

A STUDY OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN CAMEROON

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DECLARATION

I, Lisa Esi Kingsley-Arthur, do hereby declare that this dissertation is an outcome of a research conducted by me, under the supervision of Dr. Afua Boatemaa Yakohene and no part of it has been submitted anywhere for any other purpose. All sources of information collected and materials used have been duly acknowledged and referenced in the bibliography.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this to God, the wonderful counsellor and helper, whose strength has made me perfect in my weakness.

I also dedicate this work to my parents, Mr. Robert Siisi Kingsley-Arthur and Mrs Elizabeth Kayi Kingsley-Arthur for their love, support and encouragement.

Thank you to all who supported, encouraged and comforted me during my academic year.

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Notwithstanding the above, I remain solely responsible for any shortcomings that this work may suffer.

God bless you all!

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAC	-	All Anglophone Conference
AGC	-	Ambazonia Governing Council
AIG	-	Ambazonia Interim Government
ARCSS	-	Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
AU	-	African Union
CAM	-	Cameroon Anglophone Movement
CACSC	-	Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium
CDC	-	Cameroon Development Corporation
CFA	-	Central African Franc
CIMA	-	Inter-African Conference on Insurance Markets
CNU	-	Cameroon National Union
CPA	-	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPDM	-	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
CUC	-	Cameroon United Congress
EEBC	-	Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission
ELF	-	Eritrean Liberation Front
ELF-PLF	-	Eritrean Liberation Front – People's Liberation Front
ELM	-	Eritrean Liberation Movement
EPLF	-	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	-	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FWM	-	Free West-Cameroon Movement

GC	-	General Command
GCE	-	General Certificate of Education
GNP	-	Gross National Product
GS	-	General Secretariat
HLCRF	-	High-Level Revitalization Forum
IGAD	-	Intergovernmental Authority Development
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
KDP	-	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KNDP	-	Kamerun National Democratic Party
KRG	-	Kurdistan Regional Government
MoRISC	-	Movement for the Restoration of Independence in Southern Cameroon
NCP	-	National Congress Party
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
OGTR	-	Operation Ghost Town Resistance
OHADA	-	Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa
PLF	-	People's Liberation Front
PUK	-	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
RoA	-	Republic of Ambazonia
SANU	-	Sudan African Nationalist Union
SC	-	Supreme Council
SCAUF	-	Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front
SCAPO	-	Southern Cameroon People Organisation
SCBC	-	Southern Cameroon Broadcasting Corporation

SCINGA	-	Southern Cameroonians in Nigeria
SCNC	-	Southern Cameroon's National Council
SCRM	-	Southern Cameroon's Restoration Movement
SCSAF	-	Southern Cameroons South Africa Forum
SCYL	-	Southern Cameroon's Youth League
SDF	-	Social Democratic Front
SPLM/A	-	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army
SSLM/A	-	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
TPLF	-	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UK	-	United Kingdom
USA	-	United States of America
UN	-	United Nations
UNESCO	-	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPA	-	Ukrainian Insurgent Army

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ABSTRACT

Cameroon since its inception in 1961 has faced a series of secessionist struggles, mainly from its English region. Anglophone Cameroonians who feel marginalized and violated have in recent years revived a quest to secede from Cameroon. This study analyses the secessionist movements in Cameroon, bringing to light the reasons behind their formation, their actors, strategies as well as their chances of success or failure. The study employs the theory of secession as it captures and explains in full detail the occurrences and happenings in Cameroon. In conducting the study, the qualitative research approach and the purposive sampling method were used to attain a representational sample of Cameroonians. The findings from the study identified economic, political and cultural factors as the underlying reasons behind the formation of secessionist movement in Cameroon. It also pointed to the Cameroonian government and lawyers and teachers in the Anglophone regions as the main actors behind the secessionist struggle. Further findings indicated that the secessionist use both overt and covert strategies to ensure the realization of their quest for independence. Findings on the prospects of success or failure reflected that the Cameroonian government is willing to make some adjustments but highly unwilling to give into the secessionist request. The study concluded that the secessionists have genuine reasons for embarking upon the uprising and thus the central government should come out with a clear-cut policy to address the impasse. In view of these revelations, the study recommended the suspension of Cameroon from international organisations and the reversal of policies that impose French in the English systems.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Research Problem

In the 20th century, the concept of self-determination was the central justification – both legally and politically – for the pursuit of territorial changes.¹ Over the past few years, the demands for self-determination has risen in spite of the fact that, territorial changes following the act of self-determination formed only the starting point for further changes.² These increased demands have been in pursuit of a number of goals ranging from greater tolerance for the habits, customs and religions of minorities, to multilingualism and even the setting up of new states or the review of state borders.³

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of September 2007 revisits this notion of self-determination.⁴ According to the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (a Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States adopted on 24 October 1970), all people have the right to determine their political status and the freedom to pursue their cultural, economic and social development without any external interference.⁵

¹ Hilpold, Peter (2017), “Self-Determination and Autonomy: Between Secession and Internal Self-Determination,” *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 24, pp. 302.

² *Ibid.*, p. 303.

³ Archibugi, Daniele (2003), A Critical Analysis of Self-Determination of Peoples: A Cosmopolitan Perspective, *Constellations* Vol.10, No.4, pp. 488.

⁴ Titanji, Duga Ernest (2009), The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination Versus Secession: One Coin, Two Faces? *African Human Rights Law Journal*, pp. 52.

⁵ Kapustin, Anatoly (2015), Crimea’s Self-Determination in the Light of Contemporary International Law, *Journal of International Law*, 75 (1), pp. 102.

According to Banai, no existing norm of international law has been so strongly or widely accepted or promoted – at least in theory – as the right of self-determination.⁶ Discussions on the right to self-determination continues to take new shape, as the meaning of the right remains as ambiguous and vague as when it was first enunciated at Versailles by President Woodrow Wilson and others.⁷ The evolving nature of self-determination is aptly presented by Suzuki (1980). He describes self-determination as a double-edged concept, which acts as a unifying and disintegrative force. He emphasises that, the concept invokes and agitates a human desire to assert one's identity by excluding others.⁸ Griffiths also states that the right to self-determination is simply one of the most normatively confused and unspecified principles in the canon of legal doctrine. Beyond colonialism, the right to self-determination is beset by an excess of indeterminacy both in relation to its content and scope.⁹ Before World War One, people such as the Slavic of Habsburg Empire and the non-Turkish people of the Ottoman Empire were those who pursued self-determination. But after World War Two, it was people under colonial dependence that rallied behind the slogan, and even after colonialism the concept of self-determination did not die out.¹⁰

Archibugi also noted that often, different and mostly contradictory aspirations of a group of people were placed under the banner of self-determination. In his view, the concept can be

⁶ Banai, Ayelet (2015) Freedom Beyond the Threshold: Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and Global Justice, *Ethics & Global Politics*, Vol. 8:1, pp. 21.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸ Suzuki, Eisuke (1980), Self-Determination and International Law, *The Yale Journal* Vol. 89, No. 6 pp. 1247.

⁹ Griffiths, Ryan D. (2016), *Age of Secession, The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 2.

¹⁰ Hilpold, Peter (2017), *op. cit.*, p. 303.

classified into three categories, self-determination of colonial people (which is found in many sources of international law including the UN Charter), self-determination in association with secession (which has been in vogue ever since the Cold War ended) and finally, self-determination with reference to ethnic and cultural groups who want to be part of a state but wish to achieve certain collective rights.¹¹

With the end of colonialism and the Cold War, there has been a notable increase in the demand for self-determination (in association with secession) in Africa and the world at large.¹² Cases of demands for secession in Nigeria, Cameroon, Spain, Sudan and Iraq have captured the world's attention.

Similar to other numerous political and social phenomena, secession has been a subject of inquiry of often unrelated and separate disciplines. This diversity in the approach to secession has yielded diverse and sometimes irreconcilable definitions of secession.¹³ Scholars like James Crawford, limit the concept to the withdrawal of territory, which is opposed by a functioning host state. According to this definition, mutually agreed withdrawal of a territory or a withdrawal, which is opposed by a disintegrating state will not count as secession.¹⁴ Also, according to Michael Hatcher, a social scientist, secession is restricted to cases where the host state's continuity as a state is preserved following a territory's withdrawal. In his assessment, there exist only a few genuine cases of secessions, for instance, that of the Irish free state in

¹¹ Archibugi, Daniel (2003), *op. cit.*, p. 488.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 488.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Crawford, James (2006), *The Creation of States in International Law* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 374.

1922 and Norway in 1905.¹⁵ On the other hand, John Wood, a political scientist, upholds that every single case of secession is a case of disintegration, even when the host state's previous identity is preserved.¹⁶ Radan further defines secession as the formation of a new state on territory formerly belonging to or was a colonial entity of an existing state.¹⁷ This definition by Radan clearly captures the quest of Anglophone Cameroonians in Cameroon.

Cameroon, a post-colonial state formed out of the union of French and British UN Trust Territories is at the forefront of regional-centred political demands and protests for the rearrangement of state power. The genesis of these political protests dates back to the history of Cameroon and its formation, where Cameroon was recognized as a German territory at the Berlin Conference in November 1884. But after the German's defeat at the end of World War 1, Cameroon was divided between France and Great Britain.¹⁸

In the year 1960, French Cameroon was among the first of 17 – mainly francophone – African countries to gain independence from their colonial masters. Guinea was the only one of such countries that had attained independence (in 1958) before January 1 1960. Nonetheless, the Cameroonian case is more complicated.¹⁹ The territory between Nigeria and French Cameroon,

¹⁵ Hetcher, Michael (1992), *The Dynamics of Secession*, *Acta Sociologica* Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 267.

¹⁶ Wood, John R. (1981) *Secession; A Comparative Analytical Frame*, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 14, p. 123.

¹⁷ Pavković, Aleksandar *Secession and its diverse definitions* pp. 1-2 https://www.auspsa.org.au/sites/default/files/secession_and_its_diverse_definitions_aleksandar_pavkovic.pdf?c_v=1&session-id=34d341e2f9fc15092aaa41629e86c2ba accessed on 13th May, 2018.

¹⁸ Mukong, Togho Lumumba & Afanou, Kafui Sandra (2016), *Upheavals in Anglophone Cameroon; Background and Updates on the Situation as of 13.12.2016*, pp. 1-5.

¹⁹ Tiewa, Kathrin & Vubo, Emmanuel Yenshu (2015), *Celebrating Unity and Debating Unity in Cameroon's 2010 Independence Jubilees, the Cinquintenaire*, *Cahier D'Etudes Africaines*, pp.

which was administered by Britain as a UN Trust Territory, was known as English Cameroon. Britain had hoped to integrate the English Cameroonian region into Nigeria, in anticipation that the region would gain independence simultaneously with Nigeria.²⁰ Conversely, political leaders in Southern Cameroon opposed this because of their marginalization within the context of Nigeria's decolonization politics and maltreatment of natives by Nigerian officials and traders.²¹

To begin with, the English Cameroonians had four options: unification of the territories of Northern and Southern Cameroon within a single nation, integration of the two territories which had been administered as part of the British colony of Nigeria into the latter as an autonomous region, secession from Nigeria to become independent either jointly or as two segments of the same country and reunification with the former French Cameroon with the argument that "all the sectors of former (German) Kamerun be reunited to form a single independent state."²² Whereas, some local politicians supported the idea of secession, students and migrants from the territory under French rule opted for reunification that led to divided competing opinions. Consequently, the UN decided to grant independence to the two British Cameroonian territories. The choice was, however, narrowed down to two alternatives, integration into newly independent Nigeria or reunification with the equally newly independent Republic of Cameroon (formerly French Cameroon).²³

Tiewa and Vubo assert that, this limitation was highly contested, especially by secessionists.

331 – 357.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 333.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., p. 335.

²³ Ibid.

Nonetheless, plebiscites were organized to decide on the issue on the 11th and 12th of February, 1961. The majority of the electorates of Northern English Cameroon voted in favour of integration with Nigeria and became the Saradauna Province on June 1, 1961, which now forms part of Northern Nigeria. In like manner, the majority of the electorates of Southern English Cameroon opted for reunification with the Republic of Cameroon and became the Federal State of West Cameroon within the Federal Republic of Cameroon on October 1, 1961 with Ahmadou Ahidjo as President of the Republic.²⁴

Before Southern English Cameroon's reunification with French Cameroon, there arose disagreements on the form the state would take at reunification, as it called for the merger of two colonial territories with dissimilar legacies, levels of economic development, official languages and legal, administrative, political and educational traditions.²⁵ West Cameroon, being the less economically developed partner, and having political systems which were more participatory and pluralistic, contrasted with East Cameroon's centralized system. Subsequently, between 1966 and 1970, the ground work for a unitary system was laid and in May 1972, a plebiscite was held to decide on the transformation of the Federal Republic of Cameroon into a unitary state. Over the years, the English-speaking Cameroonians (some of whom refer to themselves as Ambazonians) have felt side-lined socially, economically and politically by their French counterparts, resulting in the formation of secessionist movements as a means of pushing forward the desire of some English Cameroonians to secede.²⁶

²⁴ Konings, Piet & Nyamnjoh, Francis B. (2003), *Negotiating the Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data.*

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid. .

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

There has been a notable rise in the number of secessionist movements in Africa and the world at large. Recently, Spain, Sudan and Iraq have captured the world's attention. In Cameroon, there have been uprising and protests by secessionist movements both internally and externally, mainly in the English-speaking areas where some citizens have called for a separation from their French counterparts.

France and Britain colonised Cameroon, and after the nation attained independence in early 1960, French and English constituted the two official languages, although the French Cameroonians comprised 80% of the population. The English-speakers mainly occupied the North-West and South-Western regions of the country closer to Nigeria.²⁷ The two linguistic groups have cohabited peacefully until recently, when the Paul Biya government decided to impose French Language in English courts and schools. This generated huge protests from lawyers and teachers which degenerated into unfortunate eventualities. Large arrests were made and the use of brute force to quell the rebellion led to the killing of 17 protesters on October 10, 2017 (Amnesty International 2017), although local sources put the figure for the slain at 100. Other remote causes of the conflict pointed out that the allocation of economic resources as reflected by the country's national budgets showed high levels of discrimination against the English-speaking provinces of the country (Cameroon's National Estimates for 2017). Furthermore, the government was criticised for deliberately side-lining the English politicians in the affairs of the country. Although the Prime Minister's position has been traditionally

²⁷ Mukong, Togho Lumumba & Afanou, Kafui Sandra (2016), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-5.

slated for an English politician, the incumbent Philemon Yang has been relegated to an insignificant fourth position in the country's leadership hierarchy.²⁸

These grievances by the Anglophones in Cameroon have led to the rebirth of secessionist movements that are burnt on forming a separate state called Ambazonia. This situation calls for a dialogue to draw up a road map yet the two combatants appear not to be ready to shift their position.

This research seeks to examine what form of appreciation can be made of the birth of secessionist movements in contemporary Cameroon, their actors, strategies and prospects of success and failure.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What are the reasons for the formation of secessionist movements in Cameroon?
2. Who are the different actors in the secessionist movements in Cameroon?
3. How have the secessionist movements gone about seeking secession from Cameroon?
4. What are the prospects of success and failure for the current secessionist movement in Cameroon?

1.4 Research Objectives

1. To understand the reasons for the formation of secessionist movements in Cameroon.
2. To examine the different actors in the secessionist movements in Cameroon.
3. To analyse how these secessionist movements have gone about seeking secession from

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

Cameroon.

4. To assess the chances of success and failure for the current secessionist movement in Cameroon.

1.5 Hypothesis

The research seeks to postulate that, the actors of the current secession movement in Cameroon and the adopted strategies are likely to have both negative and positive ramifications on the secession efforts.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study focuses on the geopolitical, ethnocentric and economic factors that have triggered the formation of secessionist movements in Cameroon. It also zooms in on the origins of secessionists movements, their actors and the strategies which these movements have used and intend to use since 2016 to date, in anticipation of the attainment of independence and how these strategies will affect their outcome. The choice of scope is informed by the reason that, the period after November 21 2016, witnessed the revival of secessionist movements in Cameroon.

1.7 Rationale of the Study

This study is of significance due to the rise of secessionist movements around the world (in countries such as Spain, Sudan, Iraq and Cameroon among others). The seemingly contagious tide of secession has many researchers and political analysts questioning the reasons for desiring to secede, actors involved and the effectiveness of their employed strategies of

‘combat’.

The study, therefore, seeks to add to the reservoir of knowledge in the field of secessionist movements and their prospects of success or failure in Cameroon.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

1.8.1 Secession

As Woodrow Wilson famously announced at the end of the First World War, "national aspirations must be respected; people may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent.,²⁹ in other words, self-determination, which could lead to regional autonomy or secession in a state. Most theories of secession focus on the behaviour of groups or, sometimes, their leaders. According to Seymour (2007), these groups or leaders usually identify situations that would either precipitate the aspiration by sub-national groups to leave its country or facilitate the enactment of such resolutions.³⁰ Also Sorens (2012) notes that these leaders or groups usually assume a cost-benefit decision structure, whereby they weigh the benefits and cost of exit with those of remaining within the state.³¹

Theories of secession can be classified into two broad categories; primary and derivative right theories. Primary right theories view secession as a group of peoples’ right to vote for

²⁹ Brilmayer, Lea (2015), “Secession and the Two Types of Self-Determination,” *ILSA Journal of International Law & Comparative Law*, pp. 325 – 331.

³⁰ Seymour, M. (2007), “Secession as A Remedial Right, Inquiry” *An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 50(4), pp. 402.

³¹ Boyle, Katharine & Englebert, Pierre (2006), The Primacy of Politics in Separatist Dynamics http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/wgape/10_Englebert.pdf?cv=1&session-id=34d341e2f9fc15092aaa41629e86c2ba pp. 4.

secession. Under this first category there are two theories, which are choice or plebiscitary theory and national self-determination theory. On the other hand, derivative right theories views secession as a measure to justified consequence of perpetual violation of basic human right, past maltreatment of a group of people by the state mass, violation of intra-state autonomy agreement, violation of public realization of equality of democratic state, and unlawful incorporation into the state.³²

Furthermore, Sorens (2005) classifies the theory into four broad categories: cultural, political, economic and other enabling factors.³³

1.8.1.1 The Economic Theory of Secession

Recent literatures on civil conflicts note the existence of a significant economic component as the fundamental part of many secessionist theories. Secessionist regions are alleged to be typically different from the rest of their country in terms of natural resource endowments, wealth and human or physical capital.³⁴ Thus, prejudiced economic policies from the central state with reference to its regions may affect the costs and benefits of exit or allegiance. In addition, a country's overall economic rate of growth and income level may add to the secessionist tendencies of its constituent groups.³⁵

³² Beran, Harry (1988), More Theory of Secession: A Response to Birch, *Political Studies* 36, pp. 319.

³³ Sorens, Jason (2005), The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced Democracies *Comparative Political Studies* 38 pp. 8.

³⁴ Buchanan, Allen E. (1991), Towards a Theory of Secession, *Ethics* 101: 326.

³⁵ Collins, R. O. (2008), *A History of Modern Sudan*, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

1.8.1.2 Economic Models of Secession

Considering the significance of economic gain as a driver of secession, revealing the probable gains of secession has become more and more common.³⁶ A considerable body of theoretical literature has tried to model the drivers of secession since the 1980s, as well as to project the consequences and outcomes of attaining independence or greater autonomy. Some of Buchanan's early works have focused on the 'internal exit' of a peripheral region within a host country.³⁷ According to this model, a region could choose to leave the country by voting but it would lose any public goods and internal transfers it had access to. The result of the model was that, in the case of secession, richer regions would benefit more than poorer ones therefore making a threat to secede – primarily to lessen its tax burden – more credible coming from a richer region than a poor region.³⁸ The outcome was that, whether taxes were lowered for all, or the rich region eventually seceded, the country's poorer regions would be on the losing side. This structure later turned out to be the starting point for additional models thus, providing new variations on the economic inferences of secession.³⁹

1.8.1.3 The Cultural Theory of Secession

Cultural theories relate cultural features of a specific groups or a country to the likelihood of secession. Religious, ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity is commonly claimed to encourage

³⁶ Dominicé, Christian (2006), *The Secession of the Canton Jura in Switzerland*, in: *Marcello G. Cohen (eds.), Secession International Law Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 461.

³⁷ Buchanan, A. (1997), *Theories of Secession*. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 26(10), pp. 36.

³⁸ Liscow, Z. (2012), "Why Fight Secession? Evidence of Economic Motivations from the American Civil War," *Public Choice* 153(1-2), pp. 43.

³⁹ Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Stermšek Marko (2014), *The Economics of Secession. Analysing the Economic Impact of the Collapse of the Former Yugoslavia - Governance and Economics research Network*, pp. 7

secessions. A government's suppression of certain cultural groups, even in moderately homogeneous national environments, is also alleged to encourage the pursuit of the group's own political fortunes. Lastly, when a group already has grievances against the central government, the existence of a diaspora is alleged to facilitate the organization of joint action within the group.⁴⁰

1.8.1.4 Cultural Heterogeneity

Whether religious, linguistic or ethnic, numerous scholars have suggested that cultural pluralism in a country will upsurge the number of secessionist claims. Although there are varying accounts of this argument, they all depend on the basic concepts of polarization and social heterogeneity. The evidence is rather weak if not contradictory. Whereas Sorens found positive relationships between linguistic or ethnic uniqueness and secessionist tendencies,⁴¹ McGee found no evidence that shows that attachments to ethnic identities or ethnic antipathies are significant causes of secessionism. In addition, Nieslen observes that social fractionalization actually lessened the probability of identity rebellions and wars—as it makes it less probable for a particular group to have a sufficiently large and distinct regional base— while ethnic dominance, defined as the existence in a country of a demographically dominant group, somewhat encouraged such wars and made it more possible for minority rebels to pursue autonomy.⁴² Sunstein also argued that “as ethnic heterogeneity increases, the probability of a partition decreases significantly, suggesting that it may be difficult to coordinate and win in a

⁴⁰ Boyle, Katharine & Englebert, Pierre, op. cit.

