the minimum and maximum years recorded was one year and 50 years respectively. Slightly more than a quarter (27%) of them had been at their destination for 11-20 years and a small proportion (4.1%) of the respondents sampled for the study had been in the diaspora for more than 30 years. Also, about 9 percent indicated that they had been at their respective host countries for 21-30 years.

Figure 5.2: Period of stay



Source: Fieldwork (2018)

Studies have indicated that migrants' length of stay in the country of residence can have development impact on the country of origin (IOM, 2003; Anna & Stefano, 2008; Pia & Madeleine, 2015). The length of stay of highly skilled professional migrants in destination countries is a determinant factor in the brain drain debate. Some migration scholars argue that a long stay abroad can result in brain drain and deprive the country of origin important returns on investment made in migrants' education and training (IOM, 2003, 2010b). A shorter stay is thus seen as labour migration, with associated benefits to the countries of origin through remittances, transfer of skills and technology and investment, among others (IOM, 2003).

According to Anna and Stefano (2008), the period of stay by immigrants in the countries of residence is influenced by linguistic competence, media exposure and immigrant adaptation. Pia and Madeleine (2015) argue that short-stay immigrants rather send

remittances and invest in their countries of origin more frequently than those who stay longer.

Figure 5.3 shows the residential status of the respondents. Slightly more than half of the respondents (51%) were eligible to stay legally in the host country since they had the requisite work permits and documentation. Some 4.4 percent on the other hand were either on student visas or had expired visas, thus were living in the diaspora as undocumented immigrants. Also, 21 percent had permanent residential status and 23 percent were citizens of the host country. Under the laws of Ghana, the 23 percent of the respondents with foreign citizenship can also apply for Ghanaian dual citizenship.

Figure 5.3 Residential Status



Source: Fieldwork (2018)

The percentage of Ghanaians with citizenship and permanent stay is significant, that is, 23 and 21 percent respectively. The available literature and the results from the qualitative data show a contrary picture in Qatar. Until 2018, no foreigner could acquire a permanent stay let alone citizenship. Till date, no foreigner can acquire Qatari citizenship. All foreign workers are given work permit, renewable every year. This might have

accounted for the high number of respondents with work permits in the survey. In the words of a Ghanaian opinion leader, Osman, who had lived in Qatar for 48 years:

> "I came to Qatar 48 years ago when all the current leaders of this country were either young children or yet to be born. Few of the roads you see today were tarred, with erratic electricity supply. You can imagine the hardship one had to endure in this burning heat, without power. I worked in several public institutions including Ministry of Labour for almost two decades. The issue of citizenship or permanent stay will not even cross your mind because you know you won't get them. It had not been easy renewing work permits every year, but all foreigners are treated nicely. Again, the country is peaceful, with a lot of economic opportunities. I have been advising the young Ghanaians who come here to be law-abiding and work hard to make money home. At the end of the day, that is what should be the aim of every Ghanaian that travels abroad" (Osman, 10th July 2018, Doha, Qatar).

An in-depth interview with Ofori, a Ghanaian with UK dual citizenship, working as a pathology consultant in one of the prestigious hospitals in Qatar also pointed to this narration:

> "I have been working in different countries in the Gulf Region, but Qatar is the best among all of them. Although constant renewal of work permits is a bother, they respect professionals from the western countries. With my British passport, not only do I get better remuneration than my Ghanaian counterparts here who have the same professional qualification, but also, I have better working conditions" (Ofori, 11th August 2018, Doha, Qatar).

Similar sentiments were expressed by almost all the participants interviewed in Qatar, especially the peaceful nature of the country and the varied economic opportunities. One of the universal privileges also echoed by most low-skilled Ghanaian workers was the opportunity to secure loans at a very low interest rate, ranging from 2 to 6 percent. To them, so long as you are legally employed, you should be okay as an immigrant in Qatar since all categories of workers are treated impartially and fairly by the Qatari authorities. The feeling of fair treatment also stems from the fact that even highly skilled immigrant professionals like university professors are given the same work permits.

The results from the qualitative data from USA and UK unveiled different perspectives from respondents. In the US, for example, Ghanaian immigrants especially those with permanent residence make conscious efforts to obtain citizenship. To them, the US citizenship would afford them more opportunities, higher income and better standard of living. It would also afford them certain privileges and rights in the country of residence such as ability to vote and obtain easy loans for their qualified wards' education in top American schools. The entrepreneurs among them expressed delight in the ability to travel extensively around the world for business purposes without visa requirement. The survey and qualitative data from the UK present similar results.

5. 8 Reasons for Migrating and the Migration Experience

This section examines respondents' reasons for migrating. It also further examines whether the respondents had achieved their objectives for migrating on the basis of country of residence, age, sex, level of education and marital status.

Some studies have shown that there is a correlation between reason for migration and migrants' transnational ties with their homelands. Several theoretical perspectives show that people migrate for various reasons (Teye et al., 2015; Awumbila et al., 2016). The World Migration Report (2018) presents economic, political/religious/social and education as some of the important reasons for migrating. Table 5.6 presents the critical reasons why Ghanaians migrate out of the country. The most important reason that respondents gave for migrating out of Ghana was to find job opportunities (42%), followed by the offering of employment contract (28%), education for themselves, children or spouse (21.5%) as well as family unification (8.2%). When migrants experience increases in earnings, it can enhance their welfare and human development of their families, either directly (when staying with the family abroad) or indirectly, through

remittances (World Migration Report, 2018). The present study reveals that the prospects for job opportunities and employment contract in the destination countries are the main pull factors for Ghanaian migrants. Only 8.2 percent migrated for the purpose of joining their families abroad. Some past studies on Ghanaian international migration such as Anarfi et al. (2003) and Awumbila et al. (2008) support the findings. To them, migration has been the means by which Ghanaians improve their human capital and better their living conditions.

Table 5.6: Respondents' reported reasons for migrating and migration experience

Demographic Variables N Percentage	Employment Contract 111 (28.2)	Family Reunification 32 (8.2)	Search for job opportunities 163 (41.8)	Studies (Self/Children/Spouse 84 (21.5)	Total 390 (100)
Country of residence					
Qatar	(52.5)	(10.0)	(35.0)	(2.5)	80 (100)
UK	(18.5)	(10.8)	(59.2)	(11.5)	130 (100)
USA	(25.0)	(5.6)	(32.2)	(37.2)	170 (100)
	χ^2 statistic = 78.8, df (6), p value =0.0001 <0.05				
Sex					
Female	(21.8)	(23.8)	(30.7)	(23.8)	101 (100)
Male	(30.8)	(2.8)	(45.7)	(20.8)	289 (100)
	χ^2 statistic =46.67, df (3), p value =0.0001 <0.05				
Age					
below 30 years	(25.0)	(13.6)	(43.2)	(18.2)	44 (100)
30-39 years	(35.2)	(9.5)	(43.8)	(11.4)	105 (100)
40–49 years	(17.9)	(7.5)	(44.8)	(29.9)	120 (100)
50 years & above	(28.5)	(8.2)	(41.8)	(21.5)	107 (100)
	χ^2 statistic =23.26, df (9), p value =0.006 <0.05				
Level of Education					
No education	(8.1)	(2.7)	(89.2)	(0.0)	74 (100)
Secondary	(32.7)	(7.3)	(60.0)	(0.0)	55 (100)
Tertiary	(33.3)	(10)	(24.5)	(32.2)	261 (100)
	χ^2 statistic =108.85, df (6), p value =0.0001 <0.05				
Marital Status					
Married	(37.8)	(9.4)	(23.6)	(29.2)	233 (100)

Single	(15.1)	(5.3)	(69.1)	(10.5)	152 (100)
Separated	(0.0)	(40.0)	(60.0)	(0.0)	5 (100)
		χ^2 statistic = 88.08, df (6), p value =0.0001 <0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

5.8.1 Relationship between country of residence and reasons for migrating

Table 5.6 also shows the relationship between country of residence and reason for migration. As demonstrated by the result of the chi-square test between the two variables (χ^2 statistic = 78.8, df (6), p value =0.0001), there are statistically significant variations among the study sites in respect of the reasons for migration. In Qatar for instance, a higher percentage (52.5%) migrated for employment purposes relative to those who migrated for family reunification (10%)) and for studies (2.5%). On the other hand, in USA, a higher percentage of respondents indicated that they migrated to further their education (37.2%) and for job opportunities (32.2%). Also, 59 percent of respondents sampled in the UK indicated that they migrated in search of job opportunities. Clearly, the results show that while a higher proportion of respondents in Qatar migrated on employment contract basis, a higher proportion of respondents from UK and USA migrated in search of greener pastures and to further their education respectively.

5.8.2 Sex, age, level of education and marital status as reasons for migrating

Historically, characteristics of potential migrants such as sex, age, level of education and marital status have been crucial in explaining migration decisions. Each migration flow is distinct in terms of demographic characteristics (Masood & Nijkamp, 2017; Simpson, 2017). Labour migrants have typically been young and economically active men, with recent streams of women and families migrating in search of jobs opportunities abroad. Married people are less likely to migrate on their own and more likely to return sooner.

The reasons for migrating will depend largely on the skill or education level of the potential migrant (Geis et al., 2013).

As shown in Table 5.6, sex, age, level of education and marital status significantly underpin the reasons why respondents migrated. For instance, majority of the respondents with no form of education migrated in search of job opportunities (89.2%) relative to those with secondary (60%) and tertiary (24.5%) education. Again, only respondents with tertiary education (32.2%) reported that they migrated because of the need to further their studies or that of their children or spouses. On marital status, a higher proportion of respondents who were single (69.1%) reported that they migrated in search of job opportunities as compared to 24 percent who were married. Comparatively, a higher percentage of respondents who were married either migrated for employment purposes (37.8%) or to further their studies (29.2%).

Migration literature gives credence to the afore-mentioned findings. For instance, studies have shown that a short-term income fluctuation pull less-educated male immigrants into the USA, whereas long-term income trends push less-educated male immigrants out of their countries of origin. The less-educated have the propensity to migrate based on both internal and external income dynamics more than the highly educated who migrate on a careful analysis of factors (Bansak et al., 2015; Simpson, 2017). This is evidenced by the 89.2 percent of respondents with no education, who migrated in search of job opportunities as compared to those with secondary (60%) and tertiary (24.5%) education. As earlier mentioned, married women are less likely to migrate on their own than the single ladies. The present study confirms this assertion in the migration literature: single ladies (69.1%) migrating as compared to only 24 percent who were married.

The qualitative research findings corroborate the survey outcome. In Qatar, most of the respondents indicated that they migrated to the country for employment contract. Kweku, a senior computer engineer working with an aluminium company in Qatar explained that he was recruited from Ghana to Qatar by the company among 300 other Ghanaian workers, to help establish the aluminium company. He further explained that:

> "Qatar operates a highly digitized security and immigration system which makes it very challenging, if not impossible, for prospective foreign workers to come to the country for job opportunities or greener pastures. In most cases, foreign workers, including Ghanaians come to Qatar after a recruitment process which takes place either through official channels or recruitment agencies. The foreign worker therefore comes with an employment contract" (Kweku, 25th June 2018, Doha, Qatar).

Another Ghanaian medical specialist, Yaw, who holds a British Passport as a dual citizen, observed that:

> "The majority of Ghanaians in Qatar, working in various capacities had been recruited from either Ghana or their new resident countries. He affirmed that Qatar would be a wrong place for anyone to travel to in search of job opportunities. Instead, you can look for job opportunities while working legally within the country. Getting the work might not be too challenging but your 'sponsor', the company or the individual who first brought you to the country should 'release' you (grant the approval in writing) before you could take up a new employment" (Yaw, 17th September 2018, Doha, Qatar).

Yaw's assertion explains the reason why there is also a high percentage (35 percent) of Ghanaians in Qatar searching for jobs. Due to lack of job tenure in Qatar especially among the immigrant workforce, many people lose their jobs easily and go around looking for new jobs. The survey findings also corroborate the qualitative research findings from USA and UK. In the USA for example, out of the six participants interviewed, four of them averred that they travelled to the States in pursuit of education and job opportunities.

Naomi, a domestic assistant explained her reason for migrating as follows:

> "I travelled to the US for job opportunities and education. I am a widow with four children, and it had not been easy taking care of them, in addition to my mum who is aged and looks up to me for what she will eat every day. By the grace of God, though it was not easy coming here, I am very happy now because I can send them money for their upkeep and save some to do a certificate course in nursing. My brother, education is everything in this country. I agree it is not that easy saving enough money, but the same God who brought me here will see me through" (Naomi, 15th October 2018, Washington, U.S.A).

5.8.3 Achievement of Migration Objectives

The migrants were asked whether they had achieved their objectives for migrating. Majority of the respondents (83.5%) confirmed that they had achieved their objectives for migrating (Table 5.7). Given the fact that job prospects and employment contract formed the major reasons why respondents migrated (Table 5.6) and majority of respondents are employed (see Table 5.4), it is not surprising that a significant majority of respondents have achieved their objectives of migrating. Qatar had the highest percentage of those who had not yet achieved their objectives for migrating (55 percent), followed by USA (14 percent) and the UK (3%).

Table 5.7: Respondents' achievement of objectives for migrating

Background characteristics	Achieving Objectives of Migrating		Total	
	Not Achieved	Achieved	Percentage	N
Country of residence				
Qatar	(55.0)	(45.0)	(100.0)	80
UK	(3.1)	(96.9)	(100.0)	130
USA	(13.9)	(86.1)	(100.0)	180
Total	(16.5)	(83.5)	(100.0)	390

χ^2 statistic = 92.88, df (1), p value =0.0001<0.05

Source: Fieldwork Data, 2018

In the USA and UK, most of the migrants who indicated that they had not achieved their objectives expressed the hope that they would achieve them in due course. For instance,

the students among them were optimistic of completing their courses of study. Some explained that, they had to defer their courses in order to work and save some funds to continue. Mark, a restaurant attendant, had this to say when asked about whether he had achieved his objectives for migrating to the USA:

> "I am yet to obtain my master's degree which motivated me to come to the States in the first place. The reason is that I had to defer the course mid-stream to work to be able to pay my fees and to look after myself. I also have some two younger sisters left behind to take care of. I am the only person they look up to since our parents are dead. I am sure I will make it at all cost" (Mark, 11th November 2018, New York, USA).

Akosua, a homemaker in London presented her reason why she had not achieved her objective for joining her husband in the UK as follows:

> "I joined my husband in the UK leaving behind our two children for my mother-in-law to take care of them. Sir, I had to do this painfully, but with the view that I was coming to work to support my husband and the two children. Unfortunately, I am still the same housewife with no work and my husband can hardly make enough to meet any expectations. As a Christian, I still believe things can change but I feel worried almost every day" (Akosua, 9th July 2018, London, UK).

The results from the qualitative analysis revealed that, there was no tenure of work in Qatar and that migrant workers get sacked at the slightest excuse. Abdullai, a construction worker in Qatar explained the situation in the following words:

"Sir, I have been in this country for seven years and this work now is my tenth work. I needed to be looking for work at least every year since my employers continued to sack us (the foreign workers) every time. In Qatar too, if you lose your job you would suddenly become an illegal immigrant. You are working but you live in fear of losing the job always. I am praying to God to make some small capital to start my own business in Ghana" (Abdullai, 26th September 2019, Doha, Qatar).

5.9 Summary and Conclusion

The chapter examined the socio-economic characteristics of respondents. Specifically, it focused on examining the age, sex, marital and educational status, occupation, period of stay and residential status. It also examined the reasons for migrating and whether

respondents have achieved their objectives for migrating. Some of the key findings were that majority of respondents were males as compared to females, more than half of them were in the economically active age group 30-49 years, more respondents were married, 67 percent of them were educated, majority (95%) of them were employed and more than half of them had requisite resident papers. Prospect for job opportunities and employment contract were the main pull factors for the Ghanaian immigrants. 71 percent of them had dependents below 18 years which suggested that Ghanaian migrants may have strong reasons to engage with their homeland, through remittances, return visits, investment and skills and knowledge transfer. Majority (84%) of the respondents have achieved their objectives for migrating, with Qatar having the highest percentage (55%) of migrants who had not achieved their objectives. Qualitative findings reveal that lack of tenure of jobs in Qatar account for this situation. The next chapter will analyze the participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in the engagement programmes.

CHAPTER SIX

PARTICIPATION OF THE GHANAIAN DIASPORA IN ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMMES

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the experiences, views and challenges of the Ghanaian diaspora regarding their participation in diaspora engagement programmes. The contributions of the Ghanaian diaspora are assessed in programmes such as remittances, investments, philanthropic goods as well as transfer of skills and knowledge.

6.2 Investment Benefits and Privileges from the Diaspora for Ghana's Development

According to Brinkerhoff (2012), despite the high risk of investment in some sending countries, there is the likelihood that the diaspora would invest in their homelands. Terrazas (2010) also notes that the diaspora invests in the capital market and direct foreign investments by holding deposit accounts, securing remittance flows, buying diaspora bonds, supporting diaspora mutual funds and re-engineering capital markets in their homelands. The assessment as shown on Table 6.1 covered the following areas: awareness of investments and business opportunities in Ghana, attractiveness and ownership of these businesses and investments by the diaspora.

Among the 390 respondents, 55 percent indicated that they were aware of investment and business opportunities available to the Ghanaian diaspora, with 45 percent responding to the contrary. Out of the percentage of respondents (55 percent) who were aware, the majority (76.3 percent) reported that they find these businesses/investments very attractive.

In terms of ownership of investments/businesses by the diaspora, the results in Table 6.1 show that just about a third of all the respondents reported ownership of businesses and investments in Ghana. A higher percentage of the respondents do not have any investment or business in their homeland in spite of the high percentage (76.3%) who found the opportunities attractive.

With respect to the host countries of the respondents (Table 6.1), there were significant variations from the three study countries in terms of their views about the attractiveness and the awareness level. For instance, while 60 percent from Qatar were aware of the business and investment opportunities, UK and USA reported 53.1 and 54.4 percent respectively.

Also, a higher percentage of the respondents from USA (81.6 %) indicated that the investments and businesses in Ghana are attractive to the diaspora as compared to 71 percent and 73 percent of respondents from Qatar and UK respectively. This implies that even though a higher percentage of the respondents from Qatar (60%) were aware of the existence of investments and business opportunities for the diaspora in Ghana, in terms of its attractiveness, a higher proportion of respondents from USA (81.6 %) perceive these investments as attractive compared to those in Qatar (70.8%). Regarding ownership of the investments/businesses by the diaspora, a higher percentage of those in Qatar (50 %) own investments/businesses in Ghana as compared to those in the UK (30%) and USA (32.8%). Within the Gulf Region, the primary objectives of the Ghanaian emigrants are to seek favourable and better job prospects, make enough money, invest it in Ghana and return home. Most of the respondents interviewed indicated that they have no plans of staying in Qatar forever and, therefore, they are investing their money in real estates and

other businesses so they can have something to subsist on when they return to Ghana. An artisan, working with a construction company in Qatar said that;

> "I send money home to my brother to acquire land in Accra and build for me anytime I am able to make enough money. Currently, I have four houses in Accra and one in Kumasi which are up for rent. I have also managed to buy two buses for public transport which are managed by my wife" (39-year-old male, individual interview)

Another Ghanaian technician working with Aluminum Company in Qatar indicated that;

> "The Gulf Region is a very hard place to work since one has to work in the heat. The temperature during summer can go as high as 50 degrees Celsius. I have worked in this company for the past six years and I am already making plans to return home. There is a loan facility in Qatar available to all foreign workers, with a very low interest rate. Currently, I am servicing a loan I took from my bankers for investment in the housing and restaurant business. I intend to go home immediately I finish paying" (Ghanaian metalist, 16th September 2018, Doha, Qatar).

