

**CUTTING CORNERS: STUDENTS' PERCEIVED ACADEMIC CORRUPTION AT
UNIVERSITIES IN ACCRA.**

BY

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Declaration

I Isaac Tagoe hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own work, conducted at the Department of Sociology, University of Ghana, Legon, under the joint supervision of Prof. Steve Tonah and Dr. James Dzisah. All references have been duly acknowledged. I also declare that, this thesis has neither been published nor presented to any academic institution for an academic award.

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my Pastor and Uncle Rev. Meshach Tagoe, my mother and Sarah Hoffman, my darling.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to all who have in one way or another contributed towards the completion of this thesis. I would first thank all the lecturers at the Department of Sociology for their direction and support especially my supervisors, Prof. Steve Tonah and Dr. James Dzisah. I am grateful for their time and patience. My second gratitude goes to all my MA/Mphil Sociology classmates who supported me in various ways throughout my course. I say a very big thank you to them all; their support, encouragement, and suggestions were immeasurable. My next appreciation goes to my family who supported me to complete this work successfully; without their support, I would not have come this far. I say God bless them all. I cannot close this chapter without acknowledging the participants. I would like to thank all the students at the selected universities who participated in the study for their immense support. I am really grateful for their time, efforts and above all responses, which helped to shape this thesis. Finally, I want to thank all the faculty members and administrators of these universities for making this whole thesis a success. God bless them all.

Abstract

Today, corruption is a major concern in nearly all higher education systems across the globe; it is a complex phenomenon, which has become particularly evident within the academic arena involving all the stakeholders. Generally, this thesis sought to explore from the students' perspective, the perceived academic corruption at universities in the region of Accra. The study, specifically, sought to examine the extent to which students, faculty members, and administrators were involved in academic corruption and how the influences of peer and faculty affected students' intentions to engage in corrupt activities. Employing the mixed methods approach, data were collected from three universities in Accra, and in all, a total of 380 students participated in the survey while 10 students participated in the in-depth interviews. The study revealed that corruption at these universities takes the forms of exchanging money for grades, exchanging money for certificates, paying for exams questions, exchanging sex for grade, seeking sexual favours, favouring of friends and relatives, selling of hand-out or books compulsorily and paying of unapproved charges, and it involved students, faculty members, and administrators. The study further disclosed that students were generally passive to report corrupt activities; however, the influence of peers in predicting students' corrupt intentions was stronger than the influence of faculty. In effect, the presence of this cancer on our university campuses is affecting teaching and learning.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Corruption is an insidious plague in every society since its occurrence endangers human life. It is evident in every aspect of our social lives and affects all the social institutions upon which society is built. In the words of Quayson, its manifestation:

Undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism, and other threats to human security to flourish. It hampers efforts to alleviate poverty, undermines political stability and economic growth, and diminishes the country's attractiveness for investment. (2011; p.6)

Although corruption stalls the progress of society in general, its occurrence within the education sector, in particular, is, perhaps, the most dangerous since its effects are lasting. Ostensibly, corruption in the education sector undermines the quality of education delivery, the integrity of its products, and the rights of many to education; it reduces access and quality and leads to the wastage of many talents. Its effects, furthermore, can be seen in the working attitudes of many graduates who graduate with a lot of uncertain ethical basis (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009). From the social development's point of view, young people or minors are the victims of education sector corruption; hence, it contains illegal elements, which can directly affect their attitudes and work ethics (Heyneman, Anderson & Nuraliyeva, 2008).

Regardless of its enormous effects, it is the vulnerable and those disadvantaged in the society that suffers the most from the residues of corruption within the education sector. Due to their financial difficulties and lack of "connections," the vulnerable in society find it difficult to manoeuvre their ways through a corrupt system; hence, they are denied the promises of equal

access and quality education opportunities either by falling out entirely or redirecting their ambitions. These occurrences make the equity function of education dented or lost completely.

Across the globe, the future of any country is largely dependent on the quality and integrity of its education system, and education, which is universally cherished as a basic condition for human and national development. Besides, classroom education serves as a general means for appointing people for various positions in society; hence, its denial prevents people, especially the youth and vulnerable, of their basic ability to prosper (Feinberg & Soltis, 1985).

Corruption within the education sector is universal, and it exists at all levels of the education system. In 2013, Transparency International (TI), for instance, revealed that 16% of people, who came into contact with the education sector globally, paid bribes, and 3 out of every 5 people perceived corruption in the sector. Also in Africa, TI, in 2015, reported that close to 75 million people in the sub-region paid bribes to enjoy public services such as education. Meanwhile, most of these people, according to the report, claimed they paid bribes on countless occasions for a particular service. Likewise, in Central Asia and Europe, a similar report in 2016, revealed that 30% and 9% of persons within these regions, respectively, paid bribes to access public services like primary, secondary, and vocational education.

Besides its universality, education sector corruption occurs in different forms ranging from misappropriation of funds to manipulation of research findings for personal gains. According to Kimeu (2013), an audit in 2011, for instance, revealed that an amount of Kshs4.2 billion (US\$48 million), purposed to provide free basic education in Kenya, by the Kenya Education Sector Support Program (KESSP) from 2005 to 2009 could not be accounted for due misappropriation. Similarly, in Pakistan, Gilani (2013) reported on the existence of many

"ghost schools," which never rendered any service to students, yet academic staff and other officials received their monthly salaries. According to him, in 2009 alone, about 6,480 "ghost schools" were discovered just in one province (ibid.). In addition, Chow and Nga (2013) showed evidence of admission bribery within the sector. According to them, an online survey in Vietnam showed that 62% of parents used their personal contacts, connections, and money to influence the kind of schools their children attended. Equally in Ghana, 40% of Ghanaian parents, in 2013, paid bribes or unapproved fees to get their children admitted into various schools across the country (Transparency International [TI], 2013).

Universally, the risk of corruption associated with the education sector, according to Chapman (2002) can be attributed to the high interest in education. In his view, this interest has created room for political manipulations and extortions within the sector (ibid.). Parents and governments alike recognize the importance of education in shaping lives; hence, it has given education providers the opportunities to extort favours from their clients and misappropriate education funds (Chapman, 2002). In addition to this factor, the large sums of money allocated to fund education also endanger the sector. In most countries, education receives the largest share of government funds. For example, in countries like Indonesia and Ethiopia, governments' expenditure on education in 2010 alone exceeded one-fourth of the public's budget expenditure (World Bank, 2010). In view of this, TI asserted that the education sector is "frequently the sector that has the greatest funds being disbursed to the greatest number of recipients at multiple levels, and therefore, it is at great risk of leakage" (2013; p.5). In addition, they believe that "corruption risks are particularly dire when public funds are filtered through multiple administrative layers and pass through the hands of a series of actors with little accountability" (TI, 2013; p.5). In Chapman's (2002) view, this situation is true in most developing countries, including Ghana, where monitoring systems

are weak and funds are likely to move in small amounts over-dispersed and distanced locations.

Clearly, corruption in education is identifiable in systematic abuses of power (Granovetter, 2007; TI, 2006), in relations that permit gains to be achieved through bias or illegal financial dealings (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), and in immoral and unethical behaviour that disrupt one's sense of moral integrity (Granovetter, 2007). According to Heyneman (2013), all these forms of conducts can be found particularly in every sector of university education. Universities are essential places where young people learn and inculcate values; nonetheless, students learn not only what they are taught in class, but also behaviour and characters that are inherent of the classroom curricular and these include hidden rules, which determines who progresses and who does not (Meighan & Harber, 2007). Accordingly, when these rules are not guided by the principle of integrity, increasingly, young people adopt corrupt ways to succeed in life (Chapman, 2002).

Undoubtedly, it is evident that corruption within the education sector in general and the university, in particular, is the single most insidious behaviour, which universally undermines the quality of education delivery and the integrity of its products. Considering its ubiquitous nature, corruption at universities has motivated many multidisciplinary studies within the social sciences, and one of these studies is to explore from students' perspective, the perceived corrupt practices at universities in Accra.

1.2 Problem statement

Indeed, corruption in universities has attracted the attention of many research inquiries; nonetheless, the literature available is mainly of East European (Heyneman et al, 2008; Romyantseva, 2005; Chapman & Linder, 2016) and North American (Schwartz, 2016) origin with few from sub-Saharan Africa, specifically, Nigeria (Oarhe, 2014). As a result, not much

is known in the Ghanaian context. Basically, studies within this area focus on the prevalence of corrupt practices at universities by students, instructors, as well as administrators, and how it has attracted the attention of education providers, job owners, learners, governments, and international agencies.

In Ghana, the evidence on corruption is largely focused on public sector workers in the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (Nyendu, 2015), the police (Tankebe, 2010), governance, (Mensah, Aboagye, Addo&Buatsi, 2003) and public procurement (Osei-Tutu, 2010). Similarly, in 2015, the Transparency International report on corruption in the country invariably suggested that the politicians, the police, and public officeholders were the worst culprits. Interestingly, most of these supposed corrupt officials were once students, yet none of these studies has paid close attention to corruption among students and the entire university system across the country.

With regards to the 2013TI study within Ghana's education sector, there were limitations to the findings to a large extent. For instance, the level of corruption within the sector was not disaggregated into the various levels (i.e. basic, secondary, and tertiary) in our education system, so it was impossible to tell the extent to which corruption abound at the university, for example. Due to this limitation, it is possible for people to perceive corruption at the university level if they have had similar corrupt experiences at the basic and secondary levels; this kind of reasoning, however, is mere speculation.

Accordingly, there is no empirical evidence on the nature and level of corruption at the various university campuses across the country, the extent to which some students engage in this malpractice, how some administrators and faculty members involve themselves in this scheme, the contextual factors within the university environment that influence students' corrupt intentions, and how likely corrupt students are different from unlikely corrupt

students regarding their perceptions toward corruption and academics. It is for these reasons that this study seeks to fill this lacuna in the literature by exploring from the students' perspective, the perceived academic corrupt practices at universities in the region of Accra.

1.3 General objective

Generally, this study seeks to explore from students' perspective the perceived academic corrupt practices at universities in the region of Accra.

1.4 Specific objectives

Consequently, this study seeks to achieve the following specific objectives:

- (a) To examine corrupt activities among university students.
- (b) To examine the nature of corruption among faculty members and administrators.
- (c) To explore how peer and faculty influence students' corrupt intentions.
- (d) To investigate the differences between students likely to engage in corrupt activities and those unlikely to do so.

1.5 Research questions

- (a) What is the nature of corrupt activities among university students?
- (b) What is the nature of corruption among faculty members and administrators?
- (c) How do peer and faculty influences affect students' intention to engage in corrupt activities at universities in Ghana?
- (d) What are the differences between students likely to engage in corrupt activities and those unlikely to do so?

1.6 Significance of the study

The integrity of many institutions of higher learning in most developing countries has been in doubt because of the dishonest behaviour exhibited by some individuals within the system. Higher education corruption does not only restrict access to education, but it also affects the quality of education delivery and the reliability of findings of academic researches. This study will enhance our understanding of the various forms of corrupt behaviour put up by students, faculty members, and administrative staff in the university environment. In addition, unlike other studies on academic dishonesty, this study splits the contextual factors of academic corruption into two broad areas: peer and faculty influences. This is important especially for policymakers and university authorities since they have more control over faculty behaviour than on students' peer behaviour. Hence, if the study turns out that faculty behaviour influences students' corrupt intentions more than their peer influences, then stringent rules can be put in place to control faculty behaviour in order to reduce the menace on university campuses in the country.

1.7 Definition of concept(s)

Academic corruption for the purpose of this study is considered as the unofficial exchanges of money, material gifts, and/ or favours at universities between students and their faculty members and administrators for any academic achievements including grades.

1.8 Organization of the study

Chapter one: Introduction of the study: This chapter gives background information on corruption as a major problem within the education sector in general, the possible causes, and its implications on society. The chapter continues by showing the gap in the literature and how the study intends to fill this gap, the objectives of the study, the research questions which

guides the study, and the significance of the study. It concludes by giving an overview of how the entire thesis has been organized.

Chapter two: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption measures in Ghana: This chapter begins with how Ghana as a country defines the act of corruption in its statutory books. However, the chapter is divided into two parts; the first part focuses on the extent of corruption in Ghana and the forms that they take, and the second part takes into account the various anti-corruption measures put in place since independence to fight the canker in the system.

Chapter three: Literature review: This chapter shows the connections in the body of work on higher education corruption. It highlights how higher education corruption has been defined, its classifications, factors that accelerate this menace and some incidence of corruption within the university system. The various works on higher education corrupt activities by students, faculty members were also consulted. Finally, the chapter concludes by exploring the theoretical framework, which underpins the study.

Chapter four: Research Methodology: This section of the thesis explains the stages involved in obtaining the data for the thesis. It begins by describing the research area, explaining the research design, explaining the sampling procedure and data collection methods employed in the study. The chapter continues with the description of how data was managed and analyzed, ethical issues considered in the study and the challenges encountered by the researcher on the field. Finally, the chapter shows a description of the sample for the study by giving the background information of respondents of the study.

Chapter five: Perceived corruption at universities: The chapter shows the first part of the findings from the study. It shows the extent to which corruption exists on the various campuses selected for the study. Thus, it takes into consideration the perceived corrupt

practices by students, faculty members, and administrative staff. Also, the chapter presents the relationships between respondents' observed corruption and their demographic characteristics. Finally, the chapter looks at how students responded to the corrupt behaviour exhibited on campus by reporting to the university authorities.

Chapter six: Students' corrupt intentions: The chapter continues with the findings of the study and begins by focusing on the description of a likely corrupt student and the factors that account for such acts. The chapter continues by looking at how different these students are from the unlikely corrupt students. It also presents the relative influence of peer and faculty factors in determining the students' corrupt intention, and finally looks at the reasons students engage in corruption.

Chapter seven: Summary, conclusions, and recommendations: This chapter ends the entire thesis by summarizing it. It describes how the entire thesis was carried out and highlights the major findings; it also shows how the findings address the objectives of the study and its implications. Finally, the chapter presents some recommendations for both policymakers as well as future researchers.

1.9 Conclusion

In conclusion, several studies on corruption exist in the literature; however, in the Ghanaian context, most of them focus on corruption in the other sectors of the country's economy. They focus on how the prevalence of corruption is affecting the public confidence in the police, politician and public officeholder with neglect on the education sector. This chapter gives an overview of how the thesis is organized, the gap in the literature, and the objectives of the study. In order to throw more light on this, the subsequent chapter is dedicated to exploring the various empirical works on corruption in Ghana as well as measures put in place to fight it.

CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES IN GHANA

2.1 Introduction

Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, Ghana has enjoyed some political stability in a region marred by security challenges and conflicts. Recognised as the beacon of democracy, Ghana has served as a model for many countries on the continent and the world in general. This achievement has been possible because of the successful runs of elections and transfers of power from one political party to the other. Amidst these achievements, however, corruption has always been a major challenge and the fight against it continues to take center stage. In 2001, for instance, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government led by former President Kuffour declared a "zero tolerance" for corruption campaign, which was intended to flush out corrupt officials in government. According to Aboagye (2005), this declaration by the government showed the level of corruption among public officeholders in Ghana. Also, the late President Mills' government promised to improve the government's transparency, to investigate corruption and to improve the livelihood of Ghanaians (Freedom House, 2010). As a matter of facts, subsequent governments have continuously made similar pronouncements, yet very little has been achieved so far. According to the annual reports on the state of corruption in Ghana, The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative

Justice's (CHRAJ) has consistently maintained that corruption been Ghana's most difficult hindrance to development (NACAP, 2011). Furthermore, The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report in 2015 also shared a similar view that corruption continues to hamper Ghana's socio-economic development.

2.2 Definitions of Corruption

Several meanings have been given to describe the concept of corruption in the body of work available. While some of these definitions were too broad, others, on the other hand, were too narrow, which has limited their applicability. As a result, it has made it quite difficult to settle on a universally accepted definition (Osipian, 2007). According to Chapman and Lindner(2016), the description of corruption within the literature is a matter of concern since it gives an idea of attempts made to fight it; however, the definition commonly used has been the World Bank's definition, which is "the use of public office for private gains" (1997; p.8). Offering an alternative, Jain (2001) also defined corruption as "the replacement of material goods for power" (p.32). Meanwhile, in a more basic term, corruption has been defined as "a form of behaviour which deviates from ethics, morality, tradition, law and civic virtue" (Oarhe, 2014; p.314). Recently, the definition given by the TI has been more notable: "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (2013; p.13).

In view of these definitions, academic corruption for the purpose of this study is considered as the unofficial exchanges of money, material gifts, and/ or favours at universities between students and their faculty members and administrators for any academic achievements including grades.

2.3 The legal context of corruption in Ghana

In Ghana, corruption has a long history, which dates back to the pre-colonial era (Nukunya, 2016); however, it was just in 1960 that an Act of Parliament -the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) - led to the criminalization of the menace. Accordingly, Section 239 of this Act defines "corruption of and by a public officer or Juror" as follows:

- (1) "A public officer or juror who commits corruption, or wilful oppression, or extortion, in respect of the duties of an office, commits a misdemeanour".
- (2) "A person who corrupts any other person in respect of a duty as a public officer or juror commits a misdemeanour".

Furthermore, Section 240 and 241 provided clarifications for "corruption by a public officer" and "corruption of a public officer" respectively. According to section 240:

A public officer, juror, or voter is guilty of corruption in respect of the duties of office or the vote, if the public officer directly or indirectly agrees or offers to permit the conduct of that person as an officer, juror, or voter to be influenced by the gift, promise, or prospect of any valuable consideration to be received by that person or by any other person, from any other person.

