

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

**POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONS AND DECISION
MAKING IN GHANA'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

BY

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**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA,
LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION DEGREE**

MAY, 2015.

DECLARATION

I, **RICHARDSON AZUNU** hereby declare that this dissertation is the outcome of my own research except for the references to other people's works that have duly been acknowledged.

It has neither in part nor wholly been presented for another degree in this or any other university.

I bear full responsibility for any shortcomings that may arise out this work.



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DEDICATION

To my Family



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my lecturers of the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management whose thought-provoking lectures provided the theoretical foundation for this dissertation. I am particularly indebted to my supervisory team led by Professor Kwame Ameyaw Domfeh whose thoroughness and insightful suggestions coupled with the desire to make another scholar out of me contributed immensely not only to the completion but also to the quality of this thesis.

I also wish to express my sincere thanks to Nana Yaw Boachie Danquah for putting his expertise in local government at my disposal and providing me with valuable study materials. I also acknowledge the invaluable contributions and encouragement I received from Dr. Kwame Asamoah and Prof. Emmanuel Kojo Sakyi as well as Dr. Justice Nyigmah Bawole, my Head of Department. This special note of thanks is extended to all the key stakeholders and respondents who willingly took part in this project even under the prevailing uncomfortable conditions. Finally I am grateful to my family, friends and colleagues whose inspiration, prayers and encouragement in these trying moments brought me this far. I also extend my appreciation to my able Research Assistants: Messieurs Constance Sorkpor and Regobert Bondong and Miss Portia Twerefoo for their selfless efforts to see to the completion of this thesis. Above all, to God **be all** the glory for ‘in vain do builders build if He has not built’.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	-	African National Congress
AM	-	Assembly Member
CHRAJ	-	Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
CSD	-	Community and Social Development
CEPS	-	Customs Excise and Preventive Service
DACF	-	District Assemblies Common Fund
DCD	-	District Coordinating Director
DCE	-	District Chief Executive
DDH	-	District Director of Health
GES	-	Ghana Education Service
GHS	-	Ghana Health Service
IGF	-	Internally Generated Funds
LGS	-	Local Government Service
MDAs	-	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MP	-	Member of Parliament
MMDAs	-	Metropolitan/Municipal/District Assemblies
MMDCEs	-	Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executives
NDPC	-	National Development Planning Commission
NP	-	National Party
NPM	-	New Public Management
OHOCS	-	Office of the Head of Civil Service
PAS	-	Public Administration System
PM	-	Presiding Member
PNDC	-	Provisional National Defence Council

PSC	-	Public Service Commission
RCC	-	Regional Coordinating Council
SOEs	-	State Owned Enterprises
VAT	-	Value Added Tax

LIST OF TABLES

Tables	Page
Table 1.1: Structure of the Study	10
Table 2.1: Distribution of MMDAs	26
Table 3.1: Politics-Administration Dichotomy – Summary.....	68
Table 3.2 Politics-Administration Relation – Theoretical Approaches	83
Table 3.3: Politics-Administration Relations – Preliminary Studies.....	92
Table 5.1: Elite Interviews	127
Table 5.2 Survey for Assembly Members (AMs)	127
Table 6.1: Public Administrators’ involvement in Policy Formulation.....	140
Table 6.2: Complete Removal of Administration from Politics.....	145
Table 6.3: Administrators should give Expert Advice to AMs.....	148
Table 6.4: Administrators should be involved in Policy Formulation, AM Should Stay Away from Policy Implementation.....	149
Table 6.5: Administrators Should Fully Partner AM in Policy Formulation.....	151
Table 6.6 AMs Should Partner Administrators to Implement Policy.....	152
Table 6.7: Policy Making & Execution should be a combined effort of AMs and Administrators.....	154
Table 6.8: Aggregation of Survey Questions (Statements).....	157

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		Page
Figure 2.1	Departments, Councils, and Agencies.....	24
Figure 2.2	Organizational Structure of Ministries.....	32
Figure 2.3	Structure of Ghana’s Local Government.....	42
Figure 2.4:	Conceptual Framework of Politics-Administration Interface	52
Figure 3.1:	Politics-Administrative Continuum	87
Figure 4.1	Committees of District Assemblies.....	115
Figure 6.1	Participation of Assembly Members in Policy Formulation and Implementation.....	135
Figure 6.2:	Assembly Members Should Concentrate on Policy Formulation.....	139
Figure 6.3:	Assembly Members (AMs) Should Stay Away from Policy Implementation.....	141
Figure 6.4:	Monitoring Policy Implementation.....	144
Figure 7.1:	Revised Conceptual Framework	175

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	i
CERTIFICATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	v
LIST OF TABLES	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ix
ABSTRACT.....	xv
CHAPTER ONE	1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1 Background of the Study.....	2
1.2 Problem Statement	5
1.3 Research Questions	6
1.4 Objectives of the Study	7
1.5 Scope of the Study.....	8
1.6 Relevance of the Study.....	8
1.7 Structure of the Study.....	10
CHAPTER TWO	11
THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM OF GHANA.....	11
2.0 Introduction	11
2.1 The concept of Public Administration	12
2.1.1 Public Administration Systems.....	15
2.1.2 The Public Administration Process.....	17
2.1.3 The Implementation of Government Business	17
2.2 Ghana's Public Administration System	18
2.2.1 Ministerial Organizations.....	19

2.2.2	Regional Administrations (Regional Coordinating Councils).....	24
2.2.3	District Administrations (District Assemblies).....	25
2.2.4	Services under Ministerial Organizations.....	26
2.2.5	Extra-Ministerial Organizations.....	27
2.3	Scope and Functions of Ghana's Public Administration	28
2.3.1	Structure and Process of Ghana's Public Administration System.....	29
2.4	The Civil Service of Ghana.....	30
2.4.1	Objectives and Functions of the Civil Service.....	31
2.4.2	Ministries and Departments	32
2.4.3	Membership of the Civil Service	33
2.5	The Local Government Service.....	33
2.6	Decentralisation.....	35
2.6.1	Definitions of Decentralisation.....	35
2.6.2	Deconcentration	36
2.6.3	Devolution.....	37
2.6.4	Dimensions to Decentralisation	38
2.6.5	Historical Development of Local Government in Ghana	40
2.6.6	The Structure of the Current Local Government System of Ghana.....	41
2.7	Functions of District Assemblies	43
2.7.1	The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)	44
2.7.2	The Role of the District Chief Executive (DCE) in Local Government.....	45
2.7.3	The Role of the District Co-ordinating Director (DCD).....	46
2.7.4	Relationship between the District Chief Executive and District Coordinating Director	47
2.7.5	Causes of Relationship Problem	48
2.8	Conclusion.....	53
CHAPTER THREE		55
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONS		55
3.0	Introduction	55
3.1	Politics-Administration Relations: An Overview	56

3.2	Underpinning Concepts of the Theoretical Approaches to the Politics-Administration Relations Debate	57
3.2.1	Separation of Powers	58
3.2.2	Bureaucracy	59
3.2.3	New Public Management (NPM).....	60
3.3	Politics-Administration Dichotomy (The Orthodox Model).....	62
3.4	The Modified Dichotomy.....	69
3.5	The Partnership Model	72
3.6	Other Models of Politic-Administration Relations	79
3.6.1	Politicised Bureaucracy Model.....	79
3.6.2	The British Permanent Model.....	80
3.6.3	The American Hybrid Model.....	80
3.7	Summary of Theoretical Approaches.....	81
3.8	Politics-Administration Relations in Developing Countries: Empirical Literature	84
3.8.1	Politics-Administration Relations in South Africa	84
3.8.2	Politics-Administration Relations in Tanzania	88
3.8.3	Politics-Administration Relations in Ghana: Preliminary Studies.....	92
3.9	Conclusion.....	93
CHAPTER FOUR.....		95
DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY FORMULATION.....		95
4.1	Introduction	95
4.1.1	Decisions and Decision Making	95
4.1.2	The Decision-Making Process	96
4.2	Types of Decision.....	97
4.2.1	Programmed Decisions	97
4.2.2	Non-Programmed Decisions.....	98
4.2.3	Group Decision Making.....	99
4.2.4	Strategic Decision Making.....	101
4.2.5	Tactical Decisions.....	102
4.3	Models of decision making	103
4.3.1	The Traditional Managerial Approach (Classical Model)	103

4.3.2	Political Approach to Decision Making.....	105
4.3.3	The Satisficing Model.....	108
4.3.4	The Mixed Scanning Model.....	109
4.4	Decision Making in Ghana’s Local Government (District Assembly).....	110
4.4.1	Statutory Committees of District Assemblies.....	112
4.4.2	Functions of the Executive Committee.....	112
4.4.3	Sub-Committees of the Executive Committee.....	114
4.5	Functions of Sub-Committees in District Assemblies	115
4.5.1	Development Planning Sub-Committee	115
4.5.2	Social Services Sub-Committee.....	116
4.5.3	Works Sub-Committee.....	117
4.5.4	Finance and Administrative Sub-Committee.....	117
4.5.5	Justice and Security Sub-committee	118
4.5.6	Permissible Sub-Committees	119
4.6	Relevance of the Committee System in Local Government	119
4.7	Conclusion.....	120
CHAPTER FIVE		122
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES.....		122
5.0	Introduction	122
5.1	Qualitative Data Collection Methods.....	123
5.2	Data Collection Techniques	124
5.2.1	Interviews.....	124
5.3	Selection of Research Informants	126
5.4	Qualitative Data Analysis.....	127
5.5	Scope of the Study.....	128
5.6	Ethical Considerations.....	129
5.7	Limitations of the Study	130
CHAPTER SIX.....		132
POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONS IN GHANA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS.....		132
6.0	Introduction	132

6.2	Participation of Assembly Members (AMs) and Administrators in Policy Formulation and Implementation.....	134
6.2.1	Assembly Members (AMs) Participation in Policy Formulation and Implementation	134
6.2.2	The Role of Assembly Members (AMs) in Policy Formulation.....	138
6.2.3	The Role of Administrators in Policy Formulation	140
6.2.4	Assembly Members (AMs) and Policy Implementation	141
6.2.5	Monitoring Policy Implementation.....	143
6.2.6	Complete Removal of Administration from Politics	144
6.2.7	Administrators should Give Expert Advice to Elected Officials (AMs)	146
6.2.8	Appointed Officials should be involved in Policy Formulation, Elected Officials (AMs) Should Stay Away from Policy Implementation	148
6.2.9	Appointed Officials (Administrators) Should Fully Partner Elected Officials (AMs) to Formulate Policies	150
6.2.9	Elected Officials (AMs) Should Partner Appointed Officials to Implement Policies	151
6.2.10	Policy Making and Execution should be a Combined Effort of Appointed and Elected Officials	153
6.3	Public Administrators' View on Policy Formulation and Implementation.....	157
6.4	Participation	159
6.5	The DCE Debate	164
CHAPTER SEVEN		169
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSTION		169
7.0	Introduction	169
7.1	Summary of findings.....	169
7.2	Recommendations	172
7.3	Suggestion for Future Research	173
7.4	Conclusion.....	174
7.4.1	Bounded Complementarity	175
REFERENCES		177
APPENDICES		185
APPENDIX I:INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE DISTRICT CHIEF EXECUTIVES (DCEs)		185

APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE DISTRICT COORDINATING DIRECTORS (DCDs)	188
APPENDIX III:INTERVIEW GUIDES FOR DEPARTMENTAL HEADS	191
APPENDIX IV:INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NGOs	193
APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS	195
APPENDIX VI:INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PRESIDING MEMBERS	197
APPENDIX VII:SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ASSEMBLY MEMBERS	199
APPENDIX VIII:WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS	202

ABSTRACT

This thesis on the politics-administration relations and decision making in local government of Ghana seeks to investigate how politicians and administrators relate to each other in policy formulation and implementation and the involvement of relevant stakeholders in decision making and execution in Ghana's local government. The study was conducted in three purposively sampled districts from northern and southern Ghana. It employed qualitative research approach to determine whether policy formulation and implementation practices within the politics-administration interface of Ghana's local government (district assemblies) conform to the politics-administration relations models. The study found out that there exists varying degrees of preference for the orthodox dichotomy, the modified dichotomy and the partnership or complementarity models which were comprehensively reviewed. The findings however revealed that the partnership and modified dichotomy models have an edge over the orthodox dichotomy; the study therefore proceeded to propose a bounded complementarity approach which is the synthesis of the modified dichotomy and the complementarity models, for possible adoption by Ghana's local government (district assemblies).

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Discussions on politics-administration relations in government, oftentimes referred to as the politics-administration dichotomy debate, is considered as one of the diciest intellectual issues in public administration (Svara, 2008). Demir and Nyhan (2008) opine that the dichotomy is one of the most disputed theories of public administration. Shaw, on his part, has submitted that the dichotomy has been an unsettled issue in debate which has affected the relationship between political authorities and administrative institutions to a great extent in world democracies (Shaw 2010:8).

Three main models have been developed by public administration scholars to characterize the relationship between elected and appointed officials in democratic governments. These are: the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy, the modified dichotomy, and the partnership model (Montjoy and Watson, 1995). In the orthodox model, Wilson argued that politics and administration were two separate and distinct fields that must be separated from each other, and that political questions were different from administrative questions, for which reason there should be a clear line of distinction between the two (Wilson, 1887). Goodnow (1900), in solidarity with Wilson, contended that politics has to do with policies or the expressions of the state will while administration has to do with the execution of such policies (the state will) (Shafritz et al, 2004).

A later generation of public administration scholars, however, disputed the strict separation of politics from administration as propounded by Wilson and rather proposed a partnership model of

the relationship between these two fields, founded on complementarities and interconnectedness between them (Friedrich, 1940; Appleby, 1949; Waldo, 1955). In-between the orthodox and partnership models of the relationship is the modified model which holds that the rather strict distinction between politics and administration, as advanced by Wilson, may apply to politics and administration but not to policy and administration (Montjoy and Watson, 1995).

This phenomenon (the politics-administration relations) has been investigated in many jurisdictions globally, both national and local, with varying conclusions. This study therefore intends to extend the investigation into Ghana's governance system with special focus on her local government administration.

1.1 Background of the Study

After a long spell of what many have described as military dictatorial rule in Ghana where political and administrative discretion was the preserve of the military and a few privileged elites, the last military government, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), initiated a process to broaden the boundaries of governance beyond the 'castle' (the seat of the central government) to the people. This mission was contained in a 1982 government document titled "PNDC Policy Guidelines" which clearly conveyed the urgent need for participatory democracy to ensure that the bane of remote government that had afflicted Ghanaians since independence was done away with effectively, to render government truly responsive and accountable to the governed. The document further intimated that "the assumption of power by the people cannot be complete unless a truly decentralised government system is introduced, that is, central Government in all its

manifestations, should empower local government councils to initiate, manage, and execute policies in all matters affecting them in their localities” (Ahwoi, 2010: 1).

This statement provided the foundation upon which the current local government system of Ghana was laid since this vision was translated into action in 1988 with the promulgation of the Local Government Law, 1988, (PNDCL 207), albeit six long years after the expression of intent.

Four years after the enactment of this law, Ghana began its journey into the fourth republic as a democracy. The 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution then became the supreme law of the state. In chapter twenty of the Constitution, titled ‘Decentralisation and Local Government’, Article 240 (1) states that “Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralised.” The constitution then empowered Parliament to enact appropriate laws to ensure the transfer of functions, powers, responsibilities and resources from the central government to local government units (Article 240 (2)(a)). Furthermore, Parliament was enjoined to “provide for the taking of such measures as are necessary to enhance the capacity of local government authorities to plan, initiate, co-ordinate, manage and execute policies in respect of all matters affecting the people within their areas, with a view to ultimately achieving the localisation of those activities” (Article 240 (2)(b)).

In pursuit of this task, Parliament proceeded to repeal the existing law, PNDCL 207, (1988) replacing it with the Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462. This legislation, just like its predecessor, spelt out the structure of Ghana’s local government system, with its duties and responsibilities. It conferred on local government (called district assemblies) the highest political authority in the district, with executive, legislative and deliberative powers. Being the highest political authority in the district, an assembly’s functions include formulating and implementing

plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilisation of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district (Afari-Gyan, 1999).

It is this process of deciding and implementing plans and programmes that brings to the fore the relations between decision makers and implementers at the local government level, thus rekindling this seemingly unending debate in public administration. This debate sometimes referred to as the politics-administration dichotomy, transcends national government administration frontiers and ventures into local politics and administration.

Ghana is one of the emerging democracies in Africa which has embraced a decentralised system of local government and administration. On the national front, Ghana practises a unique system of government in which the principle of separation of powers is blurred by a hybrid of the American presidential- and the British parliamentary- systems. In this unique system, the President is enjoined by the constitution to select the majority of Ministers of State from among members of Parliament (Article 78(1), 1992 Constitution). This implies that such ministers of state perform both executive and legislative functions. This partial fusion of the executive and legislature undermines institutional separation of powers and the independence of parliament while reinforcing executive manipulation and dominance (Appiah-Agyekum et al, 2013). This arrangement, it must be noted, is alien to both the American and British systems of governance, which are the fundamental models of Ghana's governance system.

It is therefore not surprising that there is a semblance of this hybridisation at the local government level where some councillors (assemblymembers) perform both political and administrative functions, thus generating this debate as to how local administrators (bureaucrats) must relate to appointed political officials and elected members of the assembly and what exact roles elected and

appointed members of the assembly must play in the overall governance system at the local level to promote development in harmony.

1.2 Problem Statement

The politics-administration relationship has been an important question in public administration for more than a century now to the extent that persistent debates have failed to stop the question from being engaging and challenging to scholars and practitioners of public administration (Demir and Nyhan, 2008). In the opinion of Johnny Shaw, the relationship has been an “unsettled issue in debate and affected the relationship between political authorities and administrative institutions to a great extent in world democracies” (Shaw 2010:8).

This enduring debate, no doubt, is as relevant today as it was in the days of early public administration scholars like Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow. This is against the backdrop of the fact that politicians and administrators, in especially developing democracies, continue to struggle for supremacy within the governance system. In fact, there seems to be no consensus in the literature on whether politicians or senior bureaucrats dominate political-administrative relationships in developing countries (Cameron, 2010). This, in most cases, results in conflicts which obviously affect the overall performance of local authorities. Ghana is no exception. In Ghana, local governments have been empowered to champion the overall development of their areas of jurisdiction (Afari-Gyan, 1999). This involves policy formulation and implementation processes which are the tasks of elected and appointed officials (i.e politicians and bureaucrats) of the assembly. The searchlight therefore falls on politics and administration and for that matter, the interaction between elected members and career bureaucrats in this relationship. What makes the

Ghanaian situation worth probing is the fact that the chief executive and even some councillors (assemblymembers) are, by law, appointed by the President.

Although some studies have been conducted over the past two decades to highlight the decentralisation programme in Ghana since 1988 (the latest being Ahwoi's (2010), *Local Government and Decentralisation in Ghana*), what has apparently eluded academic enquiry into the effectiveness of the local government system is the relationship between elected and appointed officials of the assembly. This dimension needs to be looked at critically, and that is the main task of this dissertation. The aim is to provide a deeper insight into how the relations between elected and appointed officials can impact decision making which can either enhance or impede an assembly's mandate of effectively managing the total development of the district.

1.3 Research Questions

This study was guided by the following research questions:

- How does the public administration system operate in Ghana?
- Do elected officials (Assembly members) and district chief executives (DCEs) perceive their relationships with public administrators (bureaucrats) in ways that conform to the politics-administration dichotomy models?
- Which models of politics-administration dichotomy prevail in Ghana's district assembly system?
- Which model, of the relationship between politics and administration, is most suitable to Ghana's local government?

- To what extent are the relevant stakeholders involved in the decision making process of the district assembly?
- How does the dual role of the DCE (as political head and administrative overseer) affect (a) policy formulation and (b) policy implementation at the district assembly?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

This study seeks to:

- Provide a broad understanding of Ghana's public administration system.
- Explore whether elected officials (Assembly members) and district chief executives (DCEs) perceive their relationships with public administrators (bureaucrats) in ways that conform to the politics-administration dichotomy models.
- Investigate the dominant model(s) of politics-administration relations practiced in District Assemblies of Ghana;
- Examine the dual role of the District Chief Executive (DCE) in policy formulation and implementation;
- Assess the level of participation of the relevant stakeholders in decision making in the district assemblies;
- Delve into the on-going debate on whether or not Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executives (MMDCEs)s should be elected;

- Identify the most suitable model of the politics-administration relations for possible adoption by district assemblies of Ghana.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The preoccupation of this study is on how the relations between elected and appointed officials of Ghana's local government conform to the politics-administration dichotomy models and how this relationships impact decision-making in district assemblies. The most appropriate time frame should have been from 1988 to 2012. This is because the actualisation of the current local government system of Ghana can be traced to the promulgation of the Provisional National Defence Council Law (PNDCL 207) of 1988 which gave birth to the current local government system and decentralisation in Ghana. The country has maintained this system of local governance even though there have been regime changes from military to democracy and from one democratically elected administration to another. However, this study focuses on the democratic period which took effect from January, 1993, with greater premium on current office holders. The study was carried out in three (3) districts from southern and northern Ghana.

1.6 Relevance of the Study

In this era of Ghana's drive to consolidate the gains of her democratic governance, decentralisation (and local government) is vital to its good governance credentials. This calls for a concerted effort to equip district assemblies to serve as potent conduits for local economic development and nation building. The major roles politics and administration play in this pursuit cannot be overemphasised. This study will therefore be relevant to policy makers, politicians and administrators, public administration students, researchers and the general public, since it seeks to unearth some potential opportunities as well as possible challenges that are contingent on the

relations between politicians and public administrators in local government administration. This enhanced understanding of the politics-administration relations would engender a better appreciation of the operations of the district assemblies, especially with regard to decision making and implementation processes. In particular, the study's relevance to Ghana's Local Government Service and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development cannot be overstated since these two bodies oversee the performance of the Ghanaian local government (district assemblies). Besides, the study shall be of immense importance to researchers interested in local governance and institutions that offer courses in local government administration. Ultimately, the study constitutes a modest input into the empirical literature on the unending debate on the politics-administration relations in democratic governments and provides an insight into the possibility of revising an existing theory to a customized one to address emerging governance dilemmas.

1.7 Structure of the Study

The study is presented in seven chapters, according to the structure below:

Table 1.1 Structure of the Study

Chapter	Contents
One	Introduction of the study. It will basically dwell on the background of the study, the problem statement and corresponding research questions, research objectives, proposed data generation methods and justification for the study, among others.
Two	Focuses on the Public Administration System of Ghana within both central and local government. Starting from a brief history of Ghana's past attempts at local government administration, this chapter presents a detailed structure of the current local government system – its officials, decision-making and execution processes, responsibilities of both appointed and elected office holders, achievements, challenges, etc. The import of this chapter is to have an insight into what ought to be and what prevails insofar as politics-administration relations in local government is concerned.
Three	Predominantly on the review of theoretical and empirical literature. This chapter takes a thorough look at the extant literature on politics-administration relations. Here, the various models that have been espoused by scholars are examined. This is intended to provide the theoretical underpinnings of the study. It also scans the relationships in a couple of African countries as an empirical support to the theoretical approaches identified.
Four	Contains discussion on decision making – types and models of decision making, and decision making in Ghana's local government (district assemblies).
Five	This is the methodology chapter. It contains a detailed description of data collection methods employed by the study
Six	Contains the presentation and analysis of data, and discussion of findings
Seven	Summary, conclusion and the way forward

CHAPTER TWO

THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM OF GHANA

2.0 Introduction

Public administration has been rightly described as the ‘action part of government’ (Corson and Harris, 1963). To understand how public administration performs its ‘actions’ in Ghana it is prudent to fairly understand the public administration system and how it operates. This is one of the objectives of this study and the focus of this chapter.

The chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section, the study attempts a review of the concepts of public administration and public administration systems generally. This is followed in the second section by a detailed presentation of the public administration system of Ghana. Following this is a brief discussion of the concept of ‘decentralisation’ which forms the bedrock of the local government paradigm. The next and subsequent sections will examine the relationship between politics and administration at the local government level. At this stage, the focus will be on the District Chief Executive (DCE), who is appointed by the President, and the District Coordinating Director (DCD), who is a career bureaucrat.

Our preoccupation shall be to take a cursory look at the legal framework governing the work of political office holders and bureaucrats in general, and more particularly at the local government level. Our main points of reference shall therefore be the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, the Civil Service Law of 1993 (PNDCL 327), the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462), and the Local Government Services Act of 2003 (Act 656).

It must be stated, however, that we do not intend a critical analysis of Ghana's public administration system at this stage. Instead the facts are presented 'as they are' to engender better understanding of the system and, probably, a more constructive discussion at a later stage. The object is to understand 'what ought to be' in order to appreciate the deviations as we establish 'what is' with regards to the politics-administration relations and decision-making in Ghana's local government.

2.1 The concept of Public Administration

Administration, on its own, has been defined as determined action taken in pursuit of a conscious purpose (Heady, 1984) and also the achievement of prescribed aims (Pfiffner and Presthus, 1967). It is said to be a combination of two Latin words 'ad' and 'ministrare' which together mean to serve, to direct, to control, and to manage affairs. It also refers to the provision of goods and services to members of the public with the aid of administrative and auxiliary functions such as policymaking, organising, financing, personnel provision and utilisation, determining work procedures and control (Mafunisa, 2003).

Public administration, on its part, has been defined variously. In the view of Cropf (2008), no single and authoritative definition of public administration is possible, apparently because of its eclectic nature. As a subject, public administration borrows from different areas of study such as political science, law, economics and sociology, among others. For example Chapel (1997) defines it as the process of achieving national goals and objectives through public organizations. Pfiffner and Presthus (1967) state that public administration is the accomplishment of politically determined objectives. As such it (public administration) must be concerned with policy, searching for ways to solve problems and attain society's goals. According to Corson and Harris (1963),

public administration involves decision-making, planning the work to be done, formulating objectives and goals, establishing and reviewing organizations, directing and supervising employees, exercising controls and other functions performed by government executives and supervisors; **it is the action part of government, the means by which the purposes and goals of government are realized** (emphasis mine).

This description of public administration falls in line with Urwick and Gulick's (1954) management functions of: planning, organising, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and budgeting (POSDCORB). Denhardt and Denhardt (2006), on their part, define public administration simply as the management of public programmes; and according to Derbyshire (1979), public administration is the machinery of central and local government, the process of implementing political decisions and the body of people involved in that process. To Leonard (1955:3), public administration "consists of all those operations having for their purpose the fulfilment of enforcement of public policy" ; it is the process by which objectives are defined, plans and policies formulated, institutions created and managed, human energies mobilised, resources utilised and changes effected (Chirmade, 1988) .

All these definitions (descriptions) of public administration point to one important fact: that public administration involves management of public affairs at all levels of government with a commitment to public service and in pursuit of public interest. The study of public administration is said therefore, to concern the executive branch of government, all matters of concern within itself, all matters which impinge on it and all matters on which it impinges (Adie and Thomas, 1982). Adie and Thomas state further that public administration affects all areas of life through the activities of government; it involves a vast amount of activity with jobs ranging from providing

homeland security to the exploration of outer space to sweeping of streets. All put together, Rosenbloom et al (2009:5) define public administration as “the use of managerial, political, and legal theories and processes to fulfil legislative, executive, and judicial mandates for the provision of government regulatory and service functions.” This definition seems to be broad-based enough to embrace most activities projected by other definitions but not as comprehensive as the description offered by Negro and Negro (in Rosenbloom et al., 2009). According to Negro and Negro, Public Administration:

- (a) is a cooperative group effort in a public setting;
- (b) covers all branches of government - executive, legislature, and judiciary - and their interrelationships;
- (c) has an important role in the formulation of public policy, and is thus part of the political process;
- (d) is different in significant ways from private administration; and
- (e) is closely associated with numerous private groups and individuals.

This detailed description rightly portrays public administration as a multi-dimensional field with diverse stakeholders as the government and its agencies, politicians and political parties, private entities, individuals, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society groupings, religious organisations, charity-oriented associations, and even individual citizens and the populace at large - all in the business of seeking the good of the citizenry in a cooperative fashion. All these actors

come together to form the public administration system. Is it therefore appropriate to conclude that public administration is ‘everywhere dense’? The next section provides an insight.

2.1.1 Public Administration Systems

Oftentimes, the organizations and institutions involved in the implementation of government policy are perceived as distinct and detached entities. This perception is however mistaken, as it is more appropriate and useful to consider all these organisations and institutions as constituting a ‘system’. But what is a system? Generally, a system is a collection of people, machines, and methods organised to accomplish a set of specific tasks (Schultheis and Sumner, 1998). It is an integrated set of components, or entities that interact to achieve a particular function or goal; thus systems are composed of interrelated and interdependent subsystems.

In this light, the institutions concerned with implementing government policy together with the people working in them and the processes they employ can be seen as parts of a whole entity which has a unique situation and operates in a well-defined environment. These parts, may be considered as sub-systems, which are inter-related (have relationship with one another) and also interdependent (depend on each other for utility), so that whatever happens in one part of the system has an impact on the other parts and consequently on the system as a whole. The system itself is part of a larger environment – a supra-system. Events in the supra-system affect the system and similarly, whatever happens in the system has an impact on the supra-system.

In this light, the Public Administration System (PAS) can be considered as being made of the organisations and institutions engaged in the implementation of government business, working in response to and conditioned by a political environment and being subject to political control and

accountability. It is made up of autonomous yet interdependent centres of activity, providing resources and exacting services from each other (Kempe, 1985). It is the complex whole of related organisations and agencies that are engaged in such activities as: providing support in the identification of national goals; providing support in policy-making and policy-analysis; assisting in the formulation of major guidelines for action; and efficiently implementing public policies.

Accordingly, a well-functioning public administration system engages in implementing, monitoring and evaluating public policies. It possesses the capacity for learning and transmitting the lessons learnt and for changing or reviewing these policies to fit the nation's development agenda or aspirations.

Thus, the substantive fields within which public administrators work range across "the varied interests of government and public affairs, from defence and national security to social welfare and environmental quality, from the design and construction of roads and bridges to the exploration of space, and from taxation and financial administration to human resource management" (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2006:1). In all of these, one cardinal commitment of public administration is the commitment to public service – neutrally and faithfully pursuing the public interest.