The views expressed by these interviewees further explain why people in Qatar own more investments and businesses in Ghana than those in USA and UK. It may be concluded that unfavourable conditions at their host country such as lack of permanent residence status may also encourage investment at their origin (Ministry of Interior, Qatar, 2018).

On the residential status of the respondents in the three study countries, more Ghanaian immigrants (57%) with non-permanent residence indicated their awareness of investments/businesses in Ghana compared to 43 percent who were not aware. Table 6.1 also indicates that both permanent (81%) and non-permanent residents (72%) found the investments/businesses attractive.

Meanwhile, regarding the ownership of businesses/investments in Ghana, a higher percentage of immigrants with non-permanent residential status (46%) compared to those with permanent residential status (24%) own businesses/investments in Ghana.

The results further show that a higher proportion of males (38%) own businesses/investments in Ghana than females (27.75%), even though a higher proportion of females (83.1%) than the males (73.7%) indicated that they found investments and businesses in Ghana attractive to the diaspora. According to Taylor (2006), women integrate better in the host countries whereas men participate more in transnational activities at the country of origin. The likelihood of men investing in their home countries is, therefore, higher than women. Similarly, 40 percent of respondents who are only Ghanaian citizens stated that they own businesses or have investments in Ghana compared to 22 percent of respondents with dual citizenship.

Additionally, 60 percent of respondents with secondary and tertiary education indicated that they were aware of investment opportunities in Ghana for the diaspora compared to 35 percent of respondents with no education. Also, while the majority of the respondents with secondary and tertiary education consider investment/business opportunities to be attractive, only 46 percent of respondents with no education supported this view. It is, therefore, not surprising that more educated Ghanaian immigrants (average of over 40%) own businesses/investments in Ghana than the non-educated (26%).

The results of the analysis so far show that despite the attractiveness of the investment/business opportunities in Ghana to a large percentage of the diaspora, the proportion of those that have invested is lower than expected, that is 35 percent own businesses (see Table 6.1,). The information in Table 6.1 further suggests that part of the reason for the low investment by the diaspora is poor information flow as many of them do not even know of the existence of these investment opportunities (55 %). It also suggests that attractiveness of these investment opportunities (76%) may not be the only driving force for diaspora investment in Ghana.

Table 6.1: Respondents' investments/businesses in Ghana (In percentages)

Background Characteristics	Investments/businesses in Ghana		
	Awareness by the Ghanaian diaspora	Attractiveness of investments/business to the diaspora	Own Business/Investment
Country of residence			
Qatar (n=80)	60.0	70.8	50.0
UK (n=130)	53.1	72.5	30.0
USA (n=(180)	54.4	81.6	32.8
Total N=(390)	215 55.1	164 76.3	138 35.4
Residential Status			
Permanent (n=190)	53.2	81.2	24.2
Non-permanent (n=200)	57.0	71.9	46.0
Citizenship			
Dual Citizen (n=104)	51.0	81.1	22.1
Only Ghanaian citizen (n=286)	56.6	74.7	40.2
Sex			
Female (n=101)	58.4	83.1	27.7
Male (n=289)	54.0	73.7	38.1
Age			
below 30 years (n=44)	52.3	82.6	38.6
30yrs-39yrs (n=105)	60.0	61.9	47.6
40yrs-49yrs (n=134)	51.5	85.5	25.4
50 years & above (n=107)	56.1	78.3	34.6
Level of Education			

No Education (n=74)	35.1	46.2	24.3

Table 6.1 continued:

Secondary (n=55)	60.0	81.8	45.5
Tertiary (n=261)	59.8	80.1	36.4

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

The study further identified the various types of businesses and investments that the respondents have established in Ghana. The results of this analyses are presented in Table 6.2. Businesses such as construction, trade, transport, agricultural products, real estates, capital markets, consultancy services and health care services were identified by the respondents. The results show that out of the 215 respondents (see table 6.2) who were aware of investment/business opportunities in Ghana, trading in goods (34%), real estate (28%) and transport business (25%) were major areas of investment by the respondents. Investments in health care services recorded the lowest percentage for the least identified sector followed by construction (5.1%) and agriculture (5.6%).

Table 6.2: Types of Businesses established by respondents

Business/Investments	Frequency	Percentage
Construction	11	5.1
Trading (Selling and buying of goods)	73	34.0
Transport business	54	25.1
Agriculture	12	5.6
Real Estates	61	28.4
Capital Markets	13	6.0
Consultancy Service	13	6.0
Health Care Services	2	0.9
Total	**215**	**100**

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.2.1 Investment in Financial Instruments

Some studies have shown that the contribution of the diaspora towards the development of financial and capital markets of their countries of origin has been enormous and beneficial. They help to diversify the investment sector, attract new investors into the country through their networks and offer a more reliable and stable source of funding in the economy (Ratha et al., 2011). To assess the involvement of the diaspora in financial services, the respondents were asked to indicate if they have invested in any financial instrument such as stocks, bonds, treasury bills, mutual funds, unit trust, real estate trust, among others. Per the results of the analyses, as presented in Table 6.3, almost 2 out of every 3 (64 percent) of them indicated that they had invested in financial instruments in Ghana whereas 36 percent had not. All the variables selected –country of residence, residential status, citizenship, sex, age, level of education − showed no statistically significant relationship with the respondents' financial investments in Ghana.

Table 6.3: Respondents' reported financial investments and background characteristics

Background characteristics	Investment in financial instruments in Ghana		Total Percentages	N
	Not invested	Invested		
Country of residence				
Qatar	36.3	63.8	(100.0)	80
UK	33.1	66.9	(100.0)	130
USA	37.8	62.2	(100.0)	180
Total	35.9	64.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 0.73, df (2), p value =0.69>0.05			
Residential status				
Permanent	40.0	60.0	(100.0)	190
non-Permanent	32.0	68.0	(100.0)	200
Total	35.9	64.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 2.71, df (1), p value =0.10>0.05			
Citizenship				
Dual Citizen	41.3	58.7	(100.0)	104
Only Ghanaian citizen	33.9	66.1	(100.0)	286
Total	35.9	64.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 1.83, df (1), p value =0.18>0.05			
Sex				
Female	43.6	56.4	(100.0)	101
Male	33.2	66.8	(100.0)	289
Total	35.9	64.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 3.48, df (1), p value =0.62>0.05			
Age				
below 30 years	52.3	47.7	(100.0)	44
30yrs-39yrs	37.1	62.9	(100.0)	105
40yrs-49yrs	32.1	67.9	(100.0)	134
50 years & above	32.7	67.3	(100.0)	107
Total	35.9	64.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 6.52, df (3), p value =0.89>0.05			

Table 6.3: Continued

Level of Education				
No Education	32.4	67.6	(100.0)	74
Secondary	36.4	63.6	(100.0)	55
Tertiary	36.8	63.2	(100.0)	261
Total	35.9	64.1	(100.0)	390
χ^2 statistic = 0.48, df (2), p value =0.79>0.05				

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.2.2 Types of financial instruments

Financial instruments such as unit trust, treasury bonds and bills, real estate trust, stock market and mutual funds were identified by the respondents as popular instruments of investment. (See Figure 6.1). The results further indicate that stock market (48%) and treasury bills (44%) were the major financial instruments invested in by the respondents, with all others below 4 percent. Considering the relative rewarding nature of returns and the low risk associated with treasury bills and stock market (as gleaned from the qualitative analysis), it is expected that a higher number of respondents with enough funds and understanding about this instrument would invest in them. Osei-Boateng, a 54-year old engineer working in the USA further affirms this view. He noted that he has been investing in treasury bills for the past 15 years and sends money on a quarterly basis for the purchase of these bills, especially when the rates are good. To him, these are funds he has no urgent need for and hopes to invest it all in a bigger project when he returns to Ghana. He noted:

> "I have some businesses running already but I make sure I invest what I save in the governments' treasury bills. The risk is low, so I am assured of getting my money with some interest when I decide to withdraw my investment."

The case of Osei-Boateng further gives credence to the fact that, in situations where the diaspora has intentions of returning home, they are more likely to invest in the financial market of the country.

Figure 6.1: Types of financial instrument investment by Respondents



Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.2.3 Factors enhancing diaspora investment in Ghana

The study examined some factors that could enhance greater diaspora investment in the Ghanaian economy. The results show that 54 percent of the respondents want administrative formalities reduced and 48 percent requested for some fiscal advantages and tax concessions (Table 6.4). The respondents bemoaned the bureaucratic processes and formalities one is confronted with when registering businesses or clearing goods from the ports. To them, this discourages their investment aspirations. A phone interview with a 43-year-old female nurse in UK unveiled some reasons for lack of appreciable diaspora investment in the country. Narrating her ordeal, she pointed out that:

> "In 2011, I had some medical equipment I wanted to bring to Ghana to set up a small diagnostic Centre. I went through the shipping processes and all the other administrative formalities in the States. When finally, the goods arrived in the country, I was asked to pay a lot of money to clear them. I had to go through several clearing processes before my goods could be cleared. This was greater disincentive and there was nothing I could do about it. I don't think I would like to go through the experience ever again" (Female Nurse, 17th August 2018, UK).

The implication of this is that, cumbersome administrative procedures and high fiscal tariffs could hinder diaspora investment in the country.

Table 6.4: Incentives to enhance/boost diaspora's investment in Ghana (multiple responses)

Incentives	Frequency **(N=390)**	Percentage
Fiscal advantage and tax concession	187	47.9
Free transfers of social security benefits from abroad	183	46.9
Reduced administrative formalities	210	53.8
Access to credit	154	39.5
Access to land	105	26.9

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

Also, almost half (47 percent) of the respondents noted that to enhance greater participation from the diaspora in terms of investment, there should be free transfer of social security benefits from abroad. In addition, 40 percent of respondents stated that the diaspora should have easy access to credit in order to make it attractive for them to invest in Ghana. Given the constraints associated with lack of access to credit in the economy, it may be crucial for the country to device the necessary strategies to leverage credit access for the needed capital. Lastly, 27 percent of respondents also stated that there should be easy acquisition of land for investment purposes.

6.3 Remittances

According to Brinkerhoff (2012), remittances constitute the most tangible form of contributions from the diaspora. Boyle and Kitchin (2014) note that this could be in the form of transfers from migrants to recipients in the migrants' countries of origin. Improving the flow of remittances from migrants' host countries is central to the agenda of several governments in most countries of origin. Remittances are noted to impact on receiving countries via poverty alleviation, income distribution, growth in investments and increase in consumption and savings (Addison, 2005; Fadayomi, 2010). According to Bank of Ghana, (2019), Ghana received a total of US$3.8 billion in remittances alone in 2018.

6.3.1 Remittances and background characteristics of respondents

Given the importance of remittances to the economic growth and national development of sending countries, the study conducted an analysis of the relationship between the dependent variable (remittances) and independent variables (residential status, citizenship, educational level, sex, age and marital status) of respondents. The analysis also covered variations in the remittances sent by respondents within the study countries. The results are presented in Table 6.5.

Out of the 390 respondent, 95 percent indicated that they send remittances to Ghana. An analysis of the various statistical results shows that Qatar recorded 100 percent remittances flow that is all the diaspora who participated in the study send remittances, relative to 92 percent and 96 percent of respondents from UK and USA respectively. Thus, all Ghanaians in Qatar send remittances compared to those percentages in UK and USA. The chi-square test results show a significant relationship between the two

variables – country of residence and sending of remittances ($p<0.05$). It also assessed whether there are relationships between other independent variables such as residential status, sex, age, level of education, citizenship status and the dependent variable-transfer of remittances. Table 6.5 further shows that, residential status, either permanent or temporary, does not have a statistically significant relationship with remittance transfer ($p>0.05$), likewise respondents' age ($p>0.05$) and level of education ($p>0.05$). However, even though there is no marked difference between the percentages of remittances from the educated (96%) and non-educated (92%) respondents, the results on education reinforce the findings of studies such as Orozco's (2005). He argues that education plays an important role in the level of remittances sent by migrants and that about half of remittance senders in the UK have a college degree. The results also show that the likelihood of sending remittances is not significantly aligned to a specific sex – that is if one is a male or female ($p>0.05$), considering that the majority of both males (94.1 percent) and females (98 percent) send remittances. On the other hand, even though the majority of the respondents without dual citizenship (96.5%) and those with dual citizenship (91.3%) indicated that they send remittances, the chi square test shows a significant relationship between the two variables. The reason could be that a higher percentage of respondents without dual citizenship send remittances than those with dual citizenship. This finding defies a major proposition of Gamlen (2006) which says that the extension of Citizenship rights such as dual citizenship would elicit greater diaspora participation in the economy.

Table 6.5: Respondents' remittances sent and background characteristics

Background Characteristics	Sending of Remittances		Total Percentages	N
	Do not remit	Remit		
Country of residence				
Qatar	0.0	100.0	100.0	80
UK	8.5	91.5	100.0	130
USA	4.4	95.6	100.0	180
Total	4.9	95.1	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 7.78, df (2), p value =0.02<0.05			
Residential Status				
Permanent	4.2	95.8	100.0	190
non-Permanent	5.5	94.5	100.0	200
Total	4.9	95.1	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 0.35, df (1), p value =0.55>0.05			
Citizenship				
Dual Citizen	8.7	91.3	100.0	104
Only Ghanaian citizen	3.5	96.5	100.0	286
Total	4.9	95.1	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 4.38, df (1), p value =0.04<0.05			
Sex				
Female	2.0	98.0	100.0	101
Male	5.9	94.1	100.0	289
Total	4.9	95.1	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 2.46, df (1), p value =0.12>0.05			
Age				
below 30 years	4.5	95.5	100.0	44
30yrs-39yrs	3.8	96.2	100.0	105
40yrs-49yrs	6.0	94.0	100.0	134
50 years & above	4.7	95.3	100.0	107
Total	4.9	95.1	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 0.62 df (3), p value =0.89>0.05			
Level of Education				
No Education	8.1	91.9	100.0	74
Secondary	3.6	96.4	100.0	55
Tertiary	4.2	95.8	100.0	261
Total	4.9	95.1	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 2.10, df (2), p value =0.35 >0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.3.2 Types of Migrants' remittances

Remittances could be in the form of cash or kind. They are regarded as effective tools for income distribution, poverty reduction and economic growth (Levitt, 2005; Quartey, 2009; Meulen, 2016). Table 6.6 indicates that the majority (95.1 percent) of the respondents send remittances in the form of cash than in the form of goods (43.1%). This is expected, considering the fact that a significant share of remittances received in Ghana comes in the form of cash than in kind (Quartey, 2006a, 2009). The respondents in Qatar did not only top in the transfer of cash (100 percent) but also in goods (51.3%). A higher proportion of respondents in USA (47.2%) send remittances in the form of goods than those in the UK (32.3%).

In addition, a higher proportion of respondents who were between the ages of 30-39 years (52.4%) send remittances in the form of goods than those who were within the ages of 40-49 years (40.3%), 50 years and above (42.1%) and below 30 years (31.8%). The results in Table 6.6 further show that while the majority (91.9%) of respondents with no education sends remittances in the form of cash, only 11 percent send remittances in goods. Also, the majority (62%) of the respondents with secondary education indicated that they send remittances in the form of goods compared to those with tertiary education (48%).

Table 6.6: Types of Respondents' remittances and background characteristics

Background Characteristics	Remittances (Percentage)	
	Remittances in the form cash	Remittances in the form of goods
Country of residence		
Qatar (n=80)	100.0	51.3
UK (n=130)	91.5	32.3
USA (n=(180)	95.6	47.2
Total N=(390)	95.1%	43.1
Residential Status		
Permanent (n=190)	95.8	47.4
Non-permanent (n=200)	94.5	39.0
Total N=(390)	95.1	43.1
Citizenship		
Dual Citizen (n=104)	91.3	48.1
Only Ghanaian citizen (n=286)	96.5	41.3
Total N=(390)	95.1	43.1
Sex		
Female (n=101)	98.0	47.5
Male (n=289)	94.1	41.5
Total N=(390)	95.1	43.1
Age		
below 30 years (n=44)	95.5	31.8
30yrs-39yrs (n=105)	96.2	52.4
40yrs-49yrs (n=134)	94.0	40.3
50 years & above	95.3	42.1

(n=107)		
Total N=(390)	95.1	43.1

Table 6.6: Continued

Level of Education		
No Education (n=74)	91.9	10.8
Secondary (n=55)	96.4	61.8
Tertiary (n=261)	95.8	48.3
Total N=(390)	95.1	43.1

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.3.3 Frequency of remittance flow

The consistency in the flow of these remittances is key to ensuring continued growth and development. The study, therefore, analyzed how consistent Ghanaian emigrants have been in sending remittances home. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 6.2, which shows that while 42 percent of the respondents send remittances once a month, another 41 percent send them more than once a month. Only one percent of respondents send remittances twice a year. It also shows that 12.4 percent of them send remittances every two months with 3.5 percent doing so on a quarterly basis. The constant flow of remittances to Ghana, as evidenced by the current study demonstrates the importance of this resource to the welfare of recipients and the economy of Ghana in general (Carling, 2008; Ratha et al., 2011; and Terrazas, 2011).

Figure 6.2: Frequency of remittance transfer



Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.3.4 Factors hindering the flow of remittances to Ghana.

The qualitative aspect of the study from the three study countries unveiled the following factors as hindrances to the flow of remittances to Ghana: high transfer costs, fluctuating exchange rate, high bank charges, state control over monetary transfers, cumbersome bank transfer procedures and high cost of duties and taxes at the ports.

The majority of the respondents from the US reported their frustrations over high transfer costs, volatile exchange rates, high bank charges and high cost of duties at the ports. A Ghanaian nurse in the US said that;

> "With great expectations from the Ghanaian society and extended family members, I am often obliged to send goods and money not only to my children but to some other family members as well as friends. Once they call with one problem or the other you have to send them money. What they don't know is that it is mostly not easy doing so since the transfer costs are so high here. The fluctuating exchange rates at home makes it difficult knowing the value of what you are even sending. Also, I prefer to send them cash to get whatever they need from Ghana than to send goods. This is due to the high duties I have to pay and cumbersome processes I have to go through anytime I send goods back home" (Ghanaian Nurse,14th November 2018, Washington DC-US).

The SDGs related to remittances, specifically target 10.c stipulates that member countries of the UN should reduce to less than 3 percent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 percent. Ghana should endeavor to attain the target to boost remittances from its diaspora.

These sentiments were shared by many of the Ghanaian immigrants interviewed in the UK. However, in Qatar, many of the participants referred to the excessive state control over cash transfers, lack of privacy, cumbersome bank transfer procedures as their greatest source of frustration in sending money to Ghana. A Ghanaian hairdresser in Qatar, disclosed that;

> "In Qatar the bank charges for transfer are relatively affordable, but our greater challenges are the excessive State control over the transfers and lack of privacy. You are also to provide so many information at the bank that you will sometimes feel like abandoning the whole transaction. And they limit the amount you can send making you appear stingy in the eyes of family members" (Ghanaian Hairdresser,14th July 2018, Doha-Qatar).

Suleimana, a Ghanaian security officer working in a hotel in Qatar shared his experience and views on the clearance of goods at the ports:

> "The duties and troublesome processes of clearing goods at Tema Port are just too much. Because of this, I don't even attempt it since my one-time experience with that port nearly made me go crazy. Now I prefer dividing the goods and sending them in bits as accompanied baggage through friends or other travelers, then I tip them. But as you know, that mode of transfer has its own problems. You risk not having the goods delivered at all, but I still prefer that" (Ghanaian Security Officer, 14th July 2018, Doha-Qatar)

6.4 Philanthropic Goods

The diaspora community has gained credence over the years as donors who support their homelands through philanthropy (Boyle & Kitchin, 2014). Johnson (2007) identifies two types of philanthropy; diaspora associations and diaspora foundations. These associations and foundations are noted to provide reliefs, donations and other charitable goods to their homeland. Philanthropic goods, therefore, contribute significantly towards the growth of societies, alleviating poverty, sustaining economic growth and educating the citizens in their homeland (Brinkerhoff, 2012).

