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# THE NEW LEGON OBSERVER

# GSDD

Ghana Society for Development Dialogue

A Ghana Society for Development Dialogue Publication

Vol. 2 No. 4

21 February, 2008

GH¢2.00

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
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### Our Perspective

## Campaign Finance in Ghana: Is there an Issue?



Dr. Paul Acquah, Governor of the Bank of Ghana and Mr. Kwadwo Baah Wiredu, Minister of Finance

One major problem that all contemporary democracies face is the problem of financing political parties and election campaigns or, to put it more colloquially, the problem of 'money in politics'. It is impossible to overstate the depth, complexity or importance of this problem for democracies. After all, free and fair elections are the foundation of contemporary democracies and the role of political parties in both democratic elections and governance is pivotal.

Political parties organise the electorate to participate in elections in their numbers. They help to simplify for the electorate the important issues at stake in the elections. They select and provide support for the rival candidates that the electorate will choose from, to form the government and opposition. They organise continuous

support for both government and opposition, and provide an important link between the people and their political leaders. Contemporary democracies are indeed synonymous with party politics and party government.

The performance of all these roles by political parties requires money, lots and lots of it, with each passing year. Political parties, as more or less modern bureaucratic organisations, have routine monetary requirements: to pay staff, to provide office accommodation, to pay for office consumables, to purchase vehicles and keep them on the road, and so on. But these organisational costs are as nothing compared to the amounts of money political parties and candidates have to find for election campaigns.

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The society is a registered company limited by guarantee and is independent of the management of the University of Ghana, Legon. The members of the society come from diverse professional backgrounds and are motivated solely by the need to develop a vehicle for the articulation of diverse but well-researched views on Ghana's development.

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Where is the money for all these coming from? Do we know the sources? Are the sources legal and moral? Do they present a potential threat to policy-making outcomes that favour the interests of the majority of citizens? Does the distribution of the funds from these sources among the parties compromise the concept of fairness, enshrined in the phrase "free and fair elections"? All these are aspects of the troubling problem of political finance in contemporary democracies.

Political parties have to be adequately funded so they can perform the sterling roles expected of them. The fact of the matter, however, is that ideally democratic, largely grassroots methods of funding political parties and election campaigns no longer raise anything near the vast amounts required to win elections. Mass membership fees, the sale of party memorabilia, levies on party men who hold offices of state, regular small-scale fund-raising activities undertaken by vast armies of volunteer party members, even when these efforts are supplemented by income from legal profit-making economic ventures entered into by a political party, will probably be wholly inadequate to pay for the campaign of even five parliamentary candidates in Ghana.

Thus, political parties are forced to rely on very rich donors, special interest lobbyists and corporations. Very rich individuals who can finance their own campaigns rise to the fore. Parties in government resort to kickbacks on state contracts and 'sale' of appointments. This problem of inadequate 'clean money' for political parties and their election expenses exists as much in long established and purportedly mature democracies, such as Britain and the US, as it does in only recently established democracies that are still struggling to build appropriate institutions, inculcate necessary values and consolidate their position as free societies, as in our own Ghana.

The major relevant difference is that new democracies usually lack robust institutions and traditions that can be marshalled to counteract many of the deleterious consequences of either an unregulated campaign finance environment or a regulated environment without strict enforcement. Like corruption, which exists in both developed and developing countries, the problem of money in politics has not only a higher degree of visibility in poorer, new democracies but also a greater negative impact on society and its developmental efforts and therefore, efforts to combat the problem should command correspondingly greater urgency and a higher profile.

In line with Karen Fogg's suggestion, in the Preface to the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral

Assistance (International IDEA) Handbook on Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, it is hoped that the debate we initiate, on dealing with the problem of political party and election campaign finance in this country, will focus on at least the following three questions: (i) how

free should parties be to raise and spend funds as they like? (ii) how much information about party finance should the voter be entitled to? (iii) to what extent should public resources be used to support and develop political parties and help them to campaign effectively before elections?

Beginning with this issue, we launch a series of articles on aspects of the problem of financing political parties and election campaigns. The first article looks at the current regulatory environment in Ghana and suggests that, from the point of view of deepening our democracy, what passes for a regulatory regime is incomplete and unsatisfactory but is not totally hopeless. The second article lays out the case for why democracies, especially young ones, need to deal urgently and courageously with the problem of campaign financing.

Future issues of *the New Legon Observer* will address other aspects of the problem, discussing, for example, difficulties of drafting effective legislation and the problems of enforcement, even when regulations are sensible and realistic, and drawing attention to how some countries have attempted to deal with these matters.



## THE NEW LEGON OBSERVER (NLO) WELCOMES PRESIDENT G. W. BUSH TO GHANA



Presidents J.A. Kufuor and G.W. Bush

The President of the United States of America, George W. Bush, will begin a three-day official visit to Ghana from February 19, 2008. This is the second time a sitting American pres-

ident is visiting Ghana. President Bush has already been to Tanzania, Rwanda and Benin. He is expected to visit Liberia after visiting Ghana.

High on the agenda for discussions between President Kufuor and President Bush are the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), poverty, HIV/AIDS, African unity and regional security. A statement from the White House said that the visit will also give President Bush a firsthand knowl-

edge of the progress made in efforts by the US to increase economic development and fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.

The New Legon Observer would like to take this opportunity to welcome President Bush and his entourage to Ghana. The journal is hopeful that the US President will find his visit to Ghana a memorable one. In subsequent issues, the New Legon Observer will carry in-depth discussions on the President's visit and its implications for development in Ghana.

# Enhancing and Regulating the Financing of Political Parties and Election Campaigns


Yaw Saffu<sup>1</sup>

## Imagining Contemporary Democracy Without Political Parties

To show the need for the contemporary, modern state, the Social Contract Theorists, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and J. J. Rousseau, hit on the idea of imagining life without it. Hobbes' description of life without, or outside, the state is justly famous: "nasty, brutish and short". In arguing for the need to enhance, as well as, regulate the financing of political parties and election campaigns in contemporary democracies, one could do a lot worse than adopt the strategy of the Contractualists.

Following that strategy, the centrality and indispensability of political parties to contemporary democracies can be established by imagining the chaos and unreality of holding elections, organising effective governance structures such as the legislature and the executive branch, and ensuring continuous linkage of citizens to representatives in government, all in the absence of political parties. An argument stopping 'killer' observation from historical and political science evidence, the equivalent of Hobbes' conclusion above, although clearly no patch on Hobbes' sensationally memorable phraseology, is that in over two hundred years, since the invention of mass democracy, there has been no viable democracy without political parties.

Political parties are clearly the *ahoampamu gyeene* (necessary ever



Flagbearers of NDC, CPP, PNC and NPP

present ingredient like onions in traditional Ghanaian cooking) of contemporary democracies. However you slice contemporary democracies for critical examination and analysis, it can be guaranteed that political parties will be observed occupying the centre stage. Increasingly they may be flanked on that stage by the media and a myriad of civil society organisations, competing for a share of the limelight as central institutional guarantors of democracy.

However, like the rascally Kwaku in *Ananse* stories, the political party has to be the central character and performer in the story of every true contemporary democracy. Effective, regular, free and fair competition among political parties for political power is the first defining feature of contemporary democracies, and what primarily as well as ultimately guarantees their sustainability and good governance.

## If Central, Then Show Attention: Enhance But Also Control

Suppose the centrality of multiparty electoral competition (to the conceptualisation as well as to the operational definition of sustainable democracy and to the expectation of good governance) is thus established, and liberal democracy is indeed synonymous with multiparty democracy: suppose further the following suggestions: political parties and candidates in a liberal democratic system should be completely free to raise and spend funds as they like; it is none of the voters' business to know who is funding the parties and candidates, or how this is being done; the state has far better calls on its limited resources - provision of health care, education, physical infrastructure, security, etc - than to support and develop political parties or fund the election campaigns of politicians, the overwhelming majority of whom might be self-serving.

<sup>1</sup>Yaw Saffu is a retired Professor of Politics and currently a Consultant in Democratic Governance.



Mass Political Rally

If the absurdity of such suggestions is not instantly apparent, the following questions might help to bring that home. What would the policy premises that follow from those recommendations entail for competitive fairness among political parties? Fairness, it has to be remembered, is a highly rated democratic value, as the mantra of "free and fair elections", which features so much as a definitional criterion of contemporary democracies, would suggest.

What would be the likely consequences of such policy premises for the fairness and effectiveness of outcomes of public policy-making, or for the quality of governance in general, for regime legitimacy, or for peaceful national development? The short answer to that set of non-rhetorical questions is that the conquest or the capture of the state by 'money-bags', a highly evocative Nigerian term for a distinctive brand of politicians, is likely to be complete.

The political science literature provides more than enough theoretical insights and empirical evidence to back us up in this prediction and,

hence, to make the case for the need to enhance, as well as to regulate, the financing of political parties and election campaigns.

### The Case for Enhancing Political Party and Campaign Financing

Establishing and maintaining political parties to perform all the functions that liberal democracies assign to them in the whole country throughout the year, but especially election years, cost a great deal of money. Practically every First Year Introductory Political Science textbook will list the functions political parties are expected to perform in liberal democracies. But here I return the compliment that Karl-Heinz Nassmacher pays me, in his introductory chapter in the International IDEA's *Handbook on Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns*, 2003 by reproducing the functions he lists (p.2) as necessary for the democratic process. Only political parties perform all the listed functions.

- Parties mediate or arbitrate between a pluralistic society and

its political institutions of government.

- Parties organise political campaigns in order to mobilise voters to participate in an election.
- Parties recruit political personnel by selecting and nominating candidates who stand for public office in an election.
- Parties aggregate a plurality of interests into a reasonable number of political alternatives or policy options, and thus channel conflicts between government and opposition.
- Parties enable people to generate a plurality of opinions in public debate, elaborate projects or proposals for society and transform policy options into political decisions.

To perform in order to fulfil all these expectations, political parties need organisation; they need skilled manpower; they need vast armies of committed, enthusiastic volunteer foot soldiers; and, particularly in election years, they need lots and lots of money.

Both politicians and students of politics often rate money as the most important asset in the competition for votes. An American politician once described money as "the mother's milk of politics". One authority on political finance, K. Z. Patiel concluded: "With the aid of money, shortages of manpower may be mastered and virtually all other deficiencies overcome". H. E. Alexander, another authority, observed similarly: "Money can buy goods, skills and services" (all quotes in Nassmacher, p.5).

