

Rev. E. Schrenk. and I think that after about six months we shall have a road of 49 miles across the bush to Akwapem, made by our own mission, and that is of great advantage, because there can be regular communication.

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3284. Supposing, if the slave trade ceases, we only maintain one spot there for the protection of commerce, would the spot you mention on the mouth of the Volta be the best?—I should place no Governor at the mouth of the Volta, because it is very low.

3285. Is not Addah healthy?—No, it is not healthy; and the merchants who have trade there do not even build in Addah itself; they build in Fo, which is about five miles from Addah.

3286. What is your general opinion about one Central Government?—My opinion about a Central Government is this: if there is a healthy residence where a man can live, and the Governor has a better salary, I think a gentleman may go out who is a superior man, as we find is the case in India and other colonies of Great Britain. There is no doubt that such a man might have very great influence, and that a great change might very soon take place. We have seen in one year what a Governor can do. In 1858-59 the system of government was changed; we had a commandant who travelled about and visited our chiefs in the interior, and he did more in two years than our other commandants have done in seven years.

3287. What is the period that you allude to?—1858.

3288. What was the change that took place?—The Governor went to the chiefs himself; he visited them, so that they could see that our Government thought about them.

3289. Who was the Governor?—Sir Benjamin Pine.

3290. Who was the commandant?—Mr. Freeman.

3291. In speaking of centralising the Government, are you speaking only of the Gold Coast or the whole of the possessions from the Gambia to the Bight belonging to the British?—I could not understand it otherwise than as centralising the Government of the whole of the West Coast.

3292. Taking the whole of the British posts from the Gambia to the Bight of Benin, where should the Central Government be, in your opinion?—I should choose the healthiest place—the highest point, because that is the first condition to attract a superior European to go out; but if the Government is centralised, and we have no superior man, the system will be worse than it was before, because he will have all the power in his hands.

3293. What do you suppose the most healthy spot would be?—I was in Sierra Leone, and I think the plain between the sea and the mountain is very narrow, and therefore at least not healthier than, for instance, Christiansborg; they might go up on the mountain, but I think it would be very difficult to go up and build on that mountain; it would be difficult even with a road, and the barracks there are only about 600 feet up; that will not say much. I do not know any place where so few Europeans die as on the Akwapem Mountains, and we think of establishing a sanitary establishment there for the missionaries.

3294. Mr. Mills.] Is that on British territory?—Yes; it was Danish territory until the year 1850.

3295. Chairman.] Is there any other remark which you wish to make to the Committee?—I might say something with respect to education, and how far we have got on the coast in that matter. I think the Government on the Gold Coast should have only two aims. I do not see any aim in our Government at present, but if it had an aim it should be an aim to make the negroes either independent enough to care for themselves or to improve things, so that the country would be a source of income if we look to the commerce of Great Britain. Now, with regard to education, it is a thing of great importance if we look to either of those aims. We have several thousand negroes who have now passed certain schools. The Wesleyans have schools there, but they have only a few European missionaries; we have now six, who are entirely engaged in the instruction of youth, and I am sure that the Government will soon have help. We opened two schools, one in Akropong, 1,500 feet above the level of the sea, and one in Christiansborg, [especially with a view to give better education, because we saw the perplexity of the Government in not being able to find native agents. Some of them had learnt something, but their character was not such that they could be of great advantage to the Government at this time, but five or six years hence there will be young men who will be of great help to the Government. Now, with regard to commerce, I must say that it is a little narrow-minded if people speak only of powder, guns, and rum. I am a missionary, and it is natural that I am no friend to the importation of such articles, because I know that they do much harm to the natives, and the Ashantes would never have been able to carry on the war, as they did in 1824 to 1827, and again two years ago, if Europeans had not furnished them with arms; and we would not have so many drunkards on the coast. I am sure trade has done much harm, but on the other hand, trade has done good. If we look to our population in the sea towns I do not think there would be that desire for education, which we see now, without trade. If a man has trade he finds very soon that he must be able to read an account, or to write an account. Trade has, in one respect, been valuable, with regard to education and enabling the native people to see different European articles which must enlarge their views; but trade has changed our whole industry on the coast. If we come to the interior, six days' journey, people make iron and make their own clothes, but nobody thinks, along the coast, of making iron or clothes; native industry disappears, so far as the European trade is going.

3296. Lord Stanley.] Can you inform the Committee in what way they purchase iron and clothes from the Europeans; in what way do they pay for them?—They pay chiefly in palm oil. There is a large export of palm oil from the Gold Coast. In one district all the people are engaged in the palm oil produce, which would not be the case without trade.

3297. Chairman.] Is your mission on the Gold Coast in any communication with the Sierra Leone missions?—Not officially.

3298. But you do communicate with them?—We do communicate with them.

3299. You communicate with them in a friendly manner, and co-operate, I suppose?—

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We communicate with them in a friendly manner, but we do not co-operate with them. We have given about 77 missionaries to the Church Missionary Society in Sierra Leone, Lagos, and Abbeokuta, India, &c. There are still German missionaries in their service and therefore we have communication with them.

3300. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Do you say that the cultivation of palm oil has superseded other native industry to a considerable degree?—I would not say that; but by the importation of those articles which have been made in the country, native industry has disappeared.

3301. The collection of palm oil is a business which does not require much industry, does it?—No; it does not require it, but people must clean the trees, and make the oil.

3302. Is there anything that can be called cultivation for the production of palm oil, or is it merely getting the palm oil from the natural trees?—It is merely getting the palm oil from the natural tree. There is a large plain near the Volta which once had no trees on it about 100 years ago, and the whole of that plain is now a palm forest.

3303. Have those palm trees been planted by the natives?—Yes, they have been planted by the natives.

3304. It is a kind of industry which is suited to the African, is it not?—Very.

3305. Not being laborious?—No; it is one of the first industries which they had.

3306. But the importation of European goods has had the effect of putting an end to certain native industry, has it not?—Yes; and that is a very natural thing. If the Europeans come and offer some articles, and they make them nicer and better than the natives could make them, then it is, naturally, that the negroes like to exchange their country produce for such European manufactures, and to cease to make it themselves.

3307. But are the people generally around your station a labouring population?—We have in our sea towns fishers, and in the morning we see a large number of canoes going out to sea; also traders we have in our sea towns, and farmers who have their Indian corn and yams plantations in the interior of the country; as for about five miles from the sea to the interior the land is not suitable for cultivation; it is too dry.

3308. In the interior how is it?—They are engaged in agriculture; they grow Indian corn and yams especially.

3309. Do the men work much, or do they make the women work?—The men and women both work, but the women work much.

3310. Where exactly do your stations lie; which is the principal one?—Our principal station is Christiansborg. Besides Christiansborg we have six stations in the interior, in northern directions from Christiansborg. Their distance from Christiansborg is as follows: Abokobi, 18 miles; Aburi, 32 miles; Akropong, 49 miles; Odumase, 77 miles; Kyebly, in Akim, near the Ashantee border, 112 to 120 miles; Akwamu, beyond the River Volta, 112 miles. The Akwamu station we have commenced to encourage the people in the Krepe country to cultivate cotton.

3311. Is that beyond the protectorate?—No.

3312. How far in the interior is your most remote station?—Our most remote station is about 112 English miles in the interior.

3313. How does it lie with respect to the

Ashantee territory?—It is very near the border of the Ashantee country; there are about 55,000 people among whom we labour who speak the same language as the Ashantees; and the Bible which we are translating into their language may as well be called the Ashantee Bible.

3314. What tribe are they?—The Otshi tribe, the Akim tribe, and the Akwamu tribe.

3315. Are those the three principal tribes with whom you have to do?—We have to do with Accras on the plain, with the Akwapem and Akim tribes on the mountains, the Adangme tribe along the Volta, and with the Krepe and Akwamu tribes beyond the Volta.

3316. Is your principal station on the Akwapem Mountains?—One of our principal stations is on the Akwapem Mountains; our principal station is Christiansborg. Akropong is one of our principal stations, because there is a college for the native missionaries, and another school, where young men receive a good education. There we teach also the old languages.

3317. Do you teach the native boys Latin, Greek, and Hebrew?—Yes; Latin has not commenced, but Greek and Hebrew they have learnt already.

3318. Is that of any use?—They must read the Bible in the original language; we only teach it to those who will be missionaries and teachers.

3319. You only teach the classics to the boys or young men who will be missionaries?—Yes, but there will be others who will learn at least Latin when we introduce it.

3320. Do the other Missionary Societies carry on the same kind of education?—No, they have not so many missionaries as we have. I think they would do it if they could, but they have some difficulty to find men.

3321. You teach English, do you not?—We teach English.

3322. Would you not find the English language and literature a sufficient means of developing the minds of those Africans, without teaching them Latin and Greek?—I think we must have a larger view than that; it is our resolution to make the negroes independent, and therefore we think that the native minister must be able to read the Bible in the original language if he would be independent; we should respect no minister here at home if he could not read the Bible in the original language, therefore it is our decided aim to make them independent; and we have one native minister who can take charge of a station as well as we can; he is a cousin to the King of Ashantee, and his name is Ashantee; he is a pure negro, who was educated at Basle.

3323. Does that apply to the ordinary pupils in the schools?—No, I do not know of what use Greek and Hebrew would be for them, but the more intelligent of them will learn Latin, because we cannot read a newspaper without having learnt Latin.

3324. But do you pay particular attention to their instruction in English?—We instruct them in English and in their mother tongue.

3325. Of course they can have no literature in their own language except your translation?—They had none before we came there; but in the Accra language we have translated the whole of the Bible, and in Otshi the New Testament, Genesis, and the Psalms; and after some years we shall have translated the whole of the Bible also in Otshi.

3326. But the native literature is confined to

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that translation?—Not only. We have also other books for our schools, and we hope to go on to create a native literature.

3327. In case of one of your educated natives writing to another, would he write in his own language or in English?—Either; if I have to write to a native who was educated in our schools I always write in English.

3328. What is the number of your pupils?—The number of pupils altogether in our schools is 610.

3329. *Chairman.*] Male and female?—Yes.

3330. *Mr. Cliechester Fortescue.*] What is the number of your Christian converts altogether?—We had, on the 1st of January this year, 956.

3331. Do you think that you have produced much influence on the other natives who do not profess themselves to be Christian converts?—Yes; we do think so; we see it when we preach, and we see it in the favour of the people towards the missionaries; it is only with those mountain tribes that we have much difficulty; and the reason of that is their former relation with the Ashantees.

3332. Which tribe is that?—The Akwapem tribe, under the English protection.

3333. Is that in the neighbourhood of Akropong?—In Akropong and around Akropong.

3334. What is your opinion, from your own experience of the nature of domestic slavery in that part of the country?—Our opinion is this, when we saw the difficulty in Russia in the abolition of serfdom and the commencement of the American war, we resolved at once to abolish slavery in our Christian congregations. When I speak of 956 Christians, I can say that there is not one slave-holding man among them. I have been for two years engaged in the abolition of slavery in our congregations, and I am very thankful that I have been so. I was, myself, in the beginning, decidedly against it, but the more I understand the subject, the more I find that slavery and the principles of Christianity, to love one's neighbour as we love ourselves, cannot consist together.

3335. What do you mean by abolishing slavery; do you mean by acting on the mind of the slave or on the mind of the master?—We knew nearly all who had slaves; and by investigation we found out all the slaveholders in our congregation, and then we asked them what they paid for their slaves, and they told us the sum. The first question we asked was, Will you make them free or not? Some of them declared that they would never do it, and others said that they would do it, but that they could not at once send them away; that was not what we wished. Then we declared the slave a debtor for that sum which his master had paid for him, and the master had to make a wages book for the slave, and to pay him for his future work. In this way the slave has to work for his debt, perhaps, three years and a half until he is free; at the same time, perhaps, the master will give those slaves a piece of land, and in every week about one or two days free, so that they can work on their own land; and when they have worked themselves free, then they have property for themselves, and are not people who do not know what to do; so we have made them free in a rational way. The masters have not lost anything, and the slaves have gained.

3336. That has been done by the exercise of Christian influence on the mind of the slave-owner?—Yes, only that.

3337. What is the condition of those former slaves when they have worked out their price; do they work for wages?—Yes, they work for wages; we have already now a class of people who work for wages.

3338. Paid by their former owners?—Paid by anybody who engages them. I very often employ people and pay them wages.

3339. Are the wages paid by the missionaries or by the former owners?—To slaves liberated in the above-mentioned way, the wages must be paid by the former owners; we have nothing to do whatever with money matters; we thought it only our duty not to allow our Christians to have slaves, and we have succeeded.

3340. What number of men do you suppose there are actually working for wages?—I cannot say. We have, for instance, bricklayers. We went so far that we did not pay them for the day's work of the man, but we asked, How much do you require for a foot? And so we paid them by contract. We built our industrial shops in that way for our carpenters and wheelwrights, and then we found that they worked three times more than they did when paid for a day's work.

3341. *Mr. Cheetham.*] You paid them by contract?—Yes.

3342. *Mr. Cliechester Fortescue.*] Are those emancipated slaves, having no owner, able to maintain themselves in comfort?—Decidedly, without any difficulty. But I might remark that a small number of free labourers, who are fishers, bricklayers, farmers, hammock or load-bearers, are emancipated slaves; there was a class of free labourers before we abolished slavery. But there is no doubt that an emancipated slave can maintain his liberty.

3343. How is that change regarded by the neighbouring people?—It is regarded differently. I am told by some who are more intelligent that they would agree with us if the Government would abolish slavery, but as long as we are alone they do not know of what use it would be. If, after a certain time, there were a known law for the abolition of slavery I do not think there would be great difficulty in carrying it out, if we had a Governor who had a sound and energetic policy for four or five years, and would do something for the country. We must have one thing, and that is roads. We may speak continually about improvements, but we only deceive ourselves without roads; without roads there will be no civilisation, and that our Governors do not understand it—that is the greatest pity.

3344. *Chairman.*] It is a bush country?—Yes, it is a bush country; if we would make roads, after 10 years the whole of the British protectorate, with Ashantee, would have been really so much changed, even with regard to commerce, that everybody would be thankful for that change.

3345. *Mr. Cliechester Fortescue.*] You spoke of the Government abolishing slavery in the protected territory; you did not mean by the exercise of authority, I suppose?—I would not propose to abolish it now, even if the Gold Coast were made a Colony. I would not say that the Government should abolish slavery immediately. I think the way to abolish slavery is to gain at first influence over the tribes, and then, if there is influence, you can make a law. At first there should be something done for the tribes in the interior, and I do not see any other way for doing something for them than by making roads.

3346. That

3346. That is to say, as soon as the Government have induced the majority of the owners of slaves to consent to the abolition of slavery, then it might take place?—Yes, after a number of years a law might be made. Roads will change the whole social life of the people, develop the resources of the country, increase commerce, and then British laws will be more suitable for the country. If there are roads it is not difficult to send some hundreds of men to the interior in one or two days. I do not like war, but still it is very good sometimes if the people see guns; they respect them.

3347. Do you propose to abolish domestic slavery by force of arms?—No, never. I am decidedly against warlike policy. I mean that there should be roads made, and if there are roads made the Governor can maintain any law better than he can now; even now, with regard to slavery, if they make laws the people in the interior will say, You have no power; there are no roads; you cannot fight in the interior; you tried it in the year 1858, but you were defeated.

3348. But we do not profess to enforce our laws on the protected people without their own consent?—No, you cannot do that; but I think a law can be given, so that it might be a benefit for the country. Slavery must be abolished, and it is much better not to wait too long; but it must be abolished in a careful and rational way. It cannot be done before a social change has taken place on the Gold Coast; and there is no better means for that change than roads. Roads facilitate communication, bring new life into commerce and agriculture, labour is better paid, and then slavery can be abolished.

3349. Your views tend to convert the protectorate into a natural territorial possession?—Yes, that is my view and my hope. I think the views of the Government should tend to the same aim, else I would call the policy very expensive, as there would be very little achieved by it. There should be spent some larger sums of money on that country for some years; then the revenue can be increased, and the Government will be cheaper. On sowing the harvest does depend.

3350. Is there much difference between the eastern tribes with which you have to deal and the Fantees and the other western tribes?—Yes, there is more agriculture among the eastern people, I think; and there is some difference in their energy; the eastern people have more energy than the Fantee people; for instance, in cotton cultivation they have scarcely done anything. During the last years they did not make use of the American war for that purpose; that proves something against the Fantee country.

3351. Mr. Cheetham.] Are you speaking of the Government of the country, or of the race?—I speak of the natives.

3352. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] What do the natives regard as the eastern boundary of their protectorate?—The natives regard as the eastern boundary of their protectorate, not the Volta, but the border of the Aungla district, some hundred miles from Dahomey. The Aungla language is already related with the Dahomey language. But the relations between the Aungla tribe and the Government have become weaker and weaker since 1860, because there was done nothing more for the Aunglas.

3353. Chairman.] What is the natural bound-

dary?—That is difficult to say; I look to the Aungla country as boundary.

3354. Is not that an extension beyond the first protectorate?—No.

3355. Was the first idea of the protectorate beyond the east of the Volta?—Yes.

3356. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] You speak of the tribes which were formerly under the Danish protection?—Yes.

3357. Is not it the case that the action of the Government has been very little felt in the extreme eastern district?—I might say very little, but it might be felt; and a Government with energy would have influence; for instance, they had paid the poll-tax beyond the Volta, which shows the people think that the English Government has a claim on them; but they afterwards refused to pay it, because the Government did not make roads, and did not do anything with the money. There was about 18 miles of road made about that time, but then nothing more, and from that time they refused to pay the poll-tax, because they did not know for what the money was used.

3358. Do you think that the poll-tax could be again collected in the eastern districts, provided its proceeds were spent in such works in the district where the tax was raised?—I am sure it could as soon as a Governor comes who has energy, and shows the people his interest for them by visiting the chiefs, that every chief has seen him once; the question is always the man.

3359. What is your view of the importance of the Volta River as a means of communication with the interior?—I look at the Volta as a river of importance, and it would be much more important if the steamer were to stay at Addah, but because it does not stay at Addah all the goods which are sent down the Volta must be shipped by sailing vessels.

3360. The steamer does not stop at Addah?—No; it stops at Accra, in Jamestown; it does not come to Addah.

3361. Do you agree with the other witnesses who have been examined here, that Addah should be made a British station?—I am opposed to making it a station of the Central Government; but Addah must, sooner or later, be an official place: nobody pays duty; there is export and import going on, and nobody pays duty.

3362. Mr. Cheetham.] There is no Consul there?—There is no Consul.

3363. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] There is no British officer of any sort at Addah?—No.

3364. Mr. Cheetham.] Is the trade expanding at Addah?—At that point the trade has certainly been expanded during the last five years.

3365. This is going on in the absence of all English Government?—Yes.

3366. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] You have been asked about the effect that would be produced by the withdrawal of the British power from the coast, and the consequent extension of the Ashantee power; I suppose, whatever other results were produced, it could not be effected without bloody wars, and great suffering to the coast tribes?—It is impossible; you would have wars and shedding of blood. There is another reason against that withdrawal; I think the honour of the Home Government comes in question, if the question arises about abandoning the coast: it was by the Government, and not by the Fantee people, that the last Ashantee war was commenced. Now, if the Government

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left the coast, and left us to the hatred of the Ashantees, I think it would not be very honest; that matter should be settled before any such question can arise.

3367. Do you think that the example of Dahomey would lead you to suppose that our relation with a great conquering native tyranny would be better than it is now with the minor tribes?—It would not be better; I think if the Government left the coast, the impression would be that the English cannot govern the coast; that they were afraid of the Ashantees.

3368. Do you suppose that the Ashantee power very much resembles that of Dahomey, except that it is still stronger?—I think there is a great difference between Dahomey and Ashantee; I think the Ashantees are more open to European influence than Dahomey; the cruelties are not so great in Ashantee as in Dahomey. I know that during the time of Governor Maclean there was a very friendly relation between the Ashantees and the English Government, and also some time afterwards. I know that, in about 1853, Captain Brownel, who was there at that time, settled a dispute with the Ashantees only by his courage and resolution.

3369. Do you think that the friendly relation with the Ashantees might be renewed by good management on our part?—Yes, they might be renewed. It would be very difficult for the present Governor; he may be a very good man; I esteem him as such, but, after the Ashantee war, it is nearly impossible for him to succeed. I am very sorry that he did not come to the coast at another time; he made a very good beginning. It is only the Ashantee war which has made things so bad. If the Home Government would give more pecuniary means in his hands, to give a new stimulus for the development of the country, then he might regain the confidence of the natives.

3370. But, at all events, the Ashantee power could not be extended to the coast without a violent contest, and never with the consent of our protected tribes?—No; it would mean for the tribes to die.

3371. Lord Stanley.] Do you think that the Ashantee power is increased in strength?—No; I think it is rather the contrary. They were very much weakened in 1827; they lost a large number of people at that time and a good deal of their courage, and since 1827 up to this time we cannot say that we have had what we can call a war. It was in 1862 that they came again, but they went back without any hard fighting; they had nothing to eat, and they were ill. It is the impression of the natives as well as Europeans, that the Ashantees have lost a great deal of their former vigour.

3372. We believe in Europe that 40 years is generally sufficient to repair the mischief done by a war; do you think that the effects of the war of 1827 are still felt by the Ashantees?—I think that the effects of the war are still felt, but I think that it is not so much felt as it must be among civilised nations.

3373. Do you mean that they have not recovered their losses in population, or that the Government is weaker?—They have lost not only the territory which they lost in 1827, but they have also lost territory in the interior, and they are not more so powerful as they have been, because they have not more their former self-confidence.

3374. Other tribes in the interior took advantage of their weakness, and gained or recovered territory from them?—So far as we know, some of the tribes who were dependent on the Ashantees formerly are independent now; we cannot give an exact statement of the facts, it is only reports from the people in the interior.

3375. Is there any access for Europeans to Comassie?—Yes, there was access, but during the last two years we should have risked something if we had gone there, because there was war; but formerly there was access, and, as I have said, Ashantee is the principal aim of our mission.

3376. Taking the protected tribes as a whole, have you any means of knowing what their relative strength in numbers is, as compared with the Ashantees?—I think that the population of the protected tribes is about 350,000, perhaps 400,000; but I will say 350,000, including all those who stand under English protection since the Ashantee war in 1827, and who came under English protection in 1850 from the Danes.

3377. Do you think that there is that feeling among them, that in the event of their being threatened with an attack from the Ashantees, they would unite under British organization, and be able to hold their own?—If the tribes would be united, there is no question whatever that they could resist the Ashantees; the natives only want European command and ammunition in that case. The great difficulty was in the last year to unite the eastern district and the Fantee country. The eastern people know that the Fantees are not the best soldiers, and they know that, at the present time, the eastern district is in no danger. The Ashantee king sent messengers to Christiansborg to our chief and to the chief of Dutch Accra, near Jamestown, that he has nothing to do with them, and that he has only to do with the Fantee territory. We know for a long time that he wishes to gain the territory again; the Government could not unite the two districts together, partly because not the right means were used; and then was the British influence injured so much by Commandant De Ruvignes that the position of Governor Pine in the Eastern District was very difficult.

3378. When you spoke of the education you gave the missionaries, you mentioned the difficulty of developing the thinking faculties of the native children; how does that operate; do you find that, after a certain time, they seem to lose their power of advancing further, and remain stationary, or fall back?—No; that is a point which has been touched upon here and there to me, since I came back; but for a man who knows our life at home it is no mystery. Here, at home, when they are 17, youths lose, sometimes, their energy, and you know the reason of it; but that is much more the case among such people as the Africans, for where there is no moral power there is no resistance. If they come under the influence of Christianity there is moral power in their heart, and we do not find, that when they are 14 or 15 years of age, they do not make more progress. We have in our college young men of 24 or 25, who study just as we do here at home. We opened the college in 1863; I was there at the opening of the college, and three months afterwards I was again there, and I saw that those young men had made very nice progress in Greek; so much so that they can be compared with Euro-

peans who have learnt Greek for three months. It is a mistake for people to suppose that negroes, in the whole, after a certain time, remain stationary, or fall back.

3379. Mr. *Cheetham*.] Were those young men of pure African blood?—Yes, decidedly; thick lips and black skin.

3380. And woolly hair?—And woolly hair.

3381. Mr. *Gregory*.] I think you said that the Ashantees derive their power, in their warlike expeditions, entirely from guns and ammunition imported from the coast?—I did not, I think, say entirely; but certainly they are enabled, by the importation of such arms, to carry on the war with a force that they could not have exercised with their former arms.

3382. I think you rather seem to be of opinion that it would be wise to prevent the introduction of those arms?—I think it is too late now.

3383. I presume that, in case there was any prohibition against the introduction of guns and ammunition at our stations, there would be guns and ammunition introduced from the Dutch station?—Yes.

3384. Therefore our interference would be nugatory?—Yes.

3385. How far is the Ashantee boundary from the nearest point of the coast?—I think it is about 90 miles.

3386. Where is the nearest point?—The nearest point is in the Fantee country.

3387. What are the ordinary relations of the Fantees with the Ashantees?—The relation is a commercial one. When these present disputes between the Government and the Ashantees are settled, the Ashantees come with gold dust to the Fantee coast, and the Fantee native traders are allowed to go to Ashantee with goods; that is all.

3388. The Fantees do not object in time of peace to the Ashantee trader going down to the coast?—No, not in time of peace. The Ashantees must come down to the coast; they have no salt in their country.

3389. At this moment are the Ashantees totally debarred of all access to the coast?—No, just now they have access; but there is some fear in the population on the coast that they will return again. I do not know whether it will come so or not.

3390. Is there now peace between the Ashantees and the Fantees?—No, not steady peace; it is a constant matter of uncertainty.

3391. But still the Fantees allow the Ashantees to pass through their territory?—Yes, because Cape Coast Castle is dependent on the Ashantees especially for trade; trade has suffered very much. If the Ashantees do not come, we read in every paper trade, is very dull; they are longing very much to see the Ashantees.

3392. Do the Fantees object to the Ashantees coming now through their territory?—They do not object just now; they are coming again; they did not come for two years.

3393. But yet they must be aware that the Ashantees are coming down to the coast to purchase munitions of war, which will be employed against themselves?—Yes; they are aware of it; but the Fantees alone are so weak that, unassisted by the Government and the eastern tribes, they cannot resist them, and therefore it would be very unwise to prevent their passing up and down; it is a good policy to allow them to do so.

3394. Mr. *Cheetham*.] There is a road, is there not, from Cape Coast to the Ashantee territory?—There is a path.

3395. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Through what channels have the Ashantees supplied themselves with arms and ammunition?—Arms especially from Elmina.

3396. Through the Dutch protected territory?—Yes; the Dutch furnished the Ashantees with ammunition during the time of war. Then they have got salt and tobacco up the River Volta. They come down the River Volta and obtain their salt and tobacco.

3397. Mr. *Seymour*.] Is there any British officer at the mouth of the Volta at all?—No, none at all.

3398. Mr. *Gregory*.] In your teaching and education, on what principle do you proceed with regard to the selection of the young negroes that you intend to make missionaries?—We have day schools, and we have boarding schools for boys and girls. Between those two we have a middle school, and we have a college; our middle schools are a preparation for the college. In our day school every child is allowed to come; they must come regularly, to which effect we have strict orders. After a time we find out those who have more intellect in the class where we teach English (we do not teach English to all the children, because for many it would be of no use) and other things which are not taught to every scholar, and then if they have visited our schools for about five, six, or eight years the time may come when a boy will express a wish to learn something, perhaps a trade in our shops, or to become a merchant or a builder, or a missionary, or a teacher, and to such wishes we listen. If they are fit for becoming teachers, and if we see they lead a Christian life, we allow them to enter the class where we give special instruction for teaching. For instance, there is instruction for playing the harmonium, singing, and other things which a teacher must understand. If he wishes to become a missionary, and we see that he is converted, he receives special instruction in our college.

3399. Is there much disposition on the part of those young men to become teachers?—Sometimes there is too much. We have to show them that it is not every one that can become a teacher, and during the last year we have succeeded in persuading a good many of them that it is a nice thing to be farmers, and we have several boys who are instructed by one of our native Christians in farming.

3400. As a general rule, do those young men whom you educate for missionaries afterwards maintain a correct life?—As a rule they do; because, if we see that they are not converted, we dismiss them from our college; we dismissed two last year.

3401. My object in asking is this, are there many of those persons that you have to dismiss?—No, not many; the majority go on to our satisfaction.

3402. They carry their good habits into after life?—Yes, they do.

3403. In speaking about the construction of roads, I presume it was your wish to carry out the old principle of levying a poll-tax for their construction?—Yes.

3404. Are the Committee to understand that you think the natives would willingly contribute to it if they saw the money was laid out in the

Rev.
E. Schrank,
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Rev.
E. Schrenk.
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construction of roads?—Yes; I am sorry that it was not done. We must have roads on the Gold Coast; but the stimulus must be given by a man who is able to gain their confidence again, and the Home Government must enable the local Government, by money, to do actually something for the country. If that is done, the natives will again pay poll-tax.

3405. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Do you mean a path?—No, I mean a cart road.

3406. Mr. *Gregory*.] Is it merely clearing the bush; are the roads difficult of construction?—Some of them are difficult. We have made 35 miles of road, and we have to make about 14 miles more in the mountain; that is very difficult and very expensive; but still we shall have finished, I hope, in six months.

3407. Do you metal it; do you lay down stones?—In some places we have to lay down stones; but on the plain there is very hard ground; there is iron ore everywhere on the plain.

3408. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Horses and oxen will live in the eastern district, I suppose?—I had a horse during all the time I was there, and we have sent out a farmer, two years ago, who is training the oxen to draw carts, because we have wheelwrights.

3409. But no animals will live in the western district, will they?—I think that must be shown by experience; if they cut down so little of the bush, it will be difficult; the more they cut down, the better for the animals.

3410. Mr. *Henry Seymour*.] Is it not the Tsetse fly which prevents their living in the western districts?—So it is believed, but a friend of mine went into the interior with two oxen last year, and he came back with them well.

3411. Is it not the case that the fly does not touch mules?—It does not touch mules.

3412. Are you aware that horses will not live in the south of India?—I am aware of it, and with our horses we took care; I took my horse along the Coast; when we come on to the mountains, they can live again; it is only at the foot of the mountains that we find there is some risk.

3413. But you think you could use oxen in the same way as oxen are used all over India?—Yes, I think so; but we must import stronger oxen than we have now.

3414. Sir *Francis Baring*.] I think you said that you had two plantations of coffee and one of cotton, did you not?—Yes, of coffee, but not of cotton; we have encouraged the people of a district to cultivate cotton, and the people of a whole district are now engaged in cultivating cotton, but we have no plantation of our own.

3415. With regard to the coffee plantation, that is I suppose under the superintendence of the missionaries?—Yes.

3416. How is it worked; have you got the labourers of the country?—Yes, we engage the people.

3417. And you pay them for their day's work?—Yes.

3418. You pay them wages?—Yes.

3419. Do you find any difficulty in getting them to work?—No, not much, I have myself very often to hire people, because all our provisions are carried on the head till the road is finished in the interior.

3420. It has been stated generally that many of the cotton plantations have been given up in consequence of the impossibility of getting the

natives to work steadily; does your experience confirm that?—Not on our coast.

3421. You stated that 18 miles of road was made in consequence of the levying of the poll-tax?—Yes, the Governor paid the labourers and our mission gave the superintendent.

3422. Was that done by contract or by daily payment?—I think it was done by contract, but it was done in the year before I arrived.

3423. The 35 miles of road you made yourself?—Yes.

3424. Was that done by contract, or by payment of daily wages?—One part was done by payment of daily wages, and another part was done by contract.

3425. You found you could obtain labourers to do the work?—Yes; we could obtain more than we wanted. I know that from two of our missionaries who had the superintendence of the construction of the road.

3426. You have stated that there is a superior school for the purpose of educating young men to fill situations under Government and agencies for the Government?—Yes.

3427. Is there much difficulty in obtaining European agents to carry on the business satisfactorily?—Yes, there is a difficulty, because the climate is not healthy; and I have said already the Government has neglected to make a mountain station. I think it is a great mistake, because very often an officer might have come to the mountains for some months, instead of going home when he was unwell.

3428. Is there a complaint that the Europeans that go out there and are employed there, are of an unsatisfactory class?—There is much complaint of that kind I am sorry to say, and that is the reason why our climate has acquired such a bad name. The fact is, that they do not live so that they can live.

3429. You think it would be a great benefit if the natives could be educated, so as to undertake those duties?—I am sure it would be a very great benefit.

3430. Mr. *Arthur Mills*.] You spoke of the means you employ to induce slaveholders in your congregation to set free the slaves held by them.

Are you able to state how many people are working for wages in your part in the coffee plantations, and so on?—On our coffee plantations we engage the people just as we want them. The missionary who has the superintendence of the coffee plantations calls the people from the town when the plantation is to be cleared, or when the harvest time has come. With regard to the number of the slaves in our mission, I think the whole number has been about 150.

3431. Taking the average for 12 months, would that give you an idea of what the number of the people would be who are receiving payment for work?—We engage bricklayers, people for our shops and plantations, and people who carry loads; perhaps there are, on the whole, 200, or even perhaps 250 annually engaged by our Mission; but they are not all free and independent people. Slaveholders, heathen, who hold a large number of slaves, give them occasionally some days free, in order that they may carry loads to the interior; some slaveholders give them a part of the pay, and some take the whole of the pay from the slaves.

3432. At the mouth of the Volta, you said, there was no subordinate officer representing the British interest in any way?—None.

3433. Nowhere

3433. Nowhere, at any part in those eastern settlements, is there any subordinate officer representing the British?—There is a Civil Commandant in James Town.

3434. Mr. *Cheetham*.] I understood you to say, that your object in giving this higher class of instruction, especially to the young students, was, that ultimately they may become teachers to their own people?—That they might ultimately become teachers to their own people. That is one thing; that they might be able to be employed by the Government and by merchants, or to become merchants themselves, or farmers, &c., is another aim of ours. I was the treasurer of our mission, and had frequently young men engaged to assist me, and I have found that they had not learnt enough arithmetic to be of service to me in all cases where I wanted their help.

3435. Then from your experience of the native character, I understand you to say that you see nothing in their physical formation or in their mental structure which would lead you to think that they could not be educated just as other people can?—They have certainly lower foreheads than Europeans, but I have found by experience, and the 45 Europeans engaged in our Mission know it for a fact, that pure negroes on the Gold Coast can be educated as well as Europeans; I have already stated that we have more difficulty in bringing up their thinking faculties, but that is very natural if you look at the negro as he is, and not as you would like him to be; in fact, among the lower classes in European countries, you may often find great slowness in the thinking faculties; we find arithmetic is the best thing to clear their heads.

3436. Has your body some stations in Kaffra-ria?—No; they are the Moravians.

3437. You spoke of a coffee plantation?—Yes.

3438. Do you expect that article to become an important matter of export?—It will become more important, but never so important as cotton; there is too much wet for cotton on the mountains, and therefore the soil is better suited for coffee; we have had so much success, that we can go on with it.

3439. In the cultivation of either cotton or coffee, you see nothing of that unwillingness of the natives to labour which has been spoken of?—In 1862 there were some bales of cotton exported from the Gold Coast; in 1863 we exported 244 bales; in 1864, 440 bales, and last January 93 bales, which shows such success, that there cannot be much failure in obtaining labour; of course we cannot force the people to cultivate the cotton, it is all of their own free will that they do it; we can only pay as high a price as the market here allows; it is merely their own understanding that if they work, they may make money.

3440. Then you do not admit the truth of what has been said, that there is something in the negro character which will not permit them to be steady labourers in any occupation whatever?—If the negroes see that they can make money, which they value very much, they are like other people, and ready to work. Some of them give their minds to it too much. I have had among my congregation a man whom I had to rebuke for working too much. I had to tell him that he must keep the Sabbath-day. The Bible mission on the Gold Coast comes by their industry in so different contact with the negroes, that we must be able to form a more correct

opinion about the negro character in regard to labour than other Europeans on that coast. When I arrived on the coast we had difficulty to get boards for our joiner-shop. When I left the coast we had a number of sawyers in the bush, who were taught by us to saw boards. These sawyers worked on their own account, and sold their boards to us. We have now boards enough for buildings and industry.

3441. Is there any extensive production of palm oil?—Yes; in the Krobo district they are all engaged in that sort of production.

3442. So that, as you proceed in your efforts to raise these people, you see before you ample means of employing them in industrial productions?—Yes; both must go together. Our schools give them material to use in after-life; but if we did not show them how to use it, we should only educate them to be idle. If roads are constructed, our young men will find channels of usefulness. Schools without civilisation will be a stagnant water.

3443. Do you think that, if the British Government were to withdraw from this district, the commercial and industrial pursuits of the natives would cease?—I am sure of it, and experience along the whole of the coast shows it. If the English Government leaves us, I myself will be one of the first to call the French, although I do not like the French Government.

3444. Would you say that the presence of a British settlement was necessary to protect or promote your efforts in that direction?—Yes.

3445. You said that the Wesleyans had proceeded up to the Ashantee country?—Yes; but the British Government was at their backs; it was at the time when Mr. Maclean was there, who was in most friendly relations with them. He stayed on the coast from 1832 to 1847, and he was a man who understood how to make steady progress, and influence the native customs and the native laws. His jurisdiction might have been more British.

3446. Then what you mean to convey is, that when the Wesleyans went there, the British Government still followed them?—Yes.

3447. But are there not portions of the earth in which missionaries labour with great success without the presence of the British Government; why should that not be so here?—You are aware of what took place in Madagascar; I do not think there is any Englishman who would not be sorry to prepare for us such trials, or similar trials.

3448. With respect to the abolition of the slave trade, is it your opinion that the presence of our Government, both in the squadron and in the settlements, is essential?—I think that we have proved that on the Gold Coast; I am very glad you have mentioned it, because some people say that the presence of the British Government there was of no use for the abolition of the slave trade; but on the whole of the Gold Coast, along the British territory, there is not one slave exported; and I think an Englishman should rather be proud of that success than say that it is of no use.

3449. Then you assume that if the British Government is to keep on these territories, it is essential that there should be a better system of administration?—Yes.

3450. In the first place, you say that a superior class of officers should be sent out to represent the Government?—Yes.

3451. And

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Rev. 3451. And, in the next place, it is essential
E. Schrenk. that there should be roads?—Yes.
 4 May 1865. 3452. Must those roads of necessity be made
 by the British Government?—The British
 Government must give the impulse for making
 the roads, but if the roads are made, I do not
 think the British Government should have all the
 expenses to bear; but if a Governor is there who
 has influence, he would have to use that influence
 to make agreements with the chiefs; if we had
 roads, we should open up the whole of the
 country for commerce, and the Ashantees would
 know that it was not difficult for the English
 Government to send hundreds of troops to their
 frontier; so that roads would force them to keep
 up friendly relations with the British Govern-
 ment.

3453. Mr. *Henry Seymour.*] Do you think
 that Mahomedanism is spreading greatly on the
 Western Coast of Africa?—On the Gold Coast,
 no. I think some gentlemen see too much
 spread because they like it too much.

3454. There being on one side the Mahomedans
 and on the other side the Christian missionaries;
 do you think the Mahomedans are more successful
 than the Christian missionaries?—I think the
 Mahomedans must have more success.

3455. Why?—Because we require from a
 man that he shall leave his sins, and the
 Mahomedans allow him to go on in his sins, and
 therefore I should be astonished if we made the
 same progress.

3456. You think the Mahomedans do make
 greater progress than yourselves?—I think so
 everywhere; but on our coast we cannot speak
 of that from experience, because we have
 a few Mahomedans on the Gold Coast.

3457. Do you think it is a fact that when the
 natives become Mahomedans, they are much more
 attached to their religion than when they become
 Christians?—I do not believe it at all.

3458. If a native community became Chris-
 tians, do you think they would have the same
 power to resist aggression as if they became a
 Mahomedan community?—I think so, most de-
 cidedly.

3459. Mr. *Cheetham.*] You have seen the
 practical results of both systems, have you?—Yes.

3460. Mr. *Henry Seymour.*] Do you think the
 native Christian is as energetic and as attached to
 his religion as the Mahomedan?—No, I think he
 is more attached to his religion; we have a num-
 ber of Mahomedans who have slaves; in James
 Town, very rich people, who have a large num-
 ber of slaves. If you look at the Mahomedan
 slave, you do not see any difference between him
 and any other heathen; if you ask him what he
 believes, he will say that he turns to the east in
 the morning, and perhaps repeats a certain
 prayer, and that is all his religion.

3461. When you say that a Christian minister
 asks a heathen to give up more than a Mahome-
 dan, do you not forget that the Mahomedan asks
 him to give up the use of spirits, to which he is
 strongly attached?—The negroes in the interior
 have no spirits at all, and along our coast we see
 few Mahomedans working to make proselytes.
 I cannot speak about that at all. We have Ma-
 homedans who trade to the interior, and they go
 there to bring ivory, and they have their slaves
 who are Mahomedans; but, with that exception,
 we have none.

3462. But, at all events, the Mahomedans for-
 bid one vice which is common on the coast?—
 Yes.

3463. And succeed in doing so?—I think so;
 but I do not know whether such a slave would
 drink or not.

3464. The Mahomedan, however, does forbid
 the trade in drink?—That I have seen myself;
 but that is only one sin; if a man is a thief or a
 liar that is worse than drinking.

3465. Are there any negro Christians who
 become traders into the interior of the country as
 the Mahomedans do?—Our Christian traders do
 not go further than 80 miles into the interior.

3466. Then they do not appear to be so enter-
 prising as the Mahomedan traders?—I should
 be very sorry to say that, because the Mahome-
 dans go so far into the interior for the purpose of
 bringing slaves for the Dutch for their so-called
 free emigrants.

3467. But they bring ivory and gums, and
 other things besides slaves, do they not?—They
 bring ivory and slaves; I do not know about any
 other articles.

3468. At all events, what they bring others
 could bring?—I think that if they were pre-
 vented bringing slaves, they would not go so far
 into the interior; I do not believe they would
 risk so much.

3469. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue.*] Would you
 not say that the Mahomedan African was a more
 vigorous human being than the Pagan African?
 —We have some Mahomedans in Accra especially;
 there is one rich man in whose house I have been,
 to assist a merchant in buying ivory, for I was a
 merchant before I was a missionary; I saw men
 in his house who were Mahomedans; in some
 respects they are superior to the negro, and in
 some respects not.

3470. I suppose you would say that the Ma-
 homedan African, as believing in one God, and
 professing, at all events, a higher faith, is
 superior in that respect to the heathen African?
 —I believe he is in some degree.

3471. But you have had very little experience
 on the subject?—Yes.

3472. Mr. *Henry Seymour.*] Is there any
 interest felt in your part of the coast in the
 struggle going on in Abbeokuta?—Not any
 active interest.

3473. Is it looked upon as a struggle between
 the Pagans and Mahomedans?—No, that does
 not come into question with regard to the war
 at all.

3474. Mr. *Arthur Mills.*] Do you think, as
 far as your experience goes, that Mahomedanism
 can be compared with Christianity as an instru-
 ment of civilisation, either in promoting energy
 of character or in extinguishing vice?—I have
 read history, and I should say that no one who
 knows anything of Mahomedanism can say it is to
 be compared at all. I think any one who looks
 at history might well be ashamed to speak as we
 have heard people speaking in London during the
 last few weeks.

3475. Mr. *Henry Seymour.*] Do you not think
 that the Mahomedan in Africa is considerably
 more energetic than the Mahomedan in Asia, whom
 I suppose you had in view in that last answer?
 —Not at all; the climate does not permit of more
 energy—it is better suited to a phlegmatic
 temperament—perhaps the East is more exciting.

Lunæ, 8^o die Maii, 1865.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Adderley.
Sir Francis Baring.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Buxton.
Mr. Cave.
Lord Alfred Churchill.

Mr. William Edward Forster.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Gregory.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Arthur Mills.

THE RIGHT HON. C. B. ADDERLEY, IN THE CHAIR.

VICE-ADMIRAL THE HON. SIR FREDERICK W. GREY, G.C.B., called in; and Examined.

3476. *Chairman.*] You are First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and a Vice-Admiral?—Yes.

3477. You were in command of the African stations up to the year 1860, were you not?—Up to July 1860.

3478. That post is now occupied by Sir Baldwin Walker, I believe?—No, by Commodore Wilmot. The stations have been altered since that time. The West Coast of Africa is now a separate station.

3479. What were your own head quarters?—The Cape of Good Hope.

3480. Will you state to the Committee what the arrangements were of the squadron, and what were the cruising grounds, when you were in command?—The whole direction of the squadron was under Commodore Wise first, and then afterwards under Commodore Adams. Commodore Wise went out a little after me. The station was divided, and has continued to be divided ever since, into three divisions; the north including our settlements in the Gambia and Sierra Leone, and all Liberia; the second including the Bights of Benin and Biafra, so far as Cape Lopez; and the third was from Cape Lopez to the limits of the station, to Little Fish Bay. The whole of the Portuguese possessions on the South Coast were included in the south division.

3481. Is that the arrangement now?—I believe it is unaltered.

3482. Will you state to the Committee the length of your command, and what were the years of it?—From the month of May 1857 to July 1860.

3483. What is the present strength of the squadron on the West Coast?—I am not sure of the exact actual strength, but I can state the average strength the squadron is kept up to; whether there may not be a little variation at this moment I cannot tell, but it generally consists of the commodore's ship, a corvette, two sloops, one commanded by a post-captain, 10 gun-vessels, two small vessels for service in the rivers, one store-ship, and two hulks. That is the average strength of the squadron.

3484. What is the general distribution of that squadron between the three divisions that you have mentioned; is there any usual distribution?—During the time I commanded the station there were generally three vessels on the north division, about five on the Bights, and five on 0.39.

the South Coast. About 13 vessels were generally employed in that service.

3485. Where were the hulks stationed?—At that time there was only one; two have been added since; one now is stationed at Sierra Leone, and the other, until lately, was at Fernando Po, but it has just been removed to the neighbourhood of the River Volta.

3486. What is the use of those hulks?—For coaling, provisions, and receiving supernumeraries.

3487. Is there another hulk stationed at Ascension Island?—Yes.

3488. Sir John Hay.] Besides the hulk stationed at Ascension Island, is there any other force at Ascension and St. Helena for the support of the squadron on the coast?—No; there is none at St. Helena; there is one at Ascension Island, with a steam-tug attached to her.

3489. *Chairman.*] Are there other ships stationed either at Ascension Island or St. Helena, besides those which you have mentioned?—Not at this moment; I must add that there is another small vessel for river service, the "Pioneer," which was employed in Dr. Livingston's service on the East Coast, which has been sent up to the coast to be employed by Commodore Wilmot in the river; she has just lately arrived.

3490. This squadron is independent of any ship stationed at the Cape?—Quite.

3491. Or of any ship on the East Coast?—Quite.

3492. Can you state the average cost of the squadron?—I have returns of the cost of 13 cruising ships; two vessels which you may call tenders, though one is not so at this moment; one store ship and two stationary ships. I have a return of the cost of Ascension separately. I find the total expense of that squadron, including wear and tear of machinery, coals, and pilotage to be 157,869*l.* a year. I may mention that in calculating the wear and tear there is a little difference between the Accountant General's calculation and the Comptroller's, but it is too small to be worth taking notice of; it is only 1,000*l.* or something of that kind. If the Committee wish to have it I can give the details of all the expenditure under that head.

3493. Will you put that paper in?—I will do so. (*The same was handed in.*—Vide Appendix.)

Vice-Adml.
Sir
F. W. Grey,
G.C.B.
8 May 1865.

Vice-Adml. 3494. That is, in fact, the strength and cost of the squadron kept on the West Coast of Africa for the suppression of the slave trade?—Yes.

Sir
F. W. Grey,
G.C.B.
8 May 1865.
3495. Do you consider when you were in command of the West Coast Station that the suppression of the slave trade was not the only object of having the squadron there, but that to a certain extent it was placed there for the protection of commerce?—To a very great extent it was for both purposes; there was always some part of it employed for the protection of commerce.

3496. But the positions of the three divisions of the squadron were mainly selected for the suppression of the export of slaves, were they not?—Yes.

3497. Can you state what the general instructions are with regard to the cruisers close in-shore for the purpose of stopping the export trade in slaves?—That is a point in which I had a good deal of communication with Commodore Wise. The strength of the squadron did not admit of both in shore and off shore cruising. The conclusion I arrived at was that the best way of employing them was close in-shore, and they were so employed during all the time I was there. Captures were occasionally made by vessels on the passage at a distance from the coast, but they were comparatively rare.

3498. Supposing the strength of the squadron not to be increased, and the chief object being the stoppage of the slave export in-shore, do you think the composition of the squadron for that purpose might be improved by faster ships or more steamers?—No doubt if the squadron were increased, it would give you a better chance of catching vessels which might succeed in carrying away slaves in spite of the cruisers along shore; but during the last 12 months I find from Commodore Wilmot's report that the squadrons were anchored at such a short distance from each other along the coasts of the Bights that not a single slaver succeeded in slipping slaves, but a very fast steamer, the "Cicero," was driven off the coast without being able to ship at all; having failed to ship in the Bights she went down to the Congo, where they are bought, but her boatswain and four of her men were captured by one of the cruisers, and she was driven off, so she failed again. That steamer was very much faster than any vessel we have there; her speed was not less than 11 knots, that is the report, therefore I conclude that it is not speed that is so much wanted as such a number of vessels as would be able to effectually blockade the coast. There would be an advantage undoubtedly in our having one or two fast steamers attached to the squadron if we had them.

3499. Is not the cruising in-shore more unhealthy than the cruising out at sea?—I should not say that it was more unhealthy in-shore than out at sea, provided the officers are careful not to land or to expose the men to the risks of going up the rivers, but it is a very monotonous and very hard position for the officers. I have got from Commodore Wilmot a report containing a statement on that point; it is dated the 1st of December 1864, and is a report for the whole year. I will take that part of it which alludes to trade in the Bights. He states this:—"The African squadron has this year achieved a victory in the Bights which their Lordships and the country may well rejoice at, and the year 1864 will be recorded in the annals of slave-trading

history as one of complete success over the well-contrived plans of the slave dealers. The close blockade of this part of the coast, from the River Volta to Jackin, has shown what can be done by the African cruisers under the skill and conduct of their commanders; and I must be permitted to place on record here, before entering further into this important subject, my high admiration at the zeal, energy, and patience displayed not only by the commanders but by all the officers and men of the squadron under circumstances of no ordinary trial. The terrible monotony of the African Coast is proverbial, and where there is no change nor relaxation from duty for a period of sometimes 12 months together, it will be readily acknowledged that many good qualities are necessary, not only for keeping up the cheerful condition of the men, but for the due maintenance of discipline, order, and efficiency. There are privations also, of different kinds, which the cruisers are subject to. Fresh meat is scarce, and not very enticing, and with the exception of yams which are often not to be obtained, in consequence of the drought, no other vegetables are seen, excepting they come in small quantities as presents to the officers from the private gardens of their friends on shore. Fowls, ducks, and turkeys, can be procured at Jella Coffee, but a dozen heads of poultry would not be equal to a good English fowl." Then he goes on in the same tone, showing how very trying it is to the officers and men, and then in another passage he says, "the incessant rolling which is most trying, the constant rumbling of the heavy surf upon the beach which becomes tedious from its monotony, the low and uninteresting appearance of the land, all have an effect even upon the best organised mind that is sometimes distressing, and we have, I grieve to say, examples of the effect of these trials in the invaliding of officers and others from mental disorganization." That is a very correct picture of the service on that coast under this close blockade system.

3500. In fact, the service along shore, must be more unhealthy than out at sea?—From that cause, the monotony and tediousness of it; but not from any positive malaria or fever.

3501. Does that practically involve much boat service up the river?—On that coast, there are no rivers into which boats can be sent, except at Lagos; at the Volta there has been one expedition sent up, but that has been quite an exception; it is never the practice to the cruisers on that part of the coast to send boats up the river.

3502. Sir John Hay.] You speak of the Bight of Benin, and not of the Bight of Biafra?—Yes.

3503. Chairman.] Does that involve much service in the way of the destruction of dépôts of slaves and barracons; have they to land from time to time for that purpose?—I do not remember any instance of any barracoon having been destroyed in the Bights; there was one destroyed lately on the South Coast near the mouth of the Congo.

3504. Do you agree with Commodore Wilmot that the service is very unhealthy, or do you think that it is injurious to the discipline of the Navy?—I do not consider it injurious to discipline; during the time I held the command, the object was to send the cruisers in turn for a trip to St. Helena, but it was seldom that the number of the cruisers was sufficient to allow of that. I must explain that in the year 1856 the slave trade was almost at an end. In 1857 there was a sudden

sudden revival of it to a very great extent, caused, first, by the expiration of a convention with France, who had refused to renew it, but chiefly to the very large use of the American flag and the positive orders that our cruisers should not interfere with any vessel with American papers. We could not interfere even with a vessel full of slaves, and in one instance a vessel actually passed one of our cruisers, and although our officers had strong reason to suspect that there were slaves on board, they could not meddle with them. That led to a very great increase of the slave trade in 1857 and 1858, and the consequence was that the cruisers were constantly employed on the coast with very little relaxation.

3505. What is the strength of the French squadron on the west coast of Africa?—It is difficult to say. There was only one vessel that you might look on as a cruising vessel, the commodore ship; the others were all small vessels employed in the colonial service in Senegambia and the Gaboon.

3506. On the cessation of the French treaty did they withdraw their squadron?—No.

3507. Under the treaty were they not bound to keep up 26 ships?—That was put an end to at the commencement of the Russian War, and it was not renewed afterwards.

3508. Mr. Mills.] Was that by a treaty?—No. We were bound to keep up a force of 24 ships; at the time of the Russian war it was reduced to 10, and the number has never been brought up to 24 since; and, as we do not keep up a force of 24 ships, I presume that we could not call on France to keep up a force of 26 ships.

3509. Chairman.] But we have renewed our number and they have not; is not that so?—Not to the full extent.

3510. Mr. Mills.] Is it the case that at present France is not bound to keep any ships on the coast?—I think not. The convention having ceased, I think that all engagements between France and this country have come to an end.

3511. Chairman.] Did the Americans keep a squadron on the west coast of Africa?—Until the breaking out of the civil war they did.

3512. During the war has it been wholly withdrawn?—I think I may say wholly. I am not sure that one vessel has not visited the coast, but not more than one; so, practically, they have been withdrawn.

3513. The French ships which you have mentioned were stationed near the River Assinée, were they not?—Principally in Senegambia, that is, in Senegal and Goree, and in the Gaboon. In the years 1857, 1858, when the system of emigration was going on their vessels visited the Congo, where they had an establishment also.

3514. The Dutch had no ship of war on the west coast of Africa, had they?—I cannot say. I do not remember.

3515. The Spanish and Portuguese keep a few ships off their own stations, do they not?—The Portuguese have a few ships, which go so far north as the Island of St. Thomas occasionally, but principally they were employed between the Congo and Bonga, and they captured several slaves during my time.

3516. As far as any naval means taken to suppress the slave trade, you may say that from the Gambia to the Bights, the British Navy alone is engaged at present?—Alone. I believe there

was one American cruiser occasionally in the Bights in 1858 and 1859.

3517. Do you conceive that such Spanish and Portuguese ships as there are there are really in earnest in stopping the slave export where they are stationed?—When I was on the station no Spanish ship was there at all.

3518. They have re-established their settlement at Fernando Po, have they not?—Yes. The Portuguese ships, I have no doubt, did their best; they had one corvette, and some small vessels; they were very little supported by the local governors. The Governor General was in earnest, but he was ill-supported. There was not one man in 50 along the coast who might not be bribed to permit the emigration of slaves.

3519-21. Which, in your opinion, is the most effectual mode of stopping the slave trade; this coast blockade, or some pressure on the Spanish Government, in whose dominions the only remaining demand exists?—I think there can be no doubt that if the Spanish Government are in earnest to prevent the importation of slaves into Cuba, the whole question is settled. I have reason to believe that the satisfactory information has lately been received that five slaving expeditions have been lately captured by the Governor General of Cuba, and that he had called attention to the number of negroes who are ready for emigration on the coast.

3522. What part of the West Coast of Africa was referred to as the spot where those collections of slaves were made?—I have no doubt it would be in the Bights, and on the Congo, because I find that a very large number of slaves in both those places have been kept in readiness for shipment. The attempts have been defeated by the efforts of our cruisers, and there has been a very great mortality among them in consequence.

3523. The mouth of the Congo would be within the operation of our squadron, would it not?—Yes.

3524. The mouth of the Congo is, at this moment, disputed territory, I believe?—The Portuguese Government claim the right to the territory up to the entrance of the Congo.

3525. Will you state what is your opinion with respect to the use of the British forts and settlements on shore to the operations of the squadron; do they afford any assistance to the squadron?—I think certainly not.

3526. To what part of the coast does your last answer refer?—I should say they are of little use generally, both with regard to the rivers in the north, between the Gambia and Sierra Leone (which is the only part in the north division from which slaves have lately been shipped), and also with regard to the part from the Volta to Cape Lopez. I am not aware that there had been any shipment from the Gold Coast for many years before our settlements were put upon the footing they now are on.

3527. Then, in fact, you are of opinion with regard to the uselessness of the British settlements to the operations of the squadron, that that applies to the whole of the west coast?—Certainly. The places from which the slaves are principally shipped are from Cape Volta to the southward, and we have no settlement there; Quittah is of no use.

3528. Take the Gold Coast; what is the use of the four or five forts that we maintain there?—I should be at a loss to answer that question. As far as regards the slave trade, I think none.

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Vice-Adml. 3529. You think that, as far as regards the
 Sir slave trade, if the forts were withdrawn no slave
 F. W. Grey, export could take place there?—I should not
 G.C.B. apprehend that there is any danger of it. There
 are different opinions upon that subject, but that
 8 May 1865. is my opinion.

3530. But in saying that, do you think that the squadron could undertake the blockade of the coast, or that there would be no slave export to necessitate a blockade?—If the slave trade were revived it would be necessary for the squadron to operate, but I should not apprehend any danger of its revival.

3531. If the forts were abandoned, should you propose stationing some ships off that coast at once?—There is no ship permanently stationed on the Gold Coast; it is only occasionally, when required by the governor (which has been pretty often of late) that ships are stationed there.

3532. If the forts were abandoned would ships be necessary, either stationed there or cruising off the coast?—I should be sorry to give a decided opinion on that point; but I should not apprehend the necessity of employing a large force; it might be necessary to increase the squadron to a certain extent.

3533. Can you give the Committee any opinion with regard to the necessity of the forts for the purpose of the protection of commerce?—I have formed an opinion on that point, and certainly that opinion is not favourable to the effect of those settlements in increasing our trade; I find that there has been a very great falling off indeed in the exports from that coast, and therefore I do not conceive that the settlements are productive of any advantage to our commerce.

3534. The Committee have had evidence before them which leads them to suppose that if we were to abandon those forts it is very probable that the Ashantees would overrun at all events the Fantees, and those tribes on the west side of the Gold Coast lying between them and the sea; now supposing that was to be the consequence, do you think that a power like the Ashantees, holding the whole of the country more strongly than a smaller power, would be as favourable to the continuance of commerce as the smaller tribes holding that country under the protection of the British Government?—As the interests of the natives are to carry on trade, I should not imagine that it would have any prejudicial effect on commerce; but it is a question that I am not able to answer.

3535. Sir John Hay.] You are probably aware that previously to your command on the coast a very large export of slaves took place from Bonny and other rivers in the Bight of Biafra?—Yes.

3536. The slave trade has entirely ceased from those rivers?—Yes.

3537. There are no forts or military settlements on those rivers?—None.

3538. The slave trade has been extirpated there by commerce (without any military fort to support it) in consequence of the blockade of the squadron?—It has been entirely destroyed by the operation of legal commerce, supported by our cruisers occasionally visiting those rivers.

3539. Without any military force?—Without any military force; they have not even a consular agent permanently stationed in the river.

3540. Do you not think similar reasoning would show that on other portions of the coast a similar policy might be equally successful?—I would go further, and say that the same result was produced at Lagos; before it became a British colony

the slave trade had been entirely put an end to by legal trade, and that legal trade in the year 1857 was very extensive indeed, and was increasing every day under the direction of that very able man, Mr. Campbell, who was consul there, and who died afterwards; we had no forts or establishment at that time, it was supported by a gun-boat.

3541. Chairman.] Then, in fact, the first requisition for commerce being peace, you think there was better peace kept when the native coast remained under the government of the country, than since the British have assumed the Government?—I should be sorry to give an opinion with regard to the causes of the wars that have taken place lately, but it is certainly the fact that during the last two or three years, the wars in the interior have almost destroyed our trade at Lagos, and that it is very little, compared to what it was formerly.

3542. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] Are you aware that this war began before we assumed possession of Lagos, and quite independently of it. I mean this war which has been going on since?—I do not wish to venture upon an opinion with regard to what the cause of the war was. I am not competent to give an opinion.

3543. Chairman.] Is it your general opinion that the assumption of the Government by the British, rather leads to disturbances than otherwise?—That is my impression.

3544. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] Do you mean that the fact of our occupying Lagos, in your opinion, has had anything to do with the origin or continuance of those neighbouring wars?—My impression is, that our interfering with the native tribes, instead of allowing them to fight their own battles, has had a very injurious effect. The establishment of the blockade of Abbeokuta two years ago, I believe to have been an injudicious measure.

3545. Do you think that it tended to prolong the war between the Egbas and the Ibadans?—I should not like to give a direct answer, but my impression is, that it produced mischief rather than good.

3546. Mr. Mills.] I believe that the actual result for a time, was almost to extinguish the trade of Lagos?—On looking at the returns of the exports of palm oil from Lagos, I find in a despatch of Mr. Campbell (dated in 1859) that in 1857 the total number of tons of palm oil exported from Palmas was 3,260, and Lagos 3,714; the value of which was 313,000 *l.*; from Badagry, Porto Novo, Appaveista, Godome, it was 5,750 tons, and of the value of 241,000 *l.*, making a total of 550,000 *l.* in that year. The last report is, that the palm oil exported from Lagos in 1862 was valued at 60,000 *l.*, in 1863 it was 138,000 *l.*, and in 1864 it was 123,000 *l.*; that 1864 report, I presume, includes Badagry and Palma; therefore, the falling off is certainly very remarkable, but to what cause that is to be attributed, I do not say.

3547. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] Do you not think that the long-continued war is enough to account for it?—Probably.

3548. You would not say that the blockade of the River Ogun for a few weeks was the cause of it?—To answer you I should require to go much deeper into the question with regard to the origin of the war, and how far our interference has aggravated difficulties; and I would rather not give an opinion.

3549. You have no personal knowledge of those affairs since 1857, I suppose?—Not further than reading reports which have constantly come before me from the officers on the coast; they come from the coast almost direct to the Admiralty. The impression on my mind is that the wars have been very much aggravated by the occupation of Lagos, and the extension of our territory.

3550. Do you mean by the fact of the occupation of Lagos, or by the policy which has been pursued there?—It is difficult to separate one from the other; it is the natural consequence, perhaps, of its becoming a Government establishment, and the exercise of our authority there.

3551. The natural object of the Colonial Government has been to put a stop to those wars that have been so very injurious to the trade and revenue, has it not?—No doubt.

3552. *Chairman.*] But they have not been very successful?—They have not been very successful.

3553. *Sir John Hay.*] You think the native wars would have burnt themselves out if it had not been for the supposition that one side or the other might fancy that they would obtain support from the British Government?—Yes.

3554. *Chairman.*] Otherwise the greatest power would, you think, predominate over the weaker, and establish something like a strong native government?—There were several disputes between the missionaries and the consuls at Lagos some years back. Those disputes were always settled without any resort to force, and they had no prejudicial effect on our trade.

3555. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.*] Do you mean, as a matter of fact, that our Government has given any support to either of the contending parties, such as could possibly tend to prolong the war, and if so in what way?—There may be a feeling on the native mind that it would have that tendency, and, I think, it is probable there is; but I have not had time to look much at the papers. I only speak from mere impression, and I should be very sorry to be quoted as giving a decided opinion one way or the other on a point of such importance.

3556. The only active interference was that temporary blockade of the River Ogun for the purpose of compelling the Abbeokutas to protect British trade on the river?—That is the blockade to which I alluded, and I do not think it met with the approval of the naval officers stationed there.

3557. *Chairman.*] But your general impression is that the assumption of the Government on the coast by the British, forced us into collision with the native tribes, their customs, and their Government?—That is my general impression.

3558. *Sir John Hay.*] And raised hopes which otherwise would not find place in the native bosom?—Yes; leading them to look to the British authority, rather than settle their quarrels among themselves.

3559. *Chairman.*] Your late answers with regard to the effect of our occupation on the trade seem to give some weight to the memorials from Lagos, of both the British merchants and the native residents there, which are given in the Appendix to Colonel Ord's Report; have you seen that report?—Yes.

3560. Do you attach much weight to those memorials; one of them is from the Sierra Leone traders, which complains of the state of affairs at

Lagos, and declares it to be much worse than when it was under native rule; that the native rule is much better than British rule for Lagos. There is another memorial from the British merchants, which says that the depressed condition of trade exceeds anything ever known even in the most barbarous state of the settlement, and there is a third from certain native residents of Lagos, which complains of the state of things since the British have assumed the government, saying that the state of things, under King Docemo, when there was a British Consul there, was preferable; are the Committee to understand, from your recent answers, that you attach weight to these memorials as representing a real grievance?—There is a passage in the one signed by Mr. McCoskry, which I think very much supports the view which I take; it says, "Your memorialists have reason to know or fear that some, at least, of the Egba chiefs, who are the principal supporters of the war, are encouraged in their persistence in it by false notions, instilled into their minds by injudicious advisers here, of the advantages which they will ultimately attain by their present course of action." I think that is very much the view that I should be inclined to concur in; I observe that Colonel Ord does not attach any importance to those memorials, and as he has been inquiring on the spot I should be sorry to put my opinion in opposition to his.

3561. But you are inclined to attach more weight to those memorials yourself?—Yes.

3562. Supposing the British Government were to think it was necessary, at all events, to maintain things very much as they are, so long as the slave trade continues, would you think it a wise plan that the Governments along the West Coast of Africa so to be maintained should at all events be concentrated more than they are now?—It would be a decided advantage if they were placed under one central authority.

3563. The Committee have had two opinions with regard to where that should be; one preferring Sierra Leone, as an old settlement, and as having the establishments all ready, and another recommending a point on the Gold Coast, near the Volta, as more central; that plan, of course, incurring the expense of new establishments. Which of those two would you recommend?—I do not think that there would be any advantage in moving the seat of the Government from Sierra Leone to the Volta. You would move it to the leeward of your dependencies, and all communications would be by steam as far as the Gambia; Sierra Leone is more central, and you can run down without any difficulty, even in sailing ships; and considering the establishments that you have there, and the advantages which it possesses, it would be better suited for a place of Government than any place on the Gold Coast.

3564. Sierra Leone was the Central Government before the Report of the Committee of 1842, which induced the British Government to make several other Governments, chiefly owing to the inconvenience found in judicial proceedings and military operations, from the distance of Sierra Leone from the other stations; do you conceive that the greater use of steam, at the present time, would remove the objection which was then found to the distance of Sierra Leone?—Certainly; but I should consider that if that plan were adopted, it would be advisable to reduce our establishments at other points as much as possible,

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possible, and I think that it would be better to have no military force on the Gold Coast whatever; if any force be required, it should be rather in the shape of a native police, and the difficulty about the transit would, then, to a great extent, cease.

3565. Supposing that course was pursued, should you recommend that more than one fort should be maintained on the Gold Coast?—One would be sufficient, I think.

3566. Which would you propose to retain?—Cape Coast would appear naturally to be the last place, but I observe that Accra is considered more healthy, but the fort having been destroyed by an earthquake, it would be a consideration whether it would be worth while to go to the expense of a new establishment; all that is a question to be decided on the spot.

3567. But supposing that to be done, should not we lose the means of raising a revenue upon the coast by which the greater part of the expense of the settlement is covered?—You certainly would lose the revenue which is now necessary to maintain the establishment that you have at present; but if you reduced those settlements the same amount of revenue would not be necessary, and I believe that you might remove some of those duties and other impediments to the increase of commerce, and that it would be fully compensated by the returns. I find that the revenue is barely equal to the maintenance of the present establishment.

3568. Would you simply propose a diminution of the number of the settlements at Lagos from the four which we now have, namely, Badagry, Palma, Leckie, and Lagos?—It may be interesting to the Committee for me to say that I wrote to Commodore Wilnot about that, and asked his opinion with regard to the advantage of having an extensive territory connected with Lagos, and in his answer he says he thinks it would be infinitely better to confine ourselves to the Island of Lagos and the shores immediately adjoining which are necessary for the protection of the island; and when I observe the decrease of the trade I do not see any sufficient reason for keeping up the extensive territory which we have now.

3569. If that step were taken, of course imports would take place at Badagry, Palma, and Leckie without paying customs to us, and we should therefore lose our revenue at Lagos?—Yes.

3570. But do you suppose that the loss of revenue would be compensated by the reduction of the expenditure?—It would depend entirely on what establishment you kept up. I should wish to see the establishment at Lagos reduced to the lowest possible point.

3571. At this moment the expenditure at Lagos is nearly 23,000 *l.* for the last year, and that is defrayed by the revenue arising from the customs' duties with the exception of 4,455 *l.* paid from the British Exchequer; do you think that if we sacrificed our customs in order to compensate the Government of Lagos that 4,455 *l.* paid by the British Exchequer would, in fact, cover the necessary expenditure?—I think the expenditure of the establishment at Lagos is greater than what you say. I find the civil fixed establishment in 1862 was 1,700 *l.*; in 1863 it was 6,900 *l.*; and in 1864 it was 9,836 *l.*; while the pensions have increased from 480 *l.* to 1,654 *l.*, making a total of above 11,000 *l.* out of the 22,000 *l.* of which the expenditure consists. I should think that that

might be very largely reduced indeed. That does not represent the whole cost, because there are police and gaols, and in the miscellaneous expenses, stated at 7,000 *l.*, I find in a note that part of the expense of police and gaols is included.

3572. Suppose the Governor General were placed at Sierra Leone, and that all the troops were placed there too, what would be the civil establishment which you would think necessary at the Island of Lagos?—That is a difficult question to answer. Formerly we had one consul and some assistants, I believe.

3573. I understood your proposition to be that we should still retain the government?—I said that if you did retain the government it would be advisable to reduce that establishment. Whether it is advisable to retain the government at all is another question, which must be for other people to decide, because there are difficulties, of course, in abandoning a government once established.

3574. My last few questions were intended to suppose that we retained the government, but that having placed the central Government at Sierra Leone, we should reduce the lieutenant governorships to a small amount. I understood you to propose that we should abandon Badagry, Palma, and Leckie, and retain the Island of Lagos, under the supposition that we retain it under a lieutenant governor of some sort?—I have spoken generally. I do not think there is an advantage in having an extended territory there; but I have not gone into details of what would be necessary, nor am I prepared to give an opinion on that point. If, however, you ask my opinion, I should say decidedly if that country could be put into the hands of any of the natives it would be infinitely better to have no territory there, but to have a consular agent; but I am not prepared to propose an establishment for the Government if it is retained.

3575. Your opinion is that if it were possible to restore the native king, it would be better?—Quite; but I do not know whether the present king is a man to whom it could be returned. There are difficulties, of course; but, in the first place, I am very much influenced by knowing the extreme unhealthiness of the place.

3576. On the point of unhealthiness, that actual mortality among our officers does by no means represent the whole of the injury done to the service. Do not many come home so invalided both in mind and body as to be very little capable of doing public service afterwards?—Yes, the number invalided is very large. I have got a return for three years, 1858, 1860, and 1861. I find that the deaths from disease on the coast in 1860 were 17.6 per 1,000; on the south-east coast of America, which is the nearest station to it, it was only 8.8, and on the home station it was 8.2; the number invalided on the coast was 35.2 per 1,000; on the south-east coast of America it was 21.0 per 1,000; on the home station it was 24.8. In the following year, 1861, the deaths from disease on the coast were 21.0 per 1,000; on the south-east coast of America 12.0 per 1,000, and on the home station 6.8 per 1,000. The number invalided was, on the coast, 32.0 per 1,000; south-east coast of America 22.0 per 1,000, and on the home station 26.0 per 1,000. That does not represent the whole of the injury done, because I have constantly to see officers returning from the station, and I am always very much struck with the very marked appearance

appearance of ill health which they generally present.

3577. *Mr. Mills.*] Can you give the Committee any comparison with the China Station?—No, I have not got the return with me.

3578. Do you know what comparison it would show?—The China Station is the only one which is higher, China and West Indies; they vary extremely, but of course that depends much on the service; our ships in China have been exposed to a very unhealthy service and an arduous service, and have suffered a great deal more.

3579. *Mr. Cave.*] Your answers are confined to the squadron, I presume?—Those figures which I have given are from the statistical reports of the Navy.

3580. *Lord Alfred Churchill.*] Those proportions would exist, although we gave up the settlement, I suppose?—A great part of the sickness on the coast of Africa arises from the employment of the boats and vessels up the rivers; so long as the vessels are employed upon the coast, they are a great many of them very healthy, but if they are employed up the rivers, that employment is invariably followed by fever, and the vessels are very often forced to go off the coast to recruit.

3581. *Chairman.*] Supposing the slave trade to cease, do you conceive that, for the protection of commerce, a squadron of some sort must still be maintained around the West Coast?—Most decidedly.

3582. I suppose that a much smaller squadron would suffice?—Yes, it might be reduced one-half.

3583. Considering the service would be totally different from the in-shore service, would you propose a different class of ships for the purpose of protecting commerce?—No, I think not; there need be no great change. I am afraid that they would always be very unhealthy, because they would necessarily be employed a good deal in the rivers; for instance, in the Delta of the Niger, the necessity of sending ships up there is constantly recurring and is always injurious.

3584. What would be the principal employment of the squadron so maintained on the West Coast, the slave trade having entirely ceased?—The protection of British interests is generally the same as in any other part of the world, only there it would be more difficult in many cases than it is in general.

3585. In fact, supporting the consuls, and settling disputes between the traders and the natives?—I may answer you by referring to my own experience; for instance, a requisition is sent from the governor of one of our Colonies, saying a tribe has been making inroads into our territory, and asking for assistance in preventing or punishing invasion; and then again, where we have no settlements, in the Delta of the Niger, disputes arise between the traders and the natives, arising out of what I fear is often not very scrupulous conduct on the part of the traders, and the natives commit some outrage; the commodore is then called upon to send a vessel into the river to punish the offenders; we have now a quarrel going on with King Pepee, in the Bonny River, and we had one not long ago in Benin, and that kind of thing will, I am afraid, continue.

3586. Does that kind of service at present divert the squadron from the service of the suppression of the slave trade, very much?—Very much. Those services have interfered very much with

their duties in the suppression of the slave trade; whenever boats are sent up the river, particularly at certain seasons, it is invariably followed by sickness, which often necessitates the removal of the ship from the station for a considerable period.

3587. Supposing we concentrated the Government as you suggest, would the Governor General be stationed permanently at Sierra Leone, or would you propose that by means of a steam ship he should personally communicate with his lieutenant governors?—It would be impossible to carry on the government unless he had a steamer exclusively at his own disposal.

3588. He would have a sort of roving command, and be very much afloat?—Yes.

3589. All the regular troops commanded by English officers should also be concentrated at Sierra Leone, I suppose?—Yes.

3590. And should be sent where they were required by steam transports when wanted?—Yes; the accommodation for the troops at present on the coast is very insufficient; a very large expenditure would be required to make it healthy.

3591. There is a spot at Sierra Leone where such a concentration of troops might be effected, is there not?—I think so, up the hills.

3592. How many harbours of refuge would be necessary for the squadron, supposing it were maintained for the purposes of commerce after the slave trade had ceased?—I think none but Sierra Leone; that must be maintained for the commissariat.

3593. How many coaling stations would be necessary?—I should think it would be almost necessary to have a coaling station at Fernando Po; I do not think anywhere else would be necessary; I do not know whether an arrangement might not be made with the Mail Company to supply coal for the steamers; probably it might.

3594. *Lord Alfred Churchill.*] Are you acquainted with Amboise Bay?—While I was in command of the station a proposal was made to transfer the establishment from Fernando Po to Amboise Bay, in consequence of the Spaniards having taken possession of the colony again; that was very carefully examined by Commander Wise and other officers, and their report was so unfavourable that I recommended the experiment should not be made.

3595. I thought it was considered more healthy?—Yes, it might be considered more healthy, but the anchorage was not sufficiently secure to enable the vessels to coal with safety.

3596. *Chairman.*] Have you any acquaintance with Liberia?—I went to Monrovia in 1858, and I was very much pleased with what I saw there. Both the President and the Vice President were absent; the only person there was the Secretary of State, Mr. Warner. I visited all the schools and I was greatly gratified with them; but I was very much struck with the extreme unhealthiness of the situation that had been selected for them. I believe that no white man ever slept on shore without getting a fever.

3597. Is it your general impression that that settlement will extend?—From what I have heard lately, I should imagine not; but I have no authentic information upon that point.

3598. Have you any information to give the Committee with regard to the French station at Senegal?—There are reports from Commodore

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Wilmot which could be furnished to the Committee, but I have not referred to them.

3599. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Are the Oil Rivers well adapted for commerce with the natives?—Except from being unhealthy, they are very well adapted. There are certain difficulties also in the approach to those rivers, but the vessels once in the rivers are perfectly secure.

3600. Except with respect to their unhealthiness, they are favourably situated for the purpose of carrying on commerce with the interior?—Certainly.

3601. Would you say that the same remark applies to the Gold Coast?—On the Gold Coast the vessels can anchor at any point; they can ship cargoes by canoes; but they have no rivers leading into the interior, by which produce can be brought down.

3602. The Gold Coast is very ill adapted, naturally, for the purpose of commerce with the interior?—It has no water communication with the interior, which is a great disadvantage.

3603. Do the men-of-war go any distance up the Oil Rivers?—We have had several vessels within the last few years which have been up the Oil Rivers. I can hardly say what distance they go up, but the "Investigator" has gone as far as Leukoya.

3604. How far up is that?—Ten days' steaming.

3605. Are there means of communication in the Oil Rivers with the interior, by means of ships, which are not possessed on the Gold Coast?—Certainly. The oil is brought down in large canoes, and shipped on board the ships; for instance, they have a dépôt for the collection of the oils, and then they ship them off.

3606. The fleet is in that way enabled to give protection to any trader that may require it upon the river?—To a certain extent, but there are many creeks in the rivers, and it is very difficult indeed to catch and punish the offenders; we have had some rather disastrous losses in attempting to do it.

3607. Is it possible to argue from the case of the Oil Rivers, to the case of the Gold Coast, with regard to the mode in which commerce should be supported and protected?—There is certainly very little resemblance between them, nor have I any information with regard to what the produce of the interior may be. I only go by the very large exports which there used to be some years ago, compared to the very small produce now. Colonel Ord's report states, that from 1854 to 1858 the exports from the Gold Coast amounted to 740,000*l.*, and from 1859 to 1863 it was 530,000*l.*; the returns for the last year are the least favourable of all.

3608. Would you say that the trade for which, in its natural state, the Gold Coast would be best adapted, as it originally was, is the slave trade and not legitimate commerce?—I am not aware of that; the return which I read was not at a time when there was any slave trade.

3609. All the European forts on the Gold Coast were originally established for the purpose of the slave trade, were they not?—Yes; but you are going back to a very distant time.

3610. The Gold Coast possesses none of those advantages for legitimate commerce which the Oil Rivers possess, and which commerce in the Oil Rivers has taken the place of the slave trade?—It does not possess water communication, certainly.

3611. Do you think then, such being the case,

that if we were to withdraw entirely from the Gold Coast, legitimate commerce, under these disadvantages, would of itself take the place of the slave trade as it has done in the Oil Rivers?—That is to say, assuming that the slave trade now exists.

3612. Assuming that there was no British force for the purpose of preventing it?—I am not aware how many years it is since any shipment of slaves was made from the Gold Coast; but I fancy it is a great many years, and therefore I do not see how legal commerce could take the place of the slave trade, which does not exist.

3613. I am supposing that the slave trade would be revived?—I am not aware on what ground that supposition arises; I am not competent to give an answer on a question of that kind; I am not sufficiently acquainted with the interior to enable me to judge what probability there is of the revival of the slave trade. I should not apprehend that there is much danger of that, but I do not like to commit myself to a decided answer upon that point.

3614. Do you think that the presence of a great slave-trading power, like Ashantee, at Cape Coast, without any British authority there, would not infallibly tend to revive the slave trade?—I must first ask what you mean by a great slave power; does domestic slavery exist along the whole of the coast, and Ashantee is no more a slave power than any other tribe.

3615. I mean a powerful native king such as the King of Ashantee or Dahomey, who is in the habit of making wars and getting a great number of slaves, and who will be anxious to turn them into wealth for himself?—I really have not the necessary information on that point; my evidence relates chiefly to the employment of the squadron.

3616. At all events, if such results were to follow our withdrawal from the Gold Coast, there would not be those facilities for legitimate commerce which exist in the Oil Rivers, and which have been a powerful means of putting an end to the slave trade in the Bight of Biafra?—Certainly not; I do not suppose that you would ever get the same amount of exports from the Gold Coast; I see that legitimate commerce has been constantly falling off for many years; what causes that I am unable to say.

3617. Sir *Francis Baring*.] When Lagos was extended, and Badagry and Palma were taken in, was any application made by either the Colonial Office or the Foreign Office to the Admiralty for the opinion of their officers?—I have no doubt the fact was communicated to the Admiralty.

3618. But previously to its being done was the opinion of Sir Baldwin Walker called for; I suppose if it were called for it would go through the Admiralty?—I have no recollection of any such reference having been made, but I cannot speak to that.

3619. Did you find any inconvenience by the division of power over those settlements between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office when you were in command?—That was not the case when I was in command of the station. Lagos was not in our possession as a territory at that time; it was entirely under the Foreign Office.

3620. Sierra Leone was colonial, I suppose?—Yes, but they were independent Governments altogether, and there was no inconvenience felt.

3621. It has been said that there was an idea that any Sierra Leone convert on board a ship was differently dealt with from any other native employed;

employed; have you any reason to suppose that that was so?—Do you mean boys who were taken on board for education? There were 12 African boys. An order had been given some time before I was on the station which had fallen into disuse, and which there was a great desire to revive. Twelve boys were taken on board; six were taken on board the flag-ship, and six others were distributed in different ships in the squadron. Are those the persons to whom you allude?

3622. No, I am referring to the answer given by Captain Burton to question 2575, ending with the words, "it would have been very difficult to persuade any officer of a cruiser to flog or punish him, being a Sierra Leone man." I imagine that no naval officer has power to flog a man unless he belongs to the ship, therefore I do not exactly understand what the meaning of that is?—The officers in command of the ships have no authority to act as magistrates.

3623. But with regard to those who are on board the ships, how is it?—The only people belonging to Sierra Leone serving on board ship were those I mentioned, and they were not treated differently from any other people on board.

3624. When was this order for those boys re-enacted?—The last time was at the end of 1857 or the beginning of 1858, and we had six of those boys on board the "Boscawen"; two of them were carpenters, two were blacksmiths, and two were sailmakers; they were apprenticed.

3625. How did they turn out?—Some of them turned out very well indeed; one of them is now, I think, employed at the Cape of Good Hope. The intention was, that those boys should be educated to those trades, and then return to the Colony, so that it might have the benefit of their services. In one of the other ships we had an engineer who had been brought up in a ship; he did not turn out so well, but I see no reason why they should not. There was a little difficulty not long ago, in consequence of Commodore Wilnot proposing that some of those superior boys should be allowed to mess with the midshipmen, but they all objected to it, and I must say with some justice.

3626. You have, I suppose, read a pamphlet published anonymously, but attributed to Captain Hope, where he recommends the employment of those boys, with a view of replacing the Kroomen?—I cannot think that that would answer; the Kroomen are the most valuable men you can possibly have, and I certainly have not so high an opinion of the character of liberated Africans at Sierra Leone as to think that they would ever afford the same valuable service that the Kroomen do.

3627. That has not been tried?—No.

3628. But it has been recommended by the commodore on the station, has it not?—I was not aware that it had.

3629. Supposing that pamphlet were written by Commodore Hope, which there is no doubt about, that is so, is it not?—I have not seen the pamphlet. Captain Hope was never commodore on the station; he commanded the "Prometheus" some time back. He has certainly never been in command of the station, but he may have been in command of one of the divisions.

3630. There is no commodore of the station now?—Yes, Commodore Wilnot. But not having seen the pamphlet, and not being aware of what the exact object of it is, I am unable to give an opinion upon it.

0.39.

3631. Mr. Mills.] Did I understand you to say in alluding to the high percentage of mortality in the squadron, that it was mainly due in your opinion to the employment of the Queen's ships in services which are irrespective of their special duties in the suppression of the slave trade?—Yes.

3632. It would, therefore, be incorrect to attribute to what are considered the special duties of the squadron, namely, the checking of the slave trade, that high percentage of mortality?—I would not say that the squadron, even if relieved from all extra duties up the rivers, would be as healthy as on other stations; but I have no doubt that the percentage of mortality is very largely increased by those special causes.

3633. If it were not for those duties in the interior and going up the river, do you think that the West Coast Station would be unhealthier, for instance, than the West Indian or China Station?—No, certainly not; much less unhealthy.

3634. I think you stated with regard to the probability of the legitimate commerce at Lagos being increased (if it ceased to be a British Colony and reverted to its former condition), that you thought trade would be quite as likely to increase, and more likely to increase, if it reverted to its original position as the residence of a consul?—That is the impression which I have received from reading the papers.

3635. With regard to the expediency of consolidating the settlements on the West Coast under one command, have you formed any opinion with regard to the expediency or otherwise of that officer being a naval officer?—That question has been raised, and in some ways, I think, it would be very advantageous; but I should very much fear he must sometimes be diverted from his duties as commodore of the squadron; and inconvenience might arise from his being absent from his government at St. Helena or Ascension. In some ways there would be great advantages, but it is a question of advantages and disadvantages, which require to be carefully weighed before you come to a conclusion.

3636. Sir John Hay.] I think you have alluded to two slaving expeditions having lately been seized by the Governor of Cuba?—Yes.

3637. Did you speak of expeditions about to sail from Cuba, or those on the return voyage?—The expression used is "five expeditions" (there are five), therefore, I cannot say which it is; but I believe that the Spanish Government in Cuba has been more active than it formerly was in the seizure of slavers.

3638. Do you believe that pressure or negotiation with the Spaniards would save us the trouble of keeping up a squadron for the suppression of the slave trade in Africa?—I believe that if you can get Spain to act effectually against the slave trade in Cuba, that will dispose of the whole question.

3639. Some questions have been raised before the Committee, with regard to the speed of the squadron. I gather from what you say that the stoppage of the slave trade at present depends rather on the blockading process than on the chasing process?—Yes.

3640. Would it not be desirable to have some faster ships there, for the purposes of chasing?—Very desirable; and when we get some of the fast vessels that are now building, I should be very glad to see one or two of them employed

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Vice-Adml. on the coast; but only the very fastest vessels, faster than we possess, would be of any use; if we had a vessel of 11 knots there would be slavers that would go 12 knots.

3641. With regard to the subject of the health of the squadron, is it not the case that the health of the squadron on the coast of Africa varies very considerably from epidemics which are periodical?—Occasionally, there have been outbreaks of yellow fever, but these are rare exceptions, I think; in other cases it principally arises from exposure on the rivers.

3642. Then the normal condition of the West Coast of Africa is what you state it is, namely, one of the most unhealthy services in which the men of the Navy can be employed?—Yes, from its monotony and the constant confinement of the ships on the coast it is very unhealthy; but it would not be necessarily so unhealthy as it now is if the vessels were kept out of the rivers.

3643. On the subject of the Governor General who might be employed there to superintend the whole of our dependencies, you implied, I think, in your answer, that the naval Commander in Chief was also to be the Governor; but would you think that a naval officer, not being the Commander in Chief, would be a fit and proper person to be Governor of those dependencies, having his head quarters principally afloat?—Decidedly not. I should be opposed to that, because it would be certain to lead to more difficulties. Already we find it to be the case that when a naval officer is Governor, difficulties arise which do not arise where there is a civilian. But that question would require a good deal of consideration before I could give a decided opinion with regard to a naval officer being in command of the whole coast.

3644. With respect to Ascension, is there anything you wish to say with respect to the expense of the establishments there?—I must observe, that I do not think it is fair to charge the whole of the expense of those establishments to the West Coast of Africa. I may mention, that we have lately decided on giving up our dépôt for provisions at St. Helena, and making Ascension a place of call for our ships coming from the East Indies, China, and the Cape of Good Hope; therefore, the expense I gave just now is not fairly chargeable altogether to the African squadron.

3645. *Chairman.*] But that is not included in that 158,000 *l.*?—No; we have at Ascension an establishment afloat, the "Meander" store ship; and the expense of that ship, including wages and victuals, is 18,773 *l.*; that includes the wages of all men employed on shore, marines and others, and therefore, although it is made out in this form, you must not suppose that it is the expense afloat.

3646. *Sir J. Hay.*] It is the Island of Ascension in fact?—Yes; then the establishments on shore cost altogether 668 *l.*; then extra pay to artificers and liberated Africans, 2,437 *l.*, and this last year the expenditure upon the works on shore, 3,105 *l.*; altogether, the total expenditure for the last year was 24,000 *l.*

3647. *Chairman.*] Can you state what would be the reduction of the expenditure at St. Helena in consequence of that change of plan?—For the navy it will not be very large; the only sum we pay is 100 *l.* a year to the commissariat officer who takes charge of the naval provisions; that would be discontinued, but yet we have some

expense in keeping up the stores; if we were to continue that dépôt we should be called upon to rebuild a good many of the stores, for the white ant has got into them, and that was one of our reasons for giving them up.

3648. *Sir John Hay.*] The turtles bought at Ascension are supplied gratuitously, are they not?—They are; and so are the vegetables from the Green Mountain.

3649. That is a considerable saving to the country in the issue of fresh provisions to the ships, is it not?—No; there is an amount for provisions besides; I think they are given in addition, not in lieu.

3650. But I suppose no other fresh provision could be obtained?—You have sheep and cattle; the great advantage of Ascension in that way is the sheep and cattle.

3651. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.*] You are aware that we know nothing about Ascension at the Colonial Office?—No, it is entirely under the Admiralty; it is a ship in fact.

3652. Are there any inhabitants?—It is inhabited entirely by our establishment of marines; the officers and their wives and families; there is no civil population; you are forced to keep it as low as possible, from the scanty supply of water.

3653. How long have you occupied Ascension Island?—Since we gave up Fernando Po; I forget in what year Colonel Nichol was removed to Ascension, but it was much later than the year 1807.

