


COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES

INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES

**PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE GHANA
ARMED FORCES**




**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHD) DEGREE IN AFRICAN STUDIES**

MARCH 2024

DECLARATION

I declare that this work has not been previously published, or submitted in part or in full to any university for the award of a diploma or degree.

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.....
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
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
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Date: November 3, 2025

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(Co-Supervisor)



ABSTRACT

The study examines how professional and medical experiences of peacekeeping shape the structures and personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). Peacekeeping has become a key feature of the global governance and security architecture. Since the 1960s, the GAF has contributed troops, military observers, military staff officers, and mission experts to peacekeeping as part of Ghana's foreign policy towards global peace and good neighbourliness. Peacekeeping exposes the GAF to war contexts and conflict environments with multiple and varied implications for the institution and soldiers. I argue that individual and collective experiences and lessons from peacekeeping are harnessed through advocacy, personal initiatives, introspection, uptake, and self-styled management to shape the evolutionary processes of the GAF. Thus, structures and soldier behaviour change as the GAF comes under normative pressures, coercion, and mimesis, which interact with domestic events and internal practices to create institutional change consistent with sociological institutionalism. I adopted a qualitative case study design comprising multiple methods – interviews (67), focus group discussions (5FGDs), informal conversations (11ICIs), observations, and document review – to gather data from primary and secondary sources in Accra and Takoradi. Thematic analysis was done manually and with NVivo software. We find that peacekeeping significantly influences administrative structures, establishment of select units, recruitment decisions, deployment of women, and training in GAF. Peacekeeping also shapes personnel attitudes, career choices, health decisions, practice of their military profession, and preparedness for eventualities. Peacekeeping is therefore a major factor in the transformational processes in the GAF. The study makes empirical, theoretical, and policy contributions and offers recommendations for policy and future research. **Keywords:** Peacekeeping, peacekeeping experiences, Ghana Armed Forces, institutional change, changes in structure, personnel outlook.

DEDICATION

To the Memory of my late parents

Opanyin Kwesi Bembir

Obaapanyin Ekuia Mboroba


Also, to

The Peacekeepers of the Ghana Armed Forces

And my children,

Siarfo Gyamponsah Bembir

Gyefo Gyamponsah Bembir



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My foremost thanks to The Creator of the universe for giving me life, and the ability to create this knowledge. I especially thank my supervisors for their patience and mentoring: Thank you, Professor Richard Asante, Professor Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, and Dr. Pius Siakwah. Thanks to the Ghana Armed Forces and the study participants. To my Research Assistants: Andrew Addo, Wonder Nutsugah, Eberechi Afonne, Evans Dormenyoh, Felicia I. Nduefuna, Valerie Tornu, I appreciate your hard work. Thanks to DANIDA for funding this research through the Domestic Security Implications of Peacekeeping (DSIP) Project. Many thanks, Director, Prof. Samuel Ntewusu, Mr. William Asare, Prof. Akosua Adomako-Ampofo, Dr. Obodai Torto, Dr. Mjiba Freehiwot, Prof. Esi Sutherland, Prof. Kojo Aidoo, Prof. Michael Kpessa-Whyte, Prof. Horace Campbell, General, Accounts, and Academic offices and affiliates of the Institute of African Studies for the support and encouragement. I thank the DSIP team: Dr. Peter Narh, Dr. Osman Alhassan, Dr. Benjamin Kwansa, Dr. Deborah Akobra, Prof. Dzodzi Tsikata, Dr Fiiifi Edu-Afful, and Dr Festus Aubyn. Prof. Maya Christensen, special thanks; you made Denmark feel like home. Thank you to Peter Albrecht, Nauja Kleist, DIIS Librarians, the IT team, and DFC staff for making my stay in Denmark productive. Prof. Charles and Dr. Mrs. Amoatey, Pastor Francis and Mummy Veronica Fosu, Dr. Seth Aniweh, and the DLFC Legon family, thank you for the spiritual support. My comrades, Eva Dzegblor and Mustapha Abdullah, you made the journey memorable. Monsieur Joseph Dabol, thank you. To my extended family, and in-laws especially: Paul Bembir, Kofi Bosomefi, Aba Agyeiwaa, Mr. and Mrs. Kwesi Tetteh and Gifty-Afenyi Dadzie, Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin and Selina Benson, Mr. and Mrs. Dick and Margaret Afonne. Thanks for your support. To my wife, Dr Chinenye Bembir, and children, Siarfo and Gyefo Gyamponsah Bembir (three Major PhD Results), thank you for your cooperation and love.

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


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
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

2BN	Second Infantry Battalion
2IC	Second in Command
4BN	Fourth Infantry Battalion
5BN	Fifth Infantry Battalion
ABF	Airborne Force
ACTS	Army Combat Training School
ADC	Aid de Camp
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AHQ	Army Headquarters
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APOTS	Army Peacekeeping Operations Training School
ATRAC	Army Training Command
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
AU PSOD	African Union Peace Support Operations Department
AU	African Union
BFT	Basic Fitness Test
BN	Battalion
BNT	Basic and Nursing Training School
BOD	Base Ordnance Depot
BRIG. GEN	Brigadier General (One Star General)
C/COMD	Central Command
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CAS	Chief of Air Staff
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CIMIC	Civil-military Cooperation
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief



CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CN and GT	Counter-Narcotic and Global Threat operation and logistic support
CNO	Chief Nursing Officer
CNS	Chief of Naval Staff
CO	Commanding Officer
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COL	Colonel
COMD	Command
CSM	Course Sergeant Major
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
CWO	Chief Warrant Officer
DAPKOP	Department of Army Peacekeeping Operations
DCE	Defence Civilian Establishment
DCS	Defence Civilian Staff
Def MT	Defence Mechanical Transport Unit
DG	Director General
DI	Defence Intelligence
DIIS	Danish Institute for International Studies
DIPKOP	Directorate of International Peacekeeping Operations
DIPKOP	Directorate of International Peacekeeping Operations
DKPH	Duchess of Kent's Psychiatric Hospital
DMS	Department of Medical Services
DN	Director Nursing
DOS	Department of Operational Support
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO/DFS	Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo

DWFA	‘dzi wo fie asem’ (mind your own business)
ECH	Ethics Committee for Humanities
ECOMIG	ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring and Observation Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDCS	Female Defence Civilian Staff
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FOB	Forward Operational Base
FPR	Forces Pay Regiment
FSO	Female Senior Officer
FSS	Female Senior Soldier
G1	General Staff Officer Grade I
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GAFCS	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
GAFTAG	German Armed Forces Training Advisory Group
GCC	Gold Coast Constabulary
GCR	Gold Coast Regiment
GHANBATT	Ghana Battalion
GHANCOY	Ghana Company
GHANENGCOY	Ghana Engineer Company
GHANENGCOY	Ghana Engineer Company
GHF	Ghana Air Force
GHQ	General Headquarters
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GMA	Ghana Military Academy
GN	Ghana Navy
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GSO	General Staff Officer



HIPPO	High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HQ	Headquarters
IAS	Institute of African Studies
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INF	Infantry
IPSO	Department of International Peace Support Operations
IRB	Institutional Review Board
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LA	Legal Affairs
LT COL	Lieutenant Colonel
LT GEN	Lieutenant General
LT	Lieutenant
Maj	Major
MAJ. GEN	Major General
MAT	Military Academy and Training Schools
MDCS	Male Defence Civilian Staff
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support
MILOB	Military Observer
MINUSMA	Mission multidimensionnelle integree des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali)
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en Republique democratique du Congo (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Republique democratique du Congo (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOWIP	Measuring Opportunities for Women in Peace Operations
MP	Military Police

MRS	Medical Reception Station
MSO	Male Senior Officer
MSS	Male Senior Soldier
MT Coy	Mechanical Transport Company
MTO	Mechanical Transport Officer
MWO	Master Warrant Officer
N/COMD	Northern Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NDU	National Defence University
NHQ	Naval Headquarters
OAU	Organizations of African Unity
OC	Officer Commanding
ONUC	Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (United Nations Operation in the Congo)
OPS	Operations
OR	Other ranks
ORBAT	Order of Battle
PA	Personnel Administration
PHEIC	Public Health Emergencies of International Concern
PKE	Peacekeeping economies
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PRAAD	Public Records and Archives Administration Department
PROMEX	Promotional Examination
PSO	Peace Support Operation
PT	Physical Training
PTSD	Posttraumatic stress disorder
RA	Religious Affairs
RACCLI	Royal African Colonial Corps of Light Infantry

RAD	Religious Affairs Directorate
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAP	Regimental Aid Post
RCC	Regular Career Course
RMSO	Retired Male Senior Officer
RSM	Regiment Sergeant Major
RWAFF	Royal West African Frontier Force
S & T	Supply and Transport
S/COMD	Southern Command
SG	Secretary General
SMI	Special Medical Intake
SO	School of Ordnance
SSBG	Support Services Brigade Group
SSC/SDC	Short Service Commission/ Special Duties Course
STD	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
SWO	Senior Warrant Officer
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UG	University of Ghana
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITAMS	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	United Nations mission in Cote d'Ivoire
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
WAAC	West Africa Air Corps
WAAU	West African Auxiliary Unit
WAFF	West African Frontier Force
WHO	World Health Organization
WO	Warrant Office



CHAPTER ONE

GHANA ARMED FORCES, PEACEKEEPING, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A BACKGROUND

1.0 Introduction

Peacekeeping has become a key feature of the global governance and security architecture. Beginning in 1948, peacekeeping has served as a crisis response mechanism through which the armed forces of states and other actors, usually third parties, resolve international conflicts.¹ The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) since 1960 fields contingents (troops), military observers, military staff officers, and experts on missions to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations² (Nkrumah 1965; Erskine, 1989; Aboagye, 1999a; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013; Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS), 2022).


The peacekeeping activities of GAF have also included duty tours under the umbrella of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Olonisakin, 1997; Aboagye, 1999a, 1999b; 2000; Kotia, 2015; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2017; Prouza and Horák, 2015:205-206, 220; Birikorang, 2007:9). The participation of GAF in these missions exposes it to war contexts and situations of conflict that have multiple but varied implications on the institution and its personnel.

¹ Other actors include, inter alia, police, non-governmental organizations, civilians, and private security companies.

² Ghana contributes military experts on missions, staff officers, observers, troops, and formed police units and individual police (DPKO/DFS, 2022). The nation is thus a troop-contributing country (TCC) and police-contributing country (PCC). This thesis is however focussed on the peacekeepers of the Ghana Armed Forces.

This work examines how individual and collective experiences and lessons from peacekeeping are harnessed to bring about change in GAF. It investigates the professional influences and effects of medical exposures of peacekeeping on the structural and behavioural outlook of GAF and its personnel. Professional influences include lessons, experiences, exposures, and practices that accompany soldiering in peacekeeping. The structural and behavioural changes thus constitute institutional transformations and are examined as variables of institutional change (Beckert, 2010; Asante, 2020; Agyekum, 2021). Institutional change³ or institutional transformation thus refers to changes in GAF's structures and personnel behaviour. Structural change is operationalised as changes in organisation, recruitment policy, training/operational readiness, women deployment, and the emergence of new structures (sub-institutions) in GAF. The behavioural dimension considers the effects of peacekeeping experiences on soldier professionalism (interventionism, discipline, use of mission experience), post-mission career choices, and attempts at managing medical outcomes of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is used interchangeably with peace operations (POs) and peacekeeping operations (PKOs).⁴

This chapter provides a background to the thesis and highlights the problem that informed the study. It also presents the objectives, questions, the significance, and the scope of the study.




³ The second section of Chapter Two offers a more detailed discussion on institutional change as an analytical concept.

⁴ PO encompasses peacekeeping and political missions. PKOs or peacekeeping have included elements of special political missions. Consequently, I use them interchangeably to highlight the broad spectrum of peacekeeping activities of GAF.

1.1 Background to the Study

Armed forces serve multiple purposes. These militaries are used to protect territorial integrity, wage wars, and engage in developmental activities, alongside peacekeeping operations (Fagoyinbo, 2013:27-34, 320-330; Adler and Polsky, 2010:88-98; Haekkerup, 1964; Janowitz, 1964a, 1964b; Pye, 1961:89-90).⁵

Through peacekeeping, armed forces serve as instruments for conflict management and resolution. They are, thus, used by states and multilateral organisations to broker peace, sustain peace agreements, ensure peace through some form of coercion, and help build the infrastructure to prevent relapse into conflict (DPKO/DFS, 2008; Ackermann, 2003; Sisk, 2009; Thruelsen, 2009; Lundgren, 2016). Given their persisting use for PKOs, there are contentions about whether the armed forces have become agents of peace despite being, traditionally, instruments of war (Lori, 2022; Jeong, 2004; Edmunds, 2006; Cunliffe, 2013; Albrecht, 2020; Aboagye, 1999a). Studies have found that warfare persists at inter-state, intra-state, and extra-state levels, respectively involving national armies, national forces versus armed non-state groups, and national armies versus forces of entities not recognized as a state (Cunningham and Lemke, 2013:609; Sarkees et al., 2003:49-51; Ray, 2002; Gleditsch, 2007:293-294; Gleditsch et al., 2008:479). The armed forces are also instruments in the war against terror (counterterrorism) such as the war by the USA and its allies in Afghanistan in 2001 (Veit, 2002; Salt, 2018; Smith, 2009; Basit, 2017; Marsh, 2014).