Communicating their message to the electorate, increasingly through the media, which are essentially commercial enterprises, printing and dis-

tributing posters and buying advertising space, holding campaign publicity rallies, training party workers for electoral and campaign duties, and so on, all cost a great deal of money. As the International IDEA *Handbook* insists, money is an essential part of the democratic process and should be treated as a necessary resource for good political practice.

In view of all these critical roles that political parties are expected to play in the political process for democracies to be sustainable, if they cannot raise enough 'clean money' from traditionally acceptable, ideally democratic sources, then it not only makes sense for democrats to argue for the enhancement of resources for them, it is indeed their duty as democrats to do so. This is especially obligatory in new democracies where necessary political institutions like political parties are still essentially under construction.

One obvious way of improving the resources available to political parties is to get the state to provide some funds and facilities to political parties.

Some form of public funding of political parties and candidates is now available in the majority of what one may describe as serious democracies. Unfortunately, Africa lags behind other regions of the world in the proportion of countries that have public funding provisions. The proportion drops even further when one considers the number of countries that actually honour those provisions.

As can be expected, there are many difficult technical and political issues about the increasingly necessary solution of resorting to the state for public funding of political parties and their election campaigns. There are difficult moral, political and economic questions about eligibility criteria, about criteria for distributing to eligible parties, about how much the country can afford, and so on. But the most difficult problem, particularly in Africa, is often the absence of political will on the part of the governing party.


It is a no 'brainer', as the latest entry in the American political lexicon would have it, to say that the ancient

saying, "where there is a will there is a way", is still true. There are workable, compromise solutions to all the technical and political problems that accompany the decision to adopt public funding.

If the will is there, even impoverished African governments can be expected to be capable of extending many facilities to political parties, such as a few paid positions for party organisers in each region, free office accommodation in district capitals, free time and space for party broadcasts and publicity in state-owned media, a few vehicles and fuel allocation every national election year, and so on.

The state can also use policy measures, such as tax incentives and matching membership fees, to encourage citizen participation in increasing financial resources for political parties. It can waive duties and taxes on materials purchased and used for campaign purposes. Public enhancement of resources for political parties in any of the foregoing ways can improve their capacity to play their essential democratic roles.

There are two further virtues that can be associated with state efforts to augment party resources. The first is that such efforts could go some way towards addressing one of the central problems associated with political financing, and which accounts for some of the calls for regulating campaign financing. This is the problem of massive inequality of resources among parties, often between the governing party and all others, what is usually referred to as the absence of a level playing field in the competition for votes. This is a problem of



Election observers at work

far greater consequence in newer, poorer democracies. A second virtue that can be associated with state or public funding of parties and election campaigns, in any of the ways suggested above, is that the state can use the help it is prepared to offer as a quid pro quo for driving necessary regulatory reforms of private funding. The state can bargain with political parties that are prepared to accept help in exchange for reforms. The process of bargaining in this way can itself be educational for voters. If some political parties choose to stand out against state help in exchange for regulatory reform, rival parties would be failing in their democratic duty if they choose not to use the propaganda weapons they are thus handed in the process to educate the electorate.

### The Case for Regulating Private Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns

The preceding paragraphs have argued that the roles political parties play, the scarcity of resources for political parties and the inequality of resources among them are the principal reasons why the state must intervene to ensure the augmentation of the resources available to them. On the other side of the necessity for state intervention in political funding, three principal reasons can be advanced for why the state must regulate private funding.

First, once more, inequality, in the capacity among political parties to attract private funding or generate some other legal income, needs to be



NPP Flagbearers' Race featured 17 aspirants and large amounts of private cash

examined, and tackled if necessary. If one party is so virtuous, so competent and so popular that all, or almost all, who are in a position to donate, freely give only to this party, to the exclusion of others, then democracy is not threatened. If ever such a situation existed, and I am not aware of any example of this, it might still be wise to have in reserve a regulatory regime to fall back on if the situation ever changed and the democratic process needed protection from this dominant party.

Second, there is the possibility of the injection of unwholesome, tainted money into politics. There has to be a strong presumption that if 'Mafia money' or 'drug baron money', for instance, is channelled into politics via a political party, there is the likelihood of a sinister motive to capture power to aid criminality, not to advance sustainable democracy. In any case, politicians who are willing to be financed by criminals have no business campaigning for votes in a democracy.

Third, the role of interested money, or policy distorting and deforming money, from plutocrats, lobbyists, special interests and corporations, is the commonest threat to sustainable democracy from the direction of political financing. The corrupting influences and effects of such sources of political money are known in all democracies.

Government policies are often distorted in favour of the powerful minority that finance the governing parties and their election campaigns. The interests of the majority are sacrificed

when these clash with those of the powerful minority. For instance, multinational corporations that finance parties and their campaigns may have little regard for the environment, or for the developmental aspirations of the country.

The corrupting, distorting effects of plutocratic or special interest donations to political parties may be felt even within the parties themselves. Internal party democracy may be strangled as the 'money-bags' insist on filling party offices with their nominees or curtailing internal party debate.

If unchecked, each of the above, each a reason for regulating political financing (to regulate who can or cannot give, how much they can give, disclosure provisions, cap on campaign expenditures, and so on) is capable of undermining the legitimacy of the democratic process and regime. Particularly, the grand corruption that interested money often induces is a serious, potential cause of regime delegitimation.

**In Conclusion**

Beyond these particularities, both for enhancing and for regulating political party and campaign financing, there are deep-value, over-arching ethical considerations. Of all the values at the core of liberal democracy – equality, participation, liberty, accountability, rule of law – equality is probably pre-eminent. Without equality all the other values are likely to be hollow, as only a minority would be able, in reality, to access or insist on the other values in the liberal democratic pantheon.

Equality is, or should be, at the heart of electoral democracy, the indispensable foundation for liberal democracy. If one is a democrat, if one believes in democracy, and wants a

new democracy to succeed in its consolidation efforts, then one must insist that society should strive as much as possible towards attaining equality of voice and equality of access to power wielders, alongside equality of the vote. To insist on these is to insist, among other things, that a number of political parties be publicly resourced so that a certain minimum parity in the capacity to perform exists and that private funding of electoral competition be regulated. In my view,




L - R Kofi Wayo, United Renaissance Party (URP), Dan Lartey, Ghana Consolidated Peoples Party (GCPP) and Obed Asamoah, Democratic Freedom Party (DFP)

both of these actions are needed, otherwise equality, in its various dimensions in a democracy, is likely to be negated.

# State Financing of Political Parties in Ghana: The Costs, Benefits and Risks

Nii Moi Thompson<sup>2</sup>



Professor Kofi Kumado, Legon Centre for International Affairs

The age-old calls by sections of the Ghanaian public for state-financing of political parties culminated in a bold call on January 28, 2008, by Prof. Kofi Kumado of the Legon Centre for International Affairs (LECIA) for government to set aside 2.0% of Value Added Tax (VAT) revenue for this purpose.

Government is yet to respond to the suggestion but in 2006, the most recent year with complete data on VAT revenue, this would have amounted to just over GH¢3.5 million. Over a four-year period, that could yield as much as GH¢16.3 million, assuming an annual inflation rate of 10.0%. This figure could be as high as GH¢22.9 million if, instead of the inflation rate, we use the 34.0% nominal average annual growth in VAT revenue since 2000.

However it is viewed, VAT could bring in substantial amounts of money to finance the nation's political parties.

<sup>2</sup>Nii Moi Thompson is Executive Director of the Development Policy Institute, Accra, Ghana.



The House of Parliament and Sitting Members of Parliament

But what would be the benefits and costs, as well as the risks associated with such a policy?

The popular assessment of both benefits and costs is often limited almost entirely to the financial costs and the political benefits of providing a level playing field for the nation's political parties.

But the actual costs and benefits – as well as the risks associated with them – are much broader and deeper than these narrow financial and political perspectives offer us. Using a broader analytical framework, we must be able to establish – or, in the absence of adequate data, at least speculate on – the direct and indirect as well as monetary and non-monetary costs, benefits and risks of state financing of political parties.

#### Direct and indirect costs

The most-direct cost of state financing of political parties in Ghana would be budgetary allocations, already estimated above. The eventual magnitude of this cost, however, will

depend to a large extent on how the financing is structured. The following are some of the questions that will have to be addressed in this regard: (1) should the support be routine (i.e., annual) or should it be restricted to election campaigns (i.e., every four years)?, and (2) should the state finance all the four categories of a party's budget, namely, salaries, administration, services and investment, or should it be "selective" and finance some but not the others?

If the state chooses to be selective, using whatever criteria it might agree with key stakeholders, that in turn would raise more questions. For example, which aspect of party expenditure should be state-financed, and what would be the implications for the party? If party staff are regularly paid through state financing, but are not given the supplementary resources to work with due to lack of funds, their capacity to function effectively will remain impaired.

Direct non-financial costs may include loss of political goodwill, for

example, that the government may incur from the public as a result of the diversion of VAT-related resources from a given sector for the purposes of financing political parties. The exact nature of such a cost will require some structured research, but the high likelihood of such an outcome warrants its consideration in any debate over state financing of political parties.

The impact of resource diversion from other areas of government's development agenda would constitute perhaps the largest and most visible indirect cost of state financing of political parties. The exact effect on particular sectors – such as education – would depend on how the VAT revenue is structured for purposes of party financing. If the proposed 2.0% is applied to total VAT intake, then the education sector will certainly be affected as a proportion of VAT revenue is required by law to be lodged into the Ghana Education Trust Fund for infrastructure development. If, on the other hand, the education component of VAT is ring-fenced against "encroachment", only non-education sectors are likely to be adversely affected. This will call for off-setting measures to compensate these affected sectors.

#### Direct and indirect benefits

The oft-cited benefit of state financing of political parties is that it will help bridge the gap between the bigger well-endowed parties and the smaller resource-starved ones. The indirect benefits, however, are many, going beyond party survival to the promotion of democracy and development.

In the end, the enhancement of democracy and indeed the larger

national development agenda represents the largest benefit of state financing of political parties. For one thing, state financing makes it possible for non-incumbent parties to be more engaged in the political process than they otherwise would be. They can, for instance, undertake research and offer alternative or complementary policies to those of the ruling government. This enhances the quality of development policy by offering more choices and offering a broader and richer basis for policy discourse.

To the extent that state financing also obviates or minimises the need for parties – big and small alike – to solicit funding from individuals and corporations, it is also an effective weapon in the fight against political corruption. This is so because most political-party donations are seldom free or done out of altruism; they typically constitute quid-pro-quo that can compromise the independence and ethics of elected politicians.

Minimised corruption also means many things. There would be less rancour among politicians and public confidence in both public institutions and government would be enhanced.