3654. There is a naval officer always there on shore, is there not?—There is a captain in command of the island, and we have a detachment of 100 marines, and I think about 110 Africans. I think altogether, that the population is about from 400 to 500.

3655. *Sir John Hay.*] It is a most useful possession, is it not?—It is a most useful possession; in the last few years very great progress has been made in the production of plants at the top of the hill, and they are growing very well, and we hope that it will be better supplied with water than it now is.

3656. *Mr. Baxter.*] Did I gather rightly, from the early part of your evidence, that in your opinion none of our settlements, on the West Coast of Africa, are of any use with regard to the suppression of the slave trade?—I will not go so far as to say that they are of no use, but I do not think that they are of sufficient advantage for the object of suppressing the slave trade, to make it desirable to go to any great expense in maintaining them.

3657. There has been a good deal of discussion with regard to whether the slave trade might be revived on the Gold Coast. What is your opinion upon that subject?—I am not competent to give an opinion; of course, if the removal of our settlements would lead to the revival of the slave trade, they are of value to that extent in preventing it, but I am not able to give a decided opinion with regard to that matter.

3658. As far as the suppression of the slave trade is concerned would not our squadron act more effectually on the coast of Cuba than in Africa?—We have tried that. *Sir James Hope* has had four vessels on the coast of Cuba and has not made one single capture. The difficulty is the great number of vessels passing, so that you cannot board and examine all. Now on the coast of Africa every vessel is known almost, so that if a stranger

a stranger appears on the coast our crews know her at once.

3659. Suppose that instead of having four vessels on the coast of Cuba, you took 13 or 14 vessels from Africa to Cuba, provided the present Government of the United States were willing to co-operate with us, would not that effectually put an end to the slave trade?—I do not think you could establish such a blockade as would prevent it, because I think that other nations, not the Americans, would object to the interference with their trade which would be occasioned by your boarding every vessel along the coast. The French Government and the Spanish Government would complain.

3660. We had the experiment attempted of a blockade on the coast of Cuba some years ago. Did any difficulties arise between us and any other nation except the United States at that time?—It is my impression that it was given up in consequence of the difficulties which arose.

3661. That was from the Government of the United States only, was it not?—Not only from the Government of the United States. I think we should have more difficulties with the French Government now than with the United States.

3662. But in the former operations on the Cuban Coast, was it not from difficulties with the United States alone that we gave up that attempt?—I cannot say.

3663. Lord Alfred Churchill.] Have you any reason to believe that the French Government are desirous of extending their settlement along the West Coast?—I have heard it reported lately (how far that is to be depended upon, I cannot say) that they are desirous of transferring their establishment from the Gaboon to the Congo; that the Gaboon is not answering. A French sloop has lately been in the Congo for several days, it is supposed, with the object of forwarding the removal of the settlement; but it is merely a report.

3664. Do you think it probable that in the event of our giving up Lagos as a settlement, the French Government would occupy it?—That has not entered into my head; I think it is not probable.

3665. Mr. Buxton.] I think you have stated that no slave ships have left the Gold Coast for a long time?—So far as I am aware.

3666. Is it not the fact that there really is no slave trade from that part of the coast which is under our protection, or which is in our hands?—There has been none since I have been conversant with it.

3667. Is it not the fact that formerly it was a perfect nest of slave trading?—Yes, when slave trading was a legal adventure on the part of Englishmen, as well as others.

3668. But still the slave trade does go on at other points where we have not that influence, is not that so?—Certainly; but there are many points where it does not; for instance, there was never any slave trade from the Kroo Coast.

3669. Is there any cause to which you attribute the freedom of the Kroo Coast from the slave trade?—They have always maintained their independence; the Kroomen are a very independent race.

3670. Would not the natural inference be, since the slave trade has died out on that part of the coast which we have in our hands, and has not died out in other parts, except where the Kroomen exist, that it is our possessing or protecting that

part of the coast which prevents the slave trade?—That may be so.

3671. And that if we took in hand those remaining parts of the coast, Whydah and a few other places, we might hermetically seal the West African Coast?—The question seems to me to be one of expense and human life; if you are prepared not to care about the sacrifice of life or money, you may, I have no doubt, by taking possession of numerous points on that coast, put an end to the slave trade.

3672. There are very few points at which the slave trade prevails, is not that so?—Take Whydah as an example; the occupation of Whydah has been discussed and reported on, and the result which I arrived at was that it was practicable, but that it would be attended with a very great sacrifice of life, and that the squadron on the whole was preferable in preventing the slave trade; I think that any attempt to revive the slave trade might be prevented along the Gold Coast at a less cost than that of maintaining those forts and garrisons.

3673. You are of opinion that the cruisers do actually prevent a very large amount of slave trading?—I may refer to a statement in Colonel Ord's Report, which shows that the moment our cruisers were removed from the entrance to the Pongas and Nunez Rivers, an attempt was made there which was only defeated by the slaves rising and taking possession of the vessel; the neighbourhood of our settlement at Bulama and Sierra Leone did not prevent that attempt being made.

3674. Your own experience is in favour of maintaining the cruisers there in order to suppress the slave trade?—Certainly; taking the question of human life into consideration, it is the best way, in my opinion.

3675. Supposing that we gave up the attempt to suppress the slave trade, should we not be still obliged to keep up a naval force on that coast to prevent piracy?—I have already answered that in reply to previous questions.

3676. Do you consider that it is of any value in training the officers and men, and maintaining the cruisers on the coast?—I do not think that there is any squadron in our service in which the discipline is higher or better than the African squadron; the ships coming home from there come home in a state most creditable to the officers and the men, and I look upon it as a very good school; but, of course, it is a very unpleasant one for both the officers and the men.

3677. If we had made no attempt to suppress the slave trade on the West Coast of Africa, should we simply throw those ships out of commission; should we not be obliged to keep, at all events, a portion of them in commission in order to keep the officers and the men employed, and to give them the requisite training in order to be prepared in case of a sudden outbreak of war?—My experience is, that we never have ships enough to meet the demand made upon us from various quarters of the world. It is much better economy, in my opinion, to keep the men at home, and increase the reserves in our home ports (which are not as high as they ought to be, though they are larger than they used to be). But what should be done in the case you put is a thing which would depend on the state of the world everywhere at the time.

3678. The result would not be that we should merely dismiss those officers and men and diminish our naval force to the full extent, would it?

Vice-Adml. That opens the question of what naval force it is the policy of the country to maintain.
 Sir
 F. W. Grey, 3679. But is not this a reserve which would be available in case of war?—I do not think that the reduction of the 1,000 men that you would save from that coast (which would be the outside) would enable you to reduce your force generally; at least, I should hope not.

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3680. Why do you keep this little establishment at the Island of Ascension; is it of great importance?—It is our factory, and affords means of repairing our own cruisers on the West Coast of Africa; it is becoming very valuable; we have been sending out men and machinery; it saves us a great deal.

3681. In spite of all the tedium and danger of this service, do you think it is one which naval men are eager to go on for the chance of prize money or promotion, or is it one which they dislike?—When they are appointed they make no difficulties, but I would rather leave that question to be answered by other witnesses.

3682. Sir Francis Baring.] Is the service generally unpopular?—I do not know that it is.

3683. To the men, I mean?—It is decidedly among the junior officers; the officers who go in command have a chance of making prize money.

3684. But among the men is it unpopular?—I think not; but I think that probably an officer who has been lately on the coast will tell you better about it than I can; no doubt it is to some extent unpopular.

3685. Is there the slightest difficulty in manning the ships going to the West Coast of Africa?—It does not depend on the men, because we send the men on board.

3686. But you can recollect, can you not, that before your new system came into operation, that it was well known that a ship going to the coast of Africa was manned in a very short time?—Yes, the chance of prize money operated, no doubt.

3687. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] You spoke of the frequent applications and calls upon the squadron from the different parts of the coast to settle disputes with the natives and to protect trade; from what part of the coast do those calls principally come?—I remember when I was commander of the station there were two expeditions sent up the river in the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone, one or two went up the Gambia and several into the Oil Rivers. There was one also to Corisoo Island, opposite Fernando Po; a

little war went on there, and then during this Ashantee threatening, the commodore landed half his ship's crew to garrison Cape Coast Castle for three or four months.

3688. That was an exceptional case?—Yes. I am only speaking now of the different cases which I remember. Commodore Wise twice made expeditions; there was another up the Gambia; several up the Niger; and there were expeditions up the lagoon at Lagos several times.

3689. You had frequent applications from the consuls as well as from the Governments, did you not?—Yes.

3690. If consuls were to be substituted for governors at the Gambia, or at Sierra Leone, for instance, those calls on the squadron would not cease?—Probably they would not cease; but there would not be the same cause for interference on the same demand; nor does a consul speak with quite the same authority as a governor.

3691. Would not there be the same call for interference to protect the trade in the Gambia or Sierra Leone, whether it was a governorship or a consulship?—Sierra Leone is put aside. I should not think there is any idea of doing away with either the Gambian or the Sierra Leone Governments.

3692. Then, confining ourselves to the only other two possessions, namely, the Gold Coast and Lagos, without giving any positive opinion as to what the result of our withdrawing would be, you would say that if the result were to increase the slave trade, it would necessitate a considerable increase of the squadron?—Certainly.

3693. Chairman.] Have you any remark to make with regard to the position of the Mixed Commission Courts and the Vice-Admiralty Courts. Are they, in your opinion, situated in the best places?—Sierra Leone is the best place there, I think, certainly. It is a little inconvenient for ships on the south coast, but they have got St. Helena on the other side, and they can go to either.

3694. Can you inform the Committee why the consulate at Monrovia was abandoned?—I do not know; when I was there one gentleman was both English and French consul. I do not know whether that was the reason, but I believe that change was made just after that affair of the "Regina Celi" happened, when the gentleman who filled those two offices had very conflicting duties.

CAPTAIN LEYESON WILDMAN, R.N., called in; and Examined.

Captain 3695. Chairman.] I THINK that between
 L. Wildman, February 1861 and July 1864 you were off the
 R.N. various stations of the West Coast of Africa in command of a ship?—Yes.

3696. Under orders from Commodore Wilmot?—Yes, in Her Majesty's ship "Philomel," under Commodore Edmundstone and Wilmot.

3697. What part of the coast are you most acquainted with?—I know it all.

3698. Did you make any captures while you were there?—Only on the south coast below the Congo.

3699. Is that in your opinion the only part of the coast from which there is any slave export?—No, there is slave trade in the bights, but the

coast has been blockaded so closely lately that there has been no slave trade.

3700. Commodore Wilmot has maintained a very strict blockade?—Very, in the bights.

3701. Very little export of slaves exists from the neighbourhood of Congo and Loanda?—Just so; a great deal from the Congo, but very little in the Portuguese territory between Loanda and the Congo.

3702. We have had it in evidence that the removal of a ship which was stationed off the river Nunez was followed by a revival of the slave export. Is it your opinion generally that the slave trade would revive if our ships were removed?—On the whole of the coast; but I think

that there are often reported escapes of vessels from the Pongas and Nunez, which do not take place.

3703. How does that happen?—Reports come down to Sierra Leone of vessels having escaped, and when the matter is sifted, it is found that no vessels have been there; but there are of course true reports, as well as false ones.

3704. Do you suppose that many ships engaged in legitimate trade are taken for slave ships?—No, but I think that the negroes are very fond of making such reports.

3705. What are the points on the coast, where you would expect the slave export would be most likely to revive, if we withdrew the squadron?—On the bights.

3706. But with regard to the Nunez, Pongas, and Gallinas, do you think that the slave trade would be revived?—At Nunez and Pongas it might, but not in Gallinas.

3707. Why not in Gallinas?—I think that the kings and chiefs would keep their treaty with us; they are so afraid of being taken by the Liberians that they would observe that very strictly.

3708. The influence of the Government of Liberia extends outside its actual boundary, in the suppression of the slave trade, you think?—I think that the fear of the Government of Liberia, and the fear of being possessed by that Government, has an influence upon them.

3709. The fear of becoming Liberian subjects?—Yes.

3710. Have you seen much of Liberia?—Yes; I have been there a great deal.

3711. What is your general opinion of the success of the Liberian Government?—I do not think that it is as successful as it ought to be, considering the amount of skilled labour which they have got there.

3712. Do you mean that it is not as successful as it ought to be with regard to the trade of Liberia?—Yes, with regard to the trade.

3713. Is it a vigorous government in itself over its own subjects?—I think so.

3714. Is it the tendency of Liberia to extend to a greater line of coast?—Yes, certainly.

3715. Have they not only the wish but the strength to extend?—I do not think they have the power to do any good; they may have the power of destroying all the English trade.

3716. So far as they extend, they are a very effectual barrier to the slave trade, are they not?—Yes, I think so.

3717. It would be impracticable for any slave export to take place from their coast?—Quite.

3718. What is then the cause of their not extending their trade more?—Their duties are very high, and they have been extremely jealous of white men; no white man can hold any real property, and therefore there is no money invested in the country.

3719. They are chiefly mulattos from America, are they not?—Mulattos and blacks.

3720. Are they not on friendly terms with the neighbouring British Government of Sierra Leone?—To a certain extent; but they always try to obtain possession of the territory between themselves and Sierra Leone, which has caused a little jealousy.

3721. Do you think it would be adverse to the British if they did obtain that territory?—Yes, I think it would be adverse to the British interest.

3722. In what way do you think it would act?—I think that it would spoil all the trade.

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3723. Do you think that this Liberian trade will never grow?—Not so long as their present laws are in force.

3724. Their defective revenue laws you mean?—Yes.

3725. What sort of terms do the Liberians maintain with the native tribes around them?—They are generally hated.

3726. Are they at war with them?—Wars are continually occurring; there was always war on that coast.

3727. Do the English ever assist them?—Never, to my knowledge, of late years. They were once, when first established, very nearly being turned out, and then an English ship assisted them.

3728. Have they ever applied for assistance and been refused?—I think not lately.

3729. What was the state of the slave trade in the bights in July last?—There was one steamer off the coast, and it could not ship slaves; there were a number of slaves on shore in the barracoons.

3730. In what part were these barracoons?—Some at Whydah, some at Jacquin, and some further north, to the northward of Little Popo.

3731. You have been on all the stations; is the plan of cruising the same in all cases, namely, cruising in shore?—Generally speaking, it is left to the discretion of the senior officer which plan he chooses to adopt. On the South Coast you cannot do it in the same way, because the line of coast is much larger, but in the bights it is the most effective, because you can anchor your vessels so close as to be from the masthead within sight of each other for the whole length of slave-shipping coast.

3732. Do you consider that the present blockade near shore is more effective than an attempt to capture by chasing?—Most certainly.

3733. But if there were a sufficient force, you would propose that both plans should be adopted?—Both would be better.

3734. When you were off the bights, was the squadron often called in aid of the civil establishment?—Yes, a great many times in different cases.

3735. Will you mention to the Committee any particular cases in which the squadron was called upon by the civil establishments to assist them?—I was called upon at Cape Coast to leave a ship there, which I could not do. I also had to settle an affair at Little Popo and also at Aghavey.

3736. What sort of disputes were those?—They were all in fact native disputes with the Africans and British subjects.

3737. Disputes between the natives and British traders?—Yes.

3738. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] They were disputes between Africans and British subjects?—Yes, nearly all of them.

3739. Sierra Leone men?—Yes; or Gold Coast protected subjects.

3740. *Chairman*.] Do you think that the presence of the squadron, as referee on all such occasions, rather creates and encourages disputes?—Wherever British subjects can fall back on the force they are much more apt to get into trouble with the natives.

3741. But if there was no such force to fall back upon, there would be fewer disputes you think?—I think there would be much fewer disputes.

3742. Is there much legitimate trade growing up around the Portuguese settlement?—No, not

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much legitimate trade; their duties are too high, and they ruin their trade.

3743. They do not extend their government to the mouth of the Congo, do they?—They claim to extend their government to the mouth of the Congo, but they do not exercise any jurisdiction further north than Anbrils.

3744. What duties are imposed on trade coming out of the mouth of the Congo?—None.

3745. Is trade increasing there in consequence?—Every year.

3746. There is no government there to impose any duties?—No; certain amounts are paid to the native chiefs, but there are no duties.

3747. Is it your opinion that the forts on the Gold Coast and the settlement at Lagos are necessary to co-operate with the squadron in the suppression of the slave trade?—No.

3748. Do you think that the squadron, as now composed, might blockade the slave trade without the settlements?—I think that the squadron would be much better without the settlements.

3749. Even with its present strength?—Even with its present strength.

3750. Those forts, of course, effectually blockade the slave export at their own territories?—At Cape Coast Castle and Accra; but then there is a large piece of coast between them which has no fort.

3751. Do you suppose that there is any slave export from the Gold Coast?—None.

3752. Do you not think that it is prevented by the presence of the forts?—I am hardly prepared to say.

3753. But if the forts were abandoned, do you think that any export of slaves would be prevented by the squadron?—I think so.

3754. The British squadron would have to alter their stations, would they not?—They might require more ships if the coast is given up to the natives again altogether; there would be more ships required, certainly.

3755. We have had one opinion expressed, that depot ships should be placed off the coast, which would be more effectual for blockading the slave trade than the forts; do you agree with that?—Yes; I think if we had ships, with boats to chase, they would be more effectual.

3756. How many of those stations are necessary to the squadron, either for harbours or as coaling stations?—None for harbours.

3757. Then, as coaling stations, how many are necessary for the present squadron?—I think one at Fernando Po, and one at Jellacoffee, and there ought to be one in Congo, I think.

3758. Supposing the slave trade had ceased altogether, do you think that some squadron would be necessary for the protection of British commerce?—Yes.

3759. But I suppose that a great reduction might be made under those circumstances; the squadron now consisting of 13 cruisers, besides tenders or hulks?—Yes, I think that three cruisers would be ample for the whole station, supposing there were colonial vessels to do colonial work.

3760. What is the effect of this service upon the officers and men, both with respect to health and with respect to the discipline of the navy?—With regard to discipline, it requires a great deal of extra care to keep it up, and with regard to health, it is extremely bad.

3761. Not only as to the actual mortality, but

as to invaliding the men and incapacitating them both in mind and body?—Yes.

3762. It only fails in demoralising the service from the strictness of the discipline?—Yes; if it were to be strict at all lax, it would demoralise the whole station.

3763. It is a very trying service rolling about in those seas, is it not?—Yes, it is very monotonous.

3764. How long is a ship generally kept on that station?—Generally speaking, three years.

3765. Do you think that that is too long?—I think it is too long.

3766. How long would you say should be the utmost detention of a ship there?—The utmost detention actually on the station ought to be two years.

3767. You seem yourself to have been constantly moving from one station to the other, what is the general practice?—Generally one year on each division.

3768. That change to some extent diminishes the injurious effect of the climate?—The South Coast does, but the North Coast and the bights are equally bad.

3769. Do you think that the West Coast service is popular?—With the officers certainly not; it is most unpopular.

3770. Do you think that even the chance of prize money is not sufficient inducement to make people willing to go on that coast?—No.

3771. Have you any suggestion for a volunteer service there?—I think it would be the most desirable way.

3772. How would you propose that?—I propose certain advantages to be given by the Admiralty to the officers serving on the coast and letting them volunteer.

3773. What sort of advantages could be offered according to the rules of the service?—There would have to be an exceptional rule. I think that extra time would be a great inducement; that is to say, to let the service on the coast count for more than the service on the Mediterranean station.

3774. You were stationed off that coast at the time of the assumption of the government at Lagos by the British, were you not?—Yes.

3775. Is it generally your opinion that the assumption of the government by the British is an advantage, or do you think that a native government, if it could be sufficiently strengthened, would maintain peace and order?—Infinitely superior.

3776. In what particulars superior?—Trade prospers better; there are no restrictions, and their own quarrels are settled among themselves.

3777. Do you know enough of the circumstances of Lagos, between the years 1857 and 1860, to say whether they did prosper more under a consulship than they have prospered since they have been under the government of the British?—I am certain trade has decreased since we have taken it.

3778. What is the cause of the failure of the British Government there, in your opinion?—At Lagos one great cause was the heavy duties, and another thing is the constant native wars.

3779. Do you think that the assumption of the government by the British leads to those wars?—That is my opinion.

3780. Do they come into collision with the native powers more than a mere consulate would?—I think so.

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3781. But there still would be wars among those tribes, would there not, if we withdrew?—Undoubtedly.

3782. Ending in the predominance of the strongest native power?—Yes.

3783. You say that you do not think that the Liberians are able, though willing, to extend their territory; have you any information to give to the Committee with regard to the intention of the French to extend their territory from Senegal towards the Gambia?—I have only heard rumours.

3784. Under what colours was the slave trade attempted while you were there?—At first under the American flag. A vessel which I captured was under the American flag; it had the American flag, but it had no papers.

3785. What was her crew?—They were nearly all coloured men; she was a very small vessel.

3786. Sir John Hay,] What language did those coloured men speak?—English.

3787. Where did you send that prize to be adjudged?—I found that she was too small to go across.

3788. Is it frequently the case that when those vessels are unseaworthy they are destroyed?—Yes, when they are not seaworthy.

3789. Mr. Clchester Fortescue,] Have you any personal knowledge of the state of things in the neighbourhood of Lagos?—No, I have not.

3790. You do not personally know the origin of the war which has been going on, and which has had such a bad effect on the trade?—No.

3791. It is the case, is it not, that the coast from which the slaves are now exported, and which has to be watched by the cruisers, is limited?—Very limited in the bights.

3792. But, upon the whole, it is only a comparatively small extent of coast which now requires to be blockaded or watched?—The bights are very small; on the South Coast it extends a long way.

3793. But even on the South Coast, how far does it extend?—It extends from the south of the Gaboon to Little Fish Bay.

3794. There is very little slave trading south of Loanda?—Very little; but it revived a few years ago, when some vessels were taken off Benguela.

3795. But still, in comparison with former times, the extent of it is limited?—Yes, very.

3796. Have you formed any opinion with regard to the effect of the total withdrawal of the British authority and the British settlements and forts on the coast of Africa as to the slave trade?—Under what circumstances do you mean?

3797. I speak of the total withdrawal of the British settlements or forts?—With Spain still importing?

3798. Yes?—I think the squadron would have to be very much enlarged.

3799. Their operations would have to be very much extended, you think?—Yes.

3800. And therefore the number would have to be very largely increased?—Yes.

3801. Mr. Forster,] I do not quite understand your last reply compared with a previous reply; I understood you to say before, that you thought the squadron would be able to get on better without the settlement?—So I think at present. What I mean is, that there are so many requisitions calling away the services of the ships to the settlements. They are taken away from
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their duty in the prevention of the slave trade to settle disputes with the native tribes.

3802. You do not mean that if the settlements were withdrawn the object of the squadron, that is to say, the suppression of the slave trade, would not be much more difficult of accomplishment, because, I understand you now to say, that you think the slave trade would be increased?—More vessels would very likely be wanted to watch the Gold Coast.

3803. You would apply that observation generally to the coast that you are acquainted with?—Yes.

3804. How long were you on the coast?—From February 1861 until July last year.

3805. I understand that you are of opinion that our having settlements at Lagos has led to wars; on what facts do you ground that opinion?—I did not intend to convey to the Committee that it has led to wars, but that it has kept up the wars; however, I only give my own opinion.

3806. On what fact do you found that opinion?—Wherever the British power is on the coast there are wars.

3807. In what way do you suppose the British power causes wars?—I can only judge by what I have seen.

3808. In what way do you think our presence causes wars?—The governors very often interfere in native quarrels, with the best intention, and yet keep them going on.

3809. You think that, by the interference of the British Government, the wars existing among the native powers become aggravated and intensified?—Yes.

3810. On what particular facts do you base that opinion?—Not on one fact in particular, but from what I have seen on the coast, of our interference in different wars.

3811. You cannot give any special facts confirmatory of it?—No; I would rather give my general opinion.

3812. You were, for some time, on the coast of Liberia, were you not?—Yes; I was on shore two months at one time and one month at another.

3813. I understand you to say that there is a law there preventing white men from holding real property?—Yes.

3814. Is that a law against white men generally, or against any special white men?—Against white men generally.

3815. Does the same law prevent any aliens who do not belong to Liberia holding real property?—I think that any one who holds real property in Liberia must be a citizen. I am not clear about that; but no white person can hold real property; a white person cannot be a citizen of Liberia.

3816. Have you seen the law yourself?—Yes.

3817. Have you read it?—Yes, I have read it.

3818. I understood you to say that the Liberians were generally on bad terms with the natives around them?—Yes.

3819. And that they are at war with them?—They have generally got a war south of Gallinas.

3820. Had they when you were there?—They had had disturbances there, and they had had an expedition there.

3821. When was that?—It was some time the year before last.

3822. You do not know the reason of that expedition?—The expedition, I believe, was for enforcing some taxes on the Kroonien.

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3823. You mean the Kroumen in the Liberian territory?—The Liberians claim the whole of the Krou coast; and when the Kroumen will not obey their laws they send down an expedition.

3824. *Chairman.*] To impose fines, I suppose?—To impose fines.

3825. *Mr. Forster.*] I understood you to say, that you thought the policy of Liberia tended to prevent English trade?—Very much.

3826. In what manner does it do so?—The duties are too high. There are certain ports of call; they are the only places where British ships come and trade to.

3827. Had you any business imposed upon you in consequence of that?—No. I saw a great deal of it, because I was commissioner to settle a boundary question between Liberia and England.

3828. On which side?—On the Gallinas side.

3829. At what time was that?—I was there first of all in 1862, and I was there afterwards in 1863. I was employed on that matter for about three months.

3830. Was an arrangement completed between the commissioners?—No, it was broken off.

3831. On what account was it broken off?—We could not agree with respect to any terms, and so I recommended (and the commissioner with me) that everything should be left as it was to the native chiefs, and that the Liberians should not be allowed to seize the territory; and I believe that nothing has been done further.

3832. You were acting not so much on behalf of the English Government, claiming territory of their own, but trying to interfere between the Liberians and the natives?—Yes. The English Government would have been willing to give it up altogether.

3833. Was this a territory that the English Government claimed, or were you instructed to act, at the request of the English Government, on behalf of the native chiefs?—England was anxious to give it up to Liberia, not knowing the claims of the native chiefs in the Gallinas territory.

3834. I understand you that things were left *in statu quo*, and that therefore it was not given up?—Just so.

3835. Is that claimed by the British Government still?—No, not at all.

3836. Then, how could we have given it up if we had not claimed it?—We did not give it up, but we would not allow the Liberians to take it from the chiefs.

3837. What I meant was this: when you had to meet the Liberian representatives were you empowered to act for the British Government on behalf of the territory which they claimed, or were you requested to act by us on behalf of the native chiefs?—It is difficult to answer, because my instructions were not so much to act on any one's behalf, as to define a certain boundary, and if it was possible for the Liberians to prove their claim, then to let them come up to the river.

3838. The boundary between whom?—Between them and the British Government.

3839. Then the British Government must have claimed that territory?—The chiefs claimed our protection.

3840. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.*] I suppose it was a question of how far we should recognise the Liberian Government?—Yes.

3841. *Mr. Forster.*] Can you tell the Committee the present position of this territory at

Gallinas with regard to the British Government?—They claim our protection.

3842. Do you consider that they are under our protection?—I do not know how far the English Government consider so.

3843. *Chairman.*] Are you aware of there being any treaty?—Yes; I have seen it; they have a treaty, by which we are bound to protect them if they stop the slave trade.

3844. *Mr. Forster.*] For instance, if, instead of being willing to meet you as representing the British Government, the Liberians had attacked this territory, would it have been your business to have protected it on behalf of the British Government?—I think morally it would, because those chiefs have those treaties by which the British Government are bound to protect them so long as they do not carry on the slave trade.

3845. Are there any British residents there?—Yes; they have factories on the Solomon river, and a very large trade going on.

3846. There are white men there?—Yes, there are white men there; there is an enormous trade there.

3847. What position do they consider themselves in; do they consider themselves as residents in native territories, or as residents in a British colony?—They consider themselves as residents in a native territory, under treaties with England.

3848. Who are the tribes immediately around Gallinas; the native chiefs, in connection with whom you met the Liberians?—There are a great number of little chiefs; there is one chief who is most powerful; I forget his name.

3849. You do not remember any general name applying to all the tribes?—No; only the Gallinas.

3850. Are they Pagans or Mahomedans?—Mahomedans further up the country, but not on the coast.

3851. The Gallinas' people are not Mahomedans?—No, not the men on the coast.

3852. Your chief reason for thinking that the influence of Liberia is not very advantageous, is based on their conduct in this particular, I suppose?—Yes, and partly on what I have seen in Liberia; the question first arose on their sending down one of their vessels; they have got a little schooner; they sent down and ordered the factory to pay those very heavy duties; the English factory at Gallinas; then these chiefs, when they heard that they were going to take their country, appealed to the English Governor at Sierra Leone; he sent home, and then there arose another question of a slaver which was taken inside the Gallinas river, and one of our vessels went down and took her from this little Liberian vessel.

3853. *Chairman.*] When was that treaty made between the British Government and the Gallinas?—I think it was in 1845 or 1846.

3854. You saw the treaty?—Yes.

3855. Do you recollect the nature of the treaty, or who were the parties contracting?—I rather think it was Captain Denman, but am not certain.

3856. And the several tribes?—Yes; but with one particular tribe.

3857. The treaty was a contract between Captain Denman, on the part of the British Government and the several tribes?—Yes; but I am not certain of the name of the officer signing for the British Government.

3858. Mr. Forster.] You know the position of the protected territory on the Gold Coast, I presume?—Yes.

3859. Would you consider the position, when you left the coast, of this Gallinas territory with the British Government the same as that of the protected territory of the Gold Coast?—No, certainly not.

3860. What was the difference?—We acknowledge the protectorate of the Gold Coast, and the natives claim it in the Gallinas.

3861. Chairman.] Do you recollect the treaty sufficiently to know whether there were any terms in which we offered protection on our part to the Gallinas?—I do not remember, but there is that general clause in all the slave trade treaties.

3862. In your last answer, you said that we acknowledge the protectorate of the Gold Coast, but that in the Gallinas we did not; therefore in that treaty there was nothing which offered protection, I suppose?—I think so, but I cannot recollect the precise terms, the treaty must be known officially, and could be referred to.

3863. Mr. Forster.] Would you consider, as captain in command of a ship off the coast, that the natives had any claim at all on you in consequence of that treaty?—Yes, as against foreign powers.

3864. Do you consider that there was anything in that treaty that would have given them any claim on you for action?—As far as British subjects are concerned, I think so.

3865. Under what circumstances?—Suppose the Liberians had sent a vessel down to levy those duties on that English factory, and had used force, I should have felt bound to repel them.

3866. But you would not have felt bound to repel them for anything that they did to the native chiefs?—Not on my own responsibility.

3867. You would have referred to your superior officer in command?—Yes.

3868. Mr. Clichester Fortescue.] You would have merely protected the English traders against what you considered an improper assumption of the Liberian Government?—Yes.

3869. Mr. Buxton.] Do you think that three years or three years and a-half is too long for ships to remain on the West Coast of Africa?—I do.

3870. It would be more to the advantage of the crew if the time was much shorter, you think?—Yes.

3871. Would that cause any great increase in the expense if there were more frequent changes?—I do not think it would necessarily do so.

3872. But it would tend to preserve the health of the crews, and to keep their spirits up, would it not?—Very much so.

3873. I suppose they become worn out with that tedious life?—Very much so indeed.

3874. You do not see any practical difficulty in having more frequent changes?—None whatever.

3875. If even they remained on the coast could not the ships of the squadron have with advantage more frequent changes in position?—I think not with advantage.

3876. Are the men allowed to go on shore; do they often touch the coast?—In some cases they are allowed to go on shore.

3877. How many months are they at sea at a time?—In the bights they are always at a sea, because there is no harbour.

3878. What length of time would that be for one ship?—A year.

3879. Without the men going on shore?—Without the men going on shore at all.

3880. Do you think that the Liberian people were prosperous, so far as you saw?—No, I should say not, for want of capital; if they had more capital they would be.

3881. Their system of high duties of course diminishes their trade?—Yes.

3882. Is agriculture progressing?—Yes; up the river at Monrovia there is a great deal of coffee planting.

3883. Do you think that if our cruisers were withdrawn from the coast there would be a considerable increase in the slave trade?—I think, so long as there is a demand at Cuba, it will be supplied.

3884. In spite of the squadron?—Yes, in spite of the squadron.

3885. But do you not think that our fleet has a powerful effect in diminishing the supplies?—It raises the price of negroes, but they obtain as many slaves as they want.

3886. What points are there on the African coast, within your knowledge, where the slave trade now prevails?—The south coast, around the Congo.

3887. Are there any other points where it exists?—In the bights; if the squadron was removed, it would break out again.

3888. Mr. Mills.] Does your experience lead you to concur in Sir Frederick Grey's opinion, with regard to the work in which Her Majesty's ships are employed on the coast in going up the rivers, being the most unhealthy part of the work?—Certainly.

3889. The high per-centage of mortality in the squadron is mainly to be attributed to that, and not to the work in suppressing the slave trade?—Mainly.

3890. Lord Alfred Churchill.] Is it not the case that if the Liberians are fortunate enough to catch a slaver they hang the captain?—I have never heard of such a case.

3891. Mr. Clichester Fortescue.] Those applications which compel you to go up the rivers, or to send boats up the rivers, come very frequently from consuls, do they not?—I have never had an application myself from a consul that I have attended to.

3892. They also come from the governors?—Yes; I have not always attended to them.

3893. Mr. Mills.] What is the quickest speed that any vessel, in the squadron, attains to?—The fastest vessel is the "Zebra," which goes, at the utmost, 10 knots or 10½ knots an hour.

3894. You heard Sir Frederick Grey's statement, that those calls upon the squadron for the settlement of disputes with the natives, and the protection of British trade, came just as much from the consuls as from the governors; are you aware that that is the case?—I cannot speak positively, because I never had any applications from the consuls which I attended to, and only one I think from a consul at all.

3895. But you know that the British trade has to be protected in the rivers and on those coasts where there are no British settlements?—Yes, certainly; on the oil rivers, particularly.

3896. Sir John Hay.] With regard to the speed of the vessels, you said, that the "Zebra" speed was 10 knots an hour?—Ten and a-half knots an hour.

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3897. She is the fastest in the squadron?—By far, except the "Rattlesnake;" her speed may be more, but I should doubt it being much more.

3898. Do you think that a smaller number of ships of greater speed would be more effectual in the suppression of the slave trade?—I do not think so in the bights, because in the bights you can anchor then so close to each other that nothing can come in.

3899. And if anything does come in, it cannot have time to embark?—Just so.

3900. Slavers occasionally do come in, and the squadron may have weighed, and cannot overtake them?—Yes.

3901. But if, among those ships, there had been one of very great speed, that might not have occurred?—She might have chased them.

3902. It would be desirable, then, to have some vessels of a greater speed, would it not?—In addition to those which are there now, there ought to be some quicker vessels.

3903. A squadron of a certain number, arranged with a view to a blockade, assisted by faster vessels to capture slavers?—Yes.

3904. At present that element of the squadron does not exist?—My only anxiety was, when I was in the bights, that those vessels should not chase, because I felt quite safe when we were at anchor; but if we got under weigh and chased, our ships could not catch them.

3905. As senior officer you would have done your duty more satisfactorily to yourself if you had had some vessels which would have been useful in chasing?—Certainly.

3906. With regard to the Liberian law, was that law which you saw which forbade white persons to hold real property, framed in the origin of the settlement by the Americans?—I think so.

3907. And framed with a view to induce the black population to go from the Northern States to Liberia, where they could not be interfered with by the prejudices of the whites?—Yes; they were afraid that the white people would get the ascendancy, and that they would still be slaves.

3908. And that law continues in force?—Yes.

3909. The English territory at Sherboro has gradually increased to the southward during the last 20 years, has it not?—Yes.

3910. As it increases towards the southward and towards the Gallinas, those barbarous tribes assume that they will be protected by the British Government?—Yes.

3911. The English Government is more popular than the Liberian Government?—Very much more so.

3912. The treaty which you spoke of, entered into by Captain Denman, in the Gallinas, had further stimulated the tribes to throw themselves on our protection?—Yes.

3913. Have you seen those treaties?—Yes.

3914. Do they distinctly imply a protection on our part?—As far as I can recollect, I should say yes.

3915. Has it frequently occurred that an appeal has been made to the English Government, on the faith of those treaties, to protect them from Liberia?—Yes.

3916. Although you would not have taken active operations yourself against Liberia, you would have anticipated that, on any report from you that an aggression had been made by Liberia, you would have received instructions to resist it?—Yes.

3917. Mr. Clanchester Fortescue.] You have been applied to by the native tribes to protect them against the Liberian Government?—Yes, by the tribes at Gallinas.

3918. And by those only?—By those only. Our ships have been applied to on the South Krou coast.

3919. Have you never afforded that protection?—No.

3920. Have you never received any orders from head quarters to afford that protection?—No.

3921. Sir Francis Baring.] You have been asked whether it would not be an advantage that the ships should only be kept out for two years; was it not the case that for some years that was done?—Yes.

3922. In Lord Auckland's time?—Yes.

3923. Had not that a very beneficial effect on the health of the squadron?—This was before I had been on the coast, but I have always heard that it had that effect.

3924. Was it in consequence of the fresh ship which was sent out for carrying the mails?—Yes.

3925. When the line of steam communication was carried out that removed the necessity for sending out that ship, and had a bad effect in lengthening the service?—I believe so.

LYONS McLEOD, Esq., called in: and Examined.

L. McLeod,
Esq.

3926. Chairman.] You saw service on the coast of Africa on two occasions; in the squadron from 1843 to 1846, and from 1848 until 1851?—Yes.

3927. And you have been for some time Consul in the Mozambique?—Yes.

3928. Until that consulship was abolished?—Yes.

3929. Your evidence will relate principally to the first negotiations for opening the trade on the River Niger, in which you took part?—Yes. In the year 1841, as the Committee are aware, there was a large Niger expedition fitted out, which was totally unsuccessful; and, from my experience on the West Coast of Africa, I was under the impression that it had ascended the river at the wrong season, and had remained too long in the delta; the consequence was the crews got sick,

and they were obliged to leave the river. On my return from the coast in 1851-52, I proposed an expedition for ascending the Niger with the rising of the water; that is to say, when the delta of the Niger and Chadda was covered by water so that there would be no malaria arising from the decay of vegetable matter on the banks acted on by the sun. The result was, that an expedition went up the river in 1854, and returned in 1856 without the loss of a man, and since that the Niger has been open to commerce.

3930. On what terms is it now open to commerce?—It is open to all nations.

3931. What is the establishment there?—Dr. Baikie was up the river as consul.

3932. What was his station?—I believe Biddu Nupe.

3933. How far up from the mouth is that?—It

It is above the confluence of the Niger and the Chadda.

3934. About how many miles from the sea?—About 200 miles.

3935. Do you consider that the trade of those establishments will require any further protection from the British Government?—I think it would be necessary to offer a subsidy to some company or other for the purpose of keeping open the Niger for the purpose of commerce, and my reason is this: on the death of Mr. McGregor Laird his trading operations were brought to a close. I had originally proposed the successful Niger expedition in 1854. A number of the friends of Africa came to me and asked me to form a company for the purpose of continuing Mr. McGregor Laird's operations up the river. A number of friends subscribed together 78,000 *l.*, but we found that we could not get enough capital to form a company separately, and therefore that company, called the Niger and Chadda Steam Navigation Company, was amalgamated with a company then forming by merchants in Liverpool, called the Company of African Merchants. I feel perfectly convinced that no private individual will advance the funds necessary for keeping open the Niger.

3936. Can you mention any analogous case in which the Government have subsidised a company for such a purpose?—No instance comes to my memory at this moment; but in Mr. McGregor Laird's time they subsidised his operations for five or six years.

3937. By an annuity or by a sum of money?—I believe it was a sum, commencing with 7,000 *l.* and descending to 5,000 *l.* per annum.

3938. What do you anticipate would be the chief exports from the Niger?—My object in proposing the expedition originally was to get in the rear of the slave trade, along the valley of the Niger, independently of commerce; to stop, in the first place, the supply of slaves from the interior of Africa to the West Coast, and also to strike at that fearful system of the slave trade carried on from Tripoli to Kano, a voyage of three or four months, ranging over 1,500 miles. The principal exports from Africa would be shea butter, palm and ground nut oils and kernels, kashu and kolla nuts, gums, ivory, ebony, indigo, and other dyes and dyewoods, cotton, coffee, Chili pepper, ginger, arrowroot, wax, honey, caoutchouc, salpêtre, antimony, gold, silver, copper, &c. &c. I may say that, looking at the caravans from Tripoli to Kano, we can see by what they carry what articles would be the fittest for the trade in the interior; the caravans are laden with calicoes, cambrics, coarse silks, woollen cloths, Moorish and other gaudy dresses, Egyptian linen (checked or striped with gold), turban shawls, writing paper, cotton umbrellas, sword blades, muskets, knives, scissors, needles, trinkets, armlets, and bracelets of brass and silver, pewter rings and other trinkets, amber, coral, and glass beads, spices, frankincense, &c.

3939. To whom does that consul on the Niger consider himself commissioned?—Generally to the chiefs of the river in his immediate neighbourhood, but I should think especially to King Massabah, who is very friendly both to the consul there and to our establishments at Lagos.

3940. Is he a powerful chief?—Very.

3941. Does he assert any superior authority over any other chiefs in his neighbourhood?—In an extensive district, I believe

3942. Is his tribe Mussulman or Pagan?—They are Mahomedans. L. M'Leod,
Esq.

3943. Is his power an extending power?—It is an extending power; Commander Glover, when he was in the Niger expedition, made acquaintance with Massabah, and I know he has since continued in friendly communication with him. S May 1865.

3944. Is Massabah, at this moment, implicated in the slave trade?—I do not know.

3945. Can you offer to the Committee any suggestions with regard to the possibility of a free emigration of Africans for supplanting the slave trade?—From my experience on the East Coast of Africa, I should think it was quite impracticable.

3946. You think that it could not be conducted or promoted in any way without danger of promoting a slave trade in disguise?—Not only that, but I know, from personal experience, that after the slave trade was to a certain extent suppressed on the East Coast, a renewal of the slave trade, under the denomination of free labour emigration, completely opened the whole of the markets in the interior, and gave rise to wars.

3947. I believe you took part in some proposal for opening roads into the interior on the Gold Coast, did you not?—Yes, I will show you the plan (producing a rough model of a tramroad, and of a carriage for a tramroad). This plan was not my own originally, it was proposed to the African Society by an American gentleman; it consists of digging a narrow trench along the ground, and at right angles to it you dig other trenches alternately; you then cut down trees, and lay them lengthwise, joining them together; after you have done so, you dig a ditch on each side, being the boundaries of your road, and as you dig this ditch you throw the earth out of it inwards, which enables you to form your road, and to drain it at the same time.

3948. Something in the way in which roads are formed in Russia?—It is something similar. Then, instead of having carts on them at first (for this plan is only proposed for the infancy of roads, though other roads may be built upon this foundation), I propose using these rollers (an invention which belongs to the same American gentleman); the peculiarity of the roller consists in the edge being bevelled; the consequence is, that it always mounts and goes off and on with the greatest ease.

3949. Is that roller made of wood?—That roller is made of wood; you might have two rollers, one at each end, then this road would simply form a platform; in fact, omnibuses mounted on rollers may be used on it. This kind of road is actually used at Demerara now.

3950. Have you any estimates of what the cost of such a plan would be?—No; but this road, by placing bars of wood across, would become the common Corderoy road of America, and upon that might be constructed a very strong road indeed. In fact, they are so strong that, when the River Mississippi overflowed New Orleans in 1850 or 1851, the roads were built on this plan. To prevent their being washed away, they drove baulks into the ground, fastening them to these baulks of timber; and when the water receded, there were the foundations of the road ready to commence again.

3951. Did you make any proposal to the Government of the Gold Coast to make such roads as these?—I made a proposal to the Colonial Office in the time of the late Duke of Newcastle.

3952. With particular reference to the Gold Coast?—

L. M. Leod,
Esq.
3 May 1865.

Coast?—No, it was to establish a tramroad between Abeokuta and Lagos. With regard to the question of estimate, I may state that persons would be found in this country sufficiently enterprising to produce the funds for constructing these roads on the Gold Coast, if a certain concession was given to them. I should say that the Government might make an arrangement with the native chiefs there, giving the persons who constructed the road a certain amount of ground, say half-a-mile or a mile on each side of the road.

3953. This is a plan which is supposed to be part of a system of settlement colonisation on the African coast?—Yes.

3954. You would hardly propose to the Governor of the Gold Coast to make such roads unless it were the intention of the British Government to make a more extensive settlement, would you?—If we wanted to develop the resources of the country, I should recommend these roads.

3955. You have been in Liberia, have you not?—Yes, I have; I take great interest in Liberia. In 1849, when I was a lieutenant in the Navy, Commodore Fausshawe made me an offer to establish a navy for Liberia; the British Government gave them one vessel, the French gave them another, and there were two other vessels, making four altogether; but the arrangement fell through, although everything had been arranged about my salary, simply because I had stipulated with the Commodore, that if I took service under the Liberian State my time should go on as lieutenant commander and post captain in the Royal Navy, and he had no authority to make such an arrangement.

3956. Has the Liberian Government those four vessels now?—I think they have two of them.

3957. Are they commanded by mulattos?—I think so.

3958. There is no European officer?—I think not.

3959. Did you hear the evidence that has just been given with regard to the trade of Liberia and their faulty revenue system?—Yes.

3960. Can you give us any information upon that point?—I think they have certain ports of entry, the same as the Portuguese have, on the East Coast of Africa; they are in a very similar position; they are a small state having a larger territory than they can actually hold or govern, just the same as the Mozambique territory, which extends for about 1,500 miles of the coast, taking the sinuosities of the coast into consideration. Strangers going to trade with Liberia are very much put out on seeing the difficulties in trading; but a small government cannot throw open every mile of their coast, they must have certain ports of entry.

3961. Are you of opinion that there is that jealousy felt on the part of Liberia of the British that we have heard of?—I do not think so; I should say, from my own personal experience, quite the contrary. I was personally acquainted with the late President Roberts, and also with President Benson.

3962. In Liberia most of the men in authority are mulattos, are they not?—Yes.

3963. Are there any men in authority there who are black?—President Benson is perfectly black; when he was supposed to be 12 years of age he was picked up in the bush, and could not make himself understood to anybody.

3964. Have you any opinion to express with

regard to any changes in the British Governments on the West Coast of Africa?—I think that if the Government was concentrated it would be much more beneficial. I would propose that there should be a Governor General at Sierra Leone; a lieutenant governor at the Gambia; a lieutenant governor at Sierra Leone under the Governor General; a lieutenant governor at the Gold Coast, and another at Lagos; these lieutenant governors should administer the internal government of their own colonies, and the Governor General should superintend and be responsible for the whole. I do not think it would be necessary for the lieutenant governors to communicate direct with the Colonial Office. I think the Colonial Office should be relieved from that, and that a superior man should be sent out as Governor General.

3965. Lord Alfred Churchill.] What description of vessel would be best calculated for navigating the Niger?—I think it would require two descriptions of vessels; one having a light draught of water, say three feet, which could ascend the river in all seasons, and another drawing seven feet of water, which could only go up when the river was in perfect flood, but which would also, if necessary, be used for crossing the bars, because a vessel drawing three feet of water would not have sufficient hold on the water to tow a heavy vessel over the bar.

3966. Those vessels would have to be constructed specially for this trade, I suppose?—Decidedly.

3967. Are you aware that the French are organising, or have organised, any expedition up the Niger with a view of establishing a commerce there?—Yes, I believe the French had organised an expedition to go there, and I believe that the vessel containing that expedition was wrecked last year after it left France.

3968. Were the caravans that used to come to Kano, French caravans?—They were principally Moors, I believe.

3969. Carrying French produce?—Carrying produce of all sorts.

3970. From Algiers?—No, from Tripoli and Tunis.

3971. *Chairman.*] Is there anything else which you wish to add with regard to the pawn system on the Gold Coast?—I should be glad to make a suggestion with regard to the pawn system on the Gold Coast. I think those who have studied the subject must regret to see the pawn system and the system of domestic slavery established under the British flag. As we look back upon the administration of Mr. Maclean, who was perhaps one of the best Governors of the Gold Coast, we cannot help regretting that at that time he did not take measures not to recognise the pawn system and not to recognise slavery.

3972. How do you think he could have avoided it?—I believe, at that time, when the feeling was not so strong against the slave trade as it is now, perhaps he might not have succeeded, but the time has now arrived when we must make the reflection, that it is a quarter of a century since his services have ended, and that those who come after us will be of opinion that, during the sitting of this Committee, something ought to have been proposed for doing away with the pawn system, because, doubtless, it is desirable that it should be done away with; but if this Committee does not propose something, it will probably be perpetuated.

3973. Can you suggest any mode of inter-ference

ference with that system, which might be adopted by the English Government?—I should say to the natives: legislation in Great Britain and all European countries, has, of late, tended to the abolition of imprisonment for debt; I would suggest that the judicial assessors should treat the pawn system as a debt in the first place, and in the next place give them a maximum time for the punishment of the debtor by imprisonment, say two years, which would be very severe in that climate; I believe that, taking into consideration the time that the pawn had served for his master, you would frequently find that, instead of two years being adjudged by the judicial assessor, it would only be one year or even six months, so that at the end of two years' time you would find that the pawn system had ceased on the Gold Coast altogether. Then, with regard to domestic slavery, I think that if this new system is established of a Governor General for the whole coast and a lieutenant governor for the Gold Coast, the lieutenant governor could suggest, under the protection of the Governor General, to the chiefs of the Gold Coast, that the time had arrived when domestic slavery must cease under the British flag; and that, if those chiefs looked upon themselves as under our protection, they must decide among themselves if it was not possible to change domestic slavery into a lengthened apprenticeship of any duration they pleased, we using, of course, our utmost exertions to reduce it. Supposing they agreed to an apprenticeship which was to last, say for seven years, then at the end of the seven years there would be an end of the system; but at present, in the way we are going on, it will last for ever.

3974. Do you believe that the judicial assessor could bring himself into conflict with the native

customs in this manner, and suppress them?—He does now; they are instructed at this moment to treat the pawn system simply as a debt.

3975. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Of course you do not propose to eradicate a deeply-rooted system like that of domestic slavery by force in our Protectorate?—By no means.

3976. Do you conceive it would be possible to induce the owners of slaves themselves to put an end to the system?—I think that such a man as Governor Maclean, who had the confidence of the chiefs, could induce the natives and chiefs of the whole Protectorate to change the system of domestic slavery to an apprenticeship, and, whenever the apprenticeship came to an end, there would be an end of the system of domestic slavery.

3977. That is to say, you would contemplate the abolition of domestic slavery to be brought about in this manner, after the lapse of a few years?—Yes.

3978. And do we understand you to say that you look upon that as possible?—I do, and I believe I am not singular in my opinion; I think those who have been out there before would be inclined to agree with me, but it would depend greatly on having a man who knew the natives. I do not know if I should venture to say it, but I should think such a man as Sir Benjamin Pine would succeed in doing it.

3979. Do you think that he would be able to induce the chiefs to make such a sacrifice of their own interest, and introduce such a revolution?—Yes; particularly after this Ashantee war: if they were told that, in return for the protection we give them, we required them to give up that system of domestic slavery, I think it would be effective.

L. M'Leod,
Esq.

8 May 1865.

Jouis, 11^o die Maii, 1865.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Adderley.
 Sir Francis Baring.
 Mr. Baxter.
 Mr. Buxton.
 Mr. Cave.
 Lord Alfred Churchill.

Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
 Mr. Gregory.
 Sir John Hay.
 Mr. Arthur Mills.
 Lord Stanley.

THE RIGHT HON. C. B. ADDERLEY, IN THE CHAIR.

Captain WILLIAM EDMONSTONE, R.N., C.B., called in; and Examined.

Captain W.
 Edmonstone,
 R.N., C.B.

11 May
 1865.

3980. *Chairman.*] You are at present in command of the Steam Reserve at Devonport?—Yes.

3981. You formerly held the command of the West African Station, from the year 1859 to 1862?—Yes.

3982. Under the orders of Sir Baldwin Walker?—Under the orders of Sir Frederick Grey, Sir Henry Keppel, and Sir Baldwin Walker.

3983. Since your time there has been a new arrangement at those stations, the commodore of your station being no longer under the orders of Sir Baldwin Walker?—Yes.

3984. When was that change made?—When the admiral was removed from the Cape there was no other admiral sent in his place.

3985. What was the object of that?—It was with a view to improve the correspondence. In my time the correspondence to the Commander in Chief had to go through Whitehall.

3986. And since that new arrangement the correspondence between the commodore and the Admiralty is direct?—Yes; which is very much better for the service.

3987. What was the extent of your station on the coast?—From the Gambia to Little Fish Bay; the station was arranged in three divisions.

3988. What was the number of ships under your command?—From 13 to 15 cruisers; that is to say, allowing for the numbers at Lagos; sometimes they fell short of that.

3989. And had you smaller ships of war besides?—We had one in the river, within the Lagoon of Lagos, one gun-boat; but I include that in the 15, which was the maximum.

3990. Had you any hulks or dépôt ships?—There was a hulk at Sierra Leone (the "Isis"), and lately there was one at Fernando Po.

3991. What was the service of those two hulks?—They were dépôts for coal and provisions.

3992. What was the distribution of your 15 cruisers?—The proper number was generally two on the North Coast.

3993. Extending from the Gambia to where?—Extending from the Gambia to Palmas.

3994. What was the second?—The second extended from the bights to Cape Lopez. We ought to have had five vessels there besides the

one in the bights; but we scarcely ever obtained that number.

3995. The first division cruised from the Gambia to Palmas, the second division from Palmas to the bights, and the third division from the bights to Lopez; is that so?—No; the third division cruised from Lopez to Fish Bay, taking in the islands of St. Thomas, Fernando Po, and Prince's Island.

3996. Did you take any one of those stations as your head-quarters?—No; I went from one to another.

3997. But what were the general orders or plans of operation against the slave trade?—Cruising and avoiding as much as possible boat service.

3998. Did you adopt the plan of cruising in-shore, by way of blockading, in preference to that of standing out for captures?—It varied; my orders were never to lose sight of the coast, if possible, and to cruise from point to point.

3999. Did you consider the strength of your squadron sufficient to pursue both operations?—No.

4000. You were obliged to confine yourself to one, for want of strength?—Entirely.

4001. What is your general opinion with regard to this kind of service, as affecting the health and discipline of the Navy?—The discipline in my time was very good in the West African Station.

4002. Would you consider it a trying service, and requiring very strict discipline?—It is a trying service, and requiring very strict discipline; but on the West African Coast we never allowed the men to go on shore, except at St. Helena, and that benefited the discipline a good deal.

4003. Rolling about on that sea, without ever going on shore, is rather an unpopular service in the Navy, is it not?—Yes, it is; particularly the new system since I left, the system of anchoring close to the shore.

4004. But still in a rolling sea?—That is very irksome, indeed.

4005. But should you say, generally, that that is a popular service among the officers and men?—Among the men it is popular; but, among the officers I should say it is not.

4006. Why do you make that distinction?—It is almost impossible to give a reason for it; the

the officers look for greater comforts, and the men look at the prize money and warm weather.

4007. Is there not prize money enough to make it an object to the officers?—You must draw a line between the two, I think; it is very possible that this new system of blockade will not make it so popular among the men, and that the men will not like it.

4008. Were there many captures made during your command?—A good many.

4009. On what part of the coast were those captures chiefly made?—From the Congo.

4010. Under what flag were they?—Principally under no flag; there was no nationality.

4011. Can you state of what nation the crews usually were in that case?—Of all nations; they were principally Spaniards or Portuguese, and some Englishmen, but very few; I do not think any Englishman ever came before me.

4012. What was usually done with the prizes when they were taken?—The slaves were kept in the vessel, and sent over as a prize crew to the nearest port of adjudication, that being St. Helena or Sierra Leone; if the vessel was under no nationality, she must go to a Vice Admiralty court, if not to a mixed commission court.

4013. Did it frequently happen that the prizes had to be destroyed?—Sometimes, but only under very strict circumstances; not often.

4014. Were there ever mistakes made in capturing ships that turned out not to be slave ships?—I cannot recollect a single case.

4015. Lord Stanley.] Vessels have been chased occasionally, I suppose, that turned out not to be slavers?—Very frequently; French vessels particularly.

4016. Chairman.] Was there any usual disguise which slave ships assumed; did they pretend to be whalers?—Very often whalers; but our officers can always distinguish them; they have their own particular marks.

4017. What squadrons of other nations were co-operating with you during your command?—The Americans very cordially.

4018. Was there no other?—No.

4019. What was the size of their squadron?—It was very powerful, not in point of numbers, but in point of guns.

4020. Their numbers were not so great as yours?—Not in vessels, but larger in guns; they were kept entirely at the South Coast.

4021. Were they a bigger class of ships?—They were a large class.

4022. Was their speed greater than ours?—Yes, their speed was greater.

4023. Do you think that their object was more for capture than yours?—Yes, lately they became very keen about it.

4024. Did they make many captures?—Yes, they made two or three very valuable captures.

4025. Was there any French squadron co-operating with you?—No, the only French ship I ever came across was the commodore ship. There were some small vessels going from port to port, but never cruising.

4026. Was their head quarters at Senegal, or did they make a station at Assinee?—A little, but their great head quarters were either Goree or the Gaboon.

4027. What do you think is the principal object of the French in holding Senegal; have they commercial views or military views?—Military views I should say, certainly; they have a very good and well organised force there.

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4028. Are they inclined, do you suppose, to extend their occupations on the coast?—I think they are to the north, certainly.

4029. Do you think that the French Government would be glad to possess the Gambia if the opportunity were to occur?—There is no doubt of it, I think.

4030. Do you consider that the settlement at the Gambia is useful to the English, both for the object of suppressing the slave trade and for commercial objects?—Certainly not for commercial objects; the commerce is in a very peculiar condition; in my time it went entirely to Marseilles; it may be called almost a French commerce.

4031. A French commerce exclusively, you think?—English merchants, but French commerce and French produce, scarcely anything went to England.

4032. Supposing the slave trade to have ceased altogether, do you think that there would be great injury to British interest of any kind in the French possessing the Gambia?—Yes, I think so.

4033. What would be the nature of that injury?—It is merely in case of war that that injury would arise; it is a very good harbour, and the river is a sort of a great artery. I should hesitate very much in giving it up.

4034. How would it be of use to have a station there in case of war?—Put the reverse case. Suppose the French had it, our ships would very probably suffer from it. I am of opinion that although it is of no great advantage our having it, it would be much worse if we had not it.

4035. That is merely because we want to protect our other possessions in the neighbourhood; but, supposing that we had no other possessions, then, commercially speaking, do you think it would be just as well in the hands of the French as the English?—Commercially speaking it matters very little.

4036. But so long as we have possessions on the West African Coast you think that we require a naval port to protect them?—Certainly.

4037. Have you any opinion to give to the Committee with regard to the necessity of the settlements up the river, such as McCarthy's Island?—I see no object in having a settlement at McCarthy's Island.

4038. Not for the protection of trade?—I cannot see any use in it at all. I only look to the mouth.

4039. Have you any suggestions to make with regard to improving the station at the mouth; do you think a more healthy spot might be taken at the mouth of the river, at the very headland?—I cannot say that I know much about it, but it is very possible that it might be so; there is a swamp behind Bathurst.

4040. Is the fort at the Gambia of any strength, supposing there was such a thing as an attempt on the part of a great European power to take it?—Not the least; there are four or six guns in the fort, which would be much better removed.

4041. As a fort it is useless?—Perfectly useless.

4042. You would hold it, I presume, as a barrack for troops, as a Government station?—Just as a military position.

4043. But you would not attempt to fortify it?—Certainly not.

4044. And even such a fort as there is there you consider useless?—Yes, I told the governor so at the time I was there.

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4045. The

Captain W. Edmondstone,
R.N., C.B.

11 May
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Captain W.
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R.N., C.B.

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4045. The Committee have had several suggestions made to them that the governments on the West African Coast might be better concentrated at Sierra Leone, as they were originally; have you formed any opinion with regard to that point?—I cannot say that I had until I saw Colonel Ord's recommendation. I certainly think that there would be some advantage in it; but still you must look to the fact that all those settlements have different local interests.

4046. But might not that difference of local interests, being on a very small scale, be attended to by the lieutenant governor or the commanders at the different stations?—But I do not see what you would gain by that.

4047. The proposition is that the Governor General should have all the troops under him, and have a steam ship to enable him to communicate either personally or by sending troops when required; but the main feature is that the government should be concentrated there with a government on a larger scale than it now is at the other small ports; and it has been suggested that the general policy would in that case be more uniform; what is your opinion on that subject?—Some advantage would be derived from that, but expense would be incurred in having constant communication; we must have two or three steamers to be employed for nothing else but going backwards and forwards.

4048. At the same time those steamers, going backwards and forwards, would assist in the work of the squadron, would they not?—Certainly; I do not see any objection to that.

4049. Have you any suggestion to make to the Committee with regard to the forts at Sierra Leone?—The forts at Sierra Leone are valueless as they are now; before the Russian war broke out it was proposed to increase them, but I can scarcely see much use in that.

4050. You would leave them as they are?—I think there is very little use in the forts at all.

4051. The territory that has been gradually occupied around Sierra Leone has been so occupied, chiefly for the purpose of raising a revenue, have you any suggestions to make with regard to the extension of territory around Sierra Leone?—Only to curtail it as much as possible.

4052. Are you acquainted with Liberia?—Not much; Captain Wildman was there in my time, for I sent him there.

4053. The Ivory Coast, to the south of Liberia, has never been a place for the export of slaves, has it?—No; but about three years ago I was told by a civil officer at Lagos that he had seen, and had heard from good authority, that slaving was going on on that coast. I took an early opportunity of sending the fastest vessel I had, the "Brisk," to examine that coast right down to the edge of the French settlement, and we could find no trace whatever of the slave trade going on.

4054. It has never been made a cruising ground, nor has it been occupied?—Never; our cruisers never go there.

4055. Can you assign any reason for there being no export of slaves there?—I think it is merely because it is not a slave growing country.

4056. It is the habit of the tribes not to deal in slaves?—Just so.

4057. Going a little further along the coast, do you consider the forts on the Gold Coast to be necessary for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade?—Certainly not; the forts are useless.

4058. You would propose that the posts should

be kept up as settlements, but not fortified?—Yes, the civil establishments; the forts are in a wretched condition.

4059. But supposing the other day that the king of Ashantee had been able to come down to the coast and attack them, would not a place of some strength have been useful?—Certainly, but that was what I trust may never occur again.

4060. You think that we are safe from any attack?—It ought to be our policy to avoid it.

4061. You say that the forts are in a state of dilapidation?—Frightful, but Cape Coast Castle is a very peculiar fort; everybody lives in it, including the governor of the settlement; therefore, if there were not some guns there the governor for the time being would be powerless; but, at Accra, which is a much better place for trade, and also to live in, there is no fort; the fort is next to nothing, and useless.

4062. Do you mean that you would have one post fortified where the governor resides?—I should like to have Accra myself.

4063. Why do you select Accra?—Because it is the best port on the coast; there is more trade, and it is a very superior place in every way.

4064. Do you consider those settlements, such as they are, to have been effectual in stopping the slave exports at other localities, situated at some little distance in the neighbourhood?—Certainly. That strip of coast line is very valuable to us.

4065. Do you think that we have just enough on the Gold Coast, or would you suggest that we should have more; or do you think, have we too many?—I should not say that we had too many.

4066. You would not suggest that we should have more?—No, certainly not.

4067. Do you consider the forts of use to the operations of the squadron when you were in command?—Certainly not.

4068. But did they not save your cruising over that coast?—Certainly.

4069. They relieved the squadron from cruising there?—On the Gold Coast, where we have a strip of coast line of 200 miles from one end to another, there is not a symptom of a barracoon, and never has been in our time; but, at the very edge of Quittah, there is a man who to my knowledge has been a slave dealer for many years past.

4070. Do you think that if the English were to withdraw, the slave trade would be revived?—I think that it would give us extra labour in guarding that coast.

4071. The Committee have had a suggestion made to them, that depot ships would be better than settlements on shore; what is your opinion on that point?—I do not think that they would answer the same purpose.

4072. I think Lagos was taken possession of during the period of your command?—It was.

4073. Were you on the spot at the time?—No, I was not; but the order was sent to me to annex it.

4074. From home?—Yes, from the Admiralty; it was a very positive order. I obtained information of the place being annexed, and the order on the same day. I was in the "Congo" at the time.

4075. Who effected the occupation?—Commander Bedingfield and Acting Consul M'Koskry.

4076. He himself received orders first, which were so peremptory that he did not wait for your sanction?—

sanction?—Acting Consul M'Kosky received orders, and he communicated with Commander Bedingfield; and Commander Bedingfield, from his knowledge of the coast, thought that he was merely carrying out his orders by doing it at once, and not waiting for me.

4077. You were Commander Bedingfield's superior, were you not?—I was the commodore.

4078. But Commander Bedingfield considered the order to the consul rendered it necessary for him to act at once?—Yes, he thought that he was carrying out his orders to the best of his ability by so doing.

4079. The orders from the Admiralty were to the consul to seize the town?—Yes, just so; to annex it; the Foreign Office Despatch, which I have seen since, gives the reasons for that.

4080. Could you state, generally, on what grounds that order was made?—It appears that Messrs. Campbell, Foote, and other consuls had recommended, both privately and publicly, from time to time, that this place should be annexed, with a view to the complete occupation of Lagos; in fact I was always afraid of collisions taking place between King Docemo and ourselves, but I was not consulted, so far as I can recollect.

4081. Did I understand you to suggest that the reason assigned for the seizure was that Docemo had failed to perform certain obligations?—Yes; he had failed to perform them faithfully; his government was so lax, that we felt that we were in a false position.

4082. Was that laxity chiefly with regard to the suppression of the slave trade?—Yes, and also that he would not carry out his treaty with us; every day we were afraid of some collision.

4083. But what were the points in the treaty with regard to which he failed?—It was with regard to dues, and so on.

4084. *Sir Francis Baring.* Will you be good enough to explain to the Committee what was the nature of those dues?—Customs' dues; it was treaty obligations generally.

4085. *Chairman.* Do you mean that he imposed different Customs' dues from those that he was bound to impose by the treaty?—No, I cannot say that.

4086. Can you give the Committee any general information with regard to the comparative trade of Lagos before the seizure and afterwards?—I may say that one advantage which has been derived during the last two years by the occupation of Lagos is, that we have extinguished one great source of animosity in Kosoko; the French were always communicating with Kosoko, at Palmas; now that he has come under our rule in Lagos he is very quiet, and the whole feud is put a stop to completely; we are not now always in terror as we used to be every day, of Kosoko coming in and destroying things and annoying us at Lagos; that could not have been effected under any rule but that of ourselves; it could not have been done under Docemo.

4087. You are aware that we ousted Kosoko in 1851, and set up Akitoye; do you suppose, having that opinion of Kosoko, that if we had left him alone, and in possession of the government, those disturbances would not have occurred?—That is a question which I can hardly answer.

4088. You were present at the bombardment of Porto Novo, were you not?—Yes; I carried it out.

4089. What year was that in?—In 1861.

4090. What was the justification of that treatment?

039.

ment of the town?—The King of Porto Novo had not fulfilled his treaty with us; he had broken his treaty with the consul, and he had defied us.

4091. What was the nature of that treaty; was it simply for the suppression of the slave trade, or did it enter into other matters besides?—It was both, if I recollect rightly.

4092. Do you recollect the particular point which he refused to observe, which compelled you to bombard the town?—It was principally his insolence to us, and defiance of the English authority; it was so strong that, though I objected very much indeed to the destruction of the place, when I saw the Despatch, I made up my mind that there was no way of avoiding it.

4093. Do you think, in fact, it was necessary for the security of the British merchants that this king's submission should have been enforced?—I think so.

4094. It was necessary, not only for the suppression of the slave trade, but it was also necessary for the security of trade, was it?—Yes; I think it was at the time; he was the cousin of the King of Dahomey, and a great slave trade went on from that spot through the Lagoons.

4095. What was the result of that bombardment?—Within a very short time after I destroyed the place the French assumed the protectorate.

4096. They did not long retain it, did they?—I do not know.

4097. You do not recollect the circumstances of their abandoning it?—No; that is since I left the coast.

4098. Had the French occupied it twice?—Not in my time; I am not aware.

4099. What was the immediate effect of the bombardment of Porto Novo; did it gain the object for which it was done?—Entirely.

4100. The submission of the king, and the observance of the treaty?—The submission of the king for the time entirely.

4101. But, in the interval between that bombardment and the occupation of Porto Novo by the French, did it bring Porto Novo under the authority of the British Government?—I think not; but I was not there at the time.

4102. The king was left there?—He was left there.

4103. Do you think, generally speaking, taking the whole length of your command from Little Fish Bay to the Gambia, that the settlements on shore are necessary to the operations of the squadron, and for the suppression of the slave trade, or do you think that the squadron could have done without those settlements in suppressing the slave trade?—Without having Sierra Leone for a commissariat, we could not have done that; as I said before if we had not had an establishment on the Gold Coast we should have all that additional land to blockade; that is a great advantage to us.

4104. You would have required a larger squadron?—Yes.

4105. With a larger squadron do you think that you would as effectually blocked the slave trade with the squadron alone?—We must have depôts for commissariat purposes and for coals.

4106-7. How many such depôts would be necessary for those purposes alone?—Three, one at the bights, one in Sierra Leone, and one on the South Coast?—With regard to the operations of the squadron, do you consider that they were more effectual in blockading the export of slaves from

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Africa than they would have been if they had been placed around the Cuban coast, and so stop the arrival and landing of slaves?—It was formerly my impression that we should have done better in Cuba, but Sir James Hope has tried it and it has not answered; from political difficulties it seems we could not do it at Cuba.

4108. On account of collisions with other nations?—Yes.

4109. Supposing the slave trade were suppressed, do you think the squadron would still be necessary on the West African Coast?—Yes, certainly.

✓ 4110. For what purpose?—For the protection of trade, as a marine police.

4111. You think that the presence of the squadron would be necessary as a protection against pirates?—Against pirates.

4112. But for those purposes alone, the slave trade having ceased, you would not propose to maintain so large a squadron?—Certainly not.

4113. What reduction would you suggest under those circumstances, there being no slave trade?—I should not like to reduce it below 10.

4114. Merely to enforce the orders of the consuls, to settle disputes among traders and to guard commerce against pirates?—Yes.

4115. Sir John Hay.] Do you include the Cape in that number of 10?—No, I would put 10 on the coast.

4116. Lord Stanley.] Can you tell the Committee anything with regard to the healthiness of the squadron when it was under your command?—I have not the statistical accounts by me now, but I think it was about 30 in 1,000 on the average that were invalidated.

4117. But I presume that that does not represent the whole amount of the mischief done?—No, I think certainly not, their health is very much deteriorated.

4118. Men go away without being actually invalidated, but they are unfit for active service?—Just so; very few officers come home, after three years' service, who are not more or less the worse for it.

4119. How long is a vessel detained there without relief?—Three years.

4120. That is the maximum term?—Yes.

4121. Chairman.] Do you approve of that term?—No, certainly not; I should like to reduce it.

4122. Lord Stanley.] Would not a shorter term tell unfavourably on the efficiency of the squadron in this way, namely, that you would have no officers there, who had had considerable experience of the coast. Or, would you leave a certain number of officers there, and transfer them from time to time to other vessels?—No, I would not. Of course, there is that objection, but on the whole it would be better to relieve them by shortening the term.

4123. Sir John Hay.] Do you include the Commodore in that suggestion?—No, because he can move about.

4124. You would look to the experience of the Commodore to direct the others?—Yes.

4125. Lord Stanley.] You have stated that the present maximum strength of the squadron is 15; of what size are the vessels, for the most part?—In my time, there was one frigate, one corvette, two sloops, and the rest were gunboats.

4126. For the most part they were small vessels?—Yes.

4127. I suppose, as a matter of health, it is absolutely necessary to keep the men from landing as much as possible?—Certainly; we never let them go on shore at night, except at St. Helena.

4128. You have said that the service was not unpopular among the men; is the amount of prize-money taken sufficient to account for that?—I think it partly is; I speak of a few years ago, when the ships were commissioned by volunteering, and we never had a vessel for the coast that wanted men.

4129. There was a prospect of active service, which is always attractive when on a small scale?—Yes.

4130. Sir John Hay.] Is it not the case that the seamen in the Navy have a very great preference for small ships over large ones?—Yes, and warm weather.

4131. Lord Stanley.] The climate is never objected to as being too hot?—No, I think not.

4132. The Committee have heard that the speed of the slavers has of late very much increased, and that they mostly use steam?—Yes.

4133. According to your experience, are the vessels employed in the squadron of sufficient speed to capture them?—Certainly not; but then it depends more on number than on speed.

4134. In what way?—I mean, that if you had more vessels you could blockade the coast more completely, and by that means you would attain your object better than by having fewer and faster vessels.

4135. You would rather trust to prevent the slavers coming out to catching them after they have come out?—Yes.

4136. But that must operate to diminish the prospect of prize-money?—Yes, very much.

4137. It is a wearying and a disagreeable duty, is it not?—Yes, this anchoring is particularly disagreeable; in the night it is most irksome.

4138. At the distance from the coast at which you anchor, are you completely out of reach of malaria?—I do not think that malaria could affect us at that distance.

4139. Where is the slave trade mainly carried on at present?—In the Congo; the Congo is an inexhaustible source of the slave trade. It was so in my time; it has been rather changed during the last two years, but as fast as we blockade one part of the coast it breaks out at others. I believe that at Benguela they are showing themselves now.

4140. With regard to the stations, I think I understood your evidence to be to this effect, that there is no such thing as a real fort along the whole of the coast?—Cape Coast Castle has more the appearance of a fort than any other.

4141. There is no fort which is really defensible if it were attacked, is there?—No.

4142. Those forts that do exist are, except for the purpose of resisting any casual incursion of the inland tribes, wholly useless?—Cape Coast Castle can defend the Government against native tribes, but for anything else it is perfectly useless.

4143. Supposing that there were any attack on those settlements by sea, the defence must be wholly naval?—Entirely naval.

4144. For the purposes of the squadron, I understand that all you want is a depot?—A depot for coals, and a commissariat also. I should not like to withdraw from the Cape Coast line, as that would give more land to blockade.

4145. One of those depôts you would recommend should be at Sierra Leone?—Yes.

4146. And another one on the South Coast?—Yes, one at Fernando Po and one at Loando. I put it there myself, at Fernando Po, but it has been removed to the bights, which is a little more central.

4147. Do you think that there is any strong feeling of jealousy on the part of the native tribes to the extension of the English settlements on the coast; have they any idea that we have a design on the country?—I think that they are certainly jealous of us.

4148. So that although one object in going there is simply for the suppression of the slave trade and the civilisation of the country, it is considered that we are there with some selfish design?—Yes, as far as we annex any country they always look very suspiciously upon us.

4149. Do you think it would be possible, maintaining the existing centres of government, to reduce considerably the territory attached to each, so as to hold as little inland territory as possible?—I think so, certainly. With regard to Cape Coast, the protected territory extends nearly for 300 miles, and I think we could do away with that.

4150. You would concentrate that at one point?—I should not withdraw from the coastline.

4151. But that is a line which could be defended by a naval force alone, you think?—Yes; by a naval force alone, and with a view of not obliging us to blockade more coast than we can help; because, wherever our jurisdiction does extend, it has the effect of keeping out the slave dealers.

4152. Mr. Gregory.] You have stated that the fort at the Gambia was in an extremely bad condition?—The Gambia has no fort. I think there are six guns.

4153. And it is perfectly useless as such?—It is perfectly useless.

4154. Is it your opinion that some kind of fort would be of any use at those posts, to resist merely the attacks of the natives, that it would have the effect of overawing them?—It certainly would have that effect, particularly in this part of Cape Coast, where the fort protects the governor; in fact, the governor could not do without the fort now. But in the Gambia, the fort has merely four or six guns, which are no use at all, and I do not think they are required.

4155. Not even against the natives?—No; I think not.

4156. Sir John Hay.] They point seaward, do they not?—Yes; and when they had a salute, it took half an hour to get the guns ready.

4157. Mr. Gregory.] Is the Congo blockaded by ships at anchor at this moment?—Not generally; they do anchor there, but not generally; the tide is very rapid.

4158. Would it be possible to occupy or anchor at any points in that neighbourhood which would dam up the slave trade?—That would bring us into collision with the Portuguese who claim the territory, except a small point up to the mouth of the Congo.

4159. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] I suppose that if the Portuguese were as much in earnest about the suppression of the slave trade as we are, they could have suppressed it on their coast as effectually as we have done it on the Gold Coast?—Certainly, if they were in earnest; and here and there they are in earnest.

4160. It all depends on the character of the officials?—Yes, there is no believing them. One Governor General of Loanda told me in the most solemn manner that he had nothing to do with it, and I found that he was concerned in it.

4161. Lord Stanley.] So long as the Portuguese are not in earnest about the suppression of the slave trade, do you think that any other Government can do it completely and effectually?—With regard to the Portuguese Government they always profess to be most strenuous against it; it is the underlings who are so very corrupt.

4162. Mr. Gregory.] I think you have stated that even if the slave trade were put an end to you would require 10 ships for the squadron?—About 10.

4163. And you said that it was not for the mere sake of protecting British commerce, but to be a police of the sea?—Yes.

4164. Does that suppose that the English are to take upon themselves the exclusive police of the sea?—Merely with regard to our own trade.

4165. When you spoke about putting down piracy, you did not mean that you considered that would be the duty of England alone?—Certainly not; but our own trade is very valuable, and it is clearly our duty to protect it.

4166. Sir Francis Baring.] You have mentioned that three years was too long for a ship to be on the coast without relief?—It would be better if they were relieved in less time, but I did not say exactly it was too long.

4167. At one time the rule was that they were relieved at the end of two years, was it not?—Yes, but it was never carried out, I think.

4168. Have you looked at all into the question of whether the change from two to three years has produced any bad effect?—I cannot say that I have looked into the medical statistics.

4169. Did I understand you to say that you are in favour of increasing the number of settlements on the coast?—Certainly not; but I should not recommend you to give those settlements up.

4170. There has been a question whether, supposing Lagos was wisely annexed, it was wise with respect to Badagry, Palma and Leckie, to the possession of those points besides; have you any opinion upon that point?—For revenue purposes that was necessary, I believe; I certainly should not like to have them for any other reason; but if I could draw a line, I should say that Lagos and the adjacent shores (because you must have both shores) would be all that I should take.

4171. But, with regard to putting an end to the slave trade, or promoting the civilisation, as it is called, of Africa, you do not see the necessity of taking possession of Badagry, Palma and Leckie?—Certainly not; the only use of Badagry, Palma and Leckie is to prevent the customs dues falling to them, and escaping Lagos.

4172. I believe you were present at the time when Docemo's pension was settled, was that so?—Not altogether; Docemo came to me to make a complaint after the pension was settled. The treaty was signed when I was not on the spot, but when I came back again, six weeks after that, he complained to me of some grievance which I do not pay much attention to, and he said that he should petition the Government; I said, of course, you may do that, but I do not think he made any complaint on account of the pension being inadequate, he merely complained, as all those

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negroes do, of bad usage when it was not the case; at least, I could not trace anything.

4173. He was very well treated, was he not?—Very well treated.

4174. But his kingdom was taken away?—Yes.

4175. But, with regard to the amount of the pension, the treaty stipulated that he should have a sum equal to his previous revenue; that part you did not look at?—I did not look into that, it was the business of the Governor to do that.

4176. I was under the impression from the papers in the Blue Book that you had?—No, nothing more than this; this treaty was signed without my being present at all, and Docemo complained to me. That is all I know.

4177. You have seen a good deal of the natives, have you not?—Yes.

4178. What is your impression of their capability of looking after their own affairs?—They are very clever in their way up to a certain pitch, but they never go beyond a certain range of intellect.

4179. Do you think that taking possession of Lagos has improved the character of the English in the native mind; do we stand higher now than we did before?—I should not think that it would make any difference. I do not suppose that they think much about that.

4180. I have got here certain papers with a Despatch from Governor Freeman, in which he says: "In many of my Despatches I have pointed out to your Grace the little respect which the English name commands in these parts, and my fears that the contempt which the natives have for our power ashore would lead us sooner or later into a conflict with them;" that is in 1863, after the occupation of Lagos, is it not?—I was not there at that time; that was after I left the coast.

4181. Do you know anything of a pamphlet written by a late senior officer of one division of the West Coast squadron?—No.

4182. The most injurious part of the service to the health of the squadron consists of the operations in-shore, does it not?—Yes; entirely.

4183. The natives are not injured by that?—Not so much as we are; but they are sometimes.

4184. I see that this officer recommends the employment of a certain number of native boys, with a view of bringing them up for the Navy; and he suggests that, if you could obtain a certain number of those sailors to man the boats in the different rivers and in the lagoons, it would be a great saving of life, and would also make the squadron more effective; have you considered that matter at all?—The Kroumen do that duty.

4185. But, in addition to the Kroumen, this officer makes that proposal?—I should not like to recommend that, because I should not like to have negro boys. The Kroumen are the great staff of our service there.

4186. They are very useful, but remarkably unintellectual, are they not?—Without the Kroumen we could do little or nothing; we should suffer dreadfully.

4187. They do all the heavy work?—They do all the heavy work, and all the dirty work.

4188. But they are a very unintellectual race, are they not?—They have no religion, to begin with; they are very keen with regard to money matters particularly. They are the Jews of Africa; but I should not say that they were men of low intellect at all.

4189. The pamphlet to which I have been referring states that the Kroumen are not quite fit for the duties of the more intelligent seamen, and have never been trained to the use of arms?—Never; at least, the orders were that they should not be. Sometimes they have been, but it has been against orders. We make it a rule never to train them to the use of arms; but I should not like to have any native boys, as a rule, in the service.

4190. Not with a view of their being sailors afterwards?—Just so. I should not like to give an opinion; I do not see my way.

4191. Mr. Cave.] Do you know the coast of Cuba well?—No.

4192. You have not been there?—No; I have never been there.

4193. I think you have stated that Admiral Hope had taken no slave vessels at all?—No; so I understood.

4194. You have mentioned the difficulty that would probably arise of interfering with the vessels of other nations?—Yes; a political difficulty.

4195. When we had a squadron there some years ago, did that difficulty arise with the Americans?—Yes.

4196. Did it arise with any other nation?—With the French, I think.

4197. There was a difficulty with the French, was there?—I think so.

4198. But the difficulty with the Americans has ceased, by a treaty, now, has it not?—Yes.

4199. I suppose that difficulty arises from our overhauling empty vessels on suspicion?—Yes, the difficulty is to ascertain the flag.

4200. But there is no difficulty in a vessel loaded with slaves?—Not the least if you have a treaty with that nation.

4201. But, then, is it not the fact that a real slaver has no flag at all?—Not always, but if they hoist the flag of a nation with which you have not a treaty then the difficulty arises.

4202. A slaver generally displays the flag of some nation with which you have no treaty, when chased?—No; a treaty exists with nearly every nation.

4203. The French nation is the only one with which you have no treaty?—Yes.

4204. But is it not the fact that slavers now generally sail under the French flag?—They did when I left the coast, and I had to overhaul them, and I got into a very serious correspondence with the French commodore.

4205. But when a vessel has slaves on board, and is captured, she throws her colours overboard, does she not?—Not always, but generally.

4206. The danger would be in overhauling empty vessels with no slaves on board; but when a vessel has slaves on board you can always tell that, by getting to leeward, the smell is so unmistakable, is not that so?—I do not think that, because they keep them down pretty close; you must be very near to discover them in that way.

4207. Do you know whether the course of the fair traders to Cuba is the same as the course of the slavers generally; is there much fair trade from the coast of Africa to Cuba?—Not much, I think.

4208. I suppose the course of fair traders would be rather from the northward, from the American coast?—Yes.

4209. That would be diametrically opposite to the course of the slavers?—Just so.

4210. One of the difficulties which arose with regard to Cuba was in consequence of taking an empty vessel coming out of Havanna, was it not?—I do not recollect.

4211. With regard to anchoring the squadron, I believe that the slave trade is now carried on on the coast by very fast steamers?—Yes, in the bights.

4212. Which lie off some distance, and send boats on shore?—Yes. Our object is to keep the barracons constantly in sight; our boats are constantly passing backwards and forwards. The object is to keep the barracons well in sight and well in hand at a distance of from two to three miles; that is the system now pursued by the squadron. That was not the case in my time, and is now so only in the bights.

4213. But under that system would it not be possible for the slaves to be moved from the barracons by land to some point to which the fast steamers could be sent after them?—Yes, quite possible; they get them in a most astonishing way from all parts of the coast.

4214. Do you then think that the accounts that we have received of the diminution of the slave trade from this coast can be relied upon?—They can be in the bights. I am quite satisfied that there is no shipment which has taken place during the last 10 or 12 months, particularly from Lagos.

4215. Is it possible that we can obtain reliable information from other parts of the coast?—Quite possible. The part of the coast to which our attention should be directed is south of Lando, at a place called Benguela, and north of Sierra Leone.

4216. Let me ask you whether you do not think that slavers can get away frequently with cargoes on board, not only without our being able to intercept them, but without our knowing it?—Very rarely. I think there are very few vessels we could not give some account of.

4217. Is it not the case that a slave vessel sometimes only makes one voyage, and is destroyed afterwards?—That may occur, but it is not likely; in fact I think we can give an account of almost every vessel that gets away; we ought to do it.

4218. But still you find, from time to time, an outbreak of the slave trade in a place that surprises you?—Yes.

4219. That may go on, and shipments of slaves take place three or four times before you find it out, may it not?—Yes; but hardly ever a vessel gets away but what you hear of her; it is after she has gone, perhaps, but still you hear of her.

4220. You think that the Foreign Office Returns really do exhaust the number of those vessels?—Yes, they give us a great deal of information very much to be depended upon.

4221. Mr. Mills.] I understood you to state that the shortcomings of the Portuguese were due to the connivances of the underlings rather than to the Government?—Yes.

4222. And not merely to carelessness, but to bribery or other similar influences?—Yes; they cannot be trusted.

4223. Sir Frederick Grey, in his evidence, told us that, in his opinion, the high percentage of mortality among the squadron was mainly due to the employment of the Queen's ships in services up the rivers, which were irrespective of the slave trade; do you concur in that?—Cer-

tainly; wherever they are employed up the rivers they suffer in consequence.

4224. You agree with Sir Frederick Grey that this high rate of mortality is rather due to work in cases which the vessels might be called upon to interfere, in quarrels and disputes, quite irrespective of the suppression of the slave trade?—If the crews could be kept away from the rivers and in the open sea, we should have much less sickness; I may mention one single case with regard to Porto Novo: I took 300 men up there; it was beautiful weather, and came back on the tenth day; and, although we had not one man sick, 60 men dropped; that was entirely from being employed up the river.

4225. Those occupations up the rivers are not occupations which are due to the suppression of the slave trade, are they?—Yes, they are: in this particular case that was so; it is not always the case; sometimes we go up the rivers to settle disputes.

4226. Would you say that the occupation up the rivers was mainly in those extraneous interferences, or should you say that it was due generally to matters which are connected directly with the slave trade?—The slave trade is the main object of course; but in the rivers and in the bights, generally speaking, it is with regard to the merchants' quarrels.

4227. You would say, that the merchants' quarrels, which might happen whether there was any slave trade or not, are the chief occupation in which the Queen's ships go up the rivers?—Most decidedly.

4228. If it were not for that kind of occupation, do you think that the West Coast Station would be a more unhealthy station, for instance, than the China Station or the West Indian Station?—I should say certainly not.

4229. Lord Alfred Churchill.] Do you think it would be possible to organise a marine police by which you could navigate those rivers for the purpose of making arrangements with the merchants and others?—When there is fighting going on I would not trust the Koumen.

4230. Would you not trust them if they were headed by Europeans?—No, certainly not.

4231. Mr. Gregory.] You have stated that we can preserve the health of the blockading squadron, if we never allow the men to land?—Never at night; never to sleep on shore.

4232. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] You were asked just now, whether you thought the English character had suffered in those parts from the occupation of Lagos, and I understood you to say, that you did not think it had?—I think not.

4233. Let me read the whole of the passage, part of which was read just now, from the Despatch of Governor Freeman: "In many of my Despatches I have pointed out to your Grace the little respect which the English name commands at present in these parts, and my fears that the contempt which the natives have for our power ashore would lead us sooner or later into a conflict with them. My worst anticipations have been fulfilled; for the people of Epé, a town on the lagoon, where Her Majesty's ship 'Investigator' can run in within 20 yards of the shore, have openly defied us;" should you think that the governor meant that respect for the English power was at a low ebb, and not for the English character?—The English power; the English authority, I should say.

4234. Do you know much of the state of things

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at Lagos, before we took possession of it?—Not particularly; I was not very much on shore.

4235. I suppose you have a general knowledge of the state of things there. Let me read to you a few lines from a Despatch of Consul Brand to Lord John Russell in April 1860, which describes the state of things at that time: "Lagos at present may be said to have no government; there is no effective protection to property, no mode of enforcing the payment of debts applicable to Europeans, and the wonder is that in such a state of things there are so few disturbances. The presence of the 'Brune,' inefficiently manned as she is by 25 Kroumen, if not a source of security is at least the symbol of protection, and I believe the removal of that vessel would at present be viewed as an invitation to internal disorder and external assault. No armed force could be raised through the aid of the civilised portion of the community without an independent governing authority whom the various jealous sections might respect. Again, this consulate exercises at present a feeble, irregular, and irresponsible jurisdiction over a variety of judicial police, and even administrative matters, which have gradually been pressed within the range of its action, which occupy nearly the whole of the consular officer's time, but which have no relation whatever to a consul's ordinary duties. His jurisdiction has been acquiesced in by the various sections as matter of necessity." Do you consider that those passages truly describe the state of things there?—Yes. Consul Brand came to me about it almost at the time that was written.

4236. Then, afterwards, Lord John Russell writes to Consul Foote in these terms, on the 22d of June 1861: "Her Majesty's Government would be most unwilling that the establishment of British sovereignty at Lagos should be attended with any injustice to Docemo, the present chief of the island; but they conceive that as his tenure of the island, in point of fact, depends entirely upon the continuance of the protection which has been afforded to him and his predecessor by the British naval authorities since the expulsion of Kosoko; no injustice will be inflicted upon him by changing this anomalous protectorate into an avowed occupation, provided his material interests are secured." Is that, as far as your knowledge goes, a correct statement of Docemo's position?—I think so, quite.