One advantage of the system approach to Public Administration is that it allows for the scientific study of the field that relates the public administration system and how it functions to its environment. To understand its performance, the surrounding conditions (the environment) which influence it must be understood, such as the political system which is in turn surrounded and influenced by the socio-economic system and the larger society. The PAS in turn influences events

and perceptions in these environments. Inputs from these environments are transformed through processes of the PAS into goods and services that the nation (the environment) consumes.

2.1.2 The Public Administration Process

Public administration is a process. This process consists of the various actions involved in effecting the intentions or wishes of a government (i.e implementing government policy). It is thus the continuously active “business” part of government (Wilson, 1887) concerned with carrying out the law, as made by legislative bodies or other authoritative agents and interpreted by courts, through the processes of organisation and management. As rightly pointed out by the Negros, this process involves the three arms of government, namely the executive, the legislature and the judiciary all working hand-in-hand.

2.1.3 The Implementation of Government Business

The business of any government is to seek and promote the well-being of its citizens. The implementation of this business varies immensely in its scope and substance from one jurisdiction to the other. The work of the PAS, its scope and functions therefore depend largely on what is allocated to it by the government. Governments are basically engaged in protecting life and property of the citizenry, identifying and developing the nation’s resources, and authoritatively ensuring the equitable distribution of the nation’s wealth. The PAS serves as a conduit through which government fulfils these responsibilities. It is the custodian of the nation’s records. As implied above, it assists in the formulation of policies and decisions; it mobilizes and manages resources in the economy and makes them available to government. It is also expected to facilitate the optimal allocation of resources; in fact it is the key implementer of government policy. Thus,

one cannot but agree with Khanna (1981) that the welfare of a country depends upon the way in which the country is administered, and this is how important the public administration system is in relation to implementing government business.

In Ghana, the implementing institutions of national policies have been clearly spelt out in Chapter Fourteen of the 1992 constitution which identifies the Public Services of Ghana as including: the Civil, Judicial, Audit, Education, Prisons, Parliamentary, Health, and Statistical Services. Others are: the National Fire Service, the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Police, Immigration, and Legal Services. The public services of Ghana also include public corporations other than those set up as commercial ventures; public services established by the Constitution; and such other public services as Parliament may by law prescribe (1992 Constitution, Article 190(1)).

The focus of this study, however, is on the Civil Service and, more importantly, Local Government Service, two important components of Ghana's public services, directly associated with conducting government business. They together constitute the main implementing machinery of government policy.

2.2 Ghana's Public Administration System

The activities of the Government of Ghana cover the three traditional functions of government, namely executive, legislative and judicial functions. All these areas of government are ultimately answerable to the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana, which is the supreme law of the State to which all other laws must submit. The 1992 Constitution defines the overall structure of the public administration system of Ghana, the main features of which are an executive President

elected for a four-year tenure in office in the first instance and eligible for re-election for a further four-year term in office and a Parliament into which members are elected for a four-year term and eligible for re-election in subsequent general elections. There is also a local government system which has undergone considerable expansion over the years (from 45 assemblies in 1988 to 216 assemblies in 2012).

The constitution also makes provision for an independent Judiciary and a Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) charged with the responsibility of protecting citizens (including public servants) from infringement of their rights, maladministration and injustice. There are also ministerial and regional administrations which constitute the civil service of the public administration system, the major implementer of government policy. In Ghana presently, there are 23 ministerial and 10 regional administrations, each of which is headed by a minister of state. The number of ministries is however more likely to change slightly (as has been the practice since the re-introduction of multi-party democratic governance in Ghana in January, 1993) depending on the focus and governance style (or priority and ideology) of the government in power.

2.2.1 Ministerial Organizations

As a unitary state, decentralisation in Ghana is manifest in the forms of both **deconcentration** and **devolution**, the former being the handing over of some amount of administrative authority or responsibility from the centre to field units of the same department or level of government and the latter, the creation or strengthening of sub-national units of government, the activities of which are substantially outside the direct control of the central government. In this respect, ministerial organisations are represented in the regions in a deconcentrated form.

The ministerial organizations are: Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS); ministries of Foreign Affairs; Interior; Finance and Economic Planning; Defence; Attorney General and Justice; Education; Food and Agriculture; Trade and Industry; Health; Information and Media Relations; Local Government and Rural Development; Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts; Energy and Petroleum; Transport; Roads and Highways; Lands and Natural Resources; Communications; Environment, Science and Technology; Employment and Labour Relations; Water Resources, Works and Housing; Fisheries and Aquaculture Development; Youth and Sports; Gender, Children and Social Protection; Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs; and Government Business in Parliament. Again, since the 1992 Constitution came into operation, there has been re-naming and re-alignment of some of these ministries, with occasional abolition of others. For instance the ministry for Women and Children Affairs (that existed from 2001 to 2012) has been expanded and renamed Ministry for Gender, Children and Social Protection (in January, 2013), and so has the ministry for Mines and Energy metamorphosed into the Ministry for Energy and Petroleum.

Each of these ministries is in charge of a defined sector of the economy and is responsible for policy direction and the supervision of activities in that sector. In addition to these ministries and their respective ministers, it has been the tradition that other ministers are appointed by the President and assigned various responsibilities at the presidency. At the moment, the ministers of state at the presidency are six; they include the Minister for Public-Private Partnerships, Minister for Development Authorities, Minister for Financial and Allied Institutions, Minister for Human Resource Development and Scholarships and lastly, Minister for Social and Allied institutions.

In addition to the list above, a Senior Presidential Advisor at the Presidency (who is also the Head of the National Development Planning Commission) has been appointed by the current National Democratic Congress government. Finally, three other officials with ministerial status have also been appointed and assigned the task of overseeing priority projects of the President (these officials have been nicknamed by some Ghanaians as ‘the three wise men’).

Generally, four types of organisations work under each ministry. These are: (i) government departments and agencies (ii) public boards and corporations (iii) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and (iv) commissions, committees, and councils. There has also emerged a fifth ‘hybrid’ sector composed of public universities and other tertiary institutions (Boachie-Danquah, 2003). A brief description of these follows:

2.2.1.1 Departments and Agencies

In general terms a department is considered as a specialized functional area within an organization or a division, such as finance, personnel administration/human resource, marketing and planning. Similarly within public administration there are some functions that require critical attention and hence departments are created for them. In this study public sector departments are conceptualized as monolithic institutions created within a sector ministry or the presidency responsible for singular functions. Some specific departments in Ghana as has been conceptualized in this study include Department of Feeder Roads, Department of Social Welfare, and Department of Children, just to mention a few.

Agencies are also public sector institutions but unlike departments are non-monolithic and hence perform diverse functions with powers to make and implement their own regulations. Agencies have higher autonomy than departments. Specific examples of Agencies as used in this study

include Ghana News Agency, Community Water and Sanitation Agency, and Environmental Protection Agency. While departments are not established by an Act of Parliament but fall within a sector ministry, a public agency is established by legislation. Capturing these public institutions within a continuum in ascending order—department-council-agency/authority.

2.2.1.2 Public Boards

Public Boards are also public institutions that are set up by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Such boards may work directly under the presidency of a particular jurisdiction or under a sector ministry depending on the regulations guiding the board. Often they are monolithic entities, thus they perform single functions. Examples of Public Sector Boards in Ghana as conceptualized in this study include Ghana Free Zones Board, Ghana Cocoa Board and the Ghana Standards Board (now Ghana Standards Authority). An example of an act establishing public boards is the Free Zones Act 1995, (Act 504). Public boards are specifically supposed to perform regulatory and advisory functions in promoting some sectors of the economy.

2.2.1.3 Public Corporations

Corporations are created to perform a governmental function or to operate under government control, such as a Municipal Water Company, Sewage, Housing, Public Media etc. Corporations are separate legal entities that have been incorporated through a legislative or registration process. A public corporation is a corporate body created by an Act of Parliament. Such an Act defines the powers, duties, privileges and patterns of management of these organizations. Such an organization is a statutory body to serve the general public. A public corporation is clothed with the power of the government, but possesses the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise. A public

corporation enjoys considerable autonomy in its management. In Ghana typical examples of corporations include Ghana Housing Corporation and Ghana Broadcasting Corporation.

2.2.1.4 State- Owned Enterprises

A State-owned-enterprise (SOE) is also a type of organization that works under the ministries. This sector of the public service evolved when past governments (especially the Peoples Convention Party government of the first republic) decided to engage in essentially direct economic activities. Institutions here took the character of the private business corporation, in which, unlike the civil service, a considerable amount of autonomy and flexibility in action was required. They are legal entities that are created by the government in order to partake in commercial activities on her behalf (Tsamenyi et al. 2010 and Appiah-Kubi, 2001). A state-owned enterprise (SOE) can be either wholly or partially owned by government and is typically earmarked to participate in commercial activities (Appiah-Kubi, 2001).

2.2.1.5 Hybrid Sector


Also working directly under sector ministries is the hybrid organization (Boachie Danquah, 2003). Institutions in this sector combine some of the characteristics of the civil service and SOEs. Classic examples are the public universities and other tertiary institutions under the ministry of education, which although subvented like the civil service, possess a large measure of autonomy in several areas of their operation.

2.2.1.6 Commissions and Councils

Commissions and Councils are also found within the Ghana public administrative system. They are constitutionally created bodies that are supposed to perform general regulatory and advisory

functions in some specific areas like the electoral system, lands administration, public/civic education, and human rights protection. Commissions and Councils created by the 1992 constitution include: the Judicial Council (Article 153), the Council of State (Article 89), the Police Council (Article 203 (1)), the Electoral Commission (Article 43 (1)), the Lands Commission (Article 158 (1)), the National Media Commission (Article 166 (1)), the Commission For Human Right And Administrative Justice (Article 216), National Commission for Civic Education (Article 231), and the National Development Planning Commission (Article 87).

Figure 2.1 Departments, Councils, and Agencies



Source: Derived from Office of the Head of Civil Service Reports, 2012

2.2.2 Regional Administrations (Regional Coordinating Councils)

Ghana is divided into ten regions. The regional administrations in the 10 regions are the seats of government in the regions and they supervise all activities in the regions. The 10 regions starting

from the north to south are: Upper West, Upper East, Northern, Brong Ahafo, Ashanti, Western, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra and Volta regions. Each region is headed by a Regional Minister who is supported by a Deputy Regional Minister. The Regional Minister reports directly to the President of Ghana. The administrative apparatus of the regions are the Regional Co-ordinating Councils, which co-ordinate the activities of all the local government units (district assemblies) in each region. As stated above the ministerial organisations enumerated above are all represented in the regions in a deconcentrated form.

2.2.3 District Administrations (District Assemblies)

There are currently two hundred and sixteen (216) district assemblies within the ten regions of Ghana. Forty-six (46) of these are newly created and are yet to gain firm grounding. These districts are classified by size of population. Areas with population in excess of 250,000 are created as metropolis, one-town areas with population in excess of 95,000 are created as municipalities, and areas with population in excess of 75,000 are created as district assemblies. All assemblies are headed by Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executives. The distribution of metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs) in the regions is as depicted in Table 2.1 below:

Table 2.1: Distribution of MMDAs

Region	Metropolitan	Municipal	District	Total
Upper East		2	11	13
Upper West		1	10	11
Northern	1	1	24	26
Brong Ahafo		8	19	27
Ashanti	1	7	22	30
Western	1	2	19	22
Central	1	6	13	20
Eastern		7	19	26
Greater Accra	2	7	7	16
Volta		5	20	25

Source: MLGRD, 2012

Here again, it is worth stating that the principles of deconcentration and devolution are both manifested at the district/local level of government.

2.2.4 Services under Ministerial Organizations

As stated above, Chapter fourteen of the 1992 Constitution lists the Public Services of Ghana as: the Civil Service, the Judicial Service, the Audit Service, the Education Service, the Prison Service, the Parliamentary Service, the Health Service, the Statistical Service, the National Fire Service, the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Internal Revenue Service, the Police Service, the Immigration Service, and the Legal Service.

The public services also include public corporations other than those set up as commercial ventures; public services established by the constitution, and such other public services as Parliament may by law prescribe. It is worth noting that since 1992 there have been additions to

these services. Immediate mention can be made of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Service and the Local Government Service, the latter having being separated from the Civil Service on the promulgation of the Local Government Service Act, 2003 (Act 656). All these public services work under specified ministries; for example the Police Service, the Prisons Service, the Immigration Service and the Ghana National Fire Service until quite recently were under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior; new arrangements are being proposed to transfer the Ghana National Fire Service to the Local Government ministry (this is however yet to be implemented).

It is also worth stating that although these services form part of the public administration system, each of them operates on a different scheme of service, different rules and regulations and different remuneration packages, and other conditions of service; they are sub-systems within the larger public administration system (PAS).

2.2.5 Extra-Ministerial Organizations

There are presently five extra-ministerial organisations in Ghana. These are the Office of the President, Office of the Head of Civil Service, the Council of State, Office of the State Protocol and Public Sector Reforms Secretariat. Such constitutional bodies as the Public Services Commission and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) are also worth mentioning.

The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice for instance was established by the 1992 Constitution to protect the human rights of ordinary citizens as well as the nation's workforce in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Among its functions is "to investigate

complaints of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, injustice, corruption, abuse of power and unfair treatment of any person by a public officer in the exercise of his official duties” (1992 Constitution, Article 28 (a)). So far it has played this role satisfactorily and helped to give confidence to ordinary citizens and, especially, public servants to seek redress for perceived or real injustices against them. The Public Services Commission on the other hand is an independent commission vested with the authority to supervise and regulate entrance and promotion examinations within the public services, and the establishment of standards and guidelines on the terms and conditions of employment in the public services (Articles 196 & 198 of the 1992 Constitution).

The total number of organizations that currently constitute the public administration system of Ghana is about 400, employing about 360,000 people.

2.3 Scope and Functions of Ghana’s Public Administration

As pointed out by Denhardt and Denhardt (2006), public administration varies immensely in its scope and substance. The scope and functions of Ghana’s public administration system therefore depend on what a particular government assumes unto itself. Basically, the government is responsible for the protection of life and property; the development of the resources of the state; and the equitable distribution of the resulting wealth in such a way as to improve the well-being of the citizenry generally. The Public Administration System is responsible for providing services for all the activities of government. It manages the resources of the state and makes these available to the government to enable it to decide on broad issues of policy and also directs the deployment of resources for national development. Obviously, it also plays a key role in the implementation of decisions taken by the government.

Decisions made by the government (or by the ministries) are conveyed to departments and other quasi-government agencies which have responsibility for execution. Departments and these other agencies, therefore, translate policy decisions into reality or provide services as decided by the policy-making organs. In effect they are the ‘action part of government’ (Corson& Harris, 1963) who ‘execute the state will’ (Goodnow, 1900), and therefore ‘straighten the path of government’ (Wilson, 1887). Other organizations and entrepreneurs carrying out all other government policies are under the supervision of the public administration system. Every organization in Ghana is therefore obliged to relate to government through one of the organizations of the public administration system, or the other.

2.3.1 Structure and Process of Ghana’s Public Administration System

In every independent state it is the government’s ultimate responsibility to make policies, monitor them to maturity, and evaluate them. The policies once made become the guidelines for future action by the people in the state. These policies aim at achieving what is in the public interest by the best possible means. In Ghana, policy formulation and implementation are guided by the ‘The Directive Principles of State Policy’ contained in chapter six of the 1992 constitution, which clearly spell out the desires and expectations of the Ghanaian populace towards development and general welfare in all spheres of life. The work of the government, directed in pursuit of these goals and aspirations, is made possible by public servants who serve as custodians of the records on the resources of the state and make them available to the government of the day, without partisanship. This role in policy-making brings public servants belonging to ministerial organizations (civil servants) into the heart of government business. The top civil servant is thus in a complex role relationship with the politician in the administration of the state.

The processing of public policies necessarily has to pass through ministerial organizations in charge of particular sectors of the economy. This is done in order to take account of the policies, ascertain their benefits and also the availability of resources for their execution. Thus a system of organisational structures and procedures is created for the orderly processing of public policies. These structures and procedures constitute the public administration system.

In this system, specific roles are assigned to well-defined and designated individuals and organisations for the formulation, adoptions, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and modification of public policies. Thus, the government does not implement its own policies; instead it is mainly the public administration system supported by private individuals and organizations which carry out the implementation function. Consequently, the quality of government's performance depends largely upon the ability of the public administration system to articulate the government's policies and the way it tackles its work. But the ultimate responsibility (commendation or blame) for the system's performance lies with the political leadership. In other words, the political leadership has to accept responsibility for any ineffectiveness and inefficiencies in policy implementation. Two public service institutions that are instrumental in the government business of policy formulation and policy implementation in Ghana are the civil service and the local government service. Their objectives, functions and structures are outlined in the sections that follow.

2.4 The Civil Service of Ghana

The 1992 Constitution names the Civil Service as part of the Public Services of Ghana (Article 90 (1)) comprising services in both central and local government (Article 190(2)). The Service is regulated by the Civil Service Law of 1993, (PNDCL 327). As mentioned above, however, the

Local Government Service has been decoupled from the Civil Service upon the promulgation of the Local Government Service Act, 2003 (Act 656). Presently, the civil service of Ghana is composed of the Ministries, Department and Agencies as well as regional administrative bodies. The role of the civil service within the executive arm of government is to effectively pursue policies for economic and social development. In that sense the Ghanaian civil service is viewed as the guarantor and protector of the reputation of government. It is also worth noting that the loyalty of the service is to the state. It is therefore non-political and non-partisan in nature.

2.4.1 Objectives and Functions of the Civil Service


The object of the Civil Service as detailed in PNDCL 327 is primarily to assist the government in the formulation and implementation of government policies and programmes for the development of the country. Its objectives are accomplished through advising on government plans, undertaking research for effective formulation and implementation of government policies, and monitoring, co-ordinating, evaluating, and reviewing government policies and plans. It also ensures that policies are translated into practical and cost-effective programmes and projects and maintains vigilant oversight of the implementation of policies by the various government departments and agencies assigned this responsibility. In addition, other responsibilities are assigned to it from time to time. Obviously, the duties and responsibilities of the civil service are determined by the direction the government chooses to chart to attain its developmental goals.

One critical role Ghana's Civil Service has performed creditably is its stabilizing influence on political life of the country. During transition periods (i.e. changes of Governments), the Civil Service assumes a caretaker role until a new administration assumes office. This was especially very evident in the past when military regimes were common.

2.4.2 Ministries and Departments

The functions of the Civil Service are carried out through sector ministries which are responsible for policy issues, manpower and financial matters as well as exercising overall supervisory, monitoring and co-ordinating powers over technical departments in their respective sectors. To ensure that they play their roles efficiently and effectively, a ministry is organized into four broad areas: (i) General Administration and Finance; (ii) Planning, Budgeting, Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation; (iii) Human Resource Management; and (iv) Research, Statistics, Information and Public Relations. Under the Ministries are Departments which are responsible for the implementation of the policies, plans and programmes of the government. The relationships among these areas are depicted in the organisational structure presented in Figure 2.2 below:

Figure 2.2 Organizational Structure of Ministries



2.4.3 Membership of the Civil Service

Section (4) of the Civil Service Law, 1993, PNDC Law 327, specifies the membership of the Civil Service as a person serving in a civil capacity in a post designated as a Ghana Civil Service post by or under the Law in (i) The Office of the President, (ii) A Ministry, (iii) A government department/agency at the national, regional and district levels, (iv) Any other civil service department established by or under the authority of the Law the emoluments attached to which are paid directly from the Consolidated Fund or any other source approved by the government.

It also includes persons holding posts designated as civil service posts created by or under the authority of any other enactment, the emoluments attached to which are paid directly from the Consolidated Fund or any other source approved by the government. As such, diverse professionals work in the civil service, among which are administrators, accountants, planners, management analysts, engineers, geologists, surveyors, agriculturists, lawyers, architects, archivists, scientists, and secretaries, among others. The calibre of these individuals is expected to be high, comparable in many respects with their private sector counterparts.

2.5 The Local Government Service

The current local government system Ghana operates (the district assembly) is by law the highest political authority at the local level of governance in the country. A district assembly has executive, legislative and deliberative powers.

Being the highest political authority in the district, an assembly's functions include formulating and implementing plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilisation of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district (Afari-Gyan, 1999).

To enable the district assemblies perform their functions smoothly, the decentralisation policy transfers functions, authority, means and competence from the centre or national level to the district level of government. By this policy, all government agencies in any given district are amalgamated into one administrative unit through the process of institutional integration, manpower absorption, composite budgeting and provision of resources (means). The structure, processes and staffing of the District Assembly have been so designed as to enable it to promote popular participation and local ownership of government for the achievement of central government's development agenda at the district level and consequently the realization of the overall development programme for the country. The success of resource mobilisation and the effective management of the district development process depend, to a large extent, on the type of working relationship that exists between the stakeholders and key actors at the district level.

Two of the most important and critical actors in this relationship are the political actors headed by the District Chief Executive (DCE) and the administrative operatives headed by the District Coordinating Director (DCD). The orthodox view of the working relations at the top level of government has been portrayed as very simple: politicians formulate policy while senior civil servants (public administrators) offer advice on its framing and then proceed to execute the policy. This position is quite misleading because in practice matters can be, and often are, more complicated in that there is a fine and delicate line across which there can be slippage by both politicians and administrators. This situation constitutes a rather solid base for criticism of Wilson's (1887) orthodox politics-administration dichotomy which posits a definite demarcation of the two fields (politics and administration). Before delving into the specific roles of these public officials we shall look at first, decentralisation as a concept, secondly the structure of Ghana's local government and thirdly, the functions of the local government units (district assemblies).

This is against the backdrop of the fact that the entire local government system has its roots in the concept of decentralisation – bringing decision making powers to the local people.

2.6 Decentralisation

Generally, decentralisation is a management tool which is used in the administration of both public and private set-ups (Boachie-Danquah, 2003). Its major objective is to enlarge the decision-making horizon by creating avenues for greater participation of relevant stakeholders in the decision-making and implementation processes, to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. Decentralisation in Public Administration usually involves the transfer of power, competencies, functions and financial (and other resources) from central government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) to sub-national bodies, which are normally local authorities. Governmental decentralisation normally operates along the concept of subsidiarity, which assumes that national level functions are better performed at the centre while sub-national functions are better performed by local level institutions, which operate at, and are closer to the theatres of operation, or service delivery.

2.6.1 Definitions of Decentralisation

Different definitions of ‘decentralisation’ abound in the literature. Those of the United Nations (1965), Smith (1985), Robertson (2002), Rondinelli and Cheema (1986), and Rondinelli and Nelli (1989) are highlighted below.

The United Nations (1965) defines decentralization to mean the transfer of authority on a geographical basis, whether by deconcentration of authority to field units of the same department or level of government, or by devolution of authority to local units or special statutory bodies. To

Smith (1985), decentralization refers to any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy. In the view of Robertson (2002), decentralization connotes the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to the lower levels in government. Rondinelli and Cheema (1986) on their part define decentralization as the transfer of planning, decision-making or administrative authority from the central government to its field organisations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organisations, local governments, or non-governmental organisations.

Similarly, Rondinelli and Nelli (1989) define decentralization as: the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and resource-raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to (a) field units of central government ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; and (e) non-governmental or private or voluntary organisations (NGOs/PVOs).

These definitions, amongst the very many known ones, capture the four main forms/types of decentralisation which have been identified in the literature, namely: deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation to non-governmental institutions. Two of these forms, deconcentration and devolution are explained below.

2.6.2 Deconcentration

Deconcentration involves the handing over of a certain degree of administrative authority or responsibility to lower levels within central government ministries and agencies. It is a shifting of

the workload from centrally located officials to staff or offices outside the national capital or centre. A very important feature of deconcentration is that it does not involve the transfer of decision making powers; but rather functions are transferred to the lower levels for them to perform. In the performance of these functions, the subsidiary levels are restricted to taking only routine decisions; they have to revert to the centre for directives on major decisions. Thus, deconcentration does not result in a final legal deposit or transfer of authority. Instead, the decentralising authority, in this case the centre, establishes regional or district offices of the centre and transfers some functions to them. In this way, the final legal authority still rests with the central body, and it can withdraw the assigned functions, or even, disband the territorial or administrative offices, without going through any statutory requirements or obligation such as the constitution or a legislative instrument. This type of decentralisation is basically for administrative convenience, to reduce the workload on the centre. It is therefore sometimes referred to as administrative or territorial decentralization.

2.6.3 Devolution

Another form of decentralisation that has been identified in the literature is devolution. Devolution is the creation or strengthening financially and/or legally of sub-national units of government, the activities of which are substantially outside the direct control of the central government. It involves the moving of power and authority or responsibility from central government institutions to lower or sub-national levels of authority. Under devolution, local units of government are autonomous and independent, and their legal status makes them separate and distinct from the central government. Central authorities frequently exercise only indirect supervisory control over such devolved units. Normally, local governments have clear and legally recognised geographical

boundaries within which they exercise an exclusive authority to perform explicitly granted or reserved functions. They have corporate or statutory authority to raise revenue and to expend.

The main difference between deconcentration and devolution is that unlike deconcentration, devolution involves an actual deposit of legal authority which regulates the transfer of functions and other responsibilities between the centre and the periphery; the roles and relationships between the centre and the periphery are cemented by statutory provisions. Thus, devolution is considered the most advance form of decentralization and involves the absence (or near-absence) of control, financial self-reliance, and the right to hire and fire local staff. From this angle, devolution is normally considered as ‘genuine decentralisation’.

2.6.4 Dimensions to Decentralisation

Three main dimensions to decentralisation have been identified in the literature. These are political, financial and administrative dimensions (Smoke, 2000; Bahl, 1998) The **Political dimension** is commonly referred to as political decentralisation. It involves the transfer of political authority to the local level through the establishment or re-establishment of elected local government, electoral reform, political party reform, authorization of participatory processes, and other reforms. Political decentralisation aims to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in public decision making. It also supports the democratisation process by giving the local populace more influence in the policy formulation and implementation processes. Ultimately, political decentralisation is concerned with the devolution of power to the grassroots, leading to the formation of local governments.

The **Financial dimension** is what economists refer to as **fiscal decentralisation**. This means shifting financial power to the local level. It involves increasing opportunities or reducing conditions on the intergovernmental transfer of resources and giving jurisdictions or territories greater authority to generate their own revenue (Smoke 2000; Bahl 1998; USAID 2000). Fiscal decentralisation is believed to be the most comprehensive and possibly traceable degree of decentralisation since it is directly linked to budgetary practices. It involves resource reallocation to sub-national levels of government. Arrangements for resource allocation are often negotiated between the central and local authorities based on several factors such as inter-regional equity, availability of resources at all levels of government and local fiscal management capacity (Robertson, 2002). Thus, financial (fiscal) decentralisation constitutes the bedrock of local government financing. In Ghana, for instance, local government is funded by the Central Government mainly through the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) which, according to the Constitution, shall be at least five percent (5%) of the total revenue made by Ghana annually. Presently this allocation stands at seven and half percent (7.5%) with proposals to increase it further to ten percent (10%), and justifiably so because the number of District Assemblies has increased from forty five (45) in 1988 to two hundred and sixteen (216) today.

The **Administrative dimension** is often referred to as '**administrative decentralisation**'. It involves the full or partial transfer of an array of functional responsibilities to the local level, such as public health, the operation of public schools, the management of service personnel, the building and maintenance of minor and feeder roads, and garbage collection and waste management. The responsibilities vary from country to country and by the type of local authority. Generally, administrative decentralisation is concerned mainly with increasing efficiency through improving

service delivery by the government, removing bottlenecks and reducing delays as well as increasing the ability to recover costs.

Going by our definitions, progress along any of these dimensions fits into the concept of decentralisation which involves bringing political decision-making and service delivery options to the lower levels where there is capacity to handle them, oftentimes, better.

With the understanding provided in the last sections on decentralisation and the position that decentralisation forms the basis of local government, we shall now proceed to look, in some details, at the local government system of Ghana, starting from a brief account of the evolution of local government in Ghana.

2.6.5 Historical Development of Local Government in Ghana

The earliest attempts at local administration during the colonial era were with the native authorities, which revolved around a chief or some unit of local royalty which was not very defined. The native authorities were undemocratic and mere representatives (as they were hand-picked). Their main interest was to help the British colonial government, with limited involvement in local administration, to administer law and order.

The Municipal Ordinance of 1859 established municipalities in local coastal towns of the Gold Coast. In 1943, a new Ordinance set up elected town councils for Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Cape Coast. In 1953 the Municipal Councils Ordinance was passed. This was followed, after independence, by the Local Government Act, 1961, Act 54. In all these pieces of legislation, the distinction between Central and Local government institutions was maintained. In terms of distinction, there has always been two different machineries for the administration of

Ghana: one based in the capital with branches at the local (district) level and the other separate and distinct, based in well-defined localities and referred to as Local Government.

The central government bodies at the local level dealt with national matters. They also attracted to themselves the better qualified personnel in terms of management skills and professional expertise. The Central Government agencies had less clearly defined powers in terms of local responsibilities, but had a much better presence by reason of their de facto position as bodies of central government. Decision-making took an unduly long time because these bodies had to refer decisions on most matters of any meaningful significance to a Ministry in Accra, which bogged down with matters of national significance, was unable to react quickly enough to problems referred from the local level, thus slowing down the tempo of activity.


The Local Government bodies had been set up and vested with authority specifically for local matters, and grown up side-by-side with central Government agencies that operated at the local level. They were required to provide municipal services and amenities in their localities without regard to whether or not they had the resources to deliver. These bodies lacked personnel with the requisite skills and professional expertise. Unable to raise funds to meet their obligation and attract able and competent officers, the local government bodies only succeeded in creating for themselves an unpleasant image, in most cases, of ineptitude and incompetence.

2.6.6 The Structure of the Current Local Government System of Ghana

By structure of the local government system, we mean the layers of authority and the relationship between the various parts of the local government system. The current local government system of Ghana is made up of a Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) and a four-tier Metropolitan and three-tier Municipal/District Assembly structure. The metropolitan assemblies have a four-tier

structure comprising the metropolitan assembly, the sub-metropolitan district councils, town councils and unit committees. Municipal assemblies have a three tier layer comprising the municipal assemblies, zonal councils and unit committees. The district assemblies similarly have a three-tier layer comprising the district assemblies, urban /town / area councils and unit committees. This is shown in Figure 2.3 below.