### Risks

Across the myriad benefits and costs of state financing of political parties, however, lie a number of risks that cannot be overlooked by the various stakeholders. State financing may undermine the incentive for parties to aggressively pursue membership and dues-paying drives among the rank and file. This may lead to disaffection, even alienation, and threaten the very objective of state financing, which is to help build democracy.

One way of overcoming this risk is to make access to state financing conditional upon evidence from political parties of their membership drives and the extent to which policies and activities involve the rank and file of the various parties. The parties' own fund-raising efforts could be encouraged through a system of matching of state funds with funds raised by the parties.

Another risk – an environmental one – is the likelihood that some individuals may form parties not with the noble objective of promoting democracy but rather gaining access to state financing. Here too, criteria on the basis of national presence, appeal and party organisational structures can be used to minimise, if not eliminate, such abuses.

### Conclusion

In sum, the costs, benefits, and risks of financing political parties from state resources are more diffuse than is generally believed, when one con-

centrates only on the monetary costs to the state and the financial benefits to political parties as distinct organisations. Exclusive concentration on the monetary aspects of state financing of political campaigns runs the risk of overstating costs and understating benefits. A balanced assessment that deals with net (preferably monetised) benefits is to be preferred, although such an exercise is beyond the scope of this brief essay.

And even when the decision is taken, on the basis of a decision that the benefits – both direct and indirect – outweigh the direct and indirect costs, implementation may face risks that policy makers need to bear in mind. Brief-case politicians may emerge with fly-by-night political parties to take advantage of state financing, while existing legitimate political parties may also operate in ways that defeat the purpose of state financing. All these risks can be identified and dealt with if proper mechanisms are installed to prevent them.



Betty Mould - Iddrisu and Hajia Alima Mahama: possible Vice Presidential Candidates for Election 2008

# Down Memory Lane - Past African Cup of Nations (CAN) Reflections of a Former TV Sports Commentator and Critic (Part Two - 1982)

By Ivan Addae-Mensah<sup>3</sup>

As I mentioned in the first instalment of this article published in the last issue of the New Legon Observer (Vol. 2 No. 3 of 7 February 2008), my intention in going down memory lane on Ghana's participation in past Cup of Nations tournaments is to enable us to reflect on the past to inform the present so as to plan effectively for the future.

## 1982 – Libya

After the 1980 disastrous Ibadan campaign when as defending champions, we were kicked out by Morocco in the last match of the first round, 1982 was to be another successful story for Ghana. But we had to go through periods of uncertainty, agony and potential disaster up to the very last kick of the ball in Tripoli on 19th March 1982.

### Preparation and Qualifying Matches

We went through a gruelling series of qualification matches in 1981. Our four qualification matches were against Congo, Brazzaville and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). As if we had learnt nothing from past experiences our approach seemed to suggest there was nothing at stake. Our first qualifying match



The Black Stars in the early 1960s

was against Congo Brazzaville, and the first leg took place in Kumasi on 12th April 1981. But it was not until the 8th of April, just about four days to the match, that the Ghana Football Association (GFA) hurriedly announced a team. Out of desperation, the then Chairman of the GFA, Mr. S. K. Mainoo, a past Chairman of Kotoko, decided to build a 22-man Black Stars team around Kotoko players as the nucleus. Only eight other players were invited from Eleven Wise, Hasaacas and Hearts of Oak. C.K. Gyamfi was appointed as the Coach, assisted by the Kotoko Technical Team. Ofei Ansah was appointed the captain. The Stars had

less than 72 hours to train for this match. Not surprisingly, that match ended in a 1-1 draw and we all said "Ghana, forget about Libya 1982". Judging from our performance in Kumasi, no one gave the Stars a dog's chance to beat the Congolese in Brazzaville in front of the partisan crowd.

The return match took place on Sunday April 26th. It was regarded as a *fait accompli* by the Congolese. The 60,000 capacity stadium was packed to the brim. President Sassou Nguesso himself was at the stadium. After 26 gruelling minutes during which the Ghanaians battled against

<sup>3</sup> Professor Ivan Addae-Mensah was a freelance TV sports commentator and critic for Ghana Television between 1977 and 1982. As mentioned in the first instalment of this article, the article was meant to be published before the commencement of the CAN 2008 tournament. However, due to certain publication and editorial constraints, this could not be done. Therefore by the time you read this article, the tournament may be over. The article in its present form is however still relevant, and will be relevant even after the tournament, and for posterity. It is published in order to add to the scanty published archival material on Ghana's participation in past and current Cup of Nations tournaments. The author's personal experience in some of these tournaments makes this even more necessary.



The Nigerians on the Defensive

the Congolese players, an incompetent Zambian referee, Mr. Gumbo and 60,000 Congolese fans, Adolf Armah was brought down while on a solo run towards goal. Ofei Ansah's resulting freekick went into the net off a defender. After that goal by Ghana there was one strange decision after another, leading to Seth Ampadu being sent off. A Congolese, Okou Akaba was also sent off. Mr. Gumboh was a substitute referee brought in after the original referee, Mr Mushi, also of Zambia, failed to turn up. He awarded 6 yellow cards and two red ones, and awarded the Congolese a late penalty which was wasted, to the relief of the entire Ghanaian contingent and the few supporters. Ghana won the match by one goal to nil and qualified from the two legs on a 2-1 goal aggregate.

After this unexpected 1-0 triumph away, our next opponent was to be the Congolese's neighbours, Zaire. The first leg match was scheduled to take place in Ghana on Sunday July 12th,. But on Friday 10th July a letter appeared in the Daily Graphic which could have dampened the spirit of any team preparing for such a crucial qualifying match. On his return from the OAU conference in Kenya,

President Limann announced that Ghana would boycott the OAU conference to be held in Libya in July 1982. He, however, said nothing about the Cup of Nations tournament. This prompted the minority Popular

Front Party (PFP) Member of Parliament for Tano, Mr Kyei Badu to write to the Graphic wanting to know whether Limann would also not allow the Black Stars to participate in the 1982 tournament if they qualified.

On Sunday 12th July, the Zaireans failed to turn up. After thirty minutes angry fans invaded the field, demanding a refund of their gate fees. A match was hurriedly arranged for the Stars against Accra Standfast, which Ghana won 4-0. Ghana lodged a protest with CAF to claim the two points and a two goal advantage. The Zaireans claimed unavoidable flight difficulties. CAF ruled in favour of the Zaireans and rescheduled the match for Wednesday July 22nd.

Strangely enough, when the first match was abandoned, the Stars broke camp, in spite of strong advice from Mr Simms Mensah, the then Chairman of Asante Kotoko. Ghana had forgotten that there was still the second leg to play in Kinshasa, no matter what CAF's ruling would be. So when CAF rescheduled the first match, Ghana had to hurriedly re-assemble a team. Three key players, Isaac Paha, Emmanuel Quarshie and Isaac Acquaye failed to turn up.

Quarshie and Paha, both of Sekondi Hasaacas, gave the excuse that they were preparing for crucial matches in the Club's cup winners cup competition, having earlier eliminated TP Mazembe of Zaire from that tournament.

The match took place in Kumasi on the 22nd of July. The Zaireans struck in the 5th minute, with a goal by centre forward Ndaya. During the interval the Vice President Prof. de-Graft Johnson went to the dressing room and gave the Stars some words of encouragement. Three minutes into the second half the Stars levelled the score through Francis Kumi. But the Zaireans went ahead again six minutes later from a defensive lapse. Awuley Quaye missed a back-pass, and in his attempt to chase the ball and clear it, he fell down and the ball rolled harmlessly into the net. But barely two minutes later, the Stars equalised through Willie Klutse. The Zaireans, like the Congolese, had also achieved a 2-2 draw on Ghanaian soil.

After this very poor performance, coach C.K. Gyamfi organised a trial match on July 29th and took the bold step of inviting new promising players into camp. To add to the anxiety of many Ghanaians, Gyamfi invited a 17-year old youngster with absolutely no international experience, then playing club football for Real Tamale United. His name was Abedi Ayew, popularly known as "Abedi Pele". His name was to dominate African and international football for years. But in 1981, many people in Ghana were reticent about the coach's gamble of rushing this youngster into international duty so early in his career. There were no under-17 or under-20 Federation of International Football

Associations (FIFA) or Confederation of African Football (CAF) competitions in those days for such young players to be gradually groomed. The players' allowances were also revealed as a morale booster. After one trial match against GIHOC football club, the stars departed for Kinshasa, still with young Abedi Pele very much part of the coach's plans. The Kinshasa match took place on Sunday August 2nd. The first half ended scoreless even though the stars were under pressure throughout. But the coach made two inspirational substitutions which were to determine the fate of the Black Stars. In the 26th minute of the first half Adolf Armah was injured and Gyamfi replaced him with untried Abedi Pele. He was to prove to be Ghana's saviour.

After persistent pressure, the inevitable happened in the 51st minute. The Zambian referee (another Zambian?) awarded an indirect freekick on the left flank just outside Ghana's 18-yard line. Mbinga crossed for Mobati to head home for the Zairean's first goal. They were up on aggregate by 3-2, with two away goals to their advantage in case of a draw. The whole stadium erupted. The full heat was turned on the Stars. Ghana struggled desperately for the

equaliser but it would not come. All indications were that Ghana was going to suffer an ignominious exit from the qualifying rounds of the 1982 tournament. Suddenly things changed in a two-minute spell. Razak and Abedi Pele took over the midfield, leaving Essien (yes, another Essien - John Essien) and defender Haruna Yusif to operate from the right and George Alhassan to lead the strike force. In the 65th minute, Essien outwitted two defenders before passing the ball to Haruna who crossed it onto the head of George Alhassan to score Ghana's equaliser. Two minutes later a shot from a Zairean was saved by goalkeeper John Baker who quickly threw it to Abedi Pele. He chested the ball down and sent it to Isaac Paha who connected with Kofi Badu. Badu sent Essien running along the right flank to cross the ball to George Alhassan to nod it into the net. Ghana 2, Zaire 1. This goal killed the spirit of the Zaireans even though they came close to scoring the equaliser in the 84th and 85th minutes. Some of the highlights of the game were

- The stars got not one single corner kick throughout the 90 minutes while the Zaireans had as many as nine corner kicks.
- There was only one shot at goal by Ghana throughout the first half by Francis Kumi, which went miles off target.
- Maclean, a substitute on the bench, had only one duty to perform throughout the 90 minutes- recite continuously, *Psalm 20*.
- Referee Chanyu of Zambia played five

long minutes of extra time when there had not been one single injury stoppage throughout the whole of the second half.