6.4.1 Awareness of philanthropic bodies

To assess the experiences and views of the Ghanaian migrants on philanthropic activities, the respondents were asked of their knowledge about philanthropic bodies in their countries of residence. To ascertain the relationship between country of residence and respondents' awareness of philanthropic bodies in their respective host countries, a cross-tabulation and chi-square test of significance were computed. The results are presented in Table 6.7. The results show that 94 percent of respondents were aware of philanthropic bodies in their host countries. All the respondents sampled in Qatar indicated that they were aware of philanthropic bodies. There is a statistically significant relationship between country of residence and awareness of philanthropic bodies ($p<0.05$). The in-depth interviews conducted in Qatar crystallized the reasons why all the respondents in the country knew about philanthropic bodies. A Ghanaian security officer in Doha, Qatar explained that:

> "Qatar is an Islamic country and giving of alms is part of their culture. Apart from the fact that individual citizens contribute towards philanthropic ends, there are a lot of institutions and groups that do charity works too. We the foreigners know about this because we live with them. Also, these institutions and groups put in a lot in the form of advertisement on social media platforms to solicit for donations from the public. You might have seen their stands in all the shopping malls and

> popular places for the same purpose" (A Ghanaian Security Officer, 12th November 2018, Qatar).

An elder in one of the churches in the US also attributed the high percentage of awareness about philanthropic bodies among respondents in the country to the religious nature of Ghanaians. Similar views were shared by some respondents interviewed in the UK. The church elder argued that:

> "The churches in the US are known for their philanthropic works. It is therefore very easy for us Ghanaians to know about them since we go to these churches. In spite of the fact that we have travelled away from home to make some money we will always find time to worship our God".

Table 6.7: Relationship between respondents' countries of residence and their perceived awareness of philanthropic bodies

Country of residence	Awareness of philanthropic bodies in your country of residence		Total	
	Not Aware	Aware	Percentage	N
Qatar	0.0	100.0	100.0	80
UK	6.2	93.8	100.0	130
USA	8.9	91.1	100.0	180
Total	6.2	93.8	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 7.58, df (2), p value =0.02 <0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.4.2 Types of philanthropic bodies

Respondents were further asked to identify the various philanthropic bodies they knew in their host countries. The results are presented in Table 6.8. The majority (72.1%) of the respondents indicated that religious associations are the major philanthropic bodies in their host countries, followed by State charitable institutions (19.1%) and Ghanaian Associations (8.7%).

This suggests that, for most respondents, religious associations are the major philanthropic bodies as compared to the Ghanaian associations or State charitable institutions.

A higher percentage of respondents from Qatar (25%) identified Ghanaian associations as a philanthropic body compared to 3.3 percent in UK and 4.9 percent in the US. On country to country basis, a higher percentage of respondents in the USA identified more religious associations (75.6%), compared to those in the UK (73.8%) and Qatar (62.5%).

These results are consistent with the reasons adduced by some interviewees in the US and UK (see section 6.4.1), which attributed their awareness of philanthropic bodies to the membership of churches in those countries.

Table 6.8: Types of philanthropic bodies in respondents' host countries(percentages)

	Types of philanthropic bodies		
Country of residence	Ghanaian Associations	Religious Associations	State Charitable Institutions
Qatar	25.0	62.5	12.5
UK	3.3	73.8	23.0
USA	4.9	75.6	19.5
Total	**8.7**	**72.1**	**19.1**

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.4.3 Assessment of migrants' experience in sending of philanthropic goods to Ghana

To assess the Ghanaian diaspora's philanthropic efforts, respondents were asked if they had ever taken any philanthropic goods to Ghana. The analysis was performed controlling

for socio-demographic variables, including country of residence, residential status, citizenship, sex, age, level of education and marital status. The results are presented in Table 6.9. The results show that, out of the 390 respondents, 41 percent indicated that they have taken philanthropic goods to Ghana, while 59 percent responded in the negative. On a country by country basis, it is noticed that a higher percentage of respondents from Qatar (49%) had taken philanthropic goods to Ghana, followed by USA (44%) and UK (31.5%). The study, therefore, reports a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p<0.05$).

Table 6.9: Respondents' background characteristics and sending of philanthropic goods to Ghana

Background characteristics	Philanthropic goods to Ghana: Not sent Philanthropic goods Ghana	Philanthropic goods to Ghana: Dispatched Philanthropic goods to Ghana	Total Percentage	N
Country of residence				
Qatar	51.3	48.8	100	80
UK	68.5	31.5	100	130
USA	55.6	44.4	100	180
Total	59.0	41.0	100	390
	χ 2 statistic = 7.68, df (2), p value =0.02 <0.05			
Residential Status				
Permanent	56.3	43.7	100	190
non-Permanent	61.5	38.5	100	200
Total	59.0	41.0	100	390
	χ 2 statistic = 1.08, df (1), p value =0.30 >0.05			
Citizenship				
Dual Citizen	53.8	46.2	100	104
Only Ghanaian citizen	60.8	39.2	100	286
Total	59.0	41.0	100	390
	χ 2 statistic = 1.54, df (1), p value =0.21 >0.05			
Sex				
Female	59.4	40.6	100	101

Male	58.8	41.2	100	289
Total	59.0	41.0	100	390
	χ 2 statistic = 0.10, df (1), p value =0.92 0>.05			
Age				
below 30 years	59.1	40.9	100	44
30yrs-39yrs	55.2	44.8	100	105
40yrs-49yrs	64.2	35.8	100	134
50 years & above	56.1	43.9	100	107
Total	59.0	41.0	100	390
	χ 2 statistic = 2.48, df (3), p value =0.48 >0.05			
Level of Education				
No Education	89.2	10.8	100	74
Secondary	41.8	58.2	100	55
Tertiary	54.0	46.0	100	261
Total	59.0	41.0	100	390
	χ 2 statistic = 37.26, df (2), p value =0.0001<0.05			
Marital Status				
Married	49.4	50.6	100	233
Single	73.0	27.0	100	152
separated	80.0	20.0	100	5
Total	59.0	41.0	100	390
	χ 2 statistic = 22.23, df (2), p value =0.000 <0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

Furthermore, sex, residential status and citizenship are not statistically significantly aligned with whether respondents have taken any philanthropic goods to Ghana or not (see Table 6.9). With regard to respondents' level of education, the results show that a higher proportion of the respondents with secondary education (58.2%) have undertaken such initiatives before, compared to those with tertiary education (46%) and no education (10.8%). Thus, the chi square test shows a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p<0.05$). This means that, an individual undertaking of philanthropic initiative in Ghana varies significantly by level of education.

In terms of the respondents' marital status, the study shows that there is statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p<0.05$), and a higher proportion of the respondents who were married (51%) indicated that they have undertaken philanthropic initiatives in Ghana compared to those who were single (27%) and separated (20%).

Some respondents disclosed that they shipped medical supplies and clothing to orphanages homes and medical health centres. One respondent said that he presents free drugs and clothing to health centres and orphanages annually whenever he comes to Ghana for holidays. To him, this initiative is his way of helping the society:

> "I come for holidays every Christmas with clothes and drugs for orphanages and clinics. I think if my colleagues in the diaspora would do same, it would help our society a lot, especially the small communities we all come from" (43-year-old male, USA, individual interview via skype).

Some respondents also revealed that they often send books and other sports equipment to their alma mater. Others also donate cash and present laboratory equipment to these schools.

6.4.4 Factors that would influence philanthropic initiatives

Table 6.10 presents the various factors that would motivate Ghanaian migrants to engage in philanthropic initiatives. In essence, the factors adduced by respondents were seen as issues that hinder their optimal philanthropic efforts. The majority of the respondents reported that adequate assurance of goods getting to the intended beneficiary would motivate them to contribute. Apart from the perception that most of these philanthropic goods do not get to the intended organizations and individuals, there are others who also hold the view that the goods end up in the hands of corrupt and greedy people. These often deter the migrants from undertaking such initiatives. Some 73.6 percent of the respondents indicated that they would be motivated to undertake such initiatives if there

was adequate assurance in this regard. Also, 19 percent of them pointed out that there should be adequate information about tax exemptions and clearance procedures to motivate them to freely undertake philanthropic initiatives.

Furthermore, two percent of the respondents pointed to the establishment and strengthening of Ghanaian associations to promote the welfare and protection of the diaspora to motivate them to engage in these philanthropic acts. Other two percent also indicated that there should be the provision of adequate legal instruments and civil rights of the diaspora population in order to encourage the diaspora to fulfill their national obligations. In addition, four percent of the respondents noted that they would be motivated to engage in philanthropy if the Ghanaian diplomatic missions would give them their cooperation and support. Through proper engagement and coordination, the diaspora would be better informed on priority areas and processes involved in the clearance of the goods to enable them to fully discharge this social responsibility.

Table 6.10: Motivations to increase diaspora involvement in philanthropic initiatives in Ghana

Motivations	Frequency	Percentage
Adequate information about tax exemptions and clearance procedures	74	19.0
Adequate assurance that goods get to the intended beneficiary	287	73.6
Establishment and strengthening of Ghanaian associations to promote the welfare and protection of the diaspora	8	2.1
Full cooperation and support of the Mission	14	3.6
Provision of adequate legal instruments and civil rights of the diaspora population	7	1.8
Total	390	100.0

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.5 Skills and Knowledge Transfer

Serving as knowledge network agents, the diaspora community is noted for the transfer of skills and knowledge to their homeland. For instance, the World Bank Development

Report (2009) highlights how some of the early African students impacted development in their countries of origin after returning from further studies abroad. Additionally, Boyle and Kitchin (2014) report that the diaspora community offers support to the public, private and community organizations in their home countries to enable them achieve accelerated global command and have control over their own capabilities. The diaspora is, therefore, considered as agents in the transfer of knowledge and expertise to their homeland (Brinkerhoff, 2012).

6.5.1 The likelihood of migrants transferring their skills and knowledge to Ghana

The study examined the likelihood of the diaspora transferring their skills and knowledge acquired in their host countries to Ghana by focusing on background characteristics such as country of residence, residential status, citizenship, sex, age, level of education and marital status. The decision to include residential status and citizenship was borne out of the need to ascertain the likelihood of respondents who have dual citizenship or permanent residence to return to Ghana. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 6.11.

Table 6.11: Respondents' background characteristics and their decision to work in Ghana if given the opportunity

Background characteristics	Considering working in Ghana		Total Percentage	N
	Would not consider	Would consider		
Country of residence				
Qatar	5.0	95.0	100.0	80
UK	9.2	90.8	100.0	130
USA	18.9	81.1	100.0	180
Total	12.8	87.2	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 11.81 df (2), p value =0.003 <0.05			
Residential Status				
Permanent	14.7	85.3	100.0	190
non-Permanent	11.0	89.0	100.0	200
Total	12.8	87.2	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 1.22, df (1), p value =0.27>0.05			
Citizenship				

Dual Citizen	11.5	88.5	100.0	104
Only Ghanaian citizen	13.3	86.7	100.0	286
Total	12.8	87.2	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 0.21, df (1), p value =0.65>0.05			
Sex				
Female	15.8	84.2	100.0	101
Male	11.8	88.2	100.0	289
Total	12.8	87.2	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 1.11, df (1), p value =0.29 >0.05			
Age				
below 30 years	13.6	86.4	100.0	44
30yrs-39yrs	1.9	98.1	100.0	105
40yrs-49yrs	20.9	79.1	100.0	134
50 years & above	13.1	86.9	100.0	107
Total	12.8	87.2	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 19.04, df (3), p value =0.000 <0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

Table 6.11: Continued

Level of Education				
No Education	13.5	86.5	100.0	74
Secondary	10.9	89.1	100.0	55
Tertiary	13.0	87.0	100.0	261
Total	12.8	87.2	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 0.22, df (2), p value =0.89 >0.05			
Marital Status				
Married	12.0	88.0	100.0	233
Single	14.5	85.5	100.0	152
separated	0.0	100.0	100.0	5
Total	12.8	87.2	100.0	390
	χ 2 statistic = 1.24, df (2), p value =0.54 >0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

Overall, out of the 390 respondents studied, 87 percent indicated that they would consider returning to work in Ghana if they were given the opportunity and also had a conducive working environment. Only 13 percent of the respondents indicated that they had no intentions of returning to work in Ghana. The study indicates a statistically significant

relationship between country of residence and respondent's intentions of returning home ($p<0.05$) (See Table 6.11). This is because, comparatively, a relatively higher proportion of respondents from Qatar (95%) than those in UK (90.8%) and USA (81.1%) indicated that they would consider returning. The decision not to return home could be as a result of better prevailing conditions of service, working environment or family ties and other social engagements in the host countries. The results further show that residential status, citizenship, sex, level of education and marital status are not significantly related with the likelihood of respondents returning to Ghana to work.

With respect to education, for example, there were no statistically significant variations in the responses across the various levels of education – no education (86.5%), secondary (89.1%) and tertiary (87%). However, the results indicate that relatively higher proportion of males (88.2%) would consider returning home than females (84.2%). This finding is in sync with a study by Taylor (2006), which notes that women integrate better in their host countries and do not return home as much as men, while men on the other hand, are empirically known to engage in more transnational activities in their home country in preparation for a more permanent return. Remarkably, all the respondents who were separated indicated that they would consider returning home to work. Some single (86%) and married (88%) respondents also expressed their intentions to return home to work. In terms of residential status, whether the diaspora had dual citizenship or not had no significant relationship with their decision to return to Ghana to work.

6.5.2 Return migrants' preferred sectors of employment

Of the number who would consider working in Ghana, 67 percent indicated that they would be interested in setting up their own businesses in the country and be self-

employed (Figure 6.3) Also, 25 percent of respondents reported that they would consider working in the private sector and 8.5 percent prefer to work in the civil service.

The results of the in-depth interviews conducted corroborate the above findings. Many of the interviewees in the three study countries confirmed their readiness to return home and contribute towards national development. They noted that they had acquired some skills and knowledge, social capital and important networks which would be useful in the private sector. The majority (67%) of them also confirmed their desire to be self-employed.

A Ghanaian engineer in the USA indicated that;

> "I have been in the US for the past 20 years and I am happy about what I have been able to accomplish. Apart from having a degree certificate in electrical engineering from the States, I have had 12 years' experience working as a solar technologist in a reputable company in New York. I am ready to relocate to Ghana with my acquired skills and knowledge. I hope to set up my own solar company to help solve the energy supply challenges of Ghana" (Ghanaian Engineer, 20th July 2018, New York-US).

Within the current economic climate and the unemployment situation in the country especially in the public sector, one of the priority areas on the agenda for economic reform of the Ghana Government has been the active engagement of the private sector in job creation to stimulate economic growth. This research finding is in line with government's objective in promoting the private sector for national growth. There is therefore, the need for an active engagement of the Ghanaian emigrants to enable them transfer their skills and knowledge to the country, especially in the private sector.

Figure 6.3: Respondents' preferred sectors of employment



Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.5.3 Challenges faced by return migrants in their home countries

Some studies report that returning migrants are often confronted with challenges when they return to their homeland. For instance, Anarfi and Jagare (2005a) report that most programmes that encourage the return of skilled migrants have been largely ineffective. Poor health infrastructure in the country, particularly the absence of emergency services (Taylor 2009) and frustrations with poor working environment and excessive bureaucracy in the public sector (Potter 2005, Taylor 2009), are some of the challenges often cited. Apart from the afore-mentioned challenges, some are also confronted with lack of jobs (Taylor 2009). The study examined the various barriers respondents are likely to face should they decide to return to Ghana. It relied on the perceived barriers from respondents that indicated that they would consider returning home (n=340). The results are presented in Table 6.12.

Unavailability of jobs in Ghana (80%) was reported as the major barrier. Undoubtedly, this is a major push factor as to why people migrate from their home country. As the problem of unemployment and lack of job prospects pertain in the home country, there is

the likelihood that they would not be motivated to return home, especially when prevailing conditions within the destination countries are more favorable for their sustenance and well-being.

Also, 14 percent of the respondents indicated that lack of effective professional and social integration structures would pose as major barriers if they decide to return to Ghana to work. To some respondents, this makes it difficult for the diaspora to feel accepted at the work place and the society they hope to settle in.

Table 6.12: Perceived anticipated obstacles respondents are likely to face should they decide to return to Ghana to work

Problems	Frequency	Percentage
Lack of adequate credit facilities	20	5.9
Lack of effective professional and social integration structures	48	14.1
Unavailability of Jobs	272	80.0
Total	340	100.0

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

6.5.4 Factors that would motivate migrants to work in Ghana

The study examined the factors that would motivate migrants to work in Ghana, given the importance of their potential contribution towards the development of the country. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.13. The majority (68%) of the respondents indicated that they would be motivated to return to Ghana if there is the existence of a conducive economic and political environment. To them, this will make the country an attractive hub for the diaspora. Also, 26 percent of them pointed out that, with enough job opportunities, the diaspora would be motivated to return home. A few (4%) respondents indicated that the government should provide professional and social integration schemes to help return migrants integrate well into their various jobs and communities.

Table 6.13: Factors that would motivate respondents to return to work in Ghana

Motivating factors	Frequency	Percentage
Conducive economic and political environment	265	67.9
Job opportunity	101	25.9
Provision of credit facility	9	2.1
Provision of professional and social integration schemes	15	3.8
Total	390	100.0

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

On professional and social integration challenges, a Ghanaian medical officer in UK indicated;

> "There is too much hostility against medical doctors from abroad by some staff of the health sector in Ghana. I relocated to Ghana 3 years ago to work in one of the largest public hospitals. I had to run back to UK after only a year due to the frustrations and hostility meted out to me. I was constantly confronted with unfriendly remarks like; 'this is Ghana and not the UK'. 'In Ghana we don't do things like this/that'. And what's worse is that when it comes to the agreed service package, you are never given all that you were promised before coming down. I sharply remember my frustration upon arriving in Ghana having to perch with friends when I could no longer afford staying in a hotel to wait for the accommodation I was promised. What these people did to me was a total nightmare. Another thing killing our desire to relocate to Ghana with our skills and knowledge is also the high level of expectation from family members and friends at home. Once you are coming from abroad, the local folks expect gifts and cash from you everywhere you go and this can be very frustrating" (Ghanaian medical doctor, 9th November 2018, UK).

6.6 Summary and Conclusion

The research finding on the high percentage of respondents asking for conducive political and economic environment (68 percent) as a motivational factor for their return is consistent with extant migration literature. International Migration Institute (2010) presents conducive environment as the most critical factor in attracting the diaspora to participate in the economies of their homelands. The Gamlen (2006) conceptual framework suggests that the diaspora will return to their homelands with their acquired

skills and knowledge when governments extend to them the prescribed policies and programmes, as mentioned under his typology. This particular research outcome goes further than Gamlen's targeted policies of governments in favour of the diaspora. It reports that the general fiscal and monetary conditions of the country, for instance, constitute a critical factor for the diaspora's active transnational engagement with their homelands. The chapter has also revealed, among others, that awareness creation should be fused into diaspora engagement initiatives towards successful developmental outcomes. The constant flow of remittances to Ghana reinforces the importance of this diaspora resource. The challenges associated with this important resource, together with skills and knowledge transfer, investment and philanthropy need urgent solution by government for national development.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS OF THE GHANAIAN DIASPORA ON DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT INITIATIVES

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the experiences and views of the Ghanaian diaspora regarding their participation in governments' diaspora engagement initiatives. The focus of the discussion is on diaspora associations, conferences and cultural events. It further ascertains the diasporas' experiences and views on institutional capacity initiatives and the rights and legal instruments extended to them. In the process, the challenges faced by the diaspora are highlighted for the assessment of the engagement initiatives. The chapter is therefore on how the theory of the conceptual framework was applied in the analysis of the data.