Also, according to section 241:

A person commits the criminal offense of corrupting a public officer, juror, or voter in respect of the duties of an office or in respect of the vote, if that person endeavours directly or indirectly to influence the conduct of the public officer, juror, or voter in respect of the duties of an office or in respect of the vote, by the gift, promise, or prospect of any valuable consideration to be received by the public officer, juror, or voter, or by any other person, from any person.

By this Act of Parliament, therefore, corruption in Ghana has been limited to bribery, which occurs in different ways, such as "bribery of a public officer, acceptance of bribe before an act and bribe promise." In this regard, when likened to other international conventions on corruption like the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the African

Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, this Act becomes limited in scope.

2.4 The level of corruption in Ghana

Corruption is perceived to be widespread in Ghana and cuts across the private and public sectors of the economy. The CHRAJ annual reports, for instance, highlight some of the various forms of corruption in the country including bribery, misappropriation of funds, fraud, abuse of office, embezzlement, illegal acquisition of state properties among others.

In 2000, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD-Ghana) conducted a survey on “*corruption and governance*” in Ghana and revealed that 75% of households considered corruption as a nation-wide problem; 59% and 86% also considered it as a problem within the private and public sectors, respectively. Another survey by the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) five years later also revealed that most Ghanaians perceived corruption as a serious national issue. According to the GII survey, 92.5% of Ghanaians in the urban areas considered corruption as a serious national issue in the country’s developmental agenda.

Furthermore, in 2015, Transparency International reported that majority of Ghanaians (76%) maintained corruption had worsened and placed Ghana as the most corrupt country in the sub-region after South Africa. In addition, the majority of the participants (71%), according to the report, asserted that the government had not done enough to fight the cancer of corruption that has engulfed the country. Furthermore, 36% of the patrons, who patronized public services, paid bribes.

Also, in January 2017, the GII released the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2016 in which Ghana scored 46 points out of a possible 100 and ranked in the world as the 70th most corrupt country. Actually, Ghana's current performance in the CPI reveals a 4% drop from the previous year, and it is the worst performance so far since the CPI scores became comparable in 2012 (ibid.). The report attributed Ghana's current performance to the series of public sector corruption scandals in the past few years such as "the police recruitment scam, the Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Authority (GEEDA) scandal, the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) scandal, the GHs 144 million GRA/Subah scandal, the infamous Woyome's GHs 51 million judgment debt saga and the Smarty's bus rebranding deal" (p.2).

Beside this general perception on bribery and corruption, the country is also marred with bureaucratic corruption. The 2013 Ghana Enterprise Survey, for example, showed that 24% of firms operating in Ghana were expected to give gifts to public officials in order "to get things done"; 19% of these firms were expected to make unofficial payments to get an operating license and another 11% were expected to make such payments when they came in contact with tax officials. Meanwhile, close to half (44%) of these firms, according to the survey, identified corruption as a major hindrance to doing business in Ghana (ibid.). The World Economic Forum (2009), however, suggested factors such as low salaries and unnecessary delays by civil servants as hindrances, which has motivated this bureaucratic corruption and other rent-seeking behaviours to thrive.

In addition to the bureaucratic corruption is political corruption. According to the Ghana Integrity Initiative (2008), allegations of corruption and fraud are common during the electoral process. For instance, in the 2008 election campaign, there were allegations of registration irregularities where some political parties conveyed voters from nearby countries,

and political parties, in some cases enticed people below the voting age (18) with money to register and subsequently vote.

2.5 Anti-corruption measures in Ghana

2.5.1 Legal framework

The fight against corruption has been one of the major challenges in the country since independence, so in 1960, corruption became criminalized through the passage of the Criminal Offences Act (Act 29). However, in order to increase the penalty for corrupt offenses to a maximum sentence of 25 years imprisonment, Parliament passed the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (Act 261) in 1965.

When the country finally returned to constitutional rule in January 1993 after several years of military dictatorship, Ghana adopted the Fourth Republican Constitution of 1992, which saw the systematization of the countries' anti-corruption measures. As a result, the constitution bestowed power on The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) to investigate "all instances of alleged or suspected corruption, and the misappropriation of public funds", and with the establishment of The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) - now The Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) -the development of a legal and institutional framework to fight corruption became intensified.

Subsequently, in 1998, the second Parliament of the Fourth Republic passed the Public Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Disqualification) Act (Act 550), which repealed the Public and Political Party Office Holders (Declaration of Assets and Eligibility) Law (PNDCL 280). However, whereas the latter required that both assets and liabilities be declared and gazetted, the former only required assets and liabilities to be declared.

The country further strengthened its anti-corruption laws when Parliament in 2003 passed three financial management laws, which included: the Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act 654), the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) and the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003 (Act 658). The country enacted these financial management laws to sanitize the financial management system in the country, prevent illicit enrichment, curb leakage of resources, and help combat corruption and its related misconducts.

To encourage citizens to disclose corrupt dealings with the security agencies, Parliament, in October 2006, also enacted the Whistle Blowers Act (Act 720). This Act, in addition, offered protection for persons who decide to report corruption from victimization or prosecution. However, Global Integrity, in 2009, rated this Act (Act 720) as very weak because of its low enforcement rate. In recent times, the legislation that has caught the attention of many citizens, especially the media, is the passage of the Right to Information Bill. It is believed that when this bill is passed into law, it will promote transparency in the activities of government and also boost the confidence of citizens to report corruption to the various anti-corruption agencies. However, until now, this bill has not been passed into law.

2.5.2. Anti-corruption agencies

Another area in the fight against corruption is the enforcement of these laws on corruption. Since having tough laws do not guarantee effective enforcement, it is, therefore, important to pay attention to the agencies mandated by law to enforce these laws. In Ghana, the main agency enjoined by the 1992 Constitution to tackle corruption is CHRAJ. The 1992 Constitution guarantees the independence of CHRAJ in its operations, and charges it to investigate all alleged corruption of public officials and to take action to remedy any proven violation; however, their mandate does not extend to the investigation of corruption within the private sector. In addition, CHRAJ has the responsibility to promote human rights and to

play the role of an ombudsman. In this regard, the Commission combines three institutions under one umbrella, which includes a Human Rights Institution, an Ombudsman, and an Anti-Corruption Agency. According to Doig, Watt and Williams (2005), since government appoints the commissioner(s) for CHRAJ, it lacks independence as the constitution guarantees; hence, their function as an Anti-Corruption agency is relatively weak as compared to their function as a Human Rights agency.

Before the establishment of EOCO, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was next to CHRAJ as Ghana's main anti-corruption body. Established in 1993 as an independent body to fight corruption by the Serious Fraud Office Act (Act 466), the SFO was charged with the responsibility of “monitoring, investigating and, prosecuting corruption, which resulted in any serious financial or economic loss to the state.” Like CHRAJ, the SFO was also criticized for lacking the freedom it required to operate since the directors and members of the board were government appointees (Chêne, 2010; Freedom House, 2010). In 2010, the SFO was replaced by EOCO through an Act of Parliament to address some of these challenges. EOCO has then been charged with the responsibility of recovering earnings from criminal acts, monitoring criminal activities and taking the necessary steps to curb corrupt practices.

Apart from these two anti-corruption agencies, there are other agencies under the law whose efforts complement their activities. Some of these agencies include The Police Service, the Audit Service, the Attorney General's Department, the Judicial Service, Parliament and the Ghana Revenue Authority.

Furthermore, the media and some civil society organizations are also interested in the fight against corruption. The Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), which is the local chapter of Transparency International, is one of the civil society organizations established mainly to focus on addressing corruption. They sensitize citizens on the adverse effects of corruption

and why it must be curbed, educate citizens about their civil rights and encourage them to demand from public office holders' transparency and accountability, demand for legislation and policy reforms which promotes transparency, accountability, and integrity, collaborate with other civil society organization and non-government organizations to demand for open governance and provide legal support for individuals who witness corrupt activities as some of their objectives. Another civil society organization operating in the country is the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, who promotes democracy, good governance, and economic openness. They also undertake researches in the area of corruption, governance and the economy.

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

Generally, the level of corruption within a country is directly associated with the level of corruption within the education sector as a whole and higher education institutions in particular (Rumyantseva, 2005). Today, Corruption in higher education has become a major area of concern for all stakeholders within the education sector since it affects the attitudes of students. As a result, many research inquiries have focused attention on higher education corruption and its implication on society. It is in this view that this chapter focuses on the body of work on corruption in higher education. The chapter begins by looking at the definitions of corruption at this level, the classifications given to it, the factors within the university environment that have accelerated this misconduct, and the incidence of corruption at this level. The chapter, therefore, concludes by reviewing the theoretical framework that underpins the current study.

3.2 Higher education corruption

Also referred as academic dishonesty or academic misconduct, higher education corruption has been defined as “a system of informal relations established to regulate unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office of public or corporate trust” (Osipian, 2007; p.315). This definition revealed the systematic nature of these misconducts within the university environment. Consequently, Xiao (2007) defined academic corruption as "the behaviour of certain individuals in the academic circles, driven by their desires for personal gains, and resorting to various kinds of non-normative and unethical behaviour in academic research activities” (p.47). These behaviour, for instance, among

students include: "Plagiarism, cheating on tests using text messaging or concealed notes, exchanging work with other students, buying essays from students or on the internet, having other students write examinations, attempting to influence or change any academic evaluation, falsifying or misrepresenting hours or activities in an academic experience, and facilitating, permitting, or tolerating any type of academic misconduct" (Olafson, Schraw, & Kehrwald 2014; p.661). Among faculty members, it also includes: embezzling of funds, exchanging of grades for money, selling of university admission, falsifying of research findings and stealing of ideas (Chapman & Lindner, 2016).

3.3 Classification of higher education corruption

Considering these definitions, corruption has been classified severally in the literature. For instance, Chapman (2005) classified these academic misconducts mainly by the types and levels at which they occur; In this view, corruption occurs at international level, ministerial level, regional level, district level, school level, and classroom level. Instead, Osipian (2015) classified higher education corruption by considering the phenomenon (i.e. the form of corruption that takes place), means (i.e. ways used in corrupt acts and transactions to attain certain goals), and locus (i.e. the areas and processes that become corrupted). In a direct approach, Romyantseva (2005) classified corruption at the university by taking into account, the extent to which students involve themselves in such acts. She classified corrupt practices, which involve students, as education specific corruption, and the corrupt practices, which do not involve students, as administrative corruption (ibid.). In other words, education corruption directly affected students adversely while administrative corruption indirectly affected students adversely.

3.4 Factors accelerating higher education corruption

Today, the risk of corruption in institutions of higher learning has increased across the globe. As a result, while many academics blamed this trend on several developments within the world university system, Chapman and Lindner (2016) maintained that four factors actually came together to accelerate these corrupt practices. Martin (2016), for instance, outlined five factors, which have increased the risk of corruption in higher education. First, she maintained that globally enrolments in colleges have increased rapidly over the last two decades, and this has led to the creation of some new institutions like the open and distance institutions, which are more diverse and complex in their operations; accordingly, they pose new challenges in the quality of education delivery, increasing the risk of corruption. Second, Martin (2016) suggested that the development of private universities especially in developing countries have also led to the increase in the risk of higher education corruption. She posited that since many countries have altered their laws governing the establishment of universities, there has been an increase in the number of private universities and that has led to more misappropriations. Third, the „new public management“ model, which gives more autonomy to many public universities, has limited the interference of public authorities. In her view, this new development has increased the decision making layers; hence, the increased risk of corruption. Fourth, Martin (2016) blamed this trend on globalization. According to her, this is traceable to the constant growth of transnational universities where students converge from different countries to acquire university degrees; with several cases of fake diplomas, this development has created opportunities for more corruption. Martin (2016), finally, was of the view that globalization has also created many private accreditation institutions globally, which are awarding fraudulent accreditations to many institutions. Contrary to these views, Chapman and Lindner (2016) suggested that the reduction in public funds to universities, the constant demand for public universities to generate their own funds, the increase in

administrative autonomy and the continuous demand for universities to gain international recognition have culminated to increase the risk of corruption in institutions of higher learning.

3.5 Incidence of faculty corrupt behaviour

Within higher education, faculty members are major players in the delivery of quality education. Nonetheless, some engage in acts, which are unprofessional, unethical and unapproved by university authorities. One such act is the extortion of money; the sale of books on condition to write or pass a paper is one of the common ways by which lecturers extort money from students. According to Oarhe (2014), many lecturers have benefited from the sales of "hand-outs or substandard/ plagiarised textbooks" at exorbitant prices (p. 316). In this view, most of these lectures have devised several strategies to compel students to purchase their books (ibid.). For instance, In Serbia and Bulgaria, Heyneman et al (2008) reported that some students, who were pursuing degree programs in medicine (58%), dentistry (54%), chemistry (50%), and Sociology and economics (40-50%), revealed that their lecturers compelled them to buy their books in exchange of passing grades. Likewise in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Transparency International reported in 2013 that some lecturers only permitted students who purchased books authored by them before they allow the students to sit their papers. From Egypt, Altbach (2013) also reported incidence where some university professors violated their codes of ethics because they sold their lecture notes to students on condition to passing exams, and since they set exam questions from these books, the students had no choice but to buy them. As a means to compel the students to buy the books, Altbach (2013) continued, the professors revised the texts every year. Not only do faculty members extort money through the sale of books, but they sometimes use their positional powers. Prior to the reforms in 2004, Gbedava (2013) posited that students in

Georgia normally paid between \$600 and \$10,000 per course as preparation fees to faculty members for their university entrance exams in return for admission to their preferred universities and prestigious departments. Sometimes, as part of the deal, lecturers pleaded with their colleagues to mark their private students' scripts with leniency (ibid.). Confirming this particular faculty corrupt practice in Georgia, Rostiashvili (2004), also added that sometimes faculty members conspired with themselves to ensure that they gave passing grades only to students who attended their tutorials.

Sometimes, faculty members do not only extort money from students, but they alter grades for students in exchange for money. According to Oarhe (2014), this misconduct by some faculty members is the most common form of corruption within the academic circle. In Romania, for instance, Teodorescu and Andrei (2009) reported that 36% of students enrolled in the state universities in Bucharest admitted to having observed their professors who demanded or accepted money from their students in exchange of a passing or higher grade.

Habitually, aside from the commercialization of grades, some male lecturers make sexual advances toward some female students. According to Houreld (2007), sometimes, these corrupt lecturers entrapped their victims by employing different strategies such as giving low grades to their targets whom they later invite into their offices, witch-hunting or marking down assignments of their victims and launching vendettas against those who reject them. In Romania, for example, 17% of students in public universities in Bucharest, the Romanian capital, admitted they witnessed professors who made sexual advances toward students (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009). Also, a study in some tertiary institutions in Ghana and Tanzania, according to Morley (2011), suggested that the most common form of sexual harassment was "*quid pro quo* or sex-for-grades"(p.103); in the study, Morley (2011) revealed that some male lecturers felt they had patriarchal entitlement to demand sexual favours from their female students. Nonetheless, usually, students who fall into this kind of

trouble rarely report their harassers for the fear of victimization (Manuh, Gariba, & Budu, 2007).

In addition to the sexual harassments, some faculty members sometimes falsify the findings of their researches. As a result, Anderson and Kamata (2013) argued that “in recent years, one of the most common forms of falsification has been the inappropriate alteration of images to eliminate certain data points or to improve the appearance of data trends” (p.211). Annually, 24% of researchers engage in dubious research practices which include manipulation of data (Anderson, Ronning, De Vries, & Martinson, 2007). At the University of Latvia, for example, 66% of lecturers held that their colleagues in most cases fabricated their research findings or used false data (Danovskis, 2012 as cited by Chapman & Lindner 2016). Martinson et al. (2007) added that some academic researchers (15%), in 2005, changed their research methods or findings due to pressures from sponsors.

Another faculty corrupt practice that is related to the falsification of research findings is „ghost authoring“ and plagiarism. „Ghost authoring,“ according to Robinson (2013) occurs when a corporate sponsored academic article is authored by a professional body, yet has the name of university-based researchers or professors. He suggested that because of their independent names and goodwill, the names of university-based researchers or professors give more credence to studies that have their names; hence, the use of their names by corporate organizations in exchange for a fee or credit the article to their names. For instance, in 2009, a Canadian Magazine [Maclean Magazine] suggested that a little below 8% of articles on medicine contain at least one that has been „ghost-written‘ (as cited in Robison, 2013). Furthermore, in 2008, a review of academic articles published in six medical journals indicated that 21% of the articles had individuals who did not author them, while 8% had ignored the contributions of relevant individuals (Wislar, Flanagan, Fontanarosa & De Angelis, 2011). On the other hand, a survey conducted by the University of Zagreb revealed

that one-third of lecturers surveyed knew of at least a case of plagiarism by a colleague (Cepić, 2013 as cited by Chapman & Lindner 2016). In addition, Teodorescu and Andrei (2009) also disclosed in their study in Romania that some students (16.8%) claimed to have witnessed at least a case where a professor plagiarised in his/her book.

3.6 Incidence of students corrupt behaviour

Within the university environment, the incidence of corruption is not only limited to faculty members but includes students. According to Heyneman et al. (2008), students are the „buyers' of several forms of corruption at this level. These corrupt practices include: "Obtaining illegal entrance to specialized programs, having grades raised on the grounds of an illegal payment, or paying illegally for normal education services such as housing, library use, and administrative procedures" (Heyneman et al., 2008; p.2). Sadigov (2014) however maintained that sometimes students also initiate some of these corrupt practices.

According to Heyneman et al. (2008), a survey sponsored by an Anti-Corruption Student Network in four European countries (Moldova, Croatia, Serbia, and Bulgaria) revealed a high level of corruption in university admission. According to this study, between 79% and 84% of students from three of the countries (Moldova, Serbia and Bulgaria) admitted that they paid bribes to gain university admission; meanwhile, between 18% and 20% of the students from Serbia, Croatia, and Bulgaria and 40% from Moldova revealed they used illegal means to gain university admission.