4237. I see that Commander Beddingfield, speaking of the occupation of Lagos, uses the words: "The occupation of Lagos, with a proper force on the lagoon, will do more to suppress the slave trade than all the ships we could muster along the coast." Do you agree with that?—That is speaking very strongly, but it has had that effect; from Lagos the lagoons are the great channels of communication for slaves, and if we can only get at the head-quarters of the slaves, which we have done by occupying Lagos, we check it at Porto Novo and Badagry, but not on all the other parts of the coast.

4238. But substantially you agree with Commander Beddingfield?—Quite.

4239. I suppose you are aware that Lagos, at the first starting, has been greatly hampered and injured by destructive native wars in the adjoining territories?—Yes.

4240. Are you aware that those wars had begun for a considerable time before our occupation of Lagos?—Certainly; in my time they were going on.

4241. They were not in any way caused or provoked by our occupation of Lagos?—I should say certainly not.

4242. Let me read you a Despatch from Captain Mulliner, who was then acting governor, and who paid a visit to Abeokuta in May 1863. He had a conversation with the Bashorum of Abeokuta; and Captain Mulliner says, in his Despatch: "He assured me that all robberies and destruction of property, since the removal of the blockade, were done ignorantly, and that it was a custom with them; in order to recruit the army, to destroy all trades, property, and as it were drive them to war; that this was the case especially with regard to the plunders on the river; that if he allowed trading, there would be no soldiers; and assured me, in the most solemn manner, that as soon as possible, and when the war with Ibadan was finished, which has been going on now three years, he would remove every obstacle in the way of trading, and open the roads. He begged me for the present not to allow merchants to go to Abeokuta with goods as he could not be responsible for their safety." Are you aware, consistently with that statement, that the Egbas had then been for some time stopping the trade of the Ogun?—Yes.

4243. Sir Francis Baring.] Have here a Return, presented from the Foreign Office, from which it would appear that in 1853 the total number of slaves exported were 2,500 from the whole of the West Coast, and that is the lowest number that has ever been exported according to this Return?—That is so, according to the Return.

4244. Will you just run your eye over the Returns of other years, and tell me whether you find that in any other year, either before or since the occupation of Lagos, the export has been so low, taking the whole of the coast altogether?—No, it certainly has not.

4245. It was at its lowest ebb in 1853?—Yes.

4246. It subsequently increased, and it is now reduced again?—Yes.

4247. So far as the occupation of Lagos is concerned, the number was lower when it was not in our possession than it had been since it has been in our possession?—I cannot answer why it should be so, but certainly the Returns bear that out.

4248. The trade of Lagos, at the time it was not in the British possession, was increasing largely?—It was.

4249. And since that time it has fallen off, has it not?—Yes; but the wars must certainly account for that.

4250. But you have said that the wars existed before we occupied Lagos; in spite of those wars, trade had largely increased when it was not ours, and when it was ours trade decreased?—The wars must have had a great deal to do with it. The wars have been very serious during the last three years. They have been worse than they were before.

4251. Do you really think that our interference and occupation of Lagos has not aggravated those wars?—I think that our influence would have been just the same whether we had occupied Lagos or not; or, in other words, if we did aggravate those wars we should have done just the same if there had been a consul there instead of a governor, because the same influence would have been going on.

4252. The feeling between Abeokuta and Lagos (without saying which was in fault) has been

been very much changed, has it not?—Yes, *Captain Foote* went to the Abeokutas, and he fancied that they were our friends; we found afterwards that he was mistaken; they applied several times to me for arms and guns, and I gave them to them.

4253. For what purpose?—To protect them against Dahomey.

4254. *Consul Foote* applied for them I suppose?—Yes; the application came in the usual shape.

4255. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue*.] They, having been accustomed to our assistance against Dahomey, expected that we should assist them against their other enemies, and were very much annoyed when we remained neutral?—Yes.

Captain ANDREW CLARKE, R. E.; called in, and Examined.

4259. *Chairman*.] You are an Officer of the Royal Engineers?—Yes.

4260. You were sent out by the War Department to report upon the defences on the West Coast of Africa?—Yes.

4261. What is the most northern settlement of the British?—The most northern settlement is the *Gambia*.

4262. Do the English claim any position north of the *Gambia*?—There was a disputed claim with the French as to *Portendic*, which was arranged by the Treaty of 1857, England relinquishing her exclusive right of trade and the French ceding *Allreda*, on the *Gambia*, to England.

4263. *Portendic* is north of the French settlement, *Senegal*, is it not?—Yes.

4264. To what extent do the British Government assert any right to *Portendic*?—They now only assert the right of trading, though the local chiefs still hoist the English flag, and assert that they are British subjects; but upon this point I am not very well informed.

4265. *Portendic* is from time to time visited by British men-of-war, is it not?—Yes, I believe so.

4266. There is no British establishment there, is there?—None. No traces of the former fort or settlement remain. The only signs of habitation are the temporary huts of the Moors, who live by trading in gum or fishing.

4267. Will you be kind enough to state what is your opinion with regard to the *Gambia* as a British settlement; is it useful for the purposes of trade?—Yes; it is a good trading position, but it is principally in the hands of the French; they command nearly the whole of the trade of the *Gambia*.

4268. In what way would you think the *Gambia* a good trading position?—The river, having a course of 800 miles, is navigable far into the interior, and thus brings down the produce of the country on either side for several hundreds of miles.

4269. But is not the navigation about the mouth of the river very difficult?—It is an uncertain river to make in consequence of the low land and in consequence of the fogs; but I can hardly call it a difficult river. As a military post it is utterly valueless.

4270. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue*.] You mean as against a foreign power?—Yes.

4271. *Chairman*.] Supposing it to be a good trading station for English trade, how do you account for the trade having developed to so small

4256. *Sir Francis Baring*.] Do you not find a complaint made by the English governor, that the Abeokutas did not apply early enough for assistance, and that it was in consequence of their jealousy of the English that they did not apply?—I know that they did apply at one time.

4257. *Mr. Mills*.] Do you know whether the Abeokutas did or not supply themselves with arms and ammunition from French traders, at *Porto Novo*, in order to defend themselves from Dahomey; did you ever hear that said?—No, and I do not believe it.

4258. *Sir Francis Baring*.] Through *Badagry* they did, did they not?—It is possible, but I could not prove it.

a degree?—I fancy that this is due to the trade being principally in the ground nut, which is almost exclusively in the hands of the French; there is a larger demand for it in France than in England; they employ it very largely in manufacture in *Marseilles* and the south of France.

4272. What are its disadvantages as a military station?—The navigation of the coast and approaches to the river are difficult from the lowness of the land; but, this difficulty once surmounted, the banks of the river and shores of *St. Mary's Island* are so accessible that any effectual scheme of defence would involve enormous outlay.

4273. Those disadvantages are natural disadvantages arising from the features of the land?—Yes, entirely. Besides that, it is about the most unhealthy spot on the West Coast; the town itself is very badly situated. The actual site of the town and barracks is on a low sandy point of land, partially reclaimed from the *Mangrove Marsh*, which surrounds it.

4274. To what extent should you call it at present fortified against any kind of attack?—It is utterly without defence.

4275. You think that it is utterly without defence, not only against the attack of a civilised power, but against an attack of the natives?—The small defensible barracks at *Cape St. Mary* are advantageously situated for defending the settlement against native attack, and, with some slight additions, would be sufficient to resist aggression; and, at *Bathurst*, for security against native attack, it would only be requisite to make the present barracks and stores defensible against musketry.

4276. We have heard evidence from *Captain Burton* that the tribes about there are becoming more powerful by the infusion of *Mussulman* blood; supposing that to be true, should you think that the fortifications are such as will stand against any probability of a native attack?—Were the native races to become opposed to European colonisation and adopt an aggressive policy the settlement would be very open to attack, owing to the newly acquired territory on the mainland bordering on tribes constantly at war among themselves, and to the facility for landing on the shores of the island. In such case the present fortifications would not be equal to the occasion, and extensive works and heavy expenditure would be needed to afford comparative security.

4277. Is it capable of fortification?—It is quite

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quite capable of fortification against native attack if there were Europeans to defend it.

4278. Is it capable of fortification against a civilised power?—Yes, at a great expense, which it is not advisable to incur.

4279. If it was to be so fortified against an attack of a civilized power, what point should be fortified; is it Cape St. Mary?—Cape St. Mary I should rather take up as a position.

4280. Do you conceive it probable that any foreign power would be likely to be ambitious of possessing the Gambia?—The French might occupy it to protect their own trade, but they are the only people who are likely to wish for it under any circumstances.

4281. Suppose it to be obtained by the French, could they hold it without supremacy at sea?—No, I think not.

4282. Its safety depends, in fact, in the hands of any power on supremacy at sea?—Yes, on supremacy at sea.

4283. Now, is it your recommendation that the fortifications should be improved, or that they should be left as they are?—I would recommend that a small battery should be placed there to protect it against insult, and from privateers coming in; nothing more.

4284. Should you recommend any improvement in the barracks?—The barracks are in such a wretched state, and so insufficient in point of accommodation, that to build new ones would be as economical as to improve those already in existence. There is no room for their extension on their present site.

4285. You propose that there should be new barracks?—Yes, I do.

4286. Upon Cape St. Mary?—Yes. I should make Cape St. Mary a military position.

4287. What height is it above the level of the sea; is it 600 feet?—Nothing like that.

4288. Two hundred or 300 feet?—I think about 50 feet.

4289. Is its height above the sea enough to make it comparatively healthy?—Comparatively healthy.

4290. Is Fort Bullen on the opposite shore sufficient to protect that portion of the right bank of the river which the English hold against native aggression?—Quite.

4291. You propose no improvement of Fort Bullen?—None whatever.

4292. What is your recommendation with regard to M'Carthy's Island?—I should recommend its abandonment.

4293. On what grounds do you recommend its abandonment?—On the ground that it is a most unhealthy place. As a military post it is devoid of natural or artificial defence, and by its very weakness invites native attack; it is isolated and distant from any source of supply; though ostensibly for the protection of trade up the river, it has no power to enforce this object. The tribes around it are always at war amongst themselves, and select this part of the river as their battle ground. Shots are said, on more than one occasion, to have passed through the barracks. I recommend either to abandon the post or strengthen the garrison, and the latter course would involve an outlay of at least 3,000*l*.

4294. Has the present garrison ever been in danger, or found itself too weak?—It has found itself in the face of hostile tribes too weak on one or two occasions; it has been a source of

anxiety over and over again, but no insult has ever been offered.

4295. Is it your proposal if it were abandoned that there should be any gunboat or means of communication with the interior station at the mouth?—Yes. To protect what trade there is it might be advisable to send an armed vessel occasionally up the river.

4296. Have they a gunboat there?—There is a small paddle steamer under the control of the Government of the settlements. The expense is borne by the Imperial Government.

4297. Is the island of Bulama fortified?—No.

4298. The possession of Bulama is at this moment disputed between the English and the Portuguese Governments, is it not?—That is an open question; I do not think that it is being pressed at all.

4299. Do you consider the occupation of Bulama by the English Government important?—Certainly not.

4300. Will you make the same remark with regard to Isle de Los?—That is abandoned altogether; there is no occupation.

4301. Nor is it desirable to have any occupation in it?—No.

4302. What is the state of the fortification of Sierra Leone?—There is nothing at Sierra Leone worthy of the name of a fortification. Of the existing works Fort Thornton is in the best repair, and in the best position for defence against a maritime power.

4303. What is the number of batteries on the Freetown peninsula?—There are five.

4304. Are they in an effective state?—No.

4305. If they were restored, such as they are, would they be good against any attack except by the natives?—The restoration of these works would render them effectual against attacks by maritime powers only if done in connection with a large general scheme of defence; this would lead to present and heavy permanent expenditure which would not be repaid by the results gained. Any such attack is improbable; but I think that Sierra Leone should be supported by other defences, and I should therefore propose an additional work on Cape Sierra Leone.

4306. Besides those five batteries?—I should recommend the abandonment of those batteries, with the exception of Falcon Bridge, or East Battery, and Fort Thornton. These I would retain, and I propose the construction of a new battery.

4307. You would propose a new battery, of greater strength?—Yes; of greater strength and more heavily armed.

4308. The Committee have had several recommendations to concentrate all the British Governments on the West African coast at Sierra Leone; is it with that view at all that you would recommend to strengthen the fortifications?—Not specially with that object in view; but more regarding Sierra Leone as a coaling station and naval dépôt. The French are strengthening Goree and Dakkar very much at present, making it a naval establishment. It is a question of our not being able to coal at St. Vincent. It would be necessary to have some port on the Atlantic, and Sierra Leone is the only one which offers the necessary facilities for such a naval establishment.

4309. You would do this solely with a view to
a coal

a coal dépôt?—Yes, solely to make a small naval establishment of it.

4310. Have you proposed the enlargement of the barracks?—Very considerably.

4311. Would the barracks, enlarged as you propose, be sufficient for the Governor General concentrating all the troops there which might be required on the West African coast anywhere?—It depends entirely on your policy on the West African coast.

4312. You know about the present strength of the troops commanded by British officers on the West Coast?—Yes.

4313. Would the barracks that you propose take them all in?—No.

4314. So that if there was one Governor General, and if all the troops were concentrated there, we should want considerably larger barracks?—Very considerably larger. At present the barrack accommodation and offices are totally inadequate.

4315. Are the positions of the batteries healthy?—No, for their sites are low. The barracks at Free Town are in a healthy position, comparatively speaking. Still better sites might be selected on the range of mountains close to Sierra Leone.

4316. Would that new battery which you propose be in a healthy position?—No, I think it would not make much difference.

4317. Would it be free from malaria?—It would be further removed from it.

4318. Is the channel at the mouth of the Sierra Leone river safe?—Yes, it is a safe channel about a mile in breadth, though the entrance is difficult. Currents set in various directions, and great care is necessary to avoid the dangers of its navigation.

4319. Is there not a lighthouse?—Yes.

4320. Is that a dangerous point?—No. Carpenter's Rock, 800 yards north-west of the Cape, on which the lighthouse stands, is a dangerous reef.

4321. Is the new battery which you propose near the mouth of the river?—It is on the headland, on the southern shore of the mouth of the Sierra Leone river.

4322. Do you consider that attacks from the natives are so probable that they should be provided against?—No.

4323. All your propositions, then, are against a maritime attack for the purpose of securing a coal dépôt at Sierra Leone?—Yes, at Sierra Leone.

4324. Do you consider Sierra Leone a good trading station; is it commercially advantageous?—Not very, but still I think it may be looked upon as the only point on the coast where our legal trade has at all prospered, from the oil rivers up to Goree on the west; it ought to have a very good trade, although it has not.

4325. What have you found generally to be the condition of Freetown; does it look like a thriving place?—Though not apparently a thriving place it presents facilities for improvement.

4326. Why should it be in so slovenly looking and deserted a state?—I suppose it is from the want of energy in the character of the people.

4327. To what do you attribute the languishing trade and the dirty state of Freetown, which you consider naturally a good trading station?—The whole of the country at the back of Sierra Leone is a very thinly populated country; it is poor soil in mountainous country; there is not very much produce there. I do not think there are any other causes.

4328. Why should you propose to provide Sierra Leone against maritime attack; do you think it is likely that a foreign power would be anxious to possess it?—In making it a naval dépôt where there would be large stores of coal and provisions, and possibly a repairing station for vessels, it would be desirable to take certain precautions against attack by a single vessel or a small squadron.

4329. Supposing we wanted one naval station in that part of the world, would it be any great injury to British interests that the others should fall into the hands of the French?—None whatever.

4330. When you visited the Gold Coast could you ascertain what boundaries the French assert for their settlement?—There is generally an undefined idea that north of Assinee is the boundary of the protectorate.

4331. Are there any natural features which indicate the boundary to the north?—The river runs for some 160 miles, I think, west, and then takes a turn nearly at right angles to its first course.

4332. Is there any distinct boundary to the north between the protected tribes and the kingdom of Ashantee?—Yes, the river Prah is supposed to be the boundary, but there is no real definition of the boundary.

4333. The tribes in the protectorate are very numerous, and were all once tributary to the King of Ashantee, were they not?—There are a great number of tribes.

4334. They were all once, more or less, tributary to the King of Ashantee, were they not?—Yes.

4335. At the close of the war with Holland, when the dispute was between the Dutch and the English, the English at first retained only one fort on the Gold Coast, did they not; I mean Cape Coast Castle?—Yes.

4336. Do you think it has been for the interest of the English to multiply its forts there?—No.

4337. Do you think it has been rather to the injury of the English to retain them, and that they would have been much better off if they had not retained them?—I think so, the history of the whole of the forts must be looked at; we were contending with all the other maritime powers at the time; the forts had little or nothing to do with the natives, they were originally built to repel attacks by rival neighbours.

4338. The struggle was between the different European powers?—Yes; between different European powers; and not only so, but between the settlers themselves, who waged war against each other when the mother countries were at peace. Indeed, I have seen, at Cape Coast Castle, treaties between the Dutch and English Governors making arrangements for peace while the parent states were at war.

4339. Has the trade practically flourished under the government of the English, either mercantile or the Crown Government?—It flourished more under the trading system than under the present policy.

4340. It flourished more under the government of the company of merchants than under the government of the Crown, you think?—Comparing the general trade on the coast now, I think there is evidence that it did flourish more then, for the Select Committee of the House of Commons, in 1842, although advising the change of system which had been followed since 1828, admit the merits of that administration, which,

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almost altogether commercial, had "over 150 miles of coast, and for greater distances inland, exercised a wholesome influence, preventing within that range external slave trade, maintaining peace and security among the neighbouring tribes, mitigating, and in some cases extinguishing the atrocious practices which had before prevailed unchecked." This description of the results of the administration, true in 1843, is no longer applicable to the condition of the same territory in 1863, though the one had for its support but a few ill-paid black soldiers, who, with police and militia, never exceeded 200 men, while during the last 20 years the local government has had at its disposal a force never less than, and often upwards of, 400 regular troops. In 1840 the total imports and exports of the Gold Coast amounted to 748,178 *l.* The Blue Book of the last year furnished, namely, that of 1861, shows that this amount has fallen to 307,818 *l.* The expenditure for the purposes of Government in 1861 was upwards of 25,000 *l.*, and this sum is now considerably increased. The administration in 1840 cost less than 3,750 *l.*, nor will a scrutiny of the condition of the other British settlements give more favourable results, either in their social or material progress.

4341. Do you suppose that, during the government of the merchants, there were more English merchants there than there are now under the government of the Crown?—Certainly; there are reports of many more being there.

4342. You think that the number of English merchants in the Gold Coast trade has diminished under the government of the Crown?—I think it has; there were only two or three merchants, and but 12 white men on the whole of the coast when I was there, except the civilians and soldiers of the Government.

4343. Is there any harbour on the Gold Coast?—There is only one that deserves the name of a harbour, which is Elimina, the Dutch harbour.

4344. All the rest is a sea beach with a rolling sea and a high surf?—Yes.

4345. Are there a great many forts all along the coast?—Yes, an enormous number; most of them are in ruins.

4346. The original purpose for which those forts were built you consider to have been for mutual defence against each other, the colonists of the different European powers?—Yes.

4347. What good are they then now against a very different kind of possible attack?—Those that are in repair could stand any attack from a native force; but they are the very worst places in which you can put troops for health and comfort.

4348. How many forts are there now in such a condition as to stand an attack, from the Ashantee power, for instance?—The forts at Dix Cove and Cape Coast Castle are capable, if garrisoned by British troops, of resisting any number of Ashantees.

4349. Is there any other?—You could make even Accra in its present condition, had as it is, capable of standing against any native power. The fort at Annamabo would also be quite capable of defence against any native power, if manned by British troops.

4350. Is your recommendation to the Government that we should restore any of those forts, so as to be efficient against a native attack?—No; I should propose to restore none of the forts beyond making the repairs necessary for the com-

fort of their garrisons, nor to keep up their armament or restore their defences, but I would rather recommend building barracks on healthy sites removed from the sea, and merely surrounded them with a loop-hole wall; which is all that is necessary for protection against the natives.

4351. If there were any native attack likely to happen you think that a loop-hole wall would be sufficient?—Yes.

4352. How many points are there on the coast where you could find a healthy position for such a barrack establishment?—If it was a question of open choice I should say that Accra was the best place, both from its central position and its being in an open and comparatively healthy country.

4353. Do you propose only one?—That again depends entirely on the strength of the force that you intend to have. If you are going to keep a whole regiment on the Gold Coast you must keep a certain portion of the troops at Cape Coast Castle, but I should prefer as large a number as possible at Accra.

4354. Supposing the recommendation which has been made were to be carried out, namely, that the central Government should be at Sierra Leone, with all the troops, commanded by English officers; the regular troops concentrated at Sierra Leone being sent out in steam transports when wanted; and that the commandants of other stations should have no force but the police raised on the spot; what accommodation would then be necessary on the Gold Coast in the way of barracks?—Under those circumstances, none.

4355. You think that the police would live in their own houses; that there would be no necessity for a Houssa police to be housed in barracks?—The local police would live in their own houses. I should advise no barracks in that case; the natives could live in the remnants of the old forts. The Houssa being Mahometans, their employment as police on the Gold Coast is impracticable.

4356. For the safety of the governor or of a lieutenant governor, you think that an ordinary house, with an inclosure around it, would be enough?—It would depend on what his policy was with regard to the natives.

4357. Supposing that he was to incur the wrath of the Ashantees, and they were to come down and attack him, would such a house with an inclosure around it, be sufficient protection against such an attack?—It would be of very little use if he had no force. If you withdrew all your troops, his living in a fort would be of no use to him.

4358. Supposing a lieutenant governor had nothing but an ordinary house, inclosed, could he, with such troops as could be sent down to him in the way suggested from Sierra Leone, defend himself, do you think?—Certainly. But the forts on the coast are the most uncomfortable kind of house that a man could possibly live in.

4359. Cape St. Mary, for instance, is very uncomfortable?—There are only very indifferent quarters for a small detachment at that place.

4360. You are of opinion that such a house as you propose, without our attempting to fortify it, would be a very much better residence for a governor than one of these forts?—Very much better.

4361. All the European powers who from time to time have occupied posts on the Gold Coast have left it except the Dutch and English, have

have they not?—Yes, all of them except the Dutch and English.

4362. Do you suppose it possible that the Dutch and English can continue to hold posts there, side by side, for the interests of both nations, or must not one of the two, more or less, thwart the other?—If you want to raise a revenue, of course they would interfere a little with each other; but, except that, there is no reason why they should not trade and live together in harmony, their interests running parallel.

4363. Should we not be more likely to become embroiled with the natives by the setting up of two powers, which the natives would attempt to enlist on their own side one against the other?—Only if you insist on collecting a revenue from the place; there is no other ground for jealousy that I can see.

4364. Do you conceive that a military force is necessary upon this coast for the protection of commerce?—No, it is not necessary anywhere.

4365. You do not think that the security of commerce requires any military force on the coast?—No, not a soldier.

4366. Lord Stanley.] Do you apply that observation to the whole of the African coast, or only the Gold Coast?—The whole of the African coast.

4367. Chairman.] In fact you are of opinion that the English trade does not require military protection?—No military protection, it requires naval protection; but a civil government, requiring a military establishment, is a source of weakness and embarrassment to trade.

4368. Upon the English settlement at Lagos what is your report, first with regard to the residence of the governor and the barracks for the troops?—There are no barracks for troops, there are only some bamboo huts.

4369. Is there, in fact, much improvement necessary to be carried out at Lagos in order to render the residence of the governor anything like a British establishment?—If it is to be properly and decently done, merely for the ordinary convenience and comfort of the troops, as well as of our civil establishments, an immediate expenditure of not less than 100,000*l.* would be required.

4370. On the island of Lagos alone?—Yes, on the island of Lagos alone.

4371. Is the same the case with regard to Badagry, Pabna and Leekie?—Yes, if you keep troops there, certainly.

4372. Has Lagos any strength such as to make it to resist an attack if one were likely to be made?—None.

4373. Neither against a foreign naval attack, nor against an attack from the natives?—It has no artificial defences at all now; the great natural defence of Lagos against a maritime power is its dangerous bar, and against attack by natives, its best security is its insular position.

4374. Is the situation of Lagos such that it could be made defensible?—You can make any port defensible at a large expense.

4375. You are of opinion that nothing but a large expenditure would make the island of Lagos defensible?—Nothing but a large expenditure would make it defensible against a maritime power.

4376. You have said that English trade does not require military protection on this coast; do you think that the general influence of the British Government is favourable to the protection

of trade?—The general influence of the Imperial Government of England is of course favourable to the protection of trade; but I think that the actual influence of the present system on the trade of the settlements subject to British interference has tended to diminish rather than to increase it. A comparison of the returns of exports and imports to these settlements and to the other parts of Western Africa where there are simply trading factories, or subject only to the casual intervention of a consul or of a British ship of war will show this more clearly; for whilst the exports and imports, taking the average of the former for the last nine, and of the latter for the last ten years, from and to the British settlements together, amount to 498,616*l.* 11*s.* 6*d.* annually; the average value of exports and imports to the other portions of the coast for the same periods amounts to no less a sum than 2,589,379*l.* annually. In the list of shipping on the West Coast, given in a local journal of June last, of 40 trading vessels on the coast, only seven were lying at ports in British settlements.

4377. You think that Imperial protection through the squadron would be favourable to trade, but that the position in which the British Government places itself on the shores is detrimental to trade?—Yes, because on establishing the form and power of Government, a revenue for its support is necessary, and this has to be raised either by custom dues or direct taxation of the natives, or both systems; the former naturally drives the trade away; the whole of the coast being so accessible, the mass of the traders go up and down the coast picking up trade from the various villages, and you lose your revenue; and the latter does not put the British Government in such a relation to the natives as to command their respect; if England paid the cost of these local governments altogether, and did the thing well, it is possible that it might exercise along the coast a powerful influence on the natives, but the existing system certainly is not beneficially influential.

4378. You think that if the present policy is adhered to that it should be carried out more thoroughly?—Yes, it should be carried out more thoroughly; if you do it, do it well.

4379. Lord Stanley.] In what sense do you mean that we should do it well, and do it more thoroughly; do you mean by extending our relations with the interior?—No, not at all; I mean that all our establishments there at present are make-shift ones.

4380. Chairman.] In order to make the British Government effective and respected, you conceive that a large outlay would be necessary?—Yes; I consider that a large immediate and an increased permanent annual expenditure would be necessary.

4381. Is the present influence of the Government not only bad from the effects of its incomplete establishments, and its interferences with native customs, but also from its very irregular relations with the native tribes?—Very much so.

4382. The whole system of treaties between the English Government and native tribes you consider detrimental to the interests of trade?—More or less so, certainly.

4383. In the first place, you conceive that each of the tribes endeavours to engage the influence of the British Government in its own favour, which more or less implicates the British Government with other tribes?—The first act of every

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tribe, when it revolts against native authority, is to place itself under the protection of some European flag; most of these tribes are now under English protection, and that country consequently assumes the responsibility of identifying herself with their quarrels, whether they arise from disputes with local trading agents or dissensions among the tribes themselves.

4384. You think that those disputes would be better settled by a consul, who might fall back on a naval force in case of need?—Yes; in the first place a consul is much more likely to use direct influence, and really to inquire into such a matter than where you have got a system of government backed up to a certain extent by a military force. What formerly was only the influence of the governors or chief factors at the various forts has insensibly been changed into direct exercise of authority over the tribes in their various differences and quarrels. All African history proves that this military force has been too frequently used in the settlement of one native quarrel or another.

4385. That is, in fact, the exact relation between the British Government on the Gold Coast, and the protected tribes?—I failed to discover what the definite relation is: there is no record of any clear authority, agreement, or treaty as to the protectorate; the original relation would appear to have been merely an alliance of "peace and free commerce" between Great Britain and the kings of certain districts; there have, I believe, been a great many treaties, but these treaties were previous to the introduction of the present system of government. Such treaties, however, were principally with regard to the suppression of the slave trade; the tribes in the protectorate do not acknowledge any obligation or responsibility to England.

4386. Does such a very uncertain and irregular relation not only implicate us in the internal quarrels of the tribes, but bring us into collision with certain native customs?—Yes; on the Gold Coast especially. It is the opinion of some who have considered the subject, that our interfering with the native tribes in those quarrels has kept back the more civilised tribes in the interior from getting down to the coast.

4387. What tribes are they; are they Mussulman tribes?—Yes, Mussulman tribes.

4388. In fact, you mean that the system of the English Government on the coast leads the English to maintain certain weaker Pagan tribes near the coast against the more powerful Mussulman tribes in the interior, who would otherwise probably overrun them?—Yes, to some extent; for at the Gambia English power has been impetuously enlisted on the side of the Pagan in endeavours to check Moslem faith and conquest. Moslem proselytism is slowly but steadily advancing from north and east to west and south of tropical Africa, and to check it is as futile as impolitic. Were there evidence that the efforts made for 500 years past to introduce a purer faith from Europe had met with even moderate success, there might be some hope that checking Mahometanism would lead to the triumph of Christianity over Paganism; but there is little or no hope of this; and, in the meantime, the Koran enforces on the Pagan purer morality, which raises him above cannibalism, manstealing, and degrading Fetish, and leads him to a new civilisation which, creating in him new wants, teaches him, to some extent at least, to value the lives

and industry of others. Though, on the other hand, at the very moment when hostilities were going on between the English, on the coast of Africa, and the Ashantees, the Ashantees were at war with the Mahomedans on their eastern frontier, and using the British name, and asserting that they were upheld by British influence against those very people.

4389. We maintained the Ashantees against some Mahomedan power further in the interior?—Yes, indirectly.

4390. Does not that come to what I put to you; are we not maintaining a weaker power against a more powerful tribe dwelling further in the interior?—Not directly, but indirectly we are.

4391. And the power so taken into relation with the English Government are probably weaker than those against whom they are maintained, being Pagans as against Mahomedans?—That applies certainly to the settlement of the Gambia, but it does not apply so much to the settlements on the Gold Coast.

4392. Does it not apply to the particular case that you alluded to just now?—No; that was a disturbance between the smaller tribes on this side of the Prah and the great Ashantee country; it had the effect of closing the roads through both countries, and keeping back the trade from the coast, the Mahomedans themselves. The Mahomedan conquest has not actually come down so far as the Ashantee country; it is only lately that they have been in collision.

4393. But the English interest has indirectly retarded the advance of the Mahomedan power to the whole of the coast?—Yes; in the war that I have mentioned.

4394. So that, if the English did not assume any such influence, those more powerful Mahomedan tribes would, you think, gradually get possession of the whole country up to the sea coast?—I do not know that they would get possession of the territory up to the coast, but they would force their way down to the coast, and come down and trade with us.

4395. On the whole, you think the effect would have been better in the interest of trade if the English had not so interfered?—I think so.

4396. Have you any suggestion to make to the Committee with regard to the kind of troops that we employ on the West African Coast?—I think that if we are going to hold it under present conditions, a very much smaller force of European troops, highly paid, would be more effective than the present system of native black troops.

4397. But would European troops stand the climate as well as the black troops do?—If our regiments there were recruited entirely from Africans, certainly not, but the native of the West Indies does not stand the African climate; when he is called to the front, and when you really want him, he goes under very much quicker than a European does.

4398. Should you not be afraid of a very great loss of life arising, by the use of European troops on this coast?—No; of course you would run a chance now and then, every five or six years, of an epidemic visiting the coast; but, under certain regulations, I think you would be able to keep a European force there comparatively healthy.

4399. Part of those regulations being, I presume, providing barracks upon more healthy sites?—Of course.

4400. Will you state to the Committee the system

system on which the War Department has its works on the West African Coast superintended?—Formerly, when I went out there, the works were superintended by a clerk of the works; they are now under the charge, at each station, of an officer of a West Indian regiment, who is acting engineer.

4401. There is an acting engineer at each station?—I think so at present.

4402. Does he report to the War Department every year?—He reports to the War Department by every mail, I should think.

4403. Is that report such as the one you have first made to the Department; is there a similar report to that from time to time?—No; the last report of that character was made by Captain Noble four or five years ago.

4404. Have there been many new works lately?—A few repairs that were ordered when I went out there; and there is also building going on for European non-commissioned officers at Sierra Leone. The truth is, I believe, that until this Committee has decided what is to be the future policy of occupation on the coast the works that are necessary there are not going to be carried out, because they are very numerous, and the expense is very great.

4405. That work at Sierra Leone is, however, going on?—Yes.

4406. Do you think that the change from the old system of a clerk of the works to the new system of an acting engineer at each station a good change?—Yes. That was done at my recommendation. The object was to employ the black troops as much as possible on the work; the West Indian regiments have a good many artificers among them, and they do their work very fairly.

4407. Can you inform the Committee at all the strength of the French settlement at Senegal, or their establishment?—They have got a very large establishment at Senegal and Goree. There is a force of militia at St. Louis, Bakel, and Goree, in addition to the military establishment, consisting of about 2,500 men.

4408. Both military and naval?—Both military and naval.

4409. Mr. Cave.] Have they got black troops there?—Yes, about 1,000 natives of the country; but they have about 1,500 white men there too.

4410. Chairman.] You have seen their establishment there?—Yes; Goree and Dakkar. Great improvements are being made in fortifying and strengthening the defences to cover the naval and military establishments recently formed.

4411. Are there many European troops there?—They have European artillery and European engineers, and a corps of marines.

4412. Have the French succeeded in placing their barracks on a healthy station, so as not to be subject to so great a mortality as the English troops?—Goree is comparatively healthy; it is much more open than the Gambia, and it is very much better than any position which we have. It is extensively used as a coaling station for the French ships and squadrons to and from China and India. They have, however, suffered there.

4413. From the same fever as our troops?—No, from yellow fever; when we occupied it about 50 years ago we suffered too.

4414. Do you know the strength of their naval establishment in Senegal?—I think they have 12 small vessels of war, of various kinds.

4415. Does that include such ships as cruise off Assinee?—No; it is part of the squadron.

4416. Can you inform us the strength of the Dutch establishment at Elmina?—I think that the strength of the Dutch establishment at Elmina consisted of eight or nine white officers, who held all of them civil appointments besides, and some 250 native soldiers, recruits and others; but the recruits are for Java.

4417. Have you been to Liberia?—I was at Cape Palmas only.

4418. What is your general opinion of the manner in which they are going on at Liberia, both with regard to the government and trade; are they thriving?—With regard to that subject, I can only express what I have heard, rather than what I have seen. Certainly at Cape Palmas there is no sign of anything like success. I do not know Monrovia, but they say they are rather retrograding than advancing.

4419. What is your general opinion with regard to the effect of the British settlement in stopping the slave trade at all those points?—The history of the slave trade and the settlements on the coast does not show that the British system has afforded any material aid in suppressing the traffic in slaves, except perhaps at Sierra Leone. The settlement there may have had, to some extent, an influence on the slave trade, but very little. There has been no exportation of slaves from the Gold Coast since the year 1830, previous to the establishment of the protectorate, except from Quittah, which is more on the Slave than the Gold Coast. There have been very few slaves ever taken from there, and military occupation is not likely to put a stop wholly to the practice, as the network of lagoons extending from the Volta to the bights render evasion very easy. Since we gave it up ourselves, it is an open coast; there is no place where you could well conceal the traffic. From Quittah down to the bights is where most of the slaves have been taken from.

4420. Generally speaking, do you think, especially with regard to the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast, that if the English had not taken possession of the coast, and made a settlement there, trade would have sprung up of itself, and put an end to the slave trade as fast as the English have succeeded in doing so?—I think so. I think the fact of having the governments there, one way or the other, has had no effect; that has been done by the squadron, and not by the local governments. On the contrary, I believe that direct communication between the consul and the commodore commanding the squadron would practically have had a better effect; moreover, there would have actually been better information given to the commodore, as a rule, of any probability of slaves being taken away than there has been hitherto, under the mixed systems.

4421. On all that part of the coast you think that if the native rulers had been allowed to remain, and the English had posted consuls along the coast, that the natural influence of trade to suppress the slave trade would have been greater?—I will not say that it would have been actually greater, but certainly it would have been equal to the influence exerted by the present system, and the results would have been attained at a less loss of life and treasure.

4422. You think that the results in the way of suppressing the slave trade attained by the

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British governments in Africa have not been at all commensurate with the loss of life and treasure?—Apart from the squadron, and confining it to the settlements, I think so.

4423. In fact you say that lawful commerce would be less promoted by confining the English operations to consulates?—I think that lawful commerce would be best promoted by confining English influence to that of a consul or mercantile agent, instead of trying to force, by military power and the machinery of a colonial government, our institutions and laws upon people to whom they are not suited or applicable.

4424. At Lagos, for instance, was legitimate trade gradually suppressing the slave trade before we assumed the government?—From all I could gather that was the case.

4425. At this moment the slave trade has pretty well disappeared north of the Portuguese settlement, has it not; is there anything practically going on north of the Congo?—There are slavers now running from Whydah and the bights, and there may be some now and then between Whydah and Quittah; you will see an enormous mass of lagoons at the back, and there are the places where slaves are collected and hid; they offer facilities for carrying on the slave trade.

4426. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] What are the numerous works that you say are in contemplation on the coast of Africa, which are suspended until this Committee has reported?—Principally barracks for the troops, which are now practically without them, so deficient is the accommodation in those that now exist. Hospitals and barrack offices are also required, sanitary stations have to be built, means of transport and communication with isolated outposts furnished; public works, by which life may be saved, undertaken, personal allowances, increase of pay, &c., to meet the common necessities of existence granted; and when all this has been done he must be very sanguine who, knowing anything of European settlement in Western Africa, would venture to predict that all the sacrifice thus involved would ever benefit one race or the other.

4427. Do you mean barracks only or barracks and fortifications?—I have recommended very little in the way of fortifications.

4428. Then, upon what supposition are those barracks contemplated; is it upon the supposition that the present numbers of troops of the present quality are to be stationed at the respective settlements?—It is on the supposition that two West Indian regiments will be permanently stationed on the coast.

4429. It is upon that supposition that those works are contemplated?—Yes, if carried out, it will be with the accommodation of this force in view.

4430. Do you include new barracks at every one of the settlements?—More or less.

4431. When you said that the barracks at Sierra Leone would not be sufficient, supposing Sierra Leone to become the seat of the Governor General of the African Settlements, you supposed that the present number of troops scattered over the coast would be concentrated at Sierra Leone?—That was the way in which the question was put to me, and I answered it upon that supposition.

4432. I see in Colonel Ord's Report with regard to the works at Lagos, that 20,000*l.* is given as the sum for barracks which has this year been put on the Estimates?—Yes.

4433. Do you conceive that the remaining 80,000*l.*, which would go to make up the sum you mentioned of 100,000*l.*, would be required for the civil works at Lagos?—Certainly, you would have to make roads and drains, if you wish to keep the people alive: a great deal of expenditure must be incurred to make the place habitable.

4434. Are you prepared to estimate that civil expenditure at 80,000*l.*?—Besides that I do not think that the estimate of 20,000*l.* was for merely the ordinary putting up of two companies of a regiment; independently of that there would be a great many other things to be done; sanitary stations, public offices and residences for the civil officers would have to be built, as well as provision for transport by roads, and precautions against disease by drainage, &c., made.

4435. Are you aware that the troops have been already removed from Lagos?—No, I was not aware of that.

4436. Assuming that the troops have been removed from Lagos, and that there is no intention of returning them there, your estimate of the necessary work would be very largely reduced, would it not?—Very largely reduced indeed.

4437. Did I understand you to say that you thought our trade treaties, which had been entered into with a number of chiefs along the coast, had been injurious to trade instead of beneficial?—No, not the trade treaties in themselves, but the interference, under the pretext of enforcing them, between rival traders asking the aid of the local government; it was a question of protection arising from that.

4438. But you were asked some questions about the treaties, and I understood you to say that you thought they were prejudicial?—I did not mean to say that the trade treaties were prejudicial; but the assumed rights that seem to have come out of those treaties on the Gold Coast have been the cause of embarrassment.

4439. You have the Gold Coast protectorate in your mind, have you not?—Yes, and the various tribes that were once tributary to the Ashantes.

4440. Are you aware, as a matter of history, to what extent we have been involved in wars with native tribes of which you think there is so much danger?—The history of the West African Coast shows that year after year, if our troops are not actually brought into collision with the native tribes, we are out against them somewhere or other, on requisitions made by the local governments, or the military commandants for troops in different places.

4441. Would you say, as a matter of fact, on looking back, that we have been often or seriously involved in wars with the native tribes?—I think so, very frequently.

4442. Will you give the Committee instances of that?—There are two or three instances upon the Gambia within the last 10 or 12 years; the acquisition of British Quittah the other day; Lagos again the other day; and the Ashantes again half-a-dozen times over; and the annals of the West Indian regiments quartered on the coast show the numbers of times that British arms have been brought into the field against the natives.

4443. Were not most of those so-called wars, wars of a very trifling nature?—They were trifling no doubt, comparing the numbers that were engaged with those engaged in other wars, but serious as regards the proportion of casualties and

and effects of climate on the troops, and very serious, considering the objects that were gained.

4444. There was no war, was there, with the Ashantees between the treaty of peace in 1831 and the late war in 1863?—I think not; there was a war just before that with the Crobbos. That peaceful state of things was due to the influence of Mr. McClean, during those 12 or 14 years.

4445. The Ashantee wars have been by far the most serious of any wars that we have had on the coast, have they not?—That when Governor McCarthy was killed was a serious one, but I am not so intimately acquainted with the facts as to be able to compare them; but I think that there were one or two affairs in Sierra Leone, which have been still more serious; there was also the Gambia, when our posts were driven in, and we had to wait for the French to come to our assistance.

4446. *Chairman.* But those wars, though not serious, have disturbed trade?—Yes; they have disturbed trade, and, comparing the loss of life and the loss of prestige to the British army, they have been serious.

4447. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.* The military expeditions on the coast of Africa have not been confined to places where we have actually settlements, have they; for instance, we had such a case as the bombardment of Porto Novo, and we had Lagos in 1851, and many other places where we had no actual British settlement?—That is so; but you also bombarded Acoera from Fort Christiansborg, when they refused to pay the poll-tax.

4448. Is it your opinion that the collisions with the natives, into which we have been occasionally driven in the neighbourhood of our settlements have been so injurious as to make those settlements detrimental to trade rather than beneficial?—I think that trade would have been freed, and that it would have very much more developed itself if you had protected it simply by the squadron and by the simple power exercised by a consul.

4449. The Committee have had before them a great deal of naval evidence to the effect that if the British settlements were entirely withdrawn from the coast, it would require a very large increase of the squadron for the purpose of protecting commerce and preventing a revival of the slave trade; do you differ from that view?—Yes, I think so; I think that trade, free from its present vexatious checks, would have the effect of neutralising the necessity of any increase of the squadron; before the increase of legitimate commerce the slave trade would disappear.

4450. With the exception of Sierra Leone, if all the other British settlements were withdrawn, trade would be safe, you think, and no further revival of the slave trade would arise, even without the presence of the squadron?—I never supposed the squadron would be altogether withdrawn; but I do not think, even if it were, that there would be very much danger. What has been done by the squadron, north of the bights, has been such as to check the slave trade, so that it will never revive again. There are hundreds of miles of coast where you have no settlement, and where there used to be a great deal of slave trade which your settlements have influenced in no way, and in which there is no slave trade now.

4451. You do not agree with the naval witnesses that if the British settlements on the

coast were withdrawn, a large increase of the squadron would be necessary?—No, I do not.

4452. How often have you been on the coast?—Only once.

4453. When was that?—Last year.

4454. How long were you on the coast?—Seven months.

4455. At what stations?—I visited from the Gambia to Lagos. I never visited Portendie.

4456. Where did you pass most of your time?—At the Gold Coast.

4457. How long were you at Lagos?—I was only three days at Lagos.

4458. You did not visit Badagry, Palma, or Leekie?—No, neither the one or the other.

4459. *Lord Stanley.* I understand you to say that if our present possessions are to be maintained, and if we are to continue our present system of endeavouring to influence the chiefs by treaties and by a protectorate, you think it will be necessary to incur a considerably increased expenditure in order to make the system work effectually?—Yes.

4460. In what items would that increased expenditure consist; you say that the forts are worthless, and would require repairing?—The largest items would lie in affording decent accommodation to the garrisons of the settlements. If the people of this country knew the wretched state of the barracks in which their troops are quartered there would be a general feeling of indignation. There is not a place which is really fit for the habitation of British troops.

4461. The buildings are bad, I suppose, and no great care was taken originally in choosing the sites?—The sites were selected with one particular object in view, which was to protect the landing places against other Europeans; those sites were, therefore, naturally the very worst places on which buildings could be put. The forts were built strongly, without any regard to light, ventilation, water, and comfort generally.

4462. Assuming that Parliament were to decide not to abandon any of our principal existing settlements, but to cut down the expenditure as much as possible, and generally to curtail our operations on the coast, do you think it would be practicable to hold the principal posts which we now hold (Sierra Leone, the Gambia, the Gold Coast, and Lagos) without troops, trusting solely to naval defence?—I should not advise the perpetuation of our present system of government; having governors interfering with native disputes and native quarrels, and courts arranging their matters for them. I should not suggest the withdrawing of the troops if you did perpetuate that system. You cannot cut down the expenditure if you decide under any organisation whatever to retain these settlements as British colonies; on the contrary, you must be prepared for a very considerable increase, and you will then still be liable to the constant repetition of the agitation that the occurrences of last year produced both in and out of Parliament.

4463. Do you mean interfering with the natives within the British jurisdiction?—Yes; take the Gold Coast, for instance; the Supreme Court there has constantly to sit upon cases involving points which relate to slaves and pawns; that is a constant cause of quarrel; and if you cannot enforce the orders of your own court, which you can only do by police and soldiers, of course it is perfectly valueless.

4464. You mean that, where a jurisdiction is

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asserted, and especially among barbarous tribes, there must be force to fall back upon?—Yes, unless it is the kind of jurisdiction which was formerly maintained on the coast, where Europeans left it to the natives to fight out their matters among themselves.

4465. Do you think it would be practicable to maintain the principal posts which we now hold, and to adopt a policy of strict non-interference in all matters which would bring us into collision with native quarrels and customs?—I think it would be perfectly practicable; it might be a little difficult at first, but I am satisfied, that if the British Government were determined to do it, the natives themselves (they have already succeeded to some extent in Liberia) would be able to arrange their own affairs, and perhaps more satisfactorily than we do it for them.

4466. But what your answer mainly points to is the doing away with the system which is now known as the protectorate?—Yes; and also to throwing the natives very much more on their own powers of self-government than at present.

4467. Do you think we exercise considerable influence over the natives at any distance from the Gambia?—No; I think they hate the idea of civilisation approaching them.

4468. You think the influence that we do exercise, is an influence of dread?—Yes, an influence of dread rather than respect. Our occupation of a country means to them, taxation and interference with native customs.

4469. Of course a European government is in its nature more expensive than a Native government?—Yes.

4470. And the expense was, I understand, covered mainly by customs duties?—To a certain extent; and, small as the amount is, it is very obnoxious. At the Gold Coast an attempt made to levy an income from the tribes for the cost of the protectorate has failed.

4471. Wherever we go, we have thus to impose duties upon the natives?—Yes, and we have to impose restrictions, in order to protect trade in other places.

4472. In order to prevent our customs being evaded, we must impose restrictions beyond our own frontier?—Yes.

4473. Is Freetown in a very unsatisfactory state?—You may look at it as an experiment with the black race, and there are signs of a certain comfort among them; but, looking at what has been spent, I think, on the whole, it is not a very satisfactory experiment to us.

4474. Mr. Gregory.] How long were you on the Gold Coast?—Between seven and eight weeks.

4475. We have had evidence given before this Committee, that the great want of the Gold Coast was, that the country should be opened up by means of roads?—Roads are very good things, but I do not know how it is to be done; the natives will not make them themselves.

4476. You do not believe that the natives would submit to a poll-tax for that purpose?—I am afraid not; a poll-tax was tried, and was given up.

4477. But was not there an impression among the people that the poll-tax was badly managed, and was not applied to the purposes for which it was raised?—I believe so.

4478. Do you not think that if they saw that the money was going to be laid out for the purpose of making roads, they would be willing to

submit to a poll-tax again?—I question it very much, because the roads they have are sufficient for their purpose.

4479. Do you think that roads would be, to a certain extent, a protection to the coast against the Ashantees?—It would enable us to convey troops with greater facility, of course.

4480. I think you stated a little while ago that there were powerful Mahomedan tribes in the interior who were pressing on the coast tribes, and that the indirect effect of our present system was to prevent these tribes coming down to the coast; do you know if there are any Mahomedan tribes who are pressing on the Ashantees?—I understand the Ashantees are constantly at war with the tribes on that side.

4481. I think you stated a little while ago that there were spots on the Gold Coast that would be comparatively salubrious for barrack purposes?—Yes, I think Accra is the best spot of the kind on the coast; it is a good open plain.

4482. Is there any high ground there?—There is high ground 40 miles in the interior; the ground rises about 16 miles from the coast. Fredericksburg, about a mile inland from Danish Accra, is a very eligible site; the best, I think, at Accra for barracks.

4483. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] Have you been on the Aquapim Hills?—Only at the foot. I believe that they are very healthy, but they would be too far for barracks.

4484. Sir Francis Baring.] You stated, as I understood you, that you would throw the power into the hands of the native tribes; from what you have seen, do you believe that they are capable of governing themselves comfortably?—According to their wants I think they are; but not in accordance with our views. If you allow them to govern themselves, there is a certain amount of reliance which they would learn which you now deprive them of.

4485. You were but a very short time at Lagos?—A very short time.

4486. Therefore you had no means of knowing whether the English Government gave more satisfaction to the natives than the former government?—I could learn, from the feelings of the local officers, that there was anything but satisfaction among the natives about our rule; in fact, the very measures which the English Government was taking to improve their condition interfered with private rights, and were sources of constant dissatisfaction, likely to lead to disaster at any time.

4487. Was it the measures themselves or the way in which the measures was being carried out, and by Englishmen, that produced that effect?—I think it was the measures.

4488. Lord Stanley.] They felt the practical inconvenience, and they did not care about the result?—Yes.

4489. Mr. Mills.] I understood you to say that even in the possible event of our abandoning all other settlements, you would keep Sierra Leone?—I would keep Sierra Leone simply as a naval station.

4490. Do you think it likely that, in a thinly populated and unproductive country, any large development of trade from Sierra Leone could at any time take place?—I think, if it were made to some extent a free port, it has facilities for developing a trade gradually, and becoming the head quarters of the trading stations. It has very good access.

4491. I infer it is your opinion that, from the scale on which they are at present maintained, the settlements rather tend to bring the British Government and the British name into disrepute than otherwise?—I think so. During all the anxiety of the Ashantee war, with invasion threatening the northern frontier of the protectorate, and most serious complications disturbing its eastern districts from one circumstance and another, Mr. Pine, the governor, was left without

a single European civilian to assist him; he was utterly unsupported, and the only aid he could obtain in the administration was such as could be rendered by military officers, themselves preparing to take the field.

4492. You think that the scale on which the governments are maintained is far too poor, do you?—With such a wretched poverty-stricken machinery you cannot expect to obtain any effectual results.

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4493. You are Vice Consul at Havana?—Yes.
4494. During the time when your father was absent, and since his death, you have acted as Consul General at Havana?—Yes, and after his death, until the appointment of his successor last November.

4495. How many years have you been at Havana in either capacity?—Eight years.

4496. How long was your father Consul General?—Twenty-two years.

4497. What should you say was the general result of the operations of the English in the way of suppressing the slave trade; I mean on the condition of the slave and slave importation in Cuba?—It has ameliorated the condition of the slave very much on account of the difficulty which has now arisen in obtaining slave labour, and from the increased value of the African in Cuba. With respect to the importation of slaves, of course, that has fallen off very materially.

4498. Can you state, during the period of your acquaintance with Havana, to what extent the price of a slave has arisen?—In the year 1843, when I first went to Havana, the average price of a slave was 60*l.* to 80*l.*, say 70*l.* At the present time, the price of a newly-imported slave would probably be 120*l.* or 150*l.*

4499. Do you recollect a time when the slave was so much cheaper that the planter treated him very brutally?—Yes, the average life of a slave was calculated at 21 years.

4500. They were then constantly ill-treated and over-worked?—Yes, they were worked to death.

4501. And now the price of a slave is so great that the planter takes as much care of a slave as an Englishman would take of his horse?—It is exactly the same.

4502. What is the average life of a slave now in Cuba?—I should say it is very much greater than it was 20 years ago.

4503. Do you suppose that, if the means of importing slaves were made impossible, there might be a free emigration for supplying the demand for labour in Cuba?—I do not think that there is the slightest chance of it.

4504. There is an importation of coolies now, is there not?—About 70,000 have been imported.

4505. Is the result of that satisfactory?—To a certain extent it is, the Chinese being much more intelligent than the negro, but the system of immigration is faulty, because they do not import women.

4506. Do you believe that, supposing the importation of slaves to Cuba were now stopped, the slave population could be kept up?—With a little care on the part of the planters, I do not see any reason why the population should not be kept up.

4507. You think that there are women enough to keep it up now, do you?—There is not that proportion of women that there ought to be, but still it might be done.

4508. There is not one woman to one man?—No; there is not one woman to one man.

4509. Do you suppose, or is it at all contemplated that an importation of women might take place, enabling the demand for labour to be supplied by breeding in the island?—That would open the door to the slave trade at once. They would not bring women alone; they would bring both sexes.

4510. The slave importation is still going on to a very considerable extent in Cuba?—To a very considerable extent.

4511. Chiefly from the Portuguese settlements in the West Coast of Africa, is it not?—It is chiefly from Whydah, and that part of the coast near the Congo. Very few cargoes come from the East Coast of Africa.

4512. Is the Spanish Government faithfully maintaining its treaties with England in trying to stop the importation of slaves into Cuba?—To judge by the results, I should say not.

4513. The importation of slaves into Cuba goes on by the connivance of the officers of the Spanish Government, I suppose?—Just so.

4514. At present the Captain General of Cuba (Captain General Dulce) is doing his utmost to prevent it, is he not?—He is truly in earnest.

4515. But the opposition of the Audiencia and the connivance of the officers under him renders his efforts impotent?—Entirely ineffectual.

4516. What steps do you think the Spanish Government might take to put an end to that connivance, and to make the importation of slaves into Cuba impossible?—If Spain would declare the slave trade piracy, it would put an end to it at once.

4517. Are there any alterations in the penal laws of Cuba that you would propose?—I would alter the 9th Article of the Penal Code.

4518. What effect would that have?—The 9th Article of the Penal Code provides that, as soon as a newly-arrived African is upon an estate, the authorities cannot touch him. If that was repealed, and the authorities were allowed to pursue an imported negro and take him wherever they found him, they might seize every one of them.

4519. Is there not some proposition that you have to make for the alteration of the laws relating to the freedom of newly-born slave children?—That would be in the event of emancipation. If a law were passed, declaring that all newly-born negro children should be free after a certain period, or were free when they were born, they would be able to produce as many negroes in Cuba as were required.

4520. The present state of things in which the children

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children of negro women are born slaves, leads the mothers to neglect them, does it not?—Yes, most of the children die within seven days after their birth.

4521. How long have you left Havannah?—Three months ago.

4522. Can you state what impression has been made on the minds of the Spanish Government in Cuba by recent events in America?—The thinking body of the planters believe that the time has arrived when the Government will have to make some provision for a change in the institutions of Cuba.

4523. Lord Stanley.] Are you referring to emancipation?—To emancipation.

4524. Chairman.] Do you mean that they have been led to that belief by any such event as the late President Lincoln's proclamation?—They did not pay much attention to that, because they thought it was a dead letter, and that it could not be carried out; but they have since seen that slavery is doomed in the Southern States, and that in the course of time slavery, existing as it does only in Brazil and Cuba, must eventually die out.

4525. You think that impression is general in Cuba, not only on the part of the planters, but on the minds of the governing body?—Yes.

4526. Supposing the Cuban population had any such means of expressing their feelings as the population of Brazil, is there any party in Cuba that would wish to put an end to slavery?—There is a strong anti-slavery party in Cuba.

4527. Is that feeling general amongst the population?—Amongst the slaveholders themselves; amongst the planters.

4528. What was the feeling of that class of men with regard to the American War; did they sympathise with the North rather than with the South?—With the North entirely.

4529. Why was that?—It was a political feeling. There is a very strong dislike of the Spaniard. They think the Spaniard holds the slave as a terror over Cuba, inasmuch as years ago, when there was an attempt at insurrection in the time of Lopez, the Spaniards threatened, in case the insurrection became general and they were forced to leave the island, they would follow the example of St. Domingo, and give the negroes liberty. The creoles think the slave is actually a weapon in the hands of the Spaniards.

4530. Is the slave trade interest in fact sanctioned by a few only in Cuba?—By a very limited number.

4531. The mass may be said to be anti-slavery, may they?—Yes, that is to say the planters.

4532. The officers of the Cuba Government are interested in maintaining the slave trade for the sake of the douceurs which they obtain, I suppose?—It is kept up entirely by their connivance.

4533. Mr. Baxter.] Are they paid very low salaries by the Spanish Government?—They are paid wretchedly, and they accept bribes; for instance, a lieutenant governor, for allowing 800 slaves to be landed, will get 80,000 to 100,000 dollars as a bribe.

4534. There is a Slave Trade Paper about to be presented to Parliament in a few days, I believe, which will contain an important Despatch of your father's?—A very important Despatch.

4535. You are perfectly cognizant of your father's opinions on these subjects?—Quite.

4536. Is the party which we have been alluding to, as the anti-slavery party in Cuba, also a

revolutionary party as against the Spanish Government?—Yes, quite so.

4537. And would they be revolutionary even to the extent of annexation with America?—Yes, in order to throw off the Spanish yoke.

4538. Their hatred towards Spain is so great as that?—Yes.

4539. What is the extent of the garrison of Cuba?—The ordinary garrison is 18,000.

4540. Those soldiers are distributed in various parts of the island, are they?—Yes, they are distributed in all the principal towns and posts throughout the island.

4541. What effect have the late occurrences in St. Domingo had on the slaves in Cuba?—They are perfectly aware of what is going on in St. Domingo; the Government would try to make it out that there was a revolutionary spirit arising; but I do not believe that is the case.

4542. How recently has the British squadron been cruising about the coast of Cuba?—Four months ago there were four or five gunboats cruising there.

4543. Is there one now?—Yes, I believe there is.

4544. Under the command of Admiral Sir James Hope?—Yes, under the command of Admiral Sir James Hope, but under the immediate orders of the commodore at Jamaica.

4545. Do they ever get any prize money?—I recollect of several captures being made, two with negroes, the rest empty; but it is now some time ago.

4546. What sort of naval force do the Spaniards keep up?—A very large one; but they have generally only one or two cruising.

4547. Do you think the officers are not in earnest in trying to stop the importation of slaves?—Yes, I think they are in earnest; but they never put themselves out, because they are never paid their prize money; the answer always is, "the Treasury is empty."

4548. Up to the breaking out of the American war, there was an American squadron off the coast, was there not?—In one or two cases they had some vessels there.

4549. Not regularly?—Not regularly.

4550. Do you think they were earnest?—Yes; they made five or six captures in a very short time.

4551. Does the British squadron there act as effectually as the squadron on the coast of Africa?—No.

4552. Since it would seem that import might be more easily stopped than export, why is that so?—The coast of Cuba is very extensive, and it is surrounded by quays and islands, so that information of the presence of a ship of the squadron can be very easily communicated.

4553. In what ships is the slave trade conducted?—Chiefly steamers.

4554. Of what nation?—Spanish.

4555. Owned in Spain?—Yes, in Spain or in Cuba.

4556. Notoriously owned in Spain?—The true ownership of those vessels is never known, or can never be proved.

4557. Lord Alfred Churchill.] Do they sail under the Spanish flag?—If they use any flag of their own.

4558. Chairman.] Practically, what flag do they generally hoist?—The French and Dutch; they used to hoist the American flag, but they do not do so now.

4559. What put a stop to their using the American

American flag?—The treaty with the United States for the suppression of the slave trade.

4560. Will you state generally, what is the treatment received by the emancipados of Cuba?—It is very bad.

4561. What is done for them?—The emancipado is apprenticed for four or five years, under certain conditions. The owner is bound to teach him a trade, and at the expiry of that time he is apprenticed again; the fact is, it is nothing but a source of revenue to the captains general.

4562. To what extent is the condition of the emancipado superior to that of the slave?—On the contrary, it is much worse; a slave can obtain his liberty as soon as he pays the price at which he is valued by the syndic. The emancipado can never buy his freedom, and just as long as the governor or captain general chooses to re-assign him for a stipulated sum, so long the emancipado remains a slave. Then the abuses of the system are very great; if a slave-owner has an emancipado, and one of his own slaves dies, he puts the emancipado in the place of the slave who died.

4563. What is the constitution of the Mixed Commission Court at Havana?—It consists of a Spanish judge and Spanish arbitrator, and also of a Spanish secretary; their proceedings must be carried on in Spanish. There is a British judge, but there is no arbitrator at the present moment, so the vice consul comes in as arbitrator.

4564. I suppose the Mixed Commission Court has very little practice now?—Unless a capture is made, and brought before the court, of course the court has nothing to do.

4565. You would not therefore suggest any improvement in the constitution of the court?—No.

4566. Why is there not a British arbitrator there now?—It was not thought necessary to fill up the post.

4567. In your opinion is there a chance, or any probability, under any circumstances, of the slave trade reviving in Brazil?—I think not.

4568. Supposing the Aberdeen Act were repealed, do you think it would in any way make that probable?—I do not think that any country which has abandoned the slave trade will ever take to it again.

4569. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Is it not the case that it is almost impossible to obtain a conviction in a Spanish court at Cuba for slave trading?—You cannot get evidence of any kind to convict a slave trader.

4570. How does that come to pass, seeing that there is a large anti-slavery party in the island?—Because it is money which does every thing in Cuba; the Spanish officials are corrupt from first to last.

4571. But that alone would not prevent the possibility of obtaining the evidence of witnesses, would it?—You can buy any evidence that you please in Cuba.

4572. Is there any terrorism exercised over witnesses?—There are threats of assassination always held over their heads.

4573. There is, in fact, a system of terrorism?—Yes; in Cuba the slave trader is all powerful.

4574. But nevertheless there is a considerable anti-slavery party, you say?—There is a strong anti-slavery party among the proprietary body; the intelligent planters are strongly against the slave trade, not against the institution of slavery; they would like to maintain it; but they are strongly against the slave trade.

4575. Is that feeling shared in by any of the other classes on the island?—There are only two classes on the island, the agricultural and the mercantile class; the merchants do not occupy themselves much with the question.

4576. Would the Cuban Creoles prefer to set up for themselves, rather than to be annexed to the United States?—Their idea has generally been to obtain the aid of the United States, and to form one of the States of that Union. I have never heard of their proposing to emancipate themselves, and to remain an independent nation.

4577. Are there many Spaniards in Cuba, besides the military and the officials?—Yes, a very great number.

4578. What is the feeling between them and the Creoles?—Antagonistic in the extreme.

4579. The Creoles are excluded from all offices, civil and military, are they not?—Yes.

4580. Do you think that the Creole population would be able to hold its own against the coloured slave population, without the presence of a Spanish army?—No.

4581. That, I suppose, leads them to turn towards the United States?—It is their animosity to Spain that makes them think of annexing themselves to the United States.

4582. However much they may hate the Spaniards, do they feel that they could not hold themselves against the black population without the presence of a Spanish force?—They do not think so themselves. The slave population is not intelligent enough to understand that. The free negroes who are about the towns know everything that is going on; but the country slave is little better than a machine.

4583. Do you think the Creoles of Cuba suppose that, if the Spanish power were withdrawn, they could govern the country and maintain order?—It would be just the same with them as with all the Spanish Americans; there would be anarchy and confusion in a few months. I do not think them capable of governing themselves.

4584. Supposing the Spanish power to be withdrawn, you see no future for Cuba except annexation to the United States?—No.

4585. Mr. *Gregory*.] What is the number of negroes in Cuba?—The Government estimate is about 360,000, but I should say about 700,000.

4586. I think there are very few women among them?—There is a much larger proportion of women than there used to be. I should say there are probably two women to every three men.

4587. When you say there is a larger proportion of women than there used to be, since when do you mean?—I mean within the last 15 years.

4588. Have women been largely imported?—Very largely imported.

4589. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] For the purpose of keeping up the race?—For the purpose of keeping up the race.

4590. Mr. *Gregory*.] Then the attention of the slave owner is turned more to breeding negroes than to importing them?—Very much more.

4591. Is there any system of education pursued with the free negroes?—None whatever.

4592. No schools?—Nothing of the kind.

4593. Is marriage encouraged?—Yes.

4594. Strictly, according to the rights of the Church?—Yes.

4595. You know the Southern States of America very well, do you not?—Very well indeed.

4596. Is the system of slavery in Cuba very much

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much more severe than that in the Southern States of America?—Very much so.

4597. In a great many estates in Cuba the system was not to endeavour to preserve the life of the negro by giving him moderate work, but to use him up within a short period?—That was the case long ago, but it is not so now.

4598. I heard it stated in Cuba, in 1860, that if they got seven years' service out of a slave they were satisfied: is that the general feeling?—Not now.

4599. *Chairman.*] Was that the feeling, do you think, so late as 1860?—No; I think that feeling died away after General O'Donnell's government, in 1849.

4600. Mr. *Gregory.*] I presume that it would be difficult for this importation of slaves to be carried on if there was great determination on the part of the Captain General and officials?—The present Captain General has done as much as a man could do to put down the slave trade.

4601. But unsuccessfully?—Unsuccessfully, because he cannot depend upon his officers; he has superseded them one after another.

4602. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue.*] That arises also from the state of the law?—Yes.

4603. Mr. *Gregory.*] It seems that there is no great difficulty in obtaining the most ample information with regard to the nature of the cargoes landed, where they are landed, and from

what ship?—The public seldom know anything about it.

4604. But there is no difficulty on the part of the authorities?—The authorities can always find it out if they please.

4605. I asked you that question because you are aware that your father has placed in my hands an account of all the slave vessels that touched at Cuba in 1859, the number of slaves in each vessel, and the names of the captains?—Yes, that is the annual return which is sent to the Foreign Office, and which is compiled from such information as we are able to obtain.

4606. One-third is added by your father for "unknown"?—Yes, but I think that that was entirely erroneous; this practice did not originate with him.

4607. Then, do you think that, practically, the slave trade could be put down by any internal movement of the authorities in Cuba, or that it can only be done by external force?—I think it can only be done by the Home Government of Spain altering the penal laws, and declaring the slave trade to be piracy; there is no other way of doing it.

4608. However willing the Captain General of Cuba may be to put down the slave trade, you think it is impossible to do it from the state of the law and the connivance of the officials under him?—Quite impossible.

Lune, 15^o die Maii, 1865.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Adderley.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Buxton.
Mr. Cave.
Lord Alfred Churchill.
Mr. Cheetham.

Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Gregory.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Henry Seymour.
Lord Stanley.

THE RIGHT HON. C. B. ADDERLEY, IN THE CHAIR.

ANDREW SWANZY, Esq., was called in; and Examined.

4609. *Chairman.*] WILL you state the number of years for which you were formerly resident on the Gold Coast?—I resided on the Gold Coast for six years, from 1844 to 1850, and afterwards in 1853.

4610. Will you state what offices you held during those years?—I was commandant and magistrate in the Ahanta district in Dix Cove for two years, and for three years at Annamahoe; I held the same office there under the judicial assessor.

4611. *Lord Stanley.*] Is the office of commandant a military office?—No, it is not; at that time the commandants were unpaid.

4612. *Mr. Cheetham.*] Were you appointed to that office by the Government?—I was appointed by the Government.

4613. *Chairman.*] What do you mean by the expression under the judicial assessor?—I was appointed by the Governor, of course; but I had the administration of justice in those districts, and I had to report all my cases and my decisions to the judicial assessor.

4614. With an appeal from yourself to him?—Exactly.

4615. Will you state to the Committee what has been your acquaintance with the Gold Coast since 1850?—I have been trading to the Gold Coast for the last 20 years, and still am doing so.

4616. What were you doing in 1853?—I was on the Coast again in 1853 for a short time; and at the time the Ashantees came down from the interior, I was sent up by Governor Hill as a kind of commissioner, I presume, to take the control of the native auxiliary forces there.

4617. Were you present in the camp?—Yes.

4618. What did you see?—We had no engagement with the Ashantees, but we had a very large body of auxiliary troops, from 13,000 to 14,000 men, and before the news of peace had reached all the friendly districts, we had 24,000 men.

4619. Were those men brought there by the protected chiefs?—Yes; the Ashantees were at Yancoumassie, a little distance in the interior.

4620. What is your opinion with regard to the benefits derived from the British Protectorate?—I believe they are very great myself. In the

first place, I believe that, solely through the presence of the British along the coast, the slave trade was prevented; and, in the next place, that the British Protectorate and the occupation of the forts by us led entirely to the abolition of human sacrifice; I believe also that the condition of the domestic slaves was very much ameliorated in consequence, and I can cite some singular instances of that; but there is one more benefit, and that is the greatest benefit, namely, that it keeps the chiefs from quarrelling among themselves, and by keeping them united, enables them to resist the King of Ashantee.

4621. What would be the disadvantage to English interests, or to commerce in general, if the Ashantee king was allowed to subdue those minor chiefs?—I believe that, for many years, the Gold Coast, and, in fact, the whole of that coast for 200 miles, and perhaps for 80 miles in the interior, would be in a state of constant war, as it was in the early part of this century.

4622. But supposing the King of Ashantee to have conquered them all, why should war continue to exist?—I believe he never would, he never did virtually conquer the whole of the Gold Coast district; still he would immediately attempt to conquer those chiefs one by one.

4623. Supposing he could conquer them, and that he established a strong permanent Government over the whole of that territory up to the coast, would that not be a more peaceful state of things for commerce?—It has never been so; I do not believe that, were he nominally dominant on the coast, trade would flourish in consequence, because even in his dominions there are constantly wars. When he had the control, there were constantly wars; his chiefs and viceroys were so exacting, and so exceedingly arbitrary, that the people constantly rebelled, and that was the origin of all the wars between the King of Ashantee and the Coast.

4624. Now, referring to the other advantages which you think are derived from the British Protectorate, first with regard to the suppression of the slave trade, do you think that the squadron could not have blockaded the slave trade on the Gold Coast without the English having settled on

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the shore?—I do not think they could. I can give a recent instance if necessary.

4625. The squadron does not attempt to cruise on the ground supposed to be held by the forts, but supposing there were now to be an augmented squadron undertaking the blockade, would not that, in your opinion, suffice for the suppression of the slave trade without our presence in the forts?—No, I think not.

4626. Why do you think so?—Because they could not get the necessary information; slaves are shipped often within a short distance of the British forts; and, I believe, we cannot do without our settlements on shore.

4627. How recent is your information from the Gold Coast; I mean your personal acquaintance?—1853.

4628. You can hardly give an opinion whether, if the English withdrew from their settlements on the Gold Coast, the slave trade would be likely to revive?—I can give an opinion; I believe it would, provided there was any demand.

4629. From what part?—From every part.

4630. Do you mean from the places where the forts are?—Yes.

4631. What tribes, in your opinion, would export slaves?—All of them if they had an opportunity.

4632. Both the protected tribes and the Ashantees?—Not all the protected tribes, but some of them would.

4633. With regard to the suppression of human sacrifices and cruel practices, have you any actual information with regard to the diminution of those atrocities?—I have no personal information, because I do not believe that any body possesses that; but, from what I know and saw, I believe they would return to those practices in the event of the withdrawal of the British protection from the coast.

4634. Can you give the Committee any information with regard to the actual diminution of those practices?—Human sacrifice has ceased altogether. I believe that the last instance was in 1833, or 1834, in Mr. McLean's time.

4635. Do you mean in the Protectorate?—Yes, in the Protectorate.

4636. Can you say that with regard to Ashantee those practices have ceased?—No, they remain to the present day in Ashantee.

4637. With regard to the custom of domestic slavery, to what extent has the influence of the English Government diminished or mitigated that?—To a very considerable extent, no doubt; it has ameliorated the condition of the domestic slave. In the first place, anything like oppression is impossible, because the slave has the right of appeal to the court of the judicial assessor and other magistrates, and in case of cruelty being proved against the master, the slave is generally set free; that was the case in my time, even in 1847, 1848, and 1849.

4638. When was the judicial assessor first appointed?—In 1843 I think; but prior to that time Mr. McLean took the office of judicial assessor.

4639. Do you know whether the office of judicial assessor has been carried out to the present day, in the manner first intended?—No.

4640. In what way has the office changed?—By taking, as I hear, all the power from the native chiefs.

4641. So that the judicial assessor is practi-

cally an English judge administering the English law?—Yes.

4642. Not sitting with the chiefs?—No; on the contrary, he has ignored the powers of the chiefs.

4643. When you were judge under the judicial assessor, what was the assessor practically then?—An assistant to the native chiefs.

4644. Was that the case during the whole of your experience?—During the whole of my experience, all cases brought before the judicial assessor without referring to the native courts were tried by him as a matter of course, but up to the year 1850 the native chiefs themselves had the whole jurisdiction which has been taken from them.

4645. Did you administer two kinds of law, one for the British and one for the natives?—I adjudged as well as I could the native laws, but of course if they clashed very much with our ideas, I refused to administer them or did the best I could, but I never found any difficulty.

4646. Was it because the administration of the native law was found difficult that the assessor gradually became an English judge?—I do not think so. I think that the native law was very similar to ours.

4647. Then what was the cause of the change?—The desire of obtaining power, I suppose, or probably in ignorance of the rights of the native chiefs themselves.

4648. Did the native chiefs practically in your time sit with the assessor and assist?—Not always, but in a number of cases they did. They were allowed themselves to hold separate courts.

4649. Was that found satisfactory in your time?—Yes.

4650. Should you say that the judicial administration was better in your time than it had been under the merchants' government, or that of Governor McLean?—In my time, Governor McLean's system prevailed to a great extent.

4651. On the whole, which should you say administered justice the best, the government of merchants or the government of the Crown?—I should say the government of the merchants, because Governor McLean was their representative on the coast.

4652. Are you aware that one of the grounds on which the Committee of 1842 recommended the Crown to resume the government was, that the government of merchants acted ineffectively in the administration of justice?—Yes.

4653. Do you believe that the change made, carried out the object of the Committee in improving the administration of justice?—I do not.

4654. What practical effect besides the appeal given to the slave has the administration of justice by the English had upon the custom of domestic slavery?—That is the principal effect; I may say that it has prevented practices of the most abominable description. In my time, it was not uncommon for a man to send out his wife to become a public prostitute, much to the disgust of the wife herself. That was stopped by the Government, because, when a woman complained to the judicial assessor, of course she had a free book given her; that is to say, she was made free.

4655. Were there many cases of fugitive slaves coming before your court?—Yes.

4656. How were they then adjudicated?—If possible,

possible, I used to persuade the owner of the slave who came down provided with a letter from the King of Ashantee to sell him among the coast tribes, where he would be better cared for, but if that were impossible (slavery being then recognised by us), I used myself to give them a bribe to bring him down again, to show that he had not been beheaded or ill-treated.

4657. Do you think it is better for the English, to some extent, to recognise the custom, and attempt to mitigate it by some process of sale or emancipation, or that it is better to set their faces directly against the custom, and treat it penalty?—It is much better to do it in the former way, than to attempt to treat it penalty. I think that that would be impossible; it would give rise to great disturbances, because the whole system of society is founded on domestic slavery.

4658. Do you think that we might meet the evil half way by recognising it in that way, with better effect than our present system produces?—I do; I should say it would be advisable that the judicial assessor should sit outside the fort, and that he should there adjudicate on cases of slavery.

4659. Where is the court now held?—It is held within the forts, on British ground.

4660. Is Cape Coast Castle the court to which all such appeals would come?—Yes.

4661. Does the judicial assessor make any circuit to the other forts?—I believe so.

4662. Altogether, should you say that the condition of the domestic slave is better than it used to be, before the English took possession of the government?—I have no doubt of it.

4663. Have you any opinion to give to the Committee, with regard to enabling slaves to emigrate as free passengers to the West Indies or elsewhere, where they might be useful as labourers?—I do not believe they would go.

4664. Neither to the West Indies nor anywhere else?—No.

4665. Why would they not go?—Because they have a dread of going.

4666. Would your answers apply to men under sentence of death and captives of war?—That is a different question.

4667. Do you think that those slaves who are either under sentence of death, or are captives of war, could be taken by the English compulsorily from the chiefs, giving the chiefs no compensation, and sent as free emigrants to the West Indies?—That might be done, provided they could understand their position.

4668. Have you ever considered that question?—Not so prominently as you now put it before me.

4669. Were most or all of those protected tribes under the sovereignty of Ashantee originally?—No.

4670. The Fantees were, I believe?—Not altogether; that is a great mistake. The King of Ashantee gradually conquered many of the tribes, and about the year 1820 he had the supreme control of the coast, with the exception of the Fantee tribes.

4671. What is your opinion with regard to the actual terms of the treaties between the British and the protected territories, with respect to our duties?—My impression is that we have no rights, and I do not think that we are expected, to fight solely for them; the expression used by the natives to me was, "If you hold the flag, we

will fight;" that was the idea of the treaty in my time.

4672. What were the causes which led to the King of Ashantee's invasion from 1853 to 1864?—In 1853, one of the great causes of the invasion was the discontent of the chiefs from the manner in which they were disregarded, as they are now, I believe. Cheboo was the Chief of Assin, and he sent a message to the King of Ashantee, inviting him, and promising him that he would take back his tribe to become again tributary if the king would assist him. I believe that was from the manner in which Cheboo had been treated. I believe that the great mistake usually made by the governors has been in ignoring the power and dignity of the native chiefs. I do not know whether that has been from the governors themselves or not, but it has been practically so.

4673. Have you any proposal to make with regard to the bankruptcy laws on the Gold Coast?—I think that they have been most injurious to trade; I have written to the Colonial Office twice on the subject. The bankruptcy laws have given rise to fraud. A native invests the first money he makes, generally speaking, in slaves; he takes care before he becomes a bankrupt to have a large number of those slaves; the court cannot do anything with them, and of course he escapes and goes away into the bush. Of the native traders, who before conducted themselves well and paid their accounts, and were held to be respectable, more than two-thirds have since gone through the court, certainly one-half of them.

4674. What is the nature of the amendment which you would propose?—I am not prepared to say what amendment I should propose; I should certainly propose a different law of some sort; it is impossible to deal with such people as they are in the same manner as you deal with people here, because they keep no books or accounts.

4675. It is the inapplicability of the English bankruptcy law to their state of society that you point out?—Yes.

4676. Is it the same law as ours?—Very much; a man comes forward, makes a schedule of his assets and so forth; I need hardly say that it is very difficult to trace the truth of anything of that kind for the reason I gave with regard to the existence of domestic slavery; it is impossible to deal with the assets.

4677. Will you now state to the Committee what is your commercial connection with the Gold Coast?—I have factories along the whole coast, establishments of my own; I have agents there, and I ship goods from England to them, and they dispose of those goods for me.

4678. Have not Messrs. Foster and Smith a commercial establishment there also?—Not in the same way; they ship goods on consignment only; they give credit to the native and European traders, receiving consignments in return. I ship on my own account almost entirely.

4679. Will you state generally the nature of the goods imported into Africa and exported from Africa in your agency?—They are principally Manchester goods; two-thirds are cotton goods.

4680. And you ship cutlery, I suppose?—Yes, cutlery, hardware, guns, gunpowder, lead, brass, and, in fact, nearly everything; of recent years, I have shipped little things, which prove to me

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that the natives on that particular coast are more attentive to their domestic comfort; I have shipped chairs and those things.

4681. What do you export from Africa?—Gold dust, palm oil, and ivory.

4682. Will you state generally to the Committee what has been the increase or decrease in the trade during your experience?—My trade increased very rapidly up to 1858 or 1859; it was very prosperous and then it fell off.

4683. Why did it fall off?—It fell off partly owing to the disturbances in the eastern district in Crobo; in consequence of the fine imposed there by the Government, and afterwards it was principally owing to the Ashantee war.

4684. Do you think that those disturbances, and the fines imposed by the Government, would not have occurred if the English had attempted to blockade the slave trade only from the sea, and perhaps maintained a consul only (instead of a governor), with some native power on shore?—I believe those wars would have occurred as they did occur in former years, and some would have been even worse than they were formerly.

4685. Do you not believe that the presence of an English Government on shore tends to create disturbances among the natives?—I believe it has had very much the contrary effect.

4686. Are you not of opinion that it might lead certain tribes, relying on the assistance of the English, to make war on other tribes?—I think not.

4687. Do you not think that the protected tribes rely on British assistance to some extent to resist the King of Ashantee?—Yes; but they principally rely on themselves.

4688. Do you think that if the English kept on the sea those disturbances would still occur?—I believe so from the previous history of the coast; I merely speak from my experience, and what I have read.

4689. Then how do you account for the steady increase of trade up to 1853?—In the first place, with regard to the palm oil trade, it arose in a great measure from the introduction of a small currency, capable of being exchanged for palm oil, that is to say, cowries. Upon the Gold Coast, within my recollection, cowries were not current on the whole of the Coast; after that the natives were willing to exchange their palm oil and to bring it down at once for cowries; they came down immediately with it, as soon as that introduction of cowries took place.

4690. Was there no medium of exchange before?—None, except goods; and they were unwilling to buy goods except they wanted them; the consequence was that they allowed the nuts very often to ripen and to rot on the trees.

4691. You seem to have been of opinion with regard to the bankruptcy laws and other laws, that the administration of justice by the English has more or less clashed with the native customs, do you think that that has to any extent created the disturbances, in consequence of which commerce has fallen off?—No, I think not. I think that they have been injurious to the merchants, but not in that way.

4692. Supposing the slave trade to cease, and that the English consequently having no interest to look after but commerce on the West Coast of Africa, reduced their establishments there, do you think that the mercantile interest would feel

the loss of their protection?—I do, most certainly.

4693. Are you conversant with other parts of the West Coast?—Only in so far that I have read about them, but not personally; I trade only to that part, Whydah, and all along from Cape Palmas.

4694. But are there not parts of the coast where trade thrives quite as well or better without protection?—Yes.

4695. Then how do you account for that?—I cannot account for it; at River Bonny and Calabar there is nothing except a gun-boat.

4696. Then if protection is necessary on the Gold Coast for the interests of commerce, how do you account for commerce at Calabar and Bonny thriving even better without protection?—I believe the district around Bonny is most suitable for the production of palm oil, and I believe that the carriage by river is better. That tends in a great degree to foster commerce; there is a large palm oil district there.

4697. Then the protection of the English settlement is so far disadvantageous to commerce that the object of suppressing the slave trade has led us to settle in not the best places for commerce?—That may be so; certainly the Gold Coast commerce is unimportant as compared with other places.

4698. It is possible then, the slave trade having ceased, that we might in the interest of commerce change the position of our settlements?—I think not with advantage.

4699. How far do you think a native Government would carry on the Government more cheaply than the English, and therefore find it necessary to impose smaller duties on commerce; taking the King of Bonny, for instance, do you think that he conducts his Government more cheaply than the English conduct theirs on the Gold Coast, so as to require smaller duties in order to produce a revenue?—I think not; the per-centage on the Gold Coast is 2 per cent.

4700. It is not your opinion that the English Government is expensive there?—No, not particularly so, except the military establishment.

4701. Which is paid by England?—Which is paid by England.

4702. Is it your opinion that the Governor himself might exercise more judicial authority than he does?—He should be the principal judicial authority everywhere, except, perhaps, at Sierra Leone.

4703. But is it not the case that the governors are often men not professionally acquainted with law?—So much the better, I think.

4704. You think that the law should not be strictly according to statute, but the common sense of the judge?—Yes, with a certain knowledge of the native customs and habits.

4705. Do you think the judicial assessor having become a judge, the former intention of his office could be returned to?—Without the slightest difficulty.

4706. Are you of opinion that he could be made to assist the chief in his administration of the law?—Quite so.

4707. What is your opinion with regard to the Queen's Advocate's Office?—My opinion is that it is wholly unnecessary and injurious, because I think a native cannot understand that any man should talk against him who has no interest in the case before the court; it is a very different settlement

settlement from Sierra Leone; they do not understand the system of practice at the bar; and as for protecting the Queen's interest, there is no necessity for it.

4708. What is your opinion with regard to the effect of trial by jury in our settlements?—It has been injurious in many instances. I think, generally, that certain laws, suitable only to a state of society such as exists in this country, have been introduced there and have not answered the purpose.

4709. Have you formed any decided opinion with regard to the proposals which have been made to concentrate the British Government at Sierra Leone?—I have.

4710. What is your opinion on that subject?—I should say that it would be a very excellent thing for the whole coast.

4711. On what ground have you formed that opinion?—In the first place, I believe that a better man could be obtained, provided that you made the remuneration worth his while; in the second place, I believe the policy would be more consistent; and, in the third place, I believe that a military force, without any reference whatever to the Home Government, could be immediately taken to any part of the coast where it was required, which would be an advantage. I believe that, in the event of cases such as those which recently happened on the Gold Coast, namely, the Ashantee War, the intervention of a stranger of rank would have a great effect on the natives; it always had an effect upon them in the case of a special person sent down.

4712. Supposing the Governor had his residence at Sierra Leone, and the troops were concentrated there too, do you think that the number of forts on the Gold Coast might be reduced?—I think not.

4713. Why not?—Because the forts are at such a distance from head-quarters, except Annamaboe, that we could not carry on the system without a commandant at each.

4714. Your proposal, then, would simply result in an increased expenditure, would it not?—No, I do not see that, except in the increase of the Governor's salary; for the military expenditure might be reduced in consequence.

4715. But not the civil establishment?—There might even be changes made for the better in the civil establishment.

4716. Do you believe that the revenue on the Gold Coast might be increased so as to cover all the expenses of the civil establishment?—I am afraid not under present circumstances.

4717. Do you think that the duties are as high as they can be?—Yes.

4718. Is that owing to the presence of the Dutch?—Entirely so.

4719. Supposing that we could make any arrangement with the Dutch, do you think that a higher revenue could be raised?—Without any difficulty whatever.

4720. And without checking commerce?—Yes.

4721. Supposing that the troops and the seat of Government were concentrated at Sierra Leone, would the Governor of the Gold Coast require a police?—Yes; but I think they would require some troops also on the Gold Coast.

4722. Lord Stanley. I think I understood you to say that the British Protectorate was a benefit to the natives on the Gold Coast, but I did not

hear you say that it was of any benefit to this country?—I am not aware that it is of any particular benefit to this country, except that it secures the commerce of the country.

4723. Have you any means of informing the Committee what has been the growth of commerce in the protected territories, as compared with commerce in parts over which we exercise no power, taking the last 20 years for instance?—The growth of commerce has been comparatively small within the last 20 years.

4724. As a matter of fact, trade has increased much more rapidly during the last 20 years in parts over which England exercises no control than it has on the Gold Coast, has it not?—It has; but those parts were comparatively little known some years ago, while the whole of our trade was carried on on the Gold Coast formerly.

4725. Is there any recent increase of trade on the Gold Coast?—On the contrary, there has been a decrease within the last five or six years.

4726. Although they have had the benefit of the British Protectorate for the last 20 years?—Yes, but the recent decrease in trade has been under peculiar circumstances.

4727. It has been in consequence of war and internal disturbances, you mean?—Yes.

4728. But it is for the prevention of wars and disturbances that our occupation of the country is supposed to be effective?—I believe so; I may say that for a period of 15 years there was little or no commerce at all with the British; it almost entirely ceased when the Ashantees were at war with the native tribes.

4729. Whatever the theory may be, then, the fact is that the British occupation has not secured internal tranquillity in such a manner as to give effective protection to trade?—No, it has not secured that, certainly.

4730. Then looking forward to the continuance of that protectorate as a thing desirable, do you wish that some more decisive means should be taken for making the protectorate effective?—I should certainly wish it, but I should wish it done, and it can be done, without any further increase of expense to this country.

4731. Will you explain to the Committee the plan which you would propose for that purpose?—Principally by allowing the protected native chiefs to exercise their own rights of jurisdiction in their own districts, and by keeping them united, to secure them against anything like a further attempt on the part of the King of Ashantee to again trouble the peace of the coast; it has been principally his knowledge of the want of unanimity among the protected tribes, that has led him to make those attempts.

4732. You think that too much power has been taken from the chiefs, and that our interference has been carried too far?—I do.

4733. Do you think that if they were left more alone, they would be less likely to quarrel?—Yes; but still they should be to some extent under the advice or control of the British Government.

4734. You mean that a certain amount of protection is good to prevent the chiefs quarrelling, but that if it is carried a little further, it leads to their being disunited?—I mean that interference with their rights has led to discontent on their part, and the King of Ashantee being aware of this fact, has taken the opportunity of attacking them.

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4735. In fact, you are of opinion that the chiefs think we are encroaching on their rights, and that we are endeavouring to assume all the power to ourselves?—I believe so.

4736. And that they are discontented in consequence?—Yes.

4737. And it does not appear to you that the protected people are more contented than the chiefs?—No, I presume they are not more contented.

4738. One of the rights they value most is the right of dealing as they please with their own domestic slaves?—Yes.

4739. And it is precisely our interference in that matter that has caused the greatest unpopularity among them, is it not?—I think not; our interference has never been injurious to the masters, except those that have proved cruel.

4740. Then what rights of theirs have we interfered with in such a manner as to cause discontent?—Not the rights of the people; I particularly mean the rights of the native chiefs to hold courts and exercise jurisdiction. Chiefs have been in some instances brought down from the interior to the coast at the summons of their own people, men of no standing or anything else, and tried for some petty crime, as if they were men of no importance whatever.

4741. Do you think it possible for an educated Englishman and a savage African chief to sit as judges with a co-ordinate authority?—Yes, I do; they are certainly illiterate, but not barbarous altogether. I have had an opportunity of sitting with them, and I never had a difficulty; of course the natural influence of the educated European is predominant, and generally decides the cause, but he should recognize their rights.

4742. Do you not think the effect of such a combined jurisdiction is such that it must necessarily lead in the end to all the power coming into the hands of the Europeans?—I think not; it is only in cases where unjust decisions have been come to, and oppressive measures exercised by the chiefs, that the European power need be exercised in that way, and of course when Europeans are concerned.

4743. I understood you to say that the chiefs do not expect us to fight for them, but that they say, "We will fight if you will hold the flag"?—Yes.

4744. What is meant by our holding the flag?—It means that we are to form a nucleus around which they are to assemble; we are to keep them united; indeed the whole of our regular troops are a mere handful.

4745. Does it come to this, "We have no objection to fight, provided we know that you are behind us to back us up if we are beaten"?—Not even so much as that; it means this, "Keep us united, and advise us, and we will fight our own battles."

4746. If they become disunited, and refuse to listen to our arbitration, what is our remedy?—We have no remedy; we must leave them to their own devices, I presume.

4747. Or attempt to coerce them?—Or attempt to coerce them. We might interfere in the case of a quarrel between two native chiefs, and to that extent the interference might be effectual.