7.2 Experiences and Views on Ghanaian Diaspora Associations, Conferences and Cultural Events

The diaspora associations, conferences and cultural events are part of the symbolic nation-building initiatives that enhance state-diaspora relationship (Gamlen, 2006). Members of the diaspora usually associate with people of similar kinship, religious, socio-cultural and sometimes, professional backgrounds (Kandilige, 2017). Some studies have shown that the diaspora associations have contributed towards development projects including construction of schools, libraries and hospitals for their respective communities in Ghana (Awumbila and Teye, 2014). According to Alhassan (2010), constant linkages between the local actors and the Ghanaian diaspora provide the latter with the opportunity to benefit from relevant information for their personal investment activities. Other

symbolic programmes reinforce claims of shared identity and sense of belonging to the diaspora (Teye et al., 2017).

7.2.1 Diaspora Associations

Table 7.1 is a on the relationship between the independent variables (country of residence, residential status, sex, age, level of education and marital status) and the dependent variables (hometown, ethnic, religious and professional associations). The respondents were asked whether they belong to any of the above-mentioned Ghanaian associations.

The results of the quantitative analysis indicated that 80 percent of the respondents from USA, UK and Qatar confirmed their membership of Ghanaian association with the remaining 20 percent indicating otherwise. Among the three study sites, USA presents a marked difference between those who belong to associations (95.6%) as against the non-membership group (4.4%). UK has the highest percentage of respondents who do not belong to any association (40 percent) followed by Qatar (22.5 percent). The results of the chi-square test show that there is a statistically significant relationship between country of residence and affiliation to Ghanaian associations ($p<0.05$). The high percentage (60%) of Ghanaian immigrants belonging to some associations in the UK (even though it placed third as compared to other study countries) is consistent with existing literature. Van Hear et al. (2004) note that there are about 200 associations alone in the UK consisting of umbrella organizations, charities, voluntary organizations, hometown associations, churches, NGOs and media houses with good patronage by Ghanaian immigrants. Also, Ong'ayo (2006) observes that the GUBA Foundation, Noble Friends, Akwaaba UK and Mefiri Ghana are very popular Ghanaian associations in the UK with high participation by Ghanaians.

Table 7.1: Respondents' Affiliation to Ghanaian Associations in the Diaspora by background characteristics

Background characteristics	Belong	Do not belong	Total Percentage	N
Country of residence				
Qatar	77.5	22.5	(100.0)	80
UK	60.0	40.0	(100.0)	130
USA	95.6	4.4	(100.0)	180
Total	80.0	20.0	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 60.04, df (2), p value =0.00001 <0.05			
Residential Status				
Permanent residents	92.5	7.5	(100.0)	173
Non-permanent residents	70.0	30.0	(100.0)	217
	χ^2 statistic = 23.16, df (1), p value =0.00001 <0.05			
Sex				
Female	87.1	12.9	(100.0)	101
Male	77.5	22.5	(100.0)	289
	χ^2 statistic = 18.29, df (2), p value =0.00001 <0.05			
Age				
below 30 years	77.3	22.7	(100.0)	44
30yrs-39yrs	72.4	27.6	(100.0)	105
40yrs-49yrs	78.4	21.6	(100.0)	134
50 years & above	90.7	9.3	(100.0)	107
	χ^2 statistic = 11.83, df (3), p value =0.008 <0.05			
Level of education				
No Education	31.1	68.9	(100.0)	74
Secondary	85.5	14.5	(100.0)	55
Tertiary	92.7	7.3	(100.0)	261
	χ^2 statistic = 138.10, df (2), p value =0.0001 <0.05			
Marital status				
Married	90.1	9.9	(100.0)	233
Single	63.8	36.2	(100.0)	152
Separated	100.0	0.0	(100.0)	5
	χ^2 statistic = 41.07, df (2), p value =0.00001 <0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

The high recorded membership of associations by the Ghanaian immigrants in the USA (95.6 percent) is consistent with a study by Awumbila and Teye (2014), which affirms that the Ghanaian diaspora population in the United States have formed several groups

and associations. They further note that the US has one of the oldest ethnic-based Ghanaian associations in New York with good patronage from the Ghanaian community.

Qatar recorded the second highest percentage (78%) of the Ghanaian immigrants' participation in associations. Interviews conducted in Qatar in the current study recorded that Christians and other faith-based churches are allowed to meet and fellowship freely in their places of worship. Also, the interviews revealed that more Ghanaians find the Ghanaian associations in Qatar attractive due to the existing unity and oneness of purpose among the members.

On residential status for the entire study countries, the results of the chi-square analysis show that there is a statistically significant relationship between residential status of the respondents and their affiliation to Ghanaian association ($p<0.05$). This is because a high percentage of the migrants with permanent residence (92.5%) status belong to associations than those with education or work permit (70%) (see Table 7.1). As noted, Ghanaians in Qatar, like all foreign workers in the country do not have permanent residence, but temporary resident permit. Again, available literature seems to reinforce the present findings in relation to the high percentage of Ghanaian immigrants with permanent residence status that belong to associations (Van Meeteren, 2012; Casteneda, 2014; La croix et al., 2016; Waters Gerstein, 2016).

Regarding sex, Table 7.1 shows higher percentage of female participation in the various Ghanaian associations (87.1%) than the males (77.5%). In Qatar, unlike the Western World where spouses of immigrant workers are usually given work permit to facilitate their employment in the labour market, work permits are seldom given to the spouses for employment. This situation affords them ample time to participate fully in the diaspora

associations. In response by a Ghanaian housewife to a question about her affiliation to an association in Qatar, she affirmed as follows:

> "I have been a member of a Ghanaian association and a church for the past five years. Indeed, since my arrival in Doha, I recognize that my husband's work is very demanding as he leaves early in the morning and comes back late in the evening. I have no option than to attend the association meetings alone since I am at home not working" (Interviewee, 18th July 2018, Doha-Qatar).

Furthermore, the results of the chi-square test show that age has a statistically significant relationship with the respondents' affiliation to Ghanaian associations ($p<0.05$). A higher percentage of respondents who were 50 years and above (90.7%) confirmed their membership of a Ghanaian association, compared to those below 30 years and 30-49 years (see Table 7.1). The age distribution shows that Ghanaian immigrants in the three study countries are averagely in their working ages. The working age bracket typically promotes transnational activities such as participation in associations. The finding is consistent with available literature. For instance, the Migration Policy Institute (2015) indicates that Ghanaian Immigrants in the US are all in their working ages. Piper (2008), Yun-Chung (2007) and IOM (2013) reinforce empirical research findings which indicate that migration of young and economically active population leverages transnational activities such as formation and participation of immigrants in diaspora associations.

Table 7.1 further indicates the educational level of Ghanaian immigrants and their participation in the associations. The majority of the respondents with tertiary education (92.7%) belong to Ghanaian associations compared to lower percentage of these with no education (31.1%). The results of the study further indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p<0.05$).

These results therefore present a certain pattern on the relationship between Ghanaian educated migrants and their participation in associations: more educated Ghanaian migrants participate in associations than the non-educated ones. This is evidenced in the

migration literature. Within the EU, UK has the highest number of educated Ghanaians (Ong'ayo, 2016). Also, Ghanaians in the USA are among the highly educated immigrants (Migration Policy Institute, 2015; and Arthur, 2016).

The qualitative analysis also revealed that many of the educated Ghanaians in the developed countries are obliged by circumstances to further their education in order to get decent jobs in the labour market. Two of the interviewees in UK and USA had the following to say:

> "I came to UK after my polytechnic education as a caterer but had to abandon that certificate because of the low remuneration in that field and pursue a degree certificate in nursing. Currently, I have obtained a decent job as a nurse in one of the community hospitals and I am happy about this" (A Ghanaian nurse, 15th November 2018, London, UK).

A USA interviewee also said:

> "In my case, I had an HND certificate in fashion design from one of the polytechnics in Ghana but had to do a top up course in fashion in order to get accepted by some of the fashion houses I applied to. The fee was neck breaking but I knew I had to work extra hours if I wanted to get this degree and this job. Hmm It's not easy ooh" (A Ghanaian designer, 15th November 2018, US).

On marital status, 90 percent of married respondents stated that they belong to Ghanaian associations as compared to 63.8 percent of respondents who were single. The results of the chi-square analysis therefore show a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p<0.05$). This suggests that more married Ghanaians in the selected study countries belong to Ghanaian associations.

Considering the fact that variables such as country of residence, residential status, sex, age, marital status and level of education have a statistically significant relationship with the respondents' affiliation to Ghanaian association, a binary logistic regression was performed to estimate the effect of these predictors on the diaspora's affiliation to Ghanaian associations. In view of this, a binary logistic regression was computed. The

results of this analysis are presented in Table 7.2. The Nagelkerke R^2 value of 0.57 suggests that the model predicts 57 percent of variance in the outcome variable (affiliation to Ghanaian Association) and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test which is not significant at 5% level of significance shows that these sets of selected predictor variables better predict the likelihood of respondents achieving their objectives of migrating in the study areas.

In addition, the Omnibus tests of model coefficient computed rejects the null hypothesis which suggests that the model is not a significant fit of the data ($\chi 2=173.03$, $p>0.05$). Also, the overall predictive accuracy of the model is 91.3 percent. In terms of the predictor variables selected, only country of residence ($p<0.05$) and level of education e ($p<0.05$), significantly predicted the outcome variable of the model. Conversely, sex ($p>0.05$), residential status ($p>0.05$), age ($p>0.05$) and marital status ($p<0.05$) did not significantly predict the outcome (likelihood of belonging to a Ghanaian association) of the model (see Table 7.2).

The results in Table 7.2 suggest that the likelihood of belonging to a Ghanaian association is higher for Ghanaian migrants in USA than in Qatar. For example, migrants in USA are about 12 times more likely to belong to Ghanaian association than those in Qatar. With regard to level of education, the results show that the respondents with secondary and tertiary education are more likely to belong to a Ghanaian association than those with no education. Specifically, respondents with tertiary and secondary education are about 31 and 20 times respectively more likely to be affiliated to a Ghanaian association than those with no education.

Table 7.2: Results of a binary Logistic Regression Coefficients estimating the effects of predictors on respondents' affiliation to Ghanaian association

Predictors	B	S.E.	Wald	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B) Lower	Upper
Country of residence						
Qatar (RC)				1.00		
UK	-.447	.629	.506	.639	.186	2.193
USA	*2.454*	*.733***	*11.206*	*11.630*	*2.765*	*48.920*
Residential Status						
Permanent/Citizen	-.234	.455	.265	.791	.324	1.930
Work/education permit (RC)				1.00		
Sex						
Female	-.086	.439	.038	.918	.388	2.170
Male (RC)						
Age						
Below 30 years	-.323	.601	.289	.724	.223	2.351
30-39 years	.003	.720	.000	1.003	.245	4.110
40-49 years	1.425	.785	3.294	4.158	.892	19.375
50 years and above (RC)						
Marital Status						
Married	-19.143	17542.978	.000	.000	0.000	
Single	-19.109	17542.978	.000	.000	0.000	
Separated (RC)						
Education						
No education (RC)						
Secondary	*2.994*	*.652***	*21.099*	*19.958*	*5.564*	*71.592*
Tertiary	*3.447*	*.559***	*38.008*	*31.419*	*10.501*	*94.010*

Note: Note: R2 =0.57 (Nagelkerke); Cox & Snell) = .36; (Hosmer & Lemeshow; $\chi 2$ (8) = 15.14, p>0.5) Goodness-of-Fit $\chi 2$ (11) = 173.03, p<0.5, -2 Log Likelihood = 217.283;
***p<.05, **p<.01**,
Source: Fieldwork (2018)

7.2.2 Types of Ghanaian Associations in the diaspora

The majority (62%) of the study respondents indicated that they belong to some types of Ghanaian associations in the diaspora. The results of this analysis, as shown on Figure 7.1 indicate that, the majority of Ghanaians in the study sites belong to hometown associations (61.5%), with ethnic associations (24.9%) being the least represented. This suggests that, within the selected study countries, Ghanaian diaspora identify themselves more with their hometown associations than ethnic associations. In addition, 50.3 percent and 35.9 percent of the respondents respectively indicated that they belong to religious associations and professional associations. About half (50.3%) of the respondents indicated that they belong to various religious denominations where they fellowship and seek other forms of social and financial reliefs in times of need and shocks. The hometown associations also serve as buffers for some Ghanaians in the diaspora, especially when in distress. In essence, belonging to an association seems to have far-reaching benefits aside the symbolic sense of nationalism and national identity. One respondent stated that:

> "I currently belong to two associations – the hometown association and a church (religious association). We meet frequently to discuss issues that affect my hometown and church, in order to contribute towards making the two associations better. We also offer some support to old members who are struggling financially as well as newcomers to assist them to settle down. It could be in the form of accommodation, work or money. We are able to identify ourselves well as Ghanaians with a unique purpose and also network better when we belong to such associations" (42-year-old female, 10th August 2018 USA).

This assertion finds expression in the study by Teye et al. (2017), which outlines the benefits of associations to their members and communities. In Qatar, for instance, the high percentage (50.3%) of Ghanaian immigrants in religious associations (churches) is a

reflection of the freedom of worship in the country. Unlike most countries in the Gulf Region where other religious faiths face various hostilities in the practice of their religion, Qatar has taken further steps to provide accommodation and security protection for Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, among others to worship freely without any inhibitions. A Ghanaian church elder in Qatar affirmed his observation by saying that:

> "Before coming to Qatar, I entertained my own fears based on all the news we hear of persecutions of other faiths especially we Christians in the Gulf Region. Little did I imagine the situation in Qatar to be different. You know, even though they are predominantly Muslims, not only have they opened their arms for foreign immigrants to work freely in their country, but they have also made it possible for us to worship our God without hinderance. They have even gone further to provide security protection within the premises of churches in order to forestall any eventualities. I have really come to respect them for this bold move" (Church Elder,16th August 2018, Doha, Qatar).

Figure 7.1 Types of Ghanaian Associations in the diaspora



Source: Fieldwork (2018)

7.2.3 General participation in symbolic nation building events

Symbolic nation building events such as conferences and cultural events (Emancipation Day, Home Coming Summits and the Pan African Festival of Arts and Culture) are critical towards enhancing claims of shared national identity with the diaspora. Alhassan (2010) suggests that apart from the attraction of Ghanaian diaspora to their homeland using such events, they help to promote learning of Ghanaian culture through cultural programmes and education. Given the pivotal nature of these events in ensuring full participation of the Ghanaian diaspora in the economy, the study ascertained the respondents' general participation in these events. The aim was to elicit their views and experiences regarding the effectiveness of conferences and other cultural events. For diaspora engagement with Ghana, this analysis was performed in relation to socio-demographic variables such as country of residence, residential status, sex, age, level of education and marital status. The results are presented in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 shows that the majority (72.1%) of the respondents indicated that they do not participate in these events compared with 27.9 percent of respondents that participate in such events. This suggests that a higher proportion of Ghanaians in the three study countries do not participate in conferences and cultural events.

Table 7.3: Ghanaian diaspora's general participation in symbolic nation building events by background characteristics

Background Characteristics	Participation in events: Participate	Participation in events: Do not participate	Total Percentage	N
Country of residence				
Qatar	32.5	67.5	(100.0)	80
UK	39.2	60.8	(100.0)	130
USA	17.8	82.2	(100.0)	180
Total	27.9	72.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 18.29, df (2), p value =0.00001 <0.05			
Residential status				
Citizen/permanent residence	22.0	78.0	(100.0)	173
Work/education permit	32.7	67.3	(100.0)	217
Total	27.9	72.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 4.22, df (1), p value =0.04 <0.05			
Sex				
Female	24.8	75.2	(100.0)	101
Male	29.1	70.9	(100.0)	289
Total	27.9	72.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 0.69, df (1), p value =0.41 >0.05			
Age				
below 30 years	27.3	72.7	(100.0)	44
30yrs-39yrs	29.5	70.5	(100.0)	105
40yrs-49yrs	28.4	71.6	(100.0)	134
50 years & above	26.2	73.8	(100.0)	107
Total	27.9	72.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 0.32, df (3), p value =0.96 >0.05			
Marital Status				
Married	22.7	77.3	(100.0)	233
Single	36.8	63.2	(100.0)	152
Separated	0.0	100.0	(100.0)	5
Total	27.9	72.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 11.04, df (2), p value =0.004 <0.05			
Level of Education				
No Education	48.6	51.4	(100.0)	74
Secondary	29.1	70.9	(100.0)	55
Tertiary	21.8	78.2	(100.0)	261
Total	27.9	72.1	(100.0)	390
	χ^2 statistic = 20.62, df (2), p value =0.00001 <0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

The results from the two analyses in Tables 7.1 and 7.3 seem to suggest that being a member of associations does not automatically imply that one would participate in conferences and cultural events. The in-depth interviews conducted in the three selected study countries revealed that the organisation of conferences such as home-coming summits is usually without the necessary inputs from the diaspora. They further showed that the majority of Ghanaians do not participate in these events due to poor organisation, lack of follow-up actions, unsuccessful outcomes and lack of diaspora consultation and coordination by the stakeholders. Similar sentiments were shared by respondents on cultural events. Many of the interviewees like Kofi from UK, echoed similar sentiments in the following words:

> "Our Hometown Associations in UK are strong, and we collectively take care of our members and the development of our hometowns. We know that participation in diaspora conferences in Accra or London would be useful especially for vital information sharing, but most of our members do not participate because of poor organization which results in poor conference outcomes. They need to involve the diaspora more in the planning to ensure successful outcomes" (Kofi, 11th October 2018, UK).

Akosua in USA also had this to share:

> "I hear the Ghana Embassies in Washington DC and New York occasionally organize cultural events but the information gets to us late. Again, it does not seem like they want us to participate because no invitations or announcements are put out for our information. Even when we finally find our way there, we are not made to feel welcomed. So, the question is, why then bother? They need to coordinate well with our local executives who would relay information about our various roles and make us feel a part of the whole event" (Akosua, 11th November 2018, New York, U.S.A).

In Qatar, Esi Mansah shared another emotional experience:

> "I was told Ghana Embassy was organizing a national Day Event on 6th March 2018, at one of the best hotels in Doha. As a patriotic Ghanaian, I went there with two of my Kenyan female friends only to be turned out. The security men at the hotel told us the entry was strictly by invitation. I wondered whether I was not a

> Ghanaian to be invited. In my view, every Ghanaian in Qatar should have the right to attend the national day event. If they don't have funds, they should ask the Government to provide funds because we find this action discriminatory" (Esi Mansah, 20th December 2018).

The results of the chi-square test analysis indicate that country of residence, residential status, marital status and level of education have statistically significant relationship with respondent's participation in diaspora engagement events. A relatively a higher percentage of respondents from Qatar (32.5%) and UK (39.2%) participate in these events than those in USA. Regarding the respondents who participate in these diaspora engagement events, a higher percentage of the respondents with work or education permit participate than those who are citizens or are permanent residents. In addition, a relatively higher percentage of the respondents who were single (36.8%) participate than those married whereas none of the respondents who were separated participate in these events. With regard to respondents' level of education, a higher percentage of respondents with no education (48.6%) participate than those with secondary (29.1%) and tertiary education (21.8%).