⁴¹ Sorens, Jason (2005), op. cit.

⁴² Boyle, Katharine & Englebert, Pierre, op. cit.

secessionist war in extremely diverse societies.”⁴³

For secessionism, the size of the ethnic group matters, this is consistent with Nieslen theory that the density of social ties in a region matters in influencing its secessionist stance, as this would be at least in part a function of ethnic homogeneity.⁴⁴ As for pragmatic findings regarding size, while Young finds positive substantial effects of relative group size, Sorens further notes that the total size of a group relates positively to secessionism.⁴⁵

Following this line of thought, an alternative variation of the ethnic argument proposes that, the ethnic groups’ desire for a separate destiny is affected by territorial concentration. For example, a black minority dispersed across a country offers a weak foundation for secessionist activism. Kurds on the other hand, have a more practical and intuitive claim to territorial sovereignty as they are concentrated in the Northern region of Iraq. In their economic disparity argument, groups have to be spatially concentrated to develop a secessionist tendency. Authors like Somers revealed that rural regional concentration and group concentration respectively matter for rebellious activity and secessionist desires.⁴⁶

1.8.1.5 The Politics Theory of Secession

This third factor deals with the dynamics and nature of the political system. Unlike cultural and economic theories, the focus here is on the political features of entire countries, and not only the

⁴³ Nfi, Joseph L. (2014), “The Anglophone CultureIdentity in Cameroon 50 Years after Reunification,” *International Journal of Advanced Researchhe*, pp. 121-129.

⁴⁴ Lawson, Edward & Mary Lou Bertucci (1996), *Encyclopaedia of Human Rights*, Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, 1327.

⁴⁵ Boyle, Katharine & Englebert, Pierre, op. cit. pp. 8-9.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

secessionist region.⁴⁷ Dynamics unleashed by changes in the international environment, discrimination, democratization and state failure feature largely in this literature. The politics of neighbouring states and their readiness to back insurrections would likewise change the costs and benefits of secessionist activism. Lastly, currently being a distinct administrative unit (state, province, etc.) or having once had a distinct existence as a state may promote a distinct identity and a desire to “realize” one’s political destiny.⁴⁸

1.8.1.6 Democracy

Brown (2010) explains that, theoretically, secessionism can be affected by democracy in two ways. On one hand, democratic regimes offer minorities seemingly some form of protection and a voice, thereby creating loyalty, and making it less probable that they will seek withdrawal. On the other hand, democratic transitions can aggravate prevailing ethnic tensions and dynamics and favour state disintegration as was the case in Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ The perseverance of secessionist movements in France, Canada, Spain, India and the United Kingdom advocates that there may be little relationship between secessions and the level of democracy, a perception reinforced by the findings of Seymour (2012).⁵⁰

1.8.1.7 Political Transitions

Would- be secessionists are concerned more about the intensity and extent of political change rather than the nature of regimes. Thus, political transitions tend to make states susceptible and

⁴⁷ Seymour, M. (2007), *op. cit.*

⁴⁸ Brown, G. (2010), *The Political Economy of Secessionism: Inequality, Identity, and the State*. Bath Papers in International Development, 9

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*.

⁵⁰ Seymour, M. (2012), *Peoples, Self-Determination and Secession*. ASEN Seminars, London (for further reference see: www.youtube.com/watch?v=isw3IxLM518).

can create settings that foster secessionist movements.⁵¹ For example, periods of economic transition and democratization can lead to increased ethnic identities and security dilemmas which in due course “drive” secessionism. Young (1994) also proposes that democratization and glasnost under Gorbachev “brought issues of identity to the forefront” in the Soviet Union. Collins (2008), however, suggests that transition regimes that share features of autocracy and democracy may be better suited than pure democracies to “contain violent ethno-political conflict.”⁵²

Political philosophers in the liberal tradition such as Harry Beran and Christopher Wellman have also provided ample arguments in support of the nature of secession as a justifiable political right in certain circumstances. Secession under this framework is seen as an inevitable part of the international system and thus, an analysis is required for its justification. On the other hand, casual analysts consider secession in terms of its causes and in terms of dispute resolution. Under this framework, secession is seen to lead to violence, disorder and conflict, yet it still remains as a possible resolution to conflict.⁵³

1.8.1.8 Criticisms against the Secessionist Theory

There have been numerous critiques of the secessionist concept. According to John McGarry, one of the major flaws of secession is that, it aims to protect the affected group through the attainment of territorial sovereignty, which is often accomplished by creating the necessary

⁵¹ Bookman, M. (1993), *The Economics of Secession*. London: Macmillan Press.

⁵² Collins, R. O. (2008), op. cit.

⁵³ Brown, G. (2010), op. cit. p. 9

structures for an independent nationhood.⁵⁴ Secessionists see statehood as their best option, however, the aftermath of their secession is that new minority groups are formed in the parent state thus recreating the same problem as before and resulting in a never-ending cycle. This therefore charges stakeholders to loosen their entrenched positions and accord dialogue a chance towards resolving their crises.⁵⁵

According to Nielsen, for national consciousness and cultural preservation to flourish, there is no prerequisite for a nation-state to guard and represent that national consciousness, thus, a nation is not obligated to have a nation-state of its very own promoting its interests. All that is needed for self-definition is a common culture in a non-hostile environment. Herder also stressed that, a sense of being a people and national consciousness does not demand a nation-state to give expression to that identity. People can therefore have a sense of nation without a nation-state.⁵⁶

1.8.1.9 Relevance of the Secession Theory

These criticisms notwithstanding, the secessionist theory is relevant to this research as it captures and explains in full detail the occurrences and happenings in Cameroon, where the Anglophone citizens feel marginalised and violated. After all theorists argue that, the best way to stop a fight is to split up the antagonists. Harry Beran's approach to secession, however, is

⁵⁴ Seymour, M. (2007), op. cit.

⁵⁵ Radan, P. (2012), Secessionist Referenda in International and Domestic Law, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 18(1), pp.16.

⁵⁶ Nielsen, Kai (1993), "Secession; The Case of Quebec," *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 33.

that no state can be indissoluble since that will limit the freedom of choice of the citizens.⁵⁷

1.9 Literature Review

This segment principally looks at the nature of secession, causes of secession, as well as the consequences of secession.

1.9.1 Nature of Secession

According to Seymour, secession is the formation of a new state upon territory previously being a colonial entity or forming part of an existing state.⁵⁸ Radan also asserts that secessionism is based on the formal demand for the withdrawal of a territory from an internationally recognized state with the intention of forming a new state on the withdrawn territory, which is anticipated to gain formal recognition by other states and the UN. A secessionist movement is a movement whose main aim is to remove itself from the larger nation in which it finds itself. Thus, a successful secessionist movement is one in which the movement not only succeeds in withdrawing from its former nation but is able to create a new government to rule the newly liberated territory that is both internally and internationally recognized.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Beran, Harry (1984), *A Liberal Theory of Secession*, *Political Studies* 32, pp. 24.

⁵⁸ Seymour, M. (2007), *op. cit.*

⁵⁹ Radan, P. (2012), *op. cit.*, p.11

Sorens states that there are at least three key features in regards to secession which are: the mobilization of people in support of a new state, the formal withdrawal of a territory and the formation of a new state on the withdrawn territory. Each secessionist movements follows a general model in which grievances lead to the decision to secede, which leads to the act of secession, leading to an outcome, and then the aftermath. All of these stages are influenced by predominant facilitating factors such as the type of government in the nation, economic status, the amount of violence and current world issues. Most movements become stuck at the action stage, leaving them to be perpetually ongoing.⁶⁰

1.9.2 Causes of Secessionist Movements

1.9.2.1 Human Rights Violation and Discrimination

Brown (2010) posits that the most common reason today for calls for secession from the mother state is on grounds of oppression, lack of democracy, discrimination and massive human rights violation. This justification is similar to what philosophers call the “just-cause theory”. Here, there is a nexus between the right to self-determination and the respect of human rights. Examples where human rights violations have been used as a justification for a right to secession includes the Kurds, Eritreans, Bengalis, and Southern Sudanese. The legal basis for this argument stems from the 1970 declaration on Friendly Relations. A thorough analysis of the declaration coupled with the preparatory work leads to the conclusion that secession is allowed if certain stringent conditions have been fulfilled. The fact that secession is impliedly permitted by the 1970 declaration does not mean that there are no restrictions.⁶¹ Herraclides also asserts that for there to be a right to secession, there must be continuous refusal from the state concerned to

⁶⁰ Sorens, Jason (2005), op. cit.

⁶¹ Brown, G. (2010), op. cit., p. 9

grant participatory rights to the groups or “peoples” claiming the right to secede. Another condition is that, there must be a gross and systematic violation of their fundamental rights and no hope of having a peaceful solution of the problem within the existing state structure. This was the main reason used by the advocates of American independence in 1776 since it was clear that there was no possibility of resolving their grievances with Britain so far as they were a British colony.⁶²

Miller asserts that the 1970 Declaration is a classic example for the limitation of sovereignty. The veil of sovereignty can be lifted if it can be proven that the state concerned is committing serious human rights violation and there is no prospect for solving the problem. This does make secession in that case legal, and it is left to politicians to decide if it is legitimate or not. Discrimination against a particular ethnic group, minority or peoples perpetuated by either the state or the majority population falls under the letter and spirit of the 1970 Declaration. Where the discrimination reaches a level, which threatens the physical existence of the people or minority concerned, secession becomes their only remedy. In this case there is a right to remedial secession. In most cases, the situation becomes so bad that the state is not even prepared to accept the existence of a substantial minority group or people, as is the case in Cameroon.⁶³

Titanji further notes that, secession can legally take place and has, in fact, taken place in the absence of accusations of human rights violations, as was the case in the secession of Slovakia

⁶² Heraclides, Alexis (1992), *Secession, Self-Determination and Non-Intervention: in Quest of a Normative Symbiosis*, *Journal of International Affairs* 45, pp. 405.

⁶³ Miller, David (1998), *Secession and the Principle of Nationality*, In *National Self-Determination and Secession*, ed. Margaret Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

from Czechoslovakia. The initial demands from most secessionist movements are more democracy and respect of human rights.⁶⁴

Thus, according to Beran, conflict only stems from a clash of values, interests, actions, directions or views. Once the conflict is resolved it can incite a constructive change in an organization. In most cases, conflicts increase as groups emphasize on their demands for increased benefits such as acknowledgment, appreciation, position, monetary benefits and independence.⁶⁵

1.9.2.2. Nationalism

There is no doubt that nationalism is one of the driving forces of secession. Ryabinin alleges that in the period of globalization when the borders disappear, nationalism will no longer be a problem and it will be a thing of the past. Contrary to that view, nationalism has rather become a determining element for the causes of secession, especially, in Europe and post-Soviet countries. Nationalism has influenced events such as the Hungarian referendum, Brexit, the desire of France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Greece to leave the European Union. Ryabinin further notes that in Ukraine, it is getting harder for the Russians to protect their rights because the radical political parties demand total Ukrainization of the whole country, which presupposes the demand to speak only Ukrainian, recognize the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as the fighters for freedom of Ukraine during the World War II and the restriction of freedom of speech. Thus, Ryabinin makes a conclusion that secessionist movements are fed by the identity factor, which is

⁶⁴ Titanji, Ernest Duga (2009), The right of indigenous peoples to self-determination versus Secession: One coin, two faces? *African Human Rights Law Journal*, pp. 52.

⁶⁵ Beran, Harry. (1984), A Liberal Theory of Secession, *Political Studies* 32, pp. 26.

based on the concept of nationalism. This is seen in how the Hungarians didn't consider themselves to be Ukrainians, the Catalonians didn't consider themselves to be Spaniards, the Ambazonians don't consider themselves to be Cameroonians and the same situation with the Russians in the Donbass region. In his opinion, nationalism could be only negative and aggressive when it is the reason for conflict between different groups of people.⁶⁶

1.9.3 Consequences of Secession

The consequences of secession can be discussed along the lines of political, economic, and social consequences.

1.9.3.1 Political Consequences of Secession

According to Radan, secession causes the central government of the former host state to focus its attention on strategies aimed at restricting any expansionist motives of the seceded group and the executives to keep an eye on elements sympathetic to the course of the separated group. Formulating such policies and implementing them often distracts the attention of political authorizes thereby leaving virtually very little room for discharging the core functions under governance such as providing security, good health, schools, law and order. Also, secession may rupture certain bilateral and multilateral relations among states as foreign missions see torn up countries as unsafe for holding any meaningful diplomatic relationships. Besides foreign missions, reputable world class Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) helping to improve upon social amenities and other poverty reduction projects, would wind up operations for

⁶⁶ Ryabinin, Yevgeny (2017), The Basic Causes of the Temporary Separatism, *Journal of Geography, Politics and Society*, 7(1), pp. 6-7.

insecurity reasons, which could have far reaching consequences on the delivery of social services in a country.⁶⁷

1.9.3.2 Economic Consequences of Secession

Miller (1998) posits, that technocrats and professionals working for the formal sector who belong to the seceded group often leave their positions abruptly leading to production delays, which have adverse effect on productivity and eventually results in the loss of revenue.⁶⁸ According to Buchannan, the total tax revenue of governments experiencing secession could dwindle, since members of the separating state will no longer pay income and corporate taxes to the government. Foreign investors in the country are likely to reconsider any plans for expanding operations since secession means loss of significant market to their operations. Potential investors will adopt a wait and see' attitude since the situation on the ground would not look too good for doing peaceful business. Shops and businesses belonging to the members of the seceded group would close down resulting in very damaging effect on employment levels. Loss of revenue to the state translates into difficulty in discharging statutory obligations to ministries, departments, agencies and other subverted organizations, especially the decentralized governance structures.⁶⁹

1.9.3.3 Social Consequences of Secession

Titanji (2009) alleges that secession could result in the dislocation of social fibre. This stems from the fact that members of the seceded group belong to varied social groups like churches

⁶⁷ Radan, P. (2012), op. cit. p. 18.

⁶⁸ Miller, David (1998), op. cit.

⁶⁹ Buchanan, Allen E. (1991), op. cit.

and other benevolent groups, hence, resigning from such associations abruptly may often create disruptions in operations. Marriages involving seceded people could be on rocks if a partner failed to compromise. Also, family unions have been damaged in places like Sudan where the South seceded.⁷⁰

1.9.3.4 Discussing the Gap in the Literature

The strategies adopted by secessionist movements in various countries (such as Cameroon, Iraq, Quebec, Spain and Sudan) in the form of referendums, violence, strikes and demonstrations, although similar, have generated a series of varied reactions and responses from both the host countries and their central government. Take Quebec for instance, their independence referendum in 1995 resulted in a no vote, whereas, in 2011 the same independence referendum held in Sudan resulted in South Sudan's secession from its host country.⁷¹ Because of such variances, a set of strategies used by secessionist movements cannot be identified as successful or unsuccessful. There exist no clear cut strategies that can be identified to assure secession if used. Although some of these strategies have proven fruitful and beneficial to the realization of the goals and aims of these secessionist movements, others have been futile and yielded no results or progress in terms of success.⁷²

The focus of this paper will be on some secessionist movements around the world, and how their strategies used have affected their prospects of success or failure with the main focus being Cameroon. Since World War II, there have been some successful secessions: Bangladesh

⁷⁰ Titanji, Ernest Duga (2009), op. cit.

⁷¹ Stein, Chloe. (2016), *Successful Secessionist Movements and the Uncertainty of Post-Secession Quality Life*, pp.8.

⁷² Ibid, pp.9.

in 1971, Eritrea in 1993, Timor-Leste in 2002 and Sudan in 2011. All four of these secessions were as a result of the use of violent strategies. It is important to note that, no peaceful secessionist movement has been successful since World War II.⁷³ While not the focus of this study it will be interesting to study why this is.

Though extensive scholarly work has been done on the topic of secession, very little literature on secession focuses on how the strategies adopted by secessionist movements may have both positive and negative ramifications on the secessionist efforts. A few scholarly writings on South Sudan, Bangladesh and Eritrea discuss the reasons behind the formation of the secessionist movements, the actors involved, the strategies used and whether or not they were successful.

This study intends therefore, to fill this gap in the literature, and address how the strategies used by secessionist movements may affect their chances of success or failure and if at all these strategies have an implication on how successful the movement will be or not. The study looks at some secessionist movements around the world and the strategies used by these movements. It then narrows down to the strategies adapted by the secessionist movement in Cameroon and seeks to determine their rate of success or failure based on the response of the Cameroonian central government and other state and non-state actors in the world. This allows for a chance to see if there are certain strategies that if employed will guarantee a successful secession in spite of the various types of governments around the globe.

⁷³ Ibid, pp. 9.

1.10 Sources of Data

This research used primary and secondary data. The primary data consists of interviews of some citizens of Cameroon (both Anglophone and Francophone) resident in Ghana and Cameroon who are employees of Non-Governmental Organisations, students and graduates of tertiary institutions. The secondary data comprised of books, journal articles, documentaries and Internet resources.

1.11 Research Methodology

1.11.1 Research Design

This research was conducted using the qualitative approach with the aim of exploring and understanding the underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations for secessionist movement intentions in Cameroon as these may differ depending on the actors involved. The qualitative approach permits a researcher to gain a holistic and in-depth understanding of events in order to explain complex cultural and social issues. The approach emanates from the constructivist paradigm. The expectation is that researchers will resist the enticement of imposing their personal views on the meaning of the social phenomena. The purpose of this approach is to observe the respondent's view of their reality. This approach poses a challenge of producing a methodology which is not formulated by the researcher but rather by the interviewee.⁷⁴

Taking cognizance of the fact that the required information to meet the objective of the study can be met by interacting with Cameroonian nationals residing in Cameroon and Ghana, the study employed the qualitative research approach to strategize the direction of the study. This involved

⁷⁴ Silverman, D. (2013), *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook*. London: Sage.

meeting potential respondents in person to solicit information based on the research questions.

It is a deductive research as it seeks to determine if there are certain established strategies that increase the prospects of success in the quest for secession. This approach is based on the premise of a pre-existing theory and then builds the research approach to analyze it. Studies that evaluate whether perceived ideas really suit the projected outcome as compared with other empirical studies are best suited for this approach.⁷⁵

1.11.2 Sampling Size, Population and Methodology

The purposive sampling technique was used to select knowledgeable people to express their views on the dictate of the research question. Purposive sampling (also known as selective, subjective or judgement sampling) is a sampling technique in which the researcher relies on his or her own judgment when choosing members of a population to participate in a study. The researcher used this technique in order to acquire information from a targeted sample in an attempt to obtain a fair representation of Cameroonians resident in Ghana and Cameroon. A sample size of thirty respondents from the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Centre, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA), University of Ghana, Cameroonian Association in Ghana and Cameroon were used.

1.11.3 Data Collection

In order to collect useful data relevant to achieving the research objectives of this research, in-depth interviews were undertaken with the help of a semi-structured interview guide. The use of

⁷⁵ Wiles, R. Crow G. & Pain, H. (2011), Innovation in Qualitative Research Methods: A Narrative Review. *Qualitative Research*, 11(5), pp.592.

the interview guide enabled the interviewer to highly engage the respondents in fruitful discussions. For respondents who wanted to respond to the questions in a written format, it allowed them the opportunity to employ their leisure time to write up their responses to the numerous questions emanating from the research question. The semi-structured interview guide also served as a form of control to keep participants within the limits of the subject being discussed. The researcher used this in order to access the emic viewpoint of interviewees by collecting detailed information so as to comprehend peoples' perspectives on the subject matter. Again, this was very valuable to analyse the reliability and validity of the primary and secondary data collected.

1.11.4 Data Analysis

The thematic analytical tool was employed in the collection of data due to its flexibility and simplicity. Thematic analysis is a systematic approach to the analysis of qualitative data that involves recognizing patterns or themes of cultural meaning; classifying and coding data, usually textual, according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking theoretical constructs, commonalties, overarching patterns, relationships, or explanatory principles (Lapadat 2010). This tool is important because it permitted the researcher to identify the specific patterns found in the birth of secessionist movements in Cameroon, their strategies, actors and the prospects of success.

1.11.5 Ethical Considerations

The researcher assured interviewees of their anonymity and the fact that the study is not for any political purposes but purely an academic exercise necessary to help shore up existing literature

in academia. Under no conditions were any potential respondents pressured or placed under duress to answer any questions. These ethics were used to guarantee that all interviewees participated willingly and they were made aware of the research procedures including any probable risk. To ensure and protect the confidentiality of the respondents, most of whom did not want to be cited, the researcher did not take any personal details of these respondents except what was required for the analysis of the findings.

1.12 Arrangement of Chapters

The study is structured into four chapters, and has been arranged as follows:

Chapter One comprises the introduction by highlighting the background information, problem statement, research questions, study objectives, hypothesis, scope and rationale of the study, theoretical framework, literature review, sources of data, research methodology, and the arrangement of chapters.

Chapter Two presents an overview of some secessionist movements around the world and discusses the causes, dynamics and consequences of these secessionist movements as well as the present status of the states.

Chapter Three assesses the reasons behind the formation of secessionist movements in Cameroon, their actors, strategies and prospects of success or failure.

Chapter Four discusses the research findings, states the conclusions and suggests recommendations for the study.

Endnotes

CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF SOME SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN THE WORLD

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the sources of some secessionist movements around the world based on scholarly publications. This chapter includes an analysis of the Bangladesh Secession of Pakistan, the Eritrean Secession of Ethiopia, the Iraqi-Kurdistan Secession and the South Sudan Secession of Sudan. It also seeks to understand the reasons behind their quest to secede, the dynamics and consequences of these quests as well as the present status of these countries.