Students do not only use unapproved means to gain admission into universities, but they sometimes manipulate their grades. In their study, for instance, Heyneman et al. (2008) reported that between 28% and 36% of the students in Moldova, Croatia, Serbia, and Bulgaria believed admission test scores could be manipulated. Actually, 67.3% of students in Azerbaijan admitted they paid bribes to their university authorities and lecturers to

manipulate results (Sadigov, 2014). Also in Romania, 36.7% of students admitted they witnessed a friend who directly approached a lecturer or used a middleman to influence their lecturer for grades (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009). Furthermore, in 2012, Cepić (2013) reported that the police in Croatia apprehended 12 individuals from the Zagreb Medical School suspected to have paid bribes for examination (as cited by Chapman & Lindner, 2016).

Sometimes, students also pay bribes for services such as accommodation on campus. In 2007, a Soros Foundation survey in Romania found that 11% of students admitted that dormitory managers usually demanded unapproved money and gifts, and 10% of them actually confessed they made such payments (Leu, 2013). Meanwhile, the reports of the study disclosed that students usually paid €200 (US\$258) as bribes for the accommodation on campus.

Having considered these corrupt practices, students also engage in other dishonest behaviours, which do not involve the exchange of money or material gifts; these include cheating and plagiarism. Cheating, which is the most common and prevalent academic misconduct among students, is simply the breach of established rules and regulations (Dick et al., 2003). In 2010, for instance, the majority of students (62%) in Portugal confessed that they had copied at least once in their college life (Teixeira & Rocha, 2010). Also in Taiwan, Chun-Hua, Lin, and Ling-Yu (2007) reported that 60% of undergraduate students admitted that they engaged in examination malpractice. Furthermore, among the five dishonest behaviours that students witnessed in Romanian, cheating recorded the highest (85%) as the most observed dishonest behaviour (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009). Meanwhile, a study in a Ghanaian Polytechnic revealed that most students (78.3%) accepted that cheating was wrong, yet half (50%) of them admitted they would cheat on an exam if given the chance (Mensah, Azila-Gbettor, & Appietu, 2016). On the other hand, plagiarism among students usually

involves the copying of other people's ideas without duly acknowledging them (Walker, 1998). However, Eretand Ok (2014) argued that the inception of the internet has rather worsen the rate at which student plagiarise. In Romania, for instance, while 65.7% of students reported they saw a friend who copied paragraphs from books or the internet in written assignments, 58.7% saw a friend who copied a friend's assignment (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009).

3.7 Reasons for students' higher education corruption

In a UK university, Franklyn-Stokes and Newstead (1995) suggested nine major reasons why students in colleges engage in academic malpractices. According to the study, the students gave reasons such as peer pressure; a desire to increase their marks or score, desire to help a friend, fear of failure, monetary rewards that come with it, time limitation, and laziness. Meanwhile, some also engage in malpractice because everyone does it (ibid.). On the contrary, Devlin and Gray (2007) were of the view that since not all of these malpractices are deliberate, it is inappropriate to give the same set of explanations for all of them. As a result, they gave eight reasons why students deliberately engage in academic malpractices like plagiarism: inadequate admission criteria, poor understanding of plagiarism, poor academic skills, teaching/learning issues, pride in plagiarizing, laziness/convenience, pressures, and education costs (ibid.).

3.8 Theoretical framework

Several theories over the years have been advanced in the social and behavioural sciences to explain why people engage in deviant behaviour such as corruption; some of these theories include both macro and micro level theories. For instance, at the macro level, the Strain theory (Structural-Functional Theory) and the Conflict theory have severally been used to explain deviant behaviour. Also, the Social Learning Theory, Deterrence theory, and

Labelling theory have all been used at the micro level to explain deviance. However, since the study sought to explore students' perspectives on how peer and faculty factors influence their corrupt intentions, the Social Learning theory is the most suitable micro theory underpinning the study.

According to Akers and Jensen (2006), presently, the social learning theory is one of the most used theories for explaining student misconduct. In view of this, several studies on students' misconducts in higher education in countries like the United States (McCabe et al., 2006) Romania (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009) and Ghana (Mensah et al, 2016) have all used this theory. The theory, which Bandura propounded in 1989, is actually a build-up on Sutherland's (1961) differential association theory and argues that people learn deviant, in the same manner, they learn non-deviant behaviours (Brauer & Tittle, 2012); hence, through social interactions, people learn these deviant behaviours. The theory, therefore, gives precise accounts of how both deviant and non-deviant behaviours as well as their cues (definitions) that produces them (ibid.). This is, however, better explained in the words of Akers:

the probability that persons will engage in criminal and deviant behaviour is increased and the probability of their conforming to the norm is decreased when they differentially associate with others who commit criminal behaviour and espouse definitions favourable to it, are relatively more exposed in- person or symbolically to salient criminal/deviant models, define it as desirable or justified in a situation discriminative for the behaviour, and have received in the past and anticipate in the current or future situation relatively greater reward than punishment for the behaviour.(1998: p.50)

Precisely, this explanation by Akers (1998) exposes the four main components of the theory, which would be used for this study: differential association, definitions, imitation, and differential reinforcement.

3.8.1 Differential association

According to Sutherland (1961), it is the means by which people get exposed to either positive or negative norms as they interact with others. Thus, people learn to be deviant when more of their associates or friends favour such acts. Sellers et al. (2005), however, maintained that the exposure to these norms also helps in shaping the definitions they attach to them. For this reason, the likelihood of engaging in corrupt practices is greater among students whose close friends approve of such behaviours themselves.

3.8.2 Definitions

This is an individual's own view towards a particular behaviour which is unacceptable (Akers, 1998). This definition an individual has may possibly influence him/her to accept, reject or behave indifferently towards that deviant act. This follows that the more individuals accept norms and values against anti-social behaviour, the less likely they are to commit them. Hence, offering money or gift to a lecturer for higher or passing grades would be higher among students who endorse it or weakly reject it.

3.8.3 Differential reinforcement

This deals with the "balance of anticipated or actual rewards and punishments that follow or are consequences of behaviour" (Akers, 1998; p.67). Accordingly, behaviours that are reinforced either by the reward or by avoidance of discomfort are likely to be repeated, whereas acts that attract punishment are less likely to be repeated (Pratt et al., 2010).

Akers' (1998) description of differential reinforcement accurately simplifies its fundamental relevance in explaining an individual's participation in any deviant behaviour. Thus, "whether the individual will refrain from or initiate, continue committing, or desist from criminal and

deviant acts depends on the relative frequency, amount, and probability of past, present, and anticipated rewards and punishments perceived to be attached to the behaviour” (Akers,1998: p.66). For instance, if a student successfully bribes a lecturer for a better grade, that student is likely to repeat such acts in the future.

3.8.4 Imitation

It refers to the engagement in behaviour after the observation of similar behaviour in others (Akers, 1998). Most of the behaviours that individuals exhibit are learned either intentionally or unintentionally through the influence of examples observed. Following from the concept of imitation, for instance, students who have personally observed their colleagues offer money to their lecturers for better grades by their peers are likely to engage in such acts.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the research methods that the researcher applied in the study. The chapter begins with a description of the study area; this is followed by the research design employed for the study. The chapter continues with the sampling procedure, data collection methods, data analysis, the ethical consideration as well as some challenges encountered on the field. Finally, the chapter ends with the profiles of the participants who took part in the study.

4.2 Study area

The Greater Accra Region is one of the ten administrative regions in Ghana, and the nation's capital is located in the region. It lies on the coast with a total land surface of 3,245 square kilometres, which represents 1.4% of the total land area of Ghana. To the north, the region shares the boundary with the Eastern Region, the Central Region to the west, the Volta Region to the east, and the Gulf of Guinea to the south. According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, the total population of the Greater Accra Region was 4,010,054, which represents 16.3% of the country's total population; this included 1,938,225 males and 2,071,829 females. Most (90.5%) of the inhabitants of Accra, according to the census report, were in the urban areas of the region.

In terms of education, the Ministry of education's records as at the 2013/2014 academic year showed that the total number of basic schools in the region were 2,525 schools. These included: 1,336 Crèche/ Nursery schools, 2,003 Kindergarten (KG), 2,117 Primary schools,

and 1,687 Junior High Schools (JHS). In addition, there were 90 Second-cycle schools in the region with 50 of them owned by private individuals. The majority (83%) of these second-cycle schools, however, were located in the urban areas of the region. Furthermore, more than half (57%) of the country's universities were situated in the region. The region can, therefore, boast of two (2) prominent public universities and thirty-eight (38) private universities, which offers different programs in a certificate, diploma, degree, post-graduate diploma, masters, and doctorate degrees. Beside these universities, there is one polytechnic, seven (7) quasi-public tertiary institutions, and a few nursing and teacher training colleges.

The researcher selected this region as the study area because of its high concentration of universities as compared to the other nine regions. Also, since the nation's capital is located in the region, the inhabitants, including university students, are diverse in culture, education, and economic activities.

It is important to note that the focus of the study was to explore the perceived academic corruption at universities in Accra and not to expose corrupt universities. As a result of the sensitive nature of the topic, which can dent the image of the institutions, the researcher decided to keep the universities where the current study took place anonymously.





Figure1: Map of the Greater Accra Region

4.3 Research Design

The study employed the mixed methods approach to explore from the students' perspective, the perceived corrupt practices on university campuses in Accra. This method focuses on combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods in a study to better understand and to explain the research problem.

Specifically, I employed the explanatory sequential mixed methods design for the study; this mixed methods' design is made up of two separate phases: quantitative, followed by qualitative (Creswell, 2009). Accordingly, I collected the quantitative data and analyzed it after which I collected qualitative data and analyzed it. Thus, the results of the quantitative data informed the questions and the respondents for the quantitative study; however, I merged the data from the two methods at an intermediate stage (see Figure 2). As a result, the findings from the latter complemented and helped in explaining the results obtained from the former.

The rationale underpinning the adoption of this approach was that the quantitative data provided a general understanding of the research problem, while the qualitative data refined and explained the statistical results generated from the quantitative data by exploring participants' views in more depth (ibid.). In addition, the quantitative findings informed the researcher about the participants to select for the qualitative study and the kind of questions to ask.



Source: adapted from Creswell (2009)

Figure 2: Sequential explanatory designs

4.4 The quantitative study sampling procedure

Target Population

The target population for the quantitative study included all undergraduates who were pursuing degree programs at universities in Accra and were at least in their second year. According to the National Accreditation Board (NAB) and Ministry of Education's reports in the 2013/2014 academic year, this population was estimated at 61,596; since the current figures for most universities within the study area were not readily available, the researcher, however, took this figure with caution.

Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the quantitative study

The criteria for a respondent's eligibility for the quantitative study were as follows:

1. The respondent should have been an undergraduate university student pursuing a degree program at a university located in Accra.
2. The respondent should have been a continuing student at least in his/her second year at a university located in Accra

On the other hand, the exclusion criterion for the quantitative study included:

1. The respondent should have been an undergraduate in his/her first year studying at a university located in Accra.
2. The respondent should have been a graduate, post diploma or diploma student studying at a university located in Accra.

Study population

Thus, the quantitative study focused on this population since the various elements/units within the population have enough university experiences and could speak more to the problem under consideration

Unit of analysis

The individual undergraduate pursuing a degree program, and has spent at least one academic year studying at a university in Accra constituted the sampling unit for the quantitative study.

Sampling frame

The list of all accredited universities located in the region of Accra and offering degree programs constituted the sampling frame for the quantitative component of the study. The researcher obtained the list from the NAB. This sampling frame, however, helped the researcher to select a representative sample of the target population.

Sample size

To determine the sample size for the survey, the researcher applied the formula (see Figure 3) for determining sample size for surveys propounded by Krejcie and Morgan (1970); hence, with a target population of 61,596, the researcher estimated the sample at 382. According to Neuman (2012), the rule of thumb for determining sample size for surveys is by considering the size of the population. In his view, for a small population under 1,000, a large sampling ratio of 30% should be enough for a high degree of accuracy; for a moderately large population (10,000), a smaller sampling ratio of 10% is needed for accuracy, and for a large population (over 150,000), smaller sampling ratio (1%) is required for accuracy. Hence, the larger the population, the smaller the sampling ratio, and the smaller the population size, the larger the sampling ratio (ibid.). By estimating the sample size using Krejcie and Morgan's (1970) formula at 382, the sampling ratio according to this rule of thumb was 0.62%. As a result, from the viewpoints of both Neuman (2012) and Krejcie and Morgan (1970), the sample size for the quantitative study was large enough and accurate in representation of the population.

$$S = \frac{X^2 NP (1-P)}{d^2 (N-1) + X^2 P (1-P)}$$

Where:

- S = Required Sample size
- X = Z value (at 95% confidence level, Z value is 1.96)
- N = Population Size (estimated at 61,596)
- P = Population proportion (assumed to be 0.5)
- d = Degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (0.05); it is margin of error.

Source: *adapted from Krejcie and Morgan (1970)*

Equation 1: Formula for determining sample size.

Quantitative sample selection

To sample the participants for the survey, the researcher applied the cluster sampling technique to select his respondents. According to Babbie (2005), this sampling technique is a multistage sampling method and one of the probability sampling techniques. Neuman (2012), however, gave a description of how this method works; In his view, “you first sample clusters, each of which contains elements, and then you draw a second sample from within the clusters selected in the first stage of the sampling” (Nueman, 2012; p.161). In view of this process outlined, the researcher applied this sampling technique as follows:

Firstly, by observing the list of all accredited universities within the region, the researcher categorized all the universities into two major distinct clusters based on their ownership and management. I, therefore, categorized these universities into public universities (i.e. universities established by and mainly funded by the state) and private universities (i.e. universities established and operated by private individuals). Using the simple random sampling technique, the research then selected two private universities and a public university for the study. Secondly, since the universities have been divided into faculties, the researcher further selected two faculties randomly from the selected universities using the simple random sampling method; in all, I randomly selected six (6) different faculties for the study. Thirdly, using the simple random sampling technique once again, I randomly selected a department each from all the selected faculties since the faculties could also be divided into departments; hence, this brought the total number of departments selected for the study to six (6), and with the assistance of departmental secretaries, I randomly selected some classes in all the selected departments where I finally selected the respondents for the study. At this level of the sampling process, the researcher considered the different levels within the target population (i.e. level 200,300 and 400 students); hence, using the stratified sampling method, I randomly selected from each selected department a level 200 class, a level 300class, and a

level 400 class. According to Neuman (2012), the stratified sampling technique enables the researcher to control the relative size of each stratum and this guarantees representativeness or fixes the proportion of different strata within the sample. As a result of this sampling method, the researcher randomly selected six level 200 classes, six level 300 classes and six level 400 classes where the researcher eventually selected the participants (students) for the study. Finally, depending on the size of the class, the researcher randomly selected between 18 and 25 students, who actually participated in the study.

Once I selected a class, the departmental secretaries introduced me to the lecturer, who subsequently introduced me to the students. In all the selected classrooms, the lecturers gave the opportunity for the researcher to introduce the study and its objectives to the students. During this period, the researcher also took the opportunity to assure students of anonymity, confidentiality and to encourage them to willingly participate; as a means not to disrupt the classes and also to encourage honest responses, the researcher requested that the selected students completed their questionnaires after classes when their lecturers had left.

This mode, however, was the case in all the selected classrooms with the exception of two classes. In one of those classes, the lecturer permitted the students to complete the questionnaires before the class commenced; on the other, the lecturer paused his lecture for some time and allowed all the selected students to complete their questionnaires before he continued. In all those instances, the lecturers were present while the students completed their questionnaires; however, they never interfered when the students were responding to their questions. With the help of the class representatives in some instances, I collected all completed questionnaires after the selected students completed them, but in situations when the class representatives did not assist, I collected the questionnaires myself. As a result of this approach, the survey recorded high (99.48%) response rate; in all, 380 students returned their questionnaires completed with only two (2) students who failed to do so. Averagely, it

took between ten to fifteen minutes for a participant to complete a questionnaire, which was also the case during the pre-testing.

4.5 Qualitative study sampling procedure

Target population

The target population for the qualitative study included all students who participated in the quantitative study and observed more academic corruption. The researcher was of the view that since these students had observed more academic corruption in the past; they were in a better position to give detailed information on the subject matter.

Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the qualitative study

The criteria for eligibility for respondents to participate in the qualitative study were as follows:

1. The participant should have taken part in the quantitative study.
2. The participant should have observed more academic corruption in the past academic year.

On the other hand, the exclusion criterion for the qualitative study included:

1. The participant should not have taken part in the quantitative study.
2. The participant should have observed less academic corruption in the past academic year.

Sample selection and size

Since the outcome of the survey informed the questions and participants for the qualitative study, the researcher employed the purposive sampling method to select the participants for the qualitative study. In Neuman's (2012) view, the purposive sampling method is most suitable when the researcher wants to select unique cases, which are especially informative,

and when the researcher wants to identify particular types of cases for an in-depth inquiry. As a result, the researcher subsequently contacted all the selected participants for the qualitative study via telephone and scheduled the interviews at a time and a place of their own convenience. This was possible because during the survey the researcher requested that all participants put down their telephone numbers on their questionnaires, and this enabled the researcher to get in touch with some of the survey participants for the qualitative study and even called some of them for clarifications concerning their responses in the quantitative study. As a matter of fact, all the interviews were conducted on the various campuses of the participants with the exception of one, which was held at his hostel. Generally, the interviews were held in a friendly atmosphere where participants freely aired their views on the subject and even sought for clarification when in doubt. In one of the interviews, the respondent actually opposed to the researcher recording the interview since he was into students' politics; the researcher, however, managed to clear his doubt and successfully recorded the interview. In all, the researcher contacted and selected ten (10) students for the interview, which averagely lasted for an hour.

