

THE POLICE AND SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE ROLE  
OF THE POLICE IN THE GHANAIAN POLITY (1957-79)

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GHANAIAN POLITY, (1957-79)

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR AN M.A. (POLITICAL SCIENCE) DEGREE IN THE UNIVERSITY  
OF GHANA, LESSEM

December, 1981.



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OF THE POLICE IN THE GHANAIAN POLITY (1957-79)

I hereby declare that the present work (acknowledged  
references to other works apart) is wholly written by me  
under the supervision of Professor Robin Bushman.

By  
KUMI ANSAH-KOI  
I affirm that the work has not been submitted for any  
examination in any other University.

Signature of Candidate:.....

Signature of Supervisor:.....

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KUMI ANSAH-KOJ

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CHAPTER ONE  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

It is commonplace knowledge that social research and the pursuit of intellectual clarity and enlightenment are a co-operative venture; and do not make for the independent and isolated working reminiscent of Robinson Crusoe before his coming upon Man Friday. Pursuit of the research objectives underlying this work has occasioned my incurring a huge debt of gratitude; and this acknowledgement can only attempt to meet the debt.

I am most grateful to my supervisor, Professor Robin Luckham, for his apt remarks, patience, and congenial co-operation. I acknowledge an indebtedness to that noble band of co-operative policemen who aided in the accumulation of data. In this regard I mention the then Inspector-General of Police, Mr. Felix Kyei; the registry staff at the National Police Headquarters in Accra; the Commandant of the Police Depot in Accra, Superintendent Korankye; Deputy Superintendent Billar Nuhr of the same Depot, and other police functionaries too numerous to mention. I am grateful to former police boss E.R.T. Madjitey for three interview meetings I had with him under congenial surroundings in his Asitey home, and to Dr. Kofi Ankumah of the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration for an encouraging discussion I had with him in connection with the work.

Finally, I acknowledge the immense help offered by various librarians and archivists in the course of data collection; and the booster offered by the constant inquiries of F.K. Drah, acting Head of the Political Science Department, on the progress of the undertaking.

Needless to say responsibility for the work is entirely my own; and I remain solely responsible for faults and shortcomings that may inhere in any part of the work.

KUMI ANSAH-KOI

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CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTION

Cynthia Enloe's remark that 'the police are in general dealt with only sketchily in many studies of political power and political change'<sup>1</sup> surprisingly holds true for the frequently-studied Ghanaian nation-state.<sup>2</sup> The almost-total neglect of scholarly focus on the Ghana police (and at best the trite, superficial, or fragmentary concern accorded that

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1. Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security In Divided Societies, Penguin, 1980, p.85.
  2. David Kimble's A Political History of Ghana, Dennis Austin's Politics In Ghana, and W.E.F. Ward's A History of Ghana for examples, are studies on aspects of politics in Ghana from an institutional, legal/historical perspective. Fitch and Oppenheimer's Ghana: End of An Illusion takes a class analysis approach; but none of these examples and a whole host of other literature on Ghana they exemplify give the Police Institution its due paramount prominence.

Empirical instances of Police involvement in regime destabilization is offered by Police initiation of the plot which eventually culminated in Nkrumah's overthrow. See Chapters Two and Four of the present work; and A.A. Afrifa's The Ghana Coup; and A.K. Ocran's A Myth Is Broken. The latter two are works by leaders of the coup, and offer first-hand account of police involvement in the coup operation.

state bureaucracy by academia<sup>3</sup>) is the more surprising in view of its activist involvement in regime stabilization and destabilization.<sup>4</sup>

3. An exception of sorts is S.K. Ankama's 'The Police and Maintenance of Law and Order in Ghana'; an unpublished University of London Ph.D. thesis (1967). An examination of its chapter-contents is revealing. The focus is narrowed to the 'law and order' functions of the police; and the scholar in search of a thorough and more exhaustive treatment of police role could be crestfallen and disappointed on those account by the work. It has nine chapters. "Chapter One deals with the (author's) introduction and the traditional states in Ghana. It discusses the organization of a state and the machinery for the administration of justice; and also touches upon the police idea in the traditional system. Chapter Two concerns the native system of administration; Chapter Three is entirely devoted to the Native Authority Police and the events leading to its abolition. Chapter Four provides a short account of the history of the British Police Force. Chapter Five gives the history of the Gold Coast Police. Chapter Six discusses the organization of the Ghana Police. Chapters Seven and Eight deal with their powers in normal times and emergency; and Chapter Nine discusses the legal status, appointment, promotion and transfer of a constable." (Ghana: An Annotated Bibliography of Academic Theses 1920-1970, J.K. Kofe, Boston, 1973, pp.119-120).

Another exception of sorts is Robert Dowse's 'Military And Police Rule' in Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972 (ed. Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham), Frank Cass & Co.; London, 1975, pp.16-36.

4. Empirical instance of Police involvement in regime destabilization is offered by Police initiation of the plot which eventually culminated in Nkrumah's overthrow. See Chapters Two and Four of the present work; and A.A. Afrifa's The Ghana Coup; and A.K. Ocran's A Myth Is Broken. The latter two are works by leaders of the coup, and offer first-hand account of police involvement in the coup operation.

of the government contributes immensely in so doing to mark the break from a chaotic 'state of nature' where life is 'brutish, short and nasty' and men are wild and anti-social, to civil order and the communal way of human existence. Locke

The contemporary state is replete with hosts of functionally-divergent bureaucracies fashioned to realise the ends of government and to serve the interests of those in whose favour state policies and structures are slanted. The contemporary state assigns its police organization with authority to utilise force of arms to attain particular state objectives. Police role performance in the polity therefore is crucial in that the police institution undergirds the authority of policy planners and executors by way of offering them a coercive sanction of physical force. On most issues a mere threat or possibility of the usage of this sanction suffices to evoke compliance from the vast majority of the State's citizens. The pivotal importance of the sanction of physical coercion is affirmed by political theorists within both liberal-democratic and communist polar ends of the ideological spectrum.

5. See John Locke, *A Letter concerning Toleration*.  
6. See J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*.

Liberal-democratic theorists on their part tend to assert that Force, under the control of government and as part of its machinery, is vital for the establishment and maintenance of civil order and the realization of the ends of society. In the Hobbesian conception of civil society for example, the ultimate sanction of Force that undergirds the authority of the government contributes immensely in so doing to mark the break from a chaotic 'state of nature' where life is 'brutish, short and nasty' and men are wild and anti-social, to civil order and the communal way of human existence. Locke

argues that 'the magistrate is armed with force...in order to see to the punishment of those that violate any other man's rights'.<sup>5</sup> J.S. Mill implicitly holds that compulsion and control, indeed physical force, has a positive though circumscribed niche in any polity.<sup>6</sup> In the schemata of David Easton's conception of the political process, the police constitute a vital part of the supports base of any polity.<sup>7</sup>

Theorists fundamentally opposed to liberal-democratic thinking, agree with them in imputing a crucial role-performance to physical force and those social institutions designed to apply such force within a polity. Lenin writes that 'a standing army and police are the chief instruments of state power'.<sup>8</sup> Both liberal-

5. See John Locke, A letter concerning Toleration.

6. See J.S. Mill, On Liberty.

7. See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life.

8. V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution. The Marxist Theory of The State and The Tasks of The Proletariat In The Revolution, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p.13.

9. Lenin, The State And Revolution, op.cit., p.10.

10. Ibid., p.11.

democratic thinkers and their theoretical opponents therefore identify and impute considerable importance to the role force and social institutions fashioned to apply such force play within the state. They disagree though on the purposes and functions the state and its machineries ultimately serve. While liberal thinkers perceive the state as making for civil order, harmonious existence, and a realization of human potentialities, their radical opponents perceive it as essentially dysfunctional to the realization of those ends. Lenin argues for example that 'the state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, and when class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled.'<sup>9</sup> He claims that the 'state is an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another; it is the creation of 'order' which legalises and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between classes.'<sup>10</sup> Karl Marx takes to the viewpoint that under the capitalist mode of production, 'political power is precisely the official expression

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9. Lenin, *The State And Revolution*, op.cit., p.10.

10. *Ibid.*, p.11.

of class antagonism in bourgeois society; <sup>11</sup> and the state is reduced to "...a special organization of violence for the suppression of some class". <sup>12</sup> The point is made that both Marxist and liberalist perceptions of the state-system and even the Anarchist strand in political thought, converge in an identification of force as a significant strand in the state set-up. Those schools of political thought take their separate ways on the issue of a functional analysis of states' role-performance. <sup>13</sup>

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11. Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p.182.
12. Lenin, The State and Revolution; op.cit., p.10. He writes: "...the state is a special organization of violence for the suppression of some class..."
13. There is also disagreement on the historical origins of the state. Marxists write off social contract theories of the state as being conjectural, rather than factual. The same critique is levelled against Hegel's conception of the state. In the words of Engels, "The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it "the reality of the ethical idea", "the image and an or reality of reason" as Hegel maintains." (The Origin of The Family, Private Property And The State, in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol.III, Moscow, 1973, p.326).
14. ... known and avowed, the term manifest function is sometimes employed; where these effects are not regularly foreseen and especially where this foresight might alter effects, the term latent is sometimes used." (R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957. Chapter One: "Manifest and Latent Functions", pp.19-24).

The preceding theoretical considerations are essential to place the study in proper perspective. Whatever other social roles<sup>14</sup> it may perform, the police is intimately and primarily linked with the whole process of law enforcement. Those interested in the formulation, implementation, and impact of law and social forces upon which they are based stand to gain better insight into those phenomena if they acquire deeper insight into the police institution per se as well as its impact on those processes. In the apt words of one study, "the police is charged with enforcing the law and maintaining order. What is distinctive about the responsibility of the police is that they are charged with performing these functions where all eyes are upon them and where the going is roughest: on the street. Since this is a time of increasing

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14. R.K. Merton writes that "the function of a role is the part it plays in the maintenance or destruction of the system or pattern as a whole - the terms eufunction and dysfunction sometimes being employed to distinguish the supportive from the destructive effects. Where the functional effect of a role is openly known and avowed, the term manifest function is sometimes employed; where these effects are not regularly foreseen and especially where this foresight might alter effects, the term latent is sometimes used." (R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957, Chapter One: "Manifest and Latent Functions", pp.19-84).
15. The Challenge of Crime In A Free Society. A Report by the President's Commission On Law Enforcement And Administration Of Justice, Washington D.C., 1967.

crime, increasing social unrest, and increasing public sensitivity to both, it is a time when police work is peculiarly important, and in addition to studying the police as an institution, we shall also trace its relationships and links with other institutions carry out an institutional study of the police organization not only for its intrinsic worth, but as a means of getting to a better understanding of various social institutions and forces and their internal dynamics.

#### A Statement of the Problem

Specifically, the thematic concern of this work is to record and analyse the exact role of the police institution within the socio-political environ of Ghana on her accession to national independence on 6th March, 1957 to the end of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council rule on 24th September, 1979. We shall therefore seek to ferret out, record, and analyse the impact and inter-relations of the Ghana Police within the specified time-period. Police participation within the polity (whether activist or through default) and at whatever level (whether macro or micro) in the on-going socio-political processes at the specified epoch

15. The Challenge of Crime In A Free Society. A Report By The President's Commission On Law Enforcement And Administration Of Justice, Washington D.C., 1967.



constitute our subject of scholarly concern. In point of fact the police set-up is only one of numerous state bureaucracies, and in addition to studying that institution per se, we shall also trace its relationships and links with other bureaucracies within the polity. In this regard the police connection in the military-cum-police collusion that eventually toppled Nkrumah's government would particularly interest us. Such intra-statal inquiries as the impact of urbanization, political mobilization, authoritarianism, and an increasingly monolithic state on the police organ of state and how the organization qua police organization reacted to those forces of social change within the polity would also interest us. Such deliberate recording and analysis of police role-performance in the state-system is beneficial if only because it would lay bare the intended and unintended social impact of the institution.<sup>16</sup> Possibly such unmasking would alert policy-makers and society at large to any unintended dysfunctional impact of the police institution in Ghanaian society. A realization of these research objectives would contribute towards a correction

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16. C. Wright Mills, in his The Sociological Imagination, writes highly of this act of debunking social myths.

of the imbalance created by academia's disregard of the police institution as a subject for scholarly inquiry.

Methodology

In pursuit of the research objectives we have had recourse to an array of research options. A multi-dimensional methodological approach was necessary for the sake of accuracy and reliability. No single research method is without limitation; and each has its inherent bias. There is thus a compelling need to offset such bias. "A multiple operationism, a collection of methods, combine to avoid sharing the same weaknesses",<sup>17</sup> and as well offer a much-needed corroborative support to one's research findings. In connection with this work we have had to depend much on documentary sources of various kinds.<sup>18</sup> Specifically these involve archival records, government gazettes, academic publications, hansards, police publications, and various journalistic writings. Interviews

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17. See Unobtrusive Measures: Non-reactive Research In The Social Sciences (ed. Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz and Lee Sechrest).
18. See the Bibliography for a select list of these documentary sources.

were also undertaken in connection with the work.<sup>19</sup> Physical traces like the material situation and conditions of police stations and posts in rural and urban areas and the frequency and patterns of smears on such items as police counters, cells and such like have not been unnoticed. Non-participant observation (from the perspective of police angle of involvement) has been another methodological approach drawn upon in connection with the present work. Access to police official records and documents was not as unrestricted, or even as open, as one would have wished. The Police organization is intimately involved in the state's security machinations. An outcome of such is that its bureaucrats are hypersensitive to security risks involved in even supposedly innocuous co-operation with academia. Furthermore, the institution's intensely hierachical structure made for a "passing of the buck" by all police bureaucrats whose clearance and co-operation

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19. No exhaustive list of persons interviewed is given as many of those interviewed would not want to be identified. Some of the persons interviewed in connection with this work are however named and identified as sources of particular information. The interviews were unstructured.

20. The police cleared the way for the work by giving by the police Public Relations Directorate and other bureaucrats way down the police hierarchy.

I formally solicited at the inception of the work.<sup>20</sup> The police took rather long in responding (very incompletely at that) to a set of questions they demanded from me at the outset of the work to offer them an insight into my scope of interest. They also did not appear to possess a statistical account of most information pertaining to their numbers and their activities. Neither could they be prodded to make available whatever records of theirs could be used to work out any such statistics. Through death, immense spatial separation and unwillingness to co-operate, I was physically debarred from interviewing all those one ideally would have wished to interview for the purposes of the present work. In the presentation of research findings, Chapter One is concerned with a discussion of the significance of the research. In addition, the chapter contains an explicit formulation of the research problem and objectives, a review of literature bearing on the work, an adoption of a conceptual framework, and a statement of the work's

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20. The Public Relations Directorate of the Police was no exception. Its topmost bureaucrat, the Inspector-General, had to grant clearance and official assent before co-operation was given by the police Public Relations Directorate and other bureaucrats way down the police hierarchy.

limitations. We as well state the methodological options utilized to arrive at these research findings. Chapter Two of our presentation is devoted to an explicit formulation of the socio-cultural context within which the police institution has operated in Ghana. In the chapter we also dwell on both the internal and extra-territorial matrix of Ghana's Police organization. Chapter Three is devoted to the Police as a social institution. The historical antecedents and development of police institution in the territorial expanse now known as Ghana is considered. The chapter is as well devoted to an organizational and a sociological study of the police in Ghana. Linkages and inter-connections of the police with the body-politic at large and with other state bureaucracies within the polity are delineated. Continuities, discontinuities, and adaptations that have taken place within the institution since its inception in the Ghanaian setting are also noted. Chapter Four is concerned with an identification and consideration of the political and class implications of routine police tasks in Ghana. Chapter Five deals with an identification and analysis of those occasions when the police flouted its apolitical norm and acted along politically partisan lines. A summary of the work highlighting the import of our research findings for the theory and practise of government

is stated in Chapter Six.

### Limitations

All efforts occur within limitations, and the present work has its share of such. The study is diachronic in orientation. Primary concern is on role of the police in politics since Ghana's attainment of independence to the eve of the state's third attempt at republican rule on 24th September, 1979. The time-limit imply a concern with police involvement in the politics of two ideologically-divergent civilian regimes, at least three military-cum-police juntas,<sup>21</sup> and a military junta<sup>22</sup> which ab novo and consistently through its stay in office assumed a revolutionary ethos of

21. These are the National Liberation Council (February 1966 - August 1969); the National Redemption Council; and the Supreme Military Council, which is generally perceived, notwithstanding an unchanged nomenclature, to consist of two distinct phases: an SMC I (under a then General Acheampong's chairmanship), and an SMC II phase under the Chairmanship of General F.W.K. Akuffo.

22. This is the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) (4th June, 1979 - 24th September, 1979) under the Chairmanship of Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings.

some sort. We concede the taxing influence Ghana's dire economic situation imposes on both researcher and the human subjects of research. The economic straits tended to make both concerned with how to secure basic human needs, and did not offer a proper emotional setting for some of the interviewees. Worse still, statistical recording and compilation in the polity have generally been spasmodic, unreliable, or just non-existent. The consequence of such for the present work is that we have been unable to secure all those statistics we would have wished to serve our research objectives.

The constraints enumerated above have between them served to make the work probably elude its targets of impeccability and an exhaustive treatment of its thematic concern. It nevertheless does constitute a definite and serious treatment of the theme of Police role in politics in Ghana within the years 1957 and 1979; and the drawbacks neither make the research findings inaccurate nor unreliable.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SOCIO-CULTURAL BACKGROUND

Ghana's Police is responsible for a territory of 239,460 square miles situated in the Gulf of Guinea between the francophone states of Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast and Togoland. Its compact physical terrain makes for easier communication within the state. Table One on the next page is a tabular representation of Ghana's population distribution by age and region within the years 1960 and 1970, and offers the demographic context within which the Ghana Police functions.

In point of fact the imputation of nationhood to the Ghanaian state is not really supported by empirical facts. Ghana comprises an agglomerate of ethnic groups bound together through a common set of state machinery derived from their common experience under British colonial rule.

Table Two, which immediately follows Table One, offers a general representation of these ethnic groups as well as statistics to indicate the percentage make-up of each of these ethnic groups out of the state's total population. The largest of these, the Akans, comprises a number of tribal groupings with broadly identical cultural traditions who speak various dialects of the Twi language.<sup>1</sup> Subjection to an identical colonial rule and subsequent attempts at forging statehood and nationhood out of these ethnic agglomerates have combined with forces of social change to create a common set of institutional and cultural aspects of social existence for the Ghanaian polity.

In this chapter we shall recount the historical circumstances

1. For concise accounts of Akan cultural practises and norms one may consult R.S. Rattray, Religion and Art In Ashanti, Oxford, 1927; J.B. Danquah, The Akan Doctrine of God, London 1942; Seminar On Ashanti and Brong (unpublished I.A.S. Manuscript, Legon) ed. Kwame Arhin; Eva I.R. Meyerowitz's Early History of the Akan States of Ghana, London 1974; and Chapter Two ("The Traditional Social System") of P.A. Twumasi's Medical Systems In Ghana, A Study In Medical Sociology, Accra, 1975.

For the cultural practises and norms of the other ethnic entities one may consult the following: Christine Oppong's Growing Up In Dagbon, Accra, 1973; The Rise of The Krobos, ed. E.O. Apronti, 1971, Accra; Unesco Research Into Oral Traditions of Gonja, I.A.S. unpublished manuscript; and Diana Gladys Azu's The Ga Family and Social Change, Leiden, 1974.

TABLE ONE

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GHANA'S POPULATION BY  
AGE AND REGION, 1960-1970

REGION	YEAR	UNDER 15	15-44	44-64	65 <sup>+</sup>
ACCRA CAPITAL DISTRICT	1960	39.2	49.7	8.3	2.8
	1968	47.3	41.3	9.0	2.4
	1970	42.0	48.6	7.3	2.1
EASTERN	1960	45.5	41.3	9.8	3.4
	1968	48.9	35.4	10.7	5.0
	1970	47.8	38.0	9.9	4.3
CENTRAL	1960	46.5	39.5	10.2	3.8
	1968	48.9	37.4	10.4	3.3
	1970	47.6	36.6	10.4	4.4
WESTERN	1960	41.9	46.0	9.4	2.7
	1968	46.1	39.9	10.9	3.1
	1970	45.5	42.1	9.4	3.0
VOLTA	1960	45.6	40.0	10.1	4.3
	1968	49.7	35.7	11.2	3.4
	1970	47.6	37.2	10.5	4.7
ASHANTI	1960	46.5	42.6	8.2	2.5
	1968	52.1	38.1	7.6	2.2
	1970	49.2	39.6	8.2	3.0
BRONG AHAFO	1960	46.1	43.5	7.9	2.5
	1968	51.3	35.9	9.5	3.3
	1970	48.7	39.9	8.0	3.4
NORTHERN	1960	44.7	44.5	8.2	2.5
	1968	47.5	40.2	9.4	3.3
	1970	47.2	40.9	8.6	3.4
UPPER	1960	41.7	43.8	10.9	2.6
	1968	45.1	42.5	10.6	2.9
	1970	44.6	40.1	11.2	3.3

SOURCE: Estimating Ghanaian Fertility, Mortality and Age Structure, S.K. Gaisie, University of Ghana Population Studies No.5, P.14.

culminating in the formation of the Ghanaian polity and some highlights of its history thereafter, and then delineate the Commonwealth. The 1957 Independence Constitution vested executive salient and characteristic features of the national set-up so as authority in the British Crown, represented in Ghana by a Governor to offer the socio-economic matrix within which police operations General. Legislative authority was vested in a unicameral legislature and role have been enacted within the Ghanaian context.

lature of 104 members elected on a basis of universal adult suffrage. Entrenched provisions of the constitution made for an Historical Over-view

Evolution towards independence for the Gold Coast followed the following pattern: an initial concentration of state powers in the colonial Governor and his officials in time made way for an increasingly recognized parliamentary opposition. The constitution manifested that partial fusion of legislative and executive authority characteristic of Westminster-oriented constitutions. The formulation. Thereafter there occurred an inclusion of indigenes in policy formulation, but they formed a minority on the Legislative Council, the colony's main legislative body. Over the years and in response to pressures and circumstances this minority representation became dominant and elected representation was also attained. Convention People's Party (CPP) had been seen by its opponents and Internal self-government was attained by the Gold Coast Colony in 1951; and the colonial grip was formally relinquished on 6th March, 1957. On accession to independence the Gold Coast assumed the name of Ghana. Earlier in February, the Queen had approved an Order-in-Council establishing a new constitution for Ghana and giving legal

regional assemblies was meant to meet such demand half-way. On 1st backing to her new status as an independent nation within the the 1960 Ghana became a republic within the Commonwealth. A Commonwealth. The 1957 Independence Constitution vested executive powers held earlier had made for the adoption of a new constitution, authority in the British Crown, represented in Ghana by a Governor- the 1960 Republican Constitution.

General. Legislative authority was vested in a unicameral legis- Under the new Constitution, executive powers of state were no lature of 104 members elected on a basis of universal adult suffrage. Entrenched provisions of the constitution made for an head of state. Executive powers of state were vested in a President, A independent and strong judiciary. In all, the 1957 Constitution under the previous constitution ministers of state were to be members was largely modelled on Westminster Constitutional principles and of the legislature. Electoral colleges for the adoption of presidential usages. It provided for a cabinet and prime minister and an candidates were introduced. The constitution was emphatic in asserting officially recognised parliamentary opposition. The constitution the will of the Ghanaian people as the ultimate authority of the manifested that partial fusion of legislative and executive author- constitution. Parliament was empowered to surrender part or the whole ity characteristic of Westminster-oriented constitutions. The of the sovereignty of Ghana in pursuance of a realization of a continent Constitution was not entirely devoid of local innovations, though. union of Africa. Another unique feature of the constitution was its It entrenched regional assemblies which had considerable powers conferment of legislative powers over and above that of parliament to th and which were designed to serve as a mediating institution incumbent president. Four years after its enactment two major amendments between the Central government and the body-politic. The ruling were made to the Constitution.

Convention People's Party (CPP) had been seen by its opponents and One was a proscription of all political parties other than the critics to be dictatorial, corrupt, and inept. Determined and ruling Convention People's Party. Ghana was in effect made a one-party violent agitation occurred in parts of the country for a devolution state and subjected to monolithic rule. The other amendment of governmental powers to regional and ethnic authorities so as to invested the President with power to dismiss members of the trim down the central government's power. The institution of

regional assemblies was meant to meet such demand half-way. On 1st June, 1960 Ghana became a republic within the Commonwealth. A plebiscite held earlier had made for the adoption of a new constitution, the 1960 Republican Constitution.

Under the new Constitution, executive powers of state were no more vested in the British Crown and the Queen ceased to be the country's head of state. Executive powers of state were vested in a President. As under the previous constitution ministers of state were to be members of the Legislature. Electoral colleges for the adoption of presidential candidates were introduced. The constitution was emphatic in asserting the will of the Ghanaian people as the ultimate authority of the constitution. Parliament was empowered to surrender part or the whole of the sovereignty of Ghana in pursuance of a realization of a continental union of Africa. Another unique feature of the constitution was its conferment of legislative powers over and above that of parliament to the incumbent president. Four years after its enactment two major amendments were made to the Constitution.