⁵ While private militaries, guerrilla forces, and other militias exist and serve some of the roles outlined e.g., waging war, the focus here is on the armed forces of countries and states. It thus excludes armed revolutionary elements that appear in Janowitz's (1976:187-188) concept of armed forces.

In Africa, the outset of the millennium witnessed a war between Rwanda and Uganda (1999-2000), and the Second Congo War (1998-2003) where state armies of seven nations⁶ participated in a battle to control the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Reyntjens, 2001:311). Some armed forces have also resumed nonpeaceful activities within their borders. There is re-emergence of military coups in parts of Africa – Mali (2012, 2020, 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), Guinea (2021), Niger (2023), Chad (2021), Gabon (2023) and Sudan (2021) (Whitehouse, 2012; Alozieuwa, 2013 Asante, 2020:333; Elischer and Lawrance, 2022; Singh, 2022:33; Aliyev, 2023; Raube, 2023; Andenga, 2023).

Singh (2022:33) further records 6 failed putsches in Niger, Sudan, and Guinea-Bissau between February 2021 and February 2022. Similar trends have been observed in Asia, Europe, and South America. In Asia, there have been coups in Thailand (2014) and Burma/Myanmar (2021), and a failed coup in Turkey (2016) (Singh, 2022:33; Thawngmung and Noah, 2021; Baker, 2016; Sopranzetti, 2016; Chachavalpongpun, 2014; Marović, 2019). Europe has recorded attempted coups in Montenegro (2016) and Germany (2022) (Morrison, 2018; Kraus, 2020; Ritzmann, 2023), while South America has recorded failed putsches in Peru (2022) and Brazil (2023) (Jütten, 2023; UNICEF, 2022; Delivorias and Lazarou, 2023). These wars, episodic resurgences of coups and attempted coups since 2000, are anything but conducive to peace.

Notwithstanding these nonpeaceful outlooks of some armed forces, the military has played several roles in promoting peace in many parts of the globe through peacekeeping (DPKO/DFS, 2008; Cunliffe, 2013; Autesserre, 2019:101-107; Williams, 2000; Duffey, 2000:142; Segal, 1995). Starting in 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) observed ceasefire

⁶ Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia were allied with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and rebel forces were supported by Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda.

in Palestine between Israel and its neighbours – Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon – following hostilities that accompanied the creation of the state of Israel (Erskine, 1989:143; Boutros-Ghali, 1996; S/RES/50, 1948; Department of Public Information- DPI/2311, 2003; Ben-Ari and Elron, 2001). Subsequently, the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) intervened in the Suez Crisis which involved joint forces of Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt over the use of the Suez Canal (S/RES/341, 1973; Erskine, 1989). In Africa, the military has been deployed under the auspices of the UN, African Union, ECOWAS, or through UN-AU partnership to manage intra-state conflicts.

The UN, for example, established Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1960-1964)⁷, and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to manage conflicts in the named countries (S/RES/143, 1960; Nkrumah, 1965; S/RES/872, 1993; Anyidoho, 1997; Dallaire, 2003). In the context of GAF and Ghana's defence and foreign policy, ONUC was a critical mission (Aning and Danso, 2020; Nkrumah, 1965; Afrifa, 1966; Baynham, 1985; Erskine, 1989; Aboagye, 1999a; Addae, 2005; Akurgo, 2018). As Aning and Danso (2020) argue, Ghana under its founding president envisioned itself as a continental leader and the presence of the Ghanaian corps on ONUC was a demonstration of power abroad. It was thus a statement about Africa's authority, capacity, and competence. Since that operation, peacekeeping has become a major activity of the GAF and a tool of the Ghanaian



⁷ The Democratic of Congo has hosted other missions aside from ONUC. There have been military observers (SC/RES/1258, 6 August 1999), the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, 1999-2010) established first by SC/RES/1279, 30 November 1999 which gave way to UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) on 1 July 2010 (SC/RES/1925, 28 May 2010). MONUSCO's mandate has been renewed through several SC resolutions (SC/RES/1991, 2012; SC/RES/2052, 2013, SC/RES/...), and the current mandate extends to 20 December 2023 (SC/RES/2666, 20 December 2022).

state projecting soft power and promoting international peace and security (Frinjuah, 2016; Agyekum, 2020; Ghana Defence Policy, 2009:10).

On the continental level, The Organization of African Unity (OAU) – AU since 2000 - also deployed peacekeeping mission codenamed Neutral OAU Force to Chad (AHG/Res. 101 (XVII), 1980; Naldi, 1985:593-595; Amoo, 1992:16; Sesay, 1991; Olonisakin, 1997; May and Massey, 1998; Jah, 2000; McClellan, 2003). The AU has deployed peacekeepers to Somalia [African Union Mission in Somalia-AMISOM] and Burundi [African Union Mission in Burundi-AMIB] (Sesay, 1989; Neethling, 2009:41; Albrecht and Haenlein, 2016; Badmus, 2017). At the subregional level, ECOWAS has also had deployments in Liberia (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group -ECOMOG), and Gambia (ECOWAS Mission in Gambia-ECOMIG).

UN-AU partnership missions include the UN Assistance Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Support Office to the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) among several others (Frimpong, 2023; Williams, 2009; Aubyn, 2015; Ola and Ehiane, 2016; Cawthra, 2016; S/RES/1863, S/RES/1872, 2009; Weiss and Welz, 2014:890). Global and regional organizations continue to deploy military peacekeepers as a key mechanism for managing inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts and sustaining peace (Bellamy et al., 2010; Cunliffe, 2013; UN, 2004; Fortna, 2004; Erskine, 1989; Boutros-Ghali, 1996).

The Ghana Armed Forces has been a significant troop⁸ contributor in many of the peacekeeping operations across the world vis-à-vis its traditional functions as a guarantor of territorial integrity and contributor to the country's socioeconomic development (Aning, 2007; Erskine, 1989; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2017; Passmore, 2020; Ghana Const. 1992, art. CCX. 1-3). Historically, GAF

⁸ Troops include any infantry, logistics, engineering, air, medical, mov-con, staff, and others (DPI, 1996)

emanated from the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR) which had been an infantry unit of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). The WAFF became the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) in 1928. These forces were raised by imperial Britain to maintain peace in its colonial outposts in the Gold Coast, Senegal, Nigeria, and Gambia, and served as war instruments of Britain in its military campaigns in Togo, Cameroun, and East Africa (Clifford, 1920; Haywood and Clarke, 1969; Killingray, 1983a, 1983b; Stapleton, 2022). The GCR became Ghana's military forces at the dawn of the country's independence on March 6, 1957 (Aboagye, 1999a:23,29; Bayham, 1985:91). The initial force was predominantly an infantry unit that expanded and became a unified Ghana Armed Forces comprising the Ghana Army, Ghana Navy, and the Ghana Air Force in July 1959 (Hutchful, 1985; Aboagye, 1999a, 2010; Addae, 2005). Since its establishment, GAF has evolved and continues to transform.

These changes have unfolded through interactions with domestic currents, peacekeeping engagements, and external collaborations, including training by military experts from Canada, Britain, Israel, the former Soviet Union, France, and the USA as part of security forces and technical assistance programmes. Some of the military training programmes are the joint Military Training Team from Britain and Canada (1961-1974), British Military Assistance Team (BMAT) from 1984 to 1994, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and Africa Contingency Operation Training Assistance (ACOTA) of USA; Elsie Initiative of Canada, Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Programme (RECAMP) by France, and Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP) by Canada (Ghana Military Academy, 2017:13; Birikorang, 2007:7; Federal Research Division, 1994; Emmanuel, 2015:10; Abramovici and Stoker, 2004:688-689; Aning and Bah, 2008).

As evident in the training partnerships such as ACRI, ACOTA, and RECAMP, Ghana's participation in peacekeeping has had some consequences on GAF and the country. The consequences are mixed. The Ghanaian contingents are praised in the international community for the professionalism in the execution of peacekeeping mandates (Dallaire, 2003; Beri, 2008; Choedon, 2017; Henry, 2019). GAF troops are, however, not entirely exempt from concerns about personnel misdemeanour on PKOs, including sexual exploitation and abuse (S/RES/1565, 2004; Grady, 2010; Karim and Beardsley, 2016; Smith, 2011; Allred, 2006; Jennings, 2014). In one case, a peacekeeper from the Ghana Battalion had a child with a local in the troops' area of responsibility in the 1990s.⁹

Generally, peacekeeping generates unintended consequences for host communities, troop-contributing countries (TCCs), and peacekeepers. These consequences extend to the economic, professional, and medical outcomes of peacekeeping. As PKOs are underway, spheres of economic exchanges (peacekeeping economies) are engendered in host communities (Jennings, 2018; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013). TCCs like Ghana, its military, and the peacekeepers also secure economic benefits (remuneration), particularly from the UN, and UN partnership missions (Prouza and Horák, 2015; Birikorang, 2007).

The professional impact on TCCs and their militaries is visible through peacekeeping-related training and mission deployments. These engagements influence aspects of domestic security discourses and practices in TCCs (Aning and Siegle, 2019; Henk, 2004; Wilén et al., 2015; Baledrokadroka, 2012).

⁹ Interview, RMSOX, June 2022, Accra. Over the years GAF has strongly emphasized non-sexual involvement with locals to maintain its hard-won credibility as a professional force for peacekeeping activities.

Professional training is provided to peacekeepers from TCCs through security forces assistance led by advanced militaries, primarily from the West. The training seeks to enhance soldiering skills, including counterterrorism, to improve effectiveness in peacekeeping (Banini et al., 2020; Riley and Balaram, 2013; Clune, 2014).

The training includes joint exercises and exchange programmes, through which officers and soldiers from GAF and other TCC armies receive instruction in military institutions in the UK, USA, Canada, and other Western countries.

Deployments abroad expose GAF and other peacekeepers to advanced military and democratic practices in PKOs which engender positive civil-military relations but sometimes inform non-democratic practices (Hutchful, 1997b; Levine, 2016:81; Agyekum, 2020; Banini et al., 2020). Huntington (1957:29-78) maintains that positive civil-military relations imply that the military sees itself as a servant of the statesman, obedient as far as it secures state welfare, apolitical, and subject to civil control in its management of force. This position does not reflect the African reality. Nonetheless, objective civil control is an essential component of military professionalism (Huntington, 1957; Sarvas, 1999: 100). Janowitz (1960:418) de-emphasizes the use of force and presents the professional soldier as one who is connected to society, not just the state, and shares in the goal-setting and coordinating processes of society. Again, as visible in Africa and elsewhere, militaries have mostly become disconnected from the societies they protect and share in policymaking and governance with force at the state level. The classical discourses about soldier professionalism thus do not reflect ongoing events in Africa and the history of GAF. Global deployments have, however, provided skills that combine societal norms that have influenced GAF in the provision of domestic security (Edu-Afful, 2022; Albrecht and Sukanya, 2020).

Peacekeeping deployments have sometimes been used to send off troublemakers and to disrupt coup coordination in Bangladesh (Murthy, 2007:159), Tunisia (Albrecht, 2020), and Ghana (Agyekum, 2020; Olonisakin, 1997). Peacekeepers may also become coup-prone and assume activist roles back home, as evidenced in Fiji (Baledrokadroka, 2012:115) and Ghana's first coup (Alexander, 1966; Afrifa, 1966), or provide the ground for coup coordination as Ghana's last coup demonstrated (Agyekum, 2020).

The professional outcomes of peace operations are thus non-linear. In the professional practice of peacekeeping theatres, soldiers are also exposed to health concerns and psychological aftermaths of the deployments. Peacekeepers could become patients and vectors of pandemics and epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, Ebola, and COVID-19, considered public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC) which affect them, their establishments, and nations (WHO, 2007; S/RES/1308, 2000; McInnes, 2006; Tripodi and Patel, 2004; Burci, 2014).