Figure 2.3 Structure of Ghana's Local Government



Source: Ministry of Local Government, (1994)

At the bottom and apex of the structure are the Unit Committees and Regional Co-ordinating Councils respectively. Inputs into the decision making process are generated from the unit

committees to the metropolitan/municipal/district assemblies in a bottom-up fashion while policy directives flow from the latter to the unit committees (a top-down approach) for implementation and feedback. The Regional Co-ordination Councils on the other hand are responsible for co-ordinating and harmonizing all activities of the various assemblies in the regions in line with the national development programme of the state.

2.7 Functions of District Assemblies

The functions of district assemblies have been explicitly stated in Part 1, Section 10 of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462). The first function specified by the law is that a District Assembly shall exercise political and administrative authority in the District, provide guidance, give direction to and supervise all other administrative authorities in the district. In so doing, a District Assembly shall exercise deliberative, legislative and executive functions (Section 10 (2)). It follows from this that the District Assembly is the agent of development of any district of Ghana. Thus, the decision to develop or not to develop or the pace of development rests squarely on the shoulders of the officials that man the assembly, that is, elected or appointed political office holders and appointed administrative officials or public administrators. The relation between these two categories of public officials is therefore crucial since it is a function of an effective administrative and governance system that is development oriented.

In this direction, Section 10 (3) emphatically states that a District Assembly shall be responsible for the overall development of the district; it should therefore ensure the preparation and submission of development plans of the district to the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) through the Regional Co-ordinating Council (RCC) for approval. Besides, the District Assembly shall prepare and submit its budget related to the approved plans to the

Minister of Finance, through the RCC, for approval. The District Assembly is also tasked with the formulation and execution of plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the overall development of the district (Section 10 (3) (b)).

So what roles do the political head, the District Chief Executive and the public administrator (the District Co-ordinating Director) play in the realization of all these tasks? This constitutes the subject of enquiry in the next two sections after a brief on the National Development Planning Commission which is a key stakeholder in Ghana's local government administration.

2.7.1 The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)

The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) is an important stakeholder in Ghana's political system. It is a Constitutional Commission established under Article 86 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Its membership include such important personalities as (i) the Minister for Finance; (ii) The Government Statistician; (iii) the Governor of the Bank of Ghana; (iv) A Chairman appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State; and (v) such other persons appointed by the President based on their knowledge and experience of the relevant areas and roles pertaining to development, economic, social, environmental and spatial planning. Among its functions is to make proposals for ensuring the even development of the districts of Ghana by the effective utilisation of available resources and to monitor, evaluate and co-ordinate development policies, programmes and projects (1992 Constitution, Article 87 (d)). Accordingly, Section 47 (1) of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) states that the NDPC shall prescribe the format of district development plans. By this arrangement, all district assemblies are enjoined to ensure the preparation and submission of development plans of the districts to the National

Development Planning Commission (NDPC) through the Regional Co-ordinating Council (RCC) for approval.

2.7.2 The Role of the District Chief Executive (DCE) in Local Government

As stated earlier on, the DCE is by law the political head of a district assembly. He/She is appointed by the President to champion the government's overall developmental agenda in the district, for which reason people rightly consider him/her as the President's representative in the district. To avoid any role ambiguity and the possibility of acting ultra vires, the DCE's role has been clearly spelt out for him by the 1992 Constitution and the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462). For instance, Article 243 (2) of the Constitution states that the DCE shall:

- (a) preside at meetings of the Executive Committee of the Assembly
- (b) be responsible for the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of the District Assembly, and
- (c) be the chief representative of the Central Government in the district

Besides the above roles, Section 28 of Act 462 states that: (1) the District Chief Executive may address the District Assembly in session on policies determined by the President and (2) present a report on the performance of the functions of the Executive Committee to the District Assembly at the beginning of each session, and submit the recommendations of the District Assembly on matters of national concern to the President, the Minister and the Regional Coordinating Council at the end of each session.

These roles require that the DCE should exhibit certain attributes, if he/she should succeed in his office. These attributes include political leadership, managerial competence, and accountability.

The DCE must be a man of vision; he is responsible for giving a clear direction on the developmental path of the assembly, in consonance with the overall development agenda of the central government.

He must possess political skills, to enable him manoeuvre within his policy environment. He must also possess management and leadership skills, including the ability to plan, organize, communicate clearly, motivate staff and set realistic goals. Besides, he must be honest and transparent, fair and firm, understanding, and knowledgeable of local politics. Besides, the DCE must be a good strategist so far as achieving set goals is concerned.

2.7.3 The Role of the District Co-ordinating Director (DCD)

Section 36(1) of Act 462, Local Government Act, 1993 states: “there shall be a District Coordinating Director who shall be the Secretary to the Assembly and the head of the District Coordinating Directorate”. As secretary to the assembly, he has custody of all documents and records of the Assembly. He is responsible for the provision of facts and figures to give the Assembly a basis for making decisions on district goals. This, of course, suggests the direct involvement of the DCD in decision making. The DCD is primarily responsible for setting up systems enabling the implementation of all lawful decisions of the Assembly and delivering services; it is through the efforts of the DCD that district assembly’s goals and purposes are realized. Besides, the DCD is responsible for the day-to-day functions of the Assembly work processes, control and coordination and general management, on behalf of the DCE.

He is the spending officer in charge of the financial and other resources of the assembly. In terms of accountability, the DCD is accountable for his/her performance first to the DCE and secondly

to Parliament as spending officer of the assembly to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament. In all these, the DCD provides leadership and guidance for the heads of department as well as technical and professional staff of the assembly.

2.7.4 Relationship between the District Chief Executive and District Coordinating Director

As a public administrator, the DCD is supposed to be apolitical, neutrally and loyally serving the government of the day and the interest of the people at all times. Conversely, the DCE, who is a political appointee in the midst of a non-partisan local government system, is expected to be a policy maker and not a career bureaucrat. Despite this role differentiation, however, in reality the DCD with his/her technical knowhow participates in policy making processes which have political colouration. Similarly, because the DCE is supposed to be interested in how assembly policies and/or central government programmes are implemented, he finds himself slipping into purely administrative matters sometimes.

The functional relationship between these two sets of officials may, not surprisingly, be probably characterized by tension and conflict which inevitably has the tendency of adversely affecting implementation of development programmes and activities to the detriment of the citizenry. This concern is a major problem this study seeks to address - to make suggestions for enhancing the working relationships between these two important stakeholders of the district assembly (the DCE and DCD) to engender development. Although the problems of the interface are generally not publicly debated, there are observable signs and indicators, many of which are visible to the ordinary citizens and assembly's clientele. But what are the causes of these problems? The next section outlines some determinants of the not-too-friendly working relationship between the DCE and DCD.

2.7.5 Causes of Relationship Problem

The relation problem that could exist between the DCE and the DCD and which sometimes may extend to the assembly and its bureaucratic wing may be classified into three broad categories, namely: political, organizational/structural, and personal. These are explained in turns below for clarification.

In a lecture delivered by Joe Issachar (a former Head of the Civil Service of Ghana) in 2012 at a capacity building workshop organized for key stakeholders in local government administration in Kumasi on the topic “Managing the Political Administrative Interface” and the subsequent discussions that followed, the following causes of relationship problems were identified.

2.7.5.1 Political Differences

The first among the political dimension is mistrust. The District Chief Executive appointed by a new government invariably inherits the existing local government administration machinery that served the previous administration. There is usually mistrust, misgivings and in extreme instances dislike of the DCD by the DCE. This becomes evident particularly when the DCE does not trust a DCD from a particular region or tribe and/or perceives him/her to belong to an opposing political party. The immediate response of the DCE has been to seek the transfer of the DCD to another district. If this request is not granted, the relationship is bound to degenerate further.

In addition to mistrust is the politicization of the public service. In instances where the DCE attempts to exert excessive influence and control over the Civil Service (in this case the Local Government Service), this behaviour normally meets resistance from the DCD and other career bureaucrats. In pursuit of this agenda the DCE attempts to control or influence administrative

decision making and implementation to the disaffection of the DCD. The DCE usually attempts to introduce patronage and nepotism into the district assembly system by supplying jobs to party faithful and allies and family members or cliques, contrary to the civil service principle of entry by merit. Although the local government system is supposed to be non-partisan, the polarized political environment of the country has provided fertile grounds for governments in power to penetrate the civil service. There have also been attempts to make new appointments based on political patronage, thus ignoring the principle of meritocracy. This creates uncertainty and panic among the public administration officials on the future of their career; this attitude does not augur well for a cordial working relationship.

2.7.5.2 Structural Perspective

The structural dimension of the relationship problem include: role ambiguity, disruption in channels of communication, inexperience, and non-adherence to rules and regulations. These are outlined below.

The functional relationship between the two is sometimes unclear, conflicting or ambiguous. The roles and expected behaviours toward each other are not clearly defined. For example the law states that the DCE shall be responsible for the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of the District Assembly. The same law provides in Section 36(1) of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) that “there shall be a District Co-ordinating Director who shall be the Secretary to the Assembly and the head of the District Coordinating Directorate.” So what specific role does the DCD play in recruitment and appointment for instance, as the head of the directorate when the DCE is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Assembly?

For example when the DCE attempts to undermine the merit principle in recruitment and promotions or interfere with staff discipline and deployment, the DCD considers such behaviour undermining and professionally unacceptable. Thus, in the absence of a clear role definition, personalities of the two officials become a major factor in the success or failure of the interface.


Quite related to the role conflict is the disruption in channels of communication. The principle of unity of command is often disregarded when employees receive orders from more than one official. Conflicting lines of command undermines authority, weakens discipline, divides loyalty, and creates confusion and duplication of work. The DCD finds this uncomfortable.

Another common source of disagreement is that both parties may not have been adequately groomed for office. These officials, especially the politician, assume leadership positions without being adequately prepared for it and therefore lack the vision and drive to pursue policies that would benefit the populace. It is even worse when both are new to the subject area. Normally, they do not undergo adequate induction or training before assuming office. This results initially in confidence crisis in the management of the affairs of the Assembly. For example advice or briefing from the DCD that is not evidence-based, comprehensive and timely can weaken the DCE's confidence and trust in him.

Another factor that potentially generates problems is the non-adherence to rules and regulations. Sometimes the DCE insists on circumventing existing financial and stores regulations. He awards contracts without regard to the Procurement Act. At other times goods and services paid for are not supplied or passed through the stores. The DCD sees these operations as illegal. On the other hand, the DCE sees the DCD as over reliant on rules and regulations, inflexible and unprepared to adapt to changing work environment. To him, the DCD is unresponsive and problem-creator rather

than problem-solver. The third broad cause of relation problems between the DCE and the DCD has been identified as Personal'. Associated with the personal dimension are sharing of resources and lack of respect, among others.

Resources and logistics for the Assembly's operation are usually scarce. There is therefore competition for the use of these scarce resources. So when the DCE wants to appropriate almost everything for political ends and the DCD complains or opposes this attitude it breeds disagreement between the two which eventually adversely affects their working relations. The framework of the DCE- DCD interface is depicted in Figure 2.4 below:

Figure 2.4 Conceptual framework of Politics-Administration Interface

Source: Authors own conceptualization, 2013.

By the above framework, it is expected that if the District Chief Executive discharges his official functions devoid of undue interference in administration and the District Coordinating Director performs his assignments without the tendency of sabotaging the efforts of the DCE, and the two work in an atmosphere of consultation, dialogue, accountability, mutual understanding and encouraging participation in decision making, the outcome will be an improved local government where services are delivered efficiently and effectively to the benefit of the citizenry. On the other hand in an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion amidst conflict, tension apathy, role ambiguities

and poor communication between the DCE and the DCD the local government would suffer underdevelopment as a result of poor political and administrative decisions.

2.8 Conclusion

Policy formulation and implementation are important to development in both central and local governments. These are the responsibilities of politicians and public administrators. Effective political and administrative interface is therefore crucial to making strategies and policies work and also enabling the effective delivery of services to the people.

A major interest in this chapter has been largely on the roles of the District Chief Executive (DCE) and the District Co-ordinating Director (DCD) in managing the affairs of the district assembly in the public administration system. It is obvious that the ultimate goal of any assembly is to make and implement good decisions that will enhance the well-being of the citizenry without which its existence is meaningless. However, it is management and organization that make good decision making possible for which reason it is difficult for good decision making to occur in the midst of organizational chaos, conflict and unhealthy competition between the DCE and DCD. Besides, time spent on attempting to resolve misunderstandings and disputes in the politics-administration interface might result in delays in achieving developmental goals.

Apparently, political and administrative positions are essentially and deliberately constituted to represent a system of checks and balances in power relations so that no one entity has a monopoly of power and influence at any point in time. One is tempted to believe that the apparent conflicting and ambiguous interface as against the cooperative and collaborative relationship between the two is deliberately designed to curtail the abuse of power.

It must be stated however that politics and administration appear to be two sides of the same coin. Devising strategies necessary for the two parties to develop good and meaningful working relationship not only for their own benefit, but also for the good of society is a study worth conducting; and that is the prime objective of this dissertation. It is obvious that good relations between decision makers and implementers will positively impact development to enhance the livelihood of the populace.

In the next chapter we shall take a look at first, the theoretical approaches to the politics-administration relations and second, the empirical evidence of how the interface functions in a couple of African countries.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONS

3.0 Introduction

This chapter attempts a broad review of the extant literature on the unending discussion on politics-administration relations, oftentimes referred to as the politics-administration dichotomy debate. The chapter has been divided into two parts: theoretical literature and empirical literature. The first section of the theoretical literature segment provides a general overview of the views espoused by some scholars on the relations between politics and public administration, and for that matter, elected/appointed officials in government and career public administrators. This is followed by highlights of some relevant concepts associated with these theoretical positions, such as separation of powers, bureaucracy, and the new public management (NPM), and thorough examination of three popular models of the relationship advanced by scholars to explain the workings of the politics-administration relations in government. The second section will therefore focus on what is well known as the politics-administration dichotomy, propounded by Woodrow Wilson (1887). In the third section, Robert Montjoy and Douglas Watson's (1995) modified model will take the centre stage, whereas James Svara's (1985; 1998) complementarity theory will feature in the fourth section. Mafunisa's (2008) less discussed depoliticised model and the British and American models are also outlined. This comprehensive exposition of the theoretical approaches is expected to provide an insight into the various models of the working relationship between politics and administration.

The second part will focus on the empirical literature to see how the politics-administration relations operate in less-developed countries, especially in Africa. The chapter will end with a summary and conclusion on the theoretical approaches and empirical discourse to the study of the relationship between elected officials (politicians) and appointed officials (public administrators) in local government.

3.1 Politics-Administration Relations: An Overview

The politics-administration relations question is believed by Svara (2008) to be one of the most slippery intellectual issues in public administration. Demir and Nyhan (2008), on their part, see the dichotomy as one of the most disputed theories of public administration, and in the opinion of Shaw (2010) the dichotomy has been an unsettled issue in debate which has to a large extent affected the relationship between political authorities and administrative institutions in world democracies. It is on record that this relationship was a popular topic of debate for almost half of the 20th century (Svara, 1998); and is yet to lose prominence because it constitutes the heartbeat of public administration.

Three main models have been espoused by public administration scholars and researchers to characterize the relationship between elected and appointed officials in democratic governments. These are the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy, the modified dichotomy, and the partnership model (Montjoy and Watson, 1995). In the orthodox model, Wilson argued that politics and administration were two separate and distinct fields that must be removed from each other, and that political questions were different from administrative questions, for which reason there should be a clear line of distinction between the two (Wilson, 1887). Goodnow (1900), in

solidarity with Wilson, contended that politics has to do with policies or the expressions of the state will while administration has to do with the execution of such policies (Shafritz et al, 2004).

Another generation of public administration scholars, however, disputed the strict separation of politics from administration as propounded by Wilson and rather advanced a partnership model of the relationship founded on complementarities and interconnectedness between politics and administration. In-between the orthodox and partnership models of the dichotomy, is the modified model which holds that the rather strict distinction between politics and administration, as advanced by Wilson, may apply to politics and administration but not to policy and administration (Montjoy and Watson, 1995). This phenomenon (the politics-administration relations) has been investigated in many jurisdictions globally, at both national and local levels, with varying conclusions. The following sections will navigate the orthodox dichotomy, the modified dichotomy and the partnership model in succession, to provide some understanding of the three theoretical approaches to the debate. The intention is to prepare the grounds for identifying and comparing existing practices with the three models to justify the choice and recommendation of one or the other for adoption by Ghana's local government.

3.2 Underpinning Concepts of the Theoretical Approaches to the Politics-Administration Relations Debate

Obviously, the theoretical approaches to the politics-administration relations outlined above provide us with the platform for gaining deeper insights from different perspectives of the roles the two key actors in the political system – elected officials (politicians) and appointed officials (public administrators) - play in the public policy process. One thing is clear, however, that the arguments for the three models have their own foundations. Starting from the orthodox dichotomy,

Wilson's view on the separation of politics and administration was aimed at preserving the sanctity of administration as a field that uses knowledge, expertise and experience to implement policy for the public interest. Completely separating it from politics will therefore remove it from corrupt practices associated with politics, whose main preoccupation is to seek the interest of allies. Three thoughts that match Wilson's and other scholars' thinking are: the separation of powers, bureaucracy and the New Public Management. These are outlined below.

3.2.1 Separation of Powers

The theory of separation of powers, simply put, implies that the three arms of government – the executive, legislature and judiciary – should function independently; no one organ should possess the power or authority to control or dictate to the other(s) about how to perform their duties or carry out their responsibilities. Mill (2004) explains the theory in simple language thus:

“Legislative bodies are concerned in the making of law; executive officials in the enforcement of law; and judicial officials in the interpretation of the meaning of law and in the application of it to individuals in cases of dispute or of failure to observe it. The theory that these functions should be performed by different bodies of persons, that each department should be limited to its own sphere of action without encroaching upon the others and that it should be independent within that sphere, is called the theory of Separation of Powers.” (Mill, 2004; in Johari 2010:280).

Relating this theory to the politics-administration relations therefore, Wilson and his supporters opine that since politicians, whose core function is to make policies, belong to the legislative arm of government, they should not be given the latitude to interfere with the duties of administrators, who are basically the arm of the executive, in the performance of their policy implementation function. Advocates of the orthodox model believe that protecting administration from undue political influence would yield an efficient system of administration. Willoughby (1927), a

supporter of Wilson's orthodox dichotomy model, for instance observed that a clear distinction exists between the functions of direction, supervision and control on the one hand and execution on the other hand; and that the performance of these functions must be vested in separate hands. This implies that the execution function performed by administrators should be separated from the direction, supervision and control functions of political officials.

In a way, this is a plausible stance. In the first place, appointment to the office of a public administrator is based on merit. This implies that public administrators are experts in their own field and therefore must be allowed to work independently devoid of interference and manipulation by politicians. Secondly, being career bureaucrats, public administrators are expected to exhibit a high level of professionalism, adhering to their code of ethics, and be loyal to the state (the government of the day), in executing public policy. This requires an appreciable level of discretion which can be lost if the offices of administrators are allowed to be manipulated by politicians to achieve their parochial partisan goals. It is worth noting that Montjoy and Watson's modified dichotomy which proposes the active involvement of administration in policy formulation in addition to its core function of policy implementation contravenes this principle of separation of powers, and so does Svara's complementarity (partnership) model.

3.2.2 Bureaucracy

The French economist, M. De Gournay is on record to have been the first to use the word 'bureaucracy' during the first half of the 18th Century (Lakshmana and Rao, 2010). Although several writers including J.S. Mill, Mosca and Michels, wrote extensively on the concept, one name that readily comes to mind whenever bureaucracy is mentioned is Max Weber. This is

because Weber was the first social scientist to conduct a systematic study of bureaucracy and its characteristics (Lakshmana and Rao, 2010).

Generally, bureaucracy describes a type of organisational design which is the dominant form of structure in both public and private organisations. Max Weber (1947) proposed a typical perspective of bureaucracy. To him, an ideal organisation is that which is perfectly rational and provides efficiency in its operations. Key characteristics of this ideal type of rational and efficient organisation include: division of labour and specialisation, a well-defined authority hierarchy, high formalisation, employment decisions based on merit and career tracks for employees. Clearly, elements such as division of labour, specialisation, and hierarchy support Wilson's orthodox dichotomy since first, they highlight the policy formulation and implementation processes as distinct fields of specialisation and secondly, hierarchy here supports the subordinate-superior relations between politicians and administrators on the policy ladder as stated in the politics-administration dichotomy. In the words of Hague and Harrop bureaucracy is literally, rule by officials; it is a disciplined hierarchy in which officials are subject to the authority of their superiors (Hague and Harrop, 2001). So, bureaucracy aptly constitutes a sound foundation for endorsing the orthodox model of the politics-administration relations.

3.2.3 New Public Management (NPM)

The New Public Management (NPM) is one reform that has gained so much currency all over the globe, so far as management of public affairs is concerned. As Hague and Harrop (2001:264) put it, the NPM is "a creed which swept through the Anglo-American world of public administration in the final decades of the twentieth century". Principles/components of the NPM as stated by Hood (1996) and Osborne and Gaebler (1992) include: managers are given more discretion but are

held responsible for results; departments are ‘unbundled’ into more independent operating units; more flexibility is allowed in recruiting and retaining staff; resources are allocated according to results; citizens are empowered by pushing control out of the bureaucracy into the community; be driven by goals, not rules and regulations; decentralise authority and embrace participatory management; redefine clients as customers and offer them choices – between schools, between training programmes, between housing options; and measure performance, focusing not on inputs but on outcomes, among others (Hague and Harrop, 2001).

These principles apparently inform the complementarity model of the politics-administration relationship which stresses interconnectedness between politics and administration and their respective operatives for efficient and effective service delivery. The NPM principles also advocate decentralisation and participatory democracy which together promote popular participation in the decision-making processes as well as effective implementation and monitoring mechanisms. In the opinion of Lee and Raadschelders (2008), the attractiveness and rise of political control over public administration (bureaucracy) may be attributed to the influence of the New Public Management. They observe that although the impact of NPM may vary from country to country, its influence on politics-administration relations seem to be pervasive and quite uniform. Cameron (2009) has established the fact that although the NPM-influenced reforms introduced in South Africa in the 1990s by the ANC government were not systematically implemented their influence on the political-administrative relations has been largely evident.

3.3 Politics-Administration Dichotomy (The Orthodox Model)

The politics-administration debate has been traced by many scholars to Woodrow Wilson's 1887 scholarly essay titled "The Study of Administration" (Svara, 1998; Demir, 2009; Demir and Nyhan, 2008; Shaw, 2010). In that publication, Woodrow Wilson (a political science professor and public administration scholar who later became the President of the United States of America) explicitly stated that there ought to be a clear distinction between politics and administration, thus setting the pace for this unending debate. It is therefore not surprising that the orthodox model happens to take the centre stage in discussions involving the relationship between politicians and public administrators (i.e. elected and appointed officials). In Wilson's opinion, the field of administration is a field of business; it should therefore be removed from the hurry and strife of politics (Wilson, 1887). He further asserted that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics and that administration questions are not political questions. Besides, although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices. Wilson did not stop here but further went on to argue that the broad plans of governmental actions are not administrative but rather it is the detailed execution of such plans that is administrative.

Woodrow Wilson was not alone in this line of thinking; Frank Goodnow later on identified two sides of public policy: expression and execution. Goodnow (1900) submitted that politics has to do with the expression of the state will, while administration has to do with the execution of the state will. In the words of Goodnow,

There are in all government systems two primary or ultimate functions of government, viz, the expression of the will of the state and the execution of that will. There are also in all states separate organs each of which is mainly busied with the discharge of one of these functions. These functions are respectively Politics and Administration.

Goodnow's position seems to echo that of Wilson who expressed the need to create a clear separation between political and administrative responsibilities with politicians acting as sovereign representatives of political values and interests and administrators acting as subordinate policy executors, whose major concern is efficiency (Carboni, 2010). According to Wilson, politics is about policy making while administration is an instrument used for translating formulated policies into concrete results through the application of bureaucratic expertise founded on specialised knowledge and skills. Corson and Harris's (1963) view of public administration fits in here; when they define public administration in part as 'the action part of government, the means by which the goals and purposes of government are realised'. Thus, put simply, the function of politics in this sense is to make public policy while the function of public administration is to neutrally and expertly implement public policy. Woodrow Wilson stressed this point thus:

“Seeing every day new things which the state ought to do, the next thing is to see clearly how it ought to do them. This is why there should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organisation, and to crown its dutifulness.....” (Wilson, 1887; Shafritz et al, 2004:24).

So, in Wilson's view, administration is a very important field whose function, first and foremost, is to employ knowledge and expertise to assist government realise state objectives. Now, all the things the state does through governmental action is what Dye (1987) refers to as public policy; and this, according to the orthodox dichotomy, is the function politicians are elected into public office to perform (i.e. to formulate public policy). Administration, on the other hand, is to apply expert knowledge to 'execute the state will' (Goodnow, 1900), and by so doing put government

on the right path of providing the needs of the populace by meeting their demands, more so if it (government) is going astray.

What therefore is the main thrust of the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy? In the opinion of scholars like Miller (2000) and Svara (1987), what the dichotomy model sought to do was to reduce to the barest minimum the interference of politicians in administrative functions and of administrators in political activities; each must remain in their separate fields. Goel (2008), in outlining the role of cabinet in the public policy process, buttresses this point by quoting from a Government of Bombay (1948) document which states:

“The existence of a Secretariat in the government organisation arises from the need of separating questions of policy from current administration, so that the latter is entirely handed over to a separate agency which enjoys a certain amount of freedom in the field of execution.”

Obviously, this view seeks to stress the fact that government policy issues must be removed from administration functions and that the administrative machinery must be given considerable discretionary powers to function independently and effectively. This, of course, is in line with Wilson’s position on the relationship between politics and administration.

Willoughby (1927) has also been cited as a supporter of Wilson’s orthodox view of the relationship between elected and appointed officials. He observed that a clear distinction exists between the functions of direction, supervision and control on the one hand and execution on the other hand; and that the performance of these functions must be vested in separate hands. This implies that the execution function performed by administrators should not suffer manipulation from elected officials nor should there be interference by administrators in the functions of politicians.

Mafunisa (2003), like other writers as Svara (1998); Demir (2009); Demir and Nyhan (2008); Shaw (2010); and Basu (2010), also traces the dichotomy model of politics-administration to the scholarly publications of Woodrow Wilson (1887) and Frank Goodnow (1900). According to him, the dichotomy model (which he also referred to as depoliticised democracy or the neutral model of administrative responsibility) is founded on the Wilsonian politics-administration dichotomy which advocates a clear distinction between politics and administration. In such a politico-administrative system personnel in each discipline perform specified roles. Following from this, the dichotomy model holds that public servants (public administrators) should be neutral in matters of policy while exhibiting a high sense of professionalism in executing policies formulated by their superiors (politicians). In this wise, Mafunisa contends that bureaucracy is depoliticised (separated from political manipulation) to engender administrative efficiency since ‘governments come and go, but the public servant (administrator) remains in office’. Thus, the thrust of the dichotomy model is to separate administration from politics in order to promote efficiency in service delivery no matter which government is in power.

Two key concepts apparently embedded in the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy are political guidance and neutral competence (Demir and Nyhan, 2008). Political guidance, according to these writers, refers to the responsibility bestowed on elected officials to formulate and clarify the public’s preferences and communicate them to public administrators for further action; the two processes Frank Goodnow (1900) has called ‘expression of the state will’ and ‘execution of the state will’ respectively. Demir and Nyhan (2008) also agree with Wilson’s submission that politics sets the tasks for administration by a similar affirmation that ‘political guidance sets the task for administration’. Tansu Demir and Ronald Nyhan further break political guidance down into policy leadership and legislative oversight and assert that while policy

leadership by elected officials helps formulate and communicate policy goals to public administrators, legislative oversight, on the other hand, helps elected officials to ensure that public administrators implement the policies in conformity with legislative intents. This again re-emphasises the superior-subordinate relationship between elected and appointed officials as suggested by Wilson. As rightly noted by Finer (1940), by engaging in policy leadership and legislative oversight elected officials draw the boundaries of policy implementation within which public administrators must operate.

The neutral competence component of the dichotomy concerns public administration. Public administration's fundamental responsibility is to translate value choices of politicians into concrete results; as Wilson puts it, to straighten the paths of government and to 'crown its dutifulness'. Thus, the purpose of public administrators is to provide neutral competence to the policy process (Demir and Nyhan, 2008). By the neutral competence construct, public administrators, who are career bureaucrats, are enjoined to put their expertise at the disposal of elected officials, playing a strictly advisory role, while maintaining a low political profile. By this core value, public administrators are expected to exhibit a high level of political neutrality in the discharge of their implementation function in the policy process. As observed by Miller (2000) the underlying assumption of the neutral competence construct is that public administration should be distanced from politics as much as possible; in effect appointed officials are enjoined to uphold the two principles of loyalty to the state and serving the public interest.

Looking at neutral competence from another angle, Lee and Raadschelders (2008) have observed that neutrality and politicisation of bureaucrats are influenced by the historical development of the political system. For instance in political systems such as Europe where bureaucracy preceded

democracy, politicians are more inclined to control the bureaucracy through enhanced legislative controls. On the contrary, in political systems where democracy preceded bureaucracy, such as in the United States of America, politicians have the tendency to use bureaucracy for their interests and spoils (Nelson, 1982).

In principle the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy seeks to minimise political interference in public administration. The dichotomy stresses insulation of administration from politics, exercise of an appreciable degree of discretion by administration, separation of powers in terms of person and of function between politicians and administrators, apolitical non-partisan approach to duty by public administrators, and non-interference by politicians in policy implementation. In the next section, we shall focus on the second theoretical approach, the modified dichotomy, which tends to assign decision making responsibilities to public administrators while barring politicians from policy implementation.