One was a proscription of all political parties other than the ruling Convention People's Party. Ghana was in effect made a one-party state and subjected to monolithic rule. The other amendment invested the President with power to dismiss members of the

High Court of judicature. A Preventive Detention Act (1958) passed into law made way for an indefinite detention of hundreds of citizens who had fallen out of favour with the rulers. A secret police of sorts in the form of the Ghana Young Pioneers Movement increasingly took shape; and the political atmosphere became one of insecurity and mistrust.

On 24th February, 1966, a military-cum-police coup d'etat took place; and a junta, the self-christened National Liberation Council, assumed reins of government. Its proclamation edict suspended the Republican Constitution, dismissed Nkrumah from office, dismissed his ministers, abolished the Presidential Commission set up to act in Nkrumah's absence, dismissed the National Assembly, proscribed the Convention People's Party, and relegated unto itself "until such time as a new Constitution is promulgated by the People of Ghana" the authority to "make and issue decrees which shall have the force of law" within the polity.<sup>2</sup> At least one serious attempt to topple the National Liberation Council (NLC) made up of leading servicemen in the army and police occurred. On 17th April, 1967 a section of the army wrestled power from the Council but lost

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2. Proclamation For the Constitution of A National Liberation Council For the Administration of Ghana And for Other Matters Connected Therewith, Accra, 1966.

junta. Its composition indicated a preponderance of army personnel

it almost immediately to the same Council. <sup>3</sup> Like

In 1969 a new constitution was enacted, and civil rule was restored. The NLC handed over to a democratically-elected Progress Party. The 1969 Constitution was designed to offer a legal framework for undisturbed civil non-tyrannical rule. It marked a reversion to the Westminster model of the liberal-democratic state. Entrenched provisions made for the institution of a multi-party state and an untampered enjoyment of civil liberties in the body-politic. It instituted a ceremonial presidency in which was vested all executive authority. Actual exercise of the authority devolved upon a prime minister and a cabinet of ministers who belonged to the legislative arm of the state as well. Further constitutional provisions made for a judiciary independent of executive and legislative interference, and through powers of judicial review granted the superior courts of jurisdiction, offered it authority to declare executive acts ultra vires. The Progress Party held power under the framework of this constitution till 13th January, 1972 when through another coup d'etat, a change in regimes occurred. Under (then) Colonel Ignatius Acheampong, a section of the nation's army wrestled power from its civilian incumbents and established a National Redemption Council as ruling junta. Its composition indicated a preponderance of army personnel

quite unlike it was with the National Liberation Council.<sup>3</sup> Like the latter Council, however, it vested executive and legislative Powers of state in itself and issued legislative edicts (termed decrees) within the polity. Barely three years later the legislative and executive authority vested in the National Redemption Council got shifted to a new ruling body termed the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The SMC comprised the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (General I.K. Acheampong) and all service commanders and the Inspector-General of the Police. Further changes were to occur. On 5th July, 1978, General Acheampong's colleagues on the SMC forced him to resign and General F.W.K. Akuffo assumed chairmanship of the SMC. Composition of the Council continued to comprise service

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3. The National Redemption Council on inauguration comprised Colonel I.K. Acheampong, Brigadier N.Y.R. Ashley-Larsen, Brigadier Charles Beausoliel, Colonel E.A. Erskine, Colonel J.C. Adjetey, Lt.Colonel C.D. Benni, Major A.H. Selormey, Major R.M. Baah, Major K.B. Agbo; Major R.J. Felli - (all serving soldiers); Mr. J.H. Cobbina who was Inspector-General of Police, and Mr. E.N. Moore, the Attorney-General. The National Liberation Council on inauguration comprised Lt.Gen. J.A. Ankrah, Mr. J.W.K. Harlley (the Inspector-General of Police); Major-General E.K. Kotoka, Mr. B.A. Yakubu (Deputy Commissioner of Police); Brigadier A.K. Ocran, Mr. J.E.O. Nunoo (Commissioner of Police); Colonel A.A. Afrifa, and Mr. A.K. Deku (Commissioner of Police, Criminal Investigations Department). One notes that whilst the National Redemption Council (NRC) comprised one policeman and ten soldiers, the National Liberation Council (NLC) comprised four soldiers and four policemen.

commanders and the Inspector-General of Police; and the Council's executive and legislative authority remained unchanged. On 4th June, 1979 another coup d'etat occurred. It was staged by the rank and file of the army with the connivance of a few non-commissioned officers. The coup displaced the SMC from power and placed in its stead an Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in which was vested executive and legislative powers. The 1979 coup d'etat differed from previous ones on account of its preponderant reliance on the rank and file (the 'men', as against the 'officers') in the army; and also on account of its style of rule. It made considerable use of force of arms and physical coercion (or threats of it) in pursuing moral and patriotic goals it set itself; and by and large it absolutely disregarded the niceties and conventions of the legal process. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council held on to power till September 24th 1979 when it relinquished it to a democratically-elected civilian administration. This was after it had promulgated a new Constitution, the 1979 Constitution, to be the legal bedrock

for the third attempt at civil rule. Constitution; the 1960

Republican Constitution; the 1969 Second Republican

The preceding historical over-view has, inter alia, served to delineate the historical evolution of the polity and to make the point that the polity has been through considerable instability and fluidity as regards its constitutional base and the personality of

individual power-wielders. There has been an on-going process of shifts and changes manifested in regime-changes and constitution enactments; all in an effort to establish the legal framework and institutional base requisite for a realization of the goals of the incumbents of political power.

Within the years 1957 to 1979 (with which years the present work is primarily concerned), it is a historical fact that constitutions operative at one time or the other for that period in all add up to four.<sup>4</sup> In addition, various juntas assumed political power; and in the course of time either underwent structural changes (as with the NRC to the SMC), changes in membership (as with each and all of the military-cum-police juntas), or changes in style of rule, policies, and in orientation. We conclude, on the basis of such evidence, that the polity as at those years with which our study is concerned, is characterised by poorly institutionalized political structures and may be said on that account to fit the

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4. These are the 1957 Independence Constitution; the 1960 Republican Constitution; the 1969 Second Republican Constitution; and the 1979 Third Republican Constitution.

praetorean model of state.<sup>5</sup> Police role-enactment as delineated in the succeeding chapters, occurred within such social context.

### The Economy

Ghana's pre-colonial economy was self-sufficient with regard to food-production, and it was oriented to meet internal needs. Euro-African contact in the fifteenth century on the coast ultimately culminated in fundamental changes being worked on the economy. Trade relations with Europe largely involved an exchange of (black) slaves, pepper, ivory and gold from the indigenes, for European alcohol, clothing, gun-powder and cartridges. Under the colonial experience, colonial practices and laws achieved the effect of an abandonment of socio-economic structures and processes oriented to meet indigenous needs and interests and replaced those with disoriented institutions. With the colonial imposition, the economy became a peripheral appendage of the British economy.

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5. Perlmutter writes that in a praetorean state, the motivation of the army to intervene in politics is political; and such armies are either Arbitrator-type or Ruler-type. A State could be praetorean before its army becomes praetorean, viz:- p.9, The Political Influence Of The Military (ed. Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Bernet), Yale University Press, 1980. See page 4 also of that work for a concise discussion of praetorianism.

It was assigned the task of producing particular primary commodities. Cocoa-beans, timber and gold became the specialty of the Gold Coast. The production was primarily geared towards serving colonial (metropolitan) interests. The role of the colonial state was simply to establish and maintain the socio-economic framework conducive to the pursuit of those goals; and to facilitate colonial mercantile interests as regards the colonies. No really serious and sustained measure of industrial production nor any attempt at such occurred in the colonial state. Industrialization and industrial production became the exclusive preserve of the metropole. In bare essentials such was the colonial economy. It has virtually withstood the formal cessation of colonial rule and we only need pinpoint the novel aspects and trends of the post-colonial era to complete our portrait of the essential features of the Ghanaian economy.

In 1951, with the attainment of internal self-government by the Gold Coast, its Convention People's Party government embarked upon a policy of massive production of social and economic infrastructure. Along with the policy went a liberalization of the economy. The objective of the liberalization move was to lure international capital to invest in the economy. Tax exemptions, assurances against nationalization, and guarantees against state

interference in the movement of international capital were made. Two decades later, out of disenchantment with those policies in the laissez-faire vein, the government took increasingly to socialist-oriented economic policies. It was all in an effort to meet the massive populist expectations of a better life promised to follow in the wake of independence. State capitalism assumed enormous dimensions in the economy as the state got intricately involved in the establishment, financing, and the administration of virtually all significant economic concerns and enterprises within the state. Liberalization as a policy gave way to an imposition of trade restrictions and a system of import licensing. Economic ties were established and strengthened with Warsaw pact countries at the expense of the traditional close and dependent reliance on the Western bloc.

The 1966 coup d'etat led to a re-alignment with the West and a return to the pre-1960 order of near-absolute dependence on the West for (fiscal, technical, and cultural) aid. Import restrictions and licensing were not however done away with. Subsequent regimes have in turn sought through legislative edicts to let Ghanaians assume ownership of as many enterprises within the state as possible. There has also been much rhetoric on movement, towards national 'self-reliance' as regards the production of goods and services to

meet demands emanating within the state. Efforts to break the mono-cultural base of the economy and establish in its place a truly-diversified and integrated economy have not amounted to much. A similar failure has attended the frantic efforts under Nkrumah's presidency to introduce heavy industry into the economy. In terms of structural orientation therefore, the Ghanaian economy has not undergone any fundamental alteration from the colonial economy. This has been so notwithstanding the various regimes and juntas that have exercised rule in the country and the peculiar style of rule assumed by each one of them.

The economy has been characterised of late, particularly between 1961 and 1979, with a low level of productivity, persistent and escalating inflation, a sagging and sluggish economic growth rate, excessive liquidity, unemployment, widespread shortages of basic goods and services, chronic food deficits, and an increasing flight of nationals to other lands in quest of improved life conditions. Further features of the economy are deteriorating terms of trade, deteriorating balance of payments position, an enormous national debt, and sporadic outbreaks of industrial disputes and such other acts of labour unrest. A tabular representation of the economic activities of Ghana's population aged fifteen and over for specified years is offered in Table Three on the next page, and

TABLE THREEECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF GHANA'S POPULATION AGED 15 AND  
OVER BY SEX AND IN PERCENTAGES - 1960-70

ACTIVITY	MALE			FEMALE			TOTAL		
	1960	1968	1970	1960	1968	1970	1960	1968	1970
Employed	83.3	78.4	77.1	53.6	73.6	61.1	68.6	75.8	69.0
Unemployed	5.8	3.9	6.4	3.0	1.6	2.4	4.4	2.7	4.3
Homemakers	0.6	3.4	1.0	36.7	16.6	26.1	18.4	10.4	13.8
Students	6.0	11.6	-	1.8	4.9	-	3.9	8.1	-
Aged and Disabled	3.3	2.0	-	4.6	2.6	-	4.0	2.3	-
Others	1.1	0.7	15.5	0.3	0.7	10.4	0.7	0.7	12.9

SOURCE: S.K. Gaisie, Estimating Ghanaian Fertility, Mortality and Age Structure, op.cit., p.12.

TABLE FOUR

PERSONS ENGAGED IN WAGE-EARNING EMPLOYMENT IN GHANA  
(1967-1970)

WAGE-EARNING EMPLOYMENT	1967	1968	1969	1970
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	43,654	47,536	46,516	58,929
Mining and Quarrying	26,299	26,236	25,955	25,248
Manufacturing	41,155	44,849	52,874	52,785
Construction	47,790	54,783	57,467	49,993
Electricity, Water and Sanitary	14,381	16,023	17,642	14,780
Commerce	35,628	36,913	35,930	35,929
Transport, Storage and Communication	29,962	36,374	29,571	32,543
Services	122,477	128,547	134,859	137,761
T O T A L	361,351	391,261	400,814	397,968

SOURCE: Africa South of the Sahara, 1975, London, p.366.

Table Four offer details on persons in wage-earning employment for specified years. service and other public institutions. It consists therefore of high civil servants, the commissioned Social Structure and Cultural Matrix and the police, and

The social scene evidences definite stratification along socio-economic lines. The stratification however lacks the rigidity and fortitude marking class divisions in Europe, Latin America, and other older states. Pre-capitalist stratifications co-exist in truncated forms with those deriving from the prevalent capitalist mode of production. We shall now identify the particular social factions that make up the state's social structure. There is a bourgeois stratum which owns the state's major means of production not under state ownership. The bourgeois faction owns the means of industrial and mineral production either in isolation, in partnership with the state, or in partnership with one another. It mainly comprises expatriates who normally are resident outside the country. Coming closely after this numerically fragile bourgeois proper is a massive and heterogenous petty-bourgeois stratum. Unlike the bourgeois proper, the petty-bourgeois is made up mainly of indigenes who do not actually own <sup>and</sup> of the major production concerns. It is a composite unit out of which one may discern particular factions. There is a bureaucratic petty-bourgeois

stratum. This strand man the administrative and policy-making echelons of the civil service and other public institutions. It consists therefore of high civil servants, the commissioned officers of the state's military institutions and the police, and the top-most personnel in the public corporations. As a group the bureaucratic petty-bourgeois is crucial and its influence mostly decisive in policy formulation and its implementation. It has undergone considerable growth in numbers as a result of a successful 'Ghanaianization' policy; and also because of the expanding role of the state in the economy and in the provision of social infrastructure. Its weighty influence derives from the fact that the State's role in the economy is largely one of patronage, award and control; and these state officials are therefore in a position to determine more decisively than it is elsewhere the socio-economic position of individuals, local communities, and the entire nation-state at large.<sup>6</sup>

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6. For empirical substantiation of these characterizations, see Maxwell Owusu's Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case-Study of Continuity And Change In The Politics of Ghana, 1970.

The petty-bourgeois also comprises a Comprador faction. The members of this strand characteristically serve as indigenous frontsmen for international (mainly Western, but now widening to include Warsaw-pact states) capital. In those few instances where the comprador strike into business on their own they do not, as Frantz Fanon noted, do so as 'captains of industry'. Rather, they tend to take to the merchandising of foreign wares. By far the great majority of Ghanaian 'businessmen' fall within the Comprador stratum of the local petty-bourgeois. Further within petty-bourgeois ranks in Ghana one discerns what for want of a better categorization may be termed the 'professional' petty-bourgeois. It refers to the intelligentsia in universities and research centres, lawyers, accountants, surveyors, and such other professional personnel not directly assigned to any state bureau. In terms of life-style these shades of the petty-bourgeois ape (with varying rates of success) the life-style and mannerisms of the bourgeois class in Western Europe.

In the absence of a numerically significant Ghana-based bourgeois proper, these factions of the petty-bourgeoisie pose as a national bourgeoisie. It makes frantic and determined attempts at living up to an ethic of ostentatious consumption of the output

of industrial technology. There is as well a feudal aristocracy of chiefs and royalist owners of large tracts of land. This aristocracy, together with the 'national bourgeoisie', essentially make up the state's 'dominant' class' - or if one so wishes to put it, its 'ruling elite' (C. Wright Mills). Well underneath these privileged social strata in terms of status and influence is a peasantry of rural-based small-holding agricultural producers whose toil yields the nation's crops/domestically-produced food and items. Quite the vast majority of this peasantry are land-owning cultivators who actually till the land. A significant number of other tillers however are producers whose farm produce are shared in pre-determined ratios with rural landowners and urban absentee 'farmers'.

A proletariat of factory hands exist. Owing to the limited success of attempts at bringing an industrial economy into shape within the state, the numbers of this proletariat is considerably modest. There as well exist within the social structure the inevitable de classe element of prostitutes, unemployed, and unemployables. It is this type of social setting that the Ghana Police is duty-bound to serve. We have thus far been concerned with stratifications deriving from one's relation to the means of

7. According to the 1960 Census, the spread of religious groups is as follows:  
 Christians: 42.8%  
 Traditional Religions: 38.2%

production. Immensely consequential as class relations indeed is, it need be noted nevertheless that our concern thus far is not to imply that socio-economic class divisions apart, Ghanaian society is an absolutely cohesive unit with no seams. The ubiquitous religious differences prevail. Only a small proportion of the population are outright atheists. The majority of nationals make claims to membership of various christian sects, particularly in southern and central Ghana. Islam is the principal religion in the northmost parts of the country.<sup>7</sup> Profession of any one of these religions however has for most adherents not involved an abstention from numerous animistic practices linked with the traditional cosmogony. A significant minority still hold on to traditional religious practises without claims to either Christianity or Islam. Oriental religious practises are not non-existent in the community; but its adherent are few indeed.

7. According to the 1960 Census, the spread of religious groups country-wide and in percentages is as follows:

Christians: 42.8%

Trad. Religions: 38.2%

Muslims: 12.0%

No Religion: 7.0%

Muslims: 12.0%

## TABLE FIVE

Syncretism has been a salient feature of the nation's religious life. Religion is quite prominent in the idiom and thought of most Ghanaians, and looms high in beliefs and practises. Ethnic pride and inter-ethnic animosities are prevalent; though irredentism and sub-national ethnic conflicts have not been as challenging and problematic to incumbent rulers as has been the experience in near-by Nigeria for example. The vast majority of human settlements are rural. Modern amenities and facilities are however located almost exclusively in the few urban areas.

A tabular representation of the country's urban and rural population for 1960 and 1968 is offered in Table Five on the next page. All the ethnic groups in the state pay much significance to kinship ties. Kinship determines for the individual his social duties and role as well as his rights and privileges. Some of the ethnic groups are matrilineal. The Akans are an instance in that regard. Others, like the Gas, are patrilineally oriented. It must be stated that Western acculturation has over the years made much inroad into this traditional fabric at the expense of the customary order of things. Marriage is still conceived as a union not so much between two consenting individuals as between families which become merged through the marital bond. Social change and Western acculturation are making for an increasing orientation

TABLE FIVE

URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION (BY REGION) FOR 1960 AND 1968  
(IN PERCENTAGES)

REGION	Urban		Rural	
	Percent 1960	Percent 1968	Percent 1960	Percent 1968
Accra Capital District	80	72	20	28
Eastern	20	20	80	80
Central and Western	26	32	74	68
Ashanti	25	22	75	78
Brong Ahafo	16	29	84	71
Volta	13	34	87	66
Northern and Upper	8	23	92	77
GHANA	23	30	77	70

SOURCE: S.K. Gaisie, op.cit., p.22.

meant to advance local communal and ethnic interests or to secure personal welfare facilities and aid for its members. The society is plural rather than monolithic; and the state and its institutions are entirely secular. The state remains the undisputed largest employer of labour. Its statutes do not show any anti-feminist slant as regards employment opportunities and payment policy.

To conclude, a diversity of influences have contributed to shape the polity's social structure and cultural matrix. Most prominent among these have been traditional pre-colonial usages and beliefs, Christianity, Islam, Western acculturation, and sheer ubiquitous social change. It is within the resultant social context and in response to it that the Ghana Police Force carries out its day-to-day workings.

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1. "The term 'police' is relatively new. Taken from the French who, in turn, adopted it from the Latin 'politia', the word literally means 'power of the people'. It has come to have a two-fold meaning in modern times. On the one hand it refers to the authority of the people to do whatever they think best for their general welfare and prosperity, i.e. the police power of the state; while on the other, it pertains to the police function, especially in the prevention, detection and prosecution of public crimes and nuisances." Raymond E. Clift, Guide to Modern Police Thinking.

CHAPTER THREETHE GHANA POLICE FORCE

Police<sup>1</sup> functions were carried out within the various traditional pre-colonial polities; though no definite social institution as such was exclusively devoted to its performance. Deviations from accepted rules of conduct were checked through sanctions whose enforcement was the work of special officials. At each ruler's court, for example, were officials who could be dispatched to effect the arrest and presentation for trial of those accused of criminal offences. These court officials (the 'ahenkwa' in Akan communities - from 'ahene nkoa', king's servants) run petty errands for the ruler and constituted an important part of every royal retinue. The subject was duty-bound on point of death or some other severe sanction to attend to the

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1. "The term 'police' is relatively new. Taken from the French who, in turn, adopted it from the Latin 'politia', the word literally means 'power of the people'. It has come to have a two-fold meaning in modern times. On the one hand it refers to the authority of the people to do whatever they think best for their general welfare and prosperity, i.e. the police power of the state; while on the other, it pertains to the police function, especially in the prevention, detection and prosecution of public crimes and nuisances."
- Raymond E. Clift, Guide To Modern Police Thinking.

king's call as expressed through this class of courtiers. 'Asafo' companies (a para-military organization of a town's youth to meet communal needs such as countering aggression, searching for lost community members, and cleaning up the streams and other public places) constituted another pre-colonial social institution which carried out the police function of law enforcement. Yet another of such institutions were the 'akwansrafo' (road wardens) of Ashanti particularly, who were domiciled at various points on the main highway.

"The main concern of these road wardens was to prevent guns and powder from being sold beyond metropolitan Ashanti"; and "the purpose of this embargo was to ensure continued Ashanti supremacy in muskets over the bow and arrow-wielding people of the northern Gold Coast."<sup>2</sup> We have sought to establish the performance of police functions in traditional society and to identify particular social institutions concerned with their performance.

The incident is as follows: an Ashanti trader came to the fort's policeman; in course of which exchange the trader spoke in similar fashion of the fort's European policeman. The policeman's act of ascription (from Ashanti) of the fort's policeman, in course of which exchange the trader spoke in similar fashion of the fort's European policeman. The policeman's act of ascription (from Ashanti) of the fort's policeman, in course of which exchange the trader spoke in similar fashion of the fort's European policeman. The policeman's act of ascription (from Ashanti) of the fort's policeman, in course of which exchange the trader spoke in similar fashion of the fort's European policeman.

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2. Asante And Its Neighbours, 1700-1807, J.K. Fynn, Northwestern University Press, 1971, p.120.

side: Ward, A History Of The Gold Coast, pp.163-169.

Police actually emerged. Before 1844 the various merchant companies policed <sup>its</sup> their forts to maintain in its precincts the peace essential for the conduct of their trade. The land on which most of these forts stood were still owned by African rulers, and were only hired out to the European merchants. The influence of these private police organizations were therefore confined to the forts only, and did not extend to the indigenes outside those settlements. They constituted a private police force since the merchants were a private concern and colonial rule had not as yet been imposed on the Gold Coast. Ward reports on an incident which attests to the existence of this private police organization.<sup>3</sup>

In 1828, the British government agreed on the Gold Coast being administered by a committee of three London Merchants nominated by it and paid £4,000 per annum to meet administrative

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3. The incident is as follows: an Ashanti trader came to the Anomabu Fort and happened to exchange angry words with one of the fort's policemen; in course of which exchange the policeman spoke insultingly of the Ashanti king and the trader spoke in similar fashion of the fort's European governor. The policeman's act of sacrilege (from Ashanti customary viewpoint) offended the Ashanti, who managed to kidnap and eventually beheaded the policeman. The affair almost culminated in yet another Anglo-Asante military confrontation.
- vide: Ward, A History Of The Gold Coast, pp.168-169.



expenses, and the settlements being governed by a Governor and an elected council whose jurisdiction was limited to 'the forts, roadstead, or harbours thereunto adjoining, as well as the persons residing therein'.<sup>4</sup> The first governor appointed in this regard and under such terms was Captain George Maclean. He had at his disposal a police force of a hundred and twenty men.

The main duty of this police force was to ensure the continual safety and undisturbed usage of the various trade routes that led to the European forts. In point of fact these were tasks far above its reach on account of its small numbers; but it did perform other tasks as well. One was to guard particular persons of public importance. Maclean, in this wise, had a corporal as a guard.<sup>5</sup> A further duty was to send intelligence reports relating to troop movements, preparation for war, commerce, and local political developments to the Governor at the fort.<sup>6</sup> A judicial

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4. See Chapter Two, the historical over-view of the present work.

5. See Ward, op.cit., p.183

6. Maclean for example, in the words of Ward, "...scattered the greater part of his small police force as resident constables at the courts of all the prominent chiefs; with instructions to keep him informed of everything that was going on". Ward, A History of the Gold Coast, p.184.

court based at the fort increasingly attracted litigants from the surrounding settlements; and the fort's police served in this court also. The point being made is that with the growth of British influence and jurisdiction on the Gold Coast, a peculiar form of police organization was fashioned out by the developing colonial government to help it realize the ends of its government. The effect of the Bond of 1844 was to legalise the jurisdiction that had grown up in the 'Protectorate' under Maclean's influence. The Bond deserves quotation here on account of its heavy import for the development of colonial police force. It reads:

"Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Britain and Ireland within divers countries and places adjacent to Her Majesty's forts and settlements on the Gold Coast; we, chiefs of countries and places so rereferred to, adjacent to the said forts and settlements, do hereby ACKNOWLEDGE THAT POWER AND JURISDICTION,<sup>7</sup> and declare that the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and property.

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7. Our own capitalization; meant to emphasise.

