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An imaginary line? Decolonisation, bordering and borderscapes on the Ghana–Togo border

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ABSTRACT

Africa's inherited colonial borders have been central in debates on decolonisation for reasons that include challenges posed to African mobilities and identities, suggesting that there is a crisis of ideas about the border. This article draws on critical border studies (CBS) to examine the agency and negotiating capabilities of border residents using Leklebi and Wli, on the Ghana–Togo border, as case studies. How are discourses and practices of the border embedded in the contemporary everyday life of the borderland residents? What do their bordering practices reveal about their borderscapes? Are borderscapes being created or negotiated dependent on context? It argues that in these borderlands, borderscapes and bordering are conceived and expressed contextually not only through the lens of the postcolonial territorial border but also through the precolonial migration histories as well as precolonial concepts of political space. It contributes to border studies by highlighting the importance of historical and cultural factors in bordering and borderscapes. An understanding of such complexities may, in a significant way, help us to rethink or reconsider the arbitrariness of borders.

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Introduction

The international border, in the words of one borderland resident, is an 'imaginary line', one that exists only in the imagination of the cartographers, colonial officials and postcolonial security apparatus.¹ Another noted that 'when the border is closed, it does not mean the routes to Togo are closed'.² In other words, when one border is closed many more remain open. These statements speak to larger issues regarding not only what the border is, where the border is and who borders, but also the border's role in decolonisation.

International borders represent some of the most controversial legacies of colonial rule in Africa. These borders have been at the heart of debates on sustainable independence and progressive development for Africa because of how they cut across families, communities and ethnic groups.³ At the first All-African People's Conference, an important gathering of African people, leaders and future leaders in postcolonial Africa that was held in Accra in 1958, the colonial borders were at the centre of discussions. These borders were described

as 'unnatural' and 'not conducive to peace and stability'.⁴ However, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the continental pan-African body formed in 1963, moved for the acceptance of these boundaries because of the fear of opening a Pandora's box of territorial claims. Its charter called for 'respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence'.⁵

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that the 'very adoption of the principle of inviolability of colonially inherited borders at the time of formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 whilst accepted as pragmatic, marked the beginning of reproduction of coloniality'.⁶ As he further notes: 'The unprecedented phenomenon of migration/mobility across postcolonial African borders implores us to rethink the very ideas of borders, nation, identity, state, belonging and citizenship in more flexible ways than colonialists and nationalists understood them in the 19th and 20th centuries'.⁷

Within the context of such arguments, this article examines agency and negotiating capabilities, and particularly the complex ways in which the border is seen as either important or constraining for border residents in Leklebi and Wli, two Ewe-speaking communities astride the Ghana–Togo border. It addresses the following questions: how are discourses and practices of the border embedded in the contemporary everyday life of the borderland residents on the Ghana–Togo border? What do their bordering practices reveal about their borderscapes? Are borderscapes being created or negotiated dependent on context?

The case study is important for two reasons. First, the division of the Ewe by the colonial borders, their subsequent re-partition, and the struggles over their future during colonial rule and at independence suggest that Ewe conceptions and constructions of political space were subjected to greater changes in the twentieth century than was the case for many other African societies.⁸ The Ewe, therefore, provide an important opportunity to understand the bordering dynamics and borderscapes of these borderlanders. Second, the case of Leklebi with a physical border post within the town and not at the edge of the Ghana–Togo border (borders within borders), which in effect separates one part of the town from the others, also points to the complexity of borders in this case.

The literature on border studies in Africa largely ignores the processes of bordering beyond the partitioned communities astride the international boundaries.⁹ This article, however, suggests this focus on communities/families in truncated polities that straddle the border does not fully capture borderwork. This is significant because many ethnic groups in Africa have a history of migration from another place to their present area of settlement, and in these migrations, some of the members of their families or communities remained or were left behind en route.

In these borderlands, as this article argues, a borderscape is conceived contextually, not only through the lens of the postcolonial territorial border but also through the precolonial migration histories as well as precolonial concepts of political space, which – as Sandra E. Greene points out – were not necessarily or exclusively tied to a bounded territory but also entailed membership in clans and cults.¹⁰ This article further highlights that bordering is carried through cultural and political institutions, such as cross-border festivals and chieftaincy, within the constraints of the postcolonial territorial border.

The work contributes to border studies by highlighting the importance of these historical and cultural factors in bordering and borderscapes. It points to the need for further research on cross-border relations in communities not astride the border but farther from the border. An understanding of such complexities may in a significant way help us to rethink or

reconsider the arbitrariness of borders, as it demonstrates that the assertions that partitioned Africans have suffered because of the border, while at the same time they continue with their lives as if the boundary does not exist, are not mutually opposed. Rather, it shows that they continue to live their lives despite the border.

Empirical data for this study was collected through ethnographic research carried out in three Leklebi and six Wli villages in Ghana and Togo in 2017 and 2018. It involved in-depth semi-structured interviews on both the Ghana and Togo sides of the partitioned communities of Leklebi and Wli, with chiefs, their elders, and others who are well informed about movements across the border, such as security officials and *okada* riders (commercial motor bicycle operators). The discussions focussed on the origins of these communities as well as the political, economic, social and cultural relations between the partitioned communities and other people. The interviews were complemented by participant observation.

