

DEPARTMENT FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGIONS

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

TRANSNATIONAL CONTACTS AND MUSLIM

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION IN GHANA

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research work that I have conducted represents the true ideas and views of mine. I have not sought any academic materials and literature other than what I have indicated and acknowledged. Any mistakes, misinterpretations and errors are solely mine.

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REV. DR. ABRAHAM AKRONG
(SUPERVISOR)

DEDICATION

The ambition of my family to have a Muslim scholar to serve the spiritual needs of our community (Dahile, in the Lambusie-Kaan District) made my cousin Hamidu Dingane to hand me over to the late Issaka Abdulai to attend a *Madrassah (Falahiyya Islamic School)* at Hamile in the Upper West region. At that time, I was only nine (9) years old. The greatest asset that the late Issaka bequeathed to me in life has been hard work and endurance. The late Issaka was an Islamic cleric himself who imparted Islamic knowledge to us at the forecourt of his house in order to supplement what we were taught at the *Madrassah*. We thought at that time the cleric was subjecting us to undue overwork. The Suit of the hard work as imparted to us has been the outcome of this thesis.

Though, Issaka has passed away since 1999, I dedicate this thesis to his memory and my cousin Hamidu Dingane who live to see his dream fulfil through me. The dream fulfilled is of a nature different from the one he anticipated for me; not as a Muslim cleric but an aspiring Islamic academic and a scholar. I pray that the Almighty would reward them with any useful scholarly contribution that this thesis has made to the advancement of humanity.

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ABSTRACT

A key issue worthy of academic attention in the study of the Muslim experience in the post-independence Ghana is the proliferation of new religious movements. These new religious movements found their way in Ghana in consequence of Ghana's diplomatic relations with some Islamic states such as Egypt and Libya from North Africa, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Middle East. For the first time, Muslims in the post-independence Ghana came in touch with new Islamic orientations driven by the interests of the sponsoring Islamic states to serve their religio-political agenda. Some of these Islamic movements include *Wahhabiyya* (Ahlus-Sunnah), Shi'ah and the *Green Book* of the Third Universal Theory (TUT).

The dissertation explores how these Muslim states through their embassies promoted their religio-political interest in the modern day Ghana. While the representative of these Muslim states (embassies) promoted the interests of Ghanaian Muslims on education, health, agriculture, Islamic centers and women empowerment, they in effect introduced their ideological interest in Muslim religious space in Ghana. We also examine the activities of the various quasi-state institutions and the affiliated NGOs to these Islamic states. The study further explores the extent to which these new religious ideas co-exist with the pre-colonial and the colonial Islamic movements such as the Tijaniyya in contemporary time.

Significantly, Muslims transnational contacts in Ghana extend to the United States of America, in the aftermath of 9/11. Interestingly, this interaction with the West was largely driven by the interests of the United States government to educate Muslims globally on the menace of religious terrorism. The dissertation further examines this phenomenon.

ABBREVIATIONS

ONCI: Office of National Chief Imam

IDB: Islamic Development Bank

MAP: Muslim Association Party

GLISS- Ghana-Lebanon Secondary School

GBC-Ghana Broadcasting Corporation

NAM-Non-Aligned Movement

OAU-Organisation of African Unity

AU-Africa Union

ECOWAS-Economic Community of West Africa States

ARD-Agriculture and Rural Development

CIA-Central Intelligence Agency

PNDC-People National Defence Council

NDC-National Democratic Congress

NPP-New Patriotic Party

OIC-Organisation of Islamic Conference

UDS-University for Development Studies

ASWAJ-Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah

SCICR-Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research

NGO-Non-Governmental Organisation

AFRC-Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

PFPPopular Front Party

TUT-Third Universal Theory

FMC-Federation of Muslim Council

COMOG-Coalition of Muslim Organisations
SDF-Saudi Development Fund
GES-Ghana Education Service
ICT-Information and Communication Technology
JSS: Junior Secondary School
SSS: Senior Secondary School
FOMWAG-Federation of Muslim Women Association,
IRRC: Islamic Research and Reformation Center
NEC: National Executive Council
PDC: People Defence Committee
FAGLAT: Friends Against Global Terrorism
USA: United States of America
GMSA: Ghana Muslim Students Association
HIV: Human Immune Virus
AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
UN: United Nations
CDD: Customer Due Diligence
IMF: International Monetary Fund
BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
CNN: Cable News Network
VOA: Voice of America

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CHAPTER ONE

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Transnational contacts facilitate the interactions of people across civilizations, geographic regions and continents on cultural, religious, economic, or political issues. Transnational contacts may also start a process by which countries attempt to influence or shape the perspectives of others.

Modern Ghana, which was carved out from the Volta Basin and previously referred to by a progression of colonial masters as the Gold Coast, has had various transnational interactions with states of the West African sub-region during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. These interactions were mediated and conducted through the political ambit of present day Ghana's traditional kingdoms of Gonja, Mamprusi, Dagbon and Wala, as well as the Ashanti Empires.

However, during the post-independence period a different dimension was introduced into Ghanaian Muslims' transnational relations with the Muslim world. This was as a result of Ghana's diplomatic relations with some Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

The impact of the larger Muslim world including both North Africa and the Middle East on Muslims Islamic experience in Ghana has been remarkable. For the first time, in the post-independence period, new religious groups pertaining to those countries that Ghana has forged diplomatic relations found their way into the country.

Significantly, the 11 September 2001 factor in Muslims transnational relations with the West and the United States of America in particular cannot be underrated. Although the

Western and American rapprochement towards Muslims in Ghana in the post 9/11 was to create a common platform of understanding, the conviction that Muslims should be educated in a religious context about the menace of terrorism and violence was the ultimate consideration.

This thesis looks at the effects of transnational contacts on Ghanaian Muslims' religious identity. It argues that transnational contacts are largely responsible for the origin of diversity in Islamic practices, doctrines and orientations in Ghana, as well as shifts in the perspectives of Ghanaian Muslims concerning the West.

The research categorizes Ghanaian Muslim interactions into three timeframes, namely, the pre-colonial and colonial periods, the post-independence period and the post-11 September period. For reasons of clarity, the thesis is further divided into three (3) sections, namely pre-colonial and colonial, the post-independence, and the post-9/11 periods. Each timeframe has its own distinct characteristics, and these have impacted on the identity and religious experiences of Ghanaian Muslims.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Islamic *Ummah* has one universal community based on a shared faith, has generated a serious academic debate in the ever-globalizing world (Riaz Hasan 2006: 1). This was necessary because transnational contacts, boosted by improvements in information and communication-technologies, have made the Muslim *Ummah* understand the reality and the diversity of Islamic cultures in the world. At the same time, the *Ummah's* consciousness and rhetoric operate with the intention of de-territorializing the boundaries of the

¹ *Ummah* simply means Islamic or Muslim brotherhood.

contemporary nation-state by heightening a sense of a Muslim belonging to a global community of believers.

Notwithstanding the fact that a sense of consciousness within the *Ummah* has been the binding factor among Muslims of diverse national backgrounds, their allegiance to multiple Islamic Schools of Thought and to different modern nation-states provides for interesting dynamics.¹ This is as a result of the distinctive Islamic identities and orientations that some nation-states represent. These Islamic identities and orientations could be viewed from the Saudi Arabia *Wahhabi*, Iran Shi'i and the Libya Socialist identities.

Historically, Muslims in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast, in addition to their indigenous values, were culturally influenced by the Arab/Islamic values and orientations. However, a new feature in respect of Ghanaian Muslims relations with the West and more specifically the United States of America has become an emerging phenomenon in the post the 9/11 incidents in the United States of America.

The allegiance of Ghanaian Muslims to multiple state-controlled Islamic doctrinal centres as well as the impact of Islam on the West African sub-region has not generated much scholarly interest in Ghana until recently. While studies explore the rapid and the intensity of African Muslims interconnectedness with the Muslim world (Soares et al 2007:8), the present work highlights its effects on Ghanaian Muslims perspectives to Islamic discourse.

The effects of these diverse encounters on Ghanaian Muslims understanding of the *Ummah*

This thesis draws great inspiration from Jonathan Laurence's pioneering work entitled: *Managing Transnational Islam: Muslims and the States in Western Europe*, 2006. Whereas aspects of his analysis focuses on the role of the Muslim embassies which he referred to as 'official Islam' in disseminating the religious agenda of the respective states with the diaspora Muslims in Western Europe, this work focuses on these Muslim embassies and the United States Embassy in promoting specific religio-political ideology in modern Ghana.

cannot be underrated, though the intensity of its consciousness might be inclined towards a particular continent.

The study focuses on the role of Muslim diplomatic offices and the United States embassy in Ghana and their affiliate institutions in stimulating such transnational discourse. This was done by highlighting the competing interest shown by Muslim states and the United States in the Islamic affairs in the modern Ghana with its consequences on Muslim consciousness of the *Ununaii*. It further explores a paradigm independent identity envisioned by the West and the United States in particular for Ghanaian Muslims, an Islamic identity that is not linked to the North Africa, the Middle East and the larger Arab world in general, but rather indigenously grounded in the Ghanaian socio-cultural milieu. The study also focuses on the respective roles that each group plays in the Islamic and Muslim terrain in Ghana, with its socio-cultural and political implications on the nation's development. The unique nature of each interaction in respect of each sub-region as well as of the individuals and the institutions which facilitated such interactions and contacts were examined. Finally, the study also highlights the religious issues that have emerged, shaped, and impacted on Ghanaian Muslims and Islam globally. This study, therefore, revolves around the development of Islam in the post-independence and the post 9/11 periods through diplomatic relations with the Islamic world and the United States of America. It is with the view of filling in the academic vacuum existing in the nature of the available literature.

13 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aims and objectives of the study are to:

- (i) identify the type of Islamic and cultural orientations handed down to Ghanaian Muslims by each of the respective countries in each of the periods;

- (ii) explore Ghana's diplomatic relations with selected Muslim countries and the major contributions they made to Ghanaian Muslims, including their facilitation of the introduction into Ghana of diverse religious orientations;
- (iii) examine the role of the Muslim diplomatic missions (embassies) in the rise of the Islamic Resurgence in Ghana through the introduction of Islamic sectarian diversity and religio-political ideologies;
- (iv) examine the impact of the Muslim missions' contributions on Ghanaian Muslims;
- (v) analyze the nature of Ghanaian Muslims' relations with the United States of America; and,
- (vi) identify and discuss Ghanaian Muslims' stance on terrorism.

1.4 HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses have guided the researcher in this work:

- (i) the relations between the people of the present day Ghana with Muslims in the Volta Basin witnessed significant improvements from the pre-colonial and colonial periods to 1957 (when the Gold Coast became independence Ghana);
- (ii) Muslim diplomatic missions in Ghana displaced the influence of the West African Muslims;
- (iii) Muslim diplomatic missions in Ghana facilitated Ghanaian Muslims' interactions with the outside Muslim world during the post-colonial period up to 2006;
- (iv) the allegiance of Muslim scholars to the Muslim world has facilitated the introduction of major doctrinal groups from the Middle East into the country through Muslim diplomatic missions;
- (v) Muslim diplomatic missions in Ghana facilitated the categorization of Ghanaian Muslims on doctrinal and sectarian lines.

- (vi) The 11 September 2001 attack on the United States of America has brought about an evolving paradigm in the relationship between Ghanaian Muslim scholars, the Muslims in the Middle East and the West; and
- (vii) Religious terrorism has polarized the world into two camps: the Muslim camp and the non-Muslim camp. It also brought to the fore the categorization of Muslims into two separate groups: good Muslims and bad Muslims.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In view of the unfolding interplay between the major Islamic groups in Ghana as a result of further transnational engagement and the consequential effects of the global war of terrorism on Ghanaian Muslims, the primary research question is asked:

- (i) What has accounted for the advent of diverse Islamic ideological groups and identities in Ghana and the contemporary interest of the United States in the Muslim communities of Ghana?

The following sub-questions have been posed in order to answer the above:

- (a) How have Ghanaian Muslims been relating to the various foreign-based Islamic centres in Ghana?
- (b) What are some of the incentives available within these foreign-based Islamic centres in Ghana which attracted Ghanaian Muslims interest?
- (c) How did Ghanaian Muslims build and consolidate their relations with Muslim diplomatic missions in Ghana from 1957-2006?
- (d) What are the effects of these diverse interactions and engagements on Ghanaian Muslims religious worldview?

- (e) What is the attitude of contemporary Ghanaian Muslims towards the Muslim world and issues affecting Muslims globally?
- (f) What factors have accounted for the warm relations between the West particularly the United States of America and Ghanaian Muslims.
- (g) Lastly, what unique impact has the United States of America had on Ghanaian Muslims?

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretically, the study was founded on Juergenmeyer's theory of transnational religion and the state. The general thrust of his theory was that transnational religions such as Islam and Christianity have not been reliable allies for state power. He argues that, by depending on their ideologies, some rulers may think that they are harnessing religion's vision of global expansion for their political fortunes. However, these religions could be the source of anti-national and transnational forces that will undermine the state. He concludes that the contradiction between transnational religions and religion of the nation could be overcome in instances where religion is itself the expression of transnational culture and society (Juergenmeyer 2006:7)

This theory is quite significant as the major Islamic groups examined in this study could be regarded as enjoying State support. For instance, Shi'ism as a global religious expression has been linked to the Persian Empire since 1501 and also adopted by the 1979 post revolutionary regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This thus emphasises the significance of religion to the interest of the State, and more specifically the interest of the Iranian Government. Similarly, Wahhabism is another Islamic expression in this instance receiving its support from the Kingdom of Saudi State. Though the Third Universal Theory (TUT) was fashioned

in line with Islamic values to offer an alternative universal political theory to the developing nations, yet it is linked to al-Gadhafi's political ambition in the Third World. The situation in respect of the relationship between the Egyptian Government and a particular Islamic expression and heritage and the state, is exceptional. However, following Ghana's independence, Egypt served as the gateway to the Muslim world. The study tries to bring to light the various Islamic expressions which were linked to some Muslim countries interest in Ghana due to their diplomatic engagement with Ghana in the post independence period. We will thus focus on the role of Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iran in their bid to exert their global influence on Muslims promoted a particular brand of Islam. The study further examines the Western and American interest in the Muslim communities in the post 9/11 period. The study sets out to ascertain the extent to which these governments' endorsement of a particular brand of Islamic expression has boosted their popularity in Ghana and has achieved the underlying objectives behind such endorsement.

Haynes has argued that globalization facilitates transnational networks of religious actors by feeding off each other's ideas, assisting with funds, and forming bodies to promote the interest of their transnational religious community (Haynes, 2001: 144). Though his study focused on the Catholic Church and the Organisation of Islamic Conference, it also shows the extent to which transnational religious bodies could make an impact on others in the globalized world. The present study, however, sets out to explore and examine the transnational dimension of Muslim embassies and the United States embassy in promoting specific religio-political agenda of their respective government with Ghanaian Muslims. The study does this by determining the various structures and institutions which these transnational political institutions have employed to popularize their brand of Islam in Ghana.

1.7 METHODOLOGY

1.7.1 General Approach

The researcher employed a multi-faceted approach to the study. For instance, the historical approach was employed in chapter two which assisted the researcher to identify the agent of Islamic influences in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. It further enabled the researcher to source for information from the Ghana's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the origin of her diplomatic relations with the selected Muslim countries in this study in chapter three. Historical approach also reflected in the data collected in chapter six on the origin of the doctrinal groups which are tied to the Muslim missions' religious interest in Ghana. This was done by sourcing information from the founders of these Muslim movements in Ghana.

The phenomenological approach assisted the researcher in examining the contributions to Ghanaian Muslims from the perspective of Muslim diplomatic missions and the American mission in Ghana as reflected in both chapters five, seven and eight. Lastly, the theological approach helped the researcher to interpret and analyze the religious basis of the attitudes and reactions of Ghanaian Muslim scholars to global issues in chapter eight.

1.7.2 Sources of Data and Collection

The researcher relied on both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources were gathered in the field through interviews. This has aided in the analysis on the interconnection between Muslim missions' developmental contributions to Ghanaian Muslims and their impacts. The primary data also included information on the activities of Islamic NGOs with foreign affiliation. In addition, data on the contributions of some selected Muslim diplomatic missions, as well as the United States to Ghanaian Muslims were further

gathered. Information was also gathered on the origins of the Islamic resurgence in Ghana by interviewing the founders of the various Muslim sects as in chapter six.

Purposeful sampling was employed in selecting key organizations, both Islamic and non-Islamic, with interest in assisting Muslim communities. This was so because of the indispensable nature of their activities in undertaking this research and for serving as the mouthpiece of Muslims. 200 respondents were targeted in the field. Information was further sought from the various stakeholders in the community, such as the Imams and *Ulama*, Muslim students in tertiary institutions, Muslim public servants, teachers, businessmen and women's groups. Particular attention was given to the leaders of the various doctrinal groupings.

Structured questionnaires were administered and the responses analysed in chapters seven and eight. This was necessary to obtain quantitative information about the perspectives of Ghanaian Muslims on the United States' interest as well as their perception about terrorism. The questionnaires consisted of both open and close-ended and targeted almost all prominent Muslim leaders in the community. Importantly, the structured questionnaires were administered within the three regions of Ghana, namely the Greater Accra, Ashanti and the Northern regions. Random sampling methods were employed in selecting and interviewing the target groups. These helped in giving a fair chance and opportunity to each member of the target group to express their view. The researcher relied on statistical tools such as the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and EXCEL for the analysis of the data in chapters seven and eight. The data was analysed using a descriptive statistical approach. It was also presented in a cross tabulation format.

Secondary sources of information included literature on Islam in West Africa and the Gold Coast in particular as reflected in chapter two. Literature were also depended on Islamic ideological views propounded by certain Islamic governments and individuals. Information about the activities of certain diplomatic missions and embassies in Ghana were obtained:

- (i) the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
- (ii) the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia;
- (iii) the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
- (iv) the Socialist People's Republic of Libya; and
- (v) the Embassy of the United States of America in Ghana.

Again, information was sought on the origins of certain Islamic sectarian and politico-religious institutions in Ghana. This was done by ascertaining how they have influenced and impacted on Ghanaian Muslims doctrinally and politically. These bodies include the following:

- (i) the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah or the *Wahhabiyya* religious institutions in Ghana.
- (ii) the *Shi'ah* Muslim community in Ghana and Iranian Cultural Consulate, the Libyan Arab Cultural Center and the World Islamic Call Society.

1.8 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

The research was conducted within the Greater Accra, Ashanti and the Northern regions. This was informed by the fact that the majority of Muslim population is concentrated within these three regions of Ghana. Strategically, these regions play a crucial role in the Ghanaian Muslims' tradition. The target populations are the *Imams*, *Ulama*, Muslim leaders and the enlightened Muslim youth, mainly made up of graduates and students of tertiary institutions.

In addition, data were gathered on the activities of Muslim embassies, the United States embassy and Muslim NGOs which promoted new Islamic worldviews and ideas.

1.9 LITERATURE REVIEW

The researcher consulted various sources of literature in both Arabic and English in the form of books, theses, and journal articles, (published and unpublished) on political, social, and economic factors that affect the general orientation of Muslims. Among some of these are:

1. **David Waines:** *An Introduction to Islam* (1995). The book basically focuses on the teachings of Islam based on the major doctrinal lines of each sect: Sufism, Wahabism, the Nation of Islam and Shi'ism. It also looks at the concept of the Islamic state as proposed by some Muslim thinkers in the 1930s and 1940s as a cure to Muslim global problems. The book also provides an analysis of the possibility of having a pure Islamic state as envisaged by some Muslim scholars. It also analyzes the relations between the Egyptian state and the Muslim Brotherhood.
2. **Enid Schildkrout:** *People of the Zongo* (1978): This book's perspective is sociological. It provides a detailed survey of the nature of the Zongo community in Kumasi. It also deals with the origin of the Muslim community in Ghana and specifically the growth of the Zongo. The book is relevant because it provides information on the earlier relationship between Muslims and the northern empires which was facilitated by the influx of Muslims to the southern part of Ghana. The book is relevant because it deals with the major occupation of these early Muslim settlers at the court of Ashanti Kingdom.

3. J. O. **Hunwick**: *Islam in West Africa 1000-1800 A.D.*: This book was edited by J.F Ade, Ajayi, and Idun Espies. The book is primarily a handbook for teachers and students. It gives information on the origin of Islam in West Africa and concludes on the origin of Islam in the modern Ghana. The book is relevant since it traces the origin of Islam in North Africa to West Africa and the personalities involved in the Islamisation of a section of the Ghanaians.

4. Mervyn Hiskett: *The Development of Islam in West Africa* (1984): This book is historical in perspective. It provides an in-depth history of Islam in West Africa. The relevant aspect of the book deals with Islam in the area of the Volta from 1267 A.H. (1889 C.E) is of interest to the researcher in several ways, because it deals with the historical background of Islam in Gonja, Dagomba, Mamprusi, and northern Mossi. It also discusses Islam in Wa, as well as Salaga. It also treats extensively Islam in Ashanti and the major contributory factors to the growth of Islam there. The book is relevant because it provides a detailed account of the origin of Islam in the various kingdoms in Ghana and the nature of Islam in various communities.

5. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab: *Kitab al-Tawhid* (1996): Translation, Compilation and Research Department, Dar-us-Salam, Makkah, Saudi Arabia. The book represents the teachings of the Wahabiyya movement otherwise known as Ahlu-Sunnah Wal Jama'a, its author being the founder of *Wahhabism*. The book serves as a standard guide and reference for Wahabis beliefs and practices in the world.

6. **David Owusu-Ansah:** *Talismanic Tradition in Nineteenth-Century Asante* (1991): This book documents Muslim engagement in the Asante Empire from 1795-1820. It contains the various modes with which Asante engaged the Islamic world, ranging from scholarly to administrative purposes in the chiefs palaces to spiritual and commercial purposes. The book is very relevant to the research because it gives a comprehensive and detailed account of Muslims engagement with the Asante Kingdom.

7. **S.H. JAFRI:** *The Early Development of Shi'ah Islam* (1989): This book was written by a leading *Shi'ah*. It provides an adequate and comprehensive history and major doctrinal teachings of Shi'ism. All the various stages of Shi'i religious activities are given as is a thorough analysis of every regime; the origin as well as the circumstances leading to the emergence of some Shi'i doctrines and beliefs is described. The book gives the researcher a true historical perspective of Shi'ism as well as its teachings.

Political materials consulted included the following:

8. **Hamid Enayat:** *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (1986): Here the major distinguishing features of Shi'ism in relation to Sunni'ism are discussed. The major beliefs of the two doctrinal groups are analyzed by means of a discussion of the chronological evolution of Sunnism and Shi'ism .More importantly, the book also discusses the concept of the Islamic State, based on the views of Muhammad Rida, a renowned contemporary Muslim scholar and a former Mufti of Egypt. The book is relevant in that it exposes the researcher to the actual beliefs of the two doctrinal groups as well as their major doctrinal differences. Also, the book

provides the researcher with the notions of the ideal Islamic State, as expounded by the modern Muslim scholars. In short, the book serves as a yardstick in analyzing contemporary institutions in Muslim states and the parallels they have with similar institutions in non-Muslim states and presented a broader picture as to the basis of Islam in the modern world.

9. *A New Civilization Upsurge* (2000) edited by the World Call Islamic Society: This is a compilation of speeches and papers presented at the conferences of the World Islamic Call Society from 1970-1995. The book contains the major speeches of the Libyan leader presented at the conferences where he defined his political philosophy. The book is quite relevant in the sense that some of the speeches of the Libyan leader depict the dichotomy between the Islamic world and the West, and what he perceives as the machination of the Western imperial powers and their Zionist allies against Muslims. The book also addresses what he perceived to be the causes of terrorism and the type of terrorism practiced by the West.
10. Ayatollah Seyed -Ali Khomeini: *Cultural viewpoints of the leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran* (2000): This is the major ideological work of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. It helped the researcher understand the nature of the Iranian revolution and its underpinning philosophy, as well as its major distinguishing features as compared with those of other Islamic revolutions.
11. Jalalad-dine Madani: *Islamic Revolution of Iran* (1996): This book deals with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the major events leading to it. The personality of Ayatollah Khomeini as a factor in the success of the Revolution is also dealt

with. To him religion is politics and this view is presented in the book as the spirit of a revolution in which the interest of the masses was the focal point. The fight against imperialism, colonialism and the rights of workers are issues addressed by the Imam. The book is relevant to the research, because it gives a thorough background to the kind of politico-religious institutions existing before the Revolution and the new ones introduced thereafter and provides information as to the views of some Muslims on the interconnectedness of the Revolution and Islam.

12. Kwakuvi Azasu: *Understanding the Green Book (1989)*: This is a commentary on *The Green Book* prepared by the World Centre for the Studies and Researches into *The Green Book*, Ghana Chapter, Accra. It highlights the Libyan political socialist view as espoused by the Libyan leader Col Muamar al-Gadhafi. The author surveys the major components of *The Green Book* which he considers to be political, economic, and social. A contrast between *The Green Book* and other political systems and ideologies was made and analyzed. The Communist Manifesto, Marxism, and Capitalism are touched upon. Al-Gadhafi claims that the book is the latest attempt to reorganize human society and to address the concern of the masses. The book is relevant because it addresses some social issues pertaining to religion.

13. G. K. Nukunya and Tom Kumekpor, *Readings on The Green Book (1990)*: This is a collection of articles on the Green Book, compiled by the World Centre for the Studies and Researches into *The Green Book*, Ghana Chapter, Accra. The articles were written by Ghanaian academics on the teachings of *The Green Book* on political, social, and economic issues as pertaining to it. The book is relevant

because it helps the researcher understand the attitudes of Ghanaian academics towards *The Green Book*. It also discusses its impact on Ghanaians and Ghanaian Muslims in particular.

As observed, the literature reviewed so far did not highlight Ghanaian Muslims relationships with Muslim diplomatic missions and the American embassy in the post independence Ghana. Similarly, the role of the Muslim diplomatic missions and the American embassy in the dissemination of specific brands of Islamic discourse and new religious ideas were not explored. The present work thus attempts to fill in this vacuum in the academic literature.

1.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The primary focus of this research was on the role of Muslim diplomatic missions and the American embassy in disseminating Islamic ideas in the post independence and the post 9/11 periods in Ghana. My dimension of analysing the interconnection of certain Islamic ideas with some states and their origin in Ghana could not entirely be attributed to their vitality in modern Ghana. Also, diplomatic missions and Islamic scholars were selected for the purposes of the research. Because of this selection, the research could not claim to reflect the attitude of entire Ghanaian Muslims towards global issues and the activities of Muslim missions in the country accurately.

1.11 STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTERS

The thesis has been structured in nine chapters. The first chapter which is the introduction covers the following areas: background to the study; statement of the problem, aims and objectives, hypotheses, research questions, theoretical framework, methodology, data

collection, scope of the research, literature review as well as the relevance and limitations of the study.

The chapter two discusses the origin and the development of Islam in the Volta Basin and Gold Coast in the pre-colonial and colonial times. This was presented in historical perspective. Attention was paid to the various means through which Ghanaian Muslims interacted with the Muslim world and the origin of Islam in West Africa. These included trade and commerce, quest for religious knowledge, Hajj and the policies of the colonial government.

Chapter three focuses on the role of post-independence Muslim missions in the development of Islam in Ghana. The historical background of Ghana's diplomatic relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Libya was described. Again, the chapter identifies certain personalities and organisations that promoted and fostered relations between the Muslim communities of Ghana and those Muslim states.

Chapter four looks at North African transnational Muslim bodies and Muslims in Ghana. Primarily, this chapter focuses on the contributions of Egyptian and Libyan embassies and their affiliate institutions to Muslim development in Ghana. Specifically, contributions to Ghanaian Muslims in the areas of education, health, construction of Islamic centres (mosques), agriculture and women's empowerment were identified. It also describes the specific expressions that these Muslim diplomatic missions introduced into the Ghanaian Muslim community.

Chapter five discusses the Middle Eastern Transnational Muslim bodies and Muslims in Ghana. It focuses on the role of the embassies of the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran in Muslim development. Certain institutions and NGOs which are affiliated to and connected to these religious interests are further discussed.

The tide of Islamic resurgence in the Muslim world and Ghanaian Muslims' reaction to this was discussed in chapter six. This is done in the light of the specific Islamic expressions which are tied to the selected political regimes. Specifically, the researcher focuses on the emergence of Shi'ism in the global religious terrain and the role of the Iranian Revolution in attracting a section of Ghanaian Muslims to Shi'ism. Significantly, *Wahhabism*, now known as Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah, is a religious doctrine which emerged in the latter part of the 18th century in Arabia. It later proliferated throughout the Muslim world as another expression of Islamic resurgence. Lastly, Islamic socialism as in the Libya's politico-religious theory, the Third Universal Theory (TUT), is another form of Islamic resurgence which affected Ghana and Ghanaian Muslims is discussed.

Chapter seven discusses the United States' interest in the Ghanaian Muslim community in the post 9/11. This creates a platform for Muslim transnational contacts with the United States officialdom in Ghana. Issues discussed include:

1. the Islamic basis for relations between Muslims and non-Muslims,
2. avenues through which Muslims and non-Muslims can cooperate,
3. the contributions of the United States to Ghanaian Muslims community,
4. the motive behind the United States relations with Ghanaian Muslims,
5. the Muslim perception of the United States before and after 11 September, and
6. whether Islam is in perpetual conflict with Western values.

Chapter eight covers the thrust of the United States' involvement in the Muslim community to which her war on terrorism has a direct relevance. The areas covered include the following:

1. causes of terrorism,
2. impact of terrorism on Ghanaian Muslims
3. how terrorism can be eradicated
4. role of Muslim *Ulama* in combating terrorism, and,
5. factors affecting their role.

Chapter nine is the conclusion and also makes some recommendations.

1.12 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is relevant because it is the first time that a study on the impact of transnational contacts on Ghanaian Muslim's doctrinal orientation has been undertaken. Many of the issues explored and discussed, and the linkages drawn between them, have not been the subject of previous studies. This study certainly helps increase the store of knowledge of Muslim religious doctrines as they affect Ghanaian Muslims, the extent of the contributions of diplomatic missions to the Muslim community, and Ghanaian Muslim perceptions on terrorism. All these issues are extremely relevant in contemporary times and need a detailed examination. That is what the study has set out to examine.

CHAPTER TWO

FOREIGN MUSLIMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM IN THE VOLTA BASIN AND THE GOLD COAST IN THE PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL PERIODS

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter traces the historical background of Islam in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. It does this by identifying the unique ethnic and socio-cultural identity and the background of those who facilitated the transnational contacts between the people of the region. It also establishes the major conduits through which Islam was spread through these interactions.¹ The chapter also deals with the type of Islamic doctrinal worldview facilitated by the transmitters of Islam. Lastly, it analyzes the effects of the Islamisation on some of people of the region. Before delving into the thrust of the thesis, a brief background of Ghana becomes necessary in order to lay the ground for the origin of Islam in the country.

The modern day Ghana, which was previously referred to by the successive colonial masters as the Gold Coast was carved out from the traditional kingdoms in the Volta Basin. It is located in West Africa and bordered by Cote d'Ivoire to the West, Burkina Faso to the North, Togo to the East and the Gulf of Guinea to the South. The Gold Coast attained political independence from the British colonial masters on the 6th March 1957, and thereafter the name Ghana replaced the former. One finds in Ghana the most impressive display of European military architecture in Africa. These forts, mostly British and Dutch, mark the country as a centre of Africa's notorious slave trade when it was colonised. From the glories of the medieval Ashanti kingdom to the heady days of the continent's first successful

¹ Interaction in this sense means the interface and mode of relations, which might include, economic, social and political. The other alternative meaning of the word interaction is engagement. Therefore, these two words would be used interchangeably.

independence struggle, Ghana, despite its relatively small size, has played appreciable role on decolonization in Africa. The modern day Ghana "evokes" both the ancient Empire of Ghana and the riches of the "Gold Coast," as the area was called by the British (Swift, 2009: 36). Observers note that the abundance of gold, timber and kola nuts drew Europeans to its shores first to trade for these goods and then to buy slaves (Swift, 2009: 36).



The country Ghana is abundant with a lot of natural resources which include gold, timber, industrial diamonds, bauxite, manganese, fish, rubber, petroleum, silver, salt and limestone. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Ghana has roughly twice the per capita output of the poorest nations in West Africa.

The population of Ghana, according to the year 2000 Population and Housing Census Report is 22,409,572. The dominant ethnic group is African at 98.5 percent with the European population at 1.5 percent. Ghana is an ethnically diverse and religiously pluralistic country. The dominant ethnic group comprises the Akan, Mole-Dagbani, Ewe, Gurma, Grunsi, Ga, Guan, Mande-Busanga and other minority tribes like Hausa, Fulani and Zabarma. The year

2000 Population and Housing Census estimated that Christianity is the dominant religion having 68.8% of the population, followed by Islam 15.9% and traditional religion 8.5%.

The religious landscape of Ghana is diverse though could be viewed from Northern Muslims and Southern Christian Ghana. The Muslim population in the north are concentrated in the old traditional kingdoms like the Gonja, Dagbon, Mamprusi, Wala with a significant Sissala natives who also adhere to the Islamic faith. Many of the indigenous Ghanaian tribes from the middle belt to the south are rather Christians. However, Islam has gained ground in the extreme south especially among the Fante through the pioneering work of Abubakar from northern Nigeria and two of his Fante disciples Benjamin Sam and Mahdi Apah. A significant number of Muslim populations are found scattered in the southern Ghana in quarters known as the *Zongos* (Muslim segregated settlements).

Unlike the early Muslims who settled in the north, many of the southern Muslims are latter immigrants from neighbouring West African states like the natives of Kotokoli, Chamba and Basila from northern Togo, Dendi from the Republic of Benin, Hausa, Fulani, Baribari and Yoruba from Nigeria and Mali. Other immigrants Muslims include the Moshi from the Burkina Faso and Zabarma from Niger.

In the political sphere, Muslims have been actively involved and in some occasions contested elections. The Muslim Association which was formed as an educational and a cultural organisation in 1938 transformed itself into Muslim Association Party (MAP) and joined opposition to Convention Peoples' Party (CPP) of Kwame Nkrumah. It was however disbanded in 1957.

In spite of their less numerical strength, Ghanaian Muslims in recent times have been fairly represented in the national politics and most often vie for the Vice President of the Republic. As parts of their national recognition in Ghana, Muslims have been given two National Holidays, the *Eidul-Fitr* and *Eidul Adha*. The Islamic faith is further recognised in major national ceremonies. The authority of Muslim leadership in Ghana is invested in the Office of National Chief Imam (ONCI), while the Ahmadis represent different leadership structure, the Ahmadi Muslim Mission.

2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA

Islam, Muslims claim, is the first religion of all human persons irrespective of race.

Established historical thought, however, sees Islam as a world religion that originated when Muhammad received his first divine revelation in the year 610 C.E.

Islam from the Arabia through the North Africa is known to have made its first contact with West Africa in the 7th century C.E, through the agency of Uqba b. Nafi. Peter Clarke (1982: 10) is of the view that West Africa made its first contact with Islam in the 8th century by means of the trans-Saharan trade routes from North Africa. The main attraction of West Africa to the North Africans was the slave trade: commerce, and not missionary zeal. The commercial attractiveness to this region was evidenced by the availability, and the prospect, of obtaining gold from the ancient kingdoms of West Africa (Clarke 1982: 12)

These transnational contacts between the Muslims of the North and the West Africans facilitated the conversion of certain ethnic groups to Islam. For instance, the Sanhaja Berbers tribes were the first West Africans to be converted to Islam through trading activities.

Clarke (1982: 13) concludes that, the realization that West Africa was the 'land of gold' made it the focus of greater attention in North Africa. It then attracted increasing numbers of Muslim traders to the commercial centers of West Africa (Clarke, 1982: 13). This, of course, suggests that the major thrust driving North African Muslim contacts with the West Africa was trade. It, eventually, ushered in the gradual orientation of West Africans to the North African Islamic culture, with its attendant implications as to the future cultural identity of some West Africans. The lack of in-depth religious acumen by the original transmitters of Islam in West Africa was to later affect the fortunes of Muslims there.

It could be discerned that, trade and, particularly, the slave trade facilitated the initial transnational engagement with the North African Muslims and the West Africans. Later Mande traders of the Western Sudan, who were to become very influential in the propagation of Islam in the Volta Basin, were converted to Islam through the influence of the North African, Islamized Berbers.

Trade and commerce constituted the earliest method by which the peoples of the whole region were converted to Islam. That was the case, also, in the area of the Volta Basin. All of the new converts to Islam became part of a larger Muslim world. Later, scholarly activities, the *Hajj*, the activities of the colonial governments, and the role of immigrant Lebanese as will be explained later increased this sense of belonging to a wider Muslim world. It is, however, worth stating that every Ghanaian interaction with the Muslim world has had its unique undercurrent and dynamism.

2.2 GHANAIAN MUSLIMS' ENCOUNTER WITH THE OUTSIDE MUSLIM WORLD THROUGH TRADE AND COMMERCE

It is on record that the Mande Muslim traders, who were originally associated with the Mali Empire and popularly known in West Africa as the Wangara, were the first Muslims to have facilitated relations with Muslims in the Volta Basin. This they did in the early part of the 15th century by settling in the Akan forest of Begho, near Wenchi in the present Brong Ahafo region of Ghana (Hiskett; 1962: 45). The main driving force behind the Mande traders' adventure in the forest belt of the Volta Basin and, for that matter in the Gold Coast, was the availability of gold and kola nuts. The enterprising nature of the Mande traders has been variously referred to as 'Commercial Diasporas' in the Western Sudan because they traveled far and wide during their trading engagements(Hiskett, 1962:45). They then transported their merchandise back to Jenne and Timbuktu for onward transportation to North Africa.

Hiskett (1984: 45) argued further that Mande traders even traded with the Portuguese around Elmina before the end of the 15th century. This report did not mention any early Gold Coast people who had converted to Islam. The exception however was in Bono, where the King Ali Kwame, and the royal family had adopted Islam after he had traveled to the Western Sudan to learn mining in the latter part of the 16th century (Hiskett, 1962:133).

This early encounter of the peoples of the Volta Basin and, for that matter, of the Gold Coast with the Mande traders resulted in some of the people of the Gold Coast embracing Islam. Thus Islam was introduced into the region, with all its attendant socio-cultural and political implications for its adherents.

The doctrinal background of these early Mande traders suggests that they were Ibaddiya but later embraced the teachings and practices of the Maliki School, following the Al-Moravid

conquests (Hiskett, 1962:133). Consequently, the Maliki School became the dominant School in the Western Sudan, and, more particularly the Gold Coast (Hiskett, 1962:133.).

The movement of Mande traders from one place to another made them very influential in the spread of Islam in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. For instance, it is said that as result of their trading activities, Mande scholarly community in Timbuktu arrived at Dagbon around 1700 C.E. These Mande scholars were known in Dagbon as *Yarnas*, which was the Mande word for religious leaders (Hiskett, 1962:122). This means that, while in the forest belt of the south the scholarly identity of the Mande traders was not fully established, that of the early Mande settlers in Dagbon were known. However, one could not rule out the possibility of trade as the major motivating factor of the *Yarnas* settlement in Dagbon. This is because not much is known about the role of *Yarnas* in Dagbon religious affairs. Despite this, the *Yarnas* could be regarded as the first religious leaders to have facilitated the transnational contacts of the Dagbon people with the wider Muslim world through trade.

Some people of the Gold Coast were also drawn to the transnational Islamic influence because of the triumph of the Fulani Jihads in the Hausaland in 1804, with the resultant expansion of Hausa trade in West Africa. The success of this Jihad resulted in the spread of Islam to other parts of West Africa, including the Gold Coast. Their impact was greatly felt, not only in the northern part of the Gold Coast especially Dagbon, but also in other parts of the country. Again, the major motive which attracted the Hausa-Fulani from Northern Nigeria to the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast was trade rather than any missionary zeal (Letvzion, 1968: 5). This therefore underscored the fact that, these early traders did not intend to convert the Gold Coast people to Islam. Therefore, any such conversion that they might have initiated was incidental and accidental, not deliberate.

Although, the Wangara and the Hausa-Fulani were the first groups in the West African sub-region to have facilitated the religious interaction with the people of the Volta Basin, the intensity of their religious orientations and socio-cultural dynamics associated with each group differ. For instance, it could be stressed that the Hausa-Fulani clerics were considered to be stricter and more learned than the *Yarnas*. Perhaps, the effects of the Fulani Jihad in the Hausaland reinforced the strict Islamic background among the more populous Hausa which later impacted on the Hausa settlers in the Volta Basin. This shows, therefore, that the people of the Volta Basin have undergone two types of Islamic orientation through their encounters with the early Muslim settlers. As a result, they absorbed different Islamic influences and traditions from these groups of early Muslim settlers in their respective societies.

To reiterate, the first phase of the people of the Volta Basin's interaction with regional Islam took place during their encounter with the Wangara or Mande traders whose Malian socio-cultural background was a latent form of Islam. The second phase was their encounter with the Hausa-Fulani who had less compromising and stricter attitude towards Islam. The significance of this period was that the Volta Basin Muslims' interaction with the Wangara, the Hausa and the Fulani created their linkage and connection with the regional Islam, which was West African in nature. The prevailing socio-cultural conditions in the place of origin of these early scholars affected the Volta Basin Muslim's perspective of Islam in the pre-colonial and colonial periods.

It is worth noting that one remarkable effect of the Hausa's trading engagement in the area of the Volta Basin has been that it has facilitated the emergence of certain trading centers in the region. This further enhanced the interaction between people of the Volta Basin and the Muslim communities in West Africa. The most notable centre was the Salaga Market in the

Gonjaland which emerged in 1775 as a Hausa-speaking town (Hiskett, 1962:51). The major commodity, which attracted people from the Muslim world especially Timbuktu, Bomo, and Hausaland to Salaga, was kola nuts. The kola nut was cultivated in the Akan forest and transported to Salaga where it was sold to the Hausa and the Bomo traders. The Hausa occupation of Salaga was important because it created conditions for the later Mande and Hausa penetration into the Ashanti Empire (Levtzion, 1987:2). This implies that the Ashanti Empire was to come under the influence of Hausa and Mande because of their trading expedition.

It has been argued that the Hausa kola trade brought Hausa merchants into Gonja as early as the middle of the 18th century. This is because the Muslims, whom Ndewura Jakpa met at Kafaba, claim to have come from Hausaland. Some of them were said to be Beriberi (Berbers) (Braumah, n.d:22). Also, it has been claimed that the name ‘Gonja’ originated from the Hausa expression ‘*Zani gun dza goro*’ meaning ‘I am going to the place of the red kola nut’ (Braumah, n.d:22). Buipe in the Gonjaland was the market centre in northern Ghana until 1930. The market was transferred to Salaga when Buipe became the battlefield for the struggle between the Ashanti and the Lata N’Gbanya (Lata’s clan).

The influence of the Hausa and Mande nationals was felt on the trading activities in the years following the founding of Salaga market in the northern territories that the task force officer, ‘Kil M buwura’ ensured that people patronized (Braumah, n.d: 22). This was done to curtail the possible boom in the Ashanti market through the movement of the traders from the north to the south.

Among some of the Hausa names for the Salaga market were:

1. *Kuntuag pa so*: the battlefield of the hyena.
2. *Asiga dad aria, fita da kuka*: one enters it with joy and laughter; one departs wailing
(Brammah, n.d:23).

These show the extent of the intensity of peoples' patronage of the market. It also shows the attractiveness of the merchandise in the market because people might overspend at the expense of other equally important commodities. Lastly, the use of Hausa here shows the extent of the Hausa's influence in the Salaga socio-cultural background in these northern territories.

Information available on the structure of the Hausa caravan to the Salaga market indicates that it used to have a well-organized leadership. This is because each caravan used to have a leader known in Hausa language as the *Madugu*. Among his responsibilities was the choice of the routes and halting places, the settlement of disputes, and negotiations with local chiefs about tolls. Other caravan leaders of the Hausa traders were known as *Jagaba*, the guide, while the *Uban Dawaki* the one who collects payments for tolls, assisted the *Madugu*.

Significantly, every caravan used to have a *Mallam*² (a Hausa word for a religious leader), whose role among the group was to officiate on matters of Islamic rituals. He was a literate person so in addition to leading the caravan in prayer, he kept the records and had the prerogative of choosing a suitable or prosperous day for the trip.

²Mallam means in Hausa a learned person or a religious leader. It is a corrupted word from Arabic *Mu 'alim*, meaning a teacher.

It is argued that it was through these *Mallams* that Islam made significant impact on the trade routes (Levtzion, 1987:2). This is because; some of the traders would withdraw from the caravan and settle with the chiefs if their services were needed. Such a *Mallam* was given a wife, probably the daughter of the chief. In this way a small Muslim community would start growing. Furthermore, when the *Mallam* settled in a particular community he became the host of foreign traders and visitors and, in that capacity; he was referred to as *Maigida*, or House Master, Host or Landlord, playing the role of mediator between the caravan and the community (Levtzion, 1987:2).

More Gold Coast people were introduced to Islam through the activities of these settled *Mallams*, who encouraged their colleagues to settle in the same spot and intermarry with the local people. Thus the influence of the Hausa caravan on the trade routes and the various communities into which they were absorbed was significant. The activities of these Hausa caravans give an indication of the other roles played by the Hausa during their trading expedition to the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. Consequently, the activities of these caravan leaders, whether *Madugu*, or *Maigida*, was to become a mark of identity of certain families in the southern Zongo communities in Ghana. Thus some of the families preferred to attach such nomenclature to their families' identities such as *Madugu*, and *Maigida*, reminiscent of the role played by their grandparents for Islam during their commercial expeditions. This tendency shows the extent of the impact of Hausa culture on the Muslim territory in the Gold Coast and, of course, contemporary Ghana. When Salaga Market declined due to the Civil War of 1892, the Muslim traders moved to the newly emerging trading centers such as Atebubu, Kete Karachi, and Kintampo (Abass, 2005: 35).

Ashanti is another area where West African Muslims contributed to the development of Islam in the Gold Coast and modern Ghana. The account of Muslim engagement with the Ashanti suggests that the early Muslims who settled in Kumasi were trade representatives and commercial agents guarding the interests of the northern kola nuts traders.

In the southern part of Gold Coast, especially from 1835-1865; the Muslim traders formed the nucleus of the Muslim community in Accra. For instance, the 1865 Report of the *Select Committee* of the Colonial Government indicated that Muslim merchants, who were living in James Town in Accra, were plying their trade between Accra and its neighboring countries (Dretke, 1968:29). This, therefore, suggests that the southern Gold Coast Muslims had relations with regional Muslim communities of West Africa through trade. The settlement of these early traders in Accra created the opportunity for the spread of Islamic ideas in the south. This was to be further nurtured and promoted through other means, such as scholarly activities and the annual pilgrimage to Makkah.

An important point worth emphasizing here is that the Colonial Masters in the Gold Coast also maintained trade relations with the Arab or the Muslim countries. The countries through which such trade relations were transacted were from North Africa to the Middle East. In 1923, the Gold Coast colony traded with North African countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. While in 1924 and 1925 the Gold Coast trade relations were further extended to Saudi Arabia and Libya in addition to the aforesaid countries (Jonah, 1986:160). Though such trade relations were related to importing goods from these countries, much is not known about the type of goods that were imported from those countries. However, the Gold Coast timber was the major commodity that was exported to the North Africa and the Middle East. It can be concluded that such trade relations with predominantly Muslims

countries in the colonial period did not have any significant impact on the nature of Islam in the Gold Coast, partly because the colonial interest dictated the pattern of the trade relations.

13 SCHOLARLY ACTIVITIES AND THE SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE

Scholarly activities of the early Muslims also enhanced the introduction of Islam to the Gold Coast. It is interesting to note that the early Muslim traders were literate and religious scholars. In the course of their trading expeditions in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast they linked Ghanaians with the Muslim communities of West Africa, the Islamic culture and ideas of the Hausa and Mande.

Since these early Muslims were literate, the courts and palaces of the chiefs were the first centers which initially came under the influence of Muslim scholars. This is particularly noticeable in the northern and the Ashanti kingdoms. These scholarly engagements in the chiefs' courts and palaces were not unique to the Muslim literates in the Volta Basin and northern territories. This is because these scholars have historically assumed administrative roles in the ancient kingdoms especially, in Koumbi-Saleh, the ancient Ghana Empire's capital. This was also the case in the Mali and the Songhay Empires. It was, therefore, in the main as the product of such scholarly centers within these early empires that Islam came to the Gold Coast and what is now modern Ghana.

The distinctive role played by the Muslim scholars in the palaces in the pre-colonial and colonial periods was in rendering spiritual services. This could be discerned from the role of Muslim scholars in the ancient kingdoms of modern Ghana, such as the Ashanti, Dagbon and Gonja, where they were very instrumental in solidifying the political leadership of the northern kingdoms, especially the Gonja and the Dagomba empires. For instance,

Muhammad AI-Abyad was the Muslim advisor and Imam to Jakpa the conquering warrior-hero and the King of Gonja (Hiskett, 1962:120). He was very instrumental in assisting the King through spiritual means to win most of his battles. The spiritual support Jakpa obtained from Muslim scholars attracted the attention of the Dagomba chief. This was the beginning of the Islamisation of the chiefs' palaces in Dagbon. This tendency shows the Islamic religious and spiritual influence on the leadership of the various communities in which they settled. It also shows the gradual shift of the traditional leadership from depending on their indigenous spiritual beliefs to Islamic spiritual services. With this predisposition towards Islamic spiritual services in the palaces, a new development in the area of alternative spiritual services was introduced into the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast.

Similarly, the role of the Muslim scholars in the Ashanti Empire could also be discerned from their literacy and the potency of their spiritual services. This could be seen from the fact that the Ashanti, upon realizing the roles played by Muslim literates and the nature of the Muslim spiritual services in the northern Kingdoms, began to demand the services of Muslim clerics and literates within the palace.

By 1816-1820, the influence of Muslim scholars was greatly felt in the Ashanti Empire, especially in the court of the Asantehene. This was as a result of the numerous services and roles that they played in Ashanti's government as court scribes and keeping accounts and records on trade and matters relating to war. Some of the Muslim scholars also served in the army, performed magical and religious services, acted as ambassadors for the kings on foreign missions, and as hosts for visitors from distant countries in the north including the Mossiland, Hausaland, Timbuktu, and North Africa due to their literate background (Levtzion, 1987:182).

An important role played by the northern territories' chiefs in the development of the Ashanti Empire and its government at the time was that those in the Gonja and Dagbon kingdoms used to send religious scholars and priests to the Ashanti to assist the king in winning his battles. Notable among these were Baba, Kantoma, and Suma. These religious leaders also manufactured charms and amulets for the Asantehene's courtiers (Levtzion 1987:182).

The zenith of Ashanti-Muslim relation was reached in the reign of Nana Osei Kwame (1777-1803). This was when, for the first time, Muslims were recruited into the royal household (*gyaasewa*) mainly to render spiritual services to the Asantehene and the Ashanti Kingdom at large. These services to the Ashanti Kingdom included the manufacture of charms and amulets, giving advice on policies, and determining the direction of Ashanti foreign policies. The military wing of the kingdom was also influenced by the Muslims. For instance Owusu-Ansah records that the Ashanti army, which invaded Fante State in 1807, had 'an Arab medical staff with the responsibility for recording casualties and attending to the wounded (Owusu-Ansah, 1991:9). Not much, however, is known about the ethnic background of the 'Arab medical staff, whether they were natives of West Africa or Arabs. It could, of course, be concluded that 'the Arab medical staff in this sense might refer to the written language used by Muslim scholars who might well have been West African nationals. The impact of Islamic spirituality on the Gold Coast facilitated by the Islamized nationals of West Africa who used Arabic as the language of religious communication and instruction can be clearly seen here.

As mentioned above, the influence of Muslim scholars, and therefore Islam, on the Ashanti Kingdom was felt particularly through their engagement with the Ashanti royal family, especially Nana Osei Tutu who was on the verge of embracing Islam. He was endeared to

Islam by the power of the Muslim spiritual services offered to the palace. It is on record that Nana Osei Tutu overtly expressed his belief in the potency of the Quran, once saying, I know that book [the Quran] is strong and I like it because it is the book of the great God, it does good for me, and I therefore like the people that read it '(Owusu-Ansah, 1991:10). It is noted, further, that the spiritual services of transnational Muslim scholars were demanded beyond the borders of the Gold Coast. A case in point was that, in 1817 the Ashanti government once invited one Sharif Ibrahim to pray for the king and make sacrifices to ensure the success of the Ashanti wars (Hiskett 1962:120).

It is also on record that in 1777 Asantehene Nana Osei Kwadwo, upon realizing the administrative and literacy abilities of the Muslim merchants in Kumasi, initiated an administrative reform programme for his empire. The main targets of the administrative reform were the Muslims who became the personnel of the reform administrative set-up. Interestingly by 13th AH/ 19th CE a *madrasa* (school) had already been established at Buna, west of the Black Volta to train Ashanti civil servants. The medium of instruction was undoubtedly the Arabic language. The training school was headed by one Abd Allah b. Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Watarawi (Hiskett, 1962:133). Consequently, this centre attracted scholars not only from the Ashanti and the Volta Basin region but also from Senegambia (Hiskett, 1962:133), thereby increasing the Gold Coast Muslims' transnational encounter with regional Islam through the activities of the individual *Mallams* at the school.

Perhaps, an important observation in respect of the early Muslim scholars' engagement with the Ashanti Kingdom was that they were in Ashanti to pursue their own personal interests with an eye on the benefits that they would derive in rendering spiritual and administrative services to the kingdom. Their aim was not necessarily to disseminate Islam. Most of the

Muslim clerics were merchants by profession, plying their trade between the Ashanti and the neighboring West African countries. This then shows that their personal interests overrode their responsibility to propagate Islam in the kingdom. This attitude of the Muslim scholars was to affect the nature of Islam in the kingdom as well as the material benefits that they have received in the court of the King. Similarly, although the Ashanti political leaders benefited from Islamic spiritual services, but Islam did not make converts at the Ashanti court.

When discussing scholarly activities as a conduit of transnational contacts between the people of the Gold Coast and the Muslim world, one cannot ignore the contributions of Muslim scholars in strengthening the encounter among the new converts to Islam. Of special significance were the activities of Umar Kreke of Kete Krachi and Alhassan Jarah of Salaga. They both came from the northern part of Nigeria and settled at Kete Krachi and Salaga respectively in 1870.

Umar Krake was noted to have written a great deal on theological and historical subjects and composed a number of poems of a polemical nature on Christianity. It is even argued that before the rise of Salaga and Kete Krachi, Gonja had had its share of Muslim intellectuals spearheaded by al-Hajj Muhammad b. Mustafa, an historian who wrote a history of the Gonja in 1752. These pioneer scholars in the Gold Coast turned Salaga, Kete Krachi and Gonja into centres of Islamic scholarly activities in those days. Umar Krake in particular was also noted to have been a scholar who used to travel the length and breadth of the country, especially during the month of Ramadan when his school was in recess. Some of the areas to which he traveled to disseminate Islam included Tamale, Yendi, Mamprusi, Ashanti and Tetemu (Kpong) (Abdul Razak, 1996: 51). Such trips of Umar to parts of the Gold Coast had

reinforced the faith of many Gold Coast Muslims at that time, thereby raising his status as a prominent Islamic scholar.

The role of these transnational Muslim scholars in the development of Islam in Ghana in the pre-colonial and colonial periods cannot be underestimated. The major role that they played in the development of Islam in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast relates to their being the torchbearers and repositories of the faith in the region. This was manifested in the Islamic educational centers that they established within the areas they settled. Through these centres, Islamic orientations and ideas were imparted to the Muslims. They also engaged in the dissemination of religious ideas to other Muslim settlements in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. This in a way strengthened the faith of the Muslims in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. In addition, they rendered spiritual services to the Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These spiritual services raised the prestige of Muslims among non-Muslims in the Volta Basin. It also indicates the all-encompassing nature of the religion on almost every aspect of a Muslim's life. Despite this, the spiritual services rendered by the Muslim clerics in the court of the chiefs did not result in the conversion of the chiefs in the Ashanti Empire. This might have been due to the fact that these Muslim scholars' did not see themselves as missionaries but rather as spiritual consultants. This situation therefore affected the extent of the conversion of the indigenous Ashantis in the kingdom. This is contrary to what is obtained in the northern kingdoms, where the Muslim scholars regarded themselves as spiritual consultants as well as missionaries. This eventually facilitated the virtual Islamisation of the northern kingdoms.

2.4 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Maintenance of diplomatic relations was another means through which West African Muslims facilitated transnational Islamic influence in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. For instance, it is said that the early traders who settled in Kumasi represented not only their trading interests but also acted as political representatives between the northern rulers and the Asantehene (Hiskett, 1962:134).

These reached their peak when the northern territories became tributary states to the Ashanti kingdom in the 18th century. As a result, the northern Muslim leaders used to delegate some of their religious leaders to Kumasi to pray for the Asantehene. Subsequently, the Asantehene appointed his personal Imam among the northern Muslims around 1860, this being *Imam Al-Bilad* (the official Imam recognized by Asantehene). Gradually, the holder of the title was made a member of the king's council. It is said that the present day Asante Muslim community in Kumasi (*Asante Nkramo*) who have become fully integrated into the social and political life of the Ashanti Kingdom were descendants of these early Muslims (Schilkdrout, 1978:68).

Ashanti diplomatic relations were not limited to the northern territories, but went beyond the Gold Coast. It is said that by the early 18th century Ashanti had established further diplomatic ties with the Moshi Kingdom of Wagadugu (Ouagadougou) in Burkina Faso, which was already Islamized by that time (Hiskett, 1962:133). Not much is known about the extent and the nature of such relations. However, it must be emphasized that these diplomatic ties helped spread Islamic ideas and practices in Kumasi and reinforced Ghanaian interactions with the Muslims in the West African sub-region.

Significantly, within the same century the Ashanti Kingdom also established diplomatic and friendly ties with Ahmad b. Muhammad (Ahmadu Lobbo), the ruler of Masina in Mali. This diplomatic relationship was attributed to Muslim civil servants who were serving the Ashanti Kingdom (Hiskett, 1962). Such diplomatic ties with the kingdoms in the region fostered close relations between the Ashanti and the larger Muslim *Ummah*.

A close observation of the Ashanti Kingdom's diplomatic relations with Muslim kingdoms in West Africa in the pre-colonial period does not give any evidence of any considerable impact on the development of Islam in the Gold Coast. This was because the diplomatic relations were fostered on friendly bases and purposes even though these kingdoms were Muslims. Furthermore, the overriding motive behind the Muslim kingdoms' diplomatic relations with the Ashanti was not religious. Nevertheless, Owusu-Ansah (1987) employed the concept of cultural borrowing to explain the inability of the Ashantis to adopt Islamic way of life. By this, the Ashantis harnessed aspects of useful Muslims skills such as administrative and Muslim spiritual services for the advancement of their Kingdom at the expense of embracing Islam.

On the other hand, impact of these kingdoms on the development of Islam in the Volta Basin and Ashanti Empire could be seen, even if remotely. This could be seen on the fact that the diplomatic relations created the awareness of Islamic ideas and the Muslims' way of life among the Ashanti at that time.

From the discussions above, it can be seen that the Islamic influence in the Volta Basin and much of the Islamic activities from the 15th century until the close of the 19th century were spearheaded by the Hausa, Wangara and Fulani scholars from the West African sub-region,

without any traces of indigenous Gold Coast Muslim involvement in *Da'wa*. For instance, Umar Kreke, the great pioneer scholar in the Volta Basin and Gold Coast as stated earlier migrated from the Northern Nigeria and initially settled at Salaga and subsequently at Kete Krachi. Through his religious activities in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast, he turned Salaga and Kete Krachi, the then booming market centres, into the centres of Islamic of learning. The same could be said of Alhassan Jarah who also settled at Salaga at the same time with Umar. He was a Dendi native from Dahomey (the Republic of Benin).

The apparent reason for the Islamic propagation (*Da'wa*) being spearheaded by the non-indigenous Ghanaians was that efforts were not made by these early scholars to reach out to non-Muslims and indigenous Ghanaians in the process of their *Dawa* as a result of linguistic barriers. This meant that the early indigenous Gold Coast Muslims did not benefit from any hands-on experience from the *Da'wa* activities. It could also be that the indigenous Gold Coast Muslims were not fully imbued with Islamic culture and knowledge by that time. Little could have been known about them and they certainly could not have been actively involved in *Da'wa* activities. It could partly be that the indigenous Ghanaians did not attach importance to *Da'wa* as a result of the influence of the Suwarian tradition which made them to limit the practice of the faith to themselves while respecting the worldview of others (Wilks 1989:98). It was towards the close of the 19th century and in the early 20th century that some indigenous Gold Coast Muslims joined the *Da'wa* terrain. Notable among them was Alhassan Atta of Accra, a native of Gonja and a great disciple of Umar Kreke. Ibrahim Amartey was another indigenous scholar who emerged within the Ga Muslim community in the 20th century.

It could also be discerned from the various means by which the present day Ghanaians encountered the regional Islamic world that the influence of the West African Islam on the Gold Coast Muslims in the pre-colonial and colonial periods was overwhelming. However, there was a period when Ghanaian Muslims, through their Islamisation, also impacted considerably on the outside Muslim world. For instance, out of the Zongo in Kumasi in the latter part of 20th century a puritanical Islamic group emerged. Subanu Muslimin, an Islamic organization founded in the Francophone West Africa metamorphosed in Ghana with the name Ansaru-Sunnah Islamic Society. It was founded in 1972 in Kumasi. The background of the founders of this organization suggested that they were migrant Muslims from Mali and Niger. The group was very instrumental in propagating austere Islamic ideas between Kumasi and Niger. Its pioneer scholars were educated and trained in Kumasi. This meant that the members undoubtedly would have been influenced in their propagation activities by the prevailing socio-cultural environment of Ghana. The activities of this group were not limited to Ghana but cut across the sub-region of West Africa. This shows that aspect of the Ghanaian religio-cultural impact on the sub-region. The group now has branches in Ghana, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria (Iddriss Ibrahim, interview, 15th March 2005).

2.5 HAJJ AS A MEANS OF GHANAIAN INTERACTION WITH THE OUTSIDE MUSLIM WORLD

Pilgrimage or Hajj also created an avenue for Gold Coasters and for the present day Ghanaian Muslims to interact with the Muslim world. This exposed (and continues to expose) Muslims of the region to international Islamic practices and standards as obtained in Arabia and the Gulf as a whole. The role of the pilgrimage in strengthening the faith of the present day Ghanaian Muslims and offering them international exposure had its historical antecedents. For instance, it is reported that Yahaya b. Ibrahim, at one time the leader of the Sanhaja Berbers in the Western Sudan, went on pilgrimage to Makkah in the year 1036 C.E

accompanied by a number of chiefs and an expert in Islamic law, Jawhar b. Sakkum (Clarke, 1982:14). Consequently, Yahaya b. Ibrahim came to realize the need for a reform in the practice of Islam among his people. He requested that an Islamic teacher from Kairouan be sent to help reform Islam among his people. It is also said that Mansa Musa of Mali Empire performed Hajj in the year 1324 C.E. He consequently brought an Arabian Sharif to Mali to reform Islam in his empire.

It is said that Umar Kreke of Kete Krachi, a pioneer Gold Coast Muslim scholar in the 20th century, went on a pilgrimage to Makkah in 1913 via Cairo and subsequently in 1917 and 1918. This has not however contributed to the adoption of Arabian Islamic tradition, *Wahhabism*, but rather the West African *Tijaniyya* Islamic worldview. He was originally a Qadiriyya by doctrinal background but the pilgrimage reinforced his new orientation of Islam. This was because, he was given the *Tijaniyya* litany (*Wird*) during the Hajj, and this exposed him to the *Tijaniyya* order for the first time in his life. He subsequently became the bearer of the order in the whole of the Gold Coast. As a result of his new orientation, *Tijaniyya* became the dominant sect in the Gold Coast and Ghana, largely through his activities (Abdul Razak, 1996:45).

The early accounts of the performance of Hajj by Muslims in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast show how enduring and cumbersome it was to perform the religious duty. A major impediment was a lack of a reliable means of transport. Adamu Umar Kuta, a centenarian and a pioneer Muslim scholar at Nima in the Greater Accra region and a former Hajj agent from 1940 to 1976 gave account of how the Hajj was organized in the Gold Coast.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries prospective Muslim pilgrims traveled by road to perform Hajj (Adamu, interview, 11th May 2006). This meant that a pilgrim must be physically fit and capable of withstanding any fortitude and hardship on the way. The usual norm was that prospective pilgrims would identify a particular agent within a particular community who also know some people who intend to perform the Hajj within that particular year. Normally, prospective pilgrims within Accra during the years 1820 to 1944 do not exceed more than 19-30 people in each year (Adamu, interview, 11th May 2006).

Pilgrims undertaking Hajj from the early 19th to early 20th century used camels, donkeys, and horses as a means of transport. A rich person among the prospective pilgrims could employ the services of a transport (camel, donkey, and horse) owner to convey him to the next town but always in a convoy (Adamu, interview, 11th May 2006). According to him the major routes were Accra to Lome in Togo, Lome to Dahomey (Benin), Dahomey-Lagos, Lagos-Jos, and Jos-Bomo or Madugri all in Nigeria. From Nigeria, the pilgrims then cross over to Farlumi in Chad then to Hadari a border town between Chad and Sudan. In Sudan the pilgrims would then travel to Labai and make use of a train to Khartoum, then on to Sawakin to embark upon a shipping vessel to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia (Adamu, interview, 11th May 2006). The informant intimated that the role of the agent in most situations was to lead the pilgrims to the next town or direct them to somebody who would take charge of them in that town. Such a person would then lead them to the Immigration Office for clearance. He would also lead or direct them to another town or a person in another town. This was the trend until they reached their final destination (Adamu, interview, 11th May 2006). He emphasized that a journey from one town to the other always could take a week or two by walking, or two days by a means of transport. He further indicated that, in all, the trip would take about five to six months for a person to reach Jeddah. At Jeddah some of the pilgrims employ the services of

camel owners to convey them to Makkah, which is, 73 kilometers day's journey from Jeddah to Makkah that is with a means of transport or two days walk by road. In all, Hajj trip takes about a year or more for a person to return home, that is, from the date of embarkment (Adamu, interview, 11th May 2006). Because of the huge financial resources that pilgrims require to embark upon the journey some of them engage in menial work in the course of the journey to Hajj to earn some money so that they could continue with the journey to the next town. It is argued that some groups sometimes took as much as five (5) to eight (8) years from the date of departure from home to that of return. Such groups were generally made up of people who worked along the way to earn money to continue with their journey.

Adamu, the interviewee, identified Alhaji Norga, Alfa Togma, Alhaji Alawiye and Alhaji Mai Zongo as being among the Hajj agents in the Greater Accra area who facilitate Muslim transnational connection with the Islamic world through Hajj. Adamu showed the interviewer his passport, issued in July 1943 by the British Colonial Office in Accra, so the Colonial Government approved routes to Hajj as designated in 1944. The routes were Lagos to Kano, El-Obied to Sawakin, then Khartoum to Egypt and to Jeddah. According to him he performed the Hajj in July 1943 with his late father and returned in May 1944. Because they had sufficient funds they were able to return within eleven (11) months, from August 1943 to June 1944.

2.6 THE POLICIES OF THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

With the advent of colonialism in the Gold Coast, the present day Ghana witnessed a different means of transnational Islamic influence in the Gold Coast. This was through the Colonial Government's policy of recruiting Muslims from neighboring British West African colonies into the army and the police force. For instance in 1872 the Colonial Government

recruited the Hausa constabulary from Nigeria into the Gold Coast (Dretke, 1968:24-29). These Hausa Muslims constabulary consequently played a significant role in reinforcing the regional character of Islam in the Gold Coast. These emigrant Hausas eventually gained recognition from the Colonial Government and became the official mouthpiece of Muslim leadership in Gold Coast. Even before the deployment of the Hausa police, Muslim slaves who had been freed by the Dutch had settled at Java Hill in Cape Coast. The Dutch bought these slaves from the Ashanti Kingdom to fight their wars in Java and at the end of the wars they were settled in Elmina and got pensioned when old (Dretke, 1968:24-29). Furthermore, during the British-Ashanti wars in 1873 a batch of 150 Hausa constabulary was transferred from Lagos to the Gold Coast to strengthen the British front. By the close of 1900 the number of Hausa police (who were invariably Muslims) in the British army was almost up to a thousand. It is said that some Muslims were even recruited from Sierra Leone (Dretke 1968:24-29).

Whatever the purpose of the Colonial Government in recruiting Muslims as the core of their security forces, this practice facilitated the regional character of the Ghanaian Muslim community and resulted in its subsequent dominance by leaders whose origins could be traced to other countries in the sub-region of West Africa.

2.7 THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANT LEBANESE

Ghanaian Muslims also encountered another level of transnational contact with the Muslim world during the colonial period. Emigrant Lebanese settled in the Gold Coast in 1884 becoming the first Arabs (Habushi, interview, 17th July 2005). It could also be said that they were the first Arabs that the Gold Coast people might have spoken Arabic with which, in a way, gave meaning to them for being Muslims. This is based on the fact that there is a thin

ine between Arabian and Islamic culture. In addition, the present day Ghanaian Muslims' interaction with the Lebanese serves as an exposure of their understanding as to how Arabs behave. The significance of the Lebanese interaction during the colonial period with the people who are now Ghanaian Muslims was that, the Ghanaian Muslims felt for the first time that they had within their own country interacted directly with people from Muslim world beyond the West African geographical boundaries. This represented a different level of the Gold Coast people's encounter with the global Muslim world, which is Middle Eastern in character.

It must be emphasized that these early Lebanese were wrongly and variously referred to as Turks, partly because, they were then under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. They were also referred to as Portuguese on account of their complexion and because they were the first expatriates after the Portuguese to settle in the Gold Coast. Lastly, they were also called Syrians because of the similarity between them and Syrians, partly due to the Arabic language spoken by both groups (Habushi, interview, 17th July 2005). This was further reinforced by the Gold Coast's colonial government census classification of Lebanese and Syrians as one homogenous group (Akyeampong, 2006:307). The first Lebanese to settle in the Gold Coast in 1884 was William Ibrahim Chebib, a Christian (Habushi, interview, 17th July 2005). Others followed, as a result of the favourable accounts of economic and political conditions prevailing in the Gold Coast. The majority of the Lebanese in Ghana came from northern Lebanon, especially Tripoli and its surroundings (Habushi, interview, 17* July 2005). Generally, the Lebanese in Ghana fell under the umbrella organization called the Lebanon Society, which addresses problems of welfare of members in Ghana. In the religious sphere, it is interesting to note that about 80% of the Lebanese in the present day Ghana are adherents of the Sunni school of Thoughts, whereas the *Shi'ah* Lebanese constitute about 15% and the

Christians representing 5% (Habushi, interview, 17th July 2005). Doctrinal wise, the Lebanese Sunnis were much in tune with the Salafiyya Islamic identity preached by the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh in the 19th century. Salafiyya is embedded in Muslims' quest for true religious identity and emphasizes purifying Islam from both Sufi mysticism and foreign influences, while aspiring to emulate the West in technological and scientific advancement (Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol 2, page 3). Muhammad Abduh preached this brand of Islam in Beirut, Lebanon in 1882-8 among Muslim intellectuals (Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol 2, page 3). The emigrant Lebanese Muslims who initially settled in the Gold Coast were invariably imbued with this Islamic tradition (Habushi, interview, 17th July 2005). Salafiyya is akin to *Wahhabi*, as they drew their religious inspiration from the *Wahhabi* revolution in Arabia.