Meanwhile, the major differences between politics and administration deduced from Wilson and his supporters' theory are summarised in Table 3.1 below:

Table 3.1: Politics-Administration Dichotomy – Summary

Politics	Administration
Deals with the expression of the state (peoples) will	Deals with the execution of the state (peoples) will
Determines the ends (what ought to be done)	Devises the means (how to do it)
Political functions performed mainly by politicians	Functions performed mainly by civil servants (bureaucrats)
One enters politics and become a politician through his/her popularity	One becomes a civil servant by his , qualification and competence
One becomes a politician mainly through election	One becomes a civil servant mainly through selection (by merit)
In dealing with clientele, politics seeks the interests of supporters and allies	Administration thrives on impartiality of rule and processes
Politics stresses on values	Administration stresses technical factors
Politics is about the actions of elected representatives and their electorates	Administration is about the actions of professionals
Politics is an area of change and unpredictability	Administration is an area of stability and routine
Annexing and retaining power is the primary focus of politics	Running government efficiently (and successfully) is the central focus of administration

Similarities

Despite the aforementioned differences between politics and administration, in functional systems both politicians and administrators interact at a point, which is normally at the top hierarchy where:

- Administrators get involved in politics as drafters of legislation and as co-workers of the minister;
- Both politicians and administrators seek to serve the public interest;
- Both politicians and administrators depend on each other. Politicians use administrators to further their plans or policies whilst administrators look up to politicians for brilliant careers;
- Both politicians and administrators try to find a balance between political accountability and administrative discretion.

3.4 The Modified Dichotomy

Apparently, Wilson's politics-administration dichotomy was largely accepted at the time of its postulation. Nevertheless, some public administration scholars expressed misgivings about his view of the working relations between politicians and public administrators, even during the height of its popularity (Dunn and Jeromes Jr., 2002). Notable among them were John Pfiffner, and quite recently James Svara. Pfiffner (1935), for example, in criticising the orthodox dichotomy, strongly submitted that it would be folly to suggest that administrative officers should have absolutely no hand in the formulation of policy, which according to the orthodox dichotomy is the preserve of politicians (elected officials). This is because such an arrangement is not feasible in any governance system. Similarly, Savoie (1994) has also asserted that although the politics-administration dichotomy still has some value in the understanding of contemporary problems of governance, 'it is foolhardy for anyone to simply assume that politics or policy making can be removed or separated from the practice of public administration'.

This assertion re-emphasises the opinion expressed by other scholars that policy making is a prominent function of public administration that need not be underestimated. Svara (1998), for instance, based his criticism on the 1952 International City Management Association Code of Ethics (of the United States), which defined the city manager as ‘a community leader who submits policy proposals to the council and provides the council with facts and advice on matters of policy to give the council a basis for making decisions on community goals’. This, no doubt, suggests the direct involvement of the manager who is a public administrator in policy making. This again is contrary to Wilson’s view as propounded by the orthodox dichotomy model. To Svara, ‘The manager was viewed as a participant in the deliberations about policy decisions who would offer a distinct perspective, although he would not supplant the council’s policy making prerogative.’

In his article ‘The Publicness of Public Administration’, Pesch (2011) quotes Appleby (1967) as stating that:

Administration is treated as a term involving policy-making as well as execution. It is so treated because it is felt that a great deal of policy-making is implicit in what the executive branch does, and that it is important to recognise this policy-making function (of administration). Persisting in a rigid distinction between politics and administration obstructs an assessment of the political aspects of public organisations.

Lambright (1971) also wrote:

Public administration is public policy making. As such it involves both politics and management. Virtually everyone now claims that public administration exists in a political environment and that the administrator must interact with the forces in that environment. The administrator is a participant in the political process, a politician in that he must engage in conflict resolution, exercise discretion, and make decisions affecting competing claims.

Appleby and Lambright's separate positions stated above seem to converge at one point; that administration is deeply involved in policy making, and that because administration occurs in a political environment it does not function in isolation, instead it is intertwined with politics in many ways. Obviously, this does not lend support to the theory of a rigid separation of politics from administration as propounded by the orthodox dichotomy. In fact, politicians rely very much on expert advice from technocrats in the policy formulation process; likewise, administrators do not only rely on politicians for the allocation of requisite resources to enable them perform their implementation role effectively but also for advancement in their chosen career.

These views resonate with the position of the modified politics-administration dichotomy model advanced by Montjoy and Watson (1995). Montjoy and Watson argued that although the orthodox dichotomy ideally prohibits local government managers from venturing into policy-making, in reality these managers and other public administrators are active participants in the policy-making process. Accordingly, they (Montjoy and Watson), constructed a version of the relationship that endorses the involvement of administrators in policy making but bars council members (politicians) from interfering in the management of government; that is in the implementation process.

In putting their view across, they developed a distinction between politics and administration on the one hand, and policy and administration on the other. These scholars argued that instead of just looking on to the politician to formulate policies, the manager is expected to exert policy leadership to the politician, thus breaking down the wall between politics and administration. As rightly noted by Appleby above, persisting in a rigid distinction between politics and administration may obstruct an assessment of the political aspects of public organisations.

These critics of the orthodox model hold the view that the dichotomy may apply to politics and administration but not policy and administration. In the opinion of Montjoy and Watson, in practice managers do participate in the policy process, exercise as much discretion as the council will allow, and still hold a clear line against ‘particularistic requests directed by the council to themselves or to members of staff’. They also reinforced the insulation of administration from politics posited by the orthodox model, however, by indicating that directions from the council come in the form of official policy but not in a command-and-control fashion.

From the discussion so far, it is clear that the proponents of the modified dichotomy model advocate the involvement of administration in politics by administrators providing policy leadership to elected officials to aid the policy formulation process. On the other hand, elected officials should refrain from venturing into administration by leaving implementation and general management questions to career bureaucrats who are professional administrators. This position seem confusing, however

3.5 The Partnership Model

The third of the core models describing the relationship between politics and administration, in this study, is the partnership model. This model focuses on the interconnectedness between politics and administration. It holds that administrators can have great impact on policy making and that elected officials can have great impact on administration. Svava (1998) observed that a strict separation of politics and administration as propounded by the orthodox dichotomy was unproductive. Instead, politicians and administrators must complement each other. Thus, while the modified dichotomy model approves of administrators venturing into policy making, the partnership model not only sanctions that as well but goes further to advocate elected officials’

participation in administration by being involved in the implementation and execution of laws and policies.

Shafritz et al (2004) report that Goodnow, though in principle supported the separation of policy implementation from policy formulation, later observed that actual political necessity requires some level of harmony between the expression of the state will and execution of the state will, and that, lack of harmony between the law and its execution can result in 'political paralysis'. To him this harmony can be obtained by sacrificing the independence of either politics or administration. Goodnow further indicated that while the function of politics has to do primarily with the expression of the state will, it has to do secondarily with the execution of that will. This indicates that the separation between the two must somehow be bridged, even if the independence of one is to be sacrificed. He later concluded that the executive function must of necessity be subordinated to the function of politics but cautioned that political control of administration must be mediated; for example, the general conduct, but not concrete actions of those who exercise administrative functions should be subject to control; otherwise too much control of administration by politics will inevitably produce more harm than good by nurturing inefficient administration (Goodnow, 1900). In his opinion, too much political control over administration has the tendency of making public administrators underrate their responsibilities as public servants who have been trained to deliver services to the people in an efficient manner. Goodnow accordingly proposed a more fluid view of the boundary between politics and administration than that envisioned by the orthodox dichotomy which advocates a watertight demarcation between political and administrative functions.

Other scholars have also commented on the various interrelationships between politics and administration. According to Friedric (1940), public policy is a continuous process. Its formation is inseparable from its execution; it is being formed as it is being executed, and it is likewise being executed as it is being formed. Thus, policy implementation re-enforces policy formulation and vice versa. Fredric's opinion on public policy as a cyclical phenomenon has been re-echoed by other writers like Hague and Harrop (2001), Denhardt and Denhardt (2006) and Tyagi (2007). Tyagi (2004:307) for example sees policy-formulation as a continuous process and that "policy is being formulated, re-formulated and reformulated at every stage." Supporting this with Secler-Huson's (cited in Tyagi, 2004) position that policy decision is a 'moment in process' and therefore it is being formulated at every level of the administrative hierarchy, one can clearly see the interconnectedness between policy formulation and policy implementation, which are core political and administrative functions respectively.

Svara (2001; 1999; 1998) supported the partnership model with a construct which he termed the complementarity of politics and administration. Svara's model stresses interdependency, reciprocal influence, and extensive interaction between elected and appointed officials, but with the recognition of the need for distinct roles and political supremacy. Svara (1998) considers the politics-administration dichotomy model as an aberration and stresses a model of complementarity as an alternative to the former. He quotes Woodruff (1919:37) as commenting that:

"Politics and administration are not two antagonistic elements, each seeking to enlarge its sphere of action at the expense of the other. They are not even independent powers in government, each working in a distinct field, performing its appropriate acts, and having for these purposes an authority of its own. On the contrary, they are two parts of the same mechanism, related in much the same way as to two elements in one chemical compound whose combined qualities give the

character to the substance. In a sense, politics and administration take part jointly in every act performed.”

These comments attributed to Woodruff lend credence to the fact that politics and administration are two sub-systems of a broader political system, which function in tandem for effective results in government, for which reason the malfunctioning of any of these two subsystems derails the achievement of desired outcomes of public policy. For this reason cohesion between the two fields is paramount. According to Svara, the complementarity model presumes distinction, deference, restraint, intermixture, reciprocal influence and interdependence (Svara 2001; 2006b; 2008). Distinction here refers to the difference in background and values of politicians and administrators. Deference implies respect for political supremacy by administrators in a superior-subordinate relationship, and restraint suggests the recognition by politicians of relative independence of administrators to the extent that politicians would refrain from involving themselves in detailed administration functions. On the other hand, intermixture, reciprocal influence and interdependence collectively denote mutual trust and the involvement of administrators in policy making and of politicians in policy implementation in a harmonious and synergic fashion.

Goel (2008), leaning on Luther Gulick and Paul Appleby, also added his voice to the school of thought that deems the complete separation of administration from politics as impracticable. He agrees with Appleby that administrators always participate in policy making by, for instance, formulating recommendations for legislations, and this is essentially a part of the function of policy making. In this way, public administrators are performing both policy-making and policy-implementation roles. Goel observes that this has been the trend in especially developing countries in recent years for a number of reasons including the complexity and technicality of policy decisions that necessarily require expert advice from public administrators. This advisory role of

public administration in policy formulation has always complemented the efforts of politics in shaping public policy.

Other contemporary writers have also made comments to suggest their acceptance of the partnership model of the politics-administration relations. Goel (2008) is one of them. He cites Sir Warren Fisher's definition of the duties of the civil servant in a memorandum to the Tomblin Commission (UK) as follows:

“Determination of policy is the function of a minister and once a policy is determined it is the unquestioned and unquestionable business of the civil servant to strive to carry out the policy with precisely the same energy and precisely the same goodwill whether he agrees with it or not. That is axiomatic and will never be in dispute. At the same time it is the traditional duty of civil servants, while decisions are being formulated, to make available to the political chief all the information and experience at their disposal, and to do this without fear or favour, irrespective of whether, the advice thus tendered may accord or not with minister's initial view. The presentation to the minister of relevant facts, the ascertainment and marshalling of which may often call into play the whole organisation of a department, demands of the civil servant the greatest care. The presentation of inferences from the facts equally demands from him all the wisdom and all the detachment he can command” (Goel, 2008:203).

Obviously, the partnership relation is not explicitly established in the duties of the civil servant (public administrator) outlined above, as it in one breath portrays the superior-subordinate interaction between politics and administration; and on the other hand, emphasises the importance of the public administrator in policy formulation through the provision of expert advice, emanating from knowledge and experience, to the politician. It may also appear that this definition is silent on the role of the minister (politician) in policy implementation; policy formulation is better highlighted here in the partnership.

More clearly, however, Goel establishes the complementary roles of politics and administration in the policy process by submitting that the politician provides the democratic element in administration while the public administrator provides the bureaucratic element. To him, “Both are essential, one of them to make the government popular, the other to make it efficient, and the test of good government is its successful combination of these two qualities” (Goel, 2008:203). This is a clear case for complementarity and interconnectedness of political and administrative functions which is the cornerstone of the partnership model.

Tyagi (2004), in his book ‘Public Administration – Principles and Practice’, pointed out criticisms directed towards the politics-administration dichotomy of Wilson and his followers. He cites Luther Gulick, Paul Appleby and John M. Gaus as scholars who strongly disagree with the separation of administration from politics. Statements such as: “a theory of public administration means in our time a theory of politics too” (Gaus, 1950:168); and “Administrators are continually laying down rules for the future, and administrators are continually determining what the law is, what it means in terms of action, what the rights of parties with respect both to transactions in process and transactions in prospect.....Administrators also participate in another way in the making of policy for the future; they formulate recommendations for legislation, and this is part of the function of policy-making.” (Appleby, 1967). Tyagi (2007) further quotes Peter Odegard as saying: “Policy and administration are Siamese twins in politics”, meaning the two are inseparable, that the survival of one depends on the other, and that there ought to be equilibrium in the relationship.

One other supporter of the partnership model, otherwise referred to as the complementarity model is Mafunisa (2003). He agrees with James Svara that the complementarity model is a strong

foundation for public administration at all levels of government (central and local governments). Since complementarity connotes separate parts and distinctiveness, but which function in such a way that outputs depend on the aggregate contributions of all the separate and distinctive parts, it is desirable that political office-bearers (politicians) and appointed public officials (public administrators) join forces together in the pursuit of sound governance (Svara, 2001). According to Mafunisa, complementarity emphasises interdependence amidst distinct roles; compliance along with independence; and respect for political supremacy alongside a commitment to shape and implement policy in ways that promote the public interest. Complementarity also stresses ‘deference to elected incumbents along with adherence to the law and support of fair electoral competition, and appreciation of politics along with support for professional standards’. Thus, there exists mutual interaction between political office holders and public administrators with the ultimate aim of effectively serving the public interest. As Mafunisa puts it, ‘the administrative component needs political and strategic direction from political heads, and political heads need effective administrative machinery for the translation of the political programmes into government policy’. This interdependence defeats any simplistic division of government into politics and administration. To sum up the tenets of the complementarity model, Mafunisa (2003) quotes Svara (2001) as asserting that “...there is continuity between the political and administrative spheres, not a separation of the two, except as it applies to insulating administrative staff from partisan political interference”. Thus, complementarity stresses continuity in government policy, co-operation and collaboration among political office holders and their bureaucratic counterparts, mutual respect and appreciation for each other’s field, and restraint by politicians from interfering in the day-to-day management functions of professional bureaucrats. To make this interaction work effectively, however, Svara (2001) advises that politicians must be committed to show respect for the

administrator's competence and trust their commitment to accountability and responsiveness (Lee and Raadschelders (2008).

Mafunisa (2003), in addition to the depoliticised or dichotomy model and the complementarity model, identifies three more models as depicting the relationship between politics and administration. These are the politicised bureaucracy model, the British permanent model, and the American hybrid model.

These are discussed briefly below as 'minor' models distinct from the three 'major' models which constitute the focus of this study.

3.6 Other Models of Politics-Administration Relations

3.6.1 Politicised Bureaucracy Model

The third model of politics-administration relations discussed by Mafunisa (2003) is the politicised bureaucracy model. As the name indicates, this is the direct opposite of the depoliticised bureaucracy model outlined above. This model, Mafunisa submits, argues that elected officials (politicians) have a mandate to control the public service (which is manned by public administrators). Thus, there is no distinction between politics and administration, and likewise, between party and state; instead, party structures impose administrative decisions on administrators. This model then re-enforces the subordination of administration to politics, to the extent that traditional administrative functions like appointment, reward and promotion decisions are mostly politically determined at the expense of meritocracy. In such a governance system patronage or the spoils system becomes the norm, and appointed officials are easily manipulated by elected officials, sometimes for their own parochial interests. Under the politicised bureaucracy

model, the top echelon of public management is manned by political appointees. By this arrangement, the ruling government ensures that loyal and committed party members and associates occupy senior political and bureaucratic positions in government (Mafunisa, 2003).

3.6.2 The British Permanent Model

The British public administration system is well noted for its adherence to some key attributes. These include permanency, neutrality and loyalty to the state. By this model therefore, public administrators are expected to be apolitical in the discharge of their functions as public appointees, and ever ready to loyally serve every government that comes into office without any prejudice or discrimination. This is against the background of the fact that appointments of public administrators follow bureaucratic processes and procedures rather than politically determined routes, with emphasis on merit by fair and transparent competition instead of by membership or loyalty to the ruling political party. Besides, their disciplinary procedures and dismissal decisions come through the bureaucratic process. Public administrators are accordingly barred from active partisan politics. They are however expected to offer expert policy advice to politicians and by extension, neutrally implement policies that emanate from the decision-making process. As expressed by Mafunisa (2003), British civil servants are required to perform loyally the duties assigned to them by the government of the day, whatever its political persuasion.

3.6.3 The American Hybrid Model

The fifth and final model of politics-administration relations identified by Mafunisa (2003) is the American hybrid, so named because this model contains elements of both the British merit system and the traditional American spoils system. What this implies is that the American civil service is composed of a mixture of officials whose appointments are based on merit and those who find

themselves in the civil service by virtue of their affiliation to the ruling government. These political appointees who are usually top level officials normally relinquish their positions when a President's term of office ends. This system therefore places high premium on neutral competence in the service of the government of the day as well as on selection into government based on merit. The next sections, (3.8.1 and 3.8.2) take a look at the practical manifestation of politics-administration relations in two African countries.

3.7 Summary of Theoretical Approaches

The chapter was designed mainly to throw some light on the theoretical framework that supports the politics-administration relations debate in public administration. Luminaries such as Woodrow Wilson, and Frank Goodnow (for the orthodox dichotomy model), Robert Montjoy and Douglas Watson (for the modified dichotomy model), and James Svara (for the partnership or complementarity model) constituted the core foundation of this theoretical discussion. The orthodox dichotomy model sanctions a complete separation of politics from administration to enhance efficient and effective operations of the bureaucracy in service delivery to the citizenry. The modified dichotomy advocates greater latitude for administrators to fully participate in policy formulation, in addition to their core business of policy implementation, while restricting politicians to their field of policy formulation. The partnership model, which seems to be the most preferred model among contemporary public administration scholars and practitioners, preaches complementary roles in policy formulation and implementation between politicians and public administrators. Mafusina's contribution to the debate has not been left out. He, in addition to the orthodox dichotomy and complementarity models, identified the politicised bureaucracy model, the British permanent model and the American hybrid model. These, 'minor' models (as the author

chooses to call them) have further enriched our understanding of the subject matter – the politics-administration relations.

The empirical literature supports these theoretical approaches but reveals differences in their applications in different countries and at different levels of government. Concepts such as separation of powers, bureaucracy, and the New Public Management, which in the writer's opinion are relevant doctrines to the theoretical positions espoused, were also outlined. Table 3.2 below provides a summary of the major theoretical approaches examined in this chapter.

Table 3.2: Politics-Administration Relations – Theoretical Approaches

Model	Theory	Leading Proponent(s)	Major Supporters
Orthodox Dichotomy	Complete separation of politics from administration. Politics concerned with policy formulation; Administration concerned with policy implementation. There is a master-servant relationship with politics deciding what must be done and administration obediently complying. There is no overlapping of functions.	Woodrow Wilson	Willoughby, Max Weber, Frank Goodnow
Modified Dichotomy	Full participation of administration in policy formulation in addition to core business of policy implementation; Politics should however be restricted to the policy formulation function, refraining from interfering in management of government or policy implementation.	Robert Montjoy & Douglas Watson	
Partnership (Complementarity)	Politics and administration complement each other; Politics permitted to venture into policy implementation, Administration allowed to venture into policy implementation. Symbiotic relationship based on trust, complementarity and interconnectedness of Politics and Administration.	James Svara	R. Cameron, M. J. Mafusina, J.M Gaus, Luther Gulick, Paul Appleby

3.8 Politics-Administration Relations in Developing Countries: Empirical Literature

There is no controversy in the fact that the politics-administration relations debate is as important to governance in developing countries as it is in democratically advanced ones. This is actually expected because the quality of the governance system depends largely on the type of policies governments formulate and the mode of implementation of such policies which, together, eventually affect the lives of the citizenry. The roles played by politicians and public administrators in this relationship in various jurisdictions are therefore crucial. It is even more important in less-developed countries including those found in Africa for lack of consensus in the literature as to whether politicians or public administrators dominate the political-administrative relations in developing countries (Cameron, 2010). In this section, we shall take a cursory look at how this relations work in two African countries. The objective of this section is to explore the possibly different perspectives of the politics-administration relations in the developing world and the merits and demerits associated with them.

3.8.1 Politics-Administration Relations in South Africa

South Africa, without any controversy, is one of the most advanced countries on the African continent. Yet, its history as a democratic state can only be traced to the abolishing of the apartheid system and the assumption of power by the African National Congress (ANC) government in 1994. In his paper ‘Separation of Politics from the South African Public Service: Rhetoric or Reality?’ Mafunisa (2003) identifies five models which seek to explain the relationship between politics and administration generally. These are: the dichotomy model (which he also calls depoliticised bureaucracy), politicised bureaucracy model, complementarity model, the British model, and the American hybrid model.

Mafusina (2003) submits that politicisation of the South African public service is historical. He traces this politicisation to the coming into power in 1948 of the National Party (NP), at which time the National Party staffed senior positions in the public service with loyal party members who clearly understood the apartheid system and were willing to push the policies of discrimination to the letter. In that situation, it was difficult to separate the government-of the-day and the public service; the two were virtually fused together. Cameron (2010) attests to Mafunisa's submission, even after the collapse of the apartheid system. He personally explains politicisation as partisan control of the bureaucracy, when civil service practices are governed by political rather than administrative norms, and buttressed it with Peters and Pierre's (2004:2) definition of politicisation as "the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the service". To Cameron, this practice is rife in South Africa's current governance system.


In his study 'Redefining political-administrative relations in South Africa', Cameron (2003) tentatively submits that political control over appointments of senior public servants has intensified under the post-apartheid African National Congress (ANC) government, as compared to the National Party's apartheid administration. What this means is that even routine administrative functions like appointments, promotions, transfers and performance management are largely influenced by politics to the extent that at one stage ANC members, some of whom even lacked any management experience, were deployed to senior positions in the bureaucracy. Cameron (2010) quotes from a 2007 Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study on political involvement in bureaucracies in the appointment, dismissal, promotion, transfer and performance assessment of public servants; published results indicate that South Africa was the third out of twelve countries studied that exhibited high political involvement in such

administrative activities. This practice has considerably contributed to unsatisfactory service delivery Mafunisa (2003). For instance Cameron (2010) has indicated that attempts to empower South Africa's public managers through New Public Management (NPM) reforms have been 'half-hearted' and hence frequently incompletely implemented. This has resulted in a high turnover of senior managers in South Africa's public organisations.

In the light of this however, Cameron (2003) has argued that governments should have the right to appoint senior managers who not only share their ideological beliefs but also possess the managerial competence to perform effectively. This, in effect, partly endorses South Africa's Presidential Review Commission's (of 1998) position that for the sake of possible sabotage by disloyal incumbents of previous regimes, there is the need for political appointments within the public service as a cushion against unsupportive public servants (Mafunisa, 2003).

3.8.1.1 Politics-Administration Continuum on Council Appointment of Staff

The assertion that the debate on the politics-administration relations is unending is evident in Cameron's (2003) identification of a five model-continuum of this relationship on the appointment of staff (in South Africa), as captured in figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1 Politics –Administrative Continuum Council Appointment of Staff

Source: Cameron (2003)

At the two extreme ends of the continuum are the neutral and the party-state fusion models. The neutral model depicts the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy which assumes that senior public administrators are non-partisan and are not involved in policy formulation, which is the core function of political office holders. In this model senior public administrators at all levels of government (national and local) are appointed by government along bureaucratic principle of competence and meritocracy.

Following the neutral model is the minimalist appointment model. In this model, the issue of trust is paramount in the appointment of senior public administrators such that a new council may replace existing senior staff with loyalists it can trust in advancing and implementing its policies. To this end the mayor/council appoints senior and middle management staff to comprise about five percent of total staff.

The third model on the politics-administration continuum of staff appointment is the medium patronage model. In this model both senior public administrators as well as middle management are replaced on the assumption of duty by a new council.

The medium patronage model is followed along the continuum by the comprehensive patronage model which involves the wholesale removal of administrative officials from the top to the bottom of the organisation's structure, when there is a change of administration.

Finally, at the extreme right end of the continuum is the party-state fusion model. This fifth model fuses together both local government and party interests to the extent that it is impossible to distinguish one from the other.

Cameron (2003) has associated these models with some jurisdictions worldwide. For instance he associates the minimalist appointment model to Western European countries like Germany, France and Britain and also the United States of America (USA), and the medium patronage model to Latin America.

This South African report however, recommends the minimalist appointment model as the most appropriate. This of course has a semblance of the American hybrid model identified by Mafunisa (2003) as outlined above.

3.8.2 Politics-Administration Relations in Tanzania

Jacobsen (1999) decided to take investigations into the politics-administration relations to another level, focusing on 'trust' between the two fields. In his paper: 'Trust in Political-Administrative Relations: The Case of Local Authorities in Norway and Tanzania', Jacobsen has made some

interesting revelations. Starting from Wilson (1887), Goodnow (1900), and Weber (1946), Jacobsen submits that these classical public administration scholars have stressed the need to separate politics from administration on the simple basis that politics is about values while administration is about facts. Accordingly, politics and administration should have different logics of action, different ways of validation and different tasks. This position has however been disputed by other renowned writers like Svava (1991), Rosenbloom (1989), and Jacobsen (1996). This latter category of scholars maintain that in both developed and developing countries, politics and administration are intermingled in ways that tend to turn administrators into politicians and politicians into administrators, thus dislocating the supposed separation.

The thesis of Jacobsen's work is that trust is crucial in the type of relationship that exists between politicians and public administrators. He suggests that whenever there is distrust between politicians and administrators the latter have the propensity to hold back vital information from the former, especially if such information is politically harmful to the administrator. On the contrary, in an atmosphere of trust administrators may willingly disclose information to politicians even if such information seem detrimental to them, trusting that such disclosures will not be used against them (Jacobsen, 1999), immediately or in the future.

Results from this study indicate that: first, Tanzanian administrators exhibit a significantly lower degree of trust in politicians than their Norwegian counterparts; second, in Tanzania, public administrators discuss important and difficult decisions among themselves before seeking opinions from other groups like external specialists and organised interest groups; politicians do not feature much in such deliberations. This is at variance with the Norwegian practice in which the second most prominent discussion partners after bureaucratic colleagues are politicians when difficult

decisions are about to be made. Thirdly, Tanzanian administrators regard their role in policy implementation as more decoupled from 'political signals' while Norwegian administrators are more inclined to implementing political decisions loyally even if they disagree with such decisions.

We may infer from these findings that in Tanzania the relationship between politics and administration is more skewed towards the orthodox dichotomy model, by which administration is distanced from politics along professional lines, than the complementarity model which stands for interconnectedness between the two fields. On the other hand the Norwegian system is more of complementarity in the sense that it depicts interconnectedness and interdependence between politicians and bureaucrats. Since trust plays an important role in creating and enhancing free-flow of information between politicians and administrators in decision-making (Jacobsen, 1999), political development requires that trust between politicians and administrators must be created and strengthened in any political system.

Jacobsen's (1999) study however indicates that there is a 'trust-deficit' between politicians and public administrators in a new democracy (such as Tanzania) compared with an established democracy (as Norway). This should in fact be expected since it takes time for trust to build up between two entities, especially when it comes to divulging of information. Secondly, Tanzanian administrators act less politically loyal when implementing political decisions than their Norwegian counterparts. This attitude however, according to Jacobsen (1999), may be attributed to other national traits such as culture instead of trust. Thus, although trust is important and enhances politics-administration relations, other national differences like different regimes, different national cultures, different economic situations and different staffing policies in both

administration and politics, have considerable influence on the relationship between politicians and administrators and the way they execute the policy formulation and implementation functions.

In the next section we shall briefly take a look at the findings of an earlier study conducted by the researcher on the politics-administration relations in Ghana's local government. On a 4-point Likert-type scale, respondents were asked to Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; or Strongly Disagree with simple statements relating to the politics-administration relations. In his particular study the emphasis was on the administration wing of the interface. The survey results are presented in Table 3.2 and discussed briefly below:

3.8.3 Politics-Administration Relations in Ghana: Preliminary Studies

(Strongly Agree & Agree = Agree; Disagree & Strongly Disagree = Disagree)

Table 3.3 Politics-Administration Relation Preliminary Studies – Field Data

Statement	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)
Appointed officials should fully partner elected officials to formulate policy	95	5
Elected officials should fully partner appointed officials to implement policy	80	20
Good policy decisions in government require a blending of expert knowledge with political preference	96	4
Elected officials should be responsible for policy making while appointed officials take charge of policy implementation	30	70
Administration should be completely removed from politics	45	55
Appointed officials should fully put their expertise at the disposal of elected officials	69.5	30.5
Policy making should be a combined effort of appointed and elected officials but implementation should be the sole responsibility of appointed officials	81	19
Elected officials should keep away from policy implementation	61	39
Elected officials should leave implementation to appointed officials but provide feedback on implementation to appointed officials	77	23

Statements adopted from Montjoy and Watson (1995) and modified by author (2013)

As depicted in Table 3.2 above preference for the three models of politics-administration relations is not by consensus. For instance although most of the respondents opine that good policy decisions in government require a blending of expert knowledge with political preference for which reason appointed officials should take part in policy making and elected officials should be involved in policy implementation, others still believe that elected officials should be responsible for policy

making while appointed officials take charge of policy implementation. These two positions fit into the partnership and the orthodox models respectively. The partnership model largely associated with James Svara stresses complementarity and interconnectedness between politics and administration and a harmonious relation that pulls resources and efforts of both fields together in the policy process. The dichotomy model on the other hand submits that policy making should be the responsibility of elected officials while appointed officials take up the responsibility of policy implementation. Some administrators however opted to holding on to the implementation process although they would like to feature prominently in policy formulation. The partnership approach obviously is opposed to both the orthodox dichotomy as well as the modified dichotomy.