Following this introductory section, the next section provides a brief socio-cultural and historical background of the people included in the case studies analysed in this article, to understand their bordering processes. This is followed by a discussion on the conceptual framework used to examine bordering and borderscapes among the people of Wli and Leklebi astride the Ghana–Togo border. The next section illustrates and analyses the bordering process among these borderland inhabitants, while the final section examines what this means for (de)colonising the border.

A socio-cultural and historical overview of the study area

Leklebi and Wli are located in the Volta region of Ghana and the Plateaux region of Togo (Figure 1). The major villages in Leklebi are Duga, Agbesia, Fiafe, Davor, Kame, Kudzra and Tornu, whilst the major villages in Wli are Afegame, Agorviefie and Todzi. Duga and Afegame are the traditional capitals of Leklebi and Wli, respectively.

The Leklebi and Wli are part of the Ewe-speaking people. According to Leklebi oral traditions, the Leklebi migrated from Notsie in Togo to Lavie (also in Togo) and thence to their present location in Ghana during the migration of the Ewe ethnic group from Notsie in the 17th century.¹¹ According to these traditions, the Leklebi of Ghana and the Lavie of Togo are ‘one’ people. It is interesting to note that many of the same family names, such as Biaku, Adoboe and Deh, exist in Leklebi and Lavie, and that people with these names are recognised as coming from the same family. On the journey to their present location, those who make up the Lavie decided to take a rest but did not continue and remained there. That is the origin of the name Lavie which comes from the Ewe words ‘la la vie’ (rest for a while). Similarly, the oral traditions of the people of Wli in Ghana talk about migration from Notsie in Togo, with the people of Danyi in Togo. They also claim to have the same family names in both towns.¹² Lavie is about 18 kilometres from Leklebi, and Danyi is about 11 kilometres from Wli.¹³

On the eve of the colonial partitioning of Africa in the late nineteenth century, the Ewe-speaking people in Ghana and Togo occupied the area roughly between the Volta River and the Mono River.¹⁴ The Ewe of Ghana and Togo can be found in the south-eastern and southern parts of their respective countries. They were first divided between the German colony of Togo and the British colony of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in the Anglo–German convention of 1890.¹⁵ Following the defeat of the Germans in the First World War, Germany was dispossessed of its colony, Togo. In 1919, the Franco–British Declaration formally divided Togo between the British and the French.¹⁶ This also resulted in the division of the Ewe in the




Figure 1. Study areas on the Ghana–Togo border. Map created by Philip-Neri Jayson-Quashigah.

former German colony between the British and the French. This meant that the Ewe became divided among the Gold Coast, British Togoland and French Togoland.

Both Leklebi and Wli were split in this declaration; as R. Bagulo Bening points out, ‘In conformity with the boundary determined between Evhli [Wli] and Danyi by Dr. Gruner and as agreed between Messrs. Mansfield and Coez, Evhli Todji [Wli-Todzi] should be in the British zone and subject to Apegame.’¹⁷ For Wli, all except a certain area of Todzi became part of British Togo. Even in this case, only some of their lands came under the French while

the people were in British Togo. In the case of Leklebi, only part of Leklebi-Kame, namely Leklebi-Kame Tornu, was placed in French Togo.

These territories were first administered as League of Nations-mandated territories and later United Nations (UN) trust territories by the British and the French. The Ewe did not take these divisions lightly. Several petitions were sent to the UN demanding the unification of the Ewe across the three territories. This compelled the UN to send a mission to the trust territories to investigate Ewe demands for unification.¹⁸

British Togo became part of Ghana (Gold Coast) at independence following a plebiscite in 1956, something that has been rejected by some individuals and groups since independence.¹⁹ French Togo became Togo at independence in 1960. The former Anglo–French boundary was maintained as the Ghana–Togo boundary. This accounts for the present division of the Ewe-speaking people between Ghana and Togo. In Leklebi and Wli there are official border posts – that is, approved places of entry and departure on the Ghana–Togo border. In Wli, the border post is located at Wli-Agorviefie, and in Leklebi it used to be at Leklebi-Dafor but now it is at Leklebi-Kame.

These borders, however, do not prevent the people from interacting with their families across the border. There are regular visits between these family members and joint participation in naming, marriage or funeral ceremonies on both sides of the border. As the people consistently pointed out, *'dzidudua de mama anyigbawo me gake wome ma mia fomewo me o'* ('the government divided the land, it did not divide our families'). Nonetheless, they also recognise the impact of the border on their lives. In the words of a borderland resident, 'You cannot go to your people freely in Togo. In politics, if you cross the border you become alien and if you want to sell on another side you become a smuggler'.²⁰ This is what Ndlovu-Gatsheni describes as 'colonially sounding, exclusionary and degrading terms'.²¹ The borderlanders despise these terms because they fail to take into account the relations that existed prior to the establishment of the borders.

Conceptual framework

The present work is situated within the literature on critical border studies (CBS), which examines the border as a process and a performance. This is 'a shift from the concept of the border to the notion of bordering practice; and the adoption of the lens of performance through which bordering practices are produced and reproduced'.²² In other words, CBS examines borders not as a fixity but as a process which is created/performed not only from the top but also from the bottom.