The history of the early Lebanese Muslims engagement with the Gold Coast Islamic *Ummah* is very obscure, since it has not generated any academic interest in Ghana. Perhaps, this could be due to the fact that the major motivation for the early emigrant Lebanese to settle in the Gold Coast was trade. Nevertheless, traces of their religious interaction with the Gold Coast Muslims could be found in the form of religious centres that they established such as mosques and Islamic education centres in the areas in which they initially settled, including Saltpond, Sekondi, Suhum, and Swedru (Habushi, interview, 17th July 2005).

Moreover, being expatriates in the country their involvement in national politics always generates mixed feeling from the section of the indigenous Ghanaians in recent times (Akyeapong, 2006: 303). This attitude of the indigenous Ghanaians towards the Lebanese is not different during the colonial period. They had always regarded the Lebanese and Syrians as the auxiliary of the colonial masters. This in effect hampered their political integration at

that time (Akyeapong, 2006: 301). Further, documents obtained from the colonial archives regarding the registration of Syrians and Lebanese in French West Africa in 1943 also suggests the dilemma that the Lebanese in the Gold Coast encountered in respect of their integration into the colonial security establishment. In French West Africa where the initiative was taken to register them, they interpreted it as a preliminary move to mobilization, since this measure has not been taken in Algeria and Morocco. The Lebanese and the Syrians in the Gold Coast also viewed such action with apprehension as similar action could be introduced here. It is however worth stating that their enlistment into the British security system at that time suggests that they prefer to join the Home Guards (largely made up of the white) as against the African Platoon (mainly made up of the blacks).

This could not however be said about their religious integration as they interacted with and contributed towards the development of Islam and Muslims collectively with the indigenous Muslim population. The pluralistic Ghanaian religious environment which allows for freedom of association as well as freedom of religious worship necessitated this. Having inculcated sound Islamic education into their offspring who now represent the third generation of Lebanese in Ghana, with equal rights like any other citizen in Ghana, they have manifested and put into practice their engagement with the Ghanaian Muslim *Ummah* in various ways.

In order to protect and promote the interests of Islam and Muslims in Ghana, the Lebanese formed the Ghana Society for Islamic Education and Reformation. This organization provides an avenue through which they interact with the Ghanaian Muslim *Ummah* in various fields of concern such as the propagation of Islam and education for Muslims. Because of the wealth they possess and the type of Islamic training they have acquired from their parents, the

Lebanese business community in Ghana constructed the Madina Islamic School situated at Madina in Accra in 1985 which primarily provide education to Ghanaian Muslim students. The school runs programmes from primary to the junior secondary level. The Society also constructed an ultra-modern senior secondary school in 2001 at Kwame Nkrumah Circle in Accra, known as Ghana-Lebanon Islamic Secondary School (GLISS), a reminiscent of cordial relationship between their host country, Ghana, and their motherland, Lebanon. The school runs various programmes from business studies to general arts and science. In addition, die Lebanese community established an Islamic Theological Institute at Madina called the Islamic Teachers' Training Institute. This was because of their concerns about the nature of Islamic *Da 'wa* in the country. The institute was established in 2000 to produce quality *Du 'at* (Islamic preachers) with a view of propagating Islam in the country.

One area that the Lebanese also distinguished themselves in their engagement with the Ghanaian *Ummah* is the granting of scholarships to the under-privileged Ghanaian Muslim students. It is estimated that not less than 1500 Muslim students are enjoying various forms of scholarships granted by the Lebanese business community in Ghana. In order to accomplish this they set aside a portion of their business profit as *Zakat*, an Islamic social security system for the under-privileged in the society. An interesting aspect of Lebanese engagement with the Ghanaian *Ummah* is that some members of the Lebanese business community sponsor some of their hardworking employees to perform the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Makkah.

Quite apart from the Lebanese group's facilitation of Ghanaian Muslims' Islamic orientations, some individual Lebanese also played tremendous role in facilitating their engagement with the outside Muslim *Ummah* in one way or the other. One of these is M.M

It is important to reiterate that, though the origin of the Lebanese in the present day Ghana pre dates the colonial period. I decided to stretch the nature of their engagement with Ghanaian Muslims to the 21st century. This will enable me provide a holistic dimension of their engagement with Muslims in Ghana

Hamoui who came to the Gold Coast in 1929 at the age of 13 years and was educated at Koforidua Methodist Primary School in the Eastern region. In 1945 he registered a transport company under the name “Tarzan Transport” (Hamoui: 1984). In the late 1940s he operated as one of the early transport owners in the country plying Accra, Kumasi, Tamale, Sekondi, Denu, Jasikan, Keta, Kete Krachi, and Lome. The services of the company were subsequently extended beyond the borders of Ghana so that by 1948, he was the only transport owner whose services were demanded by Ghanaian Muslim pilgrims to Saudi Arabia who were usually transported from Ghana to Sudan where they were then conveyed by train across the Red Sea to Jeddah for the annual pilgrimage.

Hamoui was in charge of transporting Nigerian, Sierra Leonean, and Ivorian Muslim pilgrims to Sudan until 1956, when the Chadian government made it difficult for foreign commercial vehicles to drive through their territory with passengers. He was a distinguished personality who also transported the Ghanaian exhibits to the Cairo International Agriculture Fair by road in 1960 via Khartoum, from where they were conveyed by rail and river transport to Cairo. Through his transport activity, he facilitated Ghanaian Muslims’ engagement with the Muslim world. His business transactions possibly resulted in the exchange of cultural products through the pilgrimage and trade fairs (Hamoui: 1984).

It is therefore not surprising that he was singularly handpicked by the late first President of Ghana, Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah, as a member of Ghana Ex-service Union, which was later known as the Ghana Legion. He was honoured and adopted by the then James Town Mantse Nii Adja Amugi in 1963 as a member of the Palace under the name Kwashie Kodjo due to his contributions to the Ga community (Hamoui: 1984).

A unique contribution that the Arab Lebanese Muslims have made to Ghanaian Muslims in recent times is in the area of the media. The Metropolitan Television Station (Metro TV) is a joint venture between some Lebanese Muslims and the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC). The major individual shareholders are Talal Fatal and his brothers. Metro TV has become a source of major Islamic religious propagation in Ghana. The television station was established in 1999 and allocates free air time for Ghanaian Muslims on Fridays to exclusively propagate Islam. The interesting dimension of the Islamic religious broadcasting at Metro TV is that air time has been allocated to a section of Ghanaian *Ulama* to propagate Islam in the major Ghanaian languages especially in Akan, Ga and Hausa. For instance, the *Islamic Highlight* programme is aired in Akan and Ga at different times on Fridays. In order to give Islam the national character that it deserves the English language is also employed in the propagation of Islam through a programme called *Islamic Insight*. The compatibility of Islam to science as well as the scientific basis of Islamic beliefs and teachings is the subject matter of another religious programme being aired on Metro TV, known as *Islam and Science*.

Al-Nisai is the Muslim women religious programme on Metro TV. This programme was designed to address the socio-cultural and religious problems confronting the development of Muslim women in Ghana. In all, Metro TV, being managed by a section of the Lebanese community in Ghana, has assisted in bringing Islam into the public sphere. It could also be said that the Lebanese Muslim community has facilitated the Islamisation of Fridays on the Ghanaian media landscape from morning to noon through the medium of Metro Television.

To sum up, Ghanaian Muslims of Lebanese descent were the first Arab Muslims that Ghanaian Muslims directly dealt with. The nature of the intensity of Islamic orientation in

Lebanon was also reflected in the attitude of the majority Lebanese-Ghanaian Muslims in Ghana. This tendency could be seen in their concern for their fellow Muslims and for their role in projecting the image of Islam and assisting the needy Muslims in Ghana. Even though they form the minority Muslims in Ghana, their professional background as businessmen enabled them to contribute more meaningfully than any other group in Ghana. In terms of doctrinal orientation they are strict Sunni Muslims. As a result, they represented the first *Wahhabis* before some Ghanaian Muslim students traveled to the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf for Islamic studies. Although they were not actively involved in the propagation of Islam they used their wealth to promote the religion. Thus Lebanese-Ghanaian Muslims represent another bloc of Muslims in Ghana. Their influence in the Islamic religious terrain is however limited to the capital city of Ghana, Accra, and its environs.

An important issue that has not been addressed within this section is what has been the nature of doctrinal worldview of Muslims in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast? The next section of the thesis attempts to address this.

2.8 THE ISLAMIC DOCTRINAL WORLDVIEW OF MUSLIMS IN THE VOLTA BASIN AND THE GOLD COAST

It is an undeniable fact that Muslims in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast have undergone various types of Islamic orientation and received a variety of ideas about Islam through different periods. The earlier Islamic orientation of the Muslims in the Gold Coast was the Qadriyya, which was overshadowed by the *Tijaniyya*. Two main factors facilitated the *Tijaniyya* outshining the Qadriyya Sufi order in the area of the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. The first factor was the elitist character of Qadriyya. This made the movement appear as a social class of the Qadriyya *Ulama* without any social significance to the ordinary Muslims. The second factor was the rivalry between the Qadriyya and the *Tijaniyya* doctrine

in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. During the colonial period, the *Tijaniyya* became the dominant doctrine in the Gold Coast.

The historical background of the doctrinal orientation of Muslims in western Sudan indicates that Ibadiyya and Sufriyya were the earliest doctrinal groups there. For example, Clarke quoted Al-Zuhri, an Arabic scholar who related that the Berber traders who facilitated the Islamisation of West Africans through their trading expedition held doctrinal beliefs similar to those of the Ibadites and the Sulrites, all of which were branches of *Kharijites* (Clarke 1982:12). There were considerable evidences showing that businessmen in Tahert, and the inhabitants of Awdaghost, Zawila Sijlimasa were all Ibadiyya in doctrinal orientation. This was around the late 8th and the early part of 9th centuries (Clarke, 1982:12). These orientations emerged with a view to addressing certain perceived needs and defects in the society at the time. It was therefore argued that one of the motivating factors for the rise of the Al-Moravid movement was the need to rectify the perception that Islam in ancient Ghana was unorthodox. Consequently, the Al-Moravid's conquest facilitated the orientation of the Muslims in western Sudan towards Maliki school of thought (Hiskett, 1984:45). This was because of the doctrinal background of the leader and the founder of the Al-Moravid movement, Abdullah b. Yasin who was doctrinally a Maliki. This was also entirely due to the educational orientation, he acquired from his tutors in the North Africa. Thus, Abdullah b. Yasin also enforced the Maliki doctrine among his students who eventually became the later *Ulama* in the western Sudan (Clarke, 1982:14). The Sanhaja Berbers, when they were thoroughly islamised, took up the role of propagating Islam in the Western Sudan and thus facilitated the spread of the Maliki *Madhhab*, or School.

Again, the other most important personality who influenced the orientation of West African Muslims was the North African scholar Al-Maghili. He became an advisor to Muhammad Rumfa of Kano. It is believed that he was a Maliki, as well as a Qadriyya in mystical orientation. His writings became the standard point of reference to Uthman Dan b. Fodio (Hiskett, 1984:150). Eventually, Uthman Dan b. Fodio was influenced doctrinally and thus his newly found Islamic orientation affected the entire region of northern Nigeria which he conquered. The success of his conquests also affected the religious orientation of the people of the Volta Basin on account of the pioneer Hausa traders' settlement in the Volta Basin and in the Gold Coast.

In the area of Volta Basin, specifically, Dagbon, Gonja and the Ashanti Kingdoms, the early scholars and traders who settled there in the pre-colonial and colonial periods were Maliki in doctrinal orientation. The strong evidence for this view is found in what Hiskett recorded around 1955 about the academic qualifications he obtained in Wenchi. This shows that students tended to link the type of academic qualifications that they received to the Maliki School of law. In this case, the student identified the type of academic qualification he acquired with his teacher's orientation. The teacher in turn identified the teacher who taught him and so on back to Imam Malik b. Anas, the founder of the Maliki School of law (Hiskett 1984:57).

A majority of Muslims in the West Africa, and more particularly in Ghana, still resort to Maliki literature to orient their students on Islam, including the *Tijaniyya* and the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'a (*Wahhabiyya*) doctrines. The fundamental Islamic jurisprudence literature which are still in use in the Islamic schools were all authored by the disciples of

Imam Malik b. Anas. It suggests a common ground of Islamic education at the primary education level.

The other observation in respect of early Muslim mystical orientation in the Volta Basin is that they belonged to the Sufi Qadriyya order. This was during the time when the Qadriyya order was the dominant mystical and popular movement. Abdul Qadir Jaylani founded the movement in the 6 AH/12th CE century in Baghdad. This Sufi order then spread to North Africa and was adopted by the Sanliaja Berbers in the Western Sudan of the Sahara. It is on record that one Kunti Sidi Ahmad Bakkai of the Kunta family was very influential in spreading the Qadriyya order in the western Sudan (Hiskett, 1984:47). This was done by means of his preaching tours and that of the Kunta clan as a whole while trading. It is recorded that Sidi Ahmad Bakkai was in Bomo in 843 A.H /1439-40 C.E. as part of his preaching and trading tours (Hiskett, 1984:47). The major criterion of distinguishing the Qadriyya from non-Sufi orientations was the emphasis put on the mystical interpretation of the Quran. The major Qadriyya doctrine, which distinguishes it from that of non-Sufi groups, is the ability of a person to achieve absorption in God (*fana*), through self-denial and fasting. Also peculiar to them is their doctrine on the personality of Muhammad, who to them, is the perfect man (*insan al-Kamil*) and also *Afdal al-khaleq* 'the most excellent creation' (Hiskett, 1984:48).

The origin of the Qadriyya movement in the Volta Basin is traced to the Wangara traders who through their trading activities spread the doctrine. Hiskett (1984:250) indicated that early traces of Qadriyya teaching could be found in Mamprusi as well as the Ashanti in 1221-2 A.H./1807 C.E. Much is not known about the specific personalities who spread this mystical

order. However, Qadriyya might have been facilitated by the traders and early *Ulama* from northern Nigeria and Jegu (Benin).

The Qadriyya mystical order of Muslims in the Western Sudan and North Africa could be regarded as the prevailing wider orientation likewise in the region of the Volta Basin and the former Gold Coast. The evidence of the Qadriyya order being the general religious orientation in West Africa could be seen in the fact that most Muslim scholars in the Western Sudan, including the leader of the Fulani, upheld such an orientation (Hiskett, 1984:251). These leaders included the Jihadist Uthman Dan b. Fodio in the northern Nigeria and Umar Kreke in the protectorate areas of the northern part of the Gold Coast (Hiskett 1984:248). The Qadriyya movement thus became the dominant mystical orientation in northern Nigeria. The early Hausa traders who originated from the Northern Nigeria were of Qadriyya order in mystical orientation. They conducted their trading activities and settled in the Volta Basin, the Gold Coast and, specifically, around the Salaga market in the Northern Region of present day Ghana. According to Charles Stewart, the trade routes were the major assembly points and teaching centres for the dissemination of the Qadriyya order (Stewart, 1965: 24). This was the trend up to, at least, the frontiers of Ashanti. The mystical background of Umar Kreke, a renowned Muslim scholar in the 20th century was Qadriyya. This was certainly a renowned Muslim scholar in the 20th century until his performance of Hajj, when he changed his orientation to that of *Tijaniyya*. He eventually became the bearer of the Tijaniyya order in the Gold Coast. It could safely be concluded said that, his earlier disciples were therefore of Qadriyya in mystical orientation until his encounter with Tijaniyya mysticism in Makkah in 1913.

The mystical orientation of the people of the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast was, therefore, to compete with the Tijaniyya order. Tijaniyya order was founded by Ahmad al-Tijani in 1815 in Cairo. He later moved to North Africa at Ayn Madi in Fez and set up his own *Zawiya*. The movement spread from North Africa to the western Sudan.

The spread of the Tijaniyya order in the Volta Basin was recorded by numerous sources. One such source indicates that Umar al-Futi, a *Tijaniyya* by orientation, might have spread the *Tijaniyya* litany to some Wangara in Bobo-Dioulassu (Burkina Faso) (Stewart 1965:27). This was before his pilgrimage to Makkah in 1825. Stewart (1965) indicates that, Umar Tal a *Tijaniyya* by inclination was the first to visit the Gold Coast through the Northern Nigeria (Stewart, 1965:27). This report, however, did not indicate the date when the visit occurred. Moreover, it does not tell us the major role played by Umar Tal in spreading *Tijaniyya* in the Gold Coast. Nevertheless, he might have dealt with the Muslim scholars at that time which in a way facilitated the orientation of the Gold Coast people to the *Tijaniyya* order. Generally, the unanimous view about the advent of the *Tijaniyya* mysticism in the Gold Coast was that with the fall of the Segou Empire in 1889 leaders who were Tijani by orientations dispersed or migrated to the east. This period, therefore, marked the commencement of the active proselytisation of the order in the Gold Coast and Nigeria (Stewart, 1965:28). The proselytisation of the movement created extent of doctrinal tension with the Qadiriyya, the then dominant orientation in the Gold Coast.

The *Tijaniyya* also spread to the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast through emigrant Hausa traders. The traders who had become imbued with the newly emerged Islamic mysticism in Northern Nigeria became its carriers in the course of their trading expedition and activities in the Gold Coast. However, their role in spreading the *Tijaniyya* order is limited to the

application of the doctrine among themselves and they were not able to impart its teachings to others. In addition, the colonial masters' policy at the end of the 19th century of recruiting Hausa constabulary from northern Nigeria to be the core of its police and troops facilitated the transfer of Muslims with a *Tijaniyya* doctrinal orientation to the Gold Coast (Stewart, 1965:29).

The most significant figure who played a remarkable role in the propagation of the *Tijaniyya* order in West Africa was Alfa Hashim, the nephew of Umar Tal. This was when he settled in Madina in Saudi Arabia in order to avoid French reprisals. While in Madina he facilitated the interaction of *Tijaniyya* leadership from other countries with West Africans, normally during the time of the pilgrimage (Stewart 1965:29). He was also known to have corresponded with other West African *Tijaniyya* leaders and given them direction on political as well as religious matters (Stewart, 1965:29).

The religious orientation of the Gold Coast Muslims changed from Qadriyya to *Tijaniyya* when Umar Kreke performed pilgrimage to Makkah in 1913 as observed earlier. During the Hajj, Umar Kreke interacted with Alfa Hashim in Madina and was thus eventually initiated into the Tijani order (Stewart, 1965:30). Consequently, he became the leading figure and the bearer of the *Tijaniyya* order in the Gold Coast. Subsequently, his students followed his example and spread the doctrine to their respective localities. Some of these disciples included Dan Tano in Kumasi and Alhassan Atta in Accra (Stewart, 1965:30). Through them the *Tijaniyya* order ultimately became the dominant Islamic doctrinal and mystical orientation in the Gold Coast.

The religious hierarchical structure of the *Tijaniyya* mysticism was determined by Ahmad Al-Tijani, the founder of the *Tijaniyya* order. For instance, he regarded himself as the *Qutb al-Aqtab* (the pole of the poles) and *Khaim al-Wilaya Muhammadiyya* (the seal of the Muhamadan sainthood) (Abu Nasr 1965:32). Although he claimed to be the *Qutb*, it was not the first time that a Sufi had laid claims to such a title. However, his position could be distinguished from others in that in his claim to be their pole he indicated that he was their chief, meaning that it was through him that other *Qutbs* draw their spiritual authority (Abu Nasr, 1965:32).

Another interesting distinction that Ahmad Tijani gave about the *Khatm al-Wilayya* was that he drew an analogous position between himself, other *Walis* (saints) and Muhammad. This could be seen from the fact that he espoused the view that Muhammad was the embodiment of all prophetic revelations as well as being the last of God's prophets, whereas he, Ahmad Tijani was the complete and perfect embodiment of *Wilaya* and from him all the *Walis* who came before him have derived, and all who will come after him will derive their inspiration (Abu Nasr, 1965:32).

The *Tijaniyya* in the Ghanaian Muslim community could be distinguished from other Muslims through the rites they performed in addition to the five daily prayers. These rites include the recitation of the litanies (*Wirids*), another prayer known as the office (*Wazifa*) and lastly, the participation in the stance (*Hadra*) (Abu Nasr, 1965:40). The most revered liturgies of the *Tijaniyya* order are the *Salatul Fatih* and *Jawharat al-Kamal*, which they sometimes recite for a particular number of times, the rewards for this being equivalent to or above reciting the Qur'an (Abu Nasr 1965:50). This aspect of their belief generates controversy and tension between them and the Ahlus-Sunnah group in Ghana.

In the early part of the 20th century, the West African sub-region did not experience any diverse teachings of the *Tijaniyya* movement until the emergence of Ibrahim Nyass of Khaolakh, Senegal in 1900. His appearance brought into being the *Jama'at Faydat al-Tijaniyya* (the *Tijaniyya* community of grace) in West Africa. He introduced two new ideas into the *Tijaniyya* movement in West Africa, the first being his concept of *Fay da* (attainment of divine grace). He claimed to have the power to transmit divine grace to his followers. He also introduced the concept of *Tarbiyya* in West Africa, which is the *Sufi* path of seeking Allah through initiation (Abdul Rahim 2003:82). The Ibrahim Nyass brand of the *Tijaniyya* competed with the mainstream *Tijaniyya* of the founder, Ahmad Tijani, over Islamic orthodoxy in Ghana. The *Tarbiyya* ideas popularized by him did generate controversy in some parts of Ghana, especially among the elderly *Ulama*. However in view of the fact that it was the youth within the *Tijaniyya* who embraced the *Tarbiyya* thought, it has gradually replaced the mainstream *Tijaniyya* of the founder as the main dominant *Sufi* thought in Ghana.

The *Tijaniyya* heritage in Ghana has witnessed a new orientation with the introduction of an indigenous and local version, the *Jello Tijaniyya*. Abdulai Maikano, a graduate of Al-Azhar in 1956 was the brainchild behind this brand of the *Tijaniyya*. The *Jello Tijaniyya* emerged as a reaction to the resurgence of *Wahhabi* thought in Ghana which constantly vilified the *Tijaniyya* thought as a whole. In due time, it has attracted a significant number of the *Tijaniyya* youth into his movement. This was further boosted in view of the friendly platform that it has created for the youth during the *Maulud* celebration.³ The *Jello Tijaniyya* is

³ The *Tijaniyya* movement seems to follow a common pattern in respect of its growth in Ghana. There is a relationship between the support the *Tarbiyya* movement enjoyed from the youth and its growth. In a sense, what has worked for the vitality of the *Tarbiyya* thought popularised by Ibrahim Nyass was the fact that he used to enjoy support among the youth and in due time these youth transformed themselves as leaders of the movement in modern time. The *Jello Tijaniyya* also seems to be showing similar pattern of the support of the

popularly known among its admirers as *Akwashi Rawah*, (From the Hausa language, meaning ‘dancing’). This refers to singing and dancing while praising Allah (Abdul Rahim 2003:86).

This needs to put into perspective regarding the national prominence of Sheikh Abdulai Maikano in Ghana. When Abdulai Maikano graduated from Al-Azhar in the early 1956, he joined the Ghana Armed Forces as a Chaplain in 1964, though was dissatisfied with this job later (Abdul Wadud: 426). He resigned from the Army in 1968 in order to focus on religious propagation. The advent of the *Wahhabi* movement in the northern region in the 1960s led by Afa Yusuf Ajura and the challenge it poses to the *Tijaniyya* orthodoxy helped transform Maikano as its vanguard. Maikano was seen as the leading scholar in the north who helped contain the perceived *Wahhabi* menace. He is also known to have followed the *Wahhabis* to other parts of the country to counter their activities (Abdul Wadud: 428). In spite that Maikano religious activities were implicated in many of the doctrinal conflicts from the 1960s to 1990s between the *Wahhabis* and the *Tijaniyya*, he was seen by many followers of the *Tijaniyya* as a leading scholar who defended the orthodoxy of the movement. In the perspective of some Muslims, Maikano’s legacy in the religious sphere has been a very violent one, not only against his *Wahhabi* opponents but against *Tijaniyya* leaders who oppose his perspective of and approach to Islam. He is also celebrated because of his perceived spiritual prowess. Maikano’s legacy in recent times has mostly been embraced by the youth partly because of his liberal inclination and tolerance for youth participation in *Maulud* celebration. His home town Prang in the Brong Ahafo region has become a center of attraction for many of his sympathizers during the annual *Maulud* celebration.

youth and its strength. However its strength in the Muslim public sphere is yet to be tested in the decades to come vis a vis the dominant *Tarbiyya* thought of Ibrahim Nyass.

Currently, the *Tijaniyya* in Ghana is divided between the *Jello-Tijaniyya* and the *Usmaniyya*. The *Jello-Tijaniyya* are those who believe that Abdulai Maikano of Prang in the Brong Ahafo region is their overall spiritual leader. On the other hand, the *Usmaniyya* are the orthodox *Tijaniyya* who draw their leadership inspiration from Usman Nuhu Sharubutu, the present national Chief Imam in Ghana. His *Tijaniyya* heritage is tilted towards Ibrahim Nyass.

The *Jello-Tijaniyya* could also be distinguished from the *Usmaniyya* or the orthodox *Tijaniyya* by the following features:

- (a) The *Jello-Tijaniyya* looks at Prang in the Brong Ahafo region as their source of leadership and inspiration.
- (b) Secondly, most of them are natives of Prang or have relations in Prang.
- (c) They always have an engrossed portrait or image of Abdulai Maikano on their rosary.
- (d) Within their *Zawiya*, the *Jawharatul Kamal* and associated prayers are recited in a different tone and style.
- (e) During prayers, when the Imam rises from the *Ruku* (prostration) and says "*Sarnia Allah Liman Hamidahu*" (Allah has heard those who praised Him'), the congregation will collectively respond louder: '*Hamdan kaseeran tayiban mubarakan fihi*', meaning 'many praises be to Allah'.
- (f) Lastly, after the end of prayers (*Taslim*), the Muazin will instruct the congregation to recite *Fatiha* and *Suratul Fill*.

It is noteworthy that Ibrahim Nyass exerted considerable influence on Muslims in Ghana and West Africa in general in the 1950s. This is in spite of the political and geographical boundaries erected by the colonial masters. In the case of Ghana, there were certain occasions

that he reprimanded and dismissed some Muslims leaders whom he deemed departed from the true Islamic spirit along the *Tijaniyya* line. One such example was his dismissal of one Jaffar Abdulah of deviancy in Islam (Nyass 1962: 86). The accusations against Jaffar could be understood from two dimensions. Aspects of the accusations were related to his claim of being the new Messiah in Ghana as he formed an organization called *Ya 'ti, Ya 'ti* (that he is coming, he is coming in Arabic) and, his claim of being superior to Prophet Musah (Moses) (Baba al-Waiz 1962:88). Secondly, it is alleged that Jaffar also initiated counter Islamic oelieis as reflected in his non-compliance pay back missed prayers and his denial of women to perform waiting period in the event of the death of the husbands. Though, the issues involved revolve around Islamic orthodoxy, it also shows how Ibrahim Nyass wielded his influence in respect of his understanding of Islam over Ghanaian Muslims at that time. For instance there were other occasions that he issued admonition against ethnic division over competition of Muslim leadership in Kumasi when Imam Muhammad Churuma passed away.

The dominance of Muslims orientation towards *Tijaniyya* and in line with its diverse teachings was to be challenged after Ghana's attainment of independence in 1957. This was as a result of Ghana's diplomatic relations with some Islamic countries which are the heartlands of different Islamic orientations. The post-independence doctrinal groups in Ghana represented the official governments' religious orientation, such as the *Wahhabiyya* from Saudi Arabia and *Shi 'ah* from the Islamic Republic of Iran. The emergence of these religious groups in post independence Ghana was accompanied by fragmentation of Muslim authority. The consequence of this, in the case of Ghana was that the *Tijaniyya* orthodoxy was challenged within this period. This was when Umar Ibrahim Imam, the pioneer *Wahhabi* in Ghana was still undergoing *Wahhabi* Islamic education. Despite that Ibrahim may be giving spiritual direction to many of his followers in the sub-region, certain deviancies of his

followers were regarded by the *Wahhabis* as inherently part of the *Tijaniyya* movement. A case in point was when Umar Ibrahim reported him to the then Grand *Mufti* of Saudi Arabia Ibn Bazz, that Ibrahim Nyass movement encourages deviancy in Islam (Umar, interview, **20th February 2005**).

A thorough analysis of the nature of Gold Coast people's interaction with the outside Islamic world in the pre-colonial and colonial periods shows that the interaction was regional in nature, related mainly to the sub-region of West Africa. For instance, the background of the Muslims who facilitated the interaction between the present-day Ghanaians and the Islamic world in that period generally shows that they were Africans of Mande, Hausa and Fulani origin. This, therefore, made Islam in the pre-colonial and colonial periods more of a religion of West Africa than of the Middle East. This is because the socio-cultural influence of the pioneer Muslims was clearly evident in the expression of Islamic perspective in the Gold Coast and Ghana.

Again, the professional background of the majority of the pioneer Muslims who facilitated Ghanaians' interaction with the Islamic world in the pre-colonial and colonial periods reveals that they were traders, who lacked a well-structured leadership and organization. This situation affected the nature of Islam in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. Consequently, the traders' preoccupation was not to spread Islam but rather to be successful in their trading activities. The implication is that the basis of the Islamic perspective as engendered by the traders in the Gold Coast was not from an Islamic viewpoint, but was rather intertwined with their respective indigenous cultural backgrounds. This situation, thus, affected the pace of Islamisation in the Gold Coast and Ghana. The only means through which they spread Islam was through procreation and intermarriages with some sections of the indigenous population.

The other category of people who spread Islam in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast as identified in the research were the Muslim clerics who were in the minority. It could be deduced that their impact in the pre-colonial and colonial periods could be viewed in three perspectives namely, their role:

- (a) among the already Islamised community
- (b) in the courts of the chiefs
- (c) in facilitating the doctrinal and mystical orientation of Muslims in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast.

(a) The Role of the Muslim Clerics among the Islamized Community

The Muslim clerics mainly concentrated their religious role among the already Islamized community. This they did by establishing Islamic religious centres and propagating Islam. They did not make any efforts to reach out to the non-Muslims. This might have arisen due to the age-old Islamic religious training and orientation in the Muslim community, which has been largely inclined towards reformation rather than missionary. By reformative *Da 'wa*, we refer to *Da 'wa* that is aimed at orienting the Muslims towards the accepted Islamic practices and belief systems emanating from the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet. This strategy denied indigenous Ghanaians in the southern part of Ghana the opportunity to embrace Islam

As a result of this, majority of the people in southern Ghana who profess Islam are non-indigenous ('non-indigenous' means somebody whose ancestral lineage could not be traced to Ghana but who could be a citizen by the laws of Ghana) but, rather, emigrant Muslims from the neighboring West African countries. The only exception is the northern part of Ghana, where the wave of Islamisation affected the indigenous people. However, this could not be explained to mean that the early settled Muslim clerics in the north made efforts to Islamize the indigenous people. Rather the traditional leadership's attitude towards Islam was

the major factor in the Islamisation of majority of the northern population. This attitude was evident in the Gonja, Wala, and Dagomba leadership's acceptance of Islam, which then paved the way for the Islamisation of majority of their subjects.

(b) The Role of the Muslim Scholars in the Courts of the Chiefs

This was necessitated by the need for the traditional leadership to make use of Muslim spiritual sciences and the literary background of the clerics. Consequently, the early Muslim clerics were invited into the chief's palaces to mainly render administrative and spiritual services. The outcome of the Muslim clerics' role in the chiefs' courts shows that they rendered spiritual services at the expense of propagating Islam. As a result, the potency of Islamic spirituality was virtually utilized by the chiefs to fortify their regimes and increase their prosperity without any direct benefit to Islam. A typical example is the role of Muslim clerics in the Ashanti kingdom, where Islam did not gain much from the engagement, in the chiefs' court in terms of converts even though the spiritual services rendered by Muslim clerics raised the prestige of Muslims in the kingdom (Owusu-Ansah, 1991:9). The reverse could be said about the Dagbon, Gonja and the Wala kingdoms where the potency of Islamic spirituality in the chiefs' courts resulted in the Islamisation of the traditional settings.

This then brings to the fore the nature of Islamisation in the chiefs' courts, this being significant in unearthing the motivating factor behind the Islamisation of some traditional political institutions. From the analyses above, it is seen that the traditional political setting within a particular society would determine the extent of Islamisation of the community. For instance, the Ashanti traditional political setting, which requires group cohesion on the ancestral and traditional leadership, provides a typical explanation for this scenario. This could be discerned from the fact that the inability of the Ashanti traditional leadership to

embrace Islam resulted in Islam losing its hold in the Kingdom. However, Owusu-Ansah argues that the Ashantis did have selective relations with Muslims. This meant that they considered which aspects of the Muslims' services were useful to their society (Owusu-Ansah, 1987:257). It has also been suggested that Islam did not represent a serious military challenge to the Asante religion (Insoll, 2001: 345). Lastly, the other theory which explains this scenario was that the early Muslims failed to reach out through *Da'wa* to Ashantis because of the invocation of reformist doctrines that they live in a *darul al-harb*, the land of the enemy (Wiiks 1906: 330).

The reverse was the case as regards the Islamisation of the northern leaderships such as the Gonja, Wala and Dagomba where virtually everybody in those kingdoms was converted. It could also imply that the common people in every traditional setting looked to the traditional leadership for inspiration and direction on matters affecting them and their religious orientation. Added to this was the culture of obedience on the part of the subjects towards their traditional leaders. This automatically predisposed them to any orientation of their chiefs. It could therefore be concluded that the attitude of the traditional leadership towards Islam largely influenced the direction of Islamisation in the chiefs' courts. Significantly, Muslim clerics at personal level might have also benefited from their engagement in the chiefs' courts as their peers did in Ashanti Empire.

Levitson (1968: 108) argued that the compromising nature of the pioneer Muslims in Ghana as against the puritanical position represented by Uthman dan Fodio in the Hausaland facilitated favorable conditions for the growth of Muslim communities, secured the position of Muslims in the chiefs' courts and infused Islamic elements into the ceremonies and customs of the communities (especially in the northern territories of

Ghana). This situation, therefore, resulted in the virtual Islamisation of certain ethnic groups in the northern part in the present day Ghana (Letvzion, 1987:108). Based on this perspective, Ghanaian Islam could be distinguished from Islam in the sub-region of West Africa because of the incorporation of some indigenous and traditional elements into some aspects of its teachings and practices.

(c) The Role of the Muslim Scholars in the Doctrinal and Mystical Orientation in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast

It was also observed that Muslims clerics in the area of Volta Basin and the Gold Coast have facilitated the orientation of Muslims towards different types of mystical Islamic orientation (Sufiyya) in the course of history. For instance, the earliest known Sufi orientation of the Muslims in the Gold Coast was the Qadriyya order as early as 1166 C.E. (Letvzion, 1968:245). It was also realized that the viewpoint of the followers of this mystical order was that they interpreted Islam mystically. The adherents of this order believe that through religious confinement (*Khalwa*) a person could achieve 'absorption' in God (*Fana*) (Letvzion, 1987:34). They also developed two major views about the personality of the Prophet, these being those of the perfect man (*Insan Kamil*) and the most excellent of creation (*Afdal al-khalq*). The mystical strata that Qadriyya leaders developed at that time was such that the axis (*Qutb*) or succor of the age, that is '*Ghawth*' occupied the highest echelon of Qadriyya (Hiskett, 1984:245). The holder of this title has the power of performing miracles. On the other hand the elitist nature of Qadriyya created the opportunity for it to be overshadowed by the populist *Tijaniyya* in 1831. The *Tijaniyya* also competed with the doctrines of Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah and Shi'ism in the post-independence period facilitated by Muslim diplomatic missions. The research also shows that the transmitters of the religion in the pre-colonial and colonial periods were not given any governmental or state support. This is in contrast to the nature of post-colonial Islam.

2.9 EFFECTS OF ISLAMISATION OF GHANAIAAN MUSLIMS

The Islamisation of some segments of Ghana has profound effects on Ghanaians. The introduction of Islam in Ghana provided Ghanaian Muslims with a sense of direction in respect of religious orientation towards the Middle East. For instance, it has become axiomatic that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represents the centre of Islam to all Muslims and to Ghanaian Muslims in particular due to the presence of the *Ka 'bah*, the Prophet's mosque and, partly, due to the fact that, Islam originated in what is now Saudi Arabia.

Again, their Islamisation meant that Ghanaian Muslims leaned towards the Islamic world for religious orientation and direction. Historically, Ghanaian Muslims in the pre-colonial and colonial periods depended on religious tutorship from the Hausa, Mande and Fulani clerics and, subsequently, higher institutions of learning in the Arab world. Even though accessibility to higher education in the Islamic world by Ghanaian Muslims during the pre-colonial and colonial periods was difficult, the notion was always that the best Islamic education could be obtained outside Ghana. Consequently, this notion has impacted on the psyche of a section of Ghanaian Muslims who prefer seeking religious *Fatwa* from the *Ulama* of the Two Holy Mosques in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or the Al-Azhar University, both noted in the Muslim world for their long-standing Islamic scholarship. This situation tends to reflect Ghanaian Muslim dependence on and allegiance to the outside Muslim world for religious direction.³ The implication was that the socio-cultural background of the Arab and the Muslim world affected such Ghanaian Muslims who seek religious

³ The Northern Regional Imam of ASWAJ, Ibrahim Basha Idriss told this researcher that there was dispute over holding Islamic education on Thursdays and Fridays instead of Saturdays and Sundays. He sought a *Fatwa* from the Muslim leadership at Al-Azhar in Egypt and in Saudi Arabia, asking for the permissibility to hold Islamic Studies on Thursdays and Fridays. He indicated that the Al-Azhar scholars ruled in his favour on having Islamic Studies on Thursday and Friday, having taken the socio-political environment of Ghana into consideration.

direction from it. This is because the tutors who gave religious direction to Ghanaian Muslims were partly influenced by their own socio-cultural environment.

Another effect of the introduction of Islam on West African Muslims including Ghanaian Muslims is that it has brought them into the orbit of the global Islamic culture. This is evident in the mode of dress and social interactions of Ghanaian Muslims. This argument is predicated on the fact that the general cultural outlook of Ghanaian Muslims is a semblance, if not a holistic imitation, of that of the Middle-East. This is rooted in the argument that Islam is a complete way of life and the tendency of many Muslims to equate Middle-Eastern culture to Islam is ubiquitous.

Subsequent to the introduction of Islam in West Africa, and Ghana in particular, the Arabic language has become the formal religious language in the Ghanaian Muslim community. There are several factors that explain this scenario. To begin with, the Arabic language is a requirement in religious worship since every Muslim is required to recite a portion of the Quran in it when he/she offers ritual prayer. Added to this is the argument that the Arabic language is the language of Islam and it is going to be the medium of communication in the hereafter. Furthermore, the ability to interpret the holy Quran rests on a deep understanding of the Arabic language. Lastly, the leading bearers of the Arabic language in the Muslim communities have been the Muslim scholars who, due to the training they received, predisposed them to speak the Arabic language rather than English as the medium of communication.

Thus, the language of religious sermons delivered in the mosques is Arabic. This is largely due to the availability of the century-old Islamic literature on sermons in Arabic. It has been

observed that most of these sermons do not reflect issues affecting the contemporary Ghanaian Muslim's socio-political needs. However, the sermons tend to give religious direction to Muslims and socio-cultural issues, alas lacking the contemporary dimension to issues affecting Muslims in Ghana.

Furthermore, the adoption of Muslim names or of names of Middle-Eastern origin has been another observable fact about the effect of the introduction of Islam in Ghana. Some Ghanaian Muslims assume that the Muslim names are Islamic and select these rather than their own indigenous names. They are however, quite oblivious of the fact that most of the names pre-date the advent of Islam and could therefore not be Islamic. This tends to somewhat spoil the expression of Muslim names in a Ghanaian's own indigenous language and makes Islam appear as an alien religion. This is despite that bearing a Muslim name serves as the mark of identification of a Muslim in every Ghanaian community. This feature is more apparent among the southerners, especially the Zongo communities, and in the northern part of Ghana. The exception to this tendency is found among the Ga and the Akan Muslims.

Pan-Islamism (Islamic solidarity) is another effect of the introduction of Islam in West Africa in general, and Ghana in particular. This is manifested in the tendency of Ghanaian Muslims to sympathize and support Muslims in other parts of the world at the expense of objectivity and detachment. This might be due to the well-entrenched concept of the Muslim *Ummah* factor which unites Muslims of diverse ethnic and geographic backgrounds together. In short, Ghanaian Muslims tend to identify with the outside Muslim and Arab world on matters of global politics and religious issues. This, therefore, shows the interconnectedness of Ghanaian Muslims with the larger Islamic world through a common religious identity. Islam

thus serves as the best conduit for fostering solidarity between Ghanaian Muslims and the Muslim world. This is manifested in Ghanaian Muslim leaders, especially Imams and *Ulama*, organizing religious forums and prayers for Muslims in other parts of the world who have been afflicted with any tragic event, be it a political, economic or natural.³

At the sub-regional level the introduction of Islam in Ghana has created the dominance of Hausa culture in the Ghanaian Muslim community, especially in the southern part of the country. This might be partly due to the effects of the triumph of the Fulani-Hausa Jihads in the 19th century with its resultant Hausa-Fulani dispersion in the sub-region of West Africa. The most noticeable effect of the influence of Hausa culture is the widely spoken Hausa language in the Muslim community of Ghana. If Arabic is the religious language for Muslims in West Africa, then Hausa is the most widely spoken vernacular language among the Muslim community in Ghana. The net effect of this is that there is the tendency on the part of non-Muslims to equate the ability to speak Hausa with being a Muslim, and being a Muslim with the ability to speak Hausa.

Aspects of Hausa language influence include its dominant use in explaining Islam in the Zongo communities in southern Ghana. This might be partly due to the fact that the Hausa clerics wielded considerable influence in the Islamic religious circles in Ghana and also because of their role in transforming the Muslim community in Ghana. This is because the prevailing type of Islam in the pre-colonial and colonial periods was largely Hausa. It also implies that little effort has been made to convert indigenous Ghanaians into Islam in the southern part of Ghana. For that matter, the impact of Islam on the southern Ghanaian

³ Several instances abound in which Muslim leaders in Ghana organize forums and press conferences and issue press statements calling for the fair political treatment of Muslims in other parts of the world. They sometimes request the larger Ghanaian Muslims to fast and pray for their fellow Muslims bedeviled with certain calamities. See *Daily Graphic*, 25 March 2003: 13.

languages is minimal. Thus, the only medium of communication among the predominantly southern non-indigenous Muslim community is the Hausa language. The exception to this argument is the Ga and Akan Muslim converts who have made frantic efforts to indigenize Islam in the southern part of Ghana through the Ga and the Akan languages under the umbrella organization of the Ghana Muslim Mission (GMM). In contrast, the northern part of Ghana shows the impact of Islam on the indigenous languages. This could be observed in the interpretation of Islam in the indigenous languages in the Dagbon, Gonja, and Wala traditional areas.

2.10 CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion shows that the transnational connection of Muslims in the sub-region of West Africa with the people of the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast changed their religious identity and orientation around the 15th Century. Originally, the people of West Africa were known to be adherents of African Traditional Religion (ATR), the nature of its practices being varied because of the multiplicity of ethnic groups on the continent. This means that with the advent of Islam in the Gold Coast, the new 'African converts' to Islam had to balance their loyalty to their own indigenous traditions, which originally served as a guide of their worldview, vis-a-vis Islam. One could not, however, rule out the fact that Islam also provided an indigenous linkage above the varieties of ATR that transcended ethnic boundaries, leading to a more universal religious orientation.

The thesis shows that the principal transmitters of Islam in the pre-colonial and colonial periods were individual Muslims especially Mande, Hausa, and Fulani traders. It reveals the dual cultural identity of the Fulani, Hausa, and Mande people in respect of their ethnic and indigenous traditions and culture which was intertwined with the Islam that they introduced

into the Gold Coast. This dual cultural identity was to become part of the way of life of some Gold Coasters. The interconnected dual cultural orientation of the original transmitters of Islam is evident in the social realm of Ghanaian Muslims' practice of Islam particularly in the sphere of Muslim marriage, naming, and funeral ceremonies. This view is also buttressed by Lapidus that the Hausa version of Islam has become the standard practice in Ghana especially in the area of marriage and naming ceremonies which tend to follow the Hausa pattern (Lapidus M, 1988: 259). The study further reveals that during the pre-colonial and colonial periods Muslims in West Africa were under one unified leadership exercised by Ibrahim Nyass.

Again, two patterns could be discerned in respect of integration of the ethnic identity of the early transmitters of Islam in Ghana. For instance, in the northern parts of Ghana the transmitters of Islam in the Wala, Gonja, and the Dagbon were fully integrated into the socio-political structures of the respective kingdoms. This situation, therefore, gave Islam the socio-political recognition and legitimacy within these traditional kingdoms. After their integration, these Muslims were not ethnically interconnected with their original homeland Muslims and the *Ummah* consciousness on their part was less intense.

In contrast, the wave of Islamisation in the south was exclusively confined to the migrant transmitters without any strong linkage with the traditional leadership and the indigenous people. This eventually affected the integration of the southern migrant Muslims into the socio-political structures of the Akan and the Ga societies. This view is self-evident in the origin of the Zongos in the southern part of Ghana which is a purely migrant Muslim settlement. The outcome of this tendency was that, it affected the image of Muslims in the south, as it was viewed as the religion of the foreigners and strangers.

The pioneer Muslims in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast engendered various forms of development such as scholarly and intellectual, and also rendered spiritual services in the courts of the chiefs. In the area of trade and commerce the pioneer Muslims were the first agents to facilitate commercial activities between West Africans and North Africans and it was through such trading activities that some West Africans were converted to Islam.

In conclusion, the Islamic way of life, which has its origin in Arabian culture, became part of Ghanaian Muslim culture. The Ghanaian Muslims as a result also represented a triple heritage in their life. That is, the Arabian Islamic culture, the Mande, Fulani and Hausa Islamic perspective and lastly, their own respective ethnic identity.⁴ The specific areas that the role of the Muslims of West African background manifested in the Islamic terrain in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast were in the establishment of educational infrastructures (*Makaranta*), and the facilitation of the Qadriyya and *Tijaniyya* Sufi orientations.

What dimension is unique to the development of Muslims and Islam in the post-independence Ghana? What were the mediums through which Islamic activities were mediated and conducted? The next chapter will attempt to answer these questions.

This paradigm of triple heritage is in sharp contrast to what Ali Mazrui espoused. Whereas his triple heritage holds that African identity has been affected by three global forces namely, Africanity and indigenous Religion. Euro-Christianity and Islam, this thesis also espouses the African triple as embedded the Arabian Islamic culture, the Mande-Hausa and Fulani culture on the other and the indigenous ethnic identity of the new adherent to Islam. For more on this, read Ali Mazrui, 1986, *the Africans, a Triple Heritage*. Published by Little Brown and Company, Boston and Ali Mazrui, 2004, *Nkrumah's Legacy and Africa's Triple Heritage between Globalisation and Counter Terrorism*. Published Ghana Universities Press.

CHAPTER THREE

POST-INDEPENDENCE

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM IN GHANA THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GHANA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SOME MUSLIM COUNTRIES

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the historical background of Ghana's diplomatic relations with some Muslim countries. In the previous chapter the impact of foreign Muslims and the development of Islam in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast during the pre-colonial and colonial periods were discussed. As observed, one unique dimension of Islam in that period was that transnational engagements were facilitated by individual Muslims who contributed to the development of Islam in the area without the support of any state or government. However, the unique dimension of the transnational engagement was the fact that the early migrant Muslims engage with the traditional Kingdoms and empires in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. The post-independence development to be discussed here, however, presents us with another dimension of the transnational factor in the development of Islam in Ghana. It is related to the role of Muslim states or governments and their institutions which facilitated the development of Islam in modern Ghana.

In doing so, an overview of the historical background of Ghana's diplomatic relations with the Muslim world's political institutions (embassies) is necessary if a holistic view of the trend in diplomatic relations is to be had. This will be a prelude to a discussion of the post-independence Islamic influence and impact on Ghanaian Muslims through Muslim diplomatic missions. The historical background will also bring to the fore the nature of Ghana's diplomatic relations with each country as well as the extent to which such transnational political institutions have contributed towards promoting diverse Islamic

expressions and influences on the Ghanaian Muslim communities. It will also identify Ghanaian Muslims' role in the promotion of relations specifically with Egypt, Libya Saudi Arabia and Iran, and their affiliate institutions

We will first focus on the basis of diplomatic relations of the modern state of Ghana and the targeted Muslim countries with a view to:

- (a) defining and tracing the origin of such diplomatic relations and the factors promoting relations with Islamic countries;
- (b) exploring the nature of Ghana's foreign policy and its impact on Islamic countries;
- (c) examining the political undertones in respect of Nkrumah's marriage to Fathia Helen Rizk; and
- (d) reviewing the historical background of Ghana's relations with some Muslim countries, specifically Egypt, Libya Saudi Arabia and Iran.

At this point it is necessary to put into perspective the meaning of diplomatic relations. This will help shed more light on how diplomatic relations are practiced (and executed).

3.1 THE DEFINITION AND THE ORIGIN OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Foreign diplomacy is considered by Satow (1997:70) as the 'application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments of independent states'. This definition shows that the starting point of diplomatic relations is when a country has attained independence or is a sovereign state. It also means that such diplomatic relations does not extend to states which have not attained independence.

Ghana, geographically situated in the Volta Basin and known by its colonial masters as the Gold Coast, attained sovereign status and independence in 1957. This marked the beginning of her diplomatic relations with other independent states, including Muslim countries. Some of the African Muslim states which Ghana formed diplomatic relations upon their attainment of independence were Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, (formerly the Persian Empire), among others, are also of special importance to this study.

3.2 FACTORS PROMOTING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MUSLIM STATES

The rationale behind Ghana's interest in establishing diplomatic relations with some Muslim countries is varied and linked with Ghana's strategic interest in these countries. Such strategic interest displayed by Ghana in the post-independence period eventually facilitated the development of Islam and Muslims in the country. It must, however, be stated that the factors underlining Ghana's diplomatic relations with the Muslim world could be categorized into internal and external. The internal factors of Ghana's diplomatic relations with the wider world as well as the Muslim countries will reveal the rationale behind Ghana's foreign policy.

3.3 INTERNAL FACTORS

As part of his framework for a diplomatic policy, the first President of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, outlined the basic tenets of Ghana's foreign and diplomatic policy at independence. The nature of Kwame Nkrumah's foreign policy represented the internal factors of Ghana's diplomatic relations with other states as well as the Islamic World. The internal factors in this sense are those which influenced Nkrumah's foreign policy direction with the wider world as well as with the Muslim countries. These basic tenets were

eventually adopted by successive regimes, and have become the major benchmark in Ghana's foreign policy. These tenets could be categorized under the following:

1. decolonization;
2. African unity,
3. non-Alignment and positive neutrality;
4. economic emancipation of Ghana and Africa; and
5. membership of strategic international organizations (Adomako, 1995: 26).

The rationale behind Nkrumah's foreign policy with the Muslim countries was corroborated by K.B Asante, his former Personal Secretary and a retired diplomat. Asante asserted that Nkrumah's policy with the Arab and the Muslim nations in Africa reflect his agenda in relation to African unity and non-alignment policies (Asante, interview, 11th May 2006).

Nkrumah adopted the strategy of dealing with the most influential and strongest Arab and Muslim country in order to pave the way for him to deal with other influential Arab and Muslim countries (Asante, interview, 11* May 2006). Coincidentally, Egypt during the post-independence period in Africa served exactly that purpose. This argument is also underpinned by the historical and geographical location of Egypt in the Muslim world. Historically Egypt had played a pivotal role among the Arab nations in terms of leadership in the early years following African independence. Geographically it was (and remains) a strategic crossroad between the African and the Asian continents and through which Muslims from Africa had to pass for the annual Hajj. Furthermore, it had the oldest University in the Islamic world (Hunwick 1990: 40).

The most important personality in Egypt who endeared himself to most Arab countries at that time was Gamal Abdel Nasser (Asante, interview, 11⁰¹ May 2006). Nkrumah was compelled to establish early ties with Gamel Nasser of Egypt in order to build a sympathetic bloc in the North Africa. This shows that the driving force behind Nkrumah's establishing diplomatic ties with Egypt was to have as an ally country and a leader who served as the unifier of the Arab nations. Nkrumah's ties with Egypt over his African unity policy also created a leadership contestation between these two leading personalities in African post-independence politics as to who lead the continent (Hunwick 1990: 45).

Notwithstanding, Nkrumah acknowledged the divided loyalty of the Egyptian nation between its Arab identity and, at the same time, its geographical membership of the African continent. This, therefore, compelled Nkrumah to establish early ties with Egypt with a view to ensuring that he counterbalanced their virtual allegiance to the Middle Eastern Arabs and the Muslim world (Asante, interview, 11th May 2006). Moreover, the role of Egypt as a leading country in the Arab and the Muslim world cannot be underestimated in the search for African unity. This is because, from the early 1950s to the late 1960 Egypt served as a model and an icon of Arab unity on the African continent.

Early diplomatic ties with Egypt yielded results when the two countries teamed up to play a leading role in the Casablanca Bloc which was invariably composed of a large number of Muslim countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The composition of the Casablanca group was due to the influential role wielded by Gamal Nasser among the Arab and Muslim nations in the early post-colonial period (Asante, interview, 11th May 2006). Nasser was on Nkrumah's side so most of the Arab nations felt obliged to follow suit. There were, however, attempts made by the Arab nations to exploit the opportunity

created by the Casablanca Bloc for their own interests and against those of Israel. This was evident when the issue of Israeli occupation of the Arab lands dominated the agenda of Arab nations in most of their meetings (Hunwick 1990:43).

Nkrumah therefore gradually and in sequence worked out his African unity policy with the Arab and the Muslim world. The unity policy consequently served as the common platform of cooperation between Nkrumah and the Arab and Muslim world. Naturally, the African unity policy was a common concern of every African leader at that time. Yet a* 10 how it should be pursued was the major anxiety of most of the leaders.

Nkrumah's decolonization policy was another appealing issue to all the African leaders. It also created another principal ground of cooperation with the Arab and the Islamic world. That period was the opportune moment in African history, since the alien forces invariably dominated the continent, which has its political, economic, and social effects on the African vision for the future. In short, the African unity and decolonization policies of Nkrumah were the inevitable issues for any leader seeking to extend relations with other states at that time in African history.

Nkrumah's ties with Nasser were established partly to exploit his influence among the Arab leaders. Nkrumah, upon gaining acceptance among the leaders, gradually introduced other aspects of his foreign policies which were non-alignment and positive neutrality, membership of strategic international organizations and decolonization. In the light of this, Asante concluded that Nkrumah's policy with the Arab nations in Africa was moderately successful in achieving his emancipation movement and non-aligned agenda (Asante, interview, 11th May 2006).

3.4 EXTERNAL FACTORS

One major external factor that influenced Ghana's relations with the Muslim States was international political alliances, as reflected in her membership of continental organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among others.

It is important to state that as the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, Nkrumah was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War period. Ghana, also hosted the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Ministerial Summit in 1991. The opportunity of hosting the summit created a platform for Ghana to share some ideas and strengthen diplomatic ties with some Muslim States in attendance. It is undisputed that membership of such groupings creates opportunity for bilateral agreements on cultural, economic and political issues. The NAM summit hosted by Ghana in Accra in 1991, for example, strengthened Ghana's friendship with the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). This situation in the end facilitated the establishment of Iranian political and religious institutions in Ghana. These contributed to the development of Islam and Muslims, as will be discussed later, as in the role of the Iranian Cultural Consulate, Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD), the Iranian Medical Missions and the Islamic University of Ghana of the Iranian Government.

Other factors that could be considered as accounting for Ghana's diplomatic relations with some Muslim states are their abundant oil resources. The fact that oil is the major source of energy in the world market made producing Muslim States economically and politically powerful and this attracted the interest of both the developed and the Third World nations.

The Muslim countries, which are the subject of this research, have abundant natural resources including oil. These countries include the Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Socialist People's Libyan Arabian Jamahiriya (Libya). With their economic wealth derived from the oil boom, the Muslim states gained some political influence in some countries as a result of bilateral economic agreements. For example, at the NAM summit in 1991 the Islamic Republic of Iran promised to assist Ghana in oil exploration (Ministry of Foreign, 2005). The 70% increase in oil price by 1973 compelled Saudi Arabia to propose a possible two-tier pricing system to give the poorer nations oil on preferential terms. Though Ghana at that time has made more from the surge of cocoa which was higher than her official aid receipts, it also thought of getting supply of oil on favorable terms (The Economist, 13* December, 1973). Le Vine also argues that Ghana has benefited from the Cocoa price bonanza in the international market by 1977; however a compound of high initial oil crisis impact including internal economic crisis made her to realign with some oil producing countries in the North Africa and the Middle East (Le Vine et al, 1979:40).

Furthermore, a common response to western or foreign domination by the Third World or developing countries also created the ground to foster diplomatic relations. For example in the early part of independence, Nkrumah was seen as the leader spearheading and proposing solutions to the developing countries political turmoil. A case in point was that he was the first leader to publicly propose the Austrian formula for the resolutions of the Lebanon crisis. This was when he met the Canadian Prime Minister in 1958. Eventually this proposition was accepted as the best formula by the United Nations for Lebanon (The Economist, 2nd August, 1958).

Again, the revolutionary explosions (or tendencies) in Libya (1969), Iran (1979) and Ghana (1981) also provided good grounds for inter-state friendship and co-operation. For instance, not quite too long before the December 1981 Revolution in Ghana; the Iranian Revolution under Imam Khomeini had taken place in 1979. Libya was also extending the revolutionary ideas of the 'Third Universal Theory' as expounded in Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gadhafi's *The Green Book*, beyond its borders. For instance, Libya foreign policy with Ghana in the early 1980s was partly dictated by her perception of the 'radical and progressive' background of the leaders of the 31st December Revolution (JolTe'1988: 47). These countries therefore saw themselves as sharing common experiences and therefore could co-operate in so many ways.

One final factor that deserves mention is the tendency among Islamic States to compete among themselves. This is done with a view to extending their cultural and religious influences across their borders to the Muslims, non-Muslims and the non-Arabic speaking countries of the world. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya could also be cited as good examples of this. Underpinning this is the fact that major Islamic doctrinal and ideological views which have strong governmental backing and influence originate from these countries. For instance, *Wahhabism* (Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah) and Shi'ism are the official religious leanings of the Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran respectively. Similarly, the Libyan leader, Muammar al-Gadhafi set forth in *The Green Book*, his brand of Islamic socialism and political ideology with a view to extending it to other countries in the world.

These governments therefore set out to consolidate and advance their positions and influences among Muslims in all parts of the world by extending their views beyond their countries' borders (Eickelman et al 1996:151). Consequently, Ghanaian Muslims have been

affected by the doctrinal orientation of these transnational governmental religious persuasions through their diplomatic relations with Ghana's government. These external factors, amongst others, have played significant roles in fostering good diplomatic relations between Ghana and the Muslim states in many spheres of national interest including the social, economic political, cultural and religious spheres.

In a way Nkrumah's personal relationships also reinforced the direction of his diplomatic relations with oilier countries. This was evident in his friendly relations with Gamal Nasser of Egypt after his marriage to Madam Fathia. The next section of this study will focus on how Nkrumah's marriage to Fathia dominated the agenda of the western countries' dealings with Ghana and on its ramifications on inter-state relations and their interests.

3.5 THE FOREIGN POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF NKRUMAH'S MARRIAGE TO FATHIA HALEN RIZK

The marriage of Nkrumah to Fathia Halem Rizk seems to have been part of Nkrumah's African unity agenda. Fathia Halen Rizk was a 26 year old university student studying Arabic in Cairo when she was married to Nkrumah in 1958. The marriage, without a doubt, preoccupied the minds of Western leaders as to the direction of Nkrumah's foreign policies. The wedding to Fathia came as a surprise to both Ghanaians and international observers alike. The British and American security agencies also scrutinized and analyzed its possible implications on the future direction of Ghana's foreign policies towards the West, and the United States in particular. For instance, Carina discovered some classified documents in 1989 and 2003 in files housed in the British Domestic Office and Colonial Office and published accounts of these in the *New African*. These documents indicated that the British Colonial Office and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were extremely concerned about the possible impact of Nkrumah's marriage to an Egyptian woman on their foreign interests

(Carina, 2006: 8). However, this was not the first time that the West had developed a keen interest in Nkrumah's private life. There were records indicating that Sir Thomas Lloyd, the Assistant Principal at the Colonial Office communicated in a letter to the then Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir Arden Clarke inquiring about rumours concerning Nkrumah relations with an English woman, Florence Manley (Carina 2006: 18).

His marriage to Fathia, an Egyptian Coptic Christian, became a matter of great suspicion for Western leaucis. Consequently, * aiioui conspiracy theories emerged among the Briiioli and the American officials as to the motive behind the union. M.E. Allen of the Commonwealth Relations Office confirmed the concern of the Western World about Nkrumah's marriage to an Egyptian woman. He was once quoted as saying 'the exact implications of the happy event have provided material for much speculation in London and Accra as well as Washington' (Carina 2006:8). Curiously, the understanding of the United States especially the CIA and the State Department was that the marriage was intended to create a political union between Egypt and Ghana. This was evident when Nasser immediately sent an emissary to Accra to decorate Nkrumah with the Grand Cross of the Order of the Nile (Carina 2006:8).

In addition to Western leaders' suspicion of the political motive behind the marriage, the United States' CIA and the State Department inquired from the British officials whether Nkrumah's marriage was intended to dilute his closeness to Israel (Carina 2006:18). This was when Nkrumah was making substantial gains from Israelis expertise in the area of agriculture, training of the Ghana Army, investment in Ghana's Black Star Shipping line and overhauling Ghana's Trade Union Congress in line with Israelis *Histadrut* (Howe 1958: 284). The other theory which emerged was that, Nkrumah's marriage to Fathia was intended to weaken his mystic union with Ghanaian women who, he used to claim, were all his brides.

To support this view, his own Finance Minister, Komla Gbedemah, was once quoted as saying that Nkrumah did that to avoid his in-laws being 'round his neck' (Carina 2006:18).

Importantly, the British High Commissioner in Accra, J.R Lupton offered a religious conspiracy theory. He claimed that a juju priest (a spiritualist) advised Nkrumah to marry an Egyptian woman with a view to making his son (the product of this marriage) a future messiah. Perhaps the messiah herein referred to might be the Mahdi whom the British had encountered in line North Africa, specifically Sudan. British authorities concluded that the union between Nkrumah and Fathia was a political weapon, which could be used against them (Carina 2006:18).

This prediction undoubtedly was a reflection of what was seen as Nkrumah's attitude towards the West. One must acknowledge, however, that, the marriage was not the major determinant of Nkrumah's foreign policy direction. It rather reinforced Nkrumah's notion of a united African continent. His policies as outlined gave little prominence to the West, since he was preoccupied with the unity of the African continent and decolonization of some countries which were still under the colonial rule. This was manifested in his famous proclamation of the 6 March 1957 before the solemnization of the marriage at the Old Polo Ground in Accra where he stated that the 'independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the continent' (Armah 2004: 4).

It was Nkrumah's emphasis on the need for decolonization and his African unity policies that had an impact on the Western interest in the African continent. The basis of these policies implicitly denounced the Western presence and interest in the continent. His marriage to Fathia was, in reality, an insignificant issue in regard to his policies although it played some

role in respect of his personal friendship with Nasser, his Egyptian counterpart. This in effect further strengthened and fostered the bond between the two countries on issues affecting the continent. This was manifested in the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries to promote their mutual interests as well as those of the continent as a whole. Lastly, Nkrumah's commitment to African unity can be seen in the fact that he named some of his children after some prominent African leaders in the post-independence Africa. The first child of this marriage was named Gamal after his Egyptian friend and the second child was given the name Sekou after the Guinean President Sekou Toure with whom he forged Ghana-Guinea Union. Coincidentally, these two Presidents were all Muslims and ruled predominantly Muslim nations. Ghana's establishment of diplomatic ties with the Islamic countries in the North Africa and the Middle East also made possible the religious and cultural influence of these countries on some Ghanaians and Ghanaian Muslims in particular.

Nkrumah turned to Islam for spiritual services which represented another level of his interaction with Muslims and Islam in Ghana. Thus it seemed that the first President of Ghana was naturally predisposed towards Islam, as shall be explored in the following section.

3.6 NKRUMAH'S INTEREST IN ISLAMIC SPIRITUALITY

Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah realized the importance of religion as a major force of globalization and made use of it (Mazrui 2002:10). This can be illustrated by the fact that at one time he considered training as a priest. It was out of his fascination with religion that his concept of consciencism was born (Mazrui 2002:1). Accordingly, Ali Mazrui saw Nkrumah's worldview of Africa with regard to religion as a product of three spiritual forces: the force of Africanity and indigenous African religions, the force of Islam and Islamic culture, and the force of Euro-Christianity and Western secular culture (Mazrui 2002:1). Therefore,

Nkrumah's encounter with Muslim diplomatic missions could be regarded as a realization of his conception of African spirituality and of Islam and Islamic culture.

As has already been noticed, his Pan-African, decolonization and non-alignment policies were what first influenced the first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, to establish diplomatic ties with some Muslim countries in Africa as well as in the Middle East. Beyond this noticeable motive, however, were the prowess of Islamic spirituality and the influence of Muslim scholars that Nkrumah occasionally consulted on personal as well as on state matters. For instance, it is said that Nkrumah used to consult Muslim holy men on both personal and political matters.¹ This he did with a view to giving him successes in all his endeavours. The most widely known Muslim scholar with intimate relation with Nkrumah was Ibrahim Nyass of Senegal (Okafor 1997:137).

Nyass was known to have visited Ghana in 1965 at the invitation of Kwame Nkrumah. During this visit religious and spiritual consultation took place between the two. It is said that Ibrahim advised Nkrumah to marry an Egyptian woman and specifically identified the woman in question. Maduka Okafor argued that the rationale behind the proposal was based on the fact that Black Africa needed to make contact with Islam. This was with a view to concretizing Nkrumah's vision of African unity, irrespective of religious and racial differences (Okafor 1997:137).

Said Sinare, Nkrumah's former spiritual advisor and a counter intelligence officer also claimed to have played a role in bringing Fathia to Ghana from Egypt. He argued that he

¹ This practice of Kwame Nkrumah has its antecedent in the old kingdoms of modern Ghana especially in Ashanti, Dagbon, and Gonja. See Okafor G. Maduka (1997). *Christianity and Islam in West Africa* The Ghana experience' Echter Verlag Wurzburg.: 137

was behind the fostering of a marital relationship between the two (Sinare, interview, July 15th 2005). He further indicated that at one time his late father, Salifu Sinare, was Nkrumah's spiritual advisor. He advised Nkrumah to get married whenever Nkrumah sought spiritual advice from his father. Coincidentally, Said Sinare, the son of Salifu Sinare who graduated from the Al-Azhar University in Egypt 1955 with specialization in Islamic studies returned to Ghana with an Egyptian wife, Suadi Mohammed Al-Rouby, a native of Khanatir District in Cairo (Sinare, interview, July 15* 2005). He took over his father's role as the spiritual advisor to Nkrumah when the father was old. Sinare claimed that he identified Fathia at Cairo in Egypt for Nkrumah as a marriage prospect.

According to him the then President of Egypt, Gamal Nasser, paid the dowry of Fathia before she came to Ghana (Sinare, interview, July 15th 2005). In spite of the variety of claims about Nkrumah's relation with Fathia, it seems that Islamic spirituality and the influence of Muslim clerics determined the direction of Nkrumah's union with her.

The influence of Islamic spirituality on Nkrumah is supported by the *Apaloo Commission Report* which stated that the spiritual prowess of Muslim holy men motivated Nkrumah to have an interest in religion and specifically Islam in 1966. (Okafor 1997:138) The report stated that because Nkrumah felt that the OAU Conference that was scheduled to take place in Accra in 1965 was running into difficulties, he sought the assistance of Ibrahim Nyass a Senegalese *Marabout* to use his spiritual powers in making the conference a successful one. He consequently made a present of a Mercedes Benz car to Ibrahim Nyass as payment for the successful service rendered to him and the state.

Nkrumah's interest in Islamic spiritual services was clearly elaborated by Hussain Rashid Al-Salawatiya in his book *Our African Identity*. Rashid indicated that Amadu Futa and Baba Norga introduced Nkrumah and his party leaders to Ibrahim Nyass at Kumasi in 1952. Nkrumah then used this rare opportunity to ask Nyass to pray for him to lead the Gold Coast to independence, to pioneer the African liberation struggle, and to suggest the appropriate time to seek independence (Hussain, 2005:128). Following this Ibrahim Nyass sought the assistance of Abdullah Gomda at Yendi in the Northern region of Ghana as to which Muslim scholars were capable of performing the prayers and the spiritual needs for Nkrumah. Consequently, Abdullah Gomda identified Abdullah Kankangin (Kankangin MotTe) and Jibril Salihu (Mallam Sofu) all of Bawku in the Upper East region, as well as Tahiru of Kumbugu, Tutubrika b. Umar Kreke, (the son of the late Umar Kreke) and Bawa of Takoradi among others (Hussain 2005 :129).

It is said that upon thorough spiritual search by the Mai lams, they advised Nkrumah on the following:

- that the year to ask for independence should be 1957, and the day should be seventh one of the month and the month should be March
- the name of the country should change from Gold Coast to Ghana. This was to give it the same status as the ancient Ghana Empire in terms of might, prosperity, and stability. This could only be achieved if and only if the spelling of the name of the country gives it the same spiritual Islamic numerological value of G-H-A-N-A (The word Ghana comes from Arabic word h^ means wealth).⁵

⁵Another theory has it that, the origin of the name Ghana is, credited to J.B Danquah. This was when he was a student at the University of London. He conducted a research on the origin of the Gold Coast tribes. He established that most of the tribes in the Gold Coast were descendants of the inhabitants of the famous ancient Ghana Empire. Nkrumah eventually adopted it as the name for the new nation-state. The Ghanaian Times 2007 6 March: 3.

Hussain, further, claimed that the Mallams advised Nkrumah on the following:

- for Ghana to become a super power, the date 7 March 1957 should be strictly adhered to
- in order to have a stable economy and a sound political country, a mosque should be built in the centre of the capital (Hussain 2005:128). (The location given to the Muslims by Nkrumah is now known as Salifu Amankwah Gardens at Kwame Nkrumah Circle in Accra).

The narration demonstrates that Islamic and Muslim spiritual prowess was given recognition within the political landscape during the early post- independence period. This also indicates that Nkrumah had come under the influence of transnational Muslim figures. These transnational Muslim scholars were mainly from the West African region. They already wielded influence on Ghanaian Muslims, who in turn, recommended them to Nkrumah.

Nkrumah's attitude towards religion and Islam in particular, is reminiscent of the way in which chiefs in the old Kingdoms' of the present day's Ghana exploited Islam to fortify their regimes and for their prosperity. Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar argued that the underlining reason for the patronage of priestly or spiritual services by African leaders (and Africans generally) might lie in the general belief in Africa of visible and invisible forces - and the perceived influence of the invisible forces on humankind (Ellis et al 1998: 179). Interestingly, this belief has not been abandoned despite the advent of science and technology. It is therefore apparent that the African worldview of the cosmology is different from that of others.