2.1 The Bangladesh Secession of Pakistan

On the dusk of March 25 1971, four American built M-47 tanks accompanied by a squad of West Pakistani soldiers raided two dormitories (Iqbal Hall for the Muslims and Jagannath Hall for the Hindus) in the University of Dhaka, East Pakistan and, without notice, began shelling both dormitories. The shelling lasted for 5 minutes after which they broke into the dormitories shooting randomly, whilst ordering students to exit the buildings with their hands above their heads. Students outside were lined against the walls and shot. In all, a total number of 109 students were killed. This tragedy marked the beginning of the civil war that led to the destruction of Pakistan.⁷⁶

Before this, in 1970, long standing ethnic, economic and political differences existed between the

⁷⁶ Vogler, Roger (2010), "The Birth of Bangladesh: Nefarious Plots and Cold War Sideshows, *Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies* Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 24-25.

two Pakistan wings. Irrespective of these differences, East and West Pakistan remained united on the account of religion, - Islam-, up until certain factors led the Easterners to make increasingly open demands for secession on the streets of Dhaka.⁷⁷

2.1.1 Reasons for the Want to Secede

In spite of the fact that East Pakistan was the most populous province in Pakistan, they were politically discriminated against. East Pakistan held less political power as compared to West Pakistan where the government headquarters was situated. Also, the representation of ethnic groups in central government was not equal; as the East Pakistanis were considered not good enough to hold high governmental posts and thus, these posts were allocated to elite West Pakistanis or emigrants from India who took on Pakistani citizenship.⁷⁸ This discrimination escalated during the reign of military General Ayub Khan from 1958 to 1969 when he banned all political parties in East Pakistan from participating in the 1962 elections because of the mass support that these parties had in East Pakistan which was the most populous province in all of Pakistan.⁷⁹

East Pakistan's discontent towards the West Pakistani Government intensified when security procedures, which were to be adopted to defend the East during the Pakistan India war in 1965 were neglected. This eventually led to a rebellion by the people of East Pakistan. Later in the year 1970, a dominant political party in East Pakistan won the election and its leader Sheikh

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 25.

⁷⁸ 1971 Liberation War, Birth of Bangladesh and Comparison with Present Day Pakistan, European Foundation for South Asian Studies, pp. 3-5.

⁷⁹ Ghulam, Mustafa & Adil, Nawaz (2014), The Separation of East Pakistan: Socio-Economic Factors, *Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp. 47.

Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League overtly demanded for more economic and political powers. This struggle for more power is what eventually culminated into the war of independence.⁸⁰

The despair of East Pakistan was not solely attributable to the political hegemony of West Pakistan but also because of the serious economic exploitations, which the region faced. West Pakistan having control over four provinces: Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh, and the North-West Frontier used up more resources as compared to East Pakistan which was the fifth province. According to Rahman, in the year 1948 up until 1960, East Pakistan accounted for 70% of Pakistan's exports, yet it gained merely 25% of imported money, with no adequate developmental investments made into the region. Gross neglect of the region was also evident in the distribution of other resources.⁸¹

Rahman further notes that, in 1948, West Pakistan had 9 fabric mills whereas the East had 11, conversely, by 1971, the number of fabric mills in the West had grown to 150 whereas the number in the East grew merely to 26. Correspondingly, over the period, an estimation of about 2.6 billion dollars' worth of resources were shifted from the East to the West.⁸²

According to Mustafa and Adil, there was also the issue of language. In 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan and the first Governor General declared Urdu as the official language for Pakistan. This triggered an outrage by the people of East Pakistan leading

⁸⁰ 1971 Liberation War, Birth of Bangladesh and Comparison ... op. cit

⁸¹ Rahman, Alburuj Razzaq (1971), Bangladesh Liberation War, pp. 1-3.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 1-3.

to the formation of the Bengali Language Movement. They challenged the declaration because Urdu was a language of the elite and only 7% of the Pakistani population spoke it, where as 56% of Pakistanis spoke Bengali. Consequently, a fierce protest was held on February 21 1952 which led to the killing of seven students. The day has hence been commemorated and observed each year to mark the relevance of the Bengali language and is now recognized by the UN as the International Mother Language Day.⁸³

In 1970, East Pakistan was hit by a devastating typhoon known as the Bhola Cyclone. According to Vogler, about 500,000 people were killed and many more were made homeless. This disaster was shocking and it created a profound despair among the East Pakistani people. The provision of relief needed to lessen the extreme miserable conditions of the Easterners were delayed by the government in West Pakistan. Stunned by the government actions, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a political firebrand in his student days, after returning from the devastating area, addressed an assembly of more than two hundred journalists in Dhaka on 26th November, claiming that 25% of the survivors died because of delays in provision of relief. He further accused the government of “deliberate cold-blooded murder.”⁸⁴

2.1.2 Dynamics of the Quest for Independence from Pakistan

On June 19 1968, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman along with 34 Bengali civil and military officers were arrested by Ayub Khan’s government and charged with conspiracy against Pakistan (Anon. 2017). This case was popularly referred to as the Agartala conspiracy case as the government accused Sheikh and his colleagues of conspiring with India against the Pakistan government in a town named Agartala. The people of East-Pakistan were nonetheless

⁸³ 1971 Liberation War, Birth of Bangladesh and Comparison ... op. cit., p. 6

⁸⁴ Vogler, Roger (2010), op. cit., pp. 25-26.

convinced that this accusation made by the government was in itself a plot against Sheikh Mujib and East-Pakistan. Hence, they started a movement and demanded for the release of Sheikh Mujib. The movement's rebellion became fiercer when a prison guard killed one of the accused, Sergeant Zahurul Haq in his cell. In the face of a mass movement, General Khan had no other option but to withdraw the Agartala plot and release the accused persons on February 22 1969.⁸⁵

Subsequently in 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, won the national elections by a landslide victory and demanded for the autonomy of East Pakistan. The party became the majority in the national assembly as it won a total of 160 seats and, therefore, had the right to form a government but, the Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party of West Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to let the Sheikh (an Easterner) become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Sheikh in his demand for the transfer of power to the newly elects, gave a speech on March 7 1971, urging citizens to turn their homes into a fort of fight. Thereafter, on March 25 at nightfall, the West Pakistani army viciously attacked the Bengali opposition and residence halls of Dhaka University. The following day, March 26, West Pakistani forces arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; after he had signed an official declaration for the independence of Bangladesh that same day. Despite the fact that West Pakistani forces were targeting politicians, activists and rebels who were demanding for the independence of East Pakistan, the West Pakistani military did not spare the lives of the civilians; leading to the massacre of 30,000 people in a week. Many Easterners fled the city in search for shelter. The

⁸⁵ 1971 Liberation War, Birth of Bangladesh and Comparison...op. cit.

government further deported all foreign journalist and shut down all radio stations to prevent any form of communication and avoid attention from the international world.⁸⁶

Following the massacre on March 25 1971, the Bengalis started fighting against West Pakistan military forces. The Bengali freedom fighters, formed a novice army force called Mukti Bahini (The force of Independence). Their head was General Muhammad Osmani and they were trained in guerrilla warfare. They divided East Pakistan into 11 subdivisions for the conduction of their operations. In the interim, some East Pakistani political leaders formed a Provisional Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and they elected Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as President; although he was still imprisoned in West Pakistan. Those who did not join in the fight – mostly women and children – took refuge in India and subsequently on the December 3 1971, West Pakistan launched attacks on Indian Territory. This resulted in India assuming an active role in the fight against West Pakistan.⁸⁷

With India's support the West-Pakistani military was defeated. Also, USA and China's failure to provide support for West Pakistan in the form of military aids contributed to West Pakistan's defeat. West Pakistani military camps were raided leading to the loss of control over territories that they had afore captured. On December 16 1971, an "Instrument of Surrender" was signed by the defeated West Pakistani General Niazi and by the Indian commander General Aurora at 16:31 Indian Standard Time. After a bloodbath that lasted 9 months, Bangladesh was finally an independent state. Accordingly, 16th December is now recognized as Victory Day in Bangladesh and 26th March as Independence Day. With sovereignty, Bangladesh is making

⁸⁶ Rahman, Alburuj Razzaq (1971), op. cit. . 1-3.

⁸⁷1971 Liberation War, Birth of Bangladesh and Comparison ... op. cit., pp. 10-11.

headway in all aspects of the country's affairs.⁸⁸

2.1.3 Consequences of the Quest to Secede from Pakistan

The Bangladesh's war of independence caused extensive material damage, disorganisation and a change in both country's economy. When the war ended, their economy was left crumbling; fortunes had been swept away and much of the capital stock was destroyed or in disrepair. The most visible form of damage was to transport facilities and this posed a serious impediment to their economic recovery as it hindered the smooth flow of goods and services.⁸⁹

2.1.4 Present Status of Bangladesh and Pakistan

Bangladesh has done well for itself in terms of social, political and economic development after its liberation from Pakistan. Although the democracy in Bangladesh needs enhancement, the country is determined to hold onto its democratic and secular path and to improve on the quality of its democracy. In this light, a constitution was formulated to illuminate the ideals of secularism and religion-based politics was banned in the ruling affairs of Bangladesh. In reality however, the rule of law does not operate to the desired extent. A major problem with the principles of legitimacy in Bangladesh is the lack of a totally independent judiciary. Despite the fact that the higher courts exercise independence, the lower courts are controlled by the Ministry of Justice.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Rahman, Alburuj Razzaq (1971), op. cit., pp. 1-3.

⁸⁹ Choudhry, Saud & Basher, Syed (2002), "The Enduring Significance of Bangladesh's War of Independence: An Analysis of Economic Costs and Consequences," *The Journal of Developing Areas*, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 44.

⁹⁰ (1971 Liberation War, Birth of Bangladesh and Comparison ... op. cit., pp. 14-30.

Furthermore, Bangladesh has put in place competent strategies intended towards the achievement of state security and the resistance of political instabilities. Also, the state has attained noteworthy improvements in terms of social development, despite the immense number of socio-economic and political obstacles it has been faced with since independence. Likewise, in terms of women empowerment and access to education, which are vital to a healthy social development, the country has made remarkable advancements.⁹¹ Moreover, Bangladesh has attained a very resilient economy. It has managed to maintain a consistent economic growth even in the face of internal challenges and external pressure from international strain factors. Certainly, Bangladesh has been remarkably better off after its liberation from Pakistan, and although developmental challenges still exist, with independence and sovereignty, Bangladesh has the power to solve its problems without the interference or domination of a superior political authority.⁹²

On the other hand, growth in Pakistan continues to accelerate although its macroeconomic imbalances are widening. The country's GDP growth has increased by 0.8% over the previous year. Human development indicators position Pakistan as one of the lowest performers in the Southern Asian Region, especially in education. The Net Enrolment Rates in education have been growing in Pakistan but still lags behind compared to other Southern Asian countries. Infant and under five mortality rates represent a similar story. Pakistan is noted to have one of the lowest female labour force participation rates in the region. Gender inequalities persist in health, education and all economic sectors. Nutrition also remains a major cross-cutting challenge, as 44% of children under age five are stunted.⁹³

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 14 – 30.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 14-30.

⁹³ The World Bank in Pakistan, (2018),

Although, in Pakistan a majority of the citizens are Muslims, the country still embraces a cast system in certain areas such as Punjab. Although the general rule in Islam proclaims all Muslims are equal human beings. Pakistan's cast system is based on the professions of their forefathers. In the Punjab region, cast titles such as Jatt, Butt and Mochi are assimilated, where they each refer to a particular profession of the forefathers.⁹⁴

Pakistan began its journey as a sovereign and independent state in 1947, whereas Bangladesh started its journey almost 24 years down the line, yet the latter has succeeded in outperforming the former. Nonetheless, regional cooperation is essential for achieving peace and stability in these countries. It is therefore crucial for Southern Asian countries, including Bangladesh and Pakistan, to improve and strengthen their bond with their neighbours.⁹⁵

2.2 Eritrean Secession from Ethiopia

On May 24 1993, Eritrea became independent and attained statehood by seceding from Ethiopia. This characterized an unusual development in post-colonial Africa as Eritrea was the first territorial unit within an existing state to successfully secede and become a state on its own. Eritrea is located along the west coast of the Red Sea, north of the Horn of Africa. The territory was named in 1890 by the Italians as "Erythraeum Mare" literally meaning "Red Sea". The

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview#1>

⁹⁴ 1971 Liberation War, Birth of Bangladesh and Comparison ... op. cit., pp. 26.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 30.

territory was ruled by the Italians from January 1 1890 until 1941,⁹⁶ when the Italians were defeated by the British in the Second World War. Britain's control of the territory lasted until 1952. During the period of British rule, the UN General Assembly set up a Commission in an effort to decide on the fate of Eritrea at the end of the British rule.⁹⁷ Thus, on September 11 1952, a ratification of the Eritrean constitution by the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie led to the establishment of the Ethio- Eritrean Federation.⁹⁸

2.2.1 Reasons for the Want to Secede

During the initial half of the federal period 1952-1955, Emperor Haile Selassie, in blatant disregard for Article 85 and 90 of the Eritrean Constitution, declared the federal Ethiopian court as the final court of appeal for the territory on September 30 1952. Even worse, freedom of press was abolished and all Pro-Eritrean newspaper publishers were shut down. To further aggravate the situation the Ethiopian government restricted mobility by enacting a law which required all Eritrean men in the urban areas to carry identity cards at all times.⁹⁹

The violation of Eritrea's autonomy became more flagrant after 1955, when intimidation, coercion and military might came into play. Outspoken members of the Eritrean Assembly were threatened or arrested on the charge of violation of federal (Ethiopian) laws. Newspaper editors

⁹⁶ Troco, Albano Agostinho (2014), *Determinants of Successful Secessions in Post-colonial Africa: Analysing the Cases of Eritrea and South Sudan*, College of Humanities, School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, pp. 24-25.

⁹⁷ Tedla, Weldeghiorghis Michael (2014), *The Eritrean Liberation Front: Social and Political Factors Shaping Its Emergence, Development and Demise, 1960-1981*, pp.19-21.

⁹⁸ Troco, Albano Agostinho (2014), *Determinants of Successful Secessions in Post-colonial Africa: Analysing the Cases of Eritrea and South Sudan*, College of Humanities, School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, pp. 26.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

were imprisoned without cause and in July 1955, Tedla Beiru, the highest executive authority in the Eritrean government resigned due to excessive meddling and pressure from the emperor's official representative in Eritrea. A year after, in 1956, the Ethiopian ruling class' language, Amharic was declared the official language of Eritrea thereby displacing Tigre and Tigrinya. The Eritrean flag was discarded and a bill was passed for the adoption of the Ethiopian flag by the region in December 1958. In 1959, votes were cast by the Eritrean Assembly to replace Eritrean laws with the Ethiopian penal code and in May 1960, the name of the Eritrean Assembly was changed from Eritrean government to Eritrean administration.¹⁰⁰

In addition, Eritrea's economy was weakened by the Ethiopian imperial regime, forcing the region to be dependent on Ethiopian production. Ethiopian officials went further ahead to discourage foreign investment and commercial engagements in Eritrea. Thus, the industries in Eritrea were forced to either shut down or relocate their businesses to Ethiopia.¹⁰¹ Formal protests or disapproval of Addis Ababa's violations of Eritrea's federal autonomy were violently suppressed. For instance, in 1960 the demand for the restoration of the flag, seal and arms of Eritrea by a group of students led to their imprisonment.¹⁰²

Finally, on November 14 1962, "with a sizeable number of Ethiopian armies surrounding the Eritrean administration building where the Assembly convened", Eritrean representatives abrogated Eritrea's federal autonomous status turning the territory into Ethiopia's fourteenth

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 27-28.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁰² Ibid.

province.¹⁰³

2.2.2 Dynamics of the Quest for Secession from Ethiopia

In the case of Eritrea, the increasing Ethiopian violation of the region's autonomy generated grievances and discontent that heightened the Eritrean resistance. Being frustrated with the system, several organized Eritrean opposition to Ethiopian domination began in earnest in the late 1950s. The Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) were the three leading movements responsible for carrying out the resistance.¹⁰⁴

2.2.2.1 The Eritrean Liberation Movement

Due to difficulties in organizing inside Eritrea, the task of establishing a movement to promote the Eritrean cause fell on the diaspora. The Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) was established on November 2 1958 as an organized underground resistance movement in the Eritrean political arena by Moslem Eritrean refugees in Sudan who sought to mobilize support inside Eritrea and abroad against the increasing erosion of the Eritrean federation.¹⁰⁵

From its inception, the ELM pursued the reunion of the Moslem-Christian divide that dominated Eritrean politics by stressing on a common Eritrean identity and a secular ideology. The ELM successfully recruited many members who spread rapidly throughout the towns and cities of Eritrea as the ELM's mobilization appealed to Eritreans of different ages, faiths and

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Tedla, Weldeghiorghis Michael (2014), op. cit., p. 33.

economic classes. Their initial line of action was to defend Eritrea's autonomy against Ethiopian encroachment¹⁰⁶, but the movement later began to advocate for Eritrea's liberation in the form of coup d'états. Thus, in September 1960, the ELM leadership embarked on a strategy of infiltration into governmental structures which would result in the overthrow of the Eritrean administration by coup d'état. However, this strategy was not supported by exiled veteran politicians who deemed the movement as a radical, communist-inspired organization.¹⁰⁷

Subsequently, in July 1960, the exiled Eritrean politicians in Cairo under the leadership of Idris Mohammed Adam founded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF considered the ELM as a potential rival and began to work against its progress. The formation of the ELF led to the demise of the ELM as the movement had to fight a two-front war against Ethiopian security forces and a new antagonistic front, ELF. In the 1960s, several ELM cadres abandoned the movement and joined the ELF, and in 1970 the movement was disbanded.¹⁰⁸

2.2.2.2 Eritrean Liberation Front

Founded in 1960 by exiled Eritrean politicians in Cairo, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was more radical and militant than the ELM. The ELF propagated armed resistance as the only alternative against Ethiopian domination. The movement started the Eritrean armed struggle in September 1961, with a guerrilla force made up of the infamous Hamid Idris Awate's companions and Eritrean veterans who had deserted the Sudanese army and the Eritrean police

¹⁰⁶ Mussie, T. G. (2011), *Eritrea*. California: Greenwood Publishing Group, pp. 63.

¹⁰⁷ Iyob, Ruth (1995), *The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 1941-1993*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-12.

¹⁰⁸ Mussie, T. G. (2011), , op. cit., p. 4

force.¹⁰⁹

In the early 1960s, the ELF leadership declared the ELF as a Moslem organization and Eritrea as an integral part of the Arab world. This strategy gained the ELF both material and ideological support from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, the Sudan and the Arab world in general. The movement at the time, had no clear ideological line, thus, advocating for a combination of Islamic fundamentalism and fervent Marxism.¹¹⁰

The ELF, from its inception in the 1960s, has faced institutional and organizational problems in its leadership apparatus and organizational structures. The ELF leadership started by replicating the organizational structure of the movement on the Algerian National Front of Liberation (AFLN). This tactic led to the division of Eritrea into four key geographical zones, each with its own military and political structures. The zonal divisions reflected the ELF's politics of exclusion and support along ethnic and religious affiliation. In addition, a new body was formed known as the Revolutionary Command, which was tasked with centralizing administrative and military control over the regions. A liaison with the Supreme Council (SC) -the exiled leadership in Cairo- was established in Sudan. The internal flow of the territorial system soon became evident as the decentralization of the zones, the lack of links between them, and the absence of a permanent central leadership in Eritrea turned the regions into independent fiefdoms, encouraging factionalism and the persistence of the corrosive Christian-Muslim schism.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Tedla, Weldeghiorghis Michael (2014), op. cit., pp. 34-36.

¹¹⁰ Negash, Tekeste (1997), *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet.

¹¹¹ Troco, Albano Agostinho (2014), *Determinants of Successful Secessions in Post-colonial Africa: Analysing the Cases of Eritrea and South Sudan*, College of Humanities, School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, pp. 29-30.

In 1968 a reform movement arose within the ELF ranks, abolishing the zones along with the Revolutionary Command in Sudan, and substituting them with an elected body based inside Eritrea, known as General Command (GC). Problems arose when the General Secretariat (GS), was made to replace the exiled Cairo-based SC. The GC refused to acknowledge the GS thus, initiating a repressive campaign of terror and violence against the reformists. In 1970, the power struggle between the new leadership and the reformists led to the emergence of three breakaway groups: The People's Liberation Front (PLF), the Eritrean Liberation Front – People's Liberation Front (ELF-PLF), and the ELF-Ubel. The ELF, however, continued to be torn apart by the centrifugal forces of ideology, ethnicity, religion and sectarianism, whilst waging war against emerging nationalist groups.¹¹²

2.2.2.3 Eritrean People's Liberation Front

In September 1973, a Moslem contingent under the leadership of Ramadan Mohammed Nur and a Christian group led by Isayas Aferworq, merged and formed the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF emerged as a breakaway group from the ELF. After seven years of factional inter-Eritrean conflict, cooperation and uneasy coexistence, the EPLF managed to push the ELF out of Eritrean territory into Sudan, thus inaugurating EPLF supremacy in the Eritrean military arena in the early 1980s. The group led the armed struggle that led to Eritrea's independence in 1993.¹¹³

From the outset, the EPLF objective was to attain national liberation through protracted war. The movement emphasized on secular nationalism around a single Eritrean identity, thus renouncing the ELF's ethno-religious divide. Furthermore, the EPLF highlighted Eritrea's

¹¹² Ibid, pp. 29-30.