Ghana won the match 2-1 to qualify for Libya 1982 on a 4-3 aggregate score. Until that day, the Leopards of Zaire had not lost any match at home in their qualification campaign.

John Baiden, writing for the Graphic on 6th August, headlined his report with **"THE GODS WERE WITH THE BLACK STARS"** But of course, with Maclean reciting *Psalm 20* throughout the entire 90 plus minutes, what else could he say? In his report, Baiden said that his heart jumped into his mouth when he saw young Abedi trot onto the field in the 34th minute as a substitute. "But probably if anything good happened to the stars that day, it was the fortuitous injury and subsequent exit of Adolf Armah. Abedi put up a flawless performance especially during the second half", he wrote.

Just a couple of months to the tournament, our hope of winning the cup for an unprecedented fourth time was dashed. I was on the Ghana delegation to the OAU summit in Nairobi. Libya had bid to host the next OAU summit. But Libya had become notorious for undermining democratically elected African leaders she considered "not revolutionary enough". Ghana, Nigeria, and a number of other countries decided to oppose Libya's application on the grounds that

- Libya had absolutely no respect for the OAU and the other Heads of State because ever since he became the Head of State of Libya, Gaddafi had never attended



A line up of Black Stars led by John Eshun (Second Right)

any OAU summit meeting. So why should he be given the honour and privilege of hosting his fellow Heads of State?

- Libya was infringing one of the fundamental principles of the OAU; that is, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

In the Conference Hall I sat directly behind the President who was next to Gambian President Jawara. Ghana spoke strongly against Libya's application. Shagari of Nigeria supported Ghana but Kerekou of Benin, opposed Ghana's position. President Jawara, who had also complained about Gaddafi's activities in his country surprisingly made an about-face and strongly supported Libya's candidature. President Arap Moi, then Presiding over the meeting, was openly shocked and, uncharacteristically, showed it in his remarks. Libya won the day. That is what led to Hon. Kyei Badu's letter to Limann in the Graphic about Ghana's possible withdrawal from the African Cup of Nations.

Some of us advised that much as we understood the President's anger and frustration against Libya, withdrawing from the Nations Cup would dampen the spirits of Ghanaians, especially after Ghana had gone through all those difficulties to qualify for the tournament, because Ghanaians "don't play with their football". But he stuck to his decision on principle and announced Ghana's withdrawal from the tournament. On 31st December 1981 President Limann was overthrown by Rawlings who then announced that Ghana would after all participate in the tournament. The Black Stars were asked to assemble for camping on 13th January 1982. Ghana therefore had barely six weeks



Black Stars with Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (in white suite and dark tie)

to assemble a team and prepare for the tournament which was scheduled to start on 5th March 1982.

Players invited into camp were: John Baker, John Bannerman (Wise); Isaac Paha, John Essien, Emmanuel Quarshie, Kofi Abbrey, Kwaku Sampson (Hasaacas); Owusu Mensah, Sampson Lamptey, Hesse Odamtten, Ben Kayede (Hearts); John Abeka, Haruna Yusif, Seth Ampadu, Albert Asase, Kofi Badu, Opoku Nti, Emmanuel Quayee (Kotoko); Kwasi Appiah (Mine Stars); Abedi Pele (RTU); James Okyere (GIHOC); Isaac Ayipey (Dumas) and George Arthur (BA United). C. K. Gyamfi was appointed the team manager.

The team played a trial match against Accra Great Olympics and won 2-0. They left for Benin on 12th February to participate in the Seven Nation Tournament from 14th to 21st February. This involved Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Upper Volta, Niger and Liberia. Only Ghana and Nigeria had qualified for Libya 1982. Ghana drew 5-5 with Ivory Coast, beat hosts Benin 4-0, Upper Volta 1-0 and beat Togo 2-1 in the

finals to win the tournament.

#### The Nations' Cup Tournament:

Ghana was drawn in Group A (the group of death) with hosts Libya, Cameroon (world cup qualifiers) and Tunisia. Group B comprised of Algeria (world cup qualifiers), Nigeria, Zambia and Ethiopia. But Ghana drew consolation from the fact that notwithstanding their huge reputations, neither Cameroon nor Tunisia had ever beaten Ghana in any African Nations Cup match up to that time, and we were banking on history repeating itself.

Although I was then in political exile in Abidjan after Rawlings' coup, I watched every match on television. With Gaddafi's decision that everything on TV including players' names and numbers should be in Arabic, I watched the TV with the sound turned off while listening to French commentaries on Ivory Coast's national radio and Radio France Internationale (RFI). It was impossible to identify any player on TV unless you knew the player personally. But I took my own notes, and the



Top right - Abedi Ayew Pele

Ivorian Daily Newspaper *Fraternité Matin* also gave very good coverage. We also received the *Daily Graphic* in Abidjan a few days after publication.

Ghana met Libya in the opening match on 5th March 1982. But just a few hours before the match, goalkeeper Joseph Carr started behaving strangely. He suspiciously feigned injury just before the match and this forced the handlers to call his bluff and field number three goalkeeper Owusu Mensah. But he proved to be a revelation. Ghana scored first in the 26th minute of the first half through George Alhassan. Libya piled pressure on Ghana, and shots at Ghana's goal were said to be coming every two minutes. But the Ghanaian defence stood firm, and Owusu Mensah was simply superb. He saved everything that came his way, especially in the 34th and 44th minutes when he saved shots that could have beaten many world class goalkeepers. But Libya scored two quick goals in the second half to lead 2-1. The first goal came in the 57th minute through Souleyman Omar, and the second in the 75th minute by Fahly Ussani. The Libyans maintained their

lead almost up to the last kick of the ball.

Abedi Pele replaced Emmanuel Quarshie in the 83rd minute. I had virtually given up hope. I had French lessons at Alliance Française d'Abidjan that day and left the house about fifteen minutes to the end of the match. Just when I got off the bus to take the short walk to Alliance Française, I heard a loud shout from the Abidjan street hawkers – "BUT" (pronounced "Buu" in French), meaning "GOAL". I immediately knew Ghana had scored, because virtually the whole of Ivory Coast supported Ghana. (Ivory Coast had not qualified that year). Apparently, just as fans were leaving the Stadium, the unexpected happened. Abedi intercepted a Libyan move in midfield, sent a floating ball towards Opoku Nti, who volleyed it non-stop past the stranded, stunned and confused Libyan goalkeeper. This was two minutes inside injury time. The shot was from around the penalty area and went straight into the net, and there was no other Ghanaian player in the area to be ruled offside or accused of having committed a foul, so, even if the

referee was biased, he had no other alternative but to accept it as a goal. The Black Stars had drawn 2-2 against overwhelming favourites Libya. The line-up was Owusu Mensah, Haruna, Kwame Sampson, Sampson Lamptey, Paha, Asase, Abbrey, Quarshie/Abedi, George Alhassan, Kofi Badu and Opoku Nti. Cameroon and Tunisia also drew 1-1 in their first encounter.

Ghana's next match was against Cameroon. Goalkeeper Owusu Mensah proved to be an equal match in ability and agility to Cameroon's world famous Thomas Nkono. The match ended in a 0-0 draw. Libya won its second match 2-0 against Tunisia and went to the top of the table with three points, while Ghana and Cameroon had 2 points each from 2 draws.

Everything therefore depended on the very last group match on 12th March 1982. Ghana had to win against Tunisia and hope that Cameroon would draw or lose to Libya. If Libya lost to Cameroon and Ghana beat Tunisia, Libya could go out of the tournament, a factor Gaddafi could not possibly countenance. In the event, Ghana beat Tunisia 1-0, with a goal scored in the first half by footballer of the year John Essien. Abedi played the full 90 minutes in this last group match. The Cameroon-Libya match ended in a 0-0 draw. Ghana was through to the semi-finals as runner up to Libya who had a superior goal difference. In group B Nigeria needed only a draw against Zambia to qualify for the semi-finals but was walloped 3-0. Then came the semi-final match against Algeria on Tuesday March 16th. Algeria had topped group B by beating Zambia 1-0, Nigeria 2-1 (in

revenge for their 3-0 loss to Nigeria in the finals of the 1980 tournament), and a 0-0 draw against Ethiopia. Algeria was heavily tipped to go through eventually to meet Libya in the finals. Like Cameroun, they had also qualified for the 1982 World Cup. All the pundits therefore gave Ghana absolutely no chance. But once again, Ghana proved that it was not overawed by anybody's reputation. Ghana scored first in the third minute of the first half with a sizzling shot by George Alhassan in the penalty box, which goalkeeper Cerbah could do nothing about. After this the Stars were on top and made the Algerians look very ordinary indeed. Unfortunately, in the 28th minute, hard-working defender Haruna Yusif attempted a back pass to Francis Kumi. But Kumi was a little slow in getting to it, and the ball found an Algerian who headed it to striker Mercekane to equalise. Algeria took a 2-1 lead in the 62nd minute through a goal by centre forward Assad.

With a goal up, they resorted to rough play and delaying tactics. In the 78th minute the referee sent off Captain Fergani for a foul on Kofi Badu. The Ghanaian supporters on the field started singing the Hearts of Oak anthem "Never say die". The Algerian and Libyan fans were reported to be trooping out of the stadium thinking victory was already for the Algerians. I was listening to RFI radio commentary in French and watching the TV coverage only in pictures. Then I heard the radio commentator say two minutes to full time. I gave up, and collected my books to go to my French Lessons at Alliance Française. Just as I stepped out of

the house, I heard the familiar shout of "BUT"... from our Marcory Ivorian neighbours. (Marcory is an Abidjan residential area with a high concentration of Nzema- and Akan-speaking Ivorians). Essien had equalised for Ghana. I quickly ran back to the house and said "forget about the French lessons for today. I have to see the end of this match". Apparently, in the 90th minute Essien was fouled outside "the 18". Kofi



Various National Teams at CAN 2008

Badu took the free kick which Essien headed home for Ghana's equaliser. Just as in the first match against Libya, this goal came 30 seconds to full time. This goal nearly generated a free-for-all fight in the press box. An irate Algerian pressman hurled a chair at Ken Bediako of Daily Graphic. But helped by Opoku Afriyie, John Bannerman and Hesse Odamtten and some Nigerian pressmen, he fought back until peace officers restored order.