4748. Judging from your experience of African affairs, which alternative do you think would be most likely to be adopted?—I believe that we

should interpose by a force, but the force required would be of the smallest kind.

4749. The expense would be paid from home, I suppose?—I presume so; but a sufficient revenue might almost be raised on the coast.

4750. There would not be a single person in the Colony who would be interested in keeping down the expense, would there?—I cannot say.

4751. Would there not be a good many people on the coast who would have a very strong interest in keeping it up?—I think nobody, except for the protection of trade; I do not think that anybody could derive any benefit from it.

4752. *Chairman.*] Those who supply the troops with food, and so on, would have an interest in keeping it up, would they not?—They are supplied by the Government, at an enormous expense, from Sierra Leone; our trade is entirely with the natives.

4753. *Lord Stanley.*] Then this country which we have held for 20 years is in that position that it is not able to supply a small expedition with anything it requires, but all the supplies must come from Sierra Leone?—It depends on what is considered by the Government necessary for the expedition. The troops are rationed in the same way as they are here, which is wholly unnecessary; when I was there, the troops provisioned themselves. The expense is very great in supplying beef and so on; whereas they could supply themselves for one-fourth of the amount, certainly, and I believe they did when I was there.

4754. The troops are all black troops, of course?—They are all black troops.

4755. *Mr. Buxton.*] Do the black troops suffer from the climate?—I never heard of any such suffering.

4756. Do you think that the natives are inclined to industry?—I am sorry to say not, from my experience.

4757. They are sharp for trade, and eager about it, are they not?—Yes, they are traders from children upwards.

4758. But not inclined to steady manual labour?—No.

4759. Are they intelligent?—Yes, many of them are very intelligent.

4760. There is really a considerable amount of not exactly civilisation, but organisation of society among them, is there not?—Yes, there is a kind of society.

4761. So far as you know, do they show good sense in judging the cases that come before them?—They have done so; I scarcely ever had to reverse the decision of a native chief.

4762. Their knowledge of all the details of any case that comes before them would much exceed that of an English judge, of course?—Yes, undoubtedly.

4763. Are they amenable to our Government; are they inclined to take advice?—Yes, very much so; not only to the Government, but to any Europeans.

4764. Do you think that they wish us to retire from the coast?—No.

4765. Do they think that it is for their interest that we should remain?—They do.

4766. And their interest must be mainly identical with ours, I suppose?—Yes.

4767. Their interest is that they should have plenty of trade, and that is our interest also, is it not?—Yes; but beyond that they know that our presence

presence prevents inter-tribal wars. I have myself repeatedly prevented quarrels between tribes by my own presence.

4768. Do you think that we could use any direct influence with the King of Ashantee to keep peace?—Yes, with great benefit. I believe he himself is desirous of being friendly to us.

4769. Have we taken any steps lately to that end?—Not of any consequence, for many years. I think that the last direct mission to the King of Ashantee was as far back as the year 1820.

4770. Do you think that if we sent a direct mission to the King of Ashantee again it would be likely to tend to peace?—Yes, I think that he places the greatest importance on any mission of that kind.

4771. That could be done without any great expense, could it not?—Yes; it would not be necessary to send a body of troops.

4772. There would be no great risk to Europeans, would there?—Not at the proper season of the year. I believe the interior to be more healthy than the coast.

4773. I meant with regard to ill-usage; would there be any risk of that?—There would not be the slightest risk.

4774. With regard to trade, it is true that at Popoy, and other points, trade has increased more rapidly than on the protected coast; is not that mainly owing to the palm oil trade being almost a new trade?—Yes.

4775. And that the country around Bonny is more suitable for it than the Gold Coast?—Yes.

4776. Do you think that if we were to withdraw from the protected territory, what trade there is would collapse?—For a certain number of years it would. I believe that there would be an internal war of the most desperate character.

4777. Do you know the annual value of exports from the Gold Coast?—I think that it is about 150,000*l.* a year on the average. I see in Colonel Ord's report it is said, that in one year there were exports to the amount of 53,000*l.*, but in that particular year my own exports were nearly that. I may observe, with regard to some of those years, that in consequence of the war with Ashantee, not only were the imports to the coast less than they were before, but I, among others, reshipped a large portion of my stock, and carried them to different parts of the coast, and sold them there.

4778. Lord Stanley.] Would those imports into the protected territory, and afterwards re-exported by you, figure first as imports and then again as exports?—No; they would figure as imports only.

4779. Mr. Cave.] The African trade is better in those parts of the coast where we have no protection than on the Gold Coast, is it not?—It is larger, and better too, I suppose.

4780. And do you account for that by the difference in the tribes which are on the coast?—No, not altogether that. There is a larger trade at Bonny and Old Calabar, because that is a particular part of the palm oil district, and there is such extensive means of conveying the produce to and fro, more conveniently than on the Gold Coast. There never has been a very large trade on the Gold Coast.

4781. Then, under any circumstances, whether we were there or no., the trade in the Bonny River would be naturally larger than on this part

of the coast, where we are?—Most certainly; the Gold Coast was formerly the very head-quarters of the slave trade.

4782. You go so far as this, that you think, if we withdrew from those places, the little trade which there is would be very much less than it is now?—I believe it would almost cease; I do not see any alternative if we were to withdraw.

4783. Then would it not seem that on one part of the coast the trade has been created by natural causes, and in other parts of the coast by our presence?—I can hardly say that, but partly by our presence; the Ashantees would trade under any circumstances, I believe; the Ashantee trade would eventually flourish, but for many years it would decrease; the trade has arisen with our presence, but I cannot say that it has arisen from our presence.

4784. Do you know anything about the Niger expedition?—Only from reading the reports.

4785. How is it that the merchants are not able to carry on that expedition without a subsidy?—I believe they could carry it on there in the same way as they do anywhere else without a subsidy.

4786. I suppose you are aware it has been stated before this Committee that without a subsidy the trade on the Niger must fail?—I do not see why it should.

4787. You know that a subsidy has been asked for, I presume?—Yes.

4788. Do you think that the grounds on which it is asked for are insufficient?—I do, certainly; I believe that it is open to commerce at the present moment; I think that a gunboat would be required occasionally, but not a subsidy; having carefully read over the different reports of the expeditions up the Niger, I have never seen that there is a population there sufficient to carry on a large trade, a trade sufficiently large to remunerate merchants for going over there, and furthermore I believe the natives to be the best carriers.

4789. Do you believe that without such a population there is a prospect of any flourishing trade on the Niger?—I do not.

4790. I presume that you have seen it stated in the papers of this morning that the Ashantees have organised a fresh expedition?—I have.

4791. Have you any private information on that subject?—Yes; I have letters in my pocket; I do not believe a word of it.

4792. It is stated that trade is dull on that coast still?—Yes.

4793. To what do you attribute that; there is no war now, is there?—It is the same thing as it was formerly, the paths being stopped, and then trade is stopped; it is not actual fighting, but a blockade of the paths.

4794. You have seen it stated probably that there is discontent at Sierra Leone, in consequence of the mixed jury system?—Yes.

4795. Have you any experience of the working of the mixed juries at Sierra Leone?—I have not.

4796. Should you say from your experience that juries of coloured people are to be trusted to give verdicts in cases where white men are concerned?—I am of opinion that they are not to be trusted.

4797. When you say that the native chiefs are to be trusted in their decisions, do you mean with

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regard to criminal cases among their own people?—Both criminal and civil, to some extent.

4798. But their ideas of crime are not the same as ours, are they?—Yes, they are very similar; in my experience very few crimes were committed; theft scarcely at all.

4799. There are imaginary crimes?—Yes, such as witchcraft; and that is how the benefit of the British Protectorate is so great in preventing the native chiefs from taking lives, and charging persons on the assumption of witchcraft; a case of that kind came before me in 1847 or 1848.

4800. In such cases the chiefs are not to be trusted, I suppose?—They would be to be trusted, provided there was an appeal to a British assessor.

4801. Would not that weaken their prestige among their subjects as much as our present system?—No, not so much as our present system, under which their right of jurisdiction is denied, I believe.

4802. *Chairman.*] The judicial assessor, when appealed to, sits alone, I presume?—Yes.

4803. Therefore he ceases to be an assessor?—Yes; he is a court of appeal, in fact.

4804. *Mr. Cave.*] You think that the effect of the present system has been to weaken the authority of the friendly chiefs instead of strengthening it?—Not always; but recently it has tended to weaken their power, and to ignore their power.

4805. You think that it encourages the tribes behind to press upon them?—Yes.

4806. Therefore, I suppose you would reduce our protectorate to very much less than its present limits; I mean as to general interference with the natives around?—Yes, it would lessen it; I mean as to the jurisdiction of the chiefs over their own people.

4807. And you think that the expense to the British Government would be diminished by that course of proceeding?—Yes, the military expense certainly would.

4808. *Mr. Cheetham.*] You spoke of the action of the bankruptcy law on the Gold Coast, and I understood you to express an opinion unfavourable to its present action?—Yes.

4809. You said that the traders invested their surplus profits in slaves?—Not only their profits, but all the property they can get possession of.

4810. Are those slaves domestic slaves?—They become domestic slaves; they buy them one from the other, or from Ashantee.

4811. They do not buy them within the protectorate, do they?—Yes, they do buy them within the protectorate.

4812. And we do not interfere?—We do not.

4813. Had you ever any interest in the coffee plantation on the Gold Coast?—No; my brother James had.

4814. Did it succeed?—Up to a certain point it did.

4815. What was the cause of the failure?—The pawn system existed some years ago, and still exists. When my brother was there, from 1837 to 1840, they preferred pawning themselves or members of their family to him, and the consequence was that he was able to ensure a certain amount of steady labour. The labourers were well treated and very happy. A Commissioner was sent out in 1841 (Dr. Madden), and he reported on that system as being too near to the slave trade

to be allowed to remain. Notice was given on the coast, and then many of those pawns would not work steadily, and left my brother, although they were to receive daily wages. The consequence was that the coffee plantation got out of cultivation, and is now totally abandoned.

4816. *Chairman.*] Do you think that that interference with the pawn system was unwise?—It is my opinion that it was unwise.

4817. *Mr. Cheetham.*] The pawn system was a system of coercion to some extent, was it not?—If a man required money, he would take a member of his family, man or woman, to another person who had money, and would pawn that servant for a certain sum; the labour of that pawn was not taken into consideration; he was merely fed and clothed by the master, and was to all intents and purposes a temporary slave.

4818. He was under coercion, was he not; his labour could be compelled, and he did not receive wages?—Yes, just so.

4819. He was for the time the property of his owner?—Yes; but that was his condition prior to the pawning, probably.

4820. *Chairman.*] Was the treatment and condition of the pawn generally better than that of the slave?—No, it was very similar. Nine-tenths of the population of that part of the coast are slaves or pawns, but they are to all intents and purposes members of the family of their master, as much as his sons or daughters, and in many instances the slave becomes the head of the family.

4821. *Lord Stanley.*] In fact, the sons and daughters are slaves?—Yes.

4822. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.*] The pawning did not make the man a slave, but it transferred him from one master to another?—Yes; very often it would happen from the death of a member of the family, because the expense of "making custom" was so great that it was necessary to raise money for the purpose of carrying out the obsequies of the dead man in what they thought a proper manner.

4823. *Mr. Cheetham.*] Was that pawning limited to any specific duration of time?—Only until the money was paid, and they could pay it the next day if they liked.

4824. Then the pawn was at liberty?—Yes, always.

4825. And would go back to the original family or master, as the case might be?—Yes, to the original family or master.

4826. When that system ceased your brother could not obtain steady labourers, you say?—He could not.

4827. Then he did not find that the native negro worked steadily?—No; some gentlemen made an effort in 1850 to grow cotton on the coast, and we sent out an American gentleman from the United States: we planted 25,000 cotton trees within a short distance of Cape Coast Castle, but merely from the want of obtaining steady labour the whole was abandoned, and I believe it has now all gone back to the bush.

4828. Did you ever employ natives by way of contract?—No, I had natives in my employment, but not for steady labour purposes; I used to have a number of Kroomen, and they were principally my servants.

4829. But you never employed any of them in any industrial pursuit by contract?—No, never.

4830. These who are engaged in trade are quick

quick enough, are they not?—They are very shrewd.

4831. Quite alive to the question of their self-interest?—Quite.

4832. So that physically and morally your knowledge of the negro would not induce you to say that he was an inferior animal altogether to the white man?—I do not like to answer that question; I have found negroes who have certainly shown intelligence equal to that of Europeans, if not superior.

4833. So that if efforts are made to educate them, you do not think that it is useless?—No, certainly not; I do not think it can be injurious.

4834. Mr. *Cave*.] What is the value of a pawn, how much money would be advanced upon the guarantee of one?—Not less than eight dollars, equal to 2*l.* sterling, up to as high as two ounces of gold, equal to 8*l.*

4835. Not more?—Not more.

4836. Sir *John Hay*.] For how many months' labour would a man be pawned?—For an indefinite period; until the money is repaid.

4837. Lord *Alfred Churchill*.] What is the principal route by which European produce finds its way into Ashantee?—By the paths; there are three or four paths; one to Accra, another to Annamaboe, and another to Elmina, branching into Cape Coast.

4838. Do the Dutch send much produce into Ashantee from the Dutch forts?—They have a very small trade carried on by means of messengers, whom they send with goods into the interior.

4839. The Dutch supply the Ashantees largely with arms and ammunition, do they not?—Yes.

4840. More than ourselves?—No, less than ourselves.

4841. They consume large quantities of salt, do they not?—It is all made on the coast.

4842. Would there be any means of exercising any control over the Ashantees by preventing this supply of salt?—No; their paths not only lead to the Gold Coast but to Assinee and down the coast. A very large proportion of the gold which came from Cape Coast Castle recently came from Ashantee in the first instance.

4843. Is that gold washed out of the rivers?—Partly; but there is an immense amount of gold in Ashantee which is annually dug up and found and not sent to this country.

4844. It is retained by the King of Ashantee?—Yes.

4845. If a Commissioner were to visit him, do you think that he would liberate his gold in exchange for commercial produce?—It would have an effect, no doubt; but the King of Ashantee's idea of wealth is gold and slaves; he would always retain a considerable part of the gold as an emblem.

4846. But still another portion he would invest in trade?—Yes.

4847. Do you think that a Commissioner going up there would be likely to meet with better results than the similar one to the King of Dahomey?—Yes, I think so, because the object of the mission to the King of Dahomey was one that he was not likely to accede to, namely, the suppression of the slave trade; but it is very different with the King of Ashantee; I think he would listen to any proposal made with regard to wars or treaties.

4848. He has no foreign slave trade, has he?—None whatever.

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4849. Therefore that argument can be put aside?—Yes. It is said that refractory slaves are sent to Java, but I do not know.

4850. Is the King of Ashantee on terms of amity with the King of Dahomey?—I believe so just now.

4851. You have reason to believe so?—I have reason to believe so.

4852. Mr. *Cave*.] You have said that the head of a family can take any members of his family and make pawns of them?—He can.

4853. Is there no time when a member of a family becomes free and independent of the head?—No, never; the whole of the family are slaves, but practically any one can go away and trade as he likes, and if he makes money in trade it is his own.

4854. But if the head of the family can catch him he can pawn him, I suppose?—That is so; but they consider it most disgraceful unless there is a family necessity. It is just the same in their eyes as if a man here were to send his wife or daughter to prostitution.

4855. The right of pawning is not confined to sons and daughters, but takes in nephews and nieces as well?—Yes, every one of the family; but he would select in preference a man not born in the family; they all of them make use of the same term signifying "my father;" you would not know which was the son and which was not.

4856. But still the head can take a man who is one of the family and pawn him?—Yes, but very generally the man consents to it.

4857. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Did I understand you to say that practically we had destroyed the authority of the various chiefs within the protected territory?—That was my impression.

4858. You do not mean that we carry on the ordinary government of the various parts of the protectorate?—I mean that we have taken from them the right of jurisdiction; they are not allowed the power to settle palavers, the power of settling cases; that is to say, their power is not acknowledged; and on the other hand, I have heard of recent cases in which chiefs from the interior have been summoned by minor officers to come down for slight causes.

4859. You do not mean that every case which the chief formerly settled among his tribe, is now settled by our authorities at Cape Coast or Accra?—No, because the natives themselves would not submit to that.

4860. Do we attempt so minute an exercise of authority as that?—I believe we do as far as we can.

4861. We have no officer of the Government in the interior, have we?—No, but the natives bring their cases down very often.

4862. Do you mean that they bring the ordinary daily cases that arise in every part of this great territory, down to our forts?—No, but I believe that where a case is brought before the native chief, and referred to a European court, no attention would be paid to the previous decision, as it used to be in former times.

4863. That would be an appeal?—Yes, an appeal.

4864. You think that where an appeal is made from the native chiefs to our courts, sufficient attention is not paid to the original decision?—I believe that none would be paid. I have information that as far as the King of Cape Coast is concerned,

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concerned, he has been denied that power of settling disputes at all, though he had a right to do so at one time.

4865. That chief being our immediate neighbour, this interference is likely to take place in a greater degree than in other cases?—Yes, no doubt.

4866. Do you think that more interference is exercised over, say the chiefs, of the eastern districts?—I believe that has been so; I believe that they have been interfered with constantly recently.

4867. You are not in favour of putting an end altogether to this jurisdiction in this protected territory?—No.

4868. But you think that it has been carried too far?—Just so; I think that their judicial rights have been too much interfered with.

4869. Do you conceive that our court should only be put in motion by the consent of the parties?—No, but by the dissent of one of the parties to the previous decision, on reasonable ground.

4870. Are you opposed to any coercive jurisdiction?—No, not so far as keeping peace between the protected tribes, and in various other ways; but their dignity and power should not be ignored.

4871. But if our jurisdiction is to exist at all, it would be necessary to set aside the decision of a chief, where an English judge would feel that it was opposed to the dictates of morality, would it not?—Certainly.

4872. And, in fact, the jurisdiction of the English would have no good effect at all, unless it were so used with respect to some of the native customs and laws?—Quite so; for instance, in the case of witchcraft, that is a very proper subject of interference on our part.

4873. You think that the judicial assessor's court, within certain limits, may continue to act with good effect?—Most assuredly; it is necessary to improve the natives, and I think they want something to check them.

4874. *Chairman.*] The Committee collect from you, that you would not advise any extension of territory on our part around the forts?—I should not, certainly.

4875. It is not a country which you think could in any way be "settled" advantageously in, in the sense of colonization?—No.

4876. Have you formed any opinion with regard to whether or not the English Government made a mistake at Lagos by taking possession of that territory?—I thought so from the first, a very great mistake.

4877. Is it your opinion that it would have been better to keep Lagos as a consulate?—Certainly.

4878. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.*] You have no personal knowledge of Lagos, have you?—I have not, but I am perfectly aware of the system of government there.

4879. *Mr. Baxter.*] Are you averse generally to adding to the number of our settlements on

the coast of Africa?—Yes, I am; with regard to colonization, I am certainly averse to that; I think that one or two of the forts might be re-occupied.

4880. *Chairman.*] Which of the forts do you think might be re-occupied?—The fort of Quittah; that I mention only in consequence of the slave trade.

4881. You would not recommend any of those forts simply as commercial stations?—No, there is no necessity for that.

4882. Have you had at any time to deal with the King of Ashantee commercially?—Yes.

4883. How is it that you have ceased to do so?—In consequence of those disturbances.

4884. Do you hope by-and-by to renew your negotiations with the King of Ashantee?—Yes, certainly; I had also commercial transactions with Dahomey.

4885. *Mr. Baxter.*] Is the King of Ashantee very anxious to get down to the coast?—That was the generally received opinion, but I do not think so, except to add to his power.

4886. Should you imagine that he wants to get down to the sea coast for the purpose of trade?—Possibly so; I believe it is partly also to raise the prestige of Ashantee.

4887. *Lord Alfred Churchill.*] Do you think that the introduction of a small metallic currency instead of cowries, would have a good effect?—I think not; copper coins were once sent out, and we could buy six shillings in copper for the ordinary akkee of 4s. 6d. in gold. They can weigh there; it is quite a common thing in the market; they can weigh five pence worth of native gold.

4888. They have weights?—Yes, every man carries weights and scales.

4889. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.*] You were asked by one of the Honourable Members to draw a comparison between the Oil Rivers and the Gold Coast; did I understand you to say that the natural commercial advantages of the Oil Rivers are so great that legitimate trade has of itself taken the place of the slave trade, but that you did not think the same results would follow on the Gold Coast, supposing our authority to be withdrawn?—I think not; I think that trade would decrease; I did not say that legitimate trade has been substituted for the slave trade in consequence of the advantages of the Oil Rivers, but I said that trade had flourished there in consequence of much of the district being covered with palm trees, and the means of communication being so good.

4890. Did you mean, that supposing our authority were withdrawn from the Gold Coast, legitimate trade would not there be able of itself to take the place of the slave trade, as it has done in the Oil Rivers?—Certainly not. I believe on the Gold Coast, as it does on the Coast of Dahomey, both the slave trade and legitimate trade would flourish together.

4891. *Chairman.*] That is to say, so long as there is any demand for slaves?—So long as there is any demand for slaves.

JOHN HARRIS, Esq., called in; and Examined.

J. Harris, Esq.

4892. *Chairman.*] You are a Merchant and Shipowner at Sherboro, are you not?—Yes.

4893. How long have you been resident on the West Coast of Africa?—For 10 years.

4894. Have you resided at Sherboro the whole of that time?—At Sherboro and Sierra Leone; principally at Sherboro.

4895. How has your trade flourished during those

those 10 years?—It has increased considerably.

4896. During the whole of that time?—During the whole of that time.

4897. To what do you attribute that increase?—Principally I think from the British traders' friendly intercourse with the chiefs. I may say that trade has not increased within the last 18 months since the Government has had possession of the place; it decreased in consequence of the war between the natives.

4898. What was the date of that?—I think it commenced in 1862.

4899. So that your trade flourished more in Sherboro before the English occupied it?—Yes.

4900. Under what government was Sherboro then?—Under the native government of the King of Sherboro. We had a consul always there, Mr. Hanson.

4901. In what way has the assumption of the Government by the English diminished your trade?—Taking possession of the country by the English was objected to by some of the population; what one party wanted the other did not, and in consequence of that they got up a war amongst them.

4902. Between the tribes that favoured us and the tribes that were against us?—Yes.

4903. How did it end?—The two parties made peace; like other wars it came to an end by doing nothing; both parties were right, and they settled it among themselves; the war afterwards verged into the Kitton Country, the Gallinas; and in 1863 Prince Mannah asked me to take a message to the Governor, telling him that he did not want any war, that trade had improved very much, that he should stop the water-side tribes in the neighbourhood of Sherboro River from making war, and that he would be glad to make peace.

4904. Does the British occupation include both the tribes who favoured us, and those who resisted us?—Yes; they are different portions of the same family.

4905. Mr. *Cliechester Fortescue*.] Is that the Caulker family?—They have nothing to do with the Caulker family.

4906. *Chairman*.] Do you think it would be better for the English to retain a consulate there, and not to take the government?—No, I think not; I think that if the Government had done what they ought to have done, and taken the thing in hand, they could have settled the war; and that if the government is now properly carried on, trade would very much increase.

4907. What, then, is your complaint?—That the government rule in Sherboro is not successful; that they interfere too much with domestic slavery, and put on duties and licenses which the natives do not understand.

4908. How could they carry on the government otherwise?—They ought not to put on duties immediately after taking possession.

4909. Was not the occupation of the country chiefly with a view to raise a revenue?—I think not.

4910. What was the object?—The object was that we should have some formal government, the government which we had, had for many years been very loose, and the chiefs had always been fighting among one another.

4911. But how did those disturbances interfere with the English, to render their interference necessary?—It injured me considerably; I lost

from 5,000*l.* or 8,000*l.* in consequence of their burning my factories.

4912. It was for the protection of the merchants that the English Government was established, you think?—Principally.

4913. Are there other factories besides your own?—No.

4914. Where was that factory that was burnt?—I have one at Sulamas, one at the Mannah River, and one at Sugary.

4915. Are those towards the Gallinas?—They are beyond the Gallinas.

4916. How are they protected?—By the chiefs; I do not require protection.

4917. Is it likely that you would require the English to spread their protection there, if the chiefs quarrelled?—No, I do not want it; the Governor has spoken about it to me, but from what I have seen of the operation of the Government at Sherboro, I do not want it.

4918. It was simply to protect the mercantile establishments that the Government took possession of Sherboro, you say?—I believe so.

4919. There may be a similar necessity wherever mercantile establishments are set up, may there not?—No; in the Gallinas I never saw the necessity; Mannah is a powerful chief, and he can protect his own strangers.

4919.* You think that if the native government became more powerful it would not be necessary for the English to interfere?—Certainly not.

4920. Is it for the interest of the English to maintain certain tribes against others which may be more powerful?—There is no necessity; a Commissioner going from Sierra Leone, if he was the proper person, would always have the necessary effect; we are in treaty communication with nearly all of them, and if they were forced to carry out the treaties we should have no difficulty in keeping the peace.

4921. Are there not more powerful tribes in the interior, who are rather pressing on the coast tribes now?—There are; but as a rule some portion of the coast tribes send up to buy war from the interior tribes.

4922. Will you explain that buying war?—A chief who has a dispute will send into the interior to some other chief, with a small present, to say that he wants to "buy war;" they never come down by themselves; they are always invited down by those on the coast.

4923. What do you think has been the effect upon the habits and civilisation of the natives by the English residence?—It has improved their habits very much; they are now getting more civilised, and using better description of things in their houses; they dress differently, they use chairs, tables, looking-glasses, and they have some idea of houses; they had only huts before.

4924. Do you know the chiefs personally?—I know them all.

4925. Are you acquainted with the treaties between the English and them?—Some portions of them.

4926. Are they all in one form?—The treaties are made for different purposes, some for the suppression of the slave trade, others are commercial treaties, and others for making chiefs keep the peace one with the other.

4927. What was the nature of the treaties with the Sherboro chiefs?—There are many of them.

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them. The last treaty was for the cession of their country.

4928. Did it involve other arrangements besides, with regard to the slave trade and commerce?—No; we have had no slave trade for many years at Sherboro, except the intercolonial slave trade from one part of the coast to another.

4929. Are the treaties you are acquainted with satisfactorily observed?—No; they are very often broken.

4930. On both sides?—On both sides. We have sometimes agreed to pay annual stipends to the chiefs, which have not been paid for some years, I believe.

4931. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Can you mention any case of that kind?—I believe the Caulkers have; none of them had a stipend for many years.

4932. Is that because the Government have thought that they did not deserve to have them?—I do not know.

4933. Was there any reason alleged, in the conduct of the chiefs, for withholding the stipends?—I do not think that they ever applied for them.

4934. They do not care about them?—I suppose not.

4935. *Chairman*.] What is your opinion with regard to the effect of the missionary labours upon the natives?—My opinion is that it is not as effective as it ought to be, considering the amount of money and the lives that are spent in it.

4936. But still, so far as it goes, you think it beneficial?—It certainly is beneficial, but it has given us some very bad characters.

4937. In what way?—I have had several boys out of the mission schools who have been strongly recommended to me, but I never had one who did not turn out a thief, and one of the worst characters in the country. I could name half-a-dozen of such cases.

4938. How do you account for that?—When they come out of the school they have nothing to do; no trade has been taught them; they know nothing but reading and writing, and very little of that. If they were taught to labour at some sort of trade before they came out of school it would be different, but now they turn out blackguards and useless.

4939. Sir *John Hay*.] Does your answer apply to the whole of these people, or only to the boys who pass through the missionary schools?—To very many of them all.

4940. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] From Sierra Leone have you had any?—I have had some from Sierra Leone, and some from the mission at Sherboro.

4941. Mr. *Baxter*.] Does that apply to all the missions on the West Coast?—I can only speak for those that I know; but I think that nearly everybody would tell you that the Sierra Leone people are the worst on the coast; in some parts the chiefs will not let them live in the country.

4942. We have had evidence before us that some of the missions do give industrial instruction to the boys?—I dare say they do, in other parts.

4943. *Chairman*.] Do you hold any land?—Yes.

4944. On what terms?—By gift from the chiefs.

4945. Have you any documentary title?—Yes.

4946. Do you consider it a safe possession?—

It has been acknowledged by the Foreign Office at home, in a dispute which I had with the Liberian Government.

4947. Is there land occupied by the English Government; is there much land held in private possession by the English?—Portions of it are; a portion of my land is within the jurisdiction of the English Government, and other portions of it are about to be allotted to different people. The Government has sent out a Colonial surveyor, to have it surveyed, before the allotments are made.

4948. What are the judicial establishments at Sherboro?—A manager, a military assistant, surgeon, an officer, some troops, and a few police.

4949. Is the judicial system satisfactory both between English subjects and between the English and the natives?—Far from it.

4950. Have you any suggestion to make with regard to any alteration which you think desirable either in the government or in the judicial establishment?—Yes; we have no means whatever of collecting debts in Sherboro; if any man committed a theft, the prosecutor would have to go 100 miles, to Sierra Leone, and to bring back his witnesses the same distance. I think that we have a right to some system in Sherboro which would save all that, and at the same time save expense to the Government and the public.

4951. Do you think that the English law could be administered both on English subjects and upon the natives?—It is so now.

4952. To the satisfaction of the natives?—Yes.

4953. Have you any acquaintance with Liberia?—I have been at Monrovia, and I have been at Cape Mount.

4954. What is your opinion with respect to the progress of trade there?—I think that it will be shut up altogether if they are allowed to carry out their laws.

4955. Do you mean their revenue laws?—Not only their revenue laws, but their regulations with regard to foreigners coming into their country to trade; they will only allow foreigners to go to ports of entry, and then they are obliged to consign their goods to the Liberians, who send them to other ports, and trade with the natives.

4956. You do not anticipate any extension of the Liberian settlement towards Sierra Leone?—No.

4957. You think it more likely that the English will stretch their territory south, towards Liberia, do you?—Yes, I have had several conversations with Prince Mannah, and the whole of the chiefs about Liberia, wanting to take possession of the Gallinas, and the Sugary territory; the chiefs object to that, and it was only my being there that prevented war. When I went there, the Liberian Government sent up and seized two schooners of mine, with property and people in them, and took them to Monrovia. I appealed to Governor Hill, who was Governor at Sierra Leone, and he sent a man-of-war to Liberia; and Captain Smith and Captain Turner took the vessels and brought them back again, and claimed compensation. I believe the matter was referred home to the Foreign Office, and Governor Hill told me that his action was approved of at home, and that a Commission was to be sent to decide how far the Liberian territory does extend. The Commissioners were appointed, but from what I heard from the Foreign Office

the other day, they do not seem to have settled anything.

4958. Do you think it would be possible, if the English Government were to concentrate their establishment at Sierra Leone, that Sherboro could be put under any native rule again?—I think not.

4959. You think that there is no native power that could be put up?—None that would be strong enough to carry on a government; our interest in Sherboro is now large, it is the most valuable part of the coast around Sierra Leone.

4960. Have you any suggestion to make with regard to the best means to facilitate the expansion of commerce about there?—Yes, to open the roads in the interior. I have been some distance into the interior, it is a very fine country and very healthy; but there are only small paths, and the people have to carry everything on their backs. The country at the back of the Gallinas and Sherboro produces a very large amount of cotton. I have had a ton of cotton sent me in a day, and they could not get it down.

4961. Do you think that we should get into conflicts with the native tribes if we were to attempt to open the roads?—Not at all; I could obtain the consent of the chiefs so far back as the Bagroo Country; they would assist us; it is about 60 miles back from the Gallinas; the king is a friend of mine, and he has asked me to establish a factory up there.

4962. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.* What amount of territory has been declared British territory at Sherboro; how do you describe it?—We have got Sherboro Island, and a portion of Bendo, and the Imperas Country and Bagroo; and then to the sea towards Bagroo there is a territory that is not ceded; the whole of the territory whose we formerly cut timber, which lies between Kent and Sherboro, is under native jurisdiction, so that there is a gap on the coast line; Yawry Bay is not ceded, and Tasso and Phantain Island.

4963. Yawry Bay lies between you and the newly acquired territory of Quiah in Sherboro, does it not?—Yes; adjoining that is the Kate River.

4964. How far back from the coast is this British territory supposed to extend?—It goes back in a direct line 40 miles, I should say.

4965. Is there much population?—It has been much disturbed in consequence of these wars, but in Bagroo, where we had been cutting timber, the population is becoming very large, and it is a magnificent river.

4966. The population is increasing again?—Yes, the population is increasing again.

4967. Has Sherboro Island much population?—There is a good population, but it is a useless place; they can scarcely produce anything.

4968. *Lord Stanley.* It is low and swampy?—It is a swamp.

4969. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.* Where does our fort or possession stand?—At Bando; the soldiers are at Victoria, close to the Yawry; and the magistrate or manager is at Bando.

4970. Are those forts on the main land or on Sherboro Island?—The one is on Sherboro Island, and the other is altogether above the island; Bando itself is only an island, and not on the main land; all our communication there is by water; all our communication with the interior is by water.

4971. Has any difficulty been found in carrying on the government of this native population?—There is a difficulty found in this, that the laws made by the managers, such as the laws relating to the licensing canoes, and interfering with domestic slavery are awkward, and the laws with regard to the carriage of goods by the natives in the interior, who will not in consequence come down to the British territory to trade.

4972. What do you mean by interference with domestic slavery?—Perhaps a man comes down in a canoe, and a policeman seizes him and says you have got slaves on board; he walks him off to the manager, and perhaps the manager lets him go, but then he has lost a couple of days; I knew a case in Sierra Leone where a Soosoo man was going to Sherboro with a canoe; the canoe was seized by Mr. Elliott, the manager at Kent, and taken into Sierra Leone and condemned as having slaves on board; the man said they were not slaves, and that they were his relations, though, of course, they might have been slaves; he wanted to be released, but the Governor said that he could not be released; he had been condemned, and his slaves were sent into the Liberated African Department, and there they remained. The chief came down and saw Mr. Walker, the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, who went to the Governor with him and tried to get the men released, but he could not do it.

4973. But are you surprised at a British officer interfering if he found what he believed to be slaves brought into the British territory?—You cannot call a man a slave when he comes into British territory of his own free will in a canoe. It is very difficult to prove that they are slaves.

4974. You state that there has been interference with domestic slavery in this Sherboro territory?—Yes.

4975. In what way?—There was a case where some of Mr. Cork's boys went out fishing; a boatman from Kent pounced upon them, and they were taken into Sierra Leone, and condemned as slaves, and the boatmen obtained 5*l.* a-piece for them.

4976. What would be your view with regard to the proper conduct for the British authorities to pursue with reference to slavery?—I do not think that they have a right to interfere with domestic slavery, unless they are badly treated, or express a desire to be liberated.

4977. Do they ever wish that?—Frequently.

4978. Have there been frequent cases of domestic slaves applying to our managers and complaining of ill-treatment?—There have been cases where they have asked for their liberty.

4979. Do they obtain their liberty when they apply for it?—Yes; they are sent to Sierra Leone.

4980. Therefore any man in this British territory coming to a British magistrate and claiming his freedom, obtains it as a matter of course?—Yes.

4981. *Mr. Cheetham.* Does that ever happen with a domestic slave?—Yes.

4982. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.* Without compensation to the owner?—Yes.

4983. And the people within the British territory are quite aware of that, are they not?—Yes, and for that cause a great many of the native people have left the British territory.

4984. *Sir John Hay.* With their slaves?—With their slaves.

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4985. Mr. *Clitchester Fortescue*.] You have said that trade had suffered some interruption since we took possession of the territory, do you believe that to be temporary?—I am certain of it; it is now increasing; I have six ships loading there now, within the last two months; the Custom regulations are a great drawback to trade; we have no custom-house at Sherboro, everything has to pay duty at Sierra Leone; ships going from England to Sherboro have to go to Sierra Leone to enter and pay the port charges; they come as if they were going into Sierra Leone to load, and then they come down to Sherboro, a distance of 120 miles, and then they have to clear outwards at Sierra Leone.

4986. If there must be a custom-house, you would rather have it at Sherboro?—We ought to have a branch; the revenue would be very much greater; we do not think that the revenue which the Europeans pay, is fairly collected; I asked the Governor about it, and he said that that was his proposition, but the Council objected to it.

4987. *Chairman*.] Was the native government, before the English took Sherboro, cheaper than the English Government now?—We scarcely had any.

4988. But have there not been duties raised since the English took possession of Sherboro, which were not necessary before?—We paid no duties before.

4989. Mr. *Clitchester Fortescue*.] But you are very willing to pay duties for the sake of having a Government which will secure law and order?—Yes.

4990. *Lord Stanley*.] Can you give the Committee any idea of the per-centage on imports?—Four per cent. is the *ad valorem* duty. We pay 1 s. 3 d. a gallon on wines and spirits; 1½ d. a pound on tobacco, and I believe there is some extra duty on powder; then we pay a license for selling spirits, 15 l. or 20 l. a year for every establishment, and 10 s. for every canoe and boat.

4991. Do you consider that with this revenue, Sherboro might be made self-supporting?—More than self-supporting.

4992. Paying its own expenses, and part of those of Sierra Leone?—Yes, paying its own expenses, and part of those of Sierra Leone; but the revenue will increase when we have peace.

4993. Are there any warlike tribes in the interior with whom we are likely to be brought into collision at Sherboro?—No, there is no fear of that.

4994. Why?—The people have too much respect for the Europeans.

4995. The interior is populous, is it not?—Yes, very.

4996. You spoke of making roads into the interior, at whose cost do you propose that those roads should be made?—We should make them out of the taxes of the country; it would pay the merchants well to have a road made, because we are now compelled to transport the produce; we should save that expense if we had good roads.

4997. The merchants would be willing to pay some part of the expense themselves, you think?—Yes, they would be willing to pay some part of the expense.

4998. Why is it that you are anxious to have British protection at Sherboro, and not at Gallinas?—Because at Gallinas, with Prince Mau-

nah's assistance, I can protect myself; the chiefs are very friendly to me.

4999. But if the disposition of the chiefs should alter, the same argument would apply for occupying the Gallinas, as for occupying Sherboro?—Yes, no doubt.

5000. *Chairman*.] How is it that the chiefs are so much more friendly to you at Gallinas than they are at Sherboro?—I have been many years with them, and I have done a great deal of good for them.

5001. The same influence might have done that with the Sherboro chiefs, might it not?—There has never been anybody with sufficient power to keep peace and order at Sherboro.

5002. *Lord Stanley*.] With regard to what you said of the natives who are brought up at the English schools, do you think that the belief in their not being generally very useful servants is common among the traders on the coast?—I believe it is general.

5003. You are speaking of those brought up at Sierra Leone?—Sierra Leone and Sherboro, where we have a mission school.

5004. They are not brought up to industrial labour?—They are not.

5005. Do you think that the fact of their being partly educated and speaking English makes them think themselves above the other natives, and makes them more unwilling to work?—Yes; they call themselves "bookmen;" they can read and write, and they think that is sufficient.

5006. Mr. *Cave*.] Do you find that the natives consume large quantities of spirits?—Yes, a considerable quantity, some portions of them.

5007. Since you have traded there, have you found that the consumption of spirits by the natives has increased?—No; I think not more than other things in proportion. I think that staple goods have increased more.

5008. Do you think that drunkenness has increased?—Not at all.

5009. Do the missionaries object to the trade in spirits?—The Mendy mission object to it.

5010. Is that on the Sherboro Island?—Yes; it is an American mission.

5011. The American missionaries find fault with the natives for consuming your spirits?—Yes.

5012. Gallinas was the principal place for the slave trade, was it not?—Yes.

5013. Where Captain Denman burnt the "Baracoons"?—Yes.

5014. At that time the chiefs were not very friendly to the Europeans, were they?—They have always been so.

5015. Did they lose nothing by the stopping of the slave trade?—They lost immensely at first, but since we have established legitimate trade, they are making up for it, because the slaves are becoming of value to them, and they will not export them. If a slave works in Gallinas for two months, he would give his master more than a Spaniard would give.

5016. What do the Spaniards give?—£. 8.

5017. What do they work at chiefly at Gallinas?—Making palm oil.

5018. Is there any recognised agricultural labour?—Rice.

5019. Carried on by the domestic slaves?—Yes.

5020. How many hours a day do they work?

—As

—As little as possible; some of them work for a fortnight, or a week, and then leave off.

5021. Can the master compel them to work more regularly?—Not at all.

5022. What means of coercion has the master with the domestic slaves?—Flogging them and putting them in irons.

5023. In Cuba a master can compel the slaves to work for a very considerable number of hours; why is that not so in Africa?—The difference is, that in Cuba they are governed by Europeans, who are more energetic.

5024. You can hardly get anything much more severe than flogging and putting in irons, can you?—They would sooner be flogged and put in irons than sold or exported from the country.

5025. But then the question is, whether they would rather be so than work?—They would take a great deal of flogging before they would work.

5026. As a matter of fact you find that they do not make good agricultural labourers, even in a state of slavery?—They do not.

5027. Mr. *Cheatham*.] I understood you to say that the trade of Sherboro was much more extensive than the Sierra Leone trade?—The Sierra Leone trade of itself is nothing; it produces nothing scarcely.

5028. Are not there the same facilities for trade at Sierra Leone as you have from Sherboro?—No, it is a different country.

5029. You do not expect the trade of Sierra Leone, under any circumstances, to be so extensive as the trade of Sherboro?—It cannot be.

5030. There has been some dissatisfaction on the part of the merchants at Sherboro; is that owing to the want of a custom-house?—Yes; it is the same at Sierra Leone; the merchants in both places complain that they are not having any

voice in the government of the colony, and the expenditure of the money.

5031. Do the merchants of Sherboro want to be a distinct government from Sierra Leone?—They only want to have a fair share of the government with the Sierra Leone merchants.

5032. Did you engage those boys from the mission schools which you have referred to as clerks?—Yes.

5033. Had they intelligence?—They had intelligence enough.

5034. But there was a want of conduct?—Yes.

5035. Lord *Alfred Churchill*.] Is there not a considerable timber trade in the neighbourhood of Sherboro?—The timber trade in the neighbourhood of Sherboro was closed altogether until lately; I have a factory in a new district altogether for timber, and I am now loading two ships, which make about the fifth or sixth within about the last 18 months.

5036. Is that timber African oak?—Yes.

5037. Is it used for Navy purposes?—No; our Navy uses very little now; the merchant navy uses a little.

5038. Are there great facilities for loading that timber?—Yes; the river allows vessels of large tonnage to go up.

5039. For what distance?—Forty miles into the interior.

5040. *Chairman*.] Did your remarks just now with regard to the Sierra Leone trade apply to it as an export trade of interior produce?—Yes; the export trade of produce from Sierra Leone would include the produce brought from Sherboro to Sierra Leone to be shipped, and also from the rivers to the northward of Sierra Leone.

5041. Do you expect the exports from Sierra Leone of the interior produce to increase?—It has not done so; it has fallen off almost entirely lately.

DAVID CHINERY, Esq., called in; and Examined.

5042. *Chairman*.] You are Managing Director to the London and African Trading Company, are you not?—Yes.

5043. Your chief trade is with Lagos and Badagry, I believe?—Yes, Lagos, Badagry, Porto Novo, and Leckie on the other side.

5044. Have you any trade with Sierra Leone?—No.

5045. Have you any with Liberia?—Yes, we have a station at Liberia.

5046. Are Lagos and Liberia the two localities of your trade?—The two main localities.

5047. I think your brother was resident for some time on the West African Coast?—For nearly seven years.

5048. Until when?—Until the 4th of May last; about 12 months since.

5049. When he died?—When he died at Lagos.

5050. Have you been yourself resident on the West African Coast?—Yes, for nearly a year.

5051. During your brother's residence, were you in correspondence with him?—Yes, continually.

5052. You have his correspondence, and you can state his opinion, as well as your own?—Quite so.

5053. I believe that you have information to

give the Committee relating to Lagos, both before its cession to the English, and since?—Yes.

5054. What is your opinion with regard to the influence of the English before the cession, and since, upon the trade of Lagos?—I think, especially during Mr. Consul Campbell's time, that trade was in a very much more satisfactory state than it is now.

5055. You think that the English trade of Lagos threw better under the Consulate than under the Government of the English?—Most decidedly so.

5056. Can you assign any reason for that?—I think that the natives in the interior and around and in Lagos feel that we are imposing upon them, especially in the case of Lagos. I have much correspondence to show that the natives felt that we are taking undue advantage over them in taking possession of Lagos.

5057. What do you mean by imposing upon them?—I mean plainly speaking, that Lagos was not willingly ceded by Docemo, but that we forced him to give it up.

5058. Do you think that they resent it as an act of oppression, or that they think it avers to their interests?—I think both.

5059. Do you believe that Docemo could have ruled that country, and that his deposition was not necessary?—Unquestionably.

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5060. What

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5060. What was the ground on which we finally took the government from him?—I can give an answer from the tone of the treaty itself, or from my own opinion. It would appear that the chief idea was to put an end to an imagined slave trade that was being carried on through Lagos.

5061. Was it for the purpose of putting an end to an "imagined" slave trade that we ousted Docemo, and not from any just complaint against him for infractions of treaty?—Not at all.

5062. Have you any opinion, or do you know your brother's opinion, with regard to the relative title of Kosoko and Akitoye, whether Kosoko was a Nampa?—My brother thought so, most decidedly.

5063. Your brother would therefore have justified the establishing of Akitoye?—Yes.

5064. But do you not think that Docemo was guilty of an infraction of the treaty which justified the assumption of his government by the English?—I have heard much on both sides, but the general impression, from the most experienced of my friends in Lagos itself, has been that Docemo had no right to be treated as he was treated.

5065. The evidence before the Committee at present is that Docemo neglected to observe the treaty made by his father; do you differ from that evidence?—I do; I consider Docemo showed himself at all times disposed to respect and assist the English officials and merchants.

5066. Is it your opinion that it would be both just and wise to reinstate Docemo?—I am certainly of opinion that it would be just to reinstate him, but with regard to the wisdom of the thing I scarcely feel competent to give an opinion.

5067. What would be the danger of reinstating him?—I do not think there would be the slightest danger.

5068. Do you think that the English would lose their prestige if they were to reinstate Docemo?—I think the English officers would, but not the English merchants.

5069. You do not think that the English merchants would be in any way endangered by the reinstatement of Docemo?—I think not.

5070. Do you think that Docemo could hold that Government?—Unquestionably.

5071. Do you think that he could hold it against Abbeokuta?—I think so; I believe that the chief ill feeling in Abbeokuta is to be accounted for by our conduct in Lagos.

5072. Are you of opinion that the supposed hostile feeling of Abbeokuta has been caused by English interference?—A vast amount of it.

5073. Do you think that if we were to reinstate Docemo and to withdraw from the Government of Lagos, leaving only a consul there, there would be any risk of the slave trade reviving?—Not at all. I stayed there some months myself, and I had great personal intercourse with the late Consul Campbell and others, especially on that question, being a member of the Slave Conference myself, and I heard of very few cases of my slaves passing through Lagos; in fact King Docemo had, to my certain knowledge, special watchmen on the lagoon, to prevent the possibility of any slave passing through Lagos.

5074. Do you think it necessary retaining the Government of Lagos, that we should also keep posts at Badagry, Palms, and Leckie?—There

should be, I think, an agency at Badagry and Leckie.

5075. For what purposes?—For the purpose of settling disputes between the merchants, and facilitating trade generally.

5076. Are those posts necessary for stopping the slave trade?—They have a material influence in preventing any revival of the slave trade from those points.

5077. If we withdrew our posts from Badagry, would there be any export of slaves from off the bar in canoes?—No; there was no slave trade carried on through Badagry for years prior to its cessation to the English, owing, doubtless, to the commerce carried on.

5078. You do not think that our holding Badagry has the effect of checking the slave trade?—There might be a case of a domestic slave now and then being brought into Badagry which there is not now, but no export from Badagry, Whydah being much more convenient.

5079. Which was the cheapest, the former native government or the present English government?—The native.

5080. Was it as effective for the protection of commerce before as it is now under the English?—Trade was very much better than it is now.

5081. So that the English establishing a government there have made the imposition of heavier duties necessary?—Yes. I think the calculation is 30,000 *l.* against 3,000 *l.* or 4,000 *l.* previously, in the case of Lagos.

5082. Have the heavier duties imposed for the greater cost of the English Government checked commerce?—I am afraid so.

5083. Is it a clearly demanded duty, or is it a disputed demand between the English Government and the native governments in the neighbourhood of the settlement?—I believe now it has been settled, for some 12 months after Lagos was ceded to us, the duties were enforced by the Government of Lagos, at Badagry, while at the same time we had to pay the native duties to the chiefs of Badagry under the King of Porto Novo; so positively, we paid two duties on the same merchandise.

5084. Mr. Seymour.] Is that the case now?—No, it is not the case now.

5085. Chairman.] That is now settled?—That has been settled by the chiefs entering into a treaty with the representatives of Her Majesty's Government; whether that is binding is disputed.

5086. Is it your opinion that the British Government at Lagos, both from its implication in native disputes, and from its cost necessitating heavy duties, will permanently tend to diminish trade there?—From this part it will decidedly, in my opinion.

5087. Would you go so far as to say that the present system will end in making the English trade desert Lagos?—I believe it will cause stagnation, instead of an increase in trade, and that there will be continual wars with the natives in the interior, such as we have intelligence of this morning, of our troops being sent to Ikodu; every soldier available at Lagos has been sent by the Governor to their assistance; and that is merely the commencement of what we have had to endure for years at our other settlements on the coast at the cost and ruin of the trade.

5088. Comparing the British commerce at Lagos

Lagos with that of Bonny, which is the most flourishing?—In every place where there are no duties, and no officials, and no Government to exercise a predominant influence, trade certainly flourishes.

5089. You state that generally as your experience of the West Coast?—Yes; take the Bight of Biafra generally; trade has gradually increased there and is still increasing since 1806; in that year the imports into Liverpool from the Bight of Biafra were 150 tons; in 1810 they were 650 tons; in 1820 they were 3,000 tons; in 1830 they were 8,000 tons; in 1840 they were 13,500 tons; in 1850 they were 16,500 tons; in 1860 they were 23,000 tons; and in 1862 they were 25,000 tons; the imports from Bonny alone were nearly 700,000 *l.* in 1862.

5090. What is the value of your present export trade from Badagry alone; I mean your individual trade?—We have a capital employed at Badagry and Lagos of from 40,000 *l.* to 50,000 *l.*

5091. Was that trade, before Badagry was ceded, better than it is now?—Certainly.

5092. Is it then your idea that it is the expectation formed by certain tribes of obtaining British interference that leads them to attack other tribes?—That is my opinion; it causes a jealousy amongst the tribes.

5093. They are encouraged by hoping to get the English on their side to attack tribes whom they would otherwise remain at peace with?—Yes, who, of necessity, would be compelled to remain at peace.

5094. Do you think that there are any more powerful tribes who, if the English stood out of the way, would obtain a predominance over the smaller tribes?—I do not think so. I take my judgment chiefly from the past; it has not been the case in the past; the Dahomians, are, no doubt, a powerful people.

5095. Is there the same interference at Leekie as there is at Badagry?—No.

5096. Should you say that accounts for Leekie thriving more, commercially, than Badagry?—Our reports from the agents there give an account of a very steady increase of trade.

5097. In what way is the official interference less at Leekie than it is at Badagry?—There is only a Government agent there, a sort of vice-consul, who is simply referred to in cases of dispute; he exercises no influence whatever beyond moral influence, and is not a constant resident.

5098. I believe your correspondent is the commandant at Leekie?—I believe the one who has just come home was, but am not sure.

5099. Are you sufficiently acquainted with other parts of the West Coast to inform the Committee whether commerce has declined in the same way, on the Gold Coast, for instance?—If trade has not declined it has been certainly quite stagnant for the last five or 10 years, but according to my figures trade has decreased certainly the export of gold to an enormous extent; that has been the case for the last 10 years.

5100. The export of gold dust from that coast has been diminishing for the last 10 years?—It has, and longer than that.

5101. Is it your opinion that British interference in some way has caused that diminution of export?—That is my own opinion, and it is shared in by a great many others, especially influential native merchants.

5102. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Will you explain to the Committee how the interference of the British has prevented gold dust being ex-
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ported, their object being to increase it as much as possible?—I think they have succeeded only in establishing a machinery which, in most cases, causes a vast amount of jealousy and ill-feeling in the surrounding tribes, and the result is always that there are wars (if not large wars) continually going on, and the natives being so employed cannot devote their time to legitimate commerce.

5103. Which are the surrounding tribes on the Gold Coast which, as you think, have been set against the British authority?—I do not know sufficient of the Gold Coast to ascertain those particulars; I speak generally.

5104. You say that this diminution of commerce has been caused by the interference of British authority, which you think has made the native tribes hostile to the British Government?—I think I did not say that it had made the neighbouring tribes hostile to the British Government. I said that it created wars in the interior between the various tribes themselves.

5105. Do you say that the presence of the British Government in the forts of the Gold Coast has increased native wars among themselves?—Yes, unquestionably I think so.

5106. Will you give the Committee any instance of that?—I do not think I can do so. I am speaking generally of the influence of the British Government, or the officials of any government whatever. There is that feeling among the surrounding tribes that the domineering laws and the exactions of the officers of the English Government are directed against them, and not for their good, as we intend them, and consequently they tend vastly to affect the commerce of the place.

5107. *Chairman*.] Is it the fact that there has been disunion among the protected tribes since the British Protectorate has been established?—Yes.

5108. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Do you mean that the protected tribes on the Gold Coast are anxious to shake off the British yoke; that they are so dissatisfied with the present British authority that they wish to escape from it?—I believe the most influential natives there (and there are some very influential and very energetic men holding high positions under Her Majesty's Government) would tell you that the presence of our Government there does not tend to do the amount of good that we think it does, and, so far as trade is concerned, that it does affect it injuriously, and this is also my decided belief.

5109. We were told just now by Mr. Swanzy that nothing but the presence of the British authority would maintain union among the tribes, you differ from that?—Yes, most decidedly.

5110. Have you ever been there?—Yes.

5111. For any length of time?—Yes, a month or five weeks; I was at Annamabo. I have had trading connections with the Gold Coast for 12 or 14 years, and have studied the question for years.

5112. Do you think that if the British authority were entirely withdrawn the country would be more peaceful and tranquil than now?—No. I think that if we had a consular agency it would do us more good, and benefit the natives more, and certainly increase commerce more, and answer every purpose if we still keep up a slave squadron.

5113. *Chairman*.] It might not be so easy for the English, having once assumed the protector-

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D. Chinery, Esq. ate, to withdraw, as it might have been to abstain from its assumption?—I should not recommend withdrawing; it would be very improper I think, under all circumstances.

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5114. Were you acquainted with the circumstances of the bombardment of Porto Novo?—Yes.

5115. Through your brother?—He was present.

5116. Was it his opinion, and is it your opinion, that there was the same injustice in what was done by the English there as in the assumption of Docemo's government?—I think it was a most glaring piece of injustice and cruelty.

5117. What was the ground on which it was justified?—It was upon a point of etiquette only. Mr. Consul Foote went up in the gunboat, accompanied by the troops, and after lowering his anchor, he sent to the king to say that he had come for the purpose of getting him to sign a treaty, and that he must go off to him on board the steamer. The king received his messenger very politely, but told him that he feared that the consul had forgotten himself, and that the King of Porto Novo was a man of as much importance in Porto Novo as the Queen of England was in England, and demanded a corresponding amount of respect; and he thought that if the consul required him to sign a treaty, that he should take the treaty to his house. To that the consul replied, that he thought that the dignity of his position there demanded that he should not stoop so low to the King of Porto Novo, but that the king should go off and sign the treaty on board the steamer; and taking that view of the case, he gave him a given hour to consider it, and if he failed by that hour, the town would be blown up at all hazards; the king did not do so, and the town was at once fired on without further to-do; some 600 or 700 human beings were sacrificed by our gunboat. The town was burnt down, and the trade was destroyed for an immense time; all upon a point which I consider absurd and ridiculous, and a lasting disgrace to us.

5118. What has been the practical result on the Government of Porto Novo by that treatment?—It caused a very bad feeling to spring up at once; several of the merchants had positively to clear out from Porto Novo; some of them were ill-used by the natives, and for 12 or 15 months no trade was done; we were forced to take our goods away; thefts and robberies were committed of course, at the same time the king and chiefs, and head men, admitted that the fault of such an onslaught rested with the Government officials, and not the merchants, and on these grounds have permitted trade to recommence.

5119. What is the government of Porto Novo?—I believe it is under the French.

5120. What is the state of trade there?—Trade is a little better than it was.

5121. But still it has not recovered?—No, it has not recovered.

5122. Though you recommend the reinstatement of Docemo at Lagos, do I understand you to say that you do not think the English could leave the Gold Coast to the native rule?—I think not. It would be possible, but I do not think it would be politic.

5123. Why not in the case of the Gold Coast, as well as at Lagos?—I scarcely know why; I

think it is more a feeling of regard for the position of the English Government than it is actually anything else.

5124. What is your idea of the probable consequences of the English withdrawing from the fort?—If they withdraw all the governors, and leave a consular agency only at Accra and Cape Coast Castle, I believe that trade would be better, and that we should be safe.

5125. What power would then be in possession of the Gold Coast?—I believe that the Ashantees would come down to the coast.

5126. Would the Ashantees overrun the Fantees?—I think not.

5127. But they being between the Ashantees and the coast, how would the latter get to the coast except by overrunning the Fantees?—I do not understand the geographical position of the other tribes there; but I should certainly say it would be the King of Ashantee that would form the chief and most important native government.

5128. Are you personally acquainted with Liberia?—I have been there.

5129. Have you a commercial connection with Liberia now?—Yes.

5130. What is your general opinion with regard to the commercial prospects of Liberia?—Trade has not increased there to the extent that you would have expected.

5131. Do you expect to get a large trade with Liberia?—The great drawback is that the government is forced to keep up its expenses by very heavy duties upon all imports.

5132. Why is the government forced to keep up very heavy duties?—They have no other means of obtaining a revenue.

5133. Do you imply by that, that the Liberian government is an expensive government?—By no means; the trade is comparatively small, and consequently the duties are much heavier than they need be if a larger trade were carried on.

5134. Then why have they to levy heavy duties, compared with other governments on the same coast?—Their government is more expensive in proportion than our government; Liberia costs much more to keep up than such a place as the Gold Coast costs us in comparison with the trade.

5135. What is the meaning of their having constituted certain ports of entry lately?—I do not know, unless it is to keep out foreigners from doing trade, or to give greater security for collecting the Customs. I think the latter, but I think it will be prejudicial to the trade, and tend rather to diminish than increase their revenue.

5136. Do you, as a merchant, think that they are jealous of foreign trade?—I do not think so; my experience with them has been quite the reverse.

5137. Have you seen enough of Liberia to form an opinion of the government there, and the effect of the Liberian government on the natives, as compared with the effect of our Government?—Most certainly, the effect of the Liberian government has been far more beneficial than the influence of the English settlement.

5138. Should you say that the influence upon the morality and civilisation of the inhabitants has been greater than that of the British Government, on the territories in their neighbourhood?—Yes, I think they have erected 30 or 40 churches in Liberia, besides a large number of native schools, at which they have 30,000 children under tuition;

tuition; there are also other institutions established for the public good; and, generally speaking, although the trade may be small, yet the tendency of the Liberian Government has been greatly to the benefit of the population, which numbers, I believe, over a quarter of a million.

5139. Will you state generally to the Committee the nature of both your import and export trade at Lagos?—Our import trade to Lagos is chiefly Manchester and Birmingham goods, and a little spirits and wines, but not much. Our exports are palm oil, a little cotton, and ivory, and palm nut kernels.

5140. Has the nature of your imports changed of late, on account of a more civilised demand there for cloth and other things, so as to lead you to suppose that the civilisation of the interior was improving?—Yes; the last advice from my brother, as to our taking Badagry, writing in January 1864, says, as to Okeodan, which is a very important place, that he had just returned from there, and that trade bids fair to rival in all the towns, not even excepting Abbeokuta. He says: "I have taken a large piece of ground to build stores on, and to begin to trade, and it is to be hoped that there will be no Government official sent there to imperil our interests."

5141. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Ikorodu is the point at which the very important trade into the interior reaches the Ogun, is it not?—No, it is situated on the River Addo, and they send their produce now direct to Badagry.

5142. Have you been at Okeodan?—I have been at Okeodan.

5143. Therefore, you know it is of great importance to our commerce that we should keep it open?—Yes, for I believe the country through which the River Addo runs is very prolific.

5144. Especially since the Egbas have closed the Ogun, as they have for several years past?—Yes.

5145. Are you aware that, in 1860, Consul Brand, writing to Lord John Russell, described the state of things in Lagos in this way: "Lagos at present may be said to have no Government; there is no effective protection to property, and no mode of enforcing the payment of debts." He goes on to say, that the small vessel, the "Brune," was their only protection; that whatever government did exist was carried on by the British Consul; and that King Docemo was a mere puppet, who was quite unable to preserve law and order; do you differ from that statement?—I should myself certainly differ from that statement, from my own experience; things must have been vastly changed since I was there with Consul Campbell, not two years previously.

5146. The description of things at Lagos which I have read was written by Consul Brand in 1860, writing from the spot?—Yes; but I should prefer the judgment of Consul Campbell.

5147. Are you able from your personal knowledge to contradict that account?—I was there in 1858, and it was quite different then.

5148. Things were much better then?—Yes.

5149. Mr. *Chestham*.] Was Consul Campbell living then?—Yes; he died in April 1859.

5150. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] I find in 1861 that Lord John Russell wrote to Consul Foote in these words: "Her Majesty's Government would be most unwilling that the establishment of British sovereignty at Lagos should be attended with any injustice to Docemo, the present chief of the

island, but they conceive that as his tenure of the island, in point of fact, depends entirely upon the continuance of the protection which has been afforded to him and his predecessor by the British naval authorities since the expulsion of Kosoko, no injustice will be inflicted upon him by changing his anomalous protectorate into an avowed occupation, provided his material interests are secured." Do you state to the Committee that you take an entirely different view of Docemo's position from that?—I do.

5151. You think that he was *bonâ fide* governor of the country, and able to maintain himself against the wars of his neighbours without our protection?—From my experience, I must say yes, decidedly, from all the information I have ever had from my brother, and on the spot, and very recently too. I think the safety of Lagos, or its inhabitants, or the trade, would be as good under Docemo, with an English consul, as it is now.

5152. Why was it necessary, then, for us to expel Kosoko, instead of leaving Docemo to do it himself?—I do not know. I do not know that it has been proved that he would not have done so if he had been left to his own resources.

5153. Your opinion is, that Docemo was then and would be again strong enough to take care of himself?—Yes, I think so.

5154. Although we are assured by the consuls on the spot that he was utterly unable to maintain anything like a government?—I think that if, when the dispute had arisen with Docemo, he had referred to our Consul at Lagos, a gumboat would have been quite sufficient.

5155. You think that if we were to withdraw to-morrow, Docemo would be able to make Lagos a safe place for our trade?—I think that if we continued our consulship at Lagos, it would be so; and for my part, I should prefer my interests in the trade to be subject to a consular agent rather than to a Colonial Government.

5156. And if we keep a man-of-war in the lagoon, I suppose?—Yes; just as we had it in Consul Campbell's time.

5157. Did I understand you to attribute the recent falling off in the trade at Lagos to the action of the Colonial Government?—No, not wholly. I think it had begun to fall off before Lagos was taken; but I think that the strong feeling existing in Abbeokuta and the surrounding tribes (and it is a strong feeling) is that we are infringing; and they send their produce to other parts.

5158. Are you aware of our Consul writing to the Foreign Office before there was any question of the occupation of Lagos, telling the Government of the commencement of those native wars, and predicting the exact state of things which has happened, namely, that those wars once begun would go on for several years, and would ruin the trade of Lagos and the neighbourhood?—I am not aware of that.

5159. But you are aware that those native wars between the Egbas and the Ibadans did break out before our occupation of Lagos?—Yes.

5160. Quite independently of that?—Quite so; but I think that it would have been settled long ago if we had not taken Lagos; if we had not aroused a feeling of distrust by the fear of our interfering.

5161. But why should the Egbas persist in carrying on the war with the Ibadans because we are at Lagos; what is the connection?—I do not

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see the connection, scarcely, except that both want to send their trade through Lagos; one wants an advantage which the other does not feel inclined to give up, and they both live in hopes of obtaining our assistance.

5162. But their war began before we did occupy Lagos?—Yes, but I believe that they both had the idea that we should render them assistance.

5163. You are aware that now for several years the Egbas have closed the Ogun, and prevented produce coming to Lagos from Abbeokuta?—Yes.

5164. Then would you not say that those causes are amply sufficient to account for that decline of trade at Lagos?—The trade at Lagos did not decline before the war which is now raging broke out; it was very good and very healthy, notwithstanding the wars in the interior; it was very fair until some three and a half years ago.

5165. But the existence of those native wars is enough to account for the decline of trade, and the stopping by the Egbas of that river, which is the main communication between Lagos and the interior, is it not?—Greatly so; that is the way in which I should account for the decline of the trade.

5166. At all events, you would admit that to be in a very great degree the cause?—Certainly; when Consul Taylor went to Abbeokuta he was told by the king himself that the English people first sent a Consul to Lagos, and then, after the Consul had been there a little time, they came and took the place away from them; and he said "We cannot let a Consul come here, because, if he does, you will do so again." The consequence was, that he was sent home without being allowed to be treated with common courtesy, or being received for even one day.

5167. Mr. *Seymour*.] There were particular circumstances that influenced him against Consul Taylor; the ordinary courtesy was dispensed with by the authorities at Lagos in sending him up?—Yes.

5168. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] But the fear entertained by the people of Abbeokuta, whatever that may have amounted to, that we might attack them, can hardly account for their wars with their neighbours in the interior?—No, certainly not; but it accounts for the prejudice which I spoke of as existing against the English occupation of Lagos.

5169. Do you suppose that the Abbeokutans, having been accustomed to be supported by the English Government against Dahomey, had been led to expect the same support in all their wars, and that they have been disappointed at not getting it?—I believe that they did expect a very great deal; and I am of opinion, that after the promises and hopes held out to them, that we should be exercising neither a sound nor a just policy to take up arms against them.

5170. Mr. *Cheetham*.] I think we gather from your evidence in general that you think we might withdraw our Government at Lagos with advantage?—Yes.

5171. And to allow it to go back again to the natives?—I do not say that it would be advisable; the question was, whether it could be done without prejudice to commerce, and I think it could.

5172. Consul Campbell was resident at Lagos, was he not?—Yes.

5173. Do you attribute the better state of things, then, to his judicious management?—Vastly.

5174. Do you think that since his death matters have not gone on so smoothly?—No.

5175. So that a judicious appointment is essential?—Yes, that is the great secret.

5176. On some of our settlements on the Gold Coast, you think we have failed in that?—Certainly; the influence of Mr. McLean would have done more than all our governors put together.

5177. So that if we were to send out an individual like Mr. McLean, you are of opinion that we might withdraw a good deal of our expenditure on that coast?—Yes.

5178. You have said that the duties in Liberia were heavy?—Yes.

5179. That is the import duties?—Yes.

5180. Have they any export trade?—Yes.

5181. What is it?—Palm oil, coffee, and so on.

5182. They have never yet cultivated cotton?—No.

5183. *Chairman*.] Would you be kind enough to state to the Committee what other mercantile houses there are connected with the Lagos trade, besides your own?—Messrs. Banner Brothers, of London; Frederick Barnes & Company, London; and Messrs. Morgan & Sons, of London.

5184. Are there mercantile houses of other European nations?—Yes, there are some.

5185. In your opinion, would Lagos have ever been fixed upon as a locality for trade if it had not been that the suppression of the slave trade had led the English Government there?—I think it would.

5186. Do you consider that it has as good a mercantile prospect as any other part of West Africa?—I think better than any of the other parts this way; the interior from Badagry, the whole of the opposite shore of the lagoon at Lagos, is crowded with palm trees within a few miles of the beach; they are wasted by tens of thousands.

5187. Mr. *Cheetham*.] Is there a large population?—A very large population.

5188. Mr. *Seymour*.] Would you expect much trade with Abbeokuta?—Not much from Abbeokuta itself.

5189. How would that trade go out to the sea?—It must come through Lagos.

5190. Should you expect much through Abbeokuta?—Yes.

5191. It is a very large town, is it not?—Yes.

5192. Do you think that by any other action of the government of Lagos we might have remained on good terms with Abbeokuta?—I scarcely know how to answer that question.

5193. I understood you to say that you thought that the presence of the Government officials was an obstruction to the trade at Lagos?—Yes.

5194. I ask whether that might be avoided by a different conduct on the part of the authorities?—Partially so. If it had remained a consulate we should not have had that misunderstanding.

5195. In what way do the Government officials interfere with the trade of Lagos?—My chief reason is, that it is the fact of there being a government having an immense influence over the natives which causes a jealous feeling in the surrounding tribes, which it is impossible to keep down. It is so; and, as I said before, I can scarcely tell you why it is so, but the facts prove that it is so in every one of our places on the

West African Coast. I have carefully studied the thing for years past. When on the spot I tried to obtain all the information I could, and I could get no specific reason, but simply that there is a jealousy that we are encroaching, and unjustly so.

5196. Will you take the single point of Lagos, and give the Committee some definite reason; I mean some instances of this jealousy?—We had an instance a very short time ago, when Docemo said in another settlement that he had not ceded Lagos, but that it had been forced from him by threats.

5197. But that is not an instance of jealousy on the part of the surrounding tribes, caused through the action of the Government, is it?—I think that would at once answer the question. The tribes there rose up, and the king was obliged to be fined, to keep them down.

5198. That was in the island itself?—Yes.

5199. But that is not an instance of jealousy on the part of the surrounding tribes; you say that the Government has not had anything to do with the Abbeokutans; with what other tribes have we had a misunderstanding since 1860 which has hindered trade?—I do not know with what other tribes we have had a misunderstanding, but I can speak for Badagry, Palma, and Porto Novo; it is a fact that our having taken Lagos at once depressed trade to a great extent, and it caused a general ill-feeling at all of these places, a feeling of distrust and almost revolt.

5200. How does it depress the trade?—They send the produce elsewhere.

5201. Where to?—I cannot tell you; it is the fact that they did.

5202. You do not know where they send them to?—No; I can only surmise.

5203. Where can they send them to?—To Little Popo and Whydah.

5204. You think that the merchants who used to bring in their palm oil no longer do so since we took Lagos?—I do not only think so, but we have actual proof; we are trading continually. Lagos during the past 18 months has scarcely paid the expenses of our clerks on the spot.

5205. Is that to be attributed to the stoppage of communication with Abbeokuta?—I think a great deal of it is to be attributed to that; but since the cession of Lagos there has been a feeling among the natives generally that the trade is not the same.

5206. Is it the fact that there is a great deal of oil stored at Abbeokuta now?—It has been very greatly exaggerated.

5207. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] You find, as a matter of fact, that the decline of the trade of Lagos has gone along with the establishment of the British Government, and you attribute that decline to the fact of that establishment?—Partially so.

5208. But you will admit, that the native wars which desolate the country around, and which have closed the rivers to trade, will at all events go a long way to account for that state of things?—No doubt that is the case with regard to the present war raging between the Egbas and the Ibadans: my opinion is merely gathered from a general statement of the facts as they exist in all the settlements on the West Coast compared with places where there are no British officials more than an agency, and my experience by my continual correspondence with our Lagos and Badagry agents.

5209. Does that comparison extend beyond the oil rivers and the Bight of Biafra?—No.

5210. Your comparison is made between the oil rivers on the one hand, and the British Colonies on the other?—Yes, quite so; but the difference would be none if we had an agent or resident governor in the rivers; the position would be just the same; I believe that the resources of the country are immense, especially at Accra; a large amount of trade could be done there.

5211. But is there any comparison to be drawn between the facilities for trade in the Oil Rivers and on the Gold Coast?—Perhaps not at Cape Coast, but certainly at Accra; the interior of Accra abounds with palms.

5212. But do not the Oil Rivers afford peculiar means of communication which make them the most favourable palm oil country in Africa?—No doubt of it, but on the other hand we have the Lagoons.

5213. Do you not expect that the palm oil trade of Lagos and Badagry will revive as soon as peace is brought about?—Yes, I hope so.

5214. If you heard to-morrow that peace had been established between the Egbas and the Ibadans, would you not look forward to the revival of trade?—We should look forward to an increase of produce for a time, but the question would be whether we should be able to go on with a flourishing trade. I hope and trust that we should; but I tell you most unreservedly, that I much fear it.

5215. There are no rivers on the Gold Coast suitable for trade or access to the interior, are there?—No; save about three or four small ones.

5216. Then, in those natural facilities for commerce, you cannot compare the Gold Coast with the oil rivers, can you?—Not on the whole, but some part of it; from Annamabo you may go right down to Lagos, passing Accra, and an immense trade can be done there; the interior abounds with palms.

5217. But the Gold Coast is without a navigable river and without a harbour?—Yes, but there would be the Lagoons leading up to the various towns.

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Jovis, 18^o die Maii, 1865.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. Adderley.
Sir Francis Baring.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Buxton.
Mr. Cave.
Lord Alfred Churchill.

Mr. Cheetham.
Mr. William Edward Forster.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Henry Seymour.
Lord Stanley.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE C. B. ADDERLEY, IN THE CHAIR.

JAMES ASPINALL TOBIN, Esq., called in; and Examined.

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5218. *Chairman.*] I THINK you are a Liverpool Merchant connected with the trade on the West Coast of Africa?—I am.

5219. With what part of the West Coast of Africa is your trade chiefly connected?—We have establishments at Sierra Leone, Sherboro, Whydah, Brass, New Calabar, Bonny, Old Calabar, Chincoco, Lindannah, and Kinsembo, and two in Liberia.

5220. Of all those, there are only Sierra Leone and Sherboro which are British settlements; the rest are not under the British Government, are they?—No.

5221. Is your principal trade outside the British settlements?—Yes, the great bulk of it; we have only very recently established a house at Sierra Leone and Sherboro.

5222. You cannot give the Committee any evidence with regard to the trade of Lagos, or the Gold Coast?—No; we have many native correspondents on the Gold Coast, who send their produce to us, but we have no distinct establishment of our own there.

5223. Have you any establishment at Liberia?—Yes, but only recently established.

5224. Have you at any of those places native agents or native traders, in any way connected with your establishments?—Yes; at Liberia we have one, but he is a sub-agent only; at Whydah we have a coloured gentleman as agent, but he is not a native of the country.

5225. Are those commission agents?—The one at Liberia is.

5226. Are there any native traders carrying on trade on their own account, unconnected with British houses, exporting to England on their own account?—Yes, in many parts there are; there are from Liberia coloured people carrying on a very large trade.

5227. In trading with those various independent chiefs, do you find the commercial treaties which England has entered into with them useful to your trade?—Yes, very essential to it.

5228. In saying that, do you distinguish commercial treaties from treaties for other purposes, such as the suppression of the slave trade?—The commercial treaties and the slave trade treaties have in almost all cases gone together, a treaty being for the suppression of the slave trade and

for freedom of trade, with the most favoured nation clause inserted in it; I think in all recent treaties that is so.

5229. Do the treaties applying to the two objects, the suppression of the slave trade and the opening of legitimate trade, generally involve also any engagement on the part of the British power to protect the chiefs?—No, not any that I am familiar with.

5230. But is the nature of those treaties this, that if those chiefs will stop the slave trade and open trade, some advantage will be offered them in return?—At Bonny they made a treaty to pay the king, on condition of his abolishing slavery and establishing entire freedom of trade, 10,000 dollars a year for five years.

5231. Is there generally a payment to a chief connected with those treaties?—Not generally, I think; in some cases there is; there was one at Old Calabar, with a payment of 2,000 dollars for five years.

5232. *Lord Stanley.*] That was to cover the temporary loss which was incurred by the cessation of the slave trade?—Yes, to cover the loss of revenue arising before the legitimate trade would compensate them for that loss.

5233. *Lord Alfred Churchill.*] Who was to pay the 2,000 dollars?—The English Government stipulated to pay.

5234. *Chairman.*] Having commerce both with Sierra Leone, which is an English settlement, and with those several native governments, which do you think is the best position for a British merchant to trade at, with an English settlement on the West Coast of Africa, or with a native government with only an English consul?—Merely for commercial purposes I should rather lean to a commercial treaty than to a settlement.

5235. You think, for the interest of British trade, it is better that the English should only establish consulates, than that they should actually undertake the government of the country?—Yes, it frees you from many contingencies.

5236. What sort of contingencies do you allude to?—The fear of getting involved in native disputes and interference with the native government.

5237. Do you see any advantage in a government as contrasted with a consulate?—As regards the

the slave trade division of the subject there may be some; as, for instance, the freedom of the slave when once he comes into British territory.

5238. You think that a British Government is better for the slave, because he becomes free on entering British territory?—Yes, that is one advantage.

5239. But does not that involve a disadvantage to the British bringing them into conflict with the natives on the subject of domestic slavery?—I think that that danger exists.

5240. You think that where the British have established governments, the position of the slave is somewhat better?—I think so. I am careful in giving that answer, because I am not familiar with the Lagos trade, and my information is taken rather from reading than from experience; but I think the tendency is that the masters would treat their slaves better, knowing that if there were any complaint freedom would readily be accorded.

5241. But do you think a British merchant would rather have a consul than a government to deal with him?—I think so; but I have not had experience of the trade at Lagos. If it were asked me whether I would at those places where there are not English settlements at this moment rather have commercial treaties, with a consul to visit them from time to time, than an English settlement, I should say I would rather have commercial treaties with a consul; at a settlement the Customs dues must be heavier, and that must drive trade to the nearest free port.

5242. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Are you speaking with reference to the oil rivers?—The oil rivers, or other places.

5243. *Chairman*.] Take Bonny; do you think that King Pepel is more likely to maintain peace there, and to promote commerce, than an English governor placed there?—I should be very sorry to see any English governor placed there.

5244. Is Pepel a strong king?—No.

5245. Why?—He is not powerful in his own dominions; his influence is shared by three or four leading chiefs.

5246. What is the nature of his government; is it aristocratic or despotic?—The king and chiefs exercise despotic power.

5247. Does he maintain sufficient government to keep the peace?—As much as native kings and chiefs do; they are frequently engaged in petty warfare, not of any serious magnitude generally, but small chronic war.

5248. In your commercial transactions with Bonny and Calabar, and other such places, have you ever found your commerce impeded by disturbances?—Yes, from King Pepel.

5249. What was the nature of that disturbance?—King Pepel was recently in this country for some time, and probably he went back with exaggerated notions of his own importance, and thought he had great influence with the English Government; one of the first things he did was, in defiance of a treaty, to attempt to extort trust from the traders, and to exact an increased Custom due beyond what had been stipulated by the Treaty of 1850.

5250. What appeal had you to resort to in that case?—We immediately appealed to the English Government, and instructions were sent out to the commander on the station (Commodore Wilmot) to interfere, and prevent a violation of the treaty.

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5251. To what government did you appeal?—To the English Government.

5252. At home?—At home; there is no other authority.

5253. Then, in fact, that created considerable delay?—It did.

5254. There was no power in the nearest government on the West Coast to give you protection?—None; we apply to the consul to come and visit the river, the consul if necessary applies to the commodore, who enters the river with a man-of-war, and they generally come to some arrangement; that dispute with King Pepel has been very satisfactorily concluded by the prompt and judicious course taken by Commodore Wilmot.

5255. How long have you had commercial transactions with Bonny and Calabar yourself?—For 30 years.

5256. During that time how often have you had to apply to the Home Government for redress, and how often through the consul, and the assistance of the squadron, have you obtained redress; half-a-dozen times or more?—Yes, I dare say more than that; but then in former years we had no treaties to guide an English supercargo and a native chief; now you have treaties, so that the king and chiefs can see where they have done wrong, and the supercargoes can see what they can do with justice; therefore, there is less liability to these disputes.

5257. When did those treaties begin?—The treaty that enters most into detail was one entered into by Consul Beercroft in 1850.

5258. Was he consul at Benin?—In the Bight; he was at Fernando Po. I may mention that the king under that treaty was subject to a fine for its violation, and that fine was paid. The commodore gave him two months to pay it, and it was paid. This is a letter dated the 3d April 1865; it is from the Chairman of the Court of Equity at Bonny. (The supercargoes there and at Old Calabar have a Court of Equity to settle disputes amicably.) He writes as follows: "Commodore Wilmot acted with promptitude and decision, dispatching the 'Pandora' to Bonny as soon as possible after receiving our letter by the February mail, in which we urged him to visit us himself, and his selection of Commander W. F. Buxton, of whose conduct in the management of the difficult duty intrusted to him we cannot speak in sufficiently high terms, was most judicious. As an officer is not permitted by the rules of the service to receive thanks directly from those he has assisted, we enclose a letter of thanks to him, which we request you to forward to the Secretary of the Admiralty for transmission." By the interference of Commander Ruxton, acting under Commodore Wilmot, that dispute has been amicably settled.

5259. Since those treaties were made, has it been ever necessary to apply to the Home Government for redress, or has the consul been able to obtain the assistance of the squadron and get redress for you?—The course taken by the traders there is generally to send home to the African Association in England a copy of the proceedings in the Court of Equity. They do not wait until they get a reply, but at the same time they apply to the consul, who, if necessary, calls in the commodore from the station.

5260. Without waiting for instructions from England?—Yes; but the African Association

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write to Earl Russell in order that he may, if he think proper, write out his own instructions to support the views of the traders there.

5261. During any of those disputes, and during the time of getting the fine paid, has commerce been impeded?—Yes, it has been stopped for the time; but generally, I may say, that has been done not by the mere arbitrary will of the commander, but in all cases that I can call to mind it has been done with the consent and after consultation with the traders on the river.

5262. Is all that country in the hands of a great number of petty chiefs?—Yes.

5263. Without any controlling native power?—There is no general controlling power.

5264. Do you believe that it is the tendency of any stronger power to overrun the weaker ones there, and to obtain the predominance?—I do not think there is in the oil rivers. They are very often engaged in wars; but the King of Bonny does not take possession of New Calabar, nor does he attempt it.

5265. Do you not know of any more vigorous powers in the interior who are gradually pressing on down to the coast?—The tendency in the interior is to come down and get access to the coast. That was the case at Lagos. The Bonny men and Brass men were not originally inhabitants of the sea coast.

5266. Lord Stanley.] It is the tendency of a powerful interior tribe to make its way down to the coast?—Yes, that is the tendency.

5267. Chairman.] Do you anticipate the native power in that way becoming stronger by the stronger tribes obtaining possession of all the government?—I think that they would split up again if that were the case; but that is a mere vague impression of mine.

5268. Do you find practically that a great many of those little chiefs, in their internal quarrels, render commerce precarious?—Those petty wars interfere, to some extent, with commerce, but they are petty wars.

5269. How far does the presence of the British Consul tend to put an end to those internal quarrels?—He has no power; he can only act by the intervention of his good offices in trying to get the angry persons to agree to some settlement of the dispute.

5270. Do you think that his presence tends to peace or disturbance among those little tribes?—I think that it tends to prevent disturbance. I think it would be desirable that the consuls should visit the rivers and places of trade on the coast much more frequently than they do.

5271. Which, in your opinion, tends most to peace among a number of little tribes, a resident British Consul, or the assumption of a Government by a British Governor?—I think that the English being settled there might keep them more in subjection and awe; but then there are the contingencies connected with that, that you get involved in their disputes.

5272. Do you trade with the mouth of the Congo?—Yes.

5273. Is there any Government establishment of any sort there?—No.

5274. Has it been proposed, or do you feel any wish that there should be anything in the nature of an English fort at the mouth of the Congo?—No; I think that the Congo should be strictly watched, but not by means of forts. I would have a hulk at the mouth of the river, which would thus be watched, and the squadron

could coal without leaving their cruising-ground, which would make it more efficient, and there would also be a great saving of expense.

5275. At this moment the mouth of the Congo is disputed territory, is it not?—The Portuguese have for a long time claimed all that part of the coast, from 5° 12' south to 8° south, but it has never been acknowledged by the English Government; on the contrary, they determined to resist it.

5276. So that there is neither a European nor a native government practically at the mouth of the Congo?—No, I do not think that there is any native government now.

5277. Is there slave trade going on there now?—Yes.

5278. Both at the Congo and Loanda?—I should not like to say that there is at Loanda.

5279. Is the Congo the only place where you know of a slave export, on the West Coast of Africa, going on now?—Yes, the Congo is the only place that I know of now. I believe that attempts have been made a little to the north of the Congo to export slaves.

5280. What means do we take to stop the slave export there?—We have the squadron.

5281. Is it part of the cruising-ground of the squadron?—Yes, but it might be made much more efficient.

5282. But you do not think that either in the interest of the suppression of the slave trade, or the protection of commerce, it would be advisable for the English to put any Government establishment or fort at the mouth of the Congo?—No.

5283. Do you think that the squadron is as efficient as it can be, both in suppressing the slave trade, and in the protection of commerce in all those parts of the West Coast with which you are connected?—No, I think not.

5284. In what respect is it inefficient?—All the rest of the coast there is perfectly open to the sea, so that a slaver can be readily seen, but the Congo is a place where they can be soon out of sight by running in; I have never seen any reason why the Congo should not be thoroughly watched and blockaded; it would be a very small expense.

5285. Do you think that the squadron is useful in blockading in-shore?—Yes, but it might be made more useful; the vessels are not fast enough.

5286. But if the object is blockading the coast, we understand from naval witnesses that they do not want such fast ships as would be wanted for capture?—But it is evident that you require a complete cordon, because if the slaver is a fast steamer of 14 or 16 knots an hour, she has nothing to do but to get a start of two miles, and she is perfectly safe; every five minutes takes her so much further out of danger, whereas if the squadron once sighted her, they must take her if they were faster ships.

5287. But must not the naval officers become aware of anything like a depot of slaves being got ready for export?—They do escape, as a matter of fact; whether they are aware of it, or whether they are deceived, or whether it is from the facility of moving from the barracoons to the place of shipment, the fact is undoubted that they do escape.

5288. Are there not certain localities in which these barracoons are usually established?—Yes; but there is no great difficulty in moving the slaves five or ten miles off.

5289. Can you say, from your own knowledge, whether that is the mode in which the slave export goes on, by perpetually shifting the depôts, so as to avoid the ships of war?—I cannot say from my own knowledge, but there are barracons in the Congo, and they ship the slaves without moving the barracons themselves.

5290. Are the Committee to understand that the barracons are usually up the river?—There are no rivers, except the Congo, for a very considerable space on that part of the coast.

5291. But if they are made on the coast, can those shipments be made without the naval officers becoming aware of them?—I doubt if there is any barracon on that part of the coast immediately on the sea: I think they are at Congo.

5292. At all events, you think that the squadron is composed of ships not fast enough for capturing slavers at sea?—Certainly.

5293. With respect to the capturing system, for your knowledge has it ever occurred, or often occurred, that ships have been taken which turned out not to be slavers, or that ships have been destroyed which might have been taken for adjudication?—While I readily acknowledge the great services of the squadron, I think the instructions to the commanding officers must be lax, or that occasionally they show a very great want of discretion, and a very great injury has been received by legitimate commerce in consequence of the arbitrary acts of some of the men-of-war officers; I have suffered myself from highly improper conduct, which the Government could not justify.

5294. Will you state to the Committee the nature of that arbitrary conduct?—I will state the one which I brought under the notice of the Government, which was the case of the "Lanuch," English packet, which belonged to my firm; she was a native boat, which we had for the purpose of communicating between all our different establishments. The person in charge of the boat had an English flag, to show that she belonged to an English merchant, and the captain of one of the English ships of war seized her, and the ground he alleged was, that she was flying the English flag without having an English register. The Customs law of England prevents a vessel being registered except by coming into an English port, on a British settlement, so that it was impossible to have such register. The commander kept the person in charge as prisoner, but released both him and the vessel next day, saying at the same time, that if he found him flying the English flag again, he would seize the vessel again. We said that if we had been guilty of an illegal act, he ought not to have released the vessel, and if otherwise, he ought not to threaten to seize her again; but the Government here appealed to the law officers of the Crown, and they at once decided that there was no violation of law at all in flying the English flag without the vessel being registered; she was taken by the "Vesuvius," in August 1859.

5295. Do you believe that vessels are sometimes destroyed unnecessarily, without adjudication?—Yes. With regard to that English packet, Commander Edmonstone, who was on the station, wrote to say that he had changed his views, and would not again capture under those circumstances. But the interference with our trade had already done the mischief. The most glaring case that I know of was that of a vessel of ours, that we had had trading for, I

think, three years, up and down the coast, and which was perfectly well known, and had often carried despatches and things for men-of-war on the station; we had sent her up to Cabenda to be repaired (Cabenda being the only good harbour), to have a new deck put in, and had sent native plank for the purpose. The vessel was dismantled, and the sails and rigging put on shore for safety; and while in this state the "Espoir," Captain Douglas commander, came in, and went on board, took the vessel out of Cabenda, and set fire to her, burning the vessel-planks and palm oil which were on board. He never took the case into any court at all for adjudication: we represented it to the English Government; we thought at first there must be some ground for such a monstrous act, and were anxious to get a copy of his despatch, but when we received it, we found he gave just the same account of the transaction as our agent had given, and as I have given the Committee.

5296. Lord Alfred Churchill.] Did you get compensation for the loss of that ship?—We did not. Under the advice of Sir Hugh Cairns and others, we took proceedings against the Queen; however, it was decided in the Court of Common Pleas that our remedy was against the captain rather than against the Crown, and after a good deal of communication with the Government, they agreed to refer it to arbitration with regard to the amount of damage; the facts were not denied.

5297. Supposing the slave trade to cease, which we have had some evidence to make us hope may not be a very distant event, what would be the necessity for a squadron, or any British Government being established for the protection of commerce alone?—You would only require a very small force indeed to visit the different parts of the coast, but nothing like the present squadron.

5298. What would their business be further than on the complaint of a consul to settle occasional disputes between traders?—That would be the point. Their very presence would be a good thing; the consul should have a small steamer placed at his disposal to visit the rivers, and the leading places of trade periodically; perhaps, every three or four months; his presence there, and the knowledge that he would be coming in a short time would tend to prevent disputes.

5299. Is there anything of the nature of piracy along that coast which would require a larger squadron than you describe as necessary for the settlement of disputes only?—I think not. In the River Congo, on the south side, the tribes are very dangerous, and there is great danger in going up the Congo; if a vessel touches on any of the small banks in the river, the Musselings tribes come out with their canoes and board and plunder her at once.

5300. Can you give the Committee any information with regard to the opening of trade on the Niger?—I am familiar with it from reading only; there is, I believe, no trade at the present time on the Niger.