Exposures to trauma in genocidal theatres such as Rwanda, Somalia, and Yugoslavia have had a post-operation psychological impact on peacekeepers who become bystanders, participants, victims of violent conflicts, and/or protectors, if saviours, of genocide survivors (Dallaire, 2003; Anyidoho, 1997; Britt and Adler, 2003; Litz et al., 1997; Dirkzwager, et al., 2003; Ray, 2009). As these health issues are seen as security threats (securitization of health) and peacekeepers as health risks (Feldbaum et al., 2006; Azuonwu et al., 2012:25-29; Patel and Tripodi 2007; Tripodi and Patel, 2002, 2004:195), their management also deepen medical practice in soldiering and security provision (medicalisation of security) (Elbe, 2010, 2011; Birenbaum, 1994; Campbell and Nobel, 2009).

Though GAF, like other armed forces, shapes personnel behaviour in a largely deterministic way, influences from its socio-cultural environment, international peacekeeping, and post-mission

outcomes for the officers and men shape the institution in various ways (Peters, 2011). The study therefore uses institutional change (sociological institutionalism) as its analytical concept to interrogate the effects of professional experiences from peacekeeping and related medical exposures on GAF. I take a departure from the general conceptions of the theory however by focussing on how the peacekeepers become drivers of institutional change.

1.2 Problem Statement: Peacekeeping-Institutional Change Nexus

Studies have documented the economic dividends that peacekeeping yields for armed forces, peacekeepers, TCCs, and host nations (Henry 2015:337; Aning, 2007; Hutchful, 1997a; Caruso et al., 2017:250; Rolandsen, 2015; Jennings and Bøås, 2015; Jennings, 2018; Felstead, 2020). Peacekeeping earnings support the meagre income of personnel and are used to finance various expenses and investments, including the education of family members and the purchase of landed property (Aning, 2007; Hutchful, 1997a; Clune, 2014). It also provides foreign income to the nation and institutional and personal resources to the armed forces (Banini, 2020:235; Salihu, 2020:620; Clune, 2016).

Other studies have examined the effects of peacekeeping on civil-military relations in TCCs (Passmore, 2020; Asante, 2020a; Dwyer, 2015; Baledrokadroka, 2012). In this literature, civil-military relations are used to explain the existence of soldier professionalism or lack thereof. The debates partly revolve around affirmative claims that peacekeeping shifts armies away from the propensity to intervene in domestic politics through coups, as observed by studies that have focussed on Ghana (Albrecht, 2019; Edu-Afful et al., 2019). The other strand of the scholarship highlights military interventions and mutinies associated with peacekeeping operations, often arising from material grievances and a sense of injustice among peacekeepers in response to events

back home (Baledrokadroka, 2012; Cunliffe, 2018; Banini et al., 2020; Afrifa, 1966). Some studies on the Ghana Armed Forces focused on how exposure to human rights and democratic standards during peacekeeping training and deployment fosters improved civil-military relations and informs the conduct of internal operations (Aubyn et al., 2019; Levine, 2016). These studies have enhanced our understanding of the effect of peacekeeping on civil-military relations and internal operations. However, little is known about the specific ways in which personnel utilize mission-related experiences, post-PKO career choices, and structural transformations ongoing in GAF as a result of peacekeeping exposures. As Huntington (1957:67) observes, readiness for eventualities such as war or pandemics is a defining element of soldier professionalism alongside other professional ethos such as discipline, devotion to duty, obedience, and collectiveness.

These professional aspects also interact with peacekeeping experiences and can be variously shaped by such outcomes. Additionally, as new threats emerge and pandemics persist, medical outcomes from peacekeeping stretch beyond stress and traumatic exposures for personnel with consequences for their professional practice. Within the broader Ghana healthcare system, a situational analysis by Ofori-Atta et. al (2010:99) for example, shows that there are shortfalls in mental healthcare provision as professionals in this field are inadequate, infrastructure for managing cases is aging, and stigma is widespread. This deficiency is mirrored by the military in its health provision in addition to a professional posture of resilience, mental toughness, and strength which can heighten negative health-seeking behaviour among personnel.

It is yet to be well understood, however, how these professional dimensions of soldiering and its medical component interact with peacekeeping exposures and the outcomes of such interaction on

institutional organization, recruitment, and training in the Ghana Armed Forces, and the outlook of GAF personnel through the uptake¹⁰ of these experiences.

This study therefore contributes to filling this gap in the discussions about the nexus between personnel's peacekeeping experiences and institutional transformation in the GAF.

1.3 Research Objectives

The study examines the influences of peacekeeping experiences on the structures and personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces. It investigates how collective and individual experiences of personnel are harnessed and contribute to institutional change in the Armed Forces.

Specifically, the study set forth to achieve three principal objectives:

- (a) Review the evolution of GAF within the context of its peacekeeping engagements.
- (b) Analyse structural changes in GAF resulting from the professional and medical dimensions of peacekeeping operations.
- (c) Examine how professional and medical experiences of peacekeeping have shaped personnel behaviour within the GAF.

1.4 Research Questions

The study is guided by the broader question: How is institutional change driven in the Ghana Armed Forces in relation to its peacekeeping activities?

The specific questions are:

- (a) What historical and institutional contexts have shaped GAF's engagement in peacekeeping?

¹⁰ Uptake is defined as the management and utilisation of peacekeeping experiences by GAF and/or personnel.

- (b) How have professional and medical experiences during peacekeeping influenced structural changes within the GAF?
- (c) In what ways have peacekeeping experiences shaped personnel's professional and medical behaviour in GAF?

1.5 Justification/Relevance of the Study

This study contributes to the scholarship on peacekeeping and peace and security. It makes contributions from empirical, theoretical, and policy dimensions. Empirically, the study's focus on professional experiences, examined through the use of mission experiences, post-mission career choices, personnel attitudes, and institutional organization, furthers ongoing debates on the effects of peacekeeping on military structures and professionalism.

Additionally, by researching medical outcomes of peacekeeping operations for GAF, this study deepens debates about medical influences in security practice. Thus, the study provides useful knowledge that contributes to efforts to understand the influences of peacekeeping on structures, soldier¹¹ professionalism, and medical practice in the armed forces in Africa.

The study contributes to theoretical debates on institutional change within sociological institutionalism. Changes in institutions, achieved through means such as knowledge transfer and the imitation of structures and practices from other institutions, have been identified in the literature (Saurugger, 2020; Schofer et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the role of individuals and groups as mediums of such transformation is scarcely highlighted. Outside the core of sociological institutionalism, Agyekum (2021) is one of the few works that portray the soldier as a constituent

¹¹ Soldiers here refers to both officers and other ranks (the men). Strictly, however, soldiers are the other ranks.

and carrier of change, as well as a mediator of transformation processes in the Ghana Armed Forces. By highlighting the mediatory roles of the soldier in institutional transformations, the study contributes to the theory. Put differently, the focus on the role of individual and group experiences in institutional change adds more nuance to sociological institutionalism.

By emphasizing the experiences of peacekeepers, this study treats individuals and groups as active mediums to transport ideas to their institutions, where their experiences from mission theatres (can) shape structures and practices. Additionally, the health outcomes of peacekeeping manifest at individual and national contingent levels. These outcomes have implications for personal and collective health within troops and nations. Ideas about the securitization of pandemics aim to minimize or prevent the possibility of peacekeepers serving as vectors for the transmission of infectious diseases (Burci, 2014; Tripodi and Patel, 2004; McInnes, 2006; WHO, 2007). Similarly, infections among personnel and exposure to traumatic events trigger demands for the medicalisation of security via the growing need for medical attention in the military (Elbe, 2010, 2011).

Particularly, the changes in security practices and structures arising from the growing health connections with the activities of the armed forces result from individual and group health experiences from PKO fields. The individual-group medical dimensions show the institutional change occurring within the dynamics of the securitization of medicine and the medicalization of security in the health-security nexus. Thus, the individual and group dimensions of institutional change are recognised more obviously while furthering debates on the health-security nexus.

The policy contribution rests on the uptake of the professional and medical experiences from peacekeeping. Examining these experiences and their impact on GAF encompasses documenting the changes and enhancing the management of professional and medical exposures of PKOs.

Essentially, participants' recommendations for structural modification in the management of professional and health experiences of peacekeepers can spur changes that relevant stakeholders will find necessary. This policy contribution aligns with military traditions in Ghana that promote a structure that builds consensus and dialogue in decision-making and institutional transformation (Hutchful, 1997a; Erskine, 1989).

While limited cases and their inherent particularities impose obvious limitations on the generalizability of findings, this study on GAF offers important lessons about the changes in the Armed Forces as an institution and in the behaviour of its personnel resulting from peacekeeping engagements.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study encompasses peacekeeping experiences of the Ghana Armed Forces irrespective of the mission theatre, year, or the role peacekeepers played in the deployments. Experiences of members of the officer corps and other ranks across missions are harnessed. This focus helped obtain a more comprehensive perspective across the spectrum of peacekeeping experiences. The study also covers the historical trajectory of Ghana's deployments since 1960. The historical overview will enhance our understanding of the contexts surrounding select deployments and the evolution of the GAF.

The study does not provide year-by-year analysis per se, but rather a historicization that offers a broad timeline nearly coterminous with major socio-political developments that affected Ghana. The choice of this period promises a deeper understanding of the changes that have occurred in the military over time due to peacekeeping generally, and the professional and medical influences of PKOs on the Ghana Armed Forces specifically.

Additionally, peacekeeping mission areas, such as Rwanda and Liberia, are identified by the literature as more likely candidates to have triggered traumatic memories. Other PKO areas, such as the DRC, are endemic for transmissible diseases. Both PKO areas were of particular interest in understanding how traumatic memories and exposures to health risks are managed by personnel and GAF.

1.7 Arrangement of Chapters

This study consists of seven chapters. In the current chapter, the discussions provided the basis for the thesis, the objectives, and the research questions. Some of the terms that will be encountered in subsequent chapters have also been operationalised. The theoretical and analytical concepts have also been highlighted. In the second chapter, the literature on the topic of study is reviewed, and the theoretical/analytical lens of the study is discussed. The chapter interrogates issues such as definitions, mandates, doctrines of peacekeeping, and the rationale for peace operations. It also reviews the unintended consequences of peacekeeping for the economies of the mission areas, the TCCs, and peacekeepers. Particularly, professional and medical outcomes of peacekeeping operations are reviewed.

The theoretical/analytical part discusses institutional change within the sociological institutionalism theory. This discussion is then connected with the peacekeeping outcomes identified in the literature to present the conceptual framework that guided the study.

The third chapter discusses how the entire research process was negotiated. It describes the study site and explains the philosophical underpinning and methods used to engage this study. The chapter contains a reflection on the research process and catalogues the processes and challenging


contexts under which the study was undertaken. The content of the chapter is therefore based on field experiences with relevant backing from the literature on qualitative studies.

In chapter four, I discuss the evolution and socio-political contexts surrounding the peacekeeping activities of the Ghana Armed Forces. It answers the question of historical contexts that have shaped GAF and its PKOs.

The fifth chapter analyses structural transformations in GAF resulting from the professional experiences and medical exposures during peacekeeping. Chapter five, therefore, answers questions about peacekeeping and structural changes in GAF.

The penultimate chapter examines how peacekeeping shapes the professional and medical behaviour of GAF personnel. It discusses themes such as professionalism (interventionism, discipline, and use of professional experiences from PKOs in personnel's trade in the force). Post-mission career choices and the management of psychological aftermaths of PKOs are also discussed.

In the concluding chapter, the findings are summarized, and conclusions and recommendations emerging from the study are presented. The chapter, therefore, concludes the study and outlines contributions to scholarship and policy regarding the nexus between peacekeeping experiences and institutional change in the Ghana Armed Forces.



1.8 Chapter Summary

Peacekeeping has had influences on peacekeepers, troops, their institutions, and the country. This study examined the nexus between the professional and medical experiences of Ghana's military peacekeepers and changes in the Ghana Armed Forces.

The current chapter introduced the background of the study, the problem that informed the research, and the objectives and research questions that guided the research. The overall organization of the chapters in this thesis is equally presented. I now turn to review the scholarship and theoretical underpinnings of the study.



CHAPTER TWO

A REVIEW OF PEACEKEEPING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of peacekeeping. It then proceeds to discuss the institutional change literature within the sociological institutionalism theory. Building on insights from the literature and theoretical reflections, I formulate a conceptual guide that informs the analysis and addresses the research questions and objectives.

The review shows that peacekeeping has several renditions and comes under differing umbrella terms. The basis for its practice draws largely from global and regional frameworks, and the overall practice has evolved. The influence of peacekeeping is also varied for the actors. The effects of peacekeeping on the armed forces and personnel are explainable within processes of institutional change.

2.1 About Peacekeeping: Concepts, Evolution, and Practice

Attempts to promote peace in conflict settings are not new. Societies have always found ways to co-exist and function with minimal conflicts. The pre-United Nations (UN) mention of ‘peacekeeper’ in 1886, however, practically referred to a strong party exerting its will or might to achieve peace in a conflict situation (Bures 2007; Last, 2003). At the multilateral level, Beck (1980:52-53) contends that the League of Nations had among its manifold duties the responsibility to preserve peace.