4.6 Data collection methods

For the survey, the researcher employed a structured questionnaire (see Appendix 1), which was self-administered. According to Neuman (2012), this data collection method ensures anonymity and avoids the interviewer biases. Since the target population for the quantitative study was students, who could read and write this data collection method was the most effective and suitable means with high response rates. The researcher distributed the questionnaires to the selected participants for the survey in their classrooms. The selected participant independently filled the questionnaires after which the course rep collected them. Averagely, it took a respondent between twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) minutes for him or

her to respond to the questions. The researcher collected the returned questionnaires later from the class representatives for analysis.

On the other hand, the qualitative study used an interview guide (see Appendix 2) for the in-depth interview. Particularly, this qualitative data collection method facilitated and complemented the interpretation of the quantitative component of the study. The researcher contacted the selected respondents and met each one of them. The meeting which lasted averagely between forty-five (45) minutes and one hour offered the opportunity for the researcher to probe further on some of the issues that cropped up during the survey analysis. During the interviews, the researcher observed and took notes while the respondents responded to the questions as well as recorded their voices. All these instruments were used in the data analysis.

4.7 Measurement

The study operationalized student corrupt intention by estimating student's willingness to exchange material gifts, money, and favour for grades or any other academic achievements in a situation where the student knew there was no other way to attain an academic success. The researcher measured these variables by using two questions: "Would you try to offer money or gift in exchange for copies of exam paper(s) or questions in advance if there is no other way to pass an exam?" and "Would you try to offer money or gifts to a lecturer/university administrator in exchange for a passing or higher grade if there is no other way to pass an exam?" The responses to these questions were "Yes", "No" and "Don't know". If a student selected "Yes" for at least one of these questions, the researcher considered that student as a "Likely corrupt student."

The study also examined three different sets of variables in relation to the dependent variable, student's corrupt intention, for the multivariate analysis namely: faculty influences and peer influences and controlled variables (respondents' demographic characteristics).

Faculty influence

The main explanatory variables for this independent variable included: perceived faculty corruption, perceived faculty-student interaction, perceived quality and relevance of instruction, and perceived lecturers' unfairness.

First, the study measured perceived faculty academic corruption by using a scale made up of six items. As a result, the participants estimated the number of faculty-corrupt cases they have observed in the last academic year for each of the following items: (a) "Asking for or accepting money/ material gift from students in exchange of a passing grade", (b) "Asking for or accepting money/material gift from students in exchange of advance copies of exam questions/papers", (c) "Making sexual advances to students in exchange of grades", (d) "Selling of hand-outs/books on condition to take part in an exam or for passing/higher grades", (e) "Giving low grade to students and recommending private tutoring", and (f) "Asking for a fee or gift in order to supervise students research essay for good grades".

The responses for the faculty corrupt behaviour ranged between one (no case) and five (more than 10 cases) and the Cronbach's alpha for the scale was .89, which signifies a strong internal reliability of the scale.

Second, the study measured students' perceived faculty-student interaction by using a six-item scale. Adapting this scale from Teodorescu and Andrei (2009), the scale has been used in several students' surveys in the United States. The first three items in this scale measured the extent to which faculty members encouraged communication with their students. As a

result, participants rated the extent to which their lecturers encouraged them to (a) “Ask questions during lectures”, (b) “Participate in class discussions,” and (c) “Students express their own viewpoints”. Another item in the scale measured how often their “Lecturers were available outside classes” hours to answer questions.” The responses for these items, however, ranged between one (not at all) and five (to a great extent). Furthermore, the last two items on the scale measured the general communication between lecturers and their students as well as their advice to students concerning the students’ future careers. Responses to these items also ranged between one (poor) and five (excellent). Subsequently, the study computed all these variables into one variable where a higher composite score signified a healthier interaction between lecturers and students. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .82, which signifies a strong internal reliability.

Third, perceived quality and relevance of instruction, which the study also adapted from Teodorescu and Andrei (2009), consisted of five items and measured on a 5-point scale. The scale measured the extent to which students were satisfied with their program of study in relation to their career in the future and the different range of courses that were offered. Responses to these items ranged between 1(poor) and 5(excellent) and the items were (a) “Majority of the courses are boring,” (b) “Lecturers' teaching methods help me understand well the subject matter,” and (c) “Lecturers show passion for the subjects they teach.”With a Cronbach's alpha of .69, it signifies a moderate internal reliability.

Lastly, the study measured faculty Unfairness with just a question, which required students to rate how objective they found the grading system. Responses to this question ranged between 1(poor) and 5 (excellent).

Peer influences

The study used three different variables to measure peer influence and these included: the perceived peer corruption in high school; perceived peer corruption at university and perceived peer academic commitment.

First, perceived peer corruption in high school measured the extent to which students perceived their friends to be corrupt when in Senior High school. The items for the scale included: (a) "The percentage of friends who relied on bought exam questions/ papers to pass their West African Secondary School Certificate Examination (WASSCE) exams" and (b) "The percentage of friends who relied on „connection men“ to improve or change their WASSCE grades." The responses for these items varied, ranging between one (none of my friends) and five (more than 90% of my friends), and the Cronbach's alpha for the scale was .81, which signifies a strong internal reliability.

Second, perceived peer corruption at university measured the extent to which students perceived their friends to be corrupt at the university. The scale consisted of seven items, which required participants to indicate how many of their friends engaged in the following corrupt activities in the last academic year: (a) "Offered money or gift in exchange of a passing grade," (b) "Bribed a lecturer or influence them through an intermediary," (c) "Paid illegal money for normal education services like accommodation, transcript etc.," (d) "Bought exam questions or papers," (e) "Offered money or gift in order to cheat in an exam," (f) "Seduced or trapped a lecturer to earn unmerited grades," and (g) "Paid money for falsified documents." Responses for these items ranged between 1 (none of my friends) and 5 (more than 90% of friends) and with a Cronbach's alpha of .93, it signifies a strong internal reliability.

Lastly, perceived peer academics commitment measured the extent to which student perceived the academic seriousness of their friends. The scale, which consisted of three items and adapted from Teodorescu and Andrei (2009), captured the extent to which participants agreed with these statements: (a) “Majority of my colleagues are motivated to study,” and (b) “My friends discussed the content of courses frequently outside the classroom”. Again, with a 5-point scale, the responses for this scale ranged between one (not at all) and five (to a great extent). The last question, however, in the scale, which requested participants to rate the extent to which their friends were prepared academically, ranged between 1(poor) and 5(excellent); with the .85Cronbach’s alpha, the scale signifies a strong internal reliability.

4.8 Data analysis

Regarding the analysis of the data obtained from the field, the researcher actually analyzed the data at two main levels before eventually merging the two analyses at an intermediate level. First, the researcher organized, managed and analyzed the survey data using the Statistic Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software, version 22. With the assistance of the software, the researcher analyzed the quantitative data at three broad levels namely univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses after cleaning the data set of errors. Since the study sought to examine the extent to which faculty members and students engaged in corruption, the researcher generated the frequencies and percentages for some of the variables at the univariate level. At the bivariate level, the study found the associations between the socio-demographic characteristics and other variables by conducting a series of chi-square test of independence. In addition, the study undertook a series of independent-sample T-tests to establish the differences between groups. Finally, to establish the relative influence of peer and faculty influences on students' corrupt intentions, the researcher conducted a binary logistic regression as a multivariate analysis.

Second, following the procedure for analyzing qualitative data outlined by Curtis and Curtis (2011), the researcher employed thematic analysis for the qualitative analysis. According to Curtis and Curtis (2011), “thematic analysis and grounded theory are methods of analytical induction frequently used for in-depth interviews and though there are differences between the two, they are very similar and the terms are used somewhat interchangeably” (p.44). As a result, during the in-depth interviews, the researcher recorded all the interviews with the aid of a tape recorder and later transcribed them verbatim. Subsequently, together with the field notes, the researcher reviewed the transcribed interviews against the recordings for accurate transcription and further coded the themes developed from the transcribed data at three stages: open, axial and selective coding.

4.9 Ethical considerations

The researcher also took into considerations a number of ethical issues to ensure that participants were not harmed emotionally, physically, and psychologically. In addition, at every point during the data collection, the researcher took the time to briefly explain to the participants, the aims of the study and its significance. Furthermore, knowing very well about the sensitive nature of the subject under investigation, the researcher took steps to assure participants of anonymity and confidentiality regarding the information they shared. Accordingly, the researcher did not coerce any participant at any time to participate in the study; participation was purely voluntary. Finally, the researcher sought for clearance at two levels: the first came from the College of Humanities Ethics Committee of the University of Ghana (see Appendix 3) to ensure that all the ethical issues regarding the study were met and the second came from the universities where the study took place. The researcher, therefore, sought clearance from the appropriate authorities of these institutions before the data collection actually began.

4.10 Field experiences and challenges

Generally, the study was conducted in an environment free of many challenges; students, faculty members, and administrative staff welcomed the study. However, there were some few challenges, which have to be mentioned. Firstly, because of the sensitive nature of the topic, some students and most likely university staff were initially skeptical about the whole study. Most of the staff especially thought I was an undercover investigator, who was in their institutions to uncover some underground dealings. These initial feelings and thoughts, by some of the staff, were due to the numerous expose by the award-winning, faceless, investigative journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas, in the country in recent years. Most of them were quick to respond, for instance, “There is no corruption here,” when I introduced the topic. In some cases, some asked, frankly, “Has Anas sent you here?” I, however, overcame these fears and skepticism by showing them, my student ID and other letters of approval from their institutions and that of my institution. In addition, I took the time to explain to them the purpose of the study to allay their fears.

Secondly, although attempts were made to get current information on the size of the population, this value was not readily available from most of the institutions in the study area due to bureaucratic challenges. The researcher, also, managed this situation by using a report on tertiary institution published by the National Accreditation Board (NAB) in 2015 to estimate the population size.

Finally, since the data collection stage of the study was in two phases, the prerequisite for participating, as mentioned earlier, in the second phase (qualitative study) was that the student must have taken part in the first phase (quantitative study) and observed more academic corruption. Unfortunately, some of the students, who qualified for this phase, refused to write their phone numbers on the questionnaire as required; some also wrote some

numbers all right, yet the numbers were wrong when the researcher contacted them. Indeed, the researcher managed this challenge by contacting only those who qualified, provided their numbers correctly, and availed themselves even though this limited the pool of students the researcher had for selection. The next section displays the demographic characteristics of the study participants for both quantitative and qualitative studies.

4.11 Profile of participants for the quantitative study

The survey consisted of 380 participants; out of this number, 54% were males and 46% were females. Their ages ranged between 18 and 50 years with most (41%) of them less than 22 years; the average age for the sample was 23 (see Table 1). However, the average age among male participants (23), for instance, was higher than that of the female. Furthermore, the majority (78%) of the students were in their late teens and early 20s under 24 years, which is consistent with Mensah et al.'s (2016) study on academic dishonesty in a Ghanaian polytechnic. This shows that most students at the tertiary level in Ghana are below 25 years.

Regarding the respondents' level of study, most (41%) of the respondents were in their second year with 28% and 31% in their third and final years respectively. More than half (58%) of these students pursued Business-related programs such as Accounting, Banking and Finance, and Business Administration; 24% pursued programs such as Psychology and Economics in the Social Sciences and a smaller proportion (18%) who pursued Science and Technology related program such as Information Technology. A closer look at Table 1 also showed that the proportion of female students who pursued the Business related programs (60%) and Social science programs (26%) were more than their male colleagues; however, the reverse was the case in the Science and Technology related program. Out of the 68 students who read the Science and Technology related program, 43 (63%) were males. This result corroborates the argument that Science and Technology programs were male-

dominated disciplines. According to Hill, Corbett and St Rose (2010), before college the ratio of boys and girls pursuing courses in Science and Maths are almost the same, yet few females than males pursue majors in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) courses in their first year in college and by the time they graduate, the number of males graduating in these fields outweigh the females.

The sample distribution on the type of university was almost evenly distributed between public (51%) and private universities (49%); however, close to half (40%) of the students were residents of either in a hostel or hall of their schools in the last academic year with a few (34%) who with their parents.

In all, the majority (66%) of the students were independent during the semesters in the academic year with little or no parental influence. Thus, the sample result suggested that most of the participants were either resident in the students' hostels/halls or in their own/rented apartments.

Table 1: Respondents' background by gender

		Male		Female	
		N	(%)	N	(%)
Age	18-21	57	32	79	52
	22-23	69	38	54	35
	24-50	54	30	20	13
	Mean(SD)	23(4)		22(2)	
Level of study	Level 200	83	41	71	41
	Level 300	60	29	48	27
	Level 400	62	30	56	32
Program of study	Business related programs	118	58	105	60
	Social science related programs	44	22	45	26
	Science and Technology related programs	43	21	25	14
University	Public university	104	51	88	50
	Private university	101	49	87	48
Living arrangements	Home with parents	68	33	61	35
	Students hostel/hall	72	35	79	45
	Own/rented apartment	65	32	35	20

Source: Researcher's fieldwork, 2017

In all, the majority (66%) of the students were independent during the semesters in the academic year with little or no parental influence. Thus, the sample result suggested that most of the participants were either resident in the students' hostels/halls or in their own/rented apartments.

4.12 Profile of participants for the qualitative study

Table 2: Participants' background for the qualitative study

Interviewee	Character name	Gender	Age	Program of study	Level of study	University
1.	Drogba	Male	23	IT	300	Private
2.	Joe	Male	22	Accounting	400	Public
3.	Ama	Female	24	Psychology	300	Private
4.	Prince	Male	24	Accounting	400	Public
5.	Steven	Male	22	Accounting	400	Public
6.	Festus	Male	24	Economics	400	Private
7.	Nana	Male	23	Psychology	200	Private
8.	Lizzy	Female		B &F	300	Public
9.	Vida	Female	23	Business Administration	200	Public
10.	Mike	Male	24	IT	200	Private

Source: Researcher's fieldwork, 2017.

B&F=Banking and Finance, IT= Information Technology

CHAPTER FIVE

ACADEMIC CORRUPTION AT UNIVERSITIES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the first part of the findings of the study. As a result, the chapter provides information on the extent of corruption among faculty members, students, and administrators. It also presents the results of a series of nonparametric tests conducted to find the association between respondents' background and the corruption they have observed. Finally, the chapter ends by looking at students' attitude toward reporting corruption.

5.2 Perceived faculty corrupt activities

Heyneman et al. (2008) described faculty members as agents or sellers of the most corrupt activities involving students. According to them, some of these corrupt practices included: altering of grades and admitting students into specialized programs illegally. As a result, some of these lecturers, who were likely to perpetrate these unethical acts, developed several strategies such as refusing to teach well and deliberately failing students in order to create and enlarge their markets (Oarhe, 2014). Clearly, these views indicated that some faculty members were deeply involved in higher education corruption; therefore, there was the need to examine the extent to which some faculty members within the Ghanaian context involved themselves in these unethical acts of corruption. To examine this, participants for the survey estimated the number of faculty corrupt cases they observed in the past academic year by rating the following faculty corrupt behaviour:

- (a) Asking for or accepting money/ material gift from students in exchange for a passing grade.

- (b) Asking for or accepting money/ material gift from students in exchange for advance copies of exams questions/papers.
- (c) Making sexual advances to students in exchange for grades.
- (d) Selling of hand-outs/books on condition to take part in an exam or for passing/higher grades.
- (e) Giving a low grade to students and recommending private tutoring.
- (f) Asking for a fee or gift in order to supervise students' research essay for good grades.

Table 3: Perceived faculty corrupt behaviours

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
No case at all	79.6	81.4	72.5	49.7	84.4	80.3
1-3 cases	13.9	13.5	19.6	33.3	10.9	13.0
4-6 cases	4.3	2.7	4.4	7.1	1.7	4.1
7-10 cases	.5	1.3	1.1	4.9	1.4	1.4
More than 10 cases	1.6	1.1	2.5	4.9	1.7	1.4
% Having observed this behaviour	20.4	18.6	27.5	50.3	15.6	19.7

Source: Researcher's fieldwork, 2017.

Table 3 shows the frequency distribution of all the six forms of faculty corrupt behaviour. From the table, half (50.3 %) of the students witnessed at least a situation where lecturers sold hand-outs or books to students on condition that they took part in exams or for a passing/higher grades, 27.5% witnessed instances where lecturers made sexual advances toward fellow students in exchange for grades, and 20.4% witnessed lecturers who accepted money or material gifts from students in exchange for grades. However, the least observed faculty corrupt behaviour (15.6%) was the case where lecturers gave low grades to students and recommended private tuition.

Obviously, selling of hand-outs/books stood out as the most observed faculty corrupt behaviour because it was the only corrupt practice, which could not be concealed; since it was a means of mass extortion, faculty members who engaged in this unethical and

unapproved behaviour could not have hidden it. As a matter of fact, all the participants who took part in the in-depth interviews attested to this assertion and described several coercing strategies adopted by some of their lecturers as they sold their books/hand-outs. The following were some excerpts from the in-depth interviews describing how some of these corrupt lecturers used their powers to forcefully get students to buy their books. For instance, one of the students in level 300 recounted her experience with one of her lecturers:

Yes, I remember in level 200; it was a university required course, and the lecturer actually didn't start teaching until we all bought the book. We bought that book at Ghs 20, yet it was Ghs 3 when you photocopy it. We were forced to buy because the class rep put down the names and index numbers of all those who bought the book upon his instructions. Since he has revised the book, the lecturer advised us not to rely on the edition our predecessors used, so we all bought the book. I remembered that all the people around me had the book before he actually began to teach. Before, whenever he came to class, he only spoke about the book until his period was over.
(3)

Another student at level 200 also confirmed this illegal act when he narrated his experience in level 100:

When I was at level 100, there were two lecturers who deliberately provided some pages with questions in their books. Automatically, if you don't have their books, you can't do their assignments. Indirectly, if you don't buy the books, you will fail and even lose about ten to fifteen marks prior to the IA. They wouldn't directly tell you "if you don't buy my book, you will fail," but they will tell you "if you have wisdom listen to what the spirits are saying."... Indirectly, it is a blow to the eye just that they have added some foam or cushion to the hand, but it is still the same blow. So if you don't buy the books, you will be losing; it is the same as failing you. (7)

Another student pursuing Accounting in his final year added this:

Ooo yes, it exists. Lecturers often sell their books or lecture notes; they say things like "all those who buy my book, you have 15 marks already." Truly, the lecturer will

make the class rep take the names and index numbers of all those who buy the book. These things have happened a lot of times since level 100, and it keeps happening. (4)

This finding of faculty members who forcefully sold their hand-outs and books confirms Oarhe's (2014) assertion that many lecturers in universities have benefited from the sales of "hand-outs or sub standard/ plagiarised textbooks" at exorbitant prices (p. 316). Similarly, as observed in Serbia and Bulgaria, this result is consistent with the survey result by Heyneman et al in 2008. According to their study, students pursuing degree programs in Medicine (58%), Dentistry (54%), Chemistry (50%), Sociology (40%), and Economics (50%) revealed that their lecturers compelled them to buy books authored by them for passing grades.