Indeed, the tendency of relying on religious priests for spiritual consultations was not only peculiar to Nkrumah alone. Religious consultation is widely practiced among many African heads of state. Notable among these personalities were Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia who once employed the services of an Indian guru, Ranganathan and Mathieu Kerekou of Benin who relied on Muhammad Amadou Cisse for spiritual directions and consultations (Ellis et al, 1998: 180). Interestingly, Muhammad Amadou Cisse is also known to have worked with the former President of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) Mobutu Sese Seko and President Omar Bongo of Gabon. In addition, President Didier Katsiraka of Mauagascar and President Paul Biya of Cameroon are known to have been followers of Rosicrucianism (Ellis et al, 1998: 180).

In West Africa, the late Ivorian President Felix Houphouet Boigny and the late President of Togo, General Gnagnesibe Eyadema, were known to have been employing the services of spiritual experts (Ellis et al, 1998:189). The conviction of many Heads of State in Africa is that 'real power has its root in the invisible world and therefore the cultivation of spiritual power is vital for the continued political existence (Ellis et al, 1998:, 190)'. This is, without doubt, due to their convictions and the tangible and psychological benefits that they derived from the utilization of spiritual services in their lives.

The reliance of politicians on the religious priests in Africa makes religion the unofficial source for protection and the covert determinant of government policy in Africa. This attitude undoubtedly makes priests in Africa very powerful in government circles, however highly unnoticed in the public. The result of this tendency is that spiritualists in a way become power brokers and have access to confidential information. This can place them above national security intelligence as they tend to deriv< ' 3 information from multipleand



highly reliable sources due to the multi-faceted information they gather through their clients. This situation might have necessitated the late Nkrumah to employ the services of Said Sinare a graduate of Al-Azhar University and a Sufi as his counter intelligence officer. This he did under the guise of a chaplaincy in the Ghana Armed Forces. Though, the clients of Sinare had known him as a government employee they still did trust him as a confidential consultant on their spiritual matters which often compelled them to disclose to him their inner-most secrets. Moreover, he was the most likely person to whom his own colleagues in the spiritual services could disclose some of the diabolic machinations of some group of people to destabilize the nation (Sinare, interview, July 15th 2005).

One other reason that explains the patronage of the services of priests by African politicians is the mass followings that they commanded. This is highly significant, since the African politician is greatly interested in numbers. Therefore aligning with religious priests may be one way of getting broad-based support from the followers of the religious priests. This strategy was adopted by Nkrumah in his dealing with Ibrahim Nyass of Senegal. Upon realizing the obstacles being put in the way of his African unity policy by the Senegalese President, Leopold Senghor, Nkrumah wooed Ibrahim Nyass, who was the most popular figure in Senegal and West Africa as a whole. Nkrumah's estimation was that Senghor was a Christian ruling the overwhelmingly Muslim population of Senegal. To align himself with the most popular figure in Senegal (with a different religious orientation to the President's) could help dilute the President's powers (Asante, interview, 11th May 2006). This strategy, by and large made Nkrumah's African unity policy successful, to the annoyance of some of his detractors in the continent.

The context of Ibrahim Nyass relations with Nkrumah could also be due to the Pan-Africanist ideology shared by both. This could be discerned from some of Ibrahim Nyass writings or epistles through which he expressed his philosophy over the destiny of the African continent. Aspects of his African philosophy were tied to his religious beliefs that every continent belongs to a particular people and people belong to different continent. To him therefore Africa is for Africans who are bound to rule it whether in immediate terms or later regardless of the perpetuation of colonial rule (Nyass 1959:65-6).

In summary, it has therefore been established that a dependence on the spirit world by African leaders has profound effects on their worldview of religion including Islam. Perhaps this might have been so because there is widespread belief by Africans that the spirit world influences their daily lives. This, therefore, makes religion in Africa a very powerful instrument to resort to in order to allay the fears of the believers and to give them a sense of security in their endeavours. Moreover, because they carry the heavy burden of their nation's welfare, politicians are compelled to seek help from multiple sources they believe will assist them to meet the expectations of the electorate and strengthen their regime. However, because of the unscientific and unverifiability of religious beliefs as well as the unorthodox demands of the religious leaders in the course of rendering their services to their clients, the politicians' patronage of the priestly services will forever remain a covert transaction between the priests and the politicians. This situation, therefore, underscores the fact that a modern system of governance cannot accept the creation of a recognized office to deal with issues on spiritual matters of the electorate within its institutions as a result of the unverifiability of religious leaders' claims and the unorthodox means they depend upon. The perception by Africans that the spirit world influences their life cannot be underrated.

Nkrumah's reliance on Muslim holy men represented the internal and individual level of his relationship and encounter with Islam and Muslims. His relationship with some Muslim states represented his inter-state and external interaction with Islam and the Muslim world for his great African concept, which shall be explored in the next section.

3.7 GHANA-EGYPT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

3.7.1 The Historical, Bilateral and Political Background

Information issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ghana in April 2005 indicates that political co-operation between Ghana and Egypt started in the late 1950s. This cooperation was necessitated while the two countries were still struggling for self-determination (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). The alien domination of the powers on the African continent shaped the radical outlook of the two countries and provided effective collaboration in the early years of independence. Consequently, Egypt was the first country and as well as, the first Muslim country to establish diplomatic relations with Ghana (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005).

Several factors underscore the warm relation between Ghana and Egypt in the early years of independence. Among these factors were membership to the Casablanca Bloc which was mainly made up of United Arab Republic (now Egypt), Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, and Ghana. The Casablanca Bloc was known to have envisaged the creation of inter-state economic institutions, with the vision of implementing an African Consultative Assembly, African Political Committee of Head of States, as well as Economic Committee and Cultural Committee and Joint African High Command of Chief of Staff (Armah 2004:101). The two countries played a leading role primarily in the preservation of freedom, unity, and integrity of the African people. This was to do away with factionalism as

decolonization gathered unprecedented momentum on the continent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Their long-term vision which also fostered relations between the two countries, for the continent, was that the two countries were the founding members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The other factor that strengthened the bond of friendship between the two Presidents was their philosophy of non-alignment and positive neutrality. Because of this they have gone down into history as the two of the founding members of the widely recognized Won-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Also, Nkrumah's marriage to an Egyptian woman, Fathia (as described above) strengthened the bond of friendship between Nasser and Nkrumah.

Even though Ghana and Egypt had co-operated politically since the late 1950, the major instrument through which bilateral co-operation has taken place in recent times between the two countries is the Egyptian Technical Co-Operation Fund for Africa which was inaugurated in February 1984. Through this instrument, Ghana has so far benefited from the following forms of assistance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

- (a) Egyptian lecturers at the Regional Maritime Academy
- (b) Egyptian experts for the Ghana Cotton Company
- (c) Egyptian medical doctors to work in the Ghanaian hospitals
- (d) training courses for Ghanaian agricultural officers at the Egyptian International Centre for Agriculture
- (e) training of Ghanaian geologists
- (f) Egyptian lecturers at the University of Ghana and all branches of Ghana Institute of Languages in Ghana, and.

Egypt continues to offer scholarships to Ghana.

The scholarship scheme applies largely to studies in the Islamic religious sciences offered at the famous Al-Azhar University, noted in the Muslim world for its outstanding Islamic scholarship (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

There are other areas of agreement, which strengthen economic co-operation between Ghanaian and Egyptian Governments. These co-operations are in the areas of trade, investment promotion, and protection. These agreements were made possible through the visit of the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Mousa to Ghana in March 1998. The trade agreement was concluded between the Ghana's former Foreign Affairs Minister, Victor Gbeho, and the Egyptian Foreign Minister (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Again, during a visit to Ghana on 1 February 2005 by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed. This established a mechanism for regular consultations on bilateral, regional, and international issues of national interest between the two countries. Ghana's Minister for Tourism and Modernization of the Capital City, Jake Obetsebi Lamptey reciprocated this visit with his visit to Egypt in March 2005. The visit also culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in the field of Tourism Co-operation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Lastly, the Egyptian government, at Ghana's request, sent down Abd El-Salam E. Draz, an agriculturist in rice production. He is to serve in Ghana for a period of not more than 6 months (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

A brief glance at the nature of Ghana's diplomatic relations with Egypt emphasizes an important fact: generally, the bilateral agreements between the two countries benefited Ghana more than Egypt. This could be seen from the numerous human resource experts that Egypt has offered to Ghana in the areas of agriculture, academia, and medicine, as well as offering geological courses for Ghanaians and scholarships for Ghanaian students. The only area of the diplomatic relations which might have benefited the two countries equally is in respect of economic agreements through investment promotion and protection agreements. It could, therefore, be concluded that the bilateral relations between the countries benefited Ghana more than Egypt.

The type of Islamic orientation offered to the Ghanaian Muslims by the Egyptian Islamic environment will be the focus of the next section of this study. This will help shed more light on the Muslim world, especially Egypt's, impact on Ghanaian Muslims in the post-colonial period.

3.72 The Type of Islamic Orientation Offered to Ghanaian Muslims by Egypt

Egypt was the first Muslim country which opened up the intellectual horizon of Ghanaian Muslims. This is evident from the numerous scholarships offered to Ghanaian Muslim students in the early post-independence period, specifically in the area of Islamic sciences. The type of training offered by Egypt to such students was the open Islamic orientation, which did not restrict them to any strict Islamic sectarian background. Consequently, this type of open Islamic orientation was replicated by these *Ulama* in Ghana. The Islamic training as handed down to the Ghanaian Muslim scholars by Egypt made them well suited for the Islamic religious terrain of the early post-colonial period. The training made them to appreciate the multiplicity of the Ghanaian religious terrain, which is made up of indigenous

African tradition and Christian tradition, as well as the diversity of Islamic cultures and values. This is because Ghanaian students were allowed to pursue Islamic training based on the prevailing Maliki Islamic orientation in Ghana rather than the Egyptian sectarian orientation. This instilled a sense of Islamic diversity on the students while in Egypt. The implication is that there is an element of selectivity in the Islamic orientation by Ghanaian *Ulama* trained in Egypt through their transnational contacts.

The research has also shown that the nature of Egyptian society which allows for and fosters free religious thinking meant that the early Egyptian-trained *Ulama* in Ghana were to be bearers of the *Tijaniyya Sufi* order. This argument is shown by the fact that a majority (if not all) of the *Ulama* trained in Egypt are Sufi and *Tijaniyya* in spiritual orientation. Notable among these early Egyptian-trained *Ulama* were the late Jamal Baba of the Greater Accra area, Abdulai Maikano of Prang in the Brong Ahafo region, a great Sufi of the 21st century in the Muslim community of Ghana, as well as Abdul Razak Tahir. Lastly, Said Sinare, a former military chaplain, and spiritual consultant to the late first President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah was among the Egyptian trained *Ulama* with Sufi inclinations.

It is therefore important to scrutinize the unique identity of the Islamic orientation of these few individual *Ulama* trained in Egypt, in order to show how their transnational contacts through education influenced their Islamic orientation in Egypt.

For instance, the late Abdulai Maikano of Prang in the Brong Ahafo region represented the epitome of Islamic mysticism and Sufism in Ghana during his lifetime. This is shown by his spiritual prowess, in the form of powers that he exhibited and offered to his followers. He was sometimes acclaimed by his followers as an extra-ordinary human being with the power

to perform miracles and communicate with Allah. Despite his death his followers still believe that he intercedes in their daily affairs. This is evident in the followers identification with the portrait of the late Maikano in their daily life. Their daily acknowledgement of this portrait shows their loyalty and fidelity to him and reveals their belief in his constant presence in their daily affairs.

The other important personality amongst the Egyptian-trained *Ulama* with strong Sufi inclination is Said Sinare a former military chaplain and a spiritual consultant to the first Ghana's first President Said Sinare was also an Al-Azhar trained Alim (Muslim scholar). The fact that he was a spiritual consultant to the then Head of State was very significant since it implied that the orientation that scholars acquired in Egypt permitted spiritual services as a solution to the ever-demanding needs of some Muslims as well as non-Muslims.

The background of these two important personalities among the Egyptian-trained *Ulama* in Ghana gives more clues to the nature of Islamic orientation in Egypt, which is mystically inclined, and the influence they passed on to Ghanaians and Ghanaian Muslims in particular.

Rational outlook is another Islamic background found among the Egyptian-trained *Ulama* in Ghana. This rationalist inclination allows them to give various dimensional perspectives and interpretations to issues that might seem to be difficult or might have been outlawed by other *Ulama*. Other notable personalities among the Egyptian-trained *Ulama* in Ghana with a strong rational background are the late Jamal Baba and Abdul Razak Tahir. This is as opposed to some *Ulama* who have been trained in the Arabian Gulf states and who abhor

e philosophisation of religious issues. The ability of the Egyptian-trained *Ulama* to contextualize issues from different backgrounds has attracted the youth towards their religious ceremonies. Numerous examples of issues abound: one could cite the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (*Maulid Nabi*), which sometimes generate controversies between Egyptian *Ulama* who permit and clamour for its celebration, as against the *Ulama* trained from the Gulf countries who have outlawed it. One must however stress the fact that Egypt, as a Muslim country, is Sunni of Hanafiyya by doctrinal orientation. Yet the Ghanaian *Ulama* trained in Egypt were not doctrinally coinherited toward; such Ghanaian *Ulama* but were allowed to maintain their Maliki Islamic doctrinal approach.

3.73 The Role of Ghanaian Muslims in Ghana-Egypt Relations

In the past the role of the Ghanaian *Ulama* trained in Egypt in facilitating Ghana-Egypt relations as an organized body was not visible. This might have been because it did not dawn on them to organize themselves as a group. In recent times, however, some *Ulama* with Egyptian training have formed an association of Alumni of the Al-Azhar University in Ghana with a view to fostering relations with Egypt and their *alma mater*.

One major defect of this is that because it is an alumni association its membership is limited and restricted to students trained at the Al-Azhar University. This implies that there has not been any conscious attempt on the larger Egyptian-trained student body to form an all-encompassing and inclusive association of students trained in Egypt in Ghana. This tendency created a major religious vacuum in the Ghana-Egypt relations in the Muslim communities of Ghana. The only noticeable influence and effect in Ghana of the Egyptian-trained *Ulama* is through the role of individual Muslim scholars.

Such influence could be viewed from the unique scholastic exposition and excellence that some of these individuals exhibited in the course of religious discourses in the Muslim communities of Ghana. This aspect of the background of these individuals has been highly revered by Muslims of different doctrinal orientation in Ghana. This is noticeable in the role of Abdul Razak Tahir, the late Abdulai Maikano, and the late Jamal Baba Al-Azhari. The role of these *Ulama* in the Muslim communities of Ghana endears the quality of Islamic scholarship to the Muslim youth, yet they are most often discouraged by the unfavourable economic conditions in Egypt to wish to pursue Islamic studies illicite* opposed to in the oil-rich Arabian Gulf states. This situation then shows the dilemma of the Muslim youth in Ghana in relation to seeking quality Islamic education *vis-a-vis* the economic conditions in the Muslim world.

The other dimension of the individual Egyptian trained *Ulama* in Ghana role in fostering relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Egypt is through the institutions established by the students trained from Egypt. In most cases these *Ulama* name the institutions they have established after their *alma mater* such as Al-Azhar or Azhariya and Ain-Shamsh Islamic Institutes etc. Some graduates trained in other Egyptian institutions also identify themselves with their institutions by attaching their institutions name to themselves. An example of this being the late Jamal Baba who attached Al-Azhari to his name meaning 'a graduate of Al-Azhar'.

The cultural manifestation of some *Ulama* trained in Egypt which fosters relations between Ghana, and Egypt could be observed from their mode of dress. The dress of these *Ulama* imitates that of the top hierarchy of Egyptian *Ulama* (*Mufti*). This tendency without a doubt

fosters a cultural link between some sections of *Ulama* trained in Egypt and some Ghanaian Muslims.

Lastly, the role played by the expatriate Egyptian experts who have been assigned various responsibilities by the Egyptian government to Ghana must be acknowledged in fostering Ghana-Egypt relations in the Muslim communities of Ghana. These experts are found in the areas of education, health and agriculture. The mere assigning of experts to Ghana to provide certain services and expertise gives proof of the sincere interest of the Egyptian government in contributing towards the development of Ghana. In addition, the role of these experts in assisting the government, and Ghanaians in general creates the sense of appreciation among the majority of Ghanaians. This reciprocal attitude by the Egyptian experts to assist Ghanaians and their innermost appreciation of the Egyptian government's interest largely improves and promotes relations between the two countries.

Islamically, the tendency of the Egyptian experts to facilitate certain developmental projects in the Muslim communities of Ghana creates the sense of Islamic Ummatic feeling among Ghanaian Muslims. This tendency on the part of the Egyptian experts reinforces the notion and the concept of Islamic brotherhood among nationals of both countries, thereby promoting Ghana-Egypt relations further.

3.8 GHANA-SAUDI ARABIA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS



3.8.1 The Historical, Bilateral and the Political Background of Ghana-Saudi Relations

Ghana's diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with Saudi Arabia dates back to March 1960. In that year the two countries accredited their respective ambassadors in Cairo and Lagos to each other's capital as a first measure. Subsequently, Ghana established a resident

diplomatic mission in Saudi Arabia and maintained it until the fall of the First Republic in 1966, when it was closed due to financial constraints (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2004).

In June 1974 Ghana reopened its embassy in Saudi Arabia at the level of *charge d'affaires* and upgraded it back to the ambassadorial level in May 1977 because of the rising number of Ghanaian pilgrims to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, during the regime of the People National Defence Council, (PNDC) relations improved with the Saudi Government, thereby permitting the Ghanaian Government to establish her Consulate-General in Jeddah in 1988 to cater for the increasing number of Ghanaian pilgrims who visit Mecca and Medina throughout the year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004). Furthermore, in 2003 Saudi Arabia assented to Ghana's request to upgrade her mission in Accra to resident ambassadorial level.

Some of the institutions of the Saudi Government which promote bilateral co-operation with Ghana's government are the Islamic Development Bank and Saudi Development Fund. The Saudi Development Fund during the PNDC regime, especially between 1985 and 1987, contracted various loans to the tune of \$31.5 million to Ghana for various projects in the country. Some of these projects were the rehabilitation of Tema and Takoradi ports (\$13 million) and the construction of Grain silos at Konongo, Kintampo, Atebubu, Nkoranza, and Techiman (\$5 million) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004). During the era of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) (1992-2000), the Saudi government further financed some projects relating to Rural Health Centres through the Saudi Development Fund. The loans were contracted in 1993 to the tune of \$9.5 million (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004). The New Patriotic Party (NPP) Government of 2001-2008 has also secured a loan from the Saudi Development Fund for the Tetteh Quashie-Mamfie Road project.

An important bilateral agency of the Saudi Government, which Ghana benefits from tremendously, is the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The Islamic Development Bank's support and funds are channeled to assist a member of countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Interestingly, Ghana is not a member and will, therefore, not be entitled to major funding from the Bank. Nevertheless the Islamic Development Bank still allots sizeable funds for non-members and Muslim minority countries, especially for the Muslims communities in those countries. The IDB development projects are sometimes offered to public institutions through bilateral agreement such as the funding of Presbyterian science block and the Islamic secondary science facilities are typical example. More also Muslim NGOs are among the beneficiaries of IDB sponsorship. Some of the IDB sponsored projects for both private and public institutions include the construction of primary, secondary, vocational and technical schools, mostly in the Northern region of Ghana, as well as in Accra and Kumasi, amounting to \$2,819 million. The IDB also assisted the Ghanaian government with a grant of \$100,000 for the expansion of students' hostel of the University of Development Studies in Tamale and a grant of \$250,000 for the construction of a Computer Science Laboratory for the Islamic Secondary School in the Northern region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004).

The most memorable Saudi Arabian personality to most Ghanaians who also played a tremendous role in improving relations between Ghana and Saudi Arabia in recent times is His Royal Highness, Prince Al-Walleed Bin Talal Bin Abdul Aziz. He visited Ghana from 28-30 April 2003. Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Prince Walleed was voted the richest man in the world in the year 2003 by Forbes Magazine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004). His visit was to explore business opportunities in Ghana. He led a 22-member business delegation. During the visit he donated funds to Ghana in various

sectors. For instance, he donated \$600,000 to the health sector, \$300,000 to pre-school education to construct a primary and a junior secondary school for the Muslim communities in and around Nima and Mamobi area in Accra, and \$100,000 to the Otumfuo Education Fund. During the visit, the Prince agreed to invest in the construction of the Ambassador Hotel, which cost about \$40m. He also agreed to establish a branch of Citi Bank in Ghana and to construct a multi-million Cedi Hotel at the Accra Airport (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004).

The Saudi Government also plays a humanitarian role in improving relations with Ghana. For example, during the September 1995 flooding in Accra it donated emergency relief items worth \$800,000 towards the victims. Furthermore, following the severe rains and flooding which rendered many people homeless and caused extensive damage to properties in Accra in June 2001, it donated relief items to Ghana for the victims through His Highness King Fahd Al-Saud. Lastly, Ghana receives an allocation of 500 slaughtered sheep after every yearly pilgrimage for distribution to the poor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004). It could therefore be discerned from the historical basis of Ghana-Saudi relations that two major issues strengthened the relations between the two countries, namely Ghana's quest to secure loans for its developmental programmes and opportunities for Muslim pilgrims to the Kingdom.

An analysis of the historical background shows that the diplomatic relations between the two countries benefited Ghana more than Saudi Arabia in respect of securing financial resources. The Saudi Government might have also opened up her doors to Ghana's government to create the opportunity for Ghanaian Muslim pilgrims to attend the annual pilgrimage to the Kingdom.

ne diplomatic relations also facilitated a special type of Islamic orientation to Ghanaian Muslims, which will be the focus of the next section. This will be done with a view to identifying the Islamic dimension to the diplomatic relations. It will also identify the agents and the institutions that facilitated the diplomatic relations. Through this study, the identity of the Saudi nationals and their organizations that facilitated Ghana-Saudi relations in the Muslim communities will be made known.

3.8.2 The Role of Ghanaian Muslims in Ghana-Saudi Relations

It must be acknowledged that before Ghana diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia commenced the annual pilgrimage of some Ghanaian Muslims to the Kingdom in itself promoted Islamic fraternal consciousness between Ghanaian Muslims and Saudi Arabians. Even though the experience of the pilgrimage during the pre-colonial and the early post-colonial periods was very tedious, it was the major medium of interaction between the two countries. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries further enhanced the smooth interaction between the Muslims of the two countries, beyond the scope of Hajj.

Initially, one important issue dominated the nature and the medium of collaboration between Muslims within the two countries. The major medium through which Ghanaian Muslims interacted with the Saudi Muslims was the Hajj. It must be acknowledged that this medium facilitated Ghanaians interaction with the Saudi Muslims during the pre-colonial and post-colonial periods. The Hajj was made more accessible with the improvement in technological advancement in the area of air transport during the post-independence period through diplomatic relations.

The effect of the Hajj on the relations between Ghanaian Muslims and the Saudi Muslims did not result in the adoption of the Saudi brand of Islamic ideology (*Wahhabism*). This was partly because Umar Krake, a renowned scholar in the Gold Coast, performance of the pilgrimage in 1913 and 1919 respectively preceded the *Wahhabi* Revolution in 1923-4. Subsequent Ghanaian Muslims who performed the pilgrimage did not embrace *Wahhabi* ideas until after Ghana attained independence.

Another important personality during the post-independence period through whom relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Saudi Arabia was promoted was Kamali Khalid, an Indian employee of the Saudi mission in Ghana. The aspect of Islamic consciousness that he promoted between Ghana and Saudi Arabia was the Saudi brand of Islamic ideology which, as mentioned before, is Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (*Wahhabism*). This he did through the promotion of Islamic education. His activities did not however generate any reaction from other Muslim groups at that time. This type of *Wahhabi* Islamic consciousness which was facilitated by Kamali linked Ghanaian Muslims with the Saudi Muslim leadership, thereby fostering collaboration in the interests of Islam between Muslims within the two countries. It is known that Kamali used to organize Islamic lectures at the then Central Mosque in Accra. This was the first early manifestation of an attempt of reorienting a section of Ghanaian Muslim students towards Saudi Islam in Ghana. Through such relationships, Ghanaian Muslims secured numerous forms of assistance in the form of scholarship or educational opportunities and educational infrastructure etc in Ghana.

Among the individual Ghanaian Muslims who also played leading role in fostering Ghana-Saudi relations were the foremost *Wahhabi* pioneer scholars in Ghana such as the late Yussif Ajura in the Northern region, Abdul Samad Habibullah and Adam Baba both in the

Ashanti region, Hamza Abdul Salam, Umar Ibrahim and Shuaib Abubakar all in the Greater Accra region. The role that these individual *Ulama* played in promoting Ghana-Saudi relations pertains to their being the first Muslims to have adopted the Saudi brand of Islamic ideology, as propounded by Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab in 1703 AD. Eventually, they became the first contact persons in their respective communities with regards to having any official transaction with the Saudi NGOs and Government.

Interestingly, these early *Wahhabi Ulama* educational institutions facilitated the orientation of Ghanaian Muslim students towards the *Wahhabiyya* brand of Islam in Ghana. These institutions include the Anbariya Islamic Educational complex and the Nuriyya Islamic Institute, the largest Islamic educational complexes in the Northern region of Ghana founded by the late Yussif Ajura and Basha Ibrahim Iddris respectively. Again, the Al-Azhariyya Islamic Educational Complex and the *Darul Hadith* Institute of Islamic Studies established by the late Adam Baba and the late Taufiq Bakr, also represent the largest Islamic educational complexes in the Ashanti region. The role of the Institute of Islamic Studies founded by Umar Ibrahim and the Tafsiliyya Islamic School by the mentor of Umar Ibrahim, the late Hamza Abdul Salam, in the orientation of Muslim students towards the *Wahhabiyya* Islamic perspective in the Greater Accra region cannot be over-emphasized. All these institutions, which were established by the pioneer Wahabis, have played tremendous roles in promoting Ghana-Saudi relations in Ghana. This is because; these institutions, as established by the pioneer *Wahhabis*, shaped the mind and the identity of their students towards the Saudi style of Islamic orientation and endeared the students towards the Saudi values and culture, thereby promoting Ghana-Saudi relations in Ghana.

The Saudi government also deepens its relations with Ghanaian Muslims through granting of scholarship in various disciplines of Islamic sciences. This has its social, economic, and political advantages to the two countries. The beneficiaries understand the social structures of the Saudi society and then adopted and promoted the Saudi Islamic social values in the Muslims communities of Ghana. Inclusive in this social orientation of Ghanaian Muslims who benefit from such scholarships is the sectarian religious culture of the Saudi society, namely the *Wahhabiyya* brand of Islam, which they promote among their Ghanaian counterparts. This implies that the *Wahhabi* perspective of Islam with its origin and support base from the Saudi Government revolves strictly around the followers understanding of the basic tenets of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet.

The major religious institutions, which promote the Saudi brand of Islam, include Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (ASWAJ), the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research (SCICR) and the Ahlus-Sunni Society popularly known as the *Anbariyya*. Two Saudi institutions such as the *Fatwa* Center (which is under the Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs) and the Muslim World League are noted for their roles in supporting Ghanaian Ulama who promote their religious interest in Ghana. The role that these institutions play is in the domain of spreading the Saudi brand of Islam in educational institutions, religious centres (mosques), social ceremonies, and during quarterly and annual conventions etc. Through their activities and programmes they have attracted a mass following in the Muslim communities of Ghana. The large number of followers consequently became the benchmark of assessing Saudi religious influence in Ghana. *Wahhabi* followers in Ghana can be identified by their mode of dress and other forms of social interaction. A corollary to the adoption of Arabian culture and a brand of Islam among them is the tendency to extol Arabian values as the best model for Muslims.

The role of the Saudi funded NGOs and NGOs with Saudi affiliation must be recognized in fostering Ghana-Saudi relations in the Muslim communities of Ghana. They promote various forms of developments in the Muslim communities in Ghana such as construction of schools, provision of portable water, Islamic centres, orphanages, and health centres, among others. These NGOs market the plight and the needs of Ghanaian Muslims to the Saudi government and philanthropists who, in turn, provide funding for development programmes for Ghanaian Muslims. They attract considerable financial resources to the Ghanaian Muslims as a result of the trust and the credibility that they have built with the Saudi Government and Saudi philanthropists. Notable among these Saudi-funded NGOs or those with Saudi affiliations are the Al-Hudaibiya Relief Services, the Al-Muntada Al-Islami and Al-Huda Islamic Society.

The Saudi Government and affiliated NGOs also promote relations with Ghanaian Muslims by organizing free pilgrimage for them to Mecca, providing sacrificial animals during the two Eids and providing free meals to the needy during the breaking of the fast of Ramadan. This in a way tends to ease the economic conditions of some Ghanaian Muslims and creates a feeling of gratitude and solidarity with Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi-funded NGOs also provide employment to some Ghanaian Muslims who largely become financially dependent on the Saudi economic conditions to survive. This tendency without doubt reinforces the extent of their allegiance and loyalty to the Saudi institutions and organizations thereby creating a ground for solidarity and thereby fostering relations between a section of Ghanaian Muslim communities and the Saudi institutions. The outcome of this research shows that NGOs with Saudi connections and affiliations dominate the Muslim religious terrain in Ghana.

A major economic leverage which has been very instrumental in fostering Saudi-Ghana relations among a section of Muslims in Ghana has been the monthly allowances that some Saudi trained-Wama in Ghana obtained from the Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This type of monthly allowances and incentives are meant for the Saudi-trained *Ulama* who propagate *Wahhabism* in the Muslim communities of Ghana. The enticing of these *Ulama* by incentives makes them adhere and uphold the approved values of the Saudi religious establishment, thereby promoting sectarian religious relations between a section of Ghanaian Muslims and ilic Saudi religious institutions.

The net effect is that the beneficiaries of these facilities and projects represent the benchmark of Ghana-Saudi relations in the Muslim communities in Ghana. This situation also shows the extent of economic dependence of some Ghanaian Muslims on the outside Muslim world which has serious consequences for the nation's political direction. These Muslims are likely to be predisposed towards the politics of the country (Saudi Arabia) that caters for their source of income. Any serious threat to the economic and political conditions of the country is regarded as a war against them in Ghana. The implication is that major global events, which have the potential of dislodging and restructuring certain institutions and political establishments in certain Muslim countries, are interpreted by sections of Ghanaian Muslims as targeting them as well as Islam as a whole due to the economic advantages that might be affected by such events. The Saudi Government represents the largest Islamic country in respect of contribution to the Muslim communities in Ghana. They therefore wield considerable influence in the Muslim communities of Ghana as a result of the developmental projects that they facilitate for the Ghanaian Muslims.

Politically, there is little to talk about the impact of Saudi political institutions on Ghanaian Muslims. Nevertheless, Ghanaian students trained in Saudi Arabia are most likely to extol the nature of Saudi political institutions in Ghana. More importantly, they could be the people who will aspire to the replication and implementation of Saudi political institutions and structures in Ghana. This view is buttressed by the perception of *Ulama* trained in Saudi Arabia who tend to criticize the perceived moral laxity in Ghanaian Muslim society as against the strict nature of Saudi society.

It could therefore be concluded that Ghana-Saudi relations have been enhanced by the Saudi Government institutions and NGOs:

- (i) which grants scholarships to Ghanaian Muslim students;
- (ii) which facilitate the activities of Saudi trained *Ulama* in Ghana in the propagation of the Saudi official Islamic orientation (*Wahhabiyya*); and
- (iii) which supports the activities of NGOs with Saudi affiliation, including arrangements for free pilgrimage to Mecca for Ghanaian Muslims so that they are able to experience the faith in its place of origin at first hand .

3.9 GHANA-ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN RELATIONS

3.9.1 Historical and Bilateral Background of Ghana-Iran Relations

Information available at the Ghana's Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows virtually insignificant relations with the Persian Empire before the Ayatollah Khomeini's Revolution. Following the 1979 Revolution the name of the country was changed to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ghana's diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran began in 1974. The two countries appointed resident ambassadors in 1976. However, Ghana closed

down its mission in Iran in 1984 as a result of a general cost-cutting exercise (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

Currently, the major machinery through which bilateral cooperation takes place between the two countries has been the Ghana-Iran Joint Commission. This joint commission was inaugurated in November 1990 and subsequently reactivated in June 2002.

The Iranian Foreign Minister, H.E Kamal KJianazzi when visiting Ghana from 30—31 March 2004 granted an amount of \$1.5 million for development assistance to Ghana. In addition, the visit also resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Development Assistance between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Ghana. The aim of the agreement is to facilitate commercial exchanges between the two countries. Ghana also currently benefits from assistance from the Islamic Republic of Iran in the areas of agriculture, health, education and culture (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). The major Iranian institutions which facilitate this economic cooperation in Ghana are Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD), the Red Crescent Society, and the Islamic University.

The trade agreement, which was signed between the two countries in 2002 shows that the balance of trade is in favour of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was evident in the direction and trend of exports and imports between the two countries from 2000-2003. The investment portfolio also witnesses the Iranian Government pushing more resources into the Ghanaian economy as against virtually nil investment by Ghana in Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). Among the Iranian companies which have taken the opportunity to explore the Ghanaian business terrain are:

- (i) Ghana-Iran Services Ltd, a joint venture dealing in the export and import in general merchandise;
- (ii) Kleen Export Company Ltd, a purely foreign owned company also involved in the export trading; and
- (iii) AEM Industrial Company Ltd, a joint venture company involved in the manufacture of paper napkins and tissue paper.

The most important area identified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the need to re-evaluate previously signed oil agreements dealing with the importation of crude oil from Iran at the rate of 500,000 barrels per year. Lastly, the report also identified the possibility of cooperation in respect of Ghana's refinery and the exploration of oil, gas and gold (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). What has been the role of Ghanaian Muslims in Ghana-Iran relations? This will be the focus of the next section of the study.

3.9.2 The Role of Ghanaian Muslims in Ghana-Iran relations

Historically, the foremost Ghanaian Muslim personality who promoted Ghana-Iran relations was Abdul Salam Abdul Hamid Bansi, the founder of the *Shi'ah* community in Ghana. This was after his graduation from an Iranian higher institution of learning in 1988.

Bansi linked some Ghanaian Muslims to the type of religious orientation pertaining to Iran. This type of the Islamic religious orientation is founded on the view of Shi'ism. Shi'ism is rooted in the concept of Ahlul-Bait (that is, prominence is to be given to the household of the Prophet on issues about Islam and Muslims).

Bansi created an Iranian religious constituency in Ghana which has since served as the bond of religious relations between some Ghanaian Muslims and Iranian religious establishments. The interwoven nature of the Iranian Islam with political orientation became part of the identity of the followers of this new Islamic orientation in Ghana. Another way in which Ghana-Iran relations is manifested is through the activities of the Iranian NGOs. The early NGO which fostered relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Iran was the Imam Hussein Foundation which was established in 1988 by the late Abdul Salam Bansi. This NGO distributes Islamic literature of Shi'i doctrinal orientation.

There are also a number of other NGOs with Iranian affiliation which promote relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Iran. The foremost among them is the Iranian Cultural Consulate. The role of the Cultural Consulate, as the hub of improving and enhancing Ghana-Iran relations, cannot be over-emphasized

The establishment of an Iranian Cultural Consulate in 1988 in Ghana brought about the vigorous promotion of Ghana-Iran relations through the distribution of Islamic literature of Iranian Shi'i orientation in the Ghanaian Muslim communities. Some of the literatures distributed by the Cultural Consulate were cultural and political. The literature distributed by the Consulate played a role in the transnational religious orientation in Ghana. This could be seen from the standpoint that it made the reader appreciate the Iranian cultural values as well as political institutions and structures. The literature distributed to the Muslim students also endeared the Iranian Islamic institutions to the reader. The outcome of this tendency was the search for religious scholarship by a section of Ghanaian Muslim students in Iran. The role of the Consulate in fostering Ghana-Iran relations in the Muslim communities of Ghana could also be viewed from the nature of its other activities. It runs numerous

programmes in respect of Iranian art, culture, Iranian political events and significant religious events and activities in Ghana.

During such occasions, participants are drawn from the various strata of the Ghanaian society, including the Muslim communities. One aspect of the Cultural Consulate activities which promotes relations between Iran and Ghanaian Muslims is that due attention is given to the Council of Muslim Chiefs, the Iranian-trained *Ulama*, the Muslim students in the tertiary institutions and the Muslim youth. Through the activities of the Cultural Consulate, the Iranian cultural, religious, and political values are marketed to Ghanaian audiences. This approach on the part of the Cultural Consulate creates sympathy and friendship among the targeted participants from the segment of the Muslim communities, thereby fostering relations between Ghana and Iran.

The larger religious framework through which Ghana-Iran relations was promoted could also be viewed from the standpoint of Iranian-trained *Ulama's* proclamation and eulogisation of Shi'i religious values in the Muslim communities of Ghana. This tendency, without doubt, had facilitated the promotion of Iranian religious and cultural values in Ghana. It in effect fostered a religious and cultural understanding between the two countries. Iran is the main country which currently promotes Shi'ite culture in the world. Muslim students who acquire Islamic scholarships to study in Iran therefore return to Ghana with a Shi'i orientation which they, in turn, propagate in the Ghanaian Muslim community.

The Islamic University of Ghana which was established by the Iranian government in April 2002 also enhances the relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Iran. The mere naming of the university 'Islamic' implies that it was established to promote the interest of Islam and

that of the Muslim communities in Ghana. This predisposition without doubt indicates the extent to which the Iranian Government is promoting relations with Ghanaian Muslims through education. Of all the Muslim diplomatic missions in Ghana, it is the Islamic Republic of Iran which has been able to establish an Islamic university for brilliant but needy Ghanaian Muslims. The university grants scholarships to students who are to pursue courses at the university. This is done by assessing the financial capabilities of students who are brilliant but needy. This naturally endears the beneficiaries to the benefactors.

The Red Crescent of Iran is at the forefront of the Iranian Health Project in Ghana. So far the Iranian Government has established three (3) clinics in Ghana which augment Ghana's health institutions. The leadership of the Muslim communities in Ghana, in providing free medical services for the needy and poor, are often relied upon to recommend to the clinics people who are in dire need of medical treatment. This enhances the bond of friendship between Iranian authorities in Ghana and the Ghanaian Muslim communities.

Ghana-Iran relations in the economic and agricultural sectors are promoted mainly by the Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD). The beneficiaries of the ARD's projects tend to appreciate the role of the Iranian Government in assisting them, thereby also fostering relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Iran.

Even though Ghana-Libya relations pre-date the September 1969 Al-Fateh Revolution, the Revolution was nevertheless very significant since the post-1969 period framed the nature of most of the relations between Ghana and Libya as exist currently. The historical trend of Ghana-Libya diplomatic relations is the focus of the next section of the study.

3.10 GHANA-LIBYA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

3.10.1 The Historical and Bilateral Background of Ghana-Libya Relations

The major motives influencing Ghana's establishing diplomatic relations with Libya were economic and Pan-African considerations. Historically, Ghana first established diplomatic relations with Libya in 1961 but in 1968 closed down its offices because of financial constraints. Relations between the two countries however improved after the June military takeover in Ghana (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004). The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) further strengthened relations in 1979 following the 4 June military takeover when Libya expressed solidarity with Ghana and responded positively to Ghana's request for crude oil supplies. Ghana reciprocated by approving Libya's request to establish a resident diplomatic mission in Accra in September 1979 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004).

The civilian administration headed by the then President of Ghana, the late Hilla Limann, initially maintained relations with Libya to the extent that a goodwill mission paid a visit to Libya to express Ghana's appreciation to the Libyan Government for the emergency supply of crude oil. The outcome of that visit resulted in the signing of a 1979 agreement between the two countries to set up a Ghana-Libya Permanent Joint Commission for Co-operation. However, in the following year 1980, the Ghana Government ordered the closure of the Libya mission in Ghana, due to a suspicion that Libyan diplomatic staff interfered in the internal politics of Ghana (St John, 1988:131).

As a way of mending the diplomatic relations, Libya was the first African country in the aftermath of the 31 December 1981 Revolution led by the People's National Defense Committee (PNDC) to airlift food aid to Ghana and expressed solidarity with and support to

the new regime. Consequently, high-level governmental delegations from the two countries exchanged visits to strengthen bilateral relations in economic and political issues. The relations between the two countries were maintained and deepened when the military regime of the (PNDC) transformed itself into civilian regime under the umbrella of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in 1992 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004).

One area that witnessed a significant improvement and deepened relations between the two countries from the outset was when Libya was suspected by Western governments of involvement in the Lockerbie bombing. Ghana played a significant role in attempting to resolve the diplomatic crisis between Libya and the Western world. Ghana initially sent the then Foreign Affairs Minister, Obed Yao Asamoah, to Libya in 1995 in order to obtain first hand information from the Libya side and subsequently reporting on this to the United Nations with a view to breaking the impasse between Libya and the West (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2004). In the latter period of the National Democratic Congress's administration, Ghana took a step in attempting to solidify diplomatic relations between the two countries. Ghana participated in the 30th anniversary of the Al-Fateh Revolution, which also coincided with the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU hosted by Libya in Sirte in September 1999.

In the year 2000 which also falls within the later part of NDC government rule, relations between the two countries soured as a result of Libyan security forces alleged harassment of Ghanaian citizens resident in Libya. Consequently, this situation made it necessary for the Libyan leader, Muammar al-Gadhafi, to organize a session for the Ghanaian residents to air the problems they encountered in Libya. In the process, the Ghanaians also expressed their support for the Libyan leader's initiative for the creation of an African union and pan-

African parliament. He emphasized his determination to establish a new Ministry for African Affairs to address the concerns and the needs of the African community (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004).

Within the same year (2000), Gadhafi who was on his way by road to the OAU summit at Lome in Togo made a stopover in Ghana. He was decorated with an award of the Order of the Volta by the then President of Ghana, Jerry John Rawlings. While on his way to Togo through Kumasi to Accra, he and his entourage performed the Friday prayers at Suhum in the Eastern region of Ghana. He heeded to the request of the Muslim leadership there to help construct an ultramodern Islamic secondary school for girls. The school was commissioned in 2002 for the Muslim community in Suhum (Imoro, interview, 18th February, 2005).

However, within the same year the Libyan leader's intention of improving relations with his African friends and brothers suffered a big blow in the hand of the Libyan people who attacked black immigrants, especially West Africans. This resulted in the death of many, including some Ghanaians. The attack was in reaction to the Libyan's disagreement with their leader's proclamation of an 'Africa without borders' policy. Consequently, the then President of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings, flew to Libya in October 2000 to bring home 238 Ghanaians out of the estimated 5000. It must, however, be acknowledged that the airlifting of Ghanaians was financed by the Libyan government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004).

Since the assumption of office by President John Agyekum Kuffour in 2000, the two countries have been doing their best to improve the deteriorating diplomatic relations between the two countries, with the Libyan sending a delegation led by Abdul Salem Al

Treiki, Secretary of the General People's Committee for the African Union, to attend Kuffour's inauguration. This was later followed by the delivery of a Mercedes Benz to the President as a sign of improving cordial relations between the two countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). Beneath the Libyan intention to extend diplomatic ties to Ghana was the need to introduce into the country Libyan political ideology and religious institutions based on Libyan orientation. For instance, the Ghana-Libya Permanent Joint Commission for Cooperation facilitated the establishment of a Libya Cultural Centre in Accra. Through this cultural centre some of the Libyan political and religious ideologies managed to infiltrate into Ghana, especially those contained in *The Green Book* (otherwise known as the Third Universal Theory), which provide political direction to the Libyan people. Furthermore, the World Islamic Call Society, founded by the Libyan Revolution, also found its way into the country.

3.10.2 The Role of Ghanaian Muslims in Ghana-Libya Relations

Ghana-Libya relations were entrenched in the Muslim communities with the granting of scholarships to Ghanaian Muslims to study in Libya. The tendency of granting scholarships to Ghanaian Muslims has been interpreted by the Libyans as assistance to Ghanaian Muslims aimed at shaping the nature of Islam in Ghana.

The first Muslim scholar trained in Libya was Muhammad Muniru, now resident in the Kadjebi in the Volta region of Ghana. His role in promoting Ghana-Libya relations was not visibly seen nor heard in the Ghanaian Muslim communities. However, his graduation from Libya and his subsequent settling in Ghana might have introduced Libyan religious dynamics in the Islamic and Muslim *Da'wa* terrain in Ghana. This Islamic dynamic is related to the type of Islamic orientation with its socialist dimension that he acquired in

Libya. The subsequent recruitment to Libya of Ghanaian Muslims for Islamic studies then set in place a Libyan Islamic ‘constituency’ in the Muslim communities of Ghana. This constituency eventually mediated between Ghanaian Muslims and Libya in the political, social and economic arenas

One Muslim personality who promoted Ghana-Libya relations was Abdullah Alhassan, a former Member of Parliament of the Popular Front Party (PFP) for the Gushegu constituency in Ghana’s Northern region. The first role that he played to promote relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Libya was as a mediator between Libyan-trained *Ulama* and the Government of Ghana. This was when the Ghanaians refused to send the national football team to Libya for the Africa Cup of Nations in 1982. Alhassan heeded the plea of the Libyan-trained *Ulama* to intervene in the matter by organizing a press conference to appeal to the Government to send the national team to participate in the tournament.

The second political role that Abdullah Alhassan played in fostering relations between Ghana and Libya was his willingness to accept an invitation from the Libyan Government to lead the activities contained in *The Green Book* in Ghana. The Libyan authorities might have been motivated by the courage that Abdullah Alhassan exhibited in appealing to Ghana to allow the national team to participate in the Africa Cup of Nations. They might have therefore thought that an astute politician of such bravery and courage as well as being a Muslim might be the right person to promote their interest in Ghana. The role of Abdullah Alhassan in the promotion of the activities of *The Green Book* shows how a Muslim politician in Ghana attaches importance to the interests of Muslims in other countries. This tendency on his part portrays the extent to which he promoted the relations between Ghanaian Muslims and the Libyan authorities.

The Libyan Arab Cultural Centre is the key government agency in Accra which fosters political relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Libya. The centre was originally established to promote cultural relations between Libya and Ghana. However, it extended most of its activities to the Muslim communities of Ghana. The Centre's activities included organizing symposia, seminars and Islamic activities for the Muslim communities of Ghana, including women and children's forums on issues pertaining to Muslim leadership in Ghana. In recent times the Centre has also promoted closer relations through free special classes in Arabic, computer studies and vocational training. Majority of the beneficiaries of these programmes are Muslim students and youth. The beneficiaries of these projects at the Libya Arab Cultural Centre tend to be the 'focus for building relations between Ghanaian Muslims and Libya.

3.103 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to show that various reasons propelled Ghana to establish diplomatic relations with the selected Muslim countries. These reasons include Pan-African unity, and non-alignment policies which necessitated Ghana's relations with Egypt, Libya, and Iran. A common revolutionary philosophy, as experienced and shared by Libya in 1969 as well as Ghana in 1981 and Iran in 1979, contributed immensely to reinforcing their diplomatic relations. The high regard accorded to Saudi Arabia in the Muslim world for being the birthplace of the Prophet of Islam and the location of the Ka'bah and the mosque of the Prophet, as well as its abundant supply of oil, compelled many countries to share diplomatic relations with her, Ghana being no exception here. It has been noted that the role of Ghanaian Muslims in promoting relations with Muslim countries vary from country to country and can also be applied to individual Muslims, NGOs and the affiliate offices of diplomatic missions.

From the previous discussion, it can be seen that the role of these transnational Muslim political and religious institutions in the political and socio-economic development of Ghanaian Muslims and of Islam in Ghana have not yet been explored. The next chapter will attempt to explore that further by focusing on the North African factor on Muslim development in Ghana.

CHAPTER FOUR

NORTH AFRICAN TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM BODIES (TMBs) AND MUSLIMS IN GHANA

4.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the nature of development projects facilitated by the Muslim diplomatic missions (embassies) in Ghana and their affiliate organizations for Ghanaian Muslims from the time of the establishment of such missions till 2006. The primary focus of the chapter is the North African influence on Ghanaian Muslims. It considers the influence of Egypt and Libya as a case of North Africa in the development of Ghanaian Muslims.

Ghanaian Muslims' transnational contacts with the Muslim world in the post-independence period have been progressive and systematic, and differ from the pre-colonial and colonial periods. As observed in the previous chapter, the Muslims in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast transnational relations with the Muslim world during the pre-colonial and colonial periods was limited mainly to the Sub-region of West Africa, except their interaction with the Lebanese. The post-independence encounter of the Muslims in Ghana with the Muslim world took a different dimension as direct links were established with the North Africa. The initial encounter of Muslims in Ghana with the North African countries was as a response to Kwame Nkrumah's (post-independence leader of Ghana) diplomatic ambition and strategy' for relationship with the Arab and Muslim countries. In the perspective of Nkrumah, North Africa has been the catalyst and the gateway to the larger Muslim world. Nkrumah's decolonization and Pan-African unity agenda were two of his policies which endeared North African leaders to him. While he was making considerable impact on these countries through his political policies, conversely these countries were to make impact on the Ghanaians in the cultural and religious spheres. These were achieved through the various

development interventions that they offered to Ghanaians which were tied to the varied expressions of Islam pertaining to those countries or tied to certain religious vision of some specific political regimes. This was so because upon Ghana's establishment of her diplomatic relations with these countries; they did not limit their role at the governmental level with Ghana but played unique role in die socio-economic development of Ghanaians. It was in the main through these developmental aids that Ghanaian Muslims became religiously imbued with the respective ideological disposition of each country. We will focus on the role of Egypt and Libya in education, health, Islamic centre; (mosques), agriculture, doctrinal/ideological orientation, and if any women's empowerment.

Aspects of the diplomatic missions' contributions to the development of Islam and Muslims in Ghana were through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and quasi-state institutions. As these institutions naturally had strong affiliations to their countries and promote the same religious and ideological agenda of their governments, the contributions of the NGOs and the quasi institutions will also be discussed if any. As elsewhere in other African countries, the origin of Muslim humanitarian activities via NGOs in Ghana is a post-independence phenomenon. Holger Weiss rather links these Muslim humanitarian activities to Muslim students who had gone to study in the North Africa and the Middle East made contacts with philanthropists and Islamic NGOs (Weiss 2004:3). This analysis ignores the role of state centric institutions in promoting these humanitarian concepts in other parts of the world, which were tied to their Islamic agenda.

Studies have shown that the major objectives underlining the activities of Islamic NGOs rest on three principles which are humanitarian relief (*Ighatha*), Islamic call (*Da 'wa*) and armed support of Islamic cause (*Jihad*) (Kaag 2007:85). Most studies on Islamic humanitarian

activities, however, tend to ignore the role of Muslim diplomatic missions and their affiliate institutions in stimulating such discourse. As indicated above, this section intends to identify the role of Muslim diplomatic missions in their quest towards addressing socio-economic needs of Ghanaian Muslims by using the Egyptian and the Libyan Embassies as the case study of North African factor on Islamic influence in Ghana. The case for Egypt in particular is interesting as it was the major conduit through which Nkrumah dealt with the larger Arab and Muslim countries. Significantly, it also hosts the oldest Islamic university in the world. Libyan influence on the Ghanaian socio-political milieu is very unique as it was largely linked to the al-Gadhafi's 1969 *Al-Fateh* Revolution which gave birth to the Third Universal Theory (TUT) otherwise called the *Green Book*.

4.1 THE ROLE OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF GHANAIAN MUSLIMS

Generally Egypt is not well endowed with resources (as compared to other countries within the parameters of the study) to offer much for Muslims in Ghana. This has curtailed Ghanaians or Ghanaian Muslims trained in Egypt to create non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with a view to attracting developmental projects to Ghana as a result of shortage of NGOs opportunities in Egypt. This is not to say, however, that there were no areas in which Egypt was able to contribute to Ghana's development. Egypt developmental contribution to Ghanaian Muslims could be categorized into education and support with Islamic missionaries, and health. However, there is little to talk about Egyptian ideological or theological penetration in Ghana.

4.1.1 Education

Much of the Egyptian contributions were in the provision of human resources in various spheres. The Egyptian embassy was the first Muslim mission to pioneer assistance to

Ghana's Government, with many teachers being seconded to various institutions of learning in Ghana, especially in the area of the sciences, the Arabic language, and Islamic studies, the majority of these experts constitute part of Ghana-Egypt Technical Cooperation. Ahmed El-Thakabi is one of such resource persons seconded by Egyptian government to Ghana. He is currently lecturing at the Department of Modern Languages, Arabic Unit, at the University of Ghana, Legon. Many of the Egyptian experts in Ghana are into education. Some of them have been posted to the branches of institutes of languages in the Greater Accra, the Ashanti, and the Northern regions as Arabic instructors, while others are posted at Mfantshipim Senior Secondary School in the Central region as mathematics and physics tutors (El-Thakaby, interview, 20th March 2006).

There are others who are on secondment as Arabic and Islamic instructors to some of the Islamic schools such as Anbariyya Islamic School and Nuriyya Islamic School, both at Tamale and the Muhammad Abyad Islamic School at Bole all in the Northern region. Some of the Islamic and Arabic instructors are at the Islamic Secondary School at Wa in the Upper West region and Umar bn Khatab Islamic School at Koforidua in the Eastern region (Jajah, interview, 25th May 2006). The overall objective of sending Arabic and Islamic missionaries to Ghana and for that matter other countries is to preserve Arab-Islamic culture and further re-strengthen her foreign policy agenda (Chanfi 2001:374). The requests for these experts are forwarded to the Al-Azhar Islamic Council which then decides who to send to Ghana. However, the salaries and other emoluments for the Arabic tutors and missionaries are borne by the Egyptian government, while the beneficiary institutions are responsible for their accommodation (Baba, interview, 25th May 2006).

However it has been discovered that, Ghanaian Muslims do not show much interest to request Islamic missionaries from Egypt. This might be partly due to their unsuitability in respect of the Ghanaian Muslim's religious background, as their understanding of the cultural background of Muslims in Ghana and the dynamics of the larger Ghanaian society partly account for this. Lastly, the language barrier has been another factor in explaining Ghanaian Muslims lack of interest in these Egyptian missionaries. This is because when the foreign Muslim missionaries mounted religious platforms they require interpreters to enable the audience to understand then messages (Baba, interview, 25^h May 2006).

An aspect of Egyptian contributions to Ghana's education is the granting of scholarship to Ghanaian Muslim students to study in Egypt. These scholarships are in the disciplines of Islamic Studies, translation, medical technology, and medicines. However, it must be admitted that the Islamic Studies represents about 80% of the total number of scholarships that Egyptian government offer to Ghanaian Muslims (Baba, interview, 25th May 2006). The Egyptian Government also assists Ghana's Government through the University of Ghana with five (5) scholarships. This allows the students to stay in Egypt for one academic year's studies in Arabic at Al-Azhar or Ain Shamsh Universities.

The major Egyptian institution which assists Ghanaian Muslim students with scholarship is the Al-Azhar Educational Scholarship Scheme. According to Baba Ahmed Yakub, the Coordinator of the Scheme, the scholarship scheme was established in 1959 as part of the Ghana-Egypt Technical Cooperation Agreement. Though by 1977, there were only two (2) Ghanaian Muslims at Al-Azhar pursuing education, their specific disciplines were not known (Chanfi 2001:372). Currently, the Government of Egypt awards at least 15 scholarships annually to Ghanaian students for studies in Egypt in various disciplines. Baba

also indicated that, the total number of Ghanaian students pursuing courses in Egypt as at 2006 is 124 (Baba, interview, 25^o May 2006).

4.12 Health

In respect of health, the Egyptian Government assists Ghana's Government with medical staff with specialist backgrounds. This is to augment the Government's policy to discharge its responsibility on health delivery. For instance, one Egyptian dentist has posted to the Koile-Bu Teaching Hospital, a pediatrician to Saint Marie Louis Children Hospital all in the Greater Accra region (El-Thakaby, interview, 20th March 2006). In addition, there are three (3) surgeons sent by the government of Egypt who are working at the Tamale Teaching Hospital in the Northern region. The Islamic Guidance Society Clinic (*Jam iyatul Hidayah Islamiyya*) at Wa in the Upper West region is also benefiting from the Egyptian Government's medical assistance. Moreover, there is the Egyptian Medical Corps at the Sunyani regional Hospital in the Brong Ahafo region (El-Thakaby, interview, 20^{*} March 2006)

Lastly, the outcome of the research also shows that some of the students who were trained in medicine in Egypt have established their own medical centres in the country. This is with a view to augment in the Government's role in health service delivery in the country. One of these medical centres is known as the Al-Azhar Clinic at Wa in the Upper West region, reminiscent of the graduates' *alma malar* (Baba, interview). Another one is located at Nima in the Greater Accra region, and the other one at Aboabo in the Ashanti region (Baba, interview).

4.1.3 Ideological Contribution

Egypt has an open society to all forms of Islamic ideologies, even though it is predominantly a Sunni country. Consequently, the flourishing of radical religious groups such as, the Islamic Brotherhood (*Ikhwan Muslimeen*) and *Al-Jihad* Islamic Organization was the natural outcome of openness of the Egyptian society.

More importantly, the curricula in the Egyptian higher educational institutions do not **restrict the interpretation of Islam to one Islamic school of thought. In other words, students within** the higher institutions of learning are given options to choose the kind of school of thought they wish to pursue for their education (Baba, interview, 18th February, 2005). Interestingly, students from Ghana always prefer to be tutored along the Maliki School of Thought. This is as a result of the Maliki School of jurisprudence being the dominant Islamic expression of Muslims in West Africa, including Ghana.

The acquisition of academic qualifications by the students along the Maliki School of jurisprudence made them suitable for the Ghanaian Muslims' religious background. Consequently, the open nature of the Egyptian society and the opportunity for diversity in Islamic expression, coupled with the permissibility of tutoring students on specific doctrinal line they desired, makes Egypt a Muslim country with no stronghold on specific Islamic theological disposition. It shows the extent of flexibility of Egyptian institutions on Islamic education in respect of theological issues. This situation thus underscores the fact that the contribution of Egyptian graduates in Ghana to any unique sectarian Islamic expression in Ghana is not quite exceptional. This is because; most often, they are associated with the *Tijaniyya* Sufi order. For instance, some leading graduates of Al-Azhar University in Ghana like Said Sinare, Abdulai Maikano, Jamal Baba and Abdul Razaq Tahir form the vanguard

of the *Tijaniyya* movement in the country. Perhaps, Ghanaian scholars have been exposed to the folk Islamic norms of Sufi orders practice in Egypt pertaining to *Maulid* celebration, group *Dhikr* and the visitation of shrines of the saints (Schielke, 2006:236).

We now turn to the second North African country which wields influence on Muslims in Ghana as a result of the post independence history of Ghana. The Popular Socialist Arab Libyan Jamahiriyya presents us with this scenario of their contributions towards the development of Muslims and ideological penetration in Ghana.

4.2 THE ROLE OF LIBYAN GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIMS IN GHANA

The major organizations of the Libyan Mission in Ghana which contribute to the Ghanaian Muslims and Ghanaians in general are the Libyan Arab Cultural Centre and the World Islamic Call Society. This was as a result of the outcome of bilateral and cultural agreements between the two countries. The Libyan Arab Cultural Centre was established in 1993 to serve as a cultural bridge between Libya and Ghanaians and Muslims (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). On the other hand, the World Islamic Call Society was also established by the Libyan Government to serve as the hub for the dissemination of Libyan brand of Islam in the world. The society also provides emergency relief aid to other countries in times of needs. It also helps in the management of mosques built by the Government of Libya (Joffe' 1988:49)

4.2.1 Education

The Libyan Cultural Consulate established a computer studies centre to provide employable skills to Ghanaians in general and Ghanaian Muslims in particular. According to the Secretary of the Libya Cultural Centre, Zakaria Mohammed, the students are trained up to

hardware programs. Opportunities are granted to the employees of government departments and institutions for free tuition on computer literacy training. About 1500 of such government employees have benefited from computer training.

In addition, the centre organizes free Arabic studies for Ghanaians and Ghanaian Muslims. The rationale behind the Arabic studies programme is to open up employment opportunities for Ghanaians wishing to work in diplomatic missions as bilingual secretaries, interpreters, and translators. Other Muslims also attend the classes to enhance their ability to read the Holy Qur'an (Zakaria, interview, 2nd November 2004). Graduates from the Arabic studies at the centre are awarded certificates. The centre also operates a free library facility for Ghanaians and Ghanaian Muslim students (Zakaria, interview, 2nd November 2004).

Another important organization of the Libyan Embassy which provides various services to the Muslim community is the World Islamic Call Society, established in Libya in 1972 and extended its activities to Ghana in 1989. The head of the World Islamic Call Society is Yunus Abdul Nabi; who indicated that his organization has concentrated its activities in the areas of education, health, and agriculture (Abdul Nabi, interview, 17th March 2005). The organization has put up many educational infrastructures for Ghanaian Muslims in almost every part of the country. Some of these include a senior secondary school for the Muslim community at Asem Kumasi in 2003 and a primary school with a mosque attached to it at Takoradi in the Eastern region. This offers education for Muslim children who aspire higher with a view to succeeding through education. Another primary school with a mosque attached to it was built by the Libyan government through the World Call Society at Wale Wale, a thousand kilometer from Tamale in the Northern region (Kamal, interview, 17th

March 2005). The organization has also assisted in the building of a secondary school at Wa in the Upper West region.

Again, some of the schools were also assisted with funds to expand their infrastructure and to purchase furniture like *Darul-Hijra* Islamic School at Mamobi in Accra. In 1989, the Libyan government through the World Islamic Call Society donated a double-decker Nissan pick-up to the headquarters of the Islamic Education Unit at Tamale in the Northern region. Subsequent assistance to the Islamic Education Unit by the Libyan Government in 1990 was in the form of the cost for running the Unit. The organization also donated to the Islamic Education Unit of the Ghana Education Service textbooks which the Unit has recommended for use in all Islamic schools under its jurisdiction. Again in 1988, the World Islamic Call Society supported the completion of the Ansar- al-Islam school at Kumasi in the Ashanti region. Muslim students who were unable to pay their fees while undertaking their studies at Islamabad in Pakistan were assisted by the Libyan authorities (Islamic Call Society 2002:386). Among some of the Libyan Government's contribution to education in 1988 included financial assistance to the Islamic School for Culture and Education, the Ansar-al- Islam Scientific Institute, and the Nasr Islamic School even though the specific location of these schools were not indicated.

Moreover, the Islamic Call Society constructed an ultramodern office complex in 1999, situated at East Legon in Accra, and with educational and vocational training centres attached to it to train the Muslim youth in various fields. The office complex has four departments, comprising computer studies, Arabic and Qur'an studies, vocational studies and a clinic. Kamal intimated that so far not less than 150 students have been trained by the organization since 2006 (Kamal, interview, 17th March 2005). The Suhum Girls Higher

School which was funded by Muammar al-Gadhafi, the Libyan leader during his trip to Ghana in 2000, is being assisted by the Islamic Call Society in various ways, including the donation of computers. The Islamic Call Society has also been sponsoring some of the Islamic scholars' monthly allowances, especially the Libyan-trained *Ulama* who are in the field of propagation and teaching (Kamal, interview, 17th March 2005). Aspects of the Islamic Call Society's contributions to Ghanaian Muslims pertain to assisting the Muslim students who are pursuing higher education within the tertiary institutions in Ghana, though, the specific numbers of the students are not known.

The research findings also reveal that Ghanaian Muslims enjoyed considerable educational support from the Libyan Government in 1988 through the World Islamic Call Society. This support includes financial assistance for building a technical school in youth research, and provision of supplies to *Ri'ayat al-Din* Institute and Anbariyya Islamic Educational Complex, all in Accra and Tamale respectively (Kamal, interview, 17th March 2005).

The Federation of Muslim Councils (FMC) also enjoyed considerable financial assistance from the Libyan Government through the World Islamic Call Society in 1991. The supports for FMC by the Libyan Government were meant for certain Islamic institutions. The supports include financial aid to the Ansar al-Islam Institute, the Mukhtar Nouri School, the National School, the Idrissi School, the Al-Huda School, the Al-Qasimiyya School and the Breikem School. Nevertheless, the specific locations of the beneficiary schools were not indicated.

In 1988, when the Islamic Guidance Society requested the expansion of their educational facilities in respect of additional classrooms, the Libyan Government through the World

Islamic Call Society heeded to their request. The World Islamic Call Society also assisted the Islamic Guidance Society (*Jam 'iyatul Hidayah*) in Wa to furnish the Wa Islamic Senior Secondary School in 1998.

4.2.2 Women Empowerment

The Libyan Arab Cultural Centre established a vocational training centre for women in order to foster their empowerment. This was done basically to create employment opportunities for those wishing to take up fashion design as a profession. Zakaria Mohammed the Secretary to the Cultural Centre said that the teaching procedure provides a week of learning on the theories and techniques of sewing. This then gives the students an insight into the actual sewing techniques thereby making it easier for them when it comes to the practical learning. The uniqueness of the centre's vocational training is that, it provides the machines for the apprentice during their training, thereby making it easier for poorer women to pursue the profession (Zakaria, interview, 2nd November 2004). The training provides both employment and self-reliant for the trainees. The Islamic Call Society's office complex also has a vocational training centre attached to it. Students come from diverse communities including Madina, Adenta, Asharley Botwe, Mamobi and Nima, to receive tuition free training from the centre. The training is also done on a shift basis, thereby making it flexible in regard to enrolment of prospective students (Kamal, Interview, 17th March 2005).

4.2.3 Health

The Islamic Call Society was very instrumental in providing partial funding to the *Hidava* Islamic Call Clinic project at Wa. This clinic is one of the most successful and outstanding non-profit making clinics in the region. Also the only expatriate Egyptian medical doctor

stationed at the clinic is solely being sponsored by the Islamic Call Society in terms of his accommodation and monthly remuneration. Through the efforts of the Islamic Call Society the Libyan government has donated a Nissan patrol vehicle to the clinic for its daily transportation requirements (Kamal, interview, 17th March 2005). It also made a donation of a Nissan patrol ambulance, together with assorted drugs and hospital equipment, to a clinic at Wa in the Upper West region in Ghana. In addition, the Organization, realizing the indispensability and the relevance of health centre in every society, has constructed an ultramodern heal ill centre at its Easi Legon office complex. Also a number of wells have been dug at Wa in the Upper West region to provide portable water to the people (Kamal, interview, 17* March 2005). In 1990, the Libyan government also assisted some health clinics established by some Ghanaian Muslims; however the specific nature and the designations of these institutions are not known (Islamic Call Society 2002:263).

4.2.4 Agriculture

In the area of agriculture the organization has donated two (2) tractors, ploughing machines and their accessories to the Islamic Guidance Society in Wa to help it engage in fanning and income-generating activities. The Society also provides free farming and ploughing services to members.

4.2.5 Mosques

In the area of the construction of Islamic centers (mosques), available information indicates that in 1988 the Anbariyya Central Mosque at Tamale in the Northern region was assisted to complete the mosque project. In the same year, financial assistance was given to complete some Islamic centers in Ghana. These include the Islamic Young Men Association's Mosque in Accra, and the Muslim Youth Cooperation Council Mosque. Again, a request for

financial assistance by the Federation of Muslim Councils for the maintenance of the Accra Central Mosque at the Abosey Okine was granted by the Libyan Government through the World Islamic Call Society in 1991. In the same year, Libya also assisted in the construction of a mosque at Kumasi in the Ashanti region. The office complex of the Islamic Guidance Society at Wa in the Upper West region was built by the Libyan government through the World Islamic Call Society in 1997.

■4.2.6 Ideological Contribution

The Libyan revolutionary uprising in 1969 brought about the coming into being of a new politico-religious ideology in the nature of *The Green Book*, otherwise known as Third Universal Theory (TUT). This ideology is regarded as the government blueprint for its socialist orientated politico-religious philosophy. The significance of this socialist philosophy is that it is based on both political and religious elements. The book emphasizes the relevance of the Shari'ah principles together with some aspects of modern political perspective. With the establishment of the Libyan Cultural Centre in Ghana the ideological views of *The Green Book* found their way into the Ghanaian Muslim community. For instance, Ghanaian Muslims are always invited, both within and outside Ghana, to participate in the celebration of the revolutionary activities which gave birth to modern Libya. Apart from this annual celebration through which Ghanaians are exposed to the revolutionary ideas of *The Green Book*, the Libyan Government also grants scholarships to Ghanaian Muslim students wishing to pursue various studies in Libya. This has the tendency of exposing Ghanaian Muslims to the real manifestation of socialist way of life of Libyans, which in one way or the other influences them.

The Libyan government through its accredited institutions promotes the values of the Green Book in different ways. For example, anyone visiting some of the Libyan establishments in Ghana will observe that some inscriptions taken from *The Green Book* pertaining to its values and principles are made visible in certain designated places. For instance, some of the health facilities funded by Libya have the quotations from a relevant portion of *The Green Book* reading, 'Enjoying the highest level of good health is one of the basic rights for every citizen'. Some of the quotations emphasize the importance of education based on *The Green Book*. Some of which read, 'Who ever establishes a school closes a prison', 'the school needs to be served by its students', and 'Knowledge is a natural right for every human being'. Some of the quotations are of political nature. For example, at the premises of the Libya Arab Cultural Centre in Ghana, one observes some inscriptions pasted on some vantage points. Some read: 'No representation in lieu of the people' and 'representation is a falsification of democracy'. This sort of propaganda sends strong messages to any casual reader about the type of political system practiced by the Libyan Government. It also attracts and develops a sense of curiosity in the reader as to the teachings of *The Green Book*. Above all, it gives the reader a positive impression about Libya and its institutions in relation to the abundant welfare facilities for the citizenry within the country. Furthermore, the existence of the International Centre for the Study of the *Green Book* and its impact on Ghanaians cannot be underestimated. The Libyan Government established the Centre in Ghana primarily to enable academia to study the principles contained in *The Green Book*. Its membership was mainly composed of intellectuals in the various universities who share a passionate interest in the teachings of the *Green Book*. Through their studies, numerous publications were produced emphasizing the unique value of socialism in the political, economic, social and religious issues. Through the reading of the Centre's publications many Ghanaians became imbued with the values of *The Green Book*. The Ghana center of

the *Green Book* and that of the Burkina Faso were noted to be the most active ones in the Sub-Saharan Africa due to the appealing nature of their activities to people across the various strata of the society (Nyang 1988:219).

Perhaps, a summarized version of Libyan Government's contributions to Ghanaian Muslims sheds more light as represented on table 1 below.

Table 1: The Contribution of the Libyan **Government** to Ghanaian Muslims

Organizations	CONTRIBUTIONS					
	School(s)	Health	Agriculture	Human Resource Development	Women Empovvverment	Mosques
Libya Cultural Consulate	-	-	-	Computer & Arabic Studies	Vocational centre	
World Islamic Society	Construction & expansion of 15 schools	2 clinics in Wa & East Legon	Donated 2 tractors to Hiday, Wa	Scholarship & salaries for Du'at	-	Construction & rehabilitations

Data source: [findings from fieldwork, 2006]

43 CONCLUSION

As observed, the result of the research indicates that Egypt and Libya, upon establishing their diplomatic ties with Ghana, dealt with Ghanaians through their own accredited organizations. While the Libyan dealt with Ghanaians through the World Islamic Call Society and the Libya Arab Cultural Centre on one hand, the Egyptian promoted their interest through the Al-Azhar Islamic Council and the Ghana-Egypt Technical Cooperation on another. The diplomatic relations also created an opportunity through which the two North African countries offered different forms of developments for Ghanaian Muslims. While Egypt offered Ghanaian Muslims with human resources, Libyan supports were in the form of provision of funds for educational infrastructure, women empowerment, donations to Islamic institutions and

organisation and agricultural equipments, building health posts, financial support for Muslim students and construction of new Islamic centers (mosques).