5301. Do you think that there is now prospect of that trade being opened?—I entertain a very strong opinion that there are the elements of a very great trade there to arise eventually; but the manner in which it must be conducted would involve so large an outlay for several years, and that outlay would be so much greater than the first profits of the trade, that I do not think,

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without some assistance from the Government, parties would enter into it.

5302. Do you think that assistance from the Government should be in the nature of a pecuniary subsidy only, or also in the nature of a protecting force of any kind?—Not a protecting force; I do not like to see commerce and men-of-war going together.

5303. You think that the peace which is necessary for opening the trade might be better secured by private enterprise than by any Government interference?—I do.

5304. You think that Government interference would, rather than otherwise, impede the opening of that trade?—Yes; I would sooner trust to good conduct, and the necessity for patience and good humour on the part of the traders, than to any demonstration of force.

5305. Presuming that neither a fort nor a Government establishment were necessary at the mouth of the Niger, or up the Niger, would it require any additional consulate there to open the trade?—I think not.

5306. Did you not yourself once make an offer to the Government with regard to opening the trade of the Niger?—Yes.

5307. What was that offer?—I have always looked on it as a matter of national importance that the Niger should be thoroughly opened up to British enterprise, and its resources developed; I was asked two years ago if I would undertake to manage that trade. I said that I thought it was attended with very great difficulty and certain loss in the earlier stages of the enterprise, and that I most undoubtedly would not enter into it without some assistance from the Government in the nature of the assistance rendered to the late Mr. McGregor Laird; I proposed to carry out Mr. Laird's plan, but embarking a much larger capital, and going into it more boldly than was within the scope of a private individual.

5308. In fact, you thought that the opening of the trade on the Niger must be by steamers more costly than a private individual could undertake?—Yes, and for this reason; a sailing vessel can be navigated at a comparatively small expense, but it is absolutely necessary that the trade in the Niger should be developed by means of steamers; the original outlay is thus greater; but more important still, there is the great risk of anything breaking down in the machinery, and the enterprise collapsing in consequence. You have also the risk that during a great portion of the year you could not communicate with the vessels as you can on the sea coast; you must have a peculiar class of steamers carrying little cargo, and of a very light draught of water, to keep up that communication; it would necessarily take some years before a trade could be developed that would give you any return for your outlay, and when you had developed that trade, and it began to be remunerative, other people who had been quietly watching your efforts and letting you run the risk, would step in and reap the fruits of your exertions.

5309. It was the first cost of opening the trade which you thought required Government assistance?—I feel satisfied that it cannot be properly carried out without.

5310. Was the nature of your offer to the Government that, supposing with their first assistance the trade was fully established, their assistance might be repaid; that their first subsidy should be in the nature of a loan afterwards

recovered?—Not quite a loan, because then it would be merely a temporary advance of money; it was to be repaid after 6 per cent. had been received by the parties engaged in the enterprise. This was the proposition: "Considering, therefore, that there are national and philanthropic, as well as commercial objects in view, and that in addition to unavoidable risks, no profit on the large capital embarked can be expected for some time, we have applied to Her Majesty's Government for a subsidy, the same as was granted to Mr. McGregor Laird; viz., for the first year, 8,000*l.*; for the second year, 7,500*l.*; for the third year, 7,000*l.*; for the fourth year, 6,500*l.*; for the fifth year, 6,000*l.*; and the company has offered that separate accounts shall be kept of trading operations in the river, and should those accounts, when the trade has been fairly established, show a profit beyond 6 per cent. on the capital embarked, they are willing, if it would be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, to agree to return one-half the excess over 6 per cent. until the payments under the subsidy shall have been reimbursed."

5311. Lord Stanley.] Those are the terms on which Indian railways are guaranteed, except that you substitute 6 per cent. for 5 per cent.?—To a certain extent that is so; not quite; but it is much on the same principle. I may mention that supposing the Government preferred a smaller sum without any return, we would carry out Mr. Laird's enterprise with a payment of 5,000*l.* a-year instead of the scale that was paid to him, and we also stated that we were not desirous ourselves of carrying it out, but that we were quite willing, and would just as soon that other parties should take it up and receive that subsidy; our object was to see what we consider a great national enterprise fairly tested and carried out; we said that if other merchants would only take the subject up we would warmly support them.

5312. Chairman.] Are the tribes around the Niger generally friendly to us?—After you pass the Delta I think they are friendly; the risk would be in passing the Delta.

5313. Are there tribes there which would be probably hostile?—That hostility might be neutralised by setting up trading establishments with them; it is a natural feeling of jealousy if they see vessels passing by to conduct a trade with people further up the river, and, as it were, cutting off their supplies; but if you established trading places you would not have much to fear from that cause. Mr. McGregor Laird's experience proves this.

5314. You think that trade might be peacefully set up without any protective establishment in connection with those tribes; not independently of them, but in connection with those tribes?—Yes, with those tribes and with different parties up the river some hundreds of miles up the river.

5315. Has your trade in all the places which you have mentioned been gradually progressing?—The trade with Africa has increased very rapidly indeed.

5316. You have for 30 years conducted trade with the West Coast of Africa, partly with British settlements and partly with parts of the coast unconnected with British settlements; can you give the Committee any comparative statement of the progress of your trade in those two quarters?—No, because it is only very recently that

that I have formed any establishment at Sierra Leone.

5317. For how many years?—About 12 months only, I think.

5318. Will you tell the Committee generally the rate of progress of your trade with Whydah, Calabar, Bonny, and the other places which you have mentioned unconnected with a British settlement?—Palm oil is the only article exported, and from those rivers the import into this country in 1830 was 10,000 tons; in 1840 it was 15,000 tons; in 1850 was 21,000 tons; and in 1860 it was 40,000 tons.

5319. Lord Stanley.] Let me ask you if that trade is considered likely to be endangered by the great recent importation of petroleum?—I do not think it is likely to be endangered. I think that a great increase would take place in the trade with Africa in other products; quite new things.

5320. Chairman.] It seems from that statement that there is a steady invariable progress?—Yes.

5321. Never checked by war to any amount?—Not if you take it in cycles of years. One year's importation may be less than the year before; but in periods of time it is as you say.

5322. Do you look confidently forward to a considerable increase in future?—An immense increase.

5323. Have you the same confidence that there will be a thriving trade at Sierra Leone?—The trade with Sierra Leone proper is small. The great bulk of the trade that may be called Sierra Leone trade is in the rivers north of it, for ground-nuts; or at Sherboro' for palm oil and palm kernels.

5324. Do you expect to be able yourself to develop much trade there?—Yes, but not at Sierra Leone proper.

5325. Where do you expect to develop the trade?—At Sherboro', and the rivers north.

5326. Why should not the river at Sierra Leone be a great exporting place?—I do not think there is the same communication by water for bringing the produce from the interior that they have in the north.

5327. But why should Sherboro' have a better prospect of trade than a place with great internal facilities, like Sierra Leone?—Sherboro' is part of the Colony of Sierra Leone; but I am speaking of the trade actually done at Sierra Leone itself.

5328. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] The Sherboro' district includes the mouths of several important rivers, does it not?—I meant, in saying that, that I thought there would be greater facilities for bringing the produce of the interior to that spot than to Sierra Leone itself.

5329. You were asked some questions by the Right Honourable Chairman, with regard to the difficulty which you found in dealing with a number of petty chiefs, and you were asked whether you thought that you would find it easier to deal with one powerful native sovereign. Can you give the Committee an opinion on that point?—I do not see that I could give a strong opinion further than this: take the case of the King of Dahomey, who at Whydah is a powerful king; no other trader can trade with you until the king has made his selection of the cargo. Now in other parts of the coast, I know the chiefs would not stand that; at Bonny for instance; indeed the king does not trade there.

5330. The only way, of course, is to take a particular instance; should you say that you

found it particularly favourable for the British merchant to deal with a powerful native Sovereign like Dahomey?—I should prefer not being so entirely in the hands of one individual. In Bonny, the king would suffer from the chiefs in case he exercised much arbitrary power.

5331. In short, you think you can get on better with those comparatively weak chiefs than you could with a powerful native despot; here is an instance of one who is considered a powerful king?—My experience has been very short at Whydah, but we were induced to embark in trade there, because the king expressed to the English Government his desire for legitimate trade; he undertook to give us his factory, which had been previously used for the slave trade, and we determined to try the experiment, and we are now trying it; our experience has not been long enough to warrant me in saying whether that will be successful or not.

5332. That is the only case in which our traders have had to do with a powerful native king?—The only one we have had; there are others more or less controlled by the co-operation and influence of the chiefs of the towns.

5333. Do you know anything about the Gold Coast?—We have a number of native correspondents there who send produce to us, and it is a trade which we endeavour to cultivate, because we think it would produce great advantage to the natives themselves.

5334. Would you think it a great advantage if the King of Ashantee was to be allowed to come down to the coast?—I would very much rather see the natives as they are at present becoming traders and merchants themselves. My own impression is, that if you have a white man trading, the natives being accustomed to look up to him as a superior person, are not so much inclined to make efforts to raise themselves as if they see a man of their own colour becoming a trader and merchant; it stimulates them when they see that there is no barrier, and that they can become traders also. A native is encouraged by seeing his own acquaintance getting on in the world, and they are very good men of business.

5335. Sir John Hay.] Pure negroes do you mean?—Yes, we have many traders who are as perfect men of business as any of our white correspondents.

5336. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] You think that those native traders enjoy greater liberty under the small chiefs of Africa than they would under such a king as the King of Dahomey or Ashantee?—Yes, I think they do; of course it would depend on the character of the monarch; it would depend upon whether his sway were gentle or otherwise.

5337. They and you would be dependent on his caprice?—Yes, we should be in his power entirely.

5338. Lord Stanley.] With regard to the subsidy proposed for the trade of the Niger, can you give the Committee any reason why it should be granted in that case, rather than in any other case where a trade has to be opened which is unproductive for the first two or three years?—The English Government and private persons, for very many years, have spent very large sums of money in attempting to develop the Niger. If it were a purely mercantile speculation, I could draw no distinction between the opening of that river and any other river.

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There are other reasons which have influenced the Government in the course which they have taken during a long series of years, when they have themselves sent out expeditions, and when they granted Mr. McGregor Laird his subsidy, the desire was to promote civilization, and, as far as possible, to destroy the slave trade. It is not looked upon, I conceive, as a mere mercantile speculation. I do not myself look upon it as a mere mercantile speculation, because so far from being desirous to embark in it with regard to any pecuniary benefit, I should prefer other parties doing it, only I should like to see it done.

5339. Admitting that the establishment of a regular trade upon the Niger would be an advantage to the people of those parts, can you give any reason why that should be subsidised by the British Government rather than any similar enterprise, or the Indus, or the Nile, or the Amazon, or any other great river which runs through a country the resources of which are comparatively undeveloped?—Not as a mere commercial enterprise; I should look at it in the same light as the Government maintaining a squadron on the coast in order to do away with the slave trade. As a mere commercial enterprise, I can see no difference between one river and another. But the Indus steam-flotilla is subsidized. There is a Government guarantee of 5 per cent. on the outlay; and the steam enterprise on the Euphrates, between Basorah and Bagdad (in Turkish territory), is also subsidized by the Indian Government.

5340. Putting it as a question of moral duty then (since you prefer that view), can you say that we are under any obligation, at the cost of the British Government, to develop the resources of the Niger country, which obligation does not lie upon us with regard to any other country which is wholly uncivilised?—Yes; the obligations of treaties made by the British Government with the kings and chiefs up the river, for the establishment of regular trade and commerce with them; independently of which I should regret very sincerely that all past exertions and outlay of life and treasure should not be utilised; and I do not think it could be utilised except in the manner proposed.

5341. Sir Francis Baring.] Can you give the Committee any information with regard to those who have been educated in the missionary schools?—Merely from general impressions.

5342. You have spoken of your native correspondents, have they been to the missionary schools?—They went to school, I believe, most of them; many of them write beautifully.

5343. There at least you have not found that they were all rogues?—No, I should be sorry to think so.

5344. The Sierra Leone boys you have not fallen in with, I suppose?—I have not formed, from all that I have heard of them, so favourable an opinion of many of the Sierra Leone men as I have of many of those on the Gold Coast, many of whom seem very straightforward and good men.

5345. Do you mean Sierra Leone men?—I am speaking rather of the Gold Coast. Many of the natives of Africa with whom I come in contact are really good and Christian men; but the general impression with regard to most of the Sierra Leone men is not very favourable.

5346. Do you mean the boys educated in the

mission schools?—No, I should not draw that distinction; I am not competent to do so, because I do not know those who have been educated in the missionary schools and those that have not. I am speaking rather of the freed coloured men in Sierra Leone. I think the missionary establishments are doing good.

5347. Mr. Cheetham.] Those are men with regard to whom you do not know whether they have gone to those schools or not?—No; but I know that many of those men on the Gold Coast have gone to school.

5348. But with regard to Sierra Leone you do not know?—I do not know.

5349. Sir Francis Baring.] Have you formed any opinion with regard to how far the natives would be able to carry on a government entirely of their own?—They do carry on the government by themselves in most places.

5350. Is that a decent government; of course at first it could not be expected to be a very regular government?—Take Bonny and Calabar, that has been what you may call a fixed government for a great many years.

5351. Is that a tolerably satisfactory government to the natives?—I think so; I believe that it is becoming better and better every year. I think that many of their worst customs are being abolished; the treaties, and the presence of the white men, have done a great deal of good.

5352. Have you any impression that there is some limit to their intellect, which should prevent their carrying on a good government?—No, I think not; I think that it is not likely, with persons who have been living in a degraded state for centuries, there can be any great and sudden change; it must take a long time.

5353. Looking at the future civilisation of Africa, if you may look so far, do you believe that the most promising mode of doing that is through the natives or through European settlements?—I have not paid much attention to that subject; but I think that the natives themselves must, under any circumstances, be the chief agents; they may be, in the first instance, set in motion through an English settlement, but I cannot say anything on that point with confidence.

5354. Mr. Buxton.] Do you find that the natives are good hands at trading?—Yes.

5355. Thoroughly good traders?—Yes, thoroughly good traders.

5356. And totally honest?—Yes, I think fairly so; they must be fairly met. Formerly it was the system of the white men to fancy that anything was good enough for a black man, and they attempted to impose upon them.

5357. Is it the result of your 30 years' experience that in commercial transactions the negro comes out as an inferior being to the ordinary white man?—No; I think they are as keen in trade, and that they understand it as well as we do; they are as well able to distinguish between genuine articles and fictitious as any person in this country.

5358. Do you think that gradually society is becoming more organised among them, and that they are rising to a higher pitch of civilization?—I think they are improving; I think that many of their worst customs, where they have been brought into contact with Europeans, have been abolished; some treaties which were entered into with Consul Hutchinson, at Old Calabar, undertook to abolish many of the most horrible practices.

5359. With regard to the subsidy that has been referred to, the sole plea for demanding it was that it would be an instalment in the suppression of the slave trade, and that if we developed trade on the Niger, it would tend to promote peace, and to turn the attention of the natives to commerce, and assist our efforts to put down the slave trade; was not that so?—The proposition was not merely to make a commercial enterprise, but to carry the mails, native traders, missionaries, explorers, Government agents and others, and generally to aid in establishing civilization, and thereby contribute to the suppression of the slave trade.

5360. Mr. *Cheetham*.] With regard to this trade on the Niger; do you propose to enter into direct communication with the natives?—Yes.

5361. Would you make it a trade of barter, or would you receive their produce for disposal in this country?—It would certainly be a trade of barter; we have been always desirous of stimulating the natives to be merchants on their own account; take the Gold Coast, for instance. But I do not think that much could be done up the Niger in that way at first; they would require to have some considerable capital to start with, because if they send their produce to this country they must wait for their returns.

5362. A subsidy was granted to Mr. Laird?—Yes.

5363. His expedition was not satisfactory, was it?—It was not satisfactory, for several reasons. Mr. McGregor Laird's whole heart was in the work, but it required an amount of capital which he was not possessed of, nor if he had possessed it would he have been justified in putting it into a risky enterprise, from which others, who had taken no share in the risk, would receive the benefit afterwards; but Mr. Laird might possibly have overcome all difficulties, if he had lived.

5364. Do you know Mr. Foster, a merchant on the West Coast of Africa?—I am not acquainted with him; I know the firm of Foster & Smith.

5365. He has been 30 years engaged in that trade without Government assistance. Why should not your company be able to accomplish the same object in extending trade up the Niger, without the assistance of the Government?—I have myself in like manner been engaged in trade with Africa for 30 years without Government assistance. The subsidy for the Niger rests on totally different grounds, as before explained.

5366. Why should the Niger Expedition be more expensive than others?—In the oil rivers on the sea coast, you can send sailing vessels of large size, and you get your returns at once; in the Niger, you cannot get up except at certain times, in consequence of the rise and fall of the water,

without a peculiar class of steamers; and you must develop a trade which does not exist now, and that by the most expensive machinery, namely, by steam navigation.

5367. Do you trade with any parts which are not under British governments?—Yes.

5368. We have four settlements under the British Government now; what is your idea, as a British merchant, with regard to the Government withdrawing from part or from the whole of the coast; in that event how would your commerce continue to be carried on?—I should be very sorry to see the establishment at Lagos, for instance, abandoned. I think that a class of free men are rising up there, whose influence will eventually be felt throughout other parts of the coast. My answer bears not simply on commercial interests, but on higher matters.

5369. But, commercially, do you think that trade would cease, supposing the British Government withdrew from the coast?—No; I do not think that that trade would cease in the event of your withdrawing. I think that it would cause, in the first instance, violent changes, which might be productive of injury, but I think it would eventually settle down, and that there would be trade.

5370. Lord *Alfred Churchhill*.] I believe that your firm, as far as possible, endeavours to encourage the native merchants to ship produce direct to England?—We do.

5371. Is that a new feature in the trade, or has it been adopted for some time?—I think it is a new feature in the way in which we conduct it. Some of the natives think, but I cannot tell whether they have any grounds for it, that they have been in the hands of Europeans, who have charged them excessive prices, and if they have sent produce to this country they have not obtained a fair return; our own principle has been to tell them exactly what moderate commission we charge, and whatever we pay they are charged with it exactly.

5372. Do you think that they are gradually falling in with that method of trade?—They are most anxious to do so. The only barrier to its greater development is the want of capital. They all want you to trust them with so many hundreds, or so many thousands of pounds. We say, "If we do so we must have a very large profit to compensate for the risk. You had better work a small trade, and get prompt returns." The moment the produce comes to hand we make them a remittance, so that they turn it over as often as possible in the course of the year.

5373. *Chairman*.] Is there any other observation which you would like to address to the Committee?—No, I think not.

Captain JAMES CROFT, called in; and Examined.

5374. *Chairman*.] ARE you Captain of a ship?—Captain and supercargo.

5375. You can give the Committee some evidence with regard to trade with certain parts of the West Coast of Africa, can you not?—Yes. I have traded between Cape Palmas and the River Bonny for the last 17 years.

5376. Have you been exporting from that part of the coast to England?—Yes.

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5377. As a merchant?—As a trader; as an agent.

5378. For what house?—For Messrs. King, of Bristol.

5379. Are you still engaged in that trade?—I have not been for the last two years. I am going up the Niger, but that expedition is at an end.

5380. What has been the nature of your trade; both

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both exports and imports?—We have taken out cotton goods, rum, tobacco, and so on; in fact, a general assortment of goods.

5381. And you bring back, what?—We bring back palm oil, ivory, and gold dust.

5382. Has the trade been increasing much during those 17 years that you have been engaged in it?—Considerably.

5383. Steadily increasing?—Yes, steadily increasing every year, unless it is on the Gold Coast; I do not think that that trade has increased.

5384. How do you account for its not increasing so much on the Gold Coast as on other parts of the coast between Palmas and Bonny?—I suppose there is a scarcity of gold.

5385. Is gold dust the only export that you bring from the Gold Coast?—There is a little palm oil in some of the places; no great quantity.

5386. Is the supply of gold dust diminishing?—I should say it was.

5387. Is that from the imperfection of the trade, or from actual diminution of the supply?—The diminution of the supply.

5388. What should you say is the best part of the coast for trade between Palmas and Bonny; from which do you export most?—From the Bights of Benin; that is to say, from Cape St. Paul's down to Lagos.

5389. What is the point of export there between Lagos and Cape St. Paul's; is there any other besides Whydah?—Yes, almost every 10 miles all the way down.

5390. What is your principal port of export; Whydah, or Popo, or where?—Whydah, Badagry, and Lagos.

5391. What other places of export are there between Quittah and Badagry, besides Whydah and Popo?—There are ports almost every 10 miles.

5392. What is the nature of your exports from that part of the coast?—Palm oil.

5393. Is your trade as thriving on the parts of the coast where the English have no settlement as where they have a settlement?—I always find it better.

5394. How do you account for that?—The Government are generally in some difficulty with the natives, thereby causing a stoppage of trade.

5395. Have you found any difficulties with the natives during the 17 years of your experience, in the Bight of Benin, for instance?—The only time that I was ever troubled was at Whydah.

5396. In that case to whom did you resort for redress?—It was in consequence of my lending my boats to one of Her Majesty's ships to land the crew out of a slaver.

5397. Then did they create a disturbance?—Yes, they were annoyed at my having done so.

5398. Did they refuse for a time to trade with you?—They did not stop the trade; they merely seized me when I was about to leave the place, and made me pay a fine.

5399. Who did that; was it the officers of Dahomey?—Yes, the officers of Dahomey; the governor, I suppose you would call him, of Whydah.

5400. You thought it better to pay the fine, and go on with the trade, did you?—I wished to leave the place, and they kept me there until I did.

5401. You paid the fine?—I paid the fine.

5402. And you went on with your trade?—I have been there since, and never was troubled.

5403. Have you ever had to apply to the consul at Benin for redress against any injustice?—No; I have never been in the Benin River.

5404. In what way then, do you find that disputes between the British Government and the natives render your trade with a British settlement less thriving than your trade on other parts of the coast?—I think it is generally brought on through the slave questions and poll-tax.

5405. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] What place are you referring to particularly?—I am speaking of the British settlements on the Gold Coast, Cape Coast, and Accra.

5406. *Chairman*.] Can you give the Committee any instance in which trade has been interrupted in that way?—There was the Crobo war at Accra, which put a stop to the trade for a long time; in fact, the trade has been diverted now to other parts of the coast, and out of the jurisdiction of the British Government.

5407. Have there been any similar interruptions at Lagos?—There has been a war going on there for the last three or four years, and trade has been very bad in consequence—it is very bad; in fact, ever since we took possession of Lagos the trade has been almost entirely stopped.

5408. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Are you aware that the war had begun for some time before we took possession of Lagos?—Yes; there were petty squabbles among themselves, and in consequence of the ex-king Kosoko threatening to attack the place.

5409. But are you aware that there was the same war between the Egbas and the Hadans?—No, I was not aware of that.

5410. *Chairman*.] Can you state to the Committee the period at which those disturbances began to impede the trade at Lagos?—No.

5411. Can you at all compare the time from 1850 to 1860, when the English only had a consul there, with the time since 1860, when they have had a governor there: were there as many disturbances and impediments to trade under the consulate before 1860, as there have been since 1860 under the Government?—Previous to it becoming a colony, and only a protectorate, they were kept continually in dread for fear of being attacked by "Kosoko," but trade was most decidedly brisker.

5412. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Do you connect the two facts together?—I remember the consul there distinctly.

5413. Do you mean to imply that the English Government have produced those wars?—No, I do not say that; but the Government have interfered, and I think that that has been the means of encouraging the natives to carry on their wars much longer than they otherwise would have done.

5414. *Chairman*.] Do you think that the English Government have raised the duties on imports, and that those duties have impeded trade?—I do not think that the duties have any effect on trade.

5415. Are the duties generally higher where there are British settlements, than in parts of the coast where there are none?—Yes; in some places there are none at all, where we trade with the natives themselves.

5416. Whereabouts are there none at all; what duties do you pay at Whydah, for instance?—There we pay duties, and it depends upon the number of masts that a ship has, and amount of the imports by an agreement with the Afahgar.

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5417. Can you compare the rate of duties that you have to pay at Whydah with those you have to pay on the Gold Coast or Lagos?—What you have to pay at Whydah is very trifling.

5418. Are the duties at Whydah much lower than those exacted in the British settlements?—Yes, very much lower.

5419. Have you any dealings with Elmina?—Yes.

5420. Is there a difference between the Dutch duties and the English duties?—There are none in the Dutch territory; only an anchorage duty of 12 dollars for a voyage, and you may visit each settlement as often as you please.

5421. Are the duties high at the English towns?—Very trifling, except at Lagos.

5422. Which are the highest, those at the Gold Coast or those at Lagos?—Lagos, considerably.

5423. Have you any dealings with the French settlement in the River Assinee?—I have traded there many years.

5424. Are the duties high at Assinee?—There are none at all.

5425. Have you much dealings with the Ivory Coast between Assinee and Cape Palmas?—At Cape Labou I have traded, on the Ivory Coast, and most of the places of trade.

5426. Importing Manchester goods?—Yes.

5427. How far do you think that your trade is protected by the forts of the Gold Coast, and by the settlement at Lagos?—With regard to myself I always prefer trading where there is no British settlement on the river.

5428. Supposing that the English withdrew altogether from the Gold Coast, should you think that your trade with the Gold Coast would go on as well?—Just as well, but we should require some protection from the "cruisers."

5429. Should you not be afraid of disturbances in the interior, and possibly an invasion of the Ashantes upon the Fantees, breaking up your trade?—It might for a time, though I think that trade would be better afterwards.

5430. Why do you think that trade would be better afterwards than it is now?—They have been quarrelling for many years, and very likely if they came to a war they might settle it, and so make an end of it.

5431. Can you state to the Committee that it is the opinion of Messrs. King, of Bristol, that the trade on the Gold Coast would not be endangered by the withdrawal of the British Government?—I am not connected with them at the present time.

5432. But you were connected with them for 13 years?—Yes.

5433. Is it your own opinion simply that you state, or do you believe that it was the opinion of Messrs. King that they depended on the protection of the British forts to carry on their trade on the Gold Coast?—It is simply my own opinion. I never depended upon the law as administered at the British forts, and I think a cruiser would be quite sufficient to protect trade.

5434. You think that there would be some protection necessary, such as the presence of a cruiser?—Yes.

5435. You do not think that you could do without any protection at all?—No, I do not think it would do to leave the coast entirely without protection.

5436. Do you think, if the British left the

Gold Coast altogether, that the localities of trade would change?—No, I think they would remain the same.

5437. Do you think that the points of export from the Gold Coast have been fixed by the position of the forts, or are you of opinion that they are the best ports of export for trade?—They are certainly the best.

5438. You do not think that the forts having been placed there for the suppression of the slave trade has led to inferior places for trade being adopted?—No, certainly not on the Gold Coast; I think the duties at Lagos have driven the trade away from there, in a measure, to places adjacent where there are no duties, Godoury and Cullino.

5439. Now Cape St. Paul's is at the mouth of the Volta; is there much trade there?—A good deal.

5440. Yet there is no English fort there?—There was an English fort there, but there is not now.

5441. And trade goes on increasing just as well without?—Yes, it goes on rapidly increasing without.

5442. [Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] Cape St. Paul is within a few miles of an English fort, is it not?—It is within 20 miles of Pram-pram.

5443. It is a portion of the British protectorate?—It is a portion of the British protectorate.

5444. [Chairman.] Can you give the Committee any statement of the increase in your trade during those 17 years?—What I have actually imported has fluctuated considerably.

5445. Taking the trade at the end of the 17 years as compared with the beginning of the 17 years, was it much greater?—Trade in palm oil steadily increasing, but quite altered, owing to a great many of the natives dealing direct with England.

5446. In what way has it quite altered?—It has very much increased; the trade is carried on in a different manner altogether.

5447. In what way is it carried on in a different manner?—Settlements are springing up, and more European traders.

5448. How has that altered the mode of trade?—Instead of trading with the natives, we have often to trade with Portuguese settlers in oil, now the slave trade is nearly done for.

5449. Where?—At Whydah and Badagry.

5450. Why do you say the Portuguese particularly at Whydah and Badagry?—They are the principal settlers in the Bight of Benin.

5451. Are there more Portuguese merchants than there are English, at Badagry, for instance?—No, not now.

5452. Has the demand in Africa for goods from England changed in its nature during those 17 years?—We are always taking out something new in the same description of cotton goods, so that there is no great difference.

5453. Is there more clothing in demand than there used to be?—There certainly is at Lagos.

5454. Is the demand for spirits increasing?—It remains about the same.

5455. [Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] Do you expect a large increase of trade at Lagos, Badagry, and Palma, in case the war in the neighbouring countries can be put an end to?—Yes, there would be a great increase at Lagos if the war was put an end to; there has been no trade going on for some time.

5456. Do you think that the new settlement

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at Lagos has yet had a fair trial, seeing that ever since its establishment, and even before its establishment, the neighbouring country has been in a state of war?—Trade was going on very steadily when there was a consul there, with the exception of “Kosoko’s” threatened invasions.

5457. Whether you connect the fact of this native war with the fact of the British establishment at Lagos (which I am not aware whether you are able to do or not), would you say that until that native war is at an end, Lagos can have a fair chance for the future?—Certainly not; until the war is at an end, there will be no trade done at Lagos; nothing to speak of.

5458. You were asked just now about the Customs duties. I suppose taxes are the price paid for a government, and that being the case, do you conceive that you get as good an article in return for your taxes at Whydah, as you do at Cape Coast or Lagos, in the shape of a government maintaining law and order?—We have extra duties at Lagos, but property, as regards theft, is quite as safe, if not more so, at Whydah; I prefer our own government if justly carried out.

5459. Which would you prefer. Would you prefer to pay smaller duties with a native government, or higher duties with a British one?—I have never been molested in any way in my trade by any of the natives up and down the coast. I have always found that I could trade without any squabbling; in fact, I found them much easier to deal with out of the British settlements, trusting to their honour to pay without having to make use of any law.

5460. That is to say, supported by a British consul and a British man-of-war?—Men-of-war come in there occasionally, but I have never had to apply for their assistance in any way, but they have a good moral effect.

5461. Those native chiefs were quite aware that you had the consul and men-of-war to fall back upon, were they not?—At Whydah they laughed both at the consul and the British fleet. The consul was there some years ago, and he threatened to blow the place down, and did nothing; ever since that they have a very poor opinion of the British power, but I still consider our fleet a very great protection; but it has a bad effect to threaten without intending or having the power to carry it out.

5462. Of the English power?—Yes.

5463. Do you find that it is as easy and safe to carry on business at Whydah as it would be at Sierra Leone?—I do not know Sierra Leone; but I have always felt perfectly safe at Whydah, though they are rather despotic there and you are obliged to conform to their rules.

5464. What number of English merchants are there at Whydah?—There were none at all when I was there. Mr. Tobin has established a factory there since.

5465. Were you the only one there at that time?—It is quite a common place of trade for all Bristol traders, Dutch, French, and Americans.

5466. Mr. Forster.] Had you a factory there?—No; I traded with natives and Portuguese.

5467. At that time were the Portuguese there?—Yes.

5468. And are they there still?—Yes, they are still there.

5469. Whydah used to be the great port for the slave trade?—Yes, within the last few years.

5470. I think that you said you had trade

there for 17 years; I suppose at one time the slave trade was in operation?—I have seen several cargoes shipped there.

5471. To what cause do you attribute the decrease of the slave trade?—To the vigilance of our cruisers, and through there only being one opening now for them, namely Cuba.

5472. Do you remember the slave trade at Lagos at all?—No; I do not.

5473. Have you seen it in operation in any other part of the coast except Whydah?—I have seen it at Porto Novo and Agua; they are within 20 miles of each side of Whydah.

5474. Did you carry on trade at all with the Portuguese settlement of Loanda, on the Congo?—No; I have not been so far south.

5475. What description of goods did you find commanded the best sale?—At different parts of the coast they require a different class of goods, and depends upon what is in demand.

5476. Take Lagos, for example?—They principally take there what they call “Manchester Domestic,” in the shape of cotton goods, plain grey.

5477. What do they take at Whydah?—At Whydah they also take a large quantity of those goods, rum, and toll tobacco.

5478. Have you found that the proportion which those goods bore to arms and spirits increased or decreased?—On some occasions, I could not sell a piece of cotton goods, they would have nothing but rum; that was just as the supply happened to be.

5479. Have you found any difference with regard to the demand for those goods in preference to spirits, as compared with the demand among the Portuguese at Whydah?—No.

5480. What sort of return cargoes did you generally get?—Palm oil, and sometimes specie.

5481. Specie from Lagos?—No, from Whydah and Gold Coast principally.

5482. The Portuguese furnished the specie, I suppose?—Yes.

5483. Did you trade with Liberia at all?—No, I only just called occasionally at Cape Palmas; I never did any large trade there; in fact, it is only a small settlement.

5484. You hardly feel that you have sufficient experience to say how far Liberia has conducted to the development of trade?—I should say that it had improved considerably since they have been there.

5485. Did you hear any complaint off the coast of Liberia, of the Government having closed several of the ports in their possessions?—No, not when I was on the coast; that has taken place since.

5486. How long is it since you left the coast?—Two years ago.

5487. Sir Francis Baring.] When were you fined at Whydah?—It is five years ago, now. I complained to the commanding officer at the time.

5488. At that time do you remember, in 1860, directions were sent from the Foreign Office to the Admiralty, that the King of Dahomey should be told that if in another year he marched his army against Abbeokuta, he should himself be attacked at whatever point his territory might appear most vulnerable; was he attacked, however?—No, certainly not.

5489. They sent two envoys, who danced before him; did they not?—I believe Commodore Wilmot and the captain of the “Brisk” were the envoys.

5490. But

5490. But instead of attacking the King of Dahomey, they sent him two envoys; did they not?—Yes.

5491. Perhaps it is not surprising that he was not very much alarmed at the threats of England after that?—I think that he feels perfectly safe where he is.

5492. Now, with regard to Lagos, you have been there several times you say, and you have conducted business at Lagos with cargoes?—Yes.

5493. Did you ever hear a complaint at Lagos of life being unsafe there before this last occupation, and when it was under King Docemo?—I never heard any of the British complain.

5494. I suppose you were in communication a good deal with the British traders?—Yes, always.

5495. And you never heard that complaint?—Never; with the exception of Kosoko's frightening them occasionally, and which was half imaginary.

5496. Mr. *Buxton*.] I understood you to say, that if our protectorate was withdrawn from the Gold Coast, before long, trade would flourish as much as it does now?—I do not think it would make the slightest difference.

5497. You have been in the habit of importing goods to Whydah, have you not?—Yes.

5498. And for a large portion of those goods you have been paid in specie?—No; the largest portion was always paid for in palm oil.

5499. But a portion in specie?—That would be entirely for surplus cargo, or something of that kind.

5500. Is there any large export of palm oil from Whydah?—Very large, indeed.

5501. What is the amount, do you remember?—Not off hand; but it has wonderfully increased in the last 10 years, since the slave trade has been nearly put a stop to.

5502. Were you fined by your brother traders at Whydah, for assisting one of Her Majesty's vessels to take part in the suppression of the slave trade?—I was fined by the natives.

5503. By the King of Dahomey?—Yes, by his orders I suppose; in fact, they handled me rather roughly.

5504. Did you import goods from Whydah to England?—Yes, palm oil.

5505. Have you had any trade of late years at Lagos?—About two years ago. I was there when Governor Freeman was about putting on the duties.

5506. You commenced trade 19 years ago with that part of the coast?—Yes.

5507. Nineteen years ago you were engaged in trade with Whydah?—No, I was in Bonny at that time; it is within the last 13 years that I have been engaged in that Whydah trade.

5508. At that time there was a considerable trade in slaves from that part of the coast, was there not?—When I first went out to that part of the coast, in 1851, there was a good deal of slave trade going on.

5509. The slave trade of late years has been principally carried on at Whydah, has it not?—Yes, and about there.

5510. Mr. *Cheetham*.] In carrying on your trade at Bonny, you had not the protection of the English Government?—No more than occasionally a man-of-war coming into the river; but it is so many years ago that I know very little about it.

5511. At that time it was under the jurisdiction of a native chief, was it not?—It was under King Pepel.

5512. Had you any difficulty in carrying on

your trade?—We had a difficulty in being paid sometimes.

5513. Generally, you think that the protection of a British station is not essential to carrying on commerce?—Not on the Gold Coast; at Lagos I would not remove the Government; I do not think it would be safe; and the present Governor (Glover) thoroughly understands the politics of the native tribes, and everything depends upon that, and the interest he takes in it.

*5514. With regard to the course which the slave trade would take, assuming we withdrew our squadron, what is your opinion upon that subject?—I think that the slave trade is pretty nearly at an end.

5515. Did you ever see any of the native manufactures of the country?—Yes, I have brought several specimens home.

5516. Were those preferred by the natives over the British goods which you imported?—They were preferred by the chiefs.

5517. There was no export of the native manufactures?—Yes, there was a large export from Lagos and Whydah to the Brazils.

5518. Mr. *Seymour*.] Of cotton manufacture?—Yes, their own manufacture.

5519. Mr. *Cheetham*.] The cotton which the natives manufacture goes to their own countrymen in the Brazils?—Yes, to their own countrymen.

5520. Have you come much in contact with the natives of that country?—Every day of my life.

5521. What is your opinion of them with regard to their capacity for carrying on trade and commerce?—There is no mistake about their capacity; they are shrewd and sharp men to do business with; plenty of low cunning.

5522. And if educated by the aid of the missionaries?—They are exceedingly sharp then.

5523. You do not at all concur with some recent opinions which describe the pure negro as not being capable of mental improvement?—With regard to commerce they are quite our match, but I have no great opinion of their intellectual powers, and their ideas as regards honesty, keeping treaties, &c. are very loose, and not to be relied upon.

5524. Do the manufactures which are imported to Whydah go up to the interior of the country?—Yes, they go right through the country.

5525. Are roads needed for the opening out of that district?—It would be a great improvement; at present we have to walk for days through swamps.

5526. Lord *Afred Churchill*.] Where did you principally convey your palm oil cargoes to?—To England.

5527. Previous to the war with America, was there not a large demand from America?—Yes, there was a large trade springing up.

5528. For palm oil?—Yes.

5529. Did you ever take cargoes to America?—Never.

5530. Is there much American demand for palm oil?—It has fallen off considerably, owing to the heavy duties in America. Spirits and tobacco are the principal things which the Americans bring there, and for that, some years ago they took back specie, now they take palm oil.

5531. I suppose petroleum is competing in America with palm oil to some extent?—I believe so, and also here in England.

5532. Mr. *Baxter*.] When you say that the

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slave trade is nearly at an end, you look forward to the cessation of the demand for slaves in Cuba in a short time, do you not?—Yes.

5533. Mr. Seymour.] Which do you think is the best part of the West Coast of Africa for trade?—I should say Bonny, without any hesitation, as regards exports in palm oil, but I think the River Niger would be the best opening to develop the resources of the interior.

5534. Do you think that we could ever have a large trade with Dahomey?—I think it will increase as soon as the slave trade is entirely at an end.

5535. Do any caravans come to Whydah from the interior of Africa?—No, none.

5536. Do you think that the manufactures exported to Whydah, penetrate far into the interior?—I think they go right through the country.

5537. Up to Timbuctoo, on to the eastward, do you mean?—I have no means of judging of that.

5538. Are there any Moors at Whydah?—No; I never heard of any.

5539. Is there any communication with Timbuctoo from Whydah?—I believe there is, occasionally a passenger who comes through.

5540. But not a regular communication by caravans?—Not a regular communication by caravans.

5541. Can you get any amount of palm oil at Whydah?—I suppose the exports there amount to about 3,000 tons a year.

5542. Is there any cotton?—Very little; they are commencing to grow it.

5543. Is there any export of slaves there, now?—I have not heard of a vessel leaving there lately, but they are always open for that trade.

5544. Are slaves brought down for that purpose, or do they export domestic slaves?—They are generally brought down for the purpose.

5545. Are there any brought down and kept in readiness up to the present time, so far as you know?—I cannot say; when I was there last, there were.

5546. They were kept in readiness?—Yes; they used to reserve them there until an opportunity for shipping them arrived.

5547. You were complaining of the heavy duties which were laid on at Lagos; do you think under any circumstances, if the British establishment were well conducted, you would get a compensating return for those duties?—I do not see the benefit that they get for the amount of duties levied.

5548. Is there no possible benefit?—They do get a certain benefit, because they have the protection of the Government, and they are making roads and sanitary arrangements, and at Lagos you can make your debtors pay.

5549. You think that roads would be an advantage in those parts of Africa with which you are acquainted?—There is no doubt of it. In carrying the palm oil down the coast a great portion of it is lost in consequence of the bad roads.

5550. Are you of opinion that you would obtain the palm oil cheaper if there were good roads?—It entirely depends on the demand for goods.

5551. At all events you would have a more certain supply and a larger supply?—It would be a great assistance to the natives.

5552. Do you think that the natives are becoming more and more inclined to cultivate the

country and becoming industrious?—Those men who return from the Brazils are, generally speaking, the best men they have in the country. Those men who have worked out their freedom in the Brazils and who return to Africa are the best members of society that they have.

5553. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] How do you find the Sierra Leone people?—I am not partial to them.

5554. Mr. Seymour.] You do like the Brazil men; they are an industrious hard-working set of men, who have been improved by their stay in the Brazils?—Yes, they have learnt some trade up there; carpentry or shoemaking, and cultivate the ground.

5555. When they come back they are willing to work?—Yes; the African, generally speaking, is not fond of work.

5556. You would think, I suppose, that if it was possible to frame proper regulations, it would be rather an advantage to let them go out to the Brazils under some kind of apprenticeship, and afterwards to return to their country?—That would be the easiest way of civilizing them; get them to emigrate.

5557. And that would be rather a benefit to the people, would it not?—Yes; I have seen a good many cargoes of slaves shipped, and I have seen them all looking perfectly delighted to be shipped off.

5558. But there are very great horrors in the traffic in the middle passage?—There is no doubt about it.

5559. Mr. Cheetham.] The Committee are not to infer that those Africans who go to the Brazils go as apprentices, are we?—They have got to work out their freedom.

5560. They go as slaves?—Yes, as slaves.

5561. Slavery exists in the Brazils at this moment, does it not?—There have been none imported of late years, but I believe it does.

5562. Mr. Seymour.] In the Brazils they make lotteries to buy each other's freedom?—Yes, I have heard they do.

5563. Those who return have more wants than the natives?—Yes, they dress like Europeans, and have the same wants.

5564. And to satisfy those European wants, they are willing to be industrious?—They are willing to be industrious.

5565. Sir Francis Baring.] You have stated that you would not recommend the removal of the British settlement from Lagos?—I think it would not be safe so long as the British residents are there.

5566. But would you have recommended taking possession of Lagos?—I would not.

5567. Who would you be afraid of?—I should be afraid of the Abbeokutans and the surrounding tribes; they have got such a dislike to the British Government.

5568. Mr. Seymour.] Have you ever been to Abbeokuta?—Yes, I have been to Abbeokuta.

5569. To what do you attribute the dislike on the part of the Abbeokutans to the British Government?—In consequence of the slaves running away and claiming British protection, and the assistance we have given to other tribes lately at war with them.

5570. Do you think that there is a greater dislike on the part of the Abbeokutans to the British Government than there is on the part of the Ibadans?—The Ibadans are friendly towards the British Government.

5571. But their slaves run away equally, do they

they not?—It is further in the interior, but they do run away, there is no doubt, occasionally.

5572. Mr. Buxton.] You have seen many cargoes of slaves shipped, you say?—Yes.

5573. And you think they like going?—They appear to be quite pleased.

5574. Since you regard it as a humane trade, it is no indecency to ask you whether you have

been engaged in it?—Certainly not, and I have always rendered our squadron every assistance by information or otherwise, and considered it the greatest curse of humanity. I only mentioned what I had actually seen; the Rev. Dr. Crowther was my guest on his last visit to England, and I am sorry you have asked me such a question.

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Dr. LIVINGSTONE, called in; and Examined.

5575. Chairman.] You have seen a great deal of various parts of Africa in exploring expeditions, as we all know?—Yes, I have travelled a good deal throughout Africa.

5576. In various parts?—Yes, in various parts, both east and west, and in the centre of the country.

5577. Are you now about to return on a further exploring expedition?—Yes, I hope to be ready next month.

5578. On the part of the British Government?—Partly for the British Government, and partly on account of the Geographical Society.

5579. Have you, from your knowledge of various parts of Africa, formed any opinion with regard to the British establishment on the West Coast?—Yes, I have.

5580. What is your general opinion of the system of the British settlements on the West Coast of Africa?—I think that the system which the British Government has followed on the West Coast of Africa has been very beneficial both to Africa and to England.

5581. In what sense has it been beneficial?—In the way of promoting lawful trade.

5582. You think it has not only tended to suppress the slave trade, but that it has opened lawful trade?—It has opened lawful trade.

5583. Do you think that lawful trade would not have opened itself without the assistance of the British?—No; the slave trade seems completely to stop all lawful trade; we have seen that pretty fully proved on the East Coast at the present day.

5584. On the East Coast the slave trade still stops legitimate commerce?—The slave trade still stops legitimate commerce, and the Government that claims possession there has to pay out a large sum annually, and no one ever makes a fortune and goes home to spend it in Portugal.

5585. Are you acquainted with the Portuguese Government on the West Coast?—I spent about eight months in Angola; four of those months were in Loanda.

5586. Are the Portuguese Governments on the West Coast similar to those on the East?—They are better on the West than they are on the East.

5587. In what way?—They seem to be more enlightened. The settlement on the West Coast is not so much of a penal settlement as it is on the East Coast.

5588. In what sense do you mean?—They send out convicts for the East Coast; there are not so many who go to the West; they do send them to the West Coast, but not so much as to the East Coast.

5589. Does the slave trade about Loanda and Angola still keep down legitimate trade?—It does; Angola is a very fine country, is very well adapted for the growth of cotton, and palm oil grows in one part of it also. But so far as I can ascertain, the legitimate trade seems to remain stationary.

5590. You attribute that to the existence of the slave trade?—Yes; to the existence of the slave trade.

5591. Does that remark apply to the coast further north as far as the Congo?—Yes.

5592. How far north would you say that the slave trade still suppressed the legitimate trade?—I think that it has influence in stopping lawful commerce up to Liberia.

5593. Do you believe that there is any slave trade north of the Congo?—No; but there is in the Congo.

5594. Do you suppose that there is slave trade at Whydah?—I do not know Whydah.

5595. What is your general belief as to where the slave trade still exists on the West Coast of Africa?—The part that I know where it exists is in the neighbourhood of Angola; it has been so much suppressed in that country, that it is quite a risk for anybody to engage in it, and those who do engage in it join in common; if any man engaged in it alone he would be ruined.

5596. Having said that there is a difference between the Portuguese Governments on the two coasts, do you believe that the Portuguese Government on the East Coast wish to alter their system, and to make it more like the system they maintain on the West Coast?—Viscount —— wrote out the programme of a company which was virtually to establish the same system on the East Coast as there is established on the West Coast, that was to be done by English capitalists. The company was bound to build schools and churches, to make roads and bridges, and to develop the resources of the country generally; this was to be done by English capitalists, and the whole to be delivered back to the Portuguese Government at the end of 20 years.

5597. All that improved system was to have been undertaken by private enterprise?—By an English company.

5598. Without any assistance on the part of the English Government or the Portuguese Government?—There was to be no assistance by the Portuguese Government except handing over the whole of the country to this company.

5599. That implies an opinion by the Portuguese on the East Coast that such a system could be better carried out by private enterprise than by a Government undertaking?—By this company.

5600. Do you generally believe that it could be carried out better by private enterprise than by a Government undertaking?—I do not think that the system could be carried out at all by a private company.

5601. I understood you to say that it was to be undertaken by a private English company?—Yes, but I referred to the opinion of the Portuguese Government; it was not my own opinion.

5602. You do not agree with the Portuguese Government in that opinion?—No.

5603. You do not think that a private company could undertake such work?—I think not.

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5604. Do you think, supposing the slave trade to cease from the cessation of the Spanish demand for slaves at Cuba, that commerce would maintain itself and go on increasing on the West Coast of Africa?—I think it would.

5605. Without the assistance of the British Government?—I think that supervision is necessary.

5606. What sort of supervision is necessary for the protection of commerce, in your opinion?—Supervision is necessary, I think; it is still necessary for us to have a settlement on the coast, and to have the aid of Her Majesty's cruisers in case of need.

5607. I presume that the slave trade having ceased, you would not propose to retain so large a squadron on the coast?—No.

5608. Would you propose that we should keep as many settlements on shore, merely for the protection of commerce?—Yes; I think the settlements are of very great importance in the plan of improving that country.

5609. Do you think, the slave trade having ceased altogether, that commerce would be more likely to thrive under such a Government as that of Lagos, than it would if we had only put a consul there, and allowed the Native Government to remain?—I think that an English Government would be by far the best.

5610. Why should you think that English Government would be by far the best?—Because we find Englishmen have always a sense of justice, and do their duty better on the whole.

5611. Do you see no risk of an English Government getting into constant collision with the native powers, and with the native customs?—I do not think it is necessary; if an establishment is made fairly with the natives, they usually respect the agreement they have come to.

5612. Do you not think among a great many petty tribes, that the presence of the English leads them to speculate on the assistance of the English against other powers, and that it tends to keep up quarrels between them?—It does lead them to speculate on that.

5613. So far as the presence of the English goes, does it not tend rather to aggravate disputes of the native powers among each other?—I do not think it tends to foster that state of things among the natives; they always look towards the English as a superior power to which they can appeal.

5614. But if there were two native tribes jealous of each other, and each speculating on the assistance of the English, does not that rather tend to lead to quarrels?—I think that if it were distinctly understood that the English would not interfere in purely native quarrels, it would not be so.

5615. Do you think it possible that an English Government should be established in the neighbourhood of 20 or 30 different tribes, and not interfere in their quarrels?—I think so. The missionaries whom I have known generally make it clearly understood that they will not interfere in any of the native quarrels, and that they will not interfere in the protection of the country; they are looked upon as part of the superior power, and they are not appealed to.

5616. In the case of Lagos and Abbeokuta, have the missionaries practically kept out of the native quarrels?—I am not acquainted with Lagos.

5617. What is your opinion generally of the character and influence of the missionaries in Africa?—I entertain a very high opinion of them.

5618. Do you allude to any particular part of Africa?—I know them better in the interior of the south, and in Sierra Leone.

5619. Taking Sierra Leone, what should you say has been the influence of the missionaries there?—I think that it has been very beneficial, both to the natives and to the English.

5620. What has it done for the natives in the first place?—The missionaries always promote trade. Some of them think they ought not to attempt the civilisation of the people, and others think that they ought; but wherever I have seen a mission established, that mission promotes civilisation and commerce, whether the missionary professes to be anxious to promote civilisation, or not.

5621. Mr. *Baxter.*] You mean promoting civilisation, by teaching industrial employment?—Yes.

5622. *Chairman.*] The Committee have heard of two systems of missionary work in Africa; one which adopts education and preaching as its means of action, and one which seems to have been carried on to a great extent on the Gold Coast by the Swiss missionaries, and into which agriculture and industrial training largely enter. To which system do you chiefly allude?—One body of missionaries advocates industrial pursuits chiefly, but they never confine themselves to those. The other professes to be anxious only to preach the Gospel, but their influence is directed also to promote the civilisation of the people.

5623. Even though it is not connected with any industrial pursuits?—Even though it is not connected with any industrial pursuits. One way in which they do that is by their example; they show an example of industry, and in that way promote civilisation without professing to be industrial missionaries.

5624. Do you believe that the missionaries have ever such a command of the local languages as to be able to preach intelligibly to the natives?—I know many who speak the language thoroughly; far better than any natives who have been born in the mission. Mr. Moffatt has been out there for 50 years, and he knows it thoroughly; he has translated all the Bible into their language; he knows it better than any native born on the station.

5625. Mr. *Clichester Fortescue.*] Which of the native languages are you alluding to?—The Sichuana.

5626. *Chairman.*] The Committee have heard great doubts expressed with regard to the influence of the missionaries in Sierra Leone upon the native character, and we have had evidence that the natives educated in the mission schools are generally disliked; can you account for that prejudice on that opinion in any way?—It is very common to hear aspersions cast on the character of the missionaries; but I account for it in this way: the lives of those men generally are a protest against the evil conduct of many of the men who go out to trade there; I do not wish to say that there are not good men among the traders, but a very large proportion of them are worthless, and the lives of those missionaries are a sort of standing protest against the moral conduct of the traders. Mr. Moffatt has been labouring with great success in one tribe for 43 years, and he is exceedingly annoyed by several of the traders

traders who have settled on the spot, and who have attempted to nullify all his teaching, corrupting the natives by their conduct.

5627. Is the character of the missionaries themselves high and unexceptionable?—You find a few among them who are not men of great ability; some of them have been guilty of improper conduct; but take them as a whole, I think they deserve a very high character.

5628. Should you say that their character is improving, and that the class of men sent out as missionaries is higher than it used to be?—When the missionaries were sent out 50 years ago it was believed by many men that any sort of man who could read his Bible, and make a wheelbarrow, was sufficient; but it was found that that was a mistake, and better educated men are now chosen; and the more care is taken in their selection, the more satisfactory are the results.

5629. Do the missionaries at Sierra Leone exercise much influence on the Government of Sierra Leone, or interfere with the Government proceedings?—I am not aware of that; when I was there, I lived in the house of the governor, Colonel Hill, and he was on very friendly terms with the Bishop of the station, and all I came in contact with seemed to be on very friendly terms with the governor.

5630. Should you say that in all parts of Africa, of which you have any experience, the missions co-operate with the Governments?—In South Africa they were supposed not to co-operate with the Government on the subject of the slave trade; they co-operated with the Government at Home, but not with many of the men in power out there.

5631. Do you mean the Government of the Cape?—Not the Government, but the influential men out in the Cape Colony; a great many of them were slaveholders, and they did not agree with the missionaries in their idea that the men ought to be emancipated.

5632. Do you think that the British Government have dealt with the native customs, such as domestic slavery, in the wisest way, or have you any suggestion to make with regard to any other mode in which they might deal with such a custom as that?—In the parts that I have been most familiar with domestic slavery is a very mild institution; if one tribe goes against another, and captives are made, the men are brought home, and they are sometimes sold to each other; the men who have gone out on a foray sell some of the captives they have brought home, and that looks exactly like slavery and the slave trade; but the condition of those men shows that this is a very mild form of slavery, compared to that which is engaged in for the supply of the ocean slave trade; they are called the children of the man who has purchased them, and if he is not kind to them they may change to another master; they may change to any one within the kingdom, and the children that those captives may beget are on just the same level as any other child in the tribe.

5633. What part of Africa are you now referring to?—Central Africa.

5634. Would that apply at all to domestic slavery on the West Coast?—No; I think not.

5635. The Committee have had it suggested by Captain Burton that a good deal of the evils of slavery might be mitigated by the British Government enabling such slaves as were taken in war, or as were under sentence of death, to emigrate freely, as labourers, to the West Indies;

do you believe that such a plan would be possible?—I do not think it would be advisable to attempt that.

5636. Why?—Because they are very much better off when they are taken captives than they would be in the West Indies. The loss of life is prodigious in the supply of people sent to other countries.

5637. Do you think that there are many negroes on the West Coast who would be willing to emigrate as free labourers to the West Indies?—I found them very willing to go to other countries to work. I employed about 15 of them for upwards of 12 months; and when coming away I paid those men off, and about 300 others volunteered to go with me to sea, although they had never seen it before, and knew nothing about it; I took only seven, and those seven became capital sailors before we got over to Bombay; they were so eager to do their duty that only one became sea-sick.

5638. Did they know where they were going to?—They knew nothing but that I was going away to sea, and that we should be away for a great many months.

5639. Where are they now?—They are now in my vessel at Bombay. I think there would be no difficulty in getting a large number to go if only one could point out to those who are in the country that they would get wages, and that they would be sent back again; but without that it would simply be a slave trade, as was the case in the French *engagé* system.

5640. Is there any other point on which you wish to give information to the Committee on the subject of their inquiry with regard to the West Coast of Africa?—There is the supposed progress of Mahomedanism. I have always since boyhood heard a good deal about the progress of that religion, and in my travels, which have been pretty extensive, I have always been on the look out to see if Mahomedanism had come down from the north farther than the Equator, and I have never found any progress made by that religion at all.

5641. Progress in which direction?—From the north to the south. I have read of certain conquests that had been made of those parts by the Mahomedans. They do not seem to care about the adults, but the young are made Mahomedans, and that is the only progress that I have been able to ascertain.

5642. Do you believe that those Mahomedan tribes themselves comes from the north-east, or do you suppose that it is merely an influx of oriental blood to a certain extent into the native African tribes?—I am not aware of what was the origin of those Mahomedans.

5643. Do you agree with Captain Burton with regard to the superior vigour of the Mahomedan tribes as compared with the Pagan tribes?—No, certainly not. I find that both in vigour and morality the native African is very much superior. I do not refer to the coast tribes. We find a number of tribes near the coast who have been contaminated by the slave trade, and are very much inferior in every respect to the pure African.

5644. Do you believe that being the case there are stronger tribes in the interior whose tendency is to overrun those coast tribes, and that if the European power stood out of the way that would probably be the event?—The slave trade so jumbles everything in the country, that you cannot form any opinion.

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5645. Now supposing, as we hope, that the slave trade may cease in a few years, and suppose the European powers stood out of the way and withdrew from the coast, are there more powerful tribes in the interior who would overrun the coast tribes and become possessed of the territories up to the sea?—I think it is doubtful whether they would come down or not, because the great secret of all power in Africa is the possession of guns and gunpowder. Those who are near the coast have more power than those inland, because they have guns and gunpowder. Those who possess bows and arrows cannot fight against those who possess guns.

5646. Have you any opinion to give to the Committee with regard to the progress of the Niger trade?—I believe that, in course of time, a very important trade could be developed there.

5647. Do you believe that private enterprise alone can develop that trade, without the assistance of the Government?—I think, in the first instance, Government assistance ought to be awarded to any company who wished to undertake that work.

5648. But, I suppose, only assistance in the nature of a subsidy, not assistance in the nature of protection, or any fort or Government establishment in the Niger?—I think that armed assistance would be necessary for the protection of trade near the mouth, but not further inland.

5649. Do you mean a ship?—Yes, a ship.

5650. You would not think anything in the nature of a fort, or occupation on shore would be necessary?—No, I think not.

5651. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Have you had any experience of the emancipated negroes who have been brought up at Sierra Leone?—No, I have not had much experience of them; I was only visiting there; I did not spend much time there.

5652. This Committee has had a great deal of evidence to show that they are generally regarded with dislike upon the coast, and considered less industrious, less trustworthy and honest than other Africans; have you any reason to confirm that on the contrary?—I have heard that statement very often, but I have heard just the opposite from the missionaries. Bishop Bowen had a very different opinion of them.

5653. I do not think that you gave the Committee your opinion just now with regard to the merits of the two missionary systems; the one that includes industrial teaching, and the one that excludes it?—I think that they are both very good, because they work towards the same object with different professions; the one says we ought merely to preach the Gospel, and the other says we ought to endeavour to elevate those people, by civilising them first; but in practice they both do the same thing.

5654. Have you formed any opinion with regard to the degree in which Christian teaching has affected the African character?—Yes, I know a very great number of converts in the middle of the country, not on the West Coast, and I have had opportunities of knowing them intimately. I have travelled with them, and I think the progress they have made in knowledge is very satisfactory, and that their conduct is very good indeed.

5655. Which are the people you speak of?—I speak of the Bechuanas.

5656. You do not know so much of the natives of those countries to which the inquiries of this Committee are directed?—I know the effect of

the missionary teaching, the Roman Catholic teaching, in places in Angola; the people there have retained the teaching that was communicated to them some 150 years ago, and now, wherever you find a village, you find people who can both read and write, and they teach each other.

5657. Is that in the Portuguese territory?—Yes, in the Portuguese territory.

5658. Is there a large number of Roman Catholic native Christians in that territory?—Yes, there is a large number who profess to be Roman Catholics; they do not know much about points of doctrine. I do not suppose they know there is any difference between themselves and other Christians; but they show themselves to be Christians.

5659. Have the Roman Catholic missionaries had much effect on the natives?—They had the whole of the country at one time under their power, and they then built their missionary establishments, which are now kept very carefully by the natives; there are no missionaries now.

5660. Are there no Protestant missionaries there now?—None whatever; the Jesuits were expelled at the time of the Marquis —, and from that time forth there have been no missionaries. I met a canon of the Church of Rome, in Ambanka: he was a very respectable man, and I found out that he was a very good man, and that he bore a very high character among the people around him; he was perfectly black, yet he was a canon of the church.

5661. I suppose our operations on the Coast of Africa, of all kinds, missionary and other, have produced an extremely small effect on so great a continent?—Compared with the whole continent, that is so, we are just on the extreme limits of it; but compared with the efforts made, I think the results have been very satisfactory. On going to Angola I had received an impression from reading the speeches of Members of Parliament and others, that our efforts on the West Coast had done nothing at all, and that they had rather aggravated the evils of the slave trade than done any good; I was very much surprised when I came within 300 miles of the West Coast of Africa to find the Portuguese talk of something as having happened "in the time of the slave trade." I had come to the conclusion from what I had read of the opinion at home, that the slave trade was going on just now as fast as ever, but they always spoke of the slave trade as a thing of the past, and when I asked them, "What do you mean; what has put a stop to it?" they said, "Oh, you know very well what we mean; you English, with your ships and other things, have put a stop to it altogether; sometimes we do engage in it now, but it is out of a sort of bravado not to be done by you English." I found that at that time when I was in Angola there were only three men engaged in it; they engaged in it in company, in order not to be ruined altogether.

5662. Are the Committee to understand that you are very anxious for the present to see both the British settlements and the squadron maintained on the West Coast of Africa?—Yes, I think it will be of very great importance to maintain them until we see what will turn out in the case of Cuba.

5663. In case the Cuban demand should cease, and, we may hope, the slave trade with it, you still wish, for the sake of Africa, and our commerce with Africa, to have our settlements maintained?—Yes; I think the presence of a strong police

police on the coast would be necessary to prevent all we had done being lost.

5664. You would wish to see a few centres of English authority and civilisation maintained?—

Yes.

5665. Lord Stanley.] How far north on the West Coast does your personal experience extend?—I was in Sierra Leone; my knowledge north extends about eight degrees from the Line.

5666. You have not been on the Gold Coast?—

No.

5667. Nor Lagos?—Nor Lagos.

5668. Nor at the Gambia?—Only at Loanda and Sierra Leone.

5669. Then all your experience of Africa, and everyone knows how extensive it is, is mainly confined to the country lying to the far south?—Lying south of eight degrees and east.

5670. When you speak of the advantage of the English settlements, and the benefit we have conferred upon the people, you speak more, I suppose, as we all do, from general knowledge, and from what you have read, rather than from actual personal observations?—Yes; except as to Sierra Leone and Loanda; I speak generally of the other parts.

5671. I did not quite understand what was the advantage which you said was derived from the existence of those English settlements apart from the question of the slave trade; do you think that they afford greater security to trade?—Greater security to trade, and to life and property; and then both the traders and missionaries settle where there is security for life, and in that way both the African and the English are benefited.

5672. You are putting it on that ground, that missionaries are more willing to settle within reach of a British possession?—They are more willing to settle within reach of British settlements; although many of them have settled beyond, they find it an advantage.

5673. You think, speaking with regard to the interests of missionaries, it is desirable that as large a part of the coast as possible should be so occupied?—It is desirable, in my opinion.

5674. With regard to the traders, are you aware that we have had it given in evidence that a considerable portion of them prefer carrying on trade outside rather than inside British settlements?—The only case that I know of of that kind was, that at Ambriz they preferred to be under native rule to being under the Portuguese; but I am not aware of any case in which traders preferred to be with the natives rather than with the English.

5675. Your attention has not been called to the question of high or low duties, probably?—No.

5676. I understood you to consider the advantage of the English settlements to consist chiefly in the moral benefit which they confer on the native populations?—Yes; and in the way of promoting lawful commerce, giving security to the traders and to the missionaries.

5677. But do you know that by far the greater part of the commerce of the West Coast is carried on at points which are not within the British settlements?—Yes; but were it not for the influence of the British and the squadron, I do not think there would be any trade there. My reason for thinking that there would be no legitimate trade is this: on the East Coast there are no European settlements, except penal settlements; there are no settlements like those that we have on the West Coast, and the consequence is that

the coast is exactly in the same state that the West Coast was before the squadron was put on; the entire trade is limited to a little ivory and gold dust, while on the West Coast the lawful trade is very much larger.

5678. Suppose the slave trade to be done away with after the cessation of the demand in the Brazils and Cuba, do you think that the same necessity would exist for occupying a large portion of the coast as is supposed to exist at present?—I think not, but I think that it would be an advantage to the country to occupy a considerable portion of the coast for the protection of commerce, even although the slave trade were stopped.

5679. Do you not think that the protection of commerce might be effectually secured by keeping, as is done in all parts of the world, a certain amount of naval force, in order to maintain the police of the seas, and probably, on semi-barbarous coasts where we have a good deal of trade, rather a larger proportion than elsewhere?—Yes, I think so.

5680. So far as the protection of commerce goes, do you think that anything more would be required than such a naval police, with one or two points for naval purposes where ships could put in?—Yes, I think that some establishment on shore will be absolutely necessary. The number of ships might be greatly decreased, but not the number of establishments on shore, because the traders always get into those establishments, and their trade ramifications extend from points to which our police operations could not reach.

5681. You think that, putting aside the question of the slave trade, supposing we only held one or two points on the coast for naval purposes, that the naval protection so given to trade, and the presence of consuls at various points along the coast, would not be sufficient?—I think it would not be sufficient; I think it would be necessary always to have more than mere consuls at different points along the coast.

5682. For what special purpose?—For the protection of trade. Disputes arise perpetually with our traders and the natives, and a consul cannot settle those disputes unless he has some power to back him.

5683. *Chirman.*] He has the squadron, has he not?—But the squadron might be greatly diminished, or after the cessation of the slave trade it might be at a distance.

5684. Lord Stanley.] From what you said with regard to the importance of the occupation of territory to the extension and security of commerce, does it not follow that it would be an advantage to our trade to extend that occupation to the various points in which the largest amount of commerce is now being developed?—It would be a benefit, I think, to extend our occupation.

5685. For instance, in the Oil Rivers, where there is a great business springing up?—Yes, in order to have greater power over the natives in cases of disputes with our traders.

5686. In short, you do not believe in the possibility of establishing a secure commerce among the African tribes, unless you occupy some part of the country, and hold it?—I think not.

5687. Mr. *Cheetham.*] You have expressed an opinion that for the interests of the missions the British protectorate should be preserved?—For the interest of the missions and of trade.

5688. But your own experience does not prove that to be the case, does it?—Not in the case of

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the missions; but it is different altogether when you come among people who have been engaged in the slave trade. I have been mostly in the interior, where there is no slave trade. I never was robbed or attacked until I came among people who had been engaged in the slave trade.

5689. But the Dutch attacked you, did they not?—Yes, they did; they had had dealings in the slave trade, in capturing people and making slaves of them.

5690. I am to understand you to be of opinion that whilst British protection is at all times favourable to missionary effort, it is not essential to it?—It is not essential, except where the slave trade exists; for my own part, I would be very much better without any interference of the Government among the people in the interior; but it would not be so if I were among people who had been engaged in the slave trade.

5691. In the interior there was trade carried on among the native chiefs without British protection, was there?—Not to any very large extent.

5692. Then your remarks referred more particularly to this West Coast as being the district of country where the slave trade is carried on?—Yes.

5693. But if that should be altered by the abolition of the slave trade in Cuba, you might with safety diminish the protection, you think?—Yes; in course of time it might be withdrawn.

5694. In your intercourse with the Africans whom you saw in the Portuguese territory, did you find that they were a different class of men to those on the West Coast; to those you saw at Porto Novo?—They are a different class of people altogether.

5695. Are they less capable of improvement than those on the West Coast?—Those in the interior struck me as being very much superior to those on the West Coast; they are much superior in appearance, and likewise in their manners; if you get beyond the line of the slave trade, where the slave trade has been carried on, you then get among people who may be called wild.

5696. They are pure Africans, I suppose?—Yes, pure Africans; there is no admixture of any other blood.

5697. That deterioration on the West Coast you ascribe to the existence of the slave trade?—Entirely.

5698. So that in any attempt to elevate them by education or the spread of Christianity, you have no doubt of an ultimate improvement of the race?—No doubt whatever of an ultimate improvement.

5699. You do not share in the opinion recently expressed with regard to the impossibility of elevating the African?—Not in the smallest degree; they are in a state of degradation, and some time will be necessary for their elevation, but with regard to their capabilities I have no doubt whatever.

5700. With regard to the Mahomedan religion, has that religion ever spread beyond the country of the Mussulmans?—No, I never found any case in which a Mahomedan showed an anxiety to propagate his religion. The year before last I met two Arabs with about half a dozen half-Arabs, who had been in the country 14 years, and they had never made any attempts to propagate Mahomedanism; I found the servant belonging to them had been some time in the Makololo country, and could speak the language of the people; I

speak that language myself, and took an opportunity of ascertaining what he knew of the Mahomedan religion, and the most that he knew of it was that it was wrong to eat meat without first cutting the throat of the animal.

5701. Lord *Alfred Churchill.*] Is your acquaintance with the East Coast equal to your acquaintance with the West Coast?—Very much more than equal.

5702. Are not the facilities for lawful commerce quite as great on the East Coast as on the West?—Quite as great, if not more so, because we have the Zambesi.

5703. To what do you attribute the greater development of trade on the West Coast?—I attribute that development of trade on the West Coast to our settlements and to the efforts of our cruisers.

5704. *Chairman.*] Is not the West Coast more within the reach of the civilised world?—It is nearer.

5705. Lord *Alfred Churchill.*] But if the facilities were as great or greater on the East Coast, lawful commerce would go there if it had protection, would it not?—Yes; it is very much nearer than India.

5706. Mr. *Seymour.*] Are you not aware that there is a trade of no less than a million and a half annually from Zanzibar to Bombay?—Yes, from the Island of Zanzibar.

5707. While on the coast there is no trade whatever?—No trade whatever; the trade does not pay the governor's salary; the Portuguese Government has to advance between 5,000 *l.* and 6,000 *l.* annually to keep up the establishment.

5708. You are aware that although the Sultan of Zanzibar owns a considerable portion of the coast, yet still there are petty tribes along the coast which prevent all communication with the interior?—Yes.

5709. You are aware that when Captain Speke went by that line to Central Africa he found, at some distance inland, he had paid two thousand times the price of the same article on the coast?—Yes.

5710. That was owing to the coast being shut up by certain tribes?—Yes, owing to the coast being shut up by certain tribes.

5711. Do you think that if we had not those settlements on the West Coast commerce would be impeded in the same manner?—That is the reason I say I think the settlements ought to be kept up.

5712. Were there not flourishing establishments 300 years ago on all that Eastern Coast?—Yes.

5713. Which have now disappeared?—Yes.

5714. Is not the civilisation of the natives much higher on the East than on the West Coast?—When you get to the interior you come to a mild people, who are engaged in agriculture; very few are engaged in hunting. Large districts are inhabited by people who make their own cloth and cotton; they plant their own cotton and spin and weave it; they make capital iron and pottery and baskets. They are a totally different people from those on the West Coast.

5715. Has it not been the general opinion of those who wish to civilise the interior of Africa, that it would be better to penetrate from the east side than from the west, because of the superiority of the eastern races?—Yes.

5716. What is the difference between domestic slavery in Central Africa and on the West Coast?—The slave becomes a child, and is called a child

a child by the man who gets him; he may change his master and go to anyone else in the tribe.

5717. You think that under proper regulations it would be a great advantage for the African to leave his own country for a time and then come back to it?—I think if it were possible to produce an impression in the country that in going away they had an assurance of coming back again, they would go very willingly.

5718. That is done to a great extent in India, is it not?—Coolies come in large numbers to the Brazils.

5719. Many of them stop for five years, and go back again?—Yes.

5720. You were asked whether you thought, if we took away our settlements, the superior races in the interior would come down to the coast, and subjugate the coast tribes; but even if that were so, would not that necessitate a long period of war, while the people were fighting together?—It would.

5721. And there would be a dreadful amount of loss of life between them before there was some settlement?—Yes.

5722. And during that time we should have no trade at all?—None.

5723. Then would it not be better in your opinion, to keep our establishments as they are now, and make them as beneficial as possible to the natives?—That is my opinion.

5724. With regard to the missions; do you find the people willing to be educated, and to give up their children to be educated?—In general they are willing; they have some difficulty about understanding the advantage of being able to read and write; it is rather difficult to convince them that it is a benefit, but as soon as they are convinced that it is a benefit, they set about it.

5725. You find them willing to send their children to the mission schools?—Yes.

5726. Generally, we may say the missions encourage civilisation and learning?—Yes, whether they profess to do so or not.

5727. Is it not the fact that the establishment of those missions along the West Coast, practically dispenses a very large amount of English money raised by voluntary subscription for the general civilisation of those people?—Yes, that is the case.

5728. Therefore, in the interest of humanity, independently of religion, it would be good policy to keep up those establishments?—Yes, I think it would be good policy to keep them up, not only for the sake of Africa, but for the sake of our own trade.

5729. *Chairman.* Is there any other remark which you wish to make to the Committee?—Yes. I should like to say that I have seen the slave trade in the valley of the Shéré. We entered a large tract of country which had never been penetrated before by any human being, and which is about 400 miles in length. That country is a capital country for the production of cotton; the people have produced, of their own free will, a superior kind of cotton, and we attempted to introduce lawful trade there, but the slave trade came in our way, and completely baffled all our efforts. The Portuguese, with the connivance of the governor, sent over arms and ammunition to one tribe, and incited that tribe against the other, and the consequence was that after some time this slaving having been going on, a panic seized a good many of the tribes, and they all fled to the river Shéré. As soon as they got over that river, they seemed to feel that they were safe; but they had left their provisions behind them, and the consequence was that many thousands of them died. I cannot give you an idea of the thousands of human beings that have been destroyed in that valley. You cannot walk anywhere. I believe you cannot walk a mile without meeting a human skeleton. That I wish to mention, as showing the effect of the slave trade in destroying any attempt to promote lawful commerce. I think that wherever the slave trade exists we cannot possibly have lawful commerce.

Dr.
Livingstone.
18 May
1865.

Mr. HENRY BARNES, called in; and Examined.

5730. *Chairman.* You are a merchant on the Gold Coast?—I am.

5731. You are a native of that country?—Yes.

5732. What is your trade there?—I trade in Manchester goods with the Ashantees and the Fantees.

5733. How far into the interior do you carry your trade?—We never send up into the interior, but they come down to us at Cape Coast to buy goods.

5734. From how far in the interior do they come?—All the Fantees trade at Cape Coast; the better trade that we get is from the Ashantees.

5735. Has that been pretty steady, or has it been often interrupted?—It is often interrupted when they come to invade our country, and there is war between us.

5736. What do you call your country?—Our country is the Fantee country, Cape Coast.

5737. Did they ever acknowledge the authority of the Ashantees?—Some time ago.

5738. In fact, the English took the Fantees from under the sovereignty of the Ashantees, did they not?—Yes; the Ashantees never came to Cape Coast; they never took possession of Cape Coast, they used to follow the Fantees, and the Fantees ran to Cape Coast.

0.39.

5739. How long have you carried on this trade as a merchant?—I have carried on trade as a merchant since 1833. In 1830 I was doing business for another; in 1833 I commenced on my own account.

5740. Was that while a company of merchants governed the Gold Coast?—It was during Governor Maclean's time.

5741. Did trade increase much at that time?—Yes.

5742. Has it gone on increasing since in the same way?—No, it has been decreasing on account of the quarrels and disturbances between us and the Ashantees.

5743. You think there was more peace in Governor Maclean's time than there has been since, do you?—Yes, we have had better days.

5744. How do you account for there being greater peace in Governor Maclean's time?—He understood the people better; he settled things quietly with them, and the people also loved him.

5745. You think that the English governors since his time have not understood the natives so well as he understood them, do you?—That is what I think.

5746. In what way have they shown that they do not understand the natives?—I do not know,

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Mr.
H. Barnes.

Mr.
H. Barnes.

18 May
1865.

but perhaps by not going on in the same way as Governor Maclean did; but I do not know much about public business myself.

5747. In what way have the British Government quarrelled with the natives; on what subject have they quarrelled?—Perhaps such as this last case: such as Governor Pine detaining this man, who brought on the quarrel.

5748. You mean detaining the fugitive slave?—Yes; something like that.

5749. Do you think that the English laws and customs are not understood by the natives?—I think so; those who are nearer understand the English better, I think; but the natives in general have their own laws, which are quite different.

5750. Do you think that it would be better if the English did not attempt to set a fugitive slave free?—Will you excuse me answering that question?

5751. Was it the case, that not only trade was better in Governor Maclean's time, but that there was more done in the way of opening up the country by roads and improvements than has been done since?—Yes. Governor Maclean ordered the people themselves to make the roads; he would send word to them, and they would clean the road directly; the roads are kept open from Cape Coast Castle to the river Prah.

5752. Who paid for the making of the roads?—I believe Governor Maclean paid for part of it, but they were made by them for nothing if the governor sent them a gallon of rum, or two gallons of rum, with a soldier.

5753. Did he pay for them by a tax upon the people?—I do not know.

5754. Do you recollect the poll tax?—Yes.

5755. Was that for the purpose of making roads?—It was not in Governor Maclean's time, it was in Governor Hill's time; it was for the purpose of doing all sorts of things which the English could do for their good.

5756. Did they understand that it was particularly for making roads?—No; it was everything that was considered good for the place.

5757. Did Governor Maclean put on any particular tax for the making of roads?—Not that I know of.

5758. Do you think that the natives would be willing to pay for the making and repairing of roads now?—I do not know.

5759. Do you think that the making of roads is a very important thing for the Gold Coast?—I do.

5760. Why do you think so?—Because even the natives themselves should make their own roads, and roads are always good every where.

5761. Where roads have been made, in what sort of carts do they carry their goods?—They cut a road open, but they never make it smooth enough for carriages.

5762. Then, how is the trade brought down to the coast?—The goods are carried on the top of their heads.

5763. When the roads are made, do they alter that?—No; they still carry things on their heads; they have no beasts of burden or carriages.

5764. Lord Stanley.] A horse will hardly live there, will he?—They die very quick, but I think that that is from the want of looking well after them.

5765. Chairman.] Then, how does the making of roads do good, if the natives still carry things on their heads?—They must have roads to go through.

5766. You mean paths, not roads for things on wheels?—Yes, that is what I mean.

5767. Have the chiefs themselves in any case made roads?—When they made roads they only cut away the bush, but in course of time it grows up again, and then the footpath is left, but when a proper road is made they would like it.

5768. Lord Stanley.] If you do open a road you have perpetually to go on clearing it, because it would not keep itself open for six months, would it?—It grows very fast; vegetation grows very fast from the rains.

5769. Mr. Henry Scymour.] A macadamised road would be permanent, I suppose?—Yes.

5770. Chairman.] Do you think that the British Government has done much good to the natives and chiefs in the neighbourhood?—Yes.

5771. In what way; has it kept them more at peace among themselves, do you think?—Yes; when anybody has done anything wrong, they are always fined and punished; that keeps the country in order; we are certainly very much obliged to the English.

5772. What do you think has been the cause of the different Ashantee wars, generally speaking?—One was in 1807, when a sergeant was killed, and that brought on Sir Charles MacCarthy's war.

5773. What was the cause of that war?—It was a sergeant at the fort quarrelling with an Ashantee trader. The Ashantee trader happened to say something against his Majesty in England, and the sergeant returned the same to the King of Ashantee. The King of Ashantee sent directly to cut his head off, and that brought on a quarrel, for Sir Charles MacCarthy would not allow his sergeant's head to be cut off in that manner.

5774. Was it not that the English upheld the Fantees against the Ashantees?—Yes.

5775. Do you think that the Fantees could defend themselves against the Ashantees, if the English did not help them?—No, I think not.

5776. Do you think that all those tribes depend upon the English, and could not hold their own against the Ashantees without our help?—I do not think they could do very well without the English.

5777. What do you think would be the consequence if the English left the Gold Coast?—I do not know, but I do not think that the Ashantees would beat the Fantees this time. We are very strong now; but if the English go away from us just now, our people are not unanimous, and that is the cause why the Ashantees would give us a great deal of trouble, but they would never destroy us as they did before.

5778. The Fantees are not unanimous, you say?—Yes; the chiefs will not join together, and they go against each other, and that will disturb the country, and they will never be happy.

5779. And you think that the presence of the English prevents their quarrelling, do you?—Yes.

5780. Are the Fantees good friends with the tribes above the Volta?—No, they are too far.

5781. Would they be likely to quarrel, or would they not quarrel, do you think?—No, they would never quarrel; they are too distant.

5782. Have you traded on your own account all this time?—I used to trade with Messrs. Forster & Smith; but when I found that I was losing money, and that I could trade a little on my own account, I began, as I am now, on my own account.

Mr.
H. Barnes.
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5783. Are there many native merchants there, trading on their own account?—There are some.

5784. Are there more than there used to be?—Yes, I think so.

5785. Were you the first native merchant who traded there on his own account?—Perhaps I was the first at Cape Coast, but I cannot say as to the whole of the Fantee country. I may be the first trading with Messrs. Forster & Smith.

5786. But now you are not trading as a commission agent for anybody else, but entirely on your own account?—Just so.

5787. Is trade thriving?—No; when the path is open, trade will be better; but when it is shut, we do very little.

5788. It depends on peace being kept, does it?—Yes.

5789. If the English left the coast, do you believe that there would be any more slave trade?—I am afraid that there would, because the English keep them from doing anything of the kind.

5790. In what part of the Gold Coast is there the largest trade?—I think Cape Coast is the head quarters. Formerly there used to be a trade at Accra, when Mr. Bannerman and Mr. Hanson were there, and Mr. Reuter; but now Cape Coast is the largest.

5791. You think that your trade would not be very safe if the English went away?—We would like to have the English with us.

5792. Lord Alfred Churchill.] What would you do if the English went away; would you give up your trade?—No; I would not give up my trade exactly, but we would rather that the English did not go away.

5793. You think that they give you protection, do you?—Yes.

5794. Do you think that the Ashantees would interfere the whole of the protectorate?—If the English went away; they are not so strong as they used to be, but they would give us trouble.

5795. Which would interfere with trade?—Yes, because we trade with the Ashantees.

5796. Are the Ashantees very desirous of trading with England?—Yes, they seem to like England much, only this war disturbs the peace.

5797. Could you suggest any means by which the trade with the Ashantees might be promoted?—I think, by giving us a good governor, who would do something like Governor Maclean, and keep peace with the Ashantees as well as the Fantees; a governor that would take care of us as he used to do.

5798. Have you never had a governor who did that except Governor Maclean?—I cannot say that.

5799. You think that to have a good governor is the principal thing?—Yes, I do.

5800. Will bullocks live on the Gold Coast?—Yes.

5801. Are there any carts or carriages there?—Gentlemen sometimes have one to go in, pulled by men; but we have none drawn by bullocks.

5802. Bullocks are used all over the interior, are they not?—We do not train them up ourselves; we do not know how.

5803. But can they live there?—Yes; there are plenty of them.

5804. A little way in the interior of the country there are chiefs that have cavalry soldiers on horseback, are there not, and not very far off?—Yes, at the back of Ashantee.

5805. The Fantees formerly obeyed the Ashantees, did they not?—Yes.

5806. And some of your first allies came from the neighbourhood of the Volta, the Akkum people, did they not?—Yes.

5807. You think that you could beat the Ashantees again, do you?—Yes, I think so, if all the people agreed; but if they quarrel against each other, we shall not.

5808. Do you think that your people are improving, are better educated, are better traders, and are better off?—Yes, with the aid of the English.

5809. If roads were made your people would know one another better and have more commerce, you think?—Yes.

5810. Roads are a good work in your country, you think?—Very much.

5811. The paths are so narrow that you cannot go along?—We do not like it at all; sometimes we want to walk, but when we find the roads so small, we are forced to go back.

5812. What you want is a good governor?—Yes. We want a good governor and plenty of good roads.

5813. A governor who understands the people, and who would be willing to make roads?—Yes; but not without a little expense, perhaps.

5814. You think that the people would be willing to contribute to that expense?—I dare say.

5815. Would you be sorry to have the English leave you?—Very sorry.

5816. And you think that it would be to the injury of the country and the people?—Yes.

5817. Lord Alfred Churchill.] Has there ever been any actual fight between the British there and the Ashantees, except that war when Sir Charles Macarthy was killed; has there ever been a fight, I mean, when anybody was killed on either side?—I think that Sir Charles Macarthy's war was the only time.

5818. When anything like fighting took place?—Yes.

5819. Since then there have been threats of fighting, but no actual war?—No.

5820. Mr. Henry Seymour.] Is not it part of our treaty with the King of Ashantee to give up fugitive slaves from his country?—Governor Maclean used to settle like that with them.

5821. But in the treaty was it not so?—Once it was talked about in the Castle, but Governor Pine did not find it in the books.

5822. But when the king asked Governor Pine to give up the fugitive slaves, Governor Pine might very easily have sent them on to Sierra Leone, and then he could not have given them?—Yes; if he had done that it would have been settled without any war.

5823. That was done before by Governor Hill?—Yes, and the King of Ashantee was quite pleased with it, and there was no war.

5824. Lord Alfred Churchill.] Do you think that if a Commission were to visit the King of Ashantee it would lead to good results?—I think it would.

5825. Chairman.] To what good results?—It would bring peace.

5826. Lord Alfred Churchill.] And tend to develop trade?—Yes.

Lunæ, 22^o die Maii, 1865.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Adderley,
Sir Francis Baring.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Buxton.
Mr. Cave.

Mr. William Edward Forster.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Arthur Mills.
Lord Stanley.

THE RIGHT HON. C. B. ADDERLEY, IN THE CHAIR.

The Rev. CHARLES ANDREW GOLLMER, called in; and Examined.

Rev. C. A.
Gollmer.

22 May
1865.

5827. *Chairman.*] YOU went first on the part of the Church Missionary Society to Sierra Leone in 1841?—In the autumn of 1841.

5828. And you returned home in 1848, I believe?—I proceeded from Sierra Leone in the autumn of 1844 to Badagry, and returned from Badagry in 1848; I then proceeded to Badagry in 1850, to Lagos in 1852, and returned from Lagos to England in 1855. I proceeded again to Africa in January 1857, and laboured in Abeokuta until the year 1862.

5829. In fact, from the year 1841 to 1862 you have been connected with missionary operations on the West Coast of Africa?—Yes.

5830. Will you first tell the Committee something of Sierra Leone; what were the operations of the Church Missionary Society during those three years you were in Sierra Leone, namely, from 1841 to 1844?—I may say that I was agreeably disappointed in finding large and good churches full of devout worshippers, the Sunday schools attended by numbers of adults, reading and learning to read; at the day schools the children from five to twelve years old were well forward in their elementary lessons; and again, the observation of the Lord's Day was marked, all abstaining from work, and attending either church or chapel, decently clad, and attentively listening. Also, there was great regard for the missionaries, and assistance was readily given us in the good work, both within and without the Colony.

5831. Had you any agricultural operations, or any other operations besides those of education?—Connected with my station at Bathurst there is a coffee farm belonging to the Church Missionary Society.

5832. Are there any others?—There were a few others in the Colony, but I am not aware of any other connected with the Church Missionary Society.

5833. Were there other missionary societies co-operating with you at that time at Sierra Leone?—There was the Wesleyan Missionary Society.

5834. Any other?—There were a few members of Lady Huntingdon's connection.

5835. Any other?—I do not think so.

5836. Did they co-operate with you in a friendly manner?—Yes, I think we were on friendly terms with them.

5837. Did you make two different schools, namely, a Wesleyan school and a Church school, or did you co-operate?—We had separate schools in most of the stations, and separate churches also.

5838. Can you state what has been the progress of this work in Sierra Leone, since you left in 1844?—I think the progress of the Colony of Sierra Leone might be seen, first, in a religious point of view, by the great increase of native Christians and scholars, and by the superior educational establishments, both for young men and young women, even the classics and the mathematics being taught to young men, and then by their liberal contributions towards the work, they supporting their own churches and schools, and especially by the transfer of the missionary churches and missionary work to native pastors; in 1841 we had but one native pastor, and now we have 12.

5839. Has this work of the superior schools that you speak of, and the self support of the church and schools, and the transfer to native pastorates, all occurred since you left?—Yes, since, I believe, 1856.

5840. What means have you of knowing this?—I have an authenticated return, which, with your permission, I will read.

5841. Will you give the substance of it?—In 1841 the Society had 21 European missionaries and laymen, no native missionaries, 36 native teachers, about 6,000 native Christians, 1,414 communicants, 50 schools, 5,949 scholars. The Church Missionary Society has three fields of labour; Sierra Leone, Yoruba, the Niger. At Sierra Leone the labours of the Society in West Africa commenced in 1805, in the neighbourhood of the Colony; they were transferred to Sierra Leone in 1816. The people were formed into Christian Churches, and were encouraged to give one-halfpenny a week for each adult, towards the expenses of the mission. In 1854 the number of elementary schools supported by the Church Missionary Society was 65, and the number of scholars 5,296. The support of these schools was then wholly thrown upon the people, who raised a large sum as an endowment, which now serves, with the fees of the children, to support the schools. In 1861, the Society supported 12 churches in the Colony, but the support of nine

of these churches was then thrown upon the people who have contributed to the support of their native pastors, whose salaries are from 75*l.* to 120*l.* per annum, and also to the repair of these churches, in all 628*l.* They have also raised as a pastoral aid fund, 50*l.*, making a total of 678*l.* The church population in Sierra Leone, which raises this amount, is 12,000, or less than one-third of the whole population (41,000). The other Christian denominations give equally liberal support to their native pastors; the people pay for the instruction of their boys at a grammar school, numbering about 100, 500*l.* a year; liberal contributions are also made to the British and Foreign Bible Society, and to various local benevolent objects. The Church Missionary Society supports, in Sierra Leone, a theological seminary with five students, a superior female school with 50 scholars, nine European missionaries, and six native ordained assistant missionaries.

5842. That is the state of things at present?—
Yes.

5843. The result of the statement that you have just made is, that the Church Missionary Society of Sierra Leone at this moment, is nearly self-supporting?—Yes.

5844. Both the churches and schools?—Yes.

5845. And there is a fund for the native pastorate which is gradually increasing?—Yes.

5846. Will you now state what are the operations of the Church Mission in any other part of the Colony of Sierra Leone?—There is a mission on the Bullom shore.