The Algerians never recovered from the shock. With only 30 seconds from a place in the finals, the match had been sent into extra time. George Alhassan made sure of Ghana's qual-

ification for the finals with a 13th minute extra time goal. Ghana had reached the finals winning 3-2, just as had happened in Sudan in 1970 when we beat Ivory Coast 2-1 in extra time. Libya beat Zambia 2-1 in the other semi-final. The opening match of 5th March 1982 was therefore to be repeated on 19th March 1982 as the final. Zambia met Algeria for the 3rd place playoff and won the bronze by 2-0. So notwithstanding all the beautiful foot ball and the many goals Algeria had scored up to the semi-finals, and the fact that they were one of Africa's two representatives for the world cup, they had not even been even compensated with a bronze medal. This was more proof that in such competitions it is not the team that scores many goals in the preliminary matches that necessarily wins the competition. It is rather the team that is resilient, consistent, and able to pace itself gradually to a climax.

The best was yet to come from young Owusu Mensah in the final against Libya on 19th March. Within the first five minutes George Alhassan had a golden opportunity to put Ghana 1-0 ahead but he missed. But he made amends later with a fantastic instinctive strike that only an alert striker like Alhassan could have taken advantage of. In the 30th minute, a shot by Essien was pushed back by the goalkeeper to George Alhassan who was at the right place at the right time to slot the ball home for the first goal. Notwithstanding one strange decision after another by the referee, Ghana managed to go into the interval with its one goal advantage. Essien got injured just before



Morroccan National Team at CAN 2008

the end of the first half and went out never to return, a sad end to a really illustrious tournament for him. He was replaced by Opoku Nti.

The Libyans levelled the score in the 69th minute. Ghana had to play a very tight and careful game to try and avoid conceding any dubious penalty or a foul outside the eighteen because the slightest infringement could be capitalised upon to their disadvantage. Indeed Kofi Abbrey was shown the yellow card in the 77th minute and had to be extra careful not to get a second booking and the sack.

In the 83rd minute a gentle lob by Alhassan nearly gave Ghana the last laugh but the ball was scooped off the line by full back Alagli. Abedi came in three minutes to the end of regulation time to replace Kofi Badu. Gaddafi had not hidden his desire to enhance his country's reputation by winning the African Nations cup on his home soil, and hosting the OAU summit in 1982. Ghana managed to hold on till full time to take the match

into extra time, which also produced no goal. The match therefore went into penalties. Both Ghana and Libya scored their first five penalties. Then came the drama. Owusu Mensah was nominated to take the sixth penalty, and he literally pushed the ball to his opposite in the Libyan goal for him to save it. The Libyans only needed to score their penalty to win the cup. Zeyoun Abdalla was asked to take the sixth penalty, but he flatly refused to do so. It took some time for him to be persuaded to take the kick. And just when everybody was ready to celebrate a Libyan victory, Owusu Mensah dived in the right direction and saved the ball. After six kicks each, it was still 5-5 on penalties. Then Ghana scored its seventh penalty through Opoku Nti, and so did Libya, making the score 6-6. Then Emmanuel Quarshie scored for Ghana with the eighth penalty kick. Libya's eighth penalty was taken by Abdel Ghomien, and again Owusu Mensah dived full length in the right direction to save it. Ghana had won the 1982 cup of nations for an unprecedented fourth time against all

odds with a 7-6 penalty shootout victory. The Stars were besieged by irate Libyan fans and had problems leaving the stadium after the match.

Libya's Fawzi Issawi was adjudged best footballer of the tournament. The Goal King was George Alhassan, with four goals. Sampson Lamptey and George Alhassan were selected for the African select team. The full list was Nkono (Cameroun), Ouachi (Tunisia) Beshari (Libya), Lamptey (Ghana), Sola (Libya), Fergani, Madjer, Assad (Algeria), Alhassan (Ghana) Fawzi (Libya) Peter Casaba (Zambia).

In 1982 there was an Essien in the Ghana Team. He went to the tournament as the footballer of the year and did wonders for the team, virtually kicking the team into the finals with his single goal against Tunisia and his last minute equaliser against Algeria. Twenty six years later in 2008, there is an Essien in the team, also arguably the best footballer of the year in Ghana. Abedi Ayew Pele at age 17 was the youngest ever to play in the African Nations cup. In 2008 we have his son, also 17, making his debut in the tournament. What will this combination do for Ghana this time round? We all pray for the best.

The final instalment of this article will be on the 1984 tournament, popularly known as 'The Bouaké Debacle', in the next issue of the New Legon Observer. Stay tuned.

# Saka Acquaye: A Memorial Essay

James Gibbs<sup>4</sup>

Saka Acquaye, who died on 27 February 2007 at the age of 83, had been an international-class athlete, and was a versatile artist who made an immense contribution to the visual and performing arts in Ghana during a life-time of service. The revival of his best known work, *The Lost Fishermen*, before enthusiastic Accra audiences during the month in which he died, gave the younger generation a chance to experience one of the classics of the Ghanaian theatre, a story told in music, song and dance that looked, in the heady sixties, as if it would establish 'Ghanaian folk opera' as a national form. In contrast to the fleeting glimpse of Acquaye's talent as a composer offered by the production, his work in the plastic arts is ever present to those moving in and around Accra. Such people cannot escape the J.B. Danquah monument at Danquah Circle, the towering Guggisberg monument at Korle Bu Teaching Hospital, 'Farmer' and 'Makola Market Woman' outside the Ghana Commercial Bank, Tema, the busts of the founders at Achimota School and the energetic performing figures at the School of Performing Arts, Legon.

Acquaye's presence was particularly felt during the sixties, but he made an extended contribution to the arts in Ghana and passionate interventions in the debates that have preoccupied those involved in the arts. He

made particularly significant contributions through promoting musicians and through membership of statutory bodies. It was a cruel irony that an artist with such an acute visual sense should have suffered from the loss of what John Milton called 'that one talent that is death to hide' – his sight – in his later years.



Saka Acquaye - Versatile Artist

Saka Acquaye was born in Korle Gonno, Accra, and was perhaps the fifth of seven children, or fifth of six, or fourth of eight - sources available to me carry different information.<sup>5</sup>

His father, John Acquayefio, a musically-gifted carpenter who had worked in the Congo and Nigeria, was partly responsible for Acquaye's early musical education. Acquaye is

quoted in an illuminating profile by W. B. Hagan (1971) as saying: "When I was a little boy my father had a concertina and he used to play for us just before bedtime songs he had learned on his travels. He played hymns, high-life and Ga traditional songs". Acquaye's mother, Regina, was a petty trader.

Acquaye's formal education included time spent at Government Boys School, Kimbu, where he showed an interest in drawing and became Assistant Leader of the brass band. It also included several years at Achimota, initially thanks to a Cadbury Scholarship. Nii Addokwei Moffatt, director of the revival of *The Lost Fishermen*, writes that that time was split between Achimota Teacher Training College (1943-46) and Achimota Art School (1947-50). At Achimota, Acquaye studied music under Ephraim Amu and began to make a mark as a sportsman. He was a precociously gifted footballer, and eventually earned a place among the foremost athletes in the country. In 1950, he represented the Gold Coast as a hurdler in the UK, on which occasion he captained the national team.

Sources indicate that Acquaye taught art for a time at St Augustine's Training College, Cape Coast, and that he moved from there to a post as a display officer at Kingsway

<sup>4</sup> Dr. James Gibbs is a student of African Literature. He has taught at several African universities, and recently retired from the University of the West of England. He has links with the University of Ghana going back to 1968.

<sup>5</sup> This tribute has been compiled from a variety of sources not all of which agree in every respect. An attempt has been made to synthesise and discriminate (jamesgibbs@btinternet.com).



Ghanaian wood carvings

Stores. He continued his interest in music, notably performing as a saxophonist with Teacher Lamptey's Accra Orchestra. It is on record that he also played with the Gold Coast Jazz Band and with E.T. Mensah's Tempos Band, and that he helped King Bruce set up the Black Beats dance band (1952).

At this time, encouraged by Ivor Cummings whom he had met in England, Acquaye harboured plans to continue his education in the USA. He was eventually able to cross the Atlantic and study Art, Sculpture and Industrial Design at the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts in Philadelphia, USA (1953-56), and Advertising and Public Relations at the Charles Morris Price School (1957-59). An *agate.net* website carries the following impressive list of awards he won in the US: the Stevenson Award (1954), Honourable Mention Portnoff Award (1955), Lila Agnes Kennedy Hill Award (1955), Stewardson Award (honourable mention, 1955), Stewardson Award (1956), Cresson European Travelling Scholarship (1956), and Ware Travelling Scholarship (1958). A profile in Kojo T. Vieta's *Flagbearers of Ghana*

(1999) adds the Eisenhower Leadership Award that enabled him to travel widely in the USA during 1956. Always involved in making music, Acquaye performed with his 'African Ensemble' during this period. They recorded work and played for Kwame Nkrumah when he visited New York (1958).

After returning home in 1959, Acquaye was employed as an Exhibitions Officer in the Ghana Information Department. His work in music (he formed the African Tones) and in the plastic arts (he made a bust of James Moxon) continued and both brought rewards. In 1963, he secured a remarkable double: he was voted 'Musician of the Year' and won an award offered by the Royal Academy, London. *Flagbearers of Ghana* salutes Acquaye as an 'outstanding sculptor'. He was also a versatile one: at various stages in his career as a plastic artist, he cast from clay models and from fibre glass, and he worked both from life, as in the case of the Moxon bust, and from photographs as in the case of the Guggisberg memorial. In both those instances, he laboured in a more or

less naturalistic tradition that was out of favour with Afrocentric thinkers. In 1964, Acquaye was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship that enabled him to return to America where he spent two years at UCLA studying opera and theatre. During this time, he reconstituted the African Ensemble who produced a 'special blend of Afro-Jazz music using African musical instruments'. They recorded albums on the Elektra, Nonesuch and Asylum labels that are nowadays much sought-after and widely-available on internet sites. In addition to private listening, some tracks on them have been used as film scores.

Although he had begun to write earlier, it appears his work as a dramatist was much encouraged by his sojourn in California. His plays and operas include *The Lost Fishermen* (that may have been started as early as 1961), *Obadzeng Goes to Town* (published 1965), *Modzawe* (presented 1970), and *Sasabonsam* (presented 1980). It is a reflection on the Ghana publishing situation that only one of these titles, *Obadzeng*, has appeared in print, and that in an inadequate school edition from Evans. In identifying Acquaye's dramatic strategy, *Flagbearers* indicates that he conceived *The Lost Fishermen* as a piece of interventionist performance theatre that used a form calculated to make maximum impact. This echoes a functional approach favoured by artists of the period. Acquaye is quoted as saying:

"I have always thought of the best way to reach the majority of our people. It occurred to me that since music, dance and drama were popular with (them), I can point out problems to the society and contribute to its development using the opera".

