


**THE EMERGING THREATS OF TERRORISM
IN WEST AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF
GHANA'S RESPONSE**

**BY
RAMZEY BAMBA
(10130478)**



**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY
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DECLARATION

I, Ramzey Bamba, hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of Dr. Philip Attuquayefio and that no part of it has been submitted anywhere else for any other purpose. Also, references to the work of other persons or bodies have been duly acknowledged.

.....
RAMZEY BAMBA
(STUDENT)

.....
DR. PHILIP ATTUQUAYEFIO
(SUPERVISOR)



DATE

DATE

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my entire family especially Naa Amerley Bamba, Titi Hilary and Kason Ramzy Bamba



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRNYMS

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| AU | African Union |
| AQIM | Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb |
| BNI | Bureau of National Investigations |
| BoG | Bank of Ghana |
| CEPS | Customs Excise and Preventive Service |
| DC | District of Colombia |
| DI | Defense Intelligence |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| GAF | Ghana Armed Forces |
| GIABA Africa | Inter Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West |
| GP | Ghana Police Service |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| IT | Information Technology |
| LI | Legislative Instrument |
| MNLA | National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MOJAO | Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa |
| NCRC | National Crisis Response Centre |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OAU | Organisation of Africa Unity |
| RD | Research and Development |

| | |
|------|--------------------------------------|
| SWW | Second World War |
| TSA | Transport and Safety Authority |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| US | United States |
| USA | United States of America |



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ABSTRACT

Major events, throughout history, have necessitated some response from humanity. One of such major events that appear to have changed the global security scene was the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States by Al Qaeda terrorist group. Although many countries across the world started putting measures in place to address the resurging global terrorist threats, West Africa seemed to have been oblivious of the need to do same until the emergence of terrorist groups like AQIM, Ansaru, Ansar Al Dine and Boko Haram. These groups have intensified their terrorist activities in countries such as Mali, Mauritania and Nigeria, with the activities of most of these terror groups transcending national boundaries. With the potential of Ghana becoming a target for terrorists, this study analyses Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa. The work investigates some of the mechanisms established by Ghana to prevent, counter or combat terrorism, and the adequacy of the measures put in place. Analysis of available data points to the fact that there are no terrorist groups or cells in Ghana, though there are some conditions that make Ghana vulnerable to terrorism. The research also reveals that Ghana has instituted some measures in the form of legislations, intelligence gathering and combat units to deal with any threat of terrorism. These measures, however, have some shortcomings that need to be tackled if Ghana is to succeed in preventing terrorism or effectively fighting it if it occurs. The work thus, proffers both long term and short term recommendations for policy consideration towards preventing terrorism in Ghana. These include the adoption of sound economic policies to address human security challenges, the introduction of political reforms to ensure participatory and all-inclusive political system and the provision of logistics and funding for agencies and institutions set up specifically for counter-terrorism. The study also recommends semi-autonomy for some of the frontline agencies like the NCRC and the FIC to enable them have some freedom of action to enhance their effectiveness. Additionally, the research recommends increased public education on terrorism by institutions like the NCCA, the Media Commission and the Ghana Education Service.

CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Problem Statement

Throughout history, events that impact on humanity have necessitated diverse responses by mankind in an attempt to forestall recurrence or minimize its repercussions. Occurrences of this nature engender unilateral, bilateral or multilateral actions to deal with them. There are many examples of these events and the resulting responses. In the first half of the Twentieth Century, the First and the Second World Wars are examples of events that have drawn global responses. Due to the massive lost of life and the untold hardship the First and the Second World Wars caused, the world responded by forming the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN) respectively to prevent futures wars of such magnitude.

In contemporary times, one event has drawn international reaction and seems to have changed the international security system, arguably since the end of the Cold War. The terrorist attack on the United States of America (USA) on September 11, 2001 has transformed the security systems of virtually every country across the globe. Al-Qaeda terrorists highjacked four aircraft and flew two into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and one into the Pentagon in Washington. A forth aircraft crashed in a field near Washington, District of Colombia (DC). It was later revealed by a high ranking Al-Qaeda detainee, Abu Zubaydah, that the forth aircraft was intended to crash into the White House.¹ The attacks brought down the Twin Towers and caused massive damage to the Pentagon, the defense headquarters of the U.S.A. About 2977 people of different nationalities died as a result of the attack.

Many countries responded by initiating measures to bolster their internal and external security systems against terrorism. In the United States (US) for instance, responsibility for airport security screening was swiftly put under the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA),² with US airports carrying out hundred percent screening of checked baggage for explosives and passengers subjected to much more thorough screening procedures. Many countries also adopted similar procedures, including all the major European countries. Yet, there were major terrorist attacks in London, Madrid as well as in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Africa has also had its share of major terrorism prior to and post-September 11, 2001. Kenya and Tanzania suffered simultaneous terrorist attacks in 1998³ when car bombs destroyed the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the capitals of Kenya and Tanzania respectively.⁴ These attacks killed at least eighty people and injured over 1600 others. Post-September 11, Kenya, especially, has suffered other terrorist attacks, including a major attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi which lasted from September 21 to 24, 2013.⁵ The attack was claimed by Al-Shabaab, a Somali militant group, killed sixty-seven people and injured 175 more.⁶ These attacks in various parts of the world and in Africa appeared not to have triggered the required response from most West Africa countries. However, recent events have dramatically changed the situation. The emergence or indeed, the resurgence of terrorism in West Africa has brought the threats of terrorism to the attention of governments, corporate bodies, civil societies and ordinary citizens alike.

Over the last two years especially, there is almost no week that passes without a news item or the other reporting terrorists attack somewhere in West African. The numerous attacks and kidnappings by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria and attacks in northern Mali are some examples. More closer to Ghana in Nigeria, Boko Haram has stepped up its attacks against civilians

and the Nigerian security services.⁷ Boko Haram is a Nigeria-based militant Islamist group which has caused mayhem in various parts of Nigeria. They have carried out bombing, assassinations and abductions in both Nigeria and Cameroon. Their main objective is to topple the Nigerian government and create an Islamic state. The attacks by Boko Haram are not only frequent but with increasing casualties and damage. The situation in Nigeria especially has recently raised questions about the preparedness of West African countries in dealing with terrorism.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The relatively weak security structures in West African countries, worsened by weak economies makes issues of security a great concern. The security sector of most West African countries is characterized by ill-equipped security agencies, inadequate collaboration among the various agencies, poor communication network and general lack of logistics support. Low budgetary allocation for training, poor intelligence sharing mechanisms and outmoded concept of security has compounds the situation. More so, the emerging security threats in West Africa appear to be mostly transnational in nature. Meanwhile, the international borders of most West African countries are porous. The porosity of the frontiers is exacerbated by the Economic Community of West Africa State's (ECOWAS) Protocol on free movement of people goods and services.

Terrorists could therefore operate across borders easily, making all countries in West Africa susceptible to terrorist attacks. Additionally, it could facilitate terrorists and criminal gangs to also elude apprehension, as has been demonstrated by Boko Haram to a large extent. For instance, the activities of Boko Haram are not limited to only Nigeria. Boko Haram has also carried out attacks and abductions in Chad as well as in Cameroon, including the abduction of the wife of the Cameroonian Deputy Prime Minister on July 27, 2014.⁸ So far, Boko Haram has successfully carried

out their operations and gotten away as reported by the media almost daily. For instance, December 1 and 5 2014, a number of attacks were carried out by Boko Haram without any of the militants being apprehended, as reported by the Muscat Daily Newspaper. Similarly, various locations in Nigeria, including Abuja, Kano, Maiduguri have all witnessed deadly attacks by Boko Haram without any significant arrest made. The attack and abduction of over 200 school girls at Chibok in Borno State, on the night of 14 – 15 April 2014 is yet another example of how Boko Haram has successfully carried out attacks with impunity. Another area that makes most West Africa countries, including Ghana, vulnerable to Boko Haram-type terrorism is the fact that terrorists do not need to travel across borders to attack a country like Ghana. There are people in Ghana who share similar ideology like those espoused by groups like Boko Haram. The emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa are therefore a danger to the security and economic development not only for the countries experiencing activities of terrorists. Terrorism is a present threat to the entire West Africa sub-region and Ghana is not exemption.

Notwithstanding the obvious security implications of disclosing Ghana's response preparedness, a cursory look at the existing structures, including the training doctrines of key agencies such as the Ghana Police (GP) and the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) appear to suggest some inadequacies in this direction. On the basis of this research problem, key questions that require answering include how are the emerging threats of terrorism shaping the security structures of Ghana? What level of education and information are Ghanaians being given with respect to the threats of terrorism? Is there a national defence policy to guide all relevant agencies in the fight against terrorism? What is the level of awareness among members of the security agencies on terrorism? It is in line with these questions that this study analysed the adequacy of Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa.

1.3 Scope of the Study

The research examined the security arrangements put in place to tackle terrorism in Ghana with particular emphases on human security measures. The role of the state, traditional rulers, religious leaders and civil society, as well as the media was investigated. The study also examined the collaboration among these stakeholders towards preventing or minimizing terrorist attack in Ghana. The study explored Ghana's collaboration, coordination and intelligence sharing with sub-regional, regional and global actors in forestalling terrorism in Ghana.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study critically examined issue and the threats of terrorism in West Africa and the measures put in place by Ghana as a state to deal with the threats. The specific objectives of the study are:

- To examine the history of terrorism in West Africa, the causes and its contemporary manifestations as well as West Africa's response;
- To determine Ghana's potential areas of vulnerability.
- To examine Ghana's response to the emergence and threats of terrorism in West Africa;
- To profess some measures and structures that could help Ghana prevent or adequately respond to terrorist attack.

1.5 Hypothesis

Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa is inadequate because of weaknesses in the measures adopted to deal with terrorism.

1.6 Rationale of the Study

The last few years have seen an increase in terrorist attacks in various parts of Africa in general and in West African in particular. Over the years, many of the armed forces in African countries have mostly focused, and rightly so, their training and preparedness towards conventional warfare. However, the emerging security threats against countries in Africa seem to be unconventional in nature. These have left the security agencies in most African countries not adequately prepared for the emerging threats. The apparent relative ease with which Al-Shabab and Boko Haram have carried out numerous attacks against Kenya and Nigeria respectively tends to lend credence to this view.

This study hopes to bring to light the measures and preparation that are required by the states, through its security agencies, other state/non-state organs and civil society to help deal with the emerging threats of terrorism. It also hopes to propose measures that Ghana could adopt, in collaboration with other sub-regional and regional agencies, to prevent or minimise terrorist attack against Ghana. This study will also add to knowledge on the mechanisms required to fight against terrorism in Ghana.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

The research is primarily based on the concept of National Security. The modern concept of national security started in the U.S. after the Second World War (SWW).⁹ However, the earliest mention of the term 'national security' could be traced back to the 1790s in Yale University when the term was used in its relation with domestic industries.¹⁰ In spite of its relatively long existence, national security has eluded global definition and has no generally accepted definition.

The concept has for a long time been interpreted narrowly to mean physical security of the state from external aggression or protection of national interests.¹¹ This notion of national security has often been described as the traditional concept of nation security.¹² Some of the proponents of this concept of national security include Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Alexander George and Harold Brown.¹³ Others include Walter Lippmann, Arnold Wolfers, Kofi Bentum Quantson,¹⁴ among many others.

Walter Lippmann, one of the earliest scholars on national security, defines national security in terms of war, saying, “A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”¹⁵ Harold Brown on his part considered national security as the ability of the states to preserve its physical integrity and to maintain its international economic relations on reasonable terms. To Brown, national security also means preservation of a nation’s institutions and governance from disruption from external forces, and to control its frontiers.¹⁶

Unlike the state-centric portrayal of national security in the past, contemporary threats to national security, especially in West Africa, are no longer only threats from external military forces. Poverty, unemployment, disease and environmental degradation have all become matters of national security. Others such as political and economic exclusion, corruption and religious extremism have all become issues that could threaten the national security of a nation, particularly in West Africa.

It is now generally accepted that there are threats beyond those posed by opposing national militaries. This has led to some criticisms against the traditional concept of national security as being overly state-centric and not able to address the issue concerning contemporary threats to national

security. Consequently, the concept of Human Security has emerged as a challenge to the traditional concept of national security.