Next to the sale of hand-outs was the act of requesting sexual favours from students in return for grades. A critical look at Table 3, once again, showed that close to 30% of the students observed instances in the past academic year when lecturers, mostly male, requested to engage in sexual or amorous relationships with their female students in exchange for grades. Although none of the students who participated in the interviews asserted not to have been victims, most of them witnessed cases involving their friends. So a third year Banking and Finance student, for instance, shared her friend's experience:

I went to visit my friend and in our conversation, she said, "can you imagine this lecturer (name withheld); he said, he likes me and wants to take me out to KFC¹, and that he will even allow me to set our IA questions because I told him I have not learned anything and not ready to go out." She asked her to come over to his office so they could talk and later to his house to cook for him. She told me, the lecturer made sexual advances toward her and asked her not to worry about the upcoming exams, especially for his course since she already has an A only if she was willing to engage him sexually. (8)

¹ Kentucky Fried Chicken, an American based fast food restaurant with branches in Ghana.

Another student shared the experience of one of his female friends who was victimized because she refused her lecturer's proposal. This was what he said:

This happened when we were at level 200. I was with this lady friend who is admired by one lecturer. We were in the classroom when the lecturer entered; he then decided to take my friend's phone number, but she refused. He later sized the phone because, according to him, she was using it and asked her to come for it after class in his office. When the class was over, she went to his office for her phone, and again, the lecturer requested her phone number. My friend told me, she refused once again and asked him to call her through the class rep, so he got angry and told her one day that "you will see what I will do to you." True to his words, my friend had D in his paper, yet she is brilliant. She wrote the paper again and had a B this time around. (1)

This corrupt behaviour about sex for grade revealed in both the quantitative and qualitative studies support Morley's (2011) assertion that the most common form of sexual harassment on university campuses was "*quid pro quo* or sex-for-grades" since most male lecturers often feel they have the rights to demand sexual favours from their female students; Furthermore, it corroborates Houreld (2007) argument that male lecturers employ several strategies such as giving of low grades and witch hunting to trap their targets. Also, it is consistent with a finding in Romania; 17% of students in a survey witnessed this form of faculty corrupt behaviour (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009).

Certainly, another common form of faculty corrupt behaviour was the request for money or gift in exchange for grades. According to Table 3, this faculty corrupt behaviour was the third most observed corrupt practice; nonetheless, in Oarhe's (2014) view, it is the most common form of corruption within the academic circle. From the table, about 20% witnessed this faculty dishonest act and confirming these corrupt activities during the interview, one of the students narrated how a lecturer warned them against such act since he was not going to tolerate that.

Last academic year, one of our lecturers because he is very strict he told us that he does not accept money, so if you don't come to class or read don't come to his office to offer him money or even beg especially the ladies since he is not like other lecturers.(10)

This finding involving faculty members who take money for grades was inconsistent with findings from other countries in Eastern Europe. As compared to these countries, the figure from this study was the lowest; 80% of students in Moldova, 66% in Serbia, 62% in Croatia and 60% in Bulgaria all knew of bribery for grades or exams among their faculty members (Heyneman et al., 2008).

5.3 Perceived students' corrupt activities

According to Heyneman et al. (2008) students usually acts as buyers of many forms of corrupt practices at the university. In their views, in situations where students obtained illegal admission into special programs, used dubious means to up their grades and made illegal payments for services on campus, the seller could either be a lecturer or an administrator. Sometimes, however, Sadigov (2014) argued that students can also initiate some of these corrupt practices. It is obvious from both views that corruption at universities involved students either as customers or initiators. Considering students' involvement in corruption within the university setup, it was necessary to examine students' perceptions on corruption within the Ghanaian context. To examine the perceive students corrupt activities, the participants estimated their friends who engaged in the following corrupt activities in the past academic year:

- (a) Offered money or gift in exchange for a passing grade.
- (b) Bribed a lecturer or influence him/her through an intermediary.
- (c) Paid illegal money for normal education services like accommodation, transcript etc..
- (d) Bought exam questions or papers.

- (e) Offered money or gift in order to cheat in an exam.
- (f) Seduced or trapped a lecturer to earn unmerited grades.
- (g) Paid money for falsified documents.

Table 4 shows the frequency distribution, in percentages, of all the seven forms of students' corrupt behaviour. Generally, the table shows that all these forms of students' corrupt behaviour, which was considered for the study, recorded values below 30%. Clearly, this was an indication that corruption among students is mostly concealed; it was only known to the individuals involved in the act and the few people they could trust.

Table 4: Perceived students' corrupt behaviours

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
None of my friends	75.8	77.8	78.7	79.0	82.9	83.1	84.2
To a little extent (below 10%)	15.9	14.9	14.4	12.8	10.9	10.4	9.0
To a significant extent (11- 50%)	5.9	4.9	4.1	5.7	3.8	4.1	3.8
Most of my friends (51- 90%)	1.9	1.6	1.9	1.4	1.9	1.4	1.9
Almost all my friends (above 90%)	.5	.8	.8	1.1	.5	1.1	1.1
% Having observed this behaviour	24.2	22.2	21.3	21.0	17.1	16.9	15.8

Source: Researcher's fieldwork, 2017.

Confirming this assertion during the in-depth interviews, one of the students showed her disappointment about her inability to give accounts of a particular student's corrupt activity, which she believed existed.

I'm sure it's there, but maybe I've not been in the right place at the right time to have witnessed it. (3)

As follows from Table 4, the most observed student's corrupt behaviour in the survey was students who offered money or gifts in return for a passing or better grade (24.2%), and students who directly or in indirectly bribed or influenced their lecturers followed next as the

second most observed students corrupt behaviour (22.2%). However, the least observed students corrupt behaviour was students who paid money for falsified documents like transcripts and certificates (15.8%).

Essentially, the narratives from the in-depth interviews proved and confirmed the existence of these students' corrupt practices. For instance, Stephen, who was in his final year, gave a personal encounter of how a gentleman approached him in his school to assist him to change some of his grades for a fee:

I was on campus when this neatly dressed, young man walked to me. He introduced himself and asked of my level. I answered, and he told me that he is here to help me change my grades if I want to. So he asked me to pay Ghs 1,000 as an initial deposit, and when everything is done, I will add the rest. But I told him that I am not into such things. All I know is to learn and whatever I get, I will take it like that because it is only God who decides for us not human. He persisted that I persuade some of my friends who have some challenges with their result if I am not interested. (5)

Another final year student also recounted how one of his friends came to him for financial assistance when his friend wanted to work on some grades:

... A friend once came to me for support. He was working on three grades, and he needed support. He didn't really tell me the amount involved, but he wanted me to help him with GHs 400 to work on three bad grades. Actually, he didn't fail in those courses; you know, before the semester ends after our IA, you can really tell if you will make an A or not, so he wanted to secure his class. He wanted to be in 2nd class upper, but then considering his IA results, he felt if he does not do something about it or put in certain measures, he might fail or move from 2nd class upper to lower. In that case, he came to me to appeal for some money. Actually, he had some amount he was supposed to pay me, so I was reluctant to give him the money until he told me that he needed the money to see someone. According to him, he was not going to pay an officer to alter the grades at the student portal, but what he was going to do is authentic since he would be given his answer booklet after the exam for him to answer

the questions again. So he is not supposed to exhaust all the space.... Actually, he had three A's in those three courses. (2)

This evidence from the fieldwork about students who change their grades essentially supports recent reports about some students who have manipulated their grades at some public universities in Accra. According to the reports on the 10th of April 2017, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana in a statement mentioned that at least 20 students were under investigation by the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI) for allegedly changing their grades (“20 UG students in BNI grip,” 2017). According to the report, the Vice Chancellor of the university said that “the students hacked the school’s grading system to change their grades but failed to cover the traces” (“20 UG students in BNI grip,” 2017, para. 2). In a related story on 13th of April, 2017, 22 students were sacked from the University of Professional Studies for allegedly manipulating their grades (Awal, 2017).

Sometimes, students do not alter their grades from their universities' computer systems; rather, they approach their lecturers directly with money and gifts or through an intermediary for exam questions or other favours they are not entitled to. A closer look at Table 4 shows that 22.2% of the students observed situations involving their peers who used this unethical means to gain certain favours they do not merit. To back these statistics, some of the participants during the in-depth interview typically gave accounts about how some of their friends went about this corrupt act. Nana, for example, explained how his friends usually approach lecturers for exam questions in advance:

... I know some friends who do that. For them, they are evening students and the majority of them are workers, so they have the money. Mostly, their questions just drop. They often buy the questions, and they are about five friends in the class. They normally go and see the lecturer, and if the lecturer approves of it and accepts the money, fine. If he/she doesn't, so be it. I know for sure that every semester, they get the questions. (7)

Another student, Festus, also recollected a similar incident involving one of his classmates:

In level 200, a guy who was in my class went to see the lecturer for exam questions, but the lecturer didn't give him the questions; rather, he was given the marking scheme for that particular paper. We got to know of it because he brought it to the exam hall, and he was caught. Some of the invigilators who were around at the time knew the handwriting of the lecturer, so they confirmed it. The guy actually confessed that it was the lecturer who gave him the marking scheme after he offered something to him. However, he didn't mention the amount. (6)

This evidence regarding students who approached their lecturers for these unmerited favours is consistent with finding in other countries. For instance, in Romania, Teodorescu and Andrei (2009) recorded that 36.7% of students in their survey witnessed their friends who directly approached or used middlemen to influence their lectures to earn a passing or higher grade in their exams. However, in Azerbaijan, the situation was different; 81.5% of the students revealed that they saw their colleagues bribed professors at different times (Sadigov, 2014).

Table 4, once again, shows that 16.3% of the students indicated they know of a female friend who seduced or trapped a lecturer to earn grades, and evidence from the interviews proved supportive to this statistic. Joe, for instance, narrated vividly how his female friend, who opened-up to him, wanted to seduce a lecturer for a grade.

One lady friend told me another friend was actually helped by a lecturer to do well in a course, and for that course, I should think about 70% of the students didn't get As. In her view, the friend was not a grade „A' student, yet she managed to get an „A'. So my friend also decided to get closer to the lecturer in order to receive some favour from him. Actually, she just told me the friend actually got closer to the lecturer or befriended the lecturer, but when she got closer to the lecturer, he nearly raped her before the semester ended. According to her, the plan was to get closer to the lecturer for him to help her pass the exam. As in, help her alter her grade, but she was not ready to have sex with him; she was ready to hang out or maybe romance with the lecturer. (2)

Although falsification of documents was the least observed student corrupt practice during the quantitative analysis, the qualitative study revealed essential evidence of this corrupt act, which gave a clearer indication of its existence. Narrating this act of corruption, some participants gave accounts of how their friends, who graduated a year ago, got their certificates.

I know of one lady who paid money for her certificate from this university. Actually, on her transcript at first, it was all Fs from the first and second semester at level 100. Also, the first semester at level 200, it was all Fs with just one A. The A was from a lecturer who happened to be her boyfriend. After that semester, she stopped attending lectures. She is actually ahead of me, but we are friends, so I know her. She is now back in town and working with the certificate she paid for. Actually, she is one person who will tell you that she does not really know, and even when she reads, she does not really get it. So she will rather offer money or sex for the grade, but it happened that no one was giving her the attention that she needed except for this one lecturer who was her boyfriend. He is the only one who gave her A. She realized that she was wasting her time because all the papers were Fs, so she decided to stop and later paid for the certificate. (6)

Another student added:

... I have known this lady since SHS, she was my senior, and she was not that intelligent. According to my roommate who was in the same class as her, she has so many re-sits. So when they pasted the list of all the graduates last year, I checked through the list, but her name was not there. Because I am in school, most of my friends called me to check their names on the list. Virtually, I checked for everyone that I knew. But because of her peculiar situation, everyone was keen to know if her name was there. Everyone knew she wouldn't graduate because she has a lot of re-sits, but on the graduation day, she was around and graduated with second class lower. As to what really happened, no one can tell whether she offered money or sex. (7)

5.4 Perceived administrators' corrupt activities

Within the context of higher education, the actions and decisions of administrators, service personnel, and other non-teaching staffs are decisive and can have consequential effects on both faculty members and students (Chapman & Lindner, 2016). Hence, when this group of individuals was also involved in the demand and supply of higher education corruption, it usually retards the progress of teaching and learning. Nevertheless, when rendering their services, Heyneman et al. (2008) opined that many administrators in many universities across the globe demand bribes for admissions, examinations, grades, and transcripts. Sometimes, Chapman and Lindner (2016) added that administrators embezzle and misappropriate university funds. These claims necessitated the need to examine the extent to which administrators in universities in Ghana also engaged in corruption.

Following from Table 4, 21.3% of the students claimed they witnessed their friends paid unproved fees or charges for various education services handled by administrators, and out of this, 14.4% of these students suggested they knew at least 10% of their friends who made such payments (see Table 4). This included services like requesting university ID cards, transcripts, and accommodation. Confirming this act of corruption in an interview, a student narrated his ordeal when he reluctantly paid three times the prescribed amount for his lost ID without receiving any official receipt:

For this, I have been a victim; it was just last semester, I left my ID card at home somewhere in the Eastern region, so in the morning of examination, I couldn't go back home. Normally, the processes in acquiring an ID on campus is that you pay the designated amount to the bank, go online and then you make the necessary disbursement and then return with the disbursement sheet to the data center for a new ID card. When you pay at the bank it takes 24 hours before it reflects it means that there has to be away. So I went to the data center and requested for an ID card and

they asked me to pay three times the amount. Ordinarily, I was supposed to pay Ghs 10, but I paid Ghs 30 for the ID card and I wasn't issued a receipt. There are a lot of people, my friends who have complained of the same issue. For the ID card issue, it's a very big issue during examinations because without the ID card you can't write the paper. (4)

Additionally, evidence from the fieldwork showed that administrators sometimes aid students to alter their grades. According to a student in an interview, he knew of an administrator in his school that changed several grades for his brother and his brother's friend for a fee. The student recounted his brother's experience, and how his brother also introduced him to the administrator for any assistance:

My brother told me of a woman at the administrations that they paid to change their grades when the results were entered into the system by this person. He said this to me when I was coming to level 100 so that if I think I write a paper, and I can't really pass, I will tell him to give me money to be given to this woman to help me. He was even here once to introduce me to her as his junior brother. Since then my brother has tried to strike a relationship between myself and the woman. Unfortunately, the grades are no more entered by them; it is done by the lecturers themselves, so I have not gone to her to change any of my results. According to my brother, they began this move when they got to level 200, so after exams, they go to these people and offer them money for their grades to be changed. (6)

Sometimes, not all administrators demand money to change grades; actually, like some male lecturers, they request for sexual favours from female students in return for better grades and other favours. Obviously, most of these administrators who make such erotic advances toward students are the male administrators who trade their integrity to satisfy their sexual desires. Once again, a student shared his cousin's experience during an interview:

Last year, my cousin was at level 400, and he told me specifically that he was in an office when an administrative staff requested sexual favours from his own classmate. The following semester when they came, the ladies result had changed drastically; as

in her grades had improved and she was very happy. However, my cousin traced it to that incident that happened in the office. (2)

Finally, there were also instances when some officers took bribes from students. This normally happened when students flouted rules in their schools, and instead of applying the rules and penalizing them, these officers rather took bribes and allowed students to leave. A student shared his friend's experience, which he witnessed; he described how an officer took Ghs 150 from his friend who mistakenly took a mobile phone to an exam hall:

... There was this time that my own friend (a close friend) mistakenly took his mobile phone to the exam hall, and one of the supervisors I don't know how come but saw it in his pocket even though the phone was off. The supervisor wrote a report and threatened to submit it if my friend does not do the necessary thing. The necessary thing has it may be was to offer something. My friend had to pay Ghs 150. It was either a level 200 or 300 paper. He has to pay for that report to be cancelled or thrown away. I was actually following my friend, so I saw everything that transpired. The request came from the supervisor. My friend even protested that he was not going to pay. We descended from the fourth floor to the ground floor and heading towards the exams units. So when we got to the ground floor of the administration block where the exams unit is, he has to pay there for the report to be crumpled and thrown into a dustbin. (10)

Noticeably, it is evident that corruption at universities involved administrators, faculty members as well as students and included behaviour such as: paying of money for grades, paying of money for certificates, paying of money for exams questions, exchanging sex for grade, seeking sexual favours, favouring to friends and relatives, and demanding unapproved fees.