3.9 Conclusion

One is tempted to believe, based on the foregone discussions that the debate on politics-administration relations in government will continue for a very long time among public administration scholars, practitioners and students as well as political scientists. This is against the backdrop of the fact that the three theoretical approaches highlighted above namely the orthodox dichotomy, the modified dichotomy and the partnership model do not seem to be mutually exclusive. Rather, each of the three models tends to exhibit some characteristics of one model or the other. For example, some features of the 'Wilsonian' orthodox dichotomy which Svara (1998) describes as an aberration are found in the 'more modern' model of partnership or complementarity, which is generally embraced by contemporary writers on the subject matter. Mention can be made of the superior-subordinate relation between politicians and public administrators emphasised by the orthodox model and equally acknowledged by advocates for complementarity. Secondly, the only striking difference between the modified dichotomy and the

orthodox dichotomy is the barring of politicians from policy implementation while public administrators are allowed to venture into policy formulation.

It is obvious however, from the empirical literature on country-specific illustrations that the separation between politics and administration varies at different administrative levels and in different countries due to different cultural practices (Wu and Liang Ma, 2010). This re-emphasises the diversity of politics-administration relations in different jurisdictions. This calls for a careful assessment of which model will work best for any political system, taking into accounts the public management environment which is not universally uniform and the cultural practices that vary from country to country and from one level of government to another. This is one of the main goals/objectives of this dissertation in relation to Ghana's local government system.

This whole project is about decision making and execution with emphasis on the relationship between the decision makers and implementers. We shall therefore devote the next chapter to understanding what goes into the decision making process, especially the importance of decisions and the decision making process, types of decisions, models of decision making, and finally decision making in Ghana's local government.

CHAPTER FOUR

DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY FORMULATION

4.1 Introduction

Decision making is paramount to the success or failure (growth or demise) of every organisation. It is therefore incumbent on decision makers in any organisation to consider decisions and decision making as the lifeblood of the organisation. In government (both national and local) economic and social development and, of course, general well-being of the citizenry depend not only on the types and quality of decisions taken by the leaders but also on the decision making process. Is the process confined to 'the powers that be' or general participation is encouraged?

This chapter reviews decision making as a process. It is divided into four main sections. The first section will focus on the decision making process; this will be followed by the types of decisions leaders are normally confronted with. The third section will be centred on approaches (or models) of decision making; with the final section dwelling on decision making in local government (district assemblies) of Ghana.

4.1.1 Decisions and Decision Making

Let us start with the effort of understanding what decisions and decision making mean. Decisions have been variously defined in the literature on management. Decisions have often been described as courses of action, which are consciously chosen to arrive at desired ends or objectives. They are the means by which organisations turn ideas into action, a process which can have either a positive or a negative impact on the fortunes of organisations. It may be regarded as an outcome of mental processes leading to the selection of a course of action among several alternatives. Decision

making involves mapping the likely consequences of decisions, working out the importance of individual factors, and choosing the best course of action to take. Decision making can therefore be defined as choosing between alternatives (Moorhead and Griffin, 2004). In the view of Cole (2004), decision making is a process of identifying a problem, evaluating alternatives, and selecting one alternative. During the whole process, the decision maker makes the best choice from among several options based on the prevailing situation to solve an identified problem or explore an opportunity. Accordingly, Rollinson (2002) opines that decision making is the process of producing a solution to a recognized problem. It follows therefore that for decisions to be made there should be a problem, this problem might have been identified, and a solution is sought to the problem. On the other hand an opportunity is identified and a decision is made on how and when to explore this opportunity for the collective good of society.

4.1.2 The Decision-Making Process

According to Mintzberg et al (1976), decision-making involves three phases. These are: intelligence, design and choice. Intelligence involves the situation whereby the decision-maker identifies a gap between an existing state and the desired state and searches for ways to close this gap. This condition for decision-making may be necessitated either by a problem which must be solved or an opportunity which must be explored and utilised. The second phase of the decision-making process is design. During design, the decision-maker develops and analyses alternative courses of action by either searching for ready-made alternatives or developing a custom-made solution (Schultheis and Sumner, 1998). This phase is followed by choice, during which the decision-maker selects the best alternative.

It must be stated however that the decision-maker, after establishing the need for decision-making, must be motivated enough to solve the identified problem or utilise the emerging opportunity subject to the availability of the required resources.

4.2 Types of Decision

There are different types of decisions to be made in any organisational set-up, with each type suitable for particular situations or circumstances. They include programmed decisions, non-programmed decisions, group decisions, strategic decisions, and tactical decisions. The characteristics of some of these decision types are outlined below.

4.2.1 Programmed Decisions

Decisions are programmed to the extent that they are repetitive and routine, and to the extent that a definite approach has been worked out for handling them before. Because an issue of problem is well-structured or known or because it has been dealt with several times in the past, the decision maker or manager does not have to go through the trouble and expense of working up an involved decision process. Programmed decision making, therefore, is relatively simple and tends to rely heavily on previous solutions. Once a structured problem is identified, its solution is usually self-evident or at least reduced to very few alternatives that have proved successful in the past. In many cases, therefore, a programmed decision is required when adequate information about the decision situation is available to the decision maker. In certain situations, due to the frequent occurrence of the situation, making a decision rule is easy because there are laid down procedures. The presence of such decision rules guides the decision maker towards the most appropriate alternative that can be chosen under the prevailing conditions. This enables him to make programmed decisions; the same rule is used to make a decision whenever such a situation arises in the future.

If the situation is the same, the rule applied has to be the same. A programmed decision making thus becomes decision making by precedent (Boachie Danquah 2005). Managers and executives simply do what they and others have done previously in similar or same situations. Under such circumstances superior officers usually formulate ground rules and leave subordinates and other ranks to make the decisions.

In this vein, Simon (1977) submits that programmed decisions are made in response to a situation that has occurred often enough to enable decision rules to be developed and applied in the future. Programmed decisions could also be viewed as decisions that occur often enough in an organisation that standardized rules are used to make them. These standardized rules can take the form of decision guidelines, standard operating procedures, or check-lists. Programmed decisions help to ensure that tasks are performed smoothly and consistently, usually following a routine procedure. When problems are not routine and repetitive to justify the making of standard rules to arrive at a decision, a non-programmed approach to decision making is adopted.

4.2.2 Non-Programmed Decisions

Programmed or routine decision making is obviously the most efficient way to handle well-structured problems. However, when problems are ill-structured, managers and executives must rely on non-programmed decision making techniques in order to develop unique or customised solutions.

For example, if a local government wants to go into a public-private partnership or intends building a multi-million cedi market complex or plans to acquire land banks, or considers an urban rezoning project, it is treading in the realms of non-programmed decision making. A new decision making

situation which involves the development and evaluation of alternatives without any laid down decision rule is called a non-programmed decision.

By its nature, non-programmed decision making is required for decisions which are new, unfamiliar or uncommon. Information about problems that call for non-programmed decisions is ambiguous or scanty, and for that matter uncertain. Such decisions are unique and non-recurring. When an executive is confronted with such an ill-structured problem, there is no tailor-made or predetermined solution; instead, a custom-made, non-programmed response is required. As Daft (2003) puts it, non-programmed decisions are made in response to situations that are unique, poorly defined and largely unstructured and have important consequences for the organization. When making non-programmed decisions, managers largely rely on their expertise, experience and intuition.

4.2.3 Group Decision Making

Most of the important decisions within organizations are made by groups or committees such as a cabinet, a council or a board. However, the interaction inherent in group decision making may lead to either a higher or lower quality of decision. Nevertheless, group decision making has several benefits. One of such benefits is that it presents more complete information and knowledge. There is more data and information within a group of expert membership than is typically found in an individual; therefore group members may provide a more diverse input into any particular decision. Group decision making therefore tends to generate more alternatives, possibly allowing the organisation to optimize more.

Another advantage of group decision making is that communication and understanding is better enhanced when group decision making is used. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of the decision(s) being accepted and supported, and for that matter it facilitates the acceptance of a solution. What this means is that if people who will be affected (or likely to be affected) by a decision get involved or participate in the decision making process, then they are most likely to accept it themselves and encourage others to do same. Therefore, group decisions tend to increase acceptance of the final solution and facilitate its implementation. One other strength of group decision making - following from the above- is that it increases legitimacy; the group decision making process is consistent with democratic ideals and may therefore be recognised as being more legitimate than decisions made by single individual managers.

This is not to say, however, that group decision making is without flaws. The first problem associated with group decision making is that the process is time consuming (Fox, 1991). It takes time to arrange meetings of groups and the interactions that take place at group meetings are frequently insufficient and oftentimes initially inconclusive. Consequently, groups take a longer time to reach a solution. Again, with group decision making, there is pressure to conform. The desire of members to be accepted and considered as an asset to the group may result in constraining an outright disagreement, thereby encouraging conformity to non-convergent viewpoints. In addition to the above flaws, there is ambiguity of responsibility associated to group decision making. Group members are supposed to share responsibilities but in group decision making, it is not possible to establish who is actually responsible for the adoption of a particular decision.

Similarly, group decision making can encourage groupthink, which is a phenomenon that emerges in a group when the group members' desire for consensus and cohesion outweighs their desire to make the best possible, yet often unpopular, contributions (Daft, 2003). As Rosenbloom et al, (2009:318) put it, the basic idea behind groupthink is that “individuals choose to minimise conflict within the group by striving for consensus in decision making without going through all the elements of the rational-comprehensive model of critically questioning and examining the objectives, means, and alternatives to the decision at hand”. It must be noted here that the committee system practiced in local government aptly fits into the group decision making domain.

4.2.4 Strategic Decision Making

Strategic decisions are usually made by top management with respect to analysing a situation and modifying it with regards to the use of the existing scarce resources. Strategic decisions affect the long term direction of the entire organisation and are typically made by top managers. According to Asch and Bowman (1989), strategic decisions are concerned with the fundamental nature of the organisation itself. Examples of strategic decisions include: decisions about the activities that the organisation should engage in; acquiring and divesting resources, including human resources and business units; and the nature and pace of organisational change. Strategic decisions are those which affect the long term performance of the business and which relate directly to its aims and objectives, its mission and vision.

Strategic decisions are often complex and the outcomes uncertain. This is because of the scarce information that is usually available. Managers at this level often depend on past experiences and their instincts when making strategic decisions. Strategic decisions normally deal with the

organizations' relationship with its environment and other interest groups; such decisions affect the organizations' goods, services or market operations.

4.2.5 Tactical Decisions

Basically, tactical decisions involve actions, ends, or means that are immediate or short-term in duration, and/or lesser in importance or magnitude than strategic decisions. Tactical decisions are medium-term decisions. Decisions made at this level are to help move the organisation closer to reaching the strategic goal. Examples of tactical decisions might be to pick an advertising agency to promote a new product or to provide an incentive plan to employees to encourage them increase production. In the case of local government tactical decision making may result in devising an incentive package to motivate tax collectors to improve on their performance to mobilise more taxes to increase the revenue base. Insomuch as a misguided strategy could take an organisation in an entirely wrong direction and lead to failure, a misguided tactic would have a more limited impact (Madura 1998); it can be more easily remedied.

In the view of Daft (2001), tactical decision making has the added responsibility of: making sure that current operations remain sustainable; making sure that the organization as a whole is successful in what it sets out to accomplish; making sure that sufficient synergies are unlocked from current operations to improve the organisation as a whole; and making sure that new operations are designed and implemented so as to optimise the value they will unlock for the organisation. While tactical decision making is very important, it needs to be seen in the context of the other types of decisions mentioned above in the organisation.

4.3 Models of decision making

There are varied approaches (models) to decision making. These include the traditional managerial approach, the political approach, the legal approach and mixed-scanning. These are reviewed below.

4.3.1 The Traditional Managerial Approach (Classical Model)

The traditional managerial approach emphasises the need for rationality in decision making, where rationality refers to the belief or principle that actions and opinions should be based on reason rather than on emotions. This model of decision making is a prescriptive approach that prescribes ways of decision making by managers. The classical model is based on economic assumptions and asserts that managers are logical, rational individuals who make decisions that are in the best interest of the organization. The classical view of decision making has always integrated the concept of rationality and rational decisions. According to Huczynski and Buchanan (2002), ‘rationality is equated with scientific reasoning, empiricism and positivism and with the use of decision criteria of evidence, logical argument and reasoning’. And thus, rational decisions are decisions which are based on rationality. The advantage of the classical model is to indicate a rational approach that can be applied to the business of reaching decisions in organisations (Li, 2008).

Key to the traditional managerial approach, therefore, is the **rational-comprehensive model** of decision making. Rational decision making is a method for systematically selecting among possible choices that is based on reason and facts. By this process the decision maker will often employ a series of analytical steps to review relevant facts, observations and possible outcomes before choosing any particular course of action. This model is therefore primarily concerned about

(i) determining the objectives of a public policy, (ii) considering the means to achieve the objectives and (iii) choosing the best alternative (Rosenbloom et al, 2009).

(i) Determining the Objectives

The first step of decision making, according to the rational-comprehensive model is for the decision maker to determine the objectives of a public policy. For example what does the policy aim at achieving and which group(s) is/are the target(s) of an intervention? It is important that the objectives must be identified in operational terms in order to enable observation and, if possible, measurement.

(ii) Considering the Means

After establishing or determining the objectives of a public policy, the next step is to consider the various means available for achieving these objectives. Ideally, all the means identified must be scrutinised.

(iii) Choosing the Best Alternative

After a detailed examination of all the potential means of accomplishing an objective, the final step is to choose from the pool the best alternative for application.

Daft (2003), submits that the classical model of decision making is considered to be normative, that is, it defines how a decision maker should make decisions. The value of the classical model has been its ability to help decision makers to be more rational. For instance, many senior managers, according to Blai (1986), rely solely on intuition and personal preferences for making decisions. Lee et al., (1999) on their part have argued that ‘the classical decision theory views the decision maker as acting in a world of complete certainty.’ It assumes that ‘decision makers are

objective, have complete information and consider all possible alternatives and their consequences before selecting the optimal solution.’ Based on the definition above, it is clear that classical decision making theory is derived from several assumptions. Herbert (1981) agreed that this process is underlain by certain assumptions and characteristics, which are highly unrealistic in practice and are widely argued in the managerial field.

And, according to Robbins (2003), the classical model of decision making could not fully represent how people make decisions in organisations, because people do not know how accurate the data used to make decisions is, how reliable the estimates of the probabilities are, and how useful the data is related to the event.

4.3.2 Political Approach to Decision Making

The political approach to decision making stresses incrementalism. The **incremental model** as outlined in Lindblom’s (1959) strategy of ‘disjointed incrementalism’ is seen as a decision making model that reinforces stability and consistency in public administration. It calls for public administrators to be responsive to the public and be politically representative of groups that constitute it. It also demands of administrators to be accountable to elected officials (Rosenboom et al, 2009). This calls for public participation in administrative decision making. Besides, it encourages development of political coalitions and consensus and allows non-expert political officers to give direction to public administrators as well as exert pressure on them to chart certain preferred courses.

This model has arisen within the management literature because managers are expected to make decisions that are economically sensible and in the organisation's best economic interest.

The six basic requirements underlying this model are listed in Etzioni (1967) as follows:

- Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evaluating all alternatives, the decision-maker focuses only on those policies which differ incrementally from existing policies.
- Only a relatively small number of policy alternatives are considered.
- For each policy alternative, only a restricted number of "important" consequences are evaluated.
- The problem confronting the decision-maker is continually redefined: Incrementalism allows for countless ends-means and means-ends adjustments which in effect make the problem more manageable.
- Thus, there is no one decision or "right" solution but a "never-ending series of attacks" on the issues at hand through serial analyses and evaluation.
- As such, incremental decision-making is described as remedial, geared more to the alleviation of present, concrete social imperfections than to the promotion of future social goals.

In the opinion of Amitai Etzioni, incrementalism tends to overlook basic societal innovations; instead it focuses on the short run and seeks only limited variations from past policies. Similarly, Rosenbloom et al (2009) have also observed that the incremental model of decision making does not support decisions intended to direct society or commit it to large-scale ventures. Besides, possible occurrence of circularity in policy making places a limitation on the incremental model.

It must be stated that despite its shortcomings, the political model of decision making is useful for making non-programmed decisions when conditions are uncertain, information is limited and there is disagreement among managers about what goals to pursue or what course of action to take (Daft, 2003). They therefore engage in coalition building for making complex organisational decisions (coalitions are informal alliances among managers who support a specific goal).

When outcomes are not predictable, managers gain support through discussions, negotiations and bargaining. Without a coalition, a powerful individual or group could derail the decision making-process. Further, coalition building gives managers the opportunity to contribute to decision making thereby enhancing the commitment to the alternative that is ultimately adopted. The political model closely resembles the real environment in which most managers and decision makers operate. Decisions are complex and involve many people, information is often ambiguous and disagreement and conflict over problems and solutions are normal.

Daft (2003), has identified four (4) basic assumptions of the political model:

- Organisations are made up of groups with diverse interest goals and values. The managers disagree about problem priorities and may not understand or share the goals and interests of the other managers.

- Information is ambiguous and incomplete. The attempt to be rational is limited by the complexity of many problems as well as personal and organisational constraints.
- Managers do not have the time, resources, or mental capacity to identify all dimensions of the problem and process all relevant information. Managers talk to each other and exchange view points, to gather information and reduce ambiguity.
- Managers engage in the push and pull debate to decide goals and discuss alternatives. Decisions are the result of bargaining and discussion among coalition members.

Fulop and Linstead (1999) argue that the political model can be applied to situations that organisations need to increase production and also to decide how to achieve this objective.

4.3.3 The Satisficing Model

One other important approach to decision making is the satisficing model. In this model, individuals make decisions that provide satisfactory and sufficient solutions to identified problems. Thus, by this model, decision makers seek well-enough solutions to their problems. This model is characterized by bounded rationality and incrementalism (Fox, 1991). Satisficing is a method for making a choice from a set of alternatives encountered sequentially when one does not know much about the possibilities ahead of time. Thus, satisficing in decision making is the examination of all alternatives until a practical (most obvious, attainable, and reasonable) solution with adequate level of acceptability is found, and stopping the search there instead of looking for the best-possible (optimum) solution. Satisficing means that the decision maker chooses the first solution alternative that satisfies minimal decision criteria. Rather than pursuing all alternatives to identify the single

solution that will maximize economic returns (as is the case with the optimising model), decision makers will opt for the first solution that appears to solve the problem (i.e. a solution that is good enough), even if better solutions are presumed to exist; as the decision maker cannot justify the time and expense of obtaining complete information (Simons, 1957). Satisficing thus takes the shortcut of setting an adjustable aspiration level and ending the search for alternatives as soon as one is encountered that exceeds the aspiration level (Simon, 1956). Most managers settle for a satisficing rather than a maximizing solution. This is partly because they have limited information and partly because they have vague criteria for what constitutes a maximizing solution (Fox, 1991). In the opinion of William Fox, the satisficing model is characterised by bounded rationality and incrementalism.

4.3.4 The Mixed Scanning Model

The decision making models/approaches reviewed in the preceding sections are not totally perfect; they all have their strengths and weaknesses. As such none is fully suitable for all decisions. To go round this problem Amitai Etzioni (1967; also cited in Rosenbloom et al, 2009) has developed a model that attempts to synthesise these models in a bid to maximise their advantages and minimise their disadvantages. This comprehensive approach to decision making is referred to as the mixed-scanning approach.

Mixed-scanning is a decision making process at the highest level, which may be instituted for making and elaborating of fundamental decisions. The approach requires that decision makers differentiate between fundamental decisions pertaining to goals and more limited decisions made within the context of those goals. This is made possible by attempting to combine the rational-comprehensive and the satisficing or incrementalism models (Rosenbloom et al, 2009; Fox, 1991).

Fox further alludes to the fact that the rational-comprehensive model applied on its own is too expensive and time consuming, whilst the satisficing model is biased towards status quo groups and issues. Combining them therefore tends to minimise the inherent shortcomings associated with each model standing independently. Similarly, Goldberg (1975) describes mixed scanning as a hierarchical mode of decision making that combines higher order, fundamental decision making with lower order, incremental decisions that work out and/or prepare for higher order ones. The term scanning according to Etzioni, is used to refer to search, collection, processing, and evaluation of information as well as to the drawing of conclusions. Mixed scanning also contains rules for allocation of resources among levels of decision making and for evaluation, leading to changes in the proportion of higher versus lower levels of scanning based on changes in the situation.

The mixed-scanning model calls for the decision maker to scan the organization regularly without processing the enormous amounts of detail generated. Fox (1991) suggests that all alternatives are reviewed and thereafter only the most promising alternatives are analysed. Decisions taken are on incremental basis and these decisions could be mixed with some more fundamental decisions. This, according to Gortner, et al, (1987), provides for flexibility during decision-making.

4.4 Decision Making in Ghana's Local Government (District Assembly)

As explicitly stated in the preceding sections of this chapter, organisations and governments are driven by decisions that impact organisational and/or public policy. Decision making (and decision making procedures) in local government is therefore of fundamental importance to the overall governance regime of Ghana's district assembly system. Going by the structure of the current local government system of Ghana (depicted in Figure 2.3), it is apparent that communication within

the system is 'bi-directional', portraying a bottom-up and a top-down approaches to decision making.

By this process, the grassroots within the base of the structure - unit committees – are supposed to be the first point of call where decisions concerning the localities are to be made. By this arrangement issues are discussed in detail, carefully weighing the pros and cons at the unit committee level after which interests, consents and concerns are channelled upward to the Metropolitan/Municipal/District Assembly (MMDA) level for aggregation leading to policy formulation. This all inclusive decision making procedure is referred to as the bottom-up approach. On the reverse, decisions and policies that are formulated are communicated from the top (the MMDAs) through the other strata to the unit committees for implementation in a top-down fashion.

Decision making at the MMDA level is also supposed to be highly participatory. It is also worth mentioning at this stage that like many large organisations, local governments discharge their mandate via the committee system. The case of Ghana's local government is not different. At this level group decision making technique is adopted by way of the committee system, whereby committees are composed of assembly members that are knowledgeable in specific fields. Here the skills, competences and experiences of all members are harnessed for relevant and timely decision making. The heads of decentralised departments in the district are also expected to attend committee meetings where their inputs into deliberations on their fields of expertise are invaluable.

It is also worth mentioning at this stage that like many large organisations, local governments discharge their mandate via the committee system. The case of Ghana's local government is not

different. The next section provides an insight into committees of District Assemblies as prescribed by the local Government Act (Act 462).

4.4.1 Statutory Committees of District Assemblies

Local authorities have considerable discretion as regards the committees they appoint to enhance the performance of their mandate. They are nonetheless required by law to appoint certain committees. In Ghana's new local government system, Article 251(1) of the 1992 Constitution and Section 19(1) of the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) both enjoin every District Assembly to establish an **Executive Committee** which shall be responsible for performing the executive and administrative functions of the Assembly. Membership of this committee, as specified by law, comprises not more than one-third of the total number of members of the Assembly elected by members from among themselves; the Presiding Member is however exempted from the membership of this committee (Section 19(2) of Act 462).

4.4.2 Functions of the Executive Committee

Act 462 (Section 21(1)) provides that the Executive Committee of a District Assembly shall exercise the executive and coordinating functions of the District Assembly. Accordingly, the functions of the Executive Committee include:

- Coordinating plans and programmes of the sub-committees and submitting these as comprehensive plans of action to the District Assembly;
- Implementing resolutions of the District Assembly;

- Overseeing the administration of the District in collaboration with the Office of the District Chief Executive;
- Recommending, where it considers necessary, in the case of non-decentralised departments in the district to the appropriate Ministry, Department or Agency the appointment and replacement on stated grounds of officers within the area of authority of the Assembly;
- Adopting measures to develop and execute approved plans of the units, areas and towns and sub-metropolitan districts within the area of authority of the Assembly; and
- Recommending to the assembly the coordination, integration and harmonisation of district development plans and policies (Ahwoi, 2010).

The Executive Committee is also expected to recommend to the District Assembly –


- (i) the economic, social, spatial and human settlement policies relating to the development of the district;
- (ii) harmonisation of the development policies of the district with national development policies;
- (iii) the integration and coordination of the processes of planning, programming, budgeting and implementation;
- (iv) initiation and implementation of development programmes and projects at the district level; and
- (v) monitoring and evaluation of all policies, programmes and projects (Act 462, Section 21(2) (f)).

The above listed functions of the Executive Committee suggest that it (Executive Committee) is the most important organ of the District Assembly on whose shoulders rests the total development of the district in terms of policy formulation and policy implementation. It is therefore not surprising that District Chief Executive presides at the meetings of the Executive Committee. The curiosity of this research, however, is to ascertain the mode of pursuing this arduous task. In other words, what role(s) do the various stakeholders play and what relationships exist between and amongst these stakeholders in policy formulation and policy implementation, and, how can these relationships be improved to enhance decision making and efficient service delivery to the local people. This brings us to the composition of the sub-committees of the Executive Committee and their functions, in the next section.

4.4.3 Sub-Committees of the Executive Committee

Section 24(1) of Act 462 provides that each Executive Committee shall set up the following Sub-committees:

- a. Development Planning Sub-committee;
- b. Social Services Sub-committee;
- c. Works sub-committee;
- d. Justice and Security Sub-committee;
- e. Finance and Administration Sub-Committee.
- f. Such other Sub-Committees as the District Assembly may determine.

Figure 4.1 Committees of District Assemblies

4.5 Functions of Sub-Committees in District Assemblies

Sub-Committees are established to perform specific functions in their scope of activities. The functions of the various sub-committees of District Assemblies are outlined below.

4.5.1 Development Planning Sub-Committee

Functions of the Development Planning Sub-Committee include the following:

- (i) Take a comprehensive look at the District;
- (ii) Identify the economic resources and potentials of the District;
- (iii) Develop an information base on the resources;
- (iv) Identify opportunities and constraints for the exploitation of these resources;

- (v) Prepare an exploitation and phasing plan and strategies;
- (vi) Consult with other sub-committees for the implications the proposed district plan may have on other sub-committees' plans; and
- (vii) Submit the plan to the Executive Committee for harmonization with other sub-committees' plans.

It is obvious that the identification, recommendation, initiation and execution of local economic development (LED) programmes and projects are the responsibilities of the Development Planning Committee. But does the political wing of District Assemblies have the capacity to carry out this task? To address this possible incapacitation, Section 24(3) provides that Heads of Departments of the District Assembly shall attend meetings of sub-committees and shall advise them on the execution of their functions. In addition, Section 24(4) permits sub-committees to co-opt other persons (whose expertise may be beneficial to particular deliberations) to attend any of its meetings. Heads of Departments and co-opted persons do not, however, have voting rights.

4.5.2 Social Services Sub-Committee

As its name connotes, the Social Service Sub-Committee is responsible for the social well-being of citizens of the district. As such its functions include:

- (i) Taking a comprehensive and long-term look at areas of social development in the district, particularly education, health, social welfare, sports and culture, among others;
 - (ii) Developing the information base on these areas of social development;
 - (iii) Identifying the strengths and weaknesses in the social services areas;
- Preparing a social services development plan (short, medium and long term), for the district;

- (iv) Examine the implications of the social development plan on other sub-sectors of the district economy;

Submitting the plans to the executive committee for harmonization.

4.5.3 Works Sub-Committee

Generally, the Works Sub-Committee's functional areas include roads, electricity, sanitation, and water. Specifically, the Works Sub-Committee:

- (i) Takes a comprehensive look at the infrastructure needs and problems of the district;
- (ii) Develops an information base on each of these programmes and functional areas;
- (iii) Maps out, initiates and phases out programmes for their development and/or their provision;
- (iv) Examines the implications of such actions for the other sub-committee proposals;
- (v) Submits the programmes to the executive committee for harmonization and action.

4.5.4 Finance and Administrative Sub-Committee

This Sub-Committee performs the following functions: It

- (i) Examines the general financial position of the assembly;
- (ii) Examines the revenue mobilization and expenditure trends of the assembly;
- (iii) Maps out strategies to improve mobilization in the present, and sets targets for the future;
- (iv) Submits financial plans to the Executive Committee for harmonization with other sub-committees' plans;
- (v) Identifies strategies to ensure judicious utilization of available resources.

It is therefore apparent that the finance and administration sub-committee is the ‘manager’ of the district assembly’s financial resources, which includes the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), the ceded revenue, internally generated revenue (IGF) and any other revenues that accrue to the district. This committee is an example of a horizontal committee whose operations affect all other committees of the assembly. It therefore requires that its members are knowledgeable in finance and financial management to ensure prudent decisions to enhance the efficient utilisation of scarce resources.

4.5.5 Justice and Security Sub-committee

There is no doubt that intra-district and inter-district conflicts may arise from time to time. Besides, there are issues that pertain to the enforcement of by-laws of the Assembly. These are the general areas of responsibility for the Justice and Security Sub-Committee of the Executive Committee of the District Assemblies. This sub-committee:

- (i) Examines these and other related conflict areas;
- (ii) Recommends to the Executive Committee ways and means to resolve disputes;
- (iii) Ensures ready access to the courts for the promotion of justice in the district, such as making sure that premises are available for use by magistrate and circuit courts and that police logistics are adequate;
- (iv) Scrutinises draft byelaws of the Assembly before their passage;
- (v) Ensures the prosecution of breaches of the byelaws of the Assembly.

The Executive Committee and its subordinate committees are mandatory; they can be dissolved and reconstituted but they cannot be replaced by any other arrangement. However any district

assembly is permitted to form other sub-committees which it deems vital to achieving its set developmental goals. This category of committees is termed ‘permissible sub-committees’.

4.5.6 Permissible Sub-Committees

Apart from the mandated sub-committees mentioned above, the Local Government Act permits District Assemblies to form any other sub-committee(s) the Assemblies deem fit to enhance their development agenda. Over the years District Assemblies have used this window to form sub-committees such as sanitation, environmental, disaster management, scholarship, women and children, health, youth and sports, among others.