It seems that the première of what was sometimes described as a 'folk opera' shocked audiences with its handling of the theme of cultural alienation. Acquaye was certainly outspoken in his recognition of the creative sustenance to be drawn from the past and from the indigenous, and the opera, which shows the consequences of breaking a traditional taboo, has an obvious link with that theme. Acquaye told Hagan:

*"If any society is ignorant of its founding fathers and their ways of life, that society becomes depersonalised, and no longer knows where to draw the inspiration and values on which to build its future".*

When Nkrumah, the apostle of 'African Personality', heard about the production, he supported a tour of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union where *The Lost Fishermen* was enthusiastically received. This showed that Acquaye's approach was ideal for 'cultural exchanges': even for those who didn't understand what was being said, there was lots to watch and a pleasing score! The production also drew good houses in Accra when it was brought back to the stage during the sixties. However, even at that point there was concern, and correspondence in the press, about the need for 'new fish'. To this Acquaye responded, in a letter published in the *Echo* in December 1968, that new work was in hand. However, little made it to the boards and *The Lost Fishermen* continued to be revived repeatedly. For example, productions of it were taken to Lagos for Festac (1977) and to London (1985).

When I interviewed Acquaye in the late sixties, he suggested that the block on his output was in part

because he had refused to produce ideologically oriented work, material that furthered the causes of the Convention People's Party. This may reflect his experience of Nkrumah's rule and explain his action following the coup that toppled the country's first president. As part of a possibly biased exposé of the Winneba Ideological Institute that Nkrumah set up the website *niica* reports that:

*"Ghana composer, Francis Saka Acquaye, was summoned to Flagstaff House in 1961 and chastised for the anti-Russian remarks made by members of the cast of his musical Obadzeng. The then Minister of Information, Tawia Adamafio, told him: 'the whole cast should go to Winneba Ideological Institute and have their minds cleansed of reactionary thoughts'."*

In writing on 'The Importance of African Popular Music Studies', John Collins states that, after Nkrumah was overthrown, Acquaye became a member of the Board established by the National Liberation Council to supervise music, dance, crafts, and drama. From this it seems that,

although they may have seen eye to eye on certain matters, there may have been issues over which Acquaye and Nkrumah clashed.

Vieta's profile lists other works and these should be noted, as should the fact that they made little impact as far as the reviewers in Accra were concerned: *Accra After Midnight*, *Dantsira*, *Ananse to Marry the Queen Mother*, *Bo Mong*, *Ananse and the Magic Drum*, *Ananse in Ghostland*, and *Hintinhintin*. An adequate assessment of Acquaye as writer for the stage will clearly have to come to terms with these neglected, or suppressed, scripts, only some of which, I think, have ever been widely available.

Although less of a presence in the theatre during the seventies, Acquaye remained an important figure on the local music scene. Early in the decade, he was partly responsible for organising the *Soul to Soul* programme that, with financial support from Ed Mosk, brought Tina Turner, Wilson Pickett, the Staple Singers, and over 100 other artists to perform in Accra. Acquaye's always hugely important musical interests also



Cultural Dancers

found expression in his work with Nii Ashitey's Ga group *Wulomei*. This contact, that spanned 1972 to 1981, included supporting Kofi Donkor in making the group's first record, *Walatu Walasa*. At a time of economic hardship, Acquaye was also involved with tours to the USA sponsored by the US State Department (1975) and Dartmouth College (1980) when his *Sasabonsam* was presented. Pioneer Tobacco Company and the Da Silva Agency supported a tour to the UK.

Acquaye's passionate interventions in debates about the Ghanaian arts included a paper on 'The Problem of Language in the Development of African Theatre' that appeared in *the Ghana Cultural Review* and was reprinted in *African Arts* (1968). In that he drew attention to the difficulties faced by a playwright in a country in which many languages are spoken, and pointed to his use of mime in *Obadzeng* as a means of overcoming this problem. He continued to comment on matters of cultural interest in the years that followed, both in articles and through interviews. For example, in a discussion with W. B. Hagan, he spoke about the inspiration he found in Ga musical improvisations and is quoted as saying: "...The totality of life is what I try to reconstruct on the stage". He also mentioned the functional approach to the arts in Ghana, and alluded to the use made of theatre by the Social Welfare Department. During 1976 he wrote under the heading 'The Consequences of Spiritual Slumber', for *Ch'Indaba*, then being edited in Accra by Wole Soyinka, calling on the country to "take ... stock" and suggesting that Japan offered a good model for balanced development. In 1998, he again intervened in the pub-

lic debate and during March of that year he was interviewed by the *Weekly Spectator*. Under the heading 'A chat with Saka Acquaye', he argued for the importance of music teaching in schools and reminisced about his work with the Ghana Arts Council.

As suggested by this reference to the Arts Council, Acquaye made a contribution to the arts from 'behind the scenes'. For example, he served as director and chief promotions officer for the Ghana Arts Council and was Chairman of the Board of the country's Film Industry Corporation. He was for various periods a member of the Greater Accra Regional Consultative Council and Chair of the W.E.B. DuBois Memorial Centre for Pan-African Culture. This public service, together with his contributions to the arts, was recognised in various ways. For example, in 1979 he was awarded a Gold Medal by the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences; in March 1994 the Entertainment Critics and Reviewers Association of Ghana (ECRAG) honoured him with a 'Flagstar' award, and, during African American Heritage / History Month (February 2005), he was presented with a Cultural Ambassador Award.


The barrier that no man can clear came after a prolonged illness and shortly before the celebration of Ghana's 50th Independence Anniversary. Saka Acquaye, once a great hurdler, has left his mark in and around Accra, and on the minds of the many who have seen productions of his work or heard his music. He also bequeathed written records of his passionately held convictions about the arts. W.B. Hagan concluded his profile of the versatile artist with a quotation that will provide

food for thought for many who were involved with the marking of Ghana@50. After speaking of the role of the forefathers and of "art and culture as the sources of the spiritual, psychological and emotional strength that man needs", Acquaye upbraided his contemporaries. He said:

*"We do not take our own art and culture seriously – that is why Ghanaian and African artists are not encouraged by their own people. We must place our art and culture in a more modern perspective. People must be made aware of these values – because it is from them that we can rediscover ourselves and (draw) the inspiration to face our national responsibilities".*

Saka Acquaye himself honoured the traditions of his forefathers. He placed them in a 'more modern perspective' and he shouldered his national responsibilities. The son of a carpenter, he became a sculptor who sometimes worked in fibreglass; the son of a concertina player, he became a saxophonist, a composer and a maker of operas; born in Korle Gonno, he held office in national bodies and made a contribution to the whole country. He wrote about fishermen who defied tradition and were lost; he, himself, Saka Acquaye, was never lost.

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# Party Financing and Political Corruption

Ama Pokua Fenny<sup>6</sup>

The run up to the United States election this year has brought to the fore many issues regarding campaign financing. Presidential hopefuls have since last year embarked on massive fundraising to secure enough funds to run their campaigns. Money plays a key role in the success of political campaigns and even in the USA, with the most regulated campaign finance system and the strictest disclosure requirements, politics is still susceptible to corruption and abuse of the system. In fact, the bid to succeed US President George W. Bush will be the most expensive race in history. The cost of the last presidential campaign in 2004, considered a peak for its time, was US\$693 million. However, common estimates of this year's total outlay have tended to come in at around US\$1 billion, and Fortune magazine recently upped its overall cost projection to US\$3 billion.

A worldwide survey of national political finance regimes reveals that most of the 104 countries studied have some form of public financing of political parties, yet about half rely on private funds from corporations, trade unions or foreigners.<sup>6</sup> These three sources are considered very influential in determining the outcome of an election and with great potential for corruption. With regard to limits, restrictions on spending are more popular (41 per cent of the countries surveyed) than restrictions



American presidents, past, present and aspirants

on contributions (28 per cent), though the majority of nations have restrictions on neither. About 62 per cent of the countries surveyed have regulations requiring public disclosure of at least some of the financial accounts of parties or candidates.<sup>7</sup> However, the ineffectiveness of these rules is very common in many countries largely because of the lack of political will to enforce them.

The financing of political campaigns across Western democracies has been fraught with many controversies as early as the beginnings of the democracies themselves. In recent times, with media campaigns becoming more and more expensive and declining party membership, the need for money has become very

acute for parties in the electoral process. The search for new money often exposes parties to corrupt practices and in some cases the involvement of crime syndicates which are often willing to finance campaigns for future favours. The impact of such dealings on democracy can be very devastating, with the public losing faith in the political process. Various attempts have been made, especially in the United States, to regulate and control the flows of money into political campaigns and ensure that the electoral process is free from the undue influence of a few wealthy donors.

Many of the major campaign finance scandals involve the nature, sources and consequences of financial sup-

<sup>6</sup> Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, *Handbook on Funding of Parties and Election Campaigns: Overview* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2001, 145–65 [[http://www.nimd.org/2001/11\\_25\\_conference\\_report\\_2\\_english.pdf](http://www.nimd.org/2001/11_25_conference_report_2_english.pdf)]).

<sup>7</sup> Data on disclosure rules come from *Money and Politics Handbook: A Guide to Increasing Transparency in Emerging Democracies* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Democracy and Governance, Technical Publication Series, 2002).

port given to political parties. Although the circumstances under which some of these major scandals occurred may vary from country to country the underlying causes remain the same. These often include a lack of openness and transparency in party finance; ineffective or inadequate government regulation; an undesirable closeness between large financial contributors and the leadership of political parties leading to subversion of democratic processes; and in some cases, straightforward bribery. The United States has long experienced problems with political finance. Its highly decentralised parties and the relative autonomy of party candidates has helped produce unusually expensive electoral campaigns and heightened concern about the corruption of the electoral process. Some of these scandals take on lives of their own and their consequences can be disproportionate to the gravity of the original offence.

### The Watergate scandal

Watergate is a general term for a series of political scandals during the presidency of Richard Nixon, that began with five men being arrested after breaking and entering into the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate hotel complex in Washington, D.C. on June 17, 1972. The scandal reached the top levels of American government, and the attempted cover-up of the break-in ultimately led to Nixon's dramatic resignation on August 9, 1974. Investigations carried out by the FBI, Senate Watergate Committee, House Judiciary Committee and the press revealed that this burglary was just one of many illegal activities authorised and carried out by Nixon's staff and those loyal to him. They also

revealed the immense scope of crimes and abuses, which include campaign fraud, political espionage and sabotage, illegal break-ins, improper tax audits, illegal wiretapping on a massive scale, and a secret slush fund laundered in Mexico to pay those who conducted these operations. Undeniable evidence, spoken by Nixon and recorded on tape, revealed that he had obstructed justice and attempted to cover up the break-in. With certainty of an impeachment in the House of Representatives and of a conviction in the Senate, Nixon resigned 10 days later, becoming the only U.S. President to have resigned from office. The Watergate scandal also indirectly caused many changes in campaign financing. The scandal became a driving factor in amending the Freedom of Information Act in 1976, as well as laws requiring new financial disclosures by key government officials.