Daniel et al. (1999:7-9) also assert that the League of Nations was created to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this task, MacQueen (2008:184) records that the League of Nations deployed international forces to conflict situations in South America and Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. As MacQueen (2008) notes, however, the operational capacity of those deployments does not compare to any contemporary conceptions of peacekeeping. Such a conclusion implies that the League of Nations cannot be viewed as a peacekeeping instrument in comparison with the 1948 indefinite truce and ceasefire observation in Palestine, which some studies mark as the start of peacekeeping (Bures, 2007; Bellamy et al., 2004; Boutros-Ghali, 1996; Segal, 1995). Daniel et al. (1999:7-9), however, document that the League of Nations used a small number of military personnel or formations ranging between hundreds and a few thousand to monitor, report, or investigate activities. The military officers also supervised the separation of warring forces and implementation of frontier agreements; established and managed neutral zones between opponents, as well as administered territories transferred between parties (p.7-8).

The peacekeeping activities of the League of Nations resemble those of the UN between 1947 and 1949, when it established the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). As Daniel et al. (1999:8) observe, League deployment to Saarland, Germany, during the plebiscite in 1934 to determine control of Saar by France or Britain numbered about 3,300 men. Furthermore, military officers in the 1947-1949 UN mission were unarmed observers under the Secretary-General who were visible and maintained prevailing order in mission areas, as observers had been under the League commissions. The earlier UN missions and deployments under the League in conflict situations were thus based on peaceful settlement of disputes and non-use of force.

The observable surge in numbers and use of armed units that have characterized peacekeeping for the past sixty-six years is more traceable to 1956 when the UN deployed Emergency Force (UNEF 1) of about 6,000 soldiers to resolve the Suez crisis [1956-1967] (Carroll, 2010; Hilmy, 2015, 2020; Daniel et al., 1999:8; Diehl, 1993). It is admissible, therefore, that the UN was not established *ex nihilo* but that the experiences of the League had been absorbed into the ‘institutional memory’ of the organization and contributed to the development of the UN’s peacekeeping efforts (MacQueen, 2008:184; Daniel et al., 1999:8).

Apparently, the UN system took off from the ruins of the League of Nations to build a ‘better institution’ that is more effective in resolving global challenges. Indeed, Goodrich (1947:1,5) highlights that the UN inherited the properties and assets of the League of Nations and practices that had evolved under the League Covenant.¹² This heritage includes lessons about peacekeeping missions undertaken by the League of Nations.


2.1.1 Defining Peacekeeping and Operations to Support Peace

Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are one of the responses of the international community to “situations of international and internal conflict” (Roberts, 1994:131; Cunliffe, 2013). Peacekeeping as a phenomenon assumes a notoriety as difficult to define (MacQueen, 2008:182; Johnston, 2007). Nonetheless, there is a plethora of definitions of the concept in the scholarly literature. The ongoing definitional struggle reflects varied views of institutions, scholars, and practitioners about peacekeeping.

¹² The League Covenant was to the League of Nations as The Charter is to the UN.

Additionally, the boundaries of PKOs, both UN and non-UN, and peacekeeping activities keep expanding with time, in scope, size, and mandate (MacQueen, 2008; Bures, 2007:409; Laurence, 2019; Peter, 2015:351; UNSC S/RES/2098, 2013; Cottey, 2008:492). The Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO),¹³ exemplifies the expansion (Peter, 2015; UNSC S/RES/2098, 2013; UNSC S/RES/2556, 2020; S/RES/2666, S/RES/2667, 2022; SC/15152, 2022). These transformations have increased the difficulty in arriving at a definition that satisfactorily embraces the various dimensions of peacekeeping. Nonetheless, based on policy and practices, some progress has been made over the years about what constitutes 'peacekeeping', albeit with variations.

The UN (1990:4) defines peacekeeping as an operation undertaken by the United Nations that involves military personnel, but which is devoid of enforcement powers to “maintain or restore international peace and security” in conflict areas. Two possibilities are presented in this definition. First, PKOs occur where there is some peace in existence – achieved through ceasefires and peace agreements – to be maintained in the period of conflict, or as it is in most cases in post-conflict situations (Naidu, 1995; Jeong, 2004:19; Cottey, 2008: 432-433; Goulding, 1993). This scenario is tenable in missions, such as UNTSO and UNMOGIP. These PKOs monitor truce observation, maintain peace brokered by warring factions, assist in troop withdrawals, and reinforce and/or supervise the implementation of agreements made by conflict parties.¹⁴



¹³ MONUSCO was established on 1 July 2010 by the UN Security Council resolution S/RES/1925 and has continued to date (2023). This stabilization mission has gone through several transformations in its decade of operation including performing activities such as monitoring the DRC sanctions regime and countering misinformation and disinformation.

¹⁴ UNTSO has been in operation since 1948 and has continued till today. Similarly, UNMOGIP established in 1949 remains an ongoing peacekeeping mission.

Second, peacekeeping occurs to restore a breach of existing peace arrangements (Fortna, 2004; de Coning, 2017). As de Coning (2017) observes, UN peacekeeping missions in Chad, Darfur, and DRC illustrate that some PKO areas lack evidence of peace. Thus, the PKOs seek to restore or engender the lost peace.

Some scholars have followed the two possible scenarios for peacekeeping envisaged by the UN, but have broadened the actors involved. In the expanded definition, peacekeeping is a third-party intervention designed to support parties in conflict in maintaining a ceasefire or negotiating a peaceful settlement. The third party can be the UN, regional organizations such as the African Union, or powerful nations like the United States or Russia (Ola and Ehiane, 2016:117; Mullenbach, 2005; Schnabel, 1997).

In *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the UN, offers an alternative definition. In that taxonomy, peacekeeping entails the deployment of UN presence involving military and/or police personnel and civilians in the field, hitherto with the consent of parties concerned: “a technique that expands the possibilities for both conflict prevention and peacemaking” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This definition recognises the shifting boundaries of peacekeeping. As Berdal and Ucko (2015:6) contend, the reference to ‘hitherto’ suggests a move from the principle of consent to a more expansive role for the military forces assembled by the UN for peacekeeping. At least, the phrase signals fluctuation in peacekeeping principles and willingness to deploy without the consent of conflict parties. As Matheson (2001:76) puts it, the increasing actions of the UN in peace operations are undertaken either with the consent of host states and parties to the conflict or under enforcement mandates under Chapter VII of the Charter or both. This implies that situations and circumstances determine whether emphasis is placed on consent.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) (2008:18), the Capstone doctrine, defines peacekeeping as a technique to preserve the peace, notwithstanding its fragility, “where fighting has been halted,” and to aid in the implementation of “agreements achieved by peacemakers.” The Capstone doctrine further recognised the evolution of peacekeeping, stating that the practice has gone beyond ceasefire observation and “separation of forces after inter-state wars” to involve a complexity of elements – military, police, and civilian – who work together to assist in building the foundations for sustainable peace. It, however, observes that whereas peacekeeping relates to conflict management, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding, it differs from other peace and security activities.

DPKO/DFS (2008:17-21) defines conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding in the following way. Conflict prevention involves using structural and diplomatic measures such as early warning mechanisms, the “good offices” of the Secretary-General, preventive deployment, or confidence-building measures to forestall escalations of intra-state or interstate tensions and disputes into violent conflict (p.17). Peacemaking includes processes and measures taken to address conflict in progress, especially diplomatically to bring hostile factions to a negotiated agreement (ibid.). Peace enforcement comprises the use of a range of coercive measures, including military force under the authorisation of the UNSC to restore international peace and security in situations determined by the Security Council as constituting a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression (DPKO/DFS, 2008:18). Peacebuilding involves complex and long-term measures and activities undertaken to strengthen national capacities at various conflict management levels. It lays the necessary foundation for sustainable peace and development to mitigate the risk of lapse or relapse into conflict (DPKO/DFS, 2008:18).

Peacebuilding thus seeks to address structural and deep-rooted causes of violent conflict and issues that affect society, and state in the performance of the latter's core functions. The Capstone doctrine depicts the relationship and differences among these operations in the following diagram (Fig. 2.1).




Figure 2.1 Interrelations among peace and security activities.
Source: DPKO/DFS (2008:19)

From Figure 2.1, the boundary of peacekeeping begins when a ceasefire is achieved. At this point, peacekeeping activities intersect with peacemaking and peace enforcement. The activities of peacemaking and peace enforcement, however, wind down as peacekeeping unfolds. Earlier in the 1990s, however, Boutros-Ghali had hinted that peacekeeping combines conflict prevention and peacemaking. If this is accepted, peacekeeping crosses the conflict boundary and engulfs considerable parts of the peacemaking sphere. Additionally, multidimensional peacekeeping which embraces the various peace and security activities, defies the above depiction of peacekeeping as the processes are more multifaceted.

Attempts to demarcate the boundaries of peacekeeping and other operations are not readily visible within the frameworks of AU, ECOWAS, or NATO. The AU conflict management mechanism, for instance, identifies peacekeeping as one of the interventions used to manage, prevent, and resolve disputes.

In the protocol that established the Peace and Security Council¹⁵ of the AU (AU, 2002:3), conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, and peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction are identified as the conflict prevention, management, and resolution mechanism (CMR). The Protocol uses peace support operation (PSO) instead of peacekeeping. Subsequently, the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)¹⁶ road map (AUC, 2015:10, 16), listed peacekeeping alongside PSO, conflict prevention, peacemaking, national reconciliation, and post-conflict reconstruction and development as CMR tasks of the Union. Thus, peacekeeping is either separate from PSO or part of the latter but can be practiced outside it. The ambiguity is not much minimized even by this explanation. NATO adopted the term in the 1990s but currently renders it as peace support defined as impartial efforts to restore or maintain peace (Dorn, 2018; NATO, 2017).

The shift partly reflects the difficulties in delineating the constituents of PSO. Johnston (2007:33) identifies peacekeeping and peace enforcement as two categories of PSO. Dorn and Stodilka (2018), however, cite the Department of National Defence (DND) of Canada (2002:201) to include conflict prevention, peacemaking, and building. The DND views enforcement and humanitarian operations as related to but not quintessential elements of PSOs.

¹⁵ The AU PSC provides leadership on Africa's peace and security challenges (AUC, 2015).

¹⁶ The APSA is the continental framework for the mechanism of security and peace. It delineates the system -roles, procedures, and instruments- for the realization of CMR mandates of AU, RECs, and RMs. The PSC is one of its five pillars – early warning systems (EWS-continental and regional), the Panel, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund are the other four pillars (AUC, 2015:14-18)

Peacekeeping, PSOs, and related terms, as Cottey (2008:432) notes, are thus employed by academics and policymakers to describe a range of complex and overlapping definitions of military operations and activities with ambiguous boundaries. A broader umbrella term is peace operations, which include “field operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence” (DPKO/DFS, 2008:95-99).

Peace operations (POs) thus cover peacekeeping and other field-based peace and security interventions that have a Security Council and/or General Assembly mandate and endorsement from conflict prevention to post-conflict peacebuilding (S/Res/1318, 2000; Secretary-General, A/70/357; S/2015/682, 2015:3, para.9; Bellamy and Williams 2005, Holt and Berkman 2006). The POs mainly comprise peacekeeping and special political missions (SPMs)¹⁷ and serve as the umbrella term for all peace and security activities (DPKO/DFS, 2008; UN Department of Peace Operations [UNDPO], 2019; Dorn, 2018). Pugh (2003:104) argues that peacekeeping was transformed into peace operations after the Cold War. Peacekeeping, however, continues to be used to describe some of the peace and security activities of the UN and other regional bodies (Cottey, 2008; UN, 2008; Dorn, 2018). While the insistence of the Non-Aligned Movement has maintained the use of peacekeeping in UN circles, distinctions exist between traditional and multidimensional PKOs (Dorn, 2018). DND (2002) also adds complex peacekeeping to indicate PKOs with uncertain consent and broad applicability of force. Traditional (or pre-Cold War) peacekeeping envisages the practice enshrined in the Capstone Doctrine (Rieff, 1994; Segal, 1995; Lipson, 2007; Bellamy and Hunt, 2015).

¹⁷ SPMs are smaller missions or offices, under the UN’s Department of Political Affairs, typically without armed units, and primarily involved in political and social discussion or negotiations (Dorn, 2018; UN, 2008).