These findings reflect the challenges on the hosting of conferences and cultural events reported in various studies such as Appiah's (2009), Ankomah et al.'s, (2012), Diaspora Affairs Office, (2017) and Teye et al., (2017). Home coming summits, for instance, have been beset with many challenges relating to administrative, logistical, lack of implementation of outcome decisions and follow-up actions. One of the consistent complaints of the diaspora is the lack of consultation between the organizers of such events and the diaspora community.

7.2.4 Predictors of diaspora participation in conference and cultural events.

Considering the low participation of Ghanaians in conferences and cultural events, the study further examined the socio-demographic variables such as country of residence, residential status, sex, age, level of education and marital status in predicting the likelihood of respondents participating in conferences and cultural events. To test for this, a binary logistic regression was computed. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7.4. The Nagelkerke R^2 value of 0.49 suggests that the model predicts 49 percent of variance in the outcome variable (participation in events) and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test which is not significant at 5 percent level of significance shows that these sets of selected predictor variables better predict the likelihood of respondents achieving their objectives of migrating in the study areas.

In addition, the Omnibus tests of model coefficient computed rejects the null hypothesis that suggests that the model is not a good fit of the data ($\chi2=17.93$, $p=0.02>0.05$). Also, the overall predictive accuracy of the model is 87.9 percent. In terms of the predictor variables selected, only country of residence ($p<0.05$) and level of education ($p<0.05$), significantly predicted the outcome variable of the model. Conversely, residential status ($p>0.05$), sex ($p>0.05$), and marital status ($p>0.05$) and age group ($p>0.05$) did not significantly predict the outcome of the model (see Table 7.4). Against this back drop, the study fails to reject the null hypothesis which states that residential status, sex, age and marital status has no effect on participation in diaspora engagement events. However, the study rejects the null hypothesis which states that country of residence and highest level of education has no effect on participation in diaspora engagement events

The results indicate that, with a negative beta coefficient, the likelihood of participating in diaspora engagement conferences and cultural events decreases among respondents in Qatar than those in the USA. For instance, Ghanaians in Qatar (OR=0.33, CI=0.139-

0.799) are less likely to participate in diaspora engagement conferences and cultural events than Ghanaians in the USA. Also, with a negative beta coefficient of -.902, the likelihood of taking part in these events lower for Ghanaians in UK than those in USA. Specifically, Ghanaians in the UK (OR=0.406, CI=0.225-0.730) are also less likely to participate in conferences and cultural events than those in the USA.

In terms of respondents' level of education, the likelihood of participating in diaspora engagement conferences and cultural events increases with increase in the level of education. The results in Table 7.4 show that respondents with no education (OR=0.413, CI=0.203-0.840) are less likely to participate than those with tertiary education (Table 7.4).

Table 7.4: Summary results of binary logistic regression coefficients estimating the effects of predictors on respondents' participation in events in the diaspora

					95% C.I.for EXP(B)	
Predictors	**B**	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**Exp(B)**	**Lower**	**Upper**
Country of residence						
Qatar	*-1.100*	*.447***	*6.056*	*.333*	*.139*	*.799*
UK	*-.902*	*.300***	*9.042*	*.406*	*.225*	*.730*
USA (RC)				1.000		
Residential Status						
Permanent	.119	.286	.172	1.126	.643	1.973
Non-permanent (RC)				1.000		
Sex						
Female	-.175	.292	.358	.840	.474	1.487
Male (RC)				1.000		
Age group						
Below 30 years	.558	.545	1.050	1.748	.601	5.084
30-39 years	.273	.409	.446	1.314	.589	2.930
40-49 years	-.116	.326	.127	.890	.470	1.686
50 years & above (RC)				1.000		
Marital Status						
Married (RC)				1.00		
Single	-.220	.295	.558	.803	.451	1.429
Separated	20.478	17950.031	.000	782312085.074	0.000	

Level of education						
No education	*-.885*	*.363***	*5.953*	*.413*	*.203*	*.840*
Secondary	-.204	.380	.289	.815	.388	1.716
Tertiary (RC)				1.00		

Note: Note: R2 =0.49 (Nagelkerke); Cox & Snell) = .091; (Hosmer & Lemeshow)

Goodness-of-Fit $\chi 2$ (8) = 17.93, p=0.02; -2 Log Likelihood = 424.801; ****p<.01**,

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

7.2.5 Level of participation of the diaspora in specific symbolic nation building events

The study examined the level of participation in specific diaspora engagement events by the respondents. These events include conferences, cultural programmes, home coming events, national day events and town hall meetings. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 7.2. It indicates that out of the 109 respondents who participated in these diaspora engagement events in Table 7.3, 60 percent of them participate specifically in cultural programmes and 35 percent in the national day events. Home-coming summits (0.7%), town hall meetings (1.4%) and conferences (3.2%) were the least patronized diaspora engagement events in Qatar, USA and UK. In as much the research findings indicate that participation in these events are generally low (See Table 7.3), some events are still more patronized than others (see figure 7.2).

In addition to giving the Ghanaian diaspora a sense of identity and belongingness, "cultural events are pivotal in promoting the learning of Ghanaian culture by the diaspora through cultural programmes and education" (Alhassan, 2010;60). For instance, parents who want their children in the diaspora (second generation Ghanaians) to learn about their rich cultural heritage would encourage them to participate in the cultural events.

This is especially so, in circumstances where such children have never visited their home country. One female respondent from the UK was of the view that:

> "Our children benefit a lot from such cultural events. The colourful kente and other traditional dances and customs are exhibited for the children to appreciate where they come from. My children have never stepped foot in Ghana before so you can imagine how happy they become when I take them to such events" (43-year-old, UK, Individual Interview).

Figure 7.2: Reported Symbolic Nation Building events attended by respondents, 2018

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

Drawing from the Transnationalism theory, the study has shown that migrants can operate outside the realm of the state. For example, the majority (80%) (see Table 7.1)of respondents participate in diaspora associations as compared to only 27 per cent (see Table 7.3) who participate in other symbolic nation building events such as homecoming events, cultural events, national day events and town hall meetings, which are largely State organized events.

7.3 Institutional Capacity Building Initiatives

Institutional capacity building initiatives include both formal and informal institutions such as ministerial level agencies, associations, transnational networks and consular and consultative bodies. The cardinal reason for such functional institutions is to ensure that there is an enhanced and sustained relationship between the State and the diaspora

(Gamlen, 2006). Such diaspora related institutions should have the requisite capacity for sustainability (Gamlen, 2006).

To ascertain the experience and views of the Ghanaian diaspora on the effectiveness of some of the existing diaspora-related institutions in Ghana, the participants were asked, during the in-depth interviews, about their experiences in the clearance of personal effects in the ports of Ghana. Their views on the level of cooperation among some key government institutions such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Trade, Interior, Diaspora Affaires office at the presidency and Diplomatic Missions Abroad were sought. Also, the capacities of these institutions for achieving efficiency in the implementation of the diaspora policies and programmes were examined. This was obtained from the diaspora as well as key informants from Accra.

7.3.1 Performance of functions and collaboration among diaspora stakeholders

On clearance of goods/personal effects from the ports, most of the respondents bemoaned their cumbersome clearance procedures and suggested measures for improvement. For instance, one Ghanaian mechanical engineer in New York indicated that:

> "My experience in terms of clearance of goods in 2015 was very bad. My problem was not even with the fees and charges, but the undue delays, long bureaucratic processes, the high level of corruption among officials at the ports, the congestion and the large number of stakeholders that one has to deal with. In this day and age, why can't we automate our clearance system and improve logistical facilities to bring efficiency at the ports?" (Ghanaian mechanical engineer, 15th November 2018, Washington DC-USA).

Another interviewee from UK expressed his views on the level of collaboration among key diaspora-related institutions in the following words:

> I don't think our relevant institutions in Ghana mandated to ensure effective engagements with us experience any form of collaboration amongst themselves. For me, I see most of their functions overlapping, resulting in unnecessary competition. I still don't understand why we can't have one single constitutionally mandated body to effectively lead and coordinate with the others. This is the same

> issue with our Ghanaian associations here. Unhealthy competition among the independent associations. Thus, in the long run nothing gets done (Interviewee 17 November 2018, UK).

7.3.2 Capacity of diaspora-related institutions

To examine the capacity of some relevant Ghanaian institutions, including the diplomatic missions abroad, to meet their consular, welfare and social protection mandates, the respondents were asked to share their views and experiences. The results are presented in Figure 7.3. In Qatar, for instance, 14 percent of respondents indicated that the diplomatic mission has an excellent capacity in providing social protection support services as compared to seven percent and five percent of respondents in UK and USA respectively. Overall, the majority of the respondents indicated that Ghana's diplomatic missions have been poor in offering them the needed consular and social protection. For example, 86 percent, 85.5 percent and 85.2 percent of respondents in Qatar, UK and USA respectively stated that the Ghanaian missions have performed poorly in providing them consular assistance. An interview with a serving staff of the Ghana Embassy in Doha, Qatar reinforced the above that;

> "Though the staffing situation is not adequate, the quality, level of professionalism and commitment of the staff are essential pre-requisites for effective operations and extension of consular and welfare services to Ghanaians. Issue of finance cannot be fully adequate given the financial challenges facing Ghana. The good news, however, is that the leadership and staff are determined to use the available capacity to achieve the desired efficiency in our operations" (Service staff, 10th July 2018, Ghana Embassy, Doha- Qatar).

The diplomatic missions may not have the requisite budget to provide the Ghanaian diaspora with all their consular and welfare needs. That notwithstanding, the missions seem to be improving in this regard, with the creation of diaspora desk offices to complement the consular officers' duties, within the usual budgetary constraints. However, some missions hold the view that some members of the Ghanaian communities

make unnecessary demands based on the misconception that they receive fat budgets from the Government of Ghana for the diaspora's welfare which they squander through corruption. The assertion is based on certain utterances from a cross-section of the diaspora. Regular information flow and interaction between the two institutions could help dispel such misconceptions and mistrust (Ghana Embassy report, Doha (b) 2019).

The relative capacities of the missions as shown on Figure 7.3 reflect the performance of the various missions in the study countries.

Figure 7.3: Ghana's Diplomatic Mission's capacity to meet consular, welfare and social protection services.

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

The results from the qualitative data analysis further reveal the challenges highlighted by the survey. For instance, Mr. Abdullai in Qatar had this to say;

> "My straightforward answer to your question about whether they have the requisite capacity to effectively engage with us or not is an emphatic no! I know this because prior to the opening of the Embassy, I was voluntarily offering consular services to our more vulnerable Ghanaian immigrants here. With the opening of the Embassy, I have been coordinating with the consular office and even though I see the commitment of the Embassy staff in helping us, it looks to me that they are limited by funds. For instance, I learnt there is no budget

> specifically allocated to the mission to help stranded Ghanaians return home. Thus, there is very little they can do to ensure that Ghanaians are effectively assisted" (Abdullai 14th August 2018, Doha).

To further corroborate the validity of the afore-mentioned assertions from the Ghanaian diaspora, two key informants, who are senior officers in diaspora offices at the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration were interviewed. Both of them, to a large extent, confirmed the claims made by the diaspora but averred that the challenges are currently being addressed comprehensively. For example, the senior officer of diaspora affairs at the office of the presidency observed that;

> "My office was established because of the reality of some challenges alluded to by the diaspora in your study. The government needed to give the office the requisite boost in terms of finance, administration and human capacity, hence the establishment of my office at the presidency. My rank is equivalent to a ministerial rank. The high ministerial level is to enable me coordinate effectively with ministers of other diaspora-related institutions. We are currently strengthening our capacity by recruiting qualified personnel as well as ensuring regular and adequate budgetary allocation. This position of strength is what afforded us the opportunity to organize a home-coming summit in 2017 and even hoping to host the last edition in July 2019" (20th December 2018, Accra- Ghana).

The home-coming summit was held as scheduled in July, 2019.

The in-depth interview with the senior officer of diaspora unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, also confirmed the claims by the diaspora on institutional capacity. He explained that;

> "Government of Ghana, recognizing the extant realities in addressing diaspora-related challenges has come up with some laudable initiatives. Prominent among these is the establishment of the diaspora affairs at the office of the President. However, there still remain other challenges which inhibit our effective performance as a unit. For instance, the downgrading of the bureau at the ministry from a fully-fledged bureau to a unit has had its own effect on our capacity. As a unit, our staffing situation has reduced tremendously leaving us with less people for the load of work. We also don't have direct budgetary allocation, since our source of funding is from the main foreign ministry's budget. The issue of finance therefore is a major challenge. On the issue of cooperation, I can say that we cooperate well with the diaspora affairs office at the presidency but cannot quite say same about other diaspora-related ministries. Currently, recognizing these

challenges, the ministry is taking the necessary steps in addressing them" (21st December 2018, Accra-Ghana).

7.4. Initiatives for Extending Rights and Legal Instruments to the Diaspora

To engender inclusiveness and greater participation of the diaspora in national development, Gamlen (2006) argues that any major important diaspora engagement should include the development of strategies that extend rights to the diaspora. These strategies could be in the form of political incorporation, provision of civil and social services as well as protecting the rights of emigrants in host countries. In the Ghanaian context, there have been several attempts to extend rights to the diaspora (Alhassan, 2010; Awumbila and Teye, 2014; Teye at al., 2017). These include the passing of the Citizenship Act (2002), the Representation of People's Amendment Act (Act 699) in 2007 and the provision of civil, social and protection of the rights of Ghanaians (Awumbila & Teye, 2014). To ascertain the successful implementation of these initiatives, the experiences and views of the Ghanaian diaspora were sought. These initiatives, in detail, include dual citizenship, social security portability, political incorporation and voting rights as well as social protection and human rights.

7.4.1 Dual citizenship rights and privileges

The study identified the percentage of respondents in the diaspora who had obtained dual citizenship. The results as shown in Table 7.5 revealed that only 26.7 percent of the respondents had dual citizenship. Of the number that had dual citizenship, higher percentages were recorded in both Qatar (31%) and UK (32%) than USA (21%). The results suggest that the majority of the respondents were not naturalized citizens of other countries. This implies that less than 3 out of every 10 respondents sampled enjoy citizenship rights of both Ghana and their countries of Residence.

Table 7.5: Respondents with dual citizenship

Country of residence	Acquisition of Dual Citizenship		Total	
	Not acquired	Acquired	Percentage	N
Qatar	68.8	31.3	(100.0)	80
UK	68.5	31.5	(100.0)	130
USA	78.9	21.1	(100.0)	180
Total	73.3	26.7	(100.0)	390
χ^2 statistic = 5.29, df (2), p value =0.07 >0.05				

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

7.4.2 Countries of Dual citizenship among the Ghanaian diaspora

A further analysis of the dual citizenship data showed that, 75 percent of the dual citizens were citizens of Ghana and the UK and 23 percent were citizens of Ghana and the USA (see Figure 7.4). Less than two percent were citizens of Ghana and Qatar. However, it must be emphasized that the relatively high percentage (31%) of dual citizens in Qatar found under Table 7.5 comprised of mainly Ghanaian dual citizens from US and UK who have migrated to Qatar to work. The findings demonstrate that there are large variations in the degree of integration within the study countries. Arguably, it is relatively easier in the developed countries to acquire citizenship and permanent residence as compared to Qatar where no immigrant can acquire its citizenship. The results also reinforce an earlier discussion in this study, based on the qualitative data that until 2018, no foreigner in Qatar could acquire permanent residency let alone citizenship. Most of the interviewees confirmed their frustrations about having to renew their working permits every year. They

narrated that permanent residence or citizenship status would have afforded them the opportunity to obtain Ghana's dual citizenship. In the case of Ghanaian-USA and UK immigrants, since they are eligible for citizenship status, they put in a lot of efforts to obtain it. The dominant religion in Qatar may also not attract the predominantly Christians. Culturally, the colonization brought Ghana closer to the UK and USA cultures. Ghana also has until recently UK educational system and this may serve as a catalyst to attract Ghanaian emigrants to acquire citizens in the UK and the USA than in Qatar.

The in-depth interviews conducted revealed diverse challenges regarding the process of citizenship acquisition. Most of the interviewees from all the three study countries mentioned the high cost of acquisition of the dual citizenship card, the heavy bureaucratic procedures involved, the unprofessional behaviours of relevant staff, lack of effective coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs & Regional Integration and The Interior as well as limitation of political and civil rights as the main challenges confronting them.

For instance, a Ghanaian taxi driver in the USA with dual citizenship status expressed his frustrations on the process and limitations of holding the dual citizenship card as follows:

> "I went to Ghana last three years purposely to acquire a dual-citizenship card but due to the long and winding bureaucratic challenges I had to abandon it half-way through the process. I ended up giving a power of attorney to a brother to pick it up for me weeks later. Truly, now it does not even mean much to me. I learnt I cannot use this card to stand for any political appointment. This limitation has killed my political aspiration as an MP in Suame" (Ghanaian Taxi Driver, 15th November 2018, USA).

Figure 7.4: Distribution of respondents by countries of dual citizenship



Source: Fieldwork (2018)

7.4.3 Social security systems in the study countries

The study enquired if respondents have social security at their current work places. Social security is the social insurance and social assistance arrangements that protect the population against various economic risks (Dethier, 2007, Ehtisham et al., 2011). There is a marked difference between the coverage of social security systems in the developed and developing worlds. In developed countries, social security covers workers and their dependents against old age, unemployment, health and other risks. The scope is, however, limited in developing countries. In developing countries, formal sector workers have access to social insurance as well as social assistance and health services. However, a large portion of the population is not covered, especially those in the informal sector (Dethier, 2007, Phillips, 2016). The respondents were specifically asked if they had social security.

The results of the analysis are presented in Table 7.6, which show that the majority (76%) of employed respondents have social security and 23 percent of them did not have. The chi-square test show that there is a statistically significant relationship between country of residence and the reported availability of social security in these respective countries ($p<0.05$). For example, though the majority of respondents indicated that they have social

security (see Table 7.6), a higher percentage of respondents in the UK (86.2%) stated they have social security compared to respondents in the USA (70%) and Qatar (76.3%).

Table 7.6: Respondents' Social security availability by country of residence

Country of residence	Availability of Social Security		Total	
	Not available	Available	Percentage	N
Qatar	23.8	76.3	(100.0)	80
UK	13.8	86.2	(100.0)	130
USA	30.0	70.0	(100.0)	180
Total	23.3	76.7	(100.0)	390
χ^2 statistic = 11.02, df (2), p value =0.004 <0.05				

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

From the review of the literature, developing countries are empirically known to have a limited scope regarding the coverage of social security system (Etisham et al., 2011). Against this background, one would have expected that as a developing country, Qatar would have a social security coverage lower than the two developed countries that is USA and UK. However, as shown on Table 7.6, the proportion of labour migrants in Qatar with social security facility (76.3%) is higher than even workers in the USA (70%). The qualitative data analysis unveiled the reasons for this situation. In the words of a Ghanaian professor working in one of the universities in Qatar;

> "I have been in Qatar for ten years, having worked in the other countries in the Gulf Region for another five years, I can say with certainty that the social protection system of Qatar is second to none in the Gulf Region. All foreign workers are registered under the social security system with retirement benefits, insurance against unforeseen accidents at workplace, health benefits and a host of other rights" (Professor, University in Qatar, 14th September 2018, Doha- Qatar).

7.4.4 Social security portability

Social security portability is defined as the ability to preserve, maintain and transfer acquired social security rights or benefits to one's home country or another country. These rights or benefits include pension schemes, unemployment insurance, health coverage, worker compensation and sickness benefits (Dethier, 2007; Hagen-Zanker, 2018). The study examined the difficulties in transferring social security benefits to Ghana from the three study countries. The results as presented in Table 7.7 indicate that 56.4 percent of the respondents do not envisage having difficulty in transferring their social security benefits to Ghana when they finally decide to return home.