The extent to which each of these countries assisted Ghanaian Muslims was depended on their economic strengths, which also corresponds with their influences on Ghanaian Muslims. In the case of Egypt, though it was not able to provide direct funding for Islamic projects, it offered Ghanaian Muslims with different kinds of human resources such as Arabic instructors, Islamic missionaries and medical personnel. This has however not resulted in the penetration of Egyptian ideological interest in Ghana. It has been found that a significant number of these Egyptian graduates tend to align themselves with the *Tijaniyya* movement.

It has been argued that the Government of Egypt has realized the prestige of Al-Azhar University among Muslims globally. Consequently, it has always been used as an instrument to reinforce Egypt's foreign policy among the graduates of Al-Azhar and other universities in Egypt (Chanfi, 2001:374). However, this tendency was not visibly noticed in Ghana.

The impact of these projects on Ghanaian Muslims life varies depending on the specific nature of the developments offered by the Muslim missions. By providing human resource experts to Ghanaian Muslims and Ghanaians in general, the Government of Egypt supports Ghana with quality staffs as obtain in their home country. However these experts do not have accurate and in-depth understanding of the socio-cultural background of Ghana. For instance, the lack of attraction of Egyptian missionaries to Ghanaian Muslims was a result of the language barrier and challenges they pose to Ghanaian Muslims culture. In spite that.

some Muslim leaders and proprietors of schools appreciate the interest of some Muslim states and governments to assist Muslim educational institutions, they are skeptical whether these governments understand the socio-cultural environment of Muslims in Ghana (Idrissu 2002:14).

On the other hand, the Libyan development assistance to Ghanaian Muslims has helped improve and boosted the infrastructural situation of Ghana and Muslims in particular. These projects have however not experienced progressive expansion and transformation beyond the original structures since the time of their establishment. This has meant that the Libyan embassy had not adopted consistent policy towards Muslim development in Ghana.

Aside assisting Muslims with various development projects, the key agenda of the Libyan organisations as identified in this research was to promote its religio-political interest in Ghana. This has largely been successful as the ideas contained in the Green Book permeated the political landscape of Ghana. Al-Gadhafi's persona as the 'Revolutionary Muslim Leader' (*Qaid Sauratul Islamiya*) is further projected by these institutions.

The other role of the Libyan institutions in Ghana was their interest in civil Muslim leadership in Ghana. This is evident in their support for the formation of *Deen-al-Islam* in 1988 and the Federation of Muslim Councils (FMC) in 1990, though both are now defunct. In recent times however, the World Islamic Call Society has collaborated with the Coalition of Muslim Organizations of Ghana (COMOG). This shows the interest of Libyan Government to work with civil Muslim leadership. However, the motive behind the interest of the Libyan Government in Muslim leadership could not accurately be established. Perhaps such interest has a local and global political undertone, considering the fact that the

Libyan revolution has a global objective to strengthen Muslim leadership and institutions world-wide. Importantly, the Libyan Government might have realized that having relations with national Muslim leadership in Ghana is the most effective means of achieving their foreign policy agenda. This could ultimately cause the alignment of Libyan political institutions to Muslim leadership in Ghana.

In short, it is significant to note that Muslim transnational encounter with North African countries open up the opportunity for modern development projects for Ghanaian Muslims in the post independence period. These developments are in contrast to the opportunities created by Ghanaian encounter with West African Muslims. The consequence of this was that the North African brand of Islam represented the first challenge to the prevailing consecutive West African brand of Islam, the *Tijaniyya*.

The next chapter sets the tone for the discussion of the Middle Eastern Islamic influence in Ghana through their development contributions. The Middle East Islamic traditions such as *Wahhabiyya* and *Shi'ah* have already been embroiled in ideological and doctrinal competition over the legitimacy of true Islamic tradition in the Middle East. This has further been extended to Ghana as a result of post independence Muslim interaction with the Islamic world.

CHAPTER FIVE

MIDDLE EAST TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM BODIES (TMBS) AND MUSLIMS IN GHANA

5.0 INTRODUCTION

The Middle Eastern factor in the development of Islam and Muslims focuses on the role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It does this by exploring their developmental contributions towards Ghanaians and the Ghanaian Muslims alike. As observed earlier, North Africa was Ghana's initial contacts with the larger Muslim world during the post independence period. This then paved the way for Ghana's relations with the Middle Eastern countries. Aside the North Africa, the Middle East also represents the hub of Islam regardless of its Islamic idiosyncratic coloration. Two of the major Islamic worldviews emanate from the Middle East, the *Wahhabiyya* from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and also being the dominant Islamic expression in the Arabian Gulf. Second, the *Shi'ah* from the Islamic Republic of Iran is another sect of Islam in the Middle East. Interestingly, upon these states establishment of their diplomatic relations with Ghana, they equally extended their ideological and religious influences into Ghana. The study will thus survey the various development packages they offer to Ghanaian Muslims in addition to ascertaining the various conduits that these states have employed to disseminate their religious and ideological views and influences in Ghana. For the start, we will focus on the role of Saudi Arabia in Muslim development in Ghana to be followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran as a case for the influence of the Middle Eastern factor on the Muslims in Ghana.

5.1 THE ROLE OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA TOWARDS MUSLIM DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA

From the sketch, two types of institutions facilitate developments in Ghana and among Ghanaian Muslims as identified below:

1. the first types of institutions are Saudi Government agencies such as the Saudi Development Fund (SDF) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). These types of Saudi institutions facilitate bilateral cooperation and agreement through development;
2. the second category of institutions which facilitate development in Ghana are the Non-Governmental Organizations with strong links to Saudi Arabia. Among these NGOs are the Al-Hudaibiyya Relief Services, the Centre for the Distribution of Islamic Books, Al-Muntada Al-Islami, Al-Huda Islamic Society, among others.

Unlike the Egyptian and Libyan diplomatic missions in Ghana, where they established direct engagement with Ghanaian Muslims through their designated institutions, the bulk of the Saudi Arabian contributions were through indirect medium such as their support for the Islamic non-governmental organizations in Ghana. Many of these NGOs enjoy strong support from Saudi Arabia and depend on the government to facilitate their activities in Ghana. Because the Saudi Government and the Saudi-affiliated NGOs have the same agenda for promoting and advancing the course of *Wahhabiyya* Islam, we will thus classify their contributions and that of the official government institutions as parts of the larger Saudi contributions to Ghanaians. This is because they all aim at achieving the same goal, the *Wahhabi* agenda. A majority of the founders of these NGOs are either graduates from higher educational institutions in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf countries. The major areas of Saudi developmental contributions and that of the NGOs to Ghanaian Muslims are in following areas:

1. educational
2. health
- 3- agriculture, and

4. doctrinal.

5.1.1 Education

An important component of the bilateral agreements between the Saudi and Ghanaian Governments is offering of educational opportunities for Ghanaian Muslims. Ghana is one of the Third World countries that have benefited from the Saudi Development Fund (SDF). For instance, in 1985 a loan agreement to the tune of 240 million cedis was signed to finance a project namely, the completion of a Secondary School science laboratory for the Presbyterian Secondary School at Legon, in Accra (Muntairi, interview, 8th February 2006).

Aspects of Saudi Arabia contributions related to the granting of scholarship to Ghanaian Muslims to study in the Saudi universities in various disciplines through her Embassy in Accra. The National Imam of the Ahlus-Sunnah in Ghana has confirmed that from the period of establishing its diplomatic ties with Ghana, from 1960s until the present (2006), at least two thousand (2000) Ghanaian Muslim students have graduated from Saudi universities as preachers, teachers, medical doctors and engineers etc. It was also indicated that the Saudi Government through the embassy is paying the majority of these preachers' salaries. This is because the Imams assist in *Dawa* (propagation) in the country (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). The salaried Saudi trained *Ulama* in Ghana are either under *Darul Ifta* of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowment or the Muslim World League.

Apart from the religious services, the Saudi Government through its scholarship schemes offers opportunities for studies in petroleum sciences, engineering, computer studies,

aboratory technology etc. However the educational qualifications of some of the students' io not permit them to come home upon the completion of their programmes since some companies interested in their professional background often recruit them. This is necessitated by the unemployable nature of their qualifications in Ghana (Hudu, interview, **4th May 2005**).

Another scholarship scheme that is presently contributing immensely to the future development of the Muslims in Ghana is the Islamic Development Bank Scholarship Scheme (IDB). The IDB was established in 1975 by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and introduced into Ghana in 1986 to offer educational opportunities for deserving Muslim students to study sciences in Turkey or enjoy the scholarship within Ghana. Though it has its headquarters in Saudi Arabia with the Saudi Government holding the largest share, the Saudi Government has little influence over its administration to favour her ideological agenda in Ghana. Since it is administered by the Saudi Government through her embassy in Ghana, it is however worthwhile to outline aspects of its contributions to the Ghanaian Muslims. The IDB scholarship scheme could however be regarded as the collective interest of the Muslim states in the development of Muslims in Ghana and other Muslims elsewhere.

The Chairman of the IDB Scholarship Scheme is Rahimu Gbadamoshi.¹ The background of its engagement with Ghanaian Muslims was a result of an official visit by a delegation of the bank to Ghana in 1986. This was with a view to assessing the role of Muslims in national development. The visit took them to several institutions. The interest of the bank on Muslims education was borne out of the fact that they were lagging behind in national

¹ Rahimu Gbadamoshi is the chairman of the IDB, the former Director General of Ghana Education Service and me current Registrar of the Islamic University, Ghana

development due to their low educational background. As a result they felt that the way forward to contribute to the Ghanaian Muslims' advancement is to assist Muslims in the educational sphere (Gbadamoshi, interview, 22nd April 2005).

The original intention of the IDB's proposal was to allow Ghanaian Muslim students to enjoy the scholarship scheme in the Ghanaian universities in the science disciplines. However a proposal for concessional admission in respect of fee-paying for these students to the Ghana's two leading tertiary universities, namely the University of Ghana at Legon in Accra and the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi was rejected by them (Gbadamoshi, interview, 22nd April 2005). The universities later proposed a tuition fee of \$9,000 per a student per academic year. As a result, the scholarship scheme was routed through the Turkish universities, but offered in Ghana for deserving Muslim students who gain admission at any of the public universities in the science discipline on merit.

Since 1986, about two hundred and twenty one (221) Ghanaian students have benefited from the scheme. Half of the students have so far graduated, while a hundred and fifteen students are still benefiting. The disciplines for which the IDB Scholarships are offered include medical sciences, agriculture, and architecture (Gbadamoshi, interview, 22nd April 2005). This provides employable skills for the students which thus enable them to contribute to the development of Ghana. As at 2006, a total amount of three million seven hundred and sixty two thousand United States Dollars have been spent on the students in **Ghana (\$3,762,000).**

In addition, the IDB also offered various forms of assistance for Muslim educational infrastructure in Ghana. For instance, an Islamic Science Secondary School built with IDB funding worth over one million Dollars is providing science education to many Muslim children in the Northern region of the country. It is a programme aimed at promoting science education among Muslim students and among northerners in general (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). The IDB has also donated science equipment (estimated to cost 20,000 dollars) to the Tamale Secondary School and the Ghana Secondary School both in Tamale. Oilier projects financed by the IDB scheme include Junior Secondary School projects at Tamale, Bimbila, and Wulensi. This is with a view to ensuring that accessible education to Muslim students and helps the Government to meet its target of free compulsory basic education (Gbadamoshi, interview, 22nd April 2005). The IDB targeting the Northern region with their projects is due to the deprived nature of the area as far as education is concerned. It has also taken into consideration the dominance of the Muslim population in the region as compared to the other two regions in the north (Gbadamoshi, interview, 22nd April 2005).

The Vice-President of the Islamic Development Bank was in the country for an international conference in 2002. He used the opportunity to persuade the Government to be a shareholder in the bank in order to enjoy the maximum benefit of the IDB. This is because the bank gives interest-free loans to member countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). The overall objectives of the IDB's scholarship scheme are to eradicate poverty in the Muslim communities through employment creation for the graduates in their chosen careers. Further, it intends to equip the Muslim youth with skills to enable them to contribute meaningfully to their motherland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004).

The Ahlus-Sunnah Theological Institute complex, the Institute of Islamic Studies based at Nima in the Greater Accra was partly financed by the IDB. The Centre consists of a four-storey building, comprising a primary and junior secondary school, which all fall under the aegis of the Islamic Education Unit of the Ghana Education Service (GES). A portion of the centre also serves as classrooms for the Institute of Islamic Studies, a theological seminary of the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah, the *Wahhabiyya* movement in Ghana. Programmes are offered from junior secondary to senior secondary levels in Arabic language. Students upon graduation and when they excel have the chance of gaining scholarship to study at the Islamic University at Medina in Saudi Arabia, or any other university within the Kingdom (Hadir, interview, 14th March 2005). Interestingly, the Theological Institute serves as the major recruitment centre of students to Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf countries with its associated proclivity for the dissemination of *Wahhabism* in Ghana (Hadir, interview, 14th March 2005).

It has been observed that from 1987-2005 IDB has sunk a total amount of \$4,146,000 (four million one hundred and forty six thousand United States dollars). It has also been established that IDB has approved 28 projects which are in the pipeline for the various Muslim communities amounting to \$4 million United States Dollars (Hudu, interview, 4th May 2005). The trend for the distribution of the IDB's projects indicates that about 80% are located in the Northern region of Ghana. It implies that Muslims within the Northern region have subscribed to the projects earlier than any other community.

Table 2: Approved IDB's Projects in Ghana for the year 1987-2005

Project	Beneficiary	Location	Date Approved
Four Education Projects	Ghanaian Government	Tamale	6/4/1988
	Ghanaian Government	Nyanpka	1988 & 2002
Polytechnic Institute	Ghanaian Government	Tamale	6/4/1988
Equipments for Science	Ghanaian Government	Tamale	6/4/1988
Institute of Islamic Studies	Islamic Research & Reformation Centre	Nima, Accra	9/9/1991
Kindergarten primary school	The Hijra Club	Accra	4/8/1994
Vocational Training Center	Anbariya Islamic Society	Tamale	6/4/1996
Primary and Junior Sec Sch	Northern Region Cooperating Council	Yendi	8/17/1996
	Northern Region Cooperating Council	Walensi	12/14/1996
Binjae Primary Sch	Regional Coordinating Council	Binjae	3/17/1997
VTC for Muslim Girls	Amhriva Islamic Institute	Tamale	9/20/1998
Dungu Technical Institute	Gh Asso for the Advment of Muslim Youth Education	Dungu	2/1/1998
School for Islamic Studies	Institute of Islamic Studies	Kumasi	7/22/2002
Isl Sec Sch for Science	Tamale Islamic Secondary School	Tamale	3/11/2002
Construction of a Secondary School	Al-Azhariya Isl School	Kumasi	4/25/2005

Data source: [findings from fieldwork, 2006]

Another office of the Saudi Government which contributes to the development of Ghanaian Muslims is the Islamic Desk at the Royal Embassy of the Saudi Arabia in Accra. The Islamic Desk of the Embassy falls under the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments in Saudi Arabia. The core objective of the Islamic Desk in the Embassy is to specifically deal with issues affecting Muslims and Islam in Ghana (Muntairi interview, 8th February 2006). The Islamic Desk in the Embassy liaises with the major Islamic non-governmental organizations in the Saudi Arabia and with Ghanaian Muslims which include the Organization of Islamic Conference² the Muslim World League³, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth⁴. The department also distributes Holy Qur'an and Islamic literature.

It is an international organization founded by Muslim and Islamic governments to promote Islam at inter-state level. Ibrahim Codjoe Quaye is their representative in Ghana.

Jobs by Saudi state with the objective of realizing the aspiration of Muslims

Is a global non-governmental organization founded by Saudi state with interest in developing the potential of the Muslim youth and addresses issues of their concern. Muhammad Ibrahim is their representative in Ghana

especially from the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.⁵ Literature obtained from Saudi Arabia accounts for not less than sixty percent (60%) of the overall Islamic literature in Ghana. In recent times, the department is providing funding for the construction of a National Mosque at Kawokudi in Accra for the Muslim communities with offices and a residence for the National Chief Imam of the Republic of Ghana. This assistance has been made possible through the assistance of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosque in Saudi Arabia, King Abdallah b. Abdul Aziz.

Al-Hudaibiyya Relief Services is one of the transnational non-governmental organizations with strong link to Saudi regime. It started operations in Ghana in 2004 with its offices located at Madina in Accra. Al-Hudaibiyya represents an NGO which facilitates beneficial transnational engagements with Ghanaian Muslims and the Muslim world. The major role that the organization plays in recent time is that it links Ghanaian Muslims with the Saudi Government and philanthropists who are willing to assist and develop Muslims and Islam in Ghana. The organization was founded primarily to take up the role of the Directorate of Mosques and Humanitarian Services, under the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments (Hadi, interview, 21st March 2006). The Directorate of Mosques and Humanitarian Services (*Idaratul-Binai Masjid Wal-Mashari Khairiya*) was closed in the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of September 11th attack on the United States. This was a result of the criticism by the international community of the perceived lax nature of the Saudi regime in respect of its role in regulating the operations of NGOs in the Kingdom (Hadi, interview 21st March 2006).

⁵Two Holy Mosque is a title given to the sitting King of Saudi Arabia, presently, King
lah b. Abdul Aziz is the holder of this title. The two Holy Mosques refer to the Ka'bah in Mecca and the
prophet Mosque in Medina

Since its establishment in Ghana, Al-Hudaibiyya has developed an innovative strategy in its developmental projects for Ghanaian Muslims. For instance, realizing the enormous developmental needs of the Muslim community in Ghana, it introduced the concept of Markaz, (an Islamic or Arabic term for a ‘Centre’). Among the facilities included in every centre (Markaz) are a school, a mosque, a borehole, a morgue and sometimes a residence for the Imam. All these facilities are part of the Al-Hudaibiyya package for the Muslim community in Ghana (Hadi, interview, 21st March 2006). This was arrived at after a careful assessment of the needs of the Muslim communities. It was meant to address the gap and the shortcomings in the nature of humanitarian delivery by most Muslim NGOs in Ghana.

Muhammad Hadi Yakubu is the Director of Operations of Al-Hudaibiya in Ghana. He indicated that the major criterion used to determine community need for a project is when the leaders of the community have applied for a particular project. The organization then does a follow-up within the community with a view to ascertaining facts about the community in order to avoid duplication. After careful appraisal of the needs of the community, prospective donors’ interests are sought, a process which may take a year or two. Finally, in the event of the application going through for funding, the leaders of the community are informed about the intention of the organization to put up the project for them. He, therefore, emphasizes that most of the projects facilitated by Al-Hudaibiya were based on the needs of the communities (Hadi, interview, 21st March 2006).

The contributions of Al-Hudaibiya to the Ghanaian Muslim community cannot be fully captured in this chapter as a result of its enormity. For the sake of brevity, it is prudent to

illustrate its contribution through the following table. Below is the table of the distribution of Al-Hudaibiyya Relief Services on a regional basis.

Table 3: Distribution of Al-Hudaibiyya Projects in the Regions of Ghana

Regions	Number of Schools	Number of Mosques	Number of Boreholes
Greater Accra	11	10	14
Ashanti	2	11	
Volta	6	-	
Eastern	6	4	15
Central	5	4	23
Western	3	3	2
Brong Ahafo	8	-	
Northern	45	56	10
Upper East	3	1	-
Upper West	-	2	5

Data source: [findings from fieldwork, 2006]

Central, Western, the Upper East and the Upper West regions received the least of Al-Hudaibiyya funded projects. The reason for this situation has been explained by Muhammad Hadi. According to him, the communities, as compared to others, did not apply for projects from the organization timeously and partly due to lack of information about the organization. However, he indicated that some of the communities have applied for some projects, which are being considered by the organization.

In short, it is necessary to summarize the contributions of Al-Hudaibiyya Relief Services on a regional basis for the purpose of simplification. In the Eastern region, it has dug fifteen (15) boreholes and built six (6) *markazs* and four (4) mosques. The organization has also dug twenty-three (23) boreholes in the Central region five (5) schools and four (4) mosques. In the Greater Accra region it dug fourteen (14) boreholes, constructed eleven (11) schools and ten (10) mosques, each with a school, comprising four (4) classroom blocks in each mosque. Al-Hudaibiyya also had dug (16) boreholes, and constructed two (2) schools and

eleven (11) mosques with a *markaz* in each in the Ashanti region. In the Western region it has constructed three (3) mosques, two (2) of these mosques has four (4) classroom blocks with quarters for an Imam and his assistant, a mortuary as well as a borehole (Hadi, interview, 21st March 2006).

In the Upper East region of Ghana it has constructed three (3) schools, one (1) mosques and a school of four (4) classrooms also with quarters for an Imam and his assistant. In addition, Al-Hudaibiyya constructed two (2) mosques and provided (5) boreholes in the Upper West region.

As observed a substantial portion of Al-Hudaibiyya projects are in the Northern region. The district distribution of these projects in the Northern region is necessary to illustrate its role in Muslim development below:

Table 4: The Distribution of Saudi Funded Projects by Districts Facilitated by Al Hudaibiyya Relief Services in the Northern region of Ghana

District	Number of Schools	Number of Mosques	Number of boreholes
Savelugu	8	12	3
Tamale	15	30	.
Yendi	7	.	.
Zabzugu	7	.	2
Mamprusi	4	10	5
Karaga	4	4	.

Data source: (findings from fieldwork, 2006]

Table 5: The Distribution of Al-Hudaibiyya Projects on a Regional Basis in

<u>Percentages</u>			
Regions	Schools	Mosques	Boreholes
Greater Accra	14.9	11.0	16.5
Ashanti	0.0	12.1	18.8
Volta	1.5	0.0	0.0
Eastern	3.0	4.4	17.6
Central	1.5	4.4	27.1
Western	3.0	3.3	2.4
Brong Ahafo	7.5	0.0	0.0
Northern	65.7	61.5	11.8
Upper East	3.0	1.1	0.0
Upper West	0.0	2.2	5.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Data source: [findings from fieldwork, 2006]

The outcome of the research on the regional distribution of Al-Hudaibiya projects shows that, the main interest of the organization is in the area of construction of educational infrastructures, mosques some with quarters for the Imams and their assistants and mortuaries and boreholes attached to some mosques.

More importantly, the concept of a *markaz* (Islamic centre) with each *markaz* comprising of a school, a mosque, and a borehole as introduced by Al-Hudaibiya in Ghana will become the benchmark for developments to be emulated by other organizations in their quest for attracting developments to the Muslim communities in Ghana. The concept of *markaz*. if fully adhered to, will make the Muslim communities highly independent and self-sufficient in terms of a developmental package.

The regional distribution of Al-Hudaibiya projects shows that, as indicated before, the Northern region as a whole has most of the projects especially the executed projects on education and mosques (65.7% and 61.5% respectively). This was due to the fact that the Northern region Muslims were aware earlier of the organization's development projects for

the Muslim communities in Ghana, and partly because the leadership of the organization comes from the Northern region. Consequently, they have been the first people to have been aware of the organization and applied for the projects, thus making them the leading beneficiary region in Ghana. It also implies that they have subscribed to these types of projects more than Muslims in any other regions in Ghana.

Moreover, the NGO has done a community mapping with a view to ascertaining the needs of the communities, thereby arriving at this formula. The organization sought applications from the various communities based on their needs for possible assistance, at the same time taking into consideration the prospective donors' interests in projects especially relating to education and boreholes. Indeed, the execution of these projects for the needy communities by Al-Hudaibiya has helped to relieve the Ghana's Government of some of its developmental burdens. The fact that the needs of some of the communities do not fall within the realm of government development projects makes it difficult for them to rely on the government, especially projects related to the construction of religious centres or mosques.

The Centre for the Distribution of Islamic Books is another Islamic non-governmental organization which also received substantial funding from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It was formed in 1980 but is now defunct. The major source of funding of the Centre was the Al-Rajhi International and Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). The Executive Director for the Centre was Muhyideen Rufai. He indicated that the organization used to receive about four hundred thousand United States dollars \$400,000 annually from the Bank (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004).

The Centre's educational contribution was the construction of the Holy Quran primary and JSS at Ada in the Eastern region. It also built a primary school at Kasoa in the Central region in 1992. The Centre also constructed a primary school known as Umar b. Khatab at Medina in the Greater Accra region in 1987 (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). The Centre also assisted the Wataniya Islamic School in the Ashanti region in 1994 with substantial funds to build additional classrooms. Among the other Islamic schools which received some finance from the organization were Khalid b. Walid Islamic School at Koforidua in the Eastern region in 1992. Likewise, the Islamic School in Wa in the Upper West region and the Al-Azhariya Islamic School in the Ashanti region were all given financial support to expand their schools facilities in 1997 and 1994 respectively (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004).

As for their engagement with the Muslim youth, the organization is known to have been the first Islamic NGO to introduce seminars and workshops for Muslim students in Ghana in the early 1980s. Muhyideen indicated that the target of the workshops by the organization were the students in the tertiary institutions. However, most of their workshops were catered at the University of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology and the University of Cape Coast. In spite of financial constraints, it did not prevent the organization from co-opting some students from the polytechnics in the regions in their activities (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). The purpose of the workshops and seminars were to give exposure to the Muslim students on the challenges facing the Muslim youth and the *Ummah* at large. He indicated that the workshop opportunities were used to further challenge the students to go into active politics as a way of serving the nation and Islam (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). The result of these workshops generated interest in the Muslim youth taking up an active political career in Ghana both at national

and local level such as the Haruna Idrissu, Inusah Fousseini and Muntaka Hafiz, all members of Ghana's Parliament. The resource persons for the workshops were a blend of western educated Muslim scholars in the academia and Islamic scholars such as the late Abdallah Botchwey, Abdallah Issaka, and Mahmud Gedel among others (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004).

The Centre for the Distribution of Islamic Books also donated sum of monies to Muslim organizations. For instance about thirty thousand United States Dollars (\$30,000) was donated to the Institute of Islamic Studies, a theological institute of the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'a at Nima in the Greater Accra region. This was to facilitate the expansion of their educational facilities in order to increase the enrolment capacity of the Institute. The organization also assisted the Hijra Islamic Club with twenty thousand dollars (\$20,000) to construct an Islamic school at Airport Residential Area for Muslim students who have no access to Islamic education in the Zongos (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). The Hijra Club was an umbrella organization of Ghanaian Muslim professionals, businesspersons, and technocrats in the civil and public service in Ghana. It was aimed at creating a platform for prominent Muslims in responsible position in the society. This was to enable its members to harness their professional background to develop the communities. It also aimed at providing technical and logistical supports for existing Muslim institutions in Ghana. The organization was also interested in imparting leadership skills to the upcoming Muslim youth (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). The organization is now defunct due to lack of commitment by the majority of its former members.

The main interest of the Centre, as indicated by this research, showed that it devoted much in the way of financial resources to assisting Ghanaian Muslims in the educational sphere.

The nature of its assistance was in the form of donations to Islamic educational institutions in need of further expansion or for the construction of new centres for needy Muslim communities.

A unique element introduced by the Centre was in the domain of organizing workshops for the Muslim students in the tertiary institutions in Ghana, something that had hardly ever been done before. The potential of the workshop as a form of education in exposing the Muslim students to contemporary challenges cannot be underestimated. In most cases such workshops also serve as forums for sharing ideas and challenging widely-held notions and practices in Muslim communities, thereby orienting the students to contemporary trends. This exposed the students into new ways and modern approaches to issues. The introduction of these workshops by the Centre, especially among the students, became another platform for engaging Muslims on current issues affecting Muslims in Ghana. This strategy has been possible due to the secular background of the organizers such as the late Abdullah Botchwey, Mahmud Gedel and Hamidu Chodi.

It is also important to look at the contribution made by Al-Muntada Al-Islami, a Saudi affiliate organization in Ghana. This will enable us to ascertain the unique contributions that they have also offered to the Muslim communities. The Al-Muntada Al-Islami Trust is another organization with substantial partial funding from Saudi philanthropists and NGOs. It is an international non-governmental organization with headquarters in London and regional offices in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia and Madison in the United States of America. It established its office in Ghana in 1990. It also has offices in sixteen countries, mostly in West Africa. The background of Al-Muntada Islami shows that it is a reputable transnational organization prior to September 11th attacks on the United States of America.

The Al-Muntada Al-Islami Trust has two educational complexes in Ghana, nameiy Al-Siddiq Educational Complex at Agona Nyakrom, in the Central region and Islamic School at Wenchi in the Brong Ahafo region. Both were constructed in 1990 (Muzu, Interview, 9 May 2005). While both have facilities from the kindergarten to the junior secondary level, the Nyakrom one has a Senior Secondary School. The schools are under the supervision of the Islamic Education Unit of the Ghana Education Service (GES) (Muzu, interview, 9th May 2005). Suleiman Muzu is the Director of Al-Muntada Islami. He indicated that as at 2003, the population of the students in the two educational complexes was one thousand and eighty-one students (1081).

The innovative element that Al-Muntada Islami introduced into the Ghanaian Muslim community is the organization of classes on Qur'anic and Islamic studies during morning and evening for Muslim children. This is known in Arabic as *Halkat Qur'an* (Qur'anic circle). The classes are purely for teaching how to recite the Holy Qur'an and to learn certain rudiments of Islam. About six thousand (6000) Qur'anic circles exist nationwide with two hundred (200) Islamic teachers on its payroll for the Islamic and the Qur'anic circle classes (Muzu, interview, 9th May 2005).

Furthermore, Al-Muntada Islami was the first Islamic organization to introduce religious camps for Muslim students in 1995. Students in the various tertiary institutions in the country were the target of Camps. These camps, most appropriately, take place when students are on long vacation and last for a month. In the camps, students are taught various courses in Islamic studies, such as the forbidden and lawful in Islam, Islamic creed, contemporary challenges facing Muslims and the Muslim youth, Islam, and national politics (Muzu, interview, 9th May 2005). The camps have been the means of shaping the Muslims

students identity with its *Wahhabi* ideological inclination. It also serves as a platform of interaction and socialization among the participants.

Apart from engaging in the organization of Qur'anic cells and workshops, Al-Muntada Al-Islami also involves in the building of Islamic schools for Muslim communities. For instance it has constructed six (6) schools blocks in six communities in five regions. In 2003 it constructed a six (6)-classroom block for the Kutuia School at Wa in the Upper West region. The organization also built a two-(2) classroom block, an office, and a vocational training centre for Muslim women at Kumasi in Ashanti region in 2003 (Muzu, interview, 9th May 2005).

Additionally, the Rahmaniya Islamic School at Tema in the Greater Accra region was assisted by Al-Muntada Al-Islami with a two-classroom block and an office in 2003. Tahiriya Islamic School at Tamale in the Northern region was also given assistance in the form of a two (2)-classroom block in 2003. Another two (2)-classroom block was also constructed for the Rahmaniya Islamic school in the Northern region. Lastly, Al-Muntada Islami assisted the Kintampo Muslim community through the Badariya Islamic School with a secondary technical school comprising a five (5)-classroom block in 2003 (Muzu. interview, 9th May 2005).

Al-Muntada Al-Islami contributions to Ghanaian Muslims shows that, it is interested in education. As a result of this it has adopted three approaches in its educational delivery in the country. These are:

- !• providing an educational infrastructure to the needy Muslim communities. The ownership of these types of projects rests with the communities; and

2. establishing educational institutions and managing them. Good examples of these types of projects are the Al-Siddiq Educational Complex at Nyakrom and one at Wenchi, in the Central and Brong Ahafo regions respectively. The organization believes in community ownership of Islamic centres. This was borne out the organization's vision on education. The Qur'anic circles are meant to impart Islamic culture on the youth, with its idiosyncratic basis on *Wahhabi* perspective of Islam as it reflects that of the organization and the resource persons.
3. The formation of Qur'anic circles are meant to promote the *Wahhabi* ideological agenda. The targets of the Qur'anic circles are the youth.

While promoting the *Wahhabi* agenda in their educational centers did not generate serious controversy with other Muslim sects in Ghana, such could not be said about the role of Muntada when they attempt to replace an old Mosque structure with a new one for a community. Whenever a community requested for a mosque project, they would insist on writing an undertaking with the community that they (Muntada Al-Islami) would send down an Imam to take charge of the mosque, despite that the community might have their Imam. In most cases the communities would enter into the agreement but renege to fight for the local or the existing Imam when the construction is over. This tendency of Muntada of promoting the *Wahhabi* agenda through their development projects created tension wherever they established mosques in most communities like at Tarkwa, Aboasi, all in the Western region, Effiakuma in the Central region and Jasikan in the Volta region. In some of the cases, the disputes were interpreted as Ahlus-Sunnah-*Tijaniyya* conflicts, while in some cases it was regarded as disagreement between the Muntada and the community.

The Al-Furqan Islamic Society of Abu Dhufair at Jeddah in Saudi Arabia is a foreign organization with a Saudi Arabian lineage whose developments were tied to the *Wahhabi* agenda. Among the assistance that the organization offered in 1995 to the Bawku Muslim community in the Upper East region was the building of a mosque, known as Masjidul Umar or Umar's Mosque. The Society constructed another mosque at Azamga in 2003, also in Bawku, known as Masjidul Usman or Usman's Mosque. In addition, the society built a mosque in 2005 at Sabon Gari in Bawku, known as Abdullah's Mosque and another at Yamanda, also in Bawku (Khalifa, interview, 3rd August 2005). Al-Furqan's assistance to the Muslim communities in Ghana was largely channeled towards the support of the members of the Ahlus-Sunnah movement in the Upper East region. It shows the interest of the organization to advance the *Wahhabi* or Ahlus-Sunnah course in Ghana.

The Al-Huda Islamic Society is a Ghanaian NGO with a strong Saudi Arabia connection. The organization was formed in 1992 by a group of Ghanaian Muslim graduates from Saudi universities led by Armiyau Jibril Saleemdeen. The offices of Al-Huda Islamic society are located at Pig Farm in Accra. The organization has four-(4) developmental concerns on its agenda. These are:

1. education,
2. an orphanage and benevolence,
3. projects, and
4. investments (Armiyau, interview, 22nd December 2006).

With its focus on education, the organization has constructed a multi-million Islamic centre known as Abdullah bn Mas'ud Centre for Qur'anic Memorization at Gbawe in the Greater Accra region. The Centre hosts students on scholarships from Ghana, Togo, Burkina Faso,

Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, Niger and Nigeria for a three (3) year diploma course in Islamic studies. The Arabic language, English, French, and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) are integral to the subjects taught at the centre (Armiyau, interview, 22nd December 2006). The promotion of the agenda of *Wahhabiyya* movement is the hallmark of the Al-Huda activities.

Like Muntada Al-Islami, the organization is also involved in the promotion of Qur'anic circles in Ghana. These circles are mostly concentrated in 3 regions, namely, the Greater Accra, Ashanti and the Northern regions. In all, the Qur'anic cells of Al-Huda attract about 700 students daily (Nuhu, interview, 22nd December 2006).

It does suggest that the overriding interest behind some of the activities of the Saudi affiliated NGOs like Muntada, Al-Furqan and Al-Huda is to promote the *Wahhabi* course in Ghana. This has largely been successful as the *Wahhabi* movement has become the second dominant Muslim group in Ghana. This was necessitated by the flexibility adopted by the Saudi regime in regards to the operations of NGOs. In a sense, it has worked in the proliferation of *Wahhabism* in Ghana. The flexible nature of the NGOs operations in the Saudi Arabia has created a means of influence for their graduates in Ghana. The graduates became the vanguard of promoting developments for Muslims in Ghana while *Wahhabism* was thriving beneath it. The development programmes facilitated by graduates were not only regarded by ordinary Muslims as novel but were reinforced with new Islamic ideology (*Wahhabism*) as the authentic expression of Islam. In a sense, the enhancement of the well being of Muslims through development was accompanied with the proliferation of Saudi brand of Islam.

5.1.2 Health

In the field of health delivery services, the Saudi Government concluded a loan agreement of 9.5 million dollars with Ghana in 1995 to finance the construction of 35 health centres distributed all over country. These projects are largely concentrated in Muslim dominated communities like Nima, Madina; Shukura and Ashaiman, all in the Greater Accra. Halid Mountain gave the nationwide breakdown of the thirty-five clinics (Muntairi interview, 8th February 2006):

Region	No. of Clii
Upper East Region	5
Upper West Region	5
Northern Region	6
Western Region	2
Greater Accra Region	4
Volta Region	3
Brong Ahafo Region	3
Central Region	2
Eastern Region	2
Ashanti Region	3
Total	35

5.1.3 Agriculture

In response to the socio-economic needs of the Ghanaian people the Saudi mission in Ghana granted a loan of Seventeen Million Saudi Riyals for the provision of com mills and crop storage facilities at Techiman, Atebubu, and Dormatin in Brong Ahafo region. This constituted Saudi contributions on agriculture to Ghana (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Organizations	Contributions				
	School(s)	Health	Agriculture	Mosque	Human Resource Development
⁷ SFD	0141 million	35 centers	Com mill & storage	-	-
The Islamic Desk	-	-	-	-	2,000 Scholarship
⁸ IDB	20 executed & 28 pending	Outreach	-	-	221 Scholarship
Al-Hudaibiwa	67	85 boreholes	-	91	-
Al-Mutada	7	Outreach	-	5	35
Al-Huda	1	-	-	4	15

Data source: [findings from fieldwork, 2006]

5.1.4 Ideological Contribution

Saudi Arabia represents the home ground of *Wahhabism*, a puritanical brand of Islam and religious ideology propounded by Muhammad bn Abdul Wahhab (known in Ghana as Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'a). The Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah puts emphasis on the Qur'an and the prophetic traditions or teachings as its basic teachings of Islam. It also challenges certain inherent practices of the teachings of the *Tijaniyya* order in Ghana.

The fact that students were recruited by the Islamic Desk of the embassy to study at the Saudi universities, the home base of *Wahhabism*, implies that, such students would be orientated along the line of their tutors' ideology. Such religious education was therefore to be replicated in their home country upon their return. These students upon their graduation maintain networks with Saudi religious institutions and other institutions within the Kingdom in order to propagate the Saudi brand of Islam (Olivier 2004:236). The first Ghanaian to have studied at Saudi Arabia was Umar Ibrahim Imam in 1959. He is the current national Imam of the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'a (ASWAJ). Umar returned to Ghana

⁸ mn! ⁹overnment establishment. SFD-Saudi Fund for Development. IDB=Islamic Development Bank. Pongf ' ¹⁰ development Bank. It is a joint bank established by members' of Organization of Islamic slwetokto- ^ headquarters is based /m Saudi Arabia. The Snudi Government is a substantial

in 1968 and embarked on vigorous *Da'wa* (propagation) in the community with the assistance of the youth in Nima. The zeal of the youth in religious activities culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Research and Reformation Centre in 1972, (the earliest *Wahhabiyya* organization in Ghana) which later metamorphosed into Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah, now a formidable religious and ideological sect in the Muslim community in Ghana with branches all over the country (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005.).

However, before the arrival of Umar to Ghana, the activities of Kamali Khalid, an Indian employee in charge of the Islamic Desk of the Saudi embassy exposed Ghanaian Muslims to *Wahhabi* ideas. For instance, Kamali used to organize outreach programmes to propagate the *Wahhabi* ideas in Ghana. Records suggest that he used to organize Islamic studies at the then Accra Central Mosque (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005.). Kamali was a senior to Umar in the Islamic University at Madina in Saudi Arabia. The doctrinal background of Kamali, without a doubt, would have determined the direction of his teachings. The role of the Islamic Desk or Islamic Department of the Saudi embassies in spreading the Saudi religious foreign policies is achieved by coordinating with Saudi institutions to promote the Saudi religious agenda (Eickelman et al 1996:151).

An avenue for the ideological and religious influence in the activities of the Saudi mission in Ghana is the distribution of religious literature to the Muslim community. The mission distributes magazines and other foreign newspapers, translation of the Holy Quran with its commentaries, biographies of the prophet and works on Islamic jurisprudence that highlight their ideological and religious positions. The literature serves as a powerful means of indoctrination of its readers. All these materials represent the hallmark of *Wahhabi* perspective of Islam. This is parallel to other studies which confirm the transnational role of

Saudi Arabia in printing Islamic literature to propagate its conservative brand of Islam. For instance, from the 1980s to 1992, the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of Qur'an, distributed more than 5 million copies of the Qur'an and other Islamic literature to Africa alone (Eickelman et al 1996:173).

Also, *Wahhabis* in Ghana are very good at the dissemination and production of religious materials through modern technologies such as the production of audio and video cassettes through which they articulate their sectarian perspective of Islam. This has become possible because of their mastery of Islamic sciences and the strong oratorical skills that they command. Some of the *Wahhabi* audio and video cassettes which emerged in Ghana are transnational in nature, especially those coming from Nigeria and Niger. The fact that audio and video cassettes of the leading *Wahhabi* scholars of West African sub-region could be obtained in Ghana fosters a stronger sense of an imagined community (*Ummah*) which transcends national boundaries, thereby giving the *Wahhabi* movement its transnational character. These materials have strong bearing on *Wahhabi* Islamic identity which is argued from the standpoint of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which are the two most authoritative sources of Islam. However, beneath this argument is the *Wahhabi* understanding and interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah. Any source which does not fall under the purview of the Quran and the Sunnah are strictly outlawed and condemned as irreligious or *Bid'a* (innovation). The tendency of pronouncing everything as *Bid'a* always pits them against the other sects such as the *Tijaniyya* and the *Shi'ah*.

Presently the local Muslim bi-monthly *Al-Risalah Bulletin* is produced by a Muslim printing house and is in circulation in Ghana. The office of the newspaper is located at Alajo in the Greater Accra region. The printing machine, according to an interviewee, was donated by

the Muslim World League through the Saudi Mission in Ghana to the resident representative in Ghana, the Ibrahim Codjoe Quaye (Ibrahim, interview, 20th February 2005). This newspaper presents and relays to Ghanaian Muslims the major religious activities as well as Saudi *Ulama* exposition on Islamic issues. This, in a way, links Ghanaian Muslims to vital and current religious news and religious rulings from Saudi Arabia with its Saudi religious idiosyncratic thoughts.

The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques⁶ in Saudi Arabia has included Ghanaian Muslims in the annual free pilgrimage facility. As part of the package, free tickets, and some allowances are given to the prospective pilgrims to enable them perform Hajj. About 200 Ghanaians have enjoyed this facility for some time now.

In the area of the acquisition of the higher Islamic education, the Saudi Arabian Embassy is leading among Islamic diplomatic missions in recruiting many Ghanaian Muslim students to the Kingdom for Islamic studies. It has been argued that recruitment of Muslim students to study in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is viewed by Saudi authorities as a political strategy rather than religious obligation (Madawi 2007:126). This is with a view to exporting their brand of Islam through the scholarship, charity, education, mosques and Islamic charity centers to other countries. Cumulatively, Ghanaian Muslim students are awarded about 50 (fifty) scholarships annually prior to 9/11 attacks from the Arabian Gulf including Saudi Arabia. Perhaps, the underlying motive behind this strategy as indicated in other studies has to do with pursuance of a foreign policy with religious objectives (Haynes 2001:154). It is worth stating that the Arabian Gulf by religious background is predominantly Ahlus-Sunnah (*Wahhabiyya*). This situation, therefore, adds to the *Wahhabi*

⁶ The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques is a title bestowed on the reigning King of Saudi Arabia at a period. The Two Holy Mosques refer to the Mecca and Medina mosques.

sectarian magnitude and vigor in Ghana (Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama‘a). These students, upon graduation, return home with the sole responsibility of spreading the ideas of Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama‘ah in Ghana.

Of all the Islamic graduates from the Islamic world, Saudi graduates in Ghana represent the most vociferous and active *Ulama* in the Muslim community on *Da‘wa* (Islamic propagation). They do this by organizing outreach religious programmes from one community to another. The core of the religious outreach programme is to persuade Ghanaian Muslims to adopt the Quran and the Sunnah as the basis of Islam, which is the core of the movement’s objective. Madawi (2007:132), argues that *Wahhabis'* interpretation relating to worship and creed can be popular abroad, as they could be seen as rational, methodological and founded on certainty and clear cut categories.

The next section of the research will assess the contribution of the Iranian Government to Ghanaians, and Ghanaian Muslims in particular. It will also assess the major conduits they employ to spread their brand of Islam (Shi‘ism).

5.2 THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN MUSLIM DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA

To facilitate its assistance to Ghana, the Islamic Republic of Iran through her embassy has put in place certain designated institutions through which her developmental aids to Ghanaian communities are channeled. These institutions include:

- (a) The Iranian Cultural Consulate;
- (b) Agriculture and Rural Development;
- (c) The Iranian Clinics; and
- (d) The Islamic University College.

The main areas in which these organizations contribute to Ghanaians are education, health, and agriculture and women empowerment. It is important to expand on the key objectives of these Iranian institutions in Ghana.



5.2.1 The Iranian Cultural Consulate

The Iranian Cultural Consulate established its office in Ghana in 1988 with the main objective of promoting cultural exchanges between Ghana's Government and the Iranian Government. Bearing in mind that the Iranian culture is intertwined with Islam, the Muslim community in Ghana thus becomes partners in the Iranian cultural collaboration as a matter of necessity (Sadat, interview, 24th November 2005).

Other aspects of the Iranian cultural objectives could be found on Iranian art, tourism, science, and history. The Consulate has a reciprocal role to learn about the Ghanaian culture to be introduced in Iran. In short, the Consulate serves as a bridge between Iran and Ghana (Sadat, interview, 24th November 2005). The current Cultural Consul is Sadat. He indicated that in the past, the Consulate concentrated its efforts on seminars, distribution of literature to institutions and individuals, participation in artistic exhibition about Ghanaian culture, exhibition of Iranian art and handicrafts, writing articles in the Ghanaian press and organizing Farsi language (Persian language) classes in the universities as well as participation in Ghanaian programmes by both Muslims and non-Muslims (Sadat, interview, 24* November 2005).

In recent times however, the Cultural Consulate focuses its activities at organizing workshops and seminars in the Ghanaian community. This is with a view to introducing Iranian culture to Ghanaians. Among the regular seminars and workshops held are Imam

Ali and Human Rights in Islam, Imam Hussein Martyrdom, which is normally offered on Muharam (February) of every year. The Unity Week in Rabi al-Awal (March) commemorates the birthday of the prophet (Sadat, interview, 24th November 2005). The Unity Week of the Iranian Cultural Consulate is very significant in the Ghanaian Muslim community. It serves as an occasion when most Muslim leaders in the country meet to echo the need for unity in the Muslim community regardless of their doctrinal differences. The need for a united Muslim front to address issues affecting Muslims internally and globally is emphasized at the occasion (Sadat, interview, 24th November 2005). It however tends out to be a programme patronized mostly by the traditional *Ulama* of the *Tijaniyya* order and the *Shi 'ah* followers. The Ahlus-Sunnah *Ulama* do not patronize it due to doctrinal and ideological differences with the Iranians. It is significant to note that, by organizing these forums in the Muslim communities, it helps consolidate Shi'ism in Ghana, though with the *Tijaniyya* movement in particular. This is because, the forum offers common religious platform between the followers of Shi'tes and other Muslims in Ghana.

5.2.2 The Iranian Clinics

The Iran Medical Mission which began operation in 1990 is another organization of the Iranian establishment in Ghana. The organization is a member of the Federation of International Red Crescent and Red Cross Societies. The medical mission is one of the clinics being operated in Africa by the Iranian Government. The other African countries where it operates are Zimbabwe, Kenya, Niger, Mali, and Ivory Coast (Abass, interview, 15^h January 2006). The key objectives for establishing the Red Crescent Society are those of the mother organizations of the International Federation of Red Crescent and Red Cross Societies. These objectives include, offering humanitarian medical services to the deserving communities. It is in line with this objective that the Iranian Red Crescent Society

established its clinics in Africa and some Middle Eastern countries to provide affordable and accessible health care services to the poor and the needy.

The services that the clinic provides in Ghana, especially in the area of medical consultancy, are 20% cheaper when compared to those in the public health services (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006). The costs of drugs are similarly 50% cheaper. Abass is the Director of the Iranian Clinic at Kwame Nkrumah Circle in Accra. He attributed the cheap health care services from the clinic to the subsidy that the society enjoys from the Iranian Government (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006). An aspect of its humanitarian services includes providing occasional free health care services to patients who do not have the means. These categories of people are introduced to the health officials by some affiliate organizations of the Iranian Mission in Ghana and the Muslim leaderships (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006).

The second major objective of the society is impartiality and neutrality in the discharge of its services with regard to the background of the beneficiaries. In other words, they do not deal with people based on their religious, ethnic, political, or racial background. That is, its services are meant for all.

The clinic in Accra is so far running only an Outpatient's Department (OPD) due to lack of logistics and space. However, part of its long-term plans is to turn the clinic into an ultra modern medical centre in Ghana. The medical experts at the clinic comprise of five (5) general medical practitioners and three (3) specialists in the areas of gynecology, ophthalmology and otolaryngology. It has its own medical laboratory (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006). Significantly, as a result of the credibility that the clinic has gained

from the Ghana's Government, it has been accredited by the Ministry of Health for the diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis in the country with funds from the Global Fund of the United Nations (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006).

5.2.3 Agriculture and Rural Development

The Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) of the Iranian Government is an organization operating in the Muslim community. This organization has certain key objectives that it operates under. These include;

- increase in level of knowledge through cultural and religious practices.
- selection of priority areas of human endeavour for assistance and provision of primary needs of life such as good health, sufficient portable water and healthy food.
- building, repairing and completing of vocational centers, agricultural services, mosques, schools, health centers, public places of convenience, road and bridges.
- technical training and creating job opportunities in computer technology, fashion design, carpentry, mechanical training, electrical and catering.
- following the agricultural and economic policies of the government of Ghana and cooperating with the relevant government organizations, including members of parliament, NGOs, as well as members of District Assembly and women groups.

With this background as to the objectives and policies of the Iranian institutions in Ghana it is necessary to identify specifically their contributions to the Ghanaian Muslims and how these contributions have facilitated the development and advancement of Muslim communities in Ghana.

5.2.4 Education

According to Omid Kamara, the secretary to the Iranian Cultural Consulate, the Iranian Embassy through the Cultural Consulate established scholarships in 1985 for Ghanaian Muslim students to study in Iranian universities and higher institutions of learning. He indicated that currently about two hundred (200) of these students have graduated and have returned to the country contributing to the economy in various ways (Omid interview, 14th April 2004). The nature of the scholarships is limited to the Islamic sciences.

The consulate also established a scholarship scheme for talented but needy Muslim students in the junior secondary schools (JSS) and senior secondary schools (SSS) who cannot afford to pay tuition fees. So far about 25 of these needy students' tuition fees are being catered for by the Consulate. Free academic support or remedial classes were also organized for both Ordinary and Advanced Level Muslim students in Accra to assist them to qualify for admission to the universities. He intimated that the rationale behind offering such scholarship and organizing the classes is to improve the chances of the Muslim Students gaining admission to tertiary institutions (Omid interview, 14th April 2004).

The Consulate exposes the Ghanaian students to Farsi by offering free Farsi classes for students in higher institutions in the country, especially the University of Ghana, to enhance the ability of the students to read and write in Farsi and to provide an opportunity for them to become multi-lingual. Such students are given special scholarships in their chosen field of studies (Omid interview, 14th April 2004). The Farsi classes at the University of Ghana cater for about 20-35 students a session and are structured according to beginners and intermediate.

The most singular achievement of the Embassy is the funding in 2000 of the Islamic University College of Ghana at East Legon in Accra. The University College has been given accreditation by the National Accreditation Board. The University College is currently offering courses in Business Administration, Computer Science and Islamic Studies.

The Consulate's vision has been to establish an Islamic training college to train qualified teachers to teach Arabic and Islamic studies in schools. Omid Kamara, the Secretary to the Consulate, indicated that the Consulate has funded the construction of junior secondary institutions in Kumasi, Tamale, Kasoa, Cape Coast, and Akim Ofoase. It has also rehabilitated a number of schools in Kumasi, Tamale, and Accra.

In addition, the Consulate established a Shi'ite theological school, called the Ahlul-Bait Islamic Institute, at East Legon in Accra. Graduates from this institution have the chance of furthering their studies in Iran or any other country in which the Iranian Government has educational institutions, such as the United Kingdom and Lebanon (Omid interview, 14th April 2004).

The Consulate is also sponsoring some teachers in Islamic studies in some schools by paying allowances to such teachers who do not have their names on government payroll in order to enable them earn a living. Furthermore, the Consulate funded the Imam Khomeini Junior Secondary School at Cape Coast. More importantly, in view of the lack of libraries and reading centres in the Muslim communities, the Consulate has established a number of public libraries in Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale (Omid interview, 14th April 2004).

The Agricultural and Rural Development (ARD is another organization under the aegis of Iranian Embassy which assists Ghanaian Muslims in the field of education. ARD has established a primary school and a place of convenience at Kotobabi in Accra. It also established a youth vocational training centre at Nima 441 Welfare Association in Accra. Alaru Ibrahim, the chairman of 441 Welfare Association said that the Centre's departments comprise sewing and tailoring, computer studies, carpentry and typing. The embassy occasionally donates some training materials to the centre, such as computers and financial aids, for the benefit of the students (Alaru interview, 22nd May 2004). It was also revealed that the ARD assisted Kasoa Muslims to construct the Immamiya Islamic School. It also built English and Arabic school in Kalariga in Tamale (Omid, interview, 14^h April 2004). The Embassy, through the ARD, in 1996 established a computer-training centre at the University for Development Studies in Tamale to train the students, the lecturers, and the university staff to acquire computer skills and also organized literacy classes for farmers in the Northern region in order to enhance their farming methods.

The research found that ARD has organized 458 computer literacy training for Ghanaians. Through this training, the Ministry of Works and Housing facilitated the award of certificates to the participants. It was also realized that, ARD has so far constructed 67 schools, mostly in the Greater Accra, Ashanti and Western regions. The ARD Director explained that about 122,500 people are benefiting from the schools (Musawi, interview, 13 March 2006). The major motive behind ARD's educational endeavors has been its conviction that education is a basic and primary necessity in improving culture and knowledge (Musawi, interview, 13^{U1} March 2006).

ARD has also constructed 17 technical and vocational schools and centres since its inception in Ghana in 1988. These vocational and technical training centres are mainly in the Greater Accra and the Northern region. It is estimated that about 37,700 people are benefiting from these centres. ARD's involvement in the construction of vocational centres is based on the conviction that it would help in knowledge transfer. A part of the Iranian Embassy's educational contribution to Ghanaian Muslims through ARD has been the construction of six (6) libraries in the Northern, Ashanti and the Greater Accra regions. These libraries are managed by the Cultural Consulate for the benefit of Ghanaian students (Musawi, interview, 13th March 2006).

The Embassy's aim in developing a keen interest in the educational sector for the Muslim community in Ghana is due to the fact that Ghanaian Muslims are lagging behind other Ghanaians in terms of secular education. This, therefore, affects their employment opportunities. Also, a part of the philosophic foundation of the Iranian revolution is to create diverse opportunities for Muslims worldwide in order to make them withstand the competitive nature of the ever-globalized world. Lastly, the religious injunction, which urges Muslims to always seek knowledge, is another motivating factor (Qur'an: 96:1-3).

5.2.5 Health

The Iranian Embassy through the Iranian Red Crescent Society has contributed to the development of health delivery in the country. For instance, as a result of the Ghana-Iran Joint Commission, the Iranian Government has established some clinics to support Ghana's efforts to ensure adequate health delivery services to the people. Three of these clinics have so far been established through the Iranian Red Crescent Society. Currently two of such

clinics are in Accra, one at Kwame Nkrumah Circle, the second at Mamobi. (now defunct). The third is in the Northern region, at Jerigu.

The services of these clinics are well patronized by the communities, partly due to the availability and relative cheapness of the drugs. They have become very famous since their establishment, due to the subsidies that the medical mission enjoys from the Iranian Government (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006). In short, the clinics are distinguished for the quality medical service they provide, to the extent that they have been approved and recognized by the Ministry of Health as centres for tuberculosis treatment. This has been the major factor in attracting most patients to the clinic. Abass argued that the clinic is the most patronized private health centres in Ghana so far, with an average patient attendance of 300-400 daily as against other private health centre with an average record of 30-150 (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006). The major motivating factor for the Iranian embassy's engagement in the health sector is to complement Government's efforts in health delivery in the country. Secondly, it is to make health delivery accessible to the Ghanaian Muslim community.

The Iranian medical mission also organizes medical outreach programmes to deprived communities in Ghana. For instance, the Nsawam Medium Prison is one of its outreach centres, being serviced every two months. Through this outreach programmes the inmates are given free medical attention (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006). The Red Crescent Society through the Medical Mission occasionally donates drugs to some health institutions in the country. These include the Psychiatric Hospitals at Asylum Down and Pantang, the Princess Marie Children's Clinic and the Osu Children's Home, an orphanage.

The ARD director indicated that it has so far built, completed, and equipped four (4) health centres and handed them over to the Iranian Medical Mission in Ghana (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006). An aspect of the Iranian Government's contribution to public health in Ghana is in the area of the provision of portable water. It is estimated that the ARD has so far provided eighty-four (84) boreholes for Ghanaians. These boreholes are mainly in the Northern and the Western regions. These were provided with a view to curbing water-borne diseases since the beneficiary communities are in Guinea worm (*Dracimcuhis medinensis*) endemic areas (Abass, interview, 15th January 2006).

5.2.6 Agriculture

The Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) of the Iranian Embassy is contributing in diverse ways to assist Ghanaian Muslims and Ghanaians in general to improve their farming methods and techniques. The activities of this organization are found all over the country. The organization has been offering free extension services to farmers in the northern region. Additionally, farmers are given interest free loans which are payable after harvest (ARD Report 2004). Other services rendered are ploughing and harrowing, improves seedlings and farm equipment

The services ARD offers are varied. For instance, it has provided technical agricultural service to farmers in the Northern and Western regions. These technical services are related mainly to assisting farmers to have the best harvest annually. ARD also rehabilitates and repairs agricultural machines for farmers, mainly in the Northern region. It is estimated that about 795 of these machinery rehabilitations have been organized for farmers since the inception of ARD in Ghana (ARD Report 2004). The organization does not limit its activities to agricultural services; it also builds convertible industrial factories for Ghanaian

farmers. These industrial factories are mainly for oil-mill processing and pressing. The areas that benefited in 1988 from the facilities were the Northern, Western and Central regions.

In addition, the ARD is involved in agro-forestry in the Northern region. The organization is involved in agro-forestry with a view to preserving the environment. It is also involved in plans to assist farmers in increasing efficiency in their harvests. The organization offers the distribution of structures for husbandry and training in bee-keeping to farmers. This is aimed at enhancing the income of farmers. The Director of ARD argues that the natural talents of farmers in bee-keeping in these regions are high. The ARD, has, since its operations in Ghana, provided 1,780 such structures of animal husbandry in order to unearth the talents among the farmers (ARD Report 2004). The main motivating factor for ARD's involvement in the agriculture sector is to improve the quality of life among Ghanaians and to reduce their dependency syndrome on food importations from outside.

5.2.7 Women Empowerment

Apart from organizing annual public lectures to highlight the role and importance of women in Islam, the Iranian Cultural Consulate takes practical steps in addressing women's problems. For instance, the Consulate assists women in promoting small-scale industries in the area of shea butter extraction, yam weaving, and com milling. This provides varied job opportunities to women in the Northern region. Through these projects, Muslim women are able to plan for their children and become less dependent on their husbands. It also enables them to make vital decisions affecting them, thereby empowering them.

The Embassy has established three female vocational training centres as part of its gender empowerment agenda, one each at Mamobi and Kawukudi, both in Accra, and another at

Bawku in the Upper East region. However, the one in Kawukudi is a multi-centre comprising facilities for electrical and computer training, and dressmaking. The centres are known as Fatima Zahra Vocational Centres, in honour of the Prophet's daughter, Fatima bint Muhammad. The centre gives training to the young Muslim women in the community. Free sewing machines are given to the trainees upon their graduation (Sadat, interview, 24th November 2005). Religious orientation along the Shiite line is an integral part of the vocational training. The organization has also been organizing training of women in weaving and home economics in the Northern, Eastern, and Central regions. The participants are awarded certificates at the end of the training.

The Consulate also has a close relationship with Federation of Muslim Women Association of Ghana (FOMWAG), which is an umbrella organization of Muslim women. The Cultural Consulate assists FOMWAG to organize the annual workshop on *Fatima Zahra*. Through this seminar, Fatima the only surviving daughter of the Prophet of Islam and the wife of Ali, the fourth caliph in Islam and the icon of Shi'ism, is portrayed as a role model to the Ghanaian Muslim women (Sadat, interview, 24th November 2005).

5.2.8 Ideological Contribution

A major factor, which partly influenced the Iranian Government to extend her diplomatic missions to certain countries, is to extend her ideological and cultural ideas and influence into those countries. Ever since the Safavids' adopted Shi'ism as the official religion of Iran in 1501 C.E, Shi'ism has become a religious instrument for the successive regimes in Iran (Moadel 2002: 372). The overall objective of the post revolutionary Iran's diplomatic relations with some countries was thus to create a religious constituency for their Government. By religious constituency is meant a segment of a particular country's citizens

sharing doctrinal and religious affinity with another country. This is done by attracting new converts into such a religious sect as it pertains to a particular country's religious direction. In the case of Iran, prominence is given to visiting Ghanaian Muslims like Muhammad Morteza Albara, a convert to Shi'ism, who was a visiting Shi'ite student to Iran from Ghana to show how it is spreading in Ghana. He used the occasion through the Isfahan Radio to inform Iranians how Shi'ism has become a third religious force in the Muslim communities after *Tijaniyya* and *Wahhabiyya* movements through the activities of Iranian institutions in Ghana (Africa Wide NIPAD 2006, 08, 23). This is in line with the post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy which primarily focuses on proselytizing its Shi'ite version of Islam and challenge the American and Western dominated world system (Haynes 2001:154). To achieve this objective in the case of Ghana, the role of the Cultural Consulate of the Embassy and the theological seminary cannot be underestimated. This is because the Iranian Cultural Consulate serves as the mouthpiece for disseminating the Iranian cultural and religious activities and programmes in Ghana. Also, the expression of Shi'ism is being facilitated by the Ghanaian Shi'ite communities who have been in one way or the other educated through the Iranian institutions of higher learning.

One must state that, of all the major religious ideological sects which were introduced into Ghana, Shi'ism is a latecomer as compared to others, such as the *Tijaniyya* and Ahlus-Sunnah (*Wahhabiyya*). It therefore means that Ghanaian Muslims before the coming of Shi'ism were already divided along *Tijaniyya* and *Wahhabiyya* lines.

Iran, being the centre of Shi'ism in the world, pursues various means to popularize such doctrine in establishing its mission in Ghana. The major means that the Iranian Government used to popularize and orientate Shi'ism in Ghana was the granting of scholarships to some

Ghanaian Muslim students willing to study in an Iranian religious seminary like Qum or universities. These pioneer students, led by Abdul Salam Bansi, in Accra were to become the nucleus of the Shi'ites in Ghana. Such strategy started yielding dividends with the return of these students who then started making inroads into the Muslim community to win converts to their newly adopted sect.

The Cultural Consulate popularizes the ideas of Shi'ism in Ghana through the establishment of the Ahlul-Bait Theological Seminary at Dzorwolu in Accra, where the institute serves the needs of other Shiite students in the West African region. Scholarships, free accommodation, and monthly allowances are offered to these students. Programmes are offered from junior to senior secondary level along the religious curriculum of Iranian educational standard. The pioneer Ghanaian graduates who studied in Iran were the first tutors of the Institute. Consequently, students of the Institute automatically become the adherents of Shi'ism upon graduation due to the kind of education they have acquired. The graduates from the school form the nucleus and vanguard of Shi'ism in the Ghanaian Muslim communities from the south to the north.

In recent times, the Ahlul-Bait Theological Seminary in Ghana is becoming a center for recruitment of graduates to other African countries. So far there are about five (5) of such recruits from Ghana in South Africa with the sole role of spreading Shi'ism. These Ghanaian Shi'ite scholars are scattered in Johannesburg, Soweto etc especially among the black township in South Africa (Nurudeen, interview, 9th November 2008). This suggests a different approach to strengthening Shi'ism in the world. Hitherto, Shi'ism enjoyed state patronage where scholars were imported from Syria, Bahrain, North-Eastern Arabia and Iraq to Iran (Lapidus, 1988: 258). This was partly necessitated when majority of Iranians

were Sunnis. In all, it however represents a dimensional growth of Shi'ism from a locally bred religious movement to a transnational and a global movement, all with the support of the Iranian state.

Other means that the Iranian Mission employs to indoctrinate Ghanaian Muslims are indirect and latent. For instance, some of their activities, celebrations, and ceremonies expose Ghanaian Muslims to the kind of Islamic expression that pertain the Islamic Republic of Iran. The celebration of *Al-Quds* Day and the anniversary celebration of the Iranian Revolution expose Ghanaian Muslims to the political and religio-cultural realities in Iran. On the celebration of *Al-Quds* Day and the martyrdom of Hussein, Shi'i students and their tutors go on procession with placards in some principal streets beginning from the Accra Girl's Secondary School to Nima. This tendency, therefore, infuses revolutionary and Islamic zeal based on Shi'i identity among the participants. It may also be a means of ideological indoctrination, particularly in the case of the youth.

The Iranian mission also exposes Ghanaian Muslims to her ideological proclivity during the celebration of any event sponsored by her or its affiliate organizations. For instance, the portrait of Imam Khomeini may be provided by the Iranian Embassy or its affiliate organizations to be displayed to indicate full support for the Iranian revolution in Ghana. On the other hand, the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the birthday of Fatima and the *Badr Day* in the manner done by the revolutionary countries like Iran, inspire a sense of history and thus keep the Islamic spirit high among Ghanaian Muslims.

Added to this is the fact that opportunities granted to leading Muslims to visit Iran during such celebrations expose them to new ideas and experiences. This is then manifested in their

speeches about their personal experience of the nature of Iranian Islamism and how [^]_{-gnan} Muslim should be guided by such Islamic vigour. In this case, Iranian Shi'i Islamic perspective, which is integral part of the Iranian socio-cultural values, is perceived as the Islamic model for Ghanaians. A case in point is the experience of Basha Ibrahim Idriss, the current Northern regional Imam of the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'a (ASWAJ)'s trip to Iran on the celebration of the Iranian Revolution. Upon his return home he has been proclaiming publicly that the Islamic Republic of Iran represents the best model of Islamic government in the Muslim world (Basha, interview, 8th December 2006). This position of Basha has however been interpreted by others that he has converted to Shi'ism.

Among all the Muslim diplomatic missions in Ghana, the Iranian Cultural Consulate stands exceptional for relying on the mass media to propagate Shiism as well as her revolutionary ideas in Ghanaian society. Quite often, the print media both public and private have been exploited by the Consulate to achieve its agenda. Through this medium, Ghanaians are attracted to reading articles about the significance of any event being celebrated by Iranian institutions, like the Iranian Revolution, the birthday of Fatima, imam Ali and governance and the martyrdom of Hussein. The reading of articles of this nature without doubt leaves positive impressions in the mind of the reader about Iran and the doctrinal values of Shi'ism. These articles, apart from improving Iran's image, also educate the reader about Iranian history, both political and religious. In recent times the Consulate established its own newspaper known as *Al-Kauthar*, with the objective of conveying Iranian political and religious news to the Ghanaian community.

Table 7: Contributions of the Iranian Government to Ghanaian Muslims

Organisations	CONTRIBUTIONS					
	School(s)	Health	Agriculture	Women Empowerment	Human Resource Development	Remedial Classes
Cultural Consulate	IUC	3 Clinics	-	3 Vocational centers	200 scholarship	1985-1999
ARD			Loans, technical agricultural services, 795 rehabilitations & repairs, 1,780 beekeeping equipments			

Data source: (Findings from fieldwork, 2006]

The above table represents the Iranian Government’s contributions to Ghanaian Muslim communities. The two main Iranian agencies which facilitated the Iranian Government’s contribution to Ghana were the Iranian Cultural Consulate and Agriculture and Rural Development

53 CONCLUSION

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Royal kingdom of Saudi Arabia represent two of the Middle East countries which provided development to Ghanaian Muslims in the post independence period. These two countries devise different modes of engaging with Ghanaians and Ghanaian Muslims in particular. The Iranian officials designed a direct mode of engagement with Ghanaian Muslims through their accredited institutions, such as the ARD, the Cultural Consulate and the Iran Medical Mission. On the other hand, the Saudi embassy operated indirect mode of engagement with Ghanaian Muslims through their accredited NGOs in Ghana, such as Al-Huda Islamic Society, Al-Muntada Islami, Al-Hudaibiyya Islamic Relief Services, and among others. The Islamic Desk in the Saudi embassy promoted its activities by liaising with organisations in Saudi Arabia and these Saudi affiliated NGOs in Ghana.

However, the extents to which these two countries have achieved their agenda through these different means of engagements differ. By establishing direct means of engaging with Ghanaian Muslims, the Iranian embassy entrusts the accountability of stimulating development on their accredited institutions. This is further reinforced by staffing these offices with Iranian expatriates who take charge of these institutions. In essence, the question of the loyalty of the personnel in relation to their responsibility does not arise. It further enables the Iranians to obtain direct feedback from the Ghanaian societies to enable them re-strategise in dealings with Ghanaians.

In contrast, the 'middlemen' role play by the Saudi affiliated NGOs to Saudi government's interest in Ghana made their activities to be seen as their brainchild. The issue of accountability of promoting development rests with the Ghanaian Muslims with strong connection with Saudi Arabia. These Ghanaian Muslims further bring to bear in their activities their rich experience of the Ghanaian socio-cultural milieu.

The developmental contributions offered by these two countries also impacted on Ghanaian Muslims in different ways. As observed, the bilateral agreements between Ghana and Saudi Arabia on one hand and Iran on the other hand, did not contribute towards dissemination of their religious influence in Ghana. However, the smooth diplomatic relations as enhanced by the bilateral agreements created conducive atmosphere for the NGOs with Saudi affiliation and Iranian institutions to make considerable impact in promoting development projects as well as the respective religio-political ideologies of these countries on Ghanaian Muslims. Both countries contributed to Muslim development in the area of education, health, the construction of Islamic centres (mosques), and agriculture. The Iranian NGOs and organisations further distinguish themselves in this research in their contribution to women

empowerment. This suggests that while the Saudi political environment is quite narrow, NGOs transaction, Iranian environment promoted formal institutions for charity mobilisation, each with its impact on Ghanaian Muslims. This has been partly necessitated by the well entrenched Islamisation of NGOs activities in both countries.

Beneath the tremendous roles that these countries play in regards to Muslim development they also promoted their religious interest in Ghana. This was seen in the role of the Islamic Desk of the Saudi embassy and the Iranian Cultural Consulate which facilitated scholarships for Ghanaian Muslim students in the Islamic sciences related to *Wahhabi* and Shi'i perspective of Islam. This links some Ghanaian Muslims with another expression of Islam found in the Middle East, and its consequences in the penetration of Arabian and Iranian cultural and political values in Ghana. The motive behind the Saudi and the Iranian Governments' focusing most of their contributions on Islamic studies for Ghanaian Muslims is intended to spread the ideas of *Wahhabism* and Shi'ism in Ghana.