5.5 Relationship between students' demographics and perceived corruption

As reviewed in the literature, several authors have defined corruption in higher education differently; however, Osipian (2007) was of the view that all the definitions suggested that

corruption in higher education is universal, and it is evident in both public and private colleges. Although both public and private colleges were plagued with corruption, Heyneman et al. (2008) were of the view that its occurrences varied widely across departments and disciplines. These views necessitated the need to explore the association between respondents' demographic characteristics and observed corruption. To explore these relationships, a series of Chi-square test of independence was conducted at two levels. First, the study explored the relationship between respondents' demographics and observed faculty corruption; second, the study explored the relationship between respondents' demographics and observed peers' corruption.

5.5.1 Perceived faculty corruption and respondents' demographic characteristics

Table 5: Association between demographic characteristics and observed faculty corruption

Demographic characteristics		Observed faculty corruption		χ^2 (Phi)
		Less N (%)	More N (%)	
Sex	Male	116 (62)	71(38)	.279
	Female	103(64.8)	56(35.2)	
Age	18-22	133(66.2)	68(33.8)	1.860
	23-50	63(58.3)	45(41.7)	
Level of study	Level 200	94(69.1)	42(30.9)	3.341
	Level 300	58(58.6)	41(41.4)	
	Level 400	67(60.4)	44(39.6)	
Program of study	Business programs	120(58.5)	85(41.5)	4.902* (.119)
	Non-business related programs	99(70.2)	42(29.8)	
University status	Public	104(57.8)	76(42.2)	4.915* (-.119)
	Private	115(69.3)	51(30.7)	
Living arrangement	Home with parents	76(64.4)	42(35.6)	.286
	Students' /hall hostel	85(61.6)	53(38.4)	
	Own/rented apartment	58(64.4)	32(35.6)	

Source: Researcher's fieldwork, 2017

* $p < 0.05$

Table 5 summarises the result of the Chi-square test of independence conducted to establish the relationship between respondents' demographics and the number of faculty corrupt cases they observed. From Table 5, male students (38%) witnessed more faculty corrupt behaviour than female students (35.5%) in the last academic year. However, statistically, there was no significant relationship ($\chi^2 = .279$, $p > 0.05$) between sex and observed faculty corruption. This result suggests that the number of observed faculty corrupt cases was not dependent on a respondent's sex.

Also, there were no statically significant relationships between the other demographic characteristics like age, level of study, and living arrangement of students and observed faculty corruption except for respondent's program of study and university attended (see Table 5). These outcomes meant that all these variables (i.e. age, level of study and living arrangement) were independent of observed faculty corrupt practices.

Following Table 5, the proportion of students (41.5%) who pursued business programs like Accounting, Banking and Finance, and Business Administration and at the same time witnessed more faculty corrupt activities were greater than those (29.8%) who pursued non-business related programs like Psychology, Economics, and Information Technology and also witnessed more faculty corrupt activities. Thus, the survey result suggests that there were more perceived corrupt lecturers in the Business Faculty from the selected colleges than in other faculties. A closer look at the table further points to the fact that statistically, there was a significant relationship ($\chi^2 = 4.902$, $p < 0.05$) between the observed faculty corruption and student's program of study. These results meant that observed faculty corruption was dependent on respondents' program of study. To establish the strength of this relationship, a Phi test was further conducted, and it turned out that the relationship between the two variables was a weak one since the Phi value obtained was .119 (see Table 5). The chi-square test result supports Heyneman et al. (2008) view that the occurrences of corruption varied

widely across departments and disciplines in higher education; however, in their study, the disciplines, which were in high demand, were those mostly characterized by bribery, and these included disciplines such as Law, Economics, Criminology, and Finance.

Table 5 further shows that there were more students in public than in private universities who witnessed more faculty corrupt practices. Whereas close to half (42.2%) of the students from the public university witnessed more faculty corrupt activities, only 30.7% of students from the private universities witnessed more faculty corrupt activities (see Table 5). This survey result suggests that there were more corrupt lecturers in public universities than in private universities since the Chi-square test of independence showed a statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 4.915, p < 0.05$) relationship between respondents' university attended and their observed faculty corruption. Further test to establish the strength of the relationship between these variables revealed a weak relationship since the Phi value was .119. This survey result was again similar to the findings by Heyneman et al. (2008) in the Kyrgyz Republic where only 5.1% of students at a private university (American University of Central Asia) described their university as "bribeable" compared to between 50 and 70% of students in government universities.

5.5.2 Perceived students corruption and respondents demographic characteristics

Once more, it has been shown, conclusively, from previous sections in this chapter that students were involved in corrupt practices while in school; in view of this, Heyneman et al. (2008) categorized them as "the buyers of most of these corrupt activities."

Table 6 shows the summary results of the Chi-square tests of independence conducted to establish the relationships between respondents' demographic characteristics and their observed peers' corrupt behaviour. The results from the test revealed that the only variable

that was statistically significant with observed peer corruption was respondents' program of study ($\chi^2=3.914$, $p< 0.05$).

Table 6: Association between demographic characteristics and perceived students' corruption

Demographic characteristics		Observed peer corruption		χ^2 (Phi)
		Less N (%)	More N (%)	
Sex	Male	106(57.3)	79(42.7)	2.127
	Female	109(64.9)	59(35.1)	
Age	18-22	116(58.6)	82(41.4)	1.996
	23-50	76(66.7)	38(33.3)	
Level of study	Level 200	87(63.5)	50(36.5)	.669
	Level 300	58(58.6)	41(41.4)	
	Level 400	70(59.8)	47(40.2)	
Program of study	Business related programs	119(56.7)	91(43.3)	3.914* (.105)
	Non-business related programs	96(67.1)	47(32.9)	
University status	Public	105(57.1)	79(42.9)	2.382
	Private	110(65.1)	59(34.9)	
Living arrangement	Home with parents	76(61.8)	47(38.2)	.941
	Students' hostel/hall	80(58.0)	58(42.0)	
	Own/rented apartment	59(64.1)	33(35.9)	

Source: Researcher's fieldwork, 2017

* $p< 0.05$

From Table 6, the proportion of students (43.3%), who pursued business-related programs and observed more peer corrupt behaviours were more than students (32.9%) from other disciplines. Since the Social Learning theory suggests that most behaviour displayed by people are learned behaviour either intentionally or unintentionally through the influence of examples they observed, then business students were more likely to engage in corrupt practices

5.6 Students' attitudes toward reporting corrupt behaviour

As an anti-corruption measure, Pring (2015) maintained that citizens have an immense role to play by reporting corrupt practices, refusing to engage in it and demanding authorities to act against it. In view of this, the study examined students' attitude towards reporting corruption in their schools. To achieve this, respondents were asked whether or not they would report a fellow student or lecturer for engaging in corruption. Table 7 displays the summary distribution of those who answered in the affirmative of reporting their peers and faculty members' corruption.

Table 7: Students' attitudes toward reporting corruption

Corrupt scenario	% saying "yes"
Would you report a colleague who offers money or gifts to a lecturer in exchange of a passing or higher grade on an exam?	25.2
Would you report a lecturer who asks for or accepts money or gift in exchange of a passing grade on an exam?	31.9
Would you report a colleague who used illegal means to gain admission?	22.0
Would you report a colleague who pays an illegal fee for accommodation?	24.0
Would you report a lecturer who makes sexual advances to fellow students in exchange of grades?	41.9

Source: researcher's fieldwork, 2017

Basically, as displayed in Table 7, the survey result points to two major conclusions. First, generally, students were very passive toward observed corrupt behaviour on campus. Therefore, regardless of who was involved, students were less enthusiastic about reporting corrupt activities to their school authorities. Following Table 7, less than half of the students were willing to report any of these corrupt activities to the university leadership; only 41.9% were prepared to report a lecturer when he makes sexual advances to a fellow student in exchange for grades, while only 25.2% were ready to report a colleague who offers money or gifts to a lecturer in exchange for a higher or passing grade. Meanwhile, students were less

concern about reporting a friend when the friend uses fake documents to gain admission or pays an unapproved fee for accommodation (see Table 7).

To find out what lies behind this passive attitude of students reporting corruption, the study used the in-depth interviews to ask respondents what they thought were the reasons. Confirming these figures, all the participants during the interviews exhibited this passivity and cited several reasons and justifications why students do not want to report corruption. Most of the respondents felt that reporting this dishonest behaviour was simply a waste of time, hence, the laid-back attitude. This student's response, for instance, typifies this category of responses:

Why should I? I don't see the reason why I should. I see it as a waste of time. Maybe, it might not be dealt with, and you will be called to bring evidence and bring all those trash. It is not worth the time. The issue is you will be called to come and substantiate your claim and that is the most annoying part. If you will report and they will do their investigations, fine. For you to be called to substantiate the case, it is not worth the time. (4)

While some students felt reporting corruption was waste of time; others maintained that reporting corruption was just not part of their responsibilities since they only came to school to study. This view was also captured during the in-depth interview:

Even though students want to see the school get better, we feel that others have been employed rather make the school better not us, the students. They are hired to do that, so if they have not noticed it why should I rather help them. I am here to study and graduate with a good class: so I have to be on my path; study, graduate, and move on. (2)

Another reason, which was consistent in most of the interviews, was the fact that students were afraid to report perpetrators of this menace for the fear of victimization. Some students shared that they had terrible experiences when they reported similar issues in the past; hence, reporting the wrongdoing will be the last thing to do on campus. As a result, they will never

report any wrongdoing to endanger their lives academically. One of the students shared his experience:

...if I get the opportunity, I will report, but the thing is that you are not even protected by the institution. Let me give an example when we were at level 100, one of our lecturers didn't come to school. He was not coming for lectures, and some of my mates went to report him to the administration. When he came to school, we were writing our interim assessment, which was supposed to be one hour; he gave us only 15 minutes. The reason was that we went to report him. At the end of the day, the students have to go and apologize to the lecturer and even wrote a letter to that effect. (1)

Another student also shared his experience:

Actually, in one course, we didn't attend that lecture (for the semester) because we were told that the lecturer was in a relationship with one lady, and the guys spoke about it; they called him (on phone) or so, and he got angry. So he said he is not going to teach our class for the rest of the semester. So things like this, I don't think any student would be encouraged to report. Even, the faculty leaders came to our class, and they rebuked us; they said it is our own actions that have caused us, so we should learn on our own. Actually, it happened practically to my group. So I don't think issues like this will encourage a student to report a fellow friend. (9)

This research finding was consistent with other studies conducted elsewhere. For instance, in Romanian, Teodorescu, and Andrei (2009) also concluded that students were passive in reporting cheating behaviours. Also, a survey among Hungarian youth showed that only 21% indicated their intention to report corruption, and in fact, just 4% specified that they had reported a case in the past (Burai, 2013). Additionally, these Hungarians also felt that reporting corruption would amount to nothing and might have negative consequences on the whistle-blower (ibid.).

Second, although students were generally reluctant to report corruption, they were more likely to report faculty corrupt behaviour than peer corrupt behaviour. A closer look at Table

7 reveals that the two forms of corrupt behaviour with the highest frequencies were those involving faculty members. Whereas 41.9% of the students said they would report a lecturer who requests sexual favours from fellow students in exchange for grades, 31.9% of them claimed they would report a lecturer who asks for or accepts money or gift in exchange of a passing grade (see Table 7). This result according to the survey was also consistent with Teodorescu and Andrei's (2009) findings in Romanian universities as well as findings from other researches about other dishonest behaviours like cheating. In Singapore, Only 1.7 % of students in a study conducted by Lim and See (2001) were willing to report a friend found cheating.

To support this survey result, the following were excerpts from the in-depth interviews indicating reasons why students were likely to report a lecturer than a friend. One category of the responses was that students were unwilling to destroy their friendship ties, and this response from a student typifies this justification:

He is my friend, and I can't betray him. I won't report him because basically he is my friend, and he trusted me that is why he came to confided in me that I did this to get that. So, reporting him means that I am breaching our relationship, and I am breaking his trust. I would not report him. I don't just make friends; I call my friends my family, so I can't do that to any of them. (10)

Another student added:

As we say in our local parlance, you will be „ducking“ your friend to lose your friendship ...After all if you all pass, you all get your first class and you are working in a very big organization. Why not that is my friend. You can even tell your kids that this guy I remember he cheated in university (laughing).... (4)

Others also felt they gain nothing for reporting; hence, they will never waste their time to do so. In their views, they thought it was better to focus on their books than to be thinking about their friends who perpetrate such crimes.

Are they (authorities) going to give me any grade or anything for reporting a student? Sorry if I sound offensive, but since I am not going to get anything for reporting, I don't think I will report.... Yes, it sounds self-fish in a way, but sometimes it is safer you do it that way. (2)

Usually, students see lecturers as higher in authority, more knowledgeable and more respectable; hence, they least expect them to engage in such discreditable acts. Most students maintained that they will on any day report a lecturer than a friend because of these perceptions they have about their lecturers.

You see, the lecturer is someone higher, someone who is supposed to be knowledgeable, someone who is not supposed to stoop so low, and someone who is supposed to have a high sense of integrity, but a student is a student no matter what. A student would always want to pass his/her exams by any means possible. If a lecturer becomes a student fine, he can engage in those things. But so far as he is a lecturer, he is in a higher authority and should not stoop so low. I will report a lecturer 100 times than a friend. (7)

CHAPTER SIX

CORRUPTION AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the second part of the findings of the study; it continues from the previous chapter. However, this chapter focuses on students' corrupt intentions. It begins by presenting participants' views on corruption. This is followed by the differences between likely corrupt students and unlikely corrupt students as well as reasons why the former engage in the corruption. Finally, the chapter presents which contextual factor predicts students' corrupt intentions more.

6.2 Students' views about corruption on campus

Akers (1998) argued that the way an individual understands or views a deviant behaviour may possibly influence him/her to accept, reject or behave indifferently towards that deviant behaviour. As a result, the study found two broad views among students regarding their intentions toward corruption; one group of students accepted that corruption was wrong, yet they were willing to perpetuate it and tried to justify their intentions, and the other group of students also accepted that corruption was wrong and refused to perpetuate it entirely. These two groups of students were identified and labelled as Likely Corrupt Students (LCS) and Unlikely Corrupt Students (UCS) respectively.

Narratives from the in-depth interview, lend support for the distinction between the two corrupt intentions. The following were some excerpts from a UCS:

My view is that students who engage in corruption on campus should stop because I can challenge them that someday, they will regret they did it. This is because they did not go through the right path. When you go through the right path before achieving

any result, you are proud of yourself; I think corruption on campus is bad. Corrupt lecturers should also stop all those corrupt activities, and I think we will all be good. When this happens, it will lift the name of our school and Ghana as a whole. (5)

Another student stated his view by projecting into the future about how engaging in corruption can adversely affect students' attitudes toward work.

I think that it is bad. If today we criticize the politicians as corrupt, this is how they began; they began at the universities. It is bad for me. I think students have to stop it. If students show this kind of attitude now, they will do worse things when they start working. As students, there is no or little money involved, but if they start working, for instance, in banks where there is a lot of money, you can just imagine. I think it is bad. We have to stop it! (1)

On the other hand, LCSs think otherwise. Although they know it was wrong, they tried to justify why they will or other students engage in it. The following were responses from the interviews which capture the views of some LCS:

I don't really support it, but sometimes students find themselves in situations that they don't have anything to do than to succumb to such practices. (6)

He affirmed his desire to engage in corruption when asked whether or not he would like to engage in such an act.

Yes, I will. If I have the means because I wouldn't like to come back after my mates have graduated to be walking around and re-sitting some papers.

Another student also added his view by blaming his school's computer system as a justification for students' corrupt actions:

I think it is not a good thing though, but it is the system. As at now, our student portal has some challenges; some students are using that as a basis to argue their point that the school is corrupt, or there is corruption going on. We are more concern about the class than the grade. If you see your class, and you are not in an encouraging class; you will be tempted to engage in such schemes, but if you think your class is okay, you

won't. If it's for my class, I will do it. Because the system is already corrupt, just a small corrupt practice would do nothing to the already corrupt system. The thing is not good, but it is more or less like the system. (2)

In the survey, Likely Corrupt Students were those who answered “yes” to at least one of the following scenarios : (a) “Would you try to offer money or gift in exchange of copies of exam paper(s) or questions in advance if there is no other way to pass an exam?” (b) “Would you try to offer money or gifts to a lecturer/university administrator in exchange of a passing or higher grade if there is no other way to pass an exam?” The survey data showed that 18% of the respondents affirmed their desire to engage in corruption given these scenarios while about 80% indicated that they will not engage in these acts or they do not know what to do (indifferent); therefore, one in every five students in the sample is likely to corrupt or would like to engage in corruption. These figures corroborate Transparency International 2004 report in Azerbaijan that bribery, as well as corruption within the education sector, can easily be avoided since only a few have made up their minds to engage in corruption (as cited by Sadigov, 2014).

6.3 Characteristics of likely corrupt students

Having gotten these two broad groups regarding their views about corruption, the study went further to find out which features differentiated the likely corrupt students from the unlikely corrupt students. To establish the characteristics of likely corrupt students, an independent samples t-test was conducted to explore the differences between likely corrupt and unlikely corrupt students.

Table 8 shows the summary of the mean scores for both likely corrupt and unlike corrupt students.

Table 8: Difference between Likely Corrupt and Unlikely Corrupt Students

	Likely Corrupt Students			Unlikely Corrupt Students			<i>t</i>
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	
Contextual factors							
Faculty influence							
Faculty corruption	58	8.59	3.60	280	8.22	3.82	.67
Perceived faculty unfairness	60	2.92	.94	290	3.17	.94	-1.89
Faculty-student interaction	61	20.74	4.80	291	22.46	4.47	-2.71**
Quality and relevance instruction	63	16.73	3.04	296	18.31	3.26	-3.54***
Peer influence							
Peers' corruption in SHS	65	4.48	2.20	300	3.74	2.02	2.64**
Peers' corruption in university	61	11.05	5.61	291	8.64	3.55	4.30***
Peers' academic engagement	44	9.61	2.59	234	11.08	2.67	-3.36***
Individual factors							
Responsibility to report corruption	63	1.44	0.50	302	1.41	0.49	0.45
Time spent studying	63	2.90	1.30	293	3.39	1.63	-2.23*
Time spent partying and relaxing	58	12.86	5.67	271	11.79	5.62	1.31
Time spent working off campus	63	2.59	2.17	297	2.47	2.14	0.38
WASSCE grades	48	11.27	4.52	216	12.08	3.85	-1.28
GPA as at 2015/2016 academic year	50	3.04	0.45	246	3.12	0.49	-1.02

Source: Researcher's fieldwork, 2017.