¹¹³ Mussie, T. G. (2011), op. cit., p. 4

African identity in clear opposition to the ELF Pan-Islamic and Pan-Arab aspirations. Despite this, the group managed to attract support from Libya, Iraq and Syria. Soon after being established, the EPLF encountered a major internal crisis springing from ideological differences amongst its members. First, a group called Menkaae demanded radical reforms in the structures of the movement accusing its leaders of being petit bourgeois nationalists and calling for the creation of a proletarian party. The leaders and most of their supporters (who refused to recant on their views) were immediately executed.¹¹⁴

In terms of ideology, the EPLF started out with a “strong socialist and nationalist image”. During its first congress in January 1977, the EPLF’s agenda envisioned an “independent Eritrean state where the economy would be largely state-owned and centrally planned”. Tigre and Tigrinya were adopted as the official languages of the movement and secular education was promoted. The EPLF started out by attracting a large number of recruits, especially among the urban, intellectual and Christian youth and two years after, its foundation it had approximately 10 thousand fighters in the field. Mussie (2011) observes that the EPLF encouraged women to join the organization and by 1991 women constituted one-third of the EPLF army. The EPLF proved to be an effective military force attacking the Ethiopian army throughout Eritrea.¹¹⁵

2.2.2.4 The Eritrean Secessionist Struggle

A series of events during the federation years led a number of Eritreans to pursue independence through the use of arms. Hamid Idris Awate launched the Eritrean armed struggle on September 1 1961 after attacking an isolated Ethiopian garrison in the western part of the country. After

¹¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 4.

¹¹⁵ Troco, Albano Agostinho (2014), *op. cit.* , pp. 1-69.

Awate's attack, the ELM, the ELF, and the EPLF continued the armed struggle over Eritrea's independence. The Eritrean armed struggle progressed from sporadic ambushes and hit and-run guerrilla operations to large-scale conventional military confrontations between the Eritrean liberation movements and the Ethiopian army.¹¹⁶

During the first decade of the conflict, the ELF resorted to rurally based guerrilla tactics due to its strategic disadvantages in open confrontations with the Ethiopian security forces. The group's attacks focused on police stations to capture Ethiopian military hardware, the assassination of individuals considered as opponents of the revolutionary cause and acts of sabotage against vital infrastructures such as oil storage tanks, roads, railways, and Ethiopian Airlines' planes. During this period, material aid for the Eritrean insurgents came from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and Libya. The Ethiopian authorities attempted to counter the ELF by exploiting regional and religious rivalries between the populace (divide and rule policy) and attacking the ELF zones (military policy). The government of Haile Selassie depended significantly upon the United States and Israel for material military support.¹¹⁷

The second decade of the Eritrean conflict started with strong Ethiopian military and diplomatic viciousness against the Eritrean secessionists. This was precipitated by the ambush and killing of a high-ranking Ethiopian military commander. In late 1970, a state of emergence was declared in Eritrea followed by an attack against the ELF-held areas including a bombing

¹¹⁶ Thomas, Charles (2012), *The Road to Afabet: The EPLF, Protracted Warfare, and the Liberation of Eritrea* in Brazilian Army Command (eds), *Acta of the XXXVII International Congress of Military History, Decolonization, Colonial, and Independence Wars from the 18th Century to the Present*. Rio de Janeiro: ECEME Press, pp. 1-15.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-15.

campaign by the Ethiopian Air Force and the implementation of forced resettlement schemes to cut off popular support to the guerrillas.¹¹⁸

Furthermore, the emperor proceeded to fight the Eritreans in the diplomatic arena preventing them from getting further military aid from Sudan, China and South Yemen. This viciousness had the immediate effect of not only reducing Eritrean guerrilla operations but also alienating the rural populace causing resurgence in membership for the liberation movements.

The period between 1970 and 1974 saw the fragmentation of the ELM and the beginning of the civil war fought between the ELF and the recently formed EPLF. The war ended in 1974 after the Dergue; the military junta that overthrew Selassie's imperial regime. This made it an imperative for the two liberation movements to mount a united front against the new regime in Addis Ababa. In 1976, Eritrean forces launched massive attacks against the Dergue's troops amassing victory after victory in the military arena and liberating most of Eritrea's towns. By early 1978, the ELF and the EPLF controlled the whole of Eritrea.¹¹⁹

After the 1978 Ethiopian offensive, the Eritrean armed struggle reached a strategic stalemate, which lasted until 1984. This period saw the beginning of a new round of armed confrontations in the Eritrean civil war ending with the defeat of the ELF and ushering in EPLF hegemony. The EPLF continued to gain support from the Eritrean masses and managed to mobilize the Eritreans against the Dergue.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Troco, Albano Agostinho (2014), *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

¹²⁰ Mussie, T. G. (2011), *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Furthermore, a weakened and demoralized Ethiopian army launched several failed attacks against the EPLF, which resulted in the build-up of the Eritreans' military arsenal as they captured large amounts of arms and ammunitions from successive abortive campaigns.¹²¹

The military stalemate was broken in 1984 with the EPLF moving into the offensive. In March 1988, the balance of power shifted in favour of the Eritreans after their decisive victory at the battle of Afabet. In this regard, Mussie (2011) comments that “the defeat of the Ethiopian army at the battle of Afabet was an immeasurable military loss for Ethiopia, but it remarkably boosted the fighting morale of the liberation army”. Fierce battles continued with the EPLF collaborating with the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Afar Liberation front. In 1990, the EPLF captured the port city of Massawa, followed by the liberation of all major towns of Eritrea.¹²²

On May 24, 1991 the EPLF liberated Asmara, whilst the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took over Addis Ababa four days later. These events lead to a regime change in Ethiopia and a de-facto independence to Eritrea.¹²³ Two years later, an internationally monitored referendum was conducted to determine the future status of the territory resulting in an overwhelming 99.8% of Eritreans voting for independence and on May 24 1993, Eritrea was officially admitted into the community of states.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Thomas, Charles (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹²² Mussie, T. G. (2011), *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹²³ Thomas, Charles (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹²⁴ Hussein, M. Adam (1994), *Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea* Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 21, No. 59, pp. 35.

2.2.3 Consequences of Eritrea's Secession from Ethiopia

Ethiopia allowed the secession of Eritrea without any form of negotiations regarding issues of currency, border demarcation and modalities of economic cooperation resulting in varying consequences on both regions in terms of division of assets or liabilities.¹²⁵ The war had devastating results on both countries in terms of economic and human costs. The war led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of peoples from both sides and millions of dollars which was expended to procure sophisticated weapons. Though the protracted and bloody fight between the two countries ended with the signing of the 'Algiers Agreement', normalization or harmonization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations remain unfulfilled and the feeling of hostility and suspicion is very potent.¹²⁶

Additionally, border issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain stalled as a result of the uncompromising stance of both countries. The willingness of the conflicting parties to reopen negotiations on the enactment of the decisions of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) with no precondition or how the actual border demarcation could take place is still unforeseen. The two sides seem to be unwilling to change their positions so as to end the border deadlocks. Hence, the unsolved border issues are at the heart of the existing stalemate.¹²⁷

The post-war stalemate provided the Eritrean leaders with the needed justification to suspend

¹²⁵ Atinafu, Kidanu & Bayeh, Endalcachew (2015), The Ethio-Eritrean Post-War Stalemate: An Assessment on the Causes and Prospects. Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 97, <https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/the-ethioeritrean-postwar-stalemate-an-assessment-on-the-causes-andprospects-2332-0761-1000146.php?cv=1&session-id=a80366932a69d3ae4307e3f631297712&aid=48783>

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 97.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

the implementation of the 1997 draft constitution. Preoccupied with threats coming from senior liberation war veterans and intellectuals, the regime suspended democracy and election in Eritrea resulting in the consolidation of the President's power through intimidation or arresting of opposition groups. Thus, political pluralism and open public debates rarely flourished in Eritrea. According to Ogbazghi (2011), the current political space of Eritrea best portrayed some form of "Personal Rule". The relationship between the civil society and state was characterized by a sort of personal tyranny. The government was too sceptical about the presence of privately owned media. Hence, only the government owned media operates in the country with the government intervening at any time to discourage the dissemination of "unnecessary material" to the public.¹²⁸

2.2.4 Present Status of Eritrea and Ethiopia

After attaining independence from neighbouring Ethiopia in 1991, the armies of the EPLF established the People's Front for Democracy and Justice Government. They banned the formation of opposition movements and made the country a one-party state, leading to a dictatorship rule led by Isaias Afewerki, who has maintained complete power since. The country has no independent judiciary, no autonomous civil society organizations or media outlets, and no legislature. Religious freedoms have been restricted by the government and all but four religious' groups (the Sunni Islam, Eritrean Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Evangelical (Lutheran) churches) have been banned.¹²⁹ The only newspaper in the country is state run and freedom of speech is non-existent. Journalist have been imprisoned and all other

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ World Report 2018, Eritrea Events of 2017 <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/eritrea>

newspapers banned in Eritrea. The national service period is unspecified and every Eritrean must serve after turning 18. Whilst some are assigned to civil service positions, others are placed in military units, where they work as forced labourers on both private and public work projects. This has resulted in the flight of 12 percent of the Eritrean population to other countries.¹³⁰

The only university in the country has been shut down. There is also a widespread rape and abduction of young women by powerful men and senior military figures. Eritreans in the diaspora are obliged to contribute 2% of their wages to support the regime irrespective of their political views. Eritrea has become a threat to its neighbouring countries and a powerfully destabilising force in the region. Within the past twenty years, the country has been at war with its neighbours: not just Ethiopia, but Djibouti, Yemen and Sudan. An estimated seventy to one hundred thousand people have been displaced or killed in these absolutely needless conflicts. Moreover, the regime offers support to the Al-Shabaab Islamic militants in Somalia, prolonging the misery of that country and further endangering the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa.¹³¹

In comparison to its Eritrean counterpart, the Ethiopian regime is not openly dictatorial. As most scholars have asserted, the commitment to establishing a mature democracy is still not observed and an established institutional political structure, which will survive the current regime is not yet in place and although the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government has conducted various rounds of elections, the legitimacy of the election

¹³⁰ Deres, Tzegai Yohannes (2012), *The Road to Democracy in Eritrea*, Eritrean National Council for Democratic Change, pp. 1-3.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, pp. 1-3.

processes remains highly contested. This is mainly due to lack of neutrality and credibility in providing a level playing field for all the stakeholders.¹³²

The prevailing Ethio-Eritrean disparity seems to continue as the denunciation and distrust by both governments remains. Accusations against each other in terms of providing support to insurgents to destabilize the other are also some of the common occurrences witnessed today. As the saying goes 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend', thus, both countries continue to undermine each other's stability by waging proxy wars in neighbouring countries and aligning with the various dissident groups. The likelihood of normalization of the bilateral relations would be a mirage with the occurrence of such wicked conduct.¹³³

2.3 The Kurdistan Secession of Iraq

From an indigenous community in the Mesopotamian plains, to a nation consisting of approximately 25-35 million people, the Kurds are historically the largest ethnic group in the world deprived of a representative sovereign state. The Kurdish people have fought for autonomy for centuries. The Kurds occupy areas around the Zagros Mountains, named Kurdistan. Their population is mostly spread across four states - namely Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, with Armenia and Georgia also having a smaller share of Kurds. This splitting of the Kurdish population stems from the outcome of the First World War, when in April of 1920, the allies at the Conference of San Remo redrew the territorial boundaries of the Middle East,

¹³² Atinafu, Kidanu & Bayeh, Endalcachew (2015), The Ethio-Eritrean Post-War Stalemate: An Assessment on the Causes and Prospects. Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 99, <https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/the-ethioeritrean-postwar-stalemate-an-assessment-on-the-causes-andprospects-2332-0761-1000146.php?cv=1&session-id=a80366932a69d3ae4307e3f631297712&aid=48783>

¹³³ Ibid., p. 100.

effectively splitting the Kurdish population amongst four separate nations. This has resulted in the Kurds being a minority in the states they find themselves in, thus fueling a quest for independence.¹³⁴

2.3.1 Reasons for the Want to Secede

In 1974, the Saddam Hussein regime promised Kurds greater rights and autonomy but instead of fulfilling the agreement, his regime began to systematically discriminate against and oppress the Kurds. To further aggravate the situation, a systematic cleansing of Iraqi Kurds, the “Al-Anfal (The Spoils)” was organized in 1988 by the Iraqi authoritarian regime. The “Anfal Campaign,” was a retaliation by Saddam’s government, to the numerous Kurds who had sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988. It was a meticulously planned genocide executed by Ali-Hassan Al-Majid (also known as “Chemical Ali”) resulting in the death of approximately 182,000 Kurds in Northern Iraq (O’Leary 2002). It was an aggressive operation of “underdevelopment, political and cultural repression, destruction, ethnic cleansing and genocide” against Iraqi Kurds. Consequently, this operation by the Iraqi government led to the destruction of some 1,200 villages.¹³⁵ Under Saddam Hussein’s supervision, the Anfal operation involved the use of chemical weapons against Iraqi-Kurdish towns and villages. A chemical attack in Halabja killed 5000 Kurdish civilians in one day.¹³⁶ Mass executions primarily of Kurdish boys

¹³⁴ Packard, Matthew (2013) *Earning Independence in Iraqi Kurdistan* pp. 180-181

¹³⁵ O’Leary, Carole A. (2002). *The Kurds of Iraq: recent history, future prospects*. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 6(4), <http://kurdultur.blogspot.com/2011/10/kurds-of-iraq-recent-history-future.html>

¹³⁶ Aziz, Mahir (2011). *The Kurds of Iraq: ethnonationalism and national identity in Iraqi Kurdistan*(Vol. 100): IB Tauris.

and men weakened organized resistance against the Iraqi regime. Shortly after the Anfal Campaign in 1991, the Kurds launched a failed revolt against Saddam.¹³⁷

2.3.2 Dynamics of the Quest for Independence

The Kurdish bid for autonomy dates back to May, 1919 in the 20th century. After the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Iraqi Kurds were burdened by British colonial rule. The British appointed Shaykh Mahmoud of the Barzinji tribe, governor of the Suleimaniya region of Northern Iraq. Mahmoud drove out the British force and declared independence. He was routed by a British division a few months later and fled to Iran. Being a recalcitrant nationalist, Shaykh Mahmoud repeated his actions numerous times in the next 25 years, always seizing a town, declaring independence from Iraq and being exiled or driven to Iran.¹³⁸

The first Kurdish-Iraqi war erupted in 1961. Kurdish rebels were fighting for an independent Kurdish region in Northern Iraq. At the time, 80% of the Iraqi ground forces were involved in the conflict and there was an approximately 105,000 casualties, which resulted in the conflict ending in a stalemate in 1970. After the end of the first Kurdish-Iraqi war, the two opposing sides reached a peacekeeping agreement in 1970. This agreement was one of the first and most important attempts to resolve the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict promising Kurds some form of autonomous results. It promised the formation of three Kurdish governorates along with other measures such as a place in local government bodies and institutions which would be effective four years after the signing of the agreement. However, due to the ratification of a plan of

¹³⁷ Packard, Matthew (2013), op. cit. p. 182.

¹³⁸ Paraschi, Dafni (2016) The Question of the Kurdish Separatist Movement Costeas-Geitonas School Model United Nations pp. 1-10

Arabization Iraq engaged in, the peace agreement failed and this led to more conflict resulting in a second Kurdish-Iraqi war between 1974 and 1975.¹³⁹

The international community's support for Kurdish secessionist movement got rid of Saddam's regime control in Northern Iraq and stopped the extermination of Kurds ensuring the beginning of the democratization of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Kurdish "safe haven" enabled the KRG to create self-governing institutions and liaise with international organizations including the UN to rebuild the economy, society, infrastructure and the oil industry. In April 1991, the revolt of Shia in Iraq and Kurds against the central government resulted in the division of Iraq into two parts by a UN resolution 688.¹⁴⁰

The newly created conditions established the Kurdistan National Assembly, "designed to protect the Kurdistan Region from the violence of Iraq's former Ba'ath regime". In 1992, the KRG achieved self-governing autonomy due to the international intervention against the Iraqi authoritarian regime. This led to the first free and democratic elections in 1992. The KRG enforced its administrative autonomous rights and improved upon the region's standard of living through creating qualitative services for citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan in collaboration with international institutions and the management important oil resources. Both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) were handed the governing power in Iraqi-Kurdistan. In 2005, the Federal Government of Iraq enacted a constitution recognizing a decentralized federal system and regional autonomy.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹Ibid., pp. 1-10

¹⁴⁰ O'Leary, Carole A. (2002)op. cit.

¹⁴¹Agushi, Tefik (2016) The Great Powers' Recognition: Crucial for Kosovo and Iraqi Kurdistan

2.3.3 Consequences of the Kurdistan Quest to Secede from Iraq

The worst of all conflicts occurred during the regime of Saddam Hussein specifically in 1983, during the Iran-Iraq war. The Kurdish soldiers in Northern Iraq rebelled against Saddam Hussein in a pursuit of autonomy. As a response to their rebellion, Saddam Hussein launched a massive attack in Kurdish inhabited regions through the use of armed forces and several chemical weapons. Generally speaking, the conflict was on going up until the ratification of the international anti-Saddam alliance at the end of the First Gulf War in 1991, which put into effect a semi no-fly zone in regions where conflict was most prominent, namely Northern Iraq. This left room for Kurdish forces to establish their power in Northern Iraq and initiate reconstruction of the region. Infrastructures were reconstructed and a Kurdish administration was formed which both helped in the recovery of the Kurdish displaced community. The reconstruction lasted up until the moment when a parliamentary democracy was put into place in 2003 and the economy started growing. Lastly, in 2005, the Iraqi constitution acknowledged an independent Kurdish region in Northern Iraq.

Today, the region is run by the local Kurdish government and is the only existing fully autonomous Kurdish region.¹⁴²

2.3.4 Present Status of Kurdistan

In July 2014, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani announced that his government was planning to hold a referendum to determine their state. This announcement triggered an alarm

Secession pp. 8-9

¹⁴²Paraschi, Dafni (2016), op. cit., pp. 1-10

among the Iraqis and their neighbours who feared a ripple effect. However, the referendum did not occur that year due to a change of government which improved the relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi government. The two sides came together to defeat the Islamic State resulting in the plans of an independence referendum by the Kurds being put on hold up until 2017. The referendum took place in September 2017 and an overwhelming number of Kurds voted for independence. The Baghdad government responded angrily to this act by the Kurds and recaptured territory held by the Kurds outside the Kurdistan region, took control of oilfields and imposed a six-month air blockade.¹⁴³

Nonetheless, major problems still remain. The landlocked Kurdistan Region is bordered by states that are unsympathetic to its Kurdish aspirations –Iran, Syria and Turkey. The region is also in dispute with the Iraqi government over some territories, specifically the historic city of Kirkuk. The main authority figure in the region has been Nechirvan Barzani, an executive of the Kurdish autonomous region since the parting of President Masoud Barzani in November 2017. Mr Masoud Barzani stepped down after holding an independence referendum that failed as it rather provoked an aggressive backlash from the central Iraqi government.¹⁴⁴

2.4 The South Sudan Secession of Sudan

Following Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1993, South Sudan is the second case of successful secession in postcolonial Africa after a long and violent struggle. South Sudan gained its independence with the consent of its former motherland, Sudan.¹⁴⁵ Until recently, Sudan was

¹⁴³ Iraqi Kurdistan Profile (2018) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28147263>

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Atinafu, Kidanu (2014),, op. cit., 315.

considered the largest state in both the African and Arab world. Sudan has experienced rampant division along ethnic lines since its independence in 1956. This polarization intensified in the last two decades when the ruling party affiliated itself with radical Islamist ideologues and politicized the Islamic identity¹⁴⁶ leading to both national and international wars and conflicts against Sudan.