4.6 Relevance of the Committee System in Local Government

Like several other committees, the committee system in the district assembly has immense importance. Primarily, committees off-load the full Assembly, which can consequently spend less time on details and greater attention to overall policy matters and other issues of major importance. Besides, the committee system ensures that all business has been subjected to prior consideration before it comes to Assembly meetings and thus avoids taking of hasty decisions. And because different matters can be considered at the same time in different committees the system has the potential of not only saving time but also giving the Assembly members the opportunity to specialise in particular aspects of the assembly’s work, helping them to make valuable contributions to it. Thus, specialised knowledge can be applied to the business for which the committee is appointed resulting in the work being done more thoroughly and at a faster pace.

Some other substantial advantages of the committee system in district assemblies include:

- (a) Their existence can simplify the tasks facing the council through the division of labour and the specialization of responsibilities.
- (b) The specialisation leads to a deeper sense of involvement and commitment; it heightens the sense of responsibility for the committee's work.
- (c) Committees are generally smaller in size and their procedures are more informal, which may encourage councillors to speak more freely.
- (d) Committees provide a useful point of contact with the officials and help to keep them in touch with public opinion.
- (e) By narrowing the ambit of concentration for the amateur councillor (elected member), the committee system enhances his education in administration and local government.
- (f) The system has the unqualified advantage of removing technical discussions from public debates since these points are expected to have been disposed of at the committee level before the committee arrives at a decision.

As the case may be, decision making at the district assembly may involve programmed or non-programmed decisions, tactical or strategic decisions, and mostly the incremental and/or satisficing, or better still the mixed-scanning approaches are employed.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter we have looked at decision making generally, and decision making in Ghana's district assemblies. It has been established that as pertains in many other organisations, decision making in district assemblies is very fundamental to the success or failure of each assembly towards the achievement of its mandate of championing the overall development of the district.

For effective decisions to be made therefore, it is important for the decision maker(s) to be conversant with decision types and decision making approaches and tools at their disposal. It is equally important to recognise that different decisions are made at different levels of the administrative hierarchy of the assembly, and that no single decision making type is suitable for all problems or opportunities.

For instance, whilst programmed decisions are made at the operational level to solve routine problems, non-programmed decision making is required to deal with ill-structured strategic decisions which have long-term repercussions. It has also been observed that group decision making is well grounded in the decision making process at the district assembly since most decisions emanate from the sub-committees of the assemblies. Since the local policies of the assembly depend on the quality of decisions made by its political and administrative operatives, it is necessary that steps are taken to place the right personnel at the right places. This includes the election and appointment of capable men and women to run the affairs of the district assembly all the time.

For decisions and policies to be generally accepted by the constituents of the assembly, the unit committees need to be adequately equipped to engender the bottom-up tactic to decision making. This will facilitate the acceptance and compliance of policies by the populace because of their involvement in the decision making process.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

TECHNIQUES

5.0 Introduction

The strength of scientific research is largely determined by the methodical strategies and decisions adopted. Thus, the focus of this chapter is to outline the methods and techniques used in the study of politics-administration relations in Ghana's local government. The study adopted both theoretical and empirical approaches. The theoretical aspect entailed detailed discussion and examination of the politics-administration relations debate as put forth by both classical and contemporary scholars (this has been accomplished in chapter three). Qualitative approach of generating relevant data was employed mainly. This approach is preferred because the phenomenon being studied (politics-administration relations) is a social one which lends itself better to qualitative analysis. As stated by (Frankford-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996), in qualitative research scientists must gain an empathic understanding of social phenomena, and they must recognise both the historical dimension of human behaviour and the subjective aspects of human experience. In general, qualitative research is about exploring issues, understanding phenomena and answering questions.

Furthermore, qualitative research is said to involve interpretive and naturalistic approach. This means that "qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003:3). The study in this regard involved extensive interaction with key actors within Ghana's

local government environment to explore and understand the phenomenon of politics-administration relations in order to answer relevant questions.

5.1 Qualitative Data Collection Methods

As stated above, this study is basically a qualitative one. It was however complemented with some minimal amount of quantitative data (generated from a mini survey). Besides the position of Frankford-Nachmias and Nachmias stated above, qualitative approach is preferred for this study for a number of reasons. These include: first, qualitative research is mostly concerned with processes rather than outcomes; secondly qualitative researches are mainly interested in meaning; how people make sense of their actions and experiences. In this vein, the researcher becomes a primary tool for data generation and analysis; thirdly, data are mediated through the researcher who is a human instrument instead of inventories, questionnaires or machines; qualitative research involves interaction with policy formulators and implementers during fieldwork (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Furthermore, with qualitative research approach, the researcher has the opportunity and privilege to meet people, visit the case sites or organisations to observe and record behaviour in its natural setting. Thus, qualitative research is both descriptive and analytical because the researcher is interested in processes, meanings, and understanding gained through words. The approach is said to be thick, deep and holistic because it is a process which allows the researcher to build concepts, assumptions and theories from details (Creswell, 1994; Manson, 1996; Neuman, 2000).

All the characteristics of qualitative research stated above render the method suitable for the current study of the relations between politics and administration in selected districts of Ghana's local government. This is because the study demands extensive interaction (formal and informal)

with relevant stakeholders in local government (district assemblies) of Ghana, as well as direct observation of the researcher in policy formulation and implementation processes in the district assemblies to enable him build concepts and develop theories, if necessary.

5.2 Data Collection Techniques

Qualitative data was collected in two stages. The first part of data came from secondary sources such as government publications and reports, policy proposals, academic publications (working papers, journal articles and dissertations, among others. Information from former officials (politicians and administrators) of the selected district assemblies was solicited to give us an indication of how the relationship between policy formulators and policy implementers has evolved over time (especially since the inception of the current local government system in 1988) and the factors that have contributed to the improvement or otherwise of the relationship. The second stage of qualitative data comprised primarily of elite interviews with the key actors in policy formulation and implementation in the selected district assemblies.

5.2.1 Interviews

Since qualitative research requires that the researcher must gain an empathic understanding of social phenomena and recognise the historical dimension of human behaviour and the subjective aspects of human experience, the researcher employed the use of interviews, observation, formal and informal interactions to generate relevant information about how the Chief Executives and Coordinating Directors relate to each other and other officials of the assembly in the course of performing their respective roles as politicians and public administrators. The interviews took the following forms:

District Chief Executives and their respective District Co-ordinating Directors selected from the northern and southern regions/belts of the country constituted the first batch of interviewees. The views of Heads of decentralised departments such as The Ghana Education Service, the Ghana Health Service, and Social Welfare Department who were available were also solicited in separate interviews to determine their level of involvement in the decision making and implementing processes in the selected districts. Other key stakeholders like the Presiding Members and Parliamentarians were also interviewed and so were some past officeholders of the selected Assemblies.

The in-depth interviews designed for key actors of the policy process were complemented by a small-scale survey conducted for assembly members (AMs). This took the form of close-ended questionnaires which were administered to all available assembly men and women of the selected districts. Seventy (70) respondents took part in the survey. The aim of the survey was to gather general information on the understanding of the respondents (AMs) on decentralisation and the district assembly concept, and especially their perceptions and roles in policy formulation, implementation, and monitoring of the implementation process on the ground. The questions were carefully designed to also seek the opinion of respondents on the best approach to promote cordial working relations between assembly members and career bureaucrats of the assembly. In addition to the interviews and questionnaire the researcher took keen interest in programmes organised under the ambit of the local government service, such as symposia and workshops that were relevant to the research, within the study period especially where politics- administration relations featured prominently. A sample of notes on discussions from one of such workshops is attached as Appendix VIII.

As anticipated, this broad spectrum of respondents generated enough data to stimulate an in-depth investigation into the subject matter of politics-administration relations in Ghana's district assemblies.

5.3 Selection of Research Informants

Politics-administration interface is obviously a specialised field. Its study must therefore involve those respondents/participants who have adequate knowledge and/or experience in the field. For this reason the study employed purposive sampling technique, considered by Welmer and Kruger (1999) as the most appropriate non-probability sampling method, to select key informants. As such, selection of the research sample was done by the researcher using his own judgement. The criteria for the selection of the districts and interviewees were (i) The DCE must have served at least one term (of four years) in the district (ii) The DCD must have had a working relationship with the DCE for at least four years (iii) Both DCE and DCD must be available (at post), and (iv) all interviewees must be willing to take part in the research (as an academic exercise). Adopting the satisficing model of decision making the first three districts that met the decision criteria were selected for the study.

Table 5.1 Elite Interviews

Designation	No. of Respondents
District Chief Executive	3
District Coordinating Director	3
Presiding Member	3
Member(s) of Parliament	3
Director- Ghana Education Service	3
Director – Ghana Health Service	3
Director – Social Welfare Department	3
Others	5
TOTAL	26

Source: Author's own construction (2013)

Table 5.2 Survey for Assembly Members (AMs)**Breakdown of Number of Respondents (AMs) by districts**

Name of District	No. of Respondents	Total No. of AMs
Nandom	20	26
Lambussie	20	25
South Tongu	30	31
TOTAL	70	82

Source: Author's own construction

5.4 Qualitative Data Analysis

Qualitative data generated through comprehensive interviews and informal interactions was analysed, based on the core concerns of the research as stipulated by the research questions and driven by the research objectives. Tape recordings and notes from especially formal discussions

together with personal observations constituted inputs for analysis of the relationship between politics and administration at the local government level.

The aim of data collected from the survey, using a 5-point Likert- type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree for each statement was to give a descriptive picture of the politics-administrative interface in the selected districts to enable the researcher to make informed inferences. Data was captured and descriptively analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Data analysis was mainly by simple frequencies.

It is worth noting that eventually the two research approaches (interviews and survey) used in this research were analysed together. It is also worth stating that the key issues at stake namely investigating the politics-administration relations and decision making and implementation processes were explained to the respondents to ensure that they fully understood the study prior to the interviews and questionnaire administration.

5.5 Scope of the Study

As indicated in the objectives of the research, the preoccupation of this study is to explore whether elected officials (Assembly members) and district chief executives (DCEs) perceive their functional relationships with public administrators (bureaucrats) in ways that conform to the politics-administration dichotomy models.

The most appropriate time frame should have been from 1988 to 2013. This is because the foundation of the current local government system of Ghana can be traced to the promulgation of the Provisional National Defence Council Law (PNDCL 207) of 1988 which gave birth to the current local government system and decentralisation in Ghana. The country has maintained this

system of local governance even though there have been regime changes from military to democracy and from one democratically elected administration to another. However this study focused on the democratic period which took effect from January, 1993, with greater premium on current office holders. The study initially targeted three (3) districts across the country, one each from northern Ghana, the middle belt and southern Ghana, This stratification was supposed to give a fair representation of what pertains nationwide in district assemblies with regard to politics-administration relations and related issues. Besides, the stratification was aimed at helping to address issues of geographical differences, socio-cultural diversity and local economic development of the district assemblies, to engender a fair generalisation of the findings. However, due to unforeseen circumstances, the study covered only northern and southern Ghana.

5.6 Ethical Considerations

In consonance with the existing arrangement requiring researchers to obtain permission before getting access to public organisations as case sites for research, we submitted an official letter from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management (of the University of Ghana Business School) to the selected districts seeking their consent for the study to be carried out in their jurisdictions, to which they obliged. We assured the officials concerned that measures would be taken to ensure that data collected would be treated with maximum confidentiality. In addition, we also agreed to preserve the anonymity of informants who so wished, especially those who would voluntarily offer information on sensitive issues of the research. In addition, the research process was also guided by general ethical requirements of scientific research and those that have been stipulated by the Ethics Committee of the University of Ghana.

As stated in the introductory chapter, this study is not the first of its kind; it has been undertaken in some advanced democracies like the United States of America, Norway, Taiwan, and in South Africa and Tanzania in Africa. These earlier studies motivated the researcher to conduct a similar study in Ghana. The study therefore adopted the basic procedures and lines of questioning from these earlier studies, with some modifications, where appropriate.

5.7 Limitations of the Study

Although this study was designed to investigate and present the Ghanaian version of the politics-administration relations debate, for circumstances unforeseen at the outset of the study, the choice of districts was not as straightforward as envisaged. This was largely because the study entered a period of general political ‘instability’ in the district assemblies orchestrated by an unprecedented massive rejection of the President’s fresh nominees to the office of Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executives. It was therefore difficult and/or uncomfortable and not conducive reaching out to outgoing Chief Executives and other officials for the interview sections as a result of which we had to abandon some of our targeted district assemblies. Also, unfortunately some District Coordinating Directors were not prepared to honour our interview appointments under the prevailing conditions. This situation, of course, imposed some limitations on the study. In spite of all these hitches however, the study was worth conducting, and in fact very interesting; the available officials and assembly members from the selected districts who satisfied our selection criteria were quite cooperative and exhibited a commendable level of interest and enthusiasm in the study. Most participants even expressed their readiness to participate in any follow-up research.

It is refreshing to note that interactions with some important actors in local government suggested that because the district assembly concept is uniform throughout Ghana and operates with the same structure and performs same functions under similar circumstances, any three districts selected at random would have yielded similar results notwithstanding some slight differences in socio-cultural and economic conditions.

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICS-ADMINISTRATION RELATIONS IN GHANA'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT: DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

6.0 Introduction

The primary objective of this study is to investigate the relations between politics and administration (politicians and administrators), in especially policy formulation and implementation to determine the most popular and preferred approach so as to recommend the most appropriate model for adoption by Ghana's local government (district assemblies). In this dissertation, three core approaches have been examined. These are: the orthodox approach (model), the modified dichotomy and the partnership (complementarity) approach (model). Wilson's (1887) orthodox approach (politics-administration dichotomy) stresses the separation of politics from administration so that the former is tasked with policy formulation, and the latter with policy implementation. In Wilson's opinion, this division of labour, insulation and removal of administration from politics is the most appropriate way to promote efficiency in government business. The modified approach, on the other hand, assigns policy formulation responsibility to both politics and administration but restricts policy implementation and general managerial issues to administration. This second approach propounded by Montjoy and Watson (1995) argue that administrators by their training and experience have a lot to offer at the policy formulation stage, especially by putting their expertise at the disposal of politicians through guidance and advice on policy issues; in fact, administrators seem to be indispensable in the policy formulation process. The third approach, the partnership approach, promulgated by Svava (1998), argues that politics

and administration are interconnected and play complementary roles in government so they should be allowed to partner each other to formulate and implement policy in harmony for desirable results.

In this chapter the study presents the data generated from the field and goes ahead to analyse and discuss the findings. The investigation was carried out in two phases. The first phase involved face-to-face interviews with some key actors in decision making of the assembly. These interviews covered the District Chief Executives (DCEs) who, by statute, are both politicians and administrators, and the District Coordinating Directors (DCDs), who are career bureaucrat. Other key actors interviewed include the members of parliament (who are ex-officio members of the assembly), presiding members, and heads of decentralised departments and senior officials of non-governmental organisations in the districts. These in-depth interviews were aimed at determining the theoretical approach (es) to the politics-administration relations to which their political and administrative practices in the selected districts conform. The interviews were also targeted towards gauging the degree of participation in the decision making and implementation processes by some relevant stakeholders. The second phase was a survey which covered assembly members (councillors). Assembly members (AMs) were served with self-administered questionnaires to solicit their views on which approach is most applicable to decision making and implementation in their districts. The analysis comprises a detailed study of responses from the interviews with the hierarchy of the assembly and other key actors and the survey, which was limited to assembly members, to determine convergent grounds or divergent views about the politics-administration interface in the selected district assemblies, to form an opinion. The issues at stake were vividly explained to respondents in both categories (interviews and survey) to demonstrate to them the academic nature of the study.


Analysis of data generated from both phases is presented and discussed simultaneously below.

6.2 Participation of Assembly Members (AMs) and Administrators in Policy Formulation and Implementation

6.2.1 Assembly Members (AMs) Participation in Policy Formulation and Implementation

Figure 6.1 below represents responses from AMs on whether they should formulate policies and go ahead with their implementation as well. From the figure below, out of the 70 respondents sampled for this survey, 22, representing 31.4% strongly disagree with the proposition that AMs should formulate policies and implement same as well. Ten (10) respondents representing 14.3% also disagree with this claim. Conversely, 14 respondents representing 20% agree while 24 AMs, representing 34.3% strongly agree that AMs should assume responsibility for both policy formulation and implementation in the assembly. These responses are presented graphically in Figure 6.1 below:

Figure 6.1 Participation of Assembly Members in Policy Formulation and Implementation



Source: Field Data, 2013

Considering the number of respondents who are of the view that AMs should formulate policies and also be involved in the implementation of these policies, it is obvious that the majority opinion is that AMs should be actively involved in both policy formulation and implementation processes at the district assembly. These responses unveil the desire of politicians to be actively involved in the policy process (decision making and execution) in local government. This position is however at variance with Watson and Montjoy's (1995) modified version of the relations which proposes a higher responsibility for administration by suggesting that administrators could venture into policy formulation in addition to their core business of policy implementation, while politicians

are restricted to their traditional role of policy formulation. This majority view does not also conform to the orthodox dichotomy theory, which emphasizes a strict distinction between politics and administration. The stance of the Assemblymen on this issue was reinforced by the South Tongu DCD who affirmed that the DCE (politician) sometimes gets involved with the implementation process. According to him:

“The politician gives us (administrators) the political will and support to implement policies and programmes. Sometimes he (DCE) gets involved. It depends on the individual’s style. I mean the individual politician’s style. Maybe there is one politician, he will want to get deeply involved, he will give the encouragement and that is a mark of a leader to get deep even into implementation. On the other hand, because of the enormity of their job or the role they play, some politicians may not necessarily be actively involved in the implementation. However, they may want to know about the outcome of a programme after it has been implemented; what was the impact and what have you. Because the buck rests with him as both the political and administrative head he will definitely want to know. He owes responsibility to the general assembly and to the people of the district. So they get involved in implementation. But what I am saying is that they give a positive influence and that I only consider as a mark of good leadership.”

A second DCD also had this to say:

“Per the Local Government Act of Ghana, the DCE plays the dual function of politics and administration. Despite that this is already rooted in the law, it only makes sense that the one who heads the district politically ensures that administration which is the machinery for executing the political agenda gets some direction”.

From the DCDs’ explanation, we may deduce that once the DCE’s involvement in policy implementation is non-confrontational the practice is considered by the administrative wing as appropriate and productive (positive influence).

A DCE's position on politicians' involvement in policy implementation is similar to that of the DCDs. According to this DCE, being the "care taker" of the district, it is more than ideal for him to be engaged in the process of initiating and implementing policies within the district. In the same vein the responsibility for terminating existing unfavourable policies rests with him the political head 'just as it pertains under any organizational regime where politics-administration hierarchy exists'. A third DCD also lends his support to the DCEs' involvement in policy implementation. He was more elaborate in his explanation. He intimated that:

"The assemblies stand to ensure that there is security, there is economic empowerment, we create an enabling environment for people to operate and every policy and programme of government is such that they benefit the entire citizenry. Everybody has the opportunity to participate and the Chief Executive has that leverage. You understand. He is both the administrative and political head O.K. Administratively he ensures that whatever programme or project we have designed for implementation are carried through without any hitch. Also, he tries to see to the harmony of staff and their work relationships. So that is from the perspective of the administrative practice. Politically, the politician has his political agenda. He will want to see to it that he has the vehicle to implement those political agenda to the people who have brought them to power and to all of us. So long as the president continues to assume office as president, he becomes president for everybody. And whatever programme that he rolls out is considered to be in the interest of all of us whether we voted for him or not. So if the politician comes, it is the responsibility of the District Chief Executive to ensure that the political agenda of the government is implemented to the letter. And we (the administrators) help him."


The DCD further revealed that the practice of administrators getting involved in mainstream policy formulation is also common. The interviewee remarked that this has become necessary so as to enable administrators carry out their implementation functions effectively. According to this DCD, administrators' involvement in policy making is made possible because of the fact that they (administrators) serve on various committees of the assembly as secretaries. As such they are allowed to suggest some policy views which in many cases become working documents for the

assembly. The basis of acceptance is explained by the fact that they are technocrats, whose judgment on policy issues is grounded on expertise and experience. This situation, we observe falls in line with Svava's (1998) argument that the city manager (administrator) as a community leader 'submits *policy proposals to the council and provides the council with facts and advice on matters of policy to give the council a basis for making decisions on community goals*'; this, certainly, suggests the direct involvement of the manager who is a public administrator in policy formulation.

This position, we again observe, does not support the orthodox dichotomy approach which calls for the strict division of policy formulation and implementation functions between politics and administration; rather it conforms to the modified dichotomy model which proposes a dual role of policy formulation and implementation to administration but limits politics to policy formulation, and even more to the partnership approach which invariably removes the boundary between politics and administration in the discharge of political and administrative functions.

6.2.2 The Role of Assembly Members (AMs) in Policy Formulation

In order to seek further clarification on respondents' views of their specific role in the policy process, the question was posed whether or not AMs should concentrate on policy formulation and leave the implementation aspect for public administrators to undertake. Figure 6.2 below depicts their responses:

Figure 6.2: Assembly Members Should Concentrate on Policy Formulation**Field Data, 2013**

Whereas 13 respondents out of the 70 AMs representing 18.6% strongly disagree, 19 respondents representing 27.1% disagree with the proposal that AMs should concentrate only on policy formulation. On the other hand, 20 AMs representing 28.6% and 14, representing 20% think otherwise; they 'strongly agree' and 'agree' respectively with the opinion that AMs should concentrate on policy formulation. Four (4) respondents, representing 5.7% however, were undecided. On the aggregate therefore, we may infer that 32 respondents (13 plus 19) disagree that AM should be tasked with only policy formulation, what Goodnow (1900) referred to as 'the expression of the state will' as against 34 (20 plus 14) who agree to this proposition. These constitute 45.7% and 48.6% respectively. The indication is that AMs are divided in their opinion as to whether they should concentrate on their core business of policy formulation and allow public administrators to handle implementation or 'the execution of the state will' (Goodnow, 1900).

6.2.3 The Role of Administrators in Policy Formulation

At this point the question whether administrators should be involved in policy formulation or leave the process entirely to assembly members comes up for examination. Table 6.1 below depicts the responses made by respondents on their position on the issue of public administrators leaving policy formulation entirely to AMs. Out of the 70 respondents available for this survey, 23 constituting 32.9% strongly disagree with the stance that administrators should stay aside and allow only AMs to formulate public policies whiles 35, constituting 50% disagree. On the contrary, just 8 or 11% of respondents agree that bureaucrats should stay away from policy formulation and only 4 or 5.7% of respondents strongly agree to this proposal.

Table 6.1: Public Administrators' involvement in Policy Formulation

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	23	32.9
Disagree	35	50.0
Agree	8	11.4
Strongly Agree	4	5.7
Total	70	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2013

From the data gathered from the field, the dominant view (82.9%) is that policy formulation should **not** be left in the hands of only AMs. This position could be an acknowledgement by assembly members (AMs) of the expertise of administrators (who serve as secretaries at committee meetings) on various policy issues which must be harnessed for effective policy formulation.


Besides, being part of the policy formulation process will offer administrators the chance to better understand the objectives of policies and hence enhance their judgment during implementation.

6.2.4 Assembly Members (AMs) and Policy Implementation

On implementation the question was posed whether elected officials (AMs) should stay away from policy implementation as posited by the modified dichotomy.

As to whether AMs should stay away from the policy implementation process and allow only the career bureaucrats of the assemblies to execute projects, programmes and policies, figure 6.3 below represents a graphical illustration of responses from respondents.

Figure 6.3: Assembly Members (AMs) Should Stay Away from Policy Implementation



Source: Field Data, 2013

From the 70 respondents, 21 AMs or 30% strongly disagree with the statement that policy implementation should be reserved for bureaucrats, 17 respondents representing 24.3% disagree but 16 respondents representing 22.9% agree, and 12 AMs constituting 17.1% strongly agree with the exemption of AMs from the policy implementation process. Only 4 respondents are undecided on the exclusion of AMs from the policy implementation process. The deduction here is that respondents who disagree with the exemption of AMs from policy implementation outnumber those who assent to this view. This position has earlier been illustrated in 6.1.2 where AMs expressed their desire to be actively involved in both policy formulation and implementation processes at the district assembly.

Perhaps the disagreement on the relegation of AM from policy execution may stem from the fact that AMs see themselves as the representatives of their people so they must not only be informed but also actively get involved in whatever activities go on in their constituencies. Clearly, these respondents are of the conviction that elected officials (Assembly members) should be part of the policy implementation processes. Perhaps this could be as a result of the fact that AMs stand a greater chance of getting their constituents to support and participate in any government policy, project or programme since they are the mouthpiece of their constituents. Through AMs who are much regarded and trusted by their people, community entry and exit will be easy for any policy or project to get the backing of the populace. This notwithstanding, the danger is that AMs who have not won the support and trust of their constituents may rather make it difficult for administrators in the policy implementation process instead of helping them. On the other hand, those who objected to AMs' participation in the policy implementation process did so based on the assumption that their involvement may amount to interference in the work of administrators who exercise their discretion based on facts rather than on value choices.


In a related interview, a DCD in answering questions concerning the involvement of politicians in performing administrative or management functions remarked that:

“You see, the Local Government Act, (Act 462) makes the politicians both administrative and political heads of the District Assembly ...you cannot divorce the politician from administrative activity, the politician (DCE) is the head of the assembly. This presupposes that while he acts as the political head he must also bear the responsibility of ensuring that all administrative issues under his watch are executed to the letter. On this basis, it is difficult to say that the politician should not be involved in handling administrative questions”

So inasmuch as the DCD judges the DCEs involvement in administration and management issues as legitimate, AMs see their involvement in policy implementation as desirable and even appropriate. On the subject of monitoring, the next section gives an idea about the position of AMs on monitoring policy implementation.

6.2.5 Monitoring Policy Implementation

An integral aspect of the policy process is monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring is the tracking or tracing of a policy during its implementation to ensure that it is following the designed line of action. A proposal was put forth to the respondents that AMs should take up the responsibility of monitoring policies and programmes to ensure adherence to agreed procedures to achieve desired targets. Eighteen (18) respondents making up to 26% strongly disagree and 10, constituting 14% disagree. Otherwise, 14, constituting 20% agree and 25, constituting 36% strongly agree to this suggestion. Nonetheless, (3) respondents, constituting 4% were not sure whether AMs should take up the responsibility of monitoring the progress of policies, programmes and projects during implementation in their jurisdictions. These views are presented pictorially in Figure 6.4 below.

Figure 6.4 Monitoring Policy Implementation

Source: Field Data, 2013

This statistics obviously reveals the fact that many AMs either underrate their legislative oversight role in policy implementation or are somehow ignorant of this responsibility. It can also mean that AMs are simply shirking what they consider as an ‘additional’ responsibility, without a commensurate remuneration.

6.2.6 Complete Removal of Administration from Politics

The next inquiry undertaken in this survey was to investigate the veracity or otherwise of Wilson’s (1887) declaration that ‘the field of administration is a field of business; it should be removed from the hurry and strife of politics’, a statement which is one of the strong pillars on which the orthodox politics-administration dichotomy theory rests. The question was therefore put whether administration should be completely removed from politics, to verify whether or not Wilson’s

position is applicable in Ghana's local government. Responses by respondents are as presented in table 6.2 below.

Table 6.2: Complete Removal of Administration from Politics

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	13	18.6
Disagree	28	40.0
Not Sure	4	5.7
Agree	14	20.0
Strongly Agree	11	15.7
Total	70	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2013

The responses presented in Table 6.2 above indicate that 13 (18.6%) of the 70 respondents strongly disagree that administration should be removed from politics while 28 (40%) disagree with this assertion. On the contrary, 14 respondents representing 20% and 11, representing 15.7% of the total number of respondents 'agree' and 'strongly agree' respectively with the argument that administration should be entirely delinked from politics. Four (4), constituting 5.7% could not immediately make up their minds on this issue.

The statistics from the above analysis suggests that majority (58.6%) of the respondents of the survey disagree with Woodrow Wilson's notion that administration should completely be removed from politics. The fate of those administrators who have allowed themselves to be politicized by politicians is however uncertain should there be a change in government since their loyalty may

be questionable. Perhaps this is why South Africa's Presidential Review Commission of 1998 recommended that 'for the sake of possible sabotage by disloyal incumbents of previous regimes, there is the need for political appointments within the public service as a cushion against unsupportive public servants (Mafunisa, 2003). Such appointees are referred to in Ghana's public service as special assistants and presidential staffers.

Let us at this point revisit Goodnow's 'U' turn on his initial stance on the politics-administration relations. Shafritz et al (2004) report that Frank Goodnow, a prime supporter of Woodrow Wilson's orthodox dichotomy, later observed that actual political necessity requires some level of harmony between the expression of the state will and execution of the state will, and that, while the function of politics has to do primarily with the expression of the state will, it has to do secondarily with the execution of that will. We observe that this is the same principle Svava embeds in his complementarity construct.

Although they are in the minority, 35.7% of respondents hold a contrary position; they generally agree with this view that administration should completely be removed from partisan politics. Their position could be justified by the fact that as public servants public administrators need to stay neutral and be loyal to all governments, and, for that matter, resist any attempt by politicians to influence them to be partial in discharging their duties and/or when exercising discretion.

6.2.7 Administrators should Give Expert Advice to Elected Officials (AMs)

Table 6.3 below indicates the responses from respondents on the suggestion that appointed officials (administrators) should render their expertise to elected officials (AMs) in the governance process at all levels. From the table, 11.4% of the respondents strongly disagree with the above

assertion while 8.6% also disagree. Out of the number, 17.1% are not sure of their positions regarding the proposal that administrators should serve as advisors to assembly members but 40% and 22.9% strongly agree and agree respectively.

This position seems to be an endorsement of the point that appointed officials are duty-bound to give their expert advice and guidance to elected officials in the discharge of their responsibilities to the state. Going by Goel's (2008) submission:

It is the traditional duty of civil servants, while decisions are being formulated, to make available to the political chief all the information and experience at their disposal, and to do this without fear or favour, irrespective of whether, the advice thus tendered may accord or not with the minister's (politician's) initial view. A DCD has earlier on acceded to this advisory responsibility to the politician by stating: "I serve as his (DCE's) advisor. I am his advisor; the chief advisor for that matter. "

Perhaps this is the more reason why appointed officials (administrators) need to stay out of partisan politics such that their judgment on issues will not be clouded by the beliefs and dictates of their political sponsors but rather based purely on expert knowledge, experience and professionalism.