This study demonstrates the everyday impact of colonialism, as shown in the political and cultural lives of contemporary borderlanders on the Ghana–Togo border. It fits in with bordering practices which, as David Newman points out, involve 'the way that borders are socially constructed (demarcated in the traditional jargon), managed (delimited) and impact our daily life practices in the newly created transition spaces and borderlands (frontier zones) which are in a constant state of flux'.²³

Bordering practice, as Vanessa Lamb notes, is a multiple-way affair. According to Lamb, 'the processes of bordering and being bordered are often simultaneous and complementary, and occur at scales that are both bound up with and unbound from nation-states'.²⁴ Lamb's description provides support for this study which shows that in these borderlands, bordering is not the sole preserve of the state through demarcations, constructing border posts or

security personnel checking documents at these border posts; rather, border residents are involved in the making, unmaking and remaking of the border.

The nature of the bordering practices suggests that efforts must be made to create/maintain/dismantle these borders. Borders, as Lamb points out, 'require work; they are created and maintained by the formal and informal labour of real people.'²⁵ 'Borderwork', as Chris Rumford refers to it, illuminates this study by showing not only the nature of the borderwork, but also who is involved in the bordering, and the nature of the relationship – that is, whether it is a complementary/contradictory or antagonistic/mutually cooperative one.²⁶

Another aspect of borderwork that is integral to this study is the performative aspect. Mark Salter notes that: 'governments, citizens, and other agents perform the border, by which I mean that they enact and resist the dominant geopolitical narratives of statecraft as they cross, or are prevented from crossing, borders.'²⁷

The performance of borders is important in understanding the meanings attached to the border. This is because the context of the performance elucidates the contradictions in words and deeds of these borderlanders. For example, one might ask: if the border is an imaginary line why do the chiefs in these communities 'inform' the security officials at the border post to allow free movement of their people during events such as festivals? In effect, what is the significance of these performances?

Also central to the study is the concept of a 'borderscape', which is perceived as 'an area, shaped and reshaped by transnational flows, that goes beyond the modernist idea of clear-cut national territories', highlighting the importance of space within border studies.²⁸ It sheds light on how these borderlanders conceptualise their political space. It speaks not only to the question of authority but also identities in the bordering practices, and the context within which these are constructed. Furthermore, the borderscape concept is also useful in understanding how the past shapes people's borderscape, as Kathryn Cassidy, Nira Yuval-Davis and Georgie Wemyss demonstrate with their study on Dover.²⁹

Building on these insights from CBS, the article draws on decolonial perspectives to examine the symbolic and substantive meaning of the international border to these borderland inhabitants. It does so through the 'idea of rethinking and re-formulating historical experiences which had once been based on the geographical separation of peoples and cultures', as argued by Edward W. Said,³⁰ and emphasising instead the 'notions of intertwined histories and overlapping territories.'³¹

The analysis involves examining the bordering process beyond communities that straddle the border, from relations between those on the border to others several kilometres beyond the border, and sometimes interspersed by other communities. These historic kinship relations are important as some still (re)connect with their families/communities across the border, as in the case of Wli and Leklebi with Lavie and Danyi, respectively.

The decolonial approach also centres the spatial perspectives of these borderlanders rather than the perspectives of Europeans. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes, decolonisation of borders involves 'rethinking the purpose of borders, meaning of nation and state as well as criteria of citizenship and belonging in the context of African mobility.'³² After all, as one European agent involved in the process noted:

We have been engaged ... in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, but we have only

been hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were.³³

Also, the decolonial approach foregrounds local sources of knowledge vis-à-vis state sources, particularly archival ones, which reflect certain worldviews with its labels of 'smugglers' and 'aliens' for people who challenged European conceptions and constructions of the boundaries. This is crucial to understanding what the border means and has meant to the people, for – as pointed out by Homi Bhabha – 'We must not merely change the narratives of our histories, but transform our sense of what it means to live.'³⁴ 'The Decolonial Turn' also, as posited by Nelson Maldonado-Torres, is about 'making visible the invisible and about analysing the mechanisms that produce such invisibility or distorted visibility in light of a large stock of ideas that must necessarily include the critical reflections of the 'invisible' people themselves.'³⁵

Thus, the decolonial perspective is useful in analysing bordering and borderscapes, here conceived as the complex and sometimes conflicting perspectives and expressions of the border. It is apposite in analysing the borderlanders' view of the international border as an imaginary line – or not – through their historical and cultural discourses and practices.

Borders, bordering and borderscapes

International borders in Africa, like in many parts of the world, are the result of colonial state-making. The question of whether these borders were arbitrary or artificial has been the subject of debate among scholars. Some studies show how these borders have divided families, polities and ethnic groups.³⁶ Wolfgang Zeller notes, however, that 'To refer to African boundaries as "arbitrary" and "artificial" is not entirely incorrect, but rather stuck in a time which, for much of the continent, was roughly five decades ago, without acknowledging what came before and after.'³⁷ In any case, as Raimondo Strassaldo points out, 'African boundaries are in no way more artificial than European or other boundaries.'³⁸ In South Asia, families were divided by international boundaries such as the India–Pakistan boundary.³⁹ Willem van Schendel and Erik de Maaker note that 'when confronted with borders in their everyday lives, Asians often experience them as arbitrary.'⁴⁰

Related to the arbitrariness or artificiality of these boundaries is the impact on Africans. According to Paul Nugent, the claim that boundaries negatively affected Africans who at the same time continue to go about their lives as if the boundary did not exist is contradictory. He states:

African boundaries have suffered a consistently poor reputation. As 'arbitrary' and 'artificial' colonial constructs, conventional wisdom has it that they were imposed upon unwilling Africans who, according to two recurrent images, have either suffered dearly from their consequences or merrily continued with life as if they did not exist. These images are mutually contradictory – a point that is seldom noticed – but they are at least based upon a common assumption, namely that Africans had nothing to do with the making of their own boundaries.⁴¹

The above arguments raise issues of the role of Africans in bordering. To address this question, it is imperative to answer the question What is the borderscape of these borderlanders? This is conceived of in multiple ways. At one level it is the postcolonial border with physical structures that is the border post with state officials who regulate the flow of people,

services and goods. At another level, it is the precolonial jurisdiction of the chief or traditional leader, while at still another level it is the socio-cultural relations between families and ethnic groups.

In the case of Leklebi, with borders within borders, the presence of the border post is emphasised. This conception of the borderscape points to the importance of place in border studies, as highlighted by Corey Johnson et al.⁴² The border post was formerly at Leklebi-Dafor, the town before Leklebi-Kame. This cut off Leklebi-Kame from the rest of Leklebi as movements of people, services and goods between the two were regulated as if one were crossing the border into another country. For example, as recounted by some elderly people from Leklebi-Kame, they were prevented from crossing the border to Leklebi-Kame after 6:00 pm, as was the case with other international border posts in Ghana. In one instance, a just-retired civil servant who was relocating from Accra to his village, Leklebi-Kame, with his belongings was prevented from doing so because it was in the night.⁴³ Another indigene of Leklebi-Kame, who was then a schoolboy coming home on vacation to visit his family in Leklebi-Kame, was not allowed to cross the border.⁴⁴ Both the civil servant and the schoolboy had to sleep in Leklebi-Duga and continue their journey the following day. This means that within the Leklebi traditional area in Ghana, part of it was treated as if it was in another country. According to some members of the community, the stress of navigating the border contributed to the collapse of the once vibrant market at Leklebi-Dafor. The present location of the border post at Leklebi-Kame also places part of the town beyond the border which sometimes necessitates negotiations with state officials to allow them to participate in activities in Ghana such as voter registration exercises.

The other conception of the borderscape, as equivalent to the jurisdiction of the chief in these communities, is evident in the authority exercised by chiefs in Ghana over communities in Togo. For instance, this includes the collection of levies from tenant farmers on lands in Togo. In Wli, this is in the form of yams and *pito* (millet or sorghum beer) from tenants on lands in Togo put towards the celebration of festivals in Ghana.⁴⁵ Land disputes in Togo are also settled in the courts of the chiefs in Ghana. There is also the claim that the chief of Wli-Todzi in Ghana enstools the chief of Agotime, which is one of the settlements in Togo.⁴⁶ As these border residents state categorically, '*anyigba la enye miato*' (the land is for us) irrespective of the international border. This land ownership is recognised by the farmers who lease these lands. Land tenure agreements take the form of sharecropping arrangements.⁴⁷

The other aspect, which involves the socio-cultural relations, includes family and ethnic relations. Beyond family relations in other communities, there are also references to '*Ewenyigba*' (Eweland). Notsie, in Togo, is the reputed cradle of the Ewe in Ghana and Togo, and this binds the Ewe together. This was the basis of the Ewe unification movement. Presently, this historic unity is expressed in festivals. For instance, the people of Wli celebrate the *Komabu Dukoza* with Danyi-Kakpa, Danyi-Atigba in Togo, Atti in Togo, and Liati in Ghana. This festival commemorates their joint migration from Notsie in Togo to their present settlements. It is rotated between the towns in Ghana and Togo.⁴⁸ In many Ewe communities in Ghana, pilgrimages are organised during festivals to Notsie in Togo to reconnect with the ancestral home. There is also a festival in Notsie that seeks to bring together all Ewe chiefs and their people.

Accordingly, a borderscape is conceived of in physical, political and socio-cultural terms. These borderscapes may vary even within the same community, and as such the context is important, as different people experience differently (for instance) the governing practices

such as sovereign rights, and who belongs – even if they are from the same families – as in the case of Leklebi. This, in turn, might influence or put limitations on bordering practices – a subject to which we now turn. How are these discourses of the border embedded in the contemporary everyday life of the borderland residents?

Bordering takes different forms and occurs at different levels and different places. These are illustrated below through the chieftaincy, festivals, commerce, citizenship and everyday courtesies.