2. Human sacrifices and other barbarous customs, such as panyarring, are abominations and contrary to the law.
3. Murders, robberies, and other crimes and offences will be TRIED and INQUIRED OF BEFORE THE QUEEN'S JUDICIAL OFFICERS and the chiefs of the districts, moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of British law. Done at Cape Coast before His Excellency the Lieutenant Governor on this 6th day of March, in the year of our Lord, 1844".

Signatories to the Bond were the Governor, the Adjutant of the colonial Militia and Police, the commanding officer of the colonial regiment, and on the other hand, quite a number of the coastal chiefs who thereby opted to join the British 'Protectorate'. In this Protectorate legal enactments and its enforcement proceeded with a view to "...moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of British law." The colonial rules and regulations were also meant to facilitate a realization of the economic motivations underlying colonial conquest and the operations of the colonial state. It was the duty of the colonial police to enforce these laws. It was therefore a crucial bedrock

of the colonial state and this is evidenced by the fact that the Inspector-General of the Troops (which troops involved the colonial militia and the colonial police organization) was almost throughout the 19th century an ex-officio member of the Governor's Executive Council.

We have made the point above that functions which fall within police practices were carried out in the pre-colonial traditional polities, but that no exclusively-police organization as such existed. We have as well shown how European merchants 'policed' their forts and its vicinities in an effort to maintain an atmosphere conducive to their trade in gold and slaves; and we have also traced the development of police institution and practices in the polity alongside the gradual assumption of colonial authority by the British Crown.

#### Historical Development

The Ghana Police Force (known in the pre-independence epoch as the Gold Coast Police Force) however had its actual inception in 1894 with the stationing of a seven-hundred-man-strong militia in the Gold Coast. The militia was brought in from Northern Nigeria to help maintain 'Pax Britannica' for the expanding Gold

Coast sphere of the British Empire. Four hundred of this assembly of seven hundred constituted the embryonic core out of which the Gold Coast Police Force was formed. The remaining three hundred became the First Gold Coast Regiment, out of which the Ghana Army was ultimately to evolve.

From its very beginnings the Gold Coast Force was oriented for action within its own social context: the British colony of the Gold Coast. It was meant to be the arm of the colonial state primarily concerned with quelling riots and insurrections, maintaining a Pax Britannica over the colonised peoples and territory, and compelling adherence to rules and regulations meant for a realization of the ends of the colonial state. An identification of these ends need not entangle us here; but we need note in this account of the development of Ghana's police institution that it was conceived as an organization of force, began on such basis, and has ever since remained as such.

It began with an entirely alien militia brought into being by a different alien (and colonising) power. The motive underlying its formation lay in the colonising power's desire to have always at hand and for instant use a body of armed, disciplined and reliable men to quell riots, insurrections, break-down of the civil

order or challenges to such, and to meet with force of arms acts within the polity deemed disruptive to a realization of the ends of the colonial state. From its establishment in 1894 till 1902 the Force performed the general police duties of arrest, crime detection and prevention, guarding (of European residential quarters, office blocks, and topmost officials), prosecution of crime, and a general maintenance of the colonial socio-legal framework.

In 1902 the Force was divided into two major sections: an Escort Branch comprising complete illiterates and the barely literate who performed the tasks of arrest, riot-quelling, insurrection-suppression, and those other police tasks largely requiring brawn; and a relatively-smaller General Police Branch which manned station counters and did the clerical and other tasks of the colonial police. Both branches continued to be under the same centralised and uniform command. Table Six on the next page lists commanders of the Gold Coast Police Force and the Inspector-Generals of the Ghana Police Force from its inception to date. The change in nomenclature from Commander and Commandant to Inspector-General for the topmost police personnel occurred with the change in colonial status.

TABLE SIXCOMMANDERS: GOLD COAST/GHANA POLICE FORCE

NAME OF OFFICER	RANK	FROM	TO
Major A.W. Kitson	COP	1894	8/8/10
E.V. Collins	COP	20/8/10	1915
E.V. Collins	IGP	1915	24/4/17
D.R.A. Bettington	IGP	25/4/17	1924
Lt.Col. H.W.M. Bamford, O.B.E.; M.C.; C.B.E.	IGP	27/8/24	3/1/38
Capt. E.C. Nottingham, M.G.	COP	8/10/38	21/5/44
Capt. R.H.W. Ballantyne, C.B.E.	COP	21/5/44	18/8/48
Capt. P. Eckel	COP	18/8/48	25/5/49
M.K.N. Collens, C.M.G.; C.B.E.	COP	21/2/49	31/12/49
A.L. Alexander, C.B.E.; O.B.E.	COP	1/5/58	15/2/59
E.R.T. Madjitey, C.B.E.	COP	9/10/58	8/1/64
J.W.K. Harlley	COP	1/1/65	24/2/66
J.W.K. Harlley, M.O.V.	IGP	25/2/66	23/9/69
B.A. Yakubu, M.O.V.; G.M.	IGP	27/9/69	12/6/71
R.D. Ampaw, B.L.	IGP	14/6/71	13/1/72
J.H. Cobbina, G.M.	IGP	13/1/72	29/9/74
Ernest Arko, C.V.; D.S.O.	IGP	30/9/74	17/7/78
B.S.K. Kwakye, O.S.G.; D.S.O.	IGP	17/7/78	4/6/79
C.O. Lamptey, B.L.	IGP	4/6/79	27/11/79
F.P. Kyei, B.A. (Hons)	IGP	27/11/79	6 <sup>th</sup> Oct. 1981
R. Kugblemu	IGP	6 <sup>th</sup> Oct. 1981	to date

Note: COP means (Commissioner of Police)

IGP means (Inspector-General of Police)

SOURCE: Ghana Police Archives, through the Registry, Ghana Police Headquarters, Accra.

In 1948 a Reserve Wing of the Gold Coast Police was set up to help cope with the socio-political unrest in the colony in the wake of the Second World War. Ex-servicemen were intensely dissatisfied with the negligible rehabilitation provisions made for them on their disbandment and directed their wrath against the colonial government. The mass of Gold Coasters on their part, were disaffected with the colonial state largely on account of the scarcity and inflationary spiral prevalent in post-war society.

Disaffection with the colonial state and its white agents in the immediate post-war era was therefore widespread; and this disaffection manifested itself in outbreaks of riots, unlawful demonstrations, looting and arson. The Police Reserve was meant to augment the regular police in countering those manifestations of native disaffection with the colonial state. Largely in reaction to this social situation of tension and unrest, a Special Branch was formed within the Police in 1949 to deal with politically-motivated crimes and the security of the colonial state.

Wireless communication was introduced into the Force ~~also~~ in 1949, when a Police Information Room was opened in Accra. The Women Police division commenced in 1952 with a batch of twelve women; and was meant to perform general police functions in addition to dealing with juvenile cases.

A Marine Police formed in 1916 was disbanded in 1942 and its duties appropriately taken over by the Customs and Excise Department. A Police Band meant to boost morale was formed in 1918; and in 1924 the Criminal Investigations Department and with it finger-printing, were introduced into the Gold Coast Police Force. 1930 marked the building of a depot for the training of Gold Coast Police recruits. A Native Authority Police co-existing with the Gold Coast Police Force on co-ordinate and autonomous basis was absorbed into the regular Ghana Police Force on the attainment of independence. The Native Authority Police was an assembly of natives in each locality paid by the respective local authorities. These men were to enforce local customary laws, deal with summary offences, and act as baillifs for the traditional courts held by the various local chiefs.

Table Seven on the next page offers a representation of the total number of policemen in the Gold Coast/Ghana Police Force for each tenth year since 1900 to 1960; and as well indicated the number of persons convicted in each of those years through the due process of the law; and the daily average number of prisoners and average cost per head to the state for each of those years.

We have recounted the historical circumstances culminating in

TABLE SEVENPOLICE AND PRISONS

Year	No. of Police	No. of Persons Convicted	Daily Ave. No. of Prisoners	Ave. Daily Cost (Per Head) in Shillings
1900	534	--	402	-
1910	742	12,339	931	3.33
1920	1,449	10,797	1,592	5.77
1930	2,025	22,162	1,825	2.88
1940	-	25,392	2,265	2.74
1950	-	-	3,428	9.10
1960	7,366	31,202	5,296	21.0

Note: Based upon Police Department Reports, Colonial Reports, and the Prison Department Reports.

SOURCE: Extracted from page 418 of G.B. Kay's THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLONIALISM IN GHANA. A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS AND STATISTICS, 1900-1960.

the establishment of the police in Ghanaian society. From a historical perspective the organization is seen as yet another example of a transfer of a social institution in a colonising country to the different socio-economic context of a colonised territory. We hurriedly note though that the Ghanaian police institution does not exactly follow its British model; and we shall soon indicate these divergencies. Functionaries of the Gold Coast Police Force perceived it as an organization belonging not so much to Gold Coast society or its peoples as to the colonial government; and therefore felt responsible to the latter. The viewpoint stemmed largely from the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the organization in 1894. As has been explained above, the Gold Coast police organization was conceived as a force and was organized as such.

It was organized on para-military lines in view of its allotted role of being the colonial state's force of arms always at hand and in constant preparedness to counteract and eliminate internal challenges to colonial authority. It is interesting to note that the British police organization lacked that degree of force characteristic of the colonial police; and neither was the former as unified and centralised as was the case with the Gold Coast Police Force. The latter resided strictly in barracks

detached from civilian settlements; in an effort to keep police-civilian unofficial inter-relationships and interaction at the barest minimum. This was also peculiar to the Gold Coast police as compared with the police organization in the colonial metropole. It must be stated though that compared with the military's, the segregation of the police was less severe. These instances of adaptation in institutional transfer, of innovative deviations from the British police model, served to promote the functional efficiency of the colonial police in meeting its peculiar role in (colonial) society.

As with most other para-military organizations the Gold Coast police force comprised a commanding echelon of few officers (mostly retired army personnel in the Gold Coast instance); and a mass of (African) recruits. The officer-rank of the hierarchy was the exclusive preserve of Europeans. The fact that these officers tended to have military background served to strengthen the para-military orientation of the police. They sought to instil in the police organization drill practises and an organizational cohesiveness normally associated with the military.

A wide social chasm founded on race, status and life-style however existed between white officer and black recruit; and

officer-class and recruits alike felt responsible and accountable to the Governor and his agents and not to the Gold Coast society nor its peoples. Training of recruits was oriented towards enhancing physical fitness and instilling instant obedience to commands in them; and the deliberate effort in most police organizations to bring functionaries to a thorough understanding of their social context lacked in the colonial police force. Recruitment policy evidenced a blatant preference for the illiterates and the barely-literate; who were more likely to internalise the organizational norm of instant, unquestioned, and unswerving obedience to given instructions. Like it was with the colonial army, the colonial police was, in the words of one of its functionaries, 'regarded as a last resort' - one joined it only after failure in other spheres of life. Part of the colonial policy was to keep intellectuals out of the force. One reason was to ensure the security of the tenure of office of the white officers. More importantly, it was to ensure that blind obedience to the colonial authorities obtained from the semi-literate and illiterate policemen is not destroyed. It was the general view of the whites that the Escorts who were illiterate were more efficient

than the General Police; who were literate.<sup>8</sup>

Most of the recruits were from the Northern Territories, whose denizens were reputed to be trustworthy, martial and unassuming; and which territory had been the least problematic to the colonising power in the long history of Euro-African contact in the Gold Coast.<sup>9</sup>

The colonial police did not at all care to present any particular image of itself to society. Its only concern was to perform those tasks we have delineated and to obey to the letter all instructions handed it by the colonial government. Its modus operandi was one of excessive show of force with a view to intimidate the native population, suppress its riotous acts, deter it from insurrection, and keep this native population in frightened submission to the colonial master. In its dealings with even mere

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8. Interview with E.R.T. Madjitey, O.B.E., Queen's Police Medal (1955) winner, and first African Commandant of the Police Force; at Asitey on 3rd April, 1981.
9. See Cynthia Enloe's Ethnic Soldiers: State Security In A Divided World for a discussion of such selective recruitment policy for purposes of state security. That book gives as well other empirical instances of governments' usage of such policy as a measure to keep to power.

suspects and accused persons in civil suits, the colonial police was on most occasions still not averse to the usage of force - and became noted throughout the society for its "talk-true"<sup>10</sup> slaps: slaps meted by the police corporal, constable, sergeant or any other police functionary at the station to the "evidently guilty" suspect or accused person to induce the latter to speak the truth and come out with a sincere confession.

The most handy and popular weapon of the colonial police was the truncheon<sup>11</sup>; and this was held by the recruit on virtually all his public outings.

On the attainment of independence the Gold Coast Police Force had its name changed to the Ghana Police Force. Another change which occurred at that epoch was a considerable increase in the number of police stations in the country - the change occurring

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10. Ghanaian pidgin English for 'speak the truth'. It was said in rhythmic accompaniment of slaps to the accused offender.
11. Truncheon is called 'Koti' in the native languages of Akan, Ga, and Adangbe. This fact of a constant wielding of the truncheon (or 'Koti') by policemen has given rise to a situation in the country whereby police functionaries and their institution has been given the nickname 'Koti' - after that 'indispensable' part of appropriate police 'apparel'.



in the direction of a spread of stations from the towns and urban areas to more and more of the rural, remote and outlandish parts of the country. In many of the latter areas police posts were established, rather than the bigger and more common police station. Other changes were an increase in the numerical strength of the Force and an opening up of the 'officer-class' echelon of the Force to Ghanaians.

In 1958, one year after independence, an Armoured Car Squadron was formed within the Police Organization, and its duties largely comprised guarding the state's Chief Executive. Another year later, in 1959, a local Police College for the training of police officers was also opened; while the Police Depot continued to concern itself with the training of recruits.

The Ghana Police Force has been concerned with maintaining a favourable public image and has in this wise established a Public Relations Directorate within its ranks. It has as well discarded the uniform of the Gold Coast Police Force. These changes apart, no really fundamental change has occurred with regard to the colonial legacy of the Gold Coast Police; which on independence became the Ghana Police Force.

In the post-independence era it has variously been officially

termed the Ghana Police Force and the Ghana Police Service. Most of the post-independence constitutions gave the organization the nomenclature Police Service; and the latter name still obtains for the organization. The concern with nomenclature derives from the desire to let the police organization be identified in the public's mind as another service organization existing to cater for society's interest and its general welfare. It is meant to de-emphasise the place of force in the organization, to erase any conception of it as an essentially repressive set-up, and to give it a favourable public image. The abandonment of the 'Police Force' nomenclature for 'Police Service' by Ghana's police organization has however not involved any fundamental shift in its orientations and role-performance.

The change has largely been only at the level of semantics; and most members of the general public as if in recognition of that fact, tend to use Ghana Police Force and Ghana Police Service interchangeably.

#### Organizational Format

The Ghana Police Force is organized on national basis, and is under a unified command. Its administrative head is an Inspector-

General of Police, who is vested by virtue of Police Force Ordinance caption Thirty-Seven and Public Service Commission Regulations with sole authority to issue instructions and determine the modus operandi of the organization. Responsibilities in the Force and its administration are however decentralised; and devolve upon commissioners of police, deputy commissioners, and other officers whose duty involve implementation of instructions emanating from the Inspector-General of Police.

In the explicit words of Police Force Instruction Number Twenty-Nine, Clause Three, "It must therefore be understood that without the express authority of the Inspector-General of Police no superior officer, inspector, or other member of the Force has authority of any kind whatsoever to:-

- (a) alter any procedure, method or existing custom of the Force;
- (b) amend any Force Instruction or Order or to interpret it otherwise than as instructed by the Inspector-General of Police;
- (c) introduce or cancel any Police Record, book or register in any Region or District;


- (d) alter in anyway any method of drill, parade, dress or any such item;
- (e) introduce any new system or procedure or in any manner to abrogate or amend any existing order or instruction whatsoever."

The format of the organization is intensely hierachical; and does vest much authority, as has been shown above, in an Inspector-General of Police firmly placed at the apex of the organization. Table Eight on the next page, is an organizational chart illustrating the topmost echelon of the Ghana Police Force.

With the various non-constitutional regimes, the Inspector-General of Police was incorporated into the membership of each of the ruling juntas. Each one of the post-independence constitutions prohibited persons or authorities from raising any Police Service save by or under the authority of an Act of Parliament; and as well instituted a Police Council charged with the tasks of advising the Executive arm of state on major matters of policy relating to internal security and the role of the Police Service, budgeting and finance, administration, and the promotion of police officers above the rank of Assistant Commissioner. The Police

## TABLE EIGHT

## TOPMOST ECHELON OF THE GHANA POLICE FORCE



Note: 1. COP means Commissioner of Police.  
 D/COP means Deputy Commissioner of Police.  
 A/COP means Assistant Commissioner of Police.

2. A/COP (regions): This means the Assistant Commissioner of Police assigned charge over each of Ghana's nine police regions.

3. CID means Criminal Investigations Department  
 Adm. means Administration.  
 Inter.C. means International Crime.  
 Sp.Br. means Special Branch.  
 Immi & P. means Immigration and Passport.  
 Pay/Acct. means Pay and Accounts.  
 W.P. means Women Police.  
 T/W means Telegraph & Wireless.  
 Mech. means Mechanical & Workshop.  
 Licens. means Licensing.

4. All these offices are not necessarily occupied at each particular point in time; for reasons of non-availability of policemen deserving promotion to the office involved, or because of a deliberate policy to keep down the number of policemen in such offices.

SOURCE: Drawn on the basis of Force Instructions.

The Police Station is the most common physical unit of the

Councils invariably comprised representatives from the Bar, Ministry of Interior, Attorney-General's Department, and then the Inspector-General of Police and the Chief Executive of State or his immediate deputy.

The Ghana Police is a full member of the International Association of Police. Its physical presence is established in virtually all human settlements in the state - either through patrol or through a stationing of police personnel in the locality. It has been noted that Ghana's police is organized on a national, centralized basis. This huge unit is however sub-divided on regional basis for purposes of smooth administration and efficient and effective performance of its functions. The Police Regions are coterminous with the state's regional divisions; and are the Eastern, Greater Accra, Western, Central, Volta, Ashanti, Northern, Upper and Brong-Ahafo regions. Regions are under the general command and administration of Assistant Commissioners of Police; and do embrace Training Depots, Police Hospitals, and other police units physically situated in the region. Regions on their part, are further divided into districts under the command of a superior officer, normally a Superintendent; and the districts do comprise a number of police stations and posts.

The Police Station is the most common physical unit of the

Ghana Police. Virtually each town has a police station, and most urban centres have a plurality of these police stations. Each police station is normally under the command of a resident Inspector. In outlandish parts of the country and in areas with very sparse population, the police post may take the place of a police station. Police posts are manned by just two or three police servicemen whose ranks fall below the Inspectorate rank; and one of them heads the unit. Each police unit (post or station) has a Station Diary, a Station Visitor's Book, and a Station Inspection Book. In the Station Diary is recorded all occurrences, complaints, reports of crime, accidents, and property received by the police unit; as well as details of persons it has arrested, prisoners in its cells, parades it has held, weather reports, routine movement of members of the Force stationed in that unit, the removal and replacement of the unit's arms and ammunitions, and indeed all other events that the police in that particular unit engage in. These entries must be made immediately and in the order as the events occur.

The Station Inspection Book is kept at all Police Units by the police officer in-charge of the unit and is kept in his office. It must be available at all times when the Station is inspected by a superior officer. In the Station Inspection Book is recorded notes on inspection made by the superior officer. The Visitor's

Book contains brief details of visits by superior police officers, and is distinct from the Inspection Book. These books apart, there is as well kept in each Police Station and Police Telephone Exchange a 'Register of Trunk Telephone Calls' and a 'Register of Licensed Premises'. In the latter is a record of particulars on every licensee whose trade or business is transacted within the area of the police station.

A further register, entitled 'Register of Complaints Under the Rent Control Ordinance', is also kept at each Police Station. Force Instruction Number 228, clause 7 however forbids the police to arbitrate in disputes between landlord and tenant - they are only to record the complaint in that Register. The function of arbitration of such disputes (or sitting in judgement over such conflicts) devolves upon Rent Control officials and ultimately upon the courts of law. Yet another register in each Police Station is the 'Register of Offences', in which particulars of offences (other than those falling under the Motor Traffic Ordinance and) reported to the police are entered.

Each regional unit of the organization has a Confidential Regional Inspection Book in which is recorded all inspection notes on regional matters. Such inspections are as a rule, made by the

Inspector-General of Police, a Commissioner of Police, a Deputy Commissioner, or an Assistant Commissioner of Police; and the Confidential Regional Inspection Book is kept by the Superior Officer-in-charge of the region in his office safe. Each district also has its Confidential District Inspection Book in which is recorded all inspection notes on district matters; and the book is kept by the superior officer in charge of the district.

Each Police Station has a 'Charge Office' opened twenty-four hours a day, a police cell-room, and an Inspector's Office - in addition to whatever other rooms it might as well possess. Force Instruction Number 43 urges it on all police stations in areas other than the urban centres to undertake Foot, Mobile, and Combined Foot and Mobile patrols regularly in their areas. An itinerary for such patrols is drawn in advance; and policemen are normally to undertake such patrol in their uniform. At the end of the patrol, a Village Patrol Register is filled. At each moment there is on duty in the station an Orderly, a policeman appointed for specified periods on a rotating basis by the officer in charge and assigned the following tasks:

- (a) making of all necessary entries in the Station Diary for the period during which he is on duty;

- (b) making of entries in the Register of Offences;
- (c) keeping the officer-in-charge of the Station informed of reports of crime, accident, and other unusual occurrences;
- (d) keeping charge of the articles in the Charge Office; and of prisoners and detained persons in the absence of the officer-in-charge of the Station;
- (e) the receipt and recording of all official telephone or other messages whilst on duty;
- (f) keeping safe custody of the armoury keys in his charge, as well as other station-keys committed to his charge by the officer-in-charge;
- (g) ensuring that the Station Clock is properly wound and correct as to time ("checking twice daily at 8.00 a.m. and 6.00 p.m. with the local Post Office" - in the words of Force Instruction Number 389).

Publications within the Ghana Police Force are the POLICE POST, previously known as the POLICE NEWS, FORCE INSTRUCTIONS, and then the POLICE GAZETTE. The POLICE GAZETTE is published weekly by the Criminal Investigations Department wing of the Police; and contains announcements and descriptions of wanted persons and missing or stolen articles. FORCE INSTRUCTIONS are administrative edicts issued by the Inspector-General; and they are widely disseminated

in the organization since they set out explicit instructions of operation for (police) servicemen. Force Instructions are issued as and when the need arises; and the instructions cover every sphere of the police organization. The POLICE POST, published monthly by the Public Relations Directorate of the Police, contains generalised articles and news, usually written by policemen; as well as letters of commendation, criticism, inquiry and suggestion from serving policemen.

Ghana Police ranks comprise a Superior officers echelon made up of the Inspector-General of Police, Commissioners of Police, Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners, Superintendents of Police, Deputy Superintendents, and Assistant Superintendents of Police - in that order. Falling after them in rank is the Inspectorate stratum, which comprises Chief Inspectors and Inspectors. Below them are the non-commissioned police-officer ranks: composed of Sergeants, Corporals, and Constables - in that order.

The Ghana Police Force comprises a General Pool of servicemen composed of Criminal Investigations Department personnel, Special Branch personnel, Motor Traffic Unit personnel, and an always-uniformed band of policemen performing general police duties. The General Pool apart, Ghana's Police also incorporates a Women Police

division, a Medical Unit with a complete Police Hospital entirely manned by police personnel, an Education Directorate comprising a Police College, Police Driving School, and Police Depots; a Musical Band Unit, a Service Workshop Unit, Police Licensing Office, a Railways and Ports Unit, a National Road Safety Committee Unit, a Police Uniforms Department, a Public Relations Directorate and a Public Complaints Unit. Other units within the organization are the Armoured Car Squadron, a Mounted Squadron, and an anti-Narcotic Squad.

#### A Sociological Study

Unlike it was with the colonial police, recruitment into Ghana's Police Force does not indicate any ethnic bias. This is not to claim however that national leaders have never sought to manipulate recruitment and promotion patterns in their bid to consolidate and maintain power. The point being advanced is that whereas colonial recruitment patterns evidenced a blatant preference for natives of northern (Gold Coast) extraction on account of the latter's supposed martial valour and political docility, entry into the Ghana Police has been equally open to all ethnic groups within the state. Recruitment into the Force is basically reserved



for Ghanaians; but the organization has considerable non-Ghanaiian personnel serving mainly in various technical units. For one year, 1979, for example, there were the following non-Ghanaiians serving in the Force: seven drivers, two tailors, three shoemakers, one bugler, one bicycle repairer, two carpenters, one painter, one welder, one auto-mechanic, three instructors, a regional sergeant-major, three district sergeant-majors, sixty-six escort sergeants, three general sergeants, sixty-seven escort corporals, three general corporals, six escort constables, and a hundred and twenty-seven other foreigners performing general duties not necessarily limited to non-commissioned officer ranks.<sup>12</sup>

As in colonial days recruitment into police ranks continues to be based on robust physique, good health, and on a height qualification which eliminates those who are short in height. Minimal educational standard expected of recruits into the general police is basic elementary education; though secondary school leavers increasingly appear to be preferred. For reasons connected with

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12. These details were given by the Registry, Ghana Police Headquarters, Accra.

its colonial functioning, its largely negative social image, and a prevalent unattractive career prospects however, the police profession does not have an attracting image on the job-market; and few school-leavers with choice opt for policing as a career.