Table 6.3: Appointed Officials (Administrators) should give Expert Advice to Elected Officials (AMs)

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	8	11.4
Disagree	6	8.6
Not Sure	12	17.1
Agree	28	40.0
Strongly Agree	16	22.9
Total	70	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2013

6.2.8 Appointed Officials should be involved in Policy Formulation, Elected Officials (AMs) Should Stay Away from Policy Implementation

Robert Montjoy and Douglas Watson's modified dichotomy was put to the test in the study. Montjoy and Watson (1995) advocate administration engaging in policy formulation but politics refraining from participation in policy implementation.

Here, the involvement of administrators in policy formulation and abstinence of assembly members from policy implementation was the focus of investigation. As shown in Table 6.4 below, 23 AMs (32.9%) of the 70 respondents strongly disagree with the viewpoint that appointed officials should be involved in the policy formulation process but elected officials should stay away from policy implementation, Similarly, 15 assembly members constituting 21.4% of the respondents disagree. Meanwhile 20 respondents making up 28.6% agree with this declaration

whiles 8 (11.4%) strongly agree that administrators should partake in policy formulation but assembly members (elected officials) should not participate in policy implementation. Four (4) AMs or 5.7% abstained from being specific.

What the above submissions appear to suggest is that, AMs do not think that they should be excluded from the policy implementation process but be involved just as their counterparts – appointed officials do when it comes to policy formulation. The rationale behind this view may be that because the AMs think that they are the link between the government and their people, it is expected that they must be involved in any activity that would enhance development. In practice, AMs could be of great help to appointed officials (administrators) in diverse ways during policy implementation and this is one major way for AMs to demonstrate to the people they represent that they are promoting their welfare and development.

Table 6.4: Appointed Officials (Administrators) should be Involved in Policy Formulation, Elected Officials (AMs) Should Stay Away from Policy Implementation

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	23	32.9
Disagree	15	21.4
Not Sure	4	5.7
Agree	20	28.6
Strongly Agree	8	11.4
Total	70	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2013

6.2.9 Appointed Officials (Administrators) Should Fully Partner Elected Officials (AMs) to Formulate Policies

With reference to administrators partnering assembly members in policy formulation, table 6.5 below depicts the position of respondents. The responses reveal that, while nobody strongly disagrees; only 11.4% disagree with administrators partnering assembly members to formulate policies. In terms of those who support the idea that partnership between administrators and assembly members in policy formulation is ideal, 41.4% agree with as many as 44.3% of respondents strongly agreeing that administrators should fully partner assembly members to formulate policies.

The DCE of Nandom in an earlier interview had painted a similar picture. When questioned whether or not public administrators should be actively involved in policy making the DCE asserted that they must be involved since they are the same class of people who will implement the policies. He affirmed that within his district, they (administrators) are highly involved in policy making. In his words:

“Yes. They do and they also discuss it. When you know the system very well, you will notice that they also proffer some ideas that help in decisions towards the formulation of the District Medium Term Development Plan. The rule is that they must be involved; they must play an objective involvement, not just involvement to seek only their interest or the interest of their party but objective involvement. They must determine whether the policy to be implemented will favour the people. So they should not involve themselves only to pursue their parochial interests.”

Pesch (2011) thinks in the same direction. He has affirmed that administration is treated as a term involving policy-making as well as execution; this is because a great deal of policy-making is inherent in what the executive branch (administration) does, and that it is important to recognise

this policy-making function of administration. Pesch (2011) also thinks it is just proper that administrators should partner politicians to make policy, assembly members think they must and the DCE confirms they do.

Table 6.5: Appointed Official Should Fully Partner Elected Officials in Policy Formulation

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Disagree	8	11.4
Not Sure	2	2.9
Agree	29	41.4
Strongly Agree	31	44.3
Total	70	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2013

Judging from the above perspective, it is obvious that the partnership model of politics-administration relations is what has gained overriding support from AMs with regard to policy formulation.

6.2.9 Elected Officials (AMs) Should Partner Appointed Officials to Implement Policies

Having established the fact that AMs favour the partnership model of politics-administration relations with respect to policy formulation, the study proceeded to investigate AMs' viewpoint on whether they should partner career bureaucrats (administrators) to implement policies.

Table 6.6 below shows the figures based on responses from respondents on the statement that “*elected officials should partner appointed officials to implement policies.*” In this direction, 8 (11.4%) and 18 (25.7%) out of the 70 AMs contacted in this study strongly disagree and disagree respectively while 17 (24.3%) agree and 27 (38.6%) strongly agree that AMs should partner administrators to implement policy.

Table 6.6 Elected Officials (AMs) Should Partner Appointed Officials to Implement Policies

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	8	11.4
Disagree	18	25.7
Agree	17	24.3
Strongly Agree	27	38.6
Total	70	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2013

The simple logical conclusion that can be drawn from the above analysis is that respondents largely support the idea of partnership as the best model of relationship that should exist between elected officials and appointed officials in relation to policy implementation.

Inferring from 6.1.6 and 6.1.7 above, it appears that assembly members recognize the fact that both appointed and elected officials need each other to effectively and efficiently deliver on their responsibilities as none of them will be able to do without the other. At this stage it is tempting to

conclude that AMs support Svara's (1998) suggestion that policy making and implementation should be a combined effort of appointed and elected officials. This viewpoint is examined in 6.2.10 below.

6.2.10 Policy Making and Execution should be a Combined Effort of Appointed and Elected Officials

To consolidate the favourable responses received above on administration and politics partnering each other in policy formulation and implementation, the study proceeded to inquire whether policy formulation and implementation should be a combined effort of appointed officials (administrators) and their assembly member (AM) counterparts. This presupposes that both politics and administration are allowed to venture simultaneously into each other's field. The responses are depicted in table 6.8 below. Out of the 70 respondents, 16, constituting 22.9% strongly disagree, 30, representing 42.9% disagree and 2.9% are not sure of what the case should be. On the other hand, 18, constituting 25.7% of respondents are in agreement with the view that policy making and execution should be a combined effort of both appointed and elected officials while 4, constituting 5.7% strongly agree.

Table 6.7: Policy Making & Execution should be a Combined Effort of Appointed and Elected Officials

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	16	22.9
Disagree	30	42.9
Not Sure	2	2.9
Agree	18	25.7
Strongly Agree	4	5.7
Total	70	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2013

What this connotes is that, respondents generally reject the idea that, policy making and execution should be a matter of joint concern or activity for appointed and elected officials. This posture of respondents, we observe, contradicts their earlier assertion and unequivocal support for the partnership model of the relationship between appointed and elected officials separately for policy making and policy execution as portrayed in 6.1.6 and 6.1.7 above.

It is apparent that assembly members would like to protect their ‘superior’ position in the politics-administration interface for which reason they would not be comfortable opening their doors ‘too wide’ for administrators to ‘intrude’.

But Woodruff (in Svara, 1998) thinks differently. Woodruff has submitted that:

”Politics and administration are not two antagonistic elements, each seeking to enlarge its sphere of action at the expense of the other. They

are not even independent powers in government, each working in a distinct field, performing its appropriate acts, and having for these purposes an authority of its own. On the contrary, they are two parts of the same mechanism, related in much the same way as to two elements in one chemical compound whose combined qualities give the character to the substance. In a sense, politics and administration take part jointly in every act performed.”

In other words politics and administration are just two sub-systems in the political system whose combined effort impact the efficiency level of the system. This, of course, is a clear case for combined effort or complementarity and interconnectedness of political and administrative functions which is the cornerstone of the partnership model.

In separate interviews with two DCEs they clearly asserted that administrators should be actively involved in policy issues. These officials indicated that if policies are to be well implemented then the collective responsibility must be organised around the public administrator who will devise the appropriate mechanisms for their implementation. The following statements demonstrate this common position.

“You cannot do without the public administrator when it comes to policy formulation. An important feature of our public administration system is the experience that is garnered by the bureaucrat while in office serving different DCEs. You may by virtue of that experience call for their support during policy formulation”.

“You are the public administrator and the policy issues are there, how they are going to be implemented largely depends on the public administrator. Whether it is important for us to implement it or not depends on them, so the involvement of the public administrator is important.”

Still on the complementary roles of politics and administration, a former DCE had this to say:

“One thing is that politicians initiate policies and the administrators implement policies through the help and guidance of the politicians. The administrators guide politicians to formulate and shape policies and the politicians support them to implement.”

The implication here is that policy formulation and implementation require collaboration between appointed and elected officials in a synergistic fashion.

The survey responses presented above are summed up in Table 6.8 below to give a fair idea (at a glance) of the direction of the survey towards addressing two main objectives of this study which are: (i) to investigate the dominant approaches/model(s) of politics-administration relations practised in district assemblies of Ghana and (ii) to recommend the most suitable approach of the relationship between politics and administration for possible adoption by district assemblies of Ghana.

Table 6.8: Aggregation of Survey Questions (Statements)

Statement	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	Not Sure (%)
AMs to formulate and Implement Policy	45.7	54.3	
Administrators should leave policy formulation entirely for AMs	82.9	17.1	
AMs should stay away from policy implementation	54.3	40	
AMs should monitor policy implementation	40	56	
Administration should completely be removed from politics	58.6	35.7	5.7
Administrators should give expert advice to AMs to formulate good policies	20	62.9	17.1
Administrators should be involved in policy formulation but AM should stay away from policy implementation	54.3	40	5.7
Administrators should fully partner AMs to formulate policies	11.4	85.7	2.9
AMs should fully partner Administrators to implement policies	37.1	62.9	
Policy making and execution should be a combined effort of appointed and elected officials (bureaucrats and AMs)	65.8	31.4	

Source: Field Data, 2014

6.3 Public Administrators' View on Policy Formulation and Implementation

In an earlier study by Azunu (2013) the following questions/statements featured prominently as in this thesis.

- Appointed officials should fully partner elected officials to formulate policy

- Elected officials should fully partner appointed officials to implement policy
- Administration should be completely removed from politics
- Policy making should be a combined effort of appointed and elected officials but implementation should be the sole responsibility of appointed officials

Comparison of the two studies provide some interrelated results. Although data for the these studies were not collected at the same time they are so connected that a thorough examination of the previous and current findings might offer an enhanced insight into the phenomenon being discussed.

In the first study (outlined on page 89) , an overwhelming majority (of administrators) supported the notion that appointed officials should fully partner elected officials to formulate policy (95%), and elected officials should fully partner appointed officials to implement policy (80%).

Similarly, in this thesis 85.7% and 69.2% (assembly members) agreed respectively on this partnership proposal. We may conveniently stand on this ground to suggest that both elected officials and appointed officials favour the partnership approach to the politics-administration relations (in local government) so far as policy formulation and implementation are concerned.

Interestingly, or rather inconsistently however, assembly members do not have a consensus on the proposition that AMs and administrators should combine their energies or efforts to formulate and implement policy. Both parties however hold a common position that the expertise of the bureaucrat must be utilized in the policy formulation process. On the proposition that administration, being a field of business, should be removed from the 'value-laden field of politics, the study observes that although there were differences in viewpoints in both surveys, the

disagreements are higher in aggregate than the agreements in percentages. We may infer from this that Wilson's position does not hold in the Ghanaian context.

We deduced from the first study that arriving at a consensus on the relationship between politics and administration is an arduous task because despite the fact that many administrators consider partnership between politics and administration in policy formulation and implementation as feasible, others consider the active involvement of politicians in the implementation process as interference so the debate on politics-administration relations continues unabated.

Before taking a close look at this summary we shall first consider another important objective of this dissertation namely: to assess the level of participation of relevant stakeholders in the district assembly's decision making process.

6.4 Participation

One of the key objectives of this research is to examine the decision making procedures at the district assembly to determine the level of participation by relevant stakeholders. In this connection Heads of some decentralised departments were contacted for first-hand information on their degree of involvement in decision making and implementation at the assembly. This is against the backdrop of the fact that Heads of decentralised departments are permitted by law to participate in the assembly's deliberations. The available Heads included Heads of the Ghana Education Service, the Community and Social Development (CSD) and the Ghana Health Service (GHS). These Heads were asked whether their departments participate in formulating and implementing policies of the assembly. The respondents from the Ghana Education Service (GES) and the Community and Social Development (CSD) departments submitted that at the district level, they are only limited to implementing policies that have been formulated from the central government.

Stated differently, these departments do not have the responsibility for the formulation of policies. (This is an example of deconcentration).

In contrast, the District Director of Health (DDH) submitted that they are involved in both policy formulation and implementation. According to the DDH, policy formulation by the directorate takes the form of control measures and mostly such policies are made in the collective by various directorates within the region. These three respondents explained that their role in implementation of policies includes ensuring that policy targets are achieved using the appropriate means available. Responses from the GES and CSD departments show that the implementation function of these departments is influenced by the assembly in a great measure. According to the respondents, this influence is mainly as a result of the resource-allocation power entrusted in the hands of the assembly. While respondents maintain that this does not influence their scheme of work, it nonetheless affects the life cycle of many projects and programmes. From related interviews with the respondents, this is what the GES District Director had to say:

“I will say a lot. The most important one is the fact that the assembly is the custodian of resources we need to implement our programmes. Delays in the disbursement of funds for me are synonymous with failed programmes. Moreover once we are under this decentralized system we are actually under the assembly. And everything that we do we are supposed to give them reports. All reports that we send to our regional and national headquarters, we give the district assembly copies. For example we write quarterly reports to the region and to the national and we always give them (the assembly) copies of these quarterly reports.”

The Director, Community and Social Development Department also had this to say:

“With our current decentralization policy we look up to the assembly, so generally the assembly facilitates what we do. And in terms of fiscal resources like money, now we seem

to be dwelling between the assembly and our mother department to implement our projects. If the assembly does not provide enough resources it suffocates our implementation processes.”

The respondent from the District Health Directorate however lamented that the influence from the assembly is seemingly insignificant or perhaps non-existent. The following statement from the District Director of Health (DDH) provides a strong evidence to explain this situation:

“I haven’t seen any (influence) yet; we invite them and include them in everything we do. They promise support but it never comes, we have insisted they attend some of our meetings which they do most of the time but as to influence it is not yet there.”

Relating this response with the above responses, we may deduce that differences exist in the degree of autonomy assumed by the departments sampled for this study. This may affect the quality of decision output. While some departments may meet and perhaps exceed their targets in the stipulated programme period because of availability of resources, others may not, because of the lack of resources. Besides, the decentralization process (devolution) seems to be incomplete since there are still traces of deconcentration.

In relation to participation in the assembly’s decision making, the department heads interviewed submitted that they serve on relevant committees within the assembly. Respondents revealed that just like all the other members on the committees, their inputs are mostly debated and eventually accepted. Consideration is often given to their inputs on the grounds of expertise and experience.

This revelation provides some evidence that there exists an avenue for the relevant stakeholders to participate in the decision making and implementation processes of the assembly, and this window

prevails at the committee and sub-committee levels where group decision making is vibrantly manifested.

All these Heads stated that their relationship with the DCE, the DCD and the assembly members is always cordial. According to them, they agree on most proposals and disagree on just a few. It however became evident that sometimes there is divided opinion between the political head and the administrative head of the district in relation to implementation. This results from differences in priorities of these personalities. This situation is well explained in the words of a District Director of GES as follows:

“The relations are cordial. You don’t go there and find anybody ‘fighting’. The relations are cordial. But when it comes to carrying out decisions that is where the problem lies. The politician, for example the DCE, is mainly the political figure; he has got all the priorities, so when you take matters there that concern these priorities he will be eager to give you the assurance that the assembly will be of help but when it gets to the technocrats that is where the problem starts.”

This is to be expected anyway, because as noted elsewhere politics is about values while administration dwells on facts. In other words some politicians, for the sake of votes, would do everything possible to satisfy their followers while bureaucrats are expected to be concerned with the rightness of actions. Under normal circumstances, the technocratic leader would always insist on ‘the right way’ of doing things. Consequently, the administrator may not sit aloof as the politician (DCE) attempts to circumvent established procedures to achieve a political agenda.

In relation to the choice of the politics-administration relations model for the district, the dominant view was that the partnership model is the most appropriate. The following statements by the district directors of Community Social Development and Health respectively illustrate this view:

“Generally, when we talk about development we cannot move in parallel lines. There must be cross country. So the third one which is partnership is what I will go for. Because who is a politician and who is a public servant or an administrator? We are all human beings and if we all don’t table our ideas it will interest you that the politician probably may not have the requisite idea as an individual to prepare the policies. You will need the ideas of the other person who is at the other side, that is the administrator, and if he supports that idea then all these are treated as if they emanated from the politician because at the end of this all we want is the best decision to be taken. I don’t want to believe that it is the honourable minister who sits down alone to draft something; it will interest you to know that it is the public servant who actually drafts the policies and the honourable minister will just sign and they will say that the politician has come up with this or that. So the politicians should actually team up with the administrators so that the best is achieved. If partnership implies that they do it together, then it is fine..... but “we tap on each other’s back.”

On the contrary however, some other respondents opted for the modified version of politics-administration relations, expressing divergent sentiments.

For instance, One DCD explained his position in the following words:

In my candid opinion the best type of practice or approach should be that of the modified version. Yes, because of the accumulation of the work experience from various policies, the bureaucrat would have met so many politicians; he would have known the style, their drive and those kinds of things. You know, that should be the best approach. That in my opinion will be in the best interest of our districts.”

A second DCD who also opted for modified dichotomy approach had this to say:

“I will say the middle one (modified dichotomy). Because if you want to go to the third one (partnership) for example we definitely are going to have conflict, but if it is the modified one when the two sides understand exactly what they are about- I am helping you to formulate the policy but leave the implementation to me I will do the implementation. When

the duties or the roles are segregated everybody knows what he or she is supposed to be doing. But if we want to take the third one (partnership) when both parties are crossing each other it will be chaotic.”

Interestingly, a DCE who opted for the partnership model claim that this approach ‘would cut administrators to size’ since it could bring the excesses of some administrators under check.

According to him, “When you give too many powers to the administrators they misbehave. I have once had an administrator who did not know anything. He was telling people that there are two heads and that he is the administrative head and I am the political head.”

This aptly reveals the subtle rivalry between politicians and administrators at the district assembly as a result of role ambiguities. As projected in the conceptual framework of this thesis titled “The War of Functional Relationship” (page 49), mistrust, duplication of functions and conflict would potentially breed poor local government; and these must be avoided to promote good local government for local development.

6.5 The DCE Debate

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats constitutes a core but rather latent determinant of good governance. This is because of the belief that good relations between these key players in the political system has the potential of promoting transparency, accountability, participation and responsiveness, which are all tenets of good governance. In Ghana, one of the contentious concerns expressed about the current local government system by sections of the populace is the appointment by the President of the District Chief Executive (DCE) (Metropolitan/Municipal Chief Executives inclusive), with regard to good governance practices. While some have openly expressed their reservations about this aspect of the local government

system, others have unreservedly lauded the practice as the most appropriate to promote peace in an already unhealthy political climate.

Both the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Local Government Act of 1993, Act 462, spell out the mode of appointment of a DCE:

- (i) the President nominates a candidate for consideration by the assembly as DCE,
- (ii) the President's nominee is vetted by at least two-thirds of the assembly members present and voting at a meeting convened purposely to consider the President's nominee. If the candidate is approved,
- (iii) The President proceeds to formally appoint him Chief Executive for the metropolitan, municipal or district assembly.

This procedure did not generate any noticeable protests or debate at the outset of the district assembly concept during the military regime, (from 1988 to 1992) and even during the early years of democratic governance that followed. However, it has become a topical issue for debate in subsequent years, and a very important one in recent times to the extent that it featured prominently in 2008 and 2012 election campaigns of the various political parties and thereafter. As pointed out above, the issues have centred mainly on the concept of good governance, which tenets include accountability and transparency.

At this juncture we shall in fulfilment of the fifth objective of this research, proceed to briefly examine some arguments for and against the appointment of Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executives into office.

When a DCE was asked to provide his candid opinion on whether or not DCEs should be elected, his response pointed to the fact that the DCE position should be an elective one. According to him, this practice may deepen the democratic process and enhance vertical accountability. The following statement by the DCE explains his position

“I support that. The DCEs should be elected; they should be accountable to the people. I got to know this because of the kind of development we have done. If they are elected then at a particular time the people will want you to tell them what you have used the money for, how much did we have and how much did you use for fuel so that you will not use the fuel recklessly. It is only the DCE who should be elected because he can be called at any time to explain to the community.”

Similarly, a DCD responded that DCEs should be elected. This DCD based his argument on the premise that the election of DCEs points to the diffusion of potential and existing conflicts as whoever emerged elected is seen to possess legitimacy that is not only limited to the appointing body (President) but also to the electorates within the district.

One Member of Parliament however expressed a contrary view. He asserted that the time is not yet ripe to allow for the election of DCEs. Below is a statement that cogently explains his reasons:

“In reality it is a difficult thing otherwise it will be the best process. But in reality I think there is a shortcoming if we elect DCEs. Already we are having problems of allowing institutions to work independently and that is the challenge we are already faced with as a nation and as a people. We will get there, gradually strengthening the institutions or when the institutions are really independent and working fairly then you are not disturbed at all even when DCEs are elected. Let us take note that the security of the President is key in all this and the way it is a particular President may not have his choice of DCE in the district, should they be elected. The DCE might be more inclined to an opposing (political) party than the party in power but if you have independent institutions such as the police, the

national security, and all these other arms of these various agencies around so determined to be very independent, think right, not to be influenced in any way and their report could be relied upon then the President is protected even in the areas where he does not have the DCE to be more or less somebody that is closer to him. Until then, trust me I don't see election of DCEs a reality. We might go forward with it but let us have the institutions working very independently; let them think for themselves and I think that is a step forward. That is the way I think."

Interestingly this issue of trust (or mistrust) came up in a workshop discussion (included as appendix III) as a potential cause of conflict between even DCEs and DCDs – the same reason why South Africa has embraced political appointments for some public service posts.

On the same issue of the election of DCEs, the dominant view among the departmental Heads is that DCEs should be elected. The reason provided for this position reflects in the following statement by District Director of Education thus:

"Then it is the people who elected the person. You will have more support from them. This is the person I am presenting to you then the people will say no we don't want to take that person. But if the person is elected then it is the people who elected him or her so you are sure they will surely give him/her their full support so that he/she can be able to perform."

On the other hand, the DDH, submitted that the status quo should be maintained (i.e the DCEs should continue to be appointed). The argument in favour of her position reflects in the following:

"You know the public do not understand what it takes to do the work. It is not a matter of a favourite person or a generous person. It takes much more than that and when the people are probably interviewed and they have been in public life, they have good parts and other sides then if somebody talks for the person but if you leave it for people to elect it is the person who has money (the richest candidate) that they will vote for and I don't think that

will help us; or somebody that is a native or somebody that is close to them, I don't think that is what we are looking for. We want a person who can really be effective”

As it stands now, this is an issue that might not be determined by such a limited study as it may even be decided through a national referendum, but at least one point is clear that there is no consensus on this matter for now, and therefore the debate may continue for some time

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

7.0 Introduction

This chapter contains a summary of findings of the study, recommended actions for the way forward, and conclusion, in succession.

7.1 Summary of findings

The key objectives of this study include: to explore whether elected officials (Assembly Members) and district chief executives (DCEs) perceive their relationships with public administrators (bureaucrats) in ways that conform to the politics-administration dichotomy models; to foster a good understanding of Ghana's public administration system; to investigate the dominant model(s) of politics-administration relations practiced in District Assemblies of Ghana; to interrogate the attitude and behaviour of the DCE and DCD in this relationship; to gauge the level of participation of relevant stakeholders in the decision making processes at the assemblies and to seek the opinions of some key stakeholders on the proposed election of DCEs; and finally, to recommend the most suitable model, on the relationship between politics and administration, for possible adoption by district assemblies of Ghana.

It was established by this study that:

- An effective government depends on an efficient public administration system. In Ghana the public administration system is constituted by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) of the civil service and the local government service which operates under the auspices of the ministry of local government and rural development. In particular, the core

functions of the civil service include helping the central government to formulate policy and implementing such policies to the benefit of the citizenry. On the other hand district assemblies are the conduits for local development. They are the highest political authority of the districts, vested with executive, legislative and deliberative powers and tasked with the overall development of the districts. This also involves policy formulation and implementation which are the traditional duties of politics and administration (politicians and administrators). The relation between these two spheres and their operatives has become an important topic for debate and inquiry.

In the quest to achieving the objectives stated above, the study employed qualitative techniques including interviews and a survey to generate data for analysis.

The highlights of findings from the analysis of data generated from the survey designed for assembly members (AMs) and supported by interview responses from the District Chief Executives, (DCEs), District Coordinating Directors (DCDs) and other key stakeholders of the selected districts are presented below.

- Majority of assembly members support the view that politicians should play a role in policy implementation in addition to policy formulation. Likewise, the DCDs consider DCEs' involvement in policy implementation as 'positive influence' and often productive. This position, it is noted, does not support Wilson's orthodox dichotomy, which prescribes a strict separation of the policy implementation function from the policy formulation function, nor does it conform to Montjoy and Watson's modified dichotomy proposition;

- Assembly Members (AMs) admit that administrators constitute an integral part of the policy formulation process so they should actively be involved in policy formulation by especially putting their expertise in policy issues at the disposal of politicians during policy formulation;
- On the removal of administration from politics, the majority position is that administration should not be removed from politics. This again is at variance with Wilson's politics-administration dichotomy model;
- In effect, administrators (appointed officials) should fully partner politicians (elected officials) to formulate policy and politicians should fully partner administrators to implement policy;
- Although many AMs support the idea of politicians monitoring policy implementation, some others do not see this oversight responsibility as binding;
- With regard to participation of relevant stakeholders in decision making at the assembly, the heads of decentralised departments in the three districts revealed that they play a major role in the decision making process as members of relevant committees and that their expert contributions are highly appreciated and utilised;
- With the choice of the most desired and applicable approach (model) of the politics-administration relations in government, the partnership view dominated over the modified dichotomy and the orthodox dichotomy models;

- Although there is no consensus on the appointment or election of DCEs, most of the interviewees are of the view that election of DCEs would be a channel for deepening democracy at the grassroots to promote accountability and harmony in Ghana's local government.
- Decision making theories such as the traditional managerial approach which encompasses the rational comprehensive model, and the political approach which stresses incrementalism and satisficing models were also discussed. Eventually it has been established that the committee system which employs the group decision making approach to make programmed and non-programmed as well as strategic decisions has been adopted as the nerve centre of the decision making process at the district assembly.

7.2 Recommendations

It has been observed that workshops and other fora are occasionally organized for DCEs and DCDs to equip them with tools and strategies to improve their effectiveness in the current local government system of Ghana.

It is hereby recommended that:

- (i) The frequency of these capacity building programmes should be increased; in fact funds should be made available to make these interactions a regular feature of the district assembly concept;
- (ii) These in-service-training programmes should be extended to assembly members and administrators (bureaucrats) to enable them appreciate their responsibilities and be current on evolving governance issues;

- (iii) There should be an intensive pre-appointment orientation programme for DCEs and by extension for DCDs to foster a better understanding between their offices in order to alleviate any potential conflict or tension between them;
- (iv) In all these interactions, the politics-administration relations and the responsibilities of politicians and administrators in this interface should feature prominently;
- (v) Above all, there should be a blueprint that would explicitly spell out the duties and responsibilities of elected and appointed officials, especially with regard to policy formulation and policy implementation and related issues, to address any issues of role ambiguities, to engender harmonious co-existence of politics and administration to promote development.


7.3 Suggestion for Future Research

Since inter-institutional relationships may impact societal development, it is hereby suggested that future studies on politics and administration relations should focus on the impact these relations have on development of Ghana's district assemblies. By extension, the impact of the proposed bounded complementarity approach on decision making and development of the district assemblies be assessed after implementation for between three and five years,

7.4 Conclusion

This study was designed to investigate and present the Ghanaian version of the politics-administration relations debate. In spite of some hitches encountered, the study was worth conducting and in fact very interesting; to the extent that the available officials and assembly members were quite cooperative and exhibited a commendable level of interest and enthusiasm in the study. Most participants even expressed their readiness to participate in any follow-up research.

As stated in the introductory chapter, this study is not the first of its kind; it has been undertaken in more advanced democracies like the United States of America, Norway, Taiwan, and in South Africa and Tanzania in Africa. These earlier studies motivated the researcher to carry out a similar study in Ghana. As expected, the findings are uniquely Ghanaian. Generally, Ghanaians are discerning and often hold divergent positions on governance issues such as this; it is therefore not surprising that there is lack of consensus on the most suitable politics-administration approach for our local government administration. It is however refreshing to note that Woodrow Wilson's politics-administration dichotomy has largely failed the test leaving the partnership approach propounded by James Svara having a slight edge over Montjoy and Watson's modified dichotomy. This makes the search for a compromised model relatively simpler. The study observes that it would be appropriate to find common grounds and proceed to strike a balance between these two approaches for a possible adoption by Ghana's local government, even if on experimental or pilot basis. An objective observation of the two approaches and largely driven by findings of the current study and the previous one presented in the empirical literature, this thesis is inclined to suggesting a **modified complementarity version** of the politics-administration relations. In this approach the very pertinent positions of the modified dichotomy would be integrated into the partnership model to form what may be termed as **bounded complementarity approach**.

Figure 7.1 Revised Conceptual Framework

7.4.1 Bounded Complementarity

Due to the professional nature of administration, and the need to be trained and well vested in administrative issues to be efficient and effective in service delivery, it is just appropriate that some sections of administration should be given a more independent status. Sections that come to mind include decisions on recruitment and selection into the service, placement, training programmes, promotions and transfers, remuneration administration, discipline and firing, among other general management functions, which must be left strictly in the hands of administration, devoid of any manipulation and/ or interference from political office bearers. Similarly, political programmes that are not directly related to administration must be left in the hands of politicians. Issues directly related to political decisions such as the fulfilment of electoral promises to locate specific projects in specific constituencies can be cited in this regard. In Ghana's local government however, it

appears that there is no clarity with reference to the routine and conventional administrative practice of the DCE, being the political and administrative head of the assembly with the responsibility for the day-to-day-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of the assembly (Act 462 (20) (b)).