Internally, the country had been wrecked by two civil wars. The first being the North South civil war, also deemed the longest civil war in Africa, and the second being the conflict in Darfur. For more than four decades, the country's government remained in a non-stop conflict with its Southern region. The rebellion of the South began prior to independence when the region refused to be governed by the Arab elite stationed in Khartoum. The reason being that the South and North had nothing in common except for memories of slavery.¹⁴⁷ Sudan was one of the first few states to experience secession by a referendum and in January 2010, South Sudan exercised its right to self-determination and by June 2011, declared itself as Africa's youngest nation.¹⁴⁸

2.4.1 Reasons for the Want to Secede

One of the significant factors that contributed to the formation of secessionist movement in South Sudan was Britain's disregard for the policy of separate administration and development for Northern and Southern Sudan at the Juba Conference in 1947, and its intent to negotiate Sudan's independence with only Northern 'Arab' national movements. Shortly before independence, the British handed over all of their powers, both political and economic, to the

¹⁴⁶ (2010,) A World of Information: Sudan, UN Data,

¹⁴⁷ Daoud, Dalal Mohamed (2012), Factors of Secession: The Case of South Sudan, pp. 23-25.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

Northern Arabs. The Southerners and other Eastern and Western Sudanese were excluded from this process due to their lack of political organizations. The South blatantly rejected unity with Khartoum but found itself in a union as the British had already decided on the matter. Consequently, the Southerners held another conference in 1954 in Juba to state their conditions with regards to their relations with Khartoum. Their leaders decided that the South should either be given autonomy under a federal system, or they should be given the right to exercise self-determination and be independent of the North. The Southerners were assured that their demands would be addressed. However, they grew wary of the failed promises concerning their autonomy when the Northerners started to infiltrate the South and replace British officials as teachers, administrators, senior officers in the police force and the army. Thus, to the Southerners, the Arabs were another group of colonizers.¹⁴⁹

Another significant factor was the Northern Arabs' national policies that were classified under regional discrimination and Arabization and implemented by the Northerners who had exclusive control of the government after independence.¹⁵⁰ Also, the pursuance of an aggressive policy of Islamization and Arabization in the South by the military government of General Abboud is seen as a factor for the formation of secessionist movements in Sudan. At the time, the political elite in the North held the view that the South was culturally void and should be filled with Arab-Islamic culture. In line with this view, the government focused mainly on education. Johnson (2004) observed that: mission schools were placed under government control; Arabic became the official medium of instruction; conversions to Islam was encouraged; and the activities of

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Nyaba, Peter Adwok (2010), "SPLM-NCP Asymmetrical Power Relations Jeopardize the Implementation of the CPA and the Future of the Sudan," *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*, pp. 138-147.

missionaries were intensely restricted until they were finally expelled in 1964.¹⁵¹

2.4.2 Dynamics of the Quest for Secession from Sudan

In August 1955, Southern soldiers under Arab officers mutinied out of fear that they would be disarmed and moved to the North. These soldiers who fled to the bushes and to neighbouring Uganda formed the core of the Anyanya movement; the first Southern guerrilla movement which later evolved into the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A). The Anyanya movement was named after a type of Southern poison and at the time of its formation, the British were anxious to withdraw and therefore refused to send troops to help control the mutiny. Shortly after, on 1 January 1956, Sudan attained independence and the British left the control of the mutiny and issues of constitutional matters solely to Khartoum.¹⁵²

The Anyanya movement had the support of the Israeli and Ugandan governments. The Ugandan government provided room for operation and training was provided whereas military training, equipment and other forms of assistance were provided by the Israeli government. The movement gained popular support, increased its followers and began to burn villages, arrest and torture Northern administrators in the South, as a sign of increased opposition to the government. The Northerners retaliated with repressive action which further fuelled the conflict. Later in November 1958, political leaders of the North decided to hand over authority to a military junta led by General Ibrahim Abboud after a bloodless army coup d'état. On his assumption of power, General Abboud ruled through a thirteen-member army junta and suspended democracy in Sudan. It was hoped that military brutality would silence the South but instead, it hardened their

¹⁵¹ Daoud, Dalal Mohamed (2012), *op. cit.*, 25-26.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

resolve to fight for self-determination. Subsequently in the 1960s, a movement; the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) was established by students and political leaders who had joined the rebels in Uganda, with Anyanya as its militant division. SANU's fundamental purpose was to attain autonomy for the South.¹⁵³

However, this goal was revised when a civilian government took over and introduced a new set of political policies which the Southerners responded positively to. The new government permitted a political opening making it possible for Southerners to be a part of Sudan's political process. The Southern Front was then formed in Khartoum as the Southerners' political party under the leadership of Clement Mboro, the Minister of Interior in the democratic government. An invitation to participate in round table discussions as a means of finding solutions to the South Sudan's problems was given to all exiled Southerners. Regrettably, the Southerners were divided into two camps, SANU inside (those in Sudan) and SANU outside (those out of Sudan) leading to the fragmentation of Anyanya. Those belonging to SANU inside opted for a federal solution and abandoned the idea of self-determination whereas those involved with SANU outside insisted on secession. Attempts were made to reconcile both parties when in 1965, a conference was held and both sides decided to let the people of the South decide through a referendum. The Northern representatives however rejected any proposition for self-determination of the South since elections were close. This rejection enraged the Southerners leading to the recommencement of the war. The war then intensified and internationalized with

¹⁵³ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

the support given by Israel, Ethiopia and Uganda to Anyanya whereas the Arab countries supported Khartoum.¹⁵⁴

The war ended when Muhammad Gaafar al-Numeri came into power in 1969 through a bloodless military coup d'état. He granted the South a degree of local autonomy and in February 1972, an Addis Ababa Agreement was signed between the North and the South after Numeri had declared openly that, the South was indeed different from the North historically, geographically, socio culturally and economically. The Addis Ababa Agreement represented a series of compromises aimed at appeasing SSLM/A leaders as the first civil war proved costly to the Government of Sudan. The SSLM/A wanted a full federal structure; however, after long lasting negotiations, the South were pleased that the government granted them autonomy for their Southern region.¹⁵⁵

After a decade of relative peace, the agreement was cut-off by President Gaafar Numeri in 1983. The South's economic significance to the North was the main reason for the infringement of the Addis Ababa agreement by Numeri. The infringement resulted in a much larger civil war in 1983 mainly led by the SPLM/A. Numeri decreed the country to be an Islamic country ruled by the Islamic Sharia Law. He then divided the Southern provinces into separate regions, suspended the Southern Executive Council, transferred the Southern military command to the North without prior consultation with the Southern Sudanese Government and the senior officers and tampered with the political boundaries to annex the oil rich Bentiu in the Southern region. The Sudan

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Martin Riegl, Bohumil Doboš (2014), *Secession in Post-Modern World: Cases of South Sudan and Somaliland Acta Geographica Universitatis Comenianae*, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 173-192.

People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) adopted a revolutionary discourse, declaring its primary goal to be the building of a new united Sudan, which would ensure justice and equality for all regions and citizens.¹⁵⁶

The movement had good reasons for its revolutionary actions and pushed its military operations into the Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains. After the overthrow of Numeiri in 1985, instability in the North increased. His rule was followed by a period of civilian rule and another coup d'état in 1993 which brought to power an alliance of military leaders and Islamist extremists under the presidency of Omar al-Bashir.¹⁵⁷ The second civil war which began in 1983 thus ended in 2005 with the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).¹⁵⁸

2.4.3 Consequences of the Secession of Southern Sudan on the Region

On 15 January 2011, an overwhelming majority of 98% of Southern Sudanese voted in favour of secession from the United Sudan. The referendum on self-determination was a condition in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was signed between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) at Naivasha, Kenya, in January 2005. The CPA proposed some major changes like democratization of government, de-centralization of decision-making, wealth-sharing between different regions and the recognition of Sudan's socio-cultural diversity.¹⁵⁹ The agreement gave the two warring

¹⁵⁶ Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, (2006), Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation, www.berghof-peacesupport.org site, pp. 17-22.

¹⁵⁷ Martin Riegl, Bohumil Doboš (2014), op. cit.

¹⁵⁸ Atinafu, Kidanu (2014), op. cit. pp. 315.

¹⁵⁹ Copnall, J. (2014), *A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan's Bitter and*

parties absolute dominion over the country. The SPLM/A in the South and NCP in the North were in a position to determine the future of the Sudan after a six-year interim period without a popular mandate. The promise to make unity attractive as stipulated in the CPA became unattainable as it was impossible to provide political solutions for the problems of the country hence the referendum on self-determination.¹⁶⁰ The fact that an overwhelming majority of southerners opted for independence in January 2011 was a testament both to the festering wounds caused by the decades of violence and injustice that had preceded the peace agreement and to the failure of the CPA in fundamentally changing the nature of the Sudanese state. Subsequently, South Sudan was declared a sovereign state and internationally recognized on 9 July 2011.¹⁶¹

As a result of separation, hundreds of thousands of Southerners living in the North and thousands of Northerners residing in the south faced certain challenges as they had no right to choose the citizenship of the state in which they had settled in with their families for many years. About half of these people were born on the ‘wrong side’ of the border; they grew up and married in these parts never perceiving that they would one day be foreigners in their chosen homes.¹⁶² The government of South Sudan advocated for the institution of dual citizenship in that, Southerners residing in the North and Northerners residing in the South should possess citizenship to both countries. In view of that, the 2011 Nationality Act of South Sudan permits South Sudanese to have dual nationality irrespective of where they live. Contrary to the demands made by Southern Sudanese, the government of Sudan amended the old nationality law a month later and

Incomplete Divorce. London: Hurst & CO, Ltd.

¹⁶⁰ Hawi, Omer Hamed (2014), *Consequences of the Secession of Southern Sudan on the Region, Post-Referendum Sudan: National and Regional Questions*, pp. 39.

¹⁶¹ Daoud, Dalal Mohamed (2012), *op. cit.*, pp. 28-49.

¹⁶² Hawi, Omer Hamed (2014), *op. cit.*, p. 42.

automatically revoked the nationality of South Sudanese living in Sudan. This Sudanese government's position was foreseen during the interim period; in that the government made it clear that citizenship will not be granted to South Sudanese living in Sudan once the South secedes. Hence, since November 2010, over 350,000 South Sudanese have been deported from Sudan while more than half million still remain in the country.¹⁶³

Also, the secession of Southern Sudan represented a challenge for the oil industry as the oil reserves lay mainly in the South, whereas all the infrastructure and services needed for its extraction lay in the North (pipeline, refineries, chemical treatment, storage and the sea port).¹⁶⁴ Sudan demanded a passage fee of 26 Sudanese dollars per barrel, while South Sudan maintained a proposal of 70 cents per barrel. Thus, on 10 April 2012, South Sudan fully suspended its oil production and shut down the Heglig oilfield following disputes over transit fees for the passage of oil through Sudan to the Port of Sudan, a vital route for export of oil from both countries.¹⁶⁵ Sudan's neighbours were also directly or indirectly affected by the secession. Most of them who were in favour of an independent Southern Sudan saw an economic opportunity in the oil wealth of the new state that they can utilise for their benefit.¹⁶⁶

Since Southern Sudan's secession in July 2011, peace has evaded both countries of the old Sudan. This is because neither Southern Sudan nor Northern Sudan is a homogeneous society; both are multi diversified in terms of ethnicity, culture and religion, therefore, secession could

¹⁶³ Atinafu, Kidanu (2014), op. cit.

¹⁶⁴ Hawi, Omer Hamed (2014), op. cit., 41.

¹⁶⁵ Yousif, Abeer & Dr, Rothbart, Daniel (2012), Sudan and South Sudan: Post-Separation Challenges, School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR), George Mason University,

¹⁶⁶ Hawi, Omer Hamed (2014), op. cit., 45.

not have been the answer to their diversity.¹⁶⁷

2.4.4 Present Status of South Sudan and North Sudan

Since gaining independence in 2011, South Sudan has had only three years of relative peace. In 2013, conflict broke out when President Salva Kiir ousted Riek Machar, his then vice president, citing his suspicion that Machar was plotting a coup. The Intergovernmental Authority Development (IGAD), a regional bloc comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda, stepped in to lead negotiations to resolve the conflict and in August 2015, Kiir and Machar signed the resulting Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). The agreement laid out a path to power-sharing. ARCSS held for only a year before fighting between Kiir and Machar's forces in the capital, Juba, reignited the civil war. Machar was ultimately forced to flee and is currently in South Africa, reportedly under house arrest. The opposition fractured in his absence, and the conflict is increasingly being fought along ethnic lines. In June 2017, IGAD attempted negotiating by announcing that it would facilitate the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) talks. From its inception, the HLRF has been politically delicate. Technically, its mandate is to strengthen the ARCSS process, because Kiir has made clear he will not renegotiate ARCSS. The situation on the ground has, however, changed dramatically since ARCSS was negotiated due to Machar's absence and the continued fracturing of opposition groups. The HLRF has attempted to bridge this gap by widening participation to eight armed groups, the government of South Sudan, and some civil society organizations. The HLRF has achieved mixed results so far. Following its first meeting in December 2017, the government of South Sudan and eight South Sudanese armed

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 41.

groups signed a cessation of hostilities agreement that entered into force on December 24. The agreement was criticized for its weak enforcement mechanisms, and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, the monitoring body tasked with assessing violations, accused both sides of breaking the agreement almost immediately after it was signed.¹⁶⁸

On February 2, 2018, the United States announced it was imposing an arm ban on Sudan that would prohibit American companies from exporting defence materials to the country. The U.S. and European actions will have limited impact without broader regional support given that the majority of small arms and light weapons in South Sudan were transferred from Kenya and Uganda, not as a result of direct sales from the West. On January 29, however, the head of the African Union (AU) Commission announced that the AU supported imposing sanctions on leaders who violate the ceasefire in South Sudan. AU pressure may signal increasing regional willingness to address ongoing violence.¹⁶⁹

The South Sudanese government continues to retain the upper hand militarily in its civil war, having pushed a key opposition group out of its headquarters in Equatoria in December. Currently, the government controls most urban areas while the opposition is fractured and reportedly struggling to procure weapons. The government has shored up its military victories by tightening control over civil society and the media.¹⁷⁰ The government continues to suppress critics, restrict the media and unlawfully detain people perceived as opposition. Media freedom

¹⁶⁸ Graveline, Sarah (2018), Expectations are Low for the Second Round of South Sudan Peace Talks, *IDA Africa Watch*, Vol. 18, pp. 4-5.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

is fragile. The presence of armed groups, political pressures and weak legal institutions undermine free reporting. Journalists risk getting arrested over reports that criticise the government and the ruling party.¹⁷¹

Since the conflict started, almost 2 million people have been internally displaced with another 2 million seeking refuge in neighbouring countries (World Report 2018). The UN has described South Sudan as one of the world's most unsafe places for aid workers—at least 83 of them have been killed since the conflict started in December 2013, with 16 in 2017 alone.¹⁷²

Today, Sudan is facing obstacles to development and progress. Al-Bashir's government is struggling to settle two major problems with Egypt: the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the ongoing Halayeb border dispute. Sudan and Egypt are in a dispute over the sovereignty of the Halayed Triangle and there is pressure from some quarters for Al-Bashir to “do more” than simply leaving memos at the UN opposing the Egyptian position. Where “more” within some ranks of the armed forces means the willingness to go to war. Although Sudan has lent its support to the Ethiopian Dam project, this has led to significant diplomatic rows over the effects the dam would have on the Egyptian water supply from the River Nile. Azhari also faced disagreements within his own party about the form of government. He desired a prime ministerial style whereas others wanted a presidential system. These differences led to the breakaway of some members of the Khatmiyah sect who were unhappy about the direction that he took. Currently, the prime ministerial issue has again taken centre stage. Under the National

¹⁷¹ South Sudan Country Profile <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082>

¹⁷² World Report 2018; South Sudan Events of 2017 <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/south-sudan>

Dialogue process, participants from opposition groups maintain that the country should return to a system of prime ministerial rule. However, in spite of the appointment of Hassan Bakri Saleh – a one-time friend and colleague of the president – to the new position created by the constitution, and despite giving up 30% of the cabinet and legislative assembly to the opposition, the President continues to hold the reins of power.¹⁷³

Finally, the Southerners, who voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession, did not vote against the Northerners but against the policies of the ruling elite which betrayed its national mission. It is not hopeless to think that sometime in the future the Sudanese people in the North and South may reconsider some form of unity or close relationship to bring them together. Both countries wanted peace, freedom, equality, stability and social welfare; if they did not achieve that by separation under their present semi-military governments, they may in the future turn towards a form of unity.¹⁷⁴

2.5 Conclusion

To conclude, it is quite clear from the assessment above that, the key champions of secession in these states were groups of people that felt marginalized or at a disadvantage and therefore became the main actors in the secessionist causes. Also, some countries like Eritrea and Sudan had more than one actor in their quest to secede. It is similarly worth noting that, despite the varying causes of the quest to secede in these states, one can identify a common denominator in the strategies used; violence, all these secessionist movements resorted to the use of violence as a

¹⁷³ Khalil Charles (2018), 2018 is the Year that could Make or Break Sudan, Middle East Monitor, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180101-2018-is-the-year-that-could-make-or-break-sudan/>

¹⁷⁴ Hawi, Omer Hamed (2014), op. cit., p. 49.

means to be heard. Lastly, it is quite clear that secession is not the ultimate solution to the issue of being marginalized, whilst some states like Eritrea ended up worse after seceding, others such as Bangladesh have gone a long way to make improvements. Thus, one can never predict what the end result of secession may be, all one can do is to speculate based on previous occurrences.

Endnotes

CHAPTER THREE

AN ASSESSMENT OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN CAMEROON

3.0 Introduction

This chapter begins with a brief history of Cameroon and goes on to further examine some secessionist movements in the country (Cameroon), bringing to light the reasons for their formation, their actors, strategies and prospects of success. The chapter reviews the activities of secessionist movements in Cameroon. The findings have been arranged to correspond with the research objectives presented in the introductory chapter.

3.1 Data Analysis

Basic descriptive statistical tools were employed to facilitate the analysis of information recorded electronically or written down during the interviews. The resulting responses in tables and graphs will be discussed in the chapter accordingly.

The sample size of 30 was obtained from members of the Cameroonian Association of Ghana (who are either graduate students in Ghana or working with international establishments in Ghana) and Cameroonian nationals living in Cameroon as reflected in table 3.1

Table 3.1: Distribution of Respondents

Area	Frequency	Sample Percentage %
Anonymous Cameroonian Nationals resident in Cameroon.	5	16.6
Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Centre	5	16.6
Graduate Students (University of Ghana and Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA))	7	23.3
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	3	10
Anonymous Cameroonian Nationals Resident Abroad	6	20
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)	3	10
Anonymous Cameroonian living in the diaspora	1	3.3
Total	30	100

Source: Lisa Kingsley-Arthur (2018)

The purposive sampling technique was used in selecting every fourth person from a member list of 98 persons in the Cameroonian Association of Ghana whereas random Cameroonians residents living in Cameroon were contacted via social media. A probe into the lives of the selected 30 indicated that they were graduates and professionals who were well vexed on the current happenings in Cameroon.

3.1.1 Administration of Research Tools

Owing to the qualitative nature of the study, the researcher personally interviewed each of the selected respondents using a semi-structured interview guide. This was facilitated by the availability of their telephone contacts and emails at the Association secretariat and on social

media. The face to face in-depth technique was really helpful in soliciting information to cover all research questions stated on the interview guide. The interview guide had five sections. Section ‘A’ collected data on the demographic features of respondents basically on their age range, highest academic achievement and number of years that they have been following the activities of the secessionist movements back at home (Cameroon). Section ‘B’ entailed questions, which were designed to meet the first research objective by probing interviewees on the reasons behind the formation of secessionist movements in Cameroon. Section ‘C’ collected data needed to address the second objective of examining the principal actors behind the secessionist movements in Cameroon. Issues concerning research objective three, which is how the secessionist movements in Cameroon have been attempting to achieve their objective occupied section ‘D’ whilst section ‘E’ evaluated the prospects of success of the secessionist agenda in Cameroon.

3.1.2 Analysis of Respondents Gender and Age

Table 3.2: Frequency Table Showing Age and Gender Distribution of Respondents

Age Range	Female		Male	
	Frequency	Percentage%	Frequency	Percentage%
Under 25 years	-	-	-	-
26 – 35 year	2	6.6	6	20
36 – 45 years	5	16.6	9	30
46 – 55 years	2	6.6	3	10
Above 55 years	1	3.3	2	6.6

Total	10	33.3	20	66.6
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Source: Lisa Kingsley-Arthur (2018)

From table 3.2, 33.3% of the total number of respondents were females with 6.6% ranging from ages 26 to 35 years and 46 to 55 years respectively. 16.6% of the female respondents were between ages 36 to 45 years with just one female respondent being above age 55 thus, representing 3.3% of the total number of respondents. On the other hand, the male respondents represent 66.6% of the total number of respondents with 20% being between ages 26 to 35, 30% between ages 36 and 45, 10% between ages 46 to 55 and finally 6.6% being above 55 years. Thus, 73.3% of the respondents are age 36 and above. This implies that the contributions made to the study were primarily from matured male and female Cameroonians. (Kingsley-Arthur 2018)

3.1.3 Distribution of Respondents Highest Academic Qualification

Table 3.3: Frequency Table Showing the Highest Academic Qualification of Respondent

Type of Qualification	Frequency	Percentage%
GCE 'A' and 'O' Levels	-	-
HND/Diploma	-	-
First Degree	4	13.3
Master's Degree	8	26.6
PHD	1	3.3

Professional Qualification with Degree	12	40
Professional Qualification only	5	16.6
Total	30	100

Source: Lisa Kingsley-Arthur (2018)

From table 3.3 above, 13.3% of the total respondents have attained their first degrees, another 26.6% of the respondents have attained their masters degrees, with only one respondent who holds a doctorate degree representing 3.3% of the total respondents. 40% of the respondents have professional qualifications with degrees and finally 16.6% have just the professional qualification. Thus, all respondents have relevant university degrees and higher professional qualifications which imply that they are capable of understanding and cooperating with the study. (Kingsley-Arthur 2018)

3.1.4 Distribution of `Respondent's Years of Experience with conflict in Cameroon

The study deemed it appropriate to examine how long the respondents have been studying the secessionist movements and the Anglophone crisis in their country. Findings have been shown in table 3.4

Table 3.4: Frequency Table Showing the Service Duration of Respondents

Service Duration	Frequency	Percentage%
1 – 3 years	1	3.3
4 – 6 years	3	10

7 – 10 years	11	36.6
11 – 15 years	8	26.6
16 – 20 years	5	16.6
Above 20 years	2	6.6
Total	30	100

Source: Lisa Kingsley-Arthur (2018)

Table 3.4 shows the number of years that the respondents have followed the happenings in Cameroon. 10% of the respondents fall between 4 to 6 years, 36.6% between 7 to 10 years, 26.6% between 11 to 15 years, 16.6% between 16 to 20 years, 6.6% above 20 years and finally one respondent between 1 to 3 years representing 3.3% of the total number of respondents. Thus, it can be inferred from table 3.4 that, respondents are fairly knowledgeable about the happening in Cameroon and can provide useful information for addressing the objectives of the study. (Kingsley-Arthur 2018)

3.2 Political History of Cameroon

Cameroon was founded by Fernando Po, a Portuguese navigator in 1472. Fernando named the place Rios dos Cameroes meaning the river of prawns.¹⁷⁵ Before the colonial era, the country was divided into chiefdoms and kingdoms based on many diverse indigenous languages. At the time, these indigenous languages were what the Christian missionaries used in the educational and religious domains.¹⁷⁶ Fast forward to 1884, the country became colonized by the Germans

¹⁷⁵ Ngoh, Victor Julius (1979), *The political Evolution of Cameroon – 1884 – 1961*, Portland State University, pp. 1.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

who named it Kamerun, however, Germany's defeat in World War One led to the territory being divided between Great Britain and France under the auspices of the League of Nations.¹⁷⁷ These territories eventually became UN Trust Territories under the British and French administrations and were popularly known as French Cameroon and English Cameroon.¹⁷⁸ Subsequently in 1960, French Cameroon gained independence from France whereas English Cameroon had to undertake a plebiscite to decide whether to join Nigeria or French Cameroon. Northern British Cameroon voted to join Nigeria and Southern British Cameroon voted to join French Cameroon to form a federal state. The reunification of the Southern British Cameroon and the French Cameroon territory is what gave rise to the Federal Republic of Cameroon in October 1961 with Ahmadou Ahidjo as President of the Republic.¹⁷⁹ However, this federal system was shaky due to an uneven allocation of power in the federal assembly and in government between the two federated states.¹⁸⁰

Since 1961, the political beliefs of President Ahidjo (1960-1982) and President Paul Biya's (1982- to date) regimes have been centralization and union.¹⁸¹ At reunification, Ahmadou Ahidjo became the Federal President and John Ngu Foncha was both Vice President of the country and Prime Minister of West Cameroon. This was in line with the constitutional provision according to which the vice president must be from West Cameroon if the federal president is from East

¹⁷⁷ Mukong, Togho Lumumba & Afanou, Kafui Sandra (2016), *Upheavals in Anglophone Cameroon; Background and Updates on the Situation as of 13.12.2016*, pp. 1.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.1.