The idea of human security was brought to global attention by Dr Mahbub ul Haq in the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report of 1994. The concept of Human Security posits that the main reference point for security should not be the state but individuals who make up the state.¹⁷ The report argues that ensuring freedom from fear and want is critical for dealing with global insecurity.¹⁸ From a Human Security perspective, it is how people define their security that matters, for when people are asked what their security concerns are, their responses are more likely to be at variance with that of the state.

There are two components to Human Security: Freedom from fear; and freedom from want.¹⁹ The meaning of these components was aptly articulated by Edward R. Stettinius Jr., the U.S. Secretary of State during the formation of the UN as follows: "The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace."²⁰

The UNDP Report, therefore, stressed on the need for the concept of security to change in two fundamental ways. First, security needs to change from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater emphasis on people's security. Second, there is the need for a change from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development, the UNDP Report adds. Several threats to security can be identified; however, most of these threats could be considered under seven main headings. These include economics, food, health and environmental security. The

rest are personal security, community security and political security.²¹ Thus, Human Security is a concern for human life and self esteem rather than concern with military violence.²² In line with these threats to human security, writers like Kofi Kwantson and Daniel Benjamin have expressed views on the implication of these threats on national security.

Daniel Benjamin is of the view that young people are more likely to be drawn to extremist ideology when some conditions prevail. He argues that when young people have no hope for education, with no hope for a job and the feeling of disconnection from modernity, where governments are unable to provide basic needs of the people and when people are aggrieved, they are more likely to be drawn to extremist ideology.²³ Daniel Benjamin says that where there is marginalisation and deprivation, terrorism thrives. He therefore suggests that there is the need to address issues that bother on political, economic and social deprivations that extremist groups used to bate new recruits.

Like Daniel Benjamin, Kofi Quantson also considers the concept of human security as relevant to a nation's security. He views national security in terms of survival, safety, well-being and contentment. He argued that the people need to survive decently, after which there is the need for protection for them to feel safe. After safety, the need for the well-being of the people and their contentment is paramount. Quantson concludes that a nation's security cannot be guaranteed if the security of the people is threatened, therefore there is the need to address the security needs of the people in a comprehensive manner in order to avoid a lingering security risk.²⁴

In spite of the broader coverage that the concept of Human Security provides towards ensuring national security, it has been criticized for looking at security in a rather simplistic manner. Critics of the concept espouse that the concept of Human Security is vague and that undermines the

effectiveness of the concept.²⁵ Other critics of the concept of human security, including Marc Levy, have argued that the concept has no correlation with national security. According to Levy, a lead author on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment, environmental degradation, which is a vital component of the threats to human security, does not present any threat to national security.²⁶

From the foregoing on the concepts of national security, for an effective security to be achieved, it is important to secure the physical territory of the state as well as ensure the fulfillment of the needs of the people. Traditional national security and human security measures therefore need to be implemented in tandem for a country to attain comprehensive national security. The relevance of the concepts of national security to this research is that the complex nature of contemporary terrorism in West Africa threatens the survival of all the countries in the sub-region and beyond. To address these threats require the adoption of a comprehensive national security approach.

1.8 Literature Review

The last few years have seen the rise in interest on matters relating to terrorism in West Africa. This has partly arisen from the frequent occurrences of terror attacks, the extreme violence involved and the increasing number of terrorist groups in different parts of West Africa. Some of the common concerns that has generated a range of literature include the causes of terrorism, how to end the current state of terrorism and measure to prevent terrorism in other parts of West Africa. There are various views by scholars and commentators to achieve these goals. These views are nearly as diverse as the number of writers and commentators who have tried to make sense of this new and compounding challenge confronting the entire sub-region.

In his article, *Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram*, Akinola Olojo examines the key drivers of public support for Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.²⁷ The paper suggested that in addition to the generally held view that the underlying causes of terrorism in Nigeria are internal factors including poverty, age-old economic inequality and structural violence, there is a growing belief that the Boko Haram insurgency has an international dimension. This assertion stems from the strategy and extreme violence, including suicide bombing, that Boko Haram has adopted in the conduct of their terrorist activities. According to Olojo, this strategy is typical of international terrorists elsewhere and this type of terrorism is unprecedented in Nigeria. Olojo argued that in spite of their violent activities, Boko Haram has been able to win support among the uneducated, unemployed and impoverished young people in areas where they are based.

The paper alluded to the influence of politicians and elite interest in the insurgency of Boko Haram. It also highlighted the manner in which Boko Haram has taken advantage of providing social services to the poor in the community to alienate the people against the state for the latter's failure to meet the needs of the former. This goes to affirm the general belief that where the state fails in its responsibility to provide the basic needs of the masses, other non state actors may fill the gap, and if such actors have extreme views, they could easily influence the masses against the state.

The role of non-state institutional leadership at the local, national and state levels in resolving the Boko Haram issue is addressed by the paper. The paper focuses on the role of religion and how it is manipulated by Boko Haram to generate mass appeal among the people in the North-eastern part of Nigeria. It also assesses the linkages that exist between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in

West Africa and beyond. The paper also discusses some measures that could be adopted by the Nigerian authorities to resolve the Boko Haram crisis.

Olojo suggests effective formulation and implementation of a proactive counter-terrorism strategy. He proposes an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for the group to help stem the group's ability to elude counterterrorism efforts. Since the Boko Haram crisis in Northern Nigeria seems to challenge conventional approaches to addressing violent conflicts, Olojo advocates the need for a bold mix of interventions and partnerships that combine elements of both hard and soft power.

While Olojo rightly identifies some of the causes, the drivers of public support to terrorist groups like Boko Haram and some measures that could be adopted to address the terrorist threats, his work stops short of affirming the existence of any real collaboration between Boko Haram and extremist groups like AQIM, Al-Shabaab and terror sleeping cells. The confirmation of these links is crucial in fashioning out appropriate response to the terror threats. The paper also fails to consider mobilization as a major enabler of Islamist terrorism in West Africa. Without such ability to mobilise, terrorist groups like Boko Haram will find it difficult to be successful as they have so far in Nigeria. This research therefore intends to address these gaps in order to come up with alternative view of addressing the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa.

Edward Newman in his article *"Exploring the Root Causes of Terrorism"* classifies the causes of terrorism into root causes and precipitant causes.²⁸ The root causes are the main focus of his paper in which he argued that "certain conditions provide a social environment and widespread grievances that, when combined with certain precipitant factors, result in the emergence of terrorist

organizations and terrorist act." The article attempts to clarify what is meant by "root causes". The paper also considers if the analysis of root causes help to explain how, where and why terrorism occurs.

The author identified factors such as poverty, demographic factors, social inequality and exclusion, dispossession and political grievances as being some main underlying causes of terrorism. Newman further grouped the underlying causes into Permissive Structural Factors and Direct Root Causes. With respect to the former, Newman noted poverty, demographic factors and urbanization. The paper looked at poverty at the individual and state levels, with the author arguing that at the individual level, "poverty can breed resentment and desperation and support for political extremism". At the state level, the paper suggested that, "poor societies often make for weak states, which may not have the capacity to prevent terrorist activity or recruitment. They also lack the capacity for the type of educational programmes that might help reduce support for terrorism." Under the demographic factors, Newman says that issues such as rapid population growth, particularly among the male population and skewed distribution of this male population across diverse ethnic groups may contribute to the start of hostility. Newman believes that urbanization, compounded by poverty and worsened by unemployment, can adversely influence dissatisfied society. This disaffection could then be exploited by extremists groups to enable them recruit and mobilise in deprived urban communities.

With the direct root causes, the author considered a number of factors including human right abuses, alienation, exclusion and social inequality. Others include dispossession, humiliation and 'clash of values'. In Newman's view, clash of values is as a result of globalization, where there is increasing interaction among value system which in certain occasions creates tension between some value

systems. This sometimes creates the fear of cultural imperialism and hegemony". This view is almost in line with Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World. Newman argues that the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism is attributable to the "clash of values."²⁹

According to Newman, leadership, funding, state sponsorship and political upheaval are just precipitant factors. They are only catalysts that trigger terrorism. He therefore argues that emergence of terrorist groups and their activities could be viewed as being dependent upon the root causes. The paper concludes with the view that no matter how prepared a society is militarily, it will not be immune from terrorism until the sources of terrorism are appreciated and appropriate mechanisms put in place to combat them.

Most writers on causes of terrorism have tended to focus on factors that aid terrorism instead of the root causes. Edward Newman however tried to provide an insight into the root causes of terrorist activities which is relevant to the situation in West Africa. This notwithstanding, the writer overemphasized the significance of the underlying causes of terrorism, since these are mostly preventive measures, relevant for countries yet to experience modern terrorism as being experienced by Nigeria. In a similar vein, the root causes dwell on by the writer are mostly peculiar to poor countries. Though relevant to this research, it is worth noting that developed countries like the US and Spain have suffered terrorism while some developing countries in West Africa have not. All the same, Newman's paper provides the foundation upon which Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism could be examined. This will ensure that appropriate measures are put in place so that the country does not fall victim to the scourge of terror raging in other parts of West Africa, and that is the major objective of this study.

The book, *Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Religion, Politics and Radicalism*, edited by James Gow, Funmi Olonisakin and Ernst Dijxhoorn, made a significant effort to problematize the emerging brand of extremist Islam. The book however disputes the growing view among Western countries that terrorists in Africa would turn their activities against Western targets. The fact that Boko Haram has predominantly focused their attacks against domestic targets seems to lend credence to the view of the authors.

Gow, Olonisakin and Dijxhoorn argue that it was important to understand the complex issues of violent extremism as a political and social phenomenon whose religious and local differences are easily misunderstood. This understanding would help people to better appreciate violent radicalism as a growing foreign policy challenge.

The book investigates the level of linkages between terrorist groups in West Africa and other parts of the world and concludes that it is generally accepted that local factors instead of external influences were the major factors causing radicalization in West Africa.³⁰ The authors also explore the implication of unemployment, poverty and other economic and social challenges on the security of West African countries. The author cites the existence of large portion of the West African population that is young and unemployed, adding that this ‘youth bulge’ has created a generation of unemployed youth who are easy target for extremist recruiters. The book stressed that poverty appears to contribute to recruitment by terrorist groups but does not necessarily lead to recruitment.

Though the book focuses on Islamic extremism, it also scrutinised ideological views of Christianity. The book asserted that radical Muslims see ‘miraculous healing and ostentatious ways of living among Christian leaders’ as unacceptable, and proliferating praise worship churches as frauds

perpetrated on the people.³¹ Hence some Muslims join extremist groups as a reaction to counter this phenomenon.

The book outlined the sense of fear expressed by Muslim organizations such as Jamatu Nasril Islam in 2014 among Nigeria's Muslims when it highlighted the prevalent of extrajudicial killings mostly based on unconfirmed suspicion' particularly against Muslims. This, the book suggested, could help explained how such state violence facilitated recruitment by terrorist groups like Boko Haram. There is some suggestion that provision of social services by terrorist groups to the poor might also facilitate recruitment³². The evidence in this book appear limited and therefore require further study to ascertain, which this study attempt to achieve.

One of the weaknesses of the book lies in the research design. Much of the research entailed focus groups, and the authors provide little information about selection, timing, size or other essentials. In the case of Nigeria, much of the research appears to have taken place prior to 2009, which was an important turning point for both the militants and the government in terms of the scale of violence and choice of targets. Moreover, the shift in tactics by Nigeria's Boko Haram, which now includes suicide bombing and coordinated attacks against military targets and civilians is cited as evidence that the Boko Haram is now part of a broader global Islamist terror network involving Al Qaeda and its affiliates. This is yet to be categorically ascertained, and this paper will seek to ascertain any linkages.

Despite these limitations, the book is relevant to this study because it provides a basis for analysis of the rapid spread of Christian 'miraculous healing' and ostentatious ways of life among some Christian leaders', and its implication on Islamist extremism in Ghana. The book is also relevant to

this research because it provides the starting point upon which to analyse the possibility of terrorist attack against Ghana due to increased investment and interest of Western Multi-National Corporation in Ghana's oil industry.

In his article, *Preventing Terrorism in West Africa: Good Governance or Collective Security?* Kehinde A. Bolaji looks at whether it is good governance or collective security that represents the best strategy to combat terrorism in West Africa.³³ The author analyses the terrorists' typology in Africa, a situation which is a reflection of what pertains in the West African sub-region. The paper also examines some principles of collective security, enumerates the principles of good governance, and proposed some measures by which West Africa can stop terrorism.