Without the ‘traditional’ label, peacekeeping and PKOs imply using military, police, and civilians to perform one or a combination of peace and security activities. In multidimensional missions where the boundaries are blurred among peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and other mission activities, Laurence (2019:256) suggests therefore that, ‘peace operations’ is usable. Thus, peacekeeping and peace operations can be used interchangeably. Nonetheless, the interchangeability can hide some of the activities such as SPMs which might occur under POs but not necessarily within PKOs.

2.1.2 The UN Charter, and AU and ECOWAS Frameworks on Peacekeeping

The United Nations Charter was established largely to give expression to the UN’s aim to prevent future global war and promote international peace and security (UN, 1945). Peacekeeping has been one of the mechanisms to secure this aim. As de Cuéllar (1985/1990: xix) points out, however, peacekeeping as a technique for conflict control and resolution is neither mentioned nor described in the Charter. Put differently, no chapter, article, or provision in the Charter is explicitly on peacekeeping. Consequently, Roberts (1994:93) rightly argues that the precise Charter basis for several UN peacekeeping operations has remained ambiguous for decades.

Studies and UN circles agree that peacekeeping was not foreseen by the Charter and its emergence resembles an ad hoc response, a practical measure, arguably born out of necessity to meet the exigencies of peace and security (UN 1990:4; Hewitt, 1999; Roberts, 1994:93). Nonetheless, Chapters VI and VII of the Charter are invoked in dealing with UN peacekeeping operations (DPKO/DFS, 2008). Chapter VI of the UN Charter contains the framework for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Chapter VII also references coercive measures such as sanctions, embargoes, and military intervention to enforce peace.

Dag Hammarskjöld, a former UN Secretary-General, described peacekeeping as ‘Chapter VI and a half activity.’ The description is arguably an implicit recognition of the struggle to situate PKOs within frameworks provided under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter (Boutros-Ghali, 1996; Goulding, 1993; Yilmaz, 2005; Karlsrud, 2015). Notably, Chapter VI espouses Pacific Settlement of Disputes; it does not refer to the use of military action by the UN, nor does peacekeeping traditionally provide the military action envisaged by Chapter VII of the UN Charter (MacQueen, 2008:186; Roberts, 1996; de Coning, 2017).

Chapter VI (Articles 33-38) requires parties to conflict to use negotiation, mediation, arbitration, enquiry, judicial settlement, and regional arrangement of other peaceful means to resolve disputes. The Security Council is required by Article 38 of the Charter to recommend a means of pacific settlement should the parties fail to arrive at a solution. Daniel et al. (1999:8) contend that Chapter VI envisaged the use of “diplomats, mediators, lawyers and judges” in the execution of pacific mandates. The assertion thus places SPMs as the more appropriate premonition under Chapter VI. In Chapter VII (Articles 39-51), armed forces of member states can under the direction of the Security Council and management of the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council use force to prevent a breach of the peace or enforce peace. de Cuéllar (1990: xix) therefore argues that the use of military personnel in peacekeeping is thus a reversal of the role envisaged for these forces by the Charter in Chapter VII under situations of aggression, threat of the same, or breach of peace.

Military peacekeepers, as Daniel et al. (1999:8) argue, are, however, seen as adjunctive as they assist the diplomatic processes to proffer pacific solutions to disputes. The use of the military for Chapter VII mandates and collective security by the UN is, however, respectively envisaged in the named chapter and the preamble of the Charter.

Observably, the Charter framework invoked for peacekeeping extends beyond Chapters VI and VII. Chapters VI and VII do not reference peace operations at regional and subregional levels or the growing partnership between the UN and regional organisations in peacekeeping. The legal basis of these PKOs is Chapter VIII. Article 52 under Chapter VIII allows for the existence of regional arrangements and agencies in ensuring international peace and security provided it is compatible with the purposes and principles of the UN (UN, 1945; UN SC/Res/1318, 2000: VII; Naldi, 1985:593; Majinge, 2011; Akindele, 1971).

While Article 52 (2, 3) emphasizes pacific settlement approaches for regional mechanisms, Article 53 (1) underscores that regional bodies can engage in enforcement actions under the authorization of the Security Council. Additionally, it provides that regional organizations can also be employed by the Council for enforcement purposes. Under these provisions, regional and subregional organisations have embarked on PKOs alone or in collaboration with the UN. The regional bodies additionally draw from their respective protocols that guide their conflict management activities when embarking on such operations. Appropriately, in keeping with DPKO/DFS (2008) observation, Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter are the basis for the varieties of peace operations undertaken by the UN and regional bodies.

Admittedly, discussing UN Charter Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and regional protocols as bases for peace operations, presents the seeming superiority of the UN and subordination of regional organizations in the simultaneous application of universality and regionalism in pursuit of global peace. The UN is however neither hierarchical nor federal in its relations with the regional and subregional entities. The assumed superiority of the UN over such bodies is also questioned in several cases (Goodrich, 1945; Wilcox, 1965:789; Ferreira-Snyman, 2011).

As Akindele (1971:30-31) contended, there are challenges to the working relationship between these instrumentalities in the promotion of peace and security as the UN assumed superiority, while the regional entities claim rights over territorial jurisdictions. In Africa, however, Aubyn (2015) has shown the burgeoning partnership between the AU and the UN, resulting in missions such as UNSOA and the handing over of AFISMA¹⁸ to MINUSMA¹⁹. There are also establishment posts in each other's peacekeeping offices.

Festus Aubyn however highlights that, though peacekeeping missions have command structures, ambiguity saddles the AU-UN relationship as roles for each party are not clearly defined. It rightly suggests therefore that UN, AU, and subregional bodies – ECOWAS, for example – should cooperate and share the burden of peacekeeping on the continent.

The frameworks governing PKOs are not restricted to the UN and regional charters or acts. There are some landmark Security Council resolutions and their guiding principles that further guide the conduct of peace operations. Among these are: Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and security; Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict; and Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (DPKO/DFS, 2008:16; UNDPO, 2019; Carey, 2001). Additionally, peacekeepers are required to operate by international human rights law and international humanitarian laws contained in the various Geneva protocols (DPKO/DFS, 2008:14). UN peacekeepers are required to observe these laws, principles, and frameworks where they apply. Evidence however shows mixed outcomes regarding compliance with these rules and regulations (Dallaire, 2003; Beri,

¹⁸ African-led International Support Mission in Mali

¹⁹ Mission multidimensionnelle integree des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali

2008; Choedon, 2017; Henry, 2019; S/RES/1565, 2004; Karim and Beardsley, 2016; Smith, 2017; Jennings, 2014).

Regionally, in Africa, the Constitutive Act of the AU, and its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter, did not have an explicit provision for peacekeeping (AU, 2000; OAU, 1963). The OAU and its successor have however had provisions for peace, security, and conflict management on the continent (OAU, 1963:3,8; AU, 2000:3,5,7,9). The AU Peace and Security Architecture governs the organization's conflict management activities, including peace operations.

At the subregional level, the ECOWAS “Protocol Relating to Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (1999)”²⁰ and the “Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2005)” guide the peacekeeping activities of the West African multilateral organisation (ECOWAS, 1999, 2005; Yoroms, 2014). Notably, however, the preamble of the ECOWAS Protocol (1999) references Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter, the Charter of OAU (now AU Constitutive Act), and various human rights treaties. Thus, regional and subregional frameworks for peace operations mostly mirror those of the UN.

2.2.3 Principles, Doctrines, and Peacekeeping Operation Mandates

Conventionally, peacekeeping relies on three main principles: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except for self-defence (Berdal and Ucko, 2015:6; Peter, 2015:358-360; DPKO/DFS, 2008:31-33). The principle of consent demands that before the establishment of the peacekeeping

²⁰ The Protocol was established as an operational structure to implement ECOWAS decision A/Dec.11/10/98 adopted in Abuja on 31 October 1998 about the conflict management protocol of 1999.

mission, the parties to the conflict must accept and commit to a political process and the mandate that supports this process (DPKO/DFS, 2008:31). Impartiality requires that PKO mandates are executed without prejudice or favour to any party to the conflict (DPKO/DFS, 2008:33; Laurence, 2019). The Capstone Doctrine however warns against misconstruing impartiality to mean inactivity or neutrality. It calls for a rigorous application of the principle without fear of retaliation or misinterpretation once the PKO has established and communicated the grounds for acting.

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate involves the self-defence of the peacekeeper under conditions of physical harm. It also implies applying force during resistance and aggressive attempts by some actors to prevent the mission from performing its duties within the mandate (DPKO/DFS, 2008:34). Some peacekeeping environments are volatile and saddled with militias, spoilers, and criminal gangs that actively threaten the peace process and civilian populations. In this context, the Security Council authorizes robust mandates that use “all necessary means” to deter the imminent threat, to help protect civilians, and to contribute to the maintenance of law and order (Williams, 2023; DPKO/DFS, 2008:34).

These PKO principles have been put to the test as explanatory power and reference for the spectrum of peacekeeping mandates over the years. The results have been mixed outcomes for UN, regional and subregional organizations, UN-regional bodies, and unilateral peacekeeping interventions. Observably, traditional peacekeeping functions had comprised (1) keeping apart parties to a truce, (2) prevention of cross border forays or encounters, and (3) neutral observers ensuring border separation between armies (Rieff, 1994; Segal, 1995; Lipson, 2007; Mégret, 2015:2). Such deployments on mostly armistice lines relied on the three peacekeeping principles. A series of operational and conceptual evolutions, however, have occurred in the normative environment and practice of peace operations (Mégret, 2015:2; Karlsrud, 2015; de Coning, 2021).

These changes have emanated from multifaced factors including changing conflict landscape, geopolitics, recurrent crises such as failures in Rwanda and Somalia, and opposing reports that have challenged traditional conceptions and practice of peacekeeping (Peter, 2019; Ogunnusi, 2010; Mégret, 2015; de Coning, 2021).

Notably, peacekeeping since 1956 has extended to (1) robustness (2) peace enforcement, and subsequently (3) peace building (Segal, 1995; Lipson, 2007; Bellamy and Hunt, 2015; Bove and Elia, 2011, Williams, 2023). These so-called post-Cold War, second-generation, third-generation peacekeeping operations– whatever the label – have increasingly become multi-dimensional. They involve civilian protection, promoting the rule of law, containing violence, and facilitating the foundations for social and economic developments (Bove et al., 2022:402; UN, 2003; Mégret, 2015; Karlsrud, 2013). The robust turn, that is, the application of all necessary means in peacekeeping, and multidimensional missions increased after the evaluation of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 which culminated in the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000; White, 2001; Zittel, 2002). Robustness, as favoured by the Brahimi Report, involves willingness, capacity, and capability to deter and confront obstructions using force, to prevent hindrance to the implementation of the mission mandate. The twin goal of robust peacekeeping is the protection of local populations and missions by using sophisticated technologies and necessary means (Dewan and Vermeij, 2014; Williams, 2023:32). Some studies also find robust operations as militarily effective in protecting peacekeepers and ensuring mission credibility in areas where peace is non-existent (Williams, 2023:32; Tardy, 2011; Mégret, 2015:2). In such situations, varied and necessary mechanisms can be used to prevent and repress atrocities to provide some basis for fostering peace.

The robust turn has nonetheless gone through moments of pushback and resurgence. In 2015, a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) contended for limited use of force (UN, 2015).

The HIPPO Report pushed back against the militarization of UN peacekeeping and stressed sustainable peace and the primacy of politics, particularly diplomacy, in achieving such peace. This civilian-led report was thus a significant step back from robustness and preference for force in achieving mission ends.

Subsequently, in 2017, the Cruz Report - named after lead author Gen. Alberto Carlos dos Santos Cruz - emphasized the need to use force to achieve mission objectives and avoid casualties of UN troops (UN, 2017). The Cruz Report observed a consistent increase in acts of violence particularly between 2013-2017 where 195 peacekeeper fatalities had been recorded. From this premise, the Report argued for the use of force to improve the security of UN peacekeepers and reduce fatalities of peacekeepers. The demand therefore was the reinterpretation of basic principles of peacekeeping to “clarify that in high-risk areas featuring high-intensity conflicts (ambushes, for instance), troops should use overwhelming force and be proactive and pre-emptive. In battles and fights, the United Nations needs to win, or troops, police, and civilian personnel will die” (UN 2017:5). Understandably, it must be frustrating for forces primarily trained to fight to standby and suffer casualties in a war zone or at least with a semblance battle. The increase in casualties of peacekeepers therefore requires PKO principles to sometimes combine with principles of war, when necessary, means are employed to protect the lives of soldiers in peacekeeping war fronts. Observably, peacekeeping missions have gone beyond keeping peace and performing post-conflict activities to involve deployments in active conflict to enforce peace and security (Gibbs, 2000:360; Hultman et al., 2014). While necessary means are applicable within robustness, peace enforcement

mandates allow its elaborate use. Peace enforcement is conducted mainly within the ambit of standard military principles which focuses on identifying enemies and threats (Dobbie, 1994:121). It involved using force to identify, deter, 'neutralise,' disarm, and punish the aggressor (MacQueen, 2008:185; S/RES/2098, 2013, S/RES/2100, 2013; de Coning, 2017). It is thus modelled after Chapter VII (Article 39-51) of the UN Charter and aims to secure a military victory. Such mandates do not require the consent of conflict parties. An expression of enforcement mandate is the force intervention brigade of MONUSCO which seeks to assist the DR Congo and its government in facing off spoilers attempting to thwart the peacebuilding process (Peter, 2015:360; Tull, 2018:167).