Ghana's economic crises alluded to above have had the effect of bringing into being in the country a huge mass of unemployed citizens.

Notwithstanding the profession's poor social image and prospects therefore, advertisements for recruits into the force are heavily responded to. Regularly over the years keen competition for admission into the Police Force occur; and many applicants fail to gain admission into any of the depots. Personnel do not always have to pass through the ranks to attain superior officer status. In 1962 persons with university education were admitted for the first time into Ghana's Police ranks; and ever since such admission has been taking place.

Those with a first degree normally join the Force as Assistant Superintendents after their training at the Police College. The organization also recruits such specialized personnel as fitters, nurses, medical practitioners and the like and trains them in police orientation and duties; after which they serve in their

specialized capacities in such technical units of the Force as the Police Hospital and the Police Workshop. Training at the Police College and the depots is a socialization process meant to break down the newly-enlisted policeman's civilian identifications and commitments and to make him internalise the organization's norms, skills, practises, weltanschung, and as well instil esprit de corp and corporate identification between him and the organization at large.

The Police itself perceives its social functions as:

- (a) Prevention and Detection of Crimes.
- (b) The apprehension of offenders.
- (c) Preservation of law and order.
- (d) The protection of person and property and
- (e) The enforcement of laws and regulations; and the skill and orientation the newly-enlisted is made to internalise stand to serve him in good stead in his performance of those functions.<sup>13</sup>

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13. From 'History, Organization And Function Of The Ghana Police Service', a manual in use at the Police Depots.

Recruits in the depots do, for example, a Social Psychology course covering themes such as Introduction to Sociology and Psychology; Sources of Behaviour, Culture and Personality; Social Control and Socialization, Delinquency; and the Social Structure of Ghana. In addition they learn some geography (mainly map-reading and sketch-making); do English, and learn as well some General Knowledge and Current Affairs.

Further, they take lessons in Biology dubbed 'First Aid' in which they learn the principles of 'First-Aid', blood circulation, bleeding, infection, fractures, burns, artificial respiration and the like; and also learn 'General Police Duties'. The latter comprise numerous and diverse themes, and include Cinematograph, Elementary Plan Drawing, the history, organization, administration and objectives of the Ghana Police Force, Finger-printing, Identification Methods, Relationship between the Police and the public, Force Instructions, Classification of Crimes and Offences, kinds of law, and liquor licensing.<sup>14</sup>

In addition to those, between six o'clock anti-meridian and nine-thirty anti-meridian the recruit in the depot does 'Squad Drill';

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14. See Appendix A for the organization's syllabus for recruit training.

in the course of which drills he learns various drill formations and practises, marching formations and practises, judo, fixing and unfixing bayonets, tae kwan do, and riot drill (as regards the latter he learns, inter alia, how to block a street to impede the progress of riots and demonstrations, mask-wearing in confrontations with riotous assemblies, grenade throwing), the right way to advance in platoon formation and charge with batons, and how to mount and dismount a truck on arriving at the scene of riots.<sup>15</sup>

An impartation of those skills apart, the socialization undergone at the depots and college by enlisting personnel is meant to instil in them a respect for authority and deference to one's superiors. Deference, smartness and prompt obedience of a superior's commands are virtues extolled by the organization's rules. Measures to make the police personnel internalise those norms do not prevail only at the depots and the college. Such measures confront the policeman throughout his stay in the organization. An instance of police regulation to substantiate such claim is the requirement that members of the Force should salute (and on their feet) their

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15. Appendix B is a Time-Table and Course Outline for 'Squad Drill' lessons at Ghana's Police Depots.

superior officers when they come across the latter.

The Police organization is one of numerous state bureaucracies within the polity. It operates through an impersonal application of rules (the Force Instructions), is marked by intense centralization of authority and a routinization of tasks (as shown in the organizational chart for example), and evidences considerable rationality in its decision-making. Max Weber affirms those features to be the characterising mark of bureaucracies<sup>16</sup>; and Ghana's Police on that account can be said to be a bureaucracy.

The organization is also professionalized. Huntington asserts that "the distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."<sup>17</sup> To a large and unambiguous extent Ghana's Police organization evinces those characteristics. Policing in the

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16. See Max Weber, Economy And Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (eds: Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich), Bedminster Press, 1968, p.946.

17. The Political Influence Of The Military, (eds; Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennet), 1980, p.38. "Officership As A Profession" by S.P. Huntington.

contemporary epoch require a prerequisite acquisition of specialized skills and knowledge acquired through prolonged experience that commences in the depots and continue throughout one's continual membership of the Force. Like other professionals the policeman is a practising expert meeting a functional need in society. In keeping with an usual practise by other professional organizations, the police la ys down values and ideals meant to guide its members in dealings with one another and with the lay public. The Ghana police thus evinces the characteristic of corporateness - a feature of all professional groupings. Its members have a sense of belonging to an organic unit and a conscious perception of themselves as a group apart in society.

Standards of professional propriety and conduct are fixed in the organization by its topmost bureaucrats and are manifested in training courses, Force Instructions, commands, and circulars; and this same body of topmost officials ultimately see to the enforcement of these standards. Like any other institution, the police set-up has its peculiar set of norms. These include incorruptibility, thorough and impartial pursuit of its professional tasks, an apolitical disposition, and an unquestioning operation within the prevalent politico-legal context. Like it is with most

other institutions, these organizational norms are largely unrealized and do stand in marked and tantalising contrast with what empirically obtains.

Our assertion of professionalism of Ghana's police organization is in no way however meant to imply an acceptance of the view that it is, by virtue of its professional standing, apolitical. It shall in fact be our burden in the fifth chapter to explode this myth of an apolitical police functioning in Ghana. As has been said of the military in another work (and the same holds with regard to Ghana's police),

"The concept that professionalism removes the military from politics is derived from the classical tradition of administrative theory, among others, which is built on the premise that politics can be separated from administration: i.e., that policy-making (the responsibility of politically elected officials) is distinguished from policy implementation (the responsibility of appointed officials)... The new administrative theory is fusionist; i.e. it recognises that bureaucracy and politics, government and administration experts and politicians, are all symbiotically related."<sup>18</sup>

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18. ibid., p.13.

The norm of incorruptibility stands in marked contrast with popular image of the organization as manned by corruptible (easily corruptible at that) personnel. Public claims of police personnel seen to be actually soliciting bribes and tips are rife. The organizational format of the police organization has been shown to be para-military in nature, and this organizational posture is marked with superordinate/subordinate ties and dealings between its members. Working relations among policemen therefore, unlike it is with many other professions, is very formalised and bureaucratised, with each professional colleague firmly keeping to his particular niche and maintaining role distances. Instructions and usages within the Force tend to strengthen its corporate nature and to promote esprit de corp among its members. Force Instruction Number 62, clauses two and three, for example, strongly illustrates the corporate identity of the organization and as well evidences the organization's concern for the welfare of its members:

2. Canteens shall be operated not with the object of making money or accumulating a large sum of money for the future but for the following purposes:
  - (a) supplying members of the Force with certain essential commodities to

enable them to make purchases without leaving barracks;

- (b) supplying the best possible articles at the lowest prices;
- (c) utilizing the profits realized to provide for recreational and other benefits within the Force.

3. Police Canteens shall be maintained solely for the use of the members of the Force, and civilians shall not be permitted to manage, have any access directly or indirectly to, or make purchases therein.

Technically the police does constitute a part of civil society, but deriving from its colonial legacy, Ghana's police organization exhibits a considerable measure of segregation from civil society; though this segregation is not as thorough as the military's.

Policemen reside in barracks normally secluded on account of their situation in isolated areas or through the erection of brick walls, hedges, or some other fence around the barrack. As a rule therefore these barracks are secluded from civil society. Rules covering these barracks cover virtually all aspects of personnel's life; and they serve to promote the corporate nature of the organization.

These regulations and rules form the subject-matter of Force

Instruction Number 14; and do include clauses such as:

"...the use of charcoal or other fires in barracks rooms other than kitchen is prohibited";

"At least once a week every room shall be completely turned out, all bedding, furniture, etc. moved and rooms thoroughly cleaned. Barracks inspections shall be held at all barracks every Saturday morning..."

"As a general rule a member of the Force shall be allowed to have one wife only, and his children, residing in Barracks with him"; and

"Roll-call shall be held at 9.00 p.m. every night, after which all ranks not on night duty shall remain in barracks overnight unless they have permission".

Disciplinary measures within the Force are stern; and any of the following acts constitutes a breach of the organization's disciplinary code. For the Inspectorate rank these include:

"Failing to respond to any reasonable request made to him by any member of the public";

"Lending money to, or borrowing money from any member of the Force"; and

"Accepting directly or indirectly any gratuity, present, subscription, or testimonial without the knowledge and permission of the Superior Police Officer under whom he is serving."<sup>19</sup>

For police personnel below the rank of inspector, breaches of discipline include:

"The use of abusive or insulting language to, or quarrelling with any member of the Force",  
'Drunkenness'; "Failing to attend to any reasonable request made to him by any member of the public";

"Neglect to assist any person injured or taken ill in the streets";

"Making or joining to make anonymous complaint";

"Lending money to, or borrowing money from any member of the Force";

"Lack of civility to any member of the public"; and

"Incurring debt without any reasonable prospect or intention of paying the same; or having incurred any debt making no reasonable effort to pay the same".<sup>20</sup>

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19. See Force Instruction Number 48<sup>A</sup>.

20. See Force Instruction Number 48<sup>B</sup>.

The Force makes no distinction between 'private' and 'public' affairs of its personnel; as is evidenced by some of the above disciplinary code. Enlistment into the Force is a total commitment of one's self to the organization; and the latter reacts on such basis towards its personnel. Force Instruction Number 57 clause two for example asserts that:

"No member of the Force shall institute legal proceedings in respect of his own family, in any Court or Tribunal within Ghana without first having received the permission of the Inspector-General of Police to do so."

Interesting in the same regard is Force Instruction Number 61, clauses six and seven:

6. "Officers in charge of Stations shall ensure that members of their detachments admitted to Hospital within their areas are visited daily by an Inspector or Non-commissioned officer detailed for this purpose. The Inspector or non-commissioned officer visiting patients shall on returning to his Station, cause to be recorded in the Station Diary brief details as to the condition of

Police patients and of any personal requests made to him. He shall also be responsible for dealing with these requests and shall, when necessary, report them to the Superior Police Officer in charge of the District.

7. When a member of the Force is sent to a Hospital outside the District in which his station is situated, a signal shall be despatched by the Officer-in-charge of that Station to the officer-in-charge of Station nearest the Hospital who shall be responsible for his being visited in accordance with this Force Instruction. On his discharge from Hospital, a signal to this effect shall be sent to his Station."

Great importance and time is devoted to drills and physical training in Ghana's police organization. Force Instruction Number Ten, clause seven makes it obligatory on the Superior Officer in charge of each region to hold a parade at a frequency of once each week when he is at post in his headquarters; and superior officers in charge of districts are similarly required (by virtue of Force Instruction Number Eleven, clause 4<sup>c</sup>) to hold such drills.

Physical exercises are meant to keep police personnel in prime physical condition. The emphasis on physical fitness and agility (not mere good health) can be explained in terms of the need to keep the Force in physical readiness to cope with riotous insurrections and such other acts of civil disorder deemed subversive of the powers that be.

One is struck, upon examination, by the petty details of Police Force Instructions. In this regard the fact ought to be noted that they leave very circumscribed room, at best, for the exercise of the sense of initiative of its non-commissioned personnel. Force Instruction Number 133, Appendix A, which instructs police mechanics and drivers on the maintenance and servicing of police vehicles, abundantly exemplifies that restricting feature of most Force Instructions; and on that account bears quotation here:

Maintenance Days	Details for cars and lorries
1. Daily	(a) Wash vehicle (b) Check (i) Water (ii) Oil level and ensure that the correct grade of oil is used when topping up. (iii) Petrol (iv) Tyre Pressures. (v) Lights.

2. Every Monday: (i) Top up battery. Ensure that fluid is at correct level, i.e. at top of separator plates.
- (ii) Grease Battery Terminals.
3. Every Tuesday & Thursday: Polish Vehicle and Upholstery.
4. 1st and 3rd Monday in each month: Engine.
- (i) Check Oil Carburattor control joints;
- (ii) Check fan belt for wear and tension;
- (iii) Grease fan belt pulley nipple;
- (iv) Oil generator bearings;
- (v) Examine and tighten engine mounting bolts, cooling system:
- (a) Check hoses for wear and leaks;
- (b) Flush system.

It goes on to specify exactly what is to be done on the 2nd and 4th Monday in each month; the 1st and 3rd Wednesday in each month; the 2nd and 4th Wednesday in each month; 1st and 3rd Friday in each month; and 2nd and 4th Friday in each month!

Ghana's police organization has been fairly successful in instilling corporate feelings and professional pride in its members. Awareness of corporate identity and professional pride is evidenced,

for example, in the following letter written by Constable Emmanuel Tawiah Bioson, entitled Ban This Fashion:

"Of late Afroism in Ghana has turned its attention on the Forces. It is a common sight if one is walking in the cities to come across Afrodelic guys in shirts with inscriptions like 'Oxford Police, Depot', 'Los Angeles Police', 'U.S. Army', 'Michigan State Police', and countless others. They don't only end at these inscriptions. They go further to wear chevrons like that of Police or Army Corporals and Sergeants. It is my personal feeling that civilians who dress in this manner are making mockery of the Forces. This state of affairs cannot go unchecked so let us do something about it. After all if they are policemen as their dressing shows they must go and Police at the countries and cities indicated in their shirts."<sup>21</sup>

The letter is more interesting on account of the constable's justification of the proposed ban: 'civilians who dress in this manner are making mockery of the Forces'.

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21. 'POLICE NEWS', Nov/Dec., 1979; No.8, p.2.

Another example of feelings of corporate membership and professional pride is offered by Sergeant E.A. Commey's letter below, entitled "Monkey Duty" - though that letter as well offers another instance of the uncomfortable chasm between unrealized organizational norms and the empiric, imperfect status quo. The letter is as follows:

" 'MONKEY DUTY' "

Kindly permit me space in the columns of your esteemed paper to expose some members of the Service for their indulgence in what can only be described as unlawful and disgraceful duties (Monkey Duty they call it).

It has now become fashionable for some junior ranks, and in some case NCO<sup>S</sup>, to accept guard duty jobs for payment in the houses of Indians, Syrians, and Lebanese nationals residing in various parts of Accra. These members who perform these unauthorised duties in the nights are mostly stationed at the Cantonments, Kotobaabi Police Stations, and even the national headquarters.

In order to enable them to have time for such unlawful duties, they arrange with duty roster preparers not to put them on the 10.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m. shift. This is most unfortunate because they perform these duties at a time when

the Service is badly in need of more men to perform official night patrol duties. If these people feel the need for money overrides the needs of the Service they should be asked to resign their jobs as policemen and take up full employment as night watchmen. In view of the seriousness of the unauthorised use of the Service uniform to perform these unlawful duties to private individuals, I would like to call on the authorities to take steps to stop this practise immediately. Severe punishment of some sort on any member caught in the act will be appreciated.

(Sgd:) Sgt.E.A. Comney  
Headquarters/Accra."<sup>22</sup>

As it is with other professions, Ghana's police has been concerned to create and maintain a favourable public image; and to safeguard professional standards and conduct. The name of the Force has been altered from Ghana Police Force to Ghana Police Service in line with its elites' desire to erase notions of the organization as a force of occupation and intimidation serving rulers' interest without regard to the public interest. Its colonial origins as a

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22. 'POLICE POST', September, 1980, No.7, p.3.

force of occupation and repression, and its organization upon such basis as well as frequent use of the organization in the post-independence era to suppress popular uprisings however bogs down the efforts of the national elite to transform its fairly negative social image. In pursuit of the goals of maintaining a favourable public image and safeguarding standards of professional conduct, a Public Complaints Unit has been established within the Force since September, 1978. Complaints of bribery, corruption, oppression and intimidation involving police personnel are to be lodged with the unit. The adequacy (or otherwise) of this institutional mechanism does not fall within the scope of interest of this work; but we note its formation in connection with the police institution's quest for a favourable social image and its efforts to maintain standards of professional conduct.

Relations either of mutual inter-dependence or skewed dependence often arises between an institution and its technology source. In this regard it is relevant to our thematic concern to note that little change has occurred in connection with Ghana's colonial dependence on British and other Western sources for the supply of technology. The little change there has been is in the direction of an expansion of the number of countries Ghana depends

on for police technology. Madjitey claims that British sources supplied Ghana's police with its arms requirements till 1960, when a few arms were obtained from Czechoslovakia. They were brought to the country on account of the Congo crisis that Ghana had got involved in, and were therefore for external use. He as well asserts that few arms were obtained for a time from America as well.<sup>23</sup>

Table Nine on the next page, indicates particular police items, their countries of origin (where that fact is known to Ghana's Police), year the item was purchased, and other pertinent explanatory remarks - and cover the years 1956 to 1980.

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23. Interview with E.R.T. Madjitey at Ashitey on 3rd April, 1981.

TABLE NINE

SOURCES OF GHANA'S POLICE TECHNOLOGY (1956-1980)

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	YEAR PURCHASED	R E M A R K S
1. 2. 3.	Police Kits Armaments Ammunition	Not Known Not Known Not Known	1956-60 -do- -do-	Purchases then were made through the Crown Agents. Actual countries of origin are therefore unknown.
1. 2. 3.	Police Kits Armaments Ammunition	Not Known Not Known Not Known	1960-74 -do- -do-	Purchases were made through the Ghana Supply Commission; but to the best of our knowledge Great Britain, U.S.A., Czechoslovakia, West Germany, Italy and Holland were the leading suppliers.
1. 2. 3.	Police Kits Armaments Ammunition	U.K., West Germany, Italy. Switzerland Switzerland	1975 -do- -do-	Nil
1. 2. 3.	Police Kits Armaments Ammunition	U.K., Belgium, Italy, Japan, West Germany Switzerland Switzerland and Germany	1976 -do- -do-	Nil

TABLE NINE CONTD.

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION OF ITEM	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	YEAR PURCHASED	R E M A R K S
1.	Police Kits	Gt. Britain, Italy, Belgium, Germany	1977	Nil
2.	Armaments	Switzerland	-do-	
3.	Ammunition	Switzerland	-do-	
1.	Police Kits	Gt. Britain, USA, Belgium, Botswana.	1978	Nil
2.	Armaments	Switzerland	-do-	
3.	Ammunition	Switzerland	-do-	
1.	Police Kits	Nil	1979	No Order was placed due to
2.	Armaments	Nil	-do-	Non-availability of Import Licence.
3.	Ammunition	Nil	-do-	
1.	Police Kits	Nil	1980	No Order was placed due to
2.	Armaments	Nil	-do-	Non-availability of Import Licence.
3.	Ammunition	Nil	-do-	

SOURCE: Obtained from the Registry, Ghana Police Headquarters, Accra.

CHAPTER FOURTHE POLITICS OF ROUTINE POLICING

In this chapter we shall analyse the political and class implications of the routine functions of Ghana's police set-up. A manual in use at the Police Depots in Ghana outlines the functions of the organization as follows:

- "(a) Prevention and Detection of Crime.
- (b) The apprehension of offenders.
- (c) Preservation of law and order.
- (d) The protection of person and property.
- (e) The enforcement of laws and regulations".<sup>1</sup>

Pursuit of these goals constitutes the routine tasks and engagement of the Police; and in so doing Ghana's police does not depart from normal police concerns in most states. We take to the view that concern with a performance of those routine tasks had political and class implications for the polity; and we shall in this chapter seek to record and explicate police routine performance and its political and class implications within the period for our study.

We would adduce empirical facts to show the organization as an institution which brought its influence to bear in the course

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1. 'History, Organization and Functions of The Ghana Police Force'; op.cit.

of its routine role-performance to effect the ends of maintaining national and territorial integrity, securing law and order and social stability, subserving class interests and ends, and working to perpetuate existing class relations. In keeping with its colonial legacy the organization has not been slow to resort to force of arms when confronted with the least challenge to its authority. Further, the Police tended to deal with outcome realities which fell foul of prevalent laws without bothering to get to grips with their underlying causal factors. Ghana's Police made some efforts to resist attempts aimed at getting it move the direction of its routine functions to serve the factional interests of politically partisan groups. On other occasions, however, it gave up resistance and acted to serve partisan ends - particularly those of the ruling faction of the state's elite.

On the attainment of independence the state of Ghana was confronted with serious crises. Prominent among these was a continuing bid for secession on the part of various ethnic and regional sub-groups within the state. Through a United Nations' supervised plebiscite the British-mandated portion of Togoland had been integrated into the Ghanaian polity just before the grant of independence. Society there however continued to be split into Integrationists and

Secessionists. The former supported the integration with Ghana and wanted its continuance, while the latter wanted the previously mandated territory to secede from Ghana and either stand on its own as a nation-state, or join with the Ewe tribal kinsmen in French Togoland to form a unified Ewe republic. Violence, expressed in a molestation of political opponents, threats of destruction of public property, arson, looting, and various acts of thuggery attended the Ewe irredentist movement; and the Convention People's Party Government made much use of the police institution in containing those challenges to its authority and clamping down those acts subversive of the territorial integrity of the newly-independent state.

Those acts of political thuggery were sporadic and were confined to the Trans-Volta sections of the state - and as they became more serious and widespread with time units of the army had to be called in to aid the police restore order and to help defend life and property. The crucial role of the police in containing and eventually suppressing those acts of civil disorder and national <sup>dis</sup>integration was confirmed by the then Minister of Interior, Mr. Ako Adjei, as indicated in the following report:

"The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Ako Adjei, yesterday paid tribute to the Ghana Police and Military Forces and officers of the Regional Organization for helping to quell the recent disturbances in the Trans-Volta Togoland region. He said that by their work and loyal devotion to duty these men had succeeded in bringing under control a serious threat to the security of Ghana."<sup>2</sup>

In carrying out those tasks, the Police manifested a pattern and style of violence traceable to its colonial origins and functions and frequently to be shown in successive years. This was a pattern of a quick resort to force of arms and an immense utilization of violence and show of force oftentimes unjustified by the dictates of the actual social situation their involvement is in reaction to. Evidence to support that contention are offered by Police role in the 'Union-Government' symposium disturbances and the 1978 Railway Shooting incident to be discussed below. With regard to our particular case in point, the Minister sort to justify Police usage of violence and the scale of such violence in these terms:

"Nevertheless I am bound to point out that when people resort to lawlessness, the perpetrators cannot justly complain if their violence is met by violence. In the dispersal of riotous and

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2. Daily Graphic, May 2nd 1957, No.2058, p.1.

armed assemblies, heads will get broken..."<sup>3</sup>

In point of fact some of the pan-Ewe nationalists had been trained in usage of firearms; and did cause some damage to life and property during activities marking the celebration of Ghana's independence. In all, in the particular insurrection to which the Honourable Minister was alluding, five people were killed and several hundreds injured through police action. Out of 355 arrests made by the police 158 were duly convicted by the courts later and sixteen acquitted.

A total of 5,193 firearms, of local origin mostly, were seized by the police and the other organizations which came to its aid.<sup>4</sup> The insurrection was therefore serious, and in helping to quell that irredentist movement the police did contribute immensely towards the preservation of the polity's territorial expanse and to arrest a situation of near-anarchy and chaos in parts thereof. Through the seizure of arms, its frequent patrols in the area, and the arrest of local leaders of the insurrection, it served to contain lawlessness and to restore civil order and calm. In serving as a force for stability and acting as a major arm of the

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3. ibid.

4. ibid.

incumbent government in countering violent, anti-national irredentist feeling, the police emerges from the whole event as having played an immensely crucial role. The pan-Ewe irredentist movement was by no means an isolated occurrence! There had been serious agitation based in Ashanti particularly for a federal form of government for the state. The agitation had commenced in the immediate pre-independence years, when it was evident that the Convention People's Party was more than likely to form the government of Ghana with the grant of independence.

The federalist agitation arose largely as a result of the Convention People's Party's insistence on cutting affected trees as its policy for the control of the swollen-shoot epidemic that had broken out on cocoa farms. Cocoa farmers, most of whom were either Ashantis or based in Ashanti, saw the government's decision as a calculated attempt to deprive them of a major source of livelihood by a government that did not have Ashanti and Ashantis as its political base. Further, they resented the government's reluctance to pay higher prices for their cocoa produce. With those grievances and the resultant disaffection most Ashantis and other Akans rallied behind the opposition National Liberation Movement and under a banner of "Mate me ho",<sup>5</sup> demanded regional

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5. Ashanti slogan, meaning "I have succeeded".

autonomy and the federal form of state organization for the polity. The Movement failed to secure its demand for federal provisions entrenched (or even written) into the 1957 Independence Constitution. The failure did not however mark the end of its efforts. Serious agitation based on the quest for regionalism and separatism continued and increasingly assumed violent dimensions. Like it was with the Ewe irredentist moves, the violence manifested in acts of political thuggery such as a hiring of thugs to beat up political opponents and a deliberate and planned disruption of opponent's political meetings and rallies.