Chieftaincy is an important institution of governance in Ghana.⁴⁹ Chiefs play important administrative roles in the day-to-day affairs of their communities. This involves adjudicating disputes or bringing development to their communities. In some of these communities, their jurisdiction does not end at the borders of the nation-state but extends across it. Bordering practices, therefore, include chiefs on the Togo side of the border owing allegiance to stools in Ghana.⁵⁰ For instance, the paramount chief of Leklebi traditional area, Togbe Agboka, is recognised as such in Leklebi-Kame Tornu in Togo.⁵¹ These political relations are also expressed in the performance of rituals regarding installing a chief. In the case of Leklebi-Kame Tornu, the chiefs in Ghana are the ones who perform the rites. This has led to some calling themselves ‘international chiefs.’⁵²

The bordering process is also expressed in the marketing of farm produce. An economic choice regarding the transportation cost and the best price informs where the produce is sent for sale. Crops may be harvested on farms in Togo and sent to homes and markets in Ghana. In Leklebi, for instance, farmers choose to sell their cocoa or coffee either in Ghana or in Togo depending on the price. In response to the question of whether this constituted ‘smuggling’, one farmer noted, ‘it is all my farm, part of my farm is in Togo so when I harvest the beans, I just dry them in the part of the farm in Togo and later send to the buyers.’⁵³ The economic exchanges that are part of the bordering process also take other forms. It is interesting to note that at a pub in Leklebi-Kame Tornu just past the Ghana border post, one can buy drinks or food in both Ghanaian or Togolese currency – Ghanaian cedi or CFA francs – and receive change in either currency.

Another aspect of bordering is cross-border relations between these communities and families, which take the form of the celebration of joint festivals. The people of Leklebi in Ghana and Lavie in Togo jointly celebrate a festival called *Agbonutoza* (the ‘coming through the gate’ festival) every other year. The festival commemorates their migration from Notsie.⁵⁴ Similarly and as noted above, the people of Wli celebrate the *Komabu Dukoza* with the Danyi.

Such festivals seek to reinforce the socio-cultural relations between these people. During the festivals, families on both sides of the border come together in either Ghana or Togo. For instance, during *Agbonutoza*, which is rotated between Leklebi and Lavie, families with the same surnames lodge with each other.⁵⁵ Like the Kulamba festival of the Chewa-speaking people of Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, the inhabitants of these communities cross the state borders without visas.⁵⁶ Although they do not need one under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to which both Ghana and Togo belong, many are oblivious of these state–state agreements. They do so because they perceive their communities/families as one irrespective of the international border.

Performances such as winks, waves, handshakes, drinks and courtesy calls from the chiefs, elders, priests, assemblymen and ordinary people of the community to the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA), Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA), Ghana Standards Authority (GSA), Food and Drugs

Authority (FDA) officials at the border posts and their counterparts on the Togo side are also part of the bordering practices.⁵⁷

Such courtesies are performed by both 'ordinary' citizens and by the chiefs and elders of these communities. The chiefs and elders notify the security officials of impending activities, such as funerals and festivals, which are jointly celebrated by these communities on both sides of the border. This highlights the importance of performativity in bordering practices. It shows the recognition of the symbolic power of the state, which – for good or bad – has the authority to restrict their movements as several examples in past have shown. As one elder person noted, 'we tell them about the event so that when our people are coming, they won't worry them.'⁵⁸

In effect, these gestures, gifts and visits are a tacit acknowledgement of an 'imaginary' line which exists not only in the minds of postcolonial officials but is very much present in the minds of the borderland inhabitants. There have even been disagreements on where the border is, and hence which part of the land is in Togo. In Leklebi, while some pointed to the river over which a bridge had been constructed, others said the boundary was beyond the river. In Wli, the border is on Togolese land according to some, while others pointed to the bridge beyond it as the boundary. This shows an acute awareness of the border.

These bordering practices demonstrate that the state is not alone in the business of bordering. Borderlanders are very much involved either through unmaking or remaking it. These differing bordering practices raise the question of the context of these borderscapes.

In certain cases, the borderscape of precolonial political and socio-cultural relations is evoked, while in others the postcolonial territorial borderscape of border posts is evoked. The evoking of a precolonial borderscape is reflected in what Inocent Moyo describes as 'border citizenship'. According to him,

What makes them border citizens is that they refuse to be citizens at the margins of two states and resist being a colonial creation – two separate and unrelated communities belonging to two different nation states. The existence of a border which separates a community which regards itself as one lays a claim for their being border citizens.⁵⁹

In these border communities, residents claim to possess dual citizenship. As one resident argued, 'we didn't ask to be divided; we were sitting here when someone came to divide the land.'⁶⁰ For them, since their towns straddle both countries, which they traverse every day, they belong to both.

As border citizens, they possess the official documents of both Ghana and Togo. Those on the Togo side possess (amongst other documents) the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and voter identification cards of Ghana which entitle them to free health care and voting in elections, respectively, with its attendant perks. The reverse is equally true. Indeed, some also admitted they vote in elections in both countries.⁶¹ Like the respondents in Nshimbi's study in the Zambia–Malawi–Mozambique borderlands, they also had no qualms about accessing health facilities in Ghana.⁶² Interestingly, at the time of the fieldwork, those on the Togo side whose NHIS cards had expired were being encouraged by their Ghanaian counterparts to take advantage of a registration exercise going on in Ghana.

However, the postcolonial borderscape and its Westphalian notion of the nation state and its citizens are also invoked in contestations over access to political power or economic resources. For instance, despite the claims of one family based on the precolonial

borderscape, in Wli, one elder pointed out that a ‘family member’ from Danyi cannot become a chief in Wli even if he is from the royal family.⁶³ This is because he is a ‘citizen’ of Togo. This buttresses Stuart Hall’s claim about the subjectivity of identity and how it changes depending on the context.⁶⁴

Again, despite claims of an Ewe ethnic identity based on common origins, a shared history and shared culture – which had been the basis of an Ewe unification movement and is reaffirmed through many Ewe festivals, as noted earlier – this has not prevented some of these border residents from excluding their Ewe ‘brothers and sisters’ in contestations over resources. In the 1980s when the people of Wli were involved in altercations with the people of Yikpa, an Ewe-speaking people in Togo, over the ownership of Wli Waterfalls, the former called on the Ghana Army to defend the borders of the country and in effect the claims of its citizens to the waterfalls.⁶⁵ Clearly, they are not oblivious of the border and what it means.