The corollary of these developments is that the principles of peacekeeping extend beyond neutrality, impartiality, and limited use of force for self-defence to include a range of coercion such as military force, and alliance with host state depending on the security situation, geopolitical interests, and nature of the conflict. Nevertheless, the first three principles might remain the lifeblood of traditional peacekeeping and the basis upon which other principles are built.

2.2.4 Deciding to Keep Peace

Establishing a mission

The Security Council plays a definitive role in determining where and when a peacekeeping mission is deployed. Through a Resolution, the Council sets out mission mandate, size, and tasks. It also amends, extends, or terminates PKOs as it deems appropriate. The Council is generally responsible for maintaining international peace and security as envisaged under provisions of UN Charter Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII (UN 1945). More importantly, as provided by Article 25 of the UN Charter (UN, 1945), the decisions of the Security Council, including sanctioning a

peacekeeping mission, are binding on all member states of the UN and must be implemented. The Council however works with the UN Secretariat in the initial phases before its decision and relies on the latter for implementation of and reporting on established missions.

Plausibly, a ten-stage process can be conceived around UN peacekeeping from initiation to closeout: *An initial consultation* with conflict parties, other relevant stakeholders in the conflict, host government, and troop contributors to determine appropriate response as conflicts develop, worsen, or approach resolution. At this stage, the UN Secretary-General requests a strategic assessment to define all possible alternatives for UN engagement. Next, *a technical field assessment* mission is deployed to the would-be site for the envisaged UN deployment for the PKO. The assessment considers the security, military, human rights, political, and humanitarian situation in the prospective mission territory. It also considers the size, resource, and financial implications of a potential peace operation (DPKO/DFS, 2008). A *Security Council resolution* is then adopted if the Council considers PKO as the appropriate intervention. The UN General Assembly then grants the *Budgetary and resource approval*.

Subsequently, the Secretary-General (SG), the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and the Department of Operational Support (DOS) engage in *staffing* the peacekeeping mission. The SG appoints senior officials including the Head of Mission (Special Representative to direct the peace operation)²¹, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, and senior civilian staff while the DPO and DOS staff the civilian aspects of the operation. Afterward, *planning* efforts about logistics and administration (political, military, operational, and support) components of the PKO including the establishment of mission headquarters are undertaken. These efforts are led by the head of mission,

²¹ The Head of Mission reports to the Under Secretary General for Peace Operations stationed at the UN Headquarters

DPO, DOS, and relevant departments, programmes, and funds of the UN. *Deployment* of the PKOs then continues with the advance team to mission headquarters and subsequently other personnel – military observers, military contingent (troops), staff officers, and police contingent among others - responsible for executing various aspects of the mandate (DPKO/DFS, 2008; Simm, 2011; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2017). The next phase is *reporting to the Security Council*. As the operation is underway, the SG regularly reports and briefs the Council on performance in the implementation of the mission mandate. The reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) (S/2022/667, S/2022/898, 2022) is an example of these feedback mechanisms. The Report was also required by the referent UNSC resolution for the renewed mandate of UNITAMS (S/RES/2636, 2022)²². These reports and briefs undergo *review and evaluation* by the Security Council and provide the basis for adjustments, renewal, or termination of the mandate of the operation. The cycle ends with the *closing of the mission* after realising the mission mandate or failing the same.

Regional and subregional arrangements are not extremely different from the UN approach. In Africa for instance, The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is responsible for authorizing deployment of peace support missions and related guidelines such as mandates. The PSC undertakes peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding functions in resolving conflict and anticipates as well as seeks to prevent disputes and conflict (Majinge, 2011:97, AUC, 2015; AU, 2002). The AU Commission collaborates with the PSC in these tasks. Aubyn (2015) observes an ongoing partnership between the AU Peace Support Operations Department (PSOD) and UN DPO with each body having a representation in the other's headquarters. The AU department for

²² UNITAMS mandate (S/RES/2636, 2022) required the Secretary General to report on the mission situation in Sudan every 90 days.

planning PSOs receives support drawn from the UN's years of PKOs. The AU PSOD is responsible for planning, staffing, and logistics aspects of PKOs of the Union.

At the subregional level, the Mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS, for instance, functions like the UNSC and is mandated to authorise PKOs, appoint commanders, review mandates, and initiate interventions after consultations with the UN and AU (Odobó et al., 2017:146, ECOWAS, 1999). Two-third majority votes of its nine members sanction a PKO. The planning of peacekeeping missions – technical assessment, review of logistical needs – is however undertaken by the Defence and Security Commission comprising Chiefs of Defence Staff of ECOWAS member states (Odobó et al., 2017:147; ECOWAS, 1999, 2001). The constitution of the mission force, primarily ECOMOG, follows that of UN PKOs and comprises the Force Commander, Deputy Force Commanders, and troops of armed forces of member states.

Troop/Personnel Contribution: Why Nations and Personnel Keep Peace.

The UN and regional organizations depend largely on personnel from member states to execute PKO mandates. The request to participate is made to potential TCCs who then deploy their forces through the top hierarchy of the armed forces. For GAF, the decision to deploy is taken at the National Security Council²³ and Cabinet level depending on foreign policy objectives and pledges made to the UN peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (MOWIP, 2020:12; Prouza and Horák, 2015:207). As Prouza and Horák (2015:207) note, the final decision remains with the President, who is the Commander in Chief of GAF. The MOWIP report (MOWIP, 2020:12) also shows that the deployment further depends on the UN's Generic Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR) and the structure provided in the SUR, which serves as an Order of Battle (ORBAT) for the

²³ The National Security Council comprises the President of Ghana, the Vice President, Ministers of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance; and Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Act 1030, 2020; Ghana, Const. VIII).

deployment. The Minister of Foreign Affairs negotiates the logistical and operational details of the mission while the Parliament [Select Committee on Defence and Interior] approves budgets for the operation (Prouza and Horák, 2015:207).

Several factors however determine the decision by Ghana and other countries to field troops and other personnel for global or regional PKOs. One of the reasons is to indicate good neighbourliness in a global community. Aning and Edu-Afful (2017) and Aning and Danso (2020) find that Ghana's continuing participation in PKOs is in pursuit of its foreign policy goal of good neighbourliness. Thus, mechanisms to secure peace and security are viewed as collective efforts that require global brotherhood, if sisterhood, to achieve. Particularly, good neighbourliness suggests being friendly and supportive to neighbours – proximate or immediate, and by extension other nations - especially in times of need (here, security needs). The support can take the form of a goodwill gesture or an investment with an expectation of reciprocity from the recipient, should the provider/helper later be in need. Thus viewed, countries such as Ghana began their peacekeeping participation, partly to secure these ends.

Peacekeeping missions are also seen as a means to send off personnel suspected of, or with the potential to conduct coups (Kathman and Melin, 2017; Albrecht, 2020). Holger Albrecht, for instance, has indicated the use of this tool in Tunisia. Used this way, peacekeeping deployments are instrumentalized to disrupt coup coordination and/or minimize, if forestall, the possibility of its occurrence. Nonetheless, as Agyekum (2020) notes, PKO deployment provided conducive grounds for the coordination of Ghana's 1981 coup. Thus, concerning coups, PK deployment can be a two-edged sword.

Some states use mission participation as an occasion to improve the professionalism of their armed forces. In a study on the Indonesian Armed Forces, for example, Anwar (2014) avers that peacekeeping is regarded as an avenue to improve professionalism, modernize weapons and equipment, and enhance the capacity of these forces. Prouza and Horák (2015) affirm that peacekeeping improves the professional skills of the GAF as they engage in typical military activities afield. However, this outcome is hardly articulated as a key rationale for Ghana's troop contributions. It can thus be understood as a positive, albeit unintended, outcome of PKOs for the GAF and the country. Notably, however, peacekeepers [and armed forces of TCCs] receive training from advanced armed forces, especially from the West, through force assistance programmes and some states might explore these benefits by engaging in peacekeeping activities.

Another reason for participation in PKOs is to earn income for the nation and its peacekeepers. Gaibulloev et al. (2015) find that UN missions have specific benefits for TCCs, and the remunerations are income-earning avenues for poor countries. In a quantitative analysis of forty-seven African states, Williams (2010:217) also found that poorer states, which have lower state legitimacy and less political repression, tend to participate in regional peacekeeping missions. While Williams (2010) highlights regional peacekeeping missions and prevailing democratic practice, it is admissible that some countries specialize in UN and non-UN PKOs to make money (Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Krishnasamy, 2003; Gjevori and Visoka, 2018:125). Observably, troop contributions from economically advanced countries have declined over time. However, TCCs and/or their troops, military experts, observers, and staff officers, whether from rich or poor nations, receive remuneration for participating in PKOs (UN, 2006; Sotomayor, 2014; Passmore, 2020).

Studies on the GAF show that remuneration from peacekeeping support personnel salaries and reduction in mission participation can generate unwelcome involvement in domestic politics as an avenue to press economic demands (Aubyn et al., 2019; Albrecht, 2019; Hutchful, 1997b). The economic rewards of peacekeeping for individuals thus shape personnel and institutional desire to participate in PKOs, namely, to earn extra income to supplement their remuneration back home.

Peacekeeping participation also serves as a form of soft power projection by TCCs and a strategy to enhance international visibility and global image (Solomon, 2007:760; Gjevori and Visoka, 2018:125; Baledrokadroka, 2012; Krishnasamy, 2003; Aning and Danso, 2020:228). Baledrokadroka (2012:105-106), for instance, demonstrates that the Fijian Armed Forces began its peacekeeping efforts, in part, to gain recognition as a responsible international citizen capable of contributing to global affairs. In a study on the Bangladeshi Armed Forces, Krishnasamy (2003:37-38) also identified the desire for international recognition of goodwill as a major influence on that country's continuing peacekeeping efforts. This motive for troop contribution is said to serve as a means to encourage foreign aid and investment (Gjevori and Visoka, 2018; Krishnasamy, 2013).

For the Ghana Armed Forces, Aning and Danso (2020:228) show that by sending the officer corps on its first mission, the country underscored Africa's authority, capacity, and competence. Such an image constituted a demonstration of power through peacekeeping in support of Pan-African ideals. As a country preferring defensive security, however, Ghana's contribution to multilateral diplomacy through PKOs can be viewed as enhancing its security within this defence-foreign policy nexus.

Some TCCs also participate in peacekeeping to contain conflict(s) from spilling over to nearby borders. Bove and Elia (2011), for example, note that proximity to conflict areas determines which countries intervene to manage the crisis. That study suggests that countries bordering crises, for instance, are more likely to intervene in nearby conflicts. In such interventionist posturing, peacekeeping becomes a more acceptable avenue for the state intending to intervene. Beardsley (2011) represents this view and suggests that peacekeeping contains conflict by reducing transnational movements and support of insurgencies, especially where the troops are from neighbouring states. Kyle Beardsley finds that lighter and more substantial deployments prevent the propensity for intrastate conflicts to generate similar conflicts in nearby countries. It is thus possible that deployments by nearby states can prevent conflicts from becoming mobile. Observably, however, while neighbouring states have interests in diffusing conflicts, it becomes necessary to frame their actions within overall PKO mandates. This will mean accounting for the totality of peacekeeping forces in conflict diffusion as troops from nearby states do not usually work in isolation. Additionally, although the need to prevent conflict from spillover can enhance the commitment of troops from nearby nations, domestic pressures and the policy stance of ruling elites sometimes prevent the contribution of troops to conflict areas in nearby countries. This is exemplified in the ‘dzi wo fie asem’ (DWFA) – non-involvement in external matters - stance of Ghana during the Ivorian conflict in 2011 (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2017).

Some personnel, as Burk (1997) observes, seek to actively participate in missions to protect and care for the vulnerable in contexts where violence has overtaken the rule of law. James Burk highlights the importance of peacekeeping and finds the practice a meaningful experience for peacekeepers.