Assassinations, arson, looting and such other acts of lawlessness characterised this other challenge to the authority and rule of the central government, and to the continued maintenance of the polity's territorial expanse. Again the police served as the arm of the central government which kept the political violence somehow within limits and ultimately halted it altogether. In Ashanti at least it performed those functions under hostile and trying conditions; given the mass support accorded the opposing National Liberation Movement in that region.

In both conflicts the police posed as an organization of disciplined men utilizing force to suppress erupted violence

disruptive of civil order and social harmony; and subversive of the polity's territorial integrity. It acted in the name of the entire polity, and in the supreme interest of the body-politic; and acted neither to secure the economic ends of a particular socio-economic stratum (such as cocoa-farming interests) nor to serve the sub-national particularist goals of any ethnic entity (such as Ewe or Ashanti irredentist feelings). The police served in those conflicts as a social machinery for a pursuit of the goals of social interests opposed to the disintegration of the colonial creation of Ghana. The police institution involved itself in those separatist violence to serve the interest of forces concerned to maintain the colonial territorial expanse as one entity; and therefore stood for the continual maintenance of the territorial status-quo bequeathed at independence. Through force of arms, the police in conjunction with other institutions similarly backed, acted to quell the disintegration moves and all that they stood for.

It is pertinent to remark in this study of routine police involvement that the incumbent Convention People's Party government primarily relied on the police machinery of state when it resorted to use force to meet the violence of the separatist movements. The army was brought into the tussle only when the police was stretched

to its maximum capacity. Army involvement, when it did come, was sporadic and intermittent. The fact of a location of police stations or posts in most human settlements within the polity served to offer the government ready bases for the gathering of intelligence on the nature, leadership, and moves of those separatist movements; and also offered the government a ready organization of men to counteract violence and lawlessness on the part of anti-government social forces.

In their micro-study of political change in the Ahafo district of the polity, Dunn and Robertson report other instances of routine usage of the police machinery to quell, or avert political violence. They report of police patrols being sent to Noberkaw, Ahafo, in response to political troubles there; and of a chief of Asufufuo who asked the government to transfer a lawsuit involving his sister and some Convention People's Party members of his community from Kukuom Native Court to the Goaso Native Court.

At the former court there had been strenuous efforts to assault her; and the effort had been frustrated by sending a police constable to accompany her back to Asufufuo.<sup>6</sup> In the latter case we have another instance of the police machinery serving as a force

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6. Dunn and Robertson, Political Change in Ahafo, London, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p.338.

of national integration and rising above partisan political involvement to safeguard the life of the chief's sister - even though her CPP opponents had their party colleagues in power. In so doing the police was living true to its tradition of protecting life and property and safeguarding public peace and order.

Those did not constitute the only social functions of Ghana's police establishment. On occasions the local police machinery got involved, on partisan basis, in local manifestations of national political feuds. An instance of police biased invocation of the law and utilization of their authority is offered below:

"Since the announcement of the results of the General Elections clashes have occurred at Kenyasi Number One (whose Odikro has been detained by the police for shouting at a mob of CPP adherents alleged to have attacked the Odikro in his house...)"<sup>7</sup>

From the customary point of reckoning the 'Odikro' is the ruler of a town and the custodian of its laws and traditions. The police organization's existence did not derive from the traditional, pre-colonial political order. It was, in its entirety, a colonial

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7. Dunn and Robertson, op.cit., p.339.

devise handed over with independence to the successor CPP government; and there occurred a corresponding transfer of the loyalty of its functionaries and the organization per se to the CPP government. Hence such blatantly unfair arrest of an 'Odikro'. But his detention was not pointless. Police action in that instance would serve to cover a politically antagonistic populace and help to make them "submissive" and "loyal" to the ruling party. It was bound to forcefully assert the authority and power of the central government in an area that was a definite stronghold of the opposition. The policemen involved in the detention would, on their part, hope that their politically partisan act would not be lost upon the ruling party-machine; particularly in its dispensation of "favours".

It was trite knowledge at the time that the politically-connected could be freed of all unpleasant consequences if they fell foul of the law, whereas those who did not have those connections would be made to face the full rigours of the law if they happened to act contrary to its provisions. The belief influenced individual and institutional behaviour and as well influenced political involvement into directions which served the partisan political interests of the ruling Convention People's Party (CPP).

For its part, not only was the police establishment discriminatory, partisan, and politically calculating in arrests and prosecutions on some occasions, it also failed to offer, on other occasions, a personal protection due opponents of the ruling party and within its capacity to offer. The plight of Osei, parliamentary member for the Goaso constituency, offers an instance of this failure:

"In parliament Osei was one of the last handful of M.P.s to remain formally in opposition; and he continued to make speeches criticizing many aspects of the regime, particularly its cavalier attitude to detaining people without trial - despite threats and blandishments from the government, and an occasion in 1960 when he was beaten up by a mob of his local opponents in the police station in Goaso."<sup>8</sup>

The **venue** for the beating of this critical and courageous parliamentarian is surprising and difficult to account for except on grounds of police partisanship. Political violence within the polity in such situations do not involve numbers and weaponry above what an average police station can successfully counteract.

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8. Dunn and Robertson, op.cit.; p.327.

Honourable Osei's beating need not occur if it was politically prudent for the police to keep his CPP mob opponents at bay; and more importantly, if the policemen at Goaso had a mind to prevent that act of a disturbance of the public order and a violation of the parliamentarian's constitution-backed rights (in a police station - of all places!).

For the most part the police represents the authority of the central government in rural and outlandish parts of the country. It is no wonder therefore that such partisanship could be exhibited by the police in the performance of its functions - organizational norms and instances to the contrary notwithstanding. The executive arm of state to which the police machinery largely belongs, was at the disposal of a political faction, the ruling CPP; and it was only logical that the latter in its authoritarian bid, should utilise this important arm of the state in consolidating its power and rule - and at the expense of its political opponents. In the event, adequate institutional provisions did not exist to enable the police entirely resist the attempts to get it partisanly involved in legitimate political struggles.

Among the provisions that served to aid the institution resist (to the extent that it did) the efforts to make it politically

partisan is the intensely hierachical nature of its structural organization which made for a vertical, downward transmission of operational orders and commands from definite, identifiable sources within the hierachy; and these orders and commands on many occasions conformed with the organization's standing rules and regulations.

The organization did really make substantially successful efforts to withstand the tide to get it partisanly biased. Madjitey, Police Commandant for most parts of the First Republic, put the dilemma this way:

"...in order to maintain professional neutrality it was essential to keep away from politics. It was our main job and it was extremely difficult. There was a lot of political interference. Some CPP members thought they must always be presumed right in conflicts. The attempt made by certain police officers to maintain that neutrality was seen as disloyalty to the government. Examples: Ampaw was refused Deputy Commissioner rank because it was said he was seen to be playing golf with the Asantehene.<sup>9</sup>

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9. The Asantehene, King of Ashanti was publicly associated with the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement; and was therefore identified with the opposition.

Those people thought they had the right to arrest indiscriminately. Hagan<sup>10</sup> asked policemen to arrest some people and bring them to him. The policemen asked why. Hagan then reported to Nkrumah, who spoke to me. I also asked their offence. Later it was seen they had only been involved in chieftaincy disputes. All these resulted in the eventual enmity between Nkrumah and myself. Abavana<sup>11</sup> wanted the sergeant at Bawku to be transferred because he claimed that sergeant wasn't 'co-operative'.

The aim of the CPP was more or less to bring the police under the Party - the so-called integrated society."<sup>12</sup>

The quotation is meant to offer an idea of the sort of pressures brought to bear by the incumbent government on an institution committed to the non-partisan and apolitical ideal. The stress became more accentuated as the CPP government became more autocratic, authoritarian, and even totalitarian - and went on with

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10. Hagan was then the Regional Minister for the Central Region.
11. He was a leading party functionary and also a Minister in the CPP government.
12. Interview with E.R.T. Madjitey at Ashitey, 18th March, 1981.

its monolithic programme. Farmers' organizations, student bodies, Women associations, and a host of other secondary groupings and associations within the state were integrated into the ruling Convention People's Party. In the process, political opposition was driven underground and Ghana officially became a one-party State. As a subtle way of averting integration in course of that monolithic drive, the Bar Association opted to have no formal executive body. The Police, on its part, continued in existence under those conditions of stress and change.

It kept in being without an abandonment of its colonial ethos and operational rules nor any fundamental change in them, and with compromised (as instances of political bias cited above indicate) success held on to its avowed principle of professional autonomy and apolitical social functioning.

Other tasks were performed by the police set-up within the polity. The Daily Graphic of May 18th, 1957 carries a report captioned 'Police Round Up Idlers in Accra'; and that report offers an instance of another social role of the police machinery. The report is as follows:

"The Accra police are now on the warpath. They have intensified their campaign to "clean up"



the municipality. Following this campaign, 28 people of whom 13 are women have appeared before an Accra court. The women were arrested along the Ring Road outside a night club for "obstructing the public way", said the police. The 15 men, the police went on, were also loitering about and "making themselves nuisance to the public". When the 28 people appeared before Magistrate A.M. Akiwumi they were fined a total of £71. They pleaded guilty."

The Ring Road area of the municipality was then developing fast into residential and office areas occupied by socially privileged and better-off denizens of the state. It is no wonder therefore that in 'taking to the warpath' the police should be concerned to check and avert 'trespassing', petty thefts, and an apparently purposeless intrusion into those areas. Overcrowded areas like Nima, Chorkor, and other slum areas of the municipality should have occupied the prior attention of the police if they were simply out to stamp out prostitution and check other acts of nuisance to the public. The action lays bare the tendency of the police, unwittingly for the most part, to go about their operations with an eye to meeting the expectations of society's elite rather than single-mindedly serving the interests of the mass of the

populace. Any genuine operation to 'clean up' Accra of its de-classe elements, termed 'idlers' in this instance, ought not to be restricted to such relatively developed areas as the Ring Road vicinity unless one wanted to maintain that area for its socially privileged and elite inhabitants.

A single-minded effort, to rid the city of de-classe 'idlers' ought to have started and been concentrated to the slums since those were the parts of the municipality those undesired 'idle' characters mostly inhabited. It is also characteristic of the police not to be concerned with the social forces and processes making for the production of that strata of the populace. Neither does the police attempt to tackle the issue from the perspective of social factors making for a migration of de-classe social elements from the rural to urban settings. The police machinery only works frantically to deal with the outcome reality of their presence in areas meant for their social superiors - the polity's share of nouveaux richeau, bourgeois, and petty-bourgeois social elements.

The assertion is not meant as a critique of police performance. In view of the organizational format and police elites' perception of the organization's role as mere law enforcers, it does stand

apparently precluded from dabbling in issues so fundamental; and in any case it is the political elite, the government to be specific, that one would expect to take those relevant decisions.

Arrests similar to the Ring Road instance are carried out intermittently within the state; under various forms of regimes. An instance of a similar arrest over a decade after the Ring Road one and under a different constitutional rule is offered below:

"77 Suspects Grabbed

77 persons were arrested in several police swoops at the Tema City Harbour yesterday. The persons, mostly young men, were suspected of loitering at the fishing harbour for unlawful purposes. They were later conveyed to the police station for interrogation... The market mummies yelled for sheer joy as the police tramped the fish market in the harbour and grabbed persons believed to be fish pilferers. Others caught were believed to be in the habit of cutting off the "money-belts", of the mummies..."<sup>13</sup>

At independence, internal security operations continued to be the exclusive preserve of the police arm of state. The police was

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13. Daily Graphic, 7th May, 1970.

intimately involved in the investigation and treason trial involving Captain Awaitey and R.R. Amponsah in 1958. It also effected the arrest of opponents of the regime who had fallen foul of laws made by the increasingly dictatorial and autocratic regime. Simply put, the CPP government relied upon the police machinery initially in its internal security machinations and in a way that was in keeping with the colonial example.

Police institutional resistance to a total abandonment of its operational ethic of apolitical law-enforcement and the organization's failure to offer blind obedience to the ruling political elites led to the latter fashioning other institutions to serve its security ends. These included the Young Pioneers Movement, which among other functions informed on opponents of the regime and reported utterances deemed subversive of the CPP regime. The Young Pioneers Movement apart, the President's Own Guard Regiment was formed out of the regular army and assigned the task of guarding the President - a task previously carried out by the police.

Security aspects of the regime could no longer be left entirely to an institution not prepared to be a blind tool of that regime. The organization had refused to let itself be run in accordance with the political tempo of the times: which was CPP monolithic rule.

In August 1962, following an assassination attempt on Nkrumah in which a bomb was detonated at Kulungugu where he then was en route to the Upper Volta, the ruling CPP had another cause to be dissatisfied and aggrieved with police performance in the polity. Initially, public speculation assumed the assassination attempt to be the work of Nkrumah's harrassed political opponents. Autocratic rule had been established, and in the process political opposition had been driven underground. So the bomb blast was presumed to be the work of the underground opposition.

Like a thunderbolt from the skies, however, leading government and party officials and known close aids of the autocratic President were officially named as being responsible for the bomb blast. These were the Information Minister, Tawiah Adamafio; Foreign Affairs Minister, Ako Adjei; the party's Executive Secretary, H.H. Cofie-Crabbe; a parliamentarian, R.B. Otchere; and J.Yaw Mamu, a civil servant. The Police Headquarters was flooded with information purporting to establish the guilt of the fallen CPP comrades.

The police, under Madjitey, refused to accept the idea of the guilt or complicity of the accused officials. It did not however embark on any collision course with the ruling political elite by dissociating itself from the allegations against them nor publicly proclaiming an alternate identification of personalities behind the

blast. In connection with investigations into the bomb blast, a police agent was sent to Togo (a base of the underground opposition) where he deliberately infringed a particular law and was sent to the Central Prison at Lome. Operatives of the underground opposition were known to be based there; and the incognito agent was to find out if the underground movement was responsible for the blast.<sup>14</sup>

Police investigations at any rate established the innocence of those leading functionaries of the one-party state and led to their conclusion that the bomb blast was the work of the underground opposition. It claimed to have found no evidence really incriminating the accused. In Madjitey's words, "I knew they were innocent and Nkrumah also knew; but he wanted to get rid of those Gas from the party - he had his suspicions since the formation of the Ga Shifiimo Kpe."<sup>15</sup> Nkrumah got them prosecuted by State Attorneys

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14. Interview with a topmost police agent.

15. Interview with Madjitey at Ashitey, 25th March, 1981. The Ga Shifiimo Kpe is Ga for Ga Solidarity Society. It was an ethnic grouping meant to secure the welfare of the Gas and advance their particular interests. The Gas are the traditional occupants of Accra, the polity's capital. A section of the Gas feared a domination of their homeland by the teeming migrants into the area, and this apprehensive sections formed the core of the Ga Shifiimo Kpe. If Madjitey's assertion is correct, then the accused would be suspected of intending to use that organization as a base to serve and advance their personal political ambitions.

on a charge of treason - police opinion notwithstanding. They were acquitted and discharged - a verdict which led to Nkrumah's dismissal of the chief justice, the detention of some defence counsels, and further political changes in the direction of an abandonment of the Westminster model of government. In one study on police performance the claim is made that "...a police that informs will slant its information to the authorities to be informed, it has to be careful about the choice of its information and will generally seek to please..."<sup>16</sup> The assertion is not collaborated by police behaviour in the instance of its conduct on the assassination affair. Police reluctance to concoct and fabricate evidence that would discredit and incriminate political figures the ruling elite wanted to be rid of is clearly manifested.

Though the government had its way and brought the victims to court on trumped-up charges, the victory occurred in spite of police reluctance rather than through police connivance or instrumentality. Indeed under Nkrumah's rule, as under the various other regimes experienced by the polity, one other routine function of the police was to inform. It sent regular and frequent intelligence reports on

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16. R.C. Cobb, The Police And The People; French Popular Protest 1789-1820, Oxford, 1970, p.18.

particular groups and individuals and on general conditions. The intelligence was normally gathered by its Special Branch unit. Most of the regimes for various reasons to be shown later in the work, however had other institutional structures for the gathering and transmission of political intelligence. As the establishment of such rival bodies as the Young Pioneers Movement and the President's Own Guard Regiment indicate, Nkrumah's era marked a period of deflation of police role in society as well as one of marked decline in the ruling elites' reliance upon the police machinery of state for political intelligence.

The immediate prelude to that deflation of police role in internal security was the 2nd January, 1964 (second) serious assassination attempt on President Nkrumah. A policeman, Constable Ametewee, on guard duty at the President's official Flagstaff House residence fired five shots at the President but only succeeded in wounding the latter slightly and killing another police guard, Superintendent Salifu Dagarti. The government did not take the assassination attempt lightly; and it had serious repercussions on the police machinery, as the following account of it shows:

"In an official statement issued from the Ghana President's office on January 8th, the Commissioner of Police, Mr. E.R.T. Madjitey and nine other police

officers were dismissed. Mr. J.W.K. Harlley, Assistant Commissioner of Police (was) appointed Acting Commissioner of the Ghana Police Force, and Mr. B.A. Yakubu and Mr. A.K. Biney (were) appointed Acting Deputy Commissioners of Police. Preventive Detention Orders were made on January 8th against Dr. J.B. Danquah, barrister, Mr. S.D. Amaning, Commissioner of Police, and Mr. M.K. Awuku, Police Superintendent. In a government statement issued by the President's office, it was stated that the detention orders against Dr. J.B. Danquah, Mr. S.D. Amaning, and Mr. M.K. Awuku were in connection with the assassination attempt on the President."<sup>17</sup>

Bretton's work<sup>18</sup> offers a concise summary of these consequences for the police organization of Constable Ametewee's assassination attempt:

"The top ranks of the police were purged, the police substantially disarmed, and communication channels within the police (were) re-oriented to tie in with the personal political machine - i.e., more officers were encouraged

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17. Africa Research Bulletin, January 1964, p.8.

18. Henry L. Bretton, The Rise And Fall Of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study Of Personal Rule In Africa, Pall Mall Press, London, 1967, p.25.

to communicate directly with the President concerning security matters".<sup>19</sup>

In fact no objective evidence existed to show that Ametewee's assassination bid was backed by his superior officers or was inspired from official police circles. He was either hired by opponents of the regime then driven underground or he acted on his own initiative. Nkrumah at any rate seized the occasion to react to the police impediment in his bid for autocratic rule. Hence those disarming measures and the summary promotion and dismissal of some police personnel.

"The attempt on his life of January 2nd, 1964 caused him to revise once again his estimate of the reliability of the police, partly because the alleged perpetrator of the attempt had been a member of the police force; or because evidence - genuine or contrived - pointed to complicity or laxity on the part of high police officers. The resulting purge of the police command brought J.W.K. Harlley to the top position and the reassignment of the presidential guard function to army units."<sup>20</sup>

It was also part of the routine functions of the police set-up to counter banditry and various forms of parapolitical and political

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19. ibid., p.60.

20. ibid., p.79.

agitation within the polity. Labour disputes and strike actions are instances of parapolitical agitation the machinery is utilized to control or suppress. The Takoradi railwaymen strike action in 1963 for example drew platoons of steel-helmeted policemen who were supposed to avert damage to property and molestation of persons but who were equally concerned to bring under control that bold challenge to the authority and stability of the Nkrumah regime. An instance of routine police use to serve the same ends under a different constitutional order (the Second Republic, under Busia's rule) is offered by the following:

"Rioters Killed.

Radio Accra reported on March 11th that three persons had been killed in riots involving workers of the African Timber and Plywood Company at Samreboi, near Takoradi. A police spokesman said that workers at the Company, a subsidiary of the United Africa Company (UAC) group, went on strike on March 12th in demand for better conditions of service. The following day, the workers demonstrated against the management and looted the company's stores and damaged property belonging to the Company. Cars were overturned, windows smashed, and communications with neighbouring areas disrupted. On March 14th, police opened fire when the workers

tried to storm the local police station in an effort to free their colleagues who had been arrested for offences connected with the riots."<sup>21</sup>

The police invariably arrive at all scenes of strikes, though they often turn up upon the invitation of management or its agents.

They intervene under a cloak of 'safeguarding life and property' and tend through involvement to keep down the incidence of violence, arson, personal assault or looting that might otherwise have attended the industrial dispute. On other occasions their presence and influence rather incense or precipitate an occurrence of any of those acts.

It has always been a vital goal of successive regimes of the polity to keep incidences of crime and violence to a barest minimum - failing its entire eradication. An increased incidence of crime, especially those marked by an utilization of violence, tend to be interpreted by the body-politic as a mark of the incumbent regime's ineptitude and its failure to protect life and property. The incidence of crime in the state is clearly an issue with political repercussions therefore; and the police machinery is crucial in this regard since it constitutes the state organ routinely concerned with crime prevention (through patrols, for example), a deterrence of

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21. Africa Research Bulletin, March 1-13, 1971, p.2043.

prospective criminals, and the apprehension and prosecution of the State's criminals. In times of military rule the army tended to encroach into the performance of those tasks and to employ harsher means than what the police normally utilized - but we should elaborate on this below, in the next chapter. When a spate of robbery with violence occurred during the Second Republic and the incumbent Busia regime was being accused by some opponents with inability to protect life and property, the regime, in defense, mooted the idea that the violence were politically motivated and constituted a deliberate measure to discredit its rule and create social disorder.

Among measures the regime took in an attempt to come to effective grips with the situation was to increase the numerical strength of the police force. Standing at 16,521 in 1971, the government put forward definite plans to increase it by three thousand more personnel during the succeeding financial year alone. It was hoped that alone would enable the crime wave then existent be brought under effective control.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to working to avert a social atmosphere of chaos

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22. Africa Research Bulletin; September 1-30, 1971; p.2231.

and governmental ineptitude, the police machinery does as well constitute a major arm of the state in countering acts disruptive of the public peace. The following interesting report illustrates police working in that regard:

"Disorder at Funeral: 8 Charged.

Eight persons will re-appear before a Labadi Magistrate Court today charged with disorderly behaviour..... All the eight persons were arrested by the police last Thursday during a disorderly funeral.... The disorder followed the death of Anyetey Alceyaa Heko, alias 'Red Boy', alias 'King', who was knocked down by a taxi cab together with his friend Okine Okantey on the Accra-Tema dual carriage while they were returning from the beach at night the previous day. Hundreds of wildly drunk young men and women, mostly jockeys, horse boys, 'tro-tro' drivers and mates, and taxi drivers turned up at his funeral with pomp and display of 'power acrobatics'. They chanted, trotted, and danced to and fro in groups - some appearing bare-chested.

Bottles were seen flying in the air, some broke in mid-air with bare hands, while others were smashed into pieces on (human) heads."<sup>23</sup>

The first of the following two incidents illustrates the organization's usage to avert an inter-ethnic clash; and the latter its usage to avert violent factional conflict between members of a religious movement:

"Land Dispute - Police Called In.

The office of the Northern Regional Administration has requested the Government to set up a committee to investigate a land dispute between the Gonjas and the Lobis. The dispute nearly caused a serious clash between the two tribes on Wednesday. The police intervened to calm matters."<sup>24</sup>

"Fierce fighting broke out among Muslims at the Old Mosque near the Central Market in Kumasi yesterday. A number of people were injured. Some of them were rushed to the Kumasi Hospital for treatment, and several others were arrested by the police for questioning in connection with the incident."<sup>25</sup>

In both instances, above, the police characteristically acted to avert a disruption of prevalent public order and peace and to forestall loss of lives and further damage to limbs and property.

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24. Daily Graphic; Friday May 29th, 1970.

25. Daily Graphic; April 11th, 1970.

Crime prevention, crime investigation, crime prosecution and deterrence apart, and in addition to saving life and property and the public peace, the police is also intimately involved in the state's efforts to eradicate anti-social, economically rewarding acts such as smuggling, profiteering and the hoarding of vital consumer items. Routine police involvement in the move to stamp out smuggling is evidenced in the following: "The Border Guards division of the Ghana Police Service at Half Assini have seized a number of contraband goods valued at about ₵1,954.25 at Miller Whart..."<sup>26</sup> Consumer preference for imported items in a social situation of scant foreign exchange and an undeveloped national industrial base has led to a situation of widespread speculation by merchants within the polity. They often hoard items with a view to selling them later at astronomically inflated prices, in disregard of the legislated prices.

Public affection for regimes is inversely related to the latter's ability to thwart merchant moves in the direction of such acts of profiteering; and therefore the whole issue of successful anti-hoarding campaigns is politically consequential. By way of countering the merchants' anti-social activity, civilian regimes embraced in our study tended to rely almost exclusively on the

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26. Daily Graphic; March 5th 1970, p.3.

police in the search for hoarded goods and other anti-hoarding exercises. Further, numerous police barriers were erected throughout the state; and the police functionaries manning these barriers searched vehicles for contraband goods (and subversion-meant arms and ammunitions!).