This is also an instance, as Rumford suggests, when borderwork is associated with claims-making.⁶⁶ The calling on state agencies such as the military also highlights an aspect of the borderwork that involves the collaboration between border residents and the state to perform the border. In other words, the relationship between the periphery and the centre is not always antagonistic. Sometimes the border is ‘co-produced’.⁶⁷

Thus, in these border communities, there are overlapping and/or conflicting mental maps and identities that are invoked in a variety of political, economic, social and cultural contexts even when the same people are involved.

(De)colonising the border

The bordering practices shown through political, economic, social and cultural relations of these border communities point, on the one hand, to people living their lives as if the border does not exist. It signifies what Christopher Changwe Nshimbi describes, regarding the Kulamba festival, as the ‘epitome of resilient ethnic and socio-cultural ties manifesting historical transboundary traditional political entities that have survived the onslaughts of the formally structured Westphalian state and its well-defined borders’.⁶⁸

These popular performances of border citizenship are an aspect of decolonising African borders. This is because, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes, they ‘challenge the very notions of the nation-state and its ideas of bounded citizenship (rigid juridical-political regimes of rights and entitlements limited to those considered to be insiders only)’.⁶⁹ This is all the more so because while both the Ghanaian and Togolese states make room for ‘dual citizenship’, it is important to point out that the bordering practices of many of these border inhabitants are not performed because of any ‘dual citizenship’ or ‘border resident’ laws.⁷⁰ Many of these border residents are not even aware of these legislations. Such bordering practices predate the enactment of these laws in the last decade. As noted earlier, the Ewe contested their separation by the colonial borders, leading to demands for the creation of an Ewe nation. Rather, border citizenship stems from their precolonial political, social and cultural relations. One might, therefore, argue these legislations are rather a reflection of the limitations of the state in remaking these border communities.

These bordering practices show that their borderscapes do not end with the truncated traditional state that straddles the Ghana–Togo border, but with other communities

inhabited by relations far removed from the border in other parts of Togo. This is based on precolonial conceptions of political space of unbounded territories.

However, border residents are involved not only in 'unmaking, unmarking and remaking and remarking of the border to a status of precolonial times', as in the case of the Venda astride the South Africa–Zimbabwe border, but also remaking and remarking it to its colonial and postcolonial status.⁷¹ Like Lamb's study on the Thai–Burma border which 'runs in contrast to the notion that border residents in Southeast Asia exclusively resist or circumvent the border', this study too shows that borderland residents also reinforce the colonial/postcolonial border.⁷²

As shown in the study these borderlanders reinforce the inherited colonial border by evoking national identities based on the borders of the postcolonial state, especially in times of contestations over access to power and resources. By asserting their claims as citizens of the state and entitled to its protection, the border residents were reinforcing the border even though it might not be in the same colonial mould.

It is, however, worth noting that these acts of (de)colonising the border are not mutually exclusive. The same borderlanders may be involved in both without seeing any contradiction. A borderlander who does not recognise the border also knows that there are security officials there to enforce the border, and from experience, they know that the security officials can arrogate onto themselves the power to deny them movement across the border under the flimsiest of excuses. So, it is in the interest of the same borderlander who claims to not recognise the border to be courteous to the security officials when crossing the border.

Hence, these border residents continue their lives as if there is no border. This is not because they do not recognise its existence; rather, this shows the contested nature of these borders and that the residents continue to live their lives across the borders despite the constraints imposed by it.

Conclusion

This article explored the agency and negotiating capabilities of border residents regarding one of Africa's intractable colonial legacies – international borders – through cross-border relations among the Leklebi and Wli on the Ghana–Togo border. This article shows that bordering is not the sole work of the state through border regulations and enforcements. Border residents are integral to the process. Sometimes this is done by the state at the behest of the border inhabitants.

Bordering and borderscapes for the border inhabitants are fluid and contextual. In certain cases the precolonial border is evoked, while in others the postcolonial is also evoked. In the performance of these borders, the performers take on various identities – family, community, ethnic and national. Which is privileged depends on the motivations, which may be economic, political or social. While in certain cases family or ethnic identities may be privileged over national identities, in other contexts national identities may matter more. The audience is also important, as it also affects how the bordering is carried out.

In the context of decolonisation, this nuanced understanding of the border in Leklebi and Wli, which is similar to the situation in many African states, raises questions about the sanctity of the international border. These findings suggest that the sanctity of the international border as a marker of postcolonial statehood and citizenship in Africa is fraught with challenges. This article highlights the importance of taking into consideration the very

complex cross-border relations at the grassroots, which is imperative for understanding the arbitrariness of the borders.