It is gleaned from Burk's (1997) work that peacekeepers are driven by new experiences, adventure to the unknown or activating known experiences in unfamiliar terrains, and normative reasons such as the desire to protect and care for victims of conflict. Battistelli (1997) however argues that soldiers have multiple and sometimes opposing motivations for serving. This observation applies to serving in PKOs. Peacekeeping is a call to duty in the process of soldiering. Thus, it forms part of the military assignments and command that must be obeyed. Nonetheless, peacekeeping missions are not necessarily altruistic engagements for peacekeepers. Ofcansky (1995: 260, 282) for example finds that the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which was the multilateral armed force in the Liberian intrastate conflict in the late 1990s and other PKOs, provided "opportunities for self-enrichment" through "black-market dealings" ordinarily unavailable to the average personnel. This makes individual drives to be enlisted and continuing availability for peacekeeping a phenomenon that can be hardly explained solely on ethically appealing grounds. Arguably, participation in such economic dealings might not have been initially premeditated, but once recorded, subsequent peacekeepers can seek to benefit from these possibilities.

Nations that host refugees and displaced persons also have the incentive to participate in PKOs. Bove and Elia (2011) find that when peacekeeping missions are framed as necessary humanitarian responsibility to protect refugees, recipient countries of displaced persons have a high interest in promoting or participating in the intervention to minimize the refugee burden in their countries. Nevertheless, interventions may be couched as peacekeeping without revealing the real intentions of the intervener (Bove and Elia, 2011; Pugh, 2004:39). This apt recognition of hidden intentions is significant in explaining some non-UN interventions in Africa such as NATO in Libya under Gaddafi (Campbell, 2013).

2.2.5 Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping

Research into the unintended consequences of UN and non-UN missions on TCCs is gaining currency (e.g., Aoi et al., 2007; Aning, 2007; Baledrokadroka, 2012; Passmore, 2020; Zaman and Biswas, 2014; Scobell, 1994; Dwyer, 2015; Hutchful, 1997a). Studies have shown that the outcomes of PKOs are mixed (Dobbie, 1994; Granatstein, 1970; Aoi et al., 2007; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013). UN missions in, for example, Mozambique, Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia are identified as successes while those in Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and Bosnia are regarded as failures (Dobbie, 1994; Berdal and Ucko, 2015:6; Dallaire, 2003). However, whether successful or otherwise, peacekeeping operations generate unintended consequences.

Unintended consequences, Vernon (1979) asserts, directly result from the cumulative outcome of the simultaneous or consecutive performance of related actions by several actors, and indirectly from the complex laws that are triggered by such outcomes. The divergence that occurs between intention and outcomes thus creates a space for an attributive explanation between the intended and the unintended effects, the former causing the latter. These unintended consequences, Lidskog and Sjödin (2018) argue, combine with the intended outcomes to shape the structure of society, the present and the future. Plausibly, one can add, these consequences directly or otherwise shape the behaviour of individuals who participate in the processes that generate these outcomes or even their counterparts and establishment outside the PKO. When viewed as a risk, a space opens for deliberations, calculations, and decision-making about the management of the externalities that peacekeeping mandates or missions generate (Wynne, 1992; Lidskog and Sjödin, 2018:4).

Unintended consequences do not equate to unwelcome outcomes per se. As outcomes of interventions undertaken for another purpose, their value is beyond the precinct of moral judgment of being good or bad; foreseen or unanticipated; desirable or otherwise; negative or positive.

The meaning offered to an unintended effect can differ for the pursuers of the intended actions and outcomes, and recipients of the unintended results. Accordingly, the unintended consequences of peacekeeping can be viewed in two ways. First, mandate-related externalities include unintended outcomes on host communities, economic, defence, professional, and health effects on personnel and TCCs and extra mandate activities such as sexual exploitation and abuse (Murphy, 2006; Ndulo, 2009). Second, deviations from the intent and objectives of TCCs for participating in the missions. Arguably, the rationale for peacekeeping, such as desires for soft power projection, economic returns, and employment for youths, as was the case for Fiji (Baledrokadroka, 2012:106,115), or training of armed forces as found in Indonesia (Anwar, 2014), can have unintended outcomes. In Fiji's case, two instances are patron-client relations between the armed forces and ruling elites as well as the activist role of the forces in domestic politics (Baledrokadroka, 2012:105).

This double-sided presentation of unintended consequences suggests a clearer picture of the range of implications peacekeeping has for host communities, TCCs, participating personnel, and their institutions. These implications include the generation of peacekeeping economies, material and financial benefits for personnel, democratic gain or loss for TCCs, professional transformations, and medical influences on personnel, armed forces, and the host and sender nations of the forces (Aning, 2007; Frinjuah, 2016; Gaibulloev et al., 2015; UN, 2020; Burk, 1997).



2.2.6 Peacekeeping Economies

Peacekeeping economies (PKEs) are a particular expression and outgrowth of peacekeeping work (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013; Edu-Afful and Aning, 2015; Jennings, 2010, 2014, 2018; Beber et al., 2019). It involves political and economic relations and structures that mediate financial flows and revenues in locales that host peacekeepers (Edu-Afful and Aning, 2015; Jennings, 2018). Some studies, Bove et al. (2022) and Di Salvator (2019), for instance, have looked at the impact of peacekeeper presence on local economies. Vincenzo Bove and colleagues studied South Sudan and found that the military presence of peacekeepers instils confidence and enhances security – perceived and observed – by reducing psychological stressors and insecurity generated by conflict and violence. They argue that the improvement in security and psychological impact on locals results in a revitalized local economy as labour provision and economic exchange resume and subsequently contribute to improvement in the subjective wellbeing of households (Bove et al., 2022: 402). Di Salvator (2019:840) also affirms that peacekeeping generates economic opportunities.

According to Jennings (2018:242), PKEs encompass an economic activity that owes its occurrence and prevailing rate to the presence of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The activities, structures, interactions, and incentives in PKEs thus occur under PKOs and are shaped by the political and economic environment within which these economies form. Consequently, without a peacekeeping presence, such economic activity will not occur, and if they do, it will be at a low pay rate and on a smaller scale. It is in this context that international personnel and residents mostly interact and where specific benefits such as income, job opportunities, and increased trade volume accrue to many locals from the PKOs (Jennings, 2018:245; Di Salvator, 2019).

PKEs exclude global expenditure spaces on PKO and the cost of peacekeeping to the UN and its member states including reimbursement to TCCs, and global procurement arrangements that occur outside the host country (Jennings, 2018:245). The economic activities that occur in PKEs can be formal or informal, and combine with the multifarious relationships and networks rooted in or formed around the interactions and transactions about these activities to give character to these economies.

Peacekeeping economies mostly benefit elites and middle-class men who tend to have more access to property, knowledge, capital, and capacity to supply the needs of peacekeepers, especially at the initial stages of the peacekeeping mission. The stratification and gendering of the benefits imply that males in lower income groups and women particularly gain less. Men however double as the main consumers of economic goods and services in peacekeeping economies while women provide a considerable volume of the goods and services (Jennings, 2018:244; 204, 2015; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013). Alongside the unequal gains in peacekeeping economies, these economies have been spaces of sexual exploitation and abuse especially women and young girls (Notar, 2006; Jennings, 2014, 2010:229, 237-239; McGill, 2014).


The activities and interactions in peacekeeping economies reward and reinforce socioeconomic hierarchies, behavioural patterns, economic actors, and gender relations (Edu-Afful and Aning, 2015; Kohl, 2015; Higate, 2007:99-100; Jennings, 2018:247). The politico-economic expression of peacekeeping is also found to mostly leave problematic imprints on host communities (Jennings, 2015; 2018; Simić, and O'Brien, 2014). These effects include the physical and infrastructure imprints such as mission structures (Jennings, 2015), peacekeeper babies whose fathers soon depart and put more pressure on the affected women (Higate, 2007; Notar, 2006; Lee and Bartel, 2020), and “localized inflation” (Carnahan et al., 2006:12).

PKEs mostly favour large and lasting missions, for example, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in Monrovia, MONUSCO in Kinshasa, and a relatively stable security situation. Nonetheless, even temporary (short-term) PKOs and small missions could generate forms of such economies. Where they do, however, the PKE is nascent and shorter in the period as relationships and networks require considerable time to form. Economic transactions might also require substantial traffic (customer base) to flourish and mature in each area over time (Jennings, 2018:241-242). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, except for a few observer missions such as UNTSO and UNMOGIP, and interim forces such as UNIFIL or metamorphosing missions like MONUC-MONUSCO, most PKOs fold up within a couple of years. It might thus be helpful to account for varieties of PKEs paying attention to, for example, mission tenure. Additionally, the emphasis on peacekeeping and peacebuilding at the core of peacekeeping economy discourses might also require further consideration to account for the increasingly blurred boundaries across peace operation activities if these are even short in time and small.

As protectors of locales and recipients of “mission dollars,” peacekeepers seem privileged in their access to services and goods within the peacekeeping economy. Such privilege is partly circumscribed, however, by mission rules and securitization of boundaries which indicates the limits of peacekeeper movement within the host community, its environs, and consequently the peacekeeping economy (Autesserre, 2010, 2014; Da Costa and Karlsrud, 2012; Jennings, 2018:245). Each mission has a security parameter zone that demarcates the extent of movement and interaction including where peacekeepers can live, socialize, and visit. Most military staff officers, military observers, and troops are usually concentrated within the security parameter zone (Jennings, 2018:247-248). These restrictions place some limitations on the extent of interactions within the PKEs.

As a sphere of exchange and economic transactions, peacekeepers as active participants in the peacekeeping economy affect and are also affected by happenings within this space. Henry (2015:374), for example, argues that peacekeepers contribute to the “social, cultural, and moral economies” of the peace operation areas. Peacekeeping spaces are thus contradictory sites of everyday experiences where peacekeepers as subjects of contradiction use or gather militarized capital²⁴ (Henry, 2015:373-375). As Marsha Henry notes, peacekeepers use this capital to demonstrate “professionalism and patriotism, endurance and enjoyment” while posing as ideal, best-fitted peacekeepers than comrades back home and in the world.

It can be gleaned therefore that peacekeeping economies are not only shaped by peacekeeper presence. The transactions and events in such economies also influence peacekeepers’ military capital, professionalism, and orientation toward home society. Outcomes of exchanges and activities in PKEs, as components of the PKO system, can benefit or have adverse implications for peacekeeping personnel, the military establishment, and TCC, in addition to the macro-level effects of peacekeeping on these actors.



²⁴ Militarized capital is cumulative social resources acquired through formal and informal training in the peacekeepers’ industry (Henry, 2015:373-375).

2.2.7 Benefits and Perils of Peacekeeping for TCCs

Peacekeeping has its benefits and downsides for TCCs, personnel, and their respective Armed Forces. One of the promises of peacekeeping is the provision of material and economic benefits. Participation in peacekeeping ensures economic gains for TCCs and the Armed Forces.

These financial returns include remuneration for personnel and contingent-owned equipment designated for peace operations (UN, 2006; Sotomayor, 2014; Gaibulloev et al., 2015; Hutchful, 1997a; Passmore, 2020). Henry (2015:377) for instance contends that peacekeepers on UN missions are associated with economic dividends and prestige unattainable in military work or national security duties. This argument largely holds. For the Ghana Armed Forces, as an example, the economic returns of PKOs provide a significant budgetary buffer for the state, the military institution, and its personnel (Aning, 2007; Hutchful, 1997a). Given that deterioration in economic conditions is known to be a core breeding ground for political discontent and consequent coups (Baynham 1978, 1988; Biswal,1992; Kraus,1978), additional income from peace mission can engineer disinterestedness on the part of the GAF in political activism and subversive operations against the state.

Persisting involvement in peacekeeping, however, implies a reduction in the numbers available to undertake domestic duties at any point. Companies of Armed Forces deployed can number anywhere over a hundred while battalions comprise more than five hundred personnel. To keep the peacekeeping participation going, more soldiers and officers are required. As Baledrokadroka (2012) notes, this opportunity employs the youth but also presents a possibility of having more personnel than a small country can finance and manage in the absence of more peacekeeping avenues.

Some scholars warn against the imperialistic tendencies of advanced capitalist states in the peacekeeping arena through the UN (Nkrumah, 1968:7; Pugh, 2004). Baynham (1994b:41) for instance, observes that geopolitical interests principally shaped interventions in Africa by the East and Western blocs until the end of the Cold War.

Pugh (2004:39) also contends that peace support operations perpetuate a particular world order by doctoring dysfunctions within the neoliberal global order and controlling or isolating unruly parts of the globe. It thus remains that PKO can serve as an instrument for more powerful states to advance their geopolitical interests.

Peacekeeping operation areas are typically not a war zone for peacekeepers. They have, however, increasingly become so, and personnel betimes become targets of insurgent groups in intra-state conflicts, who attack mission personnel for varied reasons including a test of the defence of the mission (Chandler, 2012:38; Notar, 2006; Salverda, 2013; Nadin et al., 2015). Notar (2006:416) opines that peacekeepers perform tasks in circumstances that put their own lives in danger.