Manner of law-enforcement, as distinct from the laws per se, could have important consequences in the polity. Tactless enforcement could well have immense internal and international ramifications for the polity. This is borne out by police handling of the 1970 Aliens Compliance Order. Nkrumah's Pan-African zeal had led to a loose interpretation and enforcement of immigration laws so far as black Africans were concerned; with the consequence that by the time of his forceful removal from power in 1966, there were a considerable number of aliens in the state. Most of the aliens partook in such benefits as Ghana's relatively free and widely-distributed educational and health facilities; and competed seriously with Ghanaians in small-scale cottage industries, petty-trading, and manual services on farms and in the mines. As part of its economic policies, the Busia government decided to enforce prevalent immigration rules. In that connection, it gave all immigrants fourteen days after which they had to leave the country. With the passage of those days the police combed the

length and breadth of the nation in search of illegal immigrants. The rationale behind the government's invocation of the immigration laws was that the departure of those aliens affected would create employment opportunities for unemployed Ghanaians. The exercise was ruthlessly executed by the police, the machinery of state assigned the task of its enforcement. In connection with the operation, the police boss toured the country:

"Addressing policemen at Akwatia, the I.G.P., Mr. B.A. Yakubu, said since Akwatia is a diamond area, policemen working there must do everything to help stamp out smuggling and illicit dealers in diamonds. He said the compliance order must be more vigorously pursued in the diamond areas since it was known that aliens indulged more in diamond smuggling in the country than Ghanaians."<sup>27</sup>

Though the military was involved in the operation, it played a role subservient to the police in the whole exercise. Military participation involved provision of tents at the border sites to temporarily accommodate the teeming aliens caught in various police swoops and in transit to their countries of origin. By far the vast majority of these aliens were Africans, some of whom had been domiciled in Ghana from earliest childhood. There was considerable discontent

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27. Daily Graphic; April 6th, 1970, p.3.

in other African states over the fourteen-day time limit given affected aliens to obtain the necessary documents or wound up their business concerns and leave the country. Police involvement did not concern itself with those issues. The set-up devoted itself, as law-enforcers, to implementation of the order. The zeal with which the police carried out the task is indicated below:

"...the police rounded up more than 100 aliens without resident permits in a surprise swoop at Koforidua Zongo yesterday."

"...four aliens were sentenced to a fine of N~~1~~100 or in default six months imprisonment each by a Tema District Magistrate Court yesterday. All the accused persons were arrested in a police swoop at the commercial areas in Tema."

"A combined army and police operation is to be mounted soon to clear all aliens from the diamond-mining areas..."<sup>28</sup>

Limited space facilities led to congestion in police cells, and occasioned incidents such as the following:

"Prisoners 'Sack' Police.

Convicted aliens and suspects being held in cells at the Accra Central Police Station drove out the policemen in the Station for

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28. All three excerpts are from the Daily Graphic of April 25th, 1970.

about four hours by throwing excrement and left-overs of food at them. There were 33 aliens and 27 suspects involved in the incident. The convicted aliens have already served terms of imprisonment and are awaiting deportation to their countries of origin."<sup>29</sup>

The following is interesting from the perspective of police zeal and disregard of international complications:

"POLICE, ALIENS IN ROW OVER BARS

Arguments between the Police and Eastern Nigerian bar proprietors over the Government immigration compliance order flared up when the Police wanted to enforce the order to close the beer bars. The bars are owned by Nigerians, formerly Biafrans, who are still operating in Takoradi. Yesterday the confusion reached a climax when the Police entered some of the beer-bars, forcibly ejected customers, and ordered the immediate closure of the bars...Some of the proprietors accused the Police of discriminating against them because they saw no reason why Syrians, Lebanese and Indians who have also been given up to June to leave the country were being allowed to operate their businesses under the licenses already granted them. In a telephone conversation with the Minister of the Interior, Mr.

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29. Daily Graphic; April 1st, 1970.

S.D. Dombo, he said those Eastern Nigerian beer bar proprietors with valid licenses granted by the City or Municipal Councils, could operate their beer bars."<sup>30</sup>

The accusation of bias, if factually based, constitutes an exhibition of a deference towards non-blacks manifested by quite a number of Ghanaians and probably derived from the colonial experience.

The police institution is the polity's social machinery at hand to deal with such anti-social conduct as wanton destruction of public property and stealing of public items. It became fashionable, for example, for thieves to steal copper-wires connecting telephone poles. The wires were then melted and fashioned into various ornaments. By way of routine duty the police had to contend with those anti-social acts disruptive of the polity's communication linkages. The following story illustrates the point:


"POLICE HUNT FOR THIEVES

The Winneba Police have mounted a big search for three people who could help them in their investigations into the theft of a quantity of copper wires on the Ateiku-Winneba road."<sup>31</sup>

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30. Daily Graphic; May 1st, 1970.

31. Daily Graphic; March 7th, 1970.



A further illustration serves to bear up the contention that the police is the social institution concerned with countering activities subversive of the best interests of the community, and as well constitutes guardians of the legally-sanctioned moral order of society:

"...a policeman at Accra airport cut a two-shilling loaf of bread and a variety of gold trinkets rolled down. By so doing he checked a Nigerian housewife from smuggling £70 worth of trinkets she had acquired in Ghana to Lagos yesterday."<sup>32</sup>

Police work involve considerable exposure to the public. In the event its personnel enter into frequent inter-action with the populace at large. This tends to make policemen generally cognisant of local peculiarities, mores and predispositions. These knowledge and their professional skills sometimes lead to their being tapped in times of social strife into attempts to restore normalcy. The following is illustrative of police usage in that regard:

"A Committee of Three has been appointed by the Government to investigate what were described as "allegations of intimidation, threatening and extortion" in Ashanti.

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32. Daily Graphic; May 30th, 1957, p.7.

Members of the committee are Mr. C.W. Quist, a retired Superintendent of Police, Mr. T.P. Tyrie, Superintendent of Police, and Mr. G.S. Lassey, a barrister."<sup>33</sup>

In acting as law-enforcers the police could at times be quite flexible to the desires of the incumbent elite - sometimes to the extent of virtually abandoning the very legal precept they are to endorse. The following illustration substantiates the assertion:

"The Ivory Coast fishing trawler 'Patricia', which was arrested and detained since February 4th for intruding into Ghana's territorial waters, was released last Saturday.... The trawler was arrested by a Ghana Navy Ship - GNS 'Komenda' - while fishing in Ghana's territorial waters, and handed over to the Police. Sources from the Railway and Ports Unit of the Ghana Police Service stated in Takoradi yesterday that the release of the trawler followed instructions to that effect from the Government. Under normal circumstances the crew should have been prosecuted. But the Ghana Government took that liberal decision in view of Ghana's relationship with the Ivory Coast."<sup>34</sup>

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33. Daily Graphic; June 29th, 1957.

34. Ghanaian Times; February 24th, 1970.

One should perhaps concede that the police could not have disregarded government instructions in that regard.

In their performance of patrol duties along Ghana's borders, the police could be pawns in the game of inter-states border conflicts and clashes. Three Ghanaian policemen were arrested and detained, for instance, by the Ivory Coast authorities on February 14th, 1970 in a short-lived border conflict involving the two countries.<sup>35</sup>

Further, the police institution offered another avenue for the political elite to pursue policies of international co-operation and amity. It as well offered an institutional link for the continual perpetuation of dependence ties with the colonial overlord. The assertions are lent empirical support in the following:

"EAST AND WEST AFRICAN POLICE MARKSMEN COMPETITION

Competitors participated in the competition in their various countries and the results were sent to Britain for scrutiny."<sup>36</sup>

The Police could also be trusted with the prosecution of such sensitive cases as the following:

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35. See Daily Graphic; February 24th, 1970.

36. Daily Graphic; March 5th, 1970.

"An Accra Circuit Court yesterday began hearing in camera the case in which Major Isaac M. Ashitey has been charged with possessing fire-arms, ammunitions, and transferring fire-arms and ammunitions without authority. The hearing of the case in camera followed an application by Mr. C.O. Lamptey, Superintendent of Police, that for security reasons he would like the case to be heard in camera."<sup>37</sup>

In their routine execution of the task of maintaining law and order the police in a multi-party state lends itself open to allegations of a biased invocation of statutory rules, as the following illustrates:

"An executive member of the Ga People's Association, 'Ga Shifiimo Kpe', has warned the Police not to interfere with their activities. Speaking at a rally held at the Mission House, Accra, Mr. J. Attch Quarshie accused the police of 'maltreating' peaceful members of the association. Mr. Quarshie explained that it was not the aim of the association to bring unrest and confusion to the state. But by using force on the

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37. Daily Graphic; March 19th, 1970.

members, he said, the police were trying to create trouble."<sup>38</sup>

On the other hand, under a cloak of forestalling a subversion of the lawfully constituted government, the police machinery could be used in the multi-party liberal-democratic state by a ruling party to set odds in the way of its opponents. The institution of police permits as a pre-requisite for public rallies and demonstrations lent itself as a means to impose obstacles in the way of political opponents.

Probability of police machinery usage in such biased, politically partisan way is inherent in the following threat, appearing in the 'Daily Graphic' of February 6th, 1970; and captioned 'No Police Permit For Preachers of Subversion.'

"The Volta Region Police would not grant permits for rallies to any political party which turned its rallies into arenas for preaching open subversion and inciting the public against the Government; Mr. A.S. Kpodonu, Volta Region Chief Executive, warned at Jasikan on Wednesday..."

The Police did perform other routine but politically consequential acts in society. It played prominent roles in ceremonial functions.

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38. Daily Graphic; May 30th, 1957; p.7.

During enactment of various rituals marking landmarks in the polity's history, the police act to maintain order, to provide music appropriate to the occasion and function and also takes part in marches. Other routine functions of the organization are its performance of vehicle examination to certify their road-worthiness and the direction of vehicular traffic to ease urban congestion and traffic jams.

In a polity hard-pressed for money and caught in a spiral of deficit-financing, the police organization is one of the few social institutions through which the government derives substantial revenue. Table Ten on the next page, shows the revenue collected by the Police through licensing during the years 1968 to 1971.

Juntas and civilian regimes alike routinely tend to utilise the police machinery of state in clamping down political opponents and restricting the activities of groups hostile to it. Under Busia's regime there occurred what came to be termed the Essakyrir Scare: economic crises induced by falling commodity-earnings and the neo-colonial, disoriented nature of the state's economy and an apparent governmental ineptitude led to a sudden clamour in Essakyrir, a town in the Central Region, and in other social circles

TABLE TENREVENUE COLLECTED BY THE POLICE THROUGH LICENSING: 1968-71

<u>DETAILS OF REVENUE</u>	<u>YEARS</u>		
	1968-69	1969-70	1970-71
	¢	¢	¢
Licenses			
Auctioneers	84,368	13,219	3,937
Domestic Servants	606	417	510,193
Gold Smiths	4,965	1,562	1,546
Money Lenders	3,165	1,349	1,072
Motor and Driving	4,716,124	5,195,994	4,527,761
Fire-arms	53,403	61,765	106,163
Hunting	50,522	46,153	44,654
Petrol	11,206	10,774	9,973
Police Escort Charges	38,833	37,404	61,960
Sale of Bakers Purchase Book	23,445	29,899	4,290
Sale of Unclaimed Articles	13,984	7,980	16,244
Accident Report Fees	19,217	25,395	28,243
Unclaimed Moneys	30,427	248,786	116,291
Public Services Performed for State Corporations and Private Organizations	20,669	36,651	44,798
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>5,069,722</u>	<u>5,717,348</u>	<u>5,477,125</u>

SOURCE: Report by the Auditor-General on the accounts of Ghana.  
First Report for 1973. Treasury Accounts, 1969-70/  
1970-71.

for a return to power of the ex-President. Opponents of the regime sought to make political capital out of the affair. Part of Busia's response to this erosion of his popularity was to reserve to the police powers that ostensibly enables it to effectively check rowdy behaviour and breaches of the public order - but which in reality are most likely to be used to serve partisan ends. Under those laws, passed under a Certificate of Urgency,

"no meeting or procession can be held in a public place in any part of Ghana by any persons without police permission... The Act under reference enjoins any person desiring to hold or form any meeting or procession in a public place to first apply to a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Superintendent for permission. If the officer is "satisfied that the meeting is not likely to cause a breach of the peace" he may issue a permit authorising the meeting or procession. In issuing such a permit he may prescribe any special conditions or limitations or restrictions to be observed at the meeting."<sup>39</sup>

The invocation and utilization of this device of impeding opposition and involving the police machinery in this way as an

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39. Africa Research Bulletin; September 30th, 1971; p.2229.

institutional devise is not restricted to the constitutional regimes. The junta-version of an utilization of the devise is offered below, by the National Redemption Council (NRC):

"A Public Order decree was published in Accra on May 17th, making it unlawful to hold a public meeting or procession within 500 yards of any meeting place of the NRC, the Executive Council, or any Committee of the NRC. The same would apply to any official residence of a member of the NRC, Executive Council; or any office or official residence of a regional Commissioner. It would also become unlawful to hold public meetings or processions within 500 yards of any port or airport, except with the consent of the Commissioner for Internal Affairs. Any person who intends to hold or form any meeting or procession or to celebrate any traditional custom in any public place should first apply to a superior police officer for permission."<sup>40</sup>

Both the juntas and the constitutional regimes utilised the police machinery to counter anti-social activities in the polity, such as the following:

"A middle-aged woman, Elizabeth Belief Komlagah,

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40. Africa Research Bulletin; May 1-31, 1972; p.2476.

who offered an unemployed woman for sale to a fetish priest at Atidzivie, appeared before a Denu Circuit Court charged with attempted slave-trading... While the transaction was going on, the Police came and arrested the accused. At the same court, Daniel Kwasi Brown, a seaman who offered his girl-friend Miss Comfort Donkor for sale to Togbi Ahiaku for ₵50,000 is also standing trial on a charge of attempted slave-trading."<sup>41</sup>

Or this other example:

"The Chorkor police in Accra seized a quantity of goods believed to be hoarded or looted in a swoop on houses in the area. The items included 50 bags of rice in a house at Abogye, and several bales of suiting material belonging to Miss Victoria Tetteh, a trader at the Makola market. Other items included refrigerators, vono mattresses, and a number of electronic equipment..."<sup>42</sup>

Or yet another example:

"A Police Constable, F.Y. Agboh, was shot and wounded in the thigh and the genitals by a farmer at Homenu when he went to arrest some suspects who had assaulted a driver and another sick policeman".<sup>43</sup>

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41. Ghanaian Times, June 11th, 1979

42. Ghanaian Times; June 13th, 1979.

43. Ghanaian Times; June 6th, 1979.

The Police is the social institution statutorily-required to be informed of vehicular accidents; and they are the arm of state charged with the routine identification and tracing of relatives of casualties in such accidents. Further, they stand in as a welfare agency through its care (temporarily) of the state's abandoned and lost children. As has been abundantly illustrated above, the Police is most often out to maintain society's legal order and thereby serves as an instrument of social stability. It sometimes act, however, to foster social unrest and destabilization and to infringe fundamental civic rights - as is instanced below:

"A 35-year old former finance clerk of the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development at Dunkwa-on-Offin who has been in police cells for almost two years without trial for allegedly stealing ₵55,000, has appealed to the Attorney-General to bring him to trial without further delay."<sup>44</sup>

The police organization holds an unenviable public reputation of being a major corruption-ridden social institution. In point of fact the salary and conditions of service of policemen, particularly its junior ranks, are far from attractive. Many police servicemen therefore seek to supplement their incomes through usage of their

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44. Ghanaian Times; April 20th, 1979; p.8.

official positions and assignments to make some money off lawbreakers. Policemen, in many cases, do not appreciate the crucial importance of the law they are supposed to enforce. At other times too they place more value on the money they could make through graft than on the public interest to be served through rigid enforcement of the law. The outcome is that it is not too unusual for policemen to apply the full rigours of the law only on those offenders out of their favour for one reason or the other and or those who fail to offer the desired bribe.

The following extracts from the press attest to the damage done the organization's public image by the rampant indulgence in corruption within its ranks. They as well offer particular instances of these acts of police corruption:

"What is the image of the Police Force like today? Almost every Ghanaian - high or low, rich or poor - would agree that corruption, sloth and a host of other mal-practises have brought the image of the police so low that today, even a school-boy has no fear for the Police. Corruption in the Force starts from the very moment a would-be recruit policeman or woman enters the Recruit Training School. You have to pay a bribe to enter the training, you have

to pay a bribe to become Constable Class One, or pay to see Police Examination Papers in advance. Drivers do not respect the Motor Traffic Unit of the Force because they the drivers buy their way out of traffic offences in broad daylight and in full view of the general public anytime, anywhere. The MTU Police themselves tell you how much you could pay in order not to go to Court. Some foreigners in our midst openly say that there is no Policeman high or low they could not buy: yes, they all have their price - whether it is ₵500 to 'doctor' a criminal docket or a new car to stop criminal investigation..."<sup>45</sup>

A former Central Regional Minister, Mr. J.E. Hagan, had his 'Nkodzen House' confiscated to the State in the aftermath of the 1966 coup. This was after he had been found by a Commission of Enquiry to have misappropriated state funds while in office. The confiscation was therefore a retributive measure taken by the state,

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45. "House Cleaning - The Police Connection"; Ghanaian Times Wednesday, July 4th, 1979, p.4. The author of this study is not in a position to attest to the veracity (or otherwise) of the particular claim that admission for training as a police recruit is subject to a prior payment of bribe. Police Promotion Examination Papers have repeatedly leaked over the years, however; and in consequence the conduct of such examination has been assigned to the regional West African Examinations Council.

and the Police were assigned to keep guard over the house. In time various items got stolen from the house and a search ended in the items being found in the possession of some of the police guards. They were arraigned before a law court for theft, and were prosecuted by fellow policemen. The court ultimately set them free on the grounds that evidence necessary to secure their conviction had not been adduced by the prosecution. The case was a puzzle to many; and elicited the following editorial piece from a national newspaper:

"While they fill the ears of the public with pious exhortations to 'co-operate' with the Police by 'providing information' on crime, they themselves do not scruple to connive with criminals in perpetuating crime, or in providing protection for criminals. Touch a ramshackle 'tro-tro' truck or taxi-cab and you see a policeman hiding inside the license disc - under the cover of a false name. Telephone to say that a truck loaded with contraband goods is on its way along a particular route - and the Police Radio telephone goes into service on behalf of the thieves. Get policemen arrested for pilfering property they are supposed to guard, and their colleagues on the investigating team will make sure that they have diluted charges to answer,

if even that. This is what happened in Cape Coast yesterday, as we report elsewhere. The Presiding Judge was moved to remark that he could "not force the Prosecution to go on with the case." But it was "regrettable that even where their own men were involved, the police could not make proper investigation before taking Court action." The IGP, Mr. Yakubu, was equally stupefied by the Cape Coast incident. He told the 'Graphic': 'I don't understand why anyone could say there was not sufficient evidence. The people were guarding the place; articles were missing from there; the policemen were searched and found to be in possession of the articles. What more evidence was needed?" <sup>46</sup>

The anti-police tirade continued as follows:

"We hasten to recall that it was at Cape Coast that "Twinkle J" was brutally murdered in police cells and was almost buried as the victim of 'asthma'. The political life of this country will be cleaner when the Police become clean. Until then, all our efforts at establishing the rule of law and all that goes with it will fall

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46. Daily Graphic editorial of 13th May, 1970 entitled "The Police Again!". Emphasis (by way of underlining.) is reprinted from the original article.

at the feet of a Police whose very boots are too heavy for it to carry, because they are too heavily laden with "booty".<sup>47</sup>

We have expatriated on the routine social functions performed by the police. In so doing we noted the courageous resistance of the police set-up to its politicization; and as well noted instances of its biased involvement in politics - organizational norms and operational rules notwithstanding. We have as well put forward the idea that routine police functions have political, and sometimes class implications. In this chapter also we have sought to demonstrate this empirically on the basis of the Ghanaian experience of police functioning.

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47. ibid., "Twinkle J" was a supposed criminal who died in police cell in Cape Coast as a result of torture and physical man-handling.

CHAPTER FIVE  
THE POLICE IN POLITICS

Police organizational norms lay claim to an apolitical, non-partisan characteristic. According to the claim, the police organization is disinterested and uninvolved in such political acts as the formulation of society's politico-legal underpinnings and such other issues and conflicts that tend to rend society into partisan political factions. The organization only concerns itself with the protection of life and property and with a mere implementation of laws duly arrived at through whatever socio-political framework the particular society cares to tolerate. In this claim therefore, policemen are mere law enforcers working to implement prevalent laws apparently in the interest of society and the individual; and are not concerned with advancing any particular ideological claim and interest of their own on society. The institution is seen in this perspective as strictly apolitical and merely concerned with law enforcement. Furthermore, claims to a nationalist ethos are made, and the police is seen from that viewpoint as placed above the wrangles and vicissitudes of partisan political involvement; and subserving through its social role performance society's common interests and welfare without taints of ideological preference and bias.

Our task in this chapter would be to advance the view, in line with evidence factually derived and presented in this work, that the idea of the police as an apolitical executive agency devoted to a mere implementation of society's laws and regulations is a myth so far as the experience offered by the Ghanaian polity (1957-79) is concerned.

In this chapter we shall make the point that the police (beyond executing those routine but politically consequential functions discussed in the previous chapter) has as well functioned on occasions on clearly politically-partisan basis. This occurred in connection with Police initiation and role in the 1966 coup d'etat and its aftermath of military-cum-police regime consolidation and under the various post-72 experiences of military rule of the polity. The latter involved co-optation of topmost police personnel into most of the ruling regimes; and therefore constitute other instances of police performance in partisan politics. We would therefore examine Police/Military relations in times of unconstitutional rule.

The point would be made that the coup d'etat and the resultant junta rule lead to a deflation of police internal social roles in favour of the military; and also that under the rule of military juntas there tend to occur serious institutional conflict between

the Army and the Police. Police role in the events terminating in the ouster of the Nkrumah regime and in the fall of the First Republic was considerable. All major accounts of the coup make the point that it was a joint military-cum-police operation. The plot was actually initiated by the Police boss, J.W.K. Harley, who mooted the idea to his subordinate officer A.K. Deku (head of the police Special Branch); and then to another fellow tribeman Colonel E.K. Kotoka.

It was not a mere case of police top hierarchy being privy to, or aware of the coup plot. It was entirely the brainchild of the topmost police boss and the Special Branch Unit boss. The army was brought into the plot not so much to achieve a spread of the political base of the plot as to secure a military counterweight to the imminent armed resistance bound to be offered by the President's Own Guard Regiment and by the military bases established by the President at various parts of the country. The Colonel then assumed leadership of the plot and involved other army personnel such as then Major A.A. Afrifa and Major-General Deran. The latter two were brought in on strategic grounds and were meant to throw in their weight and commands behind the plot to ensure its success.

The political decision to oust the incumbent set of political

elite through force of arms depended on the martial issue of overcoming the violence bound to arise in resistance to the coup move. It was upon such consideration that the police lost leadership of the plot to the military. The latter was superior in terms of martial prowess; and did have its own cause to be disaffected with the regime and to be seriously concerned for regime change.<sup>1</sup> Loss of leadership did not imply withdrawal from involvement, and as a consequence, "...army brigades - possibly numbering only 600 men - supported by the Police and its Criminal Investigations Department, struck in the early morning hours of February 24th, 1966"<sup>2</sup> to effect the ouster of the Nkrumah regime. Police involvement in the actual act of the coup consisted of laying its superb communication channels at the disposal of the coup move, effecting the arrest and detention of the political elite (which included cabinet ministers, political appointees administering various state organs, party functionaries

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1. See Afrifa and Ocran's various accounts of the coup. Afrifa's is The Ghana Coup; and Ocran's A Myth Is Broken.
2. Bretton, The Rise And Fall Of Kwame Nkrumah. A Study Of Personal Rule In Africa; op.cit., p.32.

even at the local level of party organization), and making efforts to maintain whatever level of political calm and order it could under those tense conditions. What factors underlay this blatant abandonment on police part of its apolitical ethos and the fact of its getting so intimately involved in the definitely political move of a coup d'etat? The 1966 Ghana coup has been differently explained and analysed in various scholarly works.<sup>3</sup> Public pronouncements and writings of the coupists explained their act to the ousted regime's increasing moves towards a totalitarian state, the steady advance made in the direction of authoritarian and autocratic rule, a curtailment of civic liberties and other fundamental rights, the apparently hopeless economic mess and crises in which the polity was engulfed, and some apprehension over

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3. Among such works are Fitch and Oppenheimer's Ghana: End Of An Illusion; and Robert Price' "Reference Group Theory and The Ghanaian Coup" article. Among viewpoints advanced in explaining the coup are those that account for it in terms of a pursuit of various corporate interests; and those that explain it as the outcome of the personal, idiosyncratic deliberations and decisions of a clique. Other viewpoints variously explain it as an outcome of a pursuit of various class and professional interests.



their jobs and profession in view of the ousted regime's swift development of rival functional institutions.<sup>4</sup> The police machinery was of immense utility in drives towards regime consolidation after each of the polity's coup experience.