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Notes

1. Discussion with Theophilus Anku Hehemeku, 76-year-old retired educationist, Leklebi-Fiafe, 19 January 2018.
2. Discussion with Seth Pentem, *fiatufenola* (regent) Leklebi-Kame Tornu, Leklebi-Kame, 16 February 2018.
3. See Ajala, “Nature of African Boundaries,” 182–8; Shepperson and Drake, “Fifth Pan-African Conference,” 58–9; West, “Global Africa,” 101; Ayittey, “United States of Africa,” 99; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Decolonising Borders”; Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*.
4. Mukisa, “Toward a Peaceful Resolution,” 16.
5. African Union, “Organisation of African Unity Charter,” Article III (3).
6. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Decolonising Borders,” 23.
7. *Ibid.*
8. This is discussed in depth in the next section.
9. See Asiwaju, *Partitioned Africans*; Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens*; Lentz, “This Is Ghanaian Territory”; Gordon, “Owners of the Land and Lunda Lords”; Flynn, “We Are the Border”; Miles, “Partitioned Royalty.”
10. Greene, *Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change*.
11. Discussions with Theophilus Anku Hehemeku, Leklebi-Fiafe, 1 February 2018; Togbe Wilson Kodzo Ekuame, *zikpuitɔ* (stool father) of Leklebi, Leklebi-Fiafe, 5 February 2018; Togbe Stanley Gborgblor, *tsiame* (linguist) of Leklebi, Leklebi-Fiafe, 6 February 2018; Harrison Korsi Deh,

- Leklebi-Fiafe, 6 February 2018; Davidson Dara, 78-year-old farmer, Leklebi-Duga, 7 February 2018; Komla Joel Agama, 83-year-old retired educationist, Leklebi-Dafor, 14 February 2018; Togbe Korsi Agbodza, 85-year-old Asidigborme *sametsitsi* (elder of Asidigborme clan), Leklebi-Duga, 14 February 2018; Togbe Ben Hehemekpe, *zikpuitɔ* of Leklebi-Dafor, Leklebi-Dafor, 15 February 2018; B. W. A. Asimenu, 83-year-old retired agriculturist, first person from Leklebi-Agbesia to graduate from secondary school, Leklebi-Agbesia, 15 February 2018; Togbe Patrick Fie, *fiatefensla* (regent) of Leklebi-Agbesia, Leklebi-Agbesia, 15 February 2018.
- On Ewe migration from Notsie, see Amenumey, *Ghana: A Concise History*, 19–22; Gavua, “Brief History,” 5. Mamattah, *Ewes of West Africa*, 31–56; Spieth, *Ewe People*, 37–8, 64.
12. Discussions with Edmund Kwashi Nyavor, former secretary to the paramount chief of Wli, Wli-Afegame, 21 October 2017; Togbe Agbitsu, *trɔ̃nuu* (priest) of Togbe Dovo, Wli-Afegame, 23 October 2017; Togbe Kodzo Gblorkpor, Atangba *sametsitsi* (elder of Atangba clan), Wli-Agorviefie, 23 October 2017; Mercy Akluwor Klutse, a 99-year-old lady, Wli-Afegame, 24 October 2017; Togbe Pata II, *sohefia* (youth chief) Wli-Afegame, 24 October 2017; Nelson Nyagbovi, *ametsitsi* (elder), Wli-Agorviefie, 25 October 2017; Togbe Anthony Nudanu, *fiatefensla* (regent) of Wli-Afegame, Wli-Afegame, 25 October 2017; Alexander Noel Nyavor, Boy Scout Leader, Wli-Afegame, 25 October 2017; Lydia Yawa Adabra, 89-year-old lady, Wli-Agorviefie, 25 October 2017.
 13. Information provided by Philip-Neri Jayson-Quashigah. It is important to point out that Wli-Todzi shares a boundary with Danyi. However, there are no motorable roads in Ghana between Wli-Todzi and the other Wli towns. Access to Wli-Todzi is several hours’ walk through the mountains, which are part of the Agumatsa range, home to Ghana’s highest waterfall and tallest mountain. By road, it is about a three-hour ride from Wli-Agorviefie through several towns in Togo to Wli-Todzi.
 14. The Ewe-speaking people are also in Benin and Nigeria.
 15. Yayoh, “German Rule in Colonial Ewedome.”
 16. On the making of the Ghana–Togo boundary see Bening, “Ghana–Togo Boundary.”
 17. Bening, “Ghana–Togo Boundary,” 198.
 18. On Ewe unification, see Amenumey, *Ewe Unification Movement*; Amenumey, “Pre-1947 Background”; United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1952, “Special Report on the Ewe and Togoland Unification.”
 19. See Brown, “Borderline Politics in Ghana.”
 20. Hehemeku, written answers to questions, 1 February 2018.
 21. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Decolonising Borders,” 24.
 22. Parker and Vaughan-Williams, “Critical Border Studies,” 729.
 23. Newman, “Borders and Bordering,” 173.
 24. Lamb, “Where Is the Border,” 1.
 25. *Ibid.*, 2.
 26. Rumford, “Introduction: Citizens and Borderwork in Europe,” 2.
 27. Johnson et al., “Interventions on Rethinking ‘the Border,’” 66.
 28. Dell’Agnese and Szary, “Borderscapes,” 6. On borderscapes see also Brambilla, “Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept”; Krichker, “Making Sense of Borderscapes.”
 29. Cassidy, Yuval-Davis and Wemyss, “Debordering and Everyday (Re)Bordering.”
 30. Quoted in Bhambra, “Postcolonial and Decolonial Reconstructions,” 122.
 31. *Ibid.*
 32. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Decolonising Borders,” 37.
 33. Quoted in Abraham, “Lines upon Maps,” 62.
 34. Quoted in Bhambra, “Postcolonial and Decolonial Reconstructions,” 123.
 35. Maldonado-Torres, “On the Coloniality of Being,” 262.
 36. Asiwaju, *Partitioned Africans*; Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens*; Lentz, “This Is Ghanaian Territory”; Flynn, “We Are the Border”; Miles, “Partitioned Royalty”; Bening, “Ghana–Togo Boundary”; Ajala, “Nature of African Boundaries”; Mariam, “Background of the Ethio–Somalian Boundary Dispute”; Lawrance, “En Proie à la Fièvre du Cacao”; Englebert, Tarango and Carter, “Dismemberment and Suffocation”; Żukowski, “Sub-Saharan African Borderlands.”