5847. What is the Society doing on the Bullom shore?—I am not prepared to give particulars with regard to that mission.

5848. Is there a Church Missionary station at Quiah?—Not at present.

5849. Nor at Sherboro?—Nor at Sherboro; but in the Timmanee country there is one.

5850. Do you know whether the inhabitants of Bullom speak a different language from those of Sierra Leone?—The language of Sierra Leone is English; the language in Bullom is partly Timmanee, and partly Soussou.

5851. What operations have the Church Missions in other parts of the West Coast of Africa?—In the Yoruba country, Badagry, Lagos, Abbeokuta, and Ibadan, we have missions.

5852. When did they first extend their mission to the Yoruba country?—In the autumn of 1844; we proceeded from Sierra Leone to Badagry, with the intention to proceed to Abbeokuta, but we were detained on the coast for 18 months.

5853. What is your present establishment at Abbeokuta?—The Yoruba Mission was commenced in 1844; it now comprises three chief stations; Lagos, Abbeokuta, Ibadan, and various out-stations, 12 European missionaries, 5 native ordained missionaries, 42 other native teachers; native Christians between 4,000 and 5,000, communicants 1,054, 16 schools and 895 scholars. The contributions of the native Christians to religious and benevolent objects amount to more than 150*l.* per annum. The people of Lagos pay for the instruction of their boys at a grammar school, 25 in number, about 100*l.* a year. The Society supports a theological seminary at Abbeokuta, where the people are taught English mathematics, and the Greek Testament.

5854. Sir Francis Baring.] When you speak of the people of Lagos, do you mean the natives?—Yes, the natives.

5855. Chairman.] It is in this part of the Church Missionary Society's operations that you

have worked recently?—From 1852 to 1855, and until 1862.

5856. How were the first operations of the Church Missionary Society in this part of the world received by the natives?—We were well received; and as the result of the beneficial effect upon the Colony of Sierra Leone, I may state that some of the liberated Africans return to their native country, and state what kindness they have received from the English, and then the chiefs and people say, "Let these white people come to us; they are your friends and our friends;" especially the King of Abbeokuta said that. When we arrived at Badagry we were well received. Soon the influence of the slave traders attempted to turn us out, but by the remonstrances of Captain Yorke, of the "Albatross," we were enabled to maintain our position.

5857. Who were those slave traders who attempted to turn you out?—It was principally Domingo Martinez, who was turned out from Lagos and went over to the Brazils, returned and wished to settle at Badagry; but he stated that so long as the English flag flew at Badagry he could not settle there, and he subsequently removed to Porto Novo.

5858. What is your own particular station in this Yoruba Mission?—Ikichi, at Abbeokuta.

5859. That is Mr. Townsend's station is it not?—No; Mr. Townsend's station is at Abbeokuta.

5860. Is Mr. Townsend the head of the Yoruba Church Mission?—Yes, because he has been there the longest.

5861. Are you equally in communication with the Sierra Leone Mission, or is there a chief of the out mission at Yoruba?—We consider ourselves equal; but Mr. Townsend has been there the longest.

5862. Generally speaking, the chiefs and people were friendly to your settling, but the slave traders opposed to it?—The natives were very friendly, especially in Abbeokuta; in 1846 this Domingo Martinez sent messengers to Abbeokuta to open the road, and to persuade them to send down slaves. Mr. Townsend and Mr. Crowther availed themselves of this opportunity to proceed to Abbeokuta, but the messengers of the slave trader represented that the missionaries were poor white men, but that the slave traders would supply them with anything they desired. The chiefs decided that those poor white men should be received because they belonged to the English nation, who had liberated their children and allowed them to return to their native country free of expense.

5863. This mission began before there was even an English consul at Lagos, did it not?—Yes.

5864. So that your missions had experience of that country before there was any consulate, since there has been a consulate, and since the consulate has been turned into a government?—Yes.

5865. Now, which of those three states of things did the mission thrive most in: when there was neither consul nor governor, when there was a consul, or when there was a governor at Lagos?—At first we had great difficulty, and we needed the protection of the squadron; that is to say, on the coast; but when my friends proceeded to the interior, to Abbeokuta, they were perfectly secure; more so than I was on the coast.

5866. What years do you speak of?—From 1845 to 1850.

5867. Who were your friends on the coast?—I was the only representative of the Church

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Missionary Society at Badagry, but there was a Wesleyan missionary there.

5868. Had you ever at Badagry to ask the protection of the fleet?—Yes, on more than one occasion; in fact, it was decided that we should be requested to leave. Some friends told us, and I had just time to write to Captain Yorke, and he most kindly came immediately, and asked the chiefs whether we resided at Badagry with their consent, and they said yes; he asked them whether we troubled them at all, and they said no; he said, "I only tell you they are British subjects, and if you trouble them you trouble the Queen; I am sent to protect the subjects of Her Majesty, and if you injure any of those people I shall come and punish you for it."

5869. After there was a consul established at Lagos in 1851, did the mission find additional protection from the consul's presence?—After taking possession of Lagos, there was of course a transition from a prosperous and lucrative slave trade to lawful commerce, with its comparatively small and slow remuneration. This transition was connected with difficulties, and very soon the slave trade went down; but after the British forces were removed, they endeavoured to regain their position at Lagos, which created some disturbances; then it was very desirable that there should be an adviser of the king and Native Government. I represented the matter to Admiral Bruce, and also the importance of Lagos, and he sent shortly afterwards a vice-consul, but I am sorry to say that he was not the right man in the right place. The King of Dahomey had asked him to leave his territory, for some reasons, and at Lagos he sided rather against the king and the Native Government than supported him, so that Admiral Bruce had to remove him again.

5870. What date was that?—That was in the latter part of 1852.

5871. That was the date when this vice-consul sided against the native king?—Yes, the latter part of 1852 or the beginning of 1853. Then, in 1853, we received a consul who was a more experienced man, namely, Mr. Campbell; and at the request of Captain Gardner, of the "Water Witch," I received him into my house, and he was my guest, with his secretary, for five weeks. I was only too thankful to be relieved of all those political troubles; and I pointed him out as Her Majesty's representative in all matters of dispute, and things went on favourably. After the first uneasiness, and the attempt of Kosoko to re-establish himself at Lagos, tranquillity was restored to a great degree, and also commerce gradually flourished; the roads to Abeokuta were opened, and abundance of provisions, palm oil, and cotton came down; and this state of things lasted until my return in 1855.

5872. Who did you find was the consul when you came back in 1855?—Consul Brand and Consul Hand; Consul Foote was the last.

5873. Did Consul Foote keep things in order?—We considered Consul Foote a very suitable man; a man of experience and energy. The roads to Abeokuta were gradually opened as the first results from his administration.

5874. Consul Foote came from Abeokuta to Lagos, did he not?—Yes, he visited Abeokuta.

5875. How long did things go on under Consul Foote?—He was very soon removed.

5876. Generally speaking, from that period until the English assumed the government, did the consulate satisfactorily keep the peace?—As far

as my knowledge goes, it did; we had always tranquillity, at least as much tranquillity as could be expected in a country like that.

5877. More so than since you have had a British Government at Lagos?—I am sorry to say that since Lagos has become a colony, we seem to have had more troubles.

5878. How do you account for that; do you account for it by the different position the English have assumed in undertaking the government?—In former years the consul desired to have magisterial power, which we felt the want of very much; if they had had it we might have done well, but perhaps at present there is a little too much power.

5879. Do you believe that Docemo could have been maintained in his government with only a British consul at Lagos?—Yes, I quite believe so; because the British consul was always supported by Her Majesty's naval officers. In 1852 when Consul Campbell was at my house, and Kosoko with thousands of his followers was going to take Lagos, Admiral Bruce was sent with some gunboats to protect us.

5880. What are your actual missionary stations now at Lagos?—One at Lagos, one at Abeokuta, and one at Ibadan.

5881. Is there one at Badagry?—That is considered an out-station.

5882. Is there one at Porto Novo?—No, we have not been able to occupy it, because it was in possession of the French; the French declined to receive the missionaries.

5883. Is there a missionary station at Palma or Leckie?—No.

5884. We understand that the mission in this part of the world having its head quarters at Abeokuta has not harmoniously co-operated with the British Government at Lagos; can you explain how that is?—I can only say that the missionaries have always been and are anxious to support the Government in all good measures.

5885. Is it that the mission find, or believe they find, that the operation of the British Government thwarts their missionary proceedings?—The operations of the British Government do not thwart us; they support our missions; but there are certainly sometimes misunderstandings arising from various causes.

5886. From one cause or the other, should you say that you got on better with the British Consul than you have with the British Government at Lagos?—I came away almost before the British governor arrived; but there were some difficulties at first, when Governor Freeman arrived. He thought that the Native Government of Abeokuta should at once come and pay him homage. The Assembly said, "We have not heard of your arrival." According to the etiquette of the country, they are always told by messenger or letter; and Governor Freeman, unfortunately, thought that the missionaries ought to have told the king that it was his duty to send a deputation to pay him due respect.

5887. So that the misunderstandings have been partially on points of etiquette between the governor and the king?—Yes. It is my opinion that if the governor had stooped a little he would have conquered simply by following the etiquette of the country; they are very particular in that respect. They were quite ready to receive him with honours.

5888. Do you think there is a feeling that the occupation of Lagos by the British was a violent proceeding?—

proceeding?—I am afraid it created a great suspicion that the next step would be that Abbeokuta would be annexed also. They argued thus: first, the English sent a consul to Lagos, and they sent a governor, and deposed Docemo. Then, when Consul Taylor was sent to Abbeokuta, they said, "Now the English want to do the same thing with Abbeokuta;" but that simply arose because they were not properly informed of our intentions; and that respect which they had expected had not perhaps been paid to them.

5889. Do you think, then, that civil war might have been avoided?—The Government might have done a great deal towards it, if not avoided it; but it began before Governor Freeman arrived. I think he might, by timely means, have prevented it, or that he might have done much to prevent it.

5890. As it is, there is a very bitter feeling which has sprung up between the towns, which, under the influence of missionary proceedings, in the former state of things, had been at peace one with the other?—Yes, quite so.

5891. Were you in the country when Porto Novo was bombarded?—Yes. I visited Porto Novo in 1845, and obtained permission from the king to make an establishment at that time, but our society had not sufficient men.

5892. What do you understand to have been the ground on which the town of Porto Novo was bombarded?—Commodore Wilnot was the first officer who went up from Lagos, passing Badagry, to Porto Novo, to make a treaty with the King of Porto Novo. On his second mission he succeeded in making the treaty; however, subsequently, they disregarded that treaty; in fact, they were guilty of a breach of the treaty, as far as I am aware.

5893. Was a breach of the treaty the ground on which the bombardment took place?—I believe the principal reason was because the King of Porto Novo would not open the road by the river, to allow commerce to come down to Lagos.

5894. Did you say that Porto Novo is now in the French occupation?—It was.

5895. But is it now?—I understand that it is not under the British protectorate; it is left alone for the present. Governor Glover has recently asked the king to shut up his creek for commercial transactions, in order to effectually blockade Abbeokuta, and the king, in simply a friendly way, has promised to do so.

5896. I suppose that you have heard the recent news of the defeat of the Abbeokutans with the assistance of the English?—Yes.

5897. Do you think that that opens a prospect of peace now?—I am afraid not.

5898. Why not?—In the first place, it is well known all over the country that the King of Abbeokuta has been sincerely attached to England for 20 years, and that he has received all Englishmen, Consul Beecroft, all the other consuls, and Her Majesty's officers. Captain Brice was sent as commissioner, and he said that he had the whole population of 100,000 people at his little finger's end. All the missionaries were kindly received, and friendly relations were existing all this time. Now all at once those very friends of ours have been defeated in this way, and it will have, I am afraid, a very bad effect, not only on those very friends but on others also; because a short time ago the King of Jebu argued in this way—the Government of Lagos has destroyed one

town, and to-morrow, perhaps, it may destroy another.

5899. You think that the tendency of the late victory will be rather to keep up a disturbed state of things?—It would have been much better if those different parties could have been reconciled by pacific measures, which I think, by perseverance, might have been effected.

5900. You have had experience in this part of the world for 20 years; do you consider the disturbed state of things during the last 10 years has undone, to a great extent, your work during the first 10 years?—Very much. We have lost several stations. Our work has been contracted, and we have been hindered in various ways.

5901. What should you say is now the result of your 20 years' work upon the natives?—The change is a very great one; it may be seen in many respects.

5902. Will you tell us the leading points in which you have succeeded?—It may be seen by approaching the large city of Abbeokuta, which Captain Burton says is 20 miles round, and is now surrounded by a much better wall. Then the streets are improved, and some even may be used for carts; then there is an improvement in the houses of some of the natives and chiefs, who have begun to copy our European residences by making doors and windows, and otherwise. Also, it may be seen inside their houses; they have more comforts, and they have a little furniture; they are better clad.

5903. Do they begin to dress like Europeans?—Many do; not the heathens, but those who come in connection with Europeans, such as missionaries and merchants; formerly no one was allowed umbrellas or shoes, but now it is universal almost.

5904. What information can you give the Committee with regard to many of the good effects of your mission upon the conduct of the natives; are human sacrifices and kidnapping less common?—When we first arrived at Abbeokuta in 1840, there was kidnapping; in fact, they had no commerce except the slave trade; they could not obtain any European merchandise but for slaves; but when lawful commerce was established at Badagry, and they carried the produce down to the coast on their heads, and they got European goods, kidnapping gradually decreased, and a few years ago there was scarcely any kidnapping whatever, or scarcely any exportation or selling of slaves; they have learnt to know that it is more profitable to keep the slaves on the farms than to sell them.

5905. The demand for slaves having fallen off, and another commerce having sprung up, were the two causes, you think?—Yes; the price of slaves was enhanced 300 per cent. during my time in Abbeokuta.

5906. Was that caused by the check given to the slave trade?—Yes, partly by the check to the slave trade, but especially by the legitimate commerce in palm oil and other things; they have given themselves to attend to commerce as a nation. In 1846 they could only cultivate the produce of the ground around their towns on account of the insecurity, and because they had no markets; but now they have farms for miles and miles, and there is abundance of produce of every description.

5907. What is the produce?—Cotton is indigenous, and has been cultivated extensively. During these recent difficulties we might have received thousands of bales of cotton; a large quantity

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quantity of palm oils and vegetable oils; beniced oil and another superior oil. Then they have the shea butter and indigo.

5908. Have human sacrifices diminished?—The first 15 years we were there we had not heard of any human sacrifice, so much so that we believed it had never been practised among them; but during those recent difficulties it has occurred on several occasions among the heathens, to appease their gods.

5909. Do you mean that the disturbances of the civil war have led to the sacrifice of captives taken in war?—They were not captives taken in war. On one occasion I found that the sacrifice was bought; a slave from the interior was purchased for the purpose; prisoners of war are made domestic slaves or sold.

5910. What has been your success in this part of your mission in the way of educating the people, and teaching them to read and write?—We have been, I may say, very successful; 20 years ago we had not even an alphabet, now we have the whole of the Old Testament and a great part of the New Testament, a Prayer-book of the Church of England, and a hymn book and other school books, translated and printed, which many of the natives can read. Our Sunday schools are attended by most of the adult population who are converts, and who are anxious not only to read the Yoruba language, but also the English language. Our day schools are attended by native children, and we instruct them in Yoruba and English.

5911. Are there many native languages or only one?—The Yoruba language is spoken by 5,000,000 people all round Abbeokuta, which is the capital of one tribe of the Yoruba country.

5912. If you get a missionary to understand that one language he can work in any part of this mission, can he?—He can go five days to the west, to the border of Dahomey; six days to the east, to the King of Ijaye; he can go up to the borders of the Niger; all the people speaking the same language, with very little difference of dialect.

5913. Do you believe that your preachers make themselves understood?—Thoroughly so; we have been preaching in Yoruba for many years. All our services, and prayers, and hymns are in the Yoruba language.

5914. How far have you succeeded in obtaining native agents in this part of your mission?—We have selected from our native converts native agents in the capacity of Scripture readers, and without knowing any English they have been a very valuable help to us.

5915. Can you state that you have observed any difference in the habits of the natives in this part of your mission owing to your work there; have they become more industrious, moral, and honest?—There is a very great difference manifest in every respect between the heathen and the converted Christian.

5916. In what point?—We have converts who have been great kidnappers, murderers, and drunkards, breaking almost every law; they have been reclaimed, and they are now sober, truthful, and honest men, and an honour to society.

5917. Do you find them tolerably intelligent?—Very much so; some more than others.

5918. And capable of education?—Perfectly so.

5919. What should you say of them compared with the natives and the liberated negroes of the same race in Sierra Leone?—The only difference

is this; that they have, I may say, an English education in Sierra Leone, and they are, in some respects, a little more refined; but in other respects our converts in Abbeokuta are superior, being instructed in their own language.

5920. Do you attempt no English education in Abbeokuta?—Yes, we teach both English and Yoruba in the schools, and some of our adults even read the English Bible, but many of them not understanding a word of English, we must, of course, use the native language.

5921. You are aware that many evil reports have been circulated against the Sierra Leone natives, even those who have been educated in the schools; are they, say, lazy, and more or less dishonest people; do you believe that is a true report?—The Sierra Leone traders and emigrants are of two classes, namely, those who have resided in Sierra Leone for a short time, and have not come under the influence of the Gospel, and have returned to their native country, or other parts of the coast; and again, those who have longer resided in Sierra Leone, but have never given up fully their heathenish practices; now of those it is almost evident that Christian virtues, such as truthfulness, soberness, and honesty, cannot be expected, but in Christian traders, who are worthy of the name, from my 20 years' experience, I say, without hesitation, I do think that they bear a favourable comparison with regard to truthfulness, soberness, and honesty with other European traders, and even some are examples to their better educated and more highly privileged European competitors.

5922. But which has been the most successful system, the more refined system at Sierra Leone, or the native system at Abbeokuta?—The native system at Abbeokuta answers our purpose almost better, because it is superior for our end; our end is to teach them the Word of God, which they understand much better in their own language than our liberated Africans could ever do at Sierra Leone, by means of the English language, of which they understand but little.

5923. We have heard of the Basle Mission being very successful in joining industrial education to their book education on the Gold Coast; have you attempted anything of the sort at Abbeokuta, or Sierra Leone, to any extent?—We have at Abbeokuta. Mr. Townsend has formed a printing establishment, which has been working for years, exclusively by the Abbeokutan natives; at my station we have instructed young men as carpenters; we have young men also instructed in sawing boards, and in other things.

5924. Is it your opinion that in educating the natives, this kind of industrial education should be joined to merely intellectual training?—They should go hand in hand, because our converts require improvement. We require their labour; we require carpenters, sawyers, and builders, and others who are competent, we instruct for native teachers.

5925. Do you get many local contributions towards the Church work in the neighbourhood of Abbeokuta?—The converts are very liberal; we have had Church missionary meetings, and the Wesleyans have also had meetings, and we have received contributions, from 6*s.* up to 30*s.* or 40*s.* apiece, to the amount of 15*l.* or 20*l.* at various meetings; they also give us materials and their labour in building churches and in repairing the churches and mission houses.

5926. Do you hope to make the Abbeokutan Mission

mission self-supporting, as you have made the Sierra Leone mission?—We hope so, very soon; they are already paying for educating their children.

5927. I understand you to say you think that, under the consulate, your mission throve better than under the governorship. Supposing that on the cessation of the slave trade the English withdrew altogether from Lagos, do you think your mission could be maintained without them?—Our mission was carried on in Abbeokuta, unsupported by any Government help.

5928. Except the fleet?—That was on the coast. The fleet could not protect the missionaries three days in the interior. Our friends in Abbeokuta were in perfect safety comparatively, whilst I, on the coast, was exposed to the influence of the slave trade.

5929. So that you were very much in the position then that the mission would be if the English Government were to withdraw altogether?—Yes, with regard to the interior only, that the Government could make its influence felt in the interior, for good or for bad.

5930. Do you think that the Abbeokutan mission could maintain itself if the English withdrew from Lagos?—I believe so; but at the same time the Government might greatly support and help the mission work by friendly intercourse with the natives, and by opening up the country.

5931. In order to do that, do you think their policy must be more conciliatory or more successful than hitherto?—That is my opinion decidedly, because the natives in that country will not be coerced at all; a kind word will go a great way.

5932. Can you give the Committee any information of the missionary establishment on the Niger?—Yes. The Niger mission was commenced in 1837, and has been wholly carried on by native teachers; it now comprises three stations, Akassa, Onitsha, and the Confluence; three native ordained ministers, 11 other native teachers, 170 native Christians, 66 communicants, 3 schools, and 52 scholars.

5933. Was this Niger mission established by the assistance of Mr. McGregor Laird?—Yes, it was established by his assistance; he gave a passage to Mr. Crowther and to the Society's agents.

5934. Mr. Crowther is now the consecrated bishop of all the territories on the West Coast not under the English Government, is he not?—Yes.

5935. Now, with regard to Mr. McGregor Laird, when his connection with the Government ceased, did the Niger mission receive a check?—The natives were very much disappointed; they had no opening to the coast, and consequently they suffered very much from the want of means, the natives not having any market for their produce.

5936. How have the missionaries been received by the chiefs in the neighbourhood?—In a very friendly manner.

5937. Do you suppose that the missionaries require no protection to carry on their mission, and that the only thing they want is means?—Hitherto they have not been molested; but they stand much in need of facilities of communication with either Lagos or Sierra Leone, and then additional protection would of course facilitate their objects.

5938. In case of their requiring protection at this moment, they would naturally resort to the

consul in the Bight of Benin?—Yes; the consul at Fernando Po is the nearest.

5939. They would get through him, if necessary, the protection of the fleet?—Yes, but they have no means of communication.

5940. Are the tribes around them Pagan or Mahomedan?—They are Pagan principally; higher up the country they are Mussulmans.

5941. Comparing the two, which have you found most friendly to your mission?—The Pagans; the Mussulmans are our decided enemies.

5942. Have you had any effect at all on any of the Mussulman tribes?—It is very difficult to gain any of them; they consider themselves superior even to Christians, and on one occasion one of them attempted my conversion.

5943. What are the courts of justice at Abbeokuta?—Abbeokuta is composed of about 130 townships, which about 40 years ago were so many separate towns all over the country, but through the slave trade and slave wars they were destroyed, and the remnant took refuge at Abbeokuta, which means "under the rock;" so called from an enormous block of granite; and so Abbeokuta gradually arose. Those 130 townships have each a separate local establishment; they have a court of law, where the chief of the township resides, and some of his elders and councillors, and one is appointed as judge; cases are regularly heard, witnesses are called in, and evidence taken; fines are imposed, and costs are paid.

5944. Practically speaking, do those native courts of justice administer the law successfully?—Successfully in their way, it answers their purpose.

5945. As between the natives which was, in your opinion, the most successful administration of justice; that of the native courts, such as you describe, or that of the British Courts, for instance, at Sierra Leone?—The British Christian Courts must, of course, be very far superior, more desirable, and more improving; they are learning from the Europeans in all those matters.

5946. But it might be possible that the administration of a very superior kind of law might not be so well adapted to the natives, as their own law courts?—Some of the British laws come into conflict with the native manners and customs of course, especially with regard to the holding of slaves as property.

5947. Do you think that at Abbeokuta, merely from what they have heard, they are adopting any of the English laws or proceedings?—The converts have now got such influence, that it is felt in every department. One of the converts is now chief warrior, and he exercises a great influence at Abbeokuta. A great captain of war he is called; the converts are listened to by the native Government, and very often their advice is taken, and peaceable measures are proposed in consequence.

5948. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] What is the nature of the native Government of Abbeokuta; is there any one head?—About 50 years ago there was a regularly constituted Government for the whole of the Yoruba country; all those different provinces were provisional Governments under one great king; they became gradually independent, and so many republics. Abbeokuta was for years a republic, until some few years ago, when they elected a king called Alake, but he died since my return to this country two years ago.

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5949. Is there any king now?—No successor as yet on account of the war.

5950. What is the position of the basharun?—He is now in the place of the viceroy; he is the chief commander both in military and civil matters, being an old chief, and a most influential and powerful chief.

5951. What are the relations between the basharun and the war chiefs on the one side, who have been in the camps, and the chiefs and elders at Abbeokuta on the other?—It is simply the relation between general and colonel; there is a generalissimo, the basharun; but *apena* means the king's counsellor; that was the title given him years ago, when he aspired to be king; to satisfy him, this title was given to him, but he has been captain of war for many years; he has for years been the principal war captain or general; all the other captains are captains of their townships, but they are captains under the basharun.

5952. Are you aware that the Lieutenant Governor of Lagos complains that he can find no one authority to deal with, and that after arranging with the basharun and his war chiefs in camp for a treaty of peace, he has been informed that the elders and chiefs at Abbeokuta are the masters of the basharun, and that his arrangement made with the basharun had been thrown overboard, and his efforts for peace made utterly fruitless?—I am not aware of this particular instance, but it is my experience that the civil ruler may sometimes not only influence but even overrule the decision of the captain of war; in fact in times of peace the captain of war is inferior, he is subordinate to the civil government; those elders are the counsellors of the king, but in time of war, as it is in other countries, the captains of war have the chief authority.

5953. This anomalous kind of government must increase the difficulty of negotiating with the Egbas, must it not?—Quite so.

5954. Will you tell the Committee who the Ogboni are?—So far as I know, they are the counterpart of Freemasons; they are a secret society; no one knows what they are except those who are initiated.

5955. They have great political power, have they not?—Yes, great political power; they know each other by shaking hands with the left hand, and by certain signs; they have to swear to be faithful, but the object is to do good to the country. When we sent some of our messengers to Abbeokuta, the first thing they did was, they seized the man and carried him to their Ogboni house or hall on the hill, and swore him in not to deceive them.

5956. Can you tell the Committee who the *apena* is?—That is the title of the judge; in every court of law there is an *apena*, who, after hearing the evidence, decides, and imposes a fine.

5957. The *apena* would be an authorised high official of the Egba government?—Yes; but they are local magistrates who have a voice in the national council; it is an open assembly where all influential men have a voice and may say something.

5958. Do you know the *apena* of Iloré?—I do not think I do.

5959. Are you aware that the *apena* lately paid a visit to the Lieutenant Governor of Lagos, during which he put forward a claim on the part of the Egbas to the possession of the whole of the territory on the Lagoon?—No, I never heard of that.

5960. That circumstance must have happened since you left?—Yes; but I do not see how the Abbeokutans could make such a claim; they never, in my time, entertained any idea of the kind.

5961. Then, if it has happened, as we are informed in our despatches, you are not aware of it?—No, I am not aware of it.

5962. With regard to the native war between the Egbas and the Ibadans, when did it begin?—I believe it was in 1861, if I am not mistaken, and it arose from some little differences between the King or chief of Ijaye, and the King of Yoruba, and the chiefs at Ibadá; the young king at Oyo felt aggrieved with a chief at Ijaye, who was formerly an officer of his father; he wished him to submit to his authority; then Ibadá had some grievances, the particulars of which I cannot state; they were various; in fact, they can make anything they please a *casus belli*.

5963. Was there not a very peculiar question of succession to the throne, the old party requiring that the elder son should, according to the good old custom, be sacrificed on his father's death, and the reforming party wishing to change that law?—That was the case in former years, but the father of the present king evaded this by removing to this town, where he was now called after the old capital of Oyo; then this old king yielded to his old officer at Ijaye; there were some personal disagreements among them. On the death of the father his son succeeded, and he wished that this old chief should acknowledge him, which the old chief did not do, if I understand rightly.

5964. The war began before the British occupation of Lagos?—Yes.

5965. The occupation of Lagos had no connection with it whatever?—None.

5966. Do you recollect the despatch of Consul Foote, in which he informs the Foreign Office of the beginning of this war, and in which he predicts exactly what has taken place; namely, that it would probably last for several years, desolate the country, and destroy trade?—I am not aware of that.

5967. The River Ogun has been for some time closed to trade, has it not?—It has been open for many years; recently it has been blockaded, or rather closed; the native government at Abbeokuta found it necessary to close it, because many of their young men instead of going to the camp would go down to the coast to trade; and in the end not to frustrate their object in making war, they were compelled to close the road; it was not from any bad feeling against the Europeans, but simply a protective measure on their part.

5968. But the result has been that little or no produce has come down from the interior to Lagos by the river?—Yes.

5969. And that the trade and revenue of Lagos has been seriously injured?—Yes.

5970. You are aware that that being the case, the Government at Lagos has been very anxious to open some other trade road into the interior?—Yes.

5971. And with that view they have endeavoured to open the road by way of Ikorodu and Ibadan?—I am aware of it; I myself, in 1852, subsequently endeavoured to open that road *viâ* Ikorodu to Ibadan; I sent messengers to the king, who was the rightful owner of Ikorodu. When I visited Ikorodu on the first occasion I was received friendly; on the second occasion

I was maltreated by the party connected with the slave traders there, and I could not succeed. Our missionaries in Ibadan endeavoured to open the road peaceably down to the coast, and they could not succeed, because the Jebus never allowed this road to be opened for any one but for themselves. The Ibadans never came down to the coast. The Jebus in former years took European goods, tobacco, rum, powder and muskets, and carried them to Ibadan, purchased slaves and brought them down to Ikorodu, or sold them, or carried them over to Lagos; so they wished to keep this road to themselves.

5972. But the Ibadans are most anxious to get access to the coast and to Lagos by way of Ikorodu, are they not?—I believe that there is a small party of the Ibadans who are anxious to engage in commerce; in fact many of them used to come to Abbeokuta and trade with the Abbeokutans, the Abbeokutan people going to Ibadan and trading with them. But many of the people in Ibadan are warriors; they live principally on war and selling slaves, and they have not been favourable to commerce.

5973. Do you mean to say that the Ibadans would not now be ready to make peace if the Egbas would make it?—We had hoped that peace would be made a short time ago; Governor Glover went to the camp of the Egbas, and was friendly received, and they allowed him to explain himself; he was satisfied with the camp of the Abbeokutans; he said, I will withdraw the protection from Ikorodu or do what you think right, because the Ikorodus have made several attempts on the Abbeokutan camp; they have carried away several hundred people as slaves and killed a good many, especially one superior chief; moreover they have, against the desire of the King of Jebu, assisted the Ibadans in war against Ijaye and the Abbeokutans, and Jebus combined by furnishing them with ammunition, and for those reasons Jebu wished to punish Ikorodu. This was explained to Governor Glover, and (I can only speak from hearsay) he said "Only make haste; only let us have the roads opened and commerce restored."

5974. His great object being to restore peace?—Yes.

5975. Are you aware that the King of Jebu is no longer an enemy of Ikorodu, that the Lieutenant Governor has succeeded in inducing Ikorodu to make submission to its lawful king, and that at present the only enemy of Ikorodu is the Egba army?—I understand that the King of Jebu wishes to be reconciled to Ikorodu.

5976. But are you aware that Ikorodu has been induced by the Lieutenant Governor to make submission to its king, as a step towards the pacification of the neighbourhood?—I have not particulars respecting this.

5977. You have said that the Lieutenant Governor's visit to the Egba camp afforded a good prospect of peace?—Yes.

5978. And that the basharun and war chiefs expressed themselves ready to make peace?—Yes.

5979. But are you aware that that hope was not fulfilled, and that the authorities at Abbeokuta expressed themselves to the Lieutenant Governor in a very different tone?—I was not aware of such a thing; what I heard was, that Governor Glover was disappointed because the Egbas could not take Ikorodu in six weeks, and commerce be established, as he hoped. It is not so easy to take a native town. The war lasting

longer than he hoped was partly the cause in changing his policy.

5980. In short, he failed in his pacific efforts?—I do not know how far peaceful efforts have been made. I have been there two years while the war has lasted, and scarcely anything peaceful was done by the Lagos Governor.

5981. Are you not aware that the Lagos Governor has addressed himself several times to both parties, especially the Egbas, with a view to peace?—Some of the chiefs who very anxiously wished to make peace, were not supported by the Government.

5982. The Government may not have wished to negotiate through private individuals?—I should say that peace, by whomsoever made, whether by the missionaries or the chiefs, or our Government, is desirable.

5983. What object could the Government have had but to restore peace?—I do not believe that they had any other object but peace and commerce; only with the native coercive measures will have a most contrary effect, whilst a kind word, or begging (as they call it), will go a great way only in the presence of the government at Lagos; we could do no more; in fact, it was not our place. The missionaries did as much as they could, till the thing had proceeded too far; but if the Governor had used his authority, I think he might have had more effect.

5984. What coercive measures have been used by the Government of Lagos?—They defeated the Abbeokutans before Ikorodu recently.

5985. Just now?—Yes.

5986. But during the last few years, when the war has been raging, what coercive measures have been used by the government of Lagos?—None against the Abbeokutans, but against the King of Jebu; Epé has been bombarded, and Ijaye has been destroyed.

5987. There was that isolated expedition against Epé; but the King of Ijaye was then the enemy of the Egbas; so that that would have tended to peace, if anything, would it not?—I am not aware that he was an enemy.

5988. But without meaning to imply, or wishing you to imply, that all the acts and words of the government of Lagos were discreet and prudent, you do not doubt that their object was to bring about the pacification of the neighbouring country?—I have no hesitation in saying that the peace of the country and the establishment of commerce was the object.

5989. You are aware that the town of Ikorodu, on the Lagoon, which was on the point of being destroyed by the Egbas, is of very vital importance to the trade of Lagos?—It has been to the slave trade of great importance for many years; and no doubt it might have been made of importance as much as any other town on the coast, simply as a medium of trade from the interior, passing on by water to Lagos, but not more than other towns, I think.

5990. You are aware that the Lieutenant Governor had entirely failed in averting the destruction of Ikorodu, and inducing the Egba army to retire by persuasion?—He gave them first permission to chastise Ikorodu, but subsequently he changed his policy, I believe, because his object in opening the roads was delayed longer than he wished; and I believe the chiefs at Ijaye and others wished him to assist Ikorodu against the

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Abbeokutans, which he did, hoping that he would be successful.

5991. And probably also because he had been successful in bringing about peace between Ikorodu and its lawful king, the King of Jebu?—I am not aware of that.

5992. But in any case his object was to induce them, by threatening the Egba army, to retire from the neighbourhood of the Lagoon?—I believe that was his object, and in order to gain his purpose of opening the road for commerce into the interior of Ibadan.

5993. And probably he was anxious to prevent the triumphant army from establishing itself on the Lagoon close to the colony of Lagos?—That is a moral and physical impossibility; the people of Abbeokuta are too intelligent to commit themselves to such an outrage, and it is physically impossible, because, though they have upwards of 1,000 canoes by which they have brought down palm oil and cotton for many years, they have not a single war canoe; they are not warriors on water; moreover, Lagos is separated from the continent by a large sheet of water, and protected not only by the gunboats but by soldiers, so that nothing less than madness could induce them to make the attempt; it never entered their minds.

5994. Are you aware that nothing would induce the Egbas to spare Ikorodu, and that the basharun gave notice to the Governor that he would stay before it for three years if necessary? I am not.

5995. You are not aware, either, that some of the authorities of Abbeokuta have given the Governor notice that they have very extensive claims indeed on the shore of the Lagoon, including some of the Lagos territory itself?—I never heard of it.

5996. From Porto Novo to Benin?—I never heard of it.

5997. If that has happened, it has been since you left?—I can never understand then, because Lagos was always an independent kingdom; there were only friendly relations between Lagos and Abbeokuta.

5998. Sir Francis Baring.] When were you at Lagos?—From 1852 to 1855.

5999. During that time can you tell me what was the state of Lagos; was life tolerably safe?—At first we had a good many little disturbances on account of the slave traders; they were expelled, and then they gradually stole back again, and they endeavoured to re-establish the slave trade, but by the protection of our ships of war we maintained our position.

6000. But more lately, when you were there after the first difficulties were conquered, was life in danger?—I was never in fear; I was in perfect safety so far as I know.

6001. But were many of the Europeans murdered?—Not one, to my knowledge.

6002. Nor any murderous attack made on them?—Not at Lagos; only one European was murdered, and that was 20 years ago, at Badagry, by some agent of the King of Porto Novo, at an isolated station on the coast.

6003. Now, with regard to trade. Trade was very much checked by the putting an end to the slave trade, but it gradually rose, I suppose?—At first there was no legitimate commerce at all; but I remember when a Hamburg merchant bought the first oil at Lagos, and the first bale of cotton; and an English merchant kicked it away in my presence as not worthy of notice,

because they had more oil than they could take; but this Hamburg merchant said he would take it, and see what could be done to encourage it; so gradually legitimate commerce increased.

6004. Was that improvement in commerce afterwards or before Kosoko was removed by the English squadron?—We had a good deal of legitimate commerce at Badagry; then the Ogun was blockaded by Kosoko, and they could not make use of that river; there was no one at Lagos who would buy either cotton or oil, or any produce, but the Abbeokutans carried their produce on their heads, in caravans of 500, protected by an armed escort, down to Badagry. There were English and native merchants who bought oil and other produce until the year 1852, when Lagos was taken.

6005. Was the trade of Badagry removed to Lagos?—Very much of it was removed to Lagos.

6006. Now, with regard to the courts of justice, it has been stated that there was no getting justice at Lagos; do you agree with that statement?—I had never any cause to appear in any court of justice, so I cannot say; but I never had any complaint to make of not getting redress.

6007. But did you ever hear any just complaint of decisions being bought and sold?—I have heard of complaints, but whether those complaints were just or unjust I am not prepared to say, because there are always two sides to a question.

6008. Did the consul interfere in cases where there was injustice done to the British?—The consul generally strongly recommended the king to see justice done.

6009. In case a British subject was injured, the consul would feel it his duty to interfere, would he not?—Quite so. I am not aware of one instance where any European has been injured, where he has not got redress more or less.

6010. That is to say, where he was entitled to redress?—Yes.

6011. Now, with regard to the slave trade (whether it was Akitoye or Docemo), do you believe that they encouraged or connived at the slave trade?—Not during my time. After Lagos was taken, in 1852, there was only one instance where an European, of the name of Amade, conjointly with a native, was guilty of a breach of the treaty with regard to conniving at the slave trade; they sent in a canoe of 20 slaves to Domingo Martinez, to Porto Novo; but the King of Porto Novo, being friendly with King Akitoye, sent to inform him of what had taken place. The king then consulted me about it; I said, "You have the senior officer, tell him what has taken place." He did so; the senior officer recommended him to expel the European and to fine the native, which was done accordingly. This was considered gross injustice, and many complained of expelling the European; but the king was bound to keep the treaty. I am not aware of any other instance of the slave trade, or conniving at the slave trade, in my time at Lagos.

6012. They did not fine the European?—They expelled him from the country.

6013. You have been asked whether those liberated African boys educated at Sierra Leone were not bad labourers; now, what do you say of the Europeans settled on the coast: perhaps

it would be pleasanter for you if I read you an extract, and asked you if you thought it a false statement or a true one: "The absence of all moral restraint, the temptations to dishonest and unfair dealing which exist in trading with ignorant natives, and the pernicious influences of the slave trade, have all contributed to produce a very loose standard of moral character amongst the mercantile agents established on certain parts of this coast. There are no doubt many honourable exceptions to this rule, but officers of long experience on the station have testified to the frequent scandals caused by the want of principle and disregard of honesty shown by many of the resident traders, and to the mischievous effects produced thereby upon the mind of the natives by encouraging them in dishonest practices, and by debasing in their eyes the character of the English merchant." Are you prepared to contradict that?—I am sorry to say that my experience coincides with much that has been now stated by you.

6014. Now, with regard to this war with Abbeokuta and Ibadan, do you remember Captain Bedingfield going to Abbeokuta?—Yes.

6015. That was very soon after 1861, was it not?—Yes, I saw him there.

6016. He has written an account of his interview with the authorities of Abbeokuta?—Yes.

6017. It is dated 16th November 1861, and is written from Lagos: "The war palaver is still, I fear, far from being brought to a finish, as they seem about equally matched, and without some intervention neither party like to give in. Their statement of the commencement and progress of the war seems to be straightforward, as far as one can judge, hearing one side only. They state that they have been always anxious for peace; that it was not until after the Ibadans had taken two or three of their towns in their endeavour to form a junction with Dahomey, with the declared intention that as soon as they had conquered the Ijees they would come on to attack Abbeokuta; that they were driven in common prudence to take the field, and that they have come to the determination to drive the Ibadans beyond their limits, in order that they may live in security, and return to their peaceful occupations. There is no doubt, I think, that the King of Dahomey has much to do with the war; he sends large presents to the Ibadans and also Ijees; the latter informed the Abbeokutans of the fact, and that Dahomey's army marched out the last dry season to join the Ibadans, if possible, in order to attack Abbeokuta; they were prevented by a severe visitation of small-pox, obliging them to return." Does your recollection agree with that?—That quite coincides with what I have heard from the authorities in Abbeokuta.

6018. Do you believe, in fact, that the Ibadans were in communication with Dahomey and receiving money from him to attack the Abbeokutans?—It is so stated, and messengers have been reported as having been seen at Ibadan at the time.

6019. Now, to come a little later, I believe Governor Glover went to the Egba camp and made certain arrangements with the Egbas; what were those engagements or promises?—Permit me rather to refer this question to my colleague, who was at Abbeokuta at the time, the Rev. Mr. Bühler, who is present. I was not on the spot.

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6020. We have had some evidence about the want of attention to agriculture; have the Colonial Government done anything in the way of promoting agriculture that you know of?—I am not aware that any encouragement has been given.

6021. Do you not think that it might be beneficial if the Government were to provide in some way or other the agriculture of the country by the introduction of new plants?—My observations only refer to Lagos. I quite believe that great assistance and encouragement might be given to agriculture in general.

6022. Do you happen to have the opinion of Sir William Hooker by you?—Yes. I have here an extract of a letter from Sir William Hooker to the Rev. Henry Venn, dated 24th March 1865, in which he says: "You state most correctly that all attempts to introduce useful plants have failed for want of a model farm and botanical garden. I have, first and last, often at great expense, sent Wardian cases, filled with rare and commercial plants, by Queen's ships, merchants, and the West African mail steamers; literally *all* to no purpose, for want of knowing how to manage them." The missionaries have no time to attend to those things; the merchants do not think it their province, and there is no one else to do it.

6023. Do the merchants subscribe much to your schools, and to objects of that kind?—We do receive a contribution now and then; some of them have been liberal.

6024. Those resident in the settlement, I mean; I do not mean the merchants in England?—No, in Sierra Leone especially, and a few at Lagos; I have myself received contributions; and at Abbeokuta also.

6025. Having lived there a long time, what do you say with regard to the future prospects of civilizing Africa: do you consider that it should be done by European settlements, or should it be done, I do you think, by enabling the negro himself to become independent and to govern himself?—I think they require simply to be educated; they themselves are quite ready for civilization, especially those tribes whom I have come into contact with.

6026. Do you think that the Abbeokutans, for instance, are able to manage their own affairs, without having a consul or a governor, to order them about?—They have managed their own affairs for many years; but a judicious and experienced consul no doubt might give them good advice, and direct their attention to various channels of commerce, and other things, which would greatly improve them.

6027. That is, confining himself to advice, and not giving orders?—Advice sometimes in a consul amounts to orders.

6028. When the occupation of Lagos took place in 1861, was the result of it such as to produce a very bad effect at Abbeokuta, and do you think that it extended to any considerable distance; has it produced a want of confidence in British good faith, and an impression that England was inclined to take possession of those points on the coast which might benefit their trade, without much reference to humanity or anything else; I do not ask you whether that was a right or wrong impression, but was that impression confined to Abbeokuta, or did it extend elsewhere?—I am not aware that it extended beyond Abbeokuta, not having any intercourse with other influential tribes in the interior; Abbeokuta

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beokuta was, as it were, shut up at the time; but we knew that the native government at Abbeokuta were very much afraid that they would one day lose their own country, and that was partly the reason why Consul Taylor was not received; partly because they had not, as they said, been properly informed.

6029. They are very particular about all matters of form?—They are very particular about them, especially in time of war.

6030. Have you any correspondence with the missionaries at Abbeokuta?—Yes, I receive frequent letters.

6031. Have you received any letters since this last news?—No, no letter has arrived; the mail was not allowed to go up to Abbeokuta by proclamation, and no mail was allowed to come down, so we only received a line somehow.

6032. Have you got a copy of that correspondence?—I have here a copy of a letter to the Colonial Secretary of Lagos, requesting a pass for the Abbeokuta mail box.—“Lagos, 25th March 1865. Sir,—On the arrival of the mail steamer from England, I am in the habit of sending a box with letters and newspapers in it, to the missionaries of the Church Missionary Society resident in Abbeokuta. This mail steamer has doubtless brought a double supply in consequence of the loss of the mails on board of the ‘Armenian.’ I beg, therefore, to apply through you for a permit for the mail box to pass the blockade lately established by this Government between Lagos and Abbeokuta. The mail box is locked by me here, and I keep the key (another key being in the possession of the Reverend H. Townsend), so that nothing can be put in after it leaves me. Should it be so required, I will undertake that no communications except those by the mail steamer shall be forwarded in the box, and I will strictly charge the bearer to take no others on peril of the penalties of breaking the blockade,—I am, Sir, your very obedient servant, James A. Lamb, Missionary, C. M. S. To H. T. Usher, Esq., Colonial Secretary.”—The reply is, “Government House, Lagos, 25th March 1865. My dear Mr. Lamb,—I have laid your application before the Governor, who states that the bearer of the mail box, if caught on the road, will receive three dozen, and the letters will be confiscated,—faithfully yours, H. T. Usher, Acting Colonial Secretary. The Reverend James A. Lamb, Church Missionary.”

6033. Is that the usual style of the office, or is it a style peculiarly applied to ministers of religion?—I am unable to say; I have had no experience in that respect.

6034. Mr. Cave.] How long is the longest period for which an African dynasty lasts?—The old King of Lagos was _____, the father of Akitoye; he had three sons, _____; Kosoko was the son of Eshilogo, and Docemo was the son of Akitoye. King _____ reigned 25 years, the second king was _____, who reigned 10 years; Eshilogo reigned eight years, _____ only reigned six years, _____ four years, Akitoye, 3½ years, and Kosoko, 6½ years.

6035. But was the first man you mentioned, the first of his race?—We cannot trace the history back beyond that.

6036. But is it a common thing for any African kingdom to remain under the same dynasty for a long period?—The Yoruba kingdom, as far as I ascertained from our interpreter, who was resident in the former capital at Oyo, remained for

many many years’ time, till the Fellatahs came from Central Africa and interfered with them.

6037. Is it not the case that under a weak prince, the kingdom generally breaks up?—Very often, as in the case of Kosoko. Akitoye was the rightful king elected by the people. Kosoko, his cousin, was a friend of the slave traders, and so the slave traders supported Kosoko in making war against Akitoye, and expelling him.

6038. If Akitoye was elected by the people, are we to understand that the monarch is an elected monarchy?—It is an elected monarchy.

6039. Entirely?—Yes, entirely by the people; from one branch of the Royal family, not always the eldest son.

6040. The choice must be confined to the Royal family?—It must be confined to the Royal family, on the female side generally.

6041. It is a family dynasty elected within those limits?—Yes.

6042. Chairman.] Is it usually from father to son that the succession passes?—Not always, it may be; here there was first the son of Eshilogo, and then another son; but Kosoko being a bad character, and having been expelled, resided in the Dahomey territory at Whydah. Akitoye being a mild man, and brother of the late king, was then elected as king; Akitoye being a peaceful man, brought Kosoko back from Whydah at great expense. The people at Badagry were so hostile to Kosoko, that they would not allow him to pass to Lagos by the river. Akitoye chartered a vessel at great cost, and brought Kosoko to Lagos, so that all the family should live together in peace; but a few years afterwards Kosoko undermined his authority, and a civil war of 20 days ensued, the slave traders supporting Kosoko. Akitoye, after 20 days’ fight, had no alternative but to escape, and he went to Abbeokuta, and Kosoko established himself.

6043. Mr. Cave.] Then the authority depends more on the personal qualities of the ruler than on the constitution of the country?—Very much; only those of the Royal family are elected, and then they choose the most popular.

6044. Does it never occur that there is no one in the Royal family who is sufficiently vigorous to rule, and that the dynasty passes into some other family?—This has taken place; we have, for instance, cases at Lagos where slaves of intelligence and energy have risen to be captains of war and most powerful in the government, and they may rise to a chieftainship in the place.

6045. A man of that sort would be very likely to break up the old kingdom under which he came into power, would he not?—They have done so in the case of Lagos, because some of the most influential chiefs sided against Akitoye and supported Kosoko.

6046. Does it not happen sometimes that the old kingdom is broken up altogether and becomes a number of petty kingdoms?—That is the case with Yoruba; about 60 years ago Yoruba was a large powerful united kingdom with 5,000,000 subjects, but within the last 40 years those eight provinces have become so many little kingdoms, governing themselves independently of the former great king.

6047. Then there is no reliance whatever to be placed on stability of an African government with regard to time?—Only so far as their locality is concerned; but friendly relations had existed before the recent difficulties between Abbeokuta and Ibadan, between Ijaye and the last extreme of Dahomey, even to the remote east, and if the
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Church Missionary Society had had the men we might have taken possession of the country for many miles north, east, and west; the country was opened and all were anxious for peace and for the white men to reside among them.

6048. Might not all that come to an end in consequence of the different views of some ambitious chief?—It would affect a certain locality; his own locality.

6049. And, as in the case of Yoruba, there would be a very considerable district which would in that way become unsettled?—They being now separate petty kingdoms it would affect them only themselves: for instance, the difficulty at Abeokuta did not affect the little kingdom at Kado, west of Abeokuta, or higher up in the interior.

6050. But if you establish friendly relations with one considerable power, and that power is afterwards broken up into those petty principalities, would you not run the risk of having all those friendly relations disturbed and destroyed?—To a certain degree, that would be so, but a portion of them might still remain friendly, whilst another might become hostile.

6051. Then, would you think the presence of the English settlement would be more likely to preserve those friendly relations under such circumstances, than a number of scattered missionaries or traders?—This would be precisely the result, as we hoped would be the effect by the establishment of the Government at Lagos; we may reasonably expect that.

6052. Have those expectations been fulfilled?—Not as yet, I think.

6053. To what do you attribute that?—To the disputes among the tribes themselves, and then the Government not being able to reconcile the different parties.

6054. Do you consider that is the result of a new settlement, or is it likely to continue as the result of our settlement?—No, it is not necessarily the result of our settlement; on the contrary, we fully expect that there will be peaceable efforts made, and that the whole country may be tranquillised and pacified, and commerce established. I do hope that that will be effected ere long.

6055. You would attribute that result to the natural mistakes made in conducting a new settlement?—Perhaps it is owing partly to the want of experience and the misunderstandings attending the first establishment of a settlement.

6056. Then you do not think that the abandonment of the settlement would lead to a better state of things?—I do not think it is necessary to abandon the settlement in order to attain the pacification of the country. I think that the country would either remain in its disturbed condition, if the Government were to withdraw, or on the other hand, I believe the Government may take measures in order to bring peace about among the different tribes.

6057. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] What would be the nature of the measures that you would recommend the government of Lagos to take for that purpose?—I would recommend, if I were consulted, pacific measures; to remonstrate and entreat them, because they are open to reason.

6058. *Chairman*.] Your general opinion is, that the British Government has had peace for its object, but that its means of communication have not been conciliatory?—Yes.

6059. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Would you say that the government at Lagos has not had moral force sufficient to bring about peace in that

way, nor physical force sufficient to compel peace?—Perhaps they have not made use of sufficient moral force; physical force I would never recommend, because it will never lead to any good.

6060. It is your opinion that the Lagos government should have used more entreaty?—Yes. The African says, "If white man beg me, I give up."

6061. You think that if they had taken that line, and entreated the Egba government for the last three years to make peace, they might have succeeded?—The Egba government was quite willing; the difficulty was to get at Ibadan. When the missionaries at Ibadan were quite destitute, some of our friends had to go a circuitous route, seven days' journey round, in order to carry provisions; my colleague can speak to that, because he was one of a party who went on a peace expedition in that respect to Ibadan.

6062. But I do not quite understand you when you say that the Egbas were willing to make peace; in what way was it necessary for the Egbas, after their complete success over the Dahomians and over the Ibadans, to persist in keeping their army in the field, and to destroy Ikorodu; is it your opinion that they were justified in that course, or is it your opinion that it was necessary to their defence, or to any proper and legitimate object which they could have had in view?—To the first question I would say, the Abeokutans asked that the Ibadan army should go off, and that peace should be made; but that so long as the Ibadans had a large army not far off, they said that they could not return home.

6063. Have you seen any real desire shown by deeds, and not only by words, on the part of the Egbas to make peace?—Yes, in more than one instance. When we spoke to them, they said, "We are quite ready." They allowed the missionaries to pass through Abeokuta, with an understanding to make peace; they only stipulated not to say, we, the Egbas, "beg you." The missionary party went in the name of the Christians of England to beg them to make peace. They said, "Why do you come round by this circuitous route; why do you not come from the Egba country? Go back, and when you come round Egba we will listen to you."

6064. But has the Lagos government seen anything, up to the latest information, in the conduct, as distinguished from the words of the Egbas, which looks like an intention to make peace; what is there pointing to that result?—There are many things I cannot explain with regard to the recent occurrences since I have been in England. I must beg leave to decline speaking about those.

6065. Do you think that the success of the Egbas over the Dahomians tended to make them more or less inclined to make peace with their other enemies?—The natural result of the victory was of course to urge them on; and certainly after that victory they put on more force, in order to prevail over the Ibadans. They were successful, and we all hoped that peace would be restored; but misunderstandings took place between the Ibadans and the Abeokutans, and the difficulties increased.

6066. But surely the destruction of Ikorodu, after it had submitted to its lawful king, could not have been necessary for the safety of Abeokuta?—I am not prepared to say that it would have been necessary for the safety of the Abeokutans, but the Abeokutans having received

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serious injury at the hands of Ikorodu, according to their native laws, wanted to chastise Ikorodu; they had made several attempts on the Egba camp, and had carried away hundreds of slaves, killed one of their chiefs, and supported Ijaye during the whole of the time, because, in conjunction with King Jebu, the Abbeokutans set out to chastise Ikorodu; and they had the sanction of Governor Glover until quite recently, I believe.

6067. Mr. Cave.] I suppose the moral force which you speak of would have more value if it were backed by physical force, even with the Egbas?—Our experience in Africa is that physical force has not gained the end in view, whilst moral force has generally been successful, more or less, although perhaps not exactly at the time or to the extent desired.

6068. One can quite imagine that a tribe would not wish to be coerced, and yet that persuasion would be more likely to be listened to, if they thought coercion might follow?—In the case of Kosoko, moral persuasion would have been to no purpose, and physical force was necessary, because he was protected by 10,000 people; he was supported by, perhaps, 60 heavy guns, which the slave traders had placed there; in fact, moral force had been tried with him. Consul Beecroft, and four naval gentlemen, had proposed a treaty of peace, but Kosoko had ordered one of the slave traders to have their heads taken off; then when they came in with a flag of truce, the flag of truce was fired on; consequently, moral force was of no avail there.

6069. But, I suppose, that the Africans are like all other people, they pay the greatest attention to those who are most able to compel them to attend?—Yes, no doubt.

6070. Mr. Mills.] Apart from the question who is to blame for the present state of things, do you think there would be less risk of troubles of this kind, if the British interests at Lagos were represented by a consul, as they have heretofore been, instead of by a governor as at present?—The present state of things may afford great protection and facilities; the powers that are now given to Lagos might be just in the same way used for opening up the country, and for protection.

6071. Is it, in fact, a question whether they have a discreet governor or an indiscreet governor, or a good consul or a bad consul, without reference to the question of the form of government, whether that of a consul or that of a Colony?—I believe that it all depends on a responsible man using his power with wisdom.

6072. You would rather have a good consul than a bad governor?—I cannot hesitate in saying that I think I would.

6073. Statements have been made with regard to certain events which happened at the time of the last attack of Dahomey, and it has been stated that at that time the Abbeokutans supplied them-

selves with ammunition from Porto Novo by an illicit slave trade with the French dealers at Porto Novo; have you any means of forming an opinion whether that is true or false?—I do not know the particulars, but I believe they were obliged to do so, because they had no means of obtaining ammunition except perhaps for slaves.

6074. Doctor Livingstone stated in his evidence with regard to the Mahomedans, that he, in his experience of Africa, had never found any case in which the Mahomedan showed anxiety to propagate their religion; does that experience correspond with yours?—The Mahomedans that I have come in contact with were anxious to make as many Pagans into Mahomedans as they could, and, as I said just now, they have even attempted to convert Europeans; but at the same time I must say that they make very little progress. The slaves whom they take or purchase they generally compel to become Mahomedans.

6075. Do you think that their influence on the Pagans of Africa is, so far as it goes, to raise those Africans from the condition in which they are as Pagans, or the contrary?—From my observation and experience I think the Pagans are the worse for being converted to Mahomedanism, because those I am acquainted with are wily, cunning sort of men, not given to agriculture, and continually conniving at the slave trade, and obtaining and seeking slaves, deceiving the people by writing charms; some of them are given to commercial transactions, but very few to agriculture.

6076. Sir Francis Baring.] You say that the Abbeokutans have, by means of the slave trade, purchased arms and ammunition at Porto Novo; that was, I suppose, in consequence of the blockade?—In consequence of the blockade at Lagos, and in consequence of not being able to carry their produce, either cotton or oil, for four days' journey across the country to Porto Novo, and not being perhaps even able to sell it there for ammunition.

6077. Have you ever heard that the Abbeokutans have attacked Ikorodu in the hope of afterwards being able to attack Lagos, or with any notion of that kind?—I never heard of such a thing, and I believe it never entered into the mind of any of them. As I stated before, they are so intelligent that they would not so commit themselves; in fact, the lesson which Lagos received in 1851 at the hands of the English is quite sufficient to induce them never to approach the English.

6078. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] You do not know that since you left they have put forward claims to territory on the Lagoon and on the main land, including a portion of the Lagos territory? I never heard of it.

6079. Chairman.] Have you anything further to state to the Committee?—No.

The Rev. GOTTLIEB BÜHLE, called in; and Examined.

Rev.
G. Bühle.

6080. Chairman.] Your first acquaintance with the African Coast was at Abbeokuta in November 1855?—Yes.

6081. And except for one return home for the benefit of your health, in 1859, you have been there until now?—Yes.

6082. That is to say, you have been for nine

years connected with the Abbeokutan Mission?—Yes.

6083. I suppose you have heard Mr. Gollmer's evidence?—Yes.

6084. Do you agree with it?—Generally.

6085. I think you can inform us more particularly with regard to the educational operations of the

the mission at Abeokuta, and of the superior educational establishment under your special charge?—Yes.

6086. Was that a grammar school?—I have, for the last six years, conducted a seminary at Abeokuta; I have had about 25 young men under my care, from the ages of about 14 to 25. I have found out with regard to their intelligence that they are equal to our middle classes in this country.

6087. Had you had experience in England in education before you went out there, so as to be able to compare the two?—Yes.

6088. For what class of natives was this school intended?—It is not a grammar school; it is for training native agents.

6089. Training native agents for what purpose? For our own mission.

6090. Are the pupils turned out from that school employed in mission work?—Yes.

6091. All of them?—Yes; all those who are intended to be teachers.

6092. You teach them Mathematics, Latin, and Greek?—Yes.

6093. And you find them capable of such instruction?—Decidedly.

6094. Where do you select such pupils from: from your inferior schools?—From the day schools.

6095. Is there anything in the nature of industrial employment connected with that school?—Not of late; I have been removed to a new station, and I have had no opportunity of introducing anything of the kind.

6096. Have you any further information to give to the Committee upon the educational operations of the mission there?—We have commenced schools wherever we have opened a station, and the schools are very well attended. I found the children at the half-yearly examination had made very good progress: their knowledge in Scripture history, for instance, was highly satisfactory, and their instruction also in the vernacular; their desire for learning English is very great, and their progress is very satisfactory.

6097. Are you equally satisfied with their moral progress and with the industrious habits which they acquire at your school?—Yes, decidedly.

6098. How far do you teach the English language, or how far is the native language a medium of instruction?—In my institution the first class is in English, and the second class is chiefly in the native language.

6099. Are they ready in acquiring the English language?—Yes; they are exceedingly fond of languages.

6100. Having been nine years at Lagos, you can give us some opinion of what the state of things was from the year 1855 to 1861, when we had only a consul at Lagos, with the state of things since the cession of the government to the British?—Formerly everything went on peaceably, because there was peace in the country, though the consul often complained, as was natural with a heathen government, especially the consul, who tried to break down the monopoly of the native traders in Abeokuta; but no serious difficulties arose. But when the war amongst the native tribes broke out, the Government in Lagos had a much more difficult position; unfortunately, the first Governor, Mr. Freeman, when he came to Lagos, gave his opinion at once, the first day of landing, that the Egbas were wrong.

0.39.

6101. That was in 1861?—Yes; this offended them very much, and they said "How could he know?" He expressed several other opinions, and the Abeokutans said it could not be his own opinion; it must be the opinion of Mr. M'Coskry, whom they hated.

6102. What was Mr. M'Coskry's official position there?—When the war broke out, he was Acting Governor.

6103. They concluded that Governor Freeman, on his arrival, took his opinion?—Yes, and therefore they had no confidence in Mr. Freeman. Mr. Campbell, when he became Governor, had several times expressed similar opinions; they did not trust him. He also condemned their policy; and it was only afterwards, last year, that he changed his mind and became the friend of the Egbas, and from that time they liked him more; but still it was too late to mediate.

6104. Do you think that he was mistaken in his views of the Abeokutan claims?—Yes; I believe that he was not quite clear about the war. First, he thought that they were wrong, and also he did not want anybody to mediate between the Egbas and the Ibadans, as he himself told me. I myself went up to Ibadan to mediate; but he told me afterwards that he had sent messengers to Ibadan to say that they should not receive any man to mediate unless he himself would come. I did not know of that when I left.

6105. Do you believe that you could have mediated between the Ibadans and the Abeokutans?—I do not know whether I had any influence on the chiefs of Ibadan, only I know that the Egba chiefs allowed me to leave their town and allowed two of my friends to go with me, and that we had to pass through their territory; but the Ibadans did not receive us in their camp, unless we would come from the camp of Abeokuta direct to the camp of Ibadan.

6106. Did you go with an actual message?—We had instructions from the chiefs to say that we were ready for peace; "If you will go off we will make peace."

6107. Your mission failed, owing to Governor Freeman not sanctioning it, did it?—I would not go so far as to say that. I believe that the chiefs of Ibadan were just waiting for the same thing as the Egbas, namely, to be begged by the opposite party.

6108. Then to what do you attribute the cause of the failure of that mission; was it merely that Governor Freeman would not approach the Ibadans in the way in which they thought their dignity required?—I believe that the Ibadans expected at that time to be successful in their expedition; that is to say, to get a piece of land down to the coast; and it was not their real desire to treat.

6109. I do not quite understand whether you think Governor Freeman's mode of communication was in fault in the failure of the mission, or that it was merely that the Ibadans were not inclined to treat?—I cannot say that his message had any influence on the chiefs; the chiefs never expressed anything of the kind.

6110. Is it the fact that the missionaries generally have found it difficult to co-operate with the government of Lagos?—We never came in contact with the government at Lagos. I do not know why the governors have been against us, but I have been told that they suspect that we have influenced the chiefs and rather encouraged them in their wars, but it is quite the contrary; we went to them almost every week,

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and begged them to try their utmost to make peace, and especially to let trade be carried on between Abbeokuta and Lagos.

6111. What do you allude to in saying that the governors have been against you?—They have considered us the enemies of the government.

6112. The governors of Lagos considered you their enemies?—Yes.

6113. How did they show that?—The governor told us plainly that he believed we were acting against his policy.

6114. Is that at a particular period only?—No, from time to time; ever since the government has been established.

6115. What was the period you meant when you said that the government of Lagos changed their views with regard to the claim of the Abbeokutans?—Last year.

6116. What was the occasion of that change of views?—That was after the Ikorodu people had refused the advice and protection of the governor, in Lagos.

6117. Then they began to favour the Abbeokutans, you think?—Our governor began to favour the Abbeokutans, and began to blockade Ikorodu.

6118. Since that the government must have changed its side again?—Yes; first he assisted the Egbas in blockading Ikorodu, and now, those very guns and vessels are employed against the Egbas.

6119. Governor Freeman, you say, was first adverse to the Abbeokutans, and then in favour of them; and since that Lieutenant Glover has been adverse to them?—Yes. Governor Glover was first against them, but he afterwards changed his policy, and thought he might establish peace by other means; but he failed in that; and then a siege takes up a long time. They usually starve a town; they do not want to kill them, but to catch them.

6120. Do I understand you to say that during the nine years you have been at Abbeokuta the British Government have changed their policy four times over?—I mean merely since the government has been established in Lagos; not at the time that the consul was there.

6121. But do I understand you to state that in the last five years the Government has changed its policy four times?—I did not mean to say that Governor Freeman had changed his policy, it was Governor Glover.

6122. Do you think that the presence of the missionaries could have kept the peace better among the tribes than the English Government, supposing there had been only a consul at Lagos?—The war is of such a kind that it was utterly impossible.

6123. You do not think, supposing the consul had remained, that the influence of the missionaries could have kept peace between the Abbeokutans and the Ibadans?—No.

6124. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] When you say that the government of Lagos changed its policy, you do not mean to imply that it ever changed its object, which was peace?—I believe its object was always to obtain peace.

6125. You mean that the methods of seeking that end have been changed?—Yes.

6126. Are you aware that Lieutenant Governor Glover persuaded the Egbas at one moment to promise him that if they could not take Ikorodu within 10 days they would go home, and that he agreed to those terms having received that pro-

mise?—Yes. A war is always so commenced in those countries; it is promised in two days, or five days, or seven days, that the town will be taken, and then they have to fix a longer time.

6127. But at all events the promise was given?—They could not. The Governor knew very well that the town was too strong to be taken in that time.

6128. But his object being somehow or other to induce the Egbas to go home and leave that country undisturbed, he did make them promise that if they could not take Ikorodu in 10 days, they would go home?—I never heard that they promised to go home. I was told by the chiefs that they only promised to take it.

6129. The Governor writes to the Home Government to say that they gave the promise; namely, that if they failed in taking it within 10 days they would give up the undertaking; you are not aware of that?—No.

6130. Are you aware that Captain Glover, partly by persuasion and partly by something like compulsion, induced the town of Ikorodu to submit to its king, the King of Jebu?—Yes, he tried that very often.

6131. You are aware that he succeeded, are you not?—No, I am not aware that he succeeded; there are so many parties in the Jebu country and in Ikorodu, that I hardly think there could be such a reconciliation.

6132. You are not aware that there is peace between King Jebu and the King of Ikorodu?—We have no letters by the last mail.

6133. Do you approve of the conduct of the Egbas in insisting on the destruction of Ikorodu?—I do not approve of the destruction of the town, only so far that the people are to some degree to be justified in trying to chastise a town which had given so much provocation, and as the Government had expressed, that they were justified, it was for the Egbas too much at once to be driven away from the town. I must say that I could not see any other way to get the Egbas away from Ikorodu; they would, of course, have besieged the town till it was starved.

6134. You are aware that they gave the Governor notice that they would remain before the town three years, if necessary?—Yes.

6135. Of course they would be destroying the trade of Lagos, and the neighbourhood during all that time; do you think that the Egbas have been intoxicated by their success against Dahomey, and against the Ibadans?—I think not, because the people in Abbeokuta were very anxious to commence trade; and, four or five times, a deputation of elders came to me, and begged me to do my utmost to make peace.

6136. Who is the real authority in Abbeokuta; who are they who have persisted in closing the roads, in preventing produce coming down to Lagos, and resisting all efforts for peace?—It is chiefly the war chiefs, because if they leave the rivers open, people will trade; the war chiefs make the law, and the chiefs in the town must carry it out.

6137. Are you not aware that the basharun and the war chiefs in the camp held out very favourable prospects of peace to the Lieutenant Governor when he visited them, but that they were overruled by the authorities at Abbeokuta?

The chiefs expected that the wars would soon be over; everybody expected that Ikorodu would be taken soon, and then they said, "After Ikorodu is taken we will take to trade."

6138. You do not think that the Egbas have been more bent on war through being intoxicated with success?—Not at all.

6139. What would you say to this language from the war chiefs, "If all the world that are on earth come with them, we will drive them as we drove the Ibadans, and perish them as we perished the Dahomians." Is not that the language of intoxication from success?—That language came from the chiefs, but it was not the opinion of the people.

6140. That is written by the basharun and the war chiefs to the Lieutenant Governor?—I know the basharun personally; he told me during the war (it is only 10 months ago he paid me a visit in the night), "I assure you, white man, I wish the war was over; but if I do not go, my life is unsafe here."

6141. But you know that the government at Lagos has been banded backwards and forwards between one authority and another, and the result is that they have failed in their efforts to obtain peace by peaceful means?—The Governor made a mistake; he wanted to obtain a treaty from the war chiefs; the war chiefs could not make treaties, the treaties must be with the consent of all the nation.

6142. Are you aware that the apena came down to Lagos and used language of a most unsatisfactory and threatening kind?—Yes, I remember that.

6143. Within the last few weeks?—Yes.

6144. Was that favourable to the cause of peace?—He merely expressed an opinion that this country all belonged to the Egbas, but the chiefs in Abbeokuta repudiate such language.

6145. Are you aware that the Governor, being very much astonished at this claim, said, "Do you claim Badagry?" and the answer was, "Yes, we claim Badagry?"—Just as the Egbas would now claim the whole of the Yoruba country, because it formerly belonged to them, but they would never think of going and establishing themselves in Badagry or claiming any other point near the sea.

6146. But do you see the least sign in such language and in such a tone of an intention to make peace and retire to their homes?—The apena is merely a private individual; he is not the governor general.

6147. He is a high official of Abbeokuta, is he not?—Yes; he is often sent as a messenger, but he acts in his own name.

6148. Was it not natural for the Government to look upon this man as an accredited representative of Abbeokuta?—I would not have considered him so.

6149. Would you have desired to see the Governor leave things as they were, and permit Ikroodu to be destroyed?—If the Governor could have got the King of Jebu on his side and persuaded the Egbas to make peace, I think it might have been done.

6150. But are you not aware that the King of Jebu was on his side, but had failed in inducing the Egbas to retire?—I have not heard that the King of Jebu had really pardoned the Khorodee people. I know that two years ago he did so, and that he received about 40 slaves, but when he had got the slaves he did not pardon them.

6151. You are not aware that all the people in that neighbourhood had made peace with one another, and that all they wished for was that the Egbas would go home and leave them to them-

selves?—No, I have not heard that, but I should be most anxious to know it.

6152. Sir Francis Baring.] There are no official documents that you know of which contain these statements which have just been put to you in those questions?—No.

6153. You have not seen them in any Blue Books or despatches?—No.

6154. But possibly you come straight from Abbeokuta?—Yes.

6155. They allowed you to pass, did they?—I came away before this last affair took place.

6156. You have been asked with respect to the hostility of Governor Freeman to the missionaries; you recollect, probably, that there was some paper when he desired the missionaries to leave Abbeokuta in an hour of difficulty, when the King of Dahomey was within sight, and an immediate attack was expected, and the missionaries declined coming away; has he not repeatedly gone back to that point as a proof of the hostility of the missionaries to the English Government?—Yes; but we, the missionaries considered it was our duty to keep to our congregations in time of need. We did not see that there was any reason to leave the town, and we did not see that the Governor had anything to do with the missionaries; we were responsible to the Society; we were bound to stick to our congregations, and so we did; and we did not see any reason why the Governor should call us away. I was at Abbeokuta, and our congregations consulted us; if we had left the town it would have been ruin, for the Dahomians were approaching.

6157. You would not desert your congregations in the hour of difficulty?—No.

6158. But whatever may have been your reason, it was taken very ill by the Governor at the time, was it not?—Yes; he was highly offended.

6159. Did the Colonial Office disapprove or approve of the opinion of the Governor?—The Government at home entirely approved of our conduct.

6160. They approved of your not deserting your congregations?—Yes; they approved of the missionaries.

6161. I am not sure that I understand rightly what took place with respect to this change of policy on the part of Governor Glover; he visited the camp of the Egbas, did he not?—Yes.

6162. When did he do that?—I do not remember the day, but I think it was in September or October; it was in the rainy season; but I am not positive as to the month.

6163. It was in October 1864, was it not?—I think so; he wanted to make a treaty with the chiefs, but they had no power to do it.

6164. There was no treaty made?—No.

6165. But there was some sort of understanding come to?—Yes, a mutual arrangement with the chiefs.

6166. Can you state what that understanding was?—The Governor kept everything secret; his plan was to keep what the chiefs promised as secret as possible.

6167. But you have probably heard what they promised, and what was the understanding made?—I do not know exactly what it was; I never heard anything of what was promised.

6168. Was there not some arrangement made that the Egbas should take this town of Ikroodu?—That was promised from the beginning; they promised they would take it as soon as possible.

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6169. What I want to know is, whether Governor Glover sanctioned this taking of Ikorodu by the Egbas, if they would take it?—Yes.

6170. Was there a proclamation issued (in fact I hold the proclamation in my hand) on the 27th of September 1864, blockading the Ogun; was that for the purpose of assisting the Egbas, or for the purpose of assisting the Ibadans?—The Governor blockaded the river in order to prevent their escaping from Ikorodu.

6171. As far as possible it was to help the Egbas to take the town, was it not?—Yes.

6172. That was in September of last year?—Yes.

6173. When did the Governor suddenly change this policy?—It was, I think, at the end of January.

6174. In September he blockaded the town in one sense, and in January he changed his policy and blockaded it in the other sense?—Yes.

6175. Did he take Ikorodu under his protection at one time?—At one time the English flag was hoisted there; he visited very frequently in Ikorodu.

6176. What was the date of that?—That was when Governor Freeman was Governor.

6177. That protectorate was abandoned?—Yes.

6178. When was that?—I do not remember the date.

6179. Was it abandoned by Governor Glover or Governor Freeman?—By Governor Glover.

6180. In consequence of orders from home?—It was also abandoned by Governor Freeman because they insulted him one day when he went over, and he would have nothing more to do with them; but afterwards when the Ikorodu made constant incursions against the Egbas, and after they had killed a good many Egbas, and the Governor had remonstrated and they still persisted in going on with their conduct, the Governor gave

them up, and said that he could not protect them any longer in such wicked deeds.

6181. Now putting that aside, let me ask if you have seen the Anglo-African paper, containing the latest news from that part of the world?—Yes.

6182. Do you observe that there is now war declared against the Egbas?—No.

6183. You do not know of that?—No.

6184. The Governor desires them to retire, and he declares a blockade, which I see is dated April the 1st; the war breaks out on the 29th of March, before the proclamation appears?—Yes.

6185. There is a message sent to them which gives them 24 hours to consider of it?—Yes.

6186. Then, as far as we know, they do not answer in a very civil way; but the message being sent at 8 o'clock, at 10 o'clock the firing begins, which is two hours instead of 24 hours; is not that so?—That is what I have read.

6187. Did you ever hear, or do you believe that there is any intention on the part of the Egbas to invade Lagos, or to take possession of any of the territories of Lagos?—No, never.

6188. You think they are not such fools as to fancy they could beat the English yet?—Certainly they are not such fools.

6189. Mr. *Chichester Portescue*.] Are you not aware that they have actually, as a matter of fact, threatened to claim or rather do claim the right to a territory on the Lagoon; I am not speaking of the island?—They never made any claim, but I dare say that the apena may have said during conversation, "This belongs to us, strictly speaking." Still his nation would never claim that territory, for they have territory enough.

6190. Sir *Francis Baring*.] To Badagry they have some nominal claim, have they not?—Merely because the Badagry people served them for some time.

Colonel EDWARD CONRAN, called in; and Examined.

Colonel
E. Conran,

6191. *Chairman*.] You have just returned from the Gold Coast?—Yes.

6192. You succeeded Major Cochrane in the command of the troops on the Gold Coast?—Yes.

6193. Major Cochrane had the command of those troops from April until August 1863, had he not?—Major Cochrane had the command of the troops from April to the beginning of August 1863.

6194. It was about that period that the Ashantee War broke out, was it not?—Major Cochrane took the field on the 17th of April, and returned to Cape Coast on the 25th of June, 1863, the Ashantees having then left the Protectorate and gone back to their own country.

6195. When you arrived the Ashantees had gone back, had they?—I landed with the headquarters of my regiment in the beginning of August 1863, when the whole of the Ashantees were in their own country.

6196. You know something of all the West African stations, do you not?—I have served on every one of them.

6197. Can you state what the usual military establishment of the Gold Coast is; I mean the establishment when there is no threat of war?—Speaking of Cape Coast only, the first establishment from 1844 to 1851 consisted of one company

of the 1st West Indian Regiment; in 1851 the Gold Coast Corps was raised, consisting of 300 men, and this force was the original strength on the Gold Coast.

6198. One company of the West Indian Regiment, and 300 Artillery?—Yes; but the company of the West Indian Regiment was withdrawn to Sierra Leone on the formation of the Gold Coast Artillery.

6199. On the formation of the Gold Coast Artillery was that the only force?—It was the only force that I am aware of under the government of the Gold Coast.

6200. Were they officered by Englishmen?—They were officered by Englishmen; the condition of the corps was different from that of the line; the men received only two-thirds of the line pay, while the officers received full pay and many other privileges.

6201. Did they live in barracks?—The men lived in barracks, and also in their own houses.

6202. Were they rather in the nature of a militia than of a regular force?—They were more like an irregular force than a regular one.

6203. Of what men was that corps composed?—Chiefly of runaway domestic slaves.

6204. Of the Tantees?—Yes.

6205. Found in the neighbourhood of our forts?—Yes.

6206. This

6206. This corps has lately been disbanded?—Yes, it was disbanded by me on the 21st of August 1863.

6207. In fact, you arrived with orders to disband them, did you not?—Yes.

6208. What was the cause of that order of disbandment?—I believe it was a want of confidence in the corps, and also in consequence of a mutiny; the men had but 8*d* a day, although performing similar duties to that of West India troops who had 1*s.* and rations, whilst the former had none.

6209. What was the cause of the insubordination and mutiny in the corps?—I attribute it partly to the bad disposition of the men, in one instance, and also to the great paucity of officers serving on the coast, and the reasons given in the former answer.

6210. Did not those officers also take civil employments?—Nearly every one of them had civil employment, which was owing to the difficulty of obtaining colonial officers to serve there.

6211. Was that habit partly the cause of the want of discipline in the corps?—I think it diminishes the authority of the officers very much when so many of them are employed in that way.

6212. When you arrived with those orders to disband the corps, what troops had you under your command?—I arrived with 400 of my own men in August 1863, namely, of the 4th West Indian Regiment, and besides which I had 200 men of the 2d West Indian Regiment, and about 120 of the 3d West Indian Regiment.

6213. That is to say, 700 men altogether?—As nearly as possible.

6214. About seven companies?—About seven companies, speaking in round numbers.

6215. Did you detain certain troops on board the "Megera"?—The orders were to send back those extra companies of the 2d and 3d West Indian Regiments in the "Megera" to the West Indies and Sierra Leone. The Governor, however, having apprehended another invasion from the Ashantees, in October or November, after the rains had ceased to fall, he instructed me under those circumstances to keep the extra troops, which I did, of course.

6216. Then what was the extra force under your command?—The whole force under my command at that time did not consist of more than 700 men.

6217. When did you arrive at Cape Coast?—In the beginning of August 1863.

6218. Where was the Governor?—The Governor was there.

6219. Was not the fort garrisoned by sailors sent ashore?—I found Cape Coast Castle garrisoned by about 10 officers, and 120 sailors and marines from Her Majesty's ship "Rattlesnake," and some other small gunboats. This naval force had just finished making an entrenched fort on a hill over the town.

6220. What did you do with them?—I sent them on board ship to make room for my own regiment.

6221. What ships were off the fort?—The "Rattlesnake" and one or two other small vessels of which I forget the name; the three companies of the 2d West Indian Regiment were then quartered at Annamahoe, and the 3d were quartered in a hired building in the town of Cape Coast.

6222. In fact, the four forts were garrisoned?—Yes.

6223. What was the number of the native troops?—I have not the smallest idea of the number of the troops of the Protectorate called allies; but I am told by Governor Pyne from 40,000 to 50,000 men.

6224. You say that the King of Ashantee had returned to his own country?—In the end of May his army had.

6225. What was the cause of his invading the Protectorate?—I believe the cause of his invading the Protectorate was in consequence of our having retained a man who took away some gold said to be of the value of from 200*l.* to 300*l.*, that he considered he was entitled to; the man found gold which the king claimed as crown property.

6226. It was not, then, the detention of a runaway slave?—The runaway slave was also protected by a certain Prince Adgiman, a native king.

6227. And the king sent to claim him, did he not?—The king sent his messengers to claim him from the protected chief the person who had taken the gold.

6228. What did the protected chief do?—It is reported that he sent an insulting message back by the messengers to the King of Ashantee, and it is said cut off one of their heads, besides ill-treating the others.

6229. Do you consider that the maltreatment of the King of the Ashantee's messenger by the king was the cause of the King of Ashantee invading the Protectorate?—I think the King of Ashantee never intended to do more than obtain satisfaction from this chief, and also to get back the man whom he intended to put to death.

6230. Do you believe he intended to attack the English?—No; but there is no telling what he might have done had his army got as far as our settlements. He appeared to be on very good terms with the British Government, but then the men were under our protection.

6231. Did you take the same view that Governor Pyne did with respect to the intentions of the King of Ashantee?—In the beginning I did, but latterly I altered my opinion.

6232. Did you think there was a great danger of invasion when you arrived?—I thought so when I arrived, but I have since altered my opinion within the last six or seven months.

6233. You have just returned with the Governor, have you not?—I have.

6234. Up to the time when you left with the Governor, did you think there was any danger?—I did not.

6235. But you do not think so now?—No, I do not.

6236. Do you think the King of Ashantee has hostile intentions?—I think he has no bad intentions towards our authority; but I think that he will have satisfaction, and that he will get hold of those two men, in spite of all we can do, as they reside far from the coast and close to the Ashantee borders.

6237. He thinks he has a ground of quarrel with the English Government for protecting two men against whom he has a claim?—Yes; he intended to take off the head of the man who took the gold.

6238. Supposing there had been no claim against the English Government of that kind, do you consider that our relations with the Protectorate were such that we should have been obliged to interfere in defence of King Adgiman against the King of Ashantee?—I think that had this

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this man not placed himself under our protection, we should have continued in peace, not being bound to go to war for quarrelsome chiefs.

6239. But did he place himself under your protection on this occasion?—He came to us to be protected, as an instance, only knowing that his head would be forfeited if taken.

6240. But did he do so under a general claim for protection, or was it merely protection claimed on the occasion?—King Ijman was formerly a subject of the King of Ashantee himself, and subject to his government.

6241. Did you consider, when you were in command of the troops, that you were bound to protect all the chiefs of the Protectorate in any quarrel with the King of Ashantee?—I considered myself entirely under the instructions of the Governor, and those views being entertained by the Governor I had to follow them; I might not have done the same thing had I been in his position, but I had no alternative, being under him.

6242. Do you think that we were bound to interfere on behalf of this chief by any general treaty of protection; or was it merely a question of his placing himself under our protection?—From the time of General MacCarthy, I understood that the chiefs of the Gold Coast considered that we were to protect them against the Ashantees, an idea that should at once be discouraged as it only enables them to quarrel, involving us in vexatious petty wars of a costly nature.

6243. You say that your views do not coincide with those of the Governor, but that, as commander of the troops, you were bound to obey his orders?—Yes; at first my views were quite in keeping with those of the Governor.

6244. I think it appears in the papers that Governor Pyne himself wished to take the command of the troops in case of an Ashantee war, was that so?—I do not know; I never gave any encouragement to that idea; I never interfered in politics, and I always held to the command of the troops exclusively.

6245. From what you have seen of the Gold Coast, have you any opinion with regard to the question whether it would be better that a military man should be governor there; a man who could undertake the command of the troops?—I think it would be better that both authorities should be concentrated in one person; but being a military man myself, I do not feel entitled to say that a military man would be best.

6246. But a civilian could not take the command of the troops, could he?—No.

6247. Would you not then think that it would be better that the command should be in the hands of a military man?—During times of disturbance, it would greatly facilitate matters.

6248. Did you in any way communicate with the War Office, except through the Governor?—I never communicated through the Governor, except in matters of a mixed nature.

6249. You communicated direct to the War Office?—Direct to the War Office, or to the Commander in Chief; but on all subjects in which I came into collision with the Governor, we corresponded with each other first before sending home our reports.

6250. Would it be possible for an officer in command of the troops on the Gold Coast to correspond with the War Office, and for the Governor to correspond with the Colonial Office, without mutually knowing what their several

communications were?—I believe that that has occurred.

6251. Sir John Hay.] It does not follow that the Governor communicates with the officer commanding the troops, when he communicates with the Colonial Office?—No.

6252. Therefore a communication might take place between the Governor and the Colonial Office, of which the officer commanding the troops could not possibly be aware?—Yes, that is quite likely, and has been the case.

6253. Chairman.] Will you state what different troops arrived at the Gold Coast during the time of your command?—On the 9th of April 1864 the "Famer" arrived, bringing 29 officers and 600 men of the 1st and 4th West Indian regiments.

6254. Where were they stationed?—I placed 400 of the 4th West Indian regiment in quarters, and the remainder I provided for by hiring houses in the town, with the exception of one company that had to go into tents for about three days, until I could hire another house for them.

6255. These reinforcements were both owing to the Governor thinking there was danger of an attack from the Ashantees?—Yes.

6256. Where was the King of Ashantee then?—At Comassie.

6257. Did a great sickness break out in the troops about that time?—The sickness was about ceasing then. The worst sickness was in April and May. It did not affect the new comers to any great extent.

6258. What are the rainy months?—The rainy months in that year were from March till the end of August.

6259. Is that the usual rainy season?—No; the usual rainy season is about from May.

6260. Mr. Chichester Porteus.] The rainy season began much earlier than usual that year?—It began six weeks earlier than usual.

6261. Chairman.] The sickness was ceasing when the reinforcements arrived?—Yes.

6262. Was there sickness among the fresh troops?—Not much.

6263. How long did they remain on the Gold Coast?—They remained from the time stated until the 30th of July.

6264. When were they sent home?—They were embarked for the West Indies and Sierra Leone on the 29th July, and sailed on the 30th.

6265. When troops are quartered in the town, as these were, is a payment made by the British Government to the owners of the houses?—The British Government paid for the lodgings of the troops in every instance.

6266. For none of the troops that you have mentioned is there any tax on the locality?—None.

6267. Has it been ever attempted to raise such a tax?—It has been attempted since then to raise a tax on the sale of spirits.

6268. Will you state what occurred with regard to that tax before you left?—Nothing occurred with regard to the license tax.

6269. What occurred with regard to the poll-tax?—The poll-tax was levied long before my time.

6270. What happened when you left upon the poll-tax being refused?—The poll-tax was refused as far back as 1858.

6271. What tax was refused which caused the troops to be called out just before you left?—The troops were called out a few days before I left for a different object, to aid the civil power.

6272. What

6272. What object?—For the purpose of enforcing the payment of a fine or damages brought against the king's magistrate.

6273. What damages were they?—They were damages for an assault committed by the native king's magistrate on a British subject. It was understood that the king refused to pay this fine, in consequence of which Governor Pyne called out the troops to aid the civil power.

6274. What was the nature of the assault?—The assault was this: a young black man had been summoned by the king and would not appear before his magistrate, stating that he was a British subject. The native police, under the king, were sent to apprehend him, and committed the assault. Our lawyer on the coast took legal proceedings in our own courts against the king's magistrate, which led to the fine being imposed, which the king decidedly refused to pay, alleging that he had seven companies at his command, which to all intents and purposes signified a threat. Those companies consisted of 7,000 men. It was chiefly for the purpose of aiding the civil power that the troops were called out.

6275. What was the amount of the fine imposed on the king?—£. 20.

6276. What was the end of this story?—The king paid the fine and submitted to the English law.

6277. Were the troops called out?—The troops were called out and remained out for an hour or two, when they were recalled into their barracks, the affair having been settled.

6278. Have you any suggestion to make to the Committee with regard to the improvement of the government arrangements at the Gold Coast?—I served myself on the Western Coast from 1841 to 1843, when the whole of the coast of Africa was under one government, and I think that answered better than the present arrangement of having four governments.

6279. Where were you then?—In Sierra Leone.

6280. You think that we might advantageously return to the plan of having the general government at Sierra Leone?—I think that plan was better than the present, and considering that we have now so much better means of communication, I think it might answer far better than it did then.

6281. What was the reason for our breaking up that system, do you think?—I think imperfect means of communication was one reason.

6282. And that reason no longer exists?—No, with our present steam communication and ships of war frequently passing.

6283. How long did it take in your time to communicate between Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast?—I have known it to take 30 days.

6284. How long does it take now?—Four days would do it to there, 5½ to Lagos, and two to the Gambia.

6285. Supposing Sierra Leone were made the head quarters of the West Coast Government, would you place all the regular troops there?—Yes, nearly all.

6286. What sort of troops would the Commandant of Lagos and the Gold Coast have?—I would have no troops at Lagos.

6287. What means would the government of Lagos have of keeping peace?—He would have the native police, the Houssas.

6288. And on the Gold Coast, what means would the Governor have of keeping peace?—

I should also give him a couple of hundred Houssa police, armed and equipped, and a company of soldiers.

6289. In both those cases the police are paid by the locality, are they not?—I believe at Lagos they are, but I question whether they could be at Cape Coast Castle, unless the annual allowance is increased from England.

6290. You think that the troops might be advantageously concentrated at Sierra Leone, and be sent to the other parts when wanted?—With perfect safety, for which purpose the Governor General should have a steamer.

6291. You would increase the barracks at Sierra Leone?—Yes, for 200 men and 10 officers.

6292. Are they good barracks?—Very good barracks, and in an excellent position.

6293. Supposing that were done, do you think that we could maintain the protectorate as we do now?—I think the sooner the people on the Gold Coast are taught to defend themselves the better.

6294. Do you think it would be possible to maintain the protectorate on the Gold Coast in the way in which Governor Pyne seems to have understood it?—The best thing the Government have done, in my opinion, was in sending out 5,000 stand of arms to be distributed among the native kings and chiefs, which we have been doing prior to our leaving there, for they are fully capable of maintaining themselves against the Ashantees without English troops.

6295. You think that for us to maintain the protectorate in the sense to which I have just referred, would require too large an army?—Yes; and even then you would not succeed in the interior, as troops could not be fed.

6296. Why not?—Because the country is so unhealthy you could not get officers to go there, or troops to live for any length of time.

6297. Do you think that if we were to arm the natives as you say that we are doing, they would act together in their own defence?—I think they would against their common enemy, the Ashantees, under the Governor's advice.

6298. You think they would not fight amongst themselves?—They are well armed, and can do that now, if inclined to do so.

6299. If we took the troops away and abandoned the protectorate you think they would be likely to defend themselves against the Ashantees, do you?—I think that taking away the troops would enable them to defend themselves better, because when the troops are there they think it is their duty to defend them.