After the coup which overthrew Nkrumah's rule, the successive National Liberation Council (NLC) junta consisted of four soldiers and three policemen. It had a policeman, J.W.K. Harley, as its vice-chairman. Policemen on that junta continued to hold their various police ranks and posts; and there was thus a direct integration of sorts between the institution and the government. Further, Harley held responsibility over the important portfolio of Internal Affairs. Police Stations, in the immediate aftermath of the coup, served as bases for the detention of the CPP's network of organizers, security personnel, and such like who could have destabilized the new regime and eventually regained political power.

The police as well offered personnel for the tracking of absconding functionaries of the disbanded party and overthrown government members. With the 1972 coup, parliamentarians and other political elites identified with the dislodged political order had to report at police stations where they were kept in custody till the regime felt they no longer constituted a threat to its stability.

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4. See in this regard Afrifa's The Ghana Coup and Ocran's A Myth Is Broken.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) likewise asked commissioners of state and senior military officials involved in the ousted administration to report at police stations - all in a bid to consolidate grip on political power.

Functions performed by the Police in society offer its functionaries skills in interaction with the populace and also offers them an inner knowledge of the society's processes. These, coupled with the fact of a territorial organization that ensures police presence in virtually all settlements within the polity, made policemen be assigned responsibility over the Internal Affairs Ministry in the allocation of ministerial responsibilities in times of military rule. We have already had occasion to draw attention to Harley, the police boss' assignment to the Internal Affairs Ministry under NLC rule.

In the same vein, that portfolio was assigned to Police Inspector-General J.H. Cobbina during the era of National Redemption Council (NRC) rule. Incidentally Cobbina was the only police member of that Council. In line with the pattern, under AFRC rule the portfolio went to Mr. Ben Fordjour, a former police Special Branch official. Even when policemen were not involved in the planning of the coup (as is the case with the 1972 coup for example), the pattern

still held true and the police Inspector-General got co-opted into the membership of the resultant junta. An exception to the latter rule is the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) junta, which included no policeman. The break is attributable to the spontaneous nature of the 4th June take-over of power which brought that junta into being; to the short duration of the latter's stay in power (it lasted for barely four months); and further, to the tendency of that junta to utilise soldiers to carry out tasks normally done by policemen.

The fact that each regime within the polity had as one of its earliest administrative acts a change in the top-level hierarchy of the police set-up and an imposition of a new IGP on the organization is indicative of the important role of the police organ of state in regime consolidation and its subsequent security operations. The tendency was to appoint as new Inspector-General of Police (IGP) a personality not associated with the fallen political elite; and there was a further tendency to appoint one whose continuance in office would hinge on his ability to help track subversion and subversionists and help maintain the rule of the incumbent regime. Thus the NRC discarded Ampaw, the IGP prior to their take-over of power and appointed J.H. Cobbina in his stead. In similar manner, the palace coup and rift within the Supreme Military Council (SMC)

which occasioned Acheampong's forced resignation and General Akuffo's assumption of the chairmanship of that Council also involved a 'resignation' of Mr. Ernest Ako, the incumbent IGP and his replacement by a successor who, in turn, was also to relinquish the office on the occurrence of the 4th June junior army ranks insurrection.

The successor, Mr. C.O. Lamptey, was in turn removed from office with the coming into being of a new republican government and the termination of AFRC rule. In sum, the crucial consequence of police performance to regime consolidation and continuation in office makes the office of its organizational head a political appointment of sorts - changing with the changing tides of political fortune.

Police crucial role in security machinations of juntas is not too difficult to demonstrate. The 17th April 1967 coup attempt by a band of soldiers under Lt.Arthur's leadership succeeded in throwing the ruling NLC into disarray and confusion - while Chairman Ankrah leapt from the official Christiansborg Castle residence into the sea in a desperate reach for refuge, the whereabouts of most other members of the Council could just not be made out. Army Commander E.K. Kotoka had been captured and eventually assassinated. It was vice-chairman J.W.K. Harlley who demoralised the coupists with a nation-wide broadcast claiming the failure of the coup and asking

the insurrectionists to surrender their arms. Acheampong's ouster was marked by an unsuccessful attempt to utilise the Police armoured squadron and other units as an initial base to effect his continued stay in power.<sup>5</sup>

On 4th June 1979, among the intermittent broadcasts urging military personnel not to take to arms but to rally behind the insurrectionists, was an announcement asserting the AFRC's awareness of a bid to utilise the Police Headquarters as a base for a gathering of forces loyal to the disarrayed SMC regime and plans to use police armoured cars, inter alia, to counter the violence of the insurrectionists. The announcement further called for an abandonment of those plans, in lieu of which the magnificent Police Headquarters would be bombed out of existence at a specified time!

Under NLC rule, when police membership on the ruling junta was almost at par numerically with that of the military, internal surveillance and other internal security machinations reverted to the police; and the military kept to its traditional distant involvement in those operations. Such had been the situation at independence; but

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5. Source of information is an informant within the ranks of the Special Branch Unit of Ghana's Police.

as has been shown above soon thereafter the CPP regime relied upon a core of party cadres, political informers, mercenaries, and the President's Own Guard Regiment in internal security manouvres and in the process relegated the police to a minor role in those tasks. The NLC disbanded all those social structures established under the previous regime and owing loyalty to the person of Nkrumah.

It as well reverted internal security operations to the Police. It was probably in execution of that function, and in the performance of his duties as Commissioner for Internal Affairs, that Harley reacted boldly to thwart the 17th April coup bid. Nkrumah's desire to effect a come-back to political power was known to all; and was never kept a secret by Nkrumah himself. The NLC regime was therefore understandably hypersensitive to security risks and issues, and the Special Branch Unit of the Police was a favoured machinery in its security machinations. At a meeting of the Ahafo Chiefs Association for example, held "...one morning in March in the Committee Room of the District Headquarters in Goaso, an important witness to proceedings in this era of police-military rule was a corporal of the Special Branch..."<sup>6</sup>

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6. Dunn and Robertson, Political Change In Ahafo... op.cit., p.227.

The police was responsible for an arrest, during this period, of one Boye-Moses alleged to have been sent by ex-president Nkrumah then in exile in Guinea to work towards a CPP return to power. Boye-Moses was put in a cage and paraded through streets in Accra by government agents made up mainly of police functionaries; and with official connivance and complicity.

In the absence of politically motivated social structures of mass mobilization and of a political police, the regular police under NLC rule, engaged in surveillance and such other acts meant to prop up the incumbent regime. The Police, for example, was responsible for large parts of the evidence adduced against Air Marshall M.A. Otu and his aide-de-camp, Lt. Kwepong. They had been accused of plotting to overthrow the NLC and establish in its stead a regime that would pave the way for Nkrumah's return to power.

Police witnesses and sources were principal in the prosecution claim that the Air Marshall had held meetings in London in connection with the alleged coup bid. The accused protested their trial before a military tribunal, demanded to be put before the regular courts, and thereafter refused to co-operate with the tribunal. It was alleged in circles within the polity that the whole accusation was

a ploy to rid the Air Force of the Air Marshall who was its head in order to make way for an appointment of an Ewe, Mr. Harlley's tribesman, to head that unit of the armed force and eventually ensure Ewe leadership of all wings of the army. There is not enough evidence to assert the falsehood or veracity of this counter-claim that attributed tribal calculations to the charges levelled against the accused.

We only allude to the affair to recall the principal role the police machinery of state played in the accumulation of the evidence given by the prosecution. At any rate suddenly the tribunal ceased to sit, the Air Marshall and his aide-de-camp were retired and set free, and the whole affair got dropped! If the police witness and reports featuring in the prosecution are mere fabrications, concoctions to serve tribal ends as claimed by some at the time, then R.C. Cobb's claim that "...a police that rules can create its own information, it can create events"<sup>7</sup> is offered substantiation in that experience within the state. That the police has not been above such fabrications is hinted at in police Deputy Commissioner A.K. Avadu's exhortation below:

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7. R.C. Cobb; The Police And The People ...op.cit., p.18.

"Mr. A.K. Avadu, Deputy Commissioner of Police in charge of the Eastern Region, has advised policemen not to lock up people in cells deliberately beyond the statutory time limit to 'show where power lies.' He charged them not to lie nor plant evidence to secure convictions."<sup>8</sup>

In countering anti-social activities in times of military rule, the military tended to abandon their exclusivity from civilian involvement and to work with the police in those regard. Thus bands of soldiers, particularly after the 1972 military coup, would go on price-checking and anti-hoarding raids in markets and other commercial places.

In their enforcement of rules and laws, the police do not entirely disregard class identity and personal connections; as is alleged for example in the following editorial article from the 'Ghanaian Times':

"...the price control law has been invoked mostly only when the poor rural trader, and not the big-time city economic criminal, is caught...Personnel of the price-enforcement agencies consider it a time-wasting and even risky exercise to touch the untouchables. And yet the pregnant woman who made an illegal profit of three pesewas was sent to jail whilst

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8. West Africa, July 11th, 1977; No.3134, p.1444.

the rich trader in Accra, caught red-handed hoarding and making huge profits in a day, went scot free because of his or her donations at public and private functions."<sup>9</sup>

Such discriminatory practice occurred most at the post-1972 coup epoch; when price legislation and attempts at its enforcement occurred with increased frequency, and Busia's laissez-faire economy had been abandoned. " It is interesting to note that those discrimination and practices of graft could occur under a regime with a professed ascetic ethos. It is also interesting that the critique could be levelled against the Police Machinery; an institution that professed disciplined and impartial enforcement of society's legal order.

The Police continued to be utilised under military rule, as under civil rule, to suppress strikes and to avert a harassment of management and destruction of property. Like it was with their social involvement in those regard under civilian rule, the Police performed those functions without concerning itself with (and delving into) the conflict or seeing to its settlement. Interventions are mostly on grounds of acting to avert a disturbance of the public peace and a break-down of law and order. On occasions

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9. Ghanaian Times; January 7th, 1979.

they act to halt and break up demonstrations on grounds of those demonstrations being held without permits.

Military juntas always tend to utilise the police in the performance of those functions and tend to keep the army uninvolved. This is probably out of a desire to maintain a favourable (military) institutional public image and to avert an erosion of whatever legitimacy and affection their juntas may have from the body-politic. An instance of police-performance of those functions is as follows:

"Police Save T.D.C. Management.

The intervention of Tema Police averted what might have resulted in a nasty incident at the premises of the Tema Development Corporation (TDC) when over 2,000 workers of the TDC on one hand, and members of the Tema Tenants Association on the other embarked on two separate demonstrations. The TDC workers, who have embarked on strike action since Wednesday, were to hold the demonstration to back their demand for payment of Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) announced by the government last July; whilst the Tema Tenants Association on the other was to march from the Tema Sports Stadium to

the TDC offices in protest against rent increases on the properties of the TDC. The increases, which range from 100 to 250 per cent and spread over a period of one year, takes effect from this month.. Earlier, the police, in stopping the TDC demonstration, explained that the workers had no permit; and invited the chairman and secretary of the local Public Service Workers Union to the police station for questioning."<sup>10</sup>

The Police machinery thus served to thwart, repress and suppress manifestations of discontent. It most often did so on a mere technicality of failure to seek police permit (obtaining of which is not for the mere asking; and which, as most often occurred, could be denied) without regard to the aptness or otherwise of the cause the act of civil protest is meant to serve.

Policemen often served as well as a corps of agent upon which rulers tended to rely to obtain the labour necessary to carry out essential tasks - as happened for instance when nurses declared a general strike in May 1979 in pursuance of a quest for higher remuneration and improved conditions of service. The strike action paralysed work in hospitals; and in point of time formed part of a

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10. Ghanaian Times; May 26th, 1979.

spate of strike actions meant to press some political demands upon the government. The incumbent SMC government was therefore concerned to keep the hospitals operating and thwart the fostering of an impression of regime unpopularity and instability. In the event police personnel were utilised to make up for the striking nurses. An instance of such usage is offered in the following report:

"Police to the Rescue.

About 40 women on training at the Accra Police Training Depot have been drafted to the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital to offer services to in-patients in the wards. A spokesman for the Ghana Police Force said that the action was in direct keeping with one of the cardinal objects of the Force - to save, or assist to save, life and property."<sup>11</sup>

Similar conception of police social role as an ad hoc machinery to meet urgent social needs underlies the following:

"Mental Patients Go Wild.

The two senior psychiatric specialists at the Ankaful Mental Hospital have appealed to the Government to provide as a matter of urgency, police or military assistance to help save life and property and to

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11. Ghanaian Times; May 28th, 1979.

prevent further indecent assault by enraged male patients on their female counterparts."<sup>12</sup>

One impact of the 4th June 'other-ranks' uprising in the army was to set a similar occurrence in motion in the Police organization. The event also occurred in June, 1979, and at a time when the AFRC was only succeeding in consolidating its rule and securing some measure of international co-operation and recognition. The police version took the form of an arrest of superior police officers deemed guilty of various malpractices. The action created a situation of institutional instability within the Police Organization; and drew the following reaction from the ruling AFRC junta:

"Call For Restraint In The Police Force.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) yesterday warned that it would not tolerate any acts of indiscipline from any members of the Ghana Police Force. The statement said it had come to the attention of the AFRC that some members of the Police Force had resorted to wanton acts of lawlessness, indiscipline and molestation of fellow members, including senior police officers. Such incidents of lawlessness were known to have taken place at Sunyani, Kumasi and Tamale, it said."<sup>13</sup>

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12. Ghanaian Times; May 25th, 1979.

13. Ghanaian Times: June 28th, 1979.

In fact the course of army accession to power and the AFRC<sup>S</sup> inception derived from closely similar "incidents of lawlessness"; and it was this pattern that the junior police officers imitated - with the significant difference that they had no view to assume rule over the polity. The AFRC<sup>S</sup> condemnation of their act is explainable in terms of that harassed regime's quest for that social stability and regime consolidation vital for the realization of its declared revolutionary objectives. The Inspector-General of Police' admission that "some of the grievances of the junior police officers were genuine but he was not happy about the method they adopted to bring them to the notice of the authorities"<sup>14</sup> lends credence to the above viewpoint.

As Lt.Col. Jeff Asma, Second Infantry Brigade Group Commander explained, "members of the Police Force would not be contributing to the success of the revolution if they showed gross disrespect and total insubordination to authority. Ghana looks up to the police as peace keepers and members of a disciplined force. You should therefore behave in the present exercise."<sup>15</sup> The Lt.Col. was addressing non-commissioned officers and other ranks of the Police Force who had arrested some of their superior officers for (alleged)

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14. Ghanaian Times; June 29th, 1979.

15. ibid.

corrupt practises. He advised them to 'compile all grievances against their officers and forward them to the Inspector-General of Police for investigation...' <sup>16</sup>

Faced with similar institutional bottlenecks, soldiers had not reacted the way the Lieutenant Colonel advised. The police had only taken up the example of the soldiers without challenging the latter's hold on power. This let-down of the junior policemen was to crystalize in a clash between police units and military units based in Takoradi; and the clash led to the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the entire affair. The junior ranks' mutiny offer an instance of police destabilization action within the polity. In point of fact Police-Military clashes and conflicts are not unknown.

Janowitz writes that 'the armed forces demonstrate their supremacy over para-military units by outright assault on para-military and police units. For example, in Peru in 1975, the military regime used its active-duty personnel to attack frontally strongposts held by the local police.' <sup>17</sup>

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16. ibid.

17. Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions And Coercion In The Developing Areas, University of Chicago Press, 1977; p.31.

In the aftermath of the 4th June insurrection, soldiers took upon themselves the task of legislated-price enforcement - a task previously carried out by the police; and the police played a subservient role in that exercise with the military. Under the various military juntas, the Military Intelligence wing of the army had increasingly been involved in the incumbent regime's security operations, and at the expense of the Special Branch wing of the police. Military rule of the polity therefore involved increasing entanglement of the military in the internal security and law-enforcement operations, and an encroachment into performance of functions associated with the civil police.

Institutional rivalry and conflict was bound to be manifested therefore; and the Takoradi police/military hostility outbreak must be seen in such light. The conflict was likely to be heightened by a less positive public estimation of the police as compared with the military; and by police pretense at being 'brothers-in-arms' with the military. The police did not partake in the summary meting out of corporal punishment to traders supposedly involved in malpractices and dealt with in that way by soldiers. Police non-involvement could be explained in terms of a training which instils in its functionaries an attitude mindful of the 'due process of the law'; in terms of their frequent interaction with a civilian populace they did not

dare to antagonise; and in terms of police resentment of the assuming role of the military in the polity's internal affairs. Police-military conflicts and clashes therefore tend to occur or worsen under military rule. An instance of police-military conflict under military rule is offered in the following:

"Officials of the Ghana Commercial Bank and policemen of the Police Armoured Squad had a hectic confrontation with a Captain of the Ghana Armed Forces at Abotakyi, near Mampong Akwapim at the week-end. It all started when the Captain ordered that the bank officials, who were riding on the armoured cars involved in the cedi notes exchange exercise, should get down. The soldier, Captain E. Amoako, who was in mufti at the time of the incident, met the armoured cars at an exchange point in the Akwapim Traditional Area. He demanded that since the bank officials were civilians they should not be allowed to make use of the armoured cars and that they should be made to get down, leaving the money in the armoured car. The Accra Zones A and C area manager of the bank, Mr. E.B. Adane, who was supervising operations, insisted that the exercise must continue since it was in the national interest. But Captain Amoako still demanded that the exercise must stop. Certain papers he was

producing to the officials to disclose his identity were seized from him by the police and the bank officials."<sup>18</sup>

The occasion was the demonetization of bank-notes then in use within the polity. The Government wanted to get rid of excess liquidity in an attempt to beat the stagflation in Ghana's economy. The public was to exchange the demonetized notes for new ones at a thirty percent discount; and very limited time was set for the whole exercise. There was thus a great rush on the part of the populace to beat the dateline; and the banks on their part tried to be within easy reach of each and all. It was against such social background that the above instance of institutional clash and conflict occurred.

Janowitz asserts that 'most nations have more than one security agency, and the agencies compete with each other'.<sup>19</sup> The assertion holds as regards the Ghanaian polity - as has been illustrated above. It is also factual, as has been shown, that the authoritarian CPP regime relied most (in terms of security) on its special institutions (such as the Young Pioneer Movement and the President's Own Guard Regiment) thereby deflating police role in the state's security

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18. Ghanaian Times; March 26th, 1979; p.12.

19. Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions...cp.cit., p.7.

machinations. In ruling, the Military (on its part) tended to involve its Military Intelligence Unit (on a dominant basis), in the polity's internal security machinations.

We have already noted the Police capability to be a destabilizing factor in the polity - in spite of its usual concern and efforts towards social stability and a maintenance of the status quo. An instance serves to highlight and underscore the point: In May 1979, University of Ghana's Commonwealth Hall students went to offer free communal labour at the Accra Railway Station as part of activities marking their Hall Day celebrations. While drumming and singing on completion of that task and waiting for a bus to convey them back to campus, they were accosted by three policemen who accused them of disturbance of the peace. Verbal confrontation and exchanges ensued, in the course of which a policeman fired a gun which killed one student and wounded three others.

This particular incident served as a major destabilizing factor in the polity. Critics of the regime capitalized on the event to reiterate political demands. It led to university student demonstrations and boycott of classes in demand of a trial of the policemen involved; and to a unilateral declaration by the National Association of Teachers of two conservative Fridays as days of mourning in

memory of the dead student (who was an elementary school-teacher on study-leave at the University). In a statement the General Secretary of the Ghana National Association of Teachers "recalled with regret various incidents since 1974 in which the Police and the Armed Forces brutalized innocent citizens...and cited several examples of police manhandling students, teachers, and heads of educational institutions; and said in all the incidents the circumstances and their causes were not serious enough to warrant shooting by the police."<sup>20</sup>

The shooting incident offered a pretext for criticisms and public disaffection to be expressed against a military regime the body-politic was disenchanted with.

"In another development, traders at the two Makola markets went on a demonstration at the Railway Station in sympathy with the students. A spokesman for the market women, Madam Vida Doodua Wristberg, in an interview with the 'Times', said they, as mothers, felt the police went too far even to the extent of using arms against defenceless students who, at that time, had gone their own way to help maintain sanitation around the Railway Station."<sup>21</sup>

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20. Ghanaian Times; May 11th, 1979.

21. Ghanaian Times; May 8th, 1979.

The social unrest and destabilization it occasioned is further evidenced in the following:

"The usual scene of smart, uniformed policemen gesticulating to make the flow of traffic smooth in Accra was completely absent yesterday. There had been no official explanation but observers believe that the peace officers were not at their posts because they did not want to attract the attention of students of the University of Ghana who were marching through the principal streets of Accra to the Castle. All police traffic posts were empty but at the Tema Station cross-roads, a young 'bookman' voluntarily directed traffic to ease the congestion."<sup>22</sup>

The social disorder and political tension occasioned by the shooting incident led to a Police statement asserting Police version of what precipitated the shooting and stating acts of violence and antagonism perpetrated against the police since the shooting. Among these acts were physical assault of three policemen on duty at various points in the capital city of Accra and the damage of police official cars they were then driving; the assault of policemen on traffic duties and seizure of their accoutrements, and the burning of police vehicle numbered GZA 8805 at the Liberation Circle, Accra. These

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22. ibid.

incidents really occurred, without the military in any way coming to the aid of the Police.

At a press conference on 13th January, 1980, the chairman of the erstwhile AFRC accused the state's security agencies of deliberately distorting reports; and preaching hatred and tribal politics in the army! He implied that the agencies always sought to advance particular partisan interests through distorted reports; and accused them of thereby working towards a disintegration of the country. They were also accused of raising false alarms and ultimately subverting governments they professed loyalty to. The 1966 coup was cited to substantiate the latter claim. The fact of a multiplicity of the state's security agencies has been noted already.

We do not know to what extent the Chairman's accusation is directed at the police institution in particular; and therefore we cannot evaluate its soundness. The criticism however offers an instance of imputation of politically-biased motivation to the state's security agencies. This accords with our basic view on the role of the police in the polity, which (view) is that not only is the police institution's routine social functioning immensely consequential to the politics and other spheres of the state's existence, the institution has also not been as apolitical as its ethos professes.

In substantiation of this view, acts of police political bias has been cited for both republican and junta rule. The juntas experienced after the 1972 coup d'etat made considerable use of the police set-up in subserving their partisan interest of regime consolidation. This was done against a social context of increasing disaffection with its rule and a loss of whatever legitimacy it might have possessed initially.

In Acheampong's drive towards autocratic rule for example, he established bases of power and support independent of the military even though the form of military rule remained unaltered. Supposedly apolitical groups such as the Society of Friends and the Peace and Solidarity Movement worked in partnership with hired thugs to contend against the various bodies demanding the resignation of the government and an abandonment of the government's intention to institute 'Union Government' - a tripartite, non-party system of rule to comprise soldiers, policemen, and then some elected civilians.

In pursuit of the objectives of the critics of the government, a symposium was scheduled for the 12th of October, 1977. Various organizations, basically apolitical, were involved in the anti-regime pressures. These included the Association of Professional Bodies, the National Union of Ghana Students, and various other secondary groups which committed themselves to the cause of terminating the

junta's rule and getting it to abandon its plans for 'Union Government'.

The 12th October symposium was organized by the Association of Professional Bodies and was meant to be a public discussion of the 'Union-Government' proposals mooted by the ruling junta. Those were times when a police permit was essential for public symposiums; and after lobbying in the corridors of power at the Osu Castle, Burma Camp and the Police Headquarters, a police permit was eventually granted for the symposium. But there were stipulations attached!

There was the proviso, for example, that there should be no procession before or after the event. Another proviso was that panelists should address issues rather than attack personalities. At that well-attended and tense symposium, just as the first speaker had uttered a few introductory sentences, thugs planted at the meeting by the ruling junta (or its agents), acted swiftly to disrupt and eventually terminate the proceedings.

In the words of one eye-witness account,

"The thugs went up the stage, wrenched papers from the panelists, and tumbled the table, speaker's stand, microphones and chairs down the legs of the dumb-founded speakers and officials. Others began to beat the Chairman

and his colleagues while some others threw chairs at the audience. It was at this stage that it dawned on some of us what was happening: those thugs had been deliberately planted to disrupt the meeting with maximum violence. So knives, stones and chairs began to fly. The crowd became hysterical and began to scramble out for dear life...

In all this confusion one thing stood out clearly: the thugs wore brand-new white T-shirts, out of which peered the faces of General Kutu Acheampong and the current members of the Supreme Military Council. At the back were inscriptions in support of Union Government."<sup>23</sup>

Then comes a most interesting aspect of the whole sordid event which attests to the political use of the police set-up also in times of military rule to subserve politically-partisan ends:

"All this time the Police were everywhere. Riot police with truncheons... Surprisingly, all of them stood idle, and looked on with bemused indifference. For me, this was the most frightening and depressing aspect of the whole operation: the Police standing there unconcerned,

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23. Ruling A Sovereign People. A Collection Of Essays, Letters And Commentaries In The Mass Media; by J.K.E. Agovi, unpublished manuscript, Institute of African Studies, Legon.

a feeling of impotence written large on their faces. I had seen the Ghana Police in action before. The enthusiasm with which they wielded their truncheons in their confrontations with university students! But on this occasion, truncheons were either resting on the ground (a sign of peace) or comfortably in hands which remained idle at the back (as if to say: What a pity!) It was frightening and sad."<sup>24</sup>

In fact the police organization was very instrumental in that junta's numerous acts of political suppression and coercion. On 11th February, 1977, students of Ghana's three universities went on peaceful demonstrations to protest against particular acts of the government. It acted similarly on 13th March, 1977. On both occasions it was the police machinery which was utilized to disrupt those acts of civil protest through the beating up of the student-marchers, the disruption of their ranks, and a random arrest of some of the demonstrators. The army was uninvolved in those repressive exercises.