Discussing the above summary, the author submits that West Africa is not presently a hub of terrorism. The paper suggests that the sub-region is only a fertile ground for breeding terrorist networks through trans-national criminal networks in areas such as small arms proliferation, illegal natural resource transfer, human and drugs trafficking.

The author traces the root causes of the tenuous security in the sub-region to poverty, underdevelopment, youth unemployment and bad governance. It also categorises the types of terrorist groups in Africa and asserts that different kinds of terrorism known in other parts of Africa are now in West Africa.

Bolaji indicates five factors responsible for transnational crimes, which are contributing factors to terrorism, in West Africa. They include the end of the Cold War, economic and trade liberalisation, technological advancement, globalisation of business and explosion in international travel, as

identified by Peters Jimi.³⁴ Bolaji goes further to examine the theoretical and practical justification for terrorism.

In dealing with terrorism, Bolaji argues that collective security and good governance are important tool for ensuring security, peace and development.³⁵ He considers good governance as consisting of guidelines for decision-makers that enable them expertly manage the human, material and economic resources in an open, accountable, transparent, equitable and lawful manner. These in turn bring about social and economic development, the paper argues. The paper then elaborates on the limit of good governance and collective security in the fight against terrorism.

The writer cites Chalk Peter in identifying some of the factors that militate against collective security measures in combating terrorism in West Africa.³⁶ These include the difficulties in ceding some state sovereignty for the purpose of regional integration, the personalization of governance and politics in West Africa and the multiplicity and overlapping nature of regional grouping. The general absence of integrated national counterterrorist structures through which to channel and direct wider regional responses and scarce national resources, both technical and human, required to invest in counterterrorism strategies are other factors that also hinder efforts to effectively deal with terrorism in West Africa. On the issue of good governance, the paper posits that West Africa has robust governance mechanism for preventing security threat. However, the sub-region has a relatively underdeveloped security framework to effectively tackle the threat.

Bolaji submits that neither good governance nor collective security can exclusively bring about the defeat of terrorism in West Africa. The paper therefore puts forward a framework for integrating good governance and collective security strategies in West Africa's effort to prevent terrorism.

In line with combining collective security and good governance to fight terrorism in the sub-region, the writer suggests some measures. These include, the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Secondly, there is the need to implement anticorruption mechanisms to drastically reduce illicit transactions. Thirdly, collaboration and coordination among sub-regional security agencies is vital to stop other transnational crimes such as kidnapping, piracy and smuggling. These measures, together with other ECOWAS protocols that dwell on democracy and good governance will help in fighting terrorism in West Africa, the paper concludes.³⁷

Unlike Bolaji's view that West Africa is not terrorist's hub, contemporary evidence suggests that West Africa is now home to terrorists of various kinds. Presently, there are a number of terrorist groups based in West Africa, including Boko Haram, Ansaru, Ansa al Dine, AQIM, MUJAO and possibly other sleeping cells. The writer rightly identifies some of the causes of terrorism in West Africa and highlights some of measure that can help combat the threats. He however fails to discuss such matters as identity and mobilization as major contributors to terrorism in West Africa.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the paper is relevant to the this study to the extent that it provides the foundation for further analysis into the mechanisms involving both good governance and collective security which are important measures that can help in the fight against the emerging threats of terrorism in the West Africa.

1.9 Sources of Data and Research Methodology

In this study, qualitative data from primary and secondary sources are mainly used. Unstructured interviews were adopted to answer specific areas of the research question. Primary data were

obtained through face to face interviews from frontline agencies in Ghana's response against terrorism, including the GAF, the GP and the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). Primary data were also collected from the National Crisis Response Centre (NCRC) and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), responsibilities for counterterrorism, and combat money laundering and terrorist financing in Ghana respectively.

One on one interviews were conducted with the leadership of the GAF Training Department, and the GP Directorate. Also the leaders of the NCRC were interviewed on November 12, 2014 as well as a senior representative of the FIC. Prominent members of major religious denominations and churches were interviewed. They included the International Central Gospel Church (ICGC), Assemblies of God, the Apostolic Church of Ghana and Evangelical Presbyterian Church, Ghana. The rest are the Accra Diocese of the Catholic Church, Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission and Ghana the Office of the Chief Imam. Members of some traditional councils and rulers were also interviewed. Unstructured questionnaire were used in all the interviews and were varied to elicit the needed information from the various respondents. In all the interviews conducted, note are taken and interaction recorded with the consent of respondent.

Some of the primary data collected from the various institutions included the activities that those institutions carry out to foster the prevention and fight against terror. Relevant legal framework documents for dealing with terrorism acquired in 30 September, 2014 to determine the extent of Ghana's preparedness to respond to terrorism.

Secondary data from books, journals articles, news magazines, conference papers and publications were used. Local and international tabloid, television and radio news, interviews and discussions

were used as well. In addition, the study used data from recognised internet sources. Lectures and seminars organised by authoritative writers on terrorism and subject matter experts are also incorporated. Qualitative method of analysis is adopted because the data collected do not lend themselves to the use of figures, tables and graphs. This is because the data to be collected are mostly classified and will not be readily released by those to provide the data/information.

1.10 Limitation of the Study

The main limitation of this research is the enormous volume of data on terrorism but most of which lack scholastic value in terms of credibility and, more importantly, for the topic of this research. Another limitation of this research is the unwillingness of respondents of interviews to provide adequate information on response preparedness due to security concerns. The study, therefore, relied more on secondary sources of data. These problems notwithstanding, they did not affect the study so much as to render it unreliable since the research objectives are achieved.

1.11 Arrangement of Chapters

The study is organised into four chapters. Chapter one is the research design. Chapter Two provides an overview of terrorism in West Africa. It further discusses the history of terrorism in West Africa from pre-colonial days to contemporary manifestations. It goes further to discuss terrorism and the sub-regional response. Chapter Three analyses Ghana's response to terrorism in West Africa by highlighting Ghana's potential areas of vulnerability and assess the existing mechanisms to prevent and to counter terrorism in Ghana. It also examines the preparedness of the relevant agencies to deal with terrorism. Chapter Four provides a summary of the findings, conclusion and recommendations.

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CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

The chapter examines the general situation of terrorism and terrorist related crimes in West Africa. It commences with the history of terrorism in West Africa and outlines its contemporary manifestation in the sub-region. The chapter then looks at the causes of terrorism and concludes with West Africa's responses to terrorism. Chapter Three is thus divided into four sub-divisions; history of terrorism in West Africa, contemporary manifestations of terrorism, causes of terrorism in West Africa and Sub-regional response to terrorism.

2.1 The History of Terrorism in West Africa

Terrorism has become a household term in West Africa in recent years. This is not because terrorism, as a phenomenon, is new. In reality, terrorism is as old as human being's willingness to use violence to attain one aim or the other.¹ One of the earliest groups that displayed features of contemporary terrorist organisation was the Zealots, also known as the Sicarii of Judea around the First Century.² They carried out a campaign of assassinations of the Roman occupation forces. Another group to exhibit familiar attributes of terrorism, as manifested in recent times, was the Assassins.³ The Assassins were a faction of Shia Islam called the Nizari Islamis,⁴ who avoided open combat with their adversaries, instead espoused assassination of enemy leaders as a strategy. Contemporary terrorists also exhibit these traits. However, to appreciate how terrorism has evolved in West Africa, it is vital to differentiate between the various acts of violence to determine which of them constitute terrorisms and which do not.

There is no global consensus on what constitute terrorism. This has engendered different definitions of terrorism, often from the perspective of the one using the term. Therefore, what constitute acts of terror to Israel could mean resistance against Zionist occupation to Palestinians. In spite of the ambiguities and difficulties in arriving at a global definition of terrorism, contemporary usage of the term is generally associated with certain kinds of violent acts carried out by individuals and groups instead of states. Terrorism is also generally associated with incidents that take place during peacetime instead of events that occur as part of conventional warfare.

The words ‘terrorism’ and ‘terror’ came from the term ‘regime de la terreur’, a period in French history that followed the French Revolution in 1789.⁵ The original view of the term was positive since the then leaders of the French Revolution believed that the results of their actions were geared towards the creation of a new and better society. In order to attain this, terrorism was seen as the solution to internal anarchy and external invasion by other European monarchies.

After the reign of terror ended in France in 1794, the term terror changed and came to symbolize the abuse of office and power. Terrorism was therefore originally perpetrated by a state in its attempt to promote its views through a system of coercive intimidation. The term has since evolved and today, various definitions abound partly due to the different view on what is terrorism and what is not. In the context of West Africa, one such definitions which provides a wider context is the one by the erstwhile Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) now AU.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union's (AU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism Article 1(3) (a), defined terrorism as any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of states party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or

cause serious injury or death to any person, any number or group of persons or cause or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environment or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

- Intimidate, put fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act or adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
- Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or create a public emergency; or
- Create a general insurrection in the state.

Article 3 of the same Convention provides that notwithstanding the provision of article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist act.⁶

There are many more variations of the definition of terrorism. These differences go to stress the complex nature of the subject of terrorism. Notwithstanding these complexities one thing certain is that terrorism is now a real threat to West Africa's peace and security. It is however important to understand how terrorism has evolved in West Africa in order to fashion out appropriate responses.

2.1.1 Terrorism in Pre-Colonial West Africa

During the pre-colonial era, West Africa witnessed a number of conflicts among the clans, chiefdoms, kingdoms and states that controlled various parts of the sub-region. There is, however, no

evidence to suggest that terrorism was a major occurrence in pre-colonial period of West Africa. Though some writers have suggested that some communities were terrorized as a result of slave raids during the trans-Saharan slave trade, evidence suggests that most slaves were captured during battle or enslaved for crimes committed.⁷

2.1.2 Terrorism during the Transatlantic Slave Trade and Colonial Era

Literature that links slave trade and colonialism to terrorism are very rare. However, there are some African scholars on terrorism who have outlined clearly-defined linkages between terrorism in Africa and the transatlantic slave trade as well as colonialism.⁸ Writers like W.E.B. Du Bois writes of the slave trade during the colonial days as state sponsored terrorism. In agreeing with this assertion, other scholars have suggested that “slavery could not have been possible without the accompanying spell of terror”.⁹ As posited by Oshita, the transatlantic slave trade and anti-colonial struggles during which African nationalists resisted the presence of European administrators were periods that witnessed the entrenched use of terrorism by both the colonial powers and the colonised.

Considering the definition by the OAU, terrorism, in this period, could mostly have been carried out by the colonial authorities. Terrorism during the Transatlantic Slave Trade could therefore be described as state sponsored. The slave trade, therefore, traumatised the people of West Africa through the massacre, humiliation and the brutal exploitation the people experienced. This sowed seeds of disunity, conflict and war among the people of the sub-region.¹⁰ Some of the violent conflicts and terrorism emerging in recent times could therefore be seen in the light of the past experience that West Africans have had with terrorism.

2.1.3 Terrorism in the Era of the Independence Struggle

The wind of freedom and self-determination that blew across Africa after the SWW saw the emergence of various anti-colonialism groups at different regions in Africa, including West Africa. The leaders of these groups included Dr Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Oliver Tambo of South Africa and Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe. Some of these leaders and their groups engaged in violent means to either forcefully capture power from colonialists or compel them to the negotiation table.¹¹ These activities could not be described as terrorism if one is to go by the OAU definition of terrorism.

Independence struggles in West Africa in general were not as violent as experienced in other parts of Africa. In West Africa, there were often demonstrations for better conditions of resettlement by veterans of the First and SWWs which sometimes resulted in unrests. These demonstrations were sometimes met with brutal repression and imprisonment of leaders of anti-colonial rule. One of the few exceptions of the relatively peaceful anti-colonial movements was in Portuguese Guinea, now Guinea Bissau.¹²

In Guinea Bissau, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), headed by Amilcar Cabral, waged a guerilla war against the colonial rulers. This is one of the few instances that provide a cogent account of the nature and extent of terrorism associated with independence struggle in West Africa. In Guinea Bissau, in particular, the Portuguese Colonialist were condemned by the UNSC for the brutal massacre of villagers who were fighting for their rightful desire of freedom and independence.¹³ As colonialism ended in West African, a new wave of violence came along with the political independence.