¹⁷⁹ Tiewa Kathrin & Vubo, Emmanuel Yenshu (2015), *Celebrating Unity and Debating Unity in Cameroon's 2010 Independence Jubilees, the Cinquintenaire, Cahier D'Etudes Africaines*, pp. 333-334.

¹⁸⁰ Konings, Piet & Njannjoh B. Francis, (2003), *Negotiating an Anglophone Identity*, Vol. 1, pp. 4.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Cameroon, and vice versa.¹⁸² At the time of reunification, President Ahidjo already had a near political monopoly in East Cameroon whereas West Cameroon represented a serious obstacle to his hegemonic ambitions.¹⁸³

In 1961, he set about bringing West Cameroon under control through a mixture of repression and exploitation of the division among the Anglophones. On 20 October 1961, President Ahidjo signed a decree reorganising the federal territory into six administrative regions, including West Cameroon, and appointed a federal inspector for each region. The federal inspectors were to report directly to the federal president.¹⁸⁴ This action provoked the Anglophones as West Cameroon could not at the same time be a federated state according to the constitution, and an administrative region by decree. Also, the federal inspector had more power than the elected prime minister of West Cameroon.¹⁸⁵

Subsequently in 1962, President Ahidjo signed several orders such as press censorship which limited public freedoms in the country. Other measures, such as the introduction of driving on the right-hand side of the road, the imposition of the metric system and the introduction of the Central African Franc (CFA) as currency took place during the 1960s.¹⁸⁶ The change in currency entailed a reduction in the purchasing power of the Anglophone population by at least 10

¹⁸² *Ibi.*

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸⁴ Ngoh, Victor Julius (1979), *op. cit.*

¹⁸⁵ International Crisis Group, (2017), *Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads*, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-camerouns-anglophone-crisis-crossroads>

¹⁸⁶ Doh, Finalay Sama (2002). *Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa Case Study on Assessing the Progress Made by Cameroon*, pp. 4.

percent. President Ahidjo also demanded that West Cameroon cut all links with Great Britain.¹⁸⁷ Anglophone elites who understood where the real power was located, competed with each other for positions in the federal government and spent more time trying to please President Ahidjo than defending the Anglophone population.¹⁸⁸ President Ahidjo took advantage of the situation and manipulated the rivalries among the elites and the ethnic and cultural divisions between Grassfields in the North (which had cultural and linguistic links with the Bamilékés of the west Francophone region) and the Sawa in the South, who had cultural and linguistic links with the Francophone coast. This led to political chaos in West Cameroon, including a split between Foncha and Muna. The split was caused by Muna who accused Foncha of being the party's number one devil when Foncha endorsed Augustine Ngom Jua as Vice President of Cameroon. Muna left the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in 1965 to form the Cameroon United Congress (CUC).¹⁸⁹

In 1965, President Ahidjo tried to use his constitutional powers to appoint Muna as prime minister instead of Ngom Jua, Foncha's heir apparent in the KNDP (the majority party in the West Cameroon parliament). This was an attempt to further weaken Foncha whom President Ahidjo believed to be less accommodating on the Anglophone question, however, the President was unsuccessful in his attempt due to the strong oppositions from the federated parliament.¹⁹⁰ A year later, President Ahidjo took advantage of divisions among the Anglophones and called for the formation of a single party in all of Cameroon in the name of national unity. With the backing of some Anglophone leaders, such as Endeley and Muna, who saw an opportunity to

¹⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, (2017), op. cit.

¹⁸⁸ Konings, Piet & Njannjoh B. Francis, (2003), op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, pp. 23.

¹⁹⁰ International Crisis Group, (2017), op. cit.

dethrone Foncha, President Ahidjo succeeded in achieving his objective.¹⁹¹ The Cameroon National Union (CNU) was thus formed in 1966. That same year all other parties were dissolved. This resulted in the Anglophones losing all their institutional leverage which they had used to plead their cause. In 1968, President Ahidjo was able to appoint his new ally, Muna, as prime minister thus, replacing Jua the former prime minister.¹⁹²

With the establishment of the single party, President Ahidjo intensified his aim of centralisation by suppressing federalism on 20 May 1972, when a referendum which resulted in the birth of the United Republic of Cameroon was held. This change led to 20th May becoming Cameroon's main national day of celebration. The Anglophones however, continued to challenge the legality of this change on the grounds that, the 1961 constitution did not provide for any alteration with regards to the form the state should take, and it also stipulated that only parliament could amend the constitution.¹⁹³

It was also in 1972 that the Anglophones really began to challenge their marginalisation. At the CNU National Congress in 1972, Bernard Fonlon publicly criticised the creation of the unitary republic. Other prominent Anglophones, such as Albert Mukong and Gorji Dinka were also fierce opposers of a unitary state. Furthermore, Foncha and Jua wrote privately to the president and expressed their opposition of the unitary state in the official media.¹⁹⁴

Subsequently in November 1982, when President Paul Biya succeeded President Ahidjo, he further centralised power. On 22 August 1983, President Biya divided the Anglophone region

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

into two provinces: Northwest and Southwest. In 1984, he changed the country's official name to the Republic of Cameroon (the name of the former Francophone territory) and removed the second star from the flag, which represented the Anglophone part of the country.¹⁹⁵

The Anglophones responded by forming movements and associations to resist their assimilation. In 1994, they protested in vain when the government, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), announced the privatisation of the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). These protests were due to the fact that the CDC played a major economic and social role in the Anglophone part of the country (Cameroon Anglophone Crisis at Crossroads 2018).¹⁹⁶ In that same year, the government's move to standardise the Anglophone and Francophone educational systems provoked strong resistance from the teachers' unions and the parents of pupils. Thus, the government had to finally create an independent General Certificate of Education (GCE) Board by presidential decree (Cameroon Anglophone Crisis at Crossroads 2018).¹⁹⁷

With unification, the Anglophones were left with a sense of economic decline in their territory. To them centralisation signified the dismantling of West Cameroon's economic structures, such as the Cameroon Bank and the West Cameroon Marketing Board, as well as the desertion of several projects, including the port of Limbé, and airports at Bamenda and Tiko.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Moncrieff, Richard, (2017), Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis is Escalating. Here's How It Could Be Resolved, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/camerouns-anglophone-crisis-escalating-heres-how-it-could-be-resolved>

¹⁹⁶ International Crisis Group, (2017), op. cit.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

Also, unification left the impression of a democratic setback, cultural assimilation and a decline of the Anglophone political status. Many Anglophones are convinced that the Francophones have a strategy intended to marginalise Southern Cameroon and are still not sufficiently aware of the disastrous impact the economic crisis of the 1980s also had on several Francophone regions.¹⁹⁹

The Anglophones, therefore, seized an opportunity to make their complaints heard when the multiparty system was restored in the 1990s. On May 26 1990, a new pro-federalism party known as the Social Democratic Front (SDF) was formed in Bamenda and although the SDF had a national inclination, it also had a strong contingent of Anglophones. Thus, the party gained grounds in the Anglophone part of the country before extending its influence into Francophone provinces. It then partook in the October 1992 presidential elections and came close to winning it.²⁰⁰

In 1993, the Anglophones organised the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) and called for the return of federalism. This was due to the prospect of a constitutional review that would change the country's one-party system to a multiparty system. The Consultative Committee for the Review of the Constitution rejected this option of federalism and opted instead for decentralisation. Foncha and Muna, yesterday's rivals, resigned from the consultative committee and openly criticised the assimilation of Anglophones in 1994. In that same year, a second All

¹⁹⁹ Anye Fru Emmanuel, (2008), *Issues of Minority Rights in the Context of Political Liberalization: The Case of Anglophone Cameroon*, pp. 83-87.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 83-87.

Anglophone Conference (AAC2) was organised in Bamenda and some of the participants called for a two-state federal system or secession.²⁰¹

During this period, Muna and Foncha launched diplomatic offensives at the UN to demand independence for Southern Cameroon. The position of the Social Democratic Front, - which was the rejection of secession and the proposal of a four-state federal system in the context of the Francophone opposition to a two-state federal system, - was judged to be ambiguous by some Anglophone militants.²⁰² Thus, in 1995, these Anglophone militants formed movements that were calling for a two-state federalism or secession. These movements were the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), the Free West Cameroon Movement (FWM), the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCRM) and the Ambazonia Movement.²⁰³

In 1999, some secessionist militants replaced the name of Southern Cameroons with the Ambazonia Republic, a name derived from the Portuguese given name of the region's coast, Amba Bay. The most well-known movement was the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) with a youth wing known as Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL). The SCYL resorted to the use of low-intensity violence as one of their main strategies. The SCNC since 1966, has taken certain diplomatic initiatives at the UN, the African Court of Banjul, the Commonwealth and national embassies to make their voice heard.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Konings, Piet & Njannjoh B. Francis, (2003), op. cit., pp. 23-48.

²⁰² Ibid., p. 30.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 31.

Despite these initiatives and the rise of these Anglophone movements resulting in the Anglophones loss of more political strength at the national level, centralization continued in the Cameroonian state.²⁰⁵ After the golden age of the 1990s, the Anglophone opposition weakened and the focus switched to the Anglophone diaspora's advocacy in the international community and the creation of an Anglophone consciousness through the educational system, writings of Anglophone intellectuals, the churches, associations and the local media. Nonetheless, the SCNC militants continued to organise protests in the Anglophone regions (every 1 October) and spectacular actions such as the proclamation of independence by the Ambazonia Republic on radio Buea in 1999 and in 2009.²⁰⁶

Recently in 2017, there was only one Anglophone among 36 ministers with portfolio. The Anglophones also believe that they are under-represented in the government administration and the security forces, because the entry examinations for the major schools and the police force are weighted in favour of Francophones. For example, in 2016, only two Anglophones were among the 138 admitted to the National Youth and Sports Centre (Centre national de la jeunesse et des sports, Cenajes) in Bamenda, which is, however, located in the Anglophone region (Cameroon Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads 2018).²⁰⁷ Personal and ethnic ambitions and rivalries among the elites did not help matters. These elites have not always been able to present a common front to defend an increasingly heterogeneous Anglophone cause. Since the 2000s, the Anglophone question has deeply divided Cameroonian society. The current crisis represents a disturbing

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 33.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 33-34

²⁰⁷ International Crisis Group, (2017), op. cit.

resurgence of this old problem as the Anglophone question in the past never manifested itself with such intensity as it has presently.²⁰⁸

Furthermore, the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), an umbrella organization of Anglophone nationalist movement formed in 1993 has become more and more vocal. The government's reaction to the SCNC has been marked by intimidation, mass arrests, long detention and also gunning down of demonstrators (Pius 2008).²⁰⁹ Government troops sporadically fired on a peaceful march by Anglophones killing a handful. Thousands have been forced into exile where they have launched a diplomatic offensive to put the grievances of Southern Cameroon on the global agenda. The government's refusal to adhere to the SCNC's call for dialogue has pushed the group to espouse secession as a final solution.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ Ibid

²⁰⁹ Atangcho, Pius, (2008). Quest for Self-Determination through Secession in Cameroon, pp.1-11.

²¹⁰ Ibid., pp.1-11.

Fig 3.1 Map of Cameroon Showing the Anglophone Region



Source: <http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/the-self-declared-republic-of-ambazonia>

3.3 Reasons Behind the Formation of Secessionist Movements in Cameroon

3.3.1 Reasons Behind the Formation of Secessionist Movements from 1961 to 2016

The unification of two regions with totally different colonial background did not prove to be an easy task. Cameroon since its inception in 1961 has faced a series of secessionist struggles mainly from the English region. Anglophone Cameroonians have for a long time felt marginalized and therefore resorted to the formation of secessionist movements in an attempt to

be heard and have their grievances addressed.²¹¹ Below are some of the reasons why secessionist movements were formed in Cameroon.

According to Lohkoko, Cameroon has experienced a series of constitutional changes since its reunification in 1961. The Anglophone Cameroonians regard these constitutional changes as an attempt by the Francophones to extinguish the Anglophone identity and annex their territory. Lohkoko further notes that the Anglophones' complaints include, the exemption of Anglophones from certain public offices (such as the Armed Forces, territorial administration, finances, industrial development, education and foreign affairs).²¹² Pius further notes that the Anglophones complain about the side-lining of the English language in official business and the lack of investment in the Anglophone region where the standard of living has allegedly dropped. Despite the glaring fact that about 80% of the country's GNP, chiefly from petroleum products, is derived from the Anglophone region.²¹³

According to Pius, another reason for the call for secession was due to the existence of fundamental differences and conflicting views between the Francophone region, which had a colonial background of assimilation, civil law and a unitary system, and the Anglophone region which had a Westminster-style parliament and a common law system.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Mukong, Togho Lumumba & Afanou, Kafui Sandra (2016), *Upheavals in Anglophone Cameroon; Background and Updates on the Situation as of 13.12.2016*, pp. 1.

²¹² Lohkoko, Awoh Emmanuel, (2013) *Cameroon. A Conflict Profile*, Conflict Studies Quarterly Issue 2, pp. 10.

²¹³ Atangcho, Pius, (2008). *Quest for Self-Determination through Secession in Cameroon*, pp.1-11.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

The Anglophones were also embittered about the imposition of a one-party rule system in 1966 and the suspension of the federal constitution which followed in 1972 by former President Ahmadou Ahidjo. Also, in 1984, the introduction of a unitary constitution through a referendum and the readopting of the name “La Republique du Cameroun” (the Republic of Cameroon) which was the name of the French-speaking Cameroon before unification did not do much to alleviate the grievances of the Anglophones.²¹⁵

Again Pius (2008) notes the complaints made by the Anglophones who alleged that, French Cameroonians were establishing a form of colonial rule in the English regions, complete with structures, and administrative, military and police personnel. Furthermore, the Anglophones accused the Francophones of applying a system and operating in a language alien to the English Cameroonians. Contrarily, the French Cameroonians claim that the English region is part of its former territory and hence it was duly transferred back to it by the UN and the British Government.²¹⁶

3.3.2 Reasons for the Revival of Secessionist Movements in Cameroon from 2016 to date

Pera (2018) asserts that Anglophone Cameroonians have disagreed with what they deemed as increasingly centralized rule under the Francophone majority in Cameroon since 1961.²¹⁷ The plight of these Anglophone Cameroonians began after World War One, when German Kamerun was divided into two main territories under British and French administrations. Kam Kah (2012)

²¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

²¹⁷ Pera, J. Richard, (2018) Cameroon Anglophone Crisis Worsens and Widens, IDA Africa Watch, Vol. 18, <https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/AfricaWatch/Africawatch-February-8-2018-vol18.pdf>

points out that the rise of complaints amongst the Anglophones began on the eve of independence, when the two territories were to be reunified.²¹⁸ These complaints were on the down low up until recently when certain occurrences have given rise to the revival of secessionist movements in Cameroon.

According to Searcey (2018), the Anglophone secessionist movement was principally run by activists abroad, who fled from Cameroon during protests years ago. However, the movement remained dormant until its reignition in late 2016 when a group of teachers and lawyers protested the appointment of Francophone teachers and judges to Anglophone schools and courts. The protests emanated from the fact that these appointed Francophone teachers and judges lacked adequate English skills and an in-depth understanding of the British-System. Thus, the movement began in the form of a protest by these lawyers and teachers who were demonstrating against the increase use of French in their schools and courts.²¹⁹

Caxton also alleges that a statement made by Laurent Easo, the Minister of Justice on 22 November 2016 proves that the government has acknowledged the problems of Anglophone lawyers and responded by stating that lawyers everywhere in the country (Cameroon) faced similar problems. Caxton further notes that the lawyers claimed that they were shocked by the gradual phasing out of common law principles in Cameroon's legislation, especially due to the recent harmonisation of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Inter-African Conference on Insurance

²¹⁸ Echitch, Size Raymond Gael, (2014), *The Discursive Formation of Nationalism: A Study of the Anglophone Secessionist Movements in Cameroon*, pp. 17.

²¹⁹ Caxton, Ateki Seta (2017), *The Anglophone Dilemma in Cameroon The Need for Comprehensive Dialogue and Reform* <http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/anglophone-dilemma-cameroon/>

Markets (CIMA) Code and the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) Uniform Acts.²²⁰ The Anglophone lawyers also raised issues of representation and the recruitment of legal personnel. In his statement, Esso mentioned that there were 1 542 active magistrates, including 91 in service at the Ministry of Justice, 1 412 in service in the courts and 39 on secondment. This group included 1 265 French-speaking magistrates and 227 English-speaking magistrates. In the case of judicial officers, there were 514 in total – 499 Francophones and 15 Anglophones. Out of the 128 magistrates practicing in the North West region, 67 (52.3%) are French speaking with a civil law background, similarly out of the 97 magistrates in the legal services, 64 (65.9%) are Francophones and finally out of the 27 magistrates in the legal services in Bamenda, there are 21 Francophones (77.8%). A similar trend is observed in the South West region.²²¹ According to all 30 (100%) interviewees, the Cameroonian government's impositions of French teachers and judges into English schools and courts in 2016 was the immediate trigger for the revival of secessionist movements in the country as the Anglophones felt that their systems were being slowly overtaken by Francophones who were not well vexed in the British schooling system and barely understood the intricacies of the common law system.

The issue of budgetary allocations also played an important role in the revival of secessionist movements in Cameroon. Over the years there have been some appreciable level of discrimination against the two southern English-speaking regions. In the 2017 national budget for instance president Biya's home region also in the south with population of 760,000 (which is only 50% of the population in Anglophone Northwest (1.4 million) and Anglophone south west

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

(1.7 million people)) had relatively more and better-quality developmental projects than the English regions as shown in Table 3.5. (Cameroon’s National Budget for 2017).

Table 3.5 A Comparison of Cameroon’s budgetary allocation to southern regions

Project Region	No of Projects	Value of projects	Population of region
Paul Biya’s French home, South-region	570	US\$ 225 million	760,000
Anglophone Northwest	500	US\$ 76 million	1,400,000
Anglophone Southwest	500	US\$ 77 million	1,700,000

Source: Extract from Cameroon’s National Budget for 2017

Caxton stated that, one other reason for the reignition of secessionist movements in Cameroon, was the domineering nature of the Francophones in the country. Pius alleges that in July 1961, at the Fouban Conference in which the reunification of Southern British Cameroon and French Cameroon was agreed upon, the ideological and future numerical domination of the Francophones could already be felt by the Anglophones.²²² Thus over time, the Anglophones felt the French Cameroonians were establishing a form of colonial rule in the English regions, complete with administrative structures, military and police personnel.²²³

Also, Pius asserts that leaders of these secessionist movements such as the SCNC were convinced that they cannot compete in an undivided Cameroon which is subjected to

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Atangcho, Pius, (2008), op. cit., pp. 1-11.

uncongenial policies regarding language, other state symbols and civil servants from Francophone territories. Thus, they saw secessionist movements as a means to an end.²²⁴ Due to the heavy competition for political, civil service and senior level positions by Anglophones - who occupied two out of ten regions in Cameroon, - the thinking that small is better than nothing at all drove these leaders to form secessionist movements that will aid in satisfying their ambitious desires. Meaning, the leaders would rather be President or hold powerful positions in an Independent Southern Cameroon than be the opposition leader of a party that might never win the elections.²²⁵ Seven (23.3%) out of the total respondents mentioned the desire to create and rule a new state as well as have control over resources in Southern Cameroon as one of the driving forces behind the formation and revival of secessionist movements in Cameroon. One respondent further alleged that these desires were being backed by multinationals in the diaspora.

Radan points to the continuous failure to renegotiate federalism which dissolved in 1972 and low representation of the Anglophone Cameroonians in decision making organs as one of the factors accounting for the formation and revival of these secessionist movements in Cameroon.²²⁶ According to 16 (53.3%) respondents the feeling of marginalisation in the political affairs of the country is accountable for the recent revival of secessionist movements in Cameroon.