### The Pacific scandal

This scandal involved the allegations of bribes being taken by Canada's Conservative government of Sir John A. Macdonald. As part of British Columbia's agreement to join the Canadian Confederation, the government had agreed to build the Canadian Pacific Railway, a transcontinental railway linking the Pacific province to the eastern provinces. Two groups competed for the contract to build the railway, Hugh Allan's Canada Pacific Railway Company and David Lewis Mac-

pherson's Inter-Oceanic Railway Company. In 1873 it became known that Allan had contributed a large sum of money to the Conservative government's re-election campaign of 1872. The Liberal party, at this time the opposition party in parliament, accused the Conservatives of having made a tacit agreement to give the contract to Hugh Allan in exchange for money. Despite Macdonald's claims that he was innocent, evidence came to light showing receipts of money from Allan to Macdonald and some of his political colleagues. Macdonald offered his resignation as the head of the Conservative party, but it was not accepted and he was convinced to stay. Perhaps as a direct result of this scandal the Conservative Party's image declined in the eyes of the public and was relegated to being the Official Opposition in the federal election of 1874, after which Alexander Mackenzie succeeded MacDonald as the new Prime Minister of Canada.

### Cash-for-honours claim

It was alleged that prior to the 2005 general elections in the United Kingdom, large secret loans were made to the Labour Party in exchange for subsequent nomina-



Richard Nixon, 37th US president, ousted by the Watergate Scandal and Abraham Lincoln 16th president famous for helping to abolish slavery

tions for peerages. Scottish National Party MP Angus MacNeil wrote to the Metropolitan Police asking them to investigate whether any laws made in 1925 banning the sale of honours had been broken. The investigation was later widened to cover the other main parties. Also investigated was whether there had been a breach of a law made in 2000 which said that all donations of more than £5,000 must be declared. All concerned in the inquiry denied wrongdoing. Mr Blair became the first Prime Minister to be questioned by police in the course of an investigation. After interviewing 136 people, the Crown Prosecution service announced that no-one would face charges.

Indeed, there are several other scandals that have occurred in other democratic countries which involve corrupt party financing. For example, all the major parties in Germany have experienced scandals with revelations of laundered money for party activities, with most cases involving illegal tax exemptions for political donations. Italy also demonstrates the problems of party finance and corruption in their most acute and dramatic forms. The crisis of the Italian political system can be traced to the nature and operation of the

party system and the funding arrangements that underpin it. The frequency of changes of government in Italy has no modern precedent and it is currently a challenge to build a new system which commands public and political confidence. Such charges open up the debate about what sort of organisations political parties are and what constitutes legitimate and appropriate means of securing the financial resources necessary for their effective operation. At root, there is the underlying concern that, left unregulated, the problems of party finance will intensify and either corrupt the entire political process or, where such corruption is already entrenched, will preclude its control and eradication.

### The process of financing political parties

Party finance is a complex issue which is embedded in myriad and disparate political and legal contexts. Party funding is therefore dependent on multiple forms of funding. There is a need to identify and illustrate the diverse forms of party finance and the ways in which corruption manifests itself. There are about three methods of party finance identified in Western democracies which should

be not be seen as alternatives but as running in parallel: they are internal finance, external finance and state finance. In reality, these simple typologies conceal a complex system of rules and regulations that govern party finance. In many jurisdictions it is, for example,

unclear what constitutes a legal or an illegal contribution and private finance can embrace everything from a trivial contribution from an individual to a large 'donation' from an organised crime syndicate.

Generally, internal finance often includes income from investments, additional contributions from party members and supporters through party rallies and similar events, and the sale of party newspapers and other publications. But the line between internal and external finance is difficult to sustain when parties have developed trading arms which inescapably bring them into contact with the business sector, and their financial success may be linked to a change in the party's public image and identity.

External funding of political parties attracts greater concern. The motives of those who make substantial contributions to political parties are often called into question and, when there are attempts to conceal or disguise donations, suspicions are aroused. While some may legitimately wish to protect their anonymity, others are concerned that the public disclosure of their contributions would excite public disapproval and even create a scandal. If the donor is a foreign national, their motives might more readily be impugned and the British Conservative Party was for many years keen not to disclose the large contributions it received from Hong Kong, Greece and elsewhere. In extreme cases, the contributions will simply be unlawful, both in the sense that they violate regulations on party finance and in the sense that the donors themselves may be representatives of criminal organisations. In Italy and Russia, the interactions



Former British Premier Tony Blair, pictured beside 12 financiers, was enmeshed by the cash-for-honours scandal towards the end of his tenure

between party politics and organised crime must not be underestimated. In some contexts, external financing is derived from the close linkages which have developed between parties and large business enterprises. In Japan and Korea such arrangements are long established and raise issues about the preferential treatment such businesses enjoy in matters of trade, taxation and investment.

In other countries, the costs of campaigning are so huge that parties and their leaders actively solicit funds from business enterprises. Such conspicuous fund-raising gives rise to concerns about what such business interests expect by way of a return on their political investment. The common fear is that the concerns of voters, or even party members and supporters, will be subordinated to the priorities of the party's financial backers. In the United States there have been demands for investigations of both President Clinton and Vice President Gore and some claim to detect links between the receipt of large donations and changes in the administration's policy.

State funding is sometimes presented as a way of freeing political parties from the obligations created by their dependence on income from trade unions or business groups. Supporters of state funding argue that US democracy lacks fairness because wealthy individuals and special interests have far greater political clout because they make contributions that are far larger than those that ordinary citizens can afford to make. They say that the only way to end the corruptive effects of large private contributions on politics is to have the government pay for cam-



German Chancellor Angela Merkel with political colleagues

paings. On the other hand, supporters of private donations argue that this is an unrealistic goal. In their opinion, government subsidisation subsidy of political speech is contrary to the spirit of democracy or freedom.

The appeal of Germany as a case study arises both from its distinctiveness as a leading example of state funding for political parties and as an example of judicial regulation of party finance. However, the danger here is that parties exchange one form of dependency for another. One study suggests that German parties have become addicted to public funds and their thirst for state funding is unquenchable. As parties and their office holders become more dependent on the state, they are less beholden to their voters, supporters and members, and this may erode ties of loyalty and weaken accountability. The resort to state finance can be seen as a possible defence against the corrupting influence of private funding but state funding has not prevented German political parties from being enmeshed in a number of

scandals. Those who placed faith in state funding as a means of rescuing political parties from the potentially corrupt influences of external finance both underestimated the escalating costs of modern political and campaign organisations and overestimated the effectiveness of laws regulating donations from external sources. For instance, the financial pressures on German political parties are more acute than elsewhere because the range of activities they engage in, especially through the party foundations, is much wider than in many other countries. As internal finance has generally proved inadequate, so too has state finance.

There are many tools available to governments to control money in politics and to prevent political parties from falling into the pockets of their donors. Legislatures can try to curb the need for private funding by passing laws to provide funding or subsidised access to the media. They can also lessen the demand for money by shortening campaign periods or capping expenditures.



Leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised countries

A second way of tackling corrupt party financing is to regulate the flows of money into politics. The most common methods are bans on contributions from certain individuals (such as convicted criminals) or institutions (for instance from foreign governments) and ceilings on donations. A third route is to increase transparency of campaign finance by introducing disclosure requirements - where the public is informed of who gave how much to whom, for what purpose and when. In this regard, a number of countries have undertaken some reforms of campaign financing.

### Reforming campaign financing

Campaign finance reform is a perennial feature on most political agendas but effective reform remains elusive. The reform impulse is readily observed around the globe and a wide variety of reforms in political finance have been advocated. Attempts to regulate party finance are not new but the plethora of scandals has focused public and media attention and thereby encouraged political leaders to reform, or at least to be seen to reform, the ways in which political formations fund their activities. Inevitably, the scope of reform varies according to the type of political party, the nature of the political system, the perceived seriousness of the problem and the availability of alternative funding regimes. Many democracies regulate from

where candidates or parties can obtain campaign funds, the amounts of funds, and whether the source of funds has to be disclosed. While Austria appears to have the fewest limits on the source and amounts of funds, and has very little disclosure requirements, the USA has the most regulated campaign finance system of all countries and the strictest disclosure requirements.

In the United States, though attempts to regulate campaign finance by legislation date back to 1867, the first successful attempts nationally to regulate and enforce campaign finance originated in the 1970s. All of these efforts were largely ineffective, easily circumvented and rarely enforced. In 1971, however, Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, requiring broad disclosure of campaign finance. It was amended in 1974 with the introduction of legal limits on contributions fueled by public reaction to the Watergate Scandal, and the creation of the Federal Election Commission (FEC). It attempted to restrict the influence of wealthy individuals by limiting individual donations to \$1000 and donations by Political Action Committees (PACs) to \$5000. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, also known as "McCain-Feingold," after its sponsors, is the most recent major federal law on campaign finance, which revised some of the legal limits

of expenditure set in 1974, and prohibited unregulated contributions to national political parties.

A good set of political finance regulations is, of course, of little use if it is not properly enforced. Effective enforcement requires independent oversight agencies endowed with powers to supervise, investigate and, if required, institute legal proceedings in cases of malpractice. Unfortunately, many governments lack the political will to give teeth to supervisory agencies lest it work to their disadvantage once out of office. The experience of the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute serves as an example of the obstacles oversight agencies face. It won access in 2003 to bank data needed to carry out an in-depth investigation of alleged illegal acts. But limits were placed on this access - it applies only on a case-by-case basis, when the electoral court rules that strict bank secrecy laws can be waived. More worrying are cases where enforcement agencies are used by the government against opposition parties. For example, Ukrainian contributors to opposition candidate Oleksander Moroz's 1999 presidential campaign were requested to provide information on the source of their wealth to the local state tax inspection branches. Following the election, a number of contributors were harassed by tax inspectors and several were forced into bankruptcy.