2.1.4 Terrorism in Post-independence West Africa

After independence, many West African countries were confronted with some challenges that contributed to political and social instability. Bad governance, mismanagement and corruption, coupled weak state connived to drive most West African countries into poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and disease, among many others. The result of all these challenges was that West African countries became susceptible to social unrests and internal conflicts.

Coup d'états became a common phenomenon in many countries in West Africa. For instance, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo and Sierra Leone all experienced numerous coup d'états, some violent, after independence.¹⁴ During these periods of military rule, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, detention without trials and many other such human rights violations were a common occurrences.¹⁵ Most of the violence and terror experience in many West African countries after independence emanated from the state often against a section of the society viewed as being against the government in power.

In certain cases, the violence was perpetrated by the ruling government against tribes, ethnic groups or communities that predominantly belonged to a particular religious group. This sowed seeds of hatred and other grievances among various groups which would later become the fault lines along which terrorism and other violent conflicts are now being waged. For example, the Liberian civil war which terrorized not only Liberians but also Sierra Leonean, resulted from the Doe government discriminating and terrorizing other ethnic groups that it viewed as threats to the government. This was a common feature in many West Africa countries with mostly authoritarian governments. For instance, Sani Abacha's military regime confrontation with the Niger Delta people contributed to the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

As the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, coup d'états appeared less fashionable and the wind of democracy was beginning to blow across much of West Africa. The hope of democracy was however dealt a setback when civil wars gripped the sub-region

The early 1990s saw the emergence of violent civil conflicts in several West African countries, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire. Most of these countries are yet to recover from the effect of these civil wars. Some of these civil wars were particularly gruesome. For instance, the amputation of limbs by the erstwhile Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF) cannot be described any other way than acts of terror.¹⁶ The RUF also gouge out eyes with knives, smashed people's hands with hammers, and some people were burned with boiling water.¹⁷

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that notwithstanding the sporadic violent acts that have occurred at various times in West Africa, the sub-region has not been particularly known for terrorism until the contemporary manifestation of the phenomenon.

2.2 Contemporary Manifestation of Terrorism in West Africa

The use of violence to achieve political, social, economic and ideological goals is not new in West Africa, as discussed earlier. However, in recent times the employment of violence for these objectives and other similar goals has assumed certain dimensions that have raised concern among West Africans and the international community as well.

Contemporary terrorism in West Africa is predominantly Islamist in nature. Kidnapping has become a preferred strategy and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians and non-combatant a common

feature. Other contemporary manifestation of terrorism in West Africa is its increasing connection with TOC and growing internationalisation of the activities of terrorists. These are discussed below.

2.2.1 The Rise in Islamic Extremism in West Africa

West Africa is becoming synonymous with Islamist extremism. The presence of AQIM, Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru), Ansa Al Dine and Boko Haram in various countries in West Africa indicate that the once distant phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalists have now made West Africa one of its strongholds. Contemporary terrorists use religion as its public face.

Almost all the main terror groups in the sub-region invoke one Islamic dictum or the other as their course. For example, as their name suggests, Boko Haram claims Western education is forbidden. The group has also professed their intention to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state. Though some writers have argued that religion is just being used as a convenient front for their criminal intent, one cannot deny the fact that virtually all the terrorist groups in West Africa are Islamist related.

They have assumed some of the traits exhibited by more established and notorious terrorists in other parts of the world. They claim responsibility for violent attacks, circulate video messages of their intention and course, openly profess their support and endorsement of other extremist groups like AQIM, Al Shabaab, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda.

With the Islamisation of their course, it becomes easier for such terrorist groups to win sympathy of other Muslims in solidarity with perceived oppressed Muslims elsewhere. In essence, the terrorists are exploiting identity as a rallying call to other Muslims to join their call for “Jihad” (Holy War)

though most the course they fight has more to do with economic and political grievances than religious.

To deal with the growing Islamist terrorism in West Africa, it would be important to investigate and unravel the basis of the emboldened strategy and activities of the terrorists in West Africa. This would help in fashioning out appropriate response that has a better chance of dealing with the increasing threats of terror in the sub-region.

2.2.2 Kidnapping as a Major Strategy for Terrorists in West Africa

Kidnapping has become a major strategy for most of the terrorist groups in West Africa. Previously, most of the kidnappings by terrorist groups targeted Westerners, ostensibly for ransom. Terrorist groups have made millions of dollars through kidnapping for ransom.¹⁸

According to The New York Times, between 2008 and 2013, Europeans paid a total of \$91.5 million in ransom to AQIM. Between 2003 and 2012, MOJAO and AQIM kidnapped westerners including Europeans, Canadians and American for ransoms amounting to over 500 million dollars.¹⁹ According to David S Cohen, the former U.S Treasury Department's Under-Secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, "Kidnapping for ransom has become today's most significant source of terrorist financing."²⁰

In more recent times, the kidnappings, especially, by Boko Haram has not been limited to citizens of Western countries. Nigerians, Cameroonians and expatriate workers from other parts of the world have been kidnapped by the group. Christians, Muslims, rich and poor alike have also been targeted by the Boko Haram. For instance, the group kidnapped over 200 school girls from Chibok in Borno

State of Nigeria and also the wife of the Deputy Prime Minister of Cameroon in the early part of 2014.

Any measure adopted to prevent or counter terrorism in West Africa must seek to understand their objectives and also undermine the terrorist source of funds in order to degrade their ability to operate. As the strategies of the terrorists change, so must the response by West African countries change in line with the new strategies. In the same vein, efforts to deal with terrorism need to be proactive rather than reactive in order to prevent recruitment and protection of vulnerable groups like women being used as suicide bombers.

2.2.3 Targeting of Civilian and the Use of Suicide Bombing and Female Recruits

In the past, most terrorists in West Africa targeted the security agencies with whom they had their greatest grievances. For example, following the Nigerian security agency's crackdown on Boko Haram in 2009, the group retaliation initially focused on government and security targets, as well as churches and Muslim leaders that rejected its brand of Islam.²¹ This has since changed.

Today, terror groups like Boko Haram and AQIM are prepared to kill, irrespective of race, tribe, religion or gender. The target adversaries of contemporary terrorists in West Africa are extensive, and the strategy is to achieve maximum death and destruction. This is manifested by the attacks carried out by Boko Haram which are mostly targeted at highly crowded places including market places, schools, bus terminal and drinking bars. As security agencies increase their efforts to tackle the threats, the terrorists adopt new tactics.

Over the last few years, the tactics of terrorist group in West Africa has changed to include suicide bombings.²² For example, on August 26, 2011 Boko Haram terrorist attacked on UN compound in Nigeria, killing twenty-three people and injuring seventy-six more. That attack marked the first high profile suicide attack by the Boko Haram terrorist group.²³ The recruitment of women to carry out some of the attacks has become another recent development in terrorism in West Africa.

There are reports that teenage girls have been used by Boko Haram to carry out suicide attacks against targets in Kano, a major city in Northern Nigeria.²⁴ This caused panic among many as one cannot tell if some of the kidnapped girls from Chibok Girls' school might have been radicalized to become suicide bombers.

These new trends by Boko Haram and other terrorists in West Africa are worrisome not only because of their attacks but also the complex dimension it has assumed. This therefore requires not only a sub-regional effort to combat but a global cooperation. Paradoxically, the indiscriminate attacks by Boko Haram provide an opportunity for Nigeria and West African leaders to erode the sympathy of the people from Boko Haram.

2.2.4 Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa

A lot of TOC permeate the West African sub-region. These include drug trafficking, smuggling, arms trafficking, money laundering, armed robbery and piracy, among other crimes. The trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) is also a major security challenge for West Africa and increasingly undermining the stability of the sub-region. Out of approximately 500 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide in 2004, an estimated eight to ten million were concentrated in the West African sub-region.²⁵

Though SALPs do not in themselves seem to cause conflicts and terrorism, their wide availability makes it easier for terrorist groups and criminal gangs to have access to instruments of violence. Given the weak national security systems across West Africa, the generally porous borders and growing demand for arms by emerging militants and criminals, arms trafficking has become a lucrative trade in West Africa. In a report authored by Freedom Onuoha and Gerald Ezirim, the boldness with which present-day militants operate in West Africa grew with the proliferation of weapons in the Sahara-Sahel region following the overthrow of Muammar Ghadafi and destabilisation of Libya.²⁶

Piracy, together with armed robbery at sea, is another TOC that has characterized recent terrorist activities in West Africa. A number of experts on terrorism believe that there is possible link between piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the financing of Islamist militants including AQIM, Ansar Al Dine, MOJAO, Boko Haram and others. Some of the millions paid to the oil gangs are thus suspected to have made their way to terrorists in northern Nigeria.²⁷ Related to piracy and terrorism financing is the disturbing development of drug trafficking and its influence on terrorism financing in West Africa.

West Africa is now a major transit hub and destination of drugs coming from Latin America and sometimes destined for Europe and America.²⁸ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) claims that cocaine seizures in West Africa rose to 47tons in 2007. At least fifty tons of cocaine, valued at about 2 billion U.S Dollars transit through West Africa each year. About one ton passes through the West African “narco-state” of Guinea-Bissau. The arrest of a former Chief of the Guinea-Bissau Navy, Rear-Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto by the U.S. Drug Enforcement

Agency for drug trafficking is ample evidence of the drug menace to West Africa. The UNODC estimates that terrorism financing, trafficking in arms and drugs and other forms of TOC generate about 1.3 billion U.S Dollars annually.²⁹ The growing relationship between illicit drug trafficking and terrorism in West Africa is a dangerous trend as it does not only threaten the political stability of the West Africa sub-region, but its economic, social and demographic development.

To address the threats posed by today's terrorists, West Africa leaders and the society at large require a multidimensional approach. This can however only be effective if the causes of terrorism in West Africa are well-understood.

2.3 Causes of Terrorism in West Africa

It is difficult to identify a single reason that can sufficiently explain the existence of terrorism in any particular country or region, and West Africa is no exception. In the case of West Africa, most of the security challenges that the sub-region had faced in the past, including military coups, civil wars and general political violence have their basis in democratic shortfalls and poor governance.

Such democratic deficits include inadequate economic opportunities, social deprivation, loss of cultural and social identity as well as endemic poverty. Others include political repression, widespread corruption in governance, dysfunctional governments and available large number of unemployed youth.³⁰ As such, there are underlying political, economic and social factors that appear to influence, and sustain the terrorism in West Africa.

2.3.1 Socio-Economic Factors

According to Oshita Oshita, poverty and unemployment are conditions that reinforce terrorism.³¹ Existence of these conditions, enflamed by extreme ideologies from radical groups, availability of SALWs and financial support, as well as the existence of extremist groups that are capable of mobilizing the idle youth, usually manifest in violence. This violence often arises from political conflicts that are largely associated with the demands of deprived groups that are usually meted with suppressive state policies.

For example, Boko Haram's activities started in the form of a revolt against economic, social and political injustice for government corruption, abusive security forces and widening regional economic disparity.³² This situation is not peculiar to the North-eastern part of Nigeria alone, it is common in many parts of West Africa and particularly endemic in countries experiencing the activities of terrorist groups.

In Northern Mali for example, poverty, unemployment among the young, economic underdevelopment and the feeling of exclusion from decision-making have provided a breeding ground for fundamentalist ideas.³³ A country with such distortions inherent in its society, achieving peace will not revolve solely around security operations to destroy or contain the terrorists threats. It must necessarily include but not limited to social development, economic prospect, political inclusion, good governance, sound economic policies and respect for human rights. Without such policies that provide some source of livelihood for the youth, extremists groups can easily radicalize them, making them susceptible to recruitment by terrorists.

2.3.2 Traditional Qur'anic Teaching System and Secular Education

Education or the lack of it plays a significant role in determining whether one is susceptible to a terrorism or not, especially in West Africa. Similarly, the kind of education one pursues can influence the ease with which a person gets radicalised.

Well educated population, with qualifications in specialised areas like engineering and information technology (IT) but without gainful employment can be vulnerable and be lured into terrorism to earn a decent income. In many West Africa countries, including Ghana, evidence seems to suggest that there is a large percentage of graduate unemployment which is still growing. This makes the sub-region a fertile ground for radical groups to recruit foot soldiers. Lack of education on the other hand reduces an individual's chances of gainful employment particularly in today's globalised world. With such low prospect for the future, people in this situation can be enticed into joining terrorist groups.