In spite of the massive development projects facilitated by Saudi Arabia to Ghana, it has been argued that the Saudi Arabia contributions to Ghana's economy represent a fraction of Ghanaian Muslims contributions into the Saudi economy (Haruna, 2004:44). This was arrived at through evaluation of the direct contribution of Ghanaian Muslims to the Saudi economy through the performance of the annual Hajj.

The next chapter analyses the outcome of Muslim diplomatic missions' involvement in religious activities in Ghana. This will be seen from the proliferation of new religio-political activities initiated and supported by these diplomatic missions.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN GHANA

6.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter intends to survey the religious and political ideas and ideologies facilitated by the governments and political institutions of Muslim diplomatic missions and their organizations based in Ghana and established since 1957 as a result of Ghana's diplomatic relations with some Muslim countries. This will give us an idea of the nature of these religious and political ideas whose introduction into Ghana was facilitated by Muslim embassies, thereby effectively propelling Islamic resurgence in Ghana.

As observed in the previous chapters on the developmental contributions made to Ghanaian Muslims by Muslim diplomatic missions, they also facilitated the introduction of religious, cultural, and political orientations and ideologies into Ghana. The specific natures of these religious orientations and ideologies are the subject matter of this chapter. The arrival of these doctrinal and semi politico-religious ideologies in the post-independence Ghana via Ghana's transnational interactions with some Muslim diplomatic missions could also be examined in the light of Ghanaian Muslims' reaction to the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in the world.

The concept of transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interaction linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-state (Vertovec 1990:1). The outcome of these interactions is the adoption or borrowing of certain norms, be it cultural or religious, from other countries. These ideas could be religious such as *Wahhabism*, Shi'ism and Islamic socialism. Even though transnationalism facilitates global cooperation between peoples and the obliteration of the nation-states concept, this thesis contends that it could

also be stimulated by inter-state cooperation through diplomatic relations. This is because diplomatic relations with other countries creates the platform for interaction between citizens and a particular diplomatic mission with which they share similar religious or political convictions. Importantly, the role of governments in extending their cultural influences to other countries through cultural consulates and attaches also drives transnationalism. Consequently, within the context of Ghanaian Muslims and their government, it was through Ghana's diplomatic relations with some Muslim countries that they were able to interact with these Muslim countries and religious institutions. All of this eventually oriented some Ghanaian Muslims along such countries' religious and doctrinal lines.

Coincidentally, majority of the countries which fall under this study represent unique Islamic identities and ideologies. These countries include Saudi Arabia, which represents the home base of *Wahhabism*, Iran where Shi'ism, is the official Islamic doctrine and Libya whose Islamic persuasion is known as the Third Universal Theory (TUT), the political and religious philosophy of the Libyan leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi.

It is an undeniable fact that the religious and political ideas which took root in these countries were the outcome of the socio-political realities which had given birth to them with consequences for the global Muslim *Ummah*. The Islamic resurgence in this context was characterized by the influx into Ghana of different forms of Islamic orientations facilitated by the Muslim diplomatic missions. This will be done by examining the origin of these doctrinal groups and the Ghanaian Muslims' reaction to them. In order to understand fully the resurgence of Islam in the world, it is important that we survey the origin, the

causes and the background of this resurgence in contemporary times. This would be done by sampling and identifying some schools of thought on the causes of this Islamic resurgence.

6.1 THE ORIGIN OF ISLAMIC SECTS

It must be acknowledged that Islamic resurgence cannot be discussed in isolation or by looking at the present situation only, even though contemporary Islam is expressed along doctrinal lines. It is always necessary, for the sake of clarity, to look at the origin of the sects in Islam, even briefly from an historical perspective.

To begin with, the Battle of Siffin, which was fought between Ali, the fourth Caliph, and Mu'awiya, the then governor of Syria in 37 A.H/657C.E is significant in the history of the development of Islamic doctrines and sects (Waines, 1995:46). The outcome of the battle resulted in the emergence of extremist politico-religious views which were hitherto not part of the Muslim *Ummah*. Some of these sects' practices are still followed by a section of the Muslim *Ummah* to this generation, the *Shi 'ah* being an example of this. The background of Kharijite and Mu'tazilite could be also viewed as a consequence of this battle (Watt, 1968:

6.2 THE BASIS OF ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN CONTEMPORARY TIMES

Different scholars had given various analytic interpretations as to the upsurge of Islamic resurgence in contemporary times. For instance, according to Voll, the causes of Islamic resurgence could be categorized into four perspectives:

One school of thought sees the resurgence in the broad historical terms as a continuation of the clash between two civilizations, Islam and the West. The proponent of this school is

Bernard Lewis. He argues that the Muslim world had gone through successive phases of revival and resistance, response and rejection (Voll, 1994:380). He further identified the Islamic revival as a significant force in contemporary times, with the Iranian Revolution bringing it to the attention of most people in the world.

The nature of this perspective indicates diversity and a competition between values that are either Western or Islamic. These divergent values are found within Western and Islamic or Muslim cultures, as indicated in the definition. This does not, however, fully explain the upsurge of *Wahhabism* in the world. This is because the origin of *Wahhabism* was aimed at to bringing about religious reformation within Islam and Arabia in particular. In other words, *Wahhabism* as an Islamic ideology did not come about to regulate the external affairs between Muslims and the non-Muslims or Islam and the West. It was conceived in order to correct the perceived corrupt practices of Islam which was prevalent in Arabia at the time. It must be acknowledged that at present the followers of Abdul Wahhab defined their distinct Islamic identity which is different from any other Muslim group including the West

The second school of thought identifies Islamic resurgence with fundamentalism and views it as a uniquely modern development. Bruce Lawrence led this school. He argued that fundamentalism is a direct product of modern era. To him, 'without modernity there are no fundamentalists. Lawrence thinks that fundamentalists accept implicitly the benefits of modernity often thriving with technology, while explicitly rejecting modernism as a holistic ideological framework (Voll, 1994:381).

The hallmark of this view shows that Muslim communities were threatened with the erosion of Islamic values in the wake of globalization through Westernization. The basis of this argument also shows the infiltration of external cultural values into the Muslim *Ummah* globally. In contrast, however, is the Muslim quest for identity through modernity while rejecting Westernization. Consequently, Islamic resurgence came up with the solution to curb this situation. This view amply explains the background of the Iranian Revolution, and the Libyan September Revolution. Historically, these Revolutions gave birth to Shi'ism as a modern global Islamic political expression and the Third Universal Theory (TUT) respectively.

Implicit in this second proposition is the view that the resurgence brought about another form of political expression in the world as a contrast to the Western democracy and secularism. This view could be discerned from the political expression of Shi'ism as a recognized political and religious identity in Iran and beyond and Islamic socialism in the political expression of the Third Universal Theory respectively. On the other hand, this explanation is not supported among those Muslims who do not link themselves to these states and organizations.

The third school is led by Ernest Gellner who sees resurgence as a product of post-modern thought and the historical internal evolution of the Islamic experience. To him, Islamic experience divided Muslims into a 'high' Islam of the scholars and the 'low' Islam of the people. He concluded that there was a latent tension between these styles of Islam, which at times resulted in conflicts with representatives of high Islam, leading the fundamentalists to embrace purification and revival (Ernest Gellner, 1992:15).

The basis of this school rests on the argument that Muslim scholars call for the revitalization and renewal of the Islamic spirit in contemporary times. It does not, however, address the reasons for this revitalization of the Islamic spirit. Nevertheless, one major argument discernable within this view is the fact that the basis of Islamic resurgence was necessitated by Muslim scholars' intention to have control over the direction of Islamic affairs at present. The extent of Muslim scholars having control of Islamic affairs might generate serious controversy among Muslims of different doctrinal persuasions. In the context of the Ghanaian Muslims the control might be visible on doctrinal lines. Even though the leadership structure in the Muslim community in Ghana is based on a superstructure, with the National Chief Imam, currently a *Tijaniyya* by background, occupying the highest echelon, other sects who do not share the same sectarian identity with the *Tijaniyya* agitated for the separate sectarian institutions and structures in the Muslim communities, as in the case of ASWAJ and *Shi 'ah* sects. This is with a view to asserting their (sectarian *Ulama*) control over Muslims who share the same doctrinal persuasion with them and to address issues along doctrinal lines.

Samuel P. Huntington, the author of *the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, also argues that 'Islamic resurgence in its extent and profundity is the latest phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, manifested in an effort to find the solution" not in Western ideologies but in Islam'. He concludes that 'it is a broad intellectual, cultural, social, and political movement prevalent throughout the Islamic world. He further emphasizes that the resurgence is mainstream and not extremist, pervasive and not isolated (Huntington, 1996:109). He predicts that the resurgence will have shown that Islam is the 'solution' to the problems of morality, identity, meaning, and faith

but not to those of social injustice, political repression, economic backwardness, military weakness, etc (Huntington, 1996:109).

This view does not take into consideration the successes of the Iranian and the Libyan Revolutions which created different political establishments, with Islamic values deeply embedded in the nature of political institutions and settings. These two Islamic regimes, exceptionally, also show their ability to address problems of social injustice and political repression. The major deficiency within the Libyan political setup is its lack of multi-partisan participation. However, this view could be countered on the grounds that Libya practices political socialism with its own defined values and principles, as against Western multi-partisan democracy. However, Huntington's prediction could be found in the secularized Muslim states as seen in some African countries, where the strict expression of Islam on political and economic issues is lacking such as Niger, Senegal, Mauretania, and Chad.

Peter Clarke (1984) analysed the Islamic resurgence in the context of West Africa. He argued that the Islamic resurgence in West Africa is a complex phenomenon. 'It incorporates reaffirmation of Islamic identity and arises primarily from religious belief. Also, it includes the demand for a return to a pure, orthodox form of Islam, the type of Islamic society which Usman dan Fodio sought to establish. It could further be an attachment to Islam as a cultural community and a well-financed movement in the Islamic world which challenges the global concept of modernity.' He, however, concluded that 'West African Muslims would not wish to assert the all-embracing, self-sufficiency of Islam and exclude any consideration of other values and ideas'. He emphasized that there is considerable tolerance and even 'mixing' (Clarke, 1984:256). This view lacks an

acknowledgement of the specific dynamics of each country in the sub-region and the local experiences, since his conclusion was largely drawn from the Nigerian Islamic political experience.

Nathan Samwini's thesis addresses this shortfall in the case of Muslim minority like Ghana. He argues that unlike the Muslim resurgence prevalent in other countries which was politically motivated, the Muslim resurgence in Ghana was primarily aimed at purifying Islam, popularizing it, driving home the idea that the Mahdi or messianic eschatology had come and improving the welfare of Muslims in Ghana (Samwini, 2006:251).

All these interpretations seem to emphasize the underlying motive behind the Islamic resurgence in contemporary time, which could be explained under Muslims search for identity as a result of colonialism and Westernization. Consequently, out of the despair of these situations Muslims are turning to Islam as the promise for a better future and as the basis for cultural identity through political means. This therefore resulted in the 'repoliticization of Islam as ultimate solution to Muslim problems'.

It has been emphasized that one major religious premise of Islamic resurgence or 'Islamism' is that the correct form of Islam cannot be practiced in the 21st century except in the context of an Islamic political regime. On account of this, the Islamists therefore agitate for the reconstruction of an Islamically-based authority that is, the gradual reconstitution of the Muslim *Ummah* through the introduction of a comprehensive system of Islamic law, government, education, and ethics in the modern world (Abu Rabi, 1994:13).

The basis of the Islamic resurgence could therefore be viewed from the perspectives of the proponents of the resurgence utilizing certain Islamic values in order to give the movement its unique religious character and identity. This was done by utilizing certain Islamic symbols such as *Tajdid* (renewal), *Islah* (reform), *Ijtihad* (reasoning) and *Harakiyya* (dynamism) to explain their philosophy and principles as based on the problems of the Muslim *Ummah* and as the means of addressing its current condition (Abu Rabi, 1994:13).

The manifestation of Islamic resurgence could therefore be seen in the religious role of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab who in 1703-87 (18th century C.E.) propounded a puritanical brand of Islam known as *Muwahidun* otherwise called in Ghana as Ahlus-Sunnah, ‘the followers of the tradition of the prophet and the companions’. He initiated his movement with a view to bringing about moral reconstruction among his people in the Gulf. Consequently, Abdul Wahhab’s ideology became prominent when he formed a political alliance with the then political regime led by a local prince, Saud. The political alliance yielded result with the entrenchment of *Wahhabism* in the Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in general and with wider global effects on a section of the Muslim *Ummah*. His *Da’wa* mission is embodied in *Tawhid* ‘Islamic monotheism’. Through his determination and courage his mission spread to almost all parts of the Arabian Gulf, where some religious scholars from Makkah, Madina, and Yemen and some rulers in Uyainah supported his views.

In addition, the effect of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which was spearheaded by Ayatollah Khomeini, cannot be ignored today. The Revolution shocked the world, since until then secularism was initially and widely proclaimed and deemed to be prevailing, and religion was seen as being pushed into the periphery. The Revolution brought to the fore a

different expression of Islam in the global arena, that is 'political Islam'. Ayatollah's 'political Islam' approach brought about unique Islamic governance with religious scholars (*Mullahs*) playing significant role in determining the direction of the Iranian life based upon Islamic principles. His approach shows the relevance of religion to governance which it was hitherto proclaimed to be outmoded.

An interestingly dimension of the Islamic resurgence was the Libyan Revolution of 1 September 1969. This Revolution did not utilize Islamic symbols in its philosophy but rather propounded a religio-political philosophy aimed at addressing global issues through the Third Universal Theory of *the Green Book*. It must be stated however, that its principles and philosophy are not different from those of mainline Islam. For example, it has been argued that the colour green is associated with the Prophet of Islam and therefore the title of the book could be understood as both an Islamic alternative and an option for Third World aspirations (Esposito, 1995:81). The title also suggests a distinction between the book and other political and philosophic books. For instance, the Chinese had their *Little Red Book*, Mao Tse-Tung's ideological guide for a Third World Revolution and the Jews and Christians had the Old and New Testaments of the Bible (Esposito, 1995:81).

The nature of the Islamic resurgence in Ghana in this context is the sectarian expression of Islam, such as Shi'ism, and the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah. Furthermore an aspect of the Islamic resurgence is politico-religious in nature as it is in respect of Libya's Third Universal Theory. One common denominator that these varied Islamic expressions have is the interest of some Islamic regimes to disseminate their values in Ghana. Thus, Islamic resurgence in this context therefore emerged and arose in Ghana due to Muslim transnational relations with the Muslim world. With these various images of Islamic

resurgent in mind, one can safely conclude that it has brought in its wake divergence expressions of Islam based on different sectarian Islamic and political-Islamic ideologies.

This brought about a divergence expression of Islam in Ghana based on different Islamic ideologies as found in the Muslim world. It therefore means that Islam is expressed differently from one place to the other, depending on the dominant doctrinal group within a particular community. For instance, the emergence of Ahlus-Sunnah (*Wahhabism*) in the 18th century in central Arabia has brought about a new expression of Islam in the world. Likewise, the emergence of Shi'ism and its revival and internationalization after the 11 February 1979 revolution in Iran has brought about another expression of Islam. The same could be said about the *Fateh* Victory Revolution of 1 September 1969 of Libya, with its socialist foundation.

Islamic resurgence in the Muslim world has worldwide ramifications for the entire Muslim world. All Muslim settlements around the globe experience one or other aspect of such ideological fervour. For instance, the emergence of *Wahhabism* in Saudi Arabia has affected all parts of the Muslim world. The same could be said about Shi'ism as well as the Libyan socialist *Green Book*.

What is the origin of the divergent expressions of Islam in Ghana in the wake of Ghanaian Muslims transnational connection with the Muslim world during the post-independence period? Initially, the next section of this study will therefore delve into this question by identifying the unique expression of Islam introduced by the Ahlus-Sunnah sect in Ghana.

J THE ORIGIN OF AHLUS-SUNNAH (*WAHABISM*) AND THE GHANAIAN MUSLIMS

Ahlus-Sunnah, or *Wahhabism*, is the name used to refer to the followers of the teachings of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab. The origin of the name *Wahhabism* clearly refers to the name of the founder. The bedrock of *Wahhabism* rests on Islamic Unitarianism with an emphasis on the literal interpretation and teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the prophet.

The historical background of central Arabia dictated the nature and the origin of this Islamic ideology. This was because central Arabia during the lifetime of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab was believed to have been engulfed in superstitious beliefs and practices in the form of veneration of saints, trees, stones, etc, and sacrifice at the tombs of the Prophet and that of the companions (Abdul Wahhab 1996:10). This necessitated Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab and his followers to resort to the destruction of the shrines of the *Shi'ah* in the southern cities of Iraq in order to restore Islam to its perceived purity (Abdul Wahhab 1996:10).

The intellectual development of Muhammad bn Abdul Wahhab was greatly influenced by the ideas and teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, great scholars of Hanbali School of Thought (Waines 1995: 208). However, these two scholars differ in their methodologies on Islam with Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab. For instance, Ibn Taymiyya emphasized social virtues of solidarity and justice as against the individual virtues, which have been so typical of Sufism. Again, Ibn Taymiyya was partial in his condemnation of Sufism due to its perceived deviation from the doctrines and rituals of Islamic teachings and their moral laxity. To Ibn Taymiyya, the pristine core of Islam are the Qur'an and the Sunnah

of the Prophet, therefore there is the room enough for *Ijtihad* to reconstruct the socio-moral condition of the Muslim *Ummah* at every time.

On the other hand, Ibn Abdul Wahhab rejected Sufism out of hand and turned the exercise of *Ijtihad* into an almost literal imitation (*Taqlid*) of the customs of the Prophet and his Companions (Waines 1995: 208). The uncompromising attitude of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab might have been due to the perceived degree of widespread of socio-moral laxity which was on the ascendancy in Arabia. As a result he called himself and his followers *Muwahhidun* (Unitarians) because of their emphasis on the unity and oneness of Allah (Abdul Wahhab 1996: 10). In short, *Wahhabism* could be understood to be uncompromising Muslims towards the subject of Unitarianism, less accommodative of indigenous values, with historically a strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah. *Wahhabiyya* is within the larger family of the Salafiyya, an Islamic identity which rested on reclaiming the true Islamic tradition of the Prophet propagated by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayim al-Jawziyya. Though, Salafiyya as an Islamic category was preached by Muhammad Abduh, it has been used synonymously with *Wahhabism* as they all preached similar Islamic ideology in respect of condemning visitation to the shrines, resentment of Sufi mysticism, and the celebration of *Maulid Nabi* (Olivier 2004:234). Significantly, Abduh's Salafiyya drew great inspiration from the *Wahhabi* revolution in Arabia and was seen as the best Islamic model at the time (Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol 2, page 4)

In recent times, the followers of this Islamic ideology preferred to be identified as Ahlus-Sunnah, that is those who adhere to the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, in addition to the collective views and positions of the Companions as against the founder's name

(Wahhabiyya or Wahhabism). Within the context of this research, the two names would be used interchangeably in reference to people of the same Islamic identity.

The Ahlus-Sunnah believes that their name originates from the Prophet. For instance, it is said that the Prophet used the word ‘Sunnah’ to refer to those who will adhere to his teachings after him (Hussain 2003:43 op cit). Moreover, the Imams and the proponents of the four schools of thought as embodied in the Shari‘a are regarded as Sunni schools and Imams. These are the Hanafi School of Abu Hanifa (D.767C.F/150.AH), the Mnliki School of Imam Anas b. Malik (795C.E/179 A.H), the Shafi’i School of Imam Shafi’i (d 819 C.E/204) and the Hanbali School of Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855 C.E/241 A.H). This has, therefore, necessitated identifying the four schools as the Sunni schools of thoughts in contrast to the Shi’i school of thought in Islam.

It must be emphasized that the early Muslim community used the word Ahlus-Sunnah in a loose form and not necessarily referring to any kind of organized religious group with that title. For instance, it is said that Ibn Abass, a Companion of the Prophet in his commentary of the Qur’an 3:106, indicated that those whose faces will turn white in the hereafter are followers of the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah (Hussain 2003:44 op cit).

Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal and Abu Hassan al-Ashari (d.652 C.E/32 AH) were known as the Imam of Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama’a and an authority of Islam within the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama’a respectively (Hussain 2003:44 op cit). Perhaps, they might have earned this title as a result of their insistence on and adherence to the teachings of the Prophet. Ibn Taymiyya, an 11th century Islamic scholar, used to identify himself with Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah and frequently referred to the companions as such.

The alternative name for the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'a is *Ahlul Hadith* (companions of the traditions). It means those who uphold to the teachings of the prophetic traditions. This name was used because of the attempt to adulterate the tradition of the Prophet at a particular point in time in the history of Islam. Consequently, the early *Hadith* or tradition compilers were regarded as the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah, because they devoted much of their time to the study and compilation of the traditions of the prophet (Hussain 2003:45 op

An important point worthy of consideration is the fact that Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab was a Hanbali in respect of jurisprudential inclination. This school of thought put emphasis on the tradition of the Prophet and believes in the wholesome application of *Hadith* in the development of Islamic legal thought. Therefore, to the Hanbali anything ever done by the Prophet gives the best precedence in the understanding of Islam (Waines 1995:208).

The puritanical position adopted by the founder of the Hanbali school of thought was imitated by Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab through his mentors namely; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and Ibn Taymiyya respectively. These two great scholars of the Hanbali school of thought also refined the thinking and methodology of the School. It could therefore be safely concluded that the origin and the nature of *Wahhabism* could be understood in two dimensions:

- 1- The type of education acquired by Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab from his tutors and his mentors on one hand, and the methodology that he depended on or adopted (Hanbali School of Thought) on the other, and.
- 2- The perceived unorthodox religious conditions in the Arabian society, which he believed, were highly superstitious and un-Islamic. This perception without doubt

was due to the nature of the educational orientation that he acquired from his tutors which had emphasized Puritanism.

This analysis therefore represents the broader picture against the backdrop of the upsurge of *Wahhabism* in the world. It also serves as the broader framework for the development of *Wahhabi* Islamic ideological identity. It has been observed that the religious orientation practiced in Arabia in the 18th century which included the perceived veneration of trees, stones, worship and sacrifices at the tomb of the Prophet and the companions resulted in puritanism of Abdul Wahhab. It is hoped that this background would be used to compare how the *Wahhabi* Islamic ideology has been developed in the world and in Ghana, in particular.

6.4 AHLUS-SUNNAH WAL-JAMA'A (*WAHHABISM*) IN GHANA

In Ghana, others call those who follow the teachings of Ibn Abdul Wahhab *Wahhabis* or *Wahhabiyya*. The followers prefer to be referred to as Muwahidun or Ahlus-Sunnah. *Wahhabism* (followers of the teaching of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab) as a religious identity manifested itself among Ghanaian Muslims with the establishment of the Saudi mission in Ghana in 1961. As stated before, it is said that Kamali Halid, an Indian employee of the Saudi Embassy, was in charge of the Islamic Desk there (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). Part of his brief was to teach Ghanaian Muslim students. Such teachings were organized at the then Accra Central Mosque. The activities of Kamali Halid there could be regarded as the first conscious manifestation of *Wahhabism* in Ghana, through the training of Ghanaian Muslim students.

Much impetus was added to the work of Kamali Halid when Umar Ibrahim graduated in 1968 from the Islamic University at Medina in Saudi Arabia. He is the current Imam and spiritual leader of Ahlu-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah. He subsequently settled in Accra, specifically in Nima, and encouraged the upsurge of *Wahhabism* in Ghana. He sometimes used to assist Kamali's work at the Accra Central Mosque. He subsequently initiated his own educational activity at the Nima Central Mosque in 1969, where the Makaranta (Islamic school) teachers and section of the *Ulama* used to attend the classes (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). Interestingly, the subjects and courses of these classes were tailored towards the educational background which he acquired in Saudi Arabia. The studies were organized under the Institute of Islamic Studies (*Ma'ahd Diraa 'satul Al-Islamiyya*).

The initial stages of teaching and propagation were characterized and bedeviled with many problems. On certain occasions the leaders of the mosque who were Sufis and *Tijaniyya* in orientation ejected these classes from the Nima Central Mosque (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). This was due to what was seen as 'strange teachings' of the *Wahhabiyya* with its associated vilification of the *Tijaniyya* teachings. Subsequently, the school was moved to Abeka, a suburb of Accra. Later on, the school was moved back to Nima when the late Ali Toloba a former Mu'adhin (somebody who sermons to prayers in Islam) at Nima Central Mosque assisted them with a plot of land. Through this humble beginning, the first batch of *Wahhabi* students was produced in the community. With their teachers they then started the open propagation of the new ideology in the community.

When discussing the propagation of *Wahhabism* in Ghana one must mention that the Saudi Embassy also played a significant role in consolidating such a religious movement in the Ghanaian Muslim community. The role played was in the area of granting scholarships to

the graduates of the Institute of Islamic Studies, the foremost *Wahhabiyya* theological institute in Accra, to study in Saudi universities. Also, religious literatures of *Wahhabi* orientations were distributed in the Ghanaian community by the Embassy. Lastly, the Saudi authority used the performance of Hajj, which is a pillar in Islam, by Ghanaian Muslims to spread the *Wahhabi* teachings in the community. Ghanaian pilgrims on Hajj observed the expression of Islam in Arabia, which is predominantly *Wahhabiyya*. Thus, the *Wahhabiyya* movement and its teachings were gradually entrenched in the Ghanaian Muslim community. With die graduation of these students from the Saudi and other Gulf universities, new Islamic educational institutions and organizations which followed the *Wahhabiyya* orientation were established.

6.5 INSTITUTIONS WHICH FACILITATE THE EXPRESSION OF *WAHHABISM* IN GHANA

The expression of *Wahhabism* in Ghana could be viewed from the activities of the following organizations with *Wahhabi* orientation. These include the Institute of Islamic Studies, the Islamic Research and Reformation Centre and the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research etc.

6.5.1 The Institute of Islamic Studies

The Institute of Islamic Studies located at Nima in Accra was the earliest *Wahhabi* educational institute. Established in 1969, the school has the enrolment capacity of 150 students per academic year ranging from the junior secondary to the senior secondary level. Successful graduates have the chances of gaining scholarships to pursue university education in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. The Institute has produced a sizeable number of *Wahhabi* scholars in Accra (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). A similar situation pertains to other *Wahhabi* educational centres in other regions of Ghana, such as

the Al-Azhariyya Islamic Educational Complex at Kumasi in the Ashanti region the Nuriyya, and the Anbariyya Islamic Schools at Tamale in the Northern region. A typical aspect of the *Wahhabiyya* educational curricula in Ghana is such that it is always tilted towards the dependence of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab Islamic exposition, such as *Kashfûl-Shub hat*, *Kitab Al-Tawhid*, and to some extent the life history of Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab. Importantly, the larger *Wahhabi* movements in Ghana facilitate the infiltration of Arabian educational materials or textbooks into Ghana.

The strength of *Wahhabiyya* institutions lies in their ability to give early training about the *Wahhabiyya* way of life in Ghana. They also serve as the first point of recruitment for Islamic tutors in the *Makaranta* educational system in Ghana, from kindergarten to primary level. This is possible when the students graduate from the institutes with a secondary Islamic school certificate. The other strength of the *Wahhabiyya* educational institutions is their preponderance as against other Muslim sects' educational centers. In all, the *Wahhabiyya* control about 60% of Muslim educational institutions as against other Muslim sects. The possible reason for this is the rich natural resources, of the home ground of Wahabism, the Arabian Gulf.

Wahhabi scholars in Ghana have access to funding for Islamic projects from the Muslim world. This has further boosted the proliferation of *Wahhabi* educational centers in the Muslim communities. Consequent to of this, students who attend the *Wahhabi* educational centers, for all intents and purposes, are oriented towards the educational approach that their tutors also acquired from the *Ulama* with *Wahhabiyya* background. A student who graduates from institutes of Islamic studies or institutions with a similar Islamic orientation tends to be regarded as an intermediate religious leader in the community, being an

intermediate person of a graduate of an Islamic university in the Arab world. Despite the fact that the *Wahhabiyya* educational centres tend to orient students towards a particular Islamic orientation, they serve as the strongest educational bloc in the Muslim community in terms of providing access to Islamic education in Ghana.

Wahhabiyya influence can also be seen in the role played by educational institutions founded by some *Wahhabis* in Ghana such as the Al-Azhariyya Islamic Educational Complex at Kumasi in the Ashanti region, ilie Anbariyya and the Nuriyya Islamic Schools in the Northern region, the Institute of Islamic Studies in the Greater Accra region, among others. These educational institutions represent the largest Muslim educational centres in Ghana which have substantial support from the Arabian Gulf States, the richest Islamic nations in the Islamic world and, coincidentally, *Wahhabiyya* by doctrinal orientation. This situation therefore paints a gloomy picture about the future of other Islamic sects in Ghana. These sects do not have any Islamic state backing them with funding. The *Tijaniyya* in particular in Ghana represents a sect without backing or support from any Islamic state.

The upsurge of *Wahhabism* in Ghana could also be viewed from the multitude of Muslim educational centres in Ghana owned by the *Wahhabis*. This is mostly attributable to the fact that the *Wahhabis* in Ghana are generally well connected to the wealthy Arab and Muslim countries, which virtually finance Muslim educational infrastructures in Ghana. Moreover, the close affinity between Muslim students trained in the major *Wahhabi* centres of learning explains the intertwined connection between ownership of most of these centers by the *Wahhabis* or people with Ahlus-Sunnah doctrinal orientation.

Generally, contemporary Islamic educational backgrounds in Ghana are influenced by *Wahhabism* because of three factors:

1. The Ghanaian *Wahhabis* are strongly linked with the Arab world, which serves as virtually the exclusive funding agencies of Muslim education in Ghana. This also implies that the beneficiaries of the majority of the Arab and Islamic countries' development projects in Ghana will be *Wahhabis* since they share the same doctrinal background with them.
2. The ownership of majority of Islamic educational centres by *Wahhabi Ulama* in Ghana.
3. As a corollary, early *Makaranta* training is mostly supervised by middle level *Wahhabiyya Ulama* with a senior secondary school background.

The factors as enumerated above indicate the interconnected nature of the booming economic fortunes and conditions in the Arab world and the extent of *Wahhabi* activism in Ghana, with its specific impact on the nature of Islamic educational background in Ghana. There are, however, some weaknesses associated with the nature of these institutions. The foremost problem is the lack of secular curricula in their educational syllabi. This approach deprives the Muslim child in Ghana of a secular education. The net effect of this type of education makes the Muslim student more of an extended Muslim with the outside Arab world than a Ghanaian, since he cannot relate effectively to his country's political and socio-cultural setting.

Also, in terms of the acquisition of professional skills or knowledge through education, the *Makaranta* system provides limited avenues for professional development in Ghana. This is

js a result of the narrow orientation that is offered to the students. In most cases, the only profession that the students tend to acquire is an Imam and an Islamic tutor.

The *Wahhabi* educational system at both the junior and senior secondary levels tends to exclude its benefits to young Muslim girls and women in Ghana. This in the end limits the Muslim women's quest for Islamic education at the higher level. The only exception to this is those which have been adopted by the Islamic Education Unit of the Ghana Education Service. In view of the *Wahhabi* educational centres deprivation of Muslim girls' higher Islamic education, it has compelled some Muslim women with *Wahhabi* background to establish separate Islamic education centers to cater for Muslim women interest.

In addition, *Wahhabi* educational centres in Ghana serve as the training ground for the penetration of Arabian Islamic orientation or Arabian Islamic. This could be observed from the type of educational curricula used in most of the *Wahhabi* centers of learning in Ghana, one of the subjects being Islamic monotheism (*Tauhid*). Coincidentally, the author of the book on *Tauhid* is Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab, the founder of the *Wahhabi* movement. One will no doubt that the prevailing socio-cultural conditions in the Arabia of his time dictated the nature of the book, which serves as another means of instructing Ghanaian Muslims on Islam. Textbooks on the history of the centre's benefactors' political and cultural values are also taught in the *Makaranta* system.

6-5.2 Islamic Research and Reformation Center

The Islamic Research and Reformation Centre (IRRC) was the earliest organization established by the *Wahhabiyya* movement in Ghana. It was established in 1972 through the instrumentality of Umar Ibrahim and Western educated Muslims led by Mijima Saly and

Abdulai Barou in Nima. These personalities who were political activists of the Convention People Party (CPP) of Kwame Nkrumah brought their experiences in party organisation to bear in the mobilization of people for IRRC. Originally, it used to be the rallying organization of the graduates from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. The major aim of the centre is to propagate Islam and *Wahhabism* in the Muslim communities. The Islamic Research served the *Wahhabiyya* interests from its inception until when, in the early 1980s, disputes broke out among the members, resulting in the fragmentation of the regular members of the movement in Ghana (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005).

The major role played by the IRRC was that it spread *Wahhabism* in Ghana's Muslim communities. It represented the earliest organization which propagated *Wahhabism* in Ghana. This was made possible through the movement's weekly outreach propagation programme in the Muslim community. This was mostly effective in the southern part of Ghana, especially in the Greater Accra, Ashanti, Eastern, Western, and the Volta regions. A careful observation of the nature of their religious proselytization method shows that the Arabian historical experience dictated its content. This could be discerned from the members' condemnation of the veneration of saints and tombs, the use of charms and amulets and divination, which they considered superstitious and, in their estimation, un-Islamic. This form of propagation is not different from the founders' perspective of Islam. Culturally, the centre played a role in its members' outlook in respect of what, in their estimation, constitutes Islamic. This manifests itself in the members' dress style which is Arabian. A typical example of this tendency is the type of cloak that some Muslim *Ulama* wear, known as *Aba ah*, and headgear or a veil for men, which is culturally Arabian.

The other manifestation of Arabian style adopted by the *Wahhabi* followers in Ghana is in the grooming of beard, which to the followers is in line with the prophetic Sunnah. The major problem faced by *Wahhabi* members in their dress and other imitations of Arab culture outlook in Ghana is that some people associate them with terrorists, as portrayed recently in the media. The other weakness of the Islamic Research and Reformation Center - and most of the Gulf organization is their inability to play an advocacy role of any kind in the Ghana's socio-political landscape. This might have partly been due to the fact that the type of education that they acquired is limited only to the religious domain. Lastly, they have not been able to reach out through *Da 'wa* to non-Muslims in Ghana.

6JS3 Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research

The Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research is another organization of the *Wahhabiyya* movement formed in Ghana in 1985. Originally its aim was to serve as the umbrella organization for all *Ulama* involved in *Da'wa* in Ghana, irrespective of their doctrinal affiliation. It has, however, become an organization for Muslim scholars from Ghana trained in the Arab and the Muslim world, especially graduates from the Arab and Gulf States universities. This, therefore, presupposes that it has become one of the leading organizations propagating *Wahhabism* in Ghana, with strong affiliation to the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia. Related to this is the fact that many Gulf States governments and organizations acknowledge it in matters concerning Islam and Muslims in Ghana. This is because most of them either require or instruct individuals and institutions who want to have transactions with them to get a recommendation from the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research.

Foreign backing initiated the establishment of the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research (SCICR). Available information suggests that one Abdallah Mu'ayad, the then Director in charge of *Da'wa* in the Muslim World League was in Ghana in 1985 (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). He observed the fragmented nature of *Du 'at* (scholars who propagate Islam) trained in Saudi Arabia. This was partly because of the different organizations with Saudi Arabian affiliations which sponsor Muslim *Du 'at* in Ghana. These include the Muslim World League and the Islamic *Fatwa* Centre (*Darul ifta*) of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowment. Consequently, Mu'ayad suggested a united umbrella organization of all *Du 'at* in Ghana. The outcome of this was the formation of the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research in 1985 (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). The organization has since then maintained its elitist character in respect of membership composition.

Because, the leadership crisis within the *Wahhabiyya* movement was due to personality clash between Umar Ibrahim and Shuaib Abubakar, it was suggested that the tenure of office of the head of this newly founded organisation be rotated between these two personalities for a maximum of six (6) months, with Umar Ibrahim being the first president (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004). When his tenure was over, his allies withdrew their supports for and cooperation with Shuaib Abubakar's presidency. This nearly crumbled the organization. Muhammad Bun Ka'uud came from Saudi Arabia to Ghana to reconcile the differences between these two leading *Wahhabi* personalities. In order to bring about sanity and unity within the leadership of SCICR an election was held, with Umar Ibrahim Shuaib Abubakar, and Ahmed Umar contesting for the presidency. Eventually, Ahmed Umar won the election, and it is he who is currently serving as the leader of SCICR (Rufai, interview, 13th February 2004).

Among the major roles that the SCICR plays in the Muslim community in recent times is that it serves as the source of recruitment for Muslim students to study in the Gulf universities. It also serves as a major point of reference for most Ghanaian Islamic organizations which have interests in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. Currently it has established a theological college at Tema, Accra, to train Muslim students who have graduated from Islamic secondary schools and wish to further their education at a higher level (Musah, interview, 3rd February 2007).

The major successes of the organization in recent times is that it has been able to forge closer ties with the Office of the National Chief Imam, to the extent that some of its members represent the Office at major ceremonies in Ghana and beyond. Significantly, the organization represents the moderate group among the Gulf-trained *Ulama* in Ghana in respect of *Da'wa's* methodology and its relationship with other Muslim sects.

As a result of this moderate stance, the organization has been accused of undermining the larger *Wahhabiyya* group's cause in Ghana and for not cooperating with others with similar ideological background in order to create a united *Wahhabi* front. It has also been suggested that its relationship with the Office of the Chief Imam is due to the ambition of individuals within its leadership who aspire to occupy the national office in case there is a vacancy. This is however, at the expense of uniting the larger *Wahhabi* community as a formidable group among Ghanaian Muslims.

However, a closer observation as to the composition of the National Executive Committee of the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research suggests that most members of the NEC have previously had problems with the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (ASWAJ),

another *Wahhabi* group in Ghana. Therefore, their relationship with the Office of the National Chief Imam is aimed at countering the influence of the Ahlus-Sunnah group in the Muslim community in Ghana. It also suggests that the purpose of the SCICR's adoption of the moderate methodology in *Da 'wa* is to show that they are diametrically different from the ASWAJ group, which is noted for extremism and radicalism. This argument is based on the fact that when most of the Supreme Council members were part of the Islamic Research and Reformation Centre propagating *Wahhabism*, they also adopted a radical approach to *Da'wa*. The group is perceived to be a rival organization to the ASWAJ on almost every issue in the Muslim community partly due to personal differences, even though they represent a bloc in the propagation of *Wahhabism* in Ghana. It could be concluded that, the SCICR approach to *Da 'wa* was strategic as to make it relevant in the Ghanaian religious-political landscape. Their alignment with the Office of National Chief Imam and adoption of moderate *Da 'wa* enable them to reach out to larger audience in the Ghanaian Muslim religious context. Lastly, because of this strategy, their members are also heralded as the forerunners to the national Muslim leadership in Ghana.

Generally, the influence of the SCICR is very limited in the Muslim communities of Ghana since the organization lacks mass membership. Yet, most of their members in their individual capacity have built up a high reputation for themselves in the Muslim communities, as a result of upholding their *Wahhabiyya* identity. Like IRRC, however, the organization does not play any significant advocacy role in the Ghanaian socio-political landscape. Also, the organization has not extended its *Da'wa* activities to non-Muslim communities. Lastly, the domain of the SCICR *Da 'wa* is found in the urban cities.

6.5.4 Islamic Charity Centre for Women Orientation

The Islamic Charity Centre for Women Orientation, which was founded in 1989 by some women with *Wahhabiyya* background, is one of the dynamic Ahlus-Sunnah organizations in the Ghanaian Muslim community. It has branches in Accra, Kumasi, Eastern, Central, and Western regions of Ghana. A group of concerned Muslim women in the Ghanaian Muslim community founded the organization. It is linked to the Federation of Muslim Women's Association of Ghana (FOMWAG). Some of the aims of the organization are to educate Muslim women about Islam, to encourage them, address the welfare needs of their children through the establishment of Islamic centres, and mobilize women to contribute towards Islam and the larger society.

Aida Jibril gave the interpretation of the organization's logo: the image of a woman with sword and a pen. According to her the sword means the Muslim woman's preparedness to fight ignorance. The pen signifies a Muslim woman seeking knowledge. She indicated that the organization established an educational complex at Mamobi in 1994. This offers facilities from a creche to a junior secondary school. The goal for enrolment at the school was 204 pupils. However, the school is now experiencing over-enrolment with about 300 pupils. It has already acquired a plot of land at Kasoa Garba in the Central region for an Islamic secondary school (Aida, interview, 18th May 2005).

The most interesting change that the organization brought to the community is that, weekend Islamic classes are organized for Muslim women. Hajia Aida indicated that the enrolment at these classes has been overwhelming. She said that the school always registers women's attendance at the classes at not below 1000 per a week. Subjects taught at the centre are:

1. Qur'an
2. Qur'anic exegesis (*Tafseer*)
3. Islamic culture
4. Tradition of the prophet (*Hadith*) etc.

Salma Tahir, a founding member of the organization indicated that it has 35 branches nationwide. When the researcher asked about the tutors' educational background in Islamic studies, she said that none of the teachers has ever been to the Islamic world but most had completed Islamic primary education in Ghana. Salma is of the view that their ability to impart knowledge to others is a gift from Allah despite their poor educational background. She, however, confessed that, for extra tutorials at home, some of the teachers rely on their husbands who are *Wahhabi* graduates from the Islamic world (Salma, interview, 18th May 2005).

In recent times the quest to impart quality Islamic education to other women compelled the tutors to contract *Wahhabi* male teachers for extra Islamic studies. Hussein Abdul Rahim is one of these tutors. He identified some of the Islamic courses that they run to instruct the female tutors. These include the foundation of *Fiqh*, *Da'wa* methodology, Quranic sciences, *Tauhid* and Islamic jurisprudence at the highest level. Arabic is the medium of instruction (Hussain, interview, 5th June 2005).

Among some of the innovations that the *Wahhabiyya* women introduced into the Muslim community is that the entertainment of Muslim women during wedding and naming ceremonies which used to be in the form of music and dancing with its concomitant un-Islamic practices has now been given an Islamic outlook. This could be seen from the fact

that they have introduced propagation (*Da'wa*) during such ceremonies. In addition, the extravagance associated with most of the former entertainments has been done away with. Aida concluded that as a result of this new orientation that the Muslim women have undergone they have been channeling their resources towards the upbringing of their children by assisting in the establishment of educational and recreational centres. She indicated that the organization now has educational complexes at Madina, Ashaiman, and Zabarima line, all in the Greater Accra region. The group also has another educational complex at Kasoa in the Central region.

The resurgence of *Wahhabiyya* in Ghana could also be seen in the type of religious activities that were organized in the mosque. In most cases, the ASWAJ mosques in Accra have been turned into religious seminaries, in which the female tutors teach the women folk Islamic studies after dawn prayers (*Salatul-Fajir*). Aida indicated that they have such Islamic classes in about fifty (50) mosques in Accra alone with the enrolment of Muslim women at 30-40 for each centre (Aida Interview, 18th May 2005)

Another dimension of the group orientation of Muslim women in the community is that they engage in *Da 'wa* publicly. This was formerly unknown and condemned by some of the *Wahhabiyya* male leaders. They organize *Da 'wa* in the community during ceremonies and occasions such as weddings, outdoorings, funerals, workshops and entertainments for Muslim women in conformity with Islamic teachings and standards.

Aida was of the view that what motivated some of them to take up this task was that in most Muslim ceremonies the dominance of the Muslim male group is such that it creates the impression that, religious issues in Islam are the exclusive preserve of the male, which as far

as Islam is concerned, is not the case. This impression has far-reaching negative consequences for the development of Muslim women. This is because, in most of the Muslim ceremonies, the male *Ulama* always paint a bad picture of the Muslim women. According to her, the male *Ulama* always emphasize during their propagation that the best Islamic teachings for Muslim women is of absolute submission, subservience and obedience to their husbands as well as their confinement to household and domestic activities. She concluded that this was the situation that Muslim women faced before the emergence of her group (Aida Interview, 18th May 2005). The study shows that *Wahhabi* women in Ghana are contesting over the religious boundaries set by the male *Ulama* as also shown in other studies (Eickelman et al 1996:93)). This is partly to create their own vision for themselves and the society at large.

In short, the activities of the Islamic Charity Centre for Women orientation have generated a spirited enthusiastic dimension of Islamic resurgence within the Muslim women's circles. This represents the *Wahhabi* women's contributions towards the Islamic resurgence in Ghana. Most of the women who participate in the centre's educational activities in the community perceive the organization as a non-sectarian: however the type of Islamic resurgence that the organization provides is purely *Wahhabi* in character. The prime activity of this centre could therefore be safely regarded as the '*Wahhabyazation*' of Muslim women in general in Ghana.

Historically, the involvement and participation of Muslim women in religious activities was not visible prior to Ghana's diplomatic relations with the Islamic world. For example, the role of Muslim women in the performance of *Salat* (prayers) and identification with Islamic veiling (*Hijab*) were not noticed until they were married. However, the contemporary

situation of the Muslim women in the post-independence Ghana suggests that there is phenomenal upsurge in Muslim women's participation in religious activities and identification with Islamic veiling as early as pre-puberty. This might be as a result of the fact that Muslim transnational contacts with the Muslim world after 1957 have facilitated the acquisition of higher Islamic education. This eventually created a greater awareness on the part of *Ulama* that Muslim women are as responsible as men in religious matters. This change in attitude could not, however, be credited solely to Ghanaian Muslims' transnational interaction with the Muslim world. This is because Western educated Muslim women also played a role significantly in invigorating the spirit of Islam among Muslim women in Ghana. These secularly educated Muslim women include Katumi Mahama, Lami Futa and Rabiatu Ammah.

6.5.5 Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah (ASWAJ)

The Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah is a new *Wahhabi* organization formed in 1997 in Ghana. It has become the leading *Wahhabi* organization due to the vibrant role that it has been playing in recent times. It also has the largest support base among the *Wahhabiyya* organizations in Ghana. It was formed to bring to the fore the public face of the *Wahhabiyya* way of life.

This organization is unique from the other *Wahhabiyya* organisations, because it has mass appeal and grass root support in the Ghanaian Muslim community. It has established branches in all parts of the country, from district to regional and national levels with a strong membership drive. Presently Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah could arguably be regarded as the foremost *Wahhabiyya* organization which caters for the ordinary *Wahhabis'* interest as against the Supreme Council and the rest. They preach *Wahhabism* loudly in the

Ghanaian Muslim community especially, through their quarterly and annual conventions. Equally important is their ability to forge closer ties with other sister organizations in the sub-region of West Africa. This resulted in the formation of the West African Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah in 2001 called *Rabitatul Du al* (the League of Muslim Preachers). This was not however without some external influence, since it has been realized that Tais Al-Jumaili was very instrumental in the formation of the West African Network of ASWAJ.¹

The National Imam of ASWAJ is Umar Ibrahim Imam. He informed the researcher about some of the problems that he and his group encountered that necessitated the formation of ASWAJ. He indicated that when he and his group first arrived in Ghana in the late 1960s, they did not intend forming an organization to represent the aspiration of the Muslims here. This is because they thought that they were all part of the Sunni Islam and could work hand in hand to advance the course of Islam and Muslims in Ghana. He indicated that this attitude of theirs manifested itself in their relationship with the Office of the National Chief Imam. For instance, both the Office of the National Chief Imam and the *Wahhabis* leadership collectively dealt with most decisions affecting Muslims, even though at that time, the Ahlus-Sunnah existed acephalously, without any organized structures in Ghana.

He indicated that at one time there were indications that the Ahlus-Sunnah sect would be marginalized in decision-making structures within the Muslim community. The net effect of this development was the strong agitation from the membership to mobilize an Ahlus-Sunnah group into an organization in order to withstand the challenges confronting it in Ghana. He indicated that at the initial stage of its formation the organization met with strong

¹ This view was based on the researcher's own involvement in Muslim activities at the community level, when he was the National Vice-President of the Ghana Muslim Students Association (OMSA). During one of Tais Al-Jumaili's visit to Ghana in 2001 a meeting was scheduled with Muslim *Du at*. At the meeting he pledged to assist in the formation of the largest forum for *Du'at* and to network with them in the sub-region of West Africa.

hostility and resistance such as harassment from the security forces. However, currently all is running smoothly (Umar, interview, 20th February 2004).

Muhammad Kamil, the regional Imam of the group in the Ashanti region, also provided another dimension to the origin of Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah. He indicated that originally all the *Wahhabi* trained *Ulama* in Ghana were under one umbrella organization, namely the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and Research. He argues that at one time some of them felt that the leadership of the Supreme Council was not doing enough to project the unique identity of the Ahlus-Sunnah group in Ghana. Among some of these personalities were the late Taufiq Bakr of the Ashanti region, Anas of Brong Ahafo region, Kamil in the Ashanti region, and Bashir Yendu of Accra (Kamil, interview,).

As a result, some of them embarked upon coordinated and aggressive *Da 'wa* within their respective regions with a view to enlightening their followers on the uniqueness of the movement as against the perceived adulterated and superstitious nature of the *Tijaniyya* sect in Ghana. He emphasized that this strategy resulted in divisions within the ranks of the Supreme Council of which they were all members. He admitted that it was as a result of their *Da 'wa* strategies that the doctrinal conflicts emerged in the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions between their followers and the *Tijaniyya* sect, especially the radical elements among them. This situation required the leadership of the Supreme Council to summarily dismiss some of them who held executive positions within the organization. The leadership of the Supreme Council also dissociated itself from the conflicts (Kamil, interview, 14th January 2007). According to Kamil, the outcome of the conflict was very regrettable and catastrophic because it resulted in the loss of lives, properties and the imprisonment of some, because of the role that they played.

However, this situation did not deter or discourage them from their *Da 'wa* propagation. Rather, they intensified this by moving from one region to the other. Their *Da 'wa* outreach programmes spread from the Brong Ahafo, Ashanti and Western regions until they finally converged at the Greater Accra region. He confirmed that the nature of their outreach programs further escalated the doctrinal differences and eventually the conflicts between the *Tijaniyya* and Ahlus-Sunnah group of which he was a member. It was during that period that they realized the helpless situation that they were in, in terms of lack of a centralized, effective, recognized leadership. This was because in most of the arbitration and litigation they tended to be at the receiving end. This is notwithstanding the fact that the National Chief Imam, as the father of all Muslims in Ghana, is also a *Tijaniyya* by doctrinal orientation whose evidence tends to override any evidence that the Ahlus-Sunnah followers will give. This was partly due to the fact that the government at that time acknowledges the National Chief Imam as the sole leader of Muslims in Ghana, and partly as a result of a lack of effective and recognized sectarian Ahlus-Sunnah leadership (Kamil, interview, M* January 2007).

Consequently, they immediately resolved to establish structures throughout the entire country. This background therefore explained the actual differences between the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'a, which represents a puritanical and less accommodative movement, as against the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and Research, which represents a moderate group among the *Wahhabi* divisions in Ghana. This historical background on the origin of Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah therefore marked the differences in the nature and approaches between the ASWAJ and the Supreme Council.

Two issues are therefore discernable and worth stressing as to the nature of the *Wahhabiyya* Movement in Ghana. It would be realized that:

1. The *Wahhabiyya* group lacks a coherent and united leadership front in Ghana. This could be observed in the diametric leadership structures of the movement as in the nature of ASWAJ, the SCICR and the Anbariyya group. The Anbariyya group is being led by the disciples of the late Yussif Ajura in the Northern region (known as the Sakasaka Road *Wahhabiyya* or the Anbariyya *Wahhabiyya*).² This was as a result of their marginalization in the national leadership structure of the ASWAJ.
2. Philosophically and ideologically, however, they all uphold their *Wahhabi* Islamic identity and propagate the same brand of *Wahhabism* in Ghana.

Among some of the factors which consolidated the strong foundation for the early *Wahhabi* leadership in Ghana and for that matter Accra in particular were:

1. The early pilgrims who have been exposed to Umar Ibrahim in Saudi Arabia while he was studying. They became his first supporters in Ghana before his arrival. This was due to the fact that these early pilgrims were convinced that Arabian Islam is the original and standard Islam.
2. The support base created by some of the youth in Nima and his mentor, Hamza Abdul Salam, was another factor. This was because of the great popularity he used to enjoy among the youth and the extent of popularity of his mentor in the community.

² *Jypphic' .ue3<^ay* 26 June, 2007: 23. This publication captured news about the election of Saeed u akar Zakana as the spiritual leader of the Al-Sunni Muslims in the country. This indicates that they are not part of the larger neither ASWAJ nor SCICR leaderships' respectively in Ghana and exist independently.

3 Because Umar emerged as the most learned person in the Islamic sciences at that time in Accra, this also gave him the upper hand in the community (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005).

6.6 BIOGRAPHY OF THE FOUNDER OF AHLUS-SUNNAH WAL-JAMA'A IN GHANA

The brain behind the formation of Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah and *Wahhabism* in Ghana was Umar Ibrahim Imam, the current Imam of the organization. He happened to be first Ghanaian to have been enrolled at and graduated from the Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia. He was born in 1932 at Ankuma in the Eastern region of Ghana to a farmer, Ibrahim Abdullah, a native of Basila from the Republic of Benin (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). He received his first Islamic education at his father's feet. The father later handed him over to Bunyaminu Alhassan to be educated. He settled at Koforidua and then at Nima in 1945 with his Mallam. The Mallam, a professional tailor trained Umar as a tailor. He married in 1957 (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005).

When his Mallam passed away in 1956 he decided to continue his academic pursuits beyond Ghana's borders. He made his first trip to Sudan in 1958, with a view to studying at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, which did not materialize. In the Sudan he joined the pilgrims traveling to Saudi Arabia in 1959 with the intention of performing the annual Hajj and seeking educational opportunities. Fortunately, after the performance of the Hajj in that year, he sat at the feet of an array of *Wahhabi* scholars in the Grand Holy Mosque in Makkah. He later continued his secondary Islamic education at *Darul-Hadith* in Mecca until 1962 when the Islamic University of Medina was established (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). He became a pioneer student of the University and was the first Ghanaian to enroll in Saudi University (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). He indicated in

respect of his education in Saudi Arabia that the major books of Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the founder of *Wahhabiyya*, such as *Kitab al-Tauhid*, *Kashful-Shub'hat*, as well as the Hanbali literature of Islamic jurisprudence were extensively used in their studies (Umar, interview, **20th February 2005**).

He returned in 1964, home for summer holidays, where according to him, he discovered the deteriorating moral and spiritual laxity of Ghanaian Muslims. This reaffirmed his resolve to correct this distorted understanding of Islam. For instance, according to him, people used not to pray and fast in certain communities in Accra on the grounds that they have reached the highest point of Tijaniyya *Tarbiyya*. These categories of Muslims claim that Allah has taken away the burden of prayers in their life. Some even claim that they can see Allah with their naked eyes. This situation necessitated the emergence of Abubakar Abdullah Maula, popularly known as Mallam Maibolala (the Mallam who whips or canes in the Hausa language) with his strict enforcement of Islamic principles by insisting that women should be strictly veiled (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005).

The prevailing religious condition of the Ghanaian Muslims at that time also brought about the late Yussif Ajura's active *Da'wa* propagation to the southern part of Ghana, especially Accra, in 1964. He then teamed up with Hamza Abdul Salam, the mentor of Umar Ibrahim, and Umar himself who was on a short vacation from Saudi Arabia to wage a crusade against the perceived prevailing religious condition of the Muslim *Ummah*. He intimated that it was normal to see Ghanaian Muslims involved in what he termed 'superstitious beliefs', like the belief in the powers of the dead, or what some people called saints, the use of talismans and amulets, and the veneration of saints, among others (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005). Umar might have been influenced by his new interpretation of Islam from his

Wahhabi tutors whose Islamic orientation was ultimately coloured by Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab's ideology of Islam.

6.7 THE DISTINCTIVE TEACHINGS OF AHLUS-SUNNAH (WAHABISM) IN GHANA

The orientation of the *Wahhabiyya* movement in Ghana in terms of their beliefs and practices are not different from any other *Wahhabiyya* anywhere. Nevertheless, socio-cultural factors and people indigenous practices vary, from community to another. Therefore, the tendency on the part of some people to get involved in some acts which amount to infidelity according to the Ahlus-Sunnah leader is high. For instance, consulting a soothsayer and believing in him/her will amount to a person forfeiting his faith. In addition, the use of talisman and amulets and drinking of Quranic erasures mixed concoctions are among the topmost issues preached against by the Ahlus-Sunnah in Ghana (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005).

The Ahlus-Sunnah could also be distinguished from other religious sects in the Muslim community in Ghana, through what they claim to be their standard points of reference:

1. They claim to be strict adherents to the teachings of the Prophet, and what the Prophet approves through the practice of the companions. Perhaps that is why they are referred to Ahlus-Sunnah, that is, those who follow the teachings and the practices of the Prophet.
2. The major books of reference used by the Ahlus-Sunnah are the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet. In the estimation of the Ahlus-Sunnah, the reliability of any source cannot match that of the Quran and the Sunnah on matters of Islam and must be rejected outright (Umar, interview, 20th February 2005).

The Ahlus-Sunnah group in Ghana could also be distinguished from other Muslim sects by their mode of dress. For instance, a typical Ahlus-Sunnah likes putting on a long dress known as *Jalbab* for men and a pair of short trousers ending just after the ankle. They could also be distinguished from other Muslims with long beards, which they claim is in conformity with the Prophet's way of life.

In conclusion, the expression of the Islamic resurgence within the *Wahhabi* movements in Ghana varies. This *Wahhabi* expression of the Islamic resurgence could be discerned from the activities of the aforementioned organizations and educational institutions in Ghana. The outcome of the research within this section shows that the Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah organization facilitates the popular expression of the *Wahhabi* brand of Islamic resurgence in Ghana through mass and grassroots mobilization of members with its radical outlook and approach.

On the other hand, the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research also facilitates the expression of the *Wahhabi* brand of Islamic resurgence through the individual efforts of their members and because it is moderate and receptive to the *Tijaniyya* sect. This diametric approach might represent different notions of *Da'wa* within the two organizations. It was also found that, despite the fact that the two organizations have different approaches to *Da'wa*, none of them abdicate their *Wahhabi* identity in Ghana. In short, *Wahhabism* is progressively and increasingly gaining root in the Muslim community in Ghana through the conversion of some *Tijaniyya* members to the new sect or ideology.

Umar's embrace of the Ahlus-Sunnah or the *Wahhabi* orientation was a matter of coincidence, since it was not the *Wahhabiyya* teaching which ultimately endeared him to

seek an education in Saudi Arabia. It must, however, be added that the wave of *Wahhabiyya* Islamic resurgence was already on the way and was to affect Ghanaian Muslims through globalization with the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's diplomatic relations with Ghana and of the Arabian Gulf states in Ghana. In short, *Wahhabism* manifested itself in Ghana through two major means, one being individual Muslim's efforts in seeking academic laurels, as in the case of Umar. Secondly, the establishment of Saudi Mission in Ghana propelled the extent of the *Wahhabi* Islamic resurgence through granting of scholarships and incentives to the adherents of the movement. As indicated earlier the *Wahhabiyya* Movement in Ghana is to some extent fragmented. The origin of Shi'ism in Ghana in the context of the Islamic resurgence will be discussed in the next section of the study.

6.8 SHI'ISM AND THE GHANAIAN MUSLIMS

6.8.1 The Origin of Shi'ism (Historical Overview)

Shi'ism is a religious doctrine and sect in Islam. Its origin could be traced back to the death of the Prophet. It is said that immediately after his death, a dispute broke out at the Saqiffa Assembly over the choice of his successor to the leadership of the *Ummah*. The dispute over the leadership was between the Madinan people (*Ansar*) on the one hand, the Makkans (*Muhajiruri*) on the other, and some cross section of the Sahabah or Companions of the Prophet camped at his residence mourning with Fatima, the only surviving daughter of the prophet, and her husband, Ali.

On the face of it, this dispute was based on the issue of personalities yet it also created a deeper and more immediate factor for the emergence of doctrinal and political views, all with almost divergent positions (Jafri 1989:27). The result of this incident gave birth to

Shi'ism in the remote sense as a religious and political doctrine in Islam. Even though argument has been raised as to any serious study on Shi'ism must of necessity take into account the nature and the composition of the Muslim community which emerged in Madina. This community was neither homogenous in its cultural outlook and traditions nor in its politico-social institutions. This is because; the new community was the result of a unification of different people of divergent cultural backgrounds (Jafri 1989:27). However, this assumption does not eliminate the deep-rooted values and traditions of the people with regard to the position occupied by the Banu Hashim in the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula. Consequently, the inclination of some of the Companions to support Ali as the leader at Saqiffa was a natural consequence of the already existing situation among the Arabs.

The immediate factor which gave rise to Shi'ism as an organized religious and political institution in Islam was the Battle of Siffin and the resulting arbitration between Ali, the fourth Caliph, and Mua'wiya, the Governor of Syria at that time, by a committee of eminent companions from both parties. Shi'ism was not the only doctrine that emerged at Siffin. The battle also gave birth to *Kharijites*, as a group of Muslims who stood on the fence between Shi'at Ah (Ah's party) and Mua'wiya supporters, and declared the two parties as unbelievers.

Originally, those who expressed special devotion and loyalty to Ali in the face of the Battle of Shiffin between Ali and Mua'wiya were known as Shi'at Ali, which simply means Ali's faction or party. However, in the course of time they changed their position from a political allegiance to a religious doctrine. They were therefore known in short as *Shi ah*. Gradually, over a period of three centuries, they formed a splinter group within the Muslim community with a separate religious creed and doctrines. For instance, the Zaidiyya are found mainly in

the Yemen, whereas Isma'iliyya are found within East Africa and India. The Imamiyya, being the largest segment of *Shi'ah* in the world, is mostly found in Iran, southern regions of Iraq and Lebanon, they are also scattered in the Gulf States, Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan (Waines 1995:157).

The Imamiyya brand of Shi'ism is the prevailing Shi'i orientation in Ghana. Therefore, the major focus of this research will be the Imamiyya *Shi'ah*, which is the prevailing Shi'i orientation in Ghana. The next section of this research will focus on the *Shi'ah* Imamiyya doctrine.

6.8.2 The Shi'i Doctrine (The Imamate Doctrine)

It is important to note that the *Shi'ah*, as is the case with any other religious groups, have divisions and sub-sects with different doctrines and beliefs such as Ismailiyya, Zaidiyya, and Imamiyya. The first doctrine of the *Shi'ah* Imamiyya is the concept of Imamate or religious leadership. It is the belief of the Imamiyya that, Allah bestows the prerogative of the Muslim leadership upon a chosen person from the family of the Prophet, who before his death and with the guidance of Allah, transfers the Imamate to another by explicit designation or text (*Nass*) (Jafri 1989:156).

By this doctrine, Imamate is exclusively the preserve of a particular family within the Muslim *Ummah*, which according to the *Shi'ah* is traceable from the Prophet to Ali (his son-in-law), from Ali to Hasan, from Hasan to Hussein up to Ja'far. That is the legacy of the chosen family. The *Shi'ah* are of the view that the number of the Imams is twelve, beginning from Ali b. Abi Talib, the fourth caliph (601-661 A.D) and ending with Muhammad b. Hasan (256-/870) who is known as Al-Mahdi (Rida 1999:32). *Mahdi* simply

means the guidance and the reformer. To the *Shi'ah* the son of Imam Hasan al-Askari was called the Mahdi, because he has disappeared and will reappear later to reform the world from injustice, corruption and oppression.

Inherent in the doctrine of 'special knowledge' (*Nass*) is the scope of the applicability of the term Sacred House (*Ahlul-Bayt*). This was due to the fact that the larger family of the Banu Hashim was claiming ownership of the title, because they are all descendants of one great ancestor, whereas the *Shi'ah* argue that the title is exclusively restricted to the family of Ali and his wife Fatima and their children (Jafri 1989: 290). This is because, to the *Shi'ah*, the leadership of the Muslim *Ummah* would be meaningless unless it is traceable to the person of Ali.

The second important doctrine of Shi'ism is the doctrine of knowledge (*Jim*). This doctrine holds that the Imam is a divinely inspired possessor of a special sum of knowledge of the religion. This type of knowledge is transferable before his death to the next Imam. This in a way makes the Imam an exclusively authoritative source of religious knowledge. It is through him that the masses draw their guidance. This special type of knowledge includes both external (*Zahir*) and the esoteric (*Batin*) meanings of the Qur'an (Jafri 1989: 290).

Another distinguishing doctrine of Shi'ism is the concept of *Taqiya*, which has been translated to mean dissimulation that is a believer can conceal his true religious identity when faced with danger. This concept, according to the *Shi'ah*, allows the believer to protect himself and his religion from the enemies in a situation where there is fear of being humiliated, killed, captured or abused. Also, the *Shi'ah* pays much reverence to the shrines of the Imams. It is recommended that every Shi'i adherent should make at least a visit

(*Ziyara*) in his/her life time to the shrines of the Imams. The essence of the visitation is to show fidelity and loyalty to the Imams (Muzaffar Rida 1999:32). In the light of this history of the doctrine, it is appropriate to survey the background of Shi'ism in Ghana and the nature of its orientation.

6.9 SHI'AH IN THE GHANAIAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY

6.9.1 The Expression of Shi'ism through Shi'i Organisations in Ghana

In Ghana, those who adhere to the teachings of Shi'ism are known as the *Shi'ah*. Their leader is Abdul Salam Abdul Hamid Bansi, the first Ghanaian to be educated in Iran as a *Shi'ah*. The expression of Shi'ism in Ghana could be discerned from the activities of organizations with strong attachment to Shi'i orientation or organizations founded by Ghanaian Muslims with that orientation.

Shi'i expression and orientation take place in the *Shi'ah* Community Mosque, which is located at Mamobi in the Greater Accra region, where they observe and carry out their religious activities. Within this mosque, religious and seminary education takes place for the Muslim youth interested in studying Islam along the *Shi'ah* perspective. In addition, Fatima bintu Zahra Vocational Training Centre is located within this mosque. This centre provides vocational training and Islamic studies to Muslim women in Accra. Educational orientation along the Shi'i line is an integral part of the vocational training at the mosque.

6.9.2 The World Ahlul-Bayt Assembly

The key *Shi'ah* organization in Ghana is the World Ahlul-Bayt Assembly located at Mamobi in Accra. This is the umbrella organization for *Shi'ah Ulama* in Ghana. Through this organization *Da'wa* activities are carried out in the Muslim community. In addition,

monthly allowances to the *Ulama* are paid through this organization. It was established that the religious activities of this organization are barely visible in the Muslim community in flhana ft has, however, been realized that most of its activities are limited to the *Shi'ah* community of believers in Ghana. It was also observed that membership to this organization is mainly made up of comparatively people aged 28 to 37. The educational background of the majority of the members' shows that they are graduates of Islamic senior secondary. This might have therefore affected their ability to embark upon aggressive *Da 'wa* to other *non-Shi'ah* Muslims as they lack experience. In all, the operations of this organisation are limited to the welfare of its members. Nevertheless, it embarks on some *Da 'wa* activities in the community. Lastly, what might have partly discouraged members from aggressive *Da 'wa* is the lack of an audience of the majority of Muslims to listen to their message as a result of the fact that the larger Muslim community has already been assimilated into the *Tijaniyya* and the Ahlus-Sunnah blocs.

6.93 The Imam Hussein Islamic Foundation

The Imam Hussein Islamic Foundation is another organization of the *Shi 'ah* community in Ghana. Abdul Salam Bansi established it in 1989. The aim of this organization is to distribute Islamic literature of *Shi 'ah* orientation to interested Muslims in the community. It also provides other services in the area of students' welfare, especially students' allowances and scholarship within the community.

In recent times, the Foundation has played a limited role in the Muslim community, partly as a result of the establishment of the Iranian Cultural Centre in Ghana which has taken over part of its role. For instance, programmes related to the distribution of *Shi 'ah* literature and the granting of scholarship to Muslim students is no longer the role of the Imam Hussein

Foundation. The Foundation, however, is still instrumental in organizing seminary education for Shi'i students in the *Shi'ah* Central Mosque at Mamobi. In short, the role of the Imam Hussein Foundation is not presently very noticeable in Ghana's Muslim community except within the Shi'i circle and is further limited to Accra.

6.9.4 The Ghana Muslim *Shi'ah* Society

The Ghana Muslim *Shi'ah* Society was founded in 2003. This organization is distinct from other *Shi'all* groups because it projects Shi'ism in the media by using the English language. Abubakar Ahmed Kamaldeen is a founding member. He indicated that the educational background of the founders of most *Shi'ah* organizations in Ghana is from Shi'i seminary and they lack a Western educational background. According to him this makes their contribution to the Muslim community not in tune with current times, since their participation is limited to the traditional Islamic approach to *Da'wa* in the vernacular.

The Ghana Muslim *Shi'ah* Society's members are the exception to this pattern, as they have a secular orientation. This, therefore, makes their participation in the Muslim community very relevant. They rely on modern and sophisticated approaches to *Da'wa*. For instance, they make use of radio and television in their propagation. As they are graduates from tertiary institutions in Ghana they are able to use English as a medium of expression in their *Da'wa*. This enables them to attract a large audience consisting of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The history of this organization suggests that it originated when some young Shi'i wished to present a different kind of image of Shi'ism in Ghana. This was necessary as the youth feel marginalized in the existing Shi'i leadership structure. Members of this new organization, for the moment, play a minimal role in the entire structure of the Shi'i movement in Ghana.

6.9.5 The League of Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Organisations

The League of Ahlul-Bayt Islamic Organization is another organization within a section the *Shi'ah*. Its function is similar to that of the World Ahlul-Bayt Assembly. Abdul Hamid Abdul Salam Bansi is the leader of Shi'ism in Ghana. He was born in 1956 at Tula in Burkina Faso. He received his primary education from his mother who was a learned person on Islam and later studied under his father, who was a religious leader at Tula (Bansi, interview, 13th February 2005). His quest for knowledge led him to travel at the age of 12 years in 1971 to Bawku in the Upper East region of Ghana. There he studied under Mohammed Amin, a physically challenged person.

Bansi for at least two years served his Mallam (a religious teacher in Hausa) from morning to evening while he completed a thorough recitation of the Qur'an. He then left Amin to seek further Islamic knowledge. This search for knowledge made him travel to Nima in Accra in 1974. There he enrolled at the Ansaru-deen Islamic School at Accra New Town for his primary education. In 1977 he enrolled at the Institute of Islamic Studies, the foremost theological institute of the *Wahhabiyya* Movement in Accra for his advanced Islamic studies (Bansi, interview, 13th February 2005). His desire to secure a scholarship to pursue further Islamic studies in the Muslim World after completion from the Institute of Islamic Studies was delayed in 1983, due to a backlog of a considerable number of students who had already completed the studies at the institute. He was therefore engaged as a tutor and an assistant typist to Umar Ibrahim Imam, the present leader of the *Wahhabi* Movement in Ghana. After waiting for some time to secure a scholarship, which was not forthcoming, he decided to embark upon a trip to further his studies outside the country. He made his way through Togo to Benin to Nigeria and then to Niger. He taught for a while at Agades before making his way to Algeria and then to Libya in pursuit of further academic laurels.