From Table 7.7, a higher proportion of Ghanaian workers in Qatar (66%) reported they can transfer their social security benefits to Ghana than their counterparts in the UK (52%) and USA (56%). These results are consistent with observations from the qualitative data. Many of the participants interviewed from both UK and the USA disclosed that there are many Ghanaian workers who cannot return to Ghana with their social security benefits. This is because, while it is easier for those who have attained dual citizenship and permanent residence status to do so, the irregular migrants find difficulty in transferring their benefits due to certain regulatory limitations and lack of bilateral agreements.

Table 7.7: Reported perceived difficulty in transferring social security benefits to Ghana

Country of residence	Transferability of your social security benefits to Ghana		Total	
	Not transferable	Transferable	Percentage	N
Qatar	33.8	66.3	100.0	80
UK	48.5	51.5	100.0	130
USA	44.4	55.6	100.0	180
Total	**43.6**	**56.4**	**100.0**	**390**

χ^2 statistic = 4.46, df (2), p value =0.11 >0.05

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

A Ghanaian shop attendant in the USA, confirmed this report by saying;

> "I know I have to go home sooner than later as I am still considered an irregular worker despite my ten year stay in the US. All attempts to get my requisite residence papers have so far failed. Even though I enjoy some aspects of these rights, I cannot transfer them in the form of cash to Ghana when I decide to go home" (Ghanaian shop attendant, 9th October2018, New York).

A Ghanaian female domestic servant in the UK also articulated her experiences and views in the following words;

> "I joined my husband in the UK in 2014, and up till now I have no legal residence. Sadly, I realized later after arriving here that my husband also had no legal residence. He had been in the UK for the past 15 years. A friend of mine, with similar experience returned to Ghana for good last year and could not get her social security rights transferred. I therefore know that my story would not be any different. Currently I'm considering abandoning everything here to go back home as the living conditions get tougher by the day" (Ghanaian female domestic servant 8th August 2018, London-UK).

In Qatar, the social security portability situation is different. Although a bilateral agreement is yet to be ratified, Ghanaian workers can easily transfer their social security benefits to Ghana. A Ghanaian male construction worker captured it as follows;

> "I have been in Qatar for 12 years and within this period, I have worked with three different companies. My social security benefits have all been transferred along with me. I will be returning home with my benefits and that makes me very happy. Here, once you are legally employed you would have all your benefits given to you any time you decide to go home irrespective of the lack of bilateral agreement" (Ghanaian construction worker, 24th November 2018, Doha-Qatar).

7.4.5 Factors accounting for challenges in social security portability

To ascertain the reasons for the perceived and experienced challenges in social security portability, respondents were asked to select some optional questions which highlighted the perceived challenges (Table 7.8). The results indicate that the majority (89%) of the respondents referred to lack of bilateral social security portability agreement between Ghana and their respective countries of residence as the most encountered challenge. For instance, one irregular migrant interviewed indicated that:

> "If there is a way of getting my benefits home, with my present status as an illegal migrant then I would have been very happy to pursue it. As it stands now, I am not aware of any bilateral agreement or law that makes it possible for my benefits to be transferred to Ghana in case I decide not to stay here again" (56-year-old male, 26th November 2018, UK, Individual interview via Skype).

Also, 6.8 percent of the respondents referred to the uncertainty in the application of the law in their countries of residence, which poses difficulties in transferring their social security benefits to Ghana. Furthermore, 3.6 percent of respondents expressed their frustrations about the existing legal barriers in the host countries.

The results presented thus far suggest that, in spite of the extension of some rights by the government, some unfavourable internal policies of migrant host countries could undermine the intended positive effect of these rights (Teye et al., 2017). Social security

portability is certainly one of the critical challenges confronting the diaspora. Ghana needs to continue to enter into bilateral agreements with its friendly countries to comprehensively address the social security portability challenges.

Table 7.8: Reported reasons for perceived difficulty in Transferring Social Security benefits, 2018

Country of residence	Legal barriers in host country	Multiple applications of the Social Security Law in the host country	No bilateral Social Security agreement between countries	Uncertainty in the application of the law in the host country	Total Percentage	N
Qatar	0.0	0.0	88.7	11.3	100	53
UK	5.9	0.0	86.6	7.5	100	67
USA	4.0	2.0	90.0	4.0	100	100
Total	3.6	1.0	88.6	6.8	100	220

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

7.4.6 Mechanism to ensure voting rights of the Ghanaian diaspora

To ensure political inclusiveness, in terms of decision making and voting rights, the government of Ghana passed the Representation of People's Amendment Act (Act 699) in 2007. The study ascertained respondents' level of awareness of ROPAA (Representative of People's Amendment Act). Table 7.9 demonstrates that 57.4 percent of the 390 respondents in the study indicated that they were aware of the ROPAA. Given the importance of ROPAA, the general expectation could be that a significant majority of the respondents would be aware and serve as key advocates for its implementation. Conversely, 43 percent of the respondents indicated that they were not aware of ROPAA and were hearing about it for the first time during the survey. This shows that a significant number of Ghanaians in the diaspora are not aware of their voting rights as spelt out in Act 699. A relatively higher percentage of the respondents from Qatar (65

percent) knew about ROPAA compared to their counterparts in the UK (50%) and US (59.4%). The results of the chi-square test showed no significant relationship between country of residence and respondents' awareness of ROPAA ($p>0.05$).

Table 7.9: Awareness of People's Amendment Act, 2006

Country of residence	Not aware	Aware	Total Percentage	N
Qatar	35.0	65.0	100	80
UK	50.0	50.0	100	130
USA	40.6	59.4	100	180
Total	42.6	57.4	100	390

χ^2 statistic = 5.11, df (2), p value =0.080 >0.05

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

7.4.7 Benefits of the implementation of ROPAA

To examine the strength of ROPAA initiative among the diaspora, the respondents were asked to identify some of the perceived benefits that the diaspora would gain if implemented. As can be seen from Table 7.10, out of the 390 respondents, 62 percent reported that a successful implementation of the ROPAA would enhance diaspora patriotism and sense of belongingness. Empirical evidence has shown that when the diaspora begins to actively take part in the political process of the country and gain the necessary voting rights, not only would it boost their sense of identity and belongingness, but it would enhance their participation in the economy (Teye et al., 2017). Another 20 percent of the respondents stated that the implementation of ROPAA would encourage the participation of the diaspora in the economy of Ghana. Further, 15.1 percent of the respondents indicated that the activities of the political parties would also be enhanced.

Again, 2.6 percent of respondents stated that the implementation of ROPAA would help in extracting obligations from the diaspora by government.

Table 7.10: Respondents' perceived benefits of ROPAA implementation

Perceived benefits of implementing ROPAA	Frequency	Percentage
Boost diaspora party politics activities in destination countries	59	15.1
Boost extraction of obligations from the diaspora by governments	10	2.6
Enhancement of diaspora patriotism and sense of belonging	242	62.1
Would encourage participation of the diaspora in the economy	79	20.3
Total	**390**	**100.0**

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

7.4.8 Social protection initiatives by Ghanaian Missions

As part of the social protection mechanisms of government, Ghanaian diplomatic missions abroad, through the diaspora desk and consular officers, are enjoined to provide consular welfare services as well as protect the rights of the Ghanaian diaspora. The study therefore ascertained from the diaspora whether they had any form of social protection from the missions abroad.

Table 7.11 shows that more than half (57.7 percent) of the 390 respondents indicated that they enjoy social protection services and 42.3 percent answered to the contrary. Comparatively, a higher percentage of the respondents in Qatar (63.8%) indicated that

they have social protection relative to 57.7 percent and 55 percent respectively of the respondents in UK and USA.

Table 7.11: Reported availability of social protection for respondents

	Availability of social protection in countries of destination		Total	
Country of residence	Not available	Available	Percentage	N
Qatar	36.3	63.8	100	80
UK	42.3	57.7	100	130
USA	45.0	55.0	100	180
Total	42.3	57.7	100	390
	χ^2 statistic = 1.74, df (2), p value =0.42 >0.05			

Source: Fieldwork (2018)

The results from the in-depth interviews were consistent with those from the quantitative survey. One of the female interviewees in Qatar noted:

> "Even though the Ghana Mission in Doha was only opened in December 2017, the level of commitment received from them with regard to some social protection services is commendable. Take for instance, prior to the commissioning of the mission, we had to send all our passports to either Riyadh or Accra for renewal amidst all its challenges and setbacks. I can say that this is now a thing of the past since it only took me 14 working days to have my passport renewed and returned safely to me without sweat. This I believe has been the major challenge faced by most Ghanaians until the opening of the mission. We are happy and proud to say we also have an Embassy that can fight and protect our rights" (Interviewee, 10th December 2018, Doha, Qatar).

7.5 Summary and Conclusion

The chapter examined the experiences, views and challenges of the respondents in the implementation of some symbolic nation-building programmes such as associations, conferences and cultural events and institutional performances as well as rights and privileges. While the participation of the diaspora in associations was recorded as high,

that of conferences and cultural events was low. Associations were viewed as useful platforms for helping distress immigrants, aside the symbolic nation- building advantages. It is also viewed as a good channel for disseminating information. However, even though the respondents agreed on the importance of conferences and cultural events, especially as channels for cultural training and education, they noted that the implementation is fraught with challenges such as lack of diaspora consultation, institutional funding, follow-up actions and administrative bottlenecks. Dual citizenship, ROPAA, social security portability and social protection are all reported as useful policies but the respondents were either not aware of their existence or had experienced some implementation challenges. The next chapter will focus on summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

The bulk of the growing literature on migration has focused on emerging trends in diaspora and development policies such as the role of migrants in development, , with few studies specifically evaluating the impact of government policies in order to gain a detailed insight into how they may influence diaspora engagement (Meulen, 2016). For the few studies where the impact of diaspora engagement policies on development have been examined, the sources of primary data collection have largely been from state officials, relegating the migrants themselves to the background (Meulen, 2016). This study sought to contribute to the literature in this area by employing a research strategy that relied on a bottom-up approach for a better understanding of the diaspora towards national development.

Accordingly, the main source of empirical data for the study is the Ghanaian diaspora in three study sites: USA, UK and the State of Qatar. Thus, the present study paid special attention to the experiences, views and challenges of members of the Ghanaian diaspora vis- a-vis the implementation of Ghana's national diaspora initiatives over the years. The study employed a mixed-method research approach covering quantitative and qualitative data collection methods (a structured questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews and observation).

This chapter therefore summarizes the main findings and draws conclusions based on the findings and the research objectives. It then provides some recommendations to inform policy and for further research.

8.2 Summary of Findings

8.2.1 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of Ghanaian diaspora in the United States, the United Kingdom and the State of Qatar.

The study surveyed 390 respondents and 20 participants for the interviews. Comparatively, a higher percentage of the respondents were sampled from the USA than from UK and Qatar. The results also indicate that the majority (74%) of respondents were males as compared to females. However, in terms of the total number of females sampled, there were more females from USA than the UK and Qatar. The age structure of respondents showed that more than half of them were in the age group 30-49 years, with Qatar recording 30-49 age group, USA- 40-49 age-group (50 % of respondents) and UK presenting 46 percent of respondents being 50 years and above. Even though the study indicated that the majority of the respondents were married, in terms of proportions, there were more married respondents sampled from the USA than Qatar and the UK.

With respect to education, a larger proportion of the respondents, that is 67 percent had diplomas, graduate and post-graduate certificates. Those with no education were only 19 percent. None of the respondents indicated basic/elementary or primary level of education as their highest level of education. The majority (95%) of them were employed, with a higher percentage being either self-employed (26%) or working as shop attendants (25%) or sales persons. More than half of respondents were eligible to stay in the host countries since they had the requisite work permit and documentation. Prospect of job opportunities, employment contract, education, and family reunification were identified as major pull factors for the Ghanaian immigrants in the host countries. However, the prospect of job opportunities was identified as the most important reason for the Ghanaian immigrants. The findings of this study corroborate studies by Anarfi et al.

(2003) and Awumbila et al. (2014) which underscored migration as a means by which Ghanaians improve their human capital and better their living conditions.

The study also revealed that while a higher proportion of the respondents in Qatar migrated because of employment contract, a higher proportion of the respondents from UK and USA respectively migrated in search of greener pastures and to further their education. The majority of the respondents with no form of education migrated in search of job opportunities compared to those with secondary and tertiary education. Only respondents with tertiary education reported that they migrated because of the need to further their studies or that of their children or spouse. Respondents who were single migrated in search of job opportunities compared to those who were married. Since the search for job opportunities or employment contract was the major reason why they migrated, and majority of them were employed at the time of the survey, the majority (84%) indicated that they had achieved their objectives for migrating. 71 percent of them had dependents below 18 years and this may suggest that Ghanaian migrants may have strong reasons to engage with their homeland, through remittances, return-visits, investment and skills and knowledge transfer. Again, 60 percent of migrants had stayed in the study sites from 1-10 years. Empirical evidence has shown that short-stay abroad enhances migrants' likelihood of returning home, investing and sending remittances. The opposite is true for long-stay abroad (Pia and Madeleine, 2015).

8.2.2 Major diaspora engagement initiatives implemented over the past three decades

The findings of this present study indicate that diaspora engagement in Ghana gained momentum from the 1990s, after a long lull following the overthrow of the first president

of the country. Emancipation Day, homecoming summits, PANAFEST and Joseph Project were identified as some of the programmes promoted by successive governments to leverage diaspora sense of identity and belonging. There were some challenges associated with these symbolic nation-building events. Prominent among them were lack of stakeholder coordination, inadequate consultation with the diaspora and lack of funding of relevant national institutions (Teye et al., 2017).

8.2.3. Participation of the diaspora in Government's engagement programmes

Investments are the bedrock on which the government can extract obligations from the diaspora. The study indicated that a higher percentage of the diaspora are aware of investment opportunities in Ghana and find these investments very attractive. However, just a little more than a third (36%) of them own businesses in Ghana. Meanwhile, a higher percentage of those in Qatar own investments/businesses in Ghana than those in USA and UK. Respondents without permanent residence and dual citizenship have businesses in Ghana than those with dual citizenship status. Trading in goods, real estate and transport business were also identified as some of the major businesses respondents are engaged in. Gamlen (2006) conceptual framework presents that dual-citizenship will boost diaspora's participation in their home countries. This finding is contrary to this assertion. Rather, those diaspora without permanent residence and dual-citizenship own more businesses in Ghana than those with the dual- citizenship cards.

Additionally, almost 6 out of every 10 (64%) respondents indicated that they had invested in financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, treasury bills, mutual funds, unit trust, real estate trust, among others. All the variables selected, namely; country of residence, residential status, citizenship, sex, age, level of education, showed no significant relationship with respondents' financial investments in Ghana. Therefore, the study

affirms that there is no significant relationship between the afore-mentioned background characteristics and respondents' financial investments in Ghana.

Stock market and treasury bills are the major financial instruments invested in by respondents. To boost diaspora's investments in Ghana, respondents identified reduced administrative formalities, fiscal advantage and tax concession, free transfer of social security benefits and access to credit as some of the factors that could help motivate the diaspora for the purpose.

The majority (95%) of the respondents indicated that they send remittances to Ghana, with majority of them being in the form of cash than goods. All the respondents in Qatar indicated that they send remittances. In view of this, the chi square test was conducted to show a statistically significant relationship between the two variables – country of residence and sending of remittances ($p<0.05$). However, residential status, either permanent or temporary, does not have a statistically significant relationship with remittances transfer among the respondents ($p>0.05$), likewise respondents' age ($p>0.05$) and level of education ($p>0.05$). High transfer costs, fluctuating exchange rate, high bank charges, state control over monetary transfers, cumbersome bank transfer procedures and high cost of duties and taxes at the ports were identified as some of the major factors that hinder migrants' financial/goods remittance transfer to Ghana.

The majority of respondents were aware of philanthropic bodies in their respective host countries. Religious associations were identified as the major philanthropic body, followed by State charitable institutions and Ghanaian Associations. With respect to various philanthropic initiatives undertaken by respondents, the study noted that more than half of the respondents have not undertaken any such initiatives in the country. Independent variables such as age, sex, dual citizenship and residential status did not

show any statistically significant relationship with sending of philanthropic goods to Ghana. On the other hand, between countries of residence, level of education, marital status showed statistically significant relationship with sending of philanthropic goods to Ghana. To enhance diaspora involvement in philanthropic activities in Ghana, respondents identified adequate assurance that goods would get to the intended beneficiary, adequate information about tax exemptions and clearance procedures as some of the major motivating factors.

After having ascertained the conditions under which Ghana's diaspora would consider returning home, the study showed that the majority of them would return to Ghana to work if they were given the opportunity and also provided with a conducive working environment. Comparatively, a relatively higher proportion of respondents from Qatar indicated that they would consider returning compared with those in UK and USA. Of the number who would consider returning to work in Ghana, majority indicated that they would prefer to be self-employed and engage in businesses or work in the private sector. However, anticipated challenges such as unavailability of jobs, lack of credit facilities and lack of effective professional and social integration structures prevent them from returning. To address these challenges, they recommended a conducive economic and political environment, job opportunities, provision of credit facilities and provision of professional and social integration schemes to motivate the diaspora to return and work in Ghana.

8.2.4 Experiences, views and challenges of the Ghanaian diaspora on government's diaspora engagement initiatives

The assessment of Ghanaian diaspora's experiences and views on governments' engagement initiatives indicated that the majority of them belong to Ghanaian associations in their respective host countries. A higher percentage of respondents' participation was recorded in the US, followed by Qatar and the UK. This finding is in consonance with the study by Awumbila and Teye (2014), which underscored the fact that the diaspora community in the USA has one of the oldest ethnic-based Ghanaian associations in New York with good patronage from the Ghanaian community. The study also showed that the majority (62% and 50% respectively) of the respondents belong to hometown and religious associations. Despite the importance of conferences and cultural events in enhancing claims for shared national identity with the diaspora, the study recorded that the majority of respondents do not participate in these events, even though Qatar reported the highest percentage of participation. The views of the Ghanaian immigrants in the study countries indicate that associations offer them more far-reaching benefits and serve as buffers for distressed Ghanaians. However, their participation in conferences and cultural events were low. They reported of administrative challenges, lack of coordination, stakeholder consultation, implementation plan and inadequate institutional funding as factors accounting for their low participation.

The country of residence, residential status, marital status and level of education have a statistically significant relationship with a respondent's participation in diaspora engagement events whereas sex and age have no statistically significant relationship with participation in these events. As predictors of the likelihood of diaspora to participate in

these events, the findings show that only country of residence and level of education significantly predicted the outcome variable of the model.

On dual citizenship rights and privileges, the results of the study indicate that the majority (73%) of respondents have not acquired dual citizenship. Of the number who had acquired dual citizenship, a higher percentage were citizens of Ghana and UK. The majority (76%) of respondents indicated that they have social security in their respective countries, even though a higher percentage of those in the UK reported that they had social security than those from USA and Qatar. This indicates that there was significant relationship between the two variables. The results further reported that 44 percent of respondents perceived having difficulties in transferring their benefits to Ghana. This is largely because of the existence of no bilateral social security agreement between the countries, uncertainty in the application of the law in the host country and some perceived legal barriers. The cost of a dual-citizenship card was found to be too high and the process of acquisition cumbersome. The diaspora-related institutions were reportedly under-resourced and lacked effective collaboration among the stake-holder institutions. Clearance procedures of goods at the ports were seen as cumbersome and costly in terms of payment of duties and taxes. Corruption among officials and lack of automation of the processes are reportedly hampering diaspora's engagement with their homeland.