According to Gary Becker, a scholar in Social Economics and a winner of Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, the more a person's human capital, the greater the awareness of the person as to what future benefits is forfeits if killed or arrested.³⁴ It therefore stands to reason that people with no prospects for the future are more likely to take up suicide bombing.

On the issue of education and radicalization, the Qur'anic schools, known in Hausa language as *Makaranta*,³⁵ have become some of the recruiting centres for terrorists. In West Africa, especially in Northern Nigeria, one major assembly point of young impressionable Muslims is at such Qur'anic schools. These *Makarantas* hold large number of children and youth, with ages ranging from three

years old to teenagers, whom their parents have handed over to *Malami* (teacher) for the purpose of imparting Islamic knowledge.

In many of these *Makarantas*, the children are often malnourished, unkempt and tend to beg in and around mosques for alms to fend for themselves. In certain cases, they beg on the streets and also make returns to their supervising *Malami*. This is referred to as the *Almajiri* system, which initially referred to the boys who travel away from home to study the Qur'an with a *Malami* whom parents considered trustworthy and devout enough to entrust with children.³⁶ *Almajiri* is now erroneously used to refer to anybody who begs for alms.³⁷

The *Almajiri* system in West Africa is often unregulated by state authorities. Practically anyone can present himself as a *Malami*, and go on to impart whatever distorted doctrines he desires as 'Islamic teachings'. Many *Makaranta* educational system practices corporal punishment and other abuses of the students are quite common. Under such environment of abuse, denial and extreme poverty, these youths mature into adults with a deep-seated mistrust, disillusionment and anger towards the society which mostly fail to protect them. With such deep-seated resentment against the states and the society, these youths form a limitless recruit-base for terrorists groups who could easily lure them into a false sense of belonging and identity.

These schools therefore need to be regulated and modernise to ensure that the schools are not turned into places of radicalization by extremist jihadists. The reform of these Islamic schools needs to also ensure that the curricula of the Qur'anic schools include subjects that afford the students opportunity for good moral upbringing and future employment in today's globalised world. This would help reduce the level of unemployment and poverty in such communities as well as minimize the feeling

of economic exclusion which spawn terrorism. It would also stop *madradas* (centre of Islamic learning) being turned into what Judy Dunker described as places of indoctrination of anti-American and anti-Western feelings where students are primed for global jihad and global Islamic community.³⁸

2.3.3 Ideology as a Cause of Terrorism

In many parts of the world, ideology has been known to have instigated terrorism and West Africa is no exception. Virtually all the terrorist organisations in West Africa have espoused one form of ideology or the other, either in the form of Islamism or nationalism. For instance, Boko Haram, Ansaru, Ansar Al Dine AQIM have all been associated with the establishment of Islamic states, the spread of Islam and the rule by Islamic law (Sharia). The Mali based group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), on the other hand, has often been associated with nationalist ideology. They have been fighting for the establishment of an independent state of Azawad in Northern Mali. Though ideology has been cited as a contributing factor to some of the recent emergence of terrorism in places like West Africa, some writers have argued that ideology is just a ploy to legitimize terrorism and help in mobilisation. They suggest that ideology alone does not make people turn to violence, and that economic, social and political factors are often intertwined.³⁹ For instance, it is generally agreed that Islam is not a source of terrorism, though many terrorist acts have been committed in the name of the religion. Some scholars argue that political and economic grievances are the main causes but religion is used as the cover to gain legitimacy and to help in mobilization. Notwithstanding this view, to combat terrorism in West Africa, religion cannot be ignored, as it has remained an immutable dynamic in contemporary terrorism discourse.

2.3.4 Identity as a Contributing Factor to Terrorism in West Africa

Identity denotes a complex construct made up of elements originating at three levels; cultural identity, social identity and personal identity. Cultural identity signifies the specific cultural values an individual becomes part of throughout life as a guiding principle for behaviour such as collectivism, absolutism in belief and familism.⁴⁰ Cultural identity values are often internalised perspectives derived from various sources including involvement with national, ethnic, religious, cultural, and educational communities. Closely related to cultural identity is social identity. According to Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, social identity represents the self-assigned importance attached to the social groups to which one belongs and with which one interacts directly.⁴¹ This goes along with the feelings associated with participation in these groups' activities.⁴² Social identity also reflects the beliefs and feelings about those groups that one perceives as opposition to the groups with which one is affiliated. These are those groups that are considered as "not us."⁴³ It is important to emphasise that loyalties to those groups associated with an individual's social identity are often passionate and specific, and social identity tend to define one's personal identity. Personal identity represents one's chosen or ascribed goals, values, and beliefs, as well as the personal perspectives a person uses to make sense of the world. To appreciate the effects of identity on terrorism in West Africa, it is vital to look how the elements of identity interact with other grievances to spawn terrorism.

The feeling of economic marginalisation, political exclusion, unemployment and endemic poverty, are common features in most West African societies including Northern Nigeria. However, rarely do these prompt a person to become a terrorist. However, when such feelings exist in an environment where passionate observance of traditional differences of "us" versus "them" religious principles which justify violence against those viewed to threaten one's religious or cultural group,⁴⁴ violence

become more likely. Additionally, a strong prioritization of the group over the individual and a belief that one's group is morally superior to the group being attacked,⁴⁵ breeds aggression. The emergence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria could partly be explained by this phenomenon of identity-disenfranchisement mix.

As stated earlier, the North-eastern parts of Nigeria where Boko Haram is based are generally very poor, with feelings of political and economic exclusion, and high level of unemployment and illiteracy. This has alienated most of the youth. Members of Boko Haram believe that people who do not believe in their brand of Islam are infidels and inferior. The feeling of 'us'; the unemployed predominantly Muslim youth, against 'them'; the Christian dominated South, and the politically influential elite, which Boko Haram consider corrupt, is prevalent. This created a volatile environment which only needed a trigger like the Nigerian Police crackdown on Boko Haram in 2009 for terrorism to emerge.

2.3.5 Political Instability as a Source of Terrorism in West Africa

West Africa has witnessed prolonged political instability including coup d'états, ethnic conflicts, electoral violence and civil wars among others. These conflicts distract security agencies from dealing with matters that could lead to terrorism, hence creating the environment for terrorists to operate. Additionally, the scarce resources that could be used to enhance human security thereby reducing terrorist's chances of recruiting foot soldier are spent on containing these conflicts. Thus, political instability provides both the space and human resource to terrorism.

Though the link between political instability and terrorism is not firmly established, it can be argued that lingering political instability could provide opportunity for terrorists to gain a foothold in even a

relatively stable state. A case in point is Captain Amadou Sonogo's coup in March 2012 in Mali. The coup d'état which came about as a result of a protracted Tuareg rebellion which the government was accused of not doing enough to quash,⁴⁶ provided the opportunity for the rebels to quickly capture the three major cities of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao. It also provided the enabling atmosphere for terrorist groups like AQIM, Ansa Al Dine and MUJAO to gain foothold in Northern Mali and other countries within the Sahel Region. Today, Boko Haram is believed to be receiving training and other logistics support from these terror groups to perpetrate and perpetuate their violent campaign in Nigeria. Similar, Guinea-Bissau's April 2012 coup worsened the security situation and diverted attention away from efforts to stem a growing drug trade. In a report to the UN Security Council in 2012, the Secretary General's Special Representative to West Africa, Said Djinit indicated that the drug trafficking worsened in Guinea Bissau" in the wake of the April 2012 coup d'état.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, evidence available suggest that funds from illicit drug trafficking are used to fuel terrorism in West Africa.

It can therefore be concluded that political instability is both direct and indirect contributing factor to terrorism in West Africa. Efforts by West African countries like Ghana to prevent or combat terrorism need to include measure to deal with political insecurity instigating and aggravating factors.

Some precipitant causes of terrorism include the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa, the displacement of terrorists from their traditional bases in the Middle East and other parts of the world through America and her allies' war on terror, and the overthrow of dictators whose strongman rule served as "shied" along the northern frontiers of West Africa against infiltration by terrorists from elsewhere.

2.4 West Africa's Response to the Emerging Threats of Terrorism in the Sub-Region

The increased activities of terrorist groups like AQIM, MOJAU, Ansaru and Boko Haram have significantly changed the outlook of security in the West African sub-region. Though there seems to be a consensus that national and bilateral arrangements are vital to counter terrorism, the complex nature of contemporary terrorism in West Africa makes it imperative that coherent and coordinated response need to be developed and maintained in order to successfully combat terrorism in the sub-region. This is particularly true for West Africa because virtually all the countries in the sub-region do not possess the individual capacity in resources, skill and technology to combat terrorism. Consequently, ECOWAS and its member states seemed apparent slow in responding to the threats of terrorism following the September 11 attacks on the US. ECOWAS's existing ability to conduct effective counterterrorism appears limited. There are no institutional structures or resources devoted specifically to fighting terrorism".⁴⁸

The emergence of groups like AQIM, Ansaru, MUJAO and the activities of Boko Haram in particular, has drew the sub-regional grouping's attention to the need to vigorously address the terror threats. Over the years, ECOWAS has made great progress in issues relating to conflict management and prevention with the introduction of some protocols. For instance, Article 3 of ECOWAS Protocol relating to the mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Security outlines fighting terrorism as one of its objectives.⁴⁹ The creation of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), and the Moratorium against the Importation and Exportation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 1998 could all be seen in the light of counterterrorism efforts.

ECOWAS also adopted Conflict Prevention Framework in January 2008 to support sub-regional responses to the interrelated challenges of cross-border crime, small arms and light weapons

proliferation, and political, security, and resource governance. Additionally, ECOWAS has identified focal points in each of its member states with the aim of building an operational network.⁵⁰

In its attempt to minimise insecurity which contributes to terrorism, ECOWAS member states have been conducting peacekeeping operations in conflict areas in the sub-region since the early 1990s. Currently, ECOWAS member states have peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Mali. Additionally, ECOWAS has peacekeepers in countries bordering the sub-region like Central African Republic and Western Sahara. The destabilisation of these countries has the potential of exposing West Africa to infiltration of terrorist groups, as suggested by some writers in the case of the insecurity in Libya and its impact on West Africa's security.

Other activities by ECOWAS that contribute to counterterrorism are in the area of terrorism financing. For example, it has developed a sub-regional mechanism to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by establishing the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA) was established in 1999. GIABA seeks to provide a common framework for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities.⁵¹ With GIABA becoming a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2010, the high standards of FATF could be applied to West Africa. GIABA is also assisting ECOWAS member countries to implement the FATF standards and best practices. With tight financial regulations and monitoring system in West Africa, access to funding by terror groups would be greatly reduced. Less funding to terrorists ultimately could mean less attacks by terrorists. Additionally, the ECOWAS Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peacekeeping and Security has as part of its objective the fight against terrorism.⁵²

There has been greater cooperation among some ECOWAS member states in the fight against maritime piracy and other TOCs. For instance, the GP and the Togolese Gendarmerie have collaborated on many occasions to apprehend armed robbers and drug traffickers in each other's respective countries.⁵³ There is also growing information sharing among a number of the security agencies in West Africa, including the police and the military.

Currently, the Ghanaian and the Togolese Navies are linked to a common Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information System (VTMIS). VTMIS is an integrated system that enables continuous electronic surveillance of the maritime domain to ensure safety of navigation, assist distress vessels and more importantly to guard against armed robbery, illicit traffic of humans and goods and fight piracy. Other countries in West Africa including Côte d'Ivoire, Benin and Nigeria are expected to join the common network soon. This collaboration and information-sharing are measures geared towards fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. With the increasing belief among experts that ransom monies obtained by pirates from ships seized make their way to terrorists, these efforts are vital toward combating terrorism in West Africa.

In addition to other ECOWAS counterterrorism mechanisms, the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) also facilitates the exchange of information among its members on potential terrorist and other international criminal activity. WAPCCO collaborates with the West African Interpol bureau, based in Abidjan, to develop and implement counterterrorism-related programmes. Interpol's West African bureau and WAPCCO have assisted countries in carrying out joint police operations to combat and prevent terrorism and terrorism financing in the West Africa.⁵⁴

To deal with the related issue of drug trafficking in West Africa, WAPCCO, Interpol and other agencies work together to implement the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on illicit drug trafficking and organised crime. They also cooperate in the establishment of transnational crime units in various West African countries.⁵⁵ WAPCCO and Interpol have also worked with UNODC to train various legal personnel.⁵⁶

Like the WAPCCO, there is also the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Security Service. Since the rise of Boko Haram attacks and kidnappings, the Committee has met on a number of occasions. On September 9, 2014, the group met in Accra to discuss among other things, how to deal with the Boko Haram issue. These efforts by West Africa that target the different support mechanisms for terrorists would help stem terrorism in West Africa from engulfing the entire sub-region.