In Libya his hopes of being enrolled at the World Islamic Call Society's College were dashed as he could not produce his passport and other relevant documents that were required. He made his way to Egypt with the hope of being admitted to the Al-Azhar University, but to no avail (Bansi, interview, 13th February 2005). Finally, he traveled to Syria where, when he saw some Shi'i *Ulama* preaching publicly he developed an interest in their preaching. Previously he was made to understand through his training at the *Wahhabiyya* Institute at Nima in Accra, that the *Shi'ah* has separate a Qur'an and a different prophet. Nevertheless, after listening to what they had to say he changed his views about them. According to him, he realized that they were not different from other Muslims he had met in his life, other than the fact that they always emphasize the importance of the family and household of the Prophet (Bansi, interview, 13th February 2005).

A Saudi philanthropist in Syria assisted him to study in Iran. He initially settled at Qum, a foremost *Shi'ah* religious learning centre. Interestingly, due to his earlier *Wahhabiyya* orientation he used to argue a great deal with the scholars during the course of his studies. In most cases he was referred to the major sources of Sunni books to disprove his own arguments. According to him, he stayed in Iran for five years until he thoroughly understood what Shi'ism is all about, without being coerced to convert to Shi'ism. He then decided to become a *Shi'ah* on his own volition (Bansi, interview, 13th February 2005). Quite apart from being thoroughly educated in Shi'ism, he also read a lot about philosophy, logic, jurisprudence, and grammar, that in a way broadened his perceptions of and relationship with other religious groups.

He intimated that before his trip to Iran he used to regard other Muslims who are not Ahlus-Sunnah (*Wahhabiyya*) as not proper Muslims who must not be tolerated. Nevertheless,

following the education he acquired in Iran he realized that his notion about Islam was wrong. To Abdul Salam there are certain general principles of Islam that every true Muslims must practice, such as the performance of prayers, fasting, performance of Hajj, but beyond that there are minor areas of difference which to him do not make such people non-Muslims (Bansi, interview, 13th February 2005).

He claims that upon his return to Ghana in 1988 he became a strange person within the community, because he was the only Ghanaian Muslim *Shi'ah* at that time. In other words, his own family, virtually ex-communicated him, and the larger Muslim community rejected him. Nevertheless, this did not deter him from making his way and proclaiming Shi'ism in the community. He established the first *Shi'ah* Islamic non-governmental organization in the community known as the Imam Hussein Islamic Foundation at Nima, in Accra. Through this organization much Islamic literature of Shi'i orientation were distributed before he embarked upon open propagation. The proprietor or the landlord of the building in which the Foundation was established later on sacked him due to pressure put on him by some *Wahhabiyya Ulama* on the grounds that he was harbouring an infidel (*Kafir*), and anybody doing that is a sinner. Nevertheless, the timely intervention of Kamaldeen Ahmed, the present National Deputy Chief Imam of Ghana who is a *Tijaniyya* by background saved Bansi's organization from collapse by offering his residence to be used as an office for it and the *Shi'ah* community (Bansi, interview, 13th February 2005). At present, the *Shi'ah* community is growing gradually to the extent that Shi'ites are spread in all parts of Ghana.

610 DISTINCTIVE TEACHINGS OF *SHI'AH* IN GHANA

It must be emphasized that the *Shi'ah* community in Ghana is not necessary different from the *Shi'ah* in Iran, the homeland and place of origin of the Ghanaian *Shi'ah*, in terms of

their emphasis on what the leadership deems to be significant and important. It is also an acceptable fact that the Ghanaian *Shi'ah* might be operating from a different socio-cultural level as opposed to any *Shi 'ah* group in other countries. There are yet some specific areas that Ghanaian *Shi ah* might be emphasizing in their teachings. Some of the areas that Ghanaian *Shi ah* put emphasis on are:

1. The first difference found in the *Shi 'ah* community as against other groups in Ghana deals with the interpretation of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet. This is because members sometimes question the authenticity of the interpretation of certain Quranic verses and the traditions of the Prophet. At some point they emphasize certain Qur'anic verses and traditions and reject others they deem unnecessary or which fall below their standards.
2. They also emphasize the reverence of the household of the Prophet (*Ahlul Bayht*). Emanating from this is the fact that they perceive the household of the Prophet as the best role model for every Muslim. Prominent among the household of the Prophet are the 12 Imams, starting from Ali to Muhammad b. Bakr.
3. They also prefer placing their forehead on bare sand or on a special stone on the ground when praying in case the spot is cemented or decorated inappropriately.
4. They insist on interpreting the true meaning of the concept of predestination. To the *Shi 'ah* predestination does not necessary mean that Allah has predestined what will happen to everybody, but has to do with Allah's giving every human the free choice to do whatever he/she desires without being impeded. Therefore everybody would be judged according to his choice of action (Bansi, interview, 13th February 2005).

In conclusion, the Islamic resurgence of Shi'ism as backed by the Iranian Government did not make any considerable impact on the life of the Muslims in Ghana as it could be said

was the case with the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Tijaniyya* sects in Ghana. This is attributable to their late coming to the Ghanaian Muslim religious terrain. This might also well be due to the nature of the membership of the Shi'i sect in Ghana which is mainly made up of young people. This shows that the members have not matured religiously, as compared to the *Tijaniyya* and Ahlus-Sunnah followers, to engage in any serious *D'wa* activities. The inactivity of the organization was as a result of the centralization of Shi'i religious and political activities within the Iranian Cultural Consulate in Ghana, where most religious and political activities are being conducted under the aegis of the Cultural Centre.

It can also be seen that Abdul Salam Bansi's embrace of the Shi'i was coincidental, as it was not Shi'ism which ultimately endeared him to study in Iran as further study was his aim, not necessarily the adoption of Shi'ism. This is evident from the fact that he made visits to Algeria, Libya, Egypt and finally to Syria where he was assisted by a Muslim philanthropist to study in Iran.

6.11 THE THIRD UNIVERSAL THEORY OF *THE GREEN BOOK* AND GHANAIAN MUSLIMS

The Libyan leader Muammar al-Gadhafi who came to power in 1969 put forward the ideas contained in *The Green Book*, which was first published in 1975. The revolution which he led toppled King Idriss, a descendant of the founder of the Sanusiyya sect in Islam. It is known as the Al-Fateh September Revolution, which literally means the 'opener' or conqueror. To Al-Gadhafi, the revolution signified the opening or ushering in of a new era. By implication, it means the conquering of backwardness, ignorance, national impotence and poverty (Ayoub 1987: 17). The *Al-Fateh* Libyan Revolution emphasized religious freedom and the moral values as contained in the Quran, and a promise to defend and

uphold the religious values of the Libyan and Muslim *Ummah* as a whole (Ayoub 1987:

Al-Gadhafi's political theory, the Third Universal Theory (TUT), is disseminated in *The Green Book*. This new socio-political theory of the Libyan Government was enunciated to give a new direction to the nation. The content of *The Green Book* is a revolutionary. This philosophy is known as the Third Universal Theory because it attempts to provide solutions to the world's myriad socio-political and economic problems following the alleged failure of previous theories such as the Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's *Communist Manifesto* and the envisaged failure of Capitalism. The book is divided into three important chapters, namely, political, economic, and social. It is necessary to highlight some essential principles of the Third Universal Theory in order to better understand its teachings.

6.11.1 Teachings of *The Green Book*

The book identifies the instruments of government as being among the major problems confronting humankind. The book further contends that all political systems in the world today are products of the struggle for power between the different instruments of government. The struggle may be peaceful or armed as evidenced among classes, sects, tribes, parties or individuals. It therefore concludes that *The Green Book* presents the ultimate solution to the contemporary problems that humankind is facing (Gadhafi: 1980:5).

The political perspective of the book is premised on the popular participation of the citizenry on matters affecting them as against the representation system. It therefore argues that 'the party is the rule of a part over the whole' (Gadhafi: 1980:5). Therefore, it contends

that the party system creates division in the society and as a means of creating opportunities for party cronies at the expense of the larger members of the society.

It also argues against the parliamentary system of government regarding it as a 'misrepresentation of the people' (Gadhafi: 1980: 17). The book further calls for the direct participation of all citizens in political matters affecting them (Gadhafi: 1980:9). It emphatically stresses that 'no representation in lieu of the people, that representation is a falsification of democracy and the party system aborts democracy' (Gadhafi: 1980: 5).

On the economy and the production system, it regards both the Marxist and the Capitalist models as being exploitative of workers. The book therefore proposes a new form of society in which the resources of the nation are shared equitably, with a view to ensuring justice and fairness in the society. This, it believes, will free humanity from all forms of bondage and servitude. The central argument of the book in respect of an economic system is that the TUT is a theory of liberation of needs in order to emancipate the masses. It contends that: those who produce, consume, are wage earners (however improved their wages may be) are all slaves of a kind with a view to improving the lot of impoverished workers it calls for the abolition of the wage-system and the reversion to principles of the natural.

In addition, the book emphasizes that natural socialism is a product of natural rules. It insisted that the terms 'workers', 'labourers' and 'toilers' in reference to those who carry out production at the workplace are deceptive and obsolete. They could however be replaced by the term 'producers', because workers, etc are undergoing qualitative and quantitative changes because of technological advancement.

It identifies the major problem inhibiting human liberation, which is lacking. That is people's needs must not be controlled by others since this can eventually lead to enslavement, thereby creating opportunities for exploitation. It emphasizes that an income is an imperative need for man. It argues that this should not be in the form of wages or charity from any person. The book also addresses the issue of transportation. It argued that it should not be in the hand of private persons for renting to others or to be able to control the needs of others (Gadhafi: 1980: 15). Housing as an essential need of humans and problems associated with it has also been recognized. In line with its philosophy it advocates the provision of housing facilities for the citizenry.

The book also deals with the problem of domestic servants, which it rejects and regards its perpetuation as a form of modern day slavery. The book heralds the emancipation of people from the fetters of injustice, despotism, exploitation and economic and political hegemony in order to establish a true society free from all forms of discrimination and exploitation. It therefore calls for the households to be serviced by their inhabitants in order to eliminate the need for domestic servants (Gadhafi: 1980: 17).

The social basis of the TUT is intertwined with the national factor which constitutes "the dynamic force of human history'. The book further sees the relationship between heroes who have struggled and sacrificed for the sake of others and the relationship they maintained with those people who are 'the others'. It therefore establishes relationships between social and national causes.

The religious basis of the Third Universal Theory was explained in terms of the social factor. It argues that the religious factor is a rival to the social factor in influencing the unity

of one group. It may divide the national group or unite groups with different nationalism. It further acknowledges that the social factor would eventually triumph as has been the nature of humankind throughout the ages (Gadhafi: 1980: 18).

The book identifies religion as an inevitable and natural factor in mankind's endeavor in life and stresses that originally and historically each nation had a religion which was harmonious. The book posited a logical framework for humankind's religious foundation and emphasizes that the sound rule was that each nation should have a religion. For it to be otherwise is abnormal. Such an abnormality creates an unsound situation, which becomes a real cause for disputes within one national group (Gadhafi: 1980: 18). It further sees the link between mankind's religiosity and its conformity with the natural law which is an homogenous one, 'that is each nation has one religion¹. It therefore concludes that, when the social factor is compatible with the religious factor, harmony prevails and the life of communities becomes stable and strong and develops soundly.

The emphasis of the family in *The Green Book* distinguishes it from other political theories, since it acknowledges the family as the cradle, the origin of mankind, and the social umbrella. It calls for the proper protection of family lineage and values which it regarded as the basis of human society due to its ripple effect on the nation as a whole.

Perhaps, the area that *The Green Book* excelled itself in its teaching is its concern for women and matters relating to them. It is the contention of the book that man and woman are both human beings with the same needs, desires, and behavioural tendencies. Therefore, discrimination against either one of them is flagrant act of oppression without any basis. It identifies "the natural role that women play in terms of motherhood in the society and thus

calls for the need for children to be raised by their mothers in a family, where the true principles of motherhood, fatherhood, and fraternity prevail ” (Gadhafi: 1980: 106).

In the estimation of the book, raising children in a nursery is unnatural and affront to the natural practice of bringing up a child in the society. This in a way deprives the children of the true family and societal values that they deserve. It however makes exceptions in respect of the upbringing of orphans and destitute children. In this regard, the book calls for the societal leadership to give protection and guardianship to the underprivileged by establishing nurseries and related institutions.

6.11.2 The Shari’ah and *The Green Book* Principles

The compatibility of the TUT with aspect of the Shari’ah principles cannot be underestimated. This is because in the general understanding of many scholars of the (TUT) most of the TUT principles are compatible and in harmony with the Shari’ah teachings. It must, however, be acknowledged that the book did not lay any claim as to the superiority of any one particular religion over another. It rather espouses general principles that could be found in almost every religion, Islam being no exception.

For instance, the fact that it acknowledges the pivotal role of religion in eradicating vices and curbing the materialistic tendencies of mankind indicates the intention of the author of *The Green Book* to propose a different political concept with a blend of religion, with humanistic values underpinning it. This approach of the book therefore falls in line with the Shari’ah’s teachings and values, which call for social responsibility and fellow feeling, irrespective of religious affiliation or political, racial and geographical boundaries or on tribal or ethnic grounds. It was in the line with this that Abdullah Z. Abu Muammar argued

that the Libyan people's revolution, which gave birth to the Third Universal Theory, had three distinct aims in mind

(a) to bring about the basis of Qur'anic principles in the Libyan people's life,

(b) to put into practice the Qur'anic teachings as enshrined in *The Green Book* aimed at bringing happiness to humankind both on this earth and in the hereafter, and lastly

(c) to bring about equality among humankind (Abu Zaidan 1984: 9).

Importantly, it has further been argued that the ethos of the *Green Book* was defined by commitment to Islamically based socialist program (Voll, 1994:287). The basis of the Third Universal Theory on Shari'ah principles could be categorized into political, economic, and social.

6.11.3 Political Basis of the TUT in the Shari'ah

Politically, Mustafa A. Mahmoud argued that al-Gadhafi has always insisted that his Third Universal Theory is a common-sense interpretation of Islam (Ayoub: 1987:27). This is because the first part of *The Green Book* is an interpretation of one single verse of the Holy Quran 'and their affairs are decided through consultation (*Shura*) among themselves.

The concept of *Shura* has occupied a special place in every Islamic political discourse. Consequently, it was given a practical meaning in the nature and content of the Third Universal Theory through the Libyan Muslim life. Therefore, the concept was interpreted through its direct bearing on the citizenry's participation in political issues affecting them. This direct participation is in contrast to the situation in a representative democracy. Therefore, according to the philosophic basis of the TUT, representation has never been an effective means of obtaining the best feedback from the people.

It must nevertheless be acknowledged that the concept of *Shura* provides a variety of interpretations within the Islamic political discourse. It could be the direct involvement of the citizenry in the deliberation of issues affecting them as is the case in Libya. On the other hand, in certain places such as Iran its interpretation could be seen in an indirect approach through delegated authority by the citizenry to their representatives and ‘the Mullahs’.

Perhaps, al-Gadhafi has been motivated to propound his political theory of *Shura* by his religious conviction that man is the vicegerent of God on earth. This gives him/her an unquestioning privilege and access to approach his Maker without any intercession or intermediary. The corollary of this, therefore, is the argument that a citizen should be given a similar chance and opportunity to determine issues that have a direct bearing on his/her life on this earth. This is in line with the prophetic model and teachings in which the Prophet dealt with all without recourse to intermediaries.

The putting into practice of the *Shura* concept manifested itself in the life of Libyan people through the direct participation of the citizenry in governance through people’s congresses and committees. This subsequently gives the leader the popular authority and the political will to champion the aspirations of the masses as reflected in their wishes and recommendations.

6.11.4 The Economic Basis of the TUT in the Shari’ah

One aspect of the economic teachings of *The Green Book* that is relevant to the Shari'a is the employee-employer relationship. Perhaps the author of *The Green Book* was motivated by his religious conviction to advocate for an equitable and a fair system of remuneration **and** reward at the workplace. As a starting point, the concept of workers as wage earners

created the perception that workers are slaves in the workplace, which Islam unreservedly condemns. In addressing this shortfall at workplaces, al-Gadhafi insists that workers should be recognized as partners at workplaces, since their role is indispensable. This recognition of workers as partners is in conformity with the Shari'ah, which emphasizes an equality of every human being and expects fair treatment of everybody whether in the workplace or anywhere else. This philosophy emancipates workers who were under the bondage of their employers. It also helps in doing away with the emergence of classes in the workplaces with its concomitant negative effects on the larger society. This is in total conformity with the Shari'ah principle of natural justice and the equal treatment of all people.

The distribution of workplace output was another principle of *The Green Book's* which conforms to the Shari'ah. Here the author looks at the factors determining economic production, which he argues consists of the raw materials, the means of production, and the producer. The author therefore insisted that the natural rule of equality requires that each of these components receive a fair share of the output. This means that each group within the components of production must receive an equal share based on their input. The significance of this principle to the Shari'a is embedded on the fact that it eliminates any attempt of exploitation and cheating on the part of the employer and also results in higher productivity on the part of the workers since they are motivated to achieve their best for the higher return.

This principle of the TUT could well be explained under the Islamic Shari'ah concept of partnership between capital and labour. It is argued that the Shari'a lays down the condition that in such a partnership, which is called *al-mudariba* or *al-qirad*, two or three parties are entitled to share the profits and loss, if any (Qaradawi 1994: 273). With this economic basis

of the Third Universal Theory in mind, the Shari'ah principles have been well conceptualized in *The Green Book*.

6.11.5 The Social Basis of the TUT in the Shari'ah

The social basis of the TUT identifies the family, the tribe, the nation, women, minorities, black people and education as its major components. It lays emphasis on upholding and defending their interests in the society. Largely, these teachings have their basis in the Shari'ah rules. For instance, the book's position on family holds that the flourishing society is one in which the individual grows naturally within the family and the family grows correspondingly in the society. The book therefore advocates the family as the central focus in the upbringing of children in order to give the society the best in human development. This principle has its basis in the Shari'ah, which calls for responsibility within the family. The responsibility for the proper upbringing of the family according to the Shari'ah rests with the head of the family, the father. Islam argues that the nature of the family's upbringing would determine the extent of success of the entire family. It was with regard to this that the Prophet for ever said that, everybody is accountable for his stewardship and the head of the family is a shepherd and shall account for his stewardship. Islam therefore tied the success of the family in the mundane world to success in the hereafter.

Again, the philosophic basis of the tribe in the TUT which is relevant to the Shari'ah principle is reflected on the need to maximize human values such as unity, intimacy, and love. The bases of these values in the Shari'ah have to do with the fact that they bind the social structure of the human race and give true meaning to being a human, which Islam advocates. Even though Islam discourages Muslims to abandon their tribal and family ties as a result of differences in religious affiliations, it also condemns ethnocentric and

tribalistic tendencies. This is evident in Allah's proclamation that He has created mankind in tribes and nations as a mark of distinction among humankind.

The TUT understands the nation as a social structure whose bond is nationalism. The basis of this argument stems from the fact that the unity of the nation is strengthened by patriotism. This view is not far from the Islamic position as to the ingredient of building a nation which derives its strength on the extent of unity among the citizens within a particular state. It was on the basis of this that the Prophet declared that 'the love of a nation is a constituent of a believer's faith in Islam. It is therefore expected that a believer demonstrates the extent of his commitment to his nation through nationalism and patriotism, which promotes social and political unity. The Shari'ah also expects that a citizen upholds the values which underpins the nation's advancement as also expounded by the TUT.

The philosophic basis of the TUT on women is manifold since it identifies the unique identity of women. For instance, it begins by positing a logical argument on the necessity for women in society. It argues that the rationale behind the creation of two opposite sexes in the society is underscored by the uniquely different roles that each sex plays.. It therefore argues that the role of women in society is indispensable and irreplaceable. In other words, the book stresses the unique role of women in the society, one which men cannot play. These roles pertain to the biological and maternal uniqueness of women. This makes women the basis and the foundation of human society. It therefore emphasizes that, the woman as a mother is one of her greatest roles in the society. This view has as its basis the Shan ah where the Prophet is reported to have said that the gate of heaven or paradise is under the feet of mothers and people must seek the entrance of paradise through their mothers. Consequently, the Prophet identified serving the parents as one of the greatest

forms of Jihad. This is partly because of the importance of the parental role in the rearing of a child.

The book's social perspective on the rearing of children and their welfare emphasizes that they should be raised by their mothers in a family. It also argues that true and natural motherhood, fatherhood, and fraternity prevail in a familial setting. This basis certainly creates the natural environment for the proper upbringing of the child and links the child to its maternal and paternal origin. On the other hand, as explained earlier, the book also made provision for societal guardian for children who do not have parents. These provisions have their basis in the Islamic Shari'ah of social responsibility and solidarity and perhaps also from the Islamic concept of child adoption. Accordingly, the Prophet once said 'I and the one, who raises an orphan, will be like these two in the Garden'.

The concern over the rights of minorities in a society was addressed by the TUT. It argues that the rights of the minority as to political and economic problems could be addressed in any society with well-entrenched values enforced by the masses in the political setting. Islamically, the concept of *Dhimmi* in reference to any minority within an Islamic state provides the best basis for this scenario. The *Dhimmi* enjoys every right and responsibility like any ordinary person within an Islamic political setting. They are therefore citizens of an Islamic state like anybody else, despite their minority status. It was in the light of this that the Prophet emphasized the need for the protection of the *Dhimmi* within the Islamic state. He said 'Whoever hurts a *Dhimmi*, I am his adversary, and I shall be an adversary for him on the day of resurrection'.

In conclusion, the major social components of the TUT are in line with the general principles of human development in society. These principles could also be contextualized according to the basis of the Shari'ah principles and teachings.

The Green Book from being a transnational politico-religious concept of the Libyan leader's remedy to the myriad problems of the Third World was embraced by the political and religious environment of Ghana. The next section of this study will attempt to explain how and why this happened and identify the mechanism that was used to spread the TUT ideas in Ghana and the principal personalities involved in this.

6.12 THE GREEN BOOK AND THE GHANAIAN COMMUNITY

The Third Universal Theory as contained in *The Green Book* made its way into Ghanaian society in 1982 through Abdulai Alhassan, a former Member of Parliament during the Third Republic of Ghana for the Popular Front Party (PFP) from the Gushegu constituency in the Northern region. According to him, the refusal of Ghanaian authorities to allow the national football team the Black Stars to participate in the African Cup of Nation tournament in Libya in 1982 initially provided the conduit through which he interacted with Libyan authorities (Abdulai, interview, 25th March 2005). The refusal by the Ghanaian authorities to participate in the Cup of Nation Tournament was due to Ghana's suspicion that Libya was involved in internal political issues in Ghana (St John 1988:131)

Consequently, some Ghanaian *Du al* who had been trained in Libya requested Abdulai Alhassan to use his influence in Parliament to convince the Government to participate in the tournament. Several examples of Libyan involvement in the developments of African Muslim communities in various fields such as education, health, and agriculture were cited

by these scholars. They farther argued that Ghana's refusal to participate in the competition would affect the development of the Muslim community in Ghana as the Libyan-assisted development projects could be cancelled (Abdulai, Interview, 25th March 2005).

Alhassan indicated that he was moved by the concerns expressed by the Muslim scholars. He was also aware that Libya, as a Muslim country, must be supported by other Muslims in this kind of situation. He addressed a press conference at the then Parliament House, urging the Government to send the national team to Libya for the tournament. Immediately after the press conference there were discussions on the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation's television and radio stations. These were, however, not broadcast since the press conference statement did not agree with the Government's position (Abdulai, Interview, 25th March 2005). In the end, the government was pressurized by the public as a result of the press conference into agreeing to the national team's participation in the tournament. The Black Stars of course, won the tournament that year.

Alhassan indicated that during the revolution of 31 December 1982, he went into a self-imposed exile to Togo for his own personal security. By early 1983 the Libyan Bureau or Embassy was reopened in Ghana. Consequently, the Libyan Ambassador was asked by the Libyan Government to look for him. He returned to Ghana in August 1983 through the influence of the Libyan Government (Abdulai, Interview, 25th March 2005). When he met the Ambassador, he was informed that the Libyan Government wanted to open a centre in Ghana for the study of *The Green Book*. He agreed to assist in establishing the study centre. He was later assisted by the late Abdullah Botchwey, Ibrahim Adai, among others (Abdulai, Interview, 25* March 2005).

6.12.1 Activities Related to *the Green Book* in Ghana

After being thoroughly briefed by the Libyan Ambassador Alhassan embarked upon grassroots mobilization of members, including the academics to join the study centre. In the process, workshops and seminars were organized to educate people in the Ghanaian community on the relevance of the Third Universal Theory.

Alhassan's involvement in the propagation of the Third Universal Theory (TUT) in Ghana attracted some people in the academia who developed a keen interest in the ideas and the practicability of the principles of the (TUT) as contained in the Green Book. It is of interest to note that not less than twenty-two (22) intellectuals and scholars of diverse religious, political, and social background were involved. The majority of these intellectuals were from academic institutions, especially the University of Ghana and the Cape Coast University. Their meetings were held at either one of the two universities. Through these meetings the principles contained in *The Green Book* resulted in the writing and compilation of twenty-seven articles in a 278 pages book addressed which various topics and subjects, including political, economic and educational issues. The editors of the book were G.K Nukunya and Tom Kumekpor.

Nukunya, for instance, indicated in his conclusion in an article on 'The Third Universal Theory and the Vision of a Just Well Ordered Society' 'that some issues raised in *The Green Book* relating to the instrument of governing, housing, wages and transportation gave proof of a sound and desirable basis on the practicality of implementation of *The Green Book* in the society (Nukunya 1990:45). Another Ghanaian scholar who studied the book thoroughly and dissected its usefulness to the society regardless of its race, color, and geographic boundaries was Kwakuvi Azasu, a lecturer at the University of Education,

Winneba. He is currently the Director of Research, Documentation, and Doctrines of Africana Mission in Ghana. He indicated that he was motivated to write a commentary on the principles of *The Green Book* because he was born during the time of Nkrumah who pursued one of the most socialist-friendly policies in Africa. Some of them were educated, thanks to the socialist policies of Nkrumah and are now making meaningful and positive contributions to the nation in various fields.

Azasu felt, after a thorough examination of its principles, that he was morally bound, to see a similar policy to Libya's being pursued everywhere. He came to the conclusion that al-Gadhafi's (TUT) was almost a replica of the socialist policies that Nkrumah pursued while he was in power. He felt that without these policies some Ghanaians would not have achieved what they have today. According to him it is Nkrumah who pursued one of the best socialist policies in Africa and now al-Gadhafi who is following a similar path. This can be seen in the fact that, unlimited chances and opportunities have been created for Libyans (Azasu, interview, 6th January 2005).

The other motivating factor, which influenced Azasu to write about *The Green Book*, was Gadhafi's concern for social values in society. In the book, Gadhafi emphasizes the need for the maintenance of religious values in every society. Azasu commented that the book calls for a respect of traditional and religious values and that it is this that makes it unique and distinct from other political theories. Therefore, the point of convergence between Azasu and Qadhafi is the view that everyone should practice his/her religion based on his ancestral and cultural background, which, as stipulated in the book, is the basis of natural law (Azasu interview, 6th January 2005). He emphasized that the ideals and the practicability of *The Green Book's* principles are timeless and have no, geographic or racial

boundary. Azasu therefore recommends the book to the Western politicians so that they can compare its policies with the political, social and economic values of the West in order to determine the values that are best for mankind in general. As to the relevance of the book to contemporary society he indicated that the book calls for selflessness and the concern for all. In other words, it represents the true picture of human face because it calls for social responsibility for all (Azasu, interview, 6th January 2005).

Another figure who has been religiously influenced by the values of *The Green Book* is Yushau Tahiiu Kuta. He travelled to Libya in 1972. He was enrolled initially at the Institute of Islamic Research and then at Qar Yunus University in Benghazi where he read law for four years. After the completion of his university studies he practiced law for some time and then practiced as a teacher in the employment of the the World Islamic Call Society. As part of his teaching assignment with the World Call Islamic Society he was sent to Tanzania for six years as a principal of the Kibruhihi Islamic School. He returned to Ghana in 1993 and was employed as a tutor by the Libyan Arab Cultural Centre for the Libyan students in Ghana. At this Centre, he taught sociology and civic education, as well as the tenets outlined in *The Green Book* for eleven years (Yushau, interview, 13th March 2005).

According to Yushau, *The Green Book* is taught at Libyan universities and colleges. As part of the process of making the teaching of the book in Libya relevant, it is made compulsory in all tertiary institutions in Libya. In addition, during the teaching process there are practical demonstrations as to the relevance of the book in students' life. During these students are divided into committees based on the principles contained in *The Green Book*. According to him this is done in order to provide the students with a practical insight before they complete their studies and are faced with real life situations.

Every examination paper is written within the universities' and colleges' premises except for the subject dealing with *The Green Book* which are written in the army barracks, with the army commanders supervising the practical demonstration of the teachings contained in it. Yushau intimated that this is done to instill a high sense of commitment and discipline among the students. In addition, the method of dispatching students to the barracks is not limited to the Libyan students alone but includes the foreign students who are studying in Libya. The implication of this procedure is that it has a ripple effect on the outside world, because on completion of these foreign students' studies at Libyan tertiary educational institutions they would have been imbued with the ideas and principles of *The Green Book*. Upon their return to their countries it is possible for them to make a considerable impact on their home countries as a result of the training they acquired on the values contained in the book (Yushau, interview, 13th March 2005).

He expressed his personal view on the practicality of implementing in Libya the principles of *The Green Book*. For instance, he claims that everybody in Libya has the right to participate in discussions on issues affecting them whether political, social or economic through the concept of the People Assembly. Of particular significance to him during his stay in Libya was the impact of the book on economic life there. He categorized some of the areas that the teachings contained in the book have influenced people's life in Libya. To begin with, the economic values as enshrined in *The Green Book* have prohibited cheating, exploitation, and extortion among other economic crimes. Workers get paid, according to a calculation based on their input every month.

As to the book's impact on the lives of women, Yushau intimated that hitherto it used to be the men who controlled market activities in Libya but with the introduction of *The Green*

Book the situation changed. This resulted in the women competing with the men in the market. A similar situation has arisen in respect of the involvement of women in almost every sphere of the Libyan economy. Perhaps the area in which *The Green Book* really affected the life of Libyans is those which affect women. To Yushau, the book's principles as enunciated on women have brought about a total liberation of women in various ways. He gave examples of women holding key positions in the army, the police, and the prison services etc, these instances being the first of their kind in the Arab world (Yushau, interview, 13th March 2005). According to Yushau, Qaddafi used to tell Libyan women that 'when you were not given military training, the Italians came, killed your husbands, maimed, and raped you'.

As regards *The Green Book's* impact on Islam, it is interesting to note that problems regarding religious leadership in Libya as they existed before the introduction of *The Green Book* has been eliminated due to the fact that it is Qaddafi's conviction that to allow some people to interpret Islam on behalf of others is tantamount to allowing them to impose their personal view on others. This to him is highly unfair (Yushau, interview, 13th March 2005). Qaddafi's understanding is that everybody has the right to discuss and speak on every issue affecting him/her and, further, that Islam is not the exclusive prerogative of any chosen people. This would therefore make every Muslim to learn the religion and understand it properly. He further identified certain social vices that are not in conformity with Islam addressed by the Libyan authorities. Issues such as gambling, intoxication and prostitution were all forbidden by them. This view is also supported by other studies, which argued that by banning intoxication beverages, gambling, and night clubs it shows how the Libyan regime was fundamentalist with its insistence of Quranic rules (Voll 1994: 289).

What has been the impact of *The Green Book* on Ghanaian Muslims? Which sphere of Ghanaian life is it that the book has mostly impacted? The next section of this study will attempt to answer that.

6.13 THE IMPACT OF *THE GREEN BOOK* ON GHANAIS

The impact of *The Green Book* on the Ghanaian society could be viewed in diverse ways; particularly in the domain of politics. For instance, Nukunya indicated that he was motivated into active participation in the activities of *The Green Book* because of its lofty political teachings. Consequently, he and other colleagues in the academia made a trip to Libya to understudy the practical application of the Green Book.

Upon their return to Ghana, they promoted in public debate on aspects of *The Green Book*. The fruit of this debate resulted in the adoption in the Ghanaian political democratic dispensation of the unit committees and district assembly concept. The then military government of Rawlings adopted the principles of *The Green Book* under the People Defense Committees (PDC), which allows for mass participation of the citizenry in governance. These have been given different names in the current constitutional dispensation namely the Unit Committees, and the District Assembly.

The promotion and facilitation of debate on the TUT was without any opposition from some sections of the public. Generally, the major argument was that the TUT was an Islamically motivated political theory devised by the Libyan leader to spread Islam in disguise. Therefore, to accept aspects of its teachings in the Ghanaian political landscape is to tolerate the infusion of Islamic culture into Ghana (Nukunya, interview). Nevertheless, such a view did not deter the facilitators of the TUT to push further for debate on its relevance.

One other way of viewing the impact of *The Green Book* on Ghanaian politicians is by reviewing what happened in the early days of the revolution. This could be seen in the officials who adopted the socialist policies in the early part of the revolutionary years. Hunwick argued that what endeared TUT to Rawlings and Thomas Sankara was its revolutionary or socialist orientated nature as contained in the book (Hunwick 1996:41).

Further evidence as to the influence of *The Green Book* on Ghanaian Muslims can be seen among the *Ulama* who have studied in Libya. These *Ulama* are Sunni by religious orientation; however, politically they are socialist. This is manifested in the way they interact with others in the Muslim community in Ghana. Also, the socialist orientation of these *Ulama* can be seen in the way they teach their students in Islamic institutions of Ghana.

This research reveals that the Islamic resurgence as championed and supported by the Libyan Government through the Third Universal Theory (TUT) mostly affected Ghanaians politically. This view is evident in the nature of participation in *The Green Book's* activities in Ghana which was limited to the academia. Perhaps the nature of the teachings of the book has necessitated such approach. This situation, therefore, resulted in the influence of *The Green Book* on the larger Muslim community being minimal. It was also found that the resources of many politicians, academics and the Muslim *Ulama* were used to spread the TUT values in Ghana. This is contrary to the outcome of other studies that, the impact of Libya's foreign policies through the TUT in Sub-Saharan Africa has not persuaded other progressive regimes and government to adopt its principles (Joffe' 1988:50). This view is based on generalization and lacks country-specific dissection of the impact of Libya's foreign policy as in the case of Ghana. The Al-Fateh Revolution gave Gadhafi a religious

mandate as he presented himself as both Libya's political and religious leader and eventually proclaimed himself Muslim world leader (*Thaa 'ir Muslim*). This was done purely to project himself in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the activities of the World Islamic Call Society in Ghana also fostered and facilitated the religious interplay between r.hanaian Muslims and the Libyan Government in championing the Islamic resurgence in the Muslim communities of Ghana through seminars and international conferences. This Libyan organization epitomized the teachings of the TUT for and projected them at the Ghanaian Muslim community.

6.14 THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN MUSLIM SECTS IN GHANA

'Interplay' is used in this section to refer to the factors fostering positive relations and friction among Muslim sects and groups in Ghana. These factors range from theological, ideological, social, to the political conditions. The main aim of this section is to identify how Ghanaian Muslims' transnational relations with the outside Islamic world promote positive relations among Muslim sects or otherwise.

The known Islamic sects and groups in Ghana are the *Tijaniyya*, the Ahlus-Sunnah (*Wahhabiyya*), the *Shi 'ah*, the Ahmadiyya, and the orthodox¹ Muslims. The focus of this study will, however, be limited to the *Tijaniyya*, Ahlus-Sunnah, and *Shi 'ah*, since they fall within the purview of the thesis. The theological and ideological, social and global political effects of these sects will be examined.

In respect of the origin of these Islamic orientations, it is worth noting that the *Tijaniyya* and the Ahlus-Sunnah fall within the Sunni School of Thought. Even though the *Tijaniyya*

¹ Orthodox in this section is used to denote Muslims who are non-sectarians but rather regard themselves as belonging to the mainstream Islam.

mysticism could be traced to mainstream Sufism, the orientation of the founder of the sect, Ahmad Tijani, has a direct connection with the Maliki School of Thought. Similarly, the Ahlus-Sunnah also derives its Islamic exposition from the Hanbali Islamic persuasion of the Sunni School of Thought. On the other hand, the Shi'i sect represents a different Islamic persuasion in relation to the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Tijaniyya*, since it falls outside the purview of the Sunni School of Thought.

Theologically, both the *Tijaniyya* and the *Shi'ah* hold similar doctrinal notions. This in the end promotes affinity and a ground of convergence of doctrinal debate in Ghana between the *Tijaniyya* and the *Shi'ah* on one hand and the Ahlus-Sunnah on the other. These similarities in doctrinal orientation between the *Tijaniyya* and the *Shi'ah* include the concept of intercession of the Prophet, in which both sects believe that the Prophet, despite his death, could intercede on behalf of those who seek divine intervention through him (Tijani n.d:137). Other areas of doctrinal convergence between the *Tijaniyya* and the *Shi'ah* include high regard for saints and some religious personalities, as well as reverence to the descendants of religious figures (Tijani n.d: 137). The two sects also believe that the Prophet and the saints are infallible. Seeking blessing through sacrifice is another tradition practiced by both sects. In one sense, the similarities in doctrinal values foster positive sectarian relations between the two sects in Ghana and at the same time pit them against any sect which attacks any of these commonly held values.

An aspect of the social concord between Shi'ism and the *Tijaniyya* sects was partly facilitated by the Iranian establishments in Ghana. The Iranian Cultural Consulate has facilitated good relations between the two sects by highlighting the major commonalities between them. Among some of the activities of the Cultural Consulate which promote

hannonious relations with the *Tijaniyya* sect in Ghana include the celebrations of the Maulid of Imam Ali, Fatima Zahra, Imam Rida, Jaffar Sadeq, and the anniversary of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the Ashura (the martyrdom of Imam Hussein). The Consulate also organizes refresher courses for the *Tijaniyya Ulama* on their roles as Imams. The activities of the Cultural Consulate in Ghana have been largely patronized by the larger *Tijaniyya Ulama* and the Muslims chiefs who are invariably *Tijaniyya* by orientation. This, therefore, shows the role of transnational Muslim institutions in promoting positive relations among a section of Muslims in Ghana.

Notwithstanding these doctrinal commonalities between the *Tijaniyya* and the *Shi 'ah* sects, the most contentious issue that sometimes drives the *Tijaniyya* away from the *Shi ah*, however, is the *Shi 'ah's* frequent attacks on the integrity of the first three caliphs of Islam, namely Abubakar, Umar, and Uthman. This attack by the *Shi 'ah* group manifests itself in the total vilification and repudiation of the legitimacy of these three Caliphs to the Islamic leadership (Enayat: 1986:32). The argument adduced by the Shi'ites is that the first three Caliphs have usurped the Muslim leadership from the Household of the Prophet. This attitude of the Shi'ites is visible on different platforms such as during doctrinal discourse, public preaching etc. In all, despite these inherent differences between the *Tijaniyya* and the *Shi'ah*, the two sects have more in common in terms of a broader and wider Islamic perspective and philosophy than any of the other Muslim sects in Ghana.

Again, the positive interplay between the *Tijaniyya* and the *Shi 'ah* in Ghana could be viewed also from the observance of certain Muslim social activities. This is mostly reflected in the performance of weekly, monthly, or annual funeral rites (*adua* in Hausa) and the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet (*Maulid nabi*). The *Shi 'ah* believes in the

anniversary and the 40th day celebration of Imam Hussein and identifies its relevance in the Muslim social sphere. On the other hand, the *Tijaniyya* sect believes in the relevance of funeral rites for any Muslim and in the annual celebration of the birthday of the Prophet. Though the Shi'ites, except the *Shi'ah* Imams do not organize any forum for the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet, they most often join the *Tijaniyya* in the celebration.

Though the *Tijaniyya* and the Ahlus-Sunnah sects are all the offshoot of Sunni Islam, doctrinally many areas of tension exist between the two sects. This could be viewed from the Ahlus-Sunnah sect constant vilification and total censure of *Tijaniyya* beliefs such as divination, the manufacture of charms and amulets, *Maulid nabi*, funeral rites and the exorcism of witchcraft, spirits, etc. This therefore partly explains the fact that the contemporary sectarian conflicts have been mostly perpetrated between the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Tijaniyya* sects over doctrinal differences. Similarly, to a large extent, the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Shi'ah* do not have much doctrinal connection and each see the other's values as corrupt Islamic expressions.

It is, however, worth observing that the major converging ground for the larger Muslim sects in Ghana is mostly in the social realm, on issues pertaining to cross inter marriages, participation in wedding and naming ceremonies, paying condolences to the bereaved families regardless of his/her doctrinal orientations, as well as matters relating to societal development. It means that the role of the social factor in cultivating and enhancing positive relations among Muslim sects in Ghana cannot be underrated. This therefore suggests that the social factor overrides transnational influences among Muslim sects in Ghana.

One area that always pits the *Tijaniyya* against the other Muslim sects in Ghana is the competition over religious space. This is reflected in the call by the other sects for a reconstitution of the Muslim leadership at the national level to reflect the reality of Muslim leadership in Ghana. This is so because these other sects and groups find themselves at the periphery of decision-making on Muslim matters at the national level which to a great extent gets its doctrinal colouration from the *Tijaniyya* sect. This is as a result of the domination of the sect at the national Muslim office. Perhaps, the larger *Tijaniyya* leadership is struggling to maintain the *status quo* as a result of the historical antecedents of the sect's role in the national Muslim leadership in Ghana. The sect has always provided successive Muslim leaders in the Volta Basin, the Gold Coast, and present day Ghana. More importantly, one cannot downplay the leverages associated with the national leadership which influences the sect to torpedo the reconstitution of the office which would then reflect the aspiration of the newly emerged Muslim sects in post-independence Ghana. The result of this tendency on the part of the *Tijaniyya* leadership has been the strong agitation from the Ahlus-Sunnah, the *Shi'ah* and the Western trained scholars that the national leadership has been doctrinally skewed in favor of the *Tijaniyya* sect.

Currently, an acknowledgement of the need to have an umbrella organization to serve as the mouthpiece of all Muslims in Ghana is not being given enthusiastic support by some Muslim sects. This is partly because, the National Chief Imam, a Tijani by sectarian orientation, is not willing to share part of the good-will that he has established with the political establishment in Ghana. Nevertheless, one major point of interaction for Muslim sects in Ghana has been at the *ad hoc* committees' level. These *ad hoc* committees include the National Hilal Committee of the Ramadan Conference, the National Hajj Council, and Inter-faith Waste Management Committees.

The role of traditional leadership in the Muslim social sphere in Ghana also determines the nature of the relationship among Muslim sects in Ghana. This, however, varies in respect of the particular sect and the cultural orientation of a particular community. At one level, the Ahlus-Sunnah sect does not give recognition to traditional leadership in their structures and social functions. Apparently, the sect feels that religious issues are the exclusive domain of the *Ulama* who must therefore be empowered to perform their religious role in the society. Perhaps the origin of this ideological worldview of the sect dictates this scenario which historically delineated a separate political leadership from religious ones in Arabia. This is in sharp contrast to the relations between the *Tijaniyya* sect, on the one hand, and traditional leadership on the other. This could be viewed from the fact that the *Tijaniyya* sect gives due recognition to traditional leadership or tribal heads in the southern Ghana's Muslim community. This always manifests itself in Muslim social programmes in respect of outdoorings, wedding and funeral ceremonies, where the *Tijaniyya* custom within the south demands that the presiding Imam seeks permission from the Muslim chiefs and tribal heads present before initiating any religious service at such social functions. The major reason normally adduced for this state of affairs is that, traditionally and historically, the *Ulama* have been installed by the Muslim chiefs and consequently they derive their authority from the traditional leadership. However, the overriding reason might be that the Muslim chiefs and tribal heads might want to re-assert their authority in the cosmopolitan cities of the south, where they do not wield any considerable and significant influence over their subjects on religious issues. This tendency is always found in the southern part of Ghana especially the *Zongos*. This is in contrast to what obtains in the northern part of Ghana, where there is clear delineation between what are purely traditional and Islamic functions

Part of the nature of the relationship among Muslim sects in Ghana is being determined by the nature of global politics in the Muslim world. This scenario is mostly applicable to states which are at loggerheads. This is when a particular government's political relations are not the best with another government. The effect of this friction between two Muslim states with different Islamic ideologies eventually filters into the nature of relations between Muslims in Ghana with different doctrinal and theological allegiance to each of the state. In putting this into historical perspective, one could cite the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. This war created a cold war between the Ahlus-sunnah and Shi'iah sects in Ghana, as it was interpreted as a full war between members of the *Shi'ah* and the Ahlus-Sunnah in Ghana. Lastly, it is worth noting that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq also pitted the Iraqi leadership against the larger *Wahhabi Ulama* in Ghana. Even though the invasion was a purely political issue, the *Wahhabi* scholars in the Gulf encouraged a negative perception against the Iraqi leadership among their counterparts in Ghana. The bottom line of the *Wahhabi Ulama's* resentment of the Iraqi leadership's invasion of Kuwait has to do with the economic power that they obtain from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait which the Iraqi invasion would have halted. Lastly, the tendency on the part of the highest *Ulama* in the Muslim world to proclaim other Muslim leaders as infidels (*Takfir*) also has an effect on Ghanaian Muslim *Ulama* who hold a doctrinal inclination towards the opposing countries (Madawi 2007: 41). Typical examples are Saudi *Ulama* proclaiming *Takfir* against other Muslim leaders such as Khomeini, Qaddhafi and Saddam Hussein. Although, the issues might have political undertone they tend to be displayed as religious matters and manifested among Muslims group with different doctrinal inclinations towards the different Islamic states.

Adherents of foreign Islamic sects in Ghana also play the role of advocacy, thereby influencing the direction of public opinion on foreign policies of the respective governments

that represented these sects. In this regard, one could cite the 1988 Ayatollah Khomeini Fatwa on Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* and the role of the *Shi'ah* Muslims in mobilizing Ghanaian Muslims for protest and demonstration in that regard. Secondly, pressure put on Ghana's Government by the Libyan-trained *Ulama* in Ghana to rescind its decision not to participate in the 1982 African Cup of Nations in Libya was another instance of Muslim's *Ulama* with allegiance to some Islamic countries who wield influence on Ghana's foreign policies direction. Lastly, the Libyan *Ulama* in Ghana became the first agents who were assigned by the Libyan Government to beef-up the support base for Muammar Qadhafi's proposed continental African Union government at the 9th Ordinary Session of the AU's Summit in Accra in 2007. The role that they played was in the area of mobilizing the masses to give popular support to Qadhafi during the Summit.²

Moreover, Muslim states or governments which propagate anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism perceive states in the Muslim world with opposing philosophies as rival states. This therefore justifies their tagging such states in negative religious terms. This mostly reflects on the nature of relations between the Libyan and Iranian Governments on one hand, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the other in respect of the latter's relations with the United States and the West which Libya and Iran always interprets as a form of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism (Madawi 2007:41). In short, the effect of such inter-states' hostility between different Islamic governments finds its manifestation in the relations among Ghanaian Muslim *Ulama* trained in each of these different Islamic countries.

²Yushau Kuta interviewed 2 July 2007. Yushau informed the researcher that, prior to the AU's Summit in Accra, the Libyan-trained *Ulama* in Ghana were invited to Libya by Gadhafi from 12-18 June 2007. They were thoroughly briefed as to the Libyan leader's agenda at the impending Summit. As a result of that they returned to Ghana to mobilize the ordinary Ghanaian Muslims to show support for Gadhafi's African Union government concept during the Summit.

Diversity as shown in the nature of *Wahhabism*, Shi'ism and Islamic Socialism which is found in different states in the Muslim world is also exploited by states with opposing Islamic perspectives or which do not share similar theological and ideological convictions. This is done by tagging the rival state with negative labels so as to make it appear that they do not belong to the right Islamic perspective. This tendency is displayed by Saudi Arabia against Iran and vice versa as they are struggling to win the hearts of many Muslims to their religious groups (Madawi 2007: 105). The higher institutions of Islamic learning of the various Muslim states facilitate this tendency. This situation in a way also reflects relations among Muslim sects in Ghana, which have strong allegiances to such states.

6.15 CONCLUSION

Generally, it could be discerned from this study that two types of Islamic resurgence were introduced in Ghana. Namely; the mainstream worldwide Islamic resurgence based on Islamic doctrinal beliefs such as the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Shi'ah*. The second type of the Islamic resurgence introduced into Ghana was political in nature as in the nature of the Third Universal Theory (TUT). For instance, the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Shi'ah* represented worldwide Islamic ideologies with monotheistic (*Tawhid*) and the household (Ahlul-Bait) concepts and teachings of Islam in Ghana respectively. The interplay between these two worldwide Islamic ideologies is mainly limited to the Muslim *Ummah* alone.

On the other hand, the Third Universal Theory represented a new political movement in the world. The distinctive nature of this movement rests mainly on the fact that the Third Universal Theory claims to represent a political universal remedy to Third World countries. It must, however, be acknowledged that it has wider global ramifications beyond the Muslim *Ummah* since it interacts with others with religious persuasions other than Islam.

The study also found that this political movement was individually inspired and motivated by Gadhafi.

Even though all the Muslim missions' religious and political ideologies introduced in Ghana impacted on the orientation of Ghanaian Muslims, the intensity of their impact varies. For instance, the Ahlus-Sunnah and the Shi'iah, having their ideological and philosophical bases in Islam, attract more Muslims to the observation of their rules and tenets. Significantly, the two sects also give clearer distinctions in respect of labeling their adherents as being Ahlus-Sunnah Muslim and *Shi'ah* Muslim. This could not, however, be said about the adherents of the Third Universal Theory in that outsiders do not label their followers.

It could therefore be argued that the hypothesis that Muslim diplomatic missions facilitated the classification of Ghanaian Muslims on doctrinal lines has not been fully established and founded. This is because such an hypothesis is mostly applicable to the impact of the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Shi'ah* which give clearer identification to their adherents and followers.

The latent dimension of the hypothesis, on the other hand, could be that the home base and cultural orientation of all the Islamic ideologies introduced in Ghana impacted on their adherents in Ghana. For instance, the Ahlus-Sunnah or the Wahabiya orientated some sections of Ghanaian Muslims culturally towards Arabian Gulf values. Likewise, Shi'ism orientated some sections of Ghanaian Muslims towards an Iranian cultural background. The Third Universal Theory orientated some Ghanaian Muslims towards Berber cultural values. This view is evident in the mode of dress of the adherents of these sects in Ghana and other social interactions.

It has also been found that the ideological foundations of the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Shi 'ah* sects are such that they could endure through many centuries and therefore the opportunity to attract more Muslims to these sects is high. This is in contrast to the ideological foundation of the TUT which is politically oriented and dependent on the ability of a particular political regime to survive.

Again, the study reveals that the interplay between the adherents of these sects and their ideology in Ghana in respect of their home base governments is not overtly observed. This could be seen in the lack of apparent collaboration between the Ghanaian adherents of the sects and ideologies and the home base governments. The research also reveals that all the institutions which facilitate Islamic resurgence in Ghana exclude Muslim women from the leadership structures.

Economically, *Wahhabiyya*, *Shi ah*, and the Libyan-trained *Ulama* in Ghana rely on their respective governments to carry out the activities of the Islamic resurgence in Ghana. The nature of the economic assistance given to the *Ulama* trained in these countries relate to monthly stipends and some developmental projects. This situation therefore underscores the role of the home base governments in propelling the activities of the Islamic resurgence in Ghana through economic assistance.

Lastly, it has been found that the origin of some of the institutions which facilitate the diversity of Islamic resurgence in the respective Muslim sects in Ghana were externally motivated and not the brainchild of Ghanaian Muslims. For instance, one could cite the origin of the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research, the West African Ahlus-Sunnah and the origin of the Center for Study of *the Green Book* in Ghana. This shows the

extent of influence of foreign governments' political and religious values on Ghanaian Muslims.

The next section deals with Ghanaian Muslims relations with the United States in the post 9/11. It will eventually unravel the unique dimension of Muslims relations with the West. It further explores the major shapes that it assumes in Ghana.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE POST 9/11 FACTOR: GHANAIAAN MUSLIMS' RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

7 0 BACKGROUND TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN GHANA

7.1 INTRODUCTION

As we observed in section II, which discussed the engagement of Ghanaian Muslims with the Arab/Muslim world, the present section will deal with their relations with the Western world, especially the United States of America, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks.

In this chapter, we discuss the various levels of interactions and acts of rapprochement that have taken place between the United States through the American Embassy and the Muslim community in Ghana as a result of her global anti-terror campaign in the Muslim communities. This history of the United States' engagement with the Muslims in Ghana can be divided into two periods namely, pre-11 September, 2001 and post-11 September

The pre-11-September period was largely characterized by an apparent lack of attention on the part of the American Embassy in designing and implementing programmes, specifically targeted at the Muslim community in Ghana. As a result, whatever American programmes and projects that Muslims benefited from during this period were incidental, and could be seen as part of a number of programmes for the larger Ghanaian community.

The effect of this apparent lack of attention displayed by the United States and the Western countries for Ghanaian Muslims in the provision of development projects made them tend to have a negative, even hostile, attitude towards them. Even though during the pre-9/11 period Ghanaian Muslims interacted with the Western world and the United States through the

Nation of Islam, such interaction did not result in any significant change in this perception. Lastly, this hostile attitude of Muslims towards the United States was reinforced by the source of funding of Muslim development projects in Ghana during the pre-9/11 period, which was largely from the Arab/Muslim world. This trend therefore reinforced the religious solidarity and affinity of Ghanaian Muslims with the Arab world.

In post-11 September, however, the United States Embassy consciously designed and implemented programmes specifically meant for the Muslim communities in Ghana. This has resulted in a positive change of attitude as regards the United States among Ghanaian Muslims. This chapter will concentrate on what it was post 9/11 which caused a mark of improvement in the United States-Muslims relations in Ghana. Since the American adventurous relations with Muslims in Ghana in the post 9/11 were related to her anti-terror campaign and education in the Muslim communities, this chapter further discusses aspects of Muslims views on terrorism.

***U* HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POST 9/11 UNITED STATES' ENGAGEMENT IN GHANA**

In putting this section into historical perspective interviews were conducted with several Muslim leaders who had, in diverse ways, facilitated, the engagement of Ghanaian Muslims with the United States of America since the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. Among such personalities was Armiyau Shuiab, the General Secretary of Friends Against Global Terrorism (FAGLAT), one of the organizations through which the American Embassy relates with the Muslim community in Ghana.

Armiyau indicated that the American Embassy's interest in the Ghanaian Muslim community took a new turn in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on America which sent

shockwave around the world. According to him, the initiative towards this new engagement came from the Americans themselves. Eric Sillah, an official of the American Embassy, initiated the engagement. He conducted research in the Muslim community on the reaction of Ghanaian Muslims to the 11 September event and their feelings about the United States in general. Cross-sections of the Muslim leaders in Accra were interviewed. Later, there was an informal meeting organized by the American Embassy with a section of these Muslim leaders, especially those who were interviewed in November 2001. The essence of this meeting was to ascertain the concerns of Ghanaian Muslims about the United States. Armiyau thought that, presumably, there was a wave of anti-American sentiments all over the Muslim world (Shuiab, interview, 13th March 2005).

The American Embassy sought to ascertain the basis of such sentiments and address to them. Some of the individuals who participated in the initial informal meeting, such as Umar Ahmed Sanda, Armiyau Shuaib, and Hamidu Chodi, then decided to extend the new engagement a little further. They did this by examining acceptable Islamic methods of addressing issues especially matters relating to political differences, conflicts and violence. They also questioned the basis of using terror and violence as a tool to protest against disagreeable issues. Lastly, one issue that they discussed was who was to lead the Muslim *Ummah* in addressing whatever concerns they might have about the United States and other countries in the world (Shuiab, interview, 13th March 2005).

In the course of their deliberations, they conceived of an idea to form an organization to address and educate Muslims on matters relating to the use of terror and violence. They therefore formed Friends Against Global Terrorism (FAGLAT), to serve as a platform and an instrument for examining the relationship between Ghanaian Muslims, America and the West

(Shuiab, interview, 13th March 2005). It can be realized, therefore, that the 11 September gftndrs created a basis for a new relationship with and engagement between Ghanaian Muslims and the United States.

73 THE UNITED STATES' PERSPECTIVE ON THE ENGAGEMENT

The perspective of the United States on their rapprochement towards Ghanaian Muslims was corroborated by David Queen a counselor at the United States' Department of Public Affairs in the Embassy. He claimed that what necessitated the engagement was the fact that in the past no attention had been paid by the Embassy to the Muslim community in Ghana. The Embassy also realized that many Ghanaian Muslims were not aware of the United States' development programmes in Ghana, especially programmes pertaining to primary education and public health, which benefited all Ghanaians, including Muslims (David, Interview, 10th March 2005)

David emphasized that the basis of the United States' rapprochement towards the Muslim community is borne out of the United States' broad policy and out of her desire to help the underprivileged Muslim communities in Ghana in general. Through this initiative some projects relating to education were commissioned in the Northern part of Ghana (David, Interview, 10th March 2005). Specifically, a branch of the United States Embassy's reference library was commissioned, and a satellite internet facility established. These facilities could be accessed by the students and staff of the University for Development Studies (UDS), in Tamale due to their proximity to the campus. All these were done with a view to assisting the Ghanaian Muslim community in the Northern region in particular (David, Interview, 10th March 2005).

The United States also made efforts to link up with the Muslim community in the southern part of Ghana. However, such efforts were limited to one particular office, that of the National Chief Imam and a sect, the *Tijaniyya* sect in particular. Gradually, the Ahlus-Sunnah group and other Muslim leaders were brought in (David, Interview, 10th March 2005).

David indicated that though the purpose of their relations with Muslims is to see how best the United States Government officials through its embassy would be able to direct good proposals from Muslim organizations. He identified another benefit of the engagement that being the fostering of a better understanding and the promotion of matters of mutual interest between the two groups in various disciplines (David, interview, 10th March 2005). Among some of the projects of the engagement are special meetings, round table discussions, public lectures to explain United States programmes and policies. Also included was the participation of the United States officials in Muslim religious holidays and ceremonies, particularly the celebration of *Eid-Fitr* and *Eid-Adha* (David, interview, 10th March 2005).

Initially, Iftar during the month of *Ramadan* was organized for some selected Muslim leaders in Accra. Due to the keen interest generated from this interaction with the Muslim leadership, a public forum was also organized to educate the staff of the Embassy about Islam and the social conditions of the Ghanaian Muslim community in particular. These ventures were undertaken to ascertain the possible interventions intended to be made by the United States' development agencies interested in Muslim development in Ghana (David, interview, 10th March 2005).

The outcome of these forums was the development intervention initiated by the United States Peace Corps to help the Muslim community in particular. The Peace Corps had already been actively involved in assisting the Ghanaian community in general. Out of this initiative the Ahlus-Sunnah group is being assisted to construct an ultra modern office centre at Nima in Accra. Initially, enough was not done to extend this initiative to Muslims outside Greater Accra. However, now the activities of the United States cover virtually the entire country.

As part of this initiative some American Muslims were invited to interact with their Ghanaian counterparts. Notable among them was Imam Hendi, a chaplain at the Georgetown University in the United States. He was taken to almost all Muslim institutions and organizations in Accra and Kumasi (David, interview, 10th March 2005). In addition, he was given the opportunity to interact with the Muslim students at the University of Ghana, Legon and the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi. In order to further reach out to Ghanaian Muslims nationwide, the United States officials organized television talk shows for Imam Hendi with Ghanaian Muslims. The climax of these was a dinner for some selected Muslim leaders in Accra at David Queen's residence (David, interview, 10th March 2005). Lastly, the United States also organized exchange programmes to the United States for Ghanaian Muslim leaders, *Ulama*, Imams and other important dignitaries.

David opined that, with this assistance in mind, the expectation of the United States regarding the Muslim community is that prejudices, biased perceptions, and attitudes towards the United States should be done away with (David, interview, 10th March 2005). He indicated that there would not be any significant change in the mode of the engagement.

Depending upon the budget available there could be more exchanges for, for example, Ghanaian Muslim students who wish to study in the United States.

David did not think any problems had arisen during this engagement. He emphasized that, generally, Ghanaian Muslims are very open and friendly, even when they disagree with some of the policies of the United States. He observed that some young men and students had been loudly critical but he did not consider that a problem, as everybody should have the opportunity to speak openly.

Among some of the minor problems they identified in the process of engagement were:

- (a) lack of understanding of the United States' policies.
- (b) incorrect information about the United States.
- (c) too much reliance on the mass media for information about the United States.
- (d) the lack of assertiveness on the part of Ghanaian Muslims to make their needs known to the government (David, interview, 10th March 2005).

He was of the view that the only motivation to continue with this policy is for people to make informed judgments based on an understanding of all viewpoints. In this regard, the United States officials would want their views to be heard and understood. He gave an assurance that the United States Government has good intentions regarding Muslims globally (David, interview, 10th March 2005).

7-4 THE BROADER POLICY OF THE ENGAGEMENT

The broader policy of the United States Government, which calls for a need for the engagement, is to create a platform for dialogue with Muslims world-wide. It is specifically

the anti-terrorism policy of the United States, which requires this engagement (David, interview, 10th March 2005). According to him, the erroneous perception by some Muslims is that Islam has been branded as a religion of terrorism which is not so. The other problem was the assumption that the United States is not committed to resolving the problems of the Middle-East. He however, expressed the view that, the U.S. is committed to solving the problem in the near future.

David indicated that the effects of the engagements have been generally positive. He argued that many Ghanaian Muslims had never met Americans and, as a result, some Muslims had distorted views about the United States. The United States' attitude is that even if they do not always agree people should respect each other's views and try to understand where they come from (David, interview, 10th March 2005).

An outcome of this new policy was, as mentioned above, the formation of a pro-U.S. Muslim group in Ghana, known as Friends Against Global Terrorism (FAGLAT). The initiative of FAGLAT was however a difficult one. For instance, Armiyau indicated that there was a feeling in the Ghanaian Muslim community that America was against Islam and Muslims. So there was an outcry against any Muslim pioneering such a dialogue. Some Muslims labeled the founders of FAGLAT as agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Shuiab, interview, 3rd January 2005). Armiyau indicated that they were however vindicated, when some leading Muslims also joined the American-Muslims dialogue in Ghana. These personalities included Umar Ibrahim and Shuaib Abubakar, two of the founding fathers of the Ahlus-Sunnah (*Wahhabism*) in Ghana (Shuiab, interview, 3rd January 2005). The next section will therefore focus on the objectives of FAGLAT.

75 THE OBJECTIVES OF FRIENDS AGAINST GLOBAL TERRORISM (FAGLAT)

Formed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America, FAGLAT is a non-religious and non-political movement, which aims at uniting all peace-loving Ghanaians. Among some of the concerns it intends to address are:

1. the unity of all nations and peoples of the world to fight for an internationally acceptable definition of terrorism and the formulation, adoption and implementation of a convention on global terrorism.
2. the combating by all means necessary, of threats to international peace and security, terrorist acts committed by government(s) or movement(s) operating in their own country of origin or in a foreign country against citizens and property in a third country as well as individuals and groups (including psychopaths, who seem to exhibit less restraint in senseless acts of terrorism at diplomatic missions, mass transportation systems, sporting events, hotels/tourist sites).
3. the provision of education through lectures, seminars, symposia, research (studies and reports) or other forms of knowledge to the international community by relentlessly drawing attention to changing threats and challenges posed by terrorism especially bio-terrorism, use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as the proliferation of other forms of weapons of mass destruction. Cyber terrorism-hackers who use hi-tech methods to attack web sites and or viruses which eat up or freeze computers [information network]. Eco-terrorism, arsons, bombings, and sabotage in the name of saving the environment, disrupting logging, recreational use of the wilderness and or animals for food and for research.

4 working in close collaboration with governments, agencies and other organizations in fanning freedom, dignity, justice and human values and to promote world peace, co-operation and understanding by eliminating hatred [bigotry and ignorance], oppression and injustice [frustration with seemingly intractable political, social and economic forces], as some of the factors that induce violent acts or tenor.

The First Executive Council members were:

- (i) Nii Adjei Larbie, former Member of Parliament for Tema East.
- (ii) Hamidu Chodi, a journalist and the Acting Director of Administration Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC)
- (iii) Umar Sanda Ahmed, a Muslim Military Chaplain, Ghana Armed Forces.
- (iv) Aimiyou Shauib, an educationist, and the Accra Regional Director of the Islamic Education Unit, Ghana Education Service. And
- (v) Hudu Mogtari, a pharmacist with the pharmaceutical company, Rees and Co.

7.6 THE NATURE OF FAGLAT ACTIVITIES IN GHANA

Some of the activities that are organized by FAGLAT include the following:

1. Iftar programmes (food for Muslims to break the fast during the month of Ramadan):
Initially, the venue for the Iftar programmes was Nima Police Park. It has however been extended to other parts of Accra, to cover places such as Shukura, Sabon Zongo, Ashaiman and Tema all in the Greater Accra region. Iftar has also been extended to other regions namely; Ashanti, Northern, Upper East, Western, Upper West, and Western. The Iftar programme has so far been extended to virtually all regions in Ghana.

During the Iftar programme, a section of the Muslim leaders are invited, especially, the Imams led by the National Chief Imam or his representative, the *Ulama*, the Council of Muslim Chiefs and a cross section of the women folk. Within this programme, some quantities of food are distributed to needy Muslims during the Month of Ramadan to help ease the breaking of their fast.

The essence of the organization of Iftar for the Muslim community by the United States Embassy is to show its solidarity with the Muslim *Ummah* during the Ramadan season. The Public Affairs Section of the United States Embassy sponsors the Iftar, and the FAGLAT facilitates and organizes the function for the Muslim community.

The Ambassador's Iftar programme for Muslim leaders in Ghana is another such occasion. This provides an opportunity for interaction with the Ghanaian Muslim community and fosters relationship between them and the Embassy during the month of Ramadan. This programme is specifically and exclusively meant for top Muslim leaders in the country and those in responsible positions within the Muslim community.

The United States Embassy through FAGLAT also organizes quiz competitions for Muslim students in the tertiary and pre-tertiary institutions in the country. In recent times, such competitions are broadcast live on national television and some radio stations for the benefit of all Ghanaians. Prizes and awards are given to the winners. In recent times, the winners are given guidance as to some of the educational opportunities in the United States for those who wish to pursue higher education in the States.

- 3 Another new dimension to the activities of the United States Embassy in Ghana is their attention to women's groups in the Muslim community. Recently, the women's wing of FAGLAT, MIRAJ¹, was formed with the aim of educating Muslim women, through workshops on reproductive issues, women's empowerment and entrepreneurial and vocational training.
4. Open forums, lectures, and roundtable discussions with Muslim leaders in Ghana are aimed at providing a platform for learning more about Islam and Muslims generally in Ghana. It also seeks to highlight some of the problems of the Muslim community. Some agencies within the United States Embassy, through this programme, will then make informed decisions to help Muslims in specific areas.
5. A football competition for Muslim youth is organized during the *Eidul-Fitr* season. The aim of this programme is to provide useful entertainment for young Muslim men in the community. This then provides a productive activity and entertainment for the youth rather than enabling them to engage in certain nefarious activities during the *Eidul-Fitr* festivities. Participating teams are drawn from almost all parts of the regions in Ghana Greater Accra, Central, Ashanti regions, Northern, Upper West, and Upper East. Trophies and other incentives are awarded to deserving teams.

7.7 THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF FAGLAT

One of the areas in which FAGLAT has excelled in recent times is in its ability to create opportunities for the Muslim *Ulama* and Imams to visit the United States. This opportunity hitherto 9/11 was not available. Consequently, some of the staunchest critics of the United

heaven ^{meaDS} ascending to the seventh heaven. This is in reference to the Prophet's ascendance to the

States and her foreign policy tend to change their attitude upon their return to Ghana. This is because the common perception of some of the *Ulama* and the Imams was that there were no Muslims in the United States. Some of them think that the United States is anti-Islam and not Muslim friendly. However, upon visiting the United States and observing, for example, that Muslims are performing valuable services in the cause of Islam, they change these perceptions.

Thanks to this programme, numerous Ghanaian Muslims have changed their attitudes towards the United States. A typical example of one of them is the National Imam of the Ahlus-Sunnah, Wal-Jama'ah. According to him, his perception about America was mostly coloured by his understanding of her foreign policies. However, his trip to the United States made him lose this negative stereotype about America. He often quotes a prominent Muslim scholar, Muhammad Abduh who once said "in Europe I found Islam but not Muslims. Here in the East I find Muslims but not Islam" (Soage 2008:14). Umar predicted that the future of Islamic civilization would come from the direction of the Western world, where the Muslim *Ummah* is capable of expressing their views and creating new dimensions to Islam (Umar, interview, 20* February 2005).

Equally important is the International Visitors Program (I.V.P), which some Ghanaian Muslims have benefited from. This programme is geared towards having some Ghanaians to visit the United States where they will learn, among other things; how the U.S. is governed. It also includes cultural and educational exchanges between the Ghanaian Muslims and the United States citizens.

Irrinn Hendi Yahaya, a chaplain of Georgetown University, visited Ghana in 2005 as part of the United States' rapprochement towards Ghanaian Muslims. As said earlier his interaction took him to almost all the Muslim institutions in Accra. He also interacted with the leadership of the Federation of Muslim Women's Association of Ghana (FOMWAG) which is the umbrella organization of Muslim women's groups in Ghana, and with Muslim students.

Part of FAGLAT's achievement has been that it has exposed Ghanaian Muslim students to educational opportunities in the United States through access to the facilities of the Martin Luther King Library in Accra to enhance their chances of being admitted to higher educational institutions in the United States. Perhaps, the most remarkable achievement of this engagement was the allocation of money to construct a regional secretariat of the Islamic Education Unit for the Muslim community in Accra in 2005. Also, the construction of National Secretariat of the Ahlus-Sunnah group in the Greater Accra region was an achievement made by FAGLAT. Another achievement was the construction of a health unit at Aboabo in Kumasi in 2006 for the Muslim community.

7.8 FINDINGS ON GHANAIAN MUSLIMS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

As indicated earlier, the outcome of 9/11 prompted the interest of the United States in the Muslim community in Ghana. The United States, in designing her broader policy for her engagement in Ghana, took into consideration the diversity of the Muslim community because of the different doctrinal groups that Ghanaian Muslims belong to, as well as differences in occupations, age and gender.

In order to obtain information from the respondents in the field about the activities of the United States in the Muslim communities, this very diversity was utilized. Questionnaires were designed, and administered in the field; to obtain information about the perception of Ghanaian Muslims on the recent interest of the United States had shown in them. Among some of the broader questions and issues that we ascertained were,; we sought the respondents' appraisal of the United States in the Muslim community, we explore avenues for cooperation between the U.S. and Ghanaian Muslims, the perception of Ghanaian Muslims about the U.S. before and after 9/11, avenues for constructive cultural dialogue and the compatibility of Islamic values with Western values.

Since the post 9/11 American interest among Muslims is to educate them about terrorism, we sought Muslims understanding of the causes of terrorism its impact on Ghanaian Muslims and eradication. We further identified the role of the *Ulama* in *Dawa* on terrorism and factors affecting them. Where necessary, the research analysis will focus on the gender, occupation, and doctrinal background of the respondents in respect of each question.

7-8.1 The Appraisal of the United States' Engagement in the Muslim Community

As a starting point of assessing Muslims understanding of the American interest in their community, the survey obtains from the respondents their evaluation of the United States' engagement in the Muslim community. This was with a view to finding out from them whether they appreciate the U.S. efforts or not. Secondly, the results of the survey identified the specific problems that the respondents associate with the nature of the engagement.