Bounded complementarity will therefore posit that while politicians and administrators must complement each other in decision making and implementation, this should be better done in an atmosphere of well-defined boundaries beyond which interfering would not be entertained nor encouraged.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE DISTRICT CHIEF EXECUTIVES (DCEs)

I am a Doctor of Philosophy student from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management of the University of Ghana Business School. I am exploring the topic Politics-Administration Relations and Decision Making in Ghana's Local Government. I will need your support and assistance in responding to questions to enable me successfully complete my PhD thesis.

I am aware of the ethical considerations of studies of this nature and would want to assure that you will be anonymous and that every information you provide in support of this study will be kept confidential. You are also assured that you will have the privilege to verify the authenticity of information you provided during the interview session after we have transcribed the data.

Thank you

Name of Candidate: Richardson Azunu

Email: r-azunu@yahoo.com

Tel: 0248294832

1(a) DCEs' Perception of their involvement in Political and Policy Activities

- Deciding to initiate/implement policy
- Deciding to terminate an existing policy
- Deciding to modify an existing policy to better address emerging issues
- Deciding to terminate a contract between the assembly and a private enterprise
- Initiation of development programmes and projects
- Providing the mission and policy direction of the assembly
- Drafting the budget for the assembly
- Creating avenues for community participation in policy making
- Addressing the community on controversial policy issues through the local media
- Deciding the location of developmental projects in the district
- Playing a major role in security matters
- Overseeing, monitoring, and evaluating implementation of policies, programmes and projects
- Accounting publicly for the performance of the assembly
- To take collective responsibility for the assembly's decisions
- Responsible for the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of the Assembly
- Responsibility for the supervision of the departments of the Assembly

1(b) DCEs' Perception of Elected/Appointed Political Office Holders' Involvement in Administrative Activities

- Removing/Changing Departmental Heads for non-compliance to political direction
- Selecting staff for administrative positions in the district assembly
- Promoting staff to higher administrative grades
- Firing decisions concerning administrative staff
- Deciding training needs of administrative personnel
- Disciplining administrative staff for non-performance
- Resolving disputes among administrative/supporting staff

1(c) Related Issues

- Should public administrators be involved in policy issues?
- Should public administrators be actively involved in policymaking or divorced from political matters?

- What should be the role and standard of behaviour for public administrators in policymaking if involved in the process?
- Can you recollect any conflict situation relating to policy issues between your office and the office of the DCD or any Senior Bureaucrat since you took office?
- How did such conflict affect policy implementation towards development of the district?
- How was the conflict resolved?
- Do you see yourself as a politician or administrator?
- What challenges do you face with the dual role of a politician (the political Head of the Assembly) and an administrator?
- Which model, of the **proposed** relationship between politics and administration, is most suitable to your District Assembly?
- What are the reasons for your choice?
- **Any general comment(s) that will enrich (i) the politics-administration relations in your Assembly and (ii) this study.**

**APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE DISTRICT COORDINATING
DIRECTORS (DCDs)**

I am a Doctor of Philosophy student from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management of the University of Ghana Business School. I am exploring the topic Politics-Administration Relations and Decision Making in Ghana's Local Government. I will need your support and assistance in responding to questions to enable me successfully complete my PhD thesis.

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Thank you

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Tel: 0248294832

1(a) DCD's Perception of Political Office Bearers' (e.g. DCE) Involvement in Administrative Functions:

- Removing/Changing Departmental Heads for non-compliance to political direction
- Selecting staff for administrative positions in the district assembly
- Promoting staff to higher administrative grades
- Firing decisions concerning administrative staff
- Deciding training needs of administrative personnel
- Disciplining administrative staff for non-performance
- Resolving disputes among administrative/supporting staff
- Implementing policy
- Responsibility for the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of the Assembly
- Responsibility for the supervision of the departments of the Assembly

1(b) DCDs' Perception of Administrative Officials' involvement in political activities/decision making

- Policy formulation
- Choosing sites for development projects in the district
- Making of byelaws
- Revenue mobilisation and utilisation
- Overseeing, monitoring, and evaluating implementation of policies, programmes and projects
- Accounting publicly for the performance of the assembly
- To take collective responsibility for the assembly's decision
- Responsibility for the supervision of the departments of the Assembly

Related Enquiries

- Should elected officials (political office holders) be actively involved in policy implementation or divorced from traditional administrative functions?
- What should be the role and standard of behaviour for elected officials in policy implementation if involved in implementation of policy?
- Are there instances of misunderstanding/dispute between political office holders (e.g. the DCE) and career bureaucrats (e.g. the DCD) on policy issues in your district?
- Which area(s) generate(s) these conflicts/misunderstanding mostly?
- How are these conflicts resolved?
- Which are the common grounds of agreement between political and administrative officials?

- Which model, of the **proposed** relationship between politics and administration, is most suitable to your District Assembly?
- **Any general comment(s) that will enrich (i) the politics-administration relations in your Assembly and (ii) this study.**

APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW GUIDES FOR DEPARTMENTAL HEADS

I am a Doctor of Philosophy student from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management of the University of Ghana Business School. I am exploring the topic Politics-Administration Relations and Decision Making in Ghana's Local Government. I will need your support and assistance in responding to questions to enable me successfully complete my PhD thesis.

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Thank you

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District Directors (Departmental Heads)

- What role(s) do you play in policymaking and policy implementation relating to your department in the district?
- What influence does the Assembly have on your policy implementation function?
- Do you serve on any committee of the District Assembly?
- To what extent are your inputs into the policymaking process accepted and utilised by the Assembly?
- Can you cite a specific input into a policy decision and how that input was accepted and used or rejected?
- How did you feel about the outcome of your contribution?
- Would you say your expertise is being utilised by the Assembly?
- How would you describe the relations between politicians (elected/politically appointed officials, e.g. the DCE) and career bureaucrats (e.g. the DCD and Public administrators) in this district?
- In what way(s) may this relationship be enhanced?
- Which of the proposed models of politics-administration relations would you endorse/recommend for your district?
- **Any general comment(s) that will enrich (i) the politics-administration relations in your Assembly and (ii) this study.**

APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NGOs

I am a Doctor of Philosophy student from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management of the University of Ghana Business School. I am exploring the topic Politics-Administration Relations and Decision Making in Ghana's Local Government. I will need your support and assistance in responding to questions to enable me successfully complete my PhD thesis.

I am aware of the ethical considerations of studies of this nature and would want to assure that you will be anonymous and that every information you provide in support of this study will be kept confidential. You are also assured that you will have the privilege to verify the authenticity of information you provided during the interview session after we have transcribed the data.

Thank you.

Name of Candidate: Richardson Azunu

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- At what level do you deal with the District Assembly? (eg: directly with the office of the DCE; with the administrative wing of the District Assembly)
- How often have you been involved in policy issues of the Assembly (especially in the area of your expertise)?
- Do you serve on any committee of the Assembly?
- If yes, are you satisfied with how your inputs into decisions affecting your field are utilised?
- How would you describe your relationship with the political officials of the District Assembly?
- How would you describe your relationship with public administrators of the District Assembly?
- What is your assessment of the relationship between political and administrative officials of the Assembly?
- Can this relationship be (further) improved? How?
- Which model of the politics-administration relations would you recommend for adoption by your District Assembly?
- **Any general comment(s) that will enrich (i) the politics-administration relations in your Assembly and (ii) this study.**

APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS

I am a Doctor of Philosophy student from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management of the University of Ghana Business School. I am exploring the topic Politics-Administration Relations and Decision Making in Ghana's Local Government. I will need your support and assistance in responding to questions to enable me successfully complete my PhD thesis.

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Thank you

Name of Candidate: Richardson Azunu

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Tel: 0248294832

- How often do you visit your Assembly
- How are you received by the Assembly (DCE, Presiding Member, Assemblymen etc) on such visits?
- How often do you participate in the Assembly's deliberations?
- Does the Assembly effectively use your expertise to enhance decision making in your district?
- Can you cite specific instances in which you think your contribution to certain policy decisions were not embraced?
- How would you describe your relationship with your DCE?
- Can you recollect any instance of disagreement between you and your DCE?
- How was such disagreement resolved?
- What is the relationship between you and the DCD?
- In your assessment, how cordial is the relationship between the DCE and the DCD?
- In what ways can this relationship be enhanced/improved?
- Which of the proposed models of politics-administration relations would you prescribe for your Assembly?
- **Any general comment(s) that will enrich (i) the politics-administration relations in your Assembly and (ii) this study.**

APPENDIX VI: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PRESIDING MEMBERS

I am a Doctor of Philosophy student from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management of the University of Ghana Business School. I am exploring the topic Politics-Administration Relations and Decision Making in Ghana's Local Government. I will need your support and assistance in responding to questions to enable me successfully complete my PhD thesis.

I am aware of the ethical considerations of studies of this nature and would want to assure that you will be anonymous and that every information you provide in support of this study will be kept confidential. You are also assured that you will have the privilege to verify the authenticity of information you provided during the interview session after we have transcribed the data.

Thank you

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How would you describe the following relationships in your Assembly?

- You (Presiding Member) and Assembly Members
- You and the DCE
- You and the DCD and other Public Administrators
- The DCE and the DCD
- The DCE and Assembly Members
- DCE and Departmental Heads
- DCE and NGOs
- DCE and the Public

How do such relationships affect decision making at the Assembly?

How can these relations be improved?

Which model of the politics-administration relations would you prescribe for your District Assembly to promote development in a peaceful atmosphere?

Any general comment(s) that will enrich (i) the politics-administration relations in your Assembly and (ii) this study.

APPENDIX VII: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ASSEMBLY MEMBERS

I am a Doctor of Philosophy student from the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management of the University of Ghana Business School. I am exploring the topic Politics-Administration Relations and Decision Making in Ghana's Local Government. I will need your support and assistance in responding to questions to enable me successfully complete my PhD thesis.

I am aware of the ethical considerations of studies of this nature and would want to assure that you will be anonymous and that every information you provide in support of this study will be kept confidential. You are also assured that you will have the privilege to verify the authenticity of information you provided during the interview session after we have transcribed the data.

Thank you

Name of Candidate: Richardson Azunu

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Kindly indicate your level of agreement with each of the statements below by stating whether you: (i) strongly Disagree (ii) Disagree (iii) Not sure (iv) Agree or (iv) Strongly Agree.

- In addition to formulating policies for the District, Assembly Members should be involved in the implementation of policies.....
- Assembly Members should concentrate on policy formulation and leave policy implementation for public administrators.....
- Assembly members should monitor how public administrators implement policies to ensure their adherence to specifications.....
- Assembly members should stay away completely from policy implementation so that administrators will perform their implementation function without interference.....
- Public Administrators should leave the policy formulation function entirely to Assemblymen.....
- Administration should be completely removed from politics.....
- Appointed officials (administrators/bureaucrats) should fully put their expertise at the disposal of elected officials.....
- Elected officials should keep away from policy implementation.....
- Appointed officials should be involved in policy formulation but elected officials should stay away from policy implementation.....
- Appointed officials should fully partner elected officials to formulate policy.....
- Elected officials should fully partner appointed officials to implement policy.....

- Policy making and execution should be a combined effort of appointed and elected officials

.....

Thank you for your cooperation.

APPENDIX VIII: WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS

DCE-DCD RELATIONS

(i) Roles of District Chief Executives and District Coordinating Directors

Introduction

Ghana's decentralization policy involves the transfer of powers, functions, competence and means from the national to the district level of government. By this policy, all government agencies in any given district are fused into one administrative unit through the process of institutional integration, manpower absorption, composite budgeting and provision of means. The structure, processes and staffing of the District Assembly has been so designed as to enable it to promote popular participation and ownership of government for the achievement of government's development agenda at the district level. The success of resource mobilisation and the management of the district development process depend to a large extent on the effective and meaningful interface or working relationship that will exist between and among many of the stakeholders and key leaders at the district level.

Two of the most important and critical actors in Ghana's local government are the political appointee (the District Chief Executive) and the topmost administrative official (the District Coordinating Director). The conventional view of the working relations at the top level of government looks deceptively simple; politicians make policy while senior civil servants offer advice on its framing and execution. In reality, however, matters can be more complicated. There is a fine and delicate line across which there can be slippage by both politicians and administrators.

In this chapter, we shall take a critical look at the legal framework governing the relationship of, and spelling out the functions of the District Chief Executive and the District Coordinating Director. Our points of reference shall be the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, the Civil Service Law of 1993 (PNDCL 327), the Local Government Act of 1993 (Act 462), and the Local Government Services Act of 2003 (656). The chapter is divided into five sections; the first four sections will examine the aforementioned legislations in succession while the fifth section will contain a summary and conclusion.

(ii) The Role of the DCE/Politician

Article 243 (2) The DCE shall:

- (a) Preside at meetings of the Executive Committee of the Assembly
- (b) Be responsible for the day-to-day performance of the executive and administrative functions of the District Assembly
- (c) Be the chief representative of the Central Government in the district

1. Political Leadership – vision and policy direction

The DCE is the president's appointee responsible for his own actions and those of the assembly and the departments under it. The DCE is responsible for giving a clear direction to the overall stance of the assembly.

2. Management of Assembly and the District

Overall responsibility for the efficient and effective running of the district (assembly). The DCE ensures that the assembly, its departments and all government organisations work together in a coherent fashion. The DCE supervises the DCD.

3. Monitor Policy Implementation

Ensure that decisions and resolutions of the assembly are implemented. Ensuring that he/she has interest in implementation of assembly's policy as well as central government policy for successful results.

4. Steering Assembly's deliberative and executive role

The DCE is responsible for piloting papers through the various stages – executive committee of the assembly.

5. Ambassadorship/Representation

The DCE represents the interests of the departments of the Assembly in the Executive and its committees, General Assembly meetings, in meetings with key stakeholder groups. Also in charge of communication with the public which must be timely, clear and consistent with overall Government and Assembly objectives and decisions.

6. Accountability/Authorizes expenditure

Within the context of individual responsibility, accounting for Assembly decisions and actions to the president and the government as a whole, to parliament via the full range of mechanisms of scrutiny and to the public.

7. Securing resources/Financial management

The DCE defends the budget for Assembly debate/approval. Also other resources from development partners etc. ensuring that all expenditures are properly and prudently managed and are related to official business.

8. Change sponsor

The minister provides leadership for reforms in the Assembly.

(iii)The Role of the DCD/Public Administrator

Section 36(1) of Act 462 Local Government Act, 1993 states: there shall be a District Coordinating Director who shall be the Secretary to the Assembly and the head of the District Coordinating Directorate.

(1) Secretary to the Assembly-

Have custody of all documents and records of the Assembly.

(2) Quality and timely advice

The DCD is responsible for the provision of facts and figures to give the Assembly a basis for making decisions on district goals. This suggests the direct involvement of the DCD in decision making.

(3) Implementation of all lawful decisions of the Assembly

The DCD is primarily responsible for setting up systems enabling the implementation of all lawful decisions of the Assembly and delivering services. It is through the DCD that decisions are realized.

(4) Administration and management of the Assembly

The DCD is responsible for the day-to-day functions of the Assembly work processes, control and coordination etc on behalf of the DCE. Administration is a noun from the English verb administer which is a combination of the Latin words **ad** and **ministrare** meaning serve. To administer is to manage or direct.

Therefore Administration simply means management of affairs. It involves such functions as planning, organizing, directing, staffing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting (PODSCORB) in organizations to keep them running.

(5) Accountability

DCD is responsible for the financial and other resources of the Assembly, Spending officer. The DCD is accountable for his/her work upwards to the DCE and in limited circumstances to

parliament-as spending officer/accounting officer of the Assembly to the public accounts committee of parliament.

(6) Leadership and change agent

The DCD provides leadership and guidance for the heads of department of the Assembly, technical and professional staff of the Assembly.

The DCD is supposed to be apolitical. Conversely, the DCE who is political is not expected to be an administrator but a policy maker.

Despite their role differentiation, in reality the DCD while expected to be apolitical, participates in policy-decision making processes which have a political base and bias.

The DCE has interest in how Assembly policies or central government programmes are implemented and so is involved in administrative matters.

The functional relationship between the two sets of officials is sometimes characterized by tension which inevitably affects implementation of development programmes and activities.

This paper discusses the nature of the problem and makes suggestions for enhancing the working relationships between the two parties.

While the problems of the interface are generally not publicly debated, there are signs/symptoms and indicators that can be observed. Many are visible to the ordinary citizens and to visitors doing business with the Assembly.

The problem of the relationship can manifest in the following ways:

- DCE complains about his DCD and the advice he/she gives.
- DCD says that DCE does not listen to his/her views and advise.
- DCE holds meetings without DCD being present to follow-up decisions or keep a record of what is said.
- DCE appears to be inadequately briefed for meetings or interviews or to answer questions at Assembly meetings.
- Trust and respect do not exist between the two sides. Relations between the two sides can deteriorate sharply and give rise to “betrayal theory”.
- DCE and DCD are seldom seen together at functions
- Suspicion of bureaucratic sabotage becomes a common theme among DCEs.
- DCE attempts to move or insert specific people of his choice i.e. based on party or own faithful, nepotism and tribalism. Creating fear (for loss of employment, demotion, transfer, reshuffles.)

Prof. Kevin Theakston (specialist in British Government, Whitehall, Civil Service and politics) outlined three significant relationship models of Minister Vs. Permanent Secretary:

- **Legal Traditional Model:** Boundaries are regulated by law. The Minister takes responsibility for policy whilst the Permanent Secretary implements. Such a system may not exist in its pure form in reality;
- **Adversarial Model:** In UK “Yes Minister.” The relationship is one of perpetual conflict;
- **The Community Model**–Utilizes the husband/wife metaphor. Captures the essence of partnership;
- Focuses on the interconnectedness between politics and administration-Administrators can have great impact on policy making and politicians can often have great impact on administration.
- Mutually dependent on each other-cordiality and cooperation
- Attendant tension, understanding, with option of outright divorce in the worst case scenario.

While the third Model captures the essence of partnership, in reality, there is a mix of the three Models in varying degrees, depending on the individuals involved.

(iv) Causes of Relationship Problem

The key issues of the interface can be grouped under three broad headings:

A Political

B Organizational/structural

C Personal

A. Political:

(i) Mistrust and Suspicion

DCE appointed by a new government will automatically inherit the Civil Service machinery that served the previous government. There is usually suspicion, dislike and sometimes hatred of the DCD. DCD of a particular tribal or regional origin cannot be trusted.

Response has been to ask that the DCD who served the previous government is posted out of that district.

(ii) Increasing politicization of the public service.

DCE attempting to assert influence and control over the Civil Service and attendant resistance.

This process includes:

- Attempts to control or influence decision making and implementation;
- Attempts to supply jobs to party members or foot soldiers and to members of family or cliques;
- Creating fear (for loss of employment, transfer, reshuffles etc.);

Attempting to change the attitudes and culture of the civil service by emphasizing the need for commitment or loyalty

(iii) The concept of constitutionally entrenched opposition

The institutionalization of a minority party officially in opposition to a majority party government, with an avowed mandate just to compete and to oppose each other has done more harm than good to the service.

It is divisive. It entrenches a deep chasm between government in power and the opposition. The opposition regards all those working for the party in power as partners in crime. Thus the hatred is extended to the DCD and staff.

The polarized political system and political culture have been conducive to the penetration of the civil service by governments in power. There have been attempts to make new appointments based on political patronage and not merit- top-down politicization.

Also the unholy alliance between DCE and other core staff, for whatever benefits, creates more problem for the service. Some civil servants have been used to settle scores, harass, victimize or levy criminal charges against opposition politicians.

(iv) Civil Servants involvement in active party politics.

DCD is called upon to represent DCE at public functions, where he makes policy statements or defend DCE or government position on policy issues.

There are also cases of DCD engaged in active party politics and competing in parliamentary primaries and general elections. This is bottom-up politicization.

(v) Time Perspectives.

Both parties differ on the speed with which goals can be achieved. DCE being politicians has the anxiety to achieve as much as possible within a short period or within the term of his party. While DCD as administrator would regard it as a process. The DCE wants immediate results; the DCD pursues continuity and consistency.

(vi) Different Styles

The DCE and the DCD may have different conflicting leadership styles. Such conflicting leadership styles send conflicting messages to other officials.

DCE could be a young action-oriented and informal person vs. an old experienced and professional DCD who sticks to rules and regulations and insists on consultation and cooperation.

(vii) Party Vs. Assembly matters.

The DCE expects that under the concept of loyalty and commitment the DCD should become a “yes person” of his political boss and can willingly violate rules and regulations and thereby forsaking public interest for personal and partisan ends.

The Assembly’s resources are diverted for party activities- Party rallies, meetings outreach programmes, fuel for party executives for party work etc.

B. Structural/Organizational:

(i) Unclear Roles and Rules

The functional relationship between the two is sometimes unclear, conflicting or ambiguous. The roles and expected behaviors to each other are not clearly defined.

In the absence of such rules the personalities of the two become a major factor in the success or failure of the interface.

(ii) Inadequate preparation for office

Both parties may not have been adequately groomed for office. People assume leadership positions without being adequately prepared for it and therefore lack the vision and drive to pursue policies that would inure to the benefit of the people.

It is even worse when both are new to the subject area. No induction or training before assuming office. The result is confidence crisis in the management of the affairs of the Assembly.

(iii) Quality of Briefing /Advice/Information to DCE

Poor quality delivery by DCD can undermine confidence and trust. DCD's advice should be evidence based comprehensive, convincing etc.

(iv) Non-adherence to financial regulations

When DCE insists on having his way against existing financial and stores regulations.

(v) Interference in personnel administration matters

When DCE attempts to undermine the merit principle in recruitment and promotions or interfere with staff discipline and deployment.

(vi) Disruption in channels of communication

The principle of unity of command is disregarded when employees receive orders from more than one person. Conflicting lines of command undermines authority, weakens discipline, divides loyalty, and creates confusion and duplication of work.

(vii) Procurement issues

Illegal award of contracts etc without regard to the procurement Act. Goods and services paid for but not supplied or passed through the stores etc.

(viii) Focus on rules and regulations:

Inflexibility of the DCD and incapacity to adapt to changing work environment. DCD is unresponsive, problem-creator rather than problem-solver. DCD fails to improve workflow processes and systems.

C. PERSONAL

(i) Sharing of Resources, Budget, Vehicles, etc.

With the all too common problem of dwindling resources for the activities of the Assembly, there is competition for the scarce resources.

When the DCE wants to appropriate almost everything for political ends then the disagreement between DCE/DCD begins.

Kaufman G, Minister in Labor Cabinet (1974-1979), in discussing the British experience in his paper, "How to be a minister," 1997 warns that there are dangers of falling prey to the bureaucratic disease –Bureau pathology- "**Ministerialitis.**"

He defines as a preoccupation and satisfaction with holding ministerial office to the exclusion of almost all other considerations.

The minister thinks that he really has a right to privileged conditions and forgets what he is there to do and the people he is there to help.

Such preoccupation with the power and privileges of the ministerial position will derail the focus on the goal of the ministry leading to poor achievement of policy.

(ii) Lack of Respect

DCE ignores advice of DCD and makes him/her subject to public scorn, rebuke and ridicule. There is a lack of respect for career civil servants. The minister yells, uses demeaning language and leading to threats and abuse of power. This is abusive, unprofessional style of leadership.

(iii) Conflict of personalities

Personality differences, from age education, religion tribal etc can be a cause for disagreement between the two parties.

(iv) Level of moral development-ethical role models

Both political and administrative Leaders bring specific personality and behavioral traits to the job. Personal needs, family influences and religious beliefs all shape leaders' value system

(v) Emotional intelligence (EI)-High/Inadequate EI

The ability to establish and maintain satisfying relations with others. Not let temper get out of control, no matter what problems, has complete trust of his staff, always speaks kindly, listens to his team, is easy to talk to and always makes careful, informed decisions.

The ultimate agenda of any Assembly is to make and implement good decisions that will bring progress to the people and that will influence whether it will be remembered for good or ill. However, it is management and organization that make good decision making possible.

It is difficult for good decisions making to occur in the midst of organizational chaos, conflict and competition between the DCD and DCD.

A lot of time is spent on resolving the issues in the interface, the consequence of which may be to delay the development agenda.

As a popular Ghanaian adage goes “when two elephants fight, it is the grass beneath that suffers.”

Tools/Suggestions for managing the relationship

The ultimate agenda of any Assembly is to make and implement good decisions that will bring progress to the people and that will influence whether it will be remembered for good or ill. However, it is management and organization that make good decision making possible.

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To resolve the problems of the relationship the following tools may be helpful:

1. DCE and DCD must tread lightly and in tandem. There must be mutual respect and not suspicion and recriminations.

The two parties should learn to develop strong interpersonal skills, communication skills and above all tolerance of each other’s views i.e. High Emotional Intelligence (EQ).

2. Provide clear roles and standing rules and procedures to guide the behavior of both officials.

A DCE is appointed by the president to be the political head of the District and is politically accountable to him and to the people.

The roles of the DCE should be clear, written and handed over to him on appointment. Clearly define respective roles, code of conduct for DCE and DCD in an official DCE'S Handbook.

3. Induction training/ Joint workshops & seminars.

Induction training should be organized on appointment of both the DCE and DCD before assumption of office.

There should be annual reviews and retreats by the Regional minister for DCEs, DCDs and core staff of the District Assemblies in order to develop a better understanding of each other, the district administration system and processes and enhance teamwork to achieve government goals.

4. Team building in the District is imperative – collaborative and cooperative effort is needed. Coordinated effort in management in relation to performance outcome is a key requirement for success of any organization.

DCE should hold regular and focused meetings with senior officers in the office of the District Assembly in order to assess their contribution to and ownership of change management process. Similarly meetings should be held with the heads of the departments of the Assembly to bring everybody in the district on board.

5. DCD should know and recognize the DCE as the political head and owner of the District budget.

DCE must be in full knowledge of all resources that come to the District and how they are used through expenditure proposals and accountability.

There should be total transparency in handling the meager resources/funds.

6. Relationship with members of the opposition should be done transparently for both sides not to have any suspicions.

The integrity of the political system is very important. Recognizing that the party in power, the opposition and the Civil Servant each has important roles to play.


7. DCD should offer good and informed technical advice, the best advice rooted in experience, history and knowledge and sharing that knowledge with the DCE. DCD should change from business as usual to results-oriented management. DCD is required to perform his tasks with dedication and commitment, displaying the values and principles of public life: professionalism, selflessness, integrity, justice and fairness, accountability, transparency, political impartiality and leadership.

8. The DCD's first duty is to the DCE who is politically in charge of the district he is serving.

The DCD is responsible to the DCE. He has the duty to ensure that the DCE succeeds. Thus the DCD must provide prompt, responsive, accountable and efficient service to the district.

VI. TOOLS/SUGGESTIONS FOR MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP-CONT.

9) Be a 360 degrees leader



52

The DCD has to report to the political boss at the top. Life isn't fair and sometimes your political boss is not quite like the one you want to have. Leading-up is about leading your boss, helping your DCE to see the right goal and find the right path before too late. Once your DCE knows that you bring judgment and get results, the way is clear for you to lead your DCE.

Leading Upwards/Leading your boss

- **Build a strong relationship with your DCE.**

Contrary to your natural thinking instead of getting away try to find common ground and find professional affinity. Put the DCE's vision first and commit yourself to achieve that vision no matter what. That will help you to stay focused and don't lose your purpose.

- **Identify and appreciate your DCE.**

Even though you find your DCE is not good enough and has bad faults he/she must have some good qualities and traits, find them and focus on them.

- **Commit to add value to your DCE's strengths**

Once you have established your leader's strengths and the ones that are more valuable to the organization, you should try to add value to those strong points.

- **Complement your DCE's weaknesses**

If you are smart enough you will see that helping your DCE with his/her weaknesses is one of the best ways to add value to him/her and you will also learn that when you are at the top you can do the same.

- **Prepare to play the game of politics-**

Politics is played in every organization; so the sooner you learn how to play this game, the better off you'll be.

Politics is the informal way that things get done in an organization. Pay close attention to how work really gets done in the organization. People who master this game follow unwritten rules that allow them to maneuver swiftly through the organization to obtain scarce resources, approval of prized projects etc.

- **Presume good intent-**

It's easy to jump to conclusions when you are asked to do something that at first doesn't feel right. Presume good intent. Provide your boss with options on how to achieve the same results in a way that feels right.

- **Expose your DCE to good leadership resources.**

This is sharing with people who have a big influence in your life the resources you found about leadership-books, DVDs, Website or any that adds value to your DCE's toolkit.

- **Support your DCE publicly. Stand up for the DCE/stand in for the DCE**

Don't be afraid to support your DCE publicly, but do so based on facts and on the strength of your DCE, not on perceptions and finally don't overdo it

- **Master the art of influencing-**

Influencing is communicating effectively with a goal in mind. Be specific in your request while highlighting why it's in your DCE's best interest to comply with your request, and you will be on your way to mastering the art of influence.

- **Do some self-examination.**

Become introspective. Ask yourself if you are perfect. The answer will surely be no. It could be that things you do annoy others. Work to improve yourself and change your behavior. As you do, you will surely see an improvement in the behavior of others.

- **If you can bear it no more**, let the person know how he/she affects you. This can be very delicate, so do it with great caution. Do this in a way that will reduce rather than exacerbate the problem
- 10. THINK CREATIVELY
- 11. Make your words have value
- 12. LISTEN
- 13. Create balance in your life
- 14. Do your job well
- 15. For every problem you identify, bring a solution
- 16. Be honest – tell the DCE what he needs to hear, not what he wants to hear

CONCLUSION

Political and administrative positions are essentially and deliberately constituted to represent a system of checks and balances in power relations so that no one has a monopoly of power and influence at any one point in time.

The relationship between the two therefore appears to be deliberately made to be, on the one hand conflicting and ambiguous and on the other cooperative and meaningful.

Politics and bureaucracy are seen as two sides of the same coin. Making it necessary for the two parties to develop good working relationship not only for their own good, but for the good of the public.

Effective political and administrative interface is therefore a crucial lever to making strategies and policies work and enabling the delivery of services to the people.

******Workshop Facilitator/ Lecturer:** Joe Issachar (former Head of the Civil Service of Ghana)

Theme: Managing the Political Administrative Interface

Venue: Kumasi, Ashanti Region

Participants: DCDs & other key stakeholders in local government administration