Aside the sub-regional efforts, individual ECOWAS member states have also taken various initiatives in response to the emerging terror threats. Some joint initiatives between West African states and the U.S. have been created to counter terrorism. For instance, there is the U.S. sponsored Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), with partner nations including Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal as well as Ghana.⁵⁷ The TSCTI is aimed at training additional forces in these countries to combat terrorism in their respective countries and foster better information sharing and operational planning between regional states. This is considered as important as establishing new units.⁵⁸ The Sahelian and Saharan belts of West Africa currently have a counter terrorism partnership with the US and its G-8 allies, especially as the African region is one of the global sites for the US's war on terror.⁵⁹

Other organisations and agencies that West Africa countries are partnering with include the UN Security Council's Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), UNODC, the AU, the European Union (EU), and the U.S. These organisations and countries have provided technical and other counter terrorism capacity-building assistance to a number of countries in the sub-region.⁶⁰

In spite of the progress made, much remains to be done with regards to ECOWAS' involvement in counterterrorism efforts on the continent. A dedicated unit to deal with counterterrorism remains to be created as the portfolio currently sits with the Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security. For ECOWAS to provide solid and strong counter terrorism support to its member states, it is critical that it has structures that focus solely on terrorism. This will require a commitment by the leadership of member states to harmonise policies and work together in spite of their varied interests and resources. Individual member states have to give up some aspects of their national independence to contribute to the wider goals and the group collective interest. Furthermore, most countries in the ECOWAS region have not put into place legislations to combat terrorism except for Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal.⁶¹ ECOWAS' role is thus critical in creating awareness and engaging with member states to put stronger legislations into place and to ensure that compliance is achieved.

A sub-regional understanding of the issue of terrorism and a plan of action for the sub-region need to be developed by ECOWAS. These measures by ECOWAS will serve as a framework around which individual member states like Ghana can build their own response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa. To this end, the next chapter analyses Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa.

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CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS OF GHANA'S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the research in the context of the conceptual approaches that has been identified to best inform Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa. The Chapter is therefore divided into sections, starting with Ghana's potential areas of vulnerability and the legal regime Ghana has put in place specifically to deal with terrorism and terror related crimes. The chapter also looks at the institutional arrangement for dealing with the threats of terrorism in Ghana, the adequacy of Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa and the challenges in preventing terrorism and terrorism in Ghana.

3.1 Ghana's Potential Areas of Vulnerability

In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2014, the President of Ghana lamented that the vastness of the African continent, the large number of unemployed youth and the wide spread poverty make the continent vulnerable to terrorism.¹ The President's description of Africa is a reflection of situation in Ghana. Though areas of vulnerability of any state are inexhaustible, the ones discussed below provide insight into Ghana's potential areas of weakness, in addition to those highlighted above by the President.

Porous borders make Ghana open to entry by anybody who dares to try. This is exacerbated by the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement of people and goods. Related to the porous borders is the challenge of illicit drug trafficking, which is now a common phenomenon in Ghana. The proliferation of SALW is yet another weakness Ghana faces. The types of weapons seized by the

Ghanaian security agencies during anti-armed robbery operations are enough to show Ghana's vulnerability to the threats of SALW. An even more worrying development is the growing alien community in almost all the regional and district capitals of Ghana. Some of these aliens are involved in key areas of the country's economy particularly in the exchange of foreign currencies. The danger in this phenomenon is that this may be a process of legitimizing laundered cash which could end up financing terrorists. Some of these aliens, in the name of NGOs, are establishing and sponsoring Islamic schools in some Muslim communities in Ghana, a situation verified by the writer of this study.

A visit to some of the Muslim communities in Accra and Takoradi by the writer of this study revealed that a number of small Islamic schools set up by mostly Middle-Eastern based NGOs have sprung up. These burgeoning schools do not appear to come under any formal control of the state or local authorities. They could therefore be used to indoctrinate young unsuspecting Ghanaian Muslim who may become foot soldiers of terrorists in the future. This concern is affirmed by Brigadier General William Ayamdo, the Director General of the NCRC who lamented that the increasing entry into Ghana by suspected terrorist and the growing number of Middle-Eastern sponsored Islamic schools in Ghana are becoming a major concern to the Centre.

In a discussion with him after his lecture to the Senior Staff Students of the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSC) in May 2014, of which the writer of this study was part, he said that some of these NGOs are active in different sectors of the Ghanaian economy. This, he said, provides these NGOs access to government institutions and free movement around the country. He indicated that his outfit, in collaboration with other agencies has expelled those identified as having links with terrorist organisations. General Ayamdo said that apart from the rising presence of these

so called NGOs, the regular visits of individuals believed to be members of terrorist organisations to Ghana raises concern. According to him, Ghana expelled a British of Caribbean origin in 2006 due to his ties with Al Qaeda.

General William Ayamdo gave an instance where a member of AQIM came to Ghana in 2007 ostensibly to buy fertilizer, which is a known ingredient for making improvised explosives devices (IED). He gave another instance where the NCRC and the BNI, with warrant from the courts have successfully thwarted efforts by dubious businesses to launder money outside Ghana in support of known terrorist groups abroad. “Currently, there are some companies and businesses that we believe belong to terrorist organisations. These businesses generally repatriate their moneys out of the country mostly illegally. Some of these moneys could find their way to fund terrorism either in West Africa or elsewhere. We are therefore monitoring those suspected”, he said.

With this situation in Ghana, coupled with the various causes of terrorism in West Africa, which is a reflection of the state of affairs in Ghana, it stands to reason that Ghana is not immune from terrorism. It is fair to conclude that Ghana’s vulnerability to terrorist threats is high. To prevent, or at least minimise the occurrence of terrorism in Ghana will therefore require a concerted and coordinated effort as well as collaboration from individuals, civil society, relevant state institutions and international effort.

3.2 Legal Framework towards Preventing Terrorism in Ghana

Legal frameworks are very vital in the fight against any form of crime. Ghana has therefore enacted various laws and also signed, acceded to, or joined various international conventions geared towards combating terrorism.

3.2.1 Domestic Legal Framework

There are a number of legislations adopted to help fight terrorism in Ghana. Ghana has enacted the Anti-Money Laundry Act 2008 (Act 749), which proscribes money laundering in all its forms. Section one of the Act clearly states that a person commits an offence of money laundering if the person knows or ought to have known that property is or forms part of the proceeds of unlawful activity and the person; (a) converts, conceals, disguises or transfers the property, (b) conceals or disguises the unlawful origin of the property, or (c) acquires, uses or takes possession of the property.

The Act also makes it's a crime to launder money everywhere as well as prohibits anyone aiding and abetting money laundry. For example Section Two of the Act states, "A person commits an offence if the person knows or ought to have known that another person has obtained proceeds from an unlawful activity and enters into an agreement with that other person or engages in a transaction where - (a) the retention or the control by or on behalf of that other person of the proceeds from unlawful activity is facilitated, or (b) the proceeds from that unlawful activity are used to make funds available to acquire property on behalf of that other person". There are punitive measures for persons who contravene the Act. According to Section 3 of the Act, anyone who contravenes Section 1 or 2 of the Act, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than five thousand penalty units or to a term of imprisonment of not less than twelve months and not more than ten years or both. The Act makes provision for the establishment a body that will oversee the implementation of the Act.

It is therefore under Section Four clause one of Act 749 that the FIC was established. The objective of the Centre as stipulated in Section Five include: (a) assist in the identification of proceeds of

unlawful activity and the combat of money laundering activities; (b) make information available to investigating authorities, the intelligence agencies and the revenue agencies to facilitate the administration and enforcement of the laws of the Republic; and (c) exchange information with similar bodies in other countries as regards money laundering activities and similar offences

Act 749 is important in the fight against terrorism in Ghana because by criminalizing money laundering and putting mechanisms in place to curtail the crime, it becomes much difficult for terrorists to gain access funding through money laundering. Additionally, money laundry is known to be closely related with kidnapping, illicit drug trafficking as well as human trafficking since moneys gained through those illegal means are what is laundered. Therefore, anti-money laundry efforts could help to prevent other criminal activities that aid terrorism. Apart from the legal regime that supports efforts against terrorism, Ghana has also enacted Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 2008 (Act 762).

The act criminalises terrorism, and it is fashioned specifically to combat terrorism, to contain terrorism, prevent acts of terrorism and ensure that Ghana's resources and financial facilities are not used to conduct acts of terrorism. Additionally, the Act makes provision for the protection of the rights of Ghanaians to live in freedom, peace and security from fear. There are some critical areas that the Acts tackles to ensure counterterrorism in Ghana.

The Act gives Concurrent and Universal Jurisdiction to the High Court of Ghana to try terrorism cases irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or where the act was committed. For instance, Section five of the Act makes provision for this Concurrent and Universal Jurisdiction whereby an

act that constitute an offense committed outside Ghana if the act constitute an offense in this country where:

- a) the person committing the act is;
 - i) a citizen of Ghana or
 - ii) not a citizen of Ghana but is ordinarily resident in Ghana.
- b) the act is committed to compel the government to do or refrain from doing an act;
- c) the act is committed against the citizen of Ghana;
- d) the act is committed against property outside the country that belongs to the republic;
- or (e) the person who commits the act is after its commission found present in Ghana.

A critical component of the Act is its criminalization of support for terrorism and terrorist activities in any forms. This is covered by Sections eleven and twelve of the Act. The Act also criminalizes recruitment of persons as terrorists or into a terrorist group. Sections fourteen and fifteen of the Act provide for this aspects. Section fourteen provides that, a person who recruits or agrees to recruit another person to be a member of a terrorist group or to participate in the commission of a terrorist act commits an offence.

Additionally, Section fifteen provides that, a person who provides or agrees to provide training or instruction in the making or use of an explosive or other lethal device; in carrying out terrorist acts; or in the practice of military exercises or movements commits an offence if the person knows that training is being provided to a terrorist organisation or to a person engaged in terrorism. Another important section of the ATA is Section sixteen of the Act.

Section sixteen of the ATA stipulates that, a person who; a) incites or promotes the commission of a terrorist act, b) incites or promote membership of a terrorist group or c) solicits property for the benefit of a terrorist group or for the commission of a terrorist act commits an offense. The importance of this section is that it would prevent individuals and groups who intend to incite acts of terrorism through political, religious and tribal means the freedom to do so. It is well known that some of the potent means of inciting terrorism are through political, tribal or race and religious incitements.

There are several punishments for offenses under the ATA, 2008 (Act 762), ranging between seven and twenty-five years imprisonment. There is also provision for the confiscation of asserts belonging terrorists and those used in committing acts of terror.

Apart from the anti-money laundering Act and the ATA, there are other acts that help in the fight against terrorism. These include the Immigration (Amendment) Act 2012 – Act 848 and the Economic and Organised Crime Act 2010 – Act 804. The former Act prohibits migrants smuggling while the latter helps in the prevention, detection and the seizure of proceeds of crime. All these legal regimes help in combating terrorism in Ghana. Ghana's response to the growing threats of terrorism in West Africa has not been limited to domestic efforts. Ghana has also been collaborating with international organisations and other countries in its bid to combat terrorism.

3.2.2 International Arrangements towards Combating Terrorism in Ghana

At the continental level, Ghana has ratified the OAU (now AU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Algiers, 1999. Ghana has also acceded to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials (2006). The

Convention prohibits the importation and exportation of arms and ammunitions into and out of the West African sub-region by states and non-state actors without the explicit authorization from the member states. The recent intensified violent activities of Boko Haram have seen Ghana increased its diplomatic efforts towards combating terrorism in West Africa and Ghana for that matter. According, Ghana has hosted a number of anti-terrorism meetings in Accra, including Chiefs of Intelligence and Security meetings, Ministerial meetings and Head of States meeting.

Outside the African continent, Ghana has ratified a number of international treaties which directly or indirectly contribute toward the fight against terrorism. For example, Ghana is a signatory to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), the Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979). Others include International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). At the Security Council level, Ghana has adopted the UNSCRs 1267 of 1999, 1373 of 2001 and 1718 of 2006. These UNSC resolutions are all aimed at the freezing or seizure of terrorist assets and related matters.