Policemen kept an open surveillance on the campus after those events; and in the latter instance the surveillance involved usage of the police' fleet of armoured vehicles.

The Police, in junior partnership with the army's military intelligence unit, formed the main prop in the post-72 regimes'

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24. ibid.

security systems; and contributed thereby towards the era of tyranny, oppression, and mismanagement experienced particularly at the terminal epoch of those years of rule by military juntas.

In spite of their fairly intimate contact with the body-politic, the police hierarchy did act in those years in ways utterly divergent from the general will of the mass of the populace. The latter was for regime change; but the Police on those occasions, unlike in 1966, chose to be loyal to the incumbent political elite and helped in that regard to repress expressions of popular opinion the ruling junta found disconcerting.

Police role-performance in those directions could lay in the military juntas co-option of the topmost police hierarchy into its circles - through the appointment of an incumbent IGP as an ex-officio member of the ruling (military) junta; and through a grant of financially-rewarding government posts to topmost police personnel. E.K. Buckman, for example, was made a Commissioner of State, as was E. Owusu Fordjour - both top-ranking police servicemen.

As it did for other regimes, intelligence reports were sent regularly from the police to the ruling elite. The fact of police involvement; and not only that but manoeuvring, to serve political ends in times of military and military-cum-police rule is attested



to by the various Indemnity Acts passed to accord indemnity to the entire police and military institution and functionaries for any action done (or undone) in the course of their rule.

Finally, we note that the era of military rule marked the period when border-guard functions and units of the police were divorced from the organization and taken over by the military. The move was explained in terms of better military logistics and discipline; and it was also claimed that the military indicate less susceptibility than the police, to various corruptive influences.

In point of fact empirical record since the separation has not altogether justified those claims. At any rate the removal of functions of border control and patrol from the police amounted to a further deflation of its role in society; and again in favour of the military. We may hazard a conclusion that military intervention and rule do involve an expansion of the military's involvement in society's internal affairs; and at the expense of the police institution. Without prejudice to the veracity or otherwise of the claim as regards other polities, it would be seen, as elaborated above, that the claim holds true for the Ghanaian polity in its experiences of military rule - particularly those that came into being after the fall of the Second Republic and which showed less reliance and dependence (than had hitherto been the case) upon the polity's police institution.

CHAPTER SIXSUMMATION AND CONCLUSION

We have been concerned to set out the exact role of the Police set-up in Ghana within 1957 and 1979. In so doing we have not failed to deal with the more consequential issue of an analysis of police role performance in the state; and we have also noted differences in style and tendency in police organization and performance under civilian and then under military (or military-cum-police) regimes. It has as well been our burden in the process to show in what ways the Police lived up to their institutional ethos; and we observed in noting their failures in that regard the fact that their claim to being apolitical is not entirely borne out by historical realities. Ghana's police is organized in a pyramid of authority, as it were; with each echelon of this centralized set-up owing explicit and peremptory obedience to its superiors.

The entire structure is identifiable by named rank and insignia, and the organization has its own ethos and guiding rules of conduct. We have also shown the Police to be an institutional machinery for the establishment and enforcement of social order.

Broadly, two schools of thought are identifiable on the issue of the foundations of a society's social order. These are the Integrationist and the Coercive schools. The former is most closely

associated with Talcott Parsons. According to it social order results from a general agreement on values which outweighs actual differences of opinion and interest.

The Coercive viewpoint, on the other hand, holds that social coherence and order are founded on force and constraint and on the domination of society by a section thereof. Marxist thinking on the nature of capitalist society exemplifies the Coercive School of thought.<sup>1</sup> The empirical evidence offered by the Ghanaian polity, as shown in this work, lends greater credence to the Coercive viewpoint. In enforcing society's law and order as it routinely does, the Police enforces the laws made by the immensely privileged elite and maintains a social order conducive to the working-out and perpetuation of the class relations existing in the polity. Insofar as the legally-enacted norms and rules enforced by the Police do not constitute the consensual norm of the entire society nor equally subserve the interests of each and all, the Police institution may be said to constitute an organ of class rule.

Further, as evidenced by Police inaction at the "Union Government

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1. See Class And Class Conflict In Industrial Society, by Ralf Dahrendor; Stanford University Press, 1959.

symposium thuggery referred to above and by Police role in the 1966 anti-Nkrumah coup, the organization does act politically to give the lie to a still-prevalent ethos of apolitical social functioning. At all times however, its act (or omissions<sup>2</sup>) are decidedly important to the political fortunes and popular assessment of incumbent regimes. Police inability to enforce 'legislated' prices under the rule of the post-Busia governments and the subsequent anti-regime furore and social discontent their inability occasioned is a case in point.

The organization was utilized by incumbent rulers to clamp down on their political opponents, to keep themselves in power, and to maintain their rule and set of priorities as formulated in their legal enactments. The set-up also carried out acts of surveillance in the interest of the incumbent regime through its Special Branch

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2. As Merton points out, an institution's social role comprises its Manifest Functions and its Latent Functions. The former refers to deliberately intended functions of that institution; while the latter refers to regular but unanticipated consequences of that institution's activities. These may not be perceived by that institution's functionaries. See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure; Glencoe Ill, Free Press, 1949, pp.21-81.

Unit. The organization routinely performed punitive, educative, preventive, welfare and deterring tasks within the national context, as elaborated above.

The Police has been shown to be a major part of both the executive and judicial organs of government. At the level of its functioning within the Executive, it was observed that in periods of military rule there occurs an increased reliance on military personnel and units in the enforcement of administrative fiats. This occurs at the expense of the police institution. The latter organization continues to be utilized in times of military rule however, for the execution of such unsavoury acts as suppression of rioters and demonstrators. Also, unlike it is with military rulers, civilian incumbents of power tend to place less reliance on the army in the consolidation of their power and in their internal surveillance operations. They tend to place greater dependence on the police institution in those regard.

Perhaps on account of their greater interaction with the body-politic and because of their minimal ethos of violence, the police are less prone (as compared to the military) to utilize violence in enforcing 'legislated' prices and other legal edicts. It is as well exhibits a greater sensitivity and respect to the

niceties of the law than do the military in law-enforcement operations. Summarily put, police performance in the polity has also involved a protection (and sometimes the abuse) of fundamental human rights, the enforcement of immigration and other laws made by the State, and the control and direction of vehicular traffic. Other routine functions of theirs have been to combat trade malpractices, to grant various licenses, and the provision of such welfare activities as maintenance of lost persons and a subsequent search for their relations. In addition, in the pursuit of their professional concerns, they have been instrumental in surveillance for the government, in the protection of life and property, and have as well served to maintain and thereby perpetuate Ghana's decadent and bankrupt neo-colonial social system. Clearly the organization constitutes an ubiquitous and immensely important arm of state.

We have drawn attention to the institutional conflict and strife that tends to occur between the Army and the Police particularly in times of military rule; and we have observed that the conflict tended to arise as a result of military encroachment into the performance of internal social functions traditionally assigned to the police.

Society's perception and image of the Police tell on the latter's social tasks. A police reputed to be efficient and incorruptible deters many a potential criminal from actually committing criminal acts. On the other hand, where the organization has somehow acquired the stigma and social aura of eager susceptibility to corrupting influences (organizational norms and code of ethics notwithstanding as has Ghana's police), rather than its social presence deterring and occasioning fright, many offenders and potential violators of various restrictive edicts<sup>3</sup> tend to seek leverages over particular functionaries within the police organization in a bid to neutralise that institution's deterring impact and threat to their activities. Violation of the state's legal edicts are therefore quite rampant and sometimes occur with considerable impunity. Leverages utilized to negate police influence include the

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3. A gamut of restrictive edicts exist in Ghana's statute books. These include various restrictions on goods to be traded in by particular merchant concerns; restrictions on the exportation and importation of particular merchandise; and a prevalence of 'legislated prices' far below what would have been if free interaction of market forces and price fixation on such basic had been allowed. Other restrictions include petrol rationing and a confining of the sale of petroleum and its products to specified days and hours.

offer to (police) servicemen of various 'gifts'; and an utilization of one's social connections with particular members of the elite to pressurize particular police functionaries act one's way. Among professional drivers and such other commercial motorists there is a customary unofficial practice of an offer of regular monetary 'tips' to police functionaries on road-check duties.

Needless to say, the effectiveness of these leverages undermine an incumbent government's effectiveness, subvert those goals the haphazardly-enforced edicts are meant to realize, and in the process erode public confidence and respect for the Police Organization. Police organizational norms and operational rules presupposed a liberal-democratic social framework; an assumption which constitutes a blatant political choice - though the police hierarchy does not seem to have come to a realization of that fact. The thrust of the socialization processes police functionaries experienced in the course of their training presupposed a plural society of sorts; and considerably served to foster an impression that no worthwhile alternative existed to the liberal-democratic mode of social organization. Hence the police set-up's unease at the increasingly leftist and authoritarian tendencies of the Nkrumah regime and its eventual collusion with the army to effect that regime's ouster.

Acheampong's 'Union Government' idea of a non-party governing tripartite alliance of the army, the police, and civilians is no deviation from the rule since the idea was not mooted by the police - which was then in junior partnership with the army. Politically partisan police involvement did not at all times occur simultaneously at all levels of the organization. Most often particular territorial units and functionaries within the organization succumbed to various pressures and acted partisanly without necessarily obtaining the prior consent or acquiescence of their superior officers.

Hence the persistence of the apolitical ethos in spite of the numerous incidents of political partisanship. Of course where partisan involvement emanated from the topmost echelon of the organization, then arising out of the para-military organization of the Force, the entire organization went the line toed by its leaders. Topmost police brass' initiation and involvement in the 1966 coup d'etat and purposive police inaction in the 'Union Government' melee are cases in point.

Those instances adequately indicate also that the force of the organization can be brought to bear in the interest of particular sectional interests against others - and in contravention of



stated organizational rules. Through frantic and repressive involvement in various measures to subjugate the interests of labour to those of capital and its owners, the police machinery did work to improve and maintain a climate for capital investments and its repatriation. Suppression of labour disputes and unrests was one of the organization's recurrent and major social functions. It rarely concerned itself in those industrial disputes with their amicable settlement or a mutually acceptable arbitration on the issues of the industrial conflict.

Cobb claims that "...an autocratic regime, which has destroyed all possible means of the free expression of opinion at any level, and has become increasingly obsessed with a public that it has driven underground and has no means of gauging, is forced to rely more and more on its police."<sup>4</sup> The experience of Ghana's police set-up under the autocratic Nkrumah and Acheempong regimes, lend massive credence to that generalization. Though as elaborated above, those governments had cause not to rely exclusively upon the police organization for its security network, largely because of reasons connected with continuing police adherence to most of its professional ethics and organisational norms.

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4. Cobb, The Police And The People; op.cit., p.57.

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APPENDIX A

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SYLLABUS

GENERAL POLICE DUTIES

SQUAD ONE

1. Objective of the Police Service
2. History of the Ghana Police Service
3. Organisation and Administration of the Service
4. Conditions of Service - ACT 350/70
5. Branches and Units of the Service
6. Force Instructions 1,28,48,59, & 92.
7. Constables Maxims, etc.
8. Relationship between the Police and the Public
9. Police Principles
10. Police Duties - General use of Truncheon, etc.
11. Station Records - Station Diary - F.I. 39
12. Station Records - C.I.D. Forms 2, 3 etc.
13. Station Duties F.I. 38
14. Discipline - Section 17 of Act 350 and F.I. 48.
15. Barracks Rules - F.I. 91
16. Uniform and Turn Out - F.I. 91
17. Police Communication - F.I. 270, 275, 276, 277
18. Local Knowledge and Observation
19. Derelict Property & Disposal of Exhibits
20. Exhibits - Arms and Ammunition disposal of - F.I. 208
21. Fingerprints
22. Identification Methods - F.I. 195

E X A M I N A T I O N

S Q U A D   T W O

23. Modus Operandi
24. Powers of Arrest etc.
25. Prisoners Escape, Escort, etc. F.I.172
26. Prisoners rights, bail etc. (See Article 21(2) of 1979 Constitution)
27. Bail - Defined, Kinds etc. - F.I. 177
28. Day and Night Duties in Town
29. Fine
30. Methods of Instituting Criminal Proceedings
31. Warrants, etc.
32. Summons, etc.
33. Children and Young Persons
34. Magistrate Office and Summary Court Functions and High Court
35. Functions of Judges and Jury etc.
36. Motor Traffic Ordinance and Regulations
37. Motor Vehicles Regulation and Licensing
38. Driving Licences - International, etc.
39. Offences relating to maintenance of Vehicles - R/TR.
40. Traffic Offences
41. Conventional Signs

SQUAD THREE

42. Elementary Plan Drawing
43. Kinds of Law
44. Interpretations of Act 29/60
45. Provision relating to Intent
46. Provision relating to Negligence
47. Provision relating to Consent and Threat
48. Attempts, Preparation, Conspiracy, etc.
49. General Exemptions
50. Classification of Crimes and Offences
51. Drunkenness
52. Assault (Section 84 of Act 29/60)
53. Assault causing Harm, Threat of Harm
54. Offences against Women and Girls
55. Abortion - Section 58 and 59 of Act 29/60
56. Criminal Homicide
57. Offences against right of property - Damage
58. Stealing (Section 124 of Act 29/60)
59. Dishonestly Receiving
60. False Pretences and other frauds
61. Robbery
62. Unlawful Entry - Section 152-155 of Act 29/60
63. Extortion, Bribery and Corruption.

SQUAD FOUR

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64. Forgery - Section 58 of Act 29/60
65. Coinage
66. Perjury and other offences
67. Visit to Licensing Office
68. Slave Dealing
69. Public Order and Security
70. Prevention of Crime
71. Release and Supervision of Convicts
72. Scientific aid to detection of Crime
73. Examination at the scene of crime
74. Crime Reports
75. F.I. 227
76. Visit to Crime Laboratory

SQUAD FIVE

77. Judges Rules
78. Interrogation of Witnesses
79. Deposition
80. Evidence - Kinds
81. Examination of Witnesses
82. Mock Trial
83. Burden of Proof
84. Joinder of Charges
85. Legal Terms
86. Practical Demonstration of an offence of Being on premises for Unlawful purposes
87. Evidence Decree/1974
88. Practical Demonstration - Traffic Control
89. Visit to Courts

SQUAD SIX

90. Liquor Licencing
  91. Cinematograph
  92. Pawn Brokers Ordinance Cap. 189.
  93. Lotteries and Betting, etc.
  94. Customs Ordinance Cap.167.
  95. Arms And Ammunition Act 118/62
  96. Wildlife Conservation Regulation
  97. Illiterate Protection Ordinance Cap.262.
  98. Aliens, Act 160/63
  99. Gold Mining Product Ordinance
  100. Diamond Mining Industry
  101. Coroners Act 18/60 - Sudden and Unnatural deaths
  102. Visit to Korle-Bu Mortuary
  103. Explosives - Regulation 1970
  104. Weight and Measures Ordinance
  105. Domestic Servants Ordinance
  106. Auction Sales Ordinance - Cap.169
  107. General Revision
  108. FINAL - EXAMINATION
-

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

1. Current topics of interest involving Political, Social and Economic issues on Ghanaian, African and World Scena.
2. Important Aspects of the United Nations - Specialised agencies and their functions.
3. Important aspects of the O.A.U.
4. The Ghana Police Service and other Police Organisations in other parts of the World.
5. Public Relations - General

Text Books:

- (i) Material from Local Dailies
- (ii) Material from Magazines/periodicals etc.

FIRST AID

1. Principles of First Aid
2. Circulation of the Blood
3. Bleeding
4. Infection
5. Shock
6. Fractures
7. Burns
8. Effects of Heat and Cold
9. Minor emergencies
10. Stretcher care - Bandaging and special equipment
11. Artificial respiration
12. Outdoor exercises.

Text Books:

Instructor's Handbook - First Aid.

E N G L I S H

English Language Study:

- (a) Tenses - Intermediate Exercises from  
    'Living English Structure' by Allen
- (b) Countable and uncountable nouns. Pronouns
- (c) Correct use of words: e.g.  
    "too" and "enough"; "some" and "any"; "get" and "got" forms  
    "do" and "make" etc.
- (d) Reported Speech.

Text Book:

- (1) Living English Structure by Allen
- (2) Guide to Patterns and Usage of English by Nornby

II (a) Reading and Comprehension

Recruits should be encouraged to read and answer questions from passages. They should be able to explain the meaning of expressions as used in the passages.

Text Book:

Practical English 3 by Ogundipe and Tredgidge

II (b) Elementary Exercises in Precis Writing.

III English Composition:

1. Mechanics of Essay Writing
2. Narrative Essay
3. Descriptive Essay
4. Report Writing
5. Private and Official Letters
6. Expository Essay
7. Writing of Minutes.

MAP READING AND INTERPRETATION

1. Importance of Map Reading to the Police  
Types of Maps and their Special uses.
2. Scales of Maps and their uses - Calculation of distances, areas etc.
3. Direction and Position -
  - (a) Compass Points and Bearings.
  - (b) Latitude, Longitude and Position.
  - (c) The Grid Lines.

(Teach the use of the Prismatic Compass)
4. Conventional Signs and Symbols used on Maps - Their Interpretation
5. Relief Features:
  - (a) Representation of relief
  - (b) Determination of heights
  - (c) Determination of Gradients.
6.
  - (a) Contours and Section Drawing
  - (b) Contour Forms of Common relief features.
7. Study of Selected Topographical Maps of Ghana.
  - (a) Relief and Drainage
  - (b) Communications
  - (c) Settlements.
8. Field Sketches:
  - (a) Sketching scenes of accidents
  - (b) Traffic flow etc.

Text Book:

Map Reading for West Africa by D.A. Nimako.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

1. Introduction to Sociology and Psychology.
2. Primary sources of behaviour, the reflex system, drives.
3. Culture and Personality.
4. Social Control and Socialization.
5. Delinquency - Content, control and treatment of.
6. The Affective reference frame - traits, sentiments and self.
7. The Cognitive reference frame - Perception, perceptual learning and thinking.
8. Individual differences - Cognitive and affective differences.
9. Social Structure of Ghana: Ethnic Groups and their languages.
  - (b) Non-Ghanaian African groups in Ghana and their influence.
  - (c) Lebanese and European groups.
10. The modern society - Place of clubs and Associations.

Text Books:

- (a) Fundamentals of Psychology - C.J. Adcock
- (b) The Beginnings of Modern Psychology - W.M. C'Neil
- (c) A Dictionary of Psychology - James Drever.

APPENDIX B1ST WEEKSQUAD DRILL - WITHOUT ARMSSQUAD ONE

DAYS	6.00AM - 6.30AM	8.00AM - 8.45AM	9.00AM - 9.30AM
MONDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	BRIEF LECTURE ON DRILL WITH RESPECT TO POLICE. ATTENTION	ATTENTION; STAND AT EASE,
TUESDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	ATTENTION, STAND AT EASE, STAND EASY.	FORMING UP IN THREE RANKS
WEDNESDAY	OFFICER COMMANDING'S PARADE		
THURSDAY	J U D O	DRESSING - THREE RANKS	NUMBERING AND PROVING - THREE RANKS
FRIDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	THE WEEK'S REVISION	R E V I S I O N
SATURDAY	R O O M S   A N D   B A R R A C K S   I N S P E C T I O N		

2ND WEEK:

SQUAD DRILL - WITHOUT ARMS

SQUAD 1

DAYS	6.00 AM - 6.30 A.M.	8.00 A.M. - 9.00 A.M.	9.00 A.M. - 9.30 A.M.
MONDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	OPEN AND CLOSE ORDER MARCH - THREE RANKS	TURNING AND INCLINING AT THE HALT.
TUESDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	FALLING OUT	DISMISSING
WEDNESDAY	OFFICER COMMANDING'S PARADE		
THURSDAY	JUDO	SIZING	SIZING
FRIDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	THE WEEK'S REVISION	REVISION
SATURDAY	ROOMS AND BARRACKS INSPECTION		

3RD WEEK:SQUAD DRILL - WITHOUT ARMSSQUAD ONE

D A Y S	6.00 A.M. - 6.30 A.M.	8.00 A.M. - 8.45 A.M.	9.00 A.M. - 9.30 A.M.
MONDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	MARCHING AND HALTING IN QUICK TIME.	MARCHING AND HALTING IN QUICK TIME.
TUESDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	MARCHING AND HALTING IN SLOW TIME.	MARCHING AND HALTING IN SLOW TIME.
WEDNESDAY	O F F I C E R C O M M A N D I N G ' S P A R A D E		
THURSDAY	J U D O	Riot Drill: Brief lecture sectional movements - Blocking of Street.	Riot Drill: Sectional movements. Blocking of street.
FRIDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	R E V I S I O N	R E V I S I O N
SATURDAY	R O O M S A N D B A R R A C K S I N S P E C T I O N		

TH WEEK:

SQUAD DRILL - WITHOUT ARMS

SQUAD 1A

DAYS	6.00 A.M. - 6.30 A.M.	8.00 A.M. - 8.45 A.M.	9.00 A.M. - 9.30 A.M.
MONDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	STEPPING OUT ON THE MARCH IN QUICK TIME.	STEPPING SHORT ON THE MARCH IN QUICK TIME.
TUESDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	STEPPING OUT ON THE MARCH IN SLOW TIME	STEPPING SHORT ON THE MARCH - IN SLOW TIME.
WEDNESDAY	OFFICER COMMANDING'S PARADE		
THURSDAY	J U D O	RIOT DRILL: PLATOON MOVEMENTS, BLOCKING OF STREET BY SECTIONS.	RIOT DRILL: BLOCKING OF STREET, ADVANCING AND CHARGING WITHOUT BATON.
FRIDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	R E V I S I O N	R E V I S I O N
SATURDAY	R O O M S A N D B A R R A C K S I N S P E C T I O N		

5TH WEEK:

SQUAD DRILL - WITHOUT ARMS

SQUAD 1A:

DAYS	6.00 AM - 6.30 AM	8.00 AM - 8.45AM	9.00 AM - 9.30 AM
MONDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	GETTING ON PARADE	GETTING ON PARADE
TUESDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	PAGES FORWARD AND TO THE REAR	THE SIDE PACING
WEDNESDAY	OFFICER COMMANDING'S PARADE		
THURSDAY	EXAMINATION		
FRIDAY	GENERAL FATIGUE		
SATURDAY	ROOMS AND BARRACKS INSPECTION		

6TH WEEK:

- 6 -

SQUAD DRILL - WITHOUT ARMS

SQUAD 2A

D A Y S	6.00AM - 6.30AM	8.00AM - 8.45AM	9.00AM - 9.30AM
MONDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	ATTENTION, STAND AT EASE, STAND EASY WITH BATON	TURNING ABOUT AND MARCHING WITH BATON
TUESDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	TURNINGS ON THE MARCH - IN SLOW TIME	TURNING ON THE MARCH - IN QUICK TIME
WEDNESDAY	O F F I C E R   C O M M A N D I N G ' S   P A R A D E		
THURSDAY	J U D O	RIOT DRILL: BLOCKING STREET, ADVANCING AND CHANGING WITH BATON	RIOT DRILL: BEATING WITH BATON AND RETREATING
FRIDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	DIAGONAL MARCH-IN SLOW TIME	DIAGONAL MARCH-IN QUICK TIME
SATURDAY	R O O M S   A N D   B A R R A C K S   I N S P E C T I O N		

7TH WEEK:

SQUAD DRILL - WITHOUT ARMS

SQUAD 2A

D A Y S	6.00AM - 6.30AM	8.00AM - 8.45AM	9.00AM - 9.30AM
MONDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	MARKING TIME, FORWARD AND HALT - SLOW TIME	MARKING TIME, FORWARD AND HALT - QUICK TIME
TUESDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	MARKING TIME, CHANGING STEP - SLOW AND QUICK TIME	CHANGING STEP ON THE MARCH - SLOW TIME
WEDNESDAY	O F F I C E R    C O M M A N D I N G ' S    P A R A D E		
THURSDAY	J U D O	RIOT DRILL: ATTENTION, EASE AND EASY USING BATON AND SHIELD	RIOT DRILL: MARCHING - QUICK AND DOUBLE TIME - USING BATON AND SHIELD
FRIDAY	PHYSICAL TRAINING	CHANGING STEP ON THE MARCH - QUICK TIME	R E V I S I O N
SATURDAY	R O O M S    A N D    B A R R A C K C    I N S P E C T I O N		