* $p < 0.5$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

From Table 8, likely corrupt students were less satisfied with lecture-students interaction, the quality of instruction and relevance of lectures and above all were less satisfied with grades from their lectures. Furthermore, these students observed more faculty corrupt behaviour in the past academic year. These results suggest that corrupt students

Generally, believe students are usually not permitted to ask questions during lectures, students are usually not permitted to participate in classroom discussions and are often not allowed to express their own views.

In addition, these students view most of their courses as boring, less relevant to their future career(s) and find teaching strategies and methods less helpful in their understanding of the courses. The survey finding corroborates Sadigov's (2014) factors why students offer bribes for their certificates rather than study. According to Sadigov (2014), students who initiate the payment of bribes in most Azerbaijani universities were of the view that universities in that country were ineffective in teaching marketable skills; hence, studying is time wasting. In addition, close to half of the Azerbaijani graduates (44.5%) paid bribes for their certificates because the courses were boring and difficult (Sadigov, 2014).

Again, Likely corrupt students' dissatisfaction with the student-lecturer interaction was consistent with Teodorescu and Andrei's (2009) survey, which suggested that prospective dishonest students were less satisfied with the interactions which existed between their lecturers and students. This dissatisfaction in lecture-student interactions was confirmed during the in-depth interview. This was how Joe, a likely corrupt student, for instance, described the student-lecturer relationship:

... For faculty members, it is a notion that they don't really like you (student) that kind of thing. So why should you also like them? Because more often than not, if you go to their offices for a normal thing like a course clashing with another course, the way they talk to us sometimes it is very bad. It's like there is no cordial relationship between us. (2)

Unlike the LCS, the UCSs were full of praise for their lecturers; they showed a lot of confidence in their lecturers and perceived them to be firm in their decisions, fair with their grades and high in integrity. This was how Steven described his lecturers when asked about some of the corrupt practices that faculty members engage in.

For the lectures on this campus, I don't see any of them engaging in corrupt practices. For that one, it is a no. My lecturers are full of integrity; even if you want to cheat in class, they will just sack you out of the class. Even if you come late before the lecture

starts, the lecturer will sack you. So integrity has been their hallmark; for them to engage in corrupt activity, it is a no! (5)

Statistically, there is a significant difference ($t = -2.71$, $p < 0.01$) between likely corrupt and unlikely corrupt students as far as their perception about faculty-student interactions is a concern (Table 8). Also, the relevance and quality of instructions showed a statistically significant ($t = -3.54$, $p < 0.001$) difference between these two groups of students. These findings mean that the differences between the two groups were very unlikely to be caused by random chance alone.

Concerning their differences regarding their peers, likely corrupt students, once again, demonstrated vast differences in their perceptions toward their friends when compared to the unlikely corrupt students (Table 8). A closer look at look at Table 8 shows that likely corrupt students observed more peer corrupt behaviour when in Senior high school than unlikely corrupt students. In other words, before their university education, LCSs were exposed to corrupt practices more than UCSs. During the interviews, one of the LCSs responses typically explained this survey result.

You see growing up from the Junior high school through to Senior high schools to the university there were some corruptions that we encountered in the way. In the Junior high school there were some teachers who will go and look for exam questions for their students for their school to make a name, in the senior high school the same thing happens so if let's take for instance a student passes through the first level of corruption thus the Junior high school level, comes to the senior high school has the same kind of favour it means that maybe the student is not fit for the university. Because there is the tendency that since that has been the norm that is what the student knows he or she would be pressured for looking for such favours. He or she would not sit down for such favours to come; he/she will look for such favours for him to be able to get a good stand. (4)

This research finding supports Sadigov's (2014) assertion that most students, who bribed at the university, were used to bribery before gaining admission into universities. Accordingly, 68% of Azerbaijani students were socialized to bribery in secondary school, while 26.5% had their first bribery encounter at the university. Also, the data result lends support to Shaw, Katsaiti, and Pecoraro (2015) finding that students who engaged in bribery while in secondary school were more likely to repeat it at the university.

Still, at the university, likely corrupt students continually observed more peer corrupt behaviour than the unlikely corrupt students. Comparing their mean scores for the observed university peer corruption, likely corrupt students had an average of 11.05 with a standard deviation of 5.61 while the unlikely corrupt students had 8.64 with a standard deviation of 3.55 (see Table 8). Clearly, these differences in their means scores in high school and at the university explain their different views toward the perpetration of corruption since deviant behaviour is learned by imitation according to the Social Learning Theory. It also lends support to another component of this theory, differential association. According to Sutherland (1961), the differential association is the means by which people get exposed to either positive or negative norms as they interact with others. Consequently, individuals learn to be deviant when more of their associates or friends favour deviance. Again, this survey result was consistent with Teodorescu and Andrei's (2009) survey in Romania where likely cheats have observed more of such behaviour since high school.

Furthermore, most of the friends of these likely corrupt students were less engaged academically than the unlikely corrupt students (Table 8). Thus, the majority of their friends were less motivated to study and discuss the content of their courses frequently. Again, this confirms the differential association component of the Social Learning Theory. Since the majority of the friends of likely corrupt students were not less serious academically, they were likely to engage in corrupt practices to either pass or better their grades. This was also

confirmed during the interviews. According to Joe, a likely corrupt student, he was nearly tempted to change one of his grades. According to him, he was tempted because one of his friends who was not serious academically had engaged someone to work on three grades. *“Frankly, I would have done it if my issue wasn’t ratified,”* he said.

On the contrary, an unlikely corrupt student, Steven, has something else to say about his friends and their decision toward learning:

For my friends, all that we know on this campus is for us to learn hard for us to pass. That has been our slogan; we need to learn for us to get a better grade. We don’t know anything like paying money to a lecturer, but I have heard. I don’t know whether it is true or not. (5)

The findings from both studies show how influential and pervasive peer behaviour is on an individual as suggested by the Social Learning Theory. A careful look at Table 8 shows that all the variables about the respondents' peer behaviour were statistically significant, which means that the differences between this two groups were very unlikely to be caused by random chance alone.

Also, looking at their individual differences from Table 8, there were some notable differences that can be pointed out. For instance, likely corrupt students spent less time to study than unlikely corrupt students. From table 8, averagely, likely corrupt students spent 2 hours, 90 minutes per week to study as compared to 3 hours, 39 minutes for unlikely corrupt students. Instead, they spent most of their time partying with friends and relaxing by playing video games, watching television, exercising, and surfing the internet. In addition, they spent more time working off campus than unlikely corrupt students. All these differences culminate in their ill intentions toward corruption and reflect their worse academic performance as their average cumulative GPA in the 2015/2016 academic year was 3.04 compared to 3.12 for unlikely corrupt students.

Surprisingly, likely corrupt students performed better than unlikely corrupt students in their WASSCE results. From Table 8 once again, the average WASSCE grade for likely corrupt students was 11.27 compared to 12.08 for the unlikely corrupt students. However, the attitude of these groups toward reporting corruption is almost the same. Both likely and unlikely corrupt students were passive toward reporting corruption. This apathy by these groups towards reporting corrupt practices mirrors results in Romania (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009).

6.4 Reasons students engage in corruption

Furthermore, the study found out why students engage in corrupt practices. As a result, four different categories of responses were found and classified as the reasons students engage in corrupt practices during the in-depth interviews. However, the study avoided indications as to the frequency of certain type of responses. Hence, the focus was to present the range of reasons why respondents and students in general would engage in corrupt practices.

The first set of responses pointed to the failure in the university system as the reason why students engage in corrupt practices. In their views, frustrations encountered by students when they have issue with their result compel them sometimes to take matters into their hands. One student whose personal experience typifies responses in this category shared this:

I was tempted to do that (engage in corruption) because I had an issue with one on my courses, but now by God's grace, it has been ratified. I actually have to trace it, and I followed up on this issue for about a year. It was a level 200 first semester paper, but then it was later on ratified in level 300. So I think it took me about a year for them (officers in charge) to do the ratification. ...frankly, I would have done it (engage in corruption) if my issue wasn't ratified. (2)

Second, the desire for students to pass or graduate by every means possible was found and categorized as the other set of reasons students gave for engaging in corrupt activities. Some of the responses that typically expressed these responses included:

I will really do it because I need to make the grades and go home; because the degree is for four years, and I wouldn't like to stay over for more than four years. (10)

Another student shared his view:

You see, the university is not like the primary school where students in a classroom are placed first, second, third, or that. The university is about completing with good grades, so if there is a way where you can complete with good grades while it is not adversely affecting others, why not? (4)

Parents sometimes expect much from their children; perhaps, because of the family's reputation and the kind of money they have invested in them. These expectations from parents and the pressure to do well in order to save the family's name were also identified as the third category of reasons why students engage in corrupt practices. One of the students' responses that capture these views is this:

... Low grades make a student think of what will happen. If a student is expected to attain a certain class, he/she has to do everything and anything possible in order to push him/herself to the class that is required of him/her. (8)

This student continued:

Some students have as well been promised, let's say, if they get first class, they will be flown out of the country for their masters or something like that. These students will do whatever they can to get themselves the class that is expected of them.

Finally, the last set of responses related students' reasons to laziness and lack of seriousness on the part of some students as a result of bad associations. This was what one student said:

Some students are just lazy and do not want to study. So if they don't know anything, they will definitely find a way to pass. (9)

Another student added:

Actually, peer pressure is the reason because when we come to level 100, we are all serious. Before you know by level 200 some students start dripping off. All because they are following bad friends, so they can't really concentrate in school to study.

These are things I see especially in the hostel. They follow friends whom don't have time to study, so their friends pay lecturers to pass them. (3)

6.5 Relative influence of peer and faculty influences on intent to engage in corruption

Globally, higher education is an important stage in the lives of many individuals and it is a place where lecturers and fellow students influence the values and attitudes of many people through learning and interaction (Moosmayer, 2012). To explore how the contextual and individual factors on university campuses affected students' corrupt intentions, the researcher built a model using the binary logistic regression in a situation where the dependent variable was students' intent to engage in corruption. As a result, the operational definition for likely corrupt students was students who would offer money or gift in exchange of advance copies of exam papers or offer money or gifts to lecturers/administrators for passing or higher grades when found in a situation where passing or obtaining desired grades would be difficult or impossible.

From the survey, the propensity to engage in corruption by students is not evenly divided between likely corrupt and unlikely corrupt students. While 18% were likely corrupt students, 82% were unlikely corrupt students. Since past studies on students' corruption had not compared the effects of peer and faculty influences on students' corrupt intentions, the researcher entered respondents' demographic characteristics variables into the first block; the researcher then entered the faculty explanatory variables into the second block.

The third block of variables to be entered into the model was the peer explanatory variables, followed by respondents' individual attitude toward corruption and academics. The researcher entered the faculty explanatory variables before the peer explanatory variables because it is perceived that faculty members influence students with their attitudes and the quality of their instructions. In addition, since it is believed that faculty and peer influences

can also influence an individual's attitude towards corruption and learning. As result, the researcher entered respondents' individual differences as the last block. The researcher entered the variables in separate blocks because it allows the individual models to be compared using the likelihood-ratio test. Also, this method enabled the study to explore the effects of peer and faculty influences on students' corrupt intentions separately. The model can be comprehended better by examining Figure 3.




Figure 3: Proposed model for students' corrupt intentions

Furthermore, Table 9 shows the summary of all the coefficients as well as odds ratios for the multivariate analysis for students' corrupt intentions for all the four models. The first model included only the demographic characteristics of the respondents, and the second model included the effects of faculty influence. From Table 9, the addition of faculty influences such as observed faculty corruption, faculty-student interaction, grade unfairness and quality and relevance of instruction improved the second model over the first one ($L2= 8.42$, $df= 8$). Although the second model is not significant, the model as a whole explained between 9.2% (Cox and Snell R square) and 16.6% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variation in students' corrupt intention; it correctly classified 86.8% of the cases. The third model further added peer influences such as observed peer SHS corruption, observed peer university corruption

and peer academic engagements. The addition of model 3 improved the data even better ($L2=14.80$, $df=11$, $p<0.01$) (Table 9). The model, however, correctly classified 89.7% of the cases, and it explained between 18.6% (Cox and Snell R square) and 33.5% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variation in students' corrupt intentions. Finally, the fourth model, which included respondents' individual differences, also improved the data, but not as model 3 did ($L2=14.74$, $df=17$, $p<0.001$). Model 4, which included all the variables, explained between 26.9% (Cox and Snell R square) and 48.6% (Nagelkerke R squared) of the variation in students' corrupt intentions, and correctly classified 88.2% of the cases.

Among all the explanatory variables, peer university corruption and time spent working off campus were the only independent variables that made unique significant contributions to the model (Table 9). However, observed peer university corruption was the strongest predictor among the entire explanatory variable under peer influence. With an odds ratio of 1.35, a unit increase in a student's peer university corruption observed almost doubles the student's propensity to engage in corruption when controlling for all other variables in the model. Furthermore, the strongest predictor of students' corrupt intentions, considering all variables, was students living arrangement. With an odds ratio of 1.81, a unit change in the living arrangements for students (i.e. for those living with their parents) doubles their propensity to engage in corruption after controlling for other key predictors in the model. The odds ratio of 0.52 for time spent studying was less than one. This indicates that for every additional hour of study per week, students were likely to reduce their propensity to engage in corruption by 0.52 times when controlling for other key predictors in the model.

Table 9: Predictors of Students' Corrupt Intentions

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	-4.92	0.01	-0.95	0.39	-5.01	0.01	-5.44	0.01
<i>Demographic characteristics</i>								
Male	0.79	2.20	0.62	1.85	0.17	1.19	0.52	1.68
Final year student	0.22	1.24	-0.15	0.86	0.34	1.41	0.28	1.33
Living with parents	0.49	1.63	0.49	1.63	0.65	1.91	0.60	1.81
Age	0.11	1.11	0.12	1.13	0.23	1.25	0.33	1.40
<i>Faculty influence</i>								
Faculty corruption			0.01	1.01	-0.12	0.89	-0.12	0.89
Grade unfairness			0.06	1.06	-0.22	0.81	-0.66	0.52
Faculty-students interaction			-0.08	0.93	0.01	1.01	-0.02	0.98
Quality and relevant of instruction			-0.16	0.86	-0.11	0.89	-0.03	0.97
<i>Peer influence</i>								
Peer SHS corruption					0.08	1.08	0.29	1.34
Peer university corruption					0.27**	1.31	0.30*	1.35
Peer academic engagement					-0.19	0.83	-0.08	0.92
<i>Individual differences</i>								
Reporting of corrupt behaviour							-0.34	0.71
Time spent studying							-0.65	0.52
Time spent working off campus							-0.63*	0.53
Time spent partying and relaxing							0.14	1.16
WASSCE grade							-0.15	0.86
GPA							-0.04	0.96
Model χ^2	4.72		13.13		27.93**		42.67***	
Df	4		8		11		17	
Model 2 vs. Model 1			8.42					
Model 3 vs. Model 2			14.80**					
Model 4 vs. Model 3			14.74*					

Source: Researcher's fieldwork, 2017.

* p < 0.5, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the major findings of the study, their implications and how they address the objectives of the study. The chapter begins with a summary of the research methods employed in the study; followed by the major result from the field and how they are similar to previous studies in the literature. Finally, the chapter concludes with the recommendations for policymakers and gives directions to other researchers in future studies.

7.2 Summary and Conclusions

With the concern for academic integrity within universities across the globe and the rate of misconduct among students, faculty members, and administrators reported in previous researches, the current study, which was conducted in some randomly selected universities in Accra, sought to explore generally from students' perspective, the perceived academic corrupt practices. Specifically, the study sought to examine the extent to which students, faculty as well as administrators were involved in corruption; how faculty and peer influences affected students' intentions to engage in corruption and finally, the differences between students with negative corrupt intentions and those without negative corrupt intentions.

The study began by employing the sequential explanatory approach, which is one of the mixed methods designs, to explore the problem; in this case, the quantitative study preceded the qualitative study and using the multi-stage cluster sampling technique, the researcher selected three universities, which were made up of one public university and two private universities, for the survey. Also, by employing Krejcie and Morgan's (1970) formula for

determining sampling sizes for surveys, the researcher estimated the sample size for the survey at 382; however, 380 actually participated in the study giving a response rate of 99.48%. The purposive sampling technique was, however, employed to select 10 students for the qualitative study. It is important to note that the selection of the 10 respondents, who also participated in the quantitative study, was based on the result of the survey. Using a structured questionnaire, which was self-administered, and an in-depth interview for the survey and the qualitative study respectively, the data was collected and analyzed in two phases; first, the quantitative data collection and analysis then second, the qualitative data collection and analysis. The two analyzed data, however, were later merged at an intermediary level and the following were the major findings:

One of the conclusions drawn from the data analysis was that there was evidence of corruption in all the universities selected for the study, and it involved students, faculty members, and administrators. These perceived corrupt practices included: exchanging money for grades, exchanging money for certificates, paying money for exams questions, exchanging sex for a grade, seeking sexual favours, favouring of friends and relatives, selling of hand-out or books compulsorily and demanding of unapproved fees. In view of this, the findings of this study conclusively confirm that indeed there was some level of corruption in institutions of higher learning as suggested in previous studies (Osipian, 2007; Heyneman et al., 2008; Oarhe, 2014; Sadigov, 2014; Chapman & Lindner, 2016).