6300. Do you think they would be equal to the task of defending themselves?—They are composed of the same material as the Ashantees, and they are as well able to fight, and better armed also.

6301. You think they would be more than a match for the Ashantees?—I think they would, combined.

6302. You say these protected tribes are actually Ashantees?—Nearly the whole of them were so at one period.

6303. Then what made them come out of their country?—They preferred the mild rule of Great Britain to that of the King of Ashantee.

6304. They came away to come under British protection?—Yes; there is a very extensive tract of land between the River Prah and Comassie, which those tribes left to come to us, called the Assin country.

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6305. Suppose such a concentration of the government at Sierra Leone were to take place, have you calculated what would be the whole strength of the regulars which would be necessary for the whole of the West Coast of Africa?—Yes; I have given that a great deal of consideration, and I am of opinion that 10 companies would be ample for the whole of the coast.

6306. Would you place seven at Sierra Leone?—I would have seven at Sierra Leone, one at Cape Coast Castle, and two at the Gambia.

6307. Lord Stanley.] What would be the strength of a company?—One hundred men, including sergeants.

6308. Chairman.] Now, suppose this plan to be carried out immediately, do you think that part of the garrison of the Gold Coast might be withdrawn at once?—I think they might; but I should recommend the police first to be put in a state of organization.

6309. To what extent do you think the garrison might be reduced?—At Cape Coast Castle the garrison is about to be reduced by 400; they are going to Sierra Leone, to take the place of the 3d West India Regiment, which is going to the West Indies.

6310. How many would that leave?—That would leave 300.

6311. And you think that might be further reduced?—Yes, that might be further reduced by 100.

6312. Leaving 200?—Leaving 200, till the police was established.

6313. You think that would be sufficient?—I think so.

6314. What forts would you take them from?—I should do away with Annamaboe, Winnebah, Accra, and Dix Cove; and keep the Castle for troops only.

6315. How many men would you put at each fort?—From six to ten are in each at present, except Accra, where there are about 80.

6316. How many officers would be required at each fort?—There must always be a medical officer and a subaltern, if such forts are to be kept up.

6317. By taking away the garrisons from those forts, do you think we should run any risk of the slave trade reviving?—I think not; I think they would never exceed domestic slavery among themselves.

6318. Have you seen much trade going on there?—There is no trade scarcely.

6319. Have you seen the operation of gold-dust washing?—Yes.

6320. Do you think that is properly con-

ducted?—The natives have a great prejudice against our knowing anything about it; they fancy that if the white man finds it out it will be all up with them; they are content with what can be picked up from day to day.

6321. You say there is very little trade?—Yes.

6322. How many merchants are there?—There are two Europeans at Cape Coast, and about the same at Accra; that was the number when I left.

6323. If there was no slave trade at all, do you think it would be worth our while keeping up the garrisons and the government to protect that trade?—I think it would be worth while to keep a small force at Cape Coast, just for appearance sake. There is a good deal of trade at Comassie, and to the northwards, between that and the Gold Coast, in gold and ivory, if once renewed.

6324. Do we pension any of the tribes around the Gold Coast?—Not to my knowledge.

6325. If we withdraw our garrison, should you propose that we should in any way obtain their submission and assistance for our own purposes, by pensioning them?—I think offers might be made to the kings and chiefs holding slaves, of a certain salary for the abolition of slavery, thereby making it a colony.

6326. You think we might get rid of domestic slavery by a process of compensation?—Yes.

6327. Have you any proposition to make on that subject?—I believe the income arising among most of the chiefs and kings, would not exceed from 50*l.* to 100*l.* a year to each of them on an average.

6328. How many are there?—Fifty or sixty, I think, but perhaps not so many chiefs of consequence.

6329. And you think that a pension of about 50*l.* a-year to each of them might be sufficient inducement to them?—Yes.

6330. What is the value of a slave?—£. 5 to 8*l.*

6331. Do you think that the civil establishment of the Gold Coast might be reduced, as well as the military establishments?—Possibly these very small governments might be reduced.

6332. Take the office of Colonial Secretary?—I should myself prefer a private secretary at such places as the Gambia and the Gold Coast, and Lagos also.

6333. Have you any opinion with regard to the magisterial establishment, with regard to the judicial assessor?—I believe the stipendiary magistrate at Lagos answers better than the system of having a chief justice at the Gold Coast.

Jovis, 25^a die Maii, 1865.

MEMBERS PRESENT :

Mr. Adderley.
Sir Francis Baring.
Mr. Baxter.
Mr. Buxton.
Mr. Cave.
Lord Alfred Churchill.

Mr. Cheetham.
Mr. William Edward Forster.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.
Mr. Gregory.
Marquis of Hartington.
Mr. Henry Seymour.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE C. B. ADDERLEY, IN THE CHAIR.

GERALD RALSTON, Esq., called in; and Examined.

6334. *Chairman.*] You are Consul General of Liberia to this country?—For Great Britain.

6335. And have been so for 10 years?—Yes, for 10 years.

6336. You are yourself an American?—Yes, I am an American, but I have been living in this country for 25 years.

6337. Will you give the Committee some information with regard to the present state of things in Liberia; is trade thriving there?—They are devoting themselves very much to the increase of their products, and there has been an increase of coffee and sugar of 40 per cent.; they are also getting a great deal of palm oil, they are paying a little attention to cotton, and a good deal to fibres. There is an article of fibre made out of the palm leaf, which can be converted into a most beautiful material for linen, and which is worth 3 s. 6 d. per lb.

6338. That is a new article?—Yes; but coffee, cotton, and oil, are the three staples of the country.

6339. During the 10 years you have known Liberia, has trade been progressing?—It has.

6340. Do you see any reason why it should not continue to increase?—On the contrary, I see every reason to expect it will increase. They are accumulating capital, and getting machinery out from England and America, and making decided improvements.

6341. We have been told that the Liberian Government have lately passed a Ports of Entry Bill, which has been a check to trade?—It has not been a check to trade, because it only came into operation on the 1st of January of the present year.

6342. Will you tell us the nature of the Bill?—The nature of the Bill is to confine the trade of foreigners to the six Ports of Entry, the same as is the custom in America, Holland, England, and all civilised countries.

6343. How many ports does that shut up?—It shuts up none.

6344. But does it shut up no port which has hitherto been made use of?—No; but foreigners have been in the habit of trading all along the coast, and giving indiscriminate trust to the aborigines, which has been the cause of endless strife, bloodshed, and destruction of property.

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6345. It will restrict the import trade to those six places, which has hitherto been irregularly carried on at every place whether ports or not?—Yes, that will be the result of it; it will have a beneficial effect on the country and on legitimate commerce.

6346. I suppose that for a certain time, until the new system has established itself, it must check trade?—There have been only two houses on the coast except at the ports of entry; those are a Hamburg house and a Liverpool house; Charles Gotthelf is the Hamburg house and the Liverpool house is Messrs. Hutton & Cookson.

6347. What was the necessity for the Ports of Entry Bill?—It has been long desired. The discussion commenced about the propriety of the thing as early as the year 1851; there has been an opposition to it, but being convinced of the propriety of the measure they carried it two years ago; they have given two years before they put it into operation, so that any traders who had establishments on the coast might remove them, and wind up their business and move to the ports of entry.

6348. The necessity for the law was on the ground of the revenue being defrauded at certain places, was it not?—Yes.

6349. Do you believe that the tendency of Liberia is to extend its territory?—It is not desirable.

6350. It does not wish it, you think?—No, it does not wish it.

6351. Why not?—Because we are a very feeble people. We have never more than 19,000 American negroes mingled with nearly 500,000 aborigines.

6352. But as the Americans increase in proportion to the natives, you anticipate that they will wish to extend their territory by-and-by?—Decidedly. We claim 600 miles of the sea coast, and 60 miles in the interior, which is 30,000 square miles.

6353. Will you state what are the boundaries of Liberia on the coast?—We claim from San Pedro on the south-east to Shebar on the north-west.

6354. Is that the same as Sherbro?—Yes, but Shebar is the proper name.

6355. You claim from the British occupation

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of Sherbro?—We claim up to the British occupation of Sherbro; the south-eastern boundary is the Rio San Pedro, which is about 45 miles from Cape Palmas to the south of Cape Palmas.

6356. Do you claim Cape Palmas?—Yes.

6357. And 45 miles further?—Yes, and 45 miles further.

6358. Is that boundary which you say the Liberians claim undisputed by other powers?—No. Unfortunately, it is disputed by Lord Russell.

6359. What is the nature of the dispute?—Earl Russell denies our having got political jurisdiction over Gumbo, Muttro, Gallinas, and Shebar; but we made treaties with the natives, and we thought that we had settled the question before a Commission of English officers and Liberian officers at Monrovia, but to our astonishment, President Benson having left here, Lord Russell wrote to me to say that he would not acknowledge our jurisdiction over those four territories.

6360. He disputes a certain space between British Sherbro and Liberia?—Yes; that is called the north-western territory.

6361. Do you understand in whose Government Lord Russell supposes that space to be?—He says that the Governor of Sierra Leone has lately made a treaty for the Shebar country, although we had made a treaty for that country a very long time prior.

6362. You do not dispute the British occupation of Sherbro, do you?—We say that they have no right to it.

6363. I understood that the boundary you mentioned was up to Sherbro?—Up to the Shebar River. Admiral Washington recommended that a British surveyor should be appointed to determine how far up the Yongh River, which is an affluent of the Shebar, would take us 60 miles in a straight line into the interior.

6364. The only question is, not as to any space between the two, but where Liberia and the British occupation join each other?—Just so.

6365. Then does Earl Russell claim the Gallinas for the English?—No, he claims it for the natives; he claims Muttro, Gumbo, and the Gallinas, as belonging to the aboriginal powers.

6366. Are they three important tribes?—No, they are not important; they are very small people.

6367. When you say that Liberia claims all this territory, to what extent does Liberia set up actual government over the territory?—We have made treaties with all those aboriginal powers, that they shall put down the slave trade within their jurisdiction.

6368. But does Liberia actually govern the country?—No, not positively; we have not sent colonies of Americo-Liberians to settle the country; we have been intending to do it, but, unfortunately, Captain Smith, of Her Majesty's ship "Torch," called in question our right to the Gallinas.

6369. Will you state the circumstances under which Captain Smith, on the part of the English, called in question your right to the Gallinas?—In 1860 there were two traders in the Gallinas country, who refused to pay duties to our Government; they were backed up by Captain Smith, and a vessel of war which the English had had the benevolence to give to us, the "Quail," took those vessels into Monrovia, for the purpose of fining them for going in contravention to our revenue laws.

6370. What countrymen were they?—Englishmen. A Jew of the name of Davis, from Kent, was the owner of those two small vessels, and he was trading in that country without acknowledging our revenue laws. Those vessels were captured by the "Quail," and taken down to Monrovia for the purpose of being regularly tried. Captain Smith came into the port of Monrovia, and hatched them, and carried them back to Sierra Leone. Having thus spit in our beard (that is a vulgar expression, but I shall think of a better one by-and-by) they made the natives believe that England no longer countenanced and supported us, and Prince Mannah in the Gallinas country, who was a regular slave trader, and had been ever since early youth, sent off messengers to the captain of the "Buonaventura Cubano," a Spanish slaver off the coast, and told him that he might come back to the Gallinas and trade with Monrovia, as the Liberian Government had no longer any power.

6371. Was this all in 1860?—No, that was in 1861; but it was in consequence of Captain Smith calling in question our jurisdiction over that territory. This "Buonaventura Cubano," who came into the Gallinas river, landed all his merchandise and all his doubloons, and ordered Prince Mannah to purchase a cargo of slaves for him. Prince Mannah, who is a regular traitor, sent off a messenger to Monrovia to say that a Spanish slaver was in the River Gallinas with a cargo of slaves, and according to treaty stipulations with Liberia he asked that a vessel of war might be sent up to capture this "Buonaventura Cubano." President Benson sent off the "Quail," and she came up to the Gallinas, and having investigated the matter, finding she was a regular slaver, did capture her; the surf was so violent that they could not bring her over the bar, and all the ground tackle of the "Quail" was lost in making the effort to get her over the bar, therefore she was compelled to go back to Monrovia to get a supply of anchors and chains. During the absence of the "Quail," Captain Smith, of the "Torch," came into port, and seeing the Liberian flag hoisted on the "Buonaventura Cubano," went on board and recaptured her, and burnt her, thus destroying the evidence that we should have had to make out that she was a slaver before the Admiralty Court at Monrovia. But Captain Smith repented of having done this, and made a statement that he had done wrong, but to shield us poor Liberians from the consequences of having captured a vessel under the Spanish flag, he said, "I assume all the responsibility." In consequence of the destruction of the "Buonaventura Cubano," the Spanish Government of Fernando Po was exceedingly offended, and he sent up a steamer of war, called the "Ceres," to batter down Monrovia, but fortunately our little people at Monrovia were prepared to receive the "Ceres," and after an action of 12 minutes we planted so many shot into her that she cleared off, and went first to Sierra Leone, and afterwards to Fernando Po; and at Fernando Po the Governor was so disappointed and so mortified that such a little State as Liberia should have given such a rough reception to this steamer of war that he was preparing a large force; we understood that five or six steamers would make an attack on Monrovia subsequently, but President Benson fortunately sent a message to me, and I got it in 20 days (which was a very short passage), recommending me to go to Earl Russell immediately and tell him all the circumstances; that they were

were in expectation of receiving a most severe attack from the Spaniards, and hoped for the interference of the British Government to prevent the destruction of Monrovia. Earl Russell most kindly, after understanding the whole question, said, "The British Government will take upon itself the responsibility of the acts and deeds of the Liberians, in consequence of Captain Smith having recaptured the 'Buonaventura Cubano,' and destroyed her;" in consequence of this the Spaniards did not attack us any more, but there was a very angry correspondence carried on between Señor Isturitz and myself with regard to this matter, and it finally died out in consequence of the British Government interfering to assume all the responsibilities of our sins.

6372. You believe you have heard the last of this?—I believe so.

6373. When did that communication take place between you and Earl Russell?—It was in the year 1862.

6374. From this account which you have given us, the Committee would be glad to know what are the terms between the Liberian and the Spanish Government with regard to the slave trade?—We have no treaty; but I have just made a treaty with Portugal, and the Count De Lavradio has promised me all his influence with the Spanish Government to induce them to make a similar treaty with Spain.

6375. Will you first tell us what treaties exist between the Liberian Government and any foreign power, with regard to the slave trade?—In every treaty which I have made, I have tried to get as strong a clause as possible with regard to the slave trade, but have not succeeded in getting it assimilated to piracy, except in two instances; namely, that of the Republic of Hayti and the Portuguese.

6376. Do all the other treaties relate not only to the slave trade, but to commerce?—Yes, it is a general treaty; denominated a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, and they all have a clause with regard to the slave trade.

6377. But have you such treaties with other foreign powers?—England and France were the two first; then Belgium, Holland, the kingdom of Sardinia, afterwards the kingdom of Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, United States of America, the Republic of Hayti, and the Hanseatic towns, Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen.

6378. What is the substance of all those treaties which you have now mentioned; are they all of one form?—More or less; they differ very little.

6379. Are they for the suppression of the slave trade, and for what you call amity and commerce?—They are for the purpose of improving the friendly and commercial relations between the powers.

6380. Is there a clause in the treaty with Hayti, making the slave trade piracy?—Yes.

6381. Which is not in other treaties?—But Count De Lavradio, who is a regular negrophile, has adopted my suggestion of putting that clause into my treaty with the Portuguese, though he was six years and a half before being able to induce his government to consent.

6382. How many nations have assimilated the slave trade to piracy?—England and America only.

6383. No other?—I think not. Liberia has allowed the right of search to England for the purpose of putting down the slave trade.

6384. Is there any treaty between Liberia and Spain and Brazil?—No; I am exceedingly desirous of making treaties with Spain and Brazil, because I consider that the English, Americans, Spaniards, and Portuguese, have been the great slave traders of the world.

6385. What is your hope of making treaties with Spain and Brazil?—I have very good hope for Brazil, but I have not so much hope for Spain. The Spanish minister has examined this treaty with the Portuguese most carefully; he has also examined the treaty with Hayti carefully, and I have expressed a very strong desire that Spain would make a similar treaty to declare the slave trade piracy.

6386. How many ships of war have you at Liberia?—Only one, the "Quail," which the English Government benevolently sent out to us.

6387. Does she ever make captures?—She captured this "Buonaventura Cubano," and she is constantly cruising along the coast to protect the country from the slave trade.

6388. But I presume there can be no slave export from the coast of Liberia?—No; because all the people are determined against it as much as the English themselves.

6389. So that the only place where the "Quail" could fall in with slavers would be on those disputed parts of your territory which are not actually under your government?—That is so.

6390. Do you believe that if the present efforts made by England, both on shore and afloat, were relaxed, the slave trade would break out again?—I believe it would.

6391. Where do you believe it would break out?—In the Gallinas, for example, and in several other parts of the coast where the Americo-Liberians are not in sufficient power to protect the country. But concentrating all the trade of Liberia in those six ports of entry, is the best guarantee against the revival of the slave trade which you can have in Liberia.

6392. Do you know of any demand for slaves now, except from Cuba?—No.

6393. Do you believe if that demand were stopped, there is any chance of a demand arising from any other quarter?—No.

6394. Do you believe in the possibility of the Brazilian demand reviving?—No; I believe that they are sincerely desirous of putting down the slave trade.

6395. If the Cuban demand were stopped, you think there would be no more slave trade?—I do.

6396. Both as Consul General of Liberia, and as an American, what is your opinion with regard to the prospect of America co-operating with England in putting a final stop to the Cuban demand?—I think the American policy is not to interfere with foreign politics at all; but they are sincerely desirous, since the anti-slavery party has come into power at Washington, to get rid of slavery, and to put a stop to the slave trade, and I think they will make every possible effort to do so. I am satisfied that the Liberians are the most determined people against the slave trade of any people in the world; even more so than the English, because they are negroes themselves, and they have a decided horror of the infamous traffic.

6397. Mr. *Cheatham*.] You are speaking of the 19,000 American negroes?—Yes.

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6398. Do you refer to the aborigines at all?—They are, of course, an ignorant people; they had been engaged in slave-trading before the Liberians acquired power over them; they are getting gradually educated into civilisation; they are making decided progress; but if they had not the countenance of the Americo-Liberians, they would relapse into the slave trade again.

6399. Sir Francis Baring.] Are the natives, as distinguished from the American coloured race, at all mixed up with the Government?—Whenever they have intelligence they have the right of voting for members of the Legislature, for the appointment of justices of the peace, and for the different officers, and so forth.

6400. How do you measure their intelligence?—By a certain quantity of ability to read and write, and the possession of a certain quantity of property.

6401. Are they found to be intelligent when they do vote and get into appointments?—They are very intelligent indeed. In our country we have kroumen who are the most intelligent negroes in the whole world; they go on board the ships of war and the vessels of all the traders on the coast.

6402. Do they hold any situations of importance in your government?—They do not.

6403. They do not rise above certain small offices, do they?—There were 5,000 recaptured Africans taken into Monrovia who were parcelled out among the farmers, and their families were educated and brought up very carefully, and many of them have been members of the legislature, justices of the peace, and become most respectable citizens.

6404. Mr. Baxter.] Do you not think that the most effective mode of putting an end to the slave trade would be to blockade the coast of Cuba, so as to prevent the importation of slaves into the island?—I do.

6405. Now that the anti-slavery party is in power in America, do you expect that the Government of the United States would be willing to co-operate with us in sending out a squadron for the purpose of preventing the importation of slaves into Cuba?—I do not think that they would be willing to interfere with foreign politics so much as that; but I think they would use all the efforts they could independently of sending a naval force. Probably a treaty might be made between England and America to aid in putting down the slave trade in Cuba.

6406. When we sent a squadron six or eight years ago to the coast of Cuba for that purpose, we got into difficulties with the Americans?—Of course, because they were all pro-slavery people at Washington, and had been for 50 years, and but for this civil war, which has destroyed all the slave property of the country, everything would have gone to ruin, and slavery would have been extended.

6407. You think that they would give us the right of search, and co-operate with us on the coast of Cuba?—There is a right of search already. President Lincoln, in the first year of his administration, made a treaty of right of search between England and America, a measure which I had been struggling for for no less than 20 years, but my countrymen always pooch-pooched the idea, and said that it would be degrading to them.

6408. You believe that it is now in the power of the Government of Great Britain and the Government of the United States completely to

put an end to the slave trade on the coast of Cuba?—Yes.

6409. And you think that the United States Government would be ready to agree with the British Government in a treaty for that purpose?—I do. I believe that the intelligent Cubans are becoming aware of the impolicy of slavery, and that they would make every effort to get rid of it.

6410. Are you aware that there is a party in Cuba not only in favour of the abolition of the slave trade, but of the abolition of slavery itself?

—Yes. The Spanish slave has always had privileges over the American slave. He can buy his Monday, then his Tuesday, then his Wednesday, and so forth up to Saturday, and when he had bought all the week, the purchase money was always determined by the adjudication of disinterested parties in the neighbourhood. The sum designated could not be controlled by the master of the slave. Now in America, the slave never could buy his freedom, except by the consent of his master. The slaves in Cuba have always been more kindly treated than in America.

6411. Is it your opinion that the continuance of the slave trade on the part of the Spaniards, with the connivance of the Spanish officials, endangers the territorial possessions of Spain in Cuba?—I do not believe that it does endanger them, because they keep up a strong force in the island. But I know that in Madrid now there is a very strong anti-slavery feeling getting up. There has been an Anti-Slavery Society established in Madrid, and they are making every effort to extend the anti-slavery feeling throughout the Peninsula as well as through the island of Cuba.

6412. Mr. Cheetham.] Assuming that Great Britain was to place a squadron on the coast of Cuba, is it your opinion that we might dispense with the squadron on the coast of Africa?—Yes, I think so. It would be far better to have a squadron on the coast of Cuba than on the coast of Africa; but the most effectual way of putting down the slave trade on the coast of Africa is to have those civilized settlements such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and so forth.

6413. Would your opinion be adverse to the removal of the British settlements on the coast, the missionaries being left to their own resources?—I am a very great advocate for the negroes governing themselves. I think Liberia is better governed than Sierra Leone, because the white people govern in Sierra Leone, whereas in Liberia the negroes govern.

6414. But are the negroes whom you speak of a very superior class to the aborigines?—Decidedly, because they have had the advantage of education in America.

6415. But how would that apply to the whole of our possessions. Supposing we withdrew, we should leave the government in the hands of the aborigines, should we not?—But the missionaries and the British Consuls would guide the people into good government.

6416. Your opinion is, that we might reside on that coast with a much less force there than we do now?—Decidedly; and I think wherever the white men govern, there is such a strong prejudice between the whites and the blacks, that there is not good government. It is most expensive to have the whites, because they die there. I should die in a fortnight; a vast number of English do die. I do not recommend that any
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but black people should govern the coast of Africa; we might get respectable West Indian negroes.

6417. Those observations would apply to all the coast from the Gambia down to Lagos, I suppose?—They would.

6418. About the cultivation of sugar, cotton, and oil; is that cultivation carried on by those Americanized negroes, or by the natives?—The American negroes have the intelligence, and have the capital and enterprise, but they find aboriginal labourers at a very cheap rate; they pay them about four dollars per month.

6419. Are those aborigines willing to work?—Perfectly.

6420. There is no difficulty in getting labour?—None whatever.

6421. Then how do you account for the fact of the very small supply of cotton?—Cotton has not been attended to with sufficient energy hitherto, and now that the American war is over, I believe that the price will get down so low that it will not be worth while for any but the Egyptians, and the Turks, and a few other powers to compete with America.

6422. You think your exports in future will consist of sugar, coffee, and palm oil?—Sugar, coffee, palm oil, and this fibre which I mentioned.

6423. Mr. *Scymour*.] You stated that you thought the slaves were better treated in Cuba than they were in America?—Decidedly; I have travelled all over Cuba, and in every State of South America.

6424. In Cuba you have never been on a plantation without seeing the whip very constantly used, have you?—I know it.

6425. Have you not heard the cries during the night of the people that were flogged?—No, I never heard that, but I know that the whip was used very frequently and abominably.

6426. Have you ever walked out while staying on a plantation in the middle of the night or evening?—I have never witnessed any cruelty of that kind; the gentlemen with whom I have stopped for a few days have always been with me, and they naturally would not like me to witness any unpleasant circumstance of that kind.

6427. But are you aware of the pace at which the slaves are used up in Cuba, and of the average of their lives?—Yes, seven years; it is horrible; dreadful.

6428. That was not the case so much in the Southern States, was it?—No. But among the slaves in America, the husband was separated from the wife, and the mother from the children, and so forth.

6429. Do you think that, practically, the laws are carried out in Cuba so as to give any kind of security to the slave?—I believe that any slave can purchase his freedom.

6430. I know that a slave can purchase his freedom, but, at the same time, would you not say that the slaves are most cruelly used on the plantations?—Decidedly; but then their condition was better than that of the American negro, because the latter, having more intelligence, was separated from his family, and had not the privilege of learning to read the Bible; they are

naturally a very religious and devotional people, and they considered the privation of learning to read and becoming Christians was a very severe one.

6431. Have you ever been on the coast of Liberia yourself?—No; I have never been further than the Cape de Verde Islands.

6432. You do not know, from personal knowledge, that the negroes on the West Coast of Africa would be fit to govern themselves?—Not from personal knowledge; but I know that intelligent men at Lagos, at Sierra Leone, and other British establishments, have manifested intelligence enough to govern the people, provided they were put in the way of doing it.

6433. You cannot give the Committee any information with regard to the West Coast of Africa from your own experience?—No, I cannot.

6434. Mr. *Cave*.] You know Cuba from your own experience, do not you?—Yes; but it is 25 years since I was there.

6435. Do you know that almost every slave in existence in Cuba now has been taken there contrary to treaty?—Entirely; it is most shameful that it should be so. I wish the English would make them suffer for it.

6436. You have told us that you have great hopes of the suppression of the slave trade by the Spaniards themselves?—Yes, on the part of the people of Cuba.

6437. And Madrid?—Yes; they have got an anti-slavery society in Madrid; you will see a full account of it in the "Star" of about a month ago, and in the "Anti-Slavery Reporter" of April.

6438. Would it not be better to begin by keeping the treaty with this country?—Yes, decidedly; and if I were the British Government I would compel them.

6439. How?—By force, if necessary.

6440. You are aware that the whole of the cultivation of Cuba is carried on by slaves imported from Africa?—I believe so.

6441. There is no difficulty in distinguishing these, commonly called Royal negroes, is there?—None whatever.

6442. If we could manage to make Spain obey the treaty, we should have no occasion for a squadron on the African coast, should we?—No, I think not; but the Cubans are so frightened now in consequence of the near abolition of slavery in the United States, that they will certainly make efforts to get rid of the accursed thing in that island as well as in the Southern States.

6443. With regard to the slaves purchasing their freedom, are you not aware that the slave who purchases his day-by-day freedom in Cuba has been constantly cheated out of those days, and that therefore the law is a dead letter?—It is in a great measure a dead letter; but in many cases it is carried out honestly, I believe; it is not as honestly carried out as I should like to see it.

6444. Mr. *Scymour*.] It is their habit to make lotteries for buying their freedom, is it not?—That must have been in operation since I was there; it is 25 years ago since I visited Cuba.

6445. *Chairman*.] Have you anything further to state to the Committee?—No.

Colonel EDWARD CONRAN, re-called; and further Examined.

6446. Lord *Alfred Churchill*.] WERE you present at Cape Coast Castle when the king was elected?—Yes.

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6447. Where does he reside?—In the town of Cape Coast.

6448. For how long a period had there been no king

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king there previous to that?—In the year 1856 the people of Cape Coast Castle discontinued having a king, and they had no king from that period up to the 21st of February last.

6449. But do we admit of a king residing in the town exercising authority contrary and opposed to that of the Governor?—No; the Governor refused to admit it. As to his holding courts, and also appointing magistrates, Governor Pine refused to admit his right to do so.

6450. His jurisdiction has never been assented to by the Colonial Office in this country?—It could not have been, because he has been so recently appointed.

6451. What are the circumstances which occa-

sioned the imposition of a fine upon the king, which you referred to last week?—I think I have stated that it was a fine of 20*l*.

6452. Was that fine paid by the king?—I have Governor Pine's authority, in writing, for stating that it was paid by the king. Governor Pyne complimented me on turning out the troops, attributing our success in making the king pay the fine to the effect produced by the troops.

6453. It has been stated in a paper, called the "African Times," that the Governor paid the fine himself?—I have it officially from Governor Pine that the king paid it, and that he attributed the fact of the payment to the exertions of our troops.

WILLIAM HACKETT, Esq., called in; and Examined.

6454. *Chairman.*] You are Chief Justice and Judicial Assessor on the Gold Coast?—I am.

6455. How long have you held both those offices?—I was appointed in April 1863, but I acted previously to that for about a year and a half.

6456. That is to say from 1861?—From October 1861, with the exception of three months.

6457. During the whole of that period (when you acted before your appointment, and since), have you acted in both capacities as chief justice and judicial assessor?—Yes, both as chief justice and judicial assessor.

6458. Practically, is there much difference in the proceedings of the courts in those two capacities?—Yes; practically there is a considerable difference, because as chief justice I felt myself bound by the English law, but not when I was judicial assessor.

6459. Do you sit in two separate courts?—No, in the same court.

6460. Are the proceedings the same?—In fact the mode of procedure is very simple. It is a mere summons; there is no pleading in either case.

6461. Is the office of judicial assessor exercised, as it was first intended, in conjunction with the native chiefs?—No. I am not aware what was the first intention, but when I went out I did not find it the practice to exercise it in conjunction with the native chiefs.

6462. We have had it in evidence that the first intention of the office was, as the title of the office implies, that the English judge should sit with the native chiefs, and administer the law in cases of dispute between the natives?—Yes, certainly; but it has not been exercised in that way to my knowledge.

6463. Then the judicial assessor does not in any case now (nor has he done so during the years you have acted) sit with the native chiefs?—No.

6464. The chiefs have never taken part with him?—No, I think not. There may have been some cases of that kind, but in general it is not so.

6465. When you say that the chief justice administers strictly the English law, what law does the judicial assessor administer?—He administers natural equity, paying attention to the customs of the country, where they are not contrary to equity or to morality.

6466. Do you find that that sort of law in the breast of the assessor, gradually and practically adapts itself to the English law?—I suppose where the English law is consistent with natural justice that it must be so.

6467. It is only an exceptional law where the native customs do not adapt themselves to the

English law?—Yes, where they are improper or unjust; where they would work evil.

6468. What native customs are you specially alluding to?—There are many of their customs which arise from superstitions.

6469. In regard to which in administering the law you are compelled to exercise your private judgment as well as you can, I suppose?—Yes, there may be many cases in which the native customs may appear to us unjust.

6470. How far, practically, have you been obliged to countenance domestic slavery in the administration of the law as judicial assessor?—I have had very little to do with that; I have never pronounced a decree which positively sanctioned slavery; I have never interfered except to prevent cruelty, but I generally avoided touching the question, because I thought it prudent.

6471. Do you think that the first intention of the office of judicial assessor was practicable?—No, I think it altogether impracticable; I believe it is impossible for any English judge, sitting with a native chief, to administer justice.

6472. Where do you sit as judicial assessor?—I used formerly to sit in the fort of Cape Coast; but the Court is now in the town.

6473. In no other forts?—In the fort at Anamaboe, the fort at Jamestown and at Accra.

6474. Any other?—Dix Cove. I have not been there, but there is a fort at Dix Cove, where the English magistrate sits.

6475. Have you appointed periods at which you sit at each of those places?—No.

6476. You make your circuit as you can?—Yes.

6477. Does business accumulate in your office as judicial assessor?—No, not to a great extent.

6478. You can practically deal with it all?—Yes; but there is sometimes great delay in cases from the interior on account of the difficulty of obtaining evidence.

6479. When you are at Cape Coast is there any inferior judge administering the law at other forts at the same time, with an appeal to you?—Yes.

6480. What are they called?—Civil commandants.

6481. Do they all exercise the same description of law as yourself?—They are supposed to do so.

6482. Where is your court as chief justice?—That is in the town of Cape Coast.

6483. Do you sit at the other forts also as chief justice?—I do.

6484. Do you sit in the two separate capacities on two separate days or on the same day?—It depends

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depends altogether on the business. We have not time generally to pay much attention to forms and ceremonies.

6485. Is your business, as chief justice, chiefly in settling disputes between British subjects or between the British and the natives?—There is a great deal of business between the natives and the British and foreigners.

6486. As judicial assessor you only preside over cases between natives, I presume?—As between the natives.

6487. Is the criminal law administered with trial by jury on the Gold Coast?—Yes, for the most part.

6488. What do the juries consist of generally?—Of natives and a few Europeans. They are intermixed.

6489. Do you find them honest and intelligent as jurymen?—Yes, I think they are tolerably honest, so far as my experience goes. I have no reason to complain of their verdicts.

6490. Either as corrupt or as unintelligent?—Neither.

6491. I suppose there is an appeal to you from the judicial officers of all the Courts in the other forts, to you both as chief justice and as judicial assessor?—There is, I believe, generally a right of appeal.

6492. Practically, are there many appeals made to you from the Inferior Courts?—Not many.

6493. Do the chiefs themselves in the Protectorate ever refer to your Court for arbitration?—Yes.

6494. I suppose that two chiefs would not settle their own disputes by reference to your arbitration, would they?—Yes; sometimes they refer to the judge, and sometimes they refer to the governor.

6495. That happens practically, does it?—Yes, it happened when I was acting as Lieutenant Governor. There was a dispute between the King of Apollonia and a neighbouring chief as to which was lord paramount, and I wrote to invite them to Cape Coast.

6496. Were you in that case acting as private referee?—No, I acted as Governor.

6497. But did the chiefs submit disputes to you judicially?—I have had cases myself as judge.

6498. You were there three months acting as Governor in Governor Pine's absence, were you not?—Yes.

6499. It was during those three months that that reference occurred?—Yes.

6500. From what you have seen of the working of those Courts, do you think that they have improved the habits of the natives generally, giving them better ideas of legal proceedings?—I think that they are a great boon to the natives.

6501. Do you think that we have improved their ideas of justice?—I think so, decidedly.

6502. Do you suppose if the English withdrew from the Gold Coast, our judicial proceedings would leave a permanent trace in their own institutions and habits?—That I could not say; I have not formed an opinion on that subject.

6503. What is your opinion of the value of the English forts to the English students, independently of any civilisation of the natives?—In a commercial point of view, I should say very little.

6504. Do you think that if we really undertake the government of that country we ought to assume more extensive operations and Govern-

ment establishments than we have, or do you think that our establishments are sufficient for the good government of the country?—I think they are not sufficient for the good government of the country. Our establishments are certainly insufficient for the government of the country at present.

6505. Do you think the influence of the English Government at the forts is such as to keep the peace among the tribes of the whole Protectorate?—I think so.

6506. Have you formed any opinion with regard to any improvements that the English might make in their establishments there?—Yes, I think there might be some improvements. One great improvement would be, instead of having young military officers as commandants, to have civilians—educated men. At present the commandants are liable to be removed at any moment; they are temporary appointments; I think if you had permanent commandants at the outstations it would improve very much the administration of justice, and the general government of the country.

6507. Mr. *Cheetham*.] Is the commandant civil or military?—He is generally a very young military officer, holding a civil appointment and liable to be removed at any moment.

6508. Mr. *Seymour*.] Is there often a change?—Very often; there are several changes in the course of the year sometimes.

6509. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.]—I suppose the Governor has recourse to those military officers from motives of economy?—Yes; he is obliged to do it, there is no other resource.

6510. Mr. *Seymour*.] Do you mean that the Governor cannot appoint a civilian?—Yes, but he has none to appoint.

6511. Then he might appoint anybody?—Yes, but the salary is too small.

6512. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] He has not the means of paying them?—He has not the means of paying them.

6513. *Chairman*.] Is it your opinion that we should have a larger staff, or merely that we should concentrate the offices in a different class of men?—I do not think it would be necessary to have a much larger staff.

6514. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Do you ever find any difficulty in enforcing your sentences as judicial assessor?—No, I think decidedly not; as a general answer I may say no. There may be one or two cases in which I have found difficulty, but I have generally found the most cheerful submission to the decrees of the British judge on the part of all the natives.

6515. Then your court as judicial assessor is, in fact, a Court of Appeal from every part of the Protectorate to which the protected tribes willingly resort?—Practically so; in fact, the natives have this idea, that their chiefs and kings are over them, and that the representative of the English Government is the head over their chiefs; it is a common form of expression to hear them say, "You are the master of all of us;" that is the tone assumed by the kings and chiefs.

6516. *Chairman*.] Do you think they mean that the English are their masters, not only as referees but as protectors also?—I do not know; that may be their idea; I never inquired what it meant.

6517. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] But the chiefs are willing that their decisions should be reviewed by you as representing the supreme power?—Yes.

6518. You conceive that great good is done in that

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that way?—Yes, immense good; because among barbarous tribes the chiefs are very little superior to the rest of the people, and it is a great boon to their people to have a superior power to appeal to from the injustice of their chiefs.

6519. Does this jurisdiction extend over a very large tract of country?—Yes, over a very large tract of country.

6520. So that by means of the peculiar jurisdiction, the British Government exercises an influence for good over a far larger tract of country than in any other of our settlements?—Yes, both directly and indirectly.

6521. What is the ordinary nature of the cases that come before you?—There is the greatest possible variety of business; in the first place, there are cases from the natives of the interior, purely native disputes, family questions, questions about land; in addition to that there are a great many questions of a commercial nature; they principally arise among the inhabitants of the sea coast; there are also a great many cases which are actions brought by foreigners; for instance, by the American traders against the natives.

6522. Do you find that the people of the interior acquiesce as willingly in your jurisdiction as the people of the coast?—More so, I think; decidedly more.

6523. There is no necessity for the use of force in carrying your decisions into effect?—I have never known it in my experience.

6524. *Chairman.*] Are your courts in the actual forts, or are they in any case in the towns around the forts?—They are in the towns generally except at Annamaboe and Dix Cove.

6525. Do you conceive that the British have any territory outside the forts?—That is a point which has never been settled, I believe.

6526. But you having been quoted as giving an opinion, do you conceive that it is so?—My opinion is that it is very doubtful; I should not like to act on the assumption that we had territory outside the forts; but that question has never been settled.

6527. *Sir Francis Baring.*] As chief justice, you administer English law?—Yes.

6528. I do not understand you to say that you administer strictly the English law, but a law so modified as to suit the circumstances of the Colony, is that so?—If there were a case arising between two Englishmen I should endeavour to act as much in consonance with the English practice as possible; not adopting the mode of pleading, because that is practically impossible.

6529. But as between an Englishman and an American and a foreigner, and as between an Englishman and a native, how would you act then?—It would depend a good deal on what the nature of the case was; if it was a commercial case I should decide it according to the principles of mercantile law in England; there are a great many cases, such as questions on bills of exchange and mutual accounts, and there my only guide is English law.

6530. But does not it in reality come to this, that you yourself decide how far you are to carry out the English law, or how much you have to drop, not being able to carry it out very strictly?—When I decide according to any law I decide according to the English law.

6531. But at times you decide not according to any law at all?—No.

6532. Do you mean to say that you carry out strict English law, as chief justice?—I do not carry out that part of English law which relates to pleading or practice.

6533. But you are the judge of how far you shall carry it out or not?—The sole judge.

6534. Now, with regard to the native law between the natives, you carry out the principles of justice, modified in accordance with the customs of the natives?—Yes; for instance, supposing the title to property is in dispute; in investigating that question I should give the property to the person who was the heir according to the custom of the country.

6535. How do you know what that is?—I take evidence on that point from the elder persons of the country.

6536. In fact the natives give you the law of the country?—That is my only means of getting at it.

6537. In fact they decide the question?—No, I decide the question on hearing the evidence.

6538. *Mr. Cheetham.*] But they do enable you to decide?—Yes; they are the books which I consult.

6539. *Sir Francis Baring.*] In India, in old times, the judges had an adviser by their side; you have not got that?—No.

6540. In a good many of those cases that come before you, between Europeans and the natives, do you find that the Europeans are always in the right?—I do not know how to answer that question.

6541. You can tell me whether they are always in the right, or whether you find the Europeans behave better on the whole than the native merchants in those cases?—I do not think I can say anything one way or the other.

6542. There is not such a preponderance of honesty on the European side as to make any strong impression on you?—I scarcely know how to answer that question.

6543. *Mr. Cheetham.*] To put it the other way, there is not such a deficiency of honesty on the native side as to have struck you?—I can only again say, that I do not know how to answer that question.

6544. You have told us that you have never sat with those native chiefs?—As a rule not. I think that I have had a native king with me occasionally.

6545. But it is the custom in other settlements on the Coast, that the judicial assessor sits with the native chiefs, is it not?—I am not aware of that.

6546. Do the natives willingly resort to your court?—Very willingly indeed.

6547. Have you, in your juries, an equal division of Europeans and natives?—No.

6548. Are they all natives?—No; we take Englishmen when we can get them.

6549. Have you never an admixture of the two?—Generally there is an admixture.

6550. Have you found practically that the native jurymen invariably give their decisions in favour of their countrymen?—No, I have not found that.

6551. What is your general opinion of the Gold Coast; in the first place, are they an inferior race of men?—No, I do not think they are.

6552. Is there anything that strikes you in their mental or physical formation which seems to indicate that they are incapable of elevation or improvement?—They are not incapable of elevation, certainly.

6553. So that in the efforts which are being made to elevate them by education or missionary labour, you see nothing to treat as futile?—I think not.

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6554. *Chairman.*] Do you observe at all a superior class of men arising among the natives who have passed through the schools of the missionaries?—Yes, I think so; I think that there is a great improvement every day. There are some persons who are remarkably intelligent.

6555. And those persons you find out have passed through the educational establishments of the missionaries?—Yes, there is one clerk in the office of the Colonial Secretary of Cape Coast who is a person of remarkable intelligence.

6556. *Mr. Forster.*] Do you act as judge in criminal cases?—Yes.

6557. What sort of cases?—All descriptions of cases, from murder downwards.

6558. Do you enforce the punishment of death?—Yes, capital punishment.

6559. What power have you to enforce capital punishment in the protected territory?—Treaties with the natives give us the power.

6560. *Chairman.*] Does it frequently happen that the punishment of death is carried out?—No; there have been only six or seven cases since I went to the Gold Coast.

6561. *Mr. Forster.*] In the case of a man being found guilty of murder, and your sentencing him to death, who carries out the sentence?—It is carried out by the person who acts as sheriff.

6562. He is a native, I presume?—Yes, he is always a native.

6563. Would the same man, or sheriff, have power all through the territory?—No; you must have a distinct staff at each station.

6564. Do you sentence to imprisonment also?—Yes; to imprisonment also.

6565. Where are people imprisoned?—They are imprisoned in the forts generally.

6566. Are there any appeals from your criminal judgments?—No.

6567. Is there ever any difficulty in enforcing them?—No.

6568. What are the punishments generally inflicted?—A few months' imprisonment, with hard labour, for larceny and minor offences.

6569. Is there any corporal punishment?—I think the inspector of prisons has the right of inflicting corporal punishment for improper conduct while in prison.

6570. You do not sentence prisoners to corporal punishment?—No; it is not the general practice.

6571. Upon what code of laws do you act in criminal cases?—According to the English law, generally; there is no other law to go by.

6572. Does anybody defend the prisoners?—Very often in important cases; in minor cases very often not.

6573. What kind of defence is there?—I suppose it is the same kind of defence that would be got up at the Old Bailey, as far as the counsel can do it.

6574. Are there native counsel?—Yes, there are native counsel; there are one or two natives who defend prisoners, I think.

6575. *Chairman.*] Are the proceedings in English?—Yes, in English.

6576. *Mr. Cave.*] Are those counsel regularly educated men?—One of them has been educated in England; he is a man of very good education.

6577. *Chairman.*] In the event of any punishment being imposed on the subjects of a distant protected tribe, would that punishment be always carried out within the English forts, or are they sent to their own tribes?—I have not known of any case of their being sent to their own tribes.

6578. *Mr. Forster.*] Do you take cognisance of divorce cases?—I am sorry to say we do; before I went to the coast they had passed an ordinance constituting the chief justice the judge of a Divorce Court, giving him the right to divorce. I have always thought that that was an ordinance which was very inadvisable.

6579. Are the Committee to understand that you have cases of divorce between natives who are not Christians?—No, that only applies to Christians.

6580. You do not interfere as Chief Justice with the domestic relations of natives who are not Christians?—No.

6581. *Mr. Seymour.*] Are there any Mahomedan cazys there?—No.

6582. Are there any native judges?—No, not regular judges.

6583. Throughout the protected territory do they all look up to you in cases requiring justice?—They have got a general habit of constituting themselves into courts of arbitration; the chief of a tribe is supposed to have judicial power.

6584. Do you think it would be a good thing to have one central government at Sierra Leone?—My opinion would depend very much on the way in which it was carried out in detail.

6585. But if you had one able Governor and a better communication between the settlements on the coast, do you think that it would work well?—Yes, if it were well done.

6586. It would depend a good deal on the choice of the Governor, would it not?—Yes.

6587. Does the prosperity of those settlements depend more on that than anything else in your opinion?—I think so.

6588. Are there any coloured commandants or men in positions of trust?—There have been, but they have been removed.

6589. Are there any now in offices of trust?—There are one or two coloured gentlemen on the Gold Coast who hold the commission of the peace; but I do not think that there is any coloured person in actual office.

6590. There is no coloured commandant?—No.

6591. Was there not a Deputy Governor, Mr. Bannerman, who was a very good one?—That was before my time.

6592. Do you think it would be good policy to train up the natives to occupy as many positions of trust as possible?—I think so.

6593. With regard to the protected states that are at a distance from Cape Coast, in cases of requiring justice, do they come down to the coast?—Yes, they come down to the coast.

6594. Do you hold any Courts far in the interior?—No; I have been once or twice 40 or 50 miles into the interior.

6595. How many miles a day can you travel there?—We travel very slowly; 25 miles is a long day's journey.

6596. Can you do it at any season of the year?—I think not in the rainy season.

6597. Do you think it would be practicable to make better roads there?—No, I think not.

6598. You do not think that roads would be useful?—You cannot keep them in order; if you make a road to-day, in six months' time, unless you kept it open, it would be overgrown.

6599. That is the case with every road, is it not?—It would be very difficult to keep up the roads in Africa.

6600. Has the experiment of making a good metal road ever been tried?—Never; there is a road about three or four miles out of Cape Coast.

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believe that it is quite as healthy for the native troops as Bathurst.

6651. What do you suppose would be the injury caused to trade by the English withdrawing their force from there?—The principal article of exportation from the Gambia is of such a bulky nature that it is liable to be destroyed on the main land; in fact, the merchants lose every year from fire and from unruly natives a large amount of property.

6652. Fire and plunder?—Fire and plunder.

6653. Are the natives peculiarly hostile to the English around there?—No, quite the contrary.

6654. There is no more danger there than anywhere else, I suppose?—No.

6655. During the 31 years that you have been there have you observed much change in the character of the natives near the river?—It is very slight; but I think there has been a slight improvement.

6656. We have had some evidence, particularly from Captain Burton, that the Mussulman tribes are gradually coming down to the river, and that they are more difficult for the English to manage than formerly; is that the case?—No; the Mussulmans are the same people we had to deal with formerly; they have not come down; they are the same people who have become Mahomedans.

6657. Have they become more troublesome?—I have not found them so; the Mahomedan population were originally kept down by the kings, who did not allow them any rights or land; they are now throwing off the yoke; they have been nearly constantly at war for the last 10 years, attempting to throw off the yoke of the native chiefs.

6658. What is the use of the English Government maintaining the strip of land between the river and the kingdom of Barra?—There is no use that I see in it, only it is difficult to say what effect it would have with regard to the collection of the revenue; for instance, should it be considered as belonging to a foreign power I do not know that we can prevent goods being landed on it.

6659. That is on the supposition of its falling to a European power?—No, even with a native power it would be the same.

6660. Do you suppose it possible, supposing the kingdom of Barra resumed the territory up the river, that there should be either imports or exports made on that shore, and brought in at the mouth of the river (supposing that still held by the English) against the will of the English?—If they are landed there they would come up the river without our being able to prevent them.

6661. If we chose to prevent that, should we not, being possessed of the mouth of the river, be able to do so?—That is a question which I have some doubts about, namely, whether we have a right to make laws to prevent a native power from landing goods in its own territory.

6662. Of course we could prevent it as well at the mouth as by occupying the whole of the river bank, could we not?—Our establishment is several miles further up the river than the commencement of the strip of land in question.

6663. But the duties would be on the imports and exports from the river to the sea?—Yes; there can be no other object in retaining that piece of land. We were bound, I think, to protect the French residents at Albreda when they gave it up to us.

6664. When you contemplate the possibility of a foreign power obtaining possession of the Gam-

bia, do you believe that the French have any desire to be possessed of the Gambia?—They have been anxious to obtain possession of the Gambia, no doubt; whether they care much about it now that they have free access to it is doubtful, so long as we keep it.

6665. But the British interests would suffer, in your opinion, if the French did become the possessors of the Gambia?—Only the merchants trading there, and the native inhabitants of the place.

6666. What injury would it be, in the first place, to the merchants, and secondly, to the natives?—The want of British protection.

6667. Would not the French protect them as well as the English do?—Perhaps the French would give them more protection.

6668. The trade is wholly French, is it not?—No, not wholly; we import a good deal more than the French, the exports are principally to France; they purchase with money, and we purchase with goods.

6669. The ground nut is exported principally to France, is it not?—Yes, principally to France.

6670. During the 31 years that you have been in the Gambia should you say that the trade has increased?—The ground nut is entirely a new trade since I have been there.

6671. And that is all to France?—Principally to France.

6672. Are you of opinion that no other trade has increased during those 31 years?—I am afraid that gold, ivory, and bees-wax have rather decreased than otherwise.

6673. What do you suppose has prevented trade increasing?—I think the wars, and the roads being shut up in the interior.

6674. Has it frequently been the case that there have been wars during those 31 years?—Yes, it has.

6675. What have those wars been occasioned by?—By merely quarrels between the natives themselves.

6676. What has set the natives quarrelling?—It is impossible to say.

6677. The Committee would like to have your evidence, whether the presence of the British Government during the 31 years that you have been there has, in your opinion, kept peace among the natives, or whether it has, on the contrary, led to disturbances among the natives?—I think it has tended to keep the peace.

6678. What has been the nature of their quarrels on the occasions when their quarrels have disturbed trade?—They have been religious. A struggle on the part of the Mussulmans to throw off the Pagan yoke.

6679. That is to say, to spread their religion?—Yes, to spread their religion.

6680. Do you conceive that all those disturbances have been religious disturbances?—They have for the last 10 years.

6681. But when any two tribes quarrel, I suppose they rather speculate on the assistance of the English?—No doubt they both apply to the English; but the English have never interfered except in tendering advice.

6682. But do you not conceive that the fact of their speculating on the assistance of the English rather tends to encourage the quarrelling?—They are so well aware that we cannot render them any real assistance that I do not think it does.

6683. But surely they know that if we chose we could interfere?—In some cases.

6684. And

6684. And in some cases we do?—The only instance was in Combo; we supported the King of Combo some years ago.

6685. It has been suggested to this Committee by several witnesses that the four African Governments might be again concentrated at Sierra Leone, as they were before 1842. What is your opinion with regard to that?—So far as the Gambia is concerned, I do not think it would be any advantage to the Gambia.

6686. Of course there would probably be less money spent at the Gambia?—I should doubt that.

6687. But my question was, whether from your knowledge as Colonial Secretary you think the Gambian Government could be conducted by a lieutenant governor under Sierra Leone, as it used to be?—No doubt it could be so conducted.

6688. You were at the Gambia at the time of Dr. Madden's report, were you not?—Yes.

6689. What did you consider were the grounds on which the separation of the Gambian Government was then made?—It was not found to work; there was no communication in those days between Sierra Leone and the Gambia.

6690. Except by sailing vessels?—Except by sailing vessels.

6691. That obstruction is now removed, is it not?—Yes; to a certain extent.

6692. What other obstacles to the combination of the government exists?—The council at Sierra Leone knows nothing of the wants of the Gambia, and is, therefore, not competent to pass ordinances.

6693. The proposal is that the local ordinances should be passed by each of the lieutenant governors, subject to the veto or approval of the Governor General. Would that remove that obstacle?—Yes; of course it would.

6694. What is the difference of time in the communication between the Gambia and Sierra Leone when Doctor Madden made his report and now?—There are monthly communications now.

6695. How was it then?—Two or three times a year.

6696. Supposing that troops were wanted at the Gambia from Sierra Leone, and a message was sent as speedily as possible to Sierra Leone, and the troops were sent by steam transport in answer to the requisition, how long would the whole transaction take?—It is impossible to say; it would depend on when the mail steamer was passing; we might have to wait a month before we could send to Sierra Leone.

6697. Are there always means at the Gambia for communication with Sierra Leone?—No; except by the mail steamer.

6698. You have to wait for the mail steamer?—Yes; since they have run we have been obliged to send to Goree for assistance instead of Sierra Leone.

6699. That is a distance of 500 miles, is it not?—Yes; Sierra Leone is 500 miles distant, Goree only 80.

6700. Doctor Madden also alleged some inconvenience in the judicial establishments?—Yes.

6701. In your opinion, how have the separate judicial establishments at the Gambia, which were made in consequence of his report, answered?—They have answered remarkably well.

6702. Have you any suggestions to make with regard to their improvement, or any information with regard to defects which might be remedied in the present judicial establishments at the Gambia?—No, none.

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6703. In forming juries, are the juries composed of natives in the Gambia?—As a general rule, they are; special juries are composed of Europeans, as a general rule.

6704. Is the Supreme Court at the Gambia ever resorted to by the natives?—Yes, in a few instances.

6705. It is not too expensive, is it?—There have been very few instances of their having recourse to it.

6706. Is that owing to its expense?—Owing to its expense, and to our having no lawyers at the Gambia, fortunately, to incite them.

6707. What is your opinion, generally speaking, of the effects of the missionary work during the 31 years that you have been at the Gambia; has it been successful?—Yes, among the liberated Africans.

6708. Have you observed a decided improvement, owing to the operations of the missionaries?—Among the liberated Africans I have.

6709. Could you distinctly say that the schools and education furnished by the missionaries have had a good effect?—Yes.

6710. So that you observe among those who have come out of the schools a better class of people?—Yes, a better class; but they have made no converts from the aborigines of the Gambia, the Mandingos.

6711. No Christians have been made from the Mandingos?—No; there may be one or two, but they are very few.

6712. I think we have had evidence that the Mandingos have generally conducted themselves better than other tribes?—They are very quiet.

6713. Should you say that they are better conducted?—Yes, I think so.

6714. Although the missionaries have had less success among them than others, yet they are the best conducted?—I do not say that they are better conducted than the liberated African portion of the population.

6715. They are chiefly Mussulmans, are they not?—Principally.

6716. You seem to think that Mussulman fanaticism has been the cause of the chief disturbances of trade?—Yes.

6717. Their object being to destroy the power of the pagans?—Yes, that was the object.

6718. In that struggle, did the Mahomedans refuse to submit to the native chiefs?—They have killed a great number of the native chiefs; in fact, they have the upper hand in the river now.

6719. Suppose it was decided to concentrate the Government at Sierra Leone, do you think that the Chief Justice residing at Sierra Leone might act for the Gambia, by forming a certain circuit and visiting the Gambia, say four times a year?—Yes, I think so; but we would require an officer with proper power to adjudicate between the natives to hold local courts.

6720. But you think that that circuit, which was found inconvenient when the communication was slow, might now, with the help of steam communication, be made to work well?—Yes, I think, as far as criminal cases are concerned, if you give the police magistrate power to adjudicate in certain cases up to 50*l*. or 100*l*.

6721. Have you known, during your official life at the Gambia, many cases of difficulties arising from the fugitive slaves being freed by our law?—The Local Government has had a good deal of trouble.

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6722. Have

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6722. Have the native chiefs made reclamations?—Yes.

6723. Can you mention any particular case of the kind?—They have merely remonstrated as yet. I recollect a woman slave whom the King of Barra claimed as his wife.

6724. The King of Barra claimed her back as his wife?—Yes.

6725. Was she given up?—No, she was not.

6726. And there it ended, I suppose?—Yes.

6727. What is your opinion generally of the usefulness of treaties between the British Government and native chiefs?—I think they are useless unless we have the power of enforcing them.

6728. Practically, have the treaties in the neighbourhood of the Gambia been observed by both sides?—No, there are a few by which we pay money and of which we have the power of enforcing the observance. They observe their part so long as that money is paid.

6729. Do I understand you to say that the payment maintains the rest of the contract?—It does.

6730. Do you approve of the system of pensioning the chiefs?—It is a good system if the trade will pay for it.

6731. Do you think that it is the more likely plan, if not the only plan, of holding the native chiefs to their engagements?—It is, I think, probably the cheapest plan.

6732. Do you think that those treaties lead the chiefs to expect protection from the British?—I do.

6733. That, you would say, is rather an evil so far as it goes?—Not only rather an evil, but I think it is a very great evil.

6734. Were you present when Commodore Wilnot made the treaty with the King of Combo?—Yes, I was present.

6735. Two years ago?—Yes.

6736. What were the circumstances of that treaty being made by a naval officer?—The Governor requested him to call upon the chiefs of the Mahomedan town, who had quarrelled with the King of Combo, to settle the quarrel and bring them to terms.

6737. Has that treaty been practically observed on both sides?—I believe not; since I left, I understand that the Mahomedans fell on the king's town at night, killed the king, and burned the town.

6738. Did we, being in treaty with that murdered king, take any steps to avenge his death?—I am not aware; I believe they denied having done it; and that there is no proof.

6739. At all events, we have done nothing?—I am not aware whether we have or not; it is since I left the Gambia.

6740. Supposing the English were to withdraw from the Gambia, what would become of the settlers who have been induced to settle on the Gambia by the presence of the English?—I do not know where they would go; they would not be safe there.

6741. Why not?—The Mahomedans would very possibly destroy the country as they did once before.

6742. But would not those settlers be more capable of defending themselves than the previous population were?—I am afraid they would not, they are too much scattered over the country; they are not collected in large villages as the natives generally are; for cultivating the ground they are spread about on farms.

6743. How far is the Legislative Council at the Gambia composed of merchants?—There are three merchants.

6744. Out of how many councillors?—I think that two have been added since I left; I think there are five.

6745. May merchants sit in the council?—There is one on the Executive Council.

6746. Is there always one?—No; it is a special case.

6747. There might be more?—There is no limit that I know of.

6748. I suppose the great mercantile interest is really the ruling interest in the Gambia?—It is.

6749. Are there many French merchants?—Yes, there are several French merchants.

6750. Are there French merchants on either of the councils?—No.

6751. Are there merchants of other nations besides the English and French there?—No; there have been American merchants occasionally; we have had American houses there at times, but I think we have none at present.

6752. Mr. Chichester Fortesque.] Could you tell us something more of the kind of connection that existed between the Gambia and Sierra Leone at the time before the separation took place?—There was very little connection whatever; the only connection was that we sent the ordinances when we wanted them passed, and they generally passed them at Sierra Leone as they received them.

6753. There was no legislative body at the Gambia at all?—No.

6754. Who was the executive officer on the spot?—There was a lieutenant governor at the Gambia for a long time, and a Queen's advocate some years before the separation took place.

6755. What judicial establishment was there?—There was a court of common pleas with unpaid officers.

6756. What class of cases was heard at the Gambia?—There were merely a police court, and a court of common pleas to hear actions between the merchants.

6757. What judge was there?—I had the honour of presiding for a short time, and afterwards the Queen's Advocate presided.

6758. Was the judge generally a layman and not a lawyer?—Always, until the Queen's Advocate was appointed.

6759. Which was shortly before the separation?—Shortly before the separation.

6760. What did you do in criminal cases?—We depended on the judge of Sierra Leone. I have known him to be absent for nearly two years.

6761. Then supposing a union of some kind to take place between the Gambia and Sierra Leone under a central governor, you would not desire to see the ordinary administration of the Gambia as far dependent on the Governor of Sierra Leone as it was then?—No, certainly not.

6762. You were asked some questions about the native wars which have been raging of late years in the neighbourhood of the Gambia, whether you thought they had been in any way increased by our presence or interference; will you tell the Committee distinctly whether there is the slightest foundation whatever for that idea?—Not the slightest.

6763. Can you call to mind anything that will even lend a shadow of colour to it?—No, I cannot imagine a case where our interference has led

to war; on the contrary, I think it has tended to stop war on several occasions.

6764. Then morally and physically our power there has not been great enough to prevent those outbreaks, but our presence has not tended to increase them?—No, quite the contrary.

6765. Probably the wars would have raged to a greater extent if we had not been there?—I think so.

6766. Was the case of Combo a case in which our interference took place solely in order to protect our own territory?—Yes, it was to protect our territory in Combo, which was very unsafe.

6767. Was not all our little territory within a very few miles of the town of Bathurst liable to be laid waste by those natives?—Yes.

6768. But we had no object in view beyond our own safety?—Just so.

6769. Is that the only case which bears even the appearance of interference among the natives within your recollection?—Yes.

6770. Do you think that the natives having found for so many years that we do not interfere with their quarrels, there is no reason to believe that they speculate in any degree on our assistance?—They know well that we will not assist them except by advice.

6771. Of course they know that we greatly disapprove of disturbances in our neighbourhood which injure our trade?—Yes, they are well aware of that.

6772. We do our best to stop them by persuasive means?—Yes, we do our best.

6773. And sometimes succeed?—Yes, we sometimes succeed; I have known cases where we have been successful on many occasions.

6774. I understood you to say, with regard to the Barra shore, there might be danger, if we did not retain the nominal sovereignty; that foreign goods might be landed there and sent up into the interior without paying duties?—Yes, that is the only danger.

6775. The nature of the customs duties levied at a place like Bathurst is peculiar, and they are not duties simply on the goods consumed in the settlement, but on goods sent up into the interior?—Yes; on goods sent up into the interior.

6776. Therefore, if those goods can give us the slip we lose our customs?—Yes; we lose our revenue.

6777. Do you think it would be possible to carry on the government of the Gambia on a smaller revenue than you now possess?—Certainly not; it would be quite impossible.

6778. You would rather say that the government is stinted in every possible way?—Yes; in every possible way.

6779. It can only keep body and soul together?—It can only keep body and soul together.

6780. What is the establishment of McCarthy's Island?—Only one officer, who is also civil commandant.

6781. One officer commanding the troops?—Yes, one officer commanding the troops; he is the civil commandant.

6782. As well as the officer commanding the troops?—Yes.

6783. What other Government officer is there?—The clerk to the police court, and half a dozen constables.

6784. Are they natives?—Yes, they are.

6785. The clerk is English, I suppose?—No; he is a native.

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6786. There are only two European officers at McCarthy's Island?—As a general rule, one executive European officer, and two medical.

6787. How many soldiers are there?—About 50.

6788. Are they black soldiers?—Yes.

6789. It is a very trifling establishment indeed?—A very trifling establishment.

6790. McCarthy's Island is the point, is it not, to which the Dover steamer runs up?—Yes.

6791. And from which it returns?—Yes, that is so; it frequently goes further up to a place double the distance.

6792. But McCarthy's Island is a post held in the upper part of the river, in connection with the Dover steamer?—Yes.

6793. For the purposes of trade?—For the purposes of trade.

6794. Do you think the passage from time to time of a little steamer up and down the river, contributes very materially to the peace of the river, and to the safety of trade?—Yes; more than double the number of troops would do.

6795. You would say that it is impossible to judge of the best mode of dealing with a Colony like the Gambia, upon general rule; but that you must take it upon its own merits, and according to its own circumstances?—Yes.

6796. Which are different from those of other settlements?—Yes, they are altogether different. No general policy for the coast would answer at the Gambia.

6797. You think that the pensions to the chiefs are a means of inducing them to keep the peace, and to treat our traders with respect?—Yes; if any robbery is committed by a native chief to whom we pay customs, we deduct the customs until he makes some compensation, and that gives us great power.

6798. You stop his stipend?—Yes.

6799. The stipend which you pay him out of the customs?—Yes.

6800. Those customs being collected on goods which are partly consumed in his own territory?—Yes.

6801. Those stipends are very small?—Yes.

6802. But they are an obvious and cheap way of inducing those chiefs to give protection to our traders?—Yes, to our traders and our goods.

6803. Lord Stanley.] How long has McCarthy's Island been held by the British Government?—I think some 40 years.

6804. What was the reason of its being first occupied?—I believe it was for the location of liberated Africans, and also for commercial purposes.

6805. In the first instance it had nothing to do with trade, had it?—It was for both combined.

6806. Can you tell us what is the present extent of the trade of the Gambia River altogether?—It is very small.

6807. I think that that trade in 1863 did not much exceed 140,000*l.*?—No, I should think not.

6808. I think that 10 years before that it stood at a considerably higher figure?—Yes.

6809. So that it has been tending of late to decrease?—During the continuance of those wars it necessarily decreased; the whole extent of the river has been in a very unsettled state for the last 10 years.

6810. Now, can you tell us, as a rule, whether the settlement has been able to pay its own expenses?—No, it has not.

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6811. There has been a deficit, has there, as a general rule, from 1834 to the present time?—No, I think not.

6812. I find it stated in Colonel Ord's Report, that the revenue in 1863 was 17,250 *l.* and the expenditure 19,300 *l.*?—Yes, the revenue has fallen off since, say, 1863, owing to those wars.

6813. Therefore, you have a decreasing trade, you have a deficient revenue, and you have the fact that this occupation of M'Carthy's Island, and the steamer plying up and down the river, which were supposed to check wars, have not succeeded in doing so?—A civil war has been raging along both banks of the river since 1862 or 1863.

6814. Can you tell us whereabouts the great bulk of the trade of the Gambia is concentrated; how far up the river?—At Yabbatenda, 200 miles above M'Carthy's Island.

6815. That is the utmost limit of trade?—Yes.

6816. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue.*] How far is that from Bathurst?—It would be about 400 miles nearly.

6817. *Chairman.*] How far is it from M'Carthy's Island?—One hundred and eighty miles, or 200 miles, I think.

6818. Lord *Stanley.*] Do you, then, think that we ought to occupy points higher up the river, if the occupation of stations and trade go together?—It was intended, when we entered into treaties 30 years ago with the chiefs of Futtatenda, for some land in that neighbourhood.

6819. If that question had had to be settled on the coast of Africa, and not at home, it would have been occupied before now, probably?—Probably, but I am not aware.

6820. Sir *Francis Baring.*] Was the arrangement disapproved of by the House of Commons?—I think it was disapproved by the Government.

6821. Lord *Stanley.*] Was that on the ground of expense?—On the ground of expense.

6822. Can you state what is the protection given to trade along 200 miles of the river by the occupation of the central point high up the river by a very small British force?—The moral influence of the Government.

6823. I suppose the troops could be of no use for the protection of trade unless they were conveyed up and down in a steamer?—Knowing they are so near at hand has a moral influence on the natives, with even the few men we have. If the natives become restive, a merchant collects his goods and takes them to M'Carthy's Island, where they are safe.

6824. *Chairman.*] Has that happened often?—Yes, it has happened often; the merchants have vessels constantly plying between the upper river and M'Carthy's Island.

6825. Lord *Stanley.*] Is there any tendency, at the present time, in the trade of the river to revive?—I have no doubt it will when peace is re-established.

6826. But what security have you for the maintenance of peace; the force you have in the river being totally insufficient to compel the re-establishment of peace?—The small force has a great influence on the natives.

6827. It depends on the good-will of the different tribes whether peace shall be re-established?—Yes, it does; but the native chiefs have been punished for robberies heretofore, and they know that they may be so again.

6828. Some of those natives are frightened by our presence to behave themselves?—Yes; sometimes.

6829. And others are threatened by the use of force?—No; I have never known threats used.

6830. Then the influence in question resolves itself into our presence?—Yes; they think, as we have punished them on former occasions, we may do so again.

6831. But if our peace-making influence on the river is preserved by our presence, what is the object of holding those points at that distance in the interior?—I do not say that it is done entirely by our presence. I am afraid that our presence alone would not do it.

6832. Can you say what number of British houses are engaged in trade?—Nine or ten.

6833. In the main the trade is in the hands of the natives, is it not?—The trade is carried on by the natives principally.

6834. The natives, I suppose, bring the trade down to the coast, and the chief business of the Europeans is to carry it on from the coast to Europe?—Yes; Europeans go up the river to trade also.

6835. Have you the means of informing the Committee how much of the exports of the Gambia go to France, and how much to England?—Not at present; but the principal part of the ground nuts goes to France.

6836. You stated, in answer to a question from the Right Honourable Chairman, that the trade was, in the main, a trade with France?—Yes; the export trade.

6837. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue.*] Not the imports?—Not the imports.

6838. The imports are mainly from this country?—Yes; they are mainly from this country. The principal imports by the French are spirits and wines.

6839. Lord *Stanley.*] How many wars have there been in your own recollection of the Colony in which the British Government has in any way been implicated?—There have been several wars where we have interfered, in consequence of robberies committed by the native chiefs.

6840. I see on the map a long strip of land coloured red, extending up on the side of the river from Bonnyadoo Creek to Swarra Creek, which is supposed to be in British occupation. Can you say whether we exercise an effective government over that?—We have not asserted any sovereignty over that since I have been there, except at a small village at Fort Bullen and Albreða.

6841. It has been ceded to us by treaty?—Yes.

6842. Will you state the object of that cession?—I believe the object was to keep the French out of the river.

6843. We pay for it, I suppose?—We pay about 100*l.* a year now.

6844. *Chairman.*] To the King of Barra?—Yes; to the King of Barra, and for the customs which were formerly paid by the vessels going up the river.

6845. Lord *Stanley.*] That coast extends for 40 or 50 miles, does it not?—Yes.

6846. We hold that territory without making any use of it, and pay for holding it, because there is some apprehension that some other power has a desire to possess it?—It incurs no expenses to us.

6847. Then, if that is so, how does it affect our relations with the King of Barra; you say that we hold that line of coast in order to be able to impose customs duties on goods entering Barra?—Yes; and to prevent the French taking possession

possession of it; that was the original idea; they took possession, after ceding the Gambia to us; the French argued that the Gambia commenced at Fort James, nearly opposite Albreda; they said that they had as perfect a right to occupy Albreda as we had, previous to the treaty of 1814.

6848. Then do the chiefs, or the people of Barra, willingly pay customs' duties on goods going to their own territory?—They get all their goods from Bathurst; no goods are allowed to be landed at Barra.

6849. In fact a considerable part of the revenue of the Colony is paid by customs' duties which fall on the people of Barra?—On the natives bordering the river.

6850. Do you think that that is a state of things calculated to produce good feeling among the natives towards us?—It produces no bad feeling whatever.

6851. *Sir Francis Baring.*] Is the occupation of that line of coast valuable, with regard to the slave trade?—The Gambia is well known to have been a slave-trading station in former years.

6852. But with regard to that particular strip of land, was that stated at all as the reason for taking possession of it?—No, I think not; that strip of land was obtained long previous to my period of service.

6853. And now it is valued for revenue purposes?—Just so.

6854. *Mr. Cheetham.*] Do I understand you to say that goods passing to the kingdom of Badiloo higher up, for instance, would pay duty?—Yes, we claim the sovereignty of the river.

6855. Wherever the goods are for they pay duty if they pass the river?—Yes.

6856. Have you had any complaints from those chiefs?—No; the fact is that they know nothing about it.

6857. Do you find that the trade and commerce of those rivers are extending?—I think so; but the returns, I am sorry to say, do not show it.

6858. But still you think there is an increasing intercourse?—Yes, I think so.

6859. Have you any traders located higher up on the river than Barra?—Yes, we have them almost all over the banks of the river.

6860. At a distance from the British possession?—Yes, 400 miles up.

6861. As far as McCarthy's Island?—Yes, far beyond that.

6862. Do they trade in safety?—They are robbed occasionally.

6863. But our Government has not been involved in any difficulty about it?—We send a Government messenger generally, who tries to settle it, when the traders get into difficulties.

6864. But supposing the native merchants have not paid their debts to the British traders, have you any treaty for their recovery?—No.

6865. The traders take their risk?—Yes, they take their risk.

6866. They do not call on the British Government to interfere?—No, we never interfere between the merchants and the natives, in such matters.

6867. The British merchants have no remedy; they cannot seize the goods of the natives?—No.

6868. *Chairman.*] In answer to a previous question you described the Government at the Gambia as being stinted and only sufficient to keep body and soul together; do you think that that is a good state for any Government to be in?—No.

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6869. Should you say that it is rather desirable either to make the Government more effectual, or to attempt less?—Of course.

6870. A stinted Government must be a bad one, must it not?—To a certain extent it must be so; it has less influence, of course.

6871. Do you know anything of other settlements on the West African Coast?—Very little.

6872. Is it your general opinion that it would be advisable in the Sierra Leone River, in Lagos, the Niger, and everywhere, to take advanced posts in the interior, like McCarthy's Island, and occupy them?—At Sierra Leone I do not think we can; we have not such a river there.

6873. Do you think it would be desirable if we could do that?—I cannot say.

6874. We have had it given in evidence that it is better to trust to the mercantile agents keeping on good terms with the native chiefs than giving the merchants a Government force to defend and protect them; should you say that the McCarthy's Island plan was a better plan?—Yes, I think it is.

6875. Do you think, there being apparently very little prospect of improvement in the carrying trade, there is any prospect of the production extending in the Gambia, either in cotton or other articles?—During the last two or three days I have had a report that the French have opened their ports to English vessels; so that we shall have the advantage of the carrying trade as well.

6876. What do you think of the prospect of agriculture, either cotton or other produce?—Cotton is indigenous to the Gambia; the natives have always cultivated it for their own purpose, for their own clothes, and it has increased to some extent; the war in America has given an impetus to it, to a very small extent.

6877. You do not form any great expectation from that?—No. With regard to the ground nut, when I went to the Gambia there was not a bushel exported, and now the average is from 12,000 to 15,000 tons a year.

6878. *Mr. Cheetham.*] You do not anticipate any large export of cotton?—Not unless the prices keep very high.

6879. Have you any suggestion to offer to the Committee with regard to the improvement of the Government?—I think that the Government has answered remarkably well since the Charter of 1843 or 1844.

6880. *Mr. Chichester Fortescue.*] As a matter of fact, has the nominal possession of this Barra shore ever involved us in any difficulty or responsibility of any sort?—Cases of slavery occasionally arise, which are attended with difficulty.

6881. Arising on that territory?—Yes, on that territory. If we are to keep the territory, I suppose we ought to see that slavery does not exist; fortunately it has not been pressed, to any extent.

6882. Have the natives any idea that we are the sovereigns of that territory?—Yes; when it suits their purpose they tell us that the country belongs to us, but on other occasions they appear to forget it.

6883. But the territory ceded was only a strip of land, a mile from the shore?—Yes; a strip of land, a mile from the shore.

6884. You have said something about the French at Albreda; are there French residents there now?—Yes.

6885. What number?—Only one, I believe.

6886. One French trader?—Yes, one French trader; he belongs to a house at Bathurst.

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6887. Would you expect to see an English trade at the Gambia if the native war should come to an end?—Yes.

6888. Do you see any prospect of its coming to an end?—Yes, I think so; the Mahomedans are the most powerful, and they will ultimately find out the advantages of keeping the river quiet.

6889. Sir Francis Baring.] What class of persons are the native traders?—There are a few of them European clerks; but they are, principally, liberated Africans who have been employed by the merchants, and a few of them trade on their own account.

Dr. ROBERT BRADSHAW, called in; and Examined.

Dr. R.
Bradshaw.

6894. *Chairman.*] You are Colonial Surgeon at Sierra Leone?—Yes.

6895. And also a member of both the Executive and the Legislative Councils?—I am now only a member of the Legislative Council since the change in the last Charter of 1864.

6896. What was that?—Prior to 1864 the Council was both executive and legislative, but now it is divided, and we have both.

6897. What was the date of the change?—It was last year.

6898. What was the cause of that change?—I really cannot say. It was done in England; it was on the appointment of Governor Blackall to the government that the change was made.

6899. How long have you been at Sierra Leone?—Twelve years.

6900. Are you thinking of returning there?—Yes, I think so.

6901. What are your views with regard to the present prospect of the colony?—The colony has been increasing steadily in prosperity ever since I went there. The revenue of the colony has increased at least 10,000*l.* a year.

6902. But has trade been increasing proportionately?—Yes; there has been no increase in taxation since I went there, and the revenue has shown that trade has proportionately increased.

6903. What branch of the trade is particularly increasing?—There is a great increase in the amount of produce, and consequently in the amount of goods sold in return for that produce.

6904. But in which produce?—In the oil seed trade principally; there is a very great increase in the past three years in the quantity of ginger grown and exported, and also in arrowroot and palm oil.

6905. What has been the effect of the annexation of Quiah and Sherboro?—It has given the agricultural people a great opportunity of farming and given them territory which they formerly had not, for there is not very much good land about Sierra Leone; it has opened a larger field for trade with much more safety to the merchants there.

6906. Are you aware that the Government of Liberia have disputed with the English Government the possession of Sherboro?—Yes, but I am perfectly aware that they have no legal right to it, for I was a party to the treaty. When the Sherboro country was given over to the English Government I was present at the time, and it was distinctly stated to Governor Hill in my presence that the Monroviens had no right to Sheba or any part of the territory given to us; the chiefs said that, but they claim Sheba, which is part of our territory now.

6906.* Sheba and Sherboro are the same?—Yes.

6890. Do you consider them respectable, and honest in their dealings?—As a general rule, they are.

6891. *Chairman.*] Has there been much change in domestic slavery during the 30 years you have been at the Gambia?—No, I think not.

6892. It goes on as much as ever, you think?—It is an institution of Africa as much as ever it was.

6893. Can you state at all the number of Governors there have been at the Gambia during the 31 years you have been there?—Eight.

6907. Do you think it would be adverse to any British interests if Sherboro became annexed to Liberia?—I am certain it would.

6908. How would British interests suffer?—At the present day the Monrovia people are all leaving it; they say they cannot exist there; they say there is no trade; there are some few people doing a little, but for the general population there is no means of employment.

6909. Then there would be no injury to British interests, but only to the people, I suppose?—Liberia could not protect British interests.

6910. Do you mean you think that Sherboro would become a troublesome neighbour?—Very much so.

6911. How would it interfere with Sierra Leone?—There would be constant rows and fights, which we should be brought into, for they could not protect our people, and they could not protect our trade; they have not sufficient force, and they are not sufficiently respected by the natives.

6912. Is there any trade between Liberia and Sherboro?—Very little, if any.

6913. Does it require protection?—No; I do not think that the trade which exists between Liberia and Sherboro does require protection, for it is very little.

6914. Do you consider the annexations and the first occupation of Sierra Leone to have been both advantageous in the way of protecting the merchants?—Yes, and also an advantage in the suppression of the slave trade.

6915. As far as the suppression of the slave trade goes, I presume the extension of Liberia would be as effectual as the extension of the British occupation?—I do not think so, for the natives would not have the same respect or fear of the Monroviens.

6916. Do you suppose that any single slave has ever been exported from Liberia, or could be?—They could be, I have no doubt, but I am not aware that there have been any.

6917. You do not think that a free settlement, such as Liberia, is a good and effectual blockade to the slave trade?—I do not.

6918. Do you think there is any prospect of Sierra Leone being self-supporting?—It is very nearly self-supporting at present; we get very little, except the expenditure of the military force, from the British Government; the only grant to our Colony is 2,000*l.* a year, which is the Governor's salary.

6919. Is there any taxation besides that of the Customs duty?—There is the house and land tax, and a road tax.

6920. Are they increasing?—They are not increasing, but they are at the same amount as they were originally fixed.

6921. Do you suppose that a larger revenue can be raised from that kind of taxation?—Yes, I do, if it was required.

6922. What is your general opinion of the working of the judicial establishment at Sierra Leone; is it satisfactory?—Tolerably so; there are no complaints against it.

6923. How does the jury system work in Sierra Leone?—Criminally it works very well, but in civil cases not so well.

6924. What is the reason of that?—There is a very general impression existing there that juries in civil cases, before they go into court, make up their minds. In criminal cases generally the system works tolerably well; in fact, as well as in any other country.

6925. Your opinion with regard to the occupation of territory seems to be this, that the more we can occupy the better?—Yes, provided we get the means of communication. There is a very fine part of our territory (namely, Bulama) which we can do very little with, for want of steam communication.

6926. Do you think that the prospect of trade and the general climate and nature of the country invite the English to settle there?—No, I do not think that any one would go out there by preference but mercantile people; and a great many Europeans go there and get on for a short time tolerably well. Of course there is great sickness and mortality in such a climate, but that is their risk.

6927. Do you see any use in occupying the ports of the isles De Los and Beulama?—Yes. I think that Beulama would be very valuable: it is splendid ground for agriculture; it is as fine as any part I ever walked over; well watered, and everything we could want, if we had the means of communicating with it; but at present we have to go up to the Gambia to communicate with Beulama.

6928. Do you think that the mercantile interest would of itself seek out Beulama as a favourable spot?—If we had regular communication between Sierra Leone and Beulama, we should have several merchants there to buy the groundnut and other matters which exist there in large quantities.

6929. But if left to themselves, do you think that the mercantile interest would seek out Beulama as a profitable speculation?—I think not, for I do not think that it would be safe for them to be there by themselves; the Portuguese are quite close, and they are very jealous of our occupation, on account of their slavery: Passao is quite close.

6930. Do the Portuguese occupy Passao?—Yes; they have a governor at Passao, which is only three hours' steaming from our port at Beulama. I visited it last year. You can go in a boat quite as fast as you can in a steamer; the navigation is so difficult with a large steamer, that we were obliged to proceed very slowly.

6931. What sort of force have the Portuguese there?—They have got white troops there; the white part of the force is very small, but they have, I understand, up at Rio Grande and altogether, some 200 or 300 soldiers, such as they are, but the settlement itself is one of the most wretched places I was ever in in my life.

6932. What is the nature of your office as colonial surgeon?—I have a large civil hospital and lunatic asylum; I have to attend to the gaol, the police, and the public officers.

6933. For which services you receive a salary from the local government, I presume?—From the local government.

6934. Are there many merchants in the two councils at Sierra Leone?—There are only two.

6935. Are they in the legislative council?—Yes.

6936. None in the executive council?—None.

6937. Can there be any in the executive council?—There can be, for the Governor has power to call them in whenever they are wanted.

6938. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] The executive council consists of the principal officials, does it not?—Yes.

6939. Along with the Governor?—Yes.

6940. The Island of Beulama commands access to a very important system of rivers, does it not?—It does.

6941. It would be likely to be a very valuable emporium of trade, you think?—Yes, if we had direct communication with it.

6942. It is also a place admirably situated for the purpose of preventing the slave trade?—Particularly so; that is why the Portuguese wanted to get us out of it, because their slaves can go over and claim their freedom there.

6943. Comparatively speaking, it is healthy, is it not?—As healthy as any part of the coast. I should think; the new barracks are very well situated, and there is a very good site for a healthy town there.

6944. Lord *Stanley*.] When you speak of the difficulty of getting at Beulama, do you mean you think there should be a steamer established to run there regularly from Sierra Leone?—Yes.

6945. At whose expense should it be established?—It would pay some portion of its own expense by taking passengers up and down there from Sierra Leone, and taking light goods for merchants; but the expense, of course, should be borne by the Government.

6946. That is to say, by the Colonial Government?—The colony have had to pay a good deal lately, but I suppose that they would be in a position to pay part at all events; it would be used a good deal for Imperial purposes; it would be the means of stopping the slave trade that exists now to some small extent in those northern rivers for want of men-of-war about there; the squadron has been reduced, or so much occupied in other parts, that we have been for months without a vessel on this northern division.

6947. It is a man-of-war that you contemplate, is it?—She might be officered by men-of-war officers; but you could get a company equal to our wants at Sierra Leone, and in the event of a force being wanted you could put troops on board; but it is impossible that anything can be done for Beulama without a steamer being at the disposal of the Sierra Leone Government.

6948. What is the distance?—About 400 miles; it is about 100 miles from the Gambia.

6949. Then of the two, I suppose, it should rather belong to the Gambia, so far as the protectorate is concerned?—Yes, in consequence of there being no communication at present; if we had direct communication it would be no great advantage to Beulama to be attached to the Gambia, and they would prefer Sierra Leone.

6950. It has no natural connection with Sierra Leone?—None whatever.

6951. Is there any trade there?—Yes, a large ground-nut trade.

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6952. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] If there were to be a central governor at Sierra Leone, moving about between the different African settlements, with a large steamer at his disposal, he would find no difficulty in visiting Beulama on his way to the Gambia, would he?—None whatever, it is in the direct way.

6953. Sir *Francis Baring*.] You have stated that you have been there 12 years?—Yes.

6954. During that time, have the native population made much progress in the way of trade?—A very great progress.

6955. And in civilization (if I may use that word)?—Yes.

6956. What position do the higher classes hold, with regard to education and manners?—There are some men of very little education; but, as a rule, they are very worthy and respectable men; their education is not much; very few of them are educated.

6957. What is your opinion of the grammar school?—It gives very good education, is very well conducted, and is now under the charge of a native clergyman, who is a very good man, under the Church Missionary Society.

6958. Do you find that the natives are anxious to put their sons to that school, and that they are gradually becoming more so every day and every year?—There is a growing desire among the natives to educate their children.

6959. Is that confined to the higher classes, or do you find it general?—It is general. Some of the higher classes have no children. The poorer classes take advantage of the schools, and there is a very large attendance.

6960. What is your opinion of those who are educated at those schools; do they turn out well?—Some of them are turning out very well, and filling good positions. Every allowance must be made for them in their transition state.

6961. They are not all rogues?—Not all; I should be sorry to say so; there are some of them who are very worthy and respectable men.

6962. Mr. *Cheetham*.] Are you acquainted with any other part of the coast?—I served at the Gambia in the years 1850 and 1851.

6963. Is there any contrast between the educated natives of Sierra Leone and the natives on the rest of the coast?—I think we supply the coast with any kind of education there is from Sierra Leone.

6964. Are there any native traders?—Yes, a number of them.

6965. How do they stand?—Some of them stand pretty well, and some badly, just the same as in any other community.

6966. Are you aware that they do not stand so well in other parts of the coast?—I am.

6967. Is there any ground for that prejudice?—I have no doubt there is ground for it, since it exists, but it is not always the best class of the community that leave our coast; you generally find some of the people, who are about the coast, are gentlemen who have spent a short time in gaol at Sierra Leone, and have taken their departure from it.

6968. The schools are still in operation, are they not?—Yes, they are increasing in number, and doing very well.

6969. Is the trade and commerce of that part of the country extending?—Very much; even the trade of Sherboro has increased wonderfully in the two years we have been occupying it.

6970. Is there any consul there?—No, none whatever.

6971. But have not some of the commercial men there desired to be separated from Sierra Leone?—Not that I have heard of.

6972. Mr. *Burton*.] Do you think that the Negro, as far as you can see, is very far below the European, as a trader?—No, I think he is quite as deft at trading as a European.

6973. Quite as able to look after his own interests?—Yes.

6974. Have you found them intelligent in other pursuits?—Yes, they are, but I wish to qualify that statement. They have a great dislike to field labour or agriculture, they think it is a degradation; that comes from the origin of most of them. They were slaves and people who were other people's property, and not free people. I think if they could be persuaded that it was not degrading to labour, we might get it, but at present there is a very great want of labour. As soon as a slave can scrape together a few pounds, he says "I will sit down and trade," and he commences a small trade; most of the population go on in that way.

6975. Is Sierra Leone becoming more healthy than it used to be?—I think so; we have done a good deal in clearing and draining; we get periodical epidemics, which are very bad, but with regard to the general healthiness of the coast, and Sierra Leone in particular, I think it has improved during the 15 years that I have been on the coast.

6976. Lord *Alfred Churchill*.] Is Beulama a port of entry?—No.

6977. Is it not the case that vessels trading there have to go to Sierra Leone to enter at the Customs' House?—No, not for Beulama, because, in consequence of not having direct communication, we have not extended our customs' laws to Beulama.

6978. Is it a free port?—Perfectly.

6979. Do the French trade there much?—They have the principal trade there, because the nuts are almost wholly consumed in France; they make oil of them.

6980. They are not imported into this country?—Very little; I do not know that there is an oil factory in England; there may be, however, but the nuts all go away in French ships.

6981. What is the great advantage of Beulama to Sierra Leone?—It would be a very great agricultural position, and we would have great means of checking slavery in the northern rivers. The French will not interfere, for they have no claim to it.

6982. Is it a healthy spot?—I should think it would be as healthy as any other place.

6983. Is it high land?—The site where our present station and new barracks are is very high and healthy; there are fens there at two or three seasons of the year, of course.

6984. Did you know the late Consul Hanson?—Very well.

6985. What was he at Sherboro?—Consular agent; vice-consul.

6986. But how do you reconcile that with Sherboro being a British possession?—It is since his death that it became so; it is only two and a half years since it was ceded to us.

6987. I believe that since that period, trade has considerably developed?—Yes, there is a very large increase of trade there.

6988. Now,

6988. Now, in the town of Sierra Leone, do the native merchants or the respectable classes live on the high ground, or principally on the low ground?—There is no low land scarcely in the town; it is built on the side of a hill; the best houses in the colony belong to the native merchants.

6989. They live on the high ground?—Yes.

6990. Sierra Leone has got a bad name as being a very unhealthy station; to what do you attribute that?—It is difficult to say, except the general unhealthiness of the whole coast; it is not more unhealthy. I look upon it as quite the healthiest part of the coast.

6991. The higher you live, the more healthy you are, I suppose?—There was an idea of having a sanatorium some time since, but there is not sufficient altitude to give us that. I find that the only really bad forms of intermittent fever are amongst the missionaries who reside on the hills, and that induced me to set my face against any further step; there was a hospital before my time on the mountains, but it was given up on account of the great mortality from chest diseases among the natives.

6992. What is the minimum height at which a sanatorium ought to be erected, do you think?—I think 3,000 feet; we have nothing like that.

6993. You do not get anything like that till you arrive at the Camaroons, do you?—I have never been there; the epidemics generally take

place at a season of the year when you could not live on the hills from the great moisture.

6994. Do the clouds themselves hang over them?—Yes, they are completely capped in clouds. During the whole of the rainy season I could not even see the Governor's house, 200 yards from my own house.

6995. I suppose that the people living on the hills would have to live in the town during the rainy seasons?—Yes; in fact, some of the people who have villas on the hills always do live in the town during the rainy season.

6996. Now, about the drainage of Sierra Leone; is it capable of being easily drained?—Very easily, because there is a great fall; in fact, after a shower of rain everything is washed into the sea without any artificial drainage.