Muslim women the Imams, public servants and the Ahlus-Sunnah sect members were those who most positively appraised the United States' interest in the Muslim community in Ghana.


Though, the gender dimension of the participants in the United States activities in the Muslim community in Ghana shows that it was skewed towards the interest of the men, this has not however completely changed their negative perceptions of the United States. The major factor accounting for this is the critical posture that they have adopted towards the United States foreign policies in the Middle-East and other parts of the world, which to some of them is highly unfavourable to the Muslims.

The Imams and businessmen generally appreciated the essence of the United States programmes because of their participation in it. This thus enabled them to fairly appraise the nature of the engagement and its benefit to Muslim communities in Ghana.

Doctrinally, Ahlus-Sunnah members mostly appreciated the value of the engagement more than other sects. This is partly due to the fruit of the concentration of the engagement of the United States' officials with the sect. Secondly, the members of the sect have enjoyed abundant advantages as against other sects during the engagement. For instance, an ultra-modern Islamic centre has been established by the United States' Embassy in Ghana for the sect at Nima in the Greater Accra region. The Embassy has also put up a multi-million Cedis clinic with all accessories for the members of the sect in the Ashanti region. Moreover, access to a U.S. Visa has been made easier to the members of the sect to visit the States, and some were even made to apply for the Visa. Lastly, officials of the United States frequently participate in the religious activities of the ASWAJ. All these interventions have done much to change the minds of the members of the sect about the nature of the engagement. These, and many other factors, have influenced the respondents' positive appraisal of the engagement.



r_B 1- Doctrinal background of the respondents and their evaluation of the worth of the United States interest in the Muslim communities in Ghana;



[Source: survey data 2005]

An attempt was made to identify the specific reasons which influenced the respondents' views for or against the United States' rapprochement towards the Ghanaian Muslims. Consequently, respondents were asked for reasons for either their positive or negative response to the engagement. Generally, three (3) major reasons which could be categorized into positive or negative were provided by the respondents.

One view was identified as representing the extent to which the responses were negative. For example, about 35 percent of the respondents indicated that the United States has a hidden agenda for initiating the rapprochement. This negative perception was mostly found among the males, students, and non-sectarian Muslims.

The reason given by these respondents for the position they expressed was that prior to MI, the United States had not shown any keen interest in having any programme with the Muslim communities. Importantly, some of the respondents cited as a reason for their negative attitude the nature of the United States' foreign policies in some Muslim countries,

which they considered unfavourable to the Muslims. Perhaps, it will be prudent to return to the reactions of a section of Muslims in Ghana which was opposed to United States' interest in the Muslim communities to support the point.² The problems raised by these Muslims include:

1. The abuse of prisoners by the Coalition Forces led by the United States in Iraq. These respondents raised this to show the double standards of the United States towards Muslims generally.
2. Non-Muslims constructing religious centres for Muslims. These respondents feel that the Qur'an forbids Muslims to allow non-Muslims to construct Islamic centres for them.

Part of the respondents' problem with the United States' interest in the Muslim communities in Ghana, emanates from their perceived double-standards exhibited by their *Ulama* towards the U.S, foreign policies. These include:

1. The ASWAJ *Ulama* had earlier organized prayer sessions to seek victory for the Iraqis against the Coalition Forces led by the United States. In the course of time, the ASWAJ is seen campaigning for, and having harmonious relations with the American Embassy, and
2. Some of the ASWAJ *Ulama* have changed their attitudes towards the United States' assisted Iftar programmes in the Muslim communities which they had earlier condemned.

This was a recorded audio-visual material of the ASWAJ outreach programme on the eradication of terrorism solicit the members support on their engagement with US officials in Ghana, organized at Islamic search and Reformation Center, Nima, Accra 24 August, 2004.

They were therefore of the view that the United States did not have the interests of the Muslim world at heart. This was further aggravated by the attitude of their *Ulama*.

On the other hand, the findings also reveal that the Imams (42%) and the public servants (41%), respectively, identified positively with the United States' interest in the Muslim immunities in Ghana. The views of these respondents are encapsulated on the beneficial outcome of the engagement to Muslims, namely :

1. The dialogue will create the basis for an understanding between Ghanaian Muslims and the United States (27.6%).
2. The rapprochement will enable Ghanaian Muslims to tap the expertise of the United States (25.9%).
3. Those who did not respond to the question represented 12.1%.

It is worth stating that the Imams mostly identified with the view that the dialogue or engagement will create a platform for understanding between the United States and the Ghanaian Muslims. This has been necessitated partly because; it is they who are mostly involved in inter-faith dialogue. Part of the Imams' positive appraisal of the United States was because substantial benefits flowing from the rapprochement towards Muslims in Ghana was channeled to them.

The public servants were of the view that engagement will result in acquiring expertise from the United States for the benefit of Ghanaian Muslims. Their view must have been influenced by their professional acquaintance with factors promoting inter-state relations.

Also in view of the intensive involvement of the Ahlus-Sunnah sect in almost all facets of the United States programmes in the Muslim communities in Ghana, their appraisal of the benefits of engagement was positive. This could be discerned from the fact that about 39 percent of the ASWAJ members, who represented the majority, were of the view that the rapprochement will create a basis for understanding between Ghanaian Muslims and the United States. This, therefore, means that prejudices against each other will be discarded depending upon the extent of the interaction between people with different backgrounds. This finding is in agreement with the inter-group contact hypothesis, which suggests that if two people of different racial or religious backgrounds could be brought together the hostility, antagonism, and prejudice expressed by each of them would be eroded, and eventually a positive attitude would develop (Deaux Wrightmann, 1981:370). Although it is acknowledged that mere contacts or interactions could not erase prejudices and biases, they have the potential of improving people's attitudes towards others positively.

The next section explores some avenues through which respondents believe that Ghanaian Muslims can cooperate with the United States in the interests of Islam and Muslims. It subsequently identifies the specific type of the issues for cooperation between the two groups in Ghana.


7-8.2 Avenues for Cooperation between the United States and Ghanaian Muslims

The purpose of the United States engagement is to identify the possible avenues of interest with Muslims in Ghana for cooperation (David, interview, 10th March 2005). Such avenues for cooperation must also be underpinned by their general appeal to the Ghanaian Muslims leadership.

The findings reveal that an overwhelming 84 percent of the respondents believe that the United States and Ghanaian Muslims could cooperate in the interests of Islam and Muslims in Ghana in the following areas:

- (i) Education (62.6).
- (ii) Health (10.9%).
- (iii) Assisting Muslims to break the fast during the month of Ramadan (6.9%).
- (iv) Fighting HIV/AIDS in the Muslim community (5.7%).
- (v) Fighting terrorism (3.4%).

Fig. 2: The areas of cooperation between Ghanaian Muslims and the United States?



[Source: Survey Data 2005]

Areas of cooperation between Ghanaian Muslims and the United States selected by the respondents vary. For instance, the men (100%), students and Ahlus-Sunnah (67) identified fighting terrorism and promoting cultural exchanges between Ghanaian Muslims and their Western counterparts as the major avenues of cooperation. This is in contrast to the issues of interest of the Imams, the non-sectarian respondents and the Muslim females who think that the focus of cooperation should be on educating Ghanaian Muslims on HIV/AIDS and providing health facilities.

The results show the diversity of interests in the areas of cooperation between Ghanaian Muslims and the United States. It shows the importance that the men, the Ahlus-Sunnah and the students' group attach to fighting terrorism and to distinguish their religiosity from the position of terrorism. It further shows their interest to interact with their counterparts Western Muslims as a result of the opportunity afforded by this new transnational engagement. It implies that these respondents are interested in issues of peace and security of Ghanaians and the sharing of ideas through interaction between the two groups so as to ensure stability and ridding the world of biases and prejudices. This will eventually improve relations between Ghanaian Muslims and the American officials in Ghana.

On the other hand, the well-being of Ghanaian Muslims was the concern of the Imams, as well as the non-sectarian Muslims and the female respondents. This is encapsulated in the need to fighting HIV/AIDS and to providing health facilities for Muslims. These areas of cooperation between Ghanaian Muslims and the United States which have been identified are in line with the broader policy of the United States' programmes for Ghanaian Muslims. This is because though the overall objective of the engagement is to educate the Muslim *Ummah* globally on the menace of terrorism. It has also been realized that terrorism could be countered by providing development projects and basic amenities for deprived communities (Makinda, 2002: 27). This is partly so because terrorism can thrive among the destitute and the impoverished. This means that the fight against terrorism also involves a trade-off development for better relations between the United States and Ghanaian Muslims and a more positive attitude of the one for the other.

The interest of the United States to facilitate Ghanaian Muslims' interaction with their Western counterparts has dwindled in recent times. This was due to alleged exploitation by

Visa fraudsters and the intransigent postures adopted by the youth and the Muslim students towards the US sponsored scholars to Ghana.

7.83. Perception about the United States before and after 9/11

In view of the intensive nature of American engagement in the Muslim communities in Ghana in the aftermath of the 9/11, the research sought from the respondents their perception about the United States before and after the 9/11 incidents. This was necessary in order to ascertain whether the image of the United States is improving or not in the Muslim communities of Ghana because of the interaction.

In order to avoid ambiguity as to the purpose of the research, specific variables were used to ensure precision and measure the perception of the respondents about the United States. For instance, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the United States before and after 9/11 on the following variables:


1. United States is a friend of Islam and Muslims.
2. United States is interested in developing the Muslim communities.
3. United States has nothing in common with the Muslim communities. And
4. The United States is anti-Islam and anti-Muslims.

The respondents' perceptions about the United States were tested on these views 'before and after' and comparative assessment was made. The result shows an improved positive perception about the United States after 9/11 as against before the 9/11 events. The variables which recorded positive improvements in the respondents' perception about the United States after 9/11 include, 'the United States is interested in developing the Muslim communities' and that 'the United States has nothing in common with Muslims'. The view of these

respondents is based on the apparent accessibility of the United States assisted development projects in the Muslim community in Ghana in the post 9/11.

On the other hand, the results show a growth in the respondents' perception of the United States after 9/11, as reflected in the views that 'the United States is anti-Islam and Muslims' and 'the United States is a friend of Islam and Muslims'. The possible reason necessitating this view was the aggressive nature of the United States' military operations in some Muslim countries after 9/11 as seen in her war on terrorism.

Fig. 3: Respondents perception about the United States before and after 9/11



[Source: Survey Data 2005]

A cross comparative assessment of the respondents' perception of the United States before and after 9/11 of respondents reveals mixed results, dependant on their gender. For instance, view as expressed after 9/11 that the United States is interested in developing the Muslim communities improved positively from 9.2% recorded before 9/11 and 12.1% recorded after. Also, the negative view was that 'the United States has nothing in common with the Muslim communities' recorded 23.6% before 9/11, and improved significantly down to 19.5% after 9/11. The positive improvement as shown in these views is as a result of the engagement of the United States with the Muslim communities in Ghana.

For example, the view that the United States is interested in the development of Muslim communities recorded an improvement after 9/11 partly because it was during the post- 9/11 period that the United States initiated specific projects to assist the Muslim communities and address issues in them. These included projects with respect to educational infrastructure for the Islamic Education Unit at Kawokudi and an ultra-modern office complex for the ASWAJ at Nima, both in the Greater Accra region. Also, significant was the provision of *Iftar* for Muslims from all walks of life. The United States also constructed a health unit for the Kumasi Muslim community in the Ashanti region. Also, a sizeable number of Muslim *Ulama* was invited by the US Embassy in Ghana to visit the United States for the first time. All such programmes have, in one way or the other, positively changed the perception of the respondents about the United States' interest in developing the Muslim communities. This was also reiterated by the National Chief Imam during a farewell visit paid to him by David Queen. The National Chief Imam was quoted as saying that he would never forget the tremendous help America and her embassy rendered to Ghanaian Muslims and Ghana in general. He emphasized that there have been various embassies in Ghana, but the American Embassy has proven to be exceptional as far as Muslims in Ghana are concerned (*National democrat, 1, 2005/*

Again, the view that 'the United States has nothing in common with Muslims' saw significant improvement after the 9/11 incidents. This is because 23.6% of the respondents recorded this view before 9/11, whereas this figure dropped down to 19.5%. The major contributory factor is that, for the first time, the United States initiated development projects for the Muslim communities. That, in itself is considered a proof of the U.S's common interest with the Muslims in Ghana. This has, therefore made the respondents appreciate such initiatives which eventually are reflected in the favourable positive upsurge of this view after 9/11.

Conversely, the view which was expressed negatively after 9/11 was that ‘the United States is anti-Islam and Muslims’. This is discernible from the fact that whereas 40.2% of the respondents expressed this view before 9/11, the response was 44.8% in post 9/11. Similarly, 17.8% of the respondents before 9/11 felt that ‘the United States is a friend of Islam and Muslims’. The percentage of this, however, was reduced to 14.4% in post 9/11.

This situation therefore points to the fact that anti-American feeling and sentiment in the Muslim communities rose after 9/11. The reason for this negativity is that in the aftermath of 9/11 the United States intensified her military operations against terrorism in some Muslim countries. Consequently, Ghanaian Muslims perceived the United States as anti-Islam and anti-Muslims. This view is epitomized in some of the respondents’ constant reference to the United States military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan in the course of the fieldwork. Again, the United States’ support for Israel rather than the Palestinian people is a typical concern raised by the respondents to justify this view. Other studies also support the view that anti-American and anti-Western sentiments are being fueled by specific events which affect common Muslim identity especially in periods of confrontation with non-Muslims (Fuller 2003:18). This therefore underscores the appropriateness of the United States officials’ engagement on anti-terror campaign with Muslim leaders in Ghana. The outcome of research thus shows that, the success of FAGLAT in its anti-terror campaign has been a mixed one. While some of the respondents have appreciated the interest of the United States to develop the Muslim communities some also view her as anti-Islam and Muslim unfriendly. Despite that some of the United States officials’ during their outreach to Muslim communities do emphasize that ‘the United States is not against Islam’ this has not completely changed Muslims attitudes towards her. An official of the United States in one of the outreach programmes in the Muslim community at Larabanga in the Northern region emphasized that

‘the United States is not against Islam as [is] being misconstrued by some Muslims’. He farther reiterated that ‘the United States is fighting a war against global terrorism and not a war against Islam’ and that, ‘We know that Islam is a religion of peace and the large majority of Muslims have joined the United States to oppose terrorism’ (*The independent* 31 October, 2005: 4). In another instance, the National Chief Imam in one of his roles to mitigate the anti-American sentiment in the Muslim community also said that ‘President George Bush is not out to antagonize Islam but rather to see that the world is free from terror’. Thus the view is that the United States is practicing what it preaches (*National Democrat*, 2005:1).

The major factor which influenced Ghanaian Muslims to judge the US negatively has been partly due to the Islamic brotherhood factor. Islamic brotherhood has served as a filter for Muslims to perceive the direction and the impact of United States’ foreign policy in the Muslim world. While Ghanaian Muslims appreciate the United States interest in developing Muslim communities in Ghana, they also criticize aspects of her foreign policy which have devastating effects on some Muslims elsewhere. Esposito also located the source of this Islamic brotherhood or Ummatic factor in the context of globalization. He said that:

Globalization of communications, technology, and travel has heightened a new consciousness of the transnational identity and the interconnectedness of the Islamic community (*Ummah*) that follows events across the Muslim world on a daily and even on hourly basis. They reinforce a sense of solidarity and identification. Regardless of national and cultural identities, most Muslims are not secular; they do self-consciously identify themselves as Muslims. They celebrate or bemoan successes and failures of Muslim struggles for self-determination, freedom from oppression ..as well as militant Jihad holy and unholy wars. (Esposito, 2003: 158.)

In all, the respondents’ perception about the United States could be categorized into two perspectives. In the first, it could be argued that Ghanaian Muslims appreciated certain commonalities binding them and the United States after 9/11 in regard to the United States’

interest in developing their communities. In assisting Muslims with development projects the United States can be seen to have something in common with Ghanaian Muslims. Notwithstanding this, the United States' war on terror made the respondents think that she is anti-Islam and Muslim un-friendly. Looking at the gender perspective in totality, the men tend to hold views that are more negative about the United States both before and after 9/11 as against the more positive outlook of the female respondents. This has partly arisen because the men invariably dominate in the facilitation of transnational Islamic interaction and connection with the Muslim and the Arab world. The consequence of this is the intense religious solidarity held by the male respondents with the Muslim and Arab world. This, therefore, serves as a mirror for judging others especially the United States.

Occupationally, the teachers and the businessmen within the sampled population hold a sentiment that is more anti-American. This shows that the teachers' perception of the United States remained constant and was representative of people with the highest score holding anti-American feeling as against other occupational groups, with about 51 percent for before and after 9/11. Moreover, the perception of the businessmen about the United States before 9/11 was about 22.0%, rising to about 44% for after 9/11, which means that their perception about the United States increased negatively from 22 percent to 44 percent. Again, their perception about the United States as a friend of Islam and Muslims generally dropped from about 33 percent before 9/11 to about 11 percent after. This means that anti-American sentiment among the businessmen rose higher after the 9/11, partly as a result of their perception of the United States' war on terrorism which they saw was targeting Muslim countries predominantly.

It points to the fact that, the anti-American sentiment in the Muslim community is real, with potential devastating effects on the United States' interests globally. It also shows the appropriateness and the relevance of the United States' rapprochement towards Muslims, since it will diffuse the negative perception about the United States among Muslims generally.

The other noticeable trend seen in the research was that it was the Imams who had positive perceptions of the United States. For instance, about 42 percent of the Imams indicated that the United States before 9/11 was anti-Islam and anti-Muslim. However, the finding showed that after 9/11 there was a decrease in the scoring for the same variable, with about 25 % of the Imams indicating anti-American sentiments. This shows a significant improvement in the Imams' perception of the United States after 9/11. This could be because in her official projects around the engagement with Ghanaian Muslims, the United States has focused on the Imams in particular.

Perhaps, it will be instructive to survey the religious conviction of one of the prominent Imams and *Alim* (a Muslim scholar) to illustrate widely held notions about and perceptions of the United States among the Muslim *Ulama* and Imams in Ghana before 9/11,³

This is a verbatim transcription of the late Taufiq's commentary on the Holy Qur'an following the 9/11 incidents against the United States. Within this translation he argued that the 9/11 incidents had been already predicted in the Qur'an for over 1500 years. Basically, he relied on numerals in the Quran in his commentary rather than a specific text which identified the events. Below is his statement on the commentary.

³Taufiq was the Ashanti Regional Imam of ASWAJ and a leading figure of the sect.

‘God destroy infidelity and infidels’ (3) ‘God raise Islam and Muslims’ (3)

Interpretation of the verse in the Quran, chapter; 9; verse; 108-109

The verse said;

‘Which is the best? He who laid his foundation on the piety to God and His pleasure? - Or he that laid his foundation on an undermined sand-cliff ready to crumble to pieces? And it does crumble to pieces with him and into the hell fire. And God guide not people that do wrong.’
(Yusuf Ali’s translation of the verse page 473).

However, Taufiq interpreted the verse in this way: (verbatim statement)

‘He who built a foundation on the fear of Allah and his pleasure it is the best. He who built a foundation on a deep hole and this hole threw the person into the hell fire.’

He further added that,

‘I would want to call your attention to this important verse in the Qur’an. It is in Suratul Taubat, which is Juz’u 11, coincidentally; the event in the United States occurred on September 11th. Again, Suratul Taubat is the 9* chapter in the Qur’an. If you count the number of words in this chapter, you will obtain 2001 words from the beginning of the verse to that verse. What I am trying to say is that to sum up everything in this chapter one gets 11,9,2001. The 11 represents the day of the event, which corresponds with the division of Qur’an to the 11th number. The 9 represents the month of the event, which was September and corresponds with the number of the chapter in the Quran. And the 2001 represents the number of the words in the chapter this corresponds with the year of the event.’

Taufiq added, (in reference to the Twin Towers),

‘Therefore, who demolished the building?’
Moreover, one of the buildings’ room numbers is written 108 and the other 109. This also corresponds to the actual verse, which occurred in the Qur’an. My simple answer is that it was God who demolished it. Even if they build a new one, it will come down.’

He then quoted a verse in the Quran:

‘are they not making sense from the Quran, if it were from any source other than Allah they would have found many contradictions.’

He added that ‘the Quran was revealed when the father of

George Bush was not bom’.

He then concluded that

‘the 9/11 was therefore a divine fulfillment’.

A farther illustration of the meaning of this verse is needed. Taufiq added the 108 and 109 were the actual verses that talk about the event in the chapter. This also corresponds with the specific floors which were mostly affected by the attack. The year that the event occurred was 2001, which was the number of words that occurred in the chapter from the beginning to 109. The chapter falls within the Juz’u 11 of the Qur’an, which corresponds with the day of the event.

Taufiq concluded that since the beginning of creation, Allah foretold the occurrence of this event, which will happen in the reign of George Bush, the Great Infidel.

Surprisingly, after Taufiq Bakr’s trip to the United States and his subsequent return to Ghana in August 2003, he became an anti-terror campaigner and pro-American activist in the Muslim communities. A specimen of his last radio programme on 14 July 2004 on Zuria FM in the Ashanti region sheds light on the sudden change in his attitude towards the United State, before his untimely death four days later on 18 July, 2004. Below is the

conversation with the audience on the radio about his perception of America and her foreign

Question; People regard America as an enemy of Islam, what is your position about this view?

Taufiq; before my trip to America, I was holding such a negative view. My negative perception about America was coloured by the American foreign policies, which invariably affect Muslim countries, such as the American invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan and the problem of Palestinians. However, upon my few days stay in the United States I gathered a contrary view altogether about America. For example, there are sizeable numbers of Muslims who are in the States but are not being harassed or persecuted.

Question; It has been alleged that you have been bought by the American government, because you used to be a staunch critic of the United States' foreign policies, what accounts for your change of attitude?

Taufiq; I have been hearing these utterances before my trip and when I came from the States it worsened people's perception about me. It is rather an unfortunate perception; I will advise that people always think well about others and do away with rumours.

You know that it is a fact that somebody like me cannot be employed by the United States, because of my religious stance and principles. My earlier view about the United States' foreign policies has never changed so why should people be accusing me that I have changed from my critical stance against United States. Granted we realize that Muslims are being given a raw deal and persecuted everywhere. I will launch a campaign against such a country or the people involved in the practice. What then is the problem?

I do not think it is even necessary to be reacting to rumours. I have even heard that I have been given unique standing to the United States President. This is strange, I will have wished so, so that I will tell him the truth and demand the right of every Muslim in the world. I am proud that it was through me that some of the *Ulama* in Kumasi have had the chance to travel to America.

Question; is there any difference between the practices of Islam in America and that of Ghana?

Taufiq; There are vast differences. The major difference is that in Africa, the understanding of Islam is mixed and coloured with our cultural practices and in reality; most African cultural practices

are negative which outweighed the actual Islamic practices.

On the other hand, most Muslims in the United States do not have strong attachment to their traditional and cultural practices, thereby giving them the opportunity to be imbued with the real and strict Islamic principles.

Perhaps the other contributory factor is the strict enforcement of the rule of law in America. For instance, when I was in Detroit as if I was in Makkah, because I have not seen any Muslim woman without a veil, it is only her face that could be seen. You can even see men dressed as though they are in Makkah. In another area known as Manhattan, the Muslim woman could only be identified by her dress.

It can therefore be observed that in targeting for dialogue of Imams and *Ulama* the American officials eventually brought about a substantial decrease in anti-American sentiment in Ghana. This changed perception of the United States has become the major position of the majority of the *Ulama* and Imams in Ghana. It shows that *Ulama* interaction with the West and the United States in the post 9/11 is yielding positive results in terms of an altered perception of the West on the part of the Muslim communities. It further suggests that these *Ulama* have had much insight into the progressive nature of the American Islam which could be replicated in Ghana.

Though the late Taufiq's sudden change in attitude, from being anti-American to pro-American after his trip to the United States was due to his earlier ignorance as to the extent of liberty and freedom that Muslims enjoy in the United States, it has also been opportunistic, for his own convenience. This is because the very conditions of Muslims on which his criticism of the United States' foreign policies depended on prior to his trip to the United States have not changed for the better. They have rather worsened specifically, the United States' invasion of Iraq following its invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, Taufiq's altered positive attitude towards the United States was partly a trade-off for development

projects. This is evident from the fact that United States built a health unit and a vocational training centre for the ASWAJ members in Kumasi, who were led by the late Taufiq. Finally, he was favourably treated by the American Embassy in Ghana, in that; some of his colleagues were recruited to visit the United States through him. In all, the stance taking by the late Taufiq shows the realism and pragmatism a Muslim scholar can adopt towards global issues, by taking into account the immediate interest of his community and moving away from being an ignorant critic to an objective analyst.

It can thus be seen that the Ghanaian Muslims' perception of the United States is being dictated by two factors, namely internal and external. The internal factors influenced the respondents to perceive the United States in a positive way, whereas the external factors influenced them to perceive the United States in a negative way. The internal factor in this context could be that the extension of the United States' development projects to Ghanaian Muslims is greatly changing their perceptions of the United States. This is manifested in the respondents' altered view of the United States, namely, that it is interested in developing Muslim communities in Ghana, and their realization that these communities have something in common with the United States.

The external factors influencing the respondents' negative perception of the United States could be her military operations in some Muslim countries as part of her war on terrorism. It is clear that despite the fact that the United States has established a good rapport with the leadership of the Ghanaian Muslim and their organizations, their perception of the United States as a friend of Islam and Muslims remains negative. In short, the United States' foreign policies in the Middle-East and her war on terrorism are affecting Ghanaian's perceptions of her negatively and she is seen as being anti-Islam and anti-Muslims. This

finding is in conformity with the United States National Intelligence Estimate which is based on an analysis of all 16 of America's intelligence agencies. This has established that the United State's war in Iraq is fueling anti-American sentiment world-wide (*Daily graphic*, 25 September, 2006).

7.8.4 Compatibility between Islamic and Western Values

The other major issue that the research dwelt on was the cultural compatibility between Islamic and Western values. This was with a view to ascertaining from the respondents whether Islamic values and Western culture converge. It was also part of the broad objective of the research to identify from them a point of convergence on which Ghanaian Muslims, the West, and more specifically, the United States could cooperate. The result reveals that about 56 percent of the respondents think that Islam is in a perpetual conflict with the West in terms of values, whereas 19 percent of the respondents indicated that Islamic and Western values are in harmony. About 25 percent of the respondents indicated that they had no views to express on this issue.

As to whether Islam is in a perpetual conflict with the Western world in terms of values, as far as the gender of the respondents is concerned, about 60 percent of the male respondents as against 40 percent of the female think that Islamic and Western cultures do not correspond. On the other hand, about 27 percent of the female respondents as against about 17 percent of the male argue that Islamic and Western cultures are in harmony. The finding therefore shows two distinct views and perspectives on the convergence or otherwise of Islamic and Western cultures, based on the gender of the respondents. Although it is men who generally shape the minds of Muslims in Ghana on religious issues, coincidentally, the research result shows that they hold negative perceptions of the congruity of Western

culture with Islamic values. However, women who invariably depend on men for religious education hold a different view of this congruity of Western and Islamic values. While much is not known about the reasons for the women's view, it does suggest that they are more receptive and more open in their opinions about Islamic and Western cultures. It could, therefore, be concluded that Muslim women tend to look at the commonalities which bring the Western and Islamic or Muslim values together. The Muslim males, on the other hand, concentrate on the major differences between the two values before arriving at this

Again, the results show that about 43 and 18 percent of the students and the Imams believe that Islamic and Western values are incongruous. The Imams who represent the nucleus for the interpretation of Islam have a variant perspective as to the differences between Islamic and Western cultures. The major argument offered by some of the Imams is that Islamic culture and values impose some extent of limitation on Muslim behaviour and activities, in contrast with the nature of Western culture which is, to a larger extent, too permissive as to behaviours and activities.

That this view emanates from the Imams implies that, since it is they who are responsible for moulding Muslim character and culture they impart such irreconcilable religious orientation on the ordinary Muslims. In other words, they make the ordinary Muslims accept the view that Islamic values and the Western culture are incongruous. The origin of this cultural incompatibility between Islamic and Western values among the Imams could be partly attributed to in the vast difference between the centers of education and orientation where the Ghanaian *Ulama* and Imams in Ghana were trained. The fact is that Muslim *Ulma* and Imams invariably receive their professional training from the Arab world which

is culturally and homogenously Islamic and devoid of any Western cultural influence. Thus, there is a greater tendency on their part to conclude that Islamic values are more congruous with Arabian culture than that of the West as a result of their lack of exposure to the Western world.

The students' position could also be that the Islamic resurgence supported by the Ghana Muslim Students Association (GMSA) in the higher educational institutions has created awareness among the student groups of the fact that their cultural values differ from those of the West. One cannot also underestimate the influence of the transnational Muslim organizations in Ghana among the Muslim students such as Al-Muntada Al-Islami, Huda Islami, and the Revival Islamic Heritage Society. These transnational Muslim organizations serve as the largest source of funding for students' activities and programmes in organizing forums, religious camps and workshops geared towards orienting Muslim students in Ghana along a particular Islamic perspective.

The congruity of Islamic values or otherwise with the West is sometimes shaky. Studies suggest that it is much related to historical episodes as it sometimes overlaps and diverges at different times. For instance, Ali Mazrui argues that relations between Islamic and Western values suggest a complex account of convergences and divergences in the 20th and 21st centuries. The specific areas in which both values were congruous in the first half of the 20th century, were in the areas of sexual behavior, gender roles, alcohol consumption and the death penalty (Mazrui 2007: 793). However, in the second half of 20th century, the relationship between Euro-American values and traditional Islamic values diverged in as far as sex, alcohol and drugs are concerned. In the 21st century the relationship between Euro-American and Islamic values still continues to diverge as American social norms become too

permissive with the idea of same sex marriages, and intolerant tendencies between the two cultures continue to flourish (Ibid). Lastly, this century is also witnessing a deeper democratization of the Muslim world as there is recognition of the impotence of political structures in it (Mazrui 2007:793). In my opinion, it is significant to state that Islamic values throughout its historical encounter with the West have remained largely stable and exceptionally consistent. It is rather Western values which sometimes converge with Islam or otherwise.

This cultural incongruity as shown by these Ghanaian respondents is also being partially influenced by the transnational Muslim *Ulama* in the West African sub-region who visit Ghana. The network created by the Ahlus-Sunnah sect in Ghana with other sister organizations in the Sub-region of West Africa provides such forum. The annual convention of the Ahlus-Sunnah movement is one of these forums which attract like-minded scholars from the Sub-region. Kabir H.Gombe, a member of the *Yan Izala* in Nigeria and a well respected scholar in Ghana holds the notion of cultural incongruity between the Islamic and the Western values.

In one of his presentation at the annual convention of ASWAJ on 28 September 2006, he linked Western values as being too steep in immorality. He argued that Western conspiracy makes the Muslim youth to believe that it is fashionable to be immoral. He identified the Western-driven technology as the major instruments through which the West corrupts the Muslim youth. The mobile phone is one of such instrument, as it is used to promote immorality in diverse ways (Gombe presentation, 28 September 2006). From the onset, to activate the Nokia handset, for example, a man extends a hand to a woman is seen; and this, in a way, promotes immorality, Gombe contended. Secondly, he continued, Muslim youth

have now been taught how to down-load immoral materials on their handsets which are accessible anywhere and any time

Further reasons were cited by Gombe as to the incongruity of Islamic and Western values. For instance, in his estimation, it is rare to meet a virgin in the United States older than 15. The adage that ‘a person’s problem is like somebody who has been assigned to identify a virgin lady in the United States’ is a common saying used to describe how difficult it is to come by something one needs. Also at Oklahoma University in the United States it is quite usual for someone to have sex with any woman one wants (Gombe presentation, 28 September 2006). Also, same sex marriages are permissible in the West by two states of the United States. He indicated that it has reached a point that a husband can put an advertisement inviting people to have sex with his wife on a commercial basis. This he concludes that the Western propaganda targets the youth with a view to diluting the Islamic values in the world. (Gombe presentation, 28th September 2006)

However, it has been argued that to assume that Islam is incompatible with Western values and civilization is to ignore past and present exchanges and cross-fertilizations. It also implies that civilizations are mutually exclusive and diametrically opposed (Esposito, 2002:123). This tendency therefore encourages prejudices and a sense of exclusivity of one group above the other, with potential for breeding conflicts and misunderstandings in the world.

Notwithstanding this, some respondents also believe that Islamic and Western values are compatible. This view was mostly seen in respondents in the teaching profession (33%), non-sectarian Muslims (39%), and public servants (15%). The background of these

respondents suggests that the nature of their professions entails interacting with people of diverse background and religious orientations. This therefore made them to appreciate the common values binding them to others. Thus, it could be concluded that a person's occupation which makes him/her interact with others with different religious backgrounds will infuse a sense of commonality with the people concerned rather than identifying the differences with the group.

In conclusion, it has been observed that Islamic and Western values have experienced some level of flexibility during the course of history. However, various factors have influenced the views of the respondents as to the compatibility between Islamic and Western values. For instance, the Imams, men and the students' hold the view that Islamic and Western values do not converge due to the role that they play in the society and the relationships they have or maintain with the Muslim world and the role of transnational Muslim bodies in Ghana. Further, it has also been established that those who believe that Islamic and Western values are compatible were influenced by the nature of their occupation which exposes them to people of different religious orientations.

7.8.5 Avenues for Constructive Cultural Dialogue


As shown earlier, the majority of the respondents think that Islamic and Western values are not congruous. They, however, suggested possible areas of cultural dialogue which could improve constructive engagement between the West and the Muslim *Ummah* globally. Such constructive cultural engagement will dispel and demystify the widely held notion in the Muslim communities that the Western world is basically biased towards Christianity whereas the Arab world is biased towards Islam. This tendency will eventually promote harmonious and shared transnational relations in Ghana.

Generally, the result reveals that a fair representation of Islamic and Muslim issues in the Western media (52.9%) emerged as the topmost, followed by inter-faith dialogue (26.4%), assistance in the form of development projects (12.1 %), among many other issues.

As to the gender of the respondent, the survey reveals that men mostly identified issues that reflect their profession or related to their domain, such as inter-faith dialogue and the participation of Western Muslims in the cultural dialogue. In fact, about 29 percent of the men, as against 19 percent of the women identified inter-faith dialogue as a possible area for improving constructive cultural dialogue between the West and the Muslims globally. The other characteristic drawn from the survey’s findings is that the men identified with the participation of Western Muslims in improving cultural dialogue as against the women who did not identify with this view. This, therefore, means that the views of the men have been dictated by the direct benefit of such programmes to them.


On the other hand, the result also shows that about 22 percent of the female respondents as against 10 percent of the men dominated in the view that cultural dialogue could improve constructive engagement between the West and Muslim *Ummah* through assistance in the form of development projects. It could therefore be observed that the women focus on those issues which have direct benefit to the larger society rather than to themselves.

Fig. 4: Gender perspective as to whether Islam is in a perpetual conflict with the Western world in terms of values



(Source: Survey Data 2005)

Fig 5. Gender perspective and avenues of cultural dialogue to improving constructive engagement between the West and Muslim *Ummah* globally



[Source: Survey Data 2005]


The result also shows that the students (46%), the *Tijaniyya* (27%), and the Ahlus-Sunnah sect members (26%) in that order, proposed that the best platform for creating cultural dialogue between the West and the Muslim *Ummah* globally is through inter-faith dialogue. The nature of the respondents' proposal suggests that they believe that contemporary global problems originate from religious differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. Even though inter-faith dialogue has not generated much interest in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Ghana, lack of it has caused some religious skirmishes between Muslims and non-Muslims in recent times (Samwini, 2003: 200-208.).

The respondents identified the fair representation of Islam and Muslim issues in the Western media as the best possible avenue for improving cultural dialogue for constructive engagement. The result shows that non-sectarian Muslims (33%) and those in the teaching profession (28%) were associated with this view. This implies that the nature of the Portrayal of Islamic and Muslim issues has been the major source of concern of people within this group. The obvious deduction from this negative portrayal of Muslim issues and the images of Islam in the Western media is its effect on the identity of Muslims globally.

This tendency has therefore compelled the respondents to suggest the need for corrective measures to remedy the situation.


The outcome of the research therefore shows that two distinct positions were suggested by the respondents for constructive cultural dialogue initiatives to bridge the cultural gap between the Muslim *Ummah* and the West. The first proposition for cultural dialogue between the West and the Muslim *Ummah* is through inter-faith dialogue. The second view is the need for fair representation of Islamic and Muslim issues in the Western media. Each view has its advantages. For instance, one cannot underestimate the role of inter-religious dialogue in fostering understanding and accommodation of each other's faith, gaining respect, and promoting unity in shared endeavors (Ramadan, 2004:200). However, one major contradiction in the respondents' view on the inter-religious dialogue is the concern attached to dialogue with non-Muslims in the West at the expense of Ghanaian non-Muslims. The reason for this is that some of the respondents' view is that the Western world tends to misinform the non-Muslims in the Third World about Islam and Muslim issues through the media and governmental policies.

% 6: Occupational perspectives and the view that Islam is in perpetual conflict with the Western world in terms of values



(Source: Survey Data 2005)

ftp. 7: Occupational perspectives and avenues for cultural dialogue to improving constructive engagement between the West and Muslim *Ummah* globally



[Source: Survey Data 2005]

As the American rapprochement to Muslims in Ghana was linked to her interest to educate Muslims globally on the menace of terrorism, the next section further explores that. It will do that by examining Muslims understanding of the causes of terrorism and how it has impacted on them.



7.9 CONCLUSION

The post 11 September 2001 incidents ushered in the third phase of Ghanaian Muslims' transnational relations with the West, especially the United States. The significance of Muslim relations with the United States in the post 9/11 period is that it offers an opportunity to narrow the cultural gap existing between Ghanaian Muslims and the United States. This, in the end, has helped to dilute Ghanaian Muslims' propensity to anti-Western and anti-American sentiment. While Ghanaian Muslims' relations with the Arab world were championed by Islamic seminary trained *Ulama*, the United States rapprochement to Ghanaian Muslims was purely propelled by Western educated Muslims. This shows the extent to which acquisition of a particular education can predispose people to certain regimes interest.

The result shows that the initial stage of this new rapprochement shown by the United States towards Muslims in Ghana was difficult for the facilitators (FAGLAT). Despite this, Ghanaian Muslims suggested the focus of their relationship with the West and United States to be in the realms of providing educational opportunities, health facilities, HIV/AIDS education etc. This is partly to maximize the benefits of their transnational relations with the United States.

The value of the United States' dialogue with Ghanaian Muslims is shown in the fact that majority of them think that the United States has a hidden agenda for initiating this rapprochement. Others, however, also believe that it will promote understanding and result in opportunities to tap the expertise of the United States.

The perception of Ghanaian Muslims about the United States before and after 9/11 provides a mixed response. This is evident in their appreciation that the United States has something in common with Ghanaian Muslims and she is interested in developing Muslim communities in Ghana. They, nevertheless, argue that the United States is anti-Islam and not Muslims friendly.

In view of the fact that the United States relations with Muslims was a novel one in Muslim history in Ghana, some respondents believe that Islamic and Western values are incongruous. However, the research explores from these respondents new avenues that cultural congruity between the Islamic and the Western world could be established. In the estimation of these respondents, cultural congruity between them and the United States can be constructed on the following areas; fair representation of Islam in the Western media, inter-faith dialogue, and the participation of Western Muslims to improve cultural dialogue

between Muslims and the West. In all, it shows that Muslims in Ghana attach much concern about their religious identity.

This exploratory background captures Muslims new relations with the United States. However one important issue which is not addressed is what has been the overriding interest of this new rapprochement towards Muslims in Ghana? The next section identifies issues arising from that which is tied to the United States policy of educating Muslims on terrorism.

CHAPTER EIGHT

go TERRORISM: THE THRUST OF UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

8.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the attitude of Ghanaian Muslims towards terrorism is discussed in the light of the United States' movement towards rapprochement with the Muslim world. As observed in our introduction to chapter eight which deals with Ghanaian Muslims relations with the United States in the post-9/11, the present chapter deals with the motive behind the interest of the United States in the Muslim communities, that being the need to educate Muslims on the causes and the possible solutions to terrorism.

Such discussion is necessary because of the interconnectedness of Ghanaian Muslims with the wider Muslim world. Fundamentally, Muslim world has been described by the West and the United States as those states which fan trans-Islamic terrorism throughout the world. Transnational Muslim extremism directed at the West and the United States drove their interest in the Muslim communities globally. This interest is aimed at mitigating anti-Western and anti-American sentiments, as well as to bridge the perceived cultural gap between the Muslim *Ummah* and the West.

Generally, the post 9/11 period provides a unique opportunity to narrow the extreme gap between an understanding of the causes of and solutions to terrorism. That this understanding is conflicted can be seen in the fact that Muslims refer to the conditions which give rise to terrorism, while the West is concerned about the appropriate means of seeking redress to issues. Another concern of the Western world is the need on the part of Muslims to separate political grievances from religious motives.

g3 BACKGROUND TO TERRORISM

The word 'terrorism' was first used in a political context in the latter part of the 18th century during the French Revolution especially in (1789-1799). The harsh rule of the Committee of Public Safety (1793-1795) led by Maximilien Robespierre was known as the Reign of Terror, during which time thousands were guillotined. The term continues to be used, although now it refers to the targeting of civilians and institutions through mass destruction and aimed at achieving political, religious, ethnic, or other goals.

So far, there is no universal and acceptable definition for the term terrorism among the international community. As a result, this has been restricted to an individual nation-state's understanding of the term. The lack of international consensus on what terrorism is, resulted in its definition being based on what it constitutes.

However, it can be argued that, terrorism could be recognized on the basis of the following criteria: violence, target, objective, motive, perpetrator, and legitimacy or legality of the act. For instance, it is unanimously agreed that, terrorism involves acts of violence or threats of violence. Nevertheless, violence alone does not constitute an act of terrorism. In addition, the act of terrorism involves deliberate targeting of civilians. The objective of terrorism involves an attempt to put fear and intimidation in the civilian population, government functionaries, and society. Again, terrorism could also be understood in terms of its motive. This could be to achieve political, religious, and ethnic goals through the spread of fear and mayhem. Perpetrators of acts of terrorism could include a government, as the case of state-sponsored terrorism, organizations, and individuals.

Despite that there is no unanimous definition of terrorism, Alex P. Schmid after a comprehensive review and consultations with other academics proposed that, an act of terrorism is the ‘peacetime equivalent of a war crime’ (Quoted by P.Heymann 2004:4). Similarly, the United States Defense Department defines terrorism as ‘the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.’ Also, Ghana’s Anti-Terrorism Act defines terrorism as an ‘act or threat of action in or outside the Republic which constitutes an offence within the scope of an international counterterrorism convention to which the Republic is a party’ (Ghana Anti-Terrorism Act, 2005).

The international community, realizing the potential threat of terrorism, has taken several measures to address this menace. These originate from international organizations or continental, sub-regional or national level. Some of the international conventions enacted by the international community to address the menace of terrorism were the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Act against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

Significantly, in the wake of terrorist attacks on the United States of America, in 2001 the United Nations under the mandate of its Security Council adopted resolution 1373, which obliges member countries to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts. Also, the Commonwealth Plan of Action on Terrorism enjoins member states to implement the United Nations Resolution 1373. In respect of the African continent, there

is the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism known as the 1999 OAU Convention. Ghana, being a signatory to these international conventions, drafted an Anti-Terrorism Act to address the menace of terrorism within its territorial boundaries.

Religious terrorism is one of the main threats to international peace and civilization. Religious extremism is embodied in the use of violence in furtherance of a perceived divinely commanded purpose. This religious extremism is not exclusive to one religion but permeates all. In the case of Islam, the perception of Islamic organizations which represent the focal point of Islamic Resurgence is a mixed one, depending upon the perceiver. For instance, they are perceived by the West and others as embodying the Islamic threat to the world. It is argued that Islamic organizations are destabilizing forces in the world that will use any tactics to gain power and achieve their aim. For others, however, they represent an authentic alternative to corrupt, exhausted, and ineffectual regimes (Esposito, 1992: 119).

The destabilizing nature of some Islamic organizations in the contemporary times emanate from the manner and the method that they employ to achieve their goals. This is largely through violence. Also, they utilize Islamic symbols and images in respect of their political agenda and identities to achieve their goals. Examples of these organizations' include; the Party of God (*JHizbullah*), Holy War (*Jihad*), Army of God (*Jundullah*), and Salvation from Hell (*Takfir Wa Hijra*). These names, therefore, conjure up among non-Muslims images of religious fanaticism and extremism with their devastating consequences on mankind.

The causes of religious terrorism in the Muslim world could be sought through the origin of Islamic reform and renewal embedded in the Islamic concept of *Tajdid* (revival) and *Islah* (reform). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries revivalist leadership sprang up across

the Islamic world with the aim of bettering the lot of the *Ummah*. For instance, in the Sudan, the Mahdi (1848-85), emerged, whereas in Libya the Sanusi arose from 1787-1859. In Saudi Arabia, the *Wahhabi*, with their puritanical and Unitarian ideology, appeared in 1703-92. The West African version of Islamic revival emanated from the modern day Nigeria led by the Fulani leaders from 1754-1817 (Esposito, 1992: 119). There were similar movements in other parts of the world to meet the challenges confronted by the Muslim *Ummah*.

The origin and the causes of Islamic revivalism were internally motivated, because they responded to decline in the various Islamic States. Muslim leaders in the eighteenth century responded to economic and socio-moral decline, military defeats, and political division within the imperial sultanates. Muslim leaders at that time argued that the causes of Muslim decline were due to the departure from true Islamic values (Esposito, 1992:55). Though, the struggles that these Muslim leaders embarked upon to bring about socio-moral reform in their respective societies were not necessarily intended to create mayhem, their actions were embodied in violence. However, terrorism in recent times has taken on a transnational dimension, particularly targeting the interest of the West and the United States.

The position of the Ghanaian Muslims must be seen, not in isolation, but in the context of the West African sub-region in which they live, since they interrelate with neighboring West African Muslims religiously, ethnically and culturally. Ghana is surrounded by Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Togo. None of these states, however, wields any strong Islamic influence on Ghanaian Muslims, like its other neighbour, Nigeria. This can be discerned in an examination of the role played by transnational and itinerant Nigerian scholars in the Muslim communities in Ghana. David Dickson supports the view that the Nigerian Islamic

Resurgence, which was encouraged by the long-standing transnational connections of West African Muslims to Middle Eastern centres of learning, could result in the spread of the Nigerian brand of puritanical Islam to West African sub-region (Dickson, 2004). This is also supported by African security analyst's assessment of Nigeria in that recent events in the north-east Nigeria, particularly in Bomo and Yobe, point to evidence of a connection between a militant youth group of Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah and the Taliban of Afghanistan. The group has been involved in attacks on police stations, government offices and civilians. The likelihood of the group exporting their brand of Islam to and recruiting others in the sub-region of West Africa is high (Obi, 2007: 25). The fact that the Hausa language has its origins in Nigeria, being the dominant lingua franca in the southern and northern Muslim part of Ghana, and is used in the exposition of Islam in Ghana further attests to the fact the Nigerian Hausa *Ulama* still wield influence on Ghanaian Muslims. The recent conviction of a Ghanaian Muslim, Sumaila Abubakari (who used the fake name Manfo Kwaku Asiedu) in London over the failed 2005 London bombings suggests that acts of terrorism could also be perpetrated by Ghanaian nationals both inside and outside the territorial borders of Ghana (Daily Graphic, November 21, 2007: 24). The long-standing transnational connections of post-independence Ghanaian Muslims with the Middle-Eastern centers of Islamic learning which have been variously blamed as the source of transnational terrorism in the world, reinforces the potential threat of terrorism in Ghana (Rabasa et al, 2004:81). While the interest of Ghanaian Muslims in the Arab/Islamic world is primarily dictated by two major factors, namely to seek religious direction and acquire funding for Islamic activities and development projects, it in effect exposes them to potential external manipulation and influences with their concomitant terrorist undertone.

The thrust of this study is the United States' rapprochement with Ghanaian Muslims, with her anti-terror campaign, and education projects in the Muslim communities of Ghana. This thesis will ascertain how Ghanaian Muslims balance their interconnection with their ethnic, cultural and religious counterparts among the Muslims in the West African sub-region and their co-religionists in the Middle-East on the one hand and their objective perspectives on the causes and solutions to terrorism in the world on the other hand.

Questionnaires were administered in the field. These were targeted at the various strata in the Muslim communities of Ghana and the respondents' responses were analyzed. Specifically, the research targeted the Muslims' gender as well as age, occupation, and adherence to a particular doctrine in the Muslim communities, among other factors.

The major issues that we ascertained from the respondents were the causes of terrorism, the impact of terrorism on Ghanaian Muslims and its eradication. Other issues also included *Ulama in Da 'wa* against terrorism as well as the factors affecting their role.

8.3 CAUSES OF TERRORISM

The respondents expressed their views as to the causes of terrorism. It must be emphasized that the causes of terrorism are complex and therefore cannot be discussed exhaustively in this study. Thus, the opinions of the scholars who study terrorism have also been varied. In this regard, the causes of international terrorism are normally seen by others as reflecting chronic moral and conscious crises experienced by the international political system (Hageel, 2002: 81). This is because these crises are results of contradictions between the ideal objectives of the international system and certain actions perpetrated by the super Powers. The significance of identifying the causes of terrorism in the world has been

supported by Mazrui. In order to reinforce the significance and the adequate diagnosis of the causes of terrorism, he compares the role of detectives who identify the anonymous murderer to someone identifying the causes of terrorism. He argues that in investigating a simple murder, the detectives seek clues from the victim of the homicide, asking for instance, why this person was the target? They then try to identify the motive for the murder, that is, which issue precipitated the crime? The detectives try to fathom what kind of person would have committed such a crime, that is, the profile of the killer (Mazrui, 2005:16).

The Higher Committee for Fighting Terrorism of the United Nations (UN) has in a report issued on 29/2 /1979, identified the causes of terrorism as ranging from political, economic and social conditions. The political conditions could be discerned from the reports as emanating from hegemony of one country, racism, use of force against weak states and countries. Others include, complete or partial foreign occupation, interference in the affairs of other countries etc (Hageel 2002:81). The economic factors have to do with lack of balance in the international economic system and foreign exploitation of natural resources of others. The social conditions include violation of human rights, deprivation, starvation, misery and illiteracy.

Aspects of the research findings also corroborate the UN's perspective on the causes of terrorism in the world. Among the causes of terrorism as identified by the respondents from the survey was:


1. injustice, unfairness, and oppression of others (52.3),
2. denial of people of their rights (19.2%),
3. interference in internal affairs of other nation (14.5%),

4. unlawful occupation of the lands of other states (11.9%), and
5. Governments' harassment and oppression of religious leaders (2.1 %).

Thus, the causes of terrorism identified by the United Nations are accidentally similar to the perception of terrorism identified by Ghanaian Muslims.

The majority of the respondents identified injustice, unfairness, and oppression as the leading causes of terrorism in the world. The following were identified by the respondents as secondary causes of terrorism, namely, the denial of people's rights, followed by the interference in the internal affairs of other nations and, finally, the unlawful occupation of the lands of other states. As shown above, government harassment and oppression of religious leaders was the least significant cause of terrorism as identified by some respondents. Chart 1, below, indicates the causes of terrorism.

Fig. 8: Causes of terrorism



[Source: Survey Data 2006)

With this background in mind, the survey result will critically assess the views of respondents ® relation to the causes of world terrorism while taking into consideration their demographic characteristics.

The male group representing (79%), Ahlus-Sunnah sect (53%), and the Imams (24%) were those who mostly identified injustice, unfairness, and oppression of others as probable causes of terrorism. On the other hand, 50% of both the students and the teachers also believe that harassment and oppression of religious leaders by the government give an impetus to world terrorism. Lastly, the view that terrorism is precipitated by the unlawful occupation of others lands was largely that of the students, the Ahlus-Sunnah, and the non-sectarian Muslims.

The possible reasons accounting for the respondents' identification of these diverse views as to the causes of terrorism emanates from their unique demographic background. Generally, the Ahlus-Sunnah and the Imams are associated with the view that terrorism is being caused by injustice, unfairness, and oppression of other people, means that these groups prefer to identify certain attributes and values which describe the action or inaction of others. This could be gleaned from the fact that injustice and unfairness are values connoting undesirable and unacceptable behaviour towards other people. The partial reason for this view of the Imams is that their role in the society which is to give religious direction has enabled them to pass judgment in respect of people's conduct and behaviour. This is because they preside over and adjudicate cases on religious and social matters. This can, of course, suggest that these respondents pass value judgment on certain political events. These events serve as a catalyst for the breeding and perpetuation of terrorism. The danger that terrorism can thrive on injustice and unfairness has also been stressed. It has been argued that terrorism attacks a perceived injustice by imposing an indiscriminate message of fear. It does not distinguish between the guilty or innocent and destroys all without regard to culpability or individual responsibility (El Fadl, 2001: 118).

In Islam, justice (*Adi*) and fairness (*Hakim*) are the attributes of Allah. Muslims are expected to emulate these qualities in order to attain and achieve the highest divine favour. Islam also expects that humankind treats one another with the sense of fairness regardless of the other person's religious, political, and or ethnic persuasions. This view is amply demonstrated in the Quran, which states:

'O you who believe stand out firmly, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear God, for God is well acquainted with all that you do'.

The foundation of the respondents' argument is therefore well-based on Islamic values and the application of these values is universal to all humankind irrespective of a person's background. It therefore means that justice and fairness are values with which everybody deserves to be treated, regardless of the background of either party. Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure what actually constitutes these values justice and fairness since they can be subjective sometimes. This makes it difficult to address issues of justice and fairness from an objective and universal perspective.

The religious dimension of the causes of terrorism is based on the premise that terrorism is brought about by the harassment of religious leaders by governments. This explains why some governments see a link between religious leaders and the causes of terrorism. There are several matters that have influenced the views of the respondents as to the relationship between religion and terrorism. First, these respondents tend to observe the religious symbols and concepts that terrorists associate with their cause, such as *Jihad* (Holy war), *Shahid* (martyrdom), war against infidels, etc. Not much could be derived from the background of the teachers and the students and their having any transnational contact with

the Muslim world. It could, however, be said that they have relied upon mass media to corroborate this view. Because when the view of these respondents was further examined, some of them were referring to events leading to political unrest in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt as a result of the Islamists making strong in-roads into the politics of those countries.

Some instances of the religious harassment and persecution of *Ulama* in the Muslim world are evident when Saudi dissidents' seizure of the Grand Mosque and accusing the Saudi royal family of compromising their *Wahhabiyya* faith. This resulted in brutal reprisals at the hands of the government against the group, without calling for dialogue to resolve the problem (Esposito, 2002:48). Again, in the 1990s and the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Saudi Government had to move forcefully to arrest and silence independent civilian *Ulama* in Mecca, Medina and Riyadh who were calling for greater political participation and accountability, and denouncing religious deviance and corruption. The same could be said about the Egyptian and Algerian governments' relations with Islamists in their respective countries (Esposito, 2002:48). All these add to the respondents' perception that the harassment of religious leaders in the Muslim world by government precipitates terrorism.

It is, however, worth stating that, the Islamists' approach to political issues in the Muslim world partly contributes to this tendency. In Egypt, for example, Muslim dissidents in a desperate attempt to coerce the government to implement Islamic law, attacked Coptic Christian churches, and destroyed Christian's shops and properties: bars and nightclubs, cinemas and video stores. All symbols of Western influence and immorality, were burned or bombed (Esposito, 1995: 98) Again, in the aftermath of the implementation of the Shari'ah

in Northern Nigeria, similar negative pictures were painted by the Islamists, where they closed non-Muslim drinking bars, cinemas and other entertainment centres.

In addition, the view that terrorism is caused by the unlawful occupation of the lands of another nation was shared by some respondents. This view is as a result of the respondents' observation of the problems in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Islam is the predominant religious affiliation of the citizens of these states. Also, conditions that cause terrorism can be found in these countries, thereby suggesting that in recent times they have contributed most to the causes of terrorism. This view is supported by the statement of the would-be London bomber, Usman Hussain, that he and two of his colleagues were motivated by the invasion of Iraq by the Coalition Forces led by the United States with the resultant killing of children and innocent people. He added that one Said Mukhtar showed them a DVD with images of children and women killed by American and British soldiers. Hussain concluded that films showing the atrocities committed by the coalition's occupation forces in Iraq helped to foster the group's political conviction to target Western interests (*The Muslim searchlight*, 2005: 5).

Perhaps, the understanding of these would-be terrorists might have arisen from their misinterpretation of the religious stance of some Muslim *Ulama* on how to deal with Western super-powers' occupation of Muslim lands, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi being one of them. He argues that fighting against the occupation of the Coalition Forces led by the United States in Iraq and other occupied Muslim countries is a legitimate form of resistance (*Muslim searchlight*, 2004: 9). He added that, fighting the Western invaders in Iraq is an obligation, which is endorsed by heavenly religions and international agreements. He,

however, distinguished between Western civilians whom Islam strictly forbids to be attacked in this sense as against the invading soldiers who could be legitimately targeted.

In short, various causes of terrorism were identified by the respondents. These include injustice and unfairness, government harassment of religious leaders, denial of other people of their rights and the unlawful occupation of another nation.

8.4 THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON GHANAIAAN MUSLIMS


The impact of global terrorism on humankind has no geographic boundaries. This is due to the intertwined and interdependent nature of our lives with people of other continents. The Ghanaian Muslims' relationship with the wider world is no exception. More importantly, the post-independence period has significantly reinforced Ghanaian Muslims relations with the Arab and Islamic world, making the *Ummah* factor in Muslim life more prominent. Part of the positive relations between Ghanaian Muslims and the Muslim world (as observed in chapters' four and five) has been reinforced by the constant flow of resources and funding from the Muslim world for developmental projects and Islamic activities in Ghana

However, the consequences of war on terrorism have had its manifold effects on Ghanaian Muslims/Arab world relations. This is because aspects of the broader policy of the war against terrorism put emphasis on scrutinizing Islamic Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and institutions which provide developments to Muslims globally and Ghanaian Muslims are no exception. The Islamic NGOs have been variously labeled by the United States and the West as a haven for terrorists because; they lack effective governmental supervision (Benthall, 2007:6). It was against this background that the assessment of the impact of terrorism on Ghanaian Muslims was necessary in order to reveal its unique nature.

Although about 53 percent of the respondents could not indicate the impact of terrorism on them or on the Ghanaian Muslim society, six (6) areas of concern were identified by 47 percent of the other respondents. The following are the general findings on the impact of terrorism on Ghanaian Muslims in descending order:

1. it has affected the smooth flow of resources to Islamic NGOs (16.6%),
 2. refusal of job opportunities to Muslims (15.0%),
 3. it has affected the reputation and the image of Ghanaian Muslims (8.3%),
 4. the effect of terrorism in the Dagbon traditional area (3.6%),
 5. Muslims are labeled terrorists when they are involved in any act of violence (3.1%),
- and.
6. Islam is not attractive to enlightened non-Muslims (.5%).

Fig. 9: Areas that terrorism has impacted on Ghanaian Muslims



[Source: Survey Data 2006)

The background of the respondents shows that the male (85%), teachers (44%) and the Ahhis-Sunnah (38%) respondents, in that order, believe that terrorism has affected the image and reputation of Ghanaian Muslims. This means that the actions of a minority of Muslims do affect the larger Muslim *Ummah*. This also implies that the larger Muslim

Ummah is made to carry the burden of some Muslims who have not been mandated by them to carry out acts of terrorism.

Part of the effect on the Muslim image and identity could also be the stereotypical tendency on the part of others to question the moral probity of the Islamic tradition and that of the larger Muslim *Ummah*'s culture. This is because in every religious category, there are people whose actions and behaviour cannot be taken as truly representative of the larger group. This situation has therefore found its expression among the respondents who believe that the action of a minority of Muslims has affected their integrity and image as Muslims.

The Imams (33%) and the Ahlus-Sunnah members (72%) respectively raised the issue of the impact of terrorism on the smooth flow of resources to Ghanaian Muslims from the Arab and the Muslim world. The dominance of the Imams and the Ahlus-Sunnah members in respect of this view implies that the operation of Islamic NGOs is mostly being spearheaded by the *Ulama* and Ahlus-Sunnah members. This is shown in the ownership of such Islamic organizations in Ghana such as Al-Huda Islamic Society, Al-Muntada, Al-Hudaibiya, and Al-Furqan Islamic Society among other groups. These organizations have served as the focal points for attracting developmental projects from the Muslim world to Ghana. This view, therefore, shows the interconnected background of the Ghanaian Muslim Imams with the Muslim world regarding religious activities in Ghana. It also identifies the virtual dependence of the Ghanaian Muslim religious leaders on the Muslim world for funding of developmental projects.

The specific impact of terrorism on the Islamic NGOs in Ghana was further elucidated through interviews with the proprietors and some directors of the NGOs in Ghana to help

shed more light on the issue: For instance, one Director lamented that the worldwide promulgation of laws against global terrorism outlawed generous donations to the Islamic NGOs, from individual philanthropists without similarly outlawing such donations from the government recognized charitable institutions in certain Arab countries (Muzu, interview, , 9th May 2005). The net result was that, because these philanthropists do not trust the government charitable organizations to serve as the channel to disburse their resources to their desired beneficiaries they halted their assistance to the Islamic NGOs on account of this legislation. This was in spite of the fact that these legislations were promulgated by governments from the Muslim world. This situation eventually affected the operation of some foreign-affiliated Islamic NGOs in Ghana. It must, however, be emphasized that although the impact of the global war against terrorism affected the operation of NGOs in Ghana it did not completely halt the activities of most of the NGOs.

Ghanaian Muslim NGOs were also affected by the global war on terrorism in another area, but then only for a short while. An operator of an Islamic NGO indicated that the effect of the global fight against terrorism with the resultant promulgation of anti-terrorism laws affected his organization for a short while (Mustapha, interview, 2nd April 2006). This was when remittances for projects were cut short for a year. The explanation given was that most Islamic governments' halted donation to beneficiary communities until they initiated laws and restructured the operation of humanitarian organizations in their countries (Mustapha, interview, 2nd April 2006)

It was also established that the fight against global terrorism resulted in the local banks applying due diligence in their dealing with foreign-affiliated Islamic NGOs. This is known³⁸ Customer Due Diligence (CDD) process. Hitherto, the CDD's processes were applicable

only to customers who contracted loans from the banks. It has however been broadened in the post 9/11 to cover Muslim NGOs with foreign affiliations. For instance, an Operations Manager of one NGO (on the basis of anonymity) said that the banks in the aftermath of the fight against terrorism at a point in time demanded certain legal documentations before confirming to offer their services to Islamic NGOs with foreign affiliation (anonymity, interview, 7th March 2007). Some of the legal documents that the banks demanded were a Certificate of Commencement of Business from the Registrar General and a Certificate of NGOs or a Social Welfare Certificate. The banks further demanded passport pictures of the signatories to the NGOs' accounts (anonymity, interview 7th March 2007). Again, they demanded utility bills for the residence of the operators of the NGOs. This was with the view to ascertaining the domiciles of the operators. Lastly, the banks also demanded a record of expenditures and the location of the projects in the country, which an Operator of an NGO argued that such role does not fall under the mandate of the banks (anonymity, interview, 7th March 2007). Lastly, the blacklisting of certain Muslim regimes by the United States as countries harboring terrorism also has its repercussion on some Muslim NGOs in Ghana. Notably, certain international banks such as the Barclays Bank and the Standard Chartered Bank refrained from having transactions with the Iranian NGOs, organizations and individuals (Daud, interview, 2nd January 2007).

The findings also reveal that about 24 percent of both teachers and public servants feel some Muslims were denied job opportunities and visas to certain countries as a result of the impact of terrorism on Ghana. This suggests that they have experienced discrimination when seeking jobs. This is because, as Muslims, they were unfairly considered as potential terrorists.

flms research shows that there are internal and external impacts of terrorism on Ghanaian Muslims. The internal impact of terrorism could be identified as the Western and the United States' embassies refusal to grant Muslims visas and travel opportunities, some corporate bodies denied them job opportunities. The external impact involves the source of funding for the Ghanaian Islamic NGOs which largely dependent on the Arab and the Muslim world for developmental projects. It could be said that the impact of terrorism on Ghanaian Muslims is multi-faceted, since it affects people of different backgrounds.


85 ERADICATION OF TERRORISM

It has been argued that the causes of terrorism are influenced by variation in time and place of instances (Hageel, 2002: 87). This view thus implies that the eradication of terrorism is also influenced by the variation in time and circumstances. It therefore means that contemporary factors which trigger terrorism must be properly understood as these will enable us identify the appropriate means of eradicating it world-wide. It is in this light that an understanding of Ghanaian Muslims' perspective on the eradication of terrorism is necessary, since it will contribute towards the global solution to terrorism.

Generally, the findings reveal the following:

1. terrorism could be eradicated through justice and fair treatment of all manner of people (40.4%),
2. education of the public on the negative consequences of terrorism (30.1 %),
3. fair understanding of Islam and Muslims by the West and the United States (11.4%),
4. terrorism could be eradicated if the United States and the West stop imposing their views on others (9.8%, and.
5. The need for a unified definition of terrorism (8.3%).

fig. 10: Avenues to eradicatingterrorism



Source: Survey Data 2006

The background of the respondents is reflected in the diverse responses that they offered on the eradication of terrorism in the world. For instance, the male (90%), the students (42%), and the Ahlus-Sunnah members (32%), in that order, believe that terrorism could be eradicated if the United States and the West stopped imposing their ideas and powers on other nations. The Americans and the Western powers project their cultures into the world and nations are being compelled to accept them or be mercilessly opposed, fought and cast as pariahs and outlaws (El-Fadl, 2001 :118). International bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been the major tool for peddling Western hegemonic tendencies. Huntington (1996:184), for instance, argued that decisions made at the UN or in the IMF reflect the interests of the West and are presented to the world as the desires of the world community. The effects of this are the high levels of dissatisfaction and disenchantment from the overwhelming majority of the citizens of the IKS developed countries and the Muslim world alike. This view is further buttressed by El-Fadl, that hegemony manifests itself in the supremacy over the production and control of "Mges that transmit value and culture in the world (El-Fadl 2001:118). It also manipulates the symbolic values by which we understand the good, the bad, the ugly and beautiful (El-

Fadl 2001:118). Consequently, this establishes the relationship between hegemony and terrorism. The outcome of this tendency manifest in conflicts, wars, and terrorist activities we experience presently.

Inherent in halting the hegemonic tendencies which trigger terrorism is the need to ensure that justice and fair treatment of all people prevail. This was the view expressed by Ahlus-Sunnah sect (50.0%). The unfairness of the West emanates from the double-standards of Western policies which have the potential to trigger terrorism. These Western double-standard policies manifest in the way that democracy is promoted-as long as it does not bring Islamic fundamentalists to power. Similarly non-proliferation of nuclear arms is preached for Iran and Iraq, but not for Israel. Human rights are an issue in China but not with Saudi Arabia. Finally, aggression against oil-owning Kuwaitis but not against non-oil owning Bosnians, Sudan Dafurians and other war-torn African countries is repulsive (Huntington, 1996: 128). Thus, it has been established that terrorism could be eradicated if the twin evil concepts of hegemony and unfairness or lack of justice could be done away with. The view of these respondents on the eradication of terrorism suggests that its causes have some political undertones, since they identify unaddressed grievances emanating from the lack of justice and fair treatment of others as being responsible for it

The view expressed by these respondents indicates that they have observed the frustration and desperation that some people go through in the course of struggling for their rights and for self-determination while the international community is unconcerned about their plight. His position is similar to the view expressed by Hageel who argued that terrorism did not emerge as an aimless, crazy violence, but as a resounding cry of protest against the previous internationally agreed and accepted values of an humanitarian ideal (Hageel, 2002: 81).

Furthermore, the view held by the students and the *Tijaniyya* sect members was that terrorism could be eradicated through fair understanding of Muslims and Islam. This implies that the identity of the larger Muslims have come under the onslaught of the West and their major propagandist tools. These respondents have been bombarded by the negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims. The anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiment in the West could be traced to three main sources: some Western academics, the Western media, and some Western evangelists.

Samuel P. Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*. ..and Bernard Lewis's *The Root of Muslim Rage*, respectively, provide typical examples of how some Western academics fan anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments. For instance, Huntington characterizes Islam and the West as age-old enemies and that conflict along the fault lines between Western and Islamic civilization has been going on for over 300 years (Huntington, 1996:252). He further argued that 'the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism, but rather it is Islam, a different civilization whose people is convinced of the superiority of their culture and is obsessed with the inferiority of their power' (1996:217). John Esposito, however, argues that this view implies that civilizations are mutually exclusive and diametrically opposed to each other. It also does not take into account the past and present cross-fertilizations of global culture (Esposito, 2002:127).

Western media is the other agent that peddles such anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments. This is seen in the images of self-seeking Muslims who do not have the mandate of the larger Muslim *Ummah* and who perpetrate acts of terrorism are given the prominence in the media, thus implying that their actions are approved by Islam or they draw their mandate and authority from the Muslim *Ummah*. These negative images and perceptions presented in

the Western media are reflected in the reaction of the respondents who articulate the need for a fair understanding of Islam and Muslims by the West and the United States.

Western evangelists' failure to understand Islam and Muslims fairly sometimes tends to exacerbate and create tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, Christian evangelistic leader Franklin Graham, Billy Graham's son, declared in November 2001 in the aftermath of 9/11 incidents that 'the God of Islam is not the same God of the Christians. He is not the son of the Christian or Judeo-Christian faith. It is a different God, and I believe it is a very evil and wicked religion' (Fuller, 2003 : 148).

The Western media has therefore been identified by the respondents as the major means of demonization of the Muslim image and Islamic religion. A careful analysis of the ownership of contemporary media in the world shows that about 80% of the news disseminated in the media emanates from the West and the United States, examples being Cable News Network (CNN), Star Television, Reuters, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Deutsche Welle TV, Voice of America (VOA), Radio France International etc. The philosophic foundations that guide the nature of these Western media are capitalism and the interest of the state and government they represent. In other words, they are the major instruments for promoting the values of these countries policies world-wide. This view was amply demonstrated in the words of the then head of External Services of the BBC, John Tusa, who once said that 'we are Britain's greatest cultural export and we are effective because we are listened to and we are believed' (Quoted in Harun, 1993: 300). This trend, therefore, has a far-reaching implication for the image of Islam and that of Muslims which also represent a different ideological bloc. This is so because the Muslim *Ummah* and developing countries' interests which do not find favours with the Western world are demonized. Regrettably these

countries and the Muslim *Ummah* have not been able to build similar global media empires to champion their aspirations and could release the type of information that is desirable for the consumption of the *Ummah*. In most cases, the information released by the Western media tends to affect the image of Muslims and Islam. The outcome of the research, therefore, shows the diversity of the solutions to the causes of terrorism in the world which include fair representation of Islam.

In conclusion, an anecdote for eradicating terrorism has been given by Mazrui and this involves a holistic dissection of its causes. For instance, he gave as an example detectives' role in identifying a crime. He argued that, in investigating an unsolved murder, the detectives seek clues from the victim of the homicide to establish why such a person was the target. Then, they try to identify the real motive for the murder for instance, what was the issue which precipitated the crime. Finally, they try to establish what kind of person committed such a crime (Mazrui, 2004: 2).