As many as 50.3% of the participants observed at least an instance where lecturers used different coercing strategies to forcefully get students to buy their lecture notes or hand-outs. By adopting strategies such as writing down the names and index numbers of students and awarding marks to those who bought their hand-outs, these lecturers extorted money from students. Also, about 30% witnessed at least a case where lecturers requested for sex from

fellow students in exchange of grades while 20.4% witnessed a least a case where lecturers accepted money or material gifts from the student in exchange of passing or higher grades.

Regarding administrators' involvement in corruption, 21.3% of the students claimed they witnessed situations where administrative staff charged unapproved fees for various education services like applying for a new ID Card. There was evidence, however, of some administrators who aided some students either to change their grades or even graduate without fulfilling all the necessary university requirements. In the case of students, 24.2% of the students were aware of instances where at least a friend offered money or gifts in return for a passing or better grade while 16.9% of them also know of at least a friend who seduced or trapped a lecturer for grades. Meanwhile, 22.2% knew of at least a friend who directly or indirectly influenced a lecturer for an unmerited favour and 15.8% also had knowledge of at least a friend who paid money for fake documents such as transcripts and certificate.

Not only were students involved in corrupt activities at all the selected universities, but they were unwilling, apathetic, and passive to report these kinds of activities. The study showed that only 25.2% were willing to report friends, who offer money or gifts to faculty members for higher or better grade; only 22% were willing to report friends, who use an unapproved means to gain admission, and only 24% were willing to report friends who pay unapproved fee for services such as accommodation. In cases which involve faculty members, for instance, only 31.9% were willing to report faculty members who ask for or accept money or gift in exchange for grades and 41.9% were willing to report faculty members who request for sex in exchange for grades. The finding lends support to Transparency International's survey undertaken in some countries in sub-Saharan Africa in 2015. According to the study, respondents suggested that reporting corruption was the most effective anti-corruption measure, yet they were unwilling to report it (Pring, 2015). In addition, the overall passivity shown by students in accepting and maintaining the status quo was consistent with other

studies carried out in other countries like Moldova, Croatia, Serbia and Bulgaria (Heyneman et al., 2008) as well as in Romania (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009). The result reveals that it is practically impossible to fight corruption if this culture of apathy and passiveness among university students is not changed.

In addition to students' passivity to report corruption, the study, essentially, revealed that the most influential correlates of students' corrupt intention were peer related contextual factors. Peer behaviours such as observed peer university corruption; observed peer SHS corruption and peer academic engagements had a stronger influence on student's intention to be corrupt. Also significant to students' corrupt intentions was their time spent working off campus. Since peer influence factors interacted significantly than faculty influence factors, the finding lends support to Bandura's Social Learning Theory, which is the theoretical framework for the study, to understand students' academic corruption. According to the Social Learning Theory individuals often learn behaviour through the examples they observed. Consequently, the finding of this study and those from other studies in the U.S. (McCabe et al., 2006) and Europe (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009) have proven that indeed, students often emulate behaviours observed from their friends as well as those approved by them.

Lastly, the study found some major differences between likely corrupt and unlikely corrupt students aside from the fact that peer influence was the strongest predictor of their corrupt intentions. In terms of the way they perceived their lectures, the likely corrupt students viewed their lecturers to be more unfair with grades than the unlikely corrupt students. In addition, the likely corrupt students were less satisfied with the instructions and interactions between lecturers and students as compared to the unlikely corrupt students. Again, the likely corrupt students happened to have observed more faculty corruption than the unlikely corrupt students. By considering their peers and associations, the likely corrupt students once again observed more peer corruption than the unlikely corrupt students both in their secondary

schools and at the university; therefore, they mostly saw their friends as less serious and less engaging academically. Individually, the likely corrupt students spent less time to study; they party a lot and spend more time to relax than the unlikely corrupt students. These differences between these groups of students once more confirm the assertion by the Social Learning theory. According to Sutherland (1961) differential association, which is a major component of the theory, is the exposure to either positive or negative norms as individuals interact with others. People, therefore, learn to be deviant when more of their associates or friends favour deviance. In addition, the findings were consistent with the result of other studies on students' dishonest behaviour in Europe (Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009).

7.3 Recommendations

It must be noted that further data must be collected on the subject matter and more sophisticated analysis needs to be done to make firm recommendations. However, the following recommendations were made base on the findings of this study.

Since students were generally passive and reluctant to report both peer and faculty corruption, the fight against corruption is only possible when this culture of this feeling is changed. It is, therefore, recommended that university authorities collaborate with students' leadership to start a campaign which stresses on peer academic integrity. University authorities should also emphasize on the Whistle-blowers Act and ensure it is effectively implemented to safeguard the interests of students who decide to report this menace for the fear victimization; for instance, a whistle-blowers' hotline can be established purposely for reporting such incidents in support of the Act. In addition, honour codes should be introduced in our school system right from the primary level to motivate students to feel a sense of personal responsibility to report misconduct. Furthermore, parenting is another area that should be looked at. Since university authorities have little or no control over the kind of people students associates

themselves with, it is highly recommended, however, that parents pay much attention to the peers of their wards right from the basic level through to the university.

Higher education corruption continues to be a major issue of concern in all colleges across the globe. As a result, there is the need to further explore this area for more insight about the problem. In view of this, other studies in the future can consider exploring the perceived level of corruption at the university from other perspectives to further solidify the extent of corruption at universities in Ghana; perhaps, future studies can focus on the perspective of faculty members. Another area of interest that future researchers can focus attention on is to consider respondents' personal experiences instead of their perception. Finally, a comparative study between public and private universities can also be carried out in order to examine which of these universities are more corrupt.

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APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DATA COLLECTION

INTRODUCTION

My name is Isaac Tagoe, an MPhil candidate with the Department of Sociology, at the University of Ghana. I am conducting a study titled “**Cutting Corners: Students’ Perceived Academic Corruption at Universities in Accra**”. I hereby invite you to participate in the first phase of this study. Any information you provide will be treated confidential and cannot be traced to you. The information you provide will be used purely for academic purposes. The data obtained from this study will be password protected and will not be made available to any second and/or third parties. If by any reason, you do not want to continue answering any of the questions you can choose to discontinue your participation in the study. Thank you very much for giving me your attention.

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. What is your sex? *(Kindly tick whichever applies)*
 - (1) Male
 - (2) Female

2. What is your age? _____ *(in years)*

3. What is your level of study? *(Kindly tick whichever applies)*
 - (1) Level 200
 - (2) Level 300
 - (3) Level 400

4. What is your program of study? _____ *(Kindly write in the space provided)*

5. Which department do you belong to? _____ *(Kindly write in the space provided)*

6. What is your status as a student? *(Kindly tick whichever applies)*
 - (1) Full-time student
 - (2) Working students

7. What is the status of your university? *(Kindly tick whichever applies)*
 - (1) Public University
 - (2) Private University

8. Where did you live last academic year? *(Kindly tick whichever applies)*
 - (1) Home with parent

- (2) Students' Hostel/Hall []
 (3) Own/Rented Apartment []

SECTION B: PERCEIVED FACULTY MEMBERS' CORRUPT BEHAVIOUR AND INTERACTION WITH STUDENTS

(a) Faculty Corrupt behaviours;

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding box in reference to the following statements on the number of case(s) of corrupt behaviour(s) you've observed from your lecturers.						
From the following statements below select your response to indicate the number of faculty members' corrupt cases you've observed		No case at all	1-3 cases	4-6 cases	7-10 cases	> 10 cases
1	Asking for or accepting money/ material gift from students in exchange of a passing grade					
2	Asking for or accepting money/material gift from students in exchange of advance copies of exam questions/papers					
3	Making sexual advances to students in exchange of grades					
4	Selling of handouts/books on condition to take part in an exam or for passing/higher grades					
5	Giving low grade to students and recommending private tutoring.					
6	Asking for a fee or gift in order to supervise students research essay for good grades					

(b) Faculty unfairness;

9. How objective are the grades from your lecturers? **(Kindly tick whichever applies)**
 1. Poor [] 2. Fair [] 3. Good [] 4. Very Good [] 5. Excellent []

(c) Faculty-students interaction

10.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding number in reference to the following statements on how lecturers encourage student-lecturer interaction in and outside the classroom.						
From the following statements below select your response to indicate the extent to which students-lecturer interaction is encouraged by lecturers in this school.		Not at all (1)	To a small extent (2)	To a moderate extent (3)	To a fairly great extent (4)	To a great extent (5)
1	Students ask questions during lectures					
2	Students participate in class discussions					
3	Students express their own viewpoints					
4	Lecturers available outside class hours to answer students' questions					

11. How will you rate the advice received from lecturers regarding the relevance of your future career plans upon graduation? **(Kindly tick whichever applies)**

1. Poor [] 2. Fair [] 3. Good [] 4. Very Good [] 5. Excellent []

12. How will you rate the overall communication between lecturers and students in your school?
(*Kindly tick whichever applies*)

1. Poor [] 2. Fair [] 3. Good [] 4. Very Good [] 5. Excellent []

(D) Quality and relevance of instruction;

13.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding number in reference to the following statements on your satisfaction with your program of study.						
From the following statements below select your response to indicate the rate of satisfaction with your program of study		Poor (1)	Fair (2)	Good (3)	Very Good (4)	Excellent (5)
1	Relevance of courses to your future career					
2	Variety of courses that is offered					

14.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding box in reference to the following statements on the quality of instruction from your lecturer(s).						
From the following statements below select your response to indicate the quality of instructions from lecturers.		Not at all (1)	To a small extent (2)	To a moderate extent (3)	To a fairly great extent (4)	To a great extent (5)
1	Majority of the courses are boring					
2	Lecturers' teaching methods help me understand well the subject matter					
3	Lecturers show passion for the subjects they teach					

SECTION C: PERCEIVED PEER CORRUPT BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS EDUCATION.

(a) Peers' corruption in high school;

15.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding box in reference to the following statements on the number (in percentage) of your friends who engaged in corrupt activities when in Senior High School (SHS)						
From the following statements below select your response to indicates the number (in percentage) of friends who engaged in corruption while in SHS		None of my friends	To a little extent (< 10%)	To a significant extent (11-50%)	Most of my Friends (51-90%)	Almost all my friends (> 90%)
1	Relied on bought exam questions/papers to pass their WASSCE exams					
2	Relied on "connection man" to improve their grades or change their grades.					

(B) Peers' corruption in university

16.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding box in reference to the following statements on the number (in percentage) of your friends who have engaged in any of these corrupt activities on campus.						
From the following statements below select your response to indicate the number (in percentage) of friends who have engaged in corruption on campus.		None of my friends	To a little extent (< 10%)	To a significant extent (11-50%)	Most of my Friends (51-90%)	Almost all my friends (> 90%)
1	Offered money or gift in exchange of a passing grade.					
2	Bribed a lecturer or influence them through an intermediary.					
3	Paid illegal money for normal education services like accommodation, transcript etc.					
4	Bought exam questions or papers					
5	Offered money or gift in order to cheat in an exam					
6	Seduced or trapped lecturers to earn unmerited grades					
7	Paid money for falsified documents					

(C) Peers' engagement in academics

17.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding box in reference to the following statements on the extent to which you agree that your friends are academically serious						
From the following statements below select your response to indicate the extent that you agree your friends are academically serious.		Not at all (1)	To a small extent (2)	To a moderate extent (3)	To a fairly great extent (4)	To a great extent (5)
1	Majority of my friends are motivated to study					
2	My friends discuss the content of courses frequently outside the class- room					

18. How will you rate the academic preparedness of your friends? **(Kindly tick whichever applies)**

1. Poor [] 2. Fair [] 3. Good [] 4. Very Good [] 5. Excellent []

SECTION D: STUDENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS CORRUPT ACTIVITIES AND EDUCATION
19.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding box in reference to the following statements on how you will react to the following situations.				
From the following statements below select your response to indicate how you will react to these situations.		Yes	No	Don't know
1	Would you try to offer money or gift in exchange of copies of exam paper(s) or questions in advance if there is no other way to pass an exam?			
2	Would you try to offer money or gifts to a lecturer/university administrator in exchange of a passing or higher grade if there is no other way to pass an exam?			

20.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding box in reference to the following statements on whether you will report the following incidence of corruption on campus to the authorities.				
From the following statements below select your response to indicate if you will report the following incidence of corruption on campus.		Yes	No	Don't know
1	A colleague who offers money or gifts to a lecturer in exchange of a passing or higher grade on an exam.			
2	A lecturer who asks for or accepts money or gift in exchange of a passing grade on an exam.			
3	A colleague who used illegal means to gain admission.			
4	A colleague who pays an illegal fee for accommodation			
5	A lecturer who makes sexual advances to fellow students in exchange of grades.			

21. How do you consider students who criticize others for offering money or gift to a lecturer or other staffs for higher or passing grades or any other favours? *(Kindly tick whichever applies)*

1. They are not real students []
2. They are selfish []
3. It is their right to do so. []

22.

Indicate your response by ticking the corresponding box in reference to the following statements on the number hours you spend per week engaging in the following activities.								
From the following statements below select your response to indicate the hours you spend per week in these activities.	None	1-5 hours	6-10 hours	11-20 hours	21 -30 hours	> 30 hours	Don't know	Not applicable
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1	Playing videogames							
2	Partying with friends							
3	Surfing the Internet							

4	Exercising								
5	Watching TV								
6	Studying								
7	working off campus								

22. What is your Grade Point Average (GPA) as at last academic year?*(e.g. ~~3.40~~, 2.05 etc.)*

23. What grade did you obtain in your high school final exam (WASSCE)?*(e.g. ~~09~~, 08 etc.)*

APPENDIX 2

INTERVIEW GUIDE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

NB: These are base questions (follow-up questions will depend on responses and especially result from quantitative analysis).

Interviewer introduces himself; explain consent and purpose of the interview.

My name is Isaac Tagoe and I am graduate student from University of Ghana; Department of Sociology. I am here to collect data in partial fulfilment of my masters ,degree. I am therefore not part of the teaching staff of this school and have no connection with your university authorities. I am here today to gather your views on the perceived corrupt practice by students and faculty member on this campus. I would, however, like to hear your views broadly on the issue mentioned and if there are any instances that you are aware of kindly share with me.

As you are aware, your involvement in this study is voluntary and your responses remain anonymous. No comments you make in this interview would be attributed to you and no record of your identity will be kept. I am however, going to record this interview with a tape recorder as well as take notes. I would like to assure you that the tape recorder and the note would be kept while they are relevant for this study. It would be destroyed afterwards. Are they any questions or comments before we begin? Thank you.

Section A: perceived students' corruption

1. In your view, what is corruption on this campus? (Examples?) (Kindly read out researcher's definition of corruption on the sheet before your)
 - I. What do you think of this definition?
 - II. Does this definition fit with your understanding?
 - III. Do you think there is anything missing?
2. Which forms of students' corrupt behaviours are you aware of on this campus? [Prompt if necessary: offering money for grades? Etc.]
3. Which of the following student corrupt practices have you observed/witnessed in the past academic year?[kindly share your experience with me]
4. Do you think these corrupt behaviours on campus can influence you or others to also engage in such behaviours?

Section B: perceived faculty member's corruption

5. What are some of the corrupt activities that they engage in? [Prompt if necessary example asking for or accepting money from students in exchange of a passing grade? Etc.]
6. Which of the following faculty corrupt practices have you observed/witnessed in the past academic year?[kindly share your experience with me]
7. How common do you think your lecturers engage in these corrupt activities on this campus?How do you know?
8. Do you think these corrupt behaviours by lecturers on campus can influence you or others to also engage in such behaviours?

Section C: Comparing likely and unlikely corrupt students

9. How will you describe a likely corrupt student? [What do you think accounts for this?]
10. Could it be that they are likely corrupt because they have observed more corrupt activities from their friends since SHS?
11. Do you think they view lecturers/ faculty members as fair? [Regarding grades etc. probe]
12. Do you think they are satisfied with the interactions that exist between lecturers and students? [Probe]
13. Do you think they are satisfied with the quality and relevance of the teachings/ instructions by lecturers? [Probe]
14. How would they view the academic engagements of their friends? [probe]

Section D: personal attitude towards corruption

15. What are your views towards these corrupt practices on campus?
16. By observing all these acts of corruption on campus, do you feel you would like to engage in them?
 - If there is no way out like passing a particular course or
 - If you can get away with it without been caught?
17. Would you report a friend who engages in any of these corrupt activities?
18. Would you report a lecturer/ faculty member who engages in any of these corrupt activities?
19. Why do you think students prefer to report lecturers who engage in these corrupt practices than their friends?

Thank you for your time and for taking part in this study. Every piece of information you have shared would go a long way to shape this study. Are there any questions or comments?

APPENDIX 3

ETHICAL CLEARANCE



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)

P. O. Box LG 74, Legon, Accra, Ghana

17th March, 2017

My Ref. No.....

Mr. Isaac Tagoe
Department of Sociology
University of Ghana
Legon

Dear Mr. Tagoe,

ECH 093/16-17: CUTTING CORNERS: STUDENTS' PERCEIVED ACADEMIC CORRUPTION AT UNIVERSITIES IN ACCRA

This is to advise you that the above reference study has been presented to the Ethics Committee for the Humanities for a full board review and the following actions taken subject to the conditions and explanation provided below:

Expiry Date: 14/09/17
On Agenda for: Initial Submission
Date of Submission: 13/02/17
ECH Action: Approved
Reporting: Quarterly



Please accept my congratulations.

Yours Sincerely,

Rev. Prof. J. O. Y. Mante
ECH Chair

CC: Rev. Prof. M. P. K. Okyerefo, Department of Sociology