6997. Sir Francis Baring.] How is your market supplied?—Very well.

6998. With regard to vegetables and fruit; how is it supplied?—There is fruit in abundance; of vegetables there is not much, but we are gradually increasing.

6999. Who grow them?—The natives.

7000. Must they not do that by digging?—If you pay for it you can get it done, but it is not very pleasant to pay 1s. for a small head of cabbage.

7001. The natives are not unwilling to do it if they can get the price they think sufficient?—No, I think they are not; it is only a few of the better class who are able to pay for those things who have them at all.

COLONEL ORD, R.E., re-called; and further Examined.

7002. Chairman.] YOU have some papers which you wish to put in; will you be so kind as to state the nature of those papers?—I hand in, by desire of the Secretary of State for the

Colonies, copies of despatches relative to the occupation of Palma and Badagry by the British Government.

Colonel Ord,
R. E.

DR. HENRY EALES, called in; and Examined.

7003. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] YOU are Colonial Surgeon at Lagos?—I am.

7004. You have been there four years, I believe?—Yes, I was there in the navy in the "Prometheus" before the place was ceded to the British.

7005. You resided there before the cession took place?—Yes; not in Lagos, but in the ship in the lagoon.

7006. And you have been there since the cession?—Yes, I have been there nearly three years.

7007. Can you state to the Committee any opinion which you have formed with regard to the commercial prospects of Lagos?—I think they are very good, when once you can make an end of the war; I think they would be good even if the Abbeokutan war were continued, of which there is not much probability; the Jebu country is friendly now with Lagos for the first time; they have also opened their markets.

7008. You think that if the Government succeeded in opening the Jebu and Ibadan countries, the trade of Lagos may prosper, even supposing the Egba war were not to come to an end?—I have no doubt it would; we have never depended entirely on the Egbas for produce, but only for a road through the country for the Ibadan produce.

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7009. Do you think that the trade of Lagos can be said to have had a fair chance hitherto, while this native war has been raging?—No, certainly not, since the war; before the war began there was an enormous trade in Lagos.

7010. Do you think there may be again?—I can see nothing to prevent it, except this war.

7011. And this war began before the cession of Lagos?—It was some time before the cession of Lagos.

7012. Are you of opinion that the fact of the cession, and the existence of the present British Government at Lagos, have had any connection whatever with the continuance of the war, or have tended in any way to prolong the war?—Not at all.

7013. The Lagos Government has not been sufficiently powerful to put an end to the wars, but it has in no way tended to prolong them; is that what you would say?—I think that it has not tended to prolong the wars in any way.

7014. What should you suppose will be the effect of Governor Glover having prevented the Egbas from destroying Ikorodu, on the lagoon, and having driven them back?—I think that the effect of this thrashing of the Egbas will be immense good; it was the only thing they were amenable to.

7015. You think that this decisive action will tend

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tend to bring about peace?—Yes, more than anything else possibly could, I think.

7016. *Chairman.*] Do you think that, generally speaking, to thrash the native chiefs is the best mode of encouraging trade?—I do not; but I think it is certainly so in this case, because they consider kindness is weakness, and impose upon you directly.

7017. Do you think that for the purpose of promoting trade up the Niger, it would be a good plan for the English Government to thrash the chiefs on that river?—I would not recommend it there, because they are willing to open up a trade.

7018. We have had it given in evidence that the best method of promoting trade is to trust to the conciliatory efforts of mercantile agents, who feel that the success of trade depends on peace. You seem to be of opinion that force is better?—Peace is best if you can get it, of course.

7019. But do you think that peace is more likely to be arrived at by force than by the good conduct of mercantile men anxious to promote trade?—I think it all depends on the circumstances of the case.

7020. At Lagos you think force was best?—Under the circumstances, I think force was best.

7021. Do you know what was the state of trade before the British assumed the government of Lagos, as compared with the state of trade since?—I cannot speak with certainty about that, but it was, no doubt, better, because the war had not reached its height; but still the change is not a consequence of the place having been taken possession of by the English.

7022. How long have you been acquainted with Lagos?—Four years.

7023. Do you think, generally speaking, that the assumption of government in a country like Africa by Europeans is a better mode of promoting trade than the placing of a consul at the native governments?—I am not prepared to give an opinion.

7024. In the assumption of government by the English you see no risk of conflict with native customs, do you?—I do see great risk.

7025. Do you also see risk in such an assumption of government by us of encouraging quarrels between tribes who may be speculating on obtaining the assistance of the English?—I think it is almost impossible to answer a general question like that. If you can get a powerful friendly tribe to overcome a very small hostile one that you cannot get at yourself on account of the bush, or the nature of the country, I think it would be a very good thing to crush the small tribe in that way, and end the war.

7026. What is your own opinion of the climate at Lagos?—It is bad.

7027. Is it a place, do you think, where the English are likely to settle permanently?—The English might, but not any one Englishman; he would not live there long enough.

7028. So your plan would be a systematic settlement of the English, the Englishmen implicated in the settlement dying rapidly one after the other?—No, not at all; they require constant change. It is not safe for men to live there more than, at the outside, one and a half or two years without change.

7029. By dint of a process of constantly sacrificing our officers, you think we might maintain a settlement at Lagos?—They need not be sacrificed if constant change takes place.

7030. But if the officers come home alive, they come home more or less invalided, do they not?—Not of necessity if they get away in time.

7031. But the actual mortality does not represent the injury done?—Not at all, because, of course, we invalid a man before he dies.

7032. *Sir Francis Baring.*] Were you resident at Lagos before the occupation of Lagos by the British?—I was in the "Prometheus;" she went over the bar, and anchored just off the land.

7033. Were you there at the time of the annexation?—Yes, I was.

7034. Do you remember what happened when a free choice was allowed to Docemo whether he would give up or not?—Yes.

7035. How many marines landed at that time?—I think we had somewhere about 10, perhaps.

7036. Were there not boats with guns in them?—If boats landed with men under arms, they had guns with them.

7037. Were you there at the time?—Yes, but I do not recollect for certain.

7038. You went as surgeon, did you not?—Yes.

7039. In case of accident?—Yes.

7040. You were there for how long before the occupation took place?—I think it must have been about nine or ten months; I cannot give you the exact date, because I did not expect to be examined to-day.

7041. How long were you actually before Lagos; was the "Prometheus" close upon Lagos, or was she sailing about?—She was at anchor within a stone's throw.

7042. Were you often on shore?—Every day.

7043. Was there any danger to your life?—Not the slightest.

7044. Did you hear of any danger to the lives of Europeans?—Not at all.

7045. Did you hear any complaints there of European merchants' lives not being safe?—I never heard that.

7046. Was not trade going on pretty briskly?—It was going on, but not very briskly, because the war had been some time in existence.

7047. Do you mean that trade was worse than it is now?—No; rather better.

7048. But it had increased pretty constantly up to that time, had it not?—It had diminished at that time. The war commenced before we got there. Before the war there was a good trade; as soon as the war began trade diminished, because the roads were stopped.

7049. Then am I to take it as your evidence that trade had fallen off at the time when Lagos was taken possession of?—Yes; it had been better some time before.

7050. How did you ascertain that?—Simply from hearsay.

7051. You do not exactly know that merchants always do complain of the state of trade?—I fancy that is a weakness of theirs.

7052. *Lord Alfred Churchill.*] Are we to understand you to say that the war with the Ibans commenced previously to the annexation of Lagos?—Yes.

7053. And that it can in no way be traced to the annexation of Lagos?—I think not.

7054. When you stated, just now, that you thought that the thrashing that the Abbeokutans had received was the best thing that could happen to them, you only meant that such a thrashing could promote commerce as an exceptional case?—

case!—Certainly, only as an exceptional case; kind measures had been tried and they had done no good.

7055. It was as a last resort that they were well thrashed, in order that they might be turned out of the country?—Scarcely as a last resort, I think; the Government were compelled to do it.

7056. You would not recommend thrashing as a general policy?—Certainly not; fair means first, and if they fail, then coercive measures.

7057. Mr. *Cheetham*.] Had your vessel been successful in preventing the export of slaves?—It might have been, but we never took any ships.

7058. Could it have sailed as fast as the slavers?—We were the fastest man-of-war on the coast, but not so fast as the generality of the slavers.

7059. Have you formed any opinion whether, if the squadron withdrew, the slave trade would revive again?—I have no doubt it would.

7060. When you were there did you take any slaves?—No; we took one empty ship.

7061. Do you believe then that a great many slaves escape?—We know that a great many escaped; I was wrong in saying that we only took one, for we took two, but they kept their American colours up and we handed them over.

7062. Was the slave trade very rife in the bights?—It was rife in the southern division, not so much in the bights.

7063. Lord *Alfred Churchill*.] You think that the slave trade would be more likely to be revived if we had a consul there, instead of having a fixed government?—It would depend on the force by which the consul was backed; if he had the same power as the governor has, it would be pretty much the same, I suppose.

7064. Do you think it would be quite as expensive as the present system of government?—I think so, certainly.

7065. With respect to the healthiness of Lagos, how are their houses built; are they built on poles?—There are all kinds of houses; the native houses are built of mud, the walls being 18 inches thick; they are square houses, nine feet high, with a thatched roof. A native merchant would have a house with a second storey, that also being built of mud with a thatched roof. The European merchants have very fine brick houses; there are some that would not disgrace the best part of London; houses that cost 2,000 *l.* in the building, I should think.

7066. Has every person got to sleep on the upper floor?—No, the majority of the slaves and the humbler class of merchants live on ground floors; when I first went there, there was scarcely a two-storeyed house, and now there are plenty; most of the Europeans sleep in the upper storeys, but not all.

7067. Mr. *Cheetham*.] But the lower storey is raised above the ground, is it not?—Very little, indeed; sometimes in the native houses it is below the level of the ground.

7068. *Chairman*.] How long were you cruising off the coast?—About three years.

7069. Was your plan chiefly that of blockading the export of slaves, or capturing of slavers at sea?—Blockading; we had not ships enough to trust to capturing.

7070. Had your vessels fast enough to capture at sea?—That depended altogether on whether the slavers were steamers or not; if they had got a good breeze they might get away.

7071. Were there any steam slavers?—Very few.

7072. Were there many steamers in the squadron?—Yes, they were nearly all steamers.

7073. There was no want of speed, then?—It all depended on the wind.

7074. But if you put the steam up, you would catch a slaver, I suppose?—No; she might beat you with a good wind.

7075. Capturing was not desisted from on account of the slowness of the fleet?—No.

7076. But merely because you were not numerous enough for both purposes?—While an efficient blockade of the whole coast was kept up, there would be no work for cruisers.

7077. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Had you opportunities of hearing much of the state of things at Lagos before the cession; for instance, did you hear anything about the kind of government that Docemo carried on?—Of course I heard; it was all hearsay. I heard a great deal of the merchants being in a most subjective state, and being obliged to do exactly what he told them; he could fine them heavily, or he could banish them.

7078. The British Government had set up Docemo there two years before, had they not?—Yes.

7079. Did the consul interfere much in the management of affairs at Lagos?—I cannot answer much for that; but from all I heard, I do not think he could interfere much.

7080. Has the government of Lagos interfered by force between the native tribes who have been at war all this time?—No, they carefully avoided it. The only show of force we have made is to prevent any quarrel taking place in our waters; to prevent their coming into our waters, so that we should not be dragged unwillingly into war.

7081. The object being to keep Lagos free from conflict?—Yes; a great many of the people at Lagos are partizans of one party or the other, and we were obliged to establish a blockade.

7082. If you had had a great eruption of fugitives from either of the defeated parties, it would have been a source of great embarrassment to the Government, would it not?—It would have involved us in war; they would have thought we gave them refuge; our tactics are different from theirs; when they are not at war, they will give a fugitive up directly.

7083. The Lagos Government has not succeeded in restoring peace by negotiation, but it has succeeded in keeping Lagos and the Lagoon in a state of security?—Quite.

7084. Sir *Francis Baring*.] Should you say that Lagos has been saved from the Abbeokutans?—I do not think they ever dreamt of attacking Lagos.

7085. Are you satisfied that the Abbeokutans never had any intention of attacking Lagos?—They would be afraid of attacking Lagos, but the Lagos farms they might have attacked, which were on the opposite side of the water.

7086. How far does the Lagos territory go; all around the lagoon?—Our farms are mostly on the other side of the water, extending about seven miles from Lagos; the people live in Lagos and cross over in the morning to their farms, then they bring their produce to Lagos and sell it.

7087. With respect to the farms in the territory of Lagos, do we claim them?—I do not know; we protect them certainly, and I fancy we

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should consider an attack on them by the Egbas sufficient cause for hostilities; all we apprehended was that they would attack and ruin our farms on the other side of the lagoon.

7088. Had you any good reason to suppose that they would attack and ruin your farms on the other side of the lagoon?—They threatened to do it several times.

7089. But threats are very often not carried out; do you really believe there was any intention to do it?—Yes, I believe there was.

7090. Was there some communication from them to that effect, so that you could speak on that point with authority?—I have heard it, and of course, when a nation threatens, it is time to look out.

7091. You heard that those threats were made?—I knew that those threats were made.

7092. Mr. Gregory.] Is it possible in your opinion to improve the sanitary condition of Lagos?—Yes, quite possible; and I think it has been improved since we have been there. Formerly the little native huts ran close to the edge of the lagoon, and now there is one street of about 60 feet wide running for a mile and a half between the houses and the lagoon; and at the back of that, at a distance of 100 yards, there is another street a mile and a half long, quite a new street. The Government have torn down the little huts and given the people remuneration for them, and made transverse thoroughfares 60 feet wide, and now we have thorough ventilation where the fresh air never penetrated; where it is practicable the drainage has been attended to, but the centre of the island is on the level of the lagoon, if not below it, so the consequence is, it is quite a swamp.

7093. What is the sanitary condition of the barracks?—It is tolerably healthy, but the barracks are bamboo.

7094. Can they be improved?—Only by taking them down and building others.

7095. If others were built after those were taken down, do you think that would improve the health of the officers and troops?—Yes; I would never have any person live on the ground floor.

7096. Would you attribute the mortality there now to the bad condition of the barracks?—Only slightly, because there are so few soldiers there.

7097. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] You consider Lagos more unhealthy than other African stations, but you do not think that our presence there requires Englishmen to remain long on the spot; you think that by their leaving it at proper times, the Government may be kept up without much sacrifice of health or life?—Yes, I believe that Englishmen might live there almost as well as in other places, if he did not stay there longer than 18 months or two years, without a change.

7098. Frequent change is essential to the life and health of Europeans at all the African stations?—Yes.

7099. Unless we are prepared to encounter that difficulty, we must leave the coast altogether?—Yes, or lose our officers.

7100. Lord Alfred Churchill.] What is the distance from Lagos to Ikorodu?—About 15 miles.

7101. Does Lagos draw any of its supplies from Ikorodu?—Yes, a few yams and cassavas, and things of that sort; it is the nearest market.

7102. Is there a large market at Ikorodu?—Tolerably large.

7103. Supplied from the country around it?—Yes, from the Jebu country.

7104. Had we not attacked the Egbas and driven them away the other day, do you think they would have continued till they had occupied those farms from which the supplies of Lagos were drawn?—If we had not driven them away they would have captured Ikorodu, in the first place, and then as soon as they got to our Lagos farms, they would have given us a great deal of trouble.

7105. They would have invaded those farms from which we derive supplies at Lagos?—Yes, I have no doubt of it.

7106. Mr. Henry Seymour.] Do you think we want any European troops at all, at Lagos?—That is a difficult question to answer; if you can depend on the Houssas, I believe they are infinitely preferable to regular troops.

7107. What is the general opinion as to the way in which the Houssas have answered?—They have answered admirably; there cannot be two opinions about that; the only thing is, that in employing any troops drawn from the place in which they were born, it is possible they may side with the natives; it is not likely, but it is possible, and that is the only reason for employing regular troops instead of Houssas; native troops are better suited for the climate; they can march away, with a few hard peas in their havresacks, without delay or inconvenience.

7108. Do you think that, after a while, the government may be conducted without the presence of European troops, and with only a few Europeans at the head, having half-blacks or negroes under them?—I do not think the native is of any good without a white man to look after him.

7109. You think that we must always look forward to the necessity of having Christians there, and maintaining a large staff of European officers?—Yes, if the colony itself cannot maintain them.

7110. But at Liberia there are very few whites?—Yes, no doubt, but that cannot be spoken of as a flourishing settlement.

7111. Do you think that Lagos is more flourishing than Liberia?—Yes, even in its present state; and I think that if it had only one-fiftieth part of the advantages of Liberia it would be a thousand times more flourishing.

7112. What are the advantages which Liberia has over Lagos?—Liberia is a magnificent country.

7113. And is not there a fine country around Lagos?—Yes, but it is not to be compared to Liberia, I think, though I was only two or three days on shore at Liberia.

7114. Surely it is a very productive country around Lagos?—Yes, and so it is around Liberia; and yet we produce 50 times as much as they do. With 2*l.* you can buy up every fruit and vegetable in the Liberian market.

7115. You have much more at Lagos, have you?—Yes, we export oxen from Lagos.

7116. Where are they raised?—In the neighbourhood of Lagos.

7117. During the time you have been at Lagos have you seen an improvement in the production of the surrounding country?—On the contrary, it has been diminishing on account of the war.

7118. Then this productive country was prosperous under the native government, under King

Docemo,

Docemo, but it has gone down under British rule during the last four years; is that what you say?—No; the war was commenced in the time of Docemo.

7119. I thought I understood you to say that Lagos was more productive than Liberia because of the presence of a European Government?—No, not because of the presence of a European Government.

7120. To what do you attribute the difference, then?—Simply because at Liberia they are a lazy set of people.

7121. You do not attribute anything of the difference to the presence of the British Government at Lagos, then?—I have seen no good effects yet; but I think the Government have not had a fair trial at Lagos; we cannot tell, because the war has been going on; it began before we took Lagos, but it has increased since.

7122. Do you think that if we gave up the government of Lagos the country would have been as productive as it was before we went there?—Yes; I believe it would depend on the war; I think if the war were over, and ships came with merchandize, they would not care whether there was any British Government or not.

7123. You think the trade would increase although the British Government left the place?—Yes.

7124. You think it would be just as well protected under a native government as under a British Government?—Very possibly it might be as large, but not equally secure.

7125. Mr. Gregory.] Do you think there would be equal security?—No, there would be no security.

7126. Mr. Henry Seymour.] But you think that the absence of security would not prevent trade flourishing?—I think agents would go out with goods if they were paid for it, and thus, although indignities would doubtless be offered, yet trade would go on.

7127. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] Do you think that in the present feeling of the trading class at Lagos there is any concern whether the Government is carried on by Englishmen or by Docemo, or that they are indifferent?—I cannot tell what are their feelings.

7128. Do you think it would make no difference?—I think not; I believe trade would be

just as good; it was a very gigantic trade before the war commenced, and before the English were there.

7129. And you think it may be again?—Yes.

7130. Mr. Forster.] It was a gigantic trade, you say, before the English were there?—Yes.

7131. Was there not a slave trade then?—Yes.

7132. Was not there a greater trade, because slaves were to be got in return?—Very likely, and many of the merchants there were slave traders, I believe; and no doubt our having a Government there prevents the slave trade.

7133. Is it not possible that this diminution of trade has arisen from the slave trade being stopped?—No; I think it is dependent entirely on these wars.

7134. Mr. Chichester Fortescue.] When you say that before the English went to Lagos there was a gigantic trade, you mean before the English settled there?—Yes.

7135. An English consul was there at the time you speak of, and had been supported by the squadron?—Yes.

7136. Do you think that trade would have gone on as well and as safely if the English had not been there in the form of a consul and a squadron?—No, not as safely, certainly, but I believe the trade might have been as large.

7137. Lord Alfred Churchill.] As a surgeon in the navy, what is your opinion with regard to the various methods of suppressing the slave trade, under the heads of cruising, blockading at anchor, and boat service?—I think cruising is the best, certainly, in a sanitary point of view.

7138. Is there much difference, in your opinion, between that and blockading at anchor?—Yes, a great deal of difference, because you may be blockading in a very unhealthy place.

7139. You think that that operates injuriously on the health of the crews?—Compared with cruising, it does.

7140. Boat service is the worst, of course?—Yes.

7141. Sir Francis Baring.] Where is the "Prometheus" now?—She is broken up; she went on the bar at Lagos.

7142. Was she broken up at Lagos?—No; she was patched up, sent home, and condemned here.

REV. JAMES WILLIAM BERRIE, was called in; and Examined.

7143. Chairman.] You are a Wesleyan Missionary on the West Coast of Africa?—Yes.

7144. Which part of the West Coast?—Sierra Leone.

7145. How long have you been there?—For nearly four years.

7146. And you have just returned?—Yes.

7147. Will you be good enough to give the Committee some information with regard to the Wesleyan Mission at Sierra Leone?—Sierra Leone is a peninsula, and on that peninsula there is Freetown, and all the surrounding villages; in Freetown we have 14 chapels, and we have 12 schools; there are eight missionaries, three of whom are Europeans; 259 lay agents; 6,308 church members or communicants; we have a larger number of attendants at the service on the Sabbath, but those are members of the society recognised and on the books.

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7148. Will you tell us the nature of your establishments elsewhere?—We have a native training institution at Freetown, which costs the society, on an average, 300*l.* a year; there are 14 students who are instructed in reading, writing, and accounts, and they learn a little Greek and Latin.

7149. Those students being intended to be teachers?—Yes, they are intended to be teachers, but not ministers; I had the charge of them.

7150. Is that the whole of your establishment at Freetown?—Yes.

7151. Have you any agricultural establishment connected with those schools on the Freetown peninsula?—No; we consider it is our duty to preach the Gospel.

7152. And not to undertake any industrial training?—Not by the orders of the society; if we do so privately it is another thing.

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7153. Is that done privately?—I use what influence I can with the natives, to increase their agricultural pursuits, but I do not find it of much avail. We have preaching places in other districts; but I scarcely know where to begin in giving an account of them.

7154. Have the Wesleyan missionaries establishments at other British settlements besides Sierra Leone?—Yes.

7155. What others?—The Gambia.

7156. The Gold Coast?—Yes.

7157. And Lagos?—Yes, Lagos and Abbeokuta.

7158. Have the missionaries establishments in any other part of the west coast of Africa outside the British settlements?—No, none.

7159. Have you stated to us all your establishments at Sierra Leone?—All the principal ones.

7160. What is the nature of any other establishment that you may have?—Similar to that at Sierra Leone, with the exception of the native training institution.

7161. Have you schools at Quiah and at the territories annexed to Sierra Leone?—Yes.

7162. Have you established any schools at Sherboro?—No; at Quiah we have a very good teacher and we have a tolerably good school, but not equal to any school in Freetown or any other part of Sierra Leone.

7163. How long have those Wesleyan establishments been set up at Freetown?—About 70 years; soon after the Colony was commenced.

7164. Were the Wesleyans there before the Church Mission, or subsequently?—I think, about the same time; I cannot tell who was there first.

7165. Have those two missions generally co-operated?—As well as possible.

7166. I suppose in no case do they actually unite in supporting the same schools, but in every case their schools and congregations are separate?—Yes.

7167. But though separate, they co-operate friendly?—Yes.

7168. Is the relation of the two missions to the Government the same, or does the Government in any way give either the preference?—I think the Legislative Council are inclined to favour the Church Missionary Society more than they do the Wesleyan Society.

7169. Is your Wesleyan establishment at Sierra Leone considered the head quarters for your establishments in other parts of the West Coast of Africa?—Cape Coast is a district and Sierra Leone is a district; there is a general superintendent at Cape Coast and there is a general superintendent at Sierra Leone.

7170. Then, is the Gambia under the superintendence of Sierra Leone, and Lagos under the superintendence of Cape Coast?—Yes.

7171. Is Abbeokuta under the superintendence of Cape Coast?—Yes.

7172. How do the Wesleyan and Church Missionaries agree at Abbeokuta?—They are on very good terms indeed, I believe; but I have not been there.

7173. But there the Church Mission would correspond with Sierra Leone, while the Wesleyan would correspond with Cape Coast?—Just so.

7174. What should you state, generally, to be the result of the labours and operations of the Wesleyan Mission at Sierra Leone during the

70 years it has been established there?—A decided success.

7175. Can you state any reliable facts which would show their success during that long period?—There is Mr. Sybbleboyle, living in Sierra Leone, who is a member of our society, one of the first merchants in the place, and, I believe, a decided Christian.

7176. Is he a native?—He is a native.

7177. Was he educated in your school?—Yes. There are others, but they are so numerous that it would take up too much time for me to mention them; there are Mæeuly Brothers, in Water-street; there is James M'Foye, in Oxford-street, and John Izziddio.

7178. Is not Mr. Izziddio a member of the council?—Yes.

7179. Is he a native, educated in your school?—No, he was not educated in our school, but he was put into business by one of our missionaries some years ago; it is through the influence of the mission on John Izziddio that he is now in the position he is in.

7180. Would you draw any distinction in point of docility and intelligence between the liberated Africans who have been landed at Sierra Leone and the native tribes on the spot?—No, I could not do that. I think the liberated Africans are about the same in that respect with those that are in the neighbourhood who are not under the British Government.

7181. We have had evidence that the liberated Africans are more or less favoured and petted by the Government, and that they are spoiled by that means so far that they are not so well conducted as the natives on the spot; should you support that opinion?—Do I understand you to mean that the liberated Africans are better treated than those who are colonial born?

7182. I mean more taken under the protection and support of the British Government than the natives are; their children being educated at the expense of the Government, and so on?—There is a decided difference between the natives in the surrounding districts and the liberated Africans who are landed from slavers. The Government decidedly protect and support their own people.

7183. Does that make any difference; do your missions find the two classes of men equally docile and subject to the civilising influence of your institutions?—Certainly.

7184. You draw no distinction between the natives and the captured Africans?—Certainly not.

7185. Had you had experience in education elsewhere before you went out to Africa?—I never was a teacher in England.

7186. What is your opinion of the Africans, as being capable of civilisation and education?—They have capital memories.

7187. Are they pretty quick in apprehending?—They have a decided taste for music.

7188. Do you believe that in process of years such an educational establishment as yours will produce a decided effect in elevating the whole race of Africans?—Most decidedly.

7189. Should you suppose that the missions have been so successful that the natives would be more capable of managing their own affairs, and governing themselves, than they were 70 years ago?—Certainly, I think so.

7190. Are they generally sought for in confidential positions and places of trust by the merchants?—Some of them occupy good positions.

7191. Are

7191. Are many of them capable of taking clerks' places in mercantile houses?—Yes.

7192. And are they found both trustworthy, intelligent, and able to manage accounts?—Some of them are; some are not so good as others.

7193. Have you generally had reason to be satisfied with your lay agents?—On the whole; we have exceptions to the rule, of course.

7194. Do your missionary establishments become more and more self-supporting?—They are becoming more so.

7195. Do you expect them by-and-by to be completely self-supporting?—We hope so, as commerce increases.

7196. Not only self-supporting in point of money, but self-supporting in the way of providing their own agents, both teachers and ministers?—Schoolmasters and native ministers, overlooked by a general superintendent.

7197. You do not think they will ever be able to go on without European superintendance?—Perhaps in the course of years, but not at present.

7198. Not for a long time to come?—Not for a long time to come.

7199. Can you give the Committee any information with regard to the Gambia?—We have a few native merchants there, and the school is thriving; the principal part of the population belong to our society.

7200. How long has the Wesleyan mission been established at the Gambia; is it as old as that of Sierra Leone, or was it more recent?—I think it is more recent, but I could not say exactly.

7201. Is there anything that strikes you, in contrasting the two, which is the most successful?—I do not think there is much difference, considering that the trade at Sierra Leone is much larger than it is at the Gambia.

7202. Are the Wesleyan missions and the Church missions equally friendly at the two places?—The Church Missionary Society have no mission at the Gambia; the Church Missionary chaplain was removed, or died (I do not now remember which), from Sierra Leone, and a coloured man, one of the agents of the Church Missionary Society, went up to the Gambia and took his place for a time; but they had only a small room, and therefore they did not interfere with our society at all.

7203. How far do you consider your missionary operations dependent on the protection of the British Government; should you feel safe without that protection?—For a time. How long circumstances might alter affairs I cannot say; but, so far as I see now, for a time we should be safe.

7204. Are you generally on good terms with the native chiefs in the neighbourhood?—Yes.

7205. Do you think that you could maintain those good terms with the native chiefs if the British Government were not close at hand to protect you?—Possibly; but I think that we are much safer under protection.

7206. You would rather trust to the British protection than to your own good management to keep on good terms with the native chiefs?—Yes.

7207. What tribes should you be most afraid of under those circumstances?—The Kossos and the Timmanees.

7208. Why?—They are the most numerous, 0.39.

and they also have a little inclination to attack the residents at Sierra Leone.

7209. Would the Mussulman or Pagan tribes be the most dreaded by the missionaries?—There is not much difference, I think.

7210. Mr. *Cheetham*.] The Timmanees own the territory around Sierra Leone?—The Timmanees formerly had Sierra Leone, and they had also what is now called British Quiah.

7211. Have you any preaching stations within their territory in the native Timmanee territory?—We have not.

7212. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Are your operations confined to liberated Africans and their descendants?—Yes.

7213. When you speak of the population among whom you labour, you mean the liberated Africans and their descendants?—Yes.

7214. You have no missionaries labouring among the native tribes of that part of Africa?—No.

7215. What is the ordinary system under which the liberated Africans or their children come into your hands. Do you receive them as they come out of the slave-ship in the first instance (speaking of those newly taken)?—When they are brought to Sierra Leone they are taken to what is called the Queen's Yard—a yard set apart for their reception, and there they undergo a medical examination. They have a certain portion of land allotted to them, and influence is brought to bear upon them from the people of the neighbourhood, and through that influence we get them to our society. They are brought by their neighbours, who have been acquainted with them in their own country.

7216. Are they supported out of your funds?—No.

7217. You do not feed or clothe them?—No.

7218. You merely instruct them?—Yes.

7219. They are fed and clothed by the Government?—Yes.

7220. Not permanently?—No, only for a time, until they can raise a crop of their own; but that depends on the time of year when they are landed. If it is in a dry season they are supported by the Government longer than when they are landed in a wet season.

7221. Are there many new arrivals of that kind now-a-days?—I think that about 500 have been landed during my residence there, during four years.

7222. Have the whole of those 500 remained at Sierra Leone?—Yes, with very few exceptions; some of them may have been taken away by parties trading up and down the coast.

7223. Do not some enlist into West Indian regiments?—Very few.

7224. It used to be so to a very considerable extent, did it not?—Some years ago it did.

7225. Among the native population of Sierra Leone I suppose there are many who are the children and grandchildren of captured slaves?—Yes.

7226. And who therefore have been trained under European Christian influence for a considerable time?—Yes.

7227. Do you find a very great difference between that class and the ordinary natives?—They are much more intelligent when we come to the second or third generation. A liberated man will have a low forehead and scarcely two ideas, but two generations from that the man will be able to compete with a European.

Rev.
J. W. Berris.
29 May
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Rev.
J. W. Berrie,
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7228. Mr. *Cheetham*.] Do you mean physically?
—Mentally and physically.

7229. Mr. *Scynour*.] Could not they compete with them physically at first?—Some of them could.

7230. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Are there not many children and grandchildren of liberated Africans at Sierra Leone?—Yes, a great many.

7231. What is the longest time back at which any of their forefathers have arrived as liberated slaves; do you suppose that it goes beyond the grandchildren?—I should think about 50 years ago.

7232. But there are a certain number whose fathers, or grandfathers, were comparatively educated men; is not that so?—All that choose to embrace the opportunities put within their reach, when landed, receive education at our schools, and some of those that were brought in in slave vessels were educated at our schools, and have continued to send their children.

7233. So that precisely the same thing has gone on for two or three generations?—Yes.

7234. Those are the people whom you spoke of as especially showing the results of missionary education?—Yes; they are decidedly improved, both mentally and physically, by their stay at Sierra Leone; there is a constant mixture of nations, and that decidedly improves them.

7235. You mean a mixture of the native races?—Yes; that decidedly improves them. The present generation of Creoles are a great deal better than the liberated people are, or ever were.

7236. You can at once recognise the difference between the Sierra Leone native and the ordinary natives of the neighbouring tribes?—Yes.

7237. How do they dress?—The Sierra Leone people dress in the English costume.

7238. All of them?—Yes; but the inhabitants of the interior, and the neighbourhood around, dress in a loose garment; loose Mandingo gowns.

7239. Do all the native peasants in Sierra Leone habitually dress in the European fashion?—Not exactly; there is a mixture of the European and native costume together.

7240. What kind of houses do they live in; are they better than the houses of the ordinary natives?—Yes; in Sierra Leone the poorer natives live in mud huts, consisting of posts stuck down into the earth and wattled with mud, and thatched with bamboo made from the palm leaf, and those that are a little more advanced in civilisation have boarded houses thatched with the same kind of stuff; the more wealthy merchants have wooden houses shingled, and those who are still better off have stone houses.

7241. Is there a decided difference between the habits of the ordinary Sierra Leone peasant and the Timmanee, or any other native of the country around?—Not among the poorer classes, but there is decidedly among the richer.

7242. Are the poorer classes, all of them, nominally Christians?—Yes.

7243. For the most part they attend the school or church or chapel?—They attend the chapel.

7244. Do they attend the school?—They attend the school on Sunday; they are engaged in trade during the week; their children go to school.

7245. Can a large proportion of them read and write?—Yes; a greater proportion than you find in England.

7246. What number are there altogether of that class of liberated Africans?—I could not say.

7247. Are there many inhabitants of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone territory who are not liberated Africans?—There are a few Maroons left; there are a few of the old settlers who were sent in Wilberforce's time from *Novo Scotia*.

7248. What language do they speak?—They speak about 14 languages in Sierra Leone: the Ebo; the Akkoo; the Yoruba; the Egbas; the Timmanee; the Kossoo; the Popo; the Congo; and the Jolluf.

7249. Depending on the tribe from which the liberated African slave originally came. Are they able to communicate with one another?—The English language brings them together.

7250. It is used as a common means of communication?—Yes; it is not spoken correctly; it is broken English.

7251. *Chairman*.] Are all those 14 languages dialects of the same language?—No, they are all different languages; they are none of them written languages.

7252. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Some of those liberated Africans have come from distant parts of Africa, of course?—Yes; the Ebos come from the Niga; the Akkoos, the Yorubas, and the Egbas come from near *Abbeokuta*; the Popos come from *Dahomey*; the Timmanees come from a few miles in the interior, south of Sierra Leone; the Congos come from the Congo River. ✱

7253. Is there much intercourse between those people and the native tribes around?—They trade up the river.

7254. How do they get on with the natives; how are they received by the natives?—They are very well received.

7255. Do you think that they are able to exercise any influence for good among the natives by the example of British habits of life, and so on?—Yes, I think they do in many instances; of course there are exceptions to that rule; but I believe they exercise good influence over the natives with whom they come into contact in the interior.

7256. This is a case of a native colony, partially civilised and Christianised, which has existed now for a number of years in the midst of numerous native populations, and one would hope that such a Colony would have exercised a considerable influence for good on those populations?—I believe it has; not to the extent you might wish, perhaps, but I believe that it has exercised a good influence over the inhabitants around.

7257. Have you any native teachers or native missionaries?—Yes.

7258. How many have you?—We have five native missionaries in Sierra Leone, and there are three Europeans, that makes eight.

7259. But you have not sent into the neighbouring country?—We have not; the neighbouring country is not under British protection; there are constant wars; the people live in small huts and little houses that could be pulled down at a few hours' notice; by reason of the wars they are often obliged to remove, and the missionary is perhaps unable to follow them, so that we lose them altogether.

7260. The interior would be too unsafe you think, not being under British protection?—It would be unsafe so far as keeping our members is concerned; our lives would not be endangered, but

but the members whom we got from the country people would be lost.

7261. Lord Stanley.] You might be exposed to having the mission broken up at any time?—Yes, at any time.

7262. Mr. Seymour.] You have no hope of converting a whole tribe at once?—If the Missionary Society had more money we should be able to do more.

7263. Mr. Cheetham.] I understand you to say that you have made no efforts beyond Sierra Leone, in the native districts?—We have not.

7264. If it is not from any fear that your labours would be interfered with, what is to prevent you doing that?—They would not be interfered with, because a very few kind words and a little present occasionally from the missionary would set that to rights; but if that chief was to be invaded we should lose the whole of our members; they would be scattered about, and we should lose them.

7265. Mr. Seymour.] If they were scattered about, would they not spread Christianity by their example?—Yes, they would; but the native people take a long time before they can have the truths of Christianity impressed on their minds so as to feel the importance of spreading it amongst their own people.

7266. Mr. Cave.] What was the proportion of the sexes of those 500 slaves that were landed at Sierra Leone during your residence?—I cannot remember.

7267. I suppose that the males very much preponderate generally?—I believe so, in a general way.

7268. In the Colony generally?—Yes.

7269. Mr. Seymour.] Are you satisfied on the whole with the success of your missions there?—It might have been better.

7270. Can you account for the bad reputation

which the Sierra Leone people bear among the English traders?—I would rather not say anything about it.

7271. Would not it be better, now, before a Committee of the House of Commons, to state publicly what your opinion is; do you think that they deserve that reputation?—I would rather not answer those questions.

7272. They are the very persons that have been brought up in your schools, are they not?—No, not the persons who are reported as being bad.

7273. You do not think generally that the persons who have had a bad name are the same people who have been educated in your schools?—No; but of course there are exceptions.

7274. Do you think that there is a general tone at Sierra Leone among the educated blacks which might be improved?—Yes, the same as there is in England.

7275. Can you account for the small influence which this Colonial experiment has had on the people surrounding them?—I think it is possible the native wars have scattered the people, and that the influence of Sierra Leone has not been concentrated sufficiently.

7276. Have you any children who have been educated at your schools who have been admitted in your churches as ministers?—Yes.

7277. Mr. Gregory.] It has been stated in evidence before this Committee, that there is a feeling rather hostile on the part of the Akkoos to the Europeans at Sierra Leone; is that the case?—I do not know that the Akkoos have any greater ill-feeling towards the Europeans than the other tribes in Sierra Leone, if they have any at all.

7278. Do you think that the black population of Sierra Leone is unfavourably disposed towards the white?—In some respects, I think they have a little ill-feeling, but not on the whole.

Rev. GEORGE SHARPE, called in; and Examined.

7279. Chairman.] You are a Wesleyan missionary at Lagos?—I am.

7280. How long have you been there?—For more than four years.

7281. How long have you had a mission at Lagos?—About 13 years at Lagos.

7282. How long at Abbeokuta?—About 10 years.

7283. Are they both flourishing?—Tolerably well.

7284. And increasing their establishments?—Yes.

7285. Tell the Committee what your establishment is?—We have only one chapel at Lagos.

7286. How many schools?—One.

7287. Are there any native teachers yet?—Yes, we have three native teachers.

7288. What do you consider is the number of your congregation?—The average congregation is 500.

7289. How many missionaries are there at Lagos?—One Wesleyan missionary.

7290. And there is one in Abbeokuta?—Yes.

7291. In both those places are the Church Missionary Society friendly with you?—They are very friendly with us.

7292. You co-operate together?—Yes.

7293. In no instance do you have the same school?—No.

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7294. Are the Government equally favourable to you and to the Church Missionary Society?—Yes, they are equally favourable to us and to the Church Missionary Society.

7295. We understand that the Church missionaries at Abbeokuta have head quarters at Sierra Leone, and one at Cape Coast?—Yes, the Wesleyans at Cape Coast.

7296. Does that produce any want of co-operation between you?—None at all.

7297. Is the Sierra Leone influence at Abbeokuta at all adverse to your operations there?—Not that I am aware of.

7298. During these 13 years that the mission has been established at Lagos, do you think that your missionary operations have produced any effect or not?—Decidedly they have.

7299. How would you describe that effect; what definite fact could you adduce to show that effect?—I should say that the morals of the people have very much improved.

7300. Are they found more honest, as labourers, for instance?—I think so.

7301. Have you had any effect on the native customs; domestic slavery, for instance?—Yes.

7302. In what way have the missionary operations affected domestic slavery?—Our members are not allowed to live in polygamy or keep slaves.

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7303. Those

Rev. G. Sharpe.

Rev. J. W. Berric.

29 May 1865.

Rev.
G. Sharpe.
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29 May
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7303. Those who have come under your influence would cease to employ slaves?—I think so.

7304. Is it the fact that a different kind of labour has been introduced, owing to the missionary operations, as distinct from domestic slavery?—I should say so.

7305. Can you say that you have produced any effect on such customs as human sacrifices and witchcraft?—Yes; there is very little witchcraft now in Lagos.

7306. There was before?—Yes, there was before.

7307. Can you trace that to the influence of the missions?—I think so.

7308. How far are your missionary operations at Lagos dependent on the protection of the Government; suppose the Government were to withdraw, should you maintain those missions?—We should try to do so.

7309. Have the missions been safer since there has been a government at Lagos, than they were when there was only a consul?—I am not aware that they have been very much safer.

7310. They began even before there was a consul there?—Yes.

7311. Can you give us any opinion as to whether they have got on better with the surrounding chiefs since they have had the protection of the British Government?—Yes, they always got on very well with Docemo; not better than we get on now.

7312. You think that whether Docemo had remained or had gone away, your missionary operations would have gone on just the same?—Yes, just the same.

7313. Suppose that from any circumstances the English thought it wise to withdraw from Lagos, should you think that those missionary operations might still continue under a native king?—I should hope so; at the same time I should fear a revival of the slave trade, which would interfere with our work.

7314. But suppose the slave trade to have ceased, which there are now hopes of, should you think that there would be any hostility of the tribes, such as to prevent your missionary operations continuing?—I should think not.

7315. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] How did you get on with Kosoko; were you there at the time?—I was not.

7316. You heard how your predecessors got on?—They were much disturbed, and the missionary had to run to Cape Coast.

7317. Was the time that you got on well, after the British Government had turned out Kosoko and set up Akitoyé as the nominal king?—Yes, decidedly.

7318. When there was a British consul at Lagos and a British man-of-war to aid him?—Yes.

7319. Sir *Francis Baring*.] How long were you at Lagos?—I was there a little more than four years.

7320. During the latter part of that time, can you tell us, was the presence of the British Government satisfactory to the native population?—To a part of the native population.

7321. How much of it?—Not to the Sierra Leone people generally,

7322. Would you say it was satisfactory to half the population?—I should say to one-half of the native population of Lagos.

7323. During Akitoyé's time were you there?—No, I was not.

7324. Have you heard what the feeling of the population was?—No.

7325. During Docemo's time, was the slave trade going on with his assistance?—Not with his assistance, but he did nothing to prevent it that I am aware of.

7326. How far had he jurisdiction?—Across the lagoon to several small places on the other side of the river.

7327. Had the English a small steamer there?—Yes, when I arrived.

7328. Did they use that steamer by treaty?—I never saw it in use at all. It once went up to Porto Novo.

7329. Did you hear that life was unsafe when you were there?—Yes, I think I did hear that once.

7330. Was trade flourishing?—Trade was flourishing when I first arrived there.

7331. Docemo did nothing to stop the slave trade, you say?—No, not that I know of.

7332. He being bound to do it by treaty, did you hear any complaints by the English consul?—I never heard of any.

7333. What was the effect on the native mind, if I may use the expression, of the last annexation of Lagos?—I think they were all perfectly satisfied with it at first.

7334. Were the Abbeokutans satisfied?—I think the Abbeokutans were afraid that we should go and take possession of their town too.

7335. Was that the communication which you received from the missionary there?—Yes; I have been up to Abbeokuta several times.

7336. What was the effect on the population of Abbeokuta when England took possession of Lagos; were they afraid that it was a step towards the occupation of Abbeokuta?—I think that was the general feeling among the natives.

7337. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] Do you conceive that the intelligent part of the Abbeokutans believed in anything so utterly absurd as any project on the part of the British Government to take possession of Abbeokuta?—I should think not; the most intelligent people of Abbeokuta would not think so, but they are few.

7338. I need hardly ask you if the missionaries had any such an idea?—No, decidedly not.

7339. Were they not able to undeceive the natives?—I think that the missionaries tried to undeceive them, but they did not succeed.

7340. Do you think that the educated Sierra Leone people at Abbeokuta believed that the British Government were going to take possession of the country?—I think that some of them tried to persuade the native people so.

7341. Do you conceive that that did a great deal of mischief?—Of course it did.

7342. Sir *Francis Baring*.] Did you ever hear that the Governor was supposed to have uttered expressions giving force to that opinion?—No.

7343. You never heard that?—Never.

Jovis, 1^o die Junii, 1865.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mr. Adderley.
Lord Alfred Churchill.
Mr. William Edward Forster.
Mr. Chichester Fortescue.

Mr. Gregory.
Sir John Hay.
Mr. Arthur Mills.
Mr. Henry Seymour.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE C. B. ADDERLEY, IN THE CHAIR.

RICHARD PINE, Esq., called in; and Examined.

7344. *Chairman.*] You are Governor of the Gold Coast?—I am.

7345. How long have you held that office?—I landed at Cape Coast in October 1862.

7346. Had you known anything of the West Coast of Africa before?—Yes; I had resided many years on the coast, in the Gambia.

7347. In what capacity?—As Queen's Advocate in the Gambia.

7348. How long were you in the Gambia?—I was for more than 10 years in the Gambia.

7349. Which years were they?—I altogether resided in the Gambia for nearly 20 years; but in 1855 I was appointed Queen's Advocate.

7350. Did you remain there until you took the governorship of the Gold Coast in 1862?—I came home in 1861, and I was appointed Governor of the Gold Coast in 1862.

7351. What did you consider your governorship to be at the Gold Coast, was it simply a number of military posts or forts without any territory around each of them?—I considered that I was technically the Governor of the forts and settlements; but I also supposed myself to have jurisdiction to a certain extent over what is called the Protectorate.

7352. When you say forts and settlements, what do you mean by settlements?—That is the technical term used in the commission.

7353. Did you suppose it implied that you had any actual governorship beyond the precincts of the forts themselves?—Yes; I did from precedents that I knew of, reviewing the acts of my predecessors.

7354. It was, to a certain extent, a doubtful point?—I had heard so long as I can recollect Africa, that the question of jurisdiction was a doubtful point.

7355. But did you consider the towns around the forts as within your governorship?—Yes, I did.

7356. Will you state to the Committee what you considered to be the nature of your jurisdiction over the Protectorate?—I considered that I was empowered to issue orders, and I expected that those orders would be obeyed throughout the Protectorate.

7357. Orders of what nature?—With regard to the policy and defences of the Protectorate and the police regulations, those orders were more in the nature of formal requests, and I have scarcely ever heard of their being disobeyed. I

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continued in the course which I found had been pursued before.

7358. Did you, in fact, in the course of your governorship issue such orders with regard to the policy, the defences, and the police regulations of the Protectorate?—Yes.

7359. Do you think that the tribes in the Protectorate consider themselves in return for that obedience to your orders to be under your protection in case they were attacked?—Yes.

7360. Whether they were attacked by an extensive power like the Ashantees, or whether they quarrelled among themselves?—In quarrels amongst themselves, I thought myself authorised to interfere with a view of procuring peace.

7361. Has that occurred during your governorship?—No; no real emente has taken place.

7362. No quarrels between two protected chiefs have taken place?—I found a long-pending quarrel between two of the protected chiefs when the Ashantee invasion broke out. I sent to those men to say that their quarrel must stand aside for the moment on account of the invasion; from that time I have never heard of any feud between them.

7363. Should you say that that relation of referee on the part of the British Government has tended to keep the tribes from quarrelling, or that it has in any way rather encouraged quarrelling among tribes speculating on the assistance of the English?—I think it has very much tended to put a stop to quarrels.

7364. What do you consider to be the cause of the offence taken by the King of Ashantee when he threatened the invasion you have just referred to?—My opinion is that the cause of the quarrel took place before my arrival in the colony, but the king had unfortunately a pretext in demanding a refugee.

7365. Did he make that demand of the British Government?—Yes, he made that demand of the British Government.

7366. Was the refugee a fugitive slave?—No, he was called a captain; one of the King of Ashantee's captains, who came there years before, and had taken refuge within the Protectorate, at a place called Denkara.

7367. Where was he escaping from?—When the king's messenger arrived and claimed him, I inquired into the circumstances, and I was told where he was, and I sent for him, and he came

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R. Pine,
Esq.,
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down and said that he had left his country because the king had oppressed him so much; that he had "fallen on him" (as they say), and taken all his property more than once.

7368. Do you consider that if you had given him up, he would have been put to death?—Such was my opinion on inquiry.

7369. You thought it your duty to retain him, to save him from the vengeance of the king?—I did not retain him; I first told him that he should answer the king; I requested that he should go and answer the charge against him; I desired him to do so, and during several interviews, I pressed him very much indeed to return to his king; I told him I did not think the king would injure him, and so on, but he knelt at my feet and said he would rather have his throat cut than return to his king.

7370. Was there not another cause of offence taken by the King of Ashantee, against a chief of one of the protected tribes who had maltreated his messenger and beheaded him?—At the time the king's messenger was sent to me with more state than usual, he being a more important person than usual; that was not mentioned at all.

7371. But was there not a messenger of the King of Ashantee put to death by one of the protected chiefs?—I am not aware of it.

7372. The King of Ashantee did in fact invade the Protectorate on that occasion?—Yes, after many months, not until the end of February or the beginning of March, although marauding parties came down.

7373. Did the protected tribes act in union in resisting that invasion?—I have not a complaint to find with them.

7374. Do you know what force they collected for the purpose of resisting the invasion?—I have every reason to believe that there were 50,000 men prepared.

7375. How far were those 50,000 men aided by you; either by officers sent to help them or by arms and ammunition?—They were aided by me with ammunition, but not as a general rule with muskets, only with powder and ball.

7376. Did you send any officers to assist them?—I also directed the major commanding to march to their assistance. They asked for support in two or three cases, and he did so march.

7377. What is your opinion of the power of the protected tribes to defend themselves without the assistance of the English against the King of Ashantee?—I feel convinced that the protected tribes are now ready and willing to defend themselves, provided they be supported to the extent that they hope to be, if they can be supplied with munitions of war to a certain extent.

7378. Do you think, supposing under any circumstances the English were to withdraw from that coast, those tribes could and would defend themselves unitedly against the Ashantees?—I think they could, but I think there would be disunion among them.

7379. Would that disunion take the shape of the Western tribes not uniting with the Volta tribes, or would there be a general disunion?—I think there would be a general disunion among them all, from jealousy.

7380. We have had some evidence to lead us to suppose that the Volta tribes felt a different interest from the others, and were more powerful than those were in the direction of Assinee, or that the tribes on the eastern side of the Gold Coast

would act independently of those on the western side of the Gold Coast, and would be more powerful against the Ashantees than the Fantees?—Those beyond the Volta, I must admit, I know very little about. At Addah and that neighbourhood they are very unruly people. I have had no absolute necessity to give them any orders, except recently, when they refused to give up some murderers.

7381. But my question amounted to this, do you think that the Fantees would be able to maintain themselves against the Ashantees, if not assisted by the tribes around the Volta, supposing the English were away?—On our side of the Volta I think the tribes would join in resisting, if necessary; but there is some jealousy between the Addah tribes; they are rather unruly.

7382. Do you believe, without assistance, supposing the English gone altogether, the Fantees would maintain their independence?—I think they would strive to do so.

7383. Is it the tendency of the Ashantees to try to overrun the other tribes, and get down to the coast?—I do not think they want to get to the coast particularly, it suits them to pillage the Fantees.

7384. Did you understand that the Fantees were under the sovereignty of the Ashantees originally, until the English set up their independence?—The great majority of them were.

7385. Are there many of the Ashantees living with the Fantees?—Yes, those who have seceded.

7386. Did you consider when the King of Ashantee was invading the Protectorate and the protected tribes presented this native force of 50,000 men against the Ashantees, that you were in danger on the Gold Coast of the Ashantees overpowering that force and attacking you?—I thought myself in danger unless they were supported by European officers; their great desire always is to be led, they were panic-struck some of them, some defended themselves with success.

7387. Do you consider that you have troops enough for your defence?—At that time I did not, but when the invasion actually broke out I had proof of it, I did not consider my force sufficient.

7388. What was the total amount of your force, then, before you had the reinforcement?—I had not 300 efficient men.

7389. The fleet would have been able to garrison the fort until the reinforcements arrived?—Yes.

7390. Your proposal to the British Government at that time was that you should yourself carry the war into the Ashantee country; you thought that a final blow must be struck at Ashantee?—Yes, that was many months after the invasion had broken out; in June I attempted to give a *resumé* of what had happened, and stated my conviction that nothing could be effectually done without a larger force.

7391. Do you still maintain the opinion that the Ashantees are hostile to the English, and have designs on their forts?—No, I do not think they have; I think they have, as they consider, grievances to be rectified by the Fantees.

7392. Do you think that we may consider the British forts now safe from the Ashantees?—I think they would be perfectly safe in the castle and the forts.

7393. You think that the protected tribes intervening there are a sufficient barrier against the

the Ashantees coming down?—Suddenly, they are.

7394. Do you consider it is your duty, in case of an invasion from the Ashantees on the Protectorate which has no apparent intention of attacking the English, to assist the protected tribes themselves?—Yes, I consider it my duty to assist them with munitions of war. I read my instructions to be, that in the event of the Ashantees re-invading the Protectorate, the troops, if the officers thought prudent, should advance to support the natives so long as they were in safety and marched within the Protectorate itself.

7395. If you had had a larger force at your command at the time, you would not only have sent munitions of war to the protected tribes, but troops also?—Yes; I sent as many troops as I could; I have said that I had not more than 300 men, but I wish to correct that, for I had procured from the Gambia and Sierra Leone 100 more; altogether there were more than 400 men.

7396. Did you not consider, when your own troops were finally withdrawn in consequence of sickness, that the fact that the Ashantees did not advance was pretty satisfactory proof that they had no hostile intentions against the British force?—I did think so; every month gave me more confidence; it is 18 or 20 months since an invading Ashantee crossed the Prah, with the exception of a slight feud in which one man was killed.

7397. Do you consider your obligations towards those tribes a matter for your own judgment, or a matter distinctly and definitely stipulated for by treaty?—I think I felt myself instructed to do so.

7398. Is there within your knowledge any distinct treaty, or any clause in any treaty, which distinctly binds the English to protect those tribes, or is it only a matter of inference and discretion for the British Governor?—I cannot say that I have ever seen a treaty to that effect.

7399. We have had some evidence that the obligation of protection is inferred from a certain clause in the Poll-tax Ordinance, is that your opinion?—Yes, I think it is.

7400. There is no distinct treaty of protection?—I think not. When the invasion broke out, almost immediately after my arrival, I did what had been heretofore done; I immediately supplied them with powder; they are always in want of powder; the allies reported to me everything that went on, and sought protection.

7401. Having had some experience of the government of the Gold Coast, both in time of peace and in time of threatened war, have you any recommendation to make to the Committee with regard to the relations between the Civil Government and the officers in command of the troops; or do you think that the existing relation between those two officers is satisfactory both in time of peace and in time of war?—I think that, as a general rule, it is satisfactory enough for the purpose, assuming that the two officers know their respective duties, and adhere to their instructions; I might suggest, perhaps, some minor details which will be understood, though I do not know whether this is the place for it; I mean with regard to the Governor's power to see all orders on certain important subjects before they are published by the commanding officer—orders with regard to the disposal of the troops.

7402. Orders from where?—Emanating from the commanding officer.

7403. Is it not the case, that all orders emanating from the commanding officer are seen by the civil Governor?—I have not found it so in certain cases.

7404. Would it be possible that the officer in command of the troops on the Gold Coast could, for instance, receive orders from home without the knowledge of the civil Governor of the Gold Coast?—I do not think, with respect to the removal or disposal of troops, that he could receive instructions which he could not and ought not to show to the Governor.

7405. Would his instructions go straight from the Horse Guards to him, or through the Governor to him?—I have always received military news sooner than the colonel commanding, and until recently I have always received at the same time a copy of almost everything sent to Colonel Conran.

7406. Do you think that in a governorship like the Gold Coast it would be better that the same person should take both offices, that is to say, that a military man should be governor, who would be able to command the troops also?—I do not think that it would be better that there should be a military Governor.

7407. Mr. Forster.] Do your suggestions mean that the commander of the troops should inform the Governor of what orders he issues, or that he should inform the Governor of what instructions he receives from home?—With regard to any important change in the troops, I think in both cases the Governor should have cognizance of the facts. I imagine that he could not issue extraordinary orders without instruction from home, and in that case I think he has always given me notice.

7408. Chairman.] As the system now exists, it is possible that he might not make those communications to the Governor?—Yes, on that point Colonel Conran and I have differed a little, but never on such an important point as to make it necessary to refer to the Home Government.

7409. On what ground do you think it not wise to have a military Governor who could be both Governor of the settlement and at the same time command the troops on an occasion of emergency?—Because I think that a strictly military man would not be adapted to the wants of that particular country.

7410. But are not the wants almost wholly military on the Gold Coast, where there are only forts, and a Protectorate for him to administer?—It is scarcely possible to convey an idea of what the Governor has to do; almost his whole time is taken up in hearing whether or not the natives have grievances, and the nature of those grievances is extraordinary. I do not think that a military man would have the same facility in dealing with them.

7411. In fact, the Governor has, to a great extent, diplomatic functions to discharge?—Yes, the natives look on their Governor, as they say, as "their father and mother," and they come to him for almost everything.

7412. We have had several recommendations from witnesses to concentrate the four Governments of the West Coast of Africa at Sierra Leone again, as they were concentrated before the year 1842. Now, supposing those recommendations to be carried out, and that there was a Governor General placed at Sierra Leone, and all the troops were placed at Sierra Leone, with

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steam transports to send them to any Lieutenant Governor who wanted them, do you think the Governor of the Gold Coast might have local forces in the nature of militia and police sufficient for his Government, without regular troops?—I think he might almost dispense with troops; such is my experience, that he would be better without them in some instances.

7413. But supposing that that was the case, on what should you have been able to rely when you expected the Ashantee invasion in 1863?—I think that the natives would be able, and that they would be compelled to defend themselves; they would not look for support; but I would suggest that the Governor should have an armed constabulary, with a few officers.

7414. Do you mean in the nature of the present police?—Not exactly that; I mean that there should be an armed constabulary.

7415. Men living at their homes without barracks?—Yes, within call. The Dutch have their own soldiers living in the town, and they come to the barracks when required.

7416. Is the Dutch system, in that particular, on the West Coast of Africa, better than ours, in your opinion?—I think it answers.

7417. At the Dutch forts, is there not a union of the civil and military command, such as I am speaking of?—Yes.

7418. Why do you think the Dutch should be able to unite those offices, and the English not?—Because the Governor, in that case, is not a military man; he only becomes a military man the moment he sets foot on the territory.

7419. If the troops were withdrawn, and no forces but the constabulary were there, you think we might have a civil Governor who would dispense with a military commander?—Unless a tremendous attack came which he could not meet, subject of course to the Fantees being beaten.

7420. The proposal being to concentrate both the Government and the troops at Sierra Leone with depôts and a sufficient number of fast steam transports, to send those troops to assist the Lieutenant Governor of the Gold Coast if it were required; do you think that might be a sufficient protection in case of danger?—I think the programme that I sent home was to the effect that a force of 200 armed constabulary should be raised, but I understood that it would be thought necessary to have a small garrison within the forts, for appearance sake; in the eyes of foreigners it would look better.

7421. Who would command in that case?—I presume that there would be at least a captain in command in that case.

7422. What would be the time consumed in your sending a message to Sierra Leone for troops, supposing there was a steam transport there, and your getting the troops?—Do you mean if we had steam communication ready at a moment's notice?

7423. Yes?—Not more than 15 days.

7424. To bring the troops if they were at Sierra Leone?—Yes, that is allowing for embarkation and disembarkation; at present it is only by monthly steamer that we can communicate.

7425. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] That is supposing you have a steam transport ready to send the troops?—Yes, that would be the shortest possible time.

7426. *Chairman*.] Have the Dutch generally been friendly to your government?—Openly so;

but I doubt their sincerity with regard to the Ashantee question.

7427. I think I recollect in your despatches of 1863, that the Dutch Governor, at your request, stopped the supply of arms to the enemy, but said he could only act as a neutral himself?—He affected that. I do not think that it went to the extent of stopping the supply. I could get no guarantee; he said that it was impossible to stop it.

7428. He said, "I must be neutral"?—He said, "I could not fire a shot for you;" those were the actual words, I think.

7429. Why should the Dutch find it against their interest to support the English against the Ashantees?—They are on friendly terms with the King of Ashantee; they have an agent in Comassie, who is supposed to procure natives for soldiers, to whom the Dutch profess to pay a bounty of 40 dollars, but those men are collected by the agent for the purpose. Since the Ashantee invasion that traffic has not been carried on, I believe.

7430. Your proposal, as I understand you, is, that there should be a very small garrison in each fort, and that the main force the Governor should have under him should be a constabulary; let me ask you what was the cause of the Gold Coast Artillery becoming so mutinous that it was obliged to be disbanded?—My opinion is that they were not kept in discipline for some years past, and that some of their wants were not looked into, and that, in point of fact, they were not treated as they had a right to expect to be treated.

7431. Do you think that the nature of the force was good in itself?—I think, taking it altogether, with proper discipline, it would be a very good force. I have employed men from that force, and I have been very well satisfied with them.

7432. You do not advise the revival of any such corps?—No.

7433. How would you propose your constabulary to be armed?—With carbines and small swords and pistols.

7434. Do you think that that would be the sole force necessary besides the small garrison?—Unless there were an overwhelming attack, those men should divide over the districts, letting each commandant have a portion.

7435-6. Mr. *Seymour*.] Is that supposing the squadron is kept up at its present amount?—The squadron at present does not assist in the Gold Coast except under specific orders.

7437. If the squadron was reduced, would you require more troops?—For the last nine months I have been in vain asking for a man-of-war to watch occasionally, and I have not received one, therefore I cannot depend much on them.

7438. *Chairman*.] What was the cause of your sending for that ship?—Because at Addah, within the Protectorate, the authorities refused to give up some murderers; another reason was, that there was a threatened *emence* at Cape Coast Castle itself.

7439. Every time you obtained the aid of the squadron, you would be drawing them off their own cruising ground?—Yes.

7440. So far, running the risk of a re-opening of the slave trade?—From my experience, I certainly must say that I think a cruiser might be spared to look at us once a month at least; it is not more than 70 miles away; they frequently

come to Accra, and take their mails, but I believe there has been a specific order not to remove them.

7441. Do you think that this governorship by the English of certain forts on the coast is a good system, or do you think we might enable the native chiefs equally well to govern the country by themselves?—I think that the removal of all apparent protection by the British would have a very bad effect.

7442. In what way would it have a bad effect?—I think the natives would be discouraged; I think they would lose the confidence which they now have, and I certainly think it would arrest the civilization of that part of the coast, slow as it is.

7443. I suppose you do not think it possible that the English could ever govern that country, except through the chiefs?—No, I do not think it is possible.

7444. But yet you do not think that, even in any process of time, we could enable the chiefs to govern themselves?—Yes, I do think that we might, but not in my time; with one exception, I have not had a difference with one native king or chief in my time of two years and seven months.

7445. Is it your opinion that our governorship of the Gold Coast has done much good to the tribes, such as civilizing or improving their condition?—I think so; I am confirmed in that opinion; because, when I left the command, a number of persons waited on me and begged me to urge the continued protection of Great Britain; from the time of Sir Charles McCarthy, they say they have found an improvement, and are not liable to the hardships and distress which were formerly pressed upon them by their enemies.

7446. Did not the King of Ashantee make use of this expression, in answer to one of your Despatches, that Governor Maclean had been on more friendly terms than you were?—He distinctly stated that I had broken faith with him.

7447. He referred to Governor Maclean?—Yes; he spoke of Governor Maclean having had a treaty with him.

7448. In your opinion, was Governor Maclean in better relations with the King of Ashantee on that subject than the present Government?—I think he was on better terms, decidedly.

7449. Do you think the circumstances were different, or that he was an abler officer?—My idea is that he was able to do a great deal more in those days than a British Governor now dare do.

7450. Why?—So many things were not reported as they are now; I do not think he did many wrong things, but he was able to go a great deal further.

7451. Was that because his was a private government of merchants and yours is a public government, amenable to the Crown and Parliament?—I think the natives did not then know their rights so well; the prestige of the English Government had a greater effect then than it has now.

7452. You do not think that the mercantile government was better than the Crown government?—No, that is not my opinion.

7453. Sir John Hay.] Was the same king ruling in Ashantee at that time?—In Sir Charles McCarthy's time it was not; in Governor Maclean's time I think it was.

7454. There has not been any change of policy in the Ashantee Court?—No; the present king is said to be a very peaceful man; the present king must be the same, because he alludes to his own relations with Governor Maclean.

7455. [Chairman.] What is the interest that the English Government have in maintaining those forts, or in what way would our interests be damaged by giving them up?—In a pecuniary point of view I cannot for a moment say that the African settlement cannot keep itself; it could keep itself, but I think that it would have a very bad effect for the English, who have protected that country so long, to give it up.

7456. You mean a bad effect upon the natives?—Yes, upon the natives.

7457. But my question referred to the effect upon English interests; in the first place, as things now stand, do you think that the slave trade would be revived on that coast?—I am afraid it would.

7458. Then, supposing the slave trade to have ceased (as we hope it will before long from the cessation of the demand), do you think it is worth the expense which the English go to to maintain those ports simply for commerce on that coast?—No, not simply for commerce.

7459. In the event of there being no slave trade, you think there would be no sufficient commercial advantage in maintaining those forts?—No, I do not think there would.

7460. Is that on the ground that it is not a good commercial position?—I am not aware that there are better commercial positions.

7461. But you would not consider it a good commercial position, would you?—It has not lately shown itself to be so; but that is to be accounted for in some measure.

7462. How is that to be accounted for?—Partly by the Ashantee invasion, and, I must admit, partly by the system with respect to the slaves in the country; they have now an idea that they are free; they are not absolutely free; their masters partially subsist them, and they do not care very much to labour for themselves while they are so partially subsisted.

7463. Have you any remarks to make on the the judicial establishments at the Gold Coast?—My opinion is, with certain persons as chief justices and judicial assessor, that the system works very well.

7464. We have understood from the other witnesses that the judicial assessors have never been able to carry out the first intention of the office in assisting the chiefs in administering justice; do you think that that is so?—I think he does assist them; they elect to come to his court, and he adjudicates for them.

7465. They do not sit together in judgment?—They do not sit together, but the king is supposed to come or to send a trustworthy person on his behalf to represent him whenever any disputes arise in his country.

7466. You think that the office of judicial assessor, as now worked, is satisfactory?—Yes; but I am bound to say that there is a little difficulty; there is not sufficient instruction to guide him. The present Chief Justice holds with me on the point that we should let the chiefs do as much as they can for themselves; but I believe that some other gentlemen think rather that he is not legal enough; that he is too much a judicial assessor; that he does not adhere to the law sufficiently.

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7467. That

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7467. That he acts too much discretionarily without a fixed law?—Yes.

7468. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] The British law, you mean?—Yes.

7469. *Chairman*.] Do you mean that you think the judicial assessor should adopt English law?—No; some think so, but I am of opinion that he should not rely solely on the English law, and in that view I am blamed by some that I have sat with, the Chief Justice more than once. I have sat with the present acting Chief Justice.

7470. Is there any very marked distinction between his administration as Chief Justice and as judicial assessor?—Yes, he takes into consideration the country laws and customs.

7471. Do you mean that any one would observe in the two courts a very different system of administration?—Certainly; the rules of evidence are not so strictly adhered to in one court as in the other.

7472. I understand you in the main to make no proposition for any alteration of the offices, but merely in the mode of administration?—I would like the position of the Chief Justice to be clearly defined; there must be a judicial officer as between British subjects. I have heard some people say, "Do away with the Chief Justice altogether;" but what is to become of the suits between British subjects? There should be some officer skilled enough to try such cases. I know one gentleman who said to me since I came home, "You are better without your courts;" but I answered, "How would you like your particular case to be dealt with; you would have to come to England; there must be a lawyer there for such cases?"

7473. With regard to taxation on the Gold Coast, in one of your despatches you seem to despair of raising any further taxation than such as is now raised by the customs duties?—While the Dutch remain in their present position.

7474. Do you think that nothing in the nature of a poll-tax could be revived?—Yes, I think it could be revived. The natives to a man profess to pay the poll-tax, but in the meantime the distress has been great, and they have not been certain of their position. However great their ignorance may be, they have known that it was likely that this inquiry would be going on; they seem to be in rather an unsettled state; they have pledged themselves to pay the poll-tax; they have actually commenced, and there are a few pounds in the chest. Mr. Barnes, who is now in England, is the treasurer. I adopted the plan of letting them manage it themselves; they set to work with a will, and they have collected some money.

7475. Was the money appropriated to any particular purpose?—It was intended to be appropriated to such works as were required, and the decision was to be made by a committee, of whom I appointed two while they appointed three, the Governor having a voice.

7476. Was the cause of the failure at first any dissatisfaction on the part of the natives with the appropriation of the tax?—That was a very great cause; it is a great grievance to this day. I never hold a palaver but they bring up this point again.

7477. You think it is possible by judicious arrangement to raise a tax from the natives for the general purposes of Government?—I feel convinced it is. I think it is 87/100 that they have in

hand; they were about to commence some improvements in the town when I left.

7478. What did you find to be the general influence of the missionary operations during your government?—My experience for many years past is, that the missionaries are good workers on the Coast; they do good.

7479. Do they generally support the Government?—In my experience for some years past they have generally supported the Government. I have at this moment to thank Mr. West, the superintendent of the Wesleyan Mission, for his assistance in keeping peace in the town of Cape Coast.

7480. Do you think that the missionaries have been successful in their own work?—I think they have been as successful as I could expect, speaking from my experience; the success is very, very slow, but progress has been made, and recently I have had an opportunity of finding how exceedingly well educated and how very much advanced in intelligence the natives of Cape Coast are at Sierra Leone: I was very much struck at Sierra Leone and in the Gambia.

7481. What is your opinion with regard to the number of forts on the Gold Coast; are there too many or too few?—I think that the fort of Annamaboe might be dispensed with; we should then have three.

7482. Do you think that that is sufficient?—I think so.

7483. You do not propose our occupying any other points, as, for instance, the mouth of the Volta?—Yes, I should very much wish a station up the Volta, at a place called N'Pong, or thereabouts.

7484. Is that healthy?—Yes, particularly healthy; I visited it.

7485. Supposing the Government were concentrated at Sierra Leone, would the Lieutenant Governor of the Gold Coast require so many forts?—Yes, I think so.

7486. You could not do with less than three, you think?—That would be four.

7487. I understand that most of the forts are in a very ruinous state?—They are wretched; not habitable.

7488. Would you propose putting them in repair?—A portion of them. I proposed their being reduced to batteries, almost.

7489. So that there would not be much expense; what would be the expense of putting them so far in repair as you would propose?—In conjunction with Colonel Conran and Major Clark I went into figures on that subject, but I have not got a copy of them here.

7490. Do you agree generally with Major Clark in his views on that subject?—Yes; he took down notes of my wishes on the subject, as he said he was instructed. I think I stated that I should prefer having 600 men as the garrison, and I think he based his calculations on that; but I have since recommended that the military force be reduced very much indeed, and the new system of constabulary adopted; not a stone has been put upon another towards the repair of the forts at present.

7491. One fort was destroyed by an earthquake; has any other fort been damaged by earthquake?—They have all been damaged except Cape Coast.

7492. By earthquake?—Yes; we never feel safe; we are always having shocks. Christiansburgh,

burgh, Accra, and James Fort are not habitable. I have been obliged to discharge prisoners from them, fearing that they would be crushed.

7493. Mr. *Chichester Fortescue*.] You were asked a question with regard to the relation between the Governor and the commanding officer; will you let me read you a few sentences from the Colonial Office Rules and Regulations, and then I will ask you whether you think they leave any doubt as to what that relation should be; the instructions are as follows: "A civilian, a naval officer, or a military officer, holding a commission in Her Majesty's land forces of inferior rank to that of a colonel, who shall be appointed to administer a Colonial Government, is not invested with the command of Her Majesty's Forces; but it is his duty, except in the case of invasion or assault by a foreign enemy, to issue to the officer in command of the forces within the Colony, orders for their march and distribution, for the formation and march of detachments and escorts, and, generally, for such military service as the safety and welfare of the Colony may appear to him to require. All the military details regarding such distribution and the manner in which the detachment shall be formed and compared, rest with the commanding military officer, who is responsible that they are conformable in every respect to the instructions issued to him by the Governor." And again, "The officer commanding Her Majesty's land forces is above charged with the superintendence of all details connected with the military department in a Colony, the regimental duty and discipline of the troops, inspections, and summoning and holding courts-martial, garrison or regimental, and the granting leave of absence to subordinate military officers. He carries into execution, on his own authority, the sentences of courts-martial, excepting sentences of death, which must be approved, on behalf of the Queen, by the officer administering the civil government. He makes to the officer administering the civil government returns of the state and condition of the troops, of the military departments, of the stores, magazines, and fortifications within the Colony, and furnishes duplicates of all returns of a similar nature to those which he may send to the military authorities at home, or to any officer under whose general command he is placed." Should you say that those regulations sufficiently define the relation between the Governor and the commanding officer?—I think them almost perfect, but experience has told me that some officers do not read them as I do. I myself think that under the expression with regard to the "returns," I should see everything of importance before it is published, as it were.

7494. Every important order?—Which is about to be promulgated.

7495. But in time of peace the commanding officer would not be at liberty, under the instructions, to issue orders, for instance, for the march of detachments, or anything of that kind, without instructions from the Governor?—I should so read it, but it has occurred. I believe that the commanding officer has removed troops (perhaps it is not a very important matter); and in the time of Major Cochrane I mentioned that an order was given for troops to march when I had not sanctioned it, and that order had to be cancelled.

7496. But it is quite clear that the distribution of the troops in the Colony in time of peace depends on the Governor's orders?—Yes.

7497. And the mode of carrying them into effect on the commanding officer?—Entirely. If I were a Lieutenant Governor and wanted men, I am not to say which men it shall be; but officers might be moved at a time when I was sure that every officer was of consequence; for the officers are of more importance than soldiers, with black troops. That officer would be removed without my knowing it, and when the deed is done, it is too late. I think that five minutes' explanation with the military authorities in London would settle the matter. With regard to the Dutch Governor of Elmina he simply becomes colonel by virtue of his office, and gives orders, whereas I can only give requisitions. The instant he leaves his colony his rank ceases; he is called Colonel of the Java Militia; he takes off his coat on his return to Europe.

7498. How do you propose to compose the armed constabulary on the coast?—It would be selected with the assistance of my subordinates out of men that I knew to be sober and well conducted, picked men, men of some courage.

7499. From the protected territories?—Yes, from the protected territories themselves.

7500. You see no risk or inconvenience in forming a corps in that way?—No, I have sufficient confidence in them.

7501. I suppose you would say that for the ordinary purposes of government an armed civil force absolutely at the disposal of the Governor is infinitely more useful than a body of troops?—Yes, as the present force is constituted.

7502. But in any case, for the ordinary purposes of Government, a civil force entirely at the Governor's disposal is more useful and available than a body of troops, is it not?—Yes; it is only in the event of a crisis that I should like to have troops, and if it were possible I should prefer European soldiers for a sudden emergency. The West Indian soldiers are not able to do the work which they may be required to do.

7503. The troops recruited in the West Indies stand the climate very badly, do they not?—Very badly.

7504. Mr. *Seymour*.] What is the relation of the chiefs to the Government on the Gold Coast?—They consider the Governor supreme, and pay him all deference and respect, for the most part.

7505. They obey your orders through the whole of the Protectorate?—Yes.

7506. Is there any hereditary chief at Cape Coast?—Yes.

7507. What relation does he bear to you; what power has he?—Up to the time of the election of the present king, he has yielded implicit obedience to the Governor of Cape Coast, almost without exception.

7508. Is there a chief as well as a king at Cape Coast Castle?—There are men called chiefs, who are supposed to be men of responsibility in the country.

7509. What is the municipal authority at Cape Coast Castle; is there a municipal council there?—There is not. The former governor, Sir Benjamin Pine, established a municipal corporation, and for want of material it has broken down; it has never existed since I was there.

7510. How long ago is it since that municipal body met for the last time?—It has not existed since the year 1860.

7511. Not since Governor Hill's time?—Yes, it existed subsequently to that. It was Sir Benjamin Pine who instituted it, and he was suc-

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ceeded by Mr. Andrews, who stayed there for two years, and during that period it was repealed.

7512. Now supposing you wanted to make improvements in the town of Cape Coast Castle, and of the roads in its vicinity, who would have authority to make any local taxation there?—I have already said that I know of no means of local taxation.

7513. Is there any local taxation for drainings, and things of that kind?—No.

7514. None?—None.

7515. Who would have authority to levy any local tax for improvements?—I feel justified in saying that no one would have authority; I doubt if it would be allowed.

7516. Would you have the power?—No; I do not consider that I have the power.

7517. Is there no authority vested in the chiefs who are elected there; are there chiefs still elected?—They are not elected that I know of; they call themselves chiefs.

7518. *Chairman.*] Was the poll-tax attempted to be levied by the British Government directly or through the chiefs?—By the Government, directly.

7519. *Mr. Seymour.*] Was it not assented to in the councils of the chiefs?—Yes.

7520. Those were chiefs summoned throughout the whole Protectorate?—Yes.

7521. Does that council of chiefs, summoned throughout the Protectorate, have any existence now?—It is the custom; I found it existing not in the Gold Coast only, but I have been in the habit of summoning the chiefs and head men on any important measure.

7522. Did you summon a council of that sort before the Ashantee war?—I called upon all persons to come forward and hear my directions.

7523. Where to?—I summoned them to what is called the "Palaver Hall."

7524. In Cape Coast?—Yes.

7525. Did you find them all come?—Scarcely a man was absent.

7526. From what distance in the interior did they come?—From the furthest parts.

7527. Did the chiefs of Denkara and Akkim, and others come?—They either came or sent their sons, nephews, or messengers.

7528. Are you of opinion that an assembly of that sort, could settle some scheme of taxation throughout the country?—If I were Governor, I should sanction and adopt it.

7529. Would you, by your instructions from the Colonial Office, have power to do so?—I think so; I should feel justified in doing it.

7530. Have you ever attempted it?—Yes, I have; I have advised them to do certain things.

7531. Have you advised them to levy taxes?—No.

7532. But taxes are very much wanted there, for the improvement of the country, are they not?—Very much wanted.

7533. *Chairman.*] I do not understand whether you think you could, through your council, tax the natives; would that be the same thing as the assent of the chiefs?—It depends upon what is meant by the word "council."

7534. You say that at a council at Cape Coast Castle, nearly all the chiefs appeared either personally or by deputy?—I would not call that a council. I call that a meeting. I myself have two councils, the executive and the legislative.

7535. You think that you would not be allowed

to tax the natives either through your executive or legislative council as now existing?—For some things I prepare the ordinances myself, and submit them to my council.

7536. Could you levy a tax throughout the protected territory by the authority of your Executive Council or Legislative Council?—That is a question which is not perhaps decided; I thought I could, as I have done it.

7537. What makes you think that you could not?—I have had reason to doubt it lately.

7538. You say that you used to think so?—Yes, until a very recent period.

7539. What made you change your opinion?—Information; the views of other persons expressed to me.

7540. Who were the persons whose opinions led you to doubt it?—Colonel Ord was the first person.

7541. He raised doubts with regard to the power of your Executive and Legislative Councils in matters of taxation?—Yes.

7542. *Mr. Seymour.*] I understand you to say that the Executive and Legislative Council are different from the council to which you summoned the chiefs from the various parts of the Protectorate on great occasions?—Yes; those are called for distinction sake, palavers.

7543. Do you think it would be possible to amalgamate your legislative council with this general council of chiefs, or their deputies, from various parts of the Protectorate?—No, I think not.

7544. Do you see any other mode of levying taxes, except through this general council of chiefs which you spoke of?—Not unless a law be passed for the purpose.

7545. Would they think themselves sufficiently represented in your Legislative Council, to consent to a tax levied on its authority only?—I thought so, and acted on that supposition.

7546. Do you think it would be possible to consult the chiefs from various parts of the Protectorate, as to levying taxes, and other important matters of legislation?—I do; I did consult them.

7547. Do you think you could periodically summon such a council?—Yes, it would be perfectly easy.

7548. A council that would contain the germs for the future of something like our own Parliament?—We must look very far forward for that, I fear.

7549. But are the chiefs willing to meet together in council?—Generally speaking they are, unless it is on a subject which they do not care about.

7550. But they do care about general improvements throughout the Protectorate?—Yes.

7551. Do you think that they would be willing to consent to something like the old poll-tax for carrying out improvements?—Yes, I feel sure of it; they never refused.

7552. Would it be possible to devise a scheme by which they should be consulted, and afford the Governor money for improving the country?—I do not think it is necessary to give any instructions on that, because, as the system is at present existing, I have never done anything without mentioning it to the chiefs.

7553. But those taxes have never been levied, and those improvements should be done; do you then

then think that you could draw out a scheme, by which the money could be found, and those improvements carried out with the consent of the natives generally?—Yes, I could draw it out easily, but I am not prepared to say (unless I obtain specific instructions to compel obedience to legislation) any more than that I found it almost impossible to levy the poll-tax.

7554. But I thought you said the reason was that the money was not expended in the manner that they anticipated?—That is one reason, the great reason.

7555. But there would be no general indisposition to levy such a tax if it were expended according to their wishes, would there?—No; they are exceedingly reasonable, but there is the natural delay of the native to do what he assents to.

7556. But they did assent to it formerly, and it was well conducted for a certain time?—Yes.

7557. Do you think if you went back and had the sanction of the Colonial Office you could devise a scheme to levy that tax again, and to expend it again in a manner that they would approve of?—Yes. I have not the slightest doubt of it; for they pledge themselves to do it. I have allowed one of their own townsmen to keep the money.

7558. How does the spirit-license work?—At present it works very well; every one has acceded to it.

7559. Do you think that that is a desirable tax?—I thought so.

7560. Do you think so now?—Yes, I do.

7561. It is a success on the whole?—Yes.

7562. Do you think that the population there would appreciate the value of roads in different parts, and are you of opinion that it would be possible to make metal roads?—It is possible, but at an enormous expense.

7563. *Chairman.*] What sort of roads were proposed to be made by the poll-tax?—Practicable paths; nothing more can be made in Africa, on account of the rapid vegetation.

7564. *Mr. Seymour.*] That vegetation is not more rapid than in Ceylon on the West Coast of India, where roads are made with perfect facility, is it?—Considering the character of the natives, their modes of proceeding, and so on, that would be very difficult indeed.

7565. Are there not depôts of merchandise all the way along the road to Comassie from Cape Coast, or were there not some years ago?—Goods were transmitted, but I am not aware of there having been depôts.

7566. And the road was very much frequented?—Yes.

7567. Is that so now?—Since the invasion it is not so much frequented.

7568. Most of your trade comes from Ashantee to the Gold Coast, does it not?—At Cape Coast it does; in the whole of the Protectorate.

7569. Does that trade continue now?—It is very much suspended.

7570. You get a considerable amount of gold dust and ivory from there, do you not?—Yes.

7571. Do you supply them with English cotton goods still?—Yes.

7572. Do they get any round by the Volta, or is Cape Coast Castle to Comassie still the high-road for that?—They get a great deal by the Volta; they get some through the Dutch settlements.

7573. More through the Dutch settlements than through Cape Coast?—They get more than they did through the Dutch settlements, because of the supposed stoppage of the roads; the Ashantees, I presume, think the roads are stopped, and they do not come down to Cape Coast Castle.

7574. Is that since the war?—Yes, since the war.

7575. They are afraid to come?—They do not come; that is all I can say.

7576. In former times they were afraid of the Fantees; was it not the practice to leave a Fantee in charge of their territory while they came down to Cape Coast?—I never heard of it.

7577. Is there any gold found in the protected territories?—Yes.

7578. Do you find gold in any considerable quantities?—Lately I have not had the means of ascertaining exactly.

7579. Do you believe that it exists in any quantities?—I feel convinced of it.

7580. Do you think that it could be more advantageously worked than it is at present?—Yes, certainly.

7581. You still get gold every year from different parts?—Yes.

7582. Are you aware whether they have found any large nuggets?—I have seen them, but rather rarely; I have generally seen them on natives of importance, such as king's messengers.

7583. You are aware, are you not, that nuggets have been brought from Ashantee as large as four pounds' weight?—I have heard of them.

7584. Have you seen such nuggets?—Never.

7585. Has there been any attempt to conduct the gold discovery on any principle?—Mr. Hughes has attempted it, but he has not been able to succeed; the expense is very great.

7586. What is the currency on the Gold Coast now; is it cowries?—Yes; cash and cowries in some districts.

7587. Are the cowries universal throughout the protected territory?—They are scarcely used at Cape Coast.

7588. Has the system of estimating slaves as currency completely gone by?—I know nothing of it.

7589. It is not known now?—I am not aware of it.

7590. Do you think now that on the whole slavery has diminished in the protected territories?—I am convinced that it has.

7591. But the system of pawning, and panyarring still continues, I suppose?—Pawning still continues, panyarring is punished whenever it is found.

7592. Speaking with regard to the population, what do you suppose is the number of payns in the Protectorate; is it three-quarters of the population?—No, I think not; not one-third.

7593. Do you think that it has diminished of late years?—I think so; I have had very little cognizance of anything of the kind.

7594. But you are aware, are you not, that all round you there are members of families pledged as pawns?—Yes, even in Cape Coast constantly, but you would not know it; I may discover it by accident perhaps.

7595. But it does exist all round you?—Yes, no doubt.

7596. A man pledges his wife or children for a debt?—Yes, but there have not been many cases recently; it is decreasing very much, because it is found to be a very insecure pledge.

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7597. Do you think that the currency now is sufficient for the wants of commerce on the Gold Coast?—Yes, I have never had complaints of it.

7598. What small currency is there besides cowries?—Pence; 3 d. 4 d. and 6 d. pieces.

7599. British coins?—Yes.

7600. Is that money sent out for the payment of the troops?—Yes.

7601. The Government send it out?—There has been a great expenditure of money since the troops arrived.

7602. There was a considerable want of currency some years ago at Cape Coast?—Yes.

7603. Since the protected tribes have been under British protection, has there been a very great extension of credit and commerce there?—There has been an extension of the credit system.

7604. Is that very general now?—The credit system, I am afraid has increased.

7605. Do the people now live in towns of their own, scattered; do they venture to build houses in the country?—Not very much.

7606. Has the war with Ashantee checked that practice?—I do not think so.

7607. But are there houses now built which are not merely in the towns?—Yes, some few.

7608. Is there any hostile feeling towards the missionaries now among the natives?—No; on the contrary, I see them universally respected.

7609. That is a great change from the state of things 20 years ago, is it not?—I think so. I can go back 25 years, and I see an immense difference.

7610. The number of children turned out from the missionary schools has had a general influence on the state of the population, you think?—Yes.

7611. Was it in the year 1835 that the first missionary went out?—I do not know.

7612. Do you think that the Wesleyan system is too severe for the people there?—The system, I think, is too severe; but I think that the administrators of the system modify it; they accommodate it to circumstances. I know many good missionaries who do so.

7613. Are there many turned out of the Wesleyan communion after having been admitted to it?—Yes; they are very strict in that respect.

7614. What becomes of them after they are turned out?—They are not very much respected; they generally go wrong, I may say.

7615. Do you think that Fetichism is on the decline?—Very much on the decline.

7616. Do you think there are a great many natives who, although they are not Christians, do not believe in the Fetich-man?—I think that they begin to find out that it is a mistake; they have not the same faith in it as they had.

7617. Is polygamy diminishing now?—Yes, it is diminishing, but it is by no means at an end.

7618. But still you have instances of women coming to the courts to be relieved?—Not on the ground of polygamy.

7619. But do you find women with a greater knowledge of their rights than they used to have?—Yes, I think they have; there is a divorce law.

7620. I thought that only applied to Christians?—They all avail themselves of it.

7621. Is there a general security throughout the country that you can send valuable products from one part of the country to another, such as gold, without a guard?—I do not think there is more than an ordinary amount of pillage.

7622. Is it safely sent from one part to another without a guard?—It is very seldom that any theft happens.

7623. But is it the practice to send goods without a guard, or not?—Without a guard, certainly, if you mean a military guard.

7624. Is there a large number of armed men with the companies of traffickers?—No; every native of Africa is armed more or less.

7625. In the case of the refugee from Ashantee whom you spoke of, do you think that one way of getting out of the difficulty, when a refugee took refuge in Cape Coast Castle, would be to send him away out of the territory?—Yes.

7626. Would that, in your opinion, be a good plan?—Yes, it would be a good plan.

7627. That was done before by Governor Hill, was it not?—Yes, I have heard that a person was sent away.

7628. May I ask why you did not send off that person whom the king of Ashantee claimed?—I suggested it till I was tired; I begged them to let me send him away. The Palaver Hall contained 150 natives deeply interested in it, and they protested, when threatened, to send him back by force.

7629. To Ashantee?—Yes. I told him that it was his duty to obey his lawful king. I pointed out that he would not injure him, but simply judge him and do justice.

7630. Have there been any cases in which refugees have been sent back on the king taking the great oath to spare the refugee's life?—I have heard of that, and I have heard that the last experiment of that kind ended in the death of the person sent back, within a few miles of Cape Coast Castle.

7631. Did you ever hear of the case mentioned by Mr. Cruickshank of a man sent back when the king's messenger took the great oath, by Sir Charles McCarthy, and the king was so frightened when he came back, that he sent him back to Cape Coast Castle for fear of any injury being done to him, the king respecting that oath so much?—I heard of that.

7632. You did not suggest to the king that the refugee might go back if the king took the same oath, did you?—Yes, I did.

7633. That does not appear in the Despatches?—I consulted those who had had the greatest experience, and they said that under no circumstances whatever should I be justified in accepting the pledge of the king; his messenger offered to take this great oath, but I was told that, according to the customs of the country, the king himself dare not admit the man, and that probably he would be kept for months, and sent back and be shown to me, but eventually he would disappear.

7634. Does the Government use the Fetich-man at all. Do the police use him?—We do not inquire; it is a very small force of police; they are men who appear at Church, at all events.

7635. You do not use the Fetich-men to gain a knowledge of secrets?—I never have; my servants, I know, have done it to find out thieves.

7636. What is the condition of the villages where the war took place; are they in fear of the Ashantees?—They are never sure that they will not have them; they are not in fear, because they say they are prepared.

7637. Are they cultivating the ground again now?—Yes, they are cultivating the ground, they have very good crops.

7638. What