37. Zeller, "Special Issue: African Borderlands," 2.
38. Quoted in Coplan, "Introduction: From Empiricism to Theory," 2.
39. Cons and Sanyal, "Geographies at the Margins."
40. Van Schendel and de Maaker, "Asian Borderlands," 3.
41. Nugent, "Arbitrary Lines and the People's Minds," 35.
42. Johnson et al., "Interventions on Rethinking 'the Border.'"
43. Discussion with David Adzagbo, a 102-year-old retired audit service staff member, Leklebi-Kame, 18 January 2018.
44. Discussion with Christian Biaku, *fiatɔ* (father of the chief) of Leklebi-Kudzra, Leklebi-Kame, 18 January 2018.
45. Discussion with Nyavor.
46. Focus group discussion with *fiawo* (chiefs), *nyɔnufiawo* (queenmothers) and *ametsitsiwo* (elders) of Wli-Todzi, Wli-Todzi, 26 October 2017. It was pointed out that the current 'chief' was installed without their knowledge. An apology was, however, subsequently rendered by the Agotime. The status of the chief is not very clear; it seems the Agotime are using the international border to assert their political independence.
47. The tenancy agreement involves giving away a percentage of the crops to the landlord. With food crops such as rice and maize, a third goes to the landlord, while with cash crops such as cocoa the landlord gets half of the harvest.
48. See notes 12 and 46.
49. See Odotei and Awedoba, *Chieftaincy in Ghana*; Bob-Milliar, "Chieftaincy, Diaspora, and Development"; Logan, "Roots of Resilience"; Adotey, "Parallel or Dependent."
50. The stool is the symbol of chiefly authority among the ethnic groups in the southern part of Ghana.
51. Focus group discussion with *nyɔnufiawo* (queenmothers) and *ametsitsiwo* (elders) of Leklebi-Kame and Leklebi-Kudzra, Leklebi-Kame, 21 January 2018; focus group discussion with *fiawo* (chiefs), *ametsitsiwo* and community leaders of Leklebi-Kame, Leklebi-Kudzra and Leklebi-Kame Tornu, Leklebi-Kame, 16 February 2018; focus group discussion with chiefs, *nyɔnufiawo*, *ametsitsiwo* of Leklebi-Kame Tornu, Togo, 20 February 2018.
52. For similar cross-border relations, see Adotey, "International Chiefs"; Adotey, "Where Is my Name."
53. Discussion with Freeman Adoboe, Leklebi-Kame, 20 February 2018.
54. According to Leklebi oral traditions, during the Ewe migration from Notsie they did not flee through the part of the wall that was broken, as was the case for some Ewe groups; rather, they walked through the main gate – hence the name of the festival. This, according to them, was possible because they were the blacksmiths of the king of Nostie, Togbe Agorkoli, and as such possessed a key to the gate.
55. See notes 11 and 51.
56. See Nshimbi, "Life in the Fringes."
57. Discussions with Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) officials, and Ministry of Food and Agriculture officials, Leklebi-Kame, 18 January 2019; GIS and GRA officials, Wli-Agorviefie, 19 February 2019; interaction with Togolese border post officials, 18 January 2018, Leklebi-Kame Tornu, Togo; Yikpa-Dafo, Togo, 18 February 2018.
58. Discussion with Ekuame.
59. Moyo, "Beitbridge–Mussina Interface," 6.
60. Discussion with Agbitsu.
61. On elections on Ghana's borderlands, see Robert-Nicoud, "Elections and Borderlands in Ghana."
62. Nshimbi, "Life in the Fringes."
63. Discussion with Nyagbovi.
64. Hall, "Who Needs Identity?"
65. Discussion with Gblorkpor. See Lentz, "This Is Ghanaian Territory" and Lawrance, "En Proie à la Fièvre du Cacao" for other resource contestations on the Ghana–Burkina Faso and Ghana–Togo border, respectively.
66. Johnson et al., "Interventions on Rethinking 'the Border.'"

67. Lamb, "Where Is the Border," 9.
68. Nshimbi, "Life in the Fringes," 3.
69. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, "Decolonising Borders," 27.
70. Republic of Ghana, Citizenship Act, 2000 (Act 591), Section 16(1). See Robert-Nicoud, "Elections and Borderlands in Ghana."
71. Moyo, "Beitbridge–Mussina Interface," 4.
72. Lamb, "Where Is the Border," 1. See also Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens*; Lentz, "This Is Ghanaian Territory."

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