In all, the international conventions and protocols that Ghana belongs to are aimed at helping Ghana prevent or better deal with issues of terrorism and other terrorist related threats. This demonstrates Ghana determination towards combating terrorism. However, for these legal regimes and the various international conventions to be effective there are institutions required to put measures in place to prevent money laundering and also counter terrorism, as well as all the other terrorism related threats to Ghana.

3.3 Institutional Arrangement for Dealing with the Threats of Terrorism in Ghana

Ghana has a number of institutions that contribute in diverse ways, directly and indirectly towards the fight against terrorism. They include the GAF, the GP, the GIS and the BNI among many others. However, to facilitate the implementation of the legal framework towards preventing terrorism in Ghana, two core institutions are charged directly with the responsibility of dealing with terrorism in Ghana. They are the FIC and NCRC established to deal with terrorism financing and counter terrorism in Ghana respectively. The roles of these two institutions in fighting terrorism are discussed below.

3.3.1 Effort to Combat Money Laundering and the Funding of Terrorism

One of the fundamental aspects of fighting terrorism arguably is to tackle the source of funding for terrorism. By preventing funds reaching terrorists, their ability to carry out operations would be greatly reduced if not eliminated. In Ghana, the FIC is the organisation tasked with anti-money laundering (AML) and combat financing of terrorism (CFT).

As the main organisation charged with dealing with the twin menace of money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF), the FIC receives, analyse and disseminate financial intelligence in Ghana and abroad.² The Centre has a mission to protect the Ghanaian economy from the scourge of ML and TF for the enhancement of national and global economic stability and growth.³ To achieve its mission the FIC has adopted a number of mechanisms to help prevention ML and TF in Ghana, according to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the FIC, Mr. Samuel T Essel. The CEO of FIC indicated that to facilitate the speedy processing of the large volume of information the Centre receives following the increased activities of terrorism in West Africa, the FIC uses technology in

the receipt and storage of data. He emphasized that FIC personnel undergo regular training, both local and abroad on AML and CFT.⁴

According to Mr. Essel, intelligence thrives on collaboration, hence the FIC has collaborated with other allied agencies and organisations in Ghana towards fighting ML and TF. Some of these organisations include the Bank of Ghana (BoG), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Gaming Commission (GM). Others include the National Insurance Commission, and individual professionals like lawyers, dealers in precious minerals, rural banks and other non-banking financial institutions. He revealed that some of these collaborations have been supported by countries like the USA, the UK and the UN as well as organisations like GIABA. He added that through these collaborations, six Superior Court Judges were sponsored by GIABA to USA to study issues relating to ML and TF in 2012.⁵

The CEO of FIC also stated that to enhance its information gathering and sharing with its international partners, the FIC signed memoranda of understanding (MOU) with a number of countries, including those signed with Nigeria and South Africa in 2012. These MOUs are in conformity with Section 5 (c) of Act 749 and consistent with the provisions in Act 807. Despite these efforts by FIC towards combating terrorism in Ghana, the Centre is not without criticism.

In February 2012 for instance, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) criticized Ghana, and some other countries, for not making satisfactory progress in implementing its action plan and the fact that there were still some shortfalls in Ghana's strategic anti-money laundry and counter terrorism financing measures. The FATF statement however indicated that Ghana has taken steps towards improving counter terrorism financing including the ratification of the UN Convention on TOC and

Customs Due Diligence guidelines. In line with Ghana's criticism, the FATF advised Ghana to work towards addressing the deficiencies identified by providing some advice. These included sufficiently criminalising ML and TF, putting in place adequate measure to confiscate funds linked to money laundering, the establishment of fully operational and properly functioning Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the establishment and implementation of adequate systems to identify and freeze terrorists assets. With these admonishing, Ghana has since put in place additional measure to deal with ML and TF.

According to the CEO of FIC, one of such measure to combat ML and TF is the amendment of the Criminal Offenses Act, (Act 29) 2012. This Act criminalizes other offenses related to ML, including unlawful use of human parts, enforced disappearance, sexual exploitation, Illicit trafficking in explosives, firearms and ammunition, and Racketeering. Other measures put in place by Ghana in response to the FATF criticism include the enactment of the Immigration (Amendment) Act, 2012 (Act 848) to criminalize migrant smuggling, the passing of the Anti-Terrorism Regulations, 2012 (LI 2181) to adequately criminalize terrorist financing and also broadened the scope of powers to freeze, seize and confiscate proceeds of terrorist related crimes, and the passing of Economic and Organized Crime Office (Operations) Regulations, 2012 (LI 2183) to complement the parent enactment, (Act 804). Ghana's Parliament also passed the AML Regulation (LI 1987) 2011. These measures helped in making the FATF remove Ghana from countries it has black-listed in its October 2012 edition of the list.⁶ Though these measures may not totally eliminate the twin crimes of ML and TF, they provide some systems and structures with the ability to combat the threats posed by these twin crimes.

3.3.2 Mechanism to Counter Terrorism in Ghana

The NCRC is the body with the primary responsibility of preventing terrorism in Ghana. It was established in 2001 under the National Security Council, in collaboration with the United States, and it is currently headed by Brigadier General W Ayamdo. This does not however mean that Ghana had no arrangement towards fighting terrorism before the establishment of the NCRC. As far back as 1998, after the twin attack on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam, Ghana has collaborated with the US government to train some Ghanaian security officers in counter-terrorism and intelligence, including the writer of this research.

The NCRC has liaison officers drawn from the BNI, the Research Department (RD) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Ghana’s version of the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Department of Defense Intelligence (DI) of the GAF. The rest include the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority, Ghana Police Service and Ghana Immigration Service. This arrangement has enabled proper coordination in intelligence gathering and sharing as well as conducting counter-terrorism operations, according to General Ayamdo. Apart from this internal collaboration, the NCRC maintains close collaboration with other counter-terrorism bodies within and outside the West African sub-regional, in Ghana’s effort to prevent terrorism in Ghana. To ensure that the evolving threats of terrorism in West Africa do not overtake Ghana, the NCRC has adopted additional measure to counter terrorism.

Through the continuous improvement in information sharing by the NCRC and its external partners, there is better tracking of known and suspected terrorists. Such vital intelligence of the movement of would be terrorist has helped Ghana arrested and deported some terror suspects. Currently, the NCRC possesses database of terrorist and their affiliates through the collaborative efforts of both

national and international counter-terrorism agencies. The database which a resulted in a list of terrorist, known as the “Spot-List” are kept at entry points into Ghana to ensure that once a such individuals on list enters Ghana, they can be tracked so as to act appropriately at the right time.

A key component of the counter-terrorism measures is the introduction of tactical level financial regulations to monitor the movement of funds in the financial institutions in Ghana. For instance, in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act 2006, (Act 723), the FIC in collaboration with Bank of has placed a limit on the amount of physical cash that one take out or bring into Ghana to US\$10,000.00 or its equivalent in travelers cheque or any other monetary instrument.⁷ Any amount in excess of the US\$10,000.00 limit shall be transferred by bank or other authorized dealers. There is also a requirement to declare to Customs officials at point of exit or entry into Ghana any cash foreign currencies being taken in or out of Ghana even if the amount is less than the stipulated limit. The traveler is then required to fill the BoG Foreign Exchange Declaration Form (FXDF). Where the amount exceeds the limit of US\$10,000, the Customs shall seize the entire amount whether declared or not.⁸ These guideline regarding importation and exportation of currency would help ensure that terrorist cannot easily moves cash around, though the generally porous borders in West Africa make these measures ineffective.

There are also guidelines and procedure for financial and accounting institution which have made financial institutions adopt anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism measures to prevent such institutions being used for ML and TF. Additionally, there is a requirement for financial institutions to appoint a person of senior status as an anti-money laundering reporting officer (AML/CFT Reporting Officer – AMLRO) in accordance with Regulation 5(1) L.I.1987. The AMLRO shall receive report suspicious or unusual transactions reports from persons handling transactions for the

financial institution.⁹ All these measures are aimed at forestalling terrorism in Ghana. The effectiveness of these measures to prevent terrorism is debatable as some of these banks that are appearing on the Ghanaian banking scene may themselves be a front to terrorists organisations. Therefore, in addition to the above-mentioned measures, the Bank of Ghana, the FIC and other financial regulatory bodies need to scrutinize these financial institutions before issuing them with license to operate.

In a lecture delivered by General W Ayamdo to Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College students of which this author was part, the General said that intelligence available indicates that the last few years have seen an increase in the number of nationals of neighbouring countries migrating to Ghana. They include, but not limited to, Nigerians, Ivoirians, and Liberians. Consequently, the NCRC has initiated community sensitization programmes in various high risk communities where these foreign nationals usually stay. The author of this study has been part of the team providing some of such sensitization programmes. The Centre also has human intelligence gathering systems set up in various communities to collect information on any suspicious individuals and their activities. The Centre also has partnership with other international agencies in training some of its personnel on de-radicalization. This has come in the wake of increasing number of Middle Eastern states and religious organisations setting up Islamic schools in various communities in Ghana.

All these, together with the sensitization programme, have contributed immensely towards many arrests and deportations. Though these measures have been helpful, there is still a lot to be done if Ghana is to avoid the terrorist situation in other West African countries like Nigeria and Mali. The NCRC needs to engage the religious groups and traditional leaders in its effort to prevent and

combat terrorism in Ghana. The Centre also needs to incorporate the GAF Special Forces (SF) more into its counter-terrorism activities.

3.3.3 The Ghana Armed Forces Contribution towards Counter-Terrorism in Ghana

Traditionally, the GAF is the institution mandated to deal with external aggression against Ghana and assist the civil police in extreme circumstances to maintain law and order within Ghana. The changing threats and the emergence of terrorism have necessitated the need for reorientation of the GAF, hence the establishment of the SF as one of the responses to the new threats. Though it is becoming more and more evident that military force is not the solution to terrorism, the establishment of the SF is important because whenever there is there is the need for a potent force to complement other efforts against terrorism, the SF force is most likely to be deployed. This is because the SF is the groups with the appropriate training, equipment and capability to handle such threats. The GAF contribution to counter terrorism is not limited to forming a special force, but also educating the personnel on terrorism. The GAF for the first time in March 2012 organised counter-terrorism seminar for seventy Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers.¹⁰ The GAF is therefore building capacity to support other agencies like the FIC and the NCRC to combat terrorism in Ghana.

It is however important to point out that the SF are still in their formative years and therefore may not be capable of dealing with sustained large scale terrorism. Also, the formation of the SF and occasional seminar for personnel on terrorism is not likely to make the required impact in fighting terror in Ghana. The SF needs continuous training, modern equipment and well-motivated personnel to succeed. Also, the training doctrine of the GAF needs to be reviewed to reflect contemporary threats, including terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea among others.

3.4 Adequacy of Ghana's Response to the Emerging Threats of Terrorism in West Africa

The adequacy of Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa lies in the ability of the response to deal with the existing threats and securing the vulnerabilities identified. The adequacy of Ghana's response would therefore be looked at in relation to: intelligence collection, analysis and sharing; human security, combat readiness and resource allocation for counter-terrorism. These areas have been chosen because even with the most effective legislative framework and the most potent military force, Ghana is highly likely to suffer terrorism if those mentioned areas are not addressed, considering the prevailing terrorist threats in West Africa.

3.4.1 Intelligence Collection, Analysis and Sharing

Effective counter-terrorism depends largely on effective intelligence operations because terrorists are mostly going to keep their intention secret and without an effective intelligence system, it is only a matter of time before they strike. Effective intelligence also relies on cooperation, collaboration and partnership among internal agencies and external partners as well as the local populace. To a large extent, the institutions responsible for intelligence have done a lot. The main shortcoming lies in the lack of effective involvement of the Ghanaian populace, civil society and the media in this effort. With the type of terrorism being witnessed in neighboring countries like Nigeria, cooperation and partnership among security agencies and foreign counterparts alone would not provide the needed intelligence to forestall terrorism in Ghana or combat it when it occurs.

There is therefore the need to involve community/traditional leaders, religious leaders, civil society groups and religious groups in the education and sensitization on terrorism and other terrorism-related crimes. In this way, each individual Ghanaian will become a human intelligence cell to

provide the necessary information to the appropriate authorities for effective counter-terrorism measure.