Radan (2008) also posited that the attempts made to side-line a group in the allocation of natural resources is another reason why secessionist movements are formed which may lead to the

²²⁴ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Radan, Peter. (2008) *Secession; A Word in Search of a Meaning* in Pakovic and Radan.

eruption of political conflict. He mentions the Ogonis of Middle Belt Nigeria led by one Ken Sewewa who was murdered by the late Nigerian head of state, General Abacha, for initiating a violent revolt over poor infrastructure at Ogoni land. Ken Sewewa is said to have incited the people against the government because a large quantum of oil exported by shell from Nigeria came from the Ogoni region yet the Ogonis could not boast of good schools, medical centres or road infrastructure.²²⁷ Thus, one can note the alleged exploitation of natural resources in Anglophone regions without any benefit to the local population as reason for the revival of secessionist movements in Cameroon. According to Sorens (2005), the Anglophones believe that their economy, which was vibrant and successful at unification, has been systematically and methodically destroyed. The Southern Cameroon State has been abandoned to itself with no industries, no good roads and hardly any development. The lone oil refinery in the country is located at Limbe in Southern Cameroon, where oil is drilled and refined but sold in Douala where the royalties are paid thus depriving the Southern Cameroons from those vital benefits (Sorens 2005).²²⁸ The permanent branding of Anglophones as foreigners, the subordinate status of Anglophones as compared to Francophones and the violent repression of public demonstrations throughout November and December 2016 also triggered further discontent leading to at least five civilians being killed and over 100 people being arrested (IRIN 15/12/2017). The government's tactics of political and physical repression further increased and politicised the Anglophone movement. According to 20 (66.6%) of the interviewees, the unequal distribution of state resources and amenities is one of the major determining factors for the

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Sorens, Jason, (2005), "The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 38, pp. 304-26.

revival of secessionist movements in Cameroon. Some respondents emphasized that the Anglophones felt like second class citizens in a state that is to be their own.

Okereke (2018) also notes the failure of the government to respect promises to fairly consider the legal, administrative and institutional traditions and cultures inherited from the previous administering powers as a major factor that led to the formation and revival of the secessionist movements in Cameroon.²²⁹

3.3.3 How the French Language Plays a Role in Issues of Language, Access to Employment and Education

The birth of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1961 brought together two distinctively different Cameroons with different economic, political and social traditions. The issue of language came up in the newly federated state as the region inherited both English and French, with one fifth of the country speaking English and the rest French. Thus, in the 1961 constitution, French and English were stated as the official language of the country (Abongdia 2010). English for West Cameroon and French for East Cameroon. Bilingualism was therefore recommended in these two languages. According to Fonlon, at the time of the declaration, most Francophone Cameroonians were interested in learning English. However, in today's world it appears to be quite the contrary. Anglophone Cameroonians appear to be more interested in learning French than the Francophone Cameroonians are in learning English mainly because of the political position of both languages.²³⁰

²²⁹ Nna-Emeka Okereke, (2018), *Analysing Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, Vol. 10, No. 3 pp. 8-12.

²³⁰ Abongdia, Afungmewu Jane-Francis, (2009), *Language Ideologies and Attitudes of Francophone Learners towards English in Yaounde, Cameroon*, pp. 5-8.

At the time of reunification, there was a policy of effective bilingualism which made English and French mediums of instruction. English was introduced into Francophone schools and French into Anglophone schools, with the aim that in the long run Cameroonians would be fluent in both languages. With UNESCO's (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) help the government was able to fund a nationalism bilingual programme. The programme had 7,500 literacy centres commonly known as l'ecole sous arbres (schools under trees). Unfortunately due to lack of external funds the programme collapsed in 1969. Also, a Bilingual Grammar School was set up by the government in 1962 at Man O War Bay (moved to Molyko-Buea). The school signed agreements of cooperation with Britain, United States of America and France leading to the establishment of the British Council. Alliance Franco-Cameroonaise and French, American and British culture centres in Cameroon.²³¹

This policy, however, was not a success due to the minority status of the Anglophones in Cameroon. The dominant nature of the French population made French the domineering language in businesses, government departments and public offices.²³² Abongdia has described this phenomenon as "one-way bilingualism), where Anglophones in Cameroon need to learn French as French is the language of power in the country.²³³ Francophones have a greater chance of been appointed to the civil service and admitted into professional schools based on

²³¹ Ndille, Roland, (2016), English and French as Official Languages in Cameroon: The Intentionality of Colonial Representations and the Failure of a Cameroon-Centric Identity; 1884 and After, *European Journal of Language Studies* Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 23-24.

²³² Abongdia, Afungmewu Jane-Francis, (2009), Language Ideologies and Attitudes of Francophone Learners towards English in Yaounde, Cameroon, pp. 5-8.

²³³ Ibid, pp. 3-5.

their regional, linguistic and ethnic representations rather than competence which reinforces a feeling of marginalisation among the Anglophones.²³⁴

According to Yuka (2011), in spite of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature of Cameroon, English and French is used in the official business of the day to day activities. French, nonetheless, is the dominant language given that the Anglophone Cameroonians constitute just about 20% of the nation's total land mark thus, representing the minority in the population. This numerical imbalance has led some Francophones to take bilingualism, and undeniably English for granted as most of the official speeches and texts are first written in French and eventually translated into English. Occasionally these translations fail to communicate the original intentions and ideas conceived in the original text as they are poorly done.²³⁵ Also, the numerical dominance of the Francophone Cameroonians over the Anglophone population gives the impression that Francophone Cameroonians can operate satisfactorily in the system without having to learn English. Consequently, French is the more prestigious language and the language to learn. Thus, whilst an average Anglophone Cameroonian finds it necessary to learn French, English to some Francophones has gradually become optional. For the Anglophones however, the drive to learn French is integrative as their ability to communicate (even minimally) in and understand French is an indicator of their smooth interaction with a greater part of the country that is dominantly French-speaking.²³⁶

Data collected in an earlier study by Abongdia showed the ideologies and attitudes towards French and English in Cameroon. A total number of 60 students and 15 lecturers were

²³⁴ Ibid, pp. 8.

²³⁵ Yuka, Lenzemo Constantine, (2011) On English as minority Official Language in Cameroon, pp. 3.

²³⁶ Ibid, pp. 3.

interviewed at Yaoundé 1, a bilingual state university. According to his research in 2010, one of the objectives was to examine if English was replacing French as a language of power in Cameroon. Although many of the respondents attested to the global significance of the English language, the following responses from lecturers highlighted the dominance of the French language in Cameroon:²³⁷

No, the Anglophones are in a minority.

No, although English and French are the official languages, both are not on the same scale.

...those who are not comfortable with French should go elsewhere e.g. Buea.

No, many lecturers in various departments are francophones and they are more comfortable with French. (Abongdia 2010)

Looking at the first two responses above, it is clear that the respondents were referring to the population of Anglophone speakers in Cameroon whereas, the last two responses show that although Yaoundé 1 is recognized officially as a bilingual university, it is expected that the students and staff speak French in the university.

When questioned about the extent to which the policy of bilingualism has been successfully, the lecturers responded as follows:²³⁸

Though most ministers are trying to be bilingual, the head of state has never addressed the nation in English. All parliamentary sessions hold in French and interpreters do the rest. Time allocated for programs on radio in English is very minimal and at times the English news is not as elaborate as the French. When you have a problem to solve in a government office and you meet a francophone and speak to him in English then you know you are doomed.

English and French are official languages but both are not on the same scale. In government departments, we find some officials who impose the use of the language they are best in.

How many members of our government can use both English and French?

One cannot point out the overwhelming presence of French in Cameroonian offices, especially in the French speaking part of the country. This is normal due to that fact that 80% of Cameroonians are Francophones. Only 20% are supposed to be Anglophones.

²³⁷ Abongdia, Afungmewu Jane-Francis & Willans, Fiona, (2010), *The Position of English Globally and Nationally: A Comparison of Cameroon and Vanuata*, pp. 8-11.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

No, the language of government, parliament and media is French; English is used just to appease the Anglophones. In fact, it is seldom used.

This makes it quite clear that French is indeed the dominant language in Cameroon, however respondents showed a desire for English to play a bigger role due to its increasing role at the global level. Respondents had this to say about the usage of both English and French.²³⁹

Lecturers:

In a situation of official bilingualism, I think that both languages should play equal roles. Both English and French should continue to play the major role they have been playing since the creation of the federal university in 1962. I think that the two official languages should be given equal space in teaching and learning.

Students:

We are a bilingual country and both languages are important. At least a fifty-fifty correspondence between both languages. I feel that bilingualism and not only mention it on papers whereas it is not practice because French language dominates. Both languages are equal: they should be given equal chances. We want to remain bilingual.²⁴⁰ (Abongdia 2010)

Language ideologies and attitudes in Cameroon seem to follow a conventional pattern. There is still a greater number of Cameroonians who are educated in the Francophone system than the Anglophone system, and French has dominated the national political and economic domains for so long that it is anticipated that this language holds enormous value at the national level.²⁴¹

3.4 Actors Involved in the Quest for Secession in Cameroon

Okereke traces the recent Anglophone crisis back to a historical resistance by Anglophone Cameroonians to the assumed assimilation of the Anglophone Cameroon population. He notes

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

that the recent crisis began in September 2016 with the uncalled-for harassment of Anglophone lawyers who were on peaceful protest marches in an attempt to make their complaints over the alleged side-lining of the Anglophone Common Law practice heard.²⁴² By October 2016, these Anglophone lawyers were on strike and subsequently in November, the Anglophone Teachers Trade Union joined in the protest by staging a solidarity strike in protest against distortions confronting the educational system in the English regions.²⁴³ One can deduce from the above that the main actors involved in the revival of the Anglophone secessionist quest in 2016 were lawyers and teachers who felt marginalized by the governments introduction of francophone ways into their purely anglophone system (schools and courts). Ensuing from the interviews, 19 (63.3%) of respondents listed Anglophone lawyers and teachers as the main actors involved in the secessionist quest in Cameroon. Respondents stated that the feeling of marginalization in Anglophone courts and schools is what led to protests by these lawyers and teachers which culminated into secessionist demands. (Kingsley-Arthur 2018).

Following this protest in December 2016, Felix Agbor Balla, an activist lawyer set up the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC). The purpose of this group was to champion the demands of the Anglophones (an end to marginalisation, preservation of the English educational and legal system, unconditional release of Cameroonians arrested in the English regions in relation to the protests and the return of federalism) following the failed attempts by the government to address these demands (Okereke 2018). Also, it was Agbor Balla who declared Operation Ghost Town Resistance (OGTR) in January 2017, which is characterized by a strict agreement to a sit- at-home ritual every Monday, Tuesday and any other

²⁴² Ibid., pp. 8-12.

²⁴³ Ibid.

day declared by the CACSC. This signifies that the inhabitants of the English regions in Cameroon are to stay away from business premises and offices in an effort to bring all economic and political activities to an abrupt halt.²⁴⁴

President Biya's government responded to the OGTR by arresting the CACSC leaders including Agbor Balla, Aforneka Fortem Neba (lecturer at the University of Buea), Mancho Bibixy (leader of the coffin protest in Bamenda), and Paul Ayah Abine (Justice of the Supreme Court). Whereas other leaders such as Wilfred Tassary, Bobga Harmony Mbuton and Elias Eyambe Ebai fled the country.²⁴⁵

Okereke posits that, following the arrest and flee of the CACSC leaders, the Anglophone diaspora took up the leadership of the struggle. They substituted the earlier quest for the restoration of the Federal system with the demand for secession in order to birth the state of Ambazonia. Several groups thus emerged within Cameroon and beyond in support of the attainment of the state of Ambazonia. Prominent amongst them are CACSC, Southern Cameroons South Africa Forum (SCSAF), Southern Cameroon People Organisation (SCAPO), Southern Cameroonians in Nigeria (SCINGA) and Movement for the Restoration of Independence in Southern Cameroon (MoRISC). Others include Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC), Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), the Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) and Republic of Ambazonia (RoA). Also, in America and Europe similar groups that project Anglophone aspirations and nationalism were formed. The Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF) emerged as the umbrella organisation for all

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

these groups under the leadership of Sisiku Julius Ayuktebe in 2017. In this same year, the SCACUF established the Southern Cameroon Broadcasting Corporation (SCBC) to sustain Anglophone aspirations through its propaganda. In the wake of the escalation of the crisis in October, the Governing Council of the SCACUF was replaced by the Ambazonia Interim Government (AIG) ensuing from the outcome of the Fourth Conclave of the SCACUF held at Zaria (Nigeria) between 27- 31 October 2017.²⁴⁶ According to 2 (6.6%) of the respondents, the Anglophone diaspora who are exploiting these groups to access power are the main actors involved in the secessionist quest.

Rebels, reportedly disguised as Cameroonian soldiers have joined in the struggle. These rebels kidnapped the Sub-Prefect (Cameroonian regional authority) of the Northwest region from his home in early February. They released photos of their captive, and the CAF is searching for him. These rebels also attacked Cameroonian soldiers at a school in the Northwest region, killing one soldier. Small-scale rebel attacks against security forces have resulted in at least 26 government personnel killed so far.²⁴⁷

Several smaller groups (made up of marginalized, angry young men whose family members have been arrested or killed) are also engaged in the struggle with four of the largest militias accounting for about 300 fighters. The largest militia is the Ambazonian Defense Forces (ADF), headed by Cho Ayaba Lucas, who has taken credit for attacks against security forces and political leaders and issued a threat: “You kill my people [and] we will chase you to the gates of

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 8-12.

²⁴⁷ Pera, Richard J., (2018), *Ambazonian Separatists Fight on in Cameroon: No Peace in Sight*, IDA Africa Watch, pp. 5

hell.” (Pera 2018). The militias do not seem to be subordinate to the political leadership, and the link between armed fighters and political leaders is tenuous²⁴⁸

3.5 Strategies Used by the Secessionists in an Attempt to Attain Independence

In early February, the interim government of Ambazonia appointed a theologian and humanitarian advocate, Dr. Samuel Ikome Sako, as a replacement for Sisiku Ayuk Tabe, the missing former interim president. Sako addressed his “fellow Ambazonians” during a 20-minute speech on YouTube in an effort to rally supporters and legitimize the secessionist cause.²⁴⁹ This demonstrates that Ambazonian leaders continue to make effective use of social media in mobilizing and encouraging supporters involved in the quest, although there are severe internet restrictions in the Anglophone regions.

Despite the fact that these leaders have been unsuccessful in gaining financial or political backing from France, the United States, the African Union and the UN, they have appealed to members of the Cameroonian diaspora for financial and political support. For example, they claim to have orchestrated demonstrations in Australia, South Africa, Brazil, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), several Western European countries (but not France), Canada, and the United States. It is however unclear how much money was obtained from these outreaches.²⁵⁰ From findings from the interviews, 25 respondents (83.3%) pointed to the uses of Social Media as one of the main strategies used by these secessionists in their quest for independence due to its far-reaching capabilities and low expense rate. The in-terim president of Ambazonia Sisiku Ayuk Tabe addresses his fellow Ambazonians through YouTube and other

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 5

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

social platforms. There is also a webpage dedicated to the republic of Ambazonia where public statements and addresses are posted (<https://www.ambazonia.org/en/>).

Ambazonians have resorted to guerrilla warfare (a type of combat that's fought by a civilian population or other people who aren't part of a typical military unit) because of the overwhelming military superiority of the Cameroon Armed Forces (CAF). According to one source, “militants have adopted the guerrilla attitude of freedom fighters in Eritrea as well as Nelson Mandela’s anti-apartheid movement in South Africa.”²⁵¹ The military goal of the secessionist forces is to ambush the CAF, not to engage them directly. Fighters train in rural areas on both sides of the Cameroon-Nigerian border (Under the leadership of Cho Ayaba) and blend in with refugees. Militants are armed with homemade kalashnikovs, rifles, improvised explosive devices and grenades. Lack of funds prevents many Ambazonians from obtaining arms, although some separatists obtained weapons from police stations that were overrun last fall.²⁵²

To realize its political goal, the SCACUF has employed a vast range of tactics, which include industrial actions (such as strikes, mass protests and OGTR) by Anglophone teachers and lawyers that have persisted in Cameroon since October and November 2016.²⁵³ The SCAUF also used measures such as encouraging the Anglophone diaspora to go on protest marches to various High Commissions and Embassies of Cameroon in America, Europe and Africa demanding the restoration of Southern Cameroon. For example, the Anglophone held a demonstration at the

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ibid, pp. 5

²⁵³ Nna-Emeka Okereke, (2018), *Analysing Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, Vol. 10, No. 3 pp. 8-12.

Cameroonian Embassy in London in August 2017 demanding a return to a federal state system in Cameroon.²⁵⁴ 26 respondents (86.6%) stated that the secessionists resorted to ghost town operations as a means of crippling the economy in an attempt to force the central government to heed to their demands.

From September 2017, the nature of the Anglophone nationalism in Cameroon gradually became violent mainly in the Anglophone regions. Bombings, terrorist attacks via arson against schools and attacks on security personnel and critical infrastructures were recorded whereas public protests intensified. The attacks on security and military personnel by aggrieved persons and militants in the Anglophone region have continued. Prior to August 2017, the apprehension of five persons led to the discovery and confiscation of bipods and tripods for precision weapons, firearms, a shielding fire episcopes, explosive charge containers, laser range finders and night vision equipment with laser rangefinder. Subsequently on September 22 2017, mass protests were staged throughout villages and towns of the Southwest and Northwest regions of Cameroon, with protesters demanding separation from the country.

Also, in major capitals across the world, public protests were conducted to coincide with President Paul Biya's address to the 72nd Summit of World Leaders at the UN Headquarters in New York. The protests were one of the activities planned by the SCACUF to precede Sisiku Julius Ayuktebe's declaration of an independent Federal Republic of Ambazonia on October 1 2017. This event was characterised by pulling down of Cameroonian national flags in several buildings and offices in the English regions and the hoisting of the Ambazonia flag; this

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

unleashed a wave of continual official repression and mild war in the regions. The decision to restore the independence of Ambazonia was part of the resolutions reached at the Conclave of SCACUF supposedly held on July 10 2017 at Buea, capital of the Southwest region.²⁵⁵

This Conclave also founded the Southern Cameroon Ambazonia Education Board (SCAEB) with a mandate to, among other things, draft a new school curriculum that is consistent with the Anglo-Saxon education system. It also established a governing body consisting of the Executive, Judicial and Legislative arms of government including the Southern Cameroon Self-Defence Committee to protect the lives and property of armless Southern Cameroonians. The Executive was tasked to work towards restoring the independence of Southern Cameroon within the shortest timeframe. It was the compliance to this mandate that led to the declaration of the independence of Ambazonia on 1 October 2017, an event that significantly altered the dynamics of the Anglophone question in Cameroon's national politics. By extension, it sought to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cameroon and was vehemently resisted by the Biya administration, which deployed its elite military known as Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) and other security and administrative apparatuses to suppress the threat. Sustained military and security operations to crush the Ambazonia threat stimulated a spill over effect beyond Cameroon with thousands of Anglophones fleeing to Nigeria as refugees. The escalation of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon in the last quarter of 2017 transformed it into one of the greatest national security threats confronting the Biya administration.²⁵⁶

In the wake of the escalation of the crisis in October, the Governing Council of the SCACUF was replaced by the Ambazonia Interim Government (AIG) following the outcome of the Fourth

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

Conclave of the SCACUF held at Zaria (Nigeria) between 27- 31 October 2017. Sisiku Julius Ayuktebe emerged as the AIG Interim President. At Cameroon Parliament in Yaoundé, the refusal of the Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) dominated parliament to discuss the Anglophone crisis has led to disruptions of parliamentary proceedings by the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) parliamentarians since October 2017.²⁵⁷ 19 (63.3%) of respondents have asserted that the secessionist have resorted to the formation of an interim government of Ambazonia as the initial step towards their desire to secede and becomes a state of their own.

3.6 Spill Over Effect of the Violence in Cameroon

Over time, conflicts in one state has been seen to have spill over effects on neighbouring countries and the region in which the conflicting state is located. These effects can present major developmental barriers for the state and its neighbours. In Cameroon, the Anglophone crisis presents serious economical effects to the region and its neighbours.²⁵⁸

3.6.1 Spill Over Effect of the Violence on West Africa

Okereke (2018) asserts that the intensified security and military operations of the Cameroonian government has led to the flight of over 30,000 of its citizens into the Nigeria-Cameroon border areas in Benue, Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Taraba States. These states share contiguous borders with the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon. As at 3 February 2018, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had successfully registered 14,057 asylum seekers from Cameroon. So far, there have been some recorded incidences of cross border violations of

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Nna-Emeka Okereke, (2018), op. cit.

Nigerian territory by Cameroon security forces in pursuit of ADF militants. The Cameroon security forces have argued that Anglophone militants operate from some Nigerian border areas and then launch attacks targeting the military and security forces of Cameroon. As such, this trend could have dangerous consequences for bilateral relations between both countries. The heavy deployment of military arsenals at Besongabang under Manyu Division, a border community within Cameroon-Nigeria border areas in December 2017 is an indication that the Government of Cameroon anticipates further escalation and is taking basic security measures to contain further decline into chaos and insurgency.²⁵⁹ Also, Nigeria fears that the Anglophone crisis may encourage Biafran secessionist movements in the country.²⁶⁰

3.7 Response of the Cameroonian Government to Secessionist Movements in Cameroon

A National Commission on the promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism has been created in Cameroon to help resolve the issue of the Anglophone crisis. According to Article 3(1) of the Presidential Decree NO. 2017/013 of January 23, the Commission will be responsible for the promotion of multiculturalism and bilingualism in Cameroon. This must be done with the view of consolidating the country's national integration, maintain peace and strengthening its people's willingness to live together. The Commission would be made up of 150 members and all its reports will be submitted to the Head of State.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 8-12.

²⁶⁰ Pera, J. Richard, (2018) Cameroon Anglophone Crisis Worsens and Widens, IDA Africa Watch, Vol. 18, <https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/AfricaWatch/Africawatch-February-8-2018-vol18.pdf>

²⁶¹ Nsom, Kini Yerima, (2017), Would Biya's Bilingualism Commission Solve Anglophone Problem? <http://www.cameroonpostline.com/would-biyas-bilingualism-commission-solve-anglophone-problem/>

The central government in Yaoundé also appears resolved to exercise military control over the Anglophone provinces. Its actions reflect a strategy to identify, arrest, or kill militants wherever they are located. Reports indicate that CAF gendarmes are conducting raids inside Nigeria in search of rebels. Employment of the Battalion d'Intervention Rapide, a special forces unit that reports directly to the president, suggests that President Biya views the secessionist movement as a direct threat to his 35-year-old regime. To battle Anglophone militants more effectively, Biya recently reorganized the structure of the military by establishing a 5th Joint Military Region for Northwest and Southwest Cameroon. The ADF has claimed that the CAF is employing remotely piloted vehicles to survey the Anglophone regions. Finally, a curfew remains in force in North West and South West regions: movement of private vehicles, persons, and goods is forbidden between 9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., and motorcycle traffic is completely suspended.²⁶²

The Biya regime further severed internet access in the two Anglophone dominated regions of Northwest and Southwest Cameroon. This measure, which was interpreted by the Anglophone population as a redefinition of Cameroon territory, escalated the grievances against Yaoundé.