Regarding political incorporation and voting rights as an initiative to ensure political inclusiveness, the findings show that 43 percent of respondents were not aware of ROPAA (Representative of People's Amendment Act) which was passed in 2007. A higher percentage of respondents in Qatar were aware than those in USA and UK. The respondents indicated that the implementation of ROPAA would enhance diaspora patriotism and sense of belonging, encourage diaspora participation in the economy, and boost diaspora party politics and also help in the extraction of obligations from the

diaspora. The findings also showed that Ghana missions abroad provide some forms of social protection for the Ghanaian diaspora.

Lack of awareness of ROPAA brings to focus the need for awareness creation on diaspora engagement initiatives by the government. Challenges alluded to by the diaspora regarding clearance of goods at the ports, lack of cooperation among diaspora related institutions, lack of adequate funding in respect of national institutions, social security portability and dual citizenship indicate that for Gamlen's typology to be relevant to Ghana's diaspora engagement efforts, the government must pay attention to these challenges and incorporate awareness mechanism in the implementation plan.

8.3 Conclusions

The study makes the following conclusions in line with the conceptual framework and some key findings:

Given the intricate, varying and multi-directional nature of the relations between the diaspora and their countries of origin, there is an over-simplification of these relations by Gamlen (Gazso, 2015), despite the usefulness of Gamlen's typology for assessing diaspora engagement initiatives to national development. For instance, while Gamlen (2006) opines that associations are very integral to enhancing participation, extracting obligations and motivating the diaspora to contribute to national development, the study's findings suggest that participation in diaspora engagement events such as conferences, homecoming and cultural events are not necessarily contingent on belonging to Ghanaian associations.

Additionally, though dual citizenship enhances transnationalism (Faist, 2008), the context of this study showed a contrary picture. For instance, majority of respondents without dual citizenship contribute to the economy of Ghana than those with dual citizenship.

Moreover, while the diaspora's association and contributions to their homeland could be largely influenced by the successful implementation of the diaspora's engagement policies (Gamlen, 2006), some findings of this study are at variance with some sections of Gamlen's typology. For example, that majority of respondents without dual citizenship contribute to the economy of Ghana than those with dual-citizenship. Consequently, the study concludes that the relevance and efficacy of diaspora engagement policies in attracting investments and other obligations from the diaspora are necessary conditions but not sufficient conditions for them to participate in national development. Contrarily, the existence of a favourable, enabling and conducive environment are sufficient

conditions to attract investments and other obligations from the Diaspora (Brinkerhoff, 2012). For instance, awareness and attractiveness of investments do not necessarily motivate the diaspora to invest in the economy of their countries of origin. There are other enabling factors such as access to credit, conducive environment, tax exemption and concessions that would motivate the diaspora to contribute to development in Ghana.

Conversely, lack of awareness of the existence of certain rights and privileges such as ROPAA by the Ghanaian diaspora may also inhibit the successful implementation of diaspora engagement policies and programmes. The study therefore further concludes that although extending rights and privileges may be important boost to the connection of the diaspora to their home countries, deficiencies in the internal diaspora policies would negatively affect the developmental impact of diaspora policies.

The diaspora's contribution in the investment sector of Ghana cannot be overstated. However, the study identified sectors where their investment is concentrated, including the housing, transport, trading and financial sectors. The conclusion of this study is that Gamlen's typology may not be universally applicable. The impact of diaspora engagement initiatives will depend on the diaspora's experiences and views about policies and programmes of governments.

The Ghanaian diaspora engagement policies and programmes have had positive impact on national development in terms of remittances, investment, philanthropy, associations, skills and knowledge transfer, among others. At the same time, there are challenges in the implementation of these diaspora initiatives, including the symbolic nation-building and rights and privileges. These challenges inhibit active participation of the diaspora in the Ghanaian economy. For instance, the study revealed that diaspora investment in the

country is low, with more untapped potential in their contributions towards national development.

8.4 Recommendations

The study showed that the Ghanaian diaspora have participated actively in the economy of Ghana particularly towards investment, remittances, skills and knowledge transfer as well as philanthropic activities. However, challenges such as lack of effective stakeholder and diaspora consultation, lack of implementation of diaspora events' decisions, lack of funding and access to credits, cumbersome administrative formalities, fiscal and monetary challenges, among others, should be tackled by Government of Ghana through finalization of a comprehensive diaspora engagement policy framework. This will guide the diaspora engagement process in Ghana.

Ghanaian diaspora participates less in conferences and cultural events. These are important symbolic nation-building events for mobilizing the Ghanaian diaspora for national development. They are even more crucial for attracting the second-generation Ghanaian diaspora who may neither have any claim to the national identity nor a sense of belonging to the country. Cultural events, for example, may be more appealing to the second-generation Ghanaian diaspora due to their cultural and educational values. To address some of the challenges accounting for this situation, which have plagued diaspora engagement of successive governments throughout Ghana's history, attention should also be paid to diaspora consultation, institutional funding, effective implementation plan and stakeholder consultation by the government.

Effective information flow to the diaspora is critical. The study recorded that most Ghanaian diaspora are not aware about the existence of some rights and privileges such as ROPAA. Some of the views expressed by the diaspora about the intended beneficiaries of philanthropic goods in Ghana suggest that they need more information and assurances in

order to elicit their full participation in the economy. Lack of information may also account for the quest for non- existing greener pastures abroad, which invariably end in frustrations, disappointments and 'brain waste'. The diaspora stakeholder institutions should work collectively under the leadership of one organization mandated to reach out to the diaspora. Diaspora desk offices created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration could be useful channels for outreach programmes and dissemination of information to the diaspora. The government needs to strengthen these formal structures and institutions.

The low diaspora investment in the country, despite the attractiveness of existing opportunities, implies that Ghana needs to focus more attention on improving the totality of fiscal and monetary conditions in the country. This could promote the desired conducive investment environment. For instance, land and credit facilities should be made more accessible, together with tarrif reductions and concessions to the Ghanaian diaspora. Mexico has a diaspora funding- matching scheme which basically adds government's funds to diaspora capital for investment purposes. This is a form of credit assistance to the diaspora to encourage investment in the country. Ghana can undertake the necessary feasibility studies to ascertain the relevance of the scheme in Ghana.

Some investors have described the prevailing high interest rate in the country as counter-productive for investment drive. Registration procedures for business establishment and clearance of goods at the ports are some of the bottlenecks in the investment sector that must be addressed by the relevant ministry or agency. Also, the Government of Ghana, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, should engage the host countries of the diaspora to enhance consular and welfare services and social protection mechanisms extended to them. It is within such conducive environment that the diaspora participation in the economy could be maximized. Government should also focus

attention on attracting more Ghanaian diaspora to invest in the financial instruments and housing as the most preferred sectors by the diaspora.

One of the key empirical outcomes of this study is the importance of Qatar in terms of diaspora investment and remittances to Ghana. Among the study countries, Qatar ranks first in the flow of investment and remittances to Ghana. The Gulf Region, in general, should attract the necessary policy attention for mutual benefit. In 2018, the Government of Ghana opened three new diplomatic missions in the Gulf Region, that is Qatar (Doha), United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi) and Kuwait. That provides the necessary impetus for Ghana to strengthen its bilateral relations with these countries and increase its diplomatic visibility in the region. The Government of Ghana should take urgent steps to ratify existing bilateral agreements, including the employment and labour agreement signed between Ghana and Qatar in 2018. This could enhance the diaspora mobilization efforts of the newly-opened Ghana Mission in Doha, Qatar and formalize and leverage employment of the teeming unemployed Ghanaian youth in Qatar.

Lack of social security portability has been one of the major challenges inhibiting the desired attraction of the diaspora to their homeland. It is recommended that the government should engage host countries and regional bodies to establish bilateral and regional agreements respectively.

It should also ratify the agreements, in good time, to attract similar timely reactions from these bilateral partners and regional bodies. For purposes of best practices and principles of reciprocity among friendly countries, the Government of Ghana should be transparent in the taxes and deductions regarding foreign workers' social security benefits. Foreign immigrants in the country should be able to transfer freely their social security benefits to their respective countries. Social security portability challenges affect mostly the irregular

migrants. They are more vulnerable especially in countries where social protection services are absent.

It is recommended that, apart from bilateral agreements with host countries, Ghana should obtain reliable data on its migrants especially the irregular ones to upscale outreach programmes, through its diplomatic missions abroad. The diplomatic missions have been registering the Ghanaians in their various areas of jurisdiction. They must be empowered to expand and intensify this exercise. Constant registration of the diaspora could be done during national day celebrations and major events involving the diaspora and the missions. The data will also help in the execution of targeted consular and welfare mechanisms with host governments to improve social protection services for the Ghanaian diaspora.

Most of the diaspora prefer to send remittances in cash rather than goods due to the bottlenecks associated with the clearance of goods from the ports. The administrative, logistical and human challenges at these ports should be addressed. The ports should endeavor to automate their systems to stem corrupt practices, among other measures. The high transfer cost and cumbersome banking procedures and requirements should be addressed through bilateral agreements between Ghana and the host countries. The mobile money operators need effective supervision by the central bank in order to sanitize the sector. The adoption of the sustainable development goals means that member States have jointly agreed to achieve all the 17 goals by 2030. Ghana should continue to pursue more pragmatic and prudent socio-economic policies in order to achieve the agreed targets especially all the goals that touch on migration.

8.5 Emerging Issues for Further Research

This study examined the diaspora engagement initiatives from the diaspora perspective. It will be interesting and useful to have a research on a similar subject which will focus on the perspectives of the diaspora, national institutions, some civil societies and non-governmental organizations. These are all key diaspora stakeholder organizations (formal and informal institutions) that could provide useful insights and understanding into diaspora engagement initiatives for national development. Such a study will be beneficial considering the multidimensional and multi-sectoral nature of migration and associated outcomes.

A research on migration of Ghanaians to the Gulf Region would be important in contributing to the few existing bodies of literature in this area. The Gulf Region is fast becoming a preferred destination for most Ghanaian migrants in recent times due to the attraction of high remuneration, job opportunities and immigration restrictions in the west. This study has shown the importance of Qatar in terms of the contributions of Ghanaian diaspora in remittances and investment. Further research on the subject-matter in the Gulf Region would position Ghana strategically to take advantage of the huge untapped diaspora investment and financial resources in the region.

One of the main research outcomes of this study is the low investment level among Ghanaian diaspora despite the government's awareness campaign and packaging to attract their investment. Further studies could be conducted to specifically investigate the factors accounting for such a situation.

Comprehensive, reliable and empirical data on the background characteristics of the diaspora is paramount to effective diaspora engagement planning. The paucity of such data on Ghanaian migrants has been the bane of many diaspora engagement initiatives. Without adequate scientific knowledge in this area, extension of consular, welfare and

social protection services would not be effective. A new empirical study to obtain accurate data of Ghanaians and their socio-economic backgrounds in the Gulf Region, through the Ghanaian diplomatic missions and the associations would also enhance diaspora engagement initiatives of government. This could be replicated in other regions.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Questionnaire

I am Emmanuel Enos, a PHD candidate from the University of Ghana pursuing Migration Studies. As part of the requirements for the PHD degree, I am currently conducting a research on assessment of Ghana's diaspora engagement initiatives for national development.

The purpose of the research is to examine the nature, experiences and views as well as challenges involved in the implementation of the government's diaspora engagement initiatives aimed at proffering the necessary policy recommendations for the mutual benefit of the Ghanaian diaspora and the State.

Please, I wish to underscore that your participation is very important for the success of this project. Kindly note that if at any point of the survey you need clarification, I would be more than ready to answer your questions. Your participation in answering the questionnaire is voluntary and you are at liberty to leave any question unanswered if you find any question uncomfortable to answer. The survey will ensure strict confidentiality.

In that regard, I wish to confirm that none of the information you provide will be passed on to a third party and the information would be used only for the purposes of this research.

Thank you for your participation.

City of the survey ……..

Emmanuel Enos

University of Ghana, Centre for Migration Studies

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Completed questionnaires can be returned to the email as indicated above

Interviewee ID/Code ……..

SECTION A: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. **Country of Residence**……
2. **City/Town** ……
3. **Age** ……

4. **Sex** 1. ☐ Male 2. ☐ Female

5. **What is your marital status?**

1. ☐ Single 2. ☐ Married 3. ☐ Separated
4. ☐ Divorce 5. ☐ Widowed 6. ☐ Cohabiting

6. **What is your highest level of education and area of study?**

1. ☐ No education
2. ☐ Primary
3. ☐ Middle/JSS
4. ☐ Vocational/Tech/Commercial
5. ☐ Senior Secondary/Senior High
6. ☐ Post-Secondary/Diploma
7. ☐ Bachelors
8. ☐ Masters
9. ☐ Doctorate
10. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

7. **What is your current occupation?**

1. ☐ Self-employed 2. ☐ Unemployed 3 ☐ Domestic Assistant
4. ☐ Student 5. ☐ Retired/Pensioner 6. ☐ Civil Servant
7. ☐ Public Servant 8. ☐ Housewife 9. ☐ Artisan
10 ☐ Lecturer 11. ☐ Other, (Please specify) ……..

8. **How many years have you been working in the above occupation?**
……

9. **Do you have dependents in your country of residence?**
1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

a) If your answer is "Yes" to the above, how many adults (18 years and above) …….
b) Number of Children (Less than 18 years old) ……

10. **How long have you lived in your country of residence?** ……

11. **What is your current nationality?** ……

12. **What is your current residence status in your country of residence?**

1. ☐ Citizen 2. ☐ Permanent resident 3. ☐ Work Permit

4. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

13. **What were your reasons for migrating to your current destination?**
(Multiple answers allowed)

1. ☐ Search for job opportunities
2. ☐ Employment
3. ☐ Studies (Self/Children/Spouse)
4. ☐ Family Reunification
5. ☐ Conflict at home
6. ☐ Medical Treatment
7. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

14. **Do you think you have so far achieved your objectives of migrating?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

Please explain your answer.

……

……

SECTION B: SYMBOLIC NATION BUILDING INITIATIVES

15. **Do you belong to any of the following Ghanaian Associations?**
(Multiple answers allowed)

1. ☐ Hometown Association
2. ☐ Tribal Association
3. ☐ Religious Association
4. ☐ Professional Association

16. **What is your view about the relationship between your Association and other Associations including Ghana's Diplomatic Mission?**

1. ☐ Excellent
2. ☐ Very Good
3. ☐ Good
4. ☐ Poor

i) If your answer is "POOR" what do you think are the challenges?

1. ☐ Unnecessary competition
2. ☐ Lack of adequate information about other Ghanaian Associations
3. ☐ Mistrust among the Ghanaian Associations, including against Ghanaian Diplomatic Mission
4. ☐ Unprofessional attitude of Ghana Embassy Staff.
5. ☐ Lack of proper coordination by the Ghana Embassy to achieve the desired unity.
6. ☐ Other (Please specify)……

ii) What are your views about improving the poor relationship situation?

1. ☐ Unnecessary rivalry among the Associations should be stopped to achieve the desired unity of purpose.
2. ☐ Information flow should be improved.
3. ☐ The Associations and Ghana diplomatic Mission should work towards leveraging the existing low level of trust.
4. ☐ Ghana Embassy Staff should behave professional towards Ghanaians in terms of Consular/Welfare.
5. ☐ The Ghana Embassy should actively coordinate the activities of the Associations toward a unified body.
6. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

17. **Have you heard about any of the following events: Cultural Programmes, National Day Events, Conference, Town Hall Meetings and Home Coming Summit?**

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
3. ☐ Other, (Please specify) ……

i) If "Yes", Have you ever attended any of the above-mentioned programmes?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
3. ☐ Other (Please Specify)

ii) Also, If your answer is "Yes" which of the above events/Summits did you attend?

1. ☐ Cultural Programmes
2. ☐ National Day Events

3. ☐ Conferences
4. ☐ Town Hall Meetings
5. ☐ Home Coming Summits

18. **Given your experience at these events, do you think cultural events are necessary**?
1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Other, (Please specify) ……

19. **If your answer is "No", please explain why?**
1. ☐ Poor organization
2. ☐ Low patronage by stakeholders
3. ☐ Lack of follow up actions
4. ☐ Unsuccessful outcomes due to poor organization, low patronage and lack of follow up actions
5. ☐ Lack of effective coordination of stakeholders by the Ghana diplomatic Mission
6. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

20. **Could you suggest ways for overcoming these challenges.**
1. ☐ Diaspora should be involved in the planning stage.
2. ☐ Active participation of the relevant stakeholders.
3. ☐ Capacity of the organizers to follow-up on outcomes.
4. ☐ Effective coordination of all stakeholders for implementation of outcomes.
5. ☐ Others, (Please specify)……

21. **Have you or any of your children ever travelled to Ghana to attend any Cultural Event or competition organized by Ministry of Education or National Youth Authority?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

i) If your answer is "Yes", how often do you travel to attend such events?
1. ☐ Three or more times in a Year
2. ☐ Twice a year
3. ☐ Once every three years
4. ☐ Once every two years
5. ☐ Once a year
6. ☐ Very rarely

ii) If your answer is "No" what are the challenges that hinder your child and yourself from attending such events? Please indicate them.

1. ☐ Lack of information on the Event or the competition.
2. ☐ No incentive to travel for the competition.
3. ☐ The diaspora is not usually targeted.
4. ☐ Poor planning and organization
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

iii) Could you suggest ways for overcoming these challenges?
1. ☐ Proper information flow to the Diaspora
2. ☐ There should be incentive for would-be participants from the Diaspora.

3. ☐ Diaspora youth should be targeted.
4. ☐ Improve planning and organization.
5. ☐ Improve follow up actions on the event outcomes.

II. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES

22. **Have you ever cleared your goods from the Ports of Ghana?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Other (Please specify)

i) If the answer is "Yes", how do you rate the experience in terms of the process of clearance?

1. ☐ Excellent 2. ☐ Good 3. ☐ Fair 4. ☐ Bad

ii) Could you share the challenges you encountered? (Multiple answers allowed)

1. ☐ Undue delays 2. ☐ High Customs duties and taxes
3. ☐ Long bureaucratic process 4. ☐ Lack of logistical facilities
5. ☐ Corruption 6. ☐ Congestion
7. ☐ Large number of stakeholder officials involved in the processing of goods.
8. ☐ Lack of automation in the clearance process.
9. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

iii) Any suggestions on how to overcome these challenges?

1. ☐ The clearance procedures should be automated.
2. ☐ Reduce delays
3. ☐ Long clearance process should be reduced.
4. ☐ Customs duties and taxes should be reduced and other charges and fees abolished.
5. ☐ Corruption among stakeholders should be addressed seriously.
6. ☐ Port handling and storage facilities should be improved to reduce congestion.
7. ☐ Large number of stakeholders found at the Ports should be addressed.
8. ☐ Modern Port logistical facilities should be introduced.

23. **Do you think there is collaboration among key diaspora-related/ institutions such as Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ministry of Trade and the Diplomatic Missions abroad?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

i) If the answer is "Yes" how would you rate the level?

1. ☐ Excellent 2. ☐ Good 3. ☐ Poor

ii) If the answer is "No", what are the key challenges?

1. ☐ Lack of effective coordination by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration.
2. ☐ Lack of distinctive functions (overlaps)
3. ☐ Competition with each other.

4. ☐ Lack of a single constitutionally mandated coordinating body.
5. ☐ Lack of a diaspora engagement policy.
6. ☐ Other (Please specify ……

24. **Do you think the diaspora-related institutions such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Trade and Interior, Ghana Missions abroad and Ghanaian Associations have requisite capacity for achieving efficiency in the implementation of diaspora engagement initiatives?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No 3. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

i) If your answer is "No" what are the challenges? (Please Specify).