8.6 *ULAMA* INVOLVEMENT CM DA'WA ON TERRORISM

The role of the *Ulama* in *Da'wa* (religious propagation) on terrorism is a recent phenomenon in Ghana. It was stimulated and promoted by the American Embassy officials during their engagement with the *Ulama* in Ghana in the aftermath of 9/11. It thus marked as a shift from lack of *Dawa* on terrorism to preaching against it. The fruit of 11 September incidents was that it brought about an appreciable level of Muslim understanding regarding the unlawful and irreligious nature of terrorism. This could be largely credited to the active role that *Ulama* have played in educating Muslims on terrorism. The role of the *Ulama* on the eradication of terrorism has been further reinforced by the terrorists' tendency to link their motive to Islamic symbols and images in order to win the sympathy of the larger

Muslim *Ummah* (HAMAS Charter: 127). It was in this regard that the respondents' appraisal was sought on the role of *Ulama* in *Da'wa* against terrorism.

The general trend of the survey's findings reveals that about 77 percent of the respondents within the sampled population indicated in the affirmative their awareness of the *Ulama* involvement in *Da'wa* against terrorism. The result shows that the rating of *Ulama* involvement in *Da'wa* against terrorism could be categorized into positive and negative rating:

The respondents' positive ratings include:

- (a) very effective 23.2%, and
- (b) effective 30.1%,

On the other hand, the negative ratings of the respondents were:

- (a) not effective 17.6%,
- (b) poor 4.7%, and
- (c) very poor 3.6%.,

The respondents' responses differed dependent upon their gender. It suggests that men were more aware of *Ulama* in *Dawa* against terrorism than women. This is partly because of the dominance of and the leading role being played by men in Muslim religious activities. This therefore has made them well informed as to the role of *Ulama* in *Da wa* on terrorism. Men also hold a more positive view of the role of *Ulama* in *Da mo* against terrorism than women. About 83 percent of the male respondents scored the effectiveness of the *Ulama* role in *Da'wa* very highly, in contrast to the perception of the female who think that *Ulama* were not effective in *Da'wa* against terrorism.

The study shows that about 58 and 33 percent of the Imams and the Ahlus-Sunnah sect respectively rated the *Ulama* in *Da 'wa* on terrorism as very effective or effective. The identification of this view with the Imams is attributable to their own self-assessment as to the extent to which that they handle religious issues in respect of terrorism.

On the other hand, the students (57%), non-sectarian Muslims (56%), and the *Shi 'ah* sect members (43%) rated *Ulama* involvement in *Da 'wa* on terrorism as very poor and poor in that order. The fact that it was largely the students and the non-sectarian Muslims that identified with this view suggests that they were not satisfied with the *Ulama* approach on the propagation on terrorism. On the other hand, the association of this view with the *Shi'ah* respondents means that the *Shi'ah* leadership in Ghana was not originally included by the anti-terror campaigners in *Da'wa* on terrorism in the community. This, therefore, is reflected in their rating of the *Ulama* as very poor. Thus, any *Da'wa* by the *Shi'ah* leadership on terrorism could be a coincidence and not necessary mean that they were targeted by the activities of the anti-terror campaigners in the Muslim community.

8.7 FACTORS AFFECTING *ULAMA* IN DA'WA AGAINST TERRORISM

The research also identified the major factors affecting *Ulama* in *Da 'wa* on terrorism. This was with the view to ascertain the specific problems that the *Ulama* encounter during *Da 'wa* on terrorism.

Although the results show that 57.5% of the respondents could not identify any specific problems that the *Ulama* encounter, four (4) main factors and problems were identified by some of the respondents as affecting *Ulama* in *Dawa* on terrorism. These factors include:

terrorism has been construed as the American and the Western label used against

- Muslims -19.7%,
- 2 lack of education of *Ulama* on the effect of terrorism - 8.3%,
 - 3, inadequate understanding of terrorism by the *Ulama* - 7.8%, and
 - 4, lack of sincerity of *Ulama* on terrorism- 6.7%

The result shows that while the male respondents assert that the major handicap of *Ulama* in *Da'wa* in respect of terrorism is due to their lack of proper perspective on the effect of terrorism, the women think that *Ulama* lack the sincerity of purpose in the dissemination of their views on terrorism. This view has been raised against the backdrop of the fact that the anti-terror campaigners did not organize special workshops and seminars to educate the larger *Ulama* in Ghana on the effects of terrorism. They rather concentrated on the distribution of food to ordinary Muslims, gala competitions for the youth, and special forums for few selected *Ulama* in Accra through which education on terrorism was disseminated. On the other hand, the women were also concerned about the double standards displayed by some of the *Ulama* in *Da'wa* on terrorism. The basis of this view suggests that some of the *Ulama* previously seemed to give approval to acts of terrorism through their preachings but later became anti-terror campaigners. This led to the women becoming disenchanted with the *Ulama* who were in *Da'wa* on terrorism in Ghana.

The study also reveals that 53 and 32 percent of the Ahlus-Sunnah and the students' respondents, respectively, were concerned about the propensity of the Western world and the United States at labeling Muslims as potential terrorists. Even though the tagging of Muslims as potential terrorists refers to just a minority of Muslims it has hampered the smooth *Da'wa* of the *Ulama*. This view was well articulated by an Ahlus-Sunnah member in the Greater Accra region when he said:

Some of us (*Ulama*) sometimes encounter problems in the course of *Da 'wa* on terrorism. This is when you raise an argument from the Quran against terrorism, only to be asked by your audience “what is die Islamic ruling on the perception that some non-Muslims regard your religion as inciting terrorism and therefore being a Muslim you are a potential terrorist, meanwhile the reality suggests contrary”?(Sualah, interview).

This illustrates the effect of external prejudices and biases by non-Muslims on the *Da 'wa* on terrorism led by the *Ulama*.

Again, the seemingly double standards articulated by some in *Da 'wa* on terrorism can be seen in the view of non-sectarian Muslims that *Ulama* lack sincerity of purpose in *Da 'wa* on terrorism. The respondents who are identified with this view are generally neutral Muslims as far as their doctrinal affiliation in the community is concerned.

It is important that this argument is illustrated with evidence from the Ahlus-Sunnah on their role in educating their members on the menace of terrorism. The education forum took place in September 2004 at the Islamic Research and Reformation Centre, Nima, in Accra. The effect of the type of orientation handed down to the larger *Wahhabi* members and the students by the *Ulama* has reflected in their attitude towards an understanding of terrorism is discussed.

After the key note address on the menace of terrorism given by the National Imam of the sect, Umar Ibrahim Imam, the open forum provided an opportunity for questions and answers. Excerpts given below are questions from the audience and the answers from the National toaro and his executives.

Question; Some of your *Ulama* claim that, it is forbidden (Haram) for any Muslim to participate in any *IJlar* program organized by the United States officials for Muslim communities, how is that

one different from the assistance that the ASWAJ is enjoying through the construction of the National Headquarters of the sect in Ghana?

Answer: In the first place, I was not in the country during the first period, so I did not know what really happened.

Question: Imam, we were at an outreach programme with you where you gave a pledge to all that you will always go by the consensus of your people. However, you seem to be contradicting yourself by engaging the Americans at the ASWAJ site at the displeasure of your people?

Answer: Yes, I still stand by the popular position of my people, provided it is realistic, and lead to the future progress of the group.

Question: According to Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim, the prophet is noted to have said that “ I shall sack the Jews and the Christians in the Arabian Gulf. ” Again, he also said that “sack the Jews and the Christians in the Arabian Gulf... ,”What is your explanation to these traditions in respect of your relation with Americans?

Answer: people need to know the background of such statements from the prophet in order to put things in perspective. This was when some of the Jews and the Christians betrayed the Prophet and formed alliance with the Makkans against the Prophet. This therefore necessitated such statements from the Prophet.

One Suallah Abubakar intervened and replied that;

The prophet was noted upon all these statements transacted businesses with Jews to the extent that he was indebted to a Jew before his death.

Question: The Qur‘an says “never take Jews and Christians as friends let alone to accept their religion”. What is your understanding of this verse in relation to the American assistance to ASWAJ?

Answer: The consensus of the *Ulama* is that Muslims can benefit from non-Muslims, provided there are no conditions and restrictions attached to the project

These seemingly irreconcilable perspectives between the ASWAJ leadership, on the one hand, and the ordinary members perception on terrorism on the other were partly due to the type of earlier orientation handed down to the members by the leadership in Ghana. It suggests that a larger number of ordinary Muslims passed a vote of no-confidence on the

Ulama who engaged in *Da'wa* on terrorism. This is no doubt due to the perceived double standards employed by some of the *Ulama*. Specifically, the ordinary members of ASWAJ do not trust the position of the leadership on terrorism due to their seeming approval of it through *Da'wa* before. The study however shows the pragmatic tendency of the *Ulama* to readjust their role to meet the accepted international standard in respect of eradication of terrorism in the world.

It also shows how critical the respondents were in respect of their understanding of the problems affecting the *Ulama* on terrorism. This position also emanated from the contradictory and opposing *Fatwa* on terrorism given by the *Ulama*. This view is not strange, since previously the majorities of the *Ulama* in the Muslims communities were invariably pro-terror and regarded the terrorist as freedom fighters even before their engagement with the West and the United States. Yet the *Ulama* later came to realize that the approach of some Muslims in relation to their legitimate cause was wrongly misdirected and hence not in conformity with Islamic values. This necessitated a leading figure of ASWAJ in the Ashanti region, the late Taufiq Bakr, to declare on 14 July 2004 at Zuria FM, a local radio programme in the Ashanti region that:

Islamic scholars in Ghana are fond of issuing hasty religious Verdicts (*Fatwa*), which later they tend to regret, by that time they have misled many people.

This view is amply reflected in the respondents' perception that the *Ulama* lack sincerity of purpose.

8-8 CONCLUSION

The primary interest of the United States in the Muslim communities was largely motivated to reach out to them with her anti-terror education. It was also meant to get closer to

Muslims for possible collaboration in various spheres in order to minimize and eradicate anti-Western and anti-American sentiment. However, many of the instability in the Muslim world were perceived by Muslims as being precipitated by American foreign policies interests.

Thus, in the estimation of Ghanaian Muslims, terrorism is being instigated by injustice, unfairness and denial of others of their rights as well as interference in the affairs of other nation. The findings further corroborated the United Nations Higher Committee findings on Terrorism. As a consequence of this, they suggested justice and fairness, educating the public on the menace of terrorism, fair understanding of Islam as well as the West to stop imposing their hegemonic tendencies on other nations.

As Ghanaian Muslims are also interconnected with the larger Muslims world through higher Islamic education and development projects, the impact of terrorism has its undercurrent effect on them. The research result shows that, Ghanaian Muslims were affected by the global war on terrorism in the domain of flow of resources from the Arab world to Muslims NGOs, the image of Muslims and that of Islam as well as refusal of job opportunities.

The Muslim NGOs in particular were affected in various ways both as a result of measures taken within and outside Ghana. For instance, in the wake of global war on terrorism, the world wide promulgation of laws on terrorism also resulted in local banks stretching their legal regimes to include strict scrutiny of Muslims NGOs. Originally these legal regimes were not meant to target Muslims NGOs, such as the CDD as we mentioned in chapter eight

The external impact of the global war on terrorism was also identified as remittances to some Muslim NGOs were cut short for a while for some NGOs while others were affected by the promulgation of laws which outlawed generous donations from individual philanthropist to NGOs other than the governments designated institutions in the Muslim world.

Notwithstanding this, Muslim *Ulama* were identified to have played a tremendous role in the education on the menace of terrorism and the respondents evaluated their role as fairly positive. However, their role in educating the masses on the menace of terrorism was without problem. The major problem that they confronted from the ordinary Muslims was the Weston label of Muslims as terrorists, lack of adequate understanding of the menace of terrorism by the *Ulama* themselves and double standards exhibited by some *Ulama*.

The study thus shows the complex situation that Muslims have found themselves in regard to the United States rapprochement towards them. While the Americans were expecting Muslims to fairly appreciate and understand her foreign policies within the context of their new relations, her foreign policies in some Muslim countries contributed to Muslims negatively perceiving her. Nevertheless, for the first time Ghanaian Muslims have appreciated the need to denounce terrorism within the framework of the larger Muslims seeking to address their grievances regardless of their nature. In short, the fruit of the post 9/11 Muslim transnational contacts with the United States provided a window of feedback to Americans about Muslims grievances on the causes on terrorism and its eradication. At the same time, Muslims also appreciated the need to denounce terrorism as well as the need to resort to appropriate channels of seeking redress to other grievances.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

90 CONCLUSIONS

This research has sought to identify the origin of diverse manifestations of Islam in modern Ghana and how these have impacted on the identities of Ghanaian Muslims. This was done by establishing the nature of Ghanaian Muslims' transnational relations with the Islamic world. These relations occurred in the various periods (including the pre-colonial, colonial, post-independence and the post 9/11) during which Ghanaian Muslims interacted with the Muslim world.

The main research question which guided the study was 'What brought about the introduction of different Islamic ideologies and identities in modern Ghana and the current interest of the United States in Muslim communities in Ghana?'

The thesis also aimed at identifying among other things, the type of Islamic and cultural orientation handed down to Ghanaian Muslims in each of these periods, to explore Ghana's diplomatic relations with selected Muslim States and these states' major contributions to Ghanaian Muslims; to examine the role of the Muslim diplomatic missions in the rise of Islamic Resurgence in Ghana with an emphasis on the type of doctrinal and religio-political ideologies introduced into Ghana; to examine the impact of Muslim diplomatic missions' contributions to Ghanaian Muslims, to explore the nature of Ghanaian Muslims relationship with the United States; and, lastly, to identify the Ghanaian Muslims' stance on terrorism.

Having identified the origins of Islam as it is practiced in the modern Ghana and shown how it has shaped its adherents' identity, the study reveals that the diversity of Islamic

expressions in Ghana was a result of Ghanaian Muslims' transnational interactions with the different Muslim world. For instance, Volta Basin and the Gold Coast Muslims' interaction within the West African sub-region during the pre-colonial and colonial periods introduced the practices of the *Tijaniyya* sect into Ghana. Again, Ghanaian Muslims' interaction with the North Africa and the Middle East after independence facilitated the arrival in Ghana of the tenets of the Ahlus-Sunnah and *Shi'ah* sects, and the ideology of Libya's the *Green Book*. Lastly, the tendency of religion-inspired terrorism stimulated the interest of the West in Muslim communities in the aftermath of the 11 September, 2001 incidents. This interest is at educating Muslims as to the menace of terrorism because some Muslim extremists' manipulate Islamic symbols in order to execute acts of terrorism.

The study shows that in each period there were different major players in the introduction and development of Islam and the Islamic way of life in Ghana. For instance, traders, itinerant Muslim scholars, the colonial master's policy, the Hajj, and the Lebanese Muslim factor aided the spread of Islam in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Again, during the post-independence period Islam was spread in Ghana by the Muslim diplomatic missions and their affiliate institutions and NGOs. Lastly, the post 9/11 the United States promotes her agenda among Ghanaian Muslims through Western educated Muslims via FAGLAT. What is also shown is that, in these periods the professional background of the transmitters of Islam differs. The transmitters of Islam in the Gold Coast during the pre-colonial and colonial periods were individual Muslim traders. This is in contrast to the state-propelled Islamic activism in the post-independence period as a result of Ghana's diplomatic relations with the Arab world. Lastly, Western educated and trained Muslim leaders encourage Ghanaian Muslims' relations with the West and, in particular, the United States in the post 9/11.

In all, Ghanaian Muslims' transnational interactions with the different continents have brought about a profound transformation. This includes the adoption of the Hausa-Fulani cultures of West Africa, the Arabian Islamic culture from the Middle East, as well as the appreciation of Western values and concerns in the Volta Basin, the Gold Coast and the present day Ghana, in that order. This can be observed through the use of Arabic names, language, mode of dress and social manners among Muslims in Ghana, as well as the adoption of Hausa cultural values on Muslims social functions such as outdoorings or naming ceremonies and marriage ceremonies, mode of dress, etc. The study therefore reveals the impact of globalization on Muslim identity in Ghana. This could be seen from the specific impact that each of the interaction made on Ghanaian Muslims identity.

By facilitating cultural, doctrinal diversities and orientations in Ghana, these different Muslim worlds have linked Ghanaian Muslims with the larger Muslim *Ummah*. This, in a way gives an identity to Ghanaian Muslims as being part of the distinct Muslim world, including also a sectarian *Ummah*.

Each of the Muslim worlds influenced and impacted on the Muslim *Ummah* in Ghana in different ways. For instance, the fact that the purveyors of Islam in Ghana in the pre-colonial and colonial periods were Africans gave the religion an African identity. This they did by blending Islam with some indigenous African communal and social values thereby creating a Ghanaian Islamic tradition. This, therefore, makes the practices of the *Tijaniyya* an African form of Islam, more amenable to African values.

The impact of the post-independence Islamic traditions on Ghanaian Muslims suggests that the North African and the Middle Eastern brand of Islam can be seen in the ethos of the the

Islamic socialism of Libya's *The Green Book*, the puritanical Islam of *Wahhabism*, and the Prophet's household brand of Islam of Shi'ism. The adherents of these post-independence Islamic traditions in Ghana formed cultural enclaves and constituencies which are considered 'foreign'. Though, their emergences in Ghana have reinforced Ghanaian Muslims identity with the larger Muslim *Ummah*. Thus, the Muslim diplomatic missions maintained their influence on Ghanaian Muslims through these new Islamic expressions that they have facilitated in Ghana.

The United States' post 9/11 vision of Islam in respect of Ghanaian Muslims is evidenced in its emphasis on Ghana's having an indigenous Islamic tradition devoid of external Arab world influences. It also calls for a national Muslim agenda and vision which takes into consideration the singularity and uniqueness of the Ghanaian Muslims' socio-economic and political needs.

These different periods in the introduction of Islam into Ghana also facilitated the growth of different forms of Islam in the present day Ghana. Although the *Tijaniyya* sect's practices in Ghana are largely conservative, it has, however, represented the major medium through which Islamic tradition has been preserved and bequeathed from generation to generation during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Furthermore, the *Tijaniyya* sect also promoted the growth of Islam in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast through education. It did this by establishing educational infrastructures, developing from within the residences of the tutors into modern educational infrastructures. It was also the major medium through which the early *Ulama* were recruited in the Volta Basin and the Gold Coast. Lastly, the sect also promoted the growth of Islam by providing spiritual services. These were not offered to Muslims alone as non-Muslims also benefited from them. The sect is, as it was then is

popular among non-Muslims, politicians, businessmen, and people seeking success in life. In effect, the sect gives Islam a sense of spiritualism and fostered strong social bond between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Gold Coast and Ghana.

The post-independence state-propelled North African and Middle Eastern Islamic traditions in Ghana also promote growth in diverse ways. This could be seen in the areas of modern health facilities, educational infrastructures, agriculture, women empowerment, and construction of Islamic centres (mosques) as well as some monthly emoluments for some Muslim scholars. The type of growth that the Middle Eastern Islamic traditions attracted for Ghanaian Muslims was in keeping with modern trends in development. This is in contrast to the type of growth facilitated by Muslims in the pre-colonial and colonial periods.

Lastly, the post-9/11 Ghanaian Muslims' engagement with the United States attracts growth in the areas of human resources development such as the construction of vocational centres and educational infrastructures. The uniqueness of the type of growth of Islam brought about by the United States for Ghanaian Muslims emphasizes the synthesis of the local Islamic tradition and secular values. This could be seen in the fact that the United States advocates for a better integration of Islamic and secular subjects in the mainstream Muslim educational system, the training of Arabic and Islamic teachers as well as infrastructural expansion and support for schools from the primary to JSS and SSS levels. This is quite distinct from the post-independence growth of Islam encouraged by Muslim diplomatic missions in Ghana.

The different Islamic expressions which were introduced into Ghana from different continents also link Ghanaian Muslims with a variety of Muslim worlds in different ways.

For example, contemporary Ghanaian Muslims' relations with the Muslims in the sub-region of West Africa are being promoted mainly by the *Tijaniyya* Sufiyya order. Secondly, as a result of some Ghanaian Muslims' ethnic allegiance to the people of neighboring states, such as the Wangara, Fulani, Hausa, Zabarma, Moshi, Kotokoli, Dendi, Chamba,

The findings reveal that this ethnic factor of Muslims with West African origin does not wield any considerable influence in the relations between Ghanaian Muslims and their co-religionists in the sub-region of West Africa. This is because major events affecting Muslims in West Africa are not interpreted by Ghanaian Muslims along religious lines. In other words, the Islamic Ummatic factor, or religious solidarity, is not often manifested in relations between Ghanaian Muslims and other West African Muslims, such as those in Cote'd Ivoire, etc. This could be seen from the fact that events affecting neighbouring countries with a largely Muslim population neither attracts special prayer sessions nor a strong public and media advocacy for their plight.

This is in contrast to the intense religious solidarity that exists between Ghanaian Muslims and the Arab/Muslim world. Virtually every event is perceived by Ghanaian Muslims through religious lenses, such as their concern for the plight of Palestinians, their condemnation of the Israelis invasion of Lebanon in 2006, as well as their condemnation of the United-States led Coalition Forces' invasion of Iraq.

The continental doctrinal connection of Ghanaian Muslims with the Muslim world reveals that the *Tijaniyya* sect is more likely than most of the expressions to be coloured by an African connection. This could be viewed from the fact that the adherents of the *Tijaniyya*

sect in Ghana pay high regard to certain religious centres in Fez, Morocco and Koalakh,^{Seneegal} the home towns of the founder of the sect, Ahmad Tijani and Ibrahim Nyass, the charismatic revivalist of the sect in West Africa, respectively. On the other hand, the Ghanaian adherents of the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Shi 'ah* sects regard the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, respectively, as the homes and centres of their doctrinal orientations. In effect it shows that, these various centers in the Muslim world wield influences over Ghanaian Muslims who adhere to their religious groups. The overall consequence is that it drives Muslims in Ghana apart on doctrinal lines from forming a common national and Islamic identity determined by the Ghanaian socio-cultural and political environment.

Despite the fact that tensions exist among the different Muslim groups in Ghana in respect of internal Muslim politics, they are however able to reach consensus on both internal and external issues affecting Ghanaian Muslims and the Muslim *Ummah* globally. This, therefore, suggests that the evolution of a Ghanaian Islamic identity which is concerned about Ghanaian collective Islamic culture is gradually taking place, taking the socio-political dynamics of their society into consideration. One could cite as examples of this, Ghanaian Muslims' stance on the *Population and Housing Census* of 2001 and numerous press releases on the plight of Muslims in the Middle East.

Moreover, Muslims relations with the Arab/Islamic world after 1957 were largely facilitated by the government of the newly independent nation-state. The study shows that various reasons propelled Ghana's diplomatic relations with selected Muslim countries, these being Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran. These reasons included, Pan-African unity, driven by Ghana's newly elected President, Kwane Nkrumah, and her non-alignment policies. The

common revolutionary philosophy experienced and shared by Ghana with Libya in 1969, as well as Iran in 1979 contributed immensely to reinforcing their diplomatic relations. Because Saudi Arabia is the birth place of the Prophet of Islam and the destination of millions of Muslims on the annual pilgrimage to the Ka'bah and the mosque of the Prophet, her status in the Muslim world is enormous. This, and the fact that she holds considerable oil reserves encourages many countries with Muslim citizens to share diplomatic relations with her, Ghana is no exception here. However, the role of Ghanaian Muslims in promoting relations with the Muslim countries varies according to whether these are individual Muslims, or those working in the Islamic NGOs and the affiliate offices of diplomatic missions'.

Muslim diplomatic missions in the post-independence period also initiated developmental projects for Ghanaian Muslims. These development packages are focused on education, health, agriculture and women's empowerment, as well as the building and endowment of Islamic centres (mosque). In addition, the influence of the aforementioned Muslim countries on Ghanaian Muslims varies, depending on the type of development projects they facilitated. Generally, the economic conditions in the country of origin dictated the extent of the diplomatic missions' contributions to Ghana and the development of Ghanaian Muslims, in particular. This, too, had a bearing on the influence that the various countries exerted on Ghanaian Muslims. This could be discerned from the fact that the countries of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya, which are well-endowed with natural resources, exert a stronger Islamic influence on the Muslim community of Ghana, as opposed to a relatively poorer Egypt.

These Muslim missions' developmental contributions to Ghanaian Muslims in the post-independence period made possible the introduction of their countries' Islamic religious,

cultural and political ideologies into Ghana. These ideologies were related to specific Islamic expressions such as *Wahhabism*, Shi'ism, and Islamic Socialism, as found in the various countries. These eventually resulted in the categorisation of Ghanaian Muslims on doctrinal lines in the post-independence Ghana.

The diplomatic missions' educational contributions to Ghanaian Muslims related to the granting of scholarships to students. These in effect, facilitated the indoctrination of number of the Ghanaian Muslim community with the prevailing sectarian ideologies found in the Muslim world. *Wahhabism* of Saudi Arabia, Shi'ism from the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Third Universal Theory of the Libyan Government were then wholeheartedly absorbed by Ghanaian Muslims. The intensity of the Islamic orientation in respect of these ideologies varies, with *Wahhabism* (Ahlus-Sunnah) and Shi'ism having a clearer sectarian categorisation and labeling of their adherents in Ghana. This was partly possible because of the type of foreign policies which dictated their relationship with Ghanaian Muslims. One could realize that globalization afforded these states to compete over the membership of Muslims to their 'official' religious expressions in the world.

Notwithstanding the fact that the educational contributions of the Muslim diplomatic missions created opportunities for Ghanaian Muslims and consolidated their gains and fortunes in Ghana, scholarships granted to the Ghanaian students were purely motivated by the Islamic regimes' desire to create their sectarian constituencies in Ghana. This view is supported by the fact that the scholarship packages were invariably restricted to the religious sciences. Regrettably, these scholarships ignored the need for developing the human resource potential of Ghanaian Muslims that would have enabled them to meet the competitive nature of the political and economic fortunes in their country.

The research reveals that the development projects facilitated by Muslim diplomatic missions have impacted on Ghanaian Muslims in diverse ways. In one sense, they have improved and enhanced the living standards and the status of the beneficiary communities. However, the socio-economic and the political landscape of Ghanaian society was not the major determining factor which influences the nature of the Muslim missions' development projects. This could be seen from the virtual lack of support by Saudi Arabia and Egypt for Ghanaian Muslims in the area of agriculture and women's empowerment.

Despite the fact that those development projects in Ghana facilitated by the Muslim diplomatic missions had some shortcomings, such as lack of teacher training colleges, lack of incorporation of secular subjects in their educational curricula, etc., they still represent the major source of funding for development projects for Ghanaian Muslims. Moreover, the relevance of Muslim missions in Ghana lay in the dependence of the majority of the Ghanaian *Ulama* on the outside Arab/Muslim world for economic survival through the monthly emoluments earned by some *Ulama*.

The research also identified two main objectives in respect of the role of foreign-based Islamic organizations in Ghana. The first role of some of the Islamic NGOs in the post-independence period was sectarian Islamic proselytisation. The organizations which fall within these categories include the Islamic Research and Reformation Centre, Ahlus-Sunnah Wal-Jama'ah, the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research, the World Islamic Call Society and the League of Ahlul-Bayt. The second objective of Islamic organizations includes providing development projects. The organizations which provide development include Al-Muntada, Al-Huda Islamic Society, Al-Hudaibiyya, Islamic Development Bank, Agriculture, the Iranian Cultural Consulate and Rural Development.

This, therefore, suggests that Ghanaian Muslims in the post-independence period realized the potential that the Arab/Islamic NGOs held. This made them to harness their relations with the Arab/Islamic world for the development of Islam and Muslims in Ghana.

The study reveals that the diversity of the Islamic Resurgence, in the form of doctrinal expressions such the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Shi'ah*, introduced by the Muslim missions in Ghana in the post-independence period was in keeping with what existed in other parts of the Muslim world. For instance, the Ahlus-Sunnah and the *Shi'ah* sects found in Ghana are manifestations of worldwide Islamic ideologies with monotheistic (*Tauhid*) and the household (*Ahlul-Bait*) concepts of Islam, respectively. The interplay between these two worldwide Islamic ideologies is mainly limited to the Muslim *Ummah* or the Muslim communities alone. As a result of this, states which adopted these two Islamic groups exploited them as part of their foreign policy objectives to propagate their political interests globally through religion. This was achieved by harnessing the benefit of these Islamic doctrinal groups' attractiveness and appeal in the Muslim world. In this sense, Juergenmeyer's theory is proved. In the case of Ghana in particular, these state-propelled religious groups such as Ahlus-Sunnah (*Wahhabism*) and *Shi'ah* enjoy Saudi Arabia and Islamic Republic of Iran support to carry out their activities in Ghana,

However, the Islamic Resurgence's political ideology that was introduced into Ghana in the post-independence period was in the form of Libya's the Third Universal Theory (TUT). The fundamental principles of this suggest that it can permeate the secular political structure and has political ramifications for a community wider than the Muslim *Ummah*. This has therefore necessitated the Libyans to exploit the Ghanaian political structures with the values of the *Green Book*.

In all, Ghanaian political and religious landscape became the battlefield for Muslim states with which Ghana established diplomatic relations with in the post independence period. Though, this could be an inevitable tendency, it however represents the impact of globalization on Muslims in Ghana.

The study also reveals that the intensity of these Islamic ideologies varies. For instance, the Ahlus-Sunnah and the Shi'iah attract more Muslims to the observation of their rules and tenets. These two sects have adherents who clearly identify with them in contrast with the Third Universal Theory (TUT) that has not wielded the same sort of influence. Economically, Ghanaian Muslims relations with the Arab/Muslim world in the post-independence period created opportunities for the respective sectarian institutions in Ghana which depend on the outside Muslim world to carry out the activities of the Islamic Resurgence in Ghana.

Lastly, it has been found that the origin of some of the institutions which facilitate the diversity of Islamic Resurgence in the respective Muslim sects in Ghana were externally propelled and motivated and not the brainchild of Ghanaian Muslims. One could cite as examples of this, in the origin of the Supreme Council for Islamic Call and Research, the West African Ahlus-Sunnah and of the Centre for Study of the *Green Book* in Ghana.

Generally, the net effect of the interconnectedness of Ghanaian Muslims' relations with the Arab and the Muslim world in the post-independence period could be seen in development projects and an ideological affinity that fostered both religious and political solidarity between Ghanaian Muslims and the larger Muslim world. As a result the Ghanaian Muslims were not able to perceive global events affecting the Arab and the Muslim world from a

more religious view point, rather than as objective observers. Some of these global events include the 36 days Lebanon-Israel war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Coalition Forces' invasion of Iraq.

The consequence of this situation was the lack of distinction made in the understanding of the ordinary Ghanaian Muslims between an act of terror and being a liberation fighter. This therefore meant that 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States of America were viewed with approval.

The nature of post 9/11 Ghanaian Muslims relations with the United States suggest that they were largely framed and precipitated by the widespread anti-American sentiment felt in the Muslim world. United States' relations with Ghanaian Muslims were to undergo a complete change, driven by the Western world's concerns as to the dangers of transnational Muslim extremism and terrorism in the world. This change also exposed Ghanaian Muslims to the dynamics of multicultural nature of Western and, particularly, American society. Finally, the post 9/11 period serves as a springboard of Western and the United States sponsored development projects in the Muslim communities in Ghana. These development projects are in the area of the provision of educational infrastructure, health units, and vocational training centres.

The research findings also reveal that even though some respondents think that the major propelling motive for the United States' interaction with Muslims in Ghana was to improve her image globally, others think that the engagement will promote understanding and attract United States funded development projects for Ghanaian Muslims.

Again, a cumulative comparison of respondents' perceptions of the United States before and after 9/11 show that, though they appreciated the interest of the United States in the development of the Muslim communities after 9/11, they did not view the United States as a friend of Islam and Muslims. The result also shows an increase in the perception that after 9/11 the United States was anti-Islam and anti-Muslims.

The findings also showed that although Islamic and the Western values are not culturally congruous, constructive cultural dialogue and engagement could take place between Muslim *Ummah* and the West through a fair representation of Islam and Muslims issues in the Western media, inter-faith dialogue, and Western facilitation of development projects in the Muslim communities. Because Ghanaian Muslims lag behind as far as secular education is concerned, majority of the respondents identified education as the paramount area in which the United States should assist Ghanaian Muslims.

Because interest in the Muslim community globally on the part of the West and America was generated by the impact on them of transnational Muslim extremism, an appraisal of the views of Ghanaian Muslims on the causes and solutions to terrorism was sought. The result shows that, injustice, unfairness, and suppression of others emerged as the greatest causes of world terrorism. Arising from this, Ghanaian Muslims identified the need for justice and fairness, halting the Western hegemonic tendencies, fair understanding of Islam and Muslims, and a unified definition of terrorism in the world as solutions to the causes of terrorism,

The respondents' rating of the *Ulama* in *Da'wa* on terrorism reveals that these were appreciated. They nevertheless identified major problems militating against the role of the



Ulama in *Da 'wa* on terrorism, including the view that terrorism is a Western construct with the view to labelling Muslims negatively. The study also found that the global war on terrorism affected Ghanaian Muslims in three ways, namely; the flow of resources from the Arab and the Muslim world to Ghanaian Muslims, the refusal of visas and the denial of job opportunities.

The demographic background of the respondents reveals the following: As far as gender is concerned it is males that mostly hold extreme and negative perceptions about the West and the United States in contrast to the women who are more likely to be favorably disposed towards the West.

Furthermore, there is a contrast in attitude towards terrorism between men and women, with the men identifying themselves with and associating positive motives behind the extremists' cause, while women inevitably will rather argue against terrorism because of its effects on mankind and societal development. The result shows that women most often adopt accepted societal and religious values as against the men whose views are most often anti-social.

A study of the responses in terms of the occupation of the respondents indicates that the Imams are more in tune with their religious role and appreciate the need to engage with the West and the United States. This is in contrast with the viewpoint of the students who were less accommodative, and represented a radical position within the research population. The doctrinal background of the respondents generally reveals that the Ahlus-Sunnah sect, whose members the United States' engagement efforts had targeted eventually have a positive outlook about the West and are playing a tremendous role in eradicating terrorism

in ghana- Lastly, because the Ahlus-Sunnah sect has transnational relations with the Arab/Muslim world its members were affected more than any other sect by the war on terrorism in respect area of the distribution of resources to them from the Arab and Islamic world.

In the pre-colonial and colonial periods, the Gold Coast Muslims' relation with the *Ummah* was mainly in respect of Muslims in the West African sub-region with whom they shared an ethnic identity. Even though Muslims interacted with their colonial masters in that period they did not relate in any degree to the West.

Ghana's relations in the post-independence period with the Arab/Muslim world were manifested through diplomatic relations. This period brought about unequal manifestation of religious affinity and solidarity between Ghanaian Muslims and the Arab world.

Muslims relations with the West in the post 9/11 period witnessed a complete change in global relations driven by the efforts of the United States of America. Muslim transnational relations with different continents were thus a result of the eventual facilitation of diverse Islamic and political orientations of the Ghanaian Muslims.

The study therefore reveals the extent to which some states managed to influence Ghanaian Muslims with their respective 'official' religious ideas in the post-independence period and post 9/11. Though, it shows how the aforementioned states have appropriated the potency of these religious groups for their powers. However it also implicitly related to the profundity of globalization, inevitably Muslims in Ghana will have experienced these religious ideas in one way or the other.

9.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

As observed earlier, the research explored the three-tiered nature of Ghanaian Muslims' relations with the external Muslim worlds and the West. The recommendations which follow, therefore, focus on Muslims relations within each of the three periods, namely, pre-colonial and colonial, post-independence, and the post 9/11, in that order:

It is recommended that further research be done on the impact of transnational *Da 'wa* being embarked on by Muslim leaders in the sub-region of West Africa, specifically in Ghana. This is with a view to unraveling the socio-cultural impact of Ghanaian *Ulama* on the sub-region and vice versa.

Again, further research needs to be conducted on the extent of the ethnic impact of West African Muslims in fostering relations with Ghanaian Muslims. This will consequently determine the extent of ethnic influences on religious orientations in Ghana.

In view of the fact that there are little academic resources for the indepth study of Islam in the pre-colonial and colonial period, it is recommended that researchers can depend on the Timbuctu Research Project being managed by the University of Cape Town in South Africa. This will help shed further light on the contours of Muslims in Africa relations with the Muslim world.

As to the role of the Muslim diplomatic missions in the development of Ghanaian Muslims in the post-independence period, despite the fact that various developmental contributions were made by the Muslim missions in Ghana for Ghanaian Muslims, the respective Islamic ideologies and doctrinal orientations of the Muslim missions were mostly felt on Ghanaian

Muslims. More therefore needs to be accomplished in the area of human resource so that Ghanaian Muslims are able to meet head on the competitive nature of the Ghanaian political and economic landscape.

It has also been observed that little attention was paid by the Islamic diplomatic missions to women's development and agriculture. This situation therefore retarded the development of Muslim women and agriculture as a means of raising their economic fortunes of in Ghana. It is therefore recommended that the developmental contributions of diplomatic missions should take into consideration the needs of both Ghanaian Muslim women and men and the economic development.

The study found out that Muslims perception about the West and more specifically the United States was negative and American perception about Muslims was negative. Thus, the only way of eradicating this negativity is through intensified education.

In view of the fact that the radical posture of the student respondents has its source in their isolation and exclusion from engagement with the United States, it is therefore suggested that efforts should be made to draw them into this engagement. This is with a view to mitigating their spreading anti-American and anti-Western propaganda in the Ghana's Muslim community.

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Do the Quran and the Sunnah permit Muslims to have relations with non-Muslim countries?

(a) Yes (b) No (c) No idea

Do you think that good relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims should be encouraged?

(a) Yes (b) No (c) No idea

Give reasons for your answer.....

If yes, in what areas should the relationship be cultivated?

(Please specify your answer in order of preference)

- (a) Education
- (b) Health
- (c) Environmental issues
- (d) Promoting world peace and justice
- (e) Others.....

Give reasons for the choice of your answer

Are you aware of any engagement by the United States of America with the Muslim communities in Ghana?

(a) Yes (b) No

The United States of America in recent time has developed keen interest in assisting the Muslim community in Ghana. Do you think it is worth encouraging?

(a) Yes (b) No

Give reasons for the choice of your answer.....

Do you believe that Ghanaian Muslims and the United States can cooperate for the benefit of Islam and Muslims?

(a) Yes (b) No

If yes, which of the following areas below do you think they can cooperate?

(Provide your answer in order of preference by ticking 1 as the most important follow by next as 2)

- (a) Education
- (b) Fighting against HIV/AIDS.
- (c) Assisting Muslims to break fasting in the month of Ramadan
- (d) Health.
- (e) Fighting terrorism
- (f) Exposing Ghanaian Muslims to Western Muslim counterparts
- (g) None of the above
- (h) All of the above
- (i) No idea.

(j) Others

15. What do you think is the reason behind the United States of America's engagement with the Ghanaian Muslim community?
- (a) To provide development to the Muslim community. []
 - (b) To strengthen the Muslim leadership in Ghana [1
 - (c) To improve the image of the United States of America []
 - (d) To fight terrorism (1
16. What was your perception of the United States of America before the September 11 attack on America?
- (a) Friends of Islam and Muslims [1
 - (b) Nothing in common with Muslims []
 - (c) Interested in developing the Muslim community []
 - (d) Anti-Islam and Muslims []
17. What is your current perception of United States in the aftermath of September 11* attack?
- (a) Friends of Islam and Muslims. []
 - (b) Interested in developing the Muslim community []
 - (c) Nothing in common with Muslims []
 - (d) Anti-Islam and Muslim []
18. Do you know the United States' mode of engagement with the Ghanaian Muslims?
- (a) Yes []
 - (b) No []
19. Do you appreciate the mode of the engagement?
- (a) Yes []
 - (b) No []
20. If no, what are your suggestions for improving it?
21. Do you agree with the view that Islam is in perpetual conflict with the Western world in terms of values?
- (a) Yes []
 - (b) No
 - (c) No idea []
22. In what ways do you think cultural dialogue will improve constructive engagement between the West and the Muslim Ummah globally?
- (a) Inter-faith dialogue. []
 - (b) Assistance in the form of development projects. []
 - (c) A fair representation of Islam in the Western media []
 - (d) Others.....

Any further comments on the relationship between the United States and Ghanaian Muslims.....

THANK YOU

APPENDIX 2: (QUESTIONNAIRE)

**DEPARTMENT FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGIONS
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA**

**CHAPTER NINE
TERRORISM: THE THRUST OF THE UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN THE
MUSLIM COMMUNITY**

This questionnaire is meant to seek information on the Ghanaian Muslims and terrorism and its impacts on Islam and Muslims. All information given would be treated as confidential and for academic purposes only.

TICK IV1 APPROPRIATE

1. Sex: (a) Male [] (b) Female []
2. Age:
(a) 18-25 Years []
(b) 26-35 Years []
(c) 36-45 Years []
(d) Over 45 Years []
3. Occupation.....
4. Educational Background:
(a) Islamic Education:
(i) Early Makaranta []
(ii) Post Early Makaranta []
(iii) Tertiary Education []
(b) Secular Education
(i) Primary Education []
(ii) Junior Secondary Education []
(iii) Senior Secondary Education []
(iv) Tertiary Education []
5. Which doctrinal group do you belong to?
(a) Tijaniyya []
(b) Ahlus-Sunnah []
(c) Shi'ah []
(d) Ahmadiyya []
(e) Do Not Belong to any Group []
(f) Others (Please Specify).....

Does the Qur'an condemn act(s) of terrorism?

- (a) Yes [] (b) No [] (c) No idea []

Does prophetic tradition condemn act(s) of terrorism?

- (a) Yes [] (b) No [] (c) No idea []

8. In your opinion, which act(s) constitute terrorism?
9. In your opinion, how has the term been used in recent times?
10. What do you think are the causes of terrorism?
11. Are some Muslims involved in act(s) of terrorism with Islamic slogan?
 (a) Yes (b) No (c) No idea
12. If yes, what do you think is their motive?
13. Are you familiar with the concepts of Darul Harb (abode of war) and Darul Islam (abode of Islam)?
 (a) Yes (b) No (c) No idea
14. Are the concepts of Darul Harb (the abode of war) and Darul Islam (abode of Islam) still relevant in modern times?
 (a) Yes (b) No (c) No idea
15. If yes, how should these concepts manifest themselves in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims?.....
16. How have these concepts affected the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims?
17. In your view, are acts of terrorism Islamically and morally justifiable?
 (a) Yes (b) No (c) No idea
 (b) Give reasons for answer.....
18. In your estimation, has such approach improved or affected the image of Islam and Muslims generally? Choose any of the answers below:
 (a) Improve the image of Islam and Muslims.
 (b) Affected the image of Islam and Muslims
19. What will be the future of Islam and Muslims if terrorism is being perpetrated by some Muslims?
 (a) Perpetual suspicion of Muslims by non-Muslims.
 (b) Muslims would be well-respected and recognized by non-Muslims.
 (a) It will curtail the development of Islam and Muslims
 (c) Muslims would not be accepted by others in certain parts of the world

(d) Muslims would be regarded as anti-civilization. I •>

20. Certain countries including the United States and Europe have promulgated legislations to curb terrorism. Do you think such initiatives are worth encouraging
(a) Yes [] (b) No [] (c) No idea []

21 Are there some difficulties with such pieces of legislations?
(a) Yes [] (b) No [] (c) No idea [J

22. If yes, can you identify some of the shortfalls of such laws?
(a) The laws are culturally and religiously skewed against some people. []
(b) The laws impede the development of Islam and Muslims globally. []
(c) The laws represent ideological warfare initiated against Islam and Muslims by the West and the United States. []
(d) All the above []
(e) None of the above [1
(f) Others. Specify.....

In your estimation, what images represent tacit support for terrorism?

(a) Naming certain places after infamous terrorist networks []
(b) Putting on insignias named after terrorist organizations []
(c) Individuals nicknaming themselves after notorious terrorists []
(d) All the above. []
(e) None of the above. [J
(f) Others. Specify.....

Do such images exist in the Ghanaian society?

(a) Yes [] (b) No [] (c) No idea [

25. Are these images available in the Ghanaian Muslim community?
(a) Yes [] (b) No [] (c) No idea []

26. Are these images traceable or associated with some people of a particular doctrinal background in Ghana?
(a) Yes [] (b) No [] (c) No idea []

27. Have you observed some Ghanaian Ulama involve in Da'wa against terrorism.
(a) Yes [] (b) No [] (c) No idea []

28. If yes, how effective are their efforts against terrorism through Da'wa?
(a) Very effective. [] (b) Effective []
(c) Not effective [] (e) Very poor f 1
(f) Poor. []

29. If no, what are some of the militating factors?
(a) Lack of orientation of the Ulama about the effects of terrorism. []
(b) It has been construed to be the Western and United States label against Islam and Muslims [1
r i

- (c) Lack of sincerity of purpose by the Ulama I j
- (d) Inadequate understanding of terrorism by the Ulama. [J
- (e) Any other?.....

30. What do you think are the root causes of terrorism?

31. What is jihad?

- (a) Armed struggle or holy war against non-Muslims to convert them to Islam []
- (b) Personal struggle against vices and other un-Islamic behaviors and practices []
- (c) Intellectual struggle to promote or defend Islam (]
- (d) Financial and material support to promote and defend Islam 1]
- (e) Any other?.....

32. What is the relationship between jihad and terrorism?

33. How can terrorism be eradicated?.....

34. Can you identify some of the areas in which terrorism have impacted on Ghanaian Muslims.....

THANK YOU.

libel he nlgbt onr,

Virgo

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Pisces



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
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Veep Alh Mahama making a presentation to David Queen, while Mrs Mary Carlin-Yartes looks on

VO

Ghanaian bomber jailed 33 years

Manjo Kwaku Asiedu, one of five would-be bombers to target London on July 21, 2005 was yesterday jailed for 33 years after admitting conspiracy to numerous explosions.

Earlier this year, a jury was unable to reach a verdict when Manjo Kwaku Asiedu, whose real name is Sumaila Abubekori, went on trial. Charged with conspiracy to murder three people, Asiedu was recommended for a 33-year term.

The judge recommended that Asiedu, 34, should be deported to Ghana. Four other men were jailed for life after being convicted of conspiracy to murder over the foiled 2005 bombings. Muktar Ibrahim, Yasir Omar, Ramil Mohammed and Hussain Osman were told they would serve a minimum of 40 years.

A sixth man, Adel Yehya, pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of conspiracy to murder and was jailed for six years and three months.

After the jury in the original trial was unable to reach a verdict, Asiedu was retried, which would have been extremely costly.

Conspiring to cause explosions, the prosecution dropped the charge of conspiracy to murder and he was charged with the *Khufina* Crown Court.

Mr Justice Calvert-Smith told the court that Asiedu had lied on an oath about his part in the bombings and that it was his motive to know the *gnaf* a motive.

Ms told Asiedu he had become the central figure in the plot and had bought the chemicals needed for the bombings.

Mr Justice Calvert-Smith (tomb) Asiedu as an 'aons' and inquired about the...

...said the public had waited for him to admit his part in the attack and "explain his motivation for the commission of such a dreadful crime".

"You have effectively chosen not to do so," he said.

The judge added that Asiedu not only failed to warn the police or his donor of the plot but also continued to assist the conspirators by trying to destroy any incriminating evidence.


But he told Asiedu "The maximum sentence for this is life imprisonment. I do not believe that the criteria for such a sentence are met in your case."

"Although your involvement was central, you were certainly not the leader or organiser of the plot."

Asiedu had claimed that he was not involved until the trial.

He said that as soon as he had had the money, he had bought a rucksack containing explosive in a park in Little Wormwood in West London.

Dut Nigel Sweeney, QC, prosecuting, said: "The defendant's principal motive in the purchase of 13 litres (110 gallons) of hydrogen peroxide, which is a vital ingredient in the main charge of the plot, was to inquire about the..."



Manjo Kwaku Asiedu

Further, he took part in a cover-up after the bomb failed to explode, both for his benefit and the benefit of his co-conspirators.

Having arrived in the UK from Ghana on a passport, he adopted the name Asiedu after, finding out that previous lodger of that name had died.

Asiedu then began attending a mosque in Finchley, North London, where he met Yehya Omar.

In June 2005, after a fire in Ms flat, he moved in with Omar at Curtis Hall in Mew Southgate.


Curtis Hall was a factory with hundreds of bottles of perfume being produced in the flat.

Taking the stand during the trial, Asiedu presented himself as a terrified man who was unwilling to participate in the events of July 11.

However, he was intimately involved in the buying of bomb ingredients, including the critical element of hydrogen peroxide and hair bleach.

He had been working as a painter and decorator at the time and had told several chemists that he needed the material to bleach wood or to strip wallpaper.

Mr Sweeney said: "He is a man who is a law-abiding citizen who could go about his business in the UK, adopting a false identity to remain here and go to the police taking them on in over 1,000 transcripts of interviews during which he posed an intricate web of lies to try and avoid the truth."



He went on to give false evidence and evidence of guilt.

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US embassy assists Muslims

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Additionally, the US novamiacnt aapuprlr aiu.noit in'iqiki in Muslim aimmuaibc* in Ghana ■iiiiimully. »h ili Diriiiiiiiit io 312tmlEao mty yfur 'fir Jaliifioilnn Officer at ihr US

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Virgo

August 23- Sept 22

You em absolutely mist thejromises made to you now, be they business or personal, and you'll be just u adamant about keeping your own word. Res peel and responsibility ere in lhc air.

/jyK S:pi M-Od?:

They've got a very scnmis look on their facet and they've just mentioned that they want to talk to you. Don't worry. Not all serious conversations turn out badly. That goes double for this ooe.

Scorpio

Oct 23-Nov21

it a very serious toot on their face, and they've just mentioned that they want to talk to you. Don't worry. all serious conversations rum out badly. That goea double for this one.

Sagittarius

Nov 22-Dec21

You've never been one to miner wofds, but you're e*po- ciaUy unwilling to waste time on small talk sow. Anything other dan yust the facts, ma'am, will leave you cold — and whoever tries to put on* nw «i vmi will definitely feel that chill

Capricorn

Dec 22-Jan 12

It's time to take stock %» RIMM :OW value. That might mean balancing the checkbook—never your favorite pastime— or *t rmgbt go a bit deeper. Either way, give yourself a lftlo time (o figure il out.

Aquarius

Jan 20-Ptb II

You're nothin' fi not famous for being free-wheeling, in ad categoric* Why, however, you mdy be thinkin' it cleaer of / Don't be seared. If you've found lnted*!, or the right person, go for it

Feb 19-Mare* 20

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Veep Honours David Queen

(by Sheila Sadeh)

THE VICE President. Alhaji A«iMahama, on Monday May. ?■* honour*. <> D.sij Queen, Counsellor lor r at the Embassy of (be United States of America, for his support for the government, and (he Muslim communities. In particular, at the Castle, Os a.

He was presented with a certificate of honour, a smock. Pugu and Kente, for his wife.

David Queen, who was accompanied to the Castle by Mrs Mary Cariin-Yartes, US

Ambassador, had been hi the country, since 2002, and was at the Castle to bid farewell to the Vice President, after a duty iou. fit the country. i >* ftes.

were misconceptions between the Muslim communities and (he Americans, hence his visit to hold round-table discussions with the Muslim communities, throughout the country, to enable them exchange

Mr Queen stated that his 3-year stay in Ghana, saw the construction of projects at

health centres, a community centre at Nima, boreholes, aa well as food donation, during Ramadan Fasting.

Queen thanked (he Vice President for inc lu> o>y dsnc tizz, ** * ?** r~ziz t? reach out to the Muslim communities.

Alhaji Alio Maham^on his

(rif*humanitarian Service, stressing (hat be had playef) ■ significant role in the nailer^ eas, especially the Muslim commusltKS.

On the fight against HIV/ AIDS pandemic, the Vice IVcsi-

deufnoiod that Mr Queen had been hntimntat. aa wdl as pkyedacridealntiefaMbefigcl

"We need io n rtk you have played inbritt- i~ M"»lin coT xruuaitj i closer id locAnohah. baay*"

The US Ambassador, Mary Carfo-Yattspfdged tie US readiness to svork with Mosfim eomnntica. to in- crease their mderstanding, adding, *heaM) and education are priority needs of fee people hence, ~WewiD do aDtey can to brlp m tins direction".



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US embassy assists Muslims

THE United States Embassy bus this year provided \$60 million in food aid and implementation of programmes geared toward ensuring democracy, good governance, private sector economic growth and basic education in the country. The facility a n* provided through the United States Agency for International Development.

Additionally, the US government supports 200.0(H) ptvple in Muslim communities in Ghana annually, which amount to \$12 milliun every year

Tin- informiuiin Officer of the US Emba'y, Mr <hstonln»r Hodges, disclosed this in an inter* v'w\ w.th inc Dufy (itofihu in Tam*t«r ui» Thur—

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This* w i.« the pr*M*»Ution of food r«-r » w»»i ru'i put- J«» vuri<m> Muslim cnsn»«in«uc-f -t Li.ariat'u iii the Wi*H (tQijjd District ifld at the Outrai and Anbany.'i mosque* in th* Tamale nairni'lih.

A total of 1H0 bag* uf rice and 90 bacc* ofaugar were presented to the communities.. 4

Mr Hodges observed that US intervention* on the country covered the provision of clinics ant community centres in Muslim communities

Ue stated that the "US is fighting is war agains* global terror is in and not a war aga:n*t Islam".

The information Officer observed that isLim Hits a religion ui peace, adding that there we.*e over seven million Muslims in toe US

According to Inin, the L'b Embasav had Ue«. privileged w join the Ghanaian Muslim i'n.mun' ty to celebrate the Ramadan

The t'hujfof Larabanga. Alhaji lhr«lui > Abuiu. thanked the embassy for the gesture but chilled i»n the US government to assist the compnwty tu rehabilitate the ancient mosque in tin ure.*. which s»-rve as a tourist attraction.

The Northern Kegior.nl Minister. Mr SVuifatv Ahiihakar Sad nutm. noted th.-ii Mu.*!i * ivnrined .t • IiH IMIIV I/tuple and enin •{.- ««>mnair.ity In i t - a t f<mri*t* with Ituinutv ml MvjuCl

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^Muslims 1 o pray for end to w ar in Iraq

MUSLIMS throughout t a country are to observe special fnsting on Thursday. April 10, to seek Allah's intorvenio in the war in Iraq.

Muslims .iiv nl.no Lo hold '•■ciil j)!ny<:r- "ii '!r il:iy, Aprsi 11, m ask Allnl' IO 3Tvi'vc anil! iTlhi v.-. r ir. Iraq In ar. end anti n*< i l! p H I t: >>> t fJUS- try and Cthui troubled par's . lilC dr

A statement issued ir. Ac. 1 >L iit L OJ. i! "Cl: 1 M's!;rc Organisations in C aru '• '< ar.d s.2Tiea by :ts President. Major rtcii Viho; •Voharr.rnea Kas&h. eaici M'::#! •;s '!6*o ."ir Mv cor. c* T.ed whenever pcatc in o; |MI' in " i v : id .- - si-rood.

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Mayor blames police for London bombing

DONALD GOVE, British and London Mayor, has accused the London bomber, Ram Yousef, of being a "terrorist" and of being "a member of the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda."



London Mayor Don Goove says that the bomber who killed seven people and injured 200 others in the July 7 attacks was a member of the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda.

Mr. Yousef was the only person to be charged with the July 7 attacks. He was charged with the murder of three people and the attempted murder of another 200.

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UK soldiers face war crimes trial

THREE British soldiers are facing war crimes charges as well as being charged with the death of a detainee in Iraq in September 2003.

The soldiers are charged with the death of a detainee in Iraq in September 2003. They are charged with the death of a detainee in Iraq in September 2003.

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Muslim coalition calls for end of war

THE Coalition of Muslim Organisations, Ghana (COMOG) has called on the United States of America and the United Kingdom to respect and heed the appeals of the vast majority of the world for an end to the war against Iraq.

It said COMOG unequivocally deplores the ongoing war and described its repercussions as unfortunate and an affront to the conscience of humanity.

This was contained in a press statement issued by COMOG in Accra yesterday and jointly signed by its Executive Director, Major General Mohammed Basah, and the General Secretary, Alhaji Mohammed Batin Alhassan.

It said as Muslims, they are saddened by the spate of killings, devastation and mayhem now being inflicted on the innocent and defenceless people of Iraq, especially women, children and the aged.

The statement noted that "while we of COMOG abhor terrorism in all its forms, we deplore the decision of the US to defy the United Nations (UN) and the overwhelming world opinion and wage the war against Iraq."

It said as the war continues,

should rather seek to protect and preserve and not destroy the integrity and authority of the UN, adding that "by unilaterally launching this war, the US has effectively undermined the integrity and authority of the UN and this has serious implications for the security and peace of the world."

"America should stop this war in the name of God in which it trusts, in the name of humanity and in

the name of justice to the innocent Iraqi victims," it said.

The statement expressed gratitude to all peace-loving people of the world who boldly vowed their disapproval of the war and urged them, as well as Muslim and Arab countries, to continue to exert moral and other forms of pressure on the US and the UK to ensure a speedy end to the war.

The statement said it should not be made for

the statement expressed gratitude to all peace-loving people of the world who boldly vowed their disapproval of the war and urged them, as well as Muslim and Arab countries, to continue to exert moral and other forms of pressure on the US and the UK to ensure a speedy end to the war.

Terror has no place in Islam - Imam

At&u lddraisu
 A Muslim chaplain at Georgetown Uoivcnily in Washington D C Imam Yahya Hendi hat condemned extremism and terrorism ■inrrihing both as ^avmc no place is lstam*. 'imam Yabjra who is on a week's visit to allwl iw lh# National Chief bum Sheikh Usmanu Nubu Siunibtmi. The voices of extremism Mid uara ism, he said, "are not voices of Islam*. l»»■

Hendi cited a Hadith in which Prophet Muhammed said anyone who attacks Jews and Christians attacks him, and said he saw no reason why a Muslim could pUni a bomb at a Christian place of worship for such acts go cotraiy to the teachinp of the Prophet Allah, he said, 'challenged us in the Holy Koran to reach out to one another, but not to despise one another... I believe in the need for

dialogue as I see hatred, war and bloodshed when I look around the world*. The world. Imam Hendi said. Is a small-integrated village in which people must coordinate and work together in peace for it to survive. He said Martin Luther King Jnr named the three enemies of the world as militarism, racism and poverty, but said all these enemies could come lo an end when people work


together in unity He said the US Government after the September 11 attac in 2001 has taken various measures to protect American Muslims from any possible recist attacks. He said more mosques were built in the US in the last fo year than it was done during the last ten years. He said th US boasts of as many as 6,138 mosques, 447 Islamic schools, and S colleges. Contd. on page 8

LETTERS/IMEWS




Imam Hendi (left,) and Imam Shanbutu to a warm embrace

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


We want more devt projects - Tema residents

A number of residents In the Tema J. ^municipality, have called on President Kufuorto use his second tenn in office to initiate more development projects and. create jobs especially fof the youth In the HnrbourCly. > Random sampling of views by the Ohana News Agency



APPENDIX 4: ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS



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The action of the French is viewed with some apprehension here by the Syrians who fear that a similar order may be introduced here. Some of the Syrians here have expressed a desire to join the Home Guard but it is believed that they do not like the idea of being posted to African Platoons.

2. It is anticipated that quite a number of Syrians in French Africa will apply to enter British Colonies in order to escape conscription.

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
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LAGOS STATE, NIGERIA
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MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE jgQUQQ COMMUNITY AN.B
/ THE DIRECTOR OF ALMUNTADA SHEIK SASEP ANP HIS ASSISTANT

• SHEIK MliZZU ON THE 21ST PF MARQH.jfigl

The Community and the Almuntada directors meet at the Chiefs house immediately
^ *£ after the Jumua prayers. Opening prayer was said by the Imam Jibiril Alhassan

The first to speak was Sheik Saeed. he thanked the Community, the chief and his eBers for coming to the meeting and called for Allah's guidance in the deliberation*

He began his main speech by saying that, they had been made to understand that there is a serious misunderstand between the chief and Alhaji Ada mu Ali. Adding that if indeed that is the case, then it will certainly retard the progress of the community.

It was pointed out to him that there is no misunderstanding between the two and that the misunderstanding is about the appointment of a new Imam for us by Almuntada and the ownership of the land on which the new Mosque is built In his reply Sheik Saeed said that, there should not be any misunderstanding what so ever about the appointment because they are not appointing an Imam for the community. What they are doing is appointing an Imam for the Mosque and by ther definition an Imam is a PREACHER and TEACHER

He want on to say that the community should not become apprehensive about the person they are bringing and emphatically added that he is only coming to assist our Imam

He also made the community to understand that, it has always been their police to have an Imam who is a native of the local community to be the Imam of their mosque, but pointed out that there are conditions attached

The first condition is that he should be somebody who have at least a certificate in secondary education in Islamic and Arabic knowledge The second condition is he must have a good character background.

The Sheik goes on to say that, if our Imam has those qualifications they were going to interview him and straight away appoint him as the Imam of the Mosque

Baba Ali pointed out to the director that our Imam has no certificate because he has not attended any institution, since it is the practice in our part of the world for Islamic students to learn at the feet of learned Mallams and Sheiks who don't give certificates.

The Sheik replied that he has taken note of the situation adding that . one of the main duties of the Imam they are bringing is to assist our Imam to reach the level they want After which they will take their Imam away

On the issue of who will lead prayers at the mosque his reply is that the two Imams will decide for themselves who will lead what prayers and at what time

On Jumu'a prayers he said one of them can read the sermon whilst the other lead the prayers. Alhaji Amadu asked them to give our Imam scholarship to study abroad but it was pointed out to him that, it will be difficult since he has no secondary education but they promised to help him get one by enrolling him in a school in Accra come September

Sheik Saeed said that last year alone Almntada gave thirty scholarships to young educated Moslems to study abroad and it is his wish that within the next year or two the community can also benefit, and that the community must encourage its young men to study hard so that it can get a number of educated young men who can easily take over from Ollie in his absence.

On where their Imam will stay when he finally comes down, the Sheik said that they were going to rent a room for him in town so as not to depend on any body.

The Zongo Chief demanded that copies of all documents coverng the mosque and the land on which it is built must be given to him, the Sheik promised to send it to him the moment he gets to Accra. The keys of the mosque was given to Sheik Sulleymana Muzza deputy director of Almntada.

The community was told that their Imam will come with an appointment and a p> description letter.

A committee was set up to run the mosque they are -

- | | | |
|----------------------------|----|-------------------------|
| 1. Sarkin Zabarma Chairman | 2 | Baba Tsalhatu Secretary |
| 3. Abdul Karim Treasurer | 4. | Mallam Issa organizer |
| 5. Mohammed Arko | 6. | Alhaji Adamu Ali |
| 7. Sulleyman Muzzu | ^ | JSXr |

Proposed new Committee

The following people were at the

meetino

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Sarkin Zongo | Alhaji Amadu |
| 2. Sarkin Zabarma | Tonko Gariba |
| 3 Sarkin Tuba | Tanko Mallam Umar |
| 4. Baba Giwa | Abdul Karim |
| Baba Mohamadu | Mallam Issa |
| 6. Ali Arzika | Baba Tsalhatu |
| 7- Ollie Arzika | Oantani |
| Alhaji Adamuali | Mallam Amadu Agona |
| | Alhassan Jibiril flmarrt |

i - c
Ceena
Y - Mallam Issa
5 - Sulleyman Muzza

lu-saos • : !9T rn cos CA»««

Dear Sir,

I have been directed by the Chief, the Mosque Committee and the entire Zengo community to inform you that they have read your letter and the content is noted.

However they have also directed me to inform you that they totally object to any attempt on your part to impose an imam on the community.

I have also been directed to inform you that you are either consciously or unconsciously going against the letter and the spirit of the agreement made between your organisation and the community on the 21st of March 2003.

The community has no problem with the coming of the Imam in any way whatsoever.

The problem lies with the contents of the letter you are referring to.

1


For if the content of your letter is anything to go by then, what you intend to do is to relegate our imam to the background, this the community shall not accept.

Our imam is informed by the second paragraph of your letter and his duty of incoming Imam is leading the prayers including Friday Khatbah.

This to us is a complete departure from the agreement with the late Sheik Muau.

In order to avoid future misunderstandings and confrontations I have enclosed a copy of the minutes of the meeting the community had with your directors Sheik Saeed and Muzzu. For you to study carefully this we believe will help you to appreciate the community sentiments and to avoid taking hasty decisions in future.

Yours faithfully



Baba Ttalhetu
(Mosque Committee Secretary)

- 101 (0) 12005

APPLICATION FOR JUSTICE

Background

07/04/0-1

In January 2002 Mallam Eesa Zakariya, a native and resident of Itcena Kyitn, Tarkwa forwarded an application letter to Suleyman Ahmed Mozu, (he Deputy Director of the above mentioned organization and also a native of Tarkwa For a Mosque to be constructed for Muslims in Becnakyim - Tarkwa.

With assistance and follow up from Mr Mozu the application was given a serious attention, hence a delegation was sent to Tarkwa to conduct a feasibility studies on the proposed site for the construction of the Mosque in Sept 2002.

After critical studies on the site the delegation realized that the proposed site is on! suitable for the project since it is far from the residential houses of the beneficiaries.

The organization therefore decided to shin the project from VViui Kiatic to any suitable location within the region.

Mallam Kcsa sensing the organizations intention to relocate the project out side Tarkwa called the organization that he has spotted a ncn site as a result of an appeal from three people from the Zongo community namely : Jibril Alhsasan . AlHILU karim Musa and llamed Mohamed Tanko to bring in the Mosque to their community.

Mallam ,Eesa in a good way explained to the team, the conditions of the organization if (hey arc ready to abide by.

Conditions:

(a) Al-Muntada Islami will demand a full transfer i

*Director of his meeting =
of the land into its custody*

(b) After the construction of the Mosque, Al-Muntada Islami will appoint its Imam to the mosque.

In a response to those conditions Mallam Jibril Alhassan and his tram agreed to the conditions of Al-Muntada hlauii explained to them by Mallam F.csa.

This prompted Madam Eesa to draw the attention of the oITice on the new site .

A delegation from the organization visited the new site and met the chief and elders of /ongo community in Tarkwa in Oct 2002 with the accompany of Mallam ICassa .

I he delegation explained again to the chief and his elders the conditions attached to llic project which they accepted, hence the organization decided tu relocate the project in /ongo .Tarkwa.

AGREEMENT:

GMANAOHTCE

At the beginning of the project the organization and the zongo community signed an agreement to govern the relationship between the two and the chief signed on behalf of the community.

The project was executed and duly commissioned in February 2003 at the cost of 199,000,000.110 (one hundred and eighty nine million cedis).

AFTERMATH OF THE PROJECT

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When the project was completed the organization appointed an Imam to the mosque in the person of Shiekli Bashiru Yakubu, but the Chief and his assistants opposed to the Imam of the organization in contrary to the agreement and rather appointed their own Imam to the mosque in the person of Jibrill Alhassan, one of the above mentioned three people who appealed to Mallam Eassa to bring the project to zongo and accepted the conditions of the organization.

Our Imam was sent to the community in November 2003, but has been classified as a 2nd Deputy Imam for the mosque which is a breach of contract. Jf-

i>k

CONCLUSION:

^Ct CyfH

CC*V

Dear Nana We therefore appeal to your high office as the overall king of Wassak traditional area to come into the aid of my organization and help restore law and order to our mosque as agreed upon between the two parties.

Oxagycfo Nana Kwamena Enimil VI
Ouanlicuc of Wassak Traditional Area,
Tarkwa.

Yours faithfully

Suleyman Almicd Mom
Deputy Director & and native of Tarkwa

Please find attached:

1. Copy of the agreement.
 2. The document of the mosque.
- 1 A report containing information about my organization and its activities.

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Permit No)^|iC>T|ScC/i|<Q_j It

Tin_YA^S^*- Wgr>> PIANNINU AM*

PERMIT TO DEVELOP LAND OR TO CONSTRUCT OR CARRY OUT WORK 11' ON
* A BUILDING WITHIN A PLANNING AREA

The r*. ' Planning CommiUee, In pursuance of the |wn> itricgaiol
lo it by the Minister responsible lor Town & Country Planning under Secuon.

It (o) of the Town & Country Planning Ordinance, hereby grant] permission to:

/vi.- N\,v.virr>vL^A. At.- T L & C _

VvJW - I (6i c~

* (o) Develop the land indicated on the attached I/250* I(2500*

S.te phn for ig purposes.

and/or* (6) Construct a building indicated on the attached I/125* I/2500 site (dan for use as.

Vv\c. <<J>+VI?

asd/or* (a) Demolish (b) Alter

(r) Extend (rf) Repair

(<) Renew the building indicated on the attached I/1 250* I/2500 site plan subject to the following
conditions:—

I (/) Thur be>ntk iscompteled within -?; —years/months from the date of issue. If development
is not completed within the time application for renewal mutt be made lo the Planning Com-
mittee.

fcv\ Tc £*. T-& L> ^ s-f/G nO ygg. fe.Lc-uc PusM r%tT^r-vn5JN

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andin accordance with the attached plan.

t Thu permit dots not relieve the applicant from the necessity of compliance with any building
or planning regulations for the lime being in force in the Planning Area.

3. This permit does not imply or confirm the right of title of the applicant to the land or building
comprised herein

Dated this, _" L - . day of Jiv

By Order of the

Planning Committee

LAND RELEASE AGREEMENT / MEMORANDUM

01- UNDERSTANDING

LAND RELEASE AGREEMENT / MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING is hereby entered this 31st day of October, 2002 BETWEEN the Chief and the Muslim Zongo Community, Tarkwa (hereinafter called the 'Lessor') on the one part AND Al-muntada Al-Islami of Accra (hereinafter called the 'Lessee') on the other part

I IT IS HEREBY AGREED THAT:


- (a) The 1st party shall lease out Plot No.2
.Situating being at Xongo/Tarkwa to the 2nd party
 - (b) The 2nd Party shall be subject to pulling down the existing old mosque, its place of which has been earmarked for the construction of the new one.
 - (c) The 2nd party shall construct a mosque on the said plot for the benefit of the Zongo Community.
 - (d) The 2nd party shall have the right to appoint an imam for the Mosque in line with the procedure of the Al-Muntada Islami, but priority will be given to the Community.
- 2 The Local Imam shall continue to exercise his officiating right as the Deputy Imam during (a) funeral (b) outdoorings and (c) marriage
 - 3 All documents, covering the mosque or the leased out plot shall be in the custody of the 2nd party.
 4. That there shall be no interference in the culture of the Muslim Community.

That the above terms of this agreement are binding on both parties unless otherwise revoked

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

SEALED.SIGNED/MARKED by the)
representative of the Lessor)
(Salifu Azika) Chief of Zongo)
Community in the presence of:)


.....
LESSOR 



(ISSAH ZAK.ARI A)

SEALED, SIGNED/MARKED by the)
representative of the Lessee)
(ALHAJI YAHYA SHAFIK) in the)
presence of:)


.....
LESSEE 

Si
(ABDUL MAJEED SUALAH)

OATH OF PROOF

On the *J* day of *fHv*, 2002 at ^O'clock
in the noon this Instrument was proved before me by the
parties herein to have been duly executed by them.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND ANQ OFFICIAL SEAL



DEPUTY OPROT'f mteTWiffiRXmG H COURT -
HIGH CC'XT Ci-ystICE

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