The Cameroonian government crackdown continues, as security forces are alleged to have killed large numbers of civilians and destroyed private property as thousands of Anglophones continue to flee to neighbouring Nigeria.²⁶³

The Biya administration's response to the Anglophone crisis has been through the use of soft and hard measures. For instance, in January 2017, the Government approved the establishment of the National Commission on the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism. In March 2017,

²⁶² Pera, Richard J., (2018), op. cit., p. 5

²⁶³ Ibid, pp. 2.

President Paul Biya's administration launched the recruitment of 1,000 Special Bilingual Teachers with experience in scientific and technical subjects in order to address the demands of Anglophone teachers.²⁶⁴

It also embarked on two unsuccessful attempts at dialogue condemned largely as non-inclusive. Generally, however, the weight of state apparatus has defined the official responses towards the Anglophone crisis. This has been characterised by the redeployment of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) to the two Anglophone regions to strengthen the operations of the police and gendarmerie. Various administrative structures in both regions issued strict guidelines on freedom of movement and public conduct.²⁶⁵

Moreover, President Biya's administration has sought diplomatic support from Nigeria and beyond whiles accommodating the visits of high level Commonwealth and UN diplomats in its bid to gain the support of the international community in addressing the Anglophone question. The crisis however still persists in the form of low-level armed resistance and criminality. Prior to the declaration of independence of Ambazonia in October 2017, the government had arrested and detained over 100 Anglophone activists it had labelled extremists. Many of them are facing various charges including terrorism-related cases under military tribunals. Some of these detainees such as Paul Ayah Abine and Felix Agbor Balla were released in August 2017 and the charges against them dropped. It is important to note that the released persons were among the leading activists that spearheaded the Anglophone crisis in 2016. It was their arrest and detention that created the leadership vacuum, which the Anglophone diaspora took over. Reports by the International Crisis Group and Amnesty International stated that torture and dehumanisation of

²⁶⁴ Nna-Emeka Okereke, (2018), *op. cit.*, pp. 8-12.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-12.

detainees were a frequent occurrence, while allegations of genocide have been levelled against the Yaoundé regime by the SCACUF and vocal Anglophone voices.²⁶⁶

The response of the Biya administration to the Anglophone crisis changed tremendously following the declaration of the independence of Ambazonia. Initial official response was the deployment of more security forces to the Northwest and Southwest regions and intensification of the crackdown of separatist elements. The escalation of tensions and violence created opportunities for guerrilla attacks from separatist/restorationists within the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF). So far, there has been the abduction and killing of security personnel including the military by the militant ADF. These attacks have resulted in the sustained internal security operations especially, in the Manyu Division close to Cameroon's border with Nigeria. In his response to the deteriorating security situation, President Biya declared war on the separatists. In a statement in November 2017, Biya stated, "it is now clear that Cameroon was at war and under attack by terrorists masking [themselves] as secessionists." Subsequently, he declared that that all security measures will be taken to restore peace and order.²⁶⁷

3.8 Response of the International Community to the Anglophone Crisis

3.8.1 African Countries and the African Union

Nigeria has been noted for the vital role it has played in the secessionist struggle in Cameroon. During the crisis, various leaders of the Ambazonia Liberation Movement fled to Nigeria to seek asylum. In January 2018, however, these leaders were arrested by the Nigerian government and extradited to Cameroon where they were to stand trial as terrorists. Among those arrested was the

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

self-proclaimed president of the federal republic of Ambazonia, Sisiku Ayub Tabe. The UNHCR has criticized this action of forcibly returning these leaders who had requested for asylum as a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, which is a cornerstone of international refugee law. Subsequently in February 2018, the Nigerian National Security Advisor publicly backed the Cameroonian government on the issue of the Anglophone problem. A position already made manifest by Nigeria's involvement in the arrest of and extradition of the members of the in-terim government of Ambazonia despite the lack of an extradition treaty between Cameroon and Nigeria. Some observers have alleged that Nigeria's support for the Cameroonian government is out of fear that the Anglophone secession might rekindle the Biafran²⁶⁸ secessionist movement. The African Union however has remained largely silent on the happening in Cameroon aside its push for peaceful dialogue between the disputing parties. .²⁶⁹

3.8.2 Response of the Western World and the United Nations

Many members of the Anglophone diaspora living in the UK strongly believe that the UK, as a former colonial power, retains responsibility for what happens to its former subjects. Successive UK governments have resisted this view. These governments have called for peaceful dialogue but have declined to take a view on what the best institutional arrangements might be for addressing the grievances of Anglophone Cameroonians. However, the international community – the UK included – has begun to engage more directly since the beginning of 2018. The EU, US, France and Equatorial Guinea have called for dialogue to end the violence. The UK's

²⁶⁸ Pera, J. Richard, (2018), op. cit.

²⁶⁹ The African Union Speaks Out on the Anglophone Crisis (2017) <http://www.betatinz.com/2017/10/african-union-speaks-out-on-anglophone-problem-cameroon.html>

Minister for Africa, Harriett Baldwin visited Cameroon on 13- 14 February. While there, she urged all sides to de-escalate the conflict and begin dialogue.

Similar messages have been reiterated on several occasions by UK ministers since then. The UK government has said it is ready to help Cameroon in resolving the crisis, should the UK's good offices be requested – but this would in practice mean an invitation from the Cameroon government, which seems unlikely to arise. In April, the UK adjusted its travel advice for the two regions, advising against all travel to the border areas with Nigeria and essential travel only in the rest of those regions. France has traditionally given strong support to President Biya and, while it may well have had more forthright things to say in private, has so far not taken a strong public position.²⁷⁰

The Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, UNOCA, François Louncéry Fall, has called on the Government to release all those detained in relation to the ongoing Anglophone crisis.

He made the statement in a press conference in Yaounde on Wednesday, April 12. The senior diplomat visited Cameroon to discuss three pertinent issues notably; the situation of the detainees, the suspension of the internet services in the two Anglophone Regions and the implementation of the recently announced measures by the Government towards addressing the crisis. Quizzed on why the UN has since not intervened on the political form of the State, given that, there is no union treaty at the UN to justify the union, he responded in a rather tactical manner. “The United Nations is not a direct advocate of the internal political matters of the State

²⁷⁰ Lunn, Jon & Brooke-Holland, Louisa, (2018), The Anglophone Cameroon crisis: June 2018 update, House of Commons; Briefing Paper Number 8331, pp. 3-12

or matters patterning to the form of the State or a nation. Cameroon is a sovereign State and therefore the UN can only give advice on the necessary measures to be adopted relating to the peaceful negotiations. The form of the State is a purely a political affair which should be handled by the National Assembly and other politicians. There is therefore the need to respect the Constitution of Cameroon and other international treaties to which Cameroon is a party,” he stated.

Being versed with politics and mediation processes, he urged the Government to speed up the implementation process of the measures announced by Government on March 30, through the Justice Minister relating to the grievances of the lawyers and the teachers.²⁷¹

3.9 Prospects of Success

Caxton notes that, with reference to the complaints of the Anglophone lawyers and teachers, the government has proposed a 2 billion CFA franc subvention to confessional schools and also promised the recruitment of 1 000 bilingual teachers into schools. The government has also produced an English version of the OHADA Uniform Act and the Cameroonian Code Penal, which existed only in French.²⁷² Also, in the past two years, the government has created an Anglophone Section at the National School of Administration and Magistracy of Cameroon, established a Common Law bench at the Supreme Court of Cameroon to examine methodically and specifically appeals from the Northwest and South-West jurisdiction sand created a Faculty

²⁷¹ Eulalia Amabo Nchang & Sylvester Atemnkeng 2017 United Nations Finally Wades Into Anglophone Crisis <http://www.cameroonpostline.com/united-nations-finally-wades-into-anglophone-crisis/>

²⁷² Caxton, Ateki Seta (2017), , op. cit.

of Law and Political Sciences at the University of Buea.²⁷³ The creation of the Departments of English Law in the Universities of Maroua, N'Gaoundéré, Douala and Dschang, and the Departments of Public Law in the Universities of Bamenda and Buea are also steps taken by the government to address the complaints by the Anglophones.²⁷⁴

Le asserts that, regarding the demands of Anglophone teachers, the Government has correspondingly provided appropriate responses, depending on the cases. For example, concerning the representation of Anglophones in the positions of support staff and teachers of State Universities, that members of the inter-ministerial committee set up for the occasion noted unanimously that, "universities of Buea and Bamenda which fully benefit from their administrative and financial autonomy, recruit in priority teachers and support staff from the two English-speaking regions, without excluding the deserving Francophones." Concerning the creation of a dedicated Higher Teacher's Training College, the same committee noted that there cannot be a "Higher Teacher's Training College" exclusively reserved for citizens of a single region or two regions.²⁷⁵ Beyond these specific responses provided by the Government to this crisis, a National Commission on the promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism was created in 2017, to help resolve the issue of the Anglophone crisis. According to Article 3(1) of the Presidential Decree NO. 2017/013 of January 23, the Commission will be responsible for the promotion of multiculturalism and bilingualism in Cameroon.²⁷⁶

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Le, Joseph (2017) Cameroon: The Anglophone Crisis - What History Remembers <https://allafrica.com/stories/201710100106.html>

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Nsom, Kini Yerima, (2017), op. cit.

The government has also appointed two Anglophones among the new Generals of the Cameroon Army. These include: Brigadier Generals Aga Robinson and Ekongwesse. Various measures to restore trust and maintain dialogue have also been made. For example, the restoration of the Internet connection in the South-West and North-West regions; the internet connection was suspended on 17 January 2017, in order to preserve public order and social cohesion at the peak of the crisis.²⁷⁷

From the above one can deduce that the secessionist may be making some form of progress in getting their demands answered however, their quest for secession may not be fulfilled. The most that can come out of their revolt may be a reduction in their marginalization.

3.10 Prospects of Failure

The reaction of President Paul Biya's regime to the Anglophone activists has been in the form of various resistance strategies. According to Tangie, the central government in Yaoundé appears to be resolved to exercise military control over the Anglophone provinces. Its actions reflect a strategy to identify, arrest, or kill militants wherever they are located. Employment of the Battalion d'Intervention Rapide, a special forces unit that reports directly to the president, suggests that President Biya views the secessionist movement as a direct threat to his 35-year-old regime. To battle Anglophone militants more effectively, Biya recently reorganized the structure of the military by establishing a 5th Joint Military Region for Northwest and Southwest Cameroon.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁷ Le, Joseph (2017) op. cit.

²⁷⁸ Pera, Richard J., (2018), op. cit., p. 5.

The government has repeatedly trivialized the Anglophone/Francophone divide in various ways. First of all, it highlighted the existence of a common Cameroonian identity under the German colonial rule and the need to remain united. Secondly, in trying to convince the international and national communities that Cameroon's policy of bilingualism is successful, President Biya in 1999, claimed that secessionist tendencies were evident only in a tiny Anglophone minority and that 'he was ready to even call for a referendum, if it became necessary' (Takougang and Krieger, 1998). The President can be said to have been bluffing on the issue of the referendum as in spite of a persistent Anglophone agitation and a pledge by English-speaking Cameroonians in North America to bear the cost of the referendum, he has since, been silent about it.²⁷⁹

Pera (2018) notes that a negotiated settlement of the Anglophone crisis seems doubtful in the near term. No country or political organization (e.g., the African Union) has voiced a desire to broker peace negotiations or even a cease-fire. Ambazonian political leaders may be willing to negotiate, but militant organizations, whose ranks are growing daily, seem unlikely to negotiate. The government probably will not release Ayuk Tabe, who most countries and the UN believe was deported illegally from Nigeria. Some believe he is a bargaining chip in future negotiations, while others have opined that he will face the death penalty. The Cameroon government has resisted calls for insertion of UN human rights monitors to investigate allegations of abuse. As long as Nigerian support continues and international public opinion is muted, President Biya is unlikely to negotiate.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ Tangie Fonchingong (2013) The quest for autonomy: The case of Anglophone Cameroon, *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 7(5), pp. 224-236.

²⁸⁰ Pera, Richard J., (2018), op. cit., pp. 4-6.

3.11 Conclusion

To conclude, the study makes it quite clear that the main factors for the formation of secessionist movements are grievances of the marginalized. These grievances when unresolved are what seem to drive them to seek secession or autonomy. Also, it is quite clear that in the secessionist struggles, there exist various actors with different motives behind their quests. Lastly, one may note that that in the strategies used, what started out as a peaceful protest gradually turned out to be a fully blown violent confrontation between the various disputants and the accommodation of one's demands, be it that of the secessionist or the government by the other is what can be used to measure the success rate of the secessionist movements.

Endnotes

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

4.0 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the analysis of the data together with their interpretation and respective findings. This final chapter summarizes the study, draws useful conclusions and makes recommendations on possible solutions and further study areas.

4.1 Summary of the Study

The study sought to investigate secessionist movements in Cameroon. Specific objectives included understanding the reasons for the formation of secessionist movements in Cameroon, examining the different secessionist actors in Cameroon, analysing how these secessionist movements have gone about seeking secession from Cameroon as well as assessing their chances of success or failure in the bid to gain independence.

The study was motivated by the need to comprehend the reasons behind the wave of disturbances emanating from secessionist movements around the world, especially in Spain, Sudan, Iraq Cameroon and others, which often claim innocent lives and destroy property. Findings will not only add to the reservoir of knowledge in the field of secessionist movements and their prospects of success or failure, but the recommendations will further enhance the body of literature concerning secessionist movements in Africa in general, and in Cameroon in particular, so as to help stakeholders within the international community adopt better strategies for dismantling socio- economic structures that breed secessionist movements.

This study adopted the theory of secession because the theory focuses on the behaviour of a group and sometimes its leaders who, according to Seymour (2007), usually identify situations that will either precipitate the aspiration of sub-national groups to leave its country, or facilitate the enactment of such resolutions. In this case, the group refers to the Anglophone Cameroonians as well as the leaders of their secessionist movements. The behaviour focused on, refers to the strategies adopted and the reasons for the adoption of such strategies and finally, the situations identified refers to occurrences that have led to or the reasons behind their desire to secede.

In agreement with Sorens' (2005) economic theory of secession, findings point out that, the Anglophone region of Cameroon is noted to be different from the rest of the country in terms of natural resources, however, the region does not seem to benefit from these natural resources. In accordance with the theory, findings from the study indicate that, some of the rationales behind the formation of secessionist movement in Cameroon are the disproportionate allocation of national revenue, the lack of central government's interest in socio-economic growth in the English area and poor road networks and communication infrastructure. Additionally, under the cultural theory of secession (Sorens (2005), findings from the study indicate that, the discrimination in Political appointments against the two Southern English regions, forcing French laws on English courts, side-lining English regions in governance arrangements and forcing French biased education curriculum on English system were enough to trigger the desire to secede. Moreover, Nielsen (1993), stated that ethnic dominance and territorial concentration, somewhat encourages the pursuit of autonomy. Following this line of thought, findings indicate the domineering nature of the Francophones and the concentration of the Anglophones in the

South-Western parts of Cameroon as reasons for the formation of secessionist movements in the country.

Findings also noted that, the political theory of secession is viable in the case of Cameroon as some of the secessionists in the English regions of Cameroon are willing to settle for a return to the Federal State of Cameroon where they enjoyed regional autonomy.

These findings confirm Sorens' (2005) classification of the secession theory as having economic, political and cultural factors. Also, the derivative rights theory of secession can be used to justify the Anglophone Cameroonians' quest to secede as the theory views secession as a measure to justified consequence of perpetual violation of basic human rights, past maltreatment of a group of people by the state mass and the violation of public realization of equality of democratic state.

Further findings on the various actors involved in the crisis pointed to lawyers and teachers in the Anglophone regions who felt marginalized by the imposition of French in their English systems. Also, the government of Cameroon was seen as a dominant actor as well as Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora. The presence of the Anglophone Cameroonians as dominant actors in the crisis only goes to confirm Boyle's cultural theory of secession. Findings further showed that, there are some state and non-state actor such as Nigeria and the UNHCR who have also played an active role in the crisis.

Further findings on how players in the secessionist movements in Cameroon carry out their activities indicated that secret meetings continue to be held to plan how to force central

government to respect their request for independence. Moreover, leaders have been selected as shadow ministers, ready to assume power as soon as self-government comes on board. It was revealed further that, teachers, lawyers and other professionals frequently go on demonstrations thus, disregarding police restriction. All these are mechanisms being employed in hopes of attaining independence.

More also, findings on the prospects of the Cameroonian secessionist movement failing or succeeding reflected that although the government is willingly to make some adjustments like, the formation of the Commission of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism, and the hiring of 1000 bilingual teachers in Anglophone schools, the government is highly unwilling to give into the secessionist request to secede from Cameroon. This finding goes to validate Sorens (2012) allegations on the fact that leaders or groups usually assume a cost-benefit decision structure. It further revealed that international community are forcing central government to use dialogue rather than killing innocent people and destroying property. However, since the secessionist message is now overwhelming, the government could be forced to give in to their demand in the foreseeable future.

4.2 Conclusion

The study investigated the activities of secessionist movements in Cameroon with specific objectives of ascertaining the rationale behind their actions as well as identifying the main actors. The research further examined the mode of operations of the movement in addition to the evaluation of their prospects of success or failure. It came out unequivocally that discrimination in political appointments, poor socio-economic infrastructures, forcing French law on English

courts as well as attempting to replace English curriculum with French lessons in English basic schools constituted some of the unhealthy situations that angered the English South into wanting to break out from Cameroon. These revelations show a direct link with some of the conclusions drawn by Hilpold in similar studies on the situation in Sudan where the minority Christian south seceded from the predominantly Muslim North. It also validated the economic, political and cultural theories of secession as stated by certain proponents such as Buchanan, Brown and Sorens. Furthermore, the study noted that, the attempts to operate the legal system solely on French laws and also force French literature on English schools infuriated English lawyers and teachers who took to the streets, (under the leadership of one Sisiku Ayuk Tabe) as the principal actors in the secessionist movements in Cameroon. As its mode of operations, the movement has elected shadow ministers who are spokes persons on various ministerial portfolios. Secret meetings are also held at unannounced locations to review the strategic direction of the movement with the sole aim of forcing government to grant them independence. The Cameroonian government continues to employ combatant tactics with the aim of dividing the movement and eventually forcing them to abandon their hope of secession. With pressure from the international community mounting on the government to call for a round table conference for dialogue, it is logical that government's atrocities will soon cease for sanity to prevail leading to either an independent state of English South Cameroon or Ambazonia.

4.3 Recommendations

In light of the challenges in confronting the secessionist movements in Cameroon the following recommendations are worth considering.

4.3.1 Immediate Reversal of Policies on total French Laws and Education System in Cameroon

The policy of the Cameroonian government to force French laws and education systems on English South, warranting series of demonstration by English lawyers and teacher, is not only reprehensible but also totally unacceptable. It is hereby recommended that UNESCO, UNICEF, the Paris French Government and other powerful global bodies prevail upon the Paul Biya government to allow courts in the English South to employ English laws to dispense justice in the jurisdiction of the two English regions of Cameroon. English schools should also continue pursuing English curriculum but not compulsory French lessons.

Perhaps it might be worth mentioning that even in Ghana, where common syllabi are implemented in public and private pre-university schools, some American and British private schools are permitted to teach American and British curriculum respectively.

4.3.2 Punishment for Cameroonian Trigger-happy soldiers caught on video

The various video clips in public domain portray uniformed soldiers with sophisticated weapons taking the lives of innocent defenceless civilians whose crime was fighting for their rights. The International Court of Justice should launch a full-scale investigation into these killings and take appropriate measures to minimise the occurrence of such unfortunate eventualities. Punishments to be meted out to such perpetrators ought to be widely publicised to serve as deterrent to security personnel in other developing economies (especially in Africa) who are often detailed to control rowdy situations.

4.3.3 Suspension of Cameroon in International Affairs

Taking cognisance of the sordid manner in which, the Cameroonian government remains inflexible in its bid to use brute force to quell the activities of secessionist movements in the country, it is only fair for the international community to protest vehemently by suspending the country in all international engagements at the UN and its operating organs. Regional and Sub-regional bodies like AU and CEMAC, could also push the Paul Biya's administration to abandon its combatant posture in addressing the crisis. The time for the international community to act is now.

4.4 Areas for Future Research

The military leaders in Nigeria headed by the late General Abacha in 1995 lined up and shot dead opinion leaders of the Oguni land, led by one Ken Sewewa for protesting against discrimination in the distribution of the national revenue. The Sudan people liberation Army (SPLA) also killed several supporters of the Christian South, in the name of fanning secession sentiments until eventually South Sudan gained independence under the auspices of the UN and its peace keeping outfit. Paul Biya's men in Cameroon are currently murdering innocent people for supporting the English South in their bid to secede. There seems to be no early warning group for swiftly diffusing tension in such circumstances. Some study is therefore absolutely necessary with the aim of coming up with some recommendations on how such internal conflicts could be identified in their early stages by a powerful constituted international group. This way affected governments, like the Biya regime in Cameroon, could be pressurised into addressing the grievances of the minority before events get out of hand resulting in the loss of innocent lives.

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