### Conclusion

Despite a stream of scandals and despite an increasing flow of academic studies, political financing and the abuses thereof remain shrouded in mystery. Many commonly heard notions surrounding them are

unproven or wrong. This is partly because "political finance" takes so many forms and is difficult to define, and partly because there remain large gaps in research (especially about political money in emerging democracies). There is no shortage

of regulations concerning political money—many of them introduced as a response to scandals. Campaign financing reforms are constantly being reformed yet those wishing to exert influence through secret funds will naturally use those channels that

remain unregulated. To say that the problems of party financing can be easily solved with the creation of more laws is an exaggeration. The emphasis should rather be on the enforcement of disclosure laws and less on an ever-expanding list of rules.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Editor,

I write to compliment the Observer Notebook article on Dr. Hilla Limann's sad experience after his Presidential term was forcibly ended. Whatever may have been his shortcomings, he displayed integrity and strong national values during his Presidency. The accord we give to our past elected Presidents is indeed a measure of our respect for our own selves. Every past elected President who has not been judged adversely by a constitutional court of law must expect and must be given the honor that is given to statesmen everywhere. This should take the form of due deference in public events of national significance, financial compensation comparable to that of the then current President, and appropriate security. The article also rightly pointed out that such honor must not be at the whim of future Presidents. Indeed, it would be apt for these

privileges to be appropriately legally and institutionally protected.

Presidents too owe society much in return: they must live the societal values they espouse before and during their term of office. It is noteworthy that one of Africa's most successful private sector entrepreneurs, Mo Ibrahim, has set up a foundation to reward past African Presidents who have demonstrated an unswerving commitment to good governance during their tenures. Mo Ibrahim made a fortune by setting up a continent-wide mobile phone network under the name of Celtel and did so without paying any bribes. When asked for a bribe, he insisted on obtaining a receipt for his Board, and that always led to the request being withdrawn. He has since sold his company, and set up the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. The essence of his think

ing is that his Foundation's African Leadership Award (\$5 million and an annual payment of \$200,000 per year thereafter) will provide both the moral and financial incentives for African Presidents to adopt stronger values of good governance. It was exciting to witness the first such award recently given to ex-President Chissano of Mozambique, in a splendid ceremony in Alexandria, Egypt. The decision was based on research findings on governance across Africa and on the recommendation of a Selection Committee chaired by Mr. Kofi Annan.

The New Legon Observer has done a great service by drawing attention to this issue. One hopes that other civil society organisations will also play a part in supporting this basic cause.

**Gobind Nankani**  
Adjiringanor, Accra

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## Kenya's Post Election Violence: Reflections On What it Does and Does Not Mean for Ghana and Africa

The violent aftermath of Kenya's elections has shocked Kenyans, Africans and the rest of the world. Frequently asked questions are: how could one of Africa's most politically stable and economically predictable countries descend into such chaos so quickly? If Kenya, then is not the rest of Africa also, despite the impressive economic and political strides of the last decade, a short step away from similar violence and chaos? Such questions are, upon some reflection, simplistic. They belie an unanalytical and ahistorical approach to understanding societies. A better approach would be to dig deeper in three ways: (i) comprehend the underlying determinants of violence and conflict, and to recognise that these factors come into play in specific country circumstances all over the world. (ii) understand the country in question more deeply, while learning from other countries' experiences. (iii) recognise that Africa is not one country: it is a geographical region encompassing many varied countries, each with its own history, economic and political structure, and dynamics.

What do these three points suggest about what Kenya's violence means for Ghana and the rest of Africa?

The Kenyan violence is sad and tragic. The loss of human life has been deeply disturbing. The revelation of deeply held feelings of mistrust and injustice in the historical access to resources, particularly between the Kikuyus and the Luos, has opened wounds that many thought had

healed. The essential point is that the violence is rooted in the pre- and post-Independence evolution of economic, social and political policies. Its antecedents are to be found in Kenya's history and the inability or unwillingness of post-Independence governments to resolve ethnic cleavages that characterise Kenya. However, just because Kenya is in Africa and other African countries too have progressed democratically with multiple ethnic groups, this does not imply that all other African countries are necessarily also at risk in the same way.



L - R Kofi Annan, Mwai Kibaki and  
Raila Odinga

Recent research on the incidence of violence and conflict around the world, undertaken by the likes of Paul Collier and Ibrahim El-Badawi is helpful here. It suggests that the causes of violence and conflict are multiple. Three factors stand out. First, is income growth. Low growth societies tend to be more easily drawn into conflicts. Second, income inequality tends also to be associated with conflict and violence. Latin American research by Norman Loayza shows a

strong relationship between crime and inequality. And third, conflict and violence are related to the strength of social and political institutions and efforts made to nurture them. Research suggests, for example, that in societies with ethnic fractionalisation, violence is lower in factional democracies (e.g. with proportional representation in elections) than in non-factional (first past the post electoral rules) democracies. Indeed, non-factional democracies are found to be not significantly different from autocracies in avoiding violence.

Another example comes from the recent successes in Colombia to subdue the FARC rebels. This can be attributed to efforts made by the Government to not just fight the rebels with greater force, but also to strengthen community links in the areas the rebels tended to dominate, and to win the 'hearts and minds' of those communities, by making simple public services such as roads, water, security available to all members in a reliable way. The 'gacaca' method of truth and reconciliation being practiced in Rwanda following its genocide experience is helping to forge links between the Hutu and the Tutsi communities. Finally, this research shows that violence and conflict are not the monopoly of any one part of the world, witness the experiences in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo; in the Middle East (Israel - Palestine); in Asia (Nepal, Sri Lanka); and in Latin America (Colombia, Bolivia).

For Ghana, this has two implications for us to ponder on. First, as we seek to accelerate growth - and as oil revenues become available in the years to come - the quality of this growth will be important: it must be shared growth, inclusive growth. The Nigerian experience with civil war is not far from home. No groups or regions must feel that they have no stake in the growth that we hope to accelerate. Recent Living Standards Measurement Studies have consistently confirmed that poverty in rural areas and in the North is declining much more slowly than elsewhere. Growth strategies must aim at ensuring that these trends are ameliorated. International experience also shows the wisdom of ensuring that the economic, social and environmental impact on the communities in oil-pro-

ducing areas be addressed, in a participatory way, from the very beginning. These efforts will require a combination of resources, participation and capacity building. Second, as Yaw Saffu has argued in this journal (Vol. 1, No. 1 of 29 November, 2007), decentralisation of resources and authority must be accelerated and the district assemblies should become fully elected bodies. This too will give each district a greater sense of participation and a stake in the growth of the wider economy. This is certainly grist for the mill of the forthcoming Presidential debates.

On the broader African scene, differentiating African economies and politics will not occur overnight. It is common for market participants and for journalists to oversimplify and

treat unknown countries as an undifferentiated mass of countries. The markets' reaction to Latin America's many economic crises in the 90s - Mexico's Tequila crisis, Brazil's Real crisis etc.- was to treat all Latin American countries alike. Since then, in part because of the countries' own efforts and in part because of the greater exposure of investors to Latin American countries, differentiation between countries is based on a deeper understanding of their underlying dynamics. Chile, Brazil and Paraguay are not seen as an undifferentiated mass. Investors in Africa are yet to get this level of understanding. We have a role to play to help them do that. Market analysts based in African countries, journalists, and other civil society organisations should rise to this challenge.



# UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST

Applications are invited for the post of

## VICE-CHANCELLOR

### 1. QUALIFICATIONS & EXPERIENCE

Candidates must be of professorial status with an outstanding academic record. They must be individuals of stature and integrity with exemplary leadership, interpersonal and communication skills, zeal, energy and the capacity for marshalling the resources needed to carry out the University's vision in the 21st Century. Candidates must also show evidence of the following qualities:

- demonstrated ability or potential to manage a University;
- ability to foster and promote good internal and external relations of the University;
- ability to project effectively the image of the University internally and externally;
- proven ability to provide strong, visionary leadership and innovation for the University.

### 2. TENURE OF OFFICE

Candidates must be eligible to hold office for a minimum of 4 four (4) years from the date of appointment before retirement.

### 3. FUNCTIONS

The Vice-Chancellor is, under the direction of the University Council, the Academic and Administrative Head as well as Chief Disciplinary Officer of the University. He/She is also responsible to the University Council for maintaining and promoting the good order and efficiency of the University. His/Her other functions are prescribed by the Statutes of the University.

### 4. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

Very attractive terms and conditions of office will be specified in the instrument of appointment.

### 5. MODE OF APPLICATION

- Interested candidates should send two (2) copies of their curriculum vitae, with qualifications, working experience, list of publications with dates etc.
- Candidates should send in, a minimum of two (2) pages and a maximum of eight (8) pages of A4 paper in 1.5 line spacing, a succinct statement of their vision for the University of Cape Coast and the strategies for achieving this.

c) Applications should be addressed to:


The Chairman,  
Search Committee (Post of Vice-Chancellor)  
Council Secretariat,  
University of Cape Coast,  
Cape Coast, Ghana.

OR

The Chairman,  
Search Committee (Post of Vice-Chancellor),  
University of Cape Coast,  
C/o Universities of Ghana  
Overseas Office,  
321 City Road,  
London EC1V 1LJ,  
U.K.

- Candidates should request three (3) referees to submit reports on them directly to the above address.
- The closing date for submission of application for this position is 31 March, 2008.

CHAIRMAN  
Search Committee



# The 3

# BENEFITS of the SSNIT PENSION SCHEME

1. OLD AGE / RETIREMENT PENSION
2. INVALIDITY PENSION
3. SURVIVORS' LUMP SUM

## WHAT ARE THE QUALIFYING CONDITIONS?

**OLD AGE / RETIREMENT PENSION**

**1**

- Must have attained the age of 60
- A reduced pension could be paid between the ages of 55-59 and
- Must have contributed for a minimum period of 240 months.

**INVALIDITY PENSION**

**2**

- Must have been a member for a minimum period of 36 months
- Must have made at least 12 monthly contributions in aggregate within the last 36 months
- Must be certified invalid by the SSNIT Medical Board.

**SURVIVORS' LUMP SUM**

**3**

- When a member dies before retirement
- Should not have attained 72 years at the time of death if member is a pensioner.

### FOR FURTHER ENQUIRIES CONTACT:

THE HEAD OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT,  
 SSNIT PENSION HOUSE,  
 P.O. BOX MB 149, MINISTRIES, ACCRA  
 TEL: 021-667731/4-9,668663-5 EXT. 7207 • 7209 • 7210 • 7212  
 TEL/FAX: 021-667742 • 686373 • TELFAX: 7011367 or any SSNIT Branch  
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Printed by G-Pak Ltd (main subsidiary, Graphic Communications Group Ltd) for  
The Ghana Society for Development Dialogue. Please address all correspondence to: The Acting Editor, New Legon Observer,  
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