While trying not to reveal sensitive information on Ghana's intelligence setup and structures, intelligence sharing among most of the key agencies responsible for counter-terrorism in Ghana is not very effective. There is need to remove bottlenecks such as unnecessary clearance requirement for effective communication and information sharing through education of the operatives and joint training exercises.

3.4.2 Human Security

Ghana has taken a number of measures to prevent terrorism or combat it when it takes place, including legislation, setting up of institutions, and collaborating with regional and global partners. These mechanisms are important in fighting terrorism in its diverse forms. In the context of countries with extreme poverty like those in West Africa including Ghana, human security issues are critical if terrorism is to be prevented or defeated. As discussed earlier, issues of human security has played a major part in the current terrorism situation in the sub-region and in Nigeria and Mali in particular. Similar human security issues prevail in Ghana but Ghana's efforts towards addressing human security issues has been marginal at best.

Poverty, youth/graduate unemployment, disease, food insecurity, environmental degradation, crime, political and economic marginalisation are still major challenges facing Ghana. Ghana's efforts to find solution to these problems are yet to yield the required result for one to be confident that Ghana has a relatively high human security. Without human security, Ghana would remain vulnerable to terrorism since it is becoming increasingly clear that disenchanting youth are easily radicalized.

Additionally, poverty and the quest for employment may lead some Ghanaians to work for terrorist without realising it. The Ghana government thus needs to increase its effort to tackle poverty, unemployment and the economic deprivation that some section of the society is feeling. This could be achieved through educational reform where employers and tertiary institution collaborate to tailor school curricula to the employment needs of the economy. The agricultural sector also needs to be improved and made attractive to entice the unemployed youth into farming. The adoption of sound economic policies by government and the fight against official corruption would also help in the achievement of human security.

3.4.3 Combat Readiness of the Ghana Armed Forces

The GAF was mainly set up to fight conventional warfare where the potential adversary was a rival state's armed forces. Over the years, the threats of conventional warfare among states have gradually decreased in West Africa especially due largely to regional integration and economic interdependencies. In place of conventional war, internal conflicts like civil wars have emerged and now terrorism has joined. These have compelled many militaries in West Africa like the GAF to adapt to the changing threats. Though the GAF seemed to have been slow in responding to the threat of terrorism due to various logistics challenges, the combat readiness against terrorism has gradually improved over the last couple of years. The establishment of the SF and the increasing education and training of personnel in terrorism and its related crimes bears testimony to this development. There is however a number of limiting areas. The training policy of the GAF has generally remained conventional warfare biased. Similarly, the GAF doctrine does not seem to have changed enough to meet the current threats. Therefore, a lot more needs to be done.

First, there is the need for the GAF to review its training policy to include emphasis on intelligence and information security at the basic training level. This would help safeguard important information from potential terrorists and help increase intelligence gathering sources of the GAF. In a similar manner, there is the need for a revised GAF Doctrine that views Ghana's main threats as civil conflicts and terrorists attack, and prepare towards that accordingly. Over the long term, the role of the GAF may have to increasingly include homeland security, with proactive training exercises with the GP in counter-terrorism in order to conduct counter-insurgency operations with the GP and the BNI.

3.4.4 Resource Allocation for Counter-Terrorism

There no argument on the fact that fighting terrorism is an expensive venture. First of all, intelligence gathering is generally driven by adequate resources in the form of cash for operatives, their sources and travel among others, logistics and other personnel. As an insider, the writer is aware that the operations of the NCRC are jointly funded by the US government and the government of Ghana, with the latter mostly defaulting in its contribution. The resulting shortfall in funding makes it difficult for the Centre to perform its task effectively across the entire country which is very important if Ghana is to succeed in preventing terrorism. Critical in this regards is the role of physical cash in paying sources and informants in order to obtain credible intelligence.

Though technology has transform the gathering of intelligence, especially in the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), human intelligence remain a key element in obtaining credible intelligence on terrorists as such groups are closely knit and secretive. Without adequate funding to pay sources and recruit, it is almost impossible to gain any inside information on terrorist groups.

Another area where resources play important role in counter-terrorism is training and exercises. Counter-terrorism requires highly trained personnel with specialised skill and continuous exercises to hone the skills acquired. These require large sums of funding. With the prevailing economic condition facing Ghana, like many third world countries, the state is unable to meet the resource needs of the various institutions tasked with combating terrorism in Ghana. Consequently, key institutions like the FIC, the NCRC and even the GAF are understaffed and in the case of the NCRC, some key institutions have no liaison officers at the Centre. Apart from this, inadequate resources have implications for the legal regimes set up for counter-terrorism to work effectively. It also adversely affect the ability of the NCRC to carry out its public education drive and outreach programmes effectively. Similarly, inadequate funding for counter-terrorism stifles efforts by various anti-terror agencies to involve civil society in their anti-terror drive since these activities are mostly expensive. These agencies are therefore unable to take the initiative to involve the civil society, hence the appearance of lack of interest by civil society groups in matters concerning terrorism in Ghana. Meanwhile, some of these civil society groups could play important role in Ghana's effort to prevent terrorism by providing public awareness on terrorism and efforts by the security agencies to combat the threat. This could help win hearts and minds of the people in favour of the counter-terrorism agencies. These prevailing conditions in Ghana would not help the country prevent terrorism or respond effectively should there be a terrorist attack. All the same, the various agencies responsible for keeping the country safe from terrorists attack and prevent terrorist from hiding in Ghana has successfully kept the terrorists abbey, though the threats still remain.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter captures the summary of major findings of the study in relation to the objectives of the research. It points out the state of Ghana's vulnerability, measures put in place to address them and the adequacy of those measures. The chapter also deals with the conclusions drawn from the findings and some recommendations. These are discussed below.

4.1 Summary of Findings

The summary of the main findings of the study are as follows:

- Some of the conditions that underlie the causes of terrorism in West Africa are prevalent in Ghana. Some of these underlying conditions include poverty, youth/graduate unemployment, economic and political marginalisation, general disillusionment among the population and political corruption. Other terrorism-contributing factors that prevail in Ghana are the proliferation of SALW and illicit drug trafficking.
- There are frequent visits of persons known to be affiliated to terrorist groups to Ghana and there are also some foreign-owned businesses that are believed to belong to terrorist organisations. Some of these businesses often repatriate their money outside Ghana illegally.
- Currently, there are no known terrorist organisations operating in Ghana and no indication of any direct threat of terrorist attack against Ghana. There are however a number of weaknesses that make Ghana vulnerable to possible terrorists activities and attack. Some of these include

the frequent entry of people with links to terrorists into Ghana and the increasing presence of migrants from countries with known terrorist activities in Ghana.

- Ghana has responded to the growing threats of terrorism in West Africa by adopted some domestic legal framework to address the threats. These include the Anti-Money Laundry (AML) Act 2008 (Act 749), the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation, 2011 (L.I.1987), the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 2008 (Act 762) and the Economic and Organised Crime Act, 2010 (Act 804), among others.

- Ghana has also joined sub-regional, regional and global institutions, and is a party to a number of treaties and protocols that work towards the prevention and elimination of terrorism. These legislations and membership of the international treaties alone cannot prevent terrorism. Consequently, Ghana has established agencies purposely to prevent or combat terrorism.

- Two are two institutions that have been established purposely to help prevent or combat terrorism in Ghana. These are the FIC and the NCRC. The former is set up to deal with ML and prevent TF while the latter is set up to counter terrorism or combat it when it occurs. Other such institutions like the GAF, the GP, GIS and the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue authority are all allied agencies that contribute toward the preventing terrorism in Ghana. In spite of this and many other measures mentioned earlier which have been put in place in Ghana to forestall terrorism, there are some limitations that militate against these measures. These include lack of active participation in the fight against terrorism by civil society, the media and religious organisations, the inability of the intelligence agencies to effectively carry out their

tasks due to various constraints mentioned earlier, and the general lack of logistics and financial support. For Ghana to effectively prevent terrorism or fight terrorism when it occurs, there is the needs for Ghana to address the shortcomings that work against efforts to fight the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa.

4.2 Conclusions

The emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa have become a great concern to all in the sub-region as well as the rest of the world. This has necessitated the need for urgent action by countries in West Africa, including Ghana, to address the current terrorist attacks in some countries in West Africa and contain the spread of such violence. The study therefore set out to assess Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa. In this regard, the study gave an overview of terrorism in West Africa, including a brief history and causes of terrorism in West Africa, contemporary manifestation of terrorism in the sub-region and West Africa's response to the threats of terrorism. The study also assessed Ghana's response to the threats of terrorism, especially area of Ghana's vulnerability, the various mechanisms for addressing the threats in order to prevent terrorism in Ghana or combat it should terrorism occur and the shortcomings of some of these mechanisms.

The information gathered from the study leads to the conclusion that though there are no established terrorist cells in Ghana, the country faces potential threats of terrorism. This is because there are various vulnerabilities in Ghana such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and many forms of marginalisation. Additionally, the periodic entry into the country by known terrorist associates, the increasing presence of benevolent organisation that are affiliated to terrorists, the existence of companies in Ghana that front for terrorists and the uncontrolled easy entry and movement of aliens

from other West African countries in Ghana further increases Ghana's vulnerability to terrorism. Ghana has however put in place certain measures to counter or combat terrorism should it occur.

The research concludes that notwithstanding the few limitations in the measures put in place in response of the terrorists threats in West Africa, there are mechanisms in the form of legal frameworks, policies and institutional set ups to deal with the emerging threats of terrorism in Ghana. These measures are both domestic and international in nature and are continuously being improved to meet the evolving threats. There are also intelligence gathering systems in place and anti-terrorism combat forces as well as other allied security services that are geared towards countering or combating terrorism in Ghana. Analysis of all these measures and the fact that so far these measures have helped prevent any form of terrorism in Ghana leads to conclusion that Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa seems adequate.

The hypothesis of the study that "Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa is inadequate" can therefore be rejected. It is however important to emphasise that as terrorist continue to change and adapt their strategy and tactics to outwits measures to combat their activities, the institution tasked with countering terrorism need to be proactive and adaptive in their approach to tackling the threats of terrorism. Additionally, Ghana needs to place more emphasis on human security measures as one of the effective measures to prevent terrorism in Ghana. These measures in addition to others already discussed will help ensure Ghana's national security, in line with the conceptual framework adopted by this study to best explain Ghana's response to the emerging threats of terrorism in West Africa.

4.3 Recommendations

The following recommendations are made on the basis of the findings of the research.

4.3.1 Long Term Recommendation for Preventing Terrorism in Ghana

As a long term measure, Ghana government needs to put in place economic and social policies that address human security issues like poverty, unemployment economic and political marginalisation. In this regard, the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Programme can be properly organised and resources to be one of the drivers of these policies.

Ghana, as a country, needs to adopt a political system that provides for an all-inclusive government which deemphasizes ‘winner takes all doctrine’ and encourages good governance and political inclusion for all. This is likely to reduce disillusionment and reduce the potential recruitment of disaffected youth as being experienced in other countries in the sub-region.

Agencies responsible for counter-terrorism such as NCRC, the FIC and the Special Forces of the GAF, as well as other such institutions should be adequately funded and equipped. This should include the provision of sophisticated information-gathering equipment, combat and communications equipment. These agencies should be made semi-autonomous from their parent organisations and budgeted for separately to provide the financial muscle required to counter terrorism.

Ghana should strengthen its partnership through relevant treaties and cooperation with other sub-regional government and organisations as well as relevant international counter-terrorism agencies to prevent terrorism in Ghana. The Government should also partner international agencies with de-

radicalization expertise to establish anti-radicalisation and deradicalisation institutions in Ghana to forestall the threats of terrorist groups spreading extremist ideologies.

4.3.2 Short Term Recommendation for Preventing Terrorism in Ghana

Counter-Terrorism agencies and organisations should pool their resources with both state and non-state institutions such as the National Commission for Civic Education and the Media Commission to educate the Ghanaian populace on the issues of terrorism. Ghana government, in collaboration with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) should train and retrain security personnel and build their capacity towards supporting policies aimed at countering terrorism in Ghana.

Related to the above recommendation is the need for Leadership of institutions to ensure that government functionaries, especially the security operatives are encouraged to observe and enforce the fundamental human rights of all Ghanaians as enshrined in the 1992 Constitution.

The government should mandate the Ministry of Education to carry out terrorism education in all the schools to sensitise students on the issue of terrorism and its related crimes and how such activities should be reported.

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