1. ☐ Lack of training
2. ☐ Lack of technical expertise
3. ☐ Lack of professionalism
4. ☐ Lack of finances
5. ☐ Lack of coherence in the application procedures as well as rules and regulations.

☐ Other (Please specify) ……

ii) Any suggestions in improving the level of capacity among these institutions?

1. ☐ There should be adequate training.
2. ☐ The staff should be technically equipped to be efficient.
3. ☐ No efforts should be spared in ensuring that the staff acts professionally.
4. ☐ Adequate funds should be provided.
5. ☐ There should be operational and legal coherence.
6. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

25. **Which hometown Association do you belong? Please indicate here.**

……

26. **Do you think hometown Associations are necessary?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

27. If your answer is "Yes" what has it achieved so far?

1. ☐ Dissemination of Information.
2. ☐ Obtained knowledge about opportunities in Ghana.
3. ☐ Satisfied the welfare aspirations of its members.
4. ☐ Undertaken communal projects in Ghana.
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

i) If your answer is "No", please specify:

1. ☐ Do not see their usefulness.
2. ☐ Lack of information flow.
3. ☐ Do not serve as institution for facilitating information flow and economic opportunities back home.
4. ☐ Lack of any development project initiatives.
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

SECTION C: INITIATIVES FOR EXTENDING RIGHTS TO THE DIASPORA AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

I. DUAL CITIZENSHIP

28. **Have you acquired Dual Citizenship?** 1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If you have answered "Yes" to the question above, which countries are you a dual citizen? ……

ii) And if your answer is "Yes" are you a member of any Ghanaian Association in your destination country? 1 ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

iii) If your answer above is "No", why are you not a member of any Ghanaian Association?

1. ☐ Not aware of its existence.
2. ☐ Don't see any membership benefit.
3. ☐ Not sure of its importance to the development of Ghana.
4. ☐ Other (Please Specify) ……

iv) If your answer is "Yes", have you ever been informed by the Ghana Mission in your host country or the Ghanaian Association about investment opportunities in Ghana?

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

v) If your answer is "No" could you provide reasons for the lack of adequate information flow?

1. ☐ Lack of finances
2. ☐ Lack of training of staff
3. ☐ Lack of trust
4. ☐ Other (Please Specify) ……

29. **Could you please state any challenges you encountered during the acquisition and use of the Dual Citizenship Card?**

1. ☐ High cost of acquisition
2. ☐ Heavy bureaucratic procedures
3. ☐ Lack of professionalism of the Public Officers
4. ☐ Lack of coordination between the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Regional Integration.
5. ☐ Lack of adequate information on qualification for acquisition
6. ☐ Limitation of political and civil rights for eg. high political office.
7. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

i) Any suggestions for improving the situation?

1. ☐ Cost of acquisition should be reduced.
2. ☐ The existing heavy bureaucratic procedures for its acquisition should be reduced.
3. ☐ Staff of relevant stakeholder institutions should be more professional in performance of their duties
4. ☐ Improve stakeholder coordination.

5. ☐ Proper information flow
6. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

II. SOCIAL SECURITY PORTABILITY

30. **Do you have Social Security at your work place?** 1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

31. **If your answer is "Yes", should you decide to finally return home, do you envisage a problem transferring your social security benefits to Ghana?**
1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) **If your answer above is "Yes", what specifically are the challenges?**
1. ☐ No bilateral Social Security agreement between the resident and home countries
2. ☐ Host country legal barriers
3. ☐ Uncertainty in the application of the Social Security law in the home country.
4. ☐ Multiple applications of the Social Security Law in the host country
5. ☐ Other (Please Specify) ……

ii) **Any suggestions for addressing these challenges**?
1. ☐ Ghana should enter into bilateral agreement on social security portability with the resident country.
2. ☐ Ghana should engage with the resident country to remove existing legal barriers on social security transfers.
3. ☐ Ghana should prevail on host-country to apply uniform Social Security laws for all foreign workers.
4. ☐ Information on Social Security law at the homeland should be shared extensively for the benefit of the diaspora population.
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

III. POLITICAL INCORPORATION AND VOTING RIGHTS

32. **Do you know about People's Amendment Act passed in 2006?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

33. **What is your view about Government's inability to implement Peoples Amendment Rights (ROPAA) which would enable you to vote abroad as a citizen of Ghana**

1. ☐ Possible negative impact on governments diaspora Engagement initiatives.
2. ☐ Will impact negatively on diaspora political party activities.
3. ☐ Could result in apathy towards the developmental efforts of governments.
4. ☐ Disenfranchising any eligible Ghanaian voting population amounts to an act of illegality.
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

34. **What would you consider as the greatest obstacles to the implementation of the Act? (Multiple answers allowed).**

1. ☐ Lack of finances
2. ☐ Lack of political will by governments
3. ☐ Lack of effective coordination between the Electoral Commission and other Stakeholders
4. ☐ Ambiguity in the Act preventing easy implementation
5. ☐ Other (Please Specify) ……

35. **What would you consider as possible benefits to the diaspora if you are allowed to vote abroad?**

1. ☐ Enhancement of diaspora patriotism, sense of belonging etc.
2. ☐ Would encourage participation of the diaspora in the economy.
3. ☐ Boost diaspora party politics activities in destination countries.
4. ☐ Boost extraction of obligations from the diaspora by governments.
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

36. **Could you suggest measures towards a successful implementation of this Voting Rights Act?**

1. ☐ Electoral Commission should adhere to the recent High Court Ruling on the issue and implement the Act.
2. ☐ Electoral Commission should be adequately resourced to implement the Act.
3. ☐ Government should have the political will to implement it.
4. ☐ Effective coordination between the Electoral Commission and other relevant stakeholders.

5. ☐ The Act should be reviewed to remove any ambiguity for easy implementation.
6. ☐ Other (Please specify)
……

IV. SOCIAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

37. **Do you have social protection in your country of destination?**
1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If your answer is "No", what is your view about the capacity of the Ghanaian Mission to meet your social protection and human rights needs?

1. ☐ Excellent 2. ☐ Very Good 3. ☐ Good 4. ☐ Poor

ii) If your answer is "POOR", specify please.
1. ☐ Missions have no such budget line for social protection and human rights interventions.
2. ☐ Poor registration of Ghanaians at Mission for planning purposes.
3. ☐ Lack of knowledge about the location of Ghanaians by the Diplomatic Mission.
4. ☐ Lack of coordination by the Diplomatic Mission with other stakeholders.
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……..

38. **Have you renewed or acquired a new passport at your country of residence?**
1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) Did you receive the renewed or the new passport early enough?
1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

ii) If you answered "No" to the above, how long did it take you to receive it?

1. ☐ Less than a month 2. ☐ One (1) month
3. ☐ Four (4) months 4. ☐ One (1) year
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

iii) In your view what might have accounted for the delay? (Multiple answers allowed, please.)

1. ☐ Corrupt practices of Passport Office Staff.
2. ☐ Cumbersome procedures.
3. ☐ Lack of coherence among the various stakeholder officials at the Passport Office.
4. ☐ Lack of adequate infrastructure, including office space, computers, scanners etc.
5. ☐ Lack of training of officers.
6. ☐ Corrupt practices of "middlemen" or, "passport contractors".
7. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

iv)Could you offer any possible ways of addressing this challenge?

1. ☐ Address corruption among Passport Office Staff.
2. ☐ Reduce cumbersome procedures.
3. ☐ Improve level of collaboration among stakeholders at the Passport Office.
4. ☐ Improve infrastructure facilities.
5. ☐ Improve capacity of staff.
6. ☐ Address corrupt acts of "middlemen" and their collaborators.
7. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

39. **Are you Ghana government sponsored student in your country of residence?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If your answer is "Yes", what are the challenges you encounter in receiving your allowances and school fees?

1. ☐ Delays in payment.
2. ☐ Unprofessional attitude of Mission's Staff.
3. ☐ Threat of expulsion by the University authorities for delays in payment of fees.
4. ☐ Inconsistency in the exact amount received
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

ii) What are the possible solutions you would like to offer to address the situation?

1. ☐ The allowances should be paid on time.
2. ☐ Mission's staff should be disciplined.
3. ☐ Ghana should strengthen ties with the destination countries.
4. ☐ The amount of money paid should be consistent.
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

40. **Before you migrated to your current country of residence, were you given pre-departure information and counselling by a government official on the country's (country of residence) immigration policies and social protection policies?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If you answered "Yes", what is the name of that Information and Counselling Unit?
……
……

ii) If the answer is "No", how has that affected your stay in the country?

1. ☐ Difficulty in obtaining resident permit.
2. ☐ Difficulty in accessing social amenities such as schools, hospitals free of charge.
3. ☐ Transfer of funds challenges
4. ☐ Living in fear of arrest by the Police.
5. ☐ Cannot access decent job opportunities.
6. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

iii) Any suggestions towards addressing such challenges?

1. ☐ Ghana Diplomatic Mission should assist in negotiating for resident permits/work permits.
2. ☐ Ghana Government should enter into bilateral agreement on labour and employment with host nation to allow Ghanaian immigrant the opportunity to access social amenities free of charge like all regular immigrants.
3. ☐ Negotiation with host government to ease the requirement for transfer of funds for irregular immigrants.
4. ☐ Bilateral negotiation by Ghana government through its diplomatic missions with the host government would remove the threat of arrest.
5. ☐ Labour laws in the resident country should be amended to afford some irregular migrant equal access to jobs.

SECTION D: PROGRAMMES FOR EXTRACTING OBLIGATIONS FROM THE DIASPORA

I. INITIATIVES FOR LEVERAGING INVESTMENT BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES

41. **Do you have a bank account in Ghana?** 1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If you indicated "Yes" to the above question, what type of bank account do you have?

1. ☐ Ghana Cedi Savings Account
2. ☐ Ghana Cedi Current Account
3. ☐ Foreign Currency Account
4. ☐ None
5. ☐ Other (Please specify)

……

42. **Are you aware of any investment opportunities in Ghana available to the Diaspora?** 1. Yes ☐ 2. No ☐

i) If you answered "Yes", do you deem these opportunities attractive enough for the participation o the Ghanaian diaspora? 1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

43. **Have you established any investment/business in Ghana?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If your answer is "Yes", what kind of investment/business? (Multiple answers allowed).

1. ☐ Construction
2. ☐ Trading (Selling and buying of goods)
3. ☐ Agricultural products
4. ☐ Transport business
5. ☐ Real Estates

6. ☐ Capital Markets
7. ☐ Manufacturing
8. ☐ Oil and Gas
9. ☐ Consultancy Service
10. ☐ Health Care Services
11. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……..

44. **What challenges do you face in the process of investing/running a business in Ghana? (Multiple answers allowed)**

1. ☐ Lack/difficulty of accessing credit
2. ☐ Bureaucratic administrative procedures
3. ☐ Inadequate infrastructure
4. ☐ Poor management by the workers
5. ☐ Insufficient information
6. ☐ Prohibitive set-up/overhead costs
7. ☐ Other (Please specify ……

i) If your answer on paragraph 42 was "Yes" which sector (s) are you interested in.

1. ☐ Tourism
2. ☐ Education
3. ☐ Health
4. ☐ Export promotion
5. ☐ Service Industry
6. ☐ Energy
7. ☐ Infrastructure
8. ☐ Water & Sanitation
9. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

45. **Have you invested in any financial instruments in Ghana?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If you have answered "Yes" to the above what financial instruments have you invested in?

1. ☐ Stock Market
2. ☐ Mutual Funds
3. ☐ Real Estate Trust
4. ☐ Treasury Bills
5. ☐ Unit Trust
6. ☐ Treasury Bonds
7. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……..

ii) In respect of Paragraph 44, what do you consider as challenges within the financial investment sector? (Multiple answers allowed)

1. ☐ Lack of adequate information.
2. ☐ Unattractive financial reward
3. ☐ Poor financial market conditions
4. ☐ Cumbersome investment procedures
5. ☐ Other (Please specify)

……

46. **Which incentive (s) would motivate you to invest in the financial sector in Ghana? (Multiple responses allowed).**

1. ☐ Fiscal advantage and tax concession
2. ☐ Free transfers of benefits from abroad
3. ☐ Reduced administrative formalities
4. ☐ Access to credit
5. ☐ Access to land
6. ☐ Salary
7. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

II. REMITTANCES

47. **Do you send money to Ghana from your resident country?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If your answer is "No", what is your reason for not sending money?

1. ☐ Bureaucratic banking procedures
2. ☐ High transfer cost
3. ☐ Not enough money to transfer
4. ☐ Lack of information on methods of transfer
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

ii) If your answer is "Yes" to the above question, how often do you send money within a year?

1. ☐ More than once a month
2. ☐ Once a month
3. ☐ Every two months
4. ☐ Twice a year
5. ☐ Quarterly
6. ☐ Less than once a year
7. ☐ Annually
8. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

48. **Do you send remittances in the form of goods?** 1.1☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

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i) If your answer is "Yes", list the type of goods and the estimated value of the goods you send in a typical year if sold today?

GOODS (e.g. fridge, computer etc.)	**ESTIMATED VALUE (e.g. US$4000.00)**

49. **What challenges do you encounter in sending remittance (money/goods) to Ghana? (Multiple responses allowed).**

1. ☐ Difficulty in accessing modes of transfer
2. ☐ High transfer costs
3. ☐ Unfavourable exchange rate
4. ☐ High bank charges
5. ☐ State control over monetary transfers
6. ☐ Lack of transaction security
7. ☐ Lack of Privacy
8. ☐ Cumbersome bank transfer procedure
9. ☐ High Cost of duties and taxes at the Ports
10. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

i) Could you offer solutions to address these challenges?

1. ☐ Modes of transfers should be easily accessible.
2. ☐ Transfer cost should be reduced.
3. ☐ Fair and competitive exchange rate.
4. ☐ Bank charges should be reduced.
5. ☐ Introduce more competition into the money transfer market.
6. ☐ Improve transaction security.
7. ☐ Improve privacy.
8. ☐ Reduce high cost of duties and taxes at the Ports.
9. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

III. PHILANTHROPIC GOODS

50. **Do you know of philanthropic goods?** 1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

51. **Do you know of any philanthropic bodies in your country of residence?**

1. ☐ Religious Body 2. ☐ State Charitable Institutions
3. ☐ Ghana Associations 4. ☐ other (Please specify)

……

i) If either of your answers to questions 49 and 50 is "Yes", have you ever taken any philanthropic initiative to Ghana? 1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

ii) If your answer is "Yes" what was the nature of the goods, how much did it cost and to which institution did you send the goods?.....

……

……

iii) If your answer is "No", could you specify the reasons for not undertaking any such kind gesture towards the needy in your homeland?

1. ☐ Lack of information
2. ☐ Lack of Mission's support
3. ☐ Uncertainty about the end use of the goods
4. ☐ Difficulty in the clearance of goods from the ports
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

52. **What would motivate you to engage in philanthropic gestures towards the needy and deprived areas and institutions in Ghana?**

1. ☐ Adequate information about the benefits to homeland.
2. ☐ Adequate information about tax exemptions and clearance procedures.
3. ☐ Provision of adequate legal instruments and civil rights of the diaspora population.
4. ☐ Establishment of strong Ghanaian Association for the welfare and protection of diaspora .
5. ☐ Full cooperation and support of the Mission.
6. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

IV. SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

53. **Given the opportunity, would you consider working in Ghana?**

1. ☐ Yes 2. ☐ No

i) If your answer is "Yes", where would you prefer to work? Only one box can be ticked, please.

1. ☐ Self-employed
2. ☐ Education Sector
3. ☐ Civil Service
4. ☐ Health sector
5. ☐ Private Sector
6. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

ii) If your answer is "No", please specify the reasons.

1. ☐ No job opportunity
2. ☐ No or limited social and professional integration facilities.
3. ☐ No adequate credit facility for business ventures.
4. ☐ Mistrust between some Ghanaians and returned migrants.
5. ☐ Uncertainty about economic and political environment.
6. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

54. **For how long would you want to work in Ghana?**

1. ☐ Permanently
2. ☐ For one year
3. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……..
4. ☐ For a month or less
5. ☐ For two years

55. **What would motivate you to return to Ghana to work?**

1. ☐ Conducive economic and political environment.
2. ☐ Job opportunity.
3. ☐ Provision of professional and social integration schemes.
4. ☐ Provision of credit facility.
5. ☐ Other (Please specify) ……

56. **Should you decide to go to Ghana to work, what could be your greatest obstacle?**

1. ☐ Unavailability of Jobs
2. ☐ Lack of effective professional and social integration structures.
3. ☐ Lack of adequate credit facilities.

4. ☐ Other (Please specify)

57. **If you are requested to pay taxes on your income you earn abroad, would you agree?** ☐ 1. ☐ es 2. No

i) If your answer is "No" what are your reasons?
   1. Paying of taxes at resident country.
   2. No salary earnings from the sending country.
   3. Enjoy social amenities and infrastructural facilities at the resident countries.
   4. Ghana has no Labour export policy with resident country.
   5. Lack of adequate provision of welfare, consular and social protection facilities from the Ghana Mission.
   6. Other (Please specify) ……

Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Guide

I am a PHD candidate from the University of Ghana (Centre for Migration Studies). I am conduction an academic research on assessment of Ghana's Diaspora Engagement Initiative for national development.

The main thrust of this interview is to elicit your views and experiences about the implementation of government's diaspora engagement initiatives for the development of Ghana. The overacting aim is to find out your reaction on how beneficial or otherwise it has been for you as a citizen. This interview will be treated confidentially. In doing so, I wish to assure you that none of the information you give will be passed on to a third party and will also, be used only for purposes of research.

---

1. Could you please tell me about yourself?

Probe: Name, Age, Marital status, level of education, employment status, area of expertise.

Probe: Resident status in the country of residence, reasons for migrating to your current destination

2. What is your view about the relationship between the Ghana Mission and other Ghanaian Associations?
3. How do you assess the following social events; namely, cultural programmes, national day events, conferences, town hall meetings and home coming summits that you have ever attended.
4. Could you please tell me about possible challenges that might have negatively affected the success of any of these social events you attended?
5. In your view, how would those challenges be overcome?
6. How would Ghanaian youth organizations such as National Youth Authority attract the Ghana diaspora youth to Ghana.
7. Have you ever cleared your personal effects from the Ports of Ghana?
8. What are your views on cooperation among diaspora-related institutions such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ministry of Interior and Ghana Missions Abroad?
9. Have you acquired dual citizenship?
10. Do you consider the lack of Social Security portability as a major limitation for permanent return of the diaspora back home?
11. Could you please tell me about your experience in voting in Ghana's elections as a diasporan.

Probe: Challenges for implementation of ROPAA (2006), benefits, solutions.

12. Per your experience with the Ghana Mission and the Association, do you consider them as having adequate capacity to socially protect you and to ensure your human rights?

Probe: Rating, areas of strength, challenges, solutions.

13. How do you assess the efficiency of the Ghana Mission to renew or issue you with a new passport whenever the need arises?

Probe: Strengths of the Mission, challenges, solutions.

14. How do you evaluate the performance of Ghana Mission in administering the payment of your sponsored school fees by government of Ghana
15. Please tell me about your knowledge regarding investment opportunities in Ghana and your own experience.
16. What do you consider as obstacles to diaspora investment in Ghana?
17. How do you assess the flow of remittances from the Ghanaian diaspora to the country?

Probe: Benefits to the country, types of remittances, goods/money, challenges, solutions.

18. Could you please tell me your own experience if any, about exportation of philanthropic goods to Ghana?

Probe: Benefits, challenges, solutions

19. Assuming you are to return permanently to Ghana, what do you consider as the greatest obstacles for your return and reintegration.

Probe: What initiatives would motivate you to transfer your skills and knowledge to your homeland?

20. Is there anything else you will want to add?

21. Do you have any questions to ask?