Indeed, there have been some casualties in UN missions. In UNAMIR, for instance, Anyidoho (1997:140) documented 13 deaths among 19 various casualties suffered by peacekeeping mission personnel of differing nationalities (Ghana, Uruguay, Senegal, and Belgium) between April and November 1994. Anwar (2014:189) also documented that Indonesian peacekeepers had suffered a casualty of 31 personnel in peacekeeping missions between 1957 and 2014. Peacekeeping can therefore affect the number of men in participating armed forces with consequences for professional soldiering and psychological effects on comrades and especially teammates who witness these casualties.

2.2.8 Peacekeeping and Professional Soldiering

A profession, Huntington (1956:7) argues, is a peculiar functional group whose characteristics are highly specialized. Ben-Ari and Elron (2001:278) further this argument and view the military profession as a legitimate and organised group of persons who possess expertise in managing – that is, the control and transformation of – violence.

From these arguments, professionalism is exhibited by the members of the armed forces when they follow the ethos and principles that guide the institution as a functional group and its specialised features. To this end, armed forces require general and special education for entry, establish an exam institution for higher military education, and stress advancement by merit and achievement. They also employ an elaborate and efficient staffing system, possess a sense of corporate unity and responsibility, and recognise their limits of professional competence (Huntington, 1956:30-56).

The professional soldier lives by strict discipline, drastically limits involvement in politics, respects and obeys hierarchy (chain of command), possesses a pessimistic view of human nature, and is loyal in devotion to duty and service to the nation (Huntington, 1956:33-35, 60, 78; Nkrumah, 1968; Sarvas, 1999). Loyalty is one of the qualities that are basic for a good soldier (Nkrumah, 1968:48-49; Sarvas, 1999:108). Sarvas (1999:106, 108) contends that loyalty to country and profession presents the professional soldier as a guardian of national interests and shield of national sovereignty. This responsibility, Nkrumah (1973:370-371) observes, can mean that the national interest can compel the armed forces to intervene in politics. They are, nevertheless, required to relinquish power to the elected civil government which has the duty and political mandate to rule or govern. Armed forces, however, sometimes intervene in domestic politics to safeguard their interests as an establishment.

Sarvas (1999:104) studied Central and Eastern European states such as Slovakia, Poland, and Romania, and showed that the military intervenes amidst uncertainty generated by insensitive purges of military hierarchies and reforms that meet them unprepared. Arguably, this possibility has been spotted in explanations for the military coup of 24 February 1966 in Ghana. It is observed in that explanation that fear of losing its professional status as a European-type Armed Force in the face of a growing drive towards a people's militia provided one of the grounds for that military intervention (Afrifa, 1966; Nkrumah, 1968). Ordinarily, professional militaries are required to be apolitical.

The ideas around an apolitical officer corps constitute Huntington's (1956) prescription of objective civilian control. This view contrasts the perspectives of Janowitz (1976). For Morris Janowitz, civil-military relations extend beyond military leadership and elected officials. The ideal soldier in this sense retains close links with society and shares in its nonmilitary values. The professional soldier is also involved in the social fabric such as hospitals, the community, and clubs (Janowitz, 1976; Sarvas, 1999:101). Professional soldiers are thus active in the socio-political spheres of society. As Sarvas (1999:102, 112) contends, it will therefore be a mistaken assumption that the professional corps is apolitical to the extent of complete withdrawal from politics. The armed forces including GAF manage to engage in political activities and influence political decision-making to better their social, living, and training conditions as well as shape defence policy.

Notwithstanding the differences in the 'Huntingtonian' and 'Janowitzian' traditions in civil-military relations analysis, their views provide important, arguably complementary, explanatory force. That complementarity should blend the internal qualities of the military, the political, and social spheres of the forces to provide a wholistic appreciation of professional soldiering

(Baynham, 1985:89; Sarvas, 1999:99-101). Such analysis will fairly acknowledge civil-military relations, the warfare and developmental duties of armed forces during peacetime and wartime as well as the peacekeeping consequences discussed in the chapter.

Peacekeeping, as seen in the preceding section, is a two-edged sword in its consequences for civil-military relations. Some studies on Ghana show that exposure to democratic practices and demands for compliance with international human rights obligations has made GAF, a force once described as a coup entrepreneur and known for strained relations with its society, considerably averse to domestic intervention and harsh treatment of civilians (Aubyn et al., 2019; Levine, 2016). In the last five years, however, there has been marked hostility between the civil populace and the Ghana Armed Forces which has resulted in the death of two soldiers, one in 2017 in connection with the country's anti-galamsey campaign and the other in 2023 and subsequent brutality from GAF (Odartey-Wellington et al., 2020; Mubarak, 2017; Adam, 2021; Ibrahim, 2020). Thus, the civil-military relationship outcomes of peacekeeping for GAF and Ghanaian society are mixed.

Some studies suggest that professionalisation training is an obvious element of peacekeeping participation. Soldiers from troop-contributing countries are trained to enhance their professional skills and efficiency in peacekeeping areas through PKO-related security force assistance (SFA) programmes (Kathman and Melin, 2017; Banini et al., 2020). The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme is an example of such military assistance which seeks to enhance soldier professionalism while advancing democratic values in militaries (Riley and Balaram, 2013; Mujkic et al., 2019). These trainings are not always altruistic. The trainings are found to be a means to provide spots of infiltration, a sort of 'footprint' of the provider nation into the armed forces of other countries.

The provider as principal thus seeks to cheaply meet threats to its security needs through the agent without the former having to directly undertake certain tasks such as counterterrorism (Biddle, 2017:126). The forces trained through SFA can therefore lose agency and might pursue the aspirations of foreign nations, and require their countries to live up to the tenets of the training country.

A further link between peacekeeping and soldiering is that the former presents an opportunity for armies not tested for war to exercise their strength and practice their trade. Admissibly, traditional peacekeeping missions blur the boundaries between policing and military duties in post-conflict situations such as Kosovo and Bosnia (Hills, 2001:79). Consequently, some scholars view the military's PKO as performing cosmopolitan enforcement of law and separation of armed combatants which situates their activities between soldiering and policing (Kaldor, 1999; Hills, 2001; Edmunds, 2006; Greener-Barcham, 2007; Weiss, 2011). As Hills (2001) however cautions, the military has a separate function in peacekeeping and does not necessarily do police work. They assist in enforcing compliance with the peace process and maintaining law and order where multilateral civilian police (CIVPOL) are weak in situations of instability, violence, and alternative security systems. Increasingly, however, military peacekeepers fight to defeat aggressive forces that threaten the realisation of mission objectives. ECOMOG mandate in Liberia, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and MONUSCO in DRC with the establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade exemplify these combat roles of peacekeepers at regional and global levels (Peter, 2015; Tull, 2018; Williams, 2023). PKOs thus, partly help soldiers to practice their trade within the limits of mission mandates.

2.2.9 Health Outcomes of Peacekeeping for Personnel and TCCs

Peacekeeping places medical requirements on troops, military observers, mission experts, and staff. Before deployment, would-be peacekeepers are required to undergo medical routines. These comprehensive medical checks are not a norm in a Ghanaian context where prevailing health-seeking behaviour suggests a lack of patronage except in the case of ill health or symptoms of the same.

The duties the armed forces perform, however, have psychological sequelae²⁵ such as nightmares, tension, and (di)stress (Bartone et al., 1998; Bartone and Ender, 1994; Lawrenson and Ogden, 2003; Hotopf et al., 2003). Mission areas are known to generate considerable (dis) stress for personnel. In genocidal contexts and settings where mass death on a scale unfamiliar to a peacetime armed force is recorded, some peacekeepers become traumatized. A few examples are UNAMIR in the Rwandan civil war, killings of refugees as occurred in the Congo (MONUC), or casualties among personnel as recorded by Bangladeshi troops on that mission (Dallaire, 2003; Chandler, 2012:37). The upshot of this traumatic exposure is that some personnel return with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD partly manifests in nightmares, aggressiveness, excessive drunkenness, or other patterns of social behaviour hitherto not exhibited by the soldier or officer. Referencing UNAMIR, Dallaire (2003) documents the psychological downsides of PKOs. As the force commander from the CAF, General Dallaire witnessed the genocide as a bystander, and informed security personnel with the ability to save lives but was constrained by the UN mandate that guided the mission and orders from the UN headquarters. That the frustration General Dallaire witnessed had traumatic effects on him reaffirms the mental health challenges that can result from peacekeeping. Consequently, as Birenbaum (1994:1484) maintains about the Canadian Armed

²⁵ Conditions that result from a previous injury, disease, or exposure to traumatic events.

Forces (CAF), for example, stress from peacekeeping demands new measures in addressing mental health issues in national forces.

Aside from the psychological dimensions of PKOs, there are other medical implications for personnel such as exposure to transmissible diseases that are endemic to some peacekeeping areas. Ebola, Lassa fever, and HIV/AIDS in some West and Central African mission areas such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DR Congo are known examples in addition to the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2000, the UN Security Council (UNSC) established a nexus between health and security arguing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic posed a risk to stability and security. In its argument, the pandemic can exacerbate violence and insecurity as well as put peacekeepers at risk (S/RES/1318, 2000; McInnes, 2006; Tripodi and Patel, 2004).

Consequently, Resolution S/RES/1318, 2000 emphasized the sensitization of peacekeeping personnel as a necessity to control and ultimately prevent the peacekeepers' spread of HIV/AIDS. Little over a decade, the UNSC declared the Ebola haemorrhagic fever (Ebola) as a threat to international peace and security (UNSC, 2014; Burci, 2014). Along this line of argument, Tripodi and Patel (2004:195) use Nigerian, Botswanan, and South African armies as cases to contend that the "widespread prevalence of HIV among military personnel threatens political and social stability." That study connected peacekeeping to HIV aids spreads highlighting that HIV-positive soldiers act as vectors in communities hosting the mission and home communities upon their return. Tripodi and Patel (2004) indicated that HIV/AIDS has security implications for Africa given the decimating impact of the disease on the army and the lives it continues to claim across the continent.

The unease that surrounds epidemics and pandemics has elevated health challenges such as HIV/AIDS to high-level threats to national, human, or biosecurity. Thus, health issues become

securitized. Consequently, there is an increasing reflection of health security components in the formulation and implementation of national and international health policies (Elbe, 2012:320; Davies, 2008; McInnes and Rushton, 2010). WHO (2007: ixx) explains that health security seeks to reduce the vulnerability of populations to acute public health events – epidemics, endemics, and pandemics – that threaten the collective health of populations across international borders. Weaver (1995:65), as quoted in Elbe (2010:12), asserts that security is a label and political choice in an attempt to conceive a phenomenon, especially without necessarily reflecting its status as a security problem or otherwise. Elbe (2010) furthers this argument and contends that health issues are raised to security status as a resource mobilization front to address a range of health concerns.


Whatever informs the securitization process, it is undeniable that the protection of vulnerable populations and medical readiness against health emergencies remains a priority for nations, populations, and the military. Nonetheless, while securitization broadens the security agenda to include social issues, it has an unspoken assumption that security logic is static and often produces undesirable outcomes that must be checked and controlled. It does not account for how security practice becomes transformed due to its links with hitherto non-military matters. Recognising this static logic of the securitization process, Lebouef and Broughton (2008) call for a shift in focus from the process itself to the analysis of effects, consequences, and impacts. With such a shifted focus, one can grasp the transformations ongoing within security practice in the management of diseases of international concern.

As medical countermeasures such as antiretroviral therapies and vaccines emerge to combat pandemics – HIV/AIDS and COVID-19 as cases in point – peacekeeping and other deployments require the armed forces to ingest/inject the medical countermeasures (Elbe, 2012:321-322). By this measure, government and institutional policy for securing the country and the military

establishment require medical interventions such as collective ingestion of pills and mass injection of vaccines (Elbe, 2012:321) as occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, medical practice in these domains becomes further institutionalised in security operations through expansion, adaptation, further medical training, and capacity building to offer these services and those necessitated by peace operations and other missions of GAF.

Taken together, the requirements placed on TCCs and peacekeepers, as well as the outcomes of peace operations for the personnel and the institution, are additional sources of influence in the Ghana Armed Forces. The other part of the influences on GAF includes the socio-political developments of the country, geopolitical events across the globe, and security force assistance.

In the next section, I discuss the dynamics of institutional change as the analytical tool within the theory of sociological institutionalism.




2.3 Institutional Change through the Lens of Sociological Institutionalism: A Theoretical Perspective

2.3.1 Sociological Institutionalism

Sociological institutionalism is one of three neo-institutionalist perspectives that have sought to explain the influences of institutions on the preferences and actions of actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Bandelj and Morgan, 2015; Peters, 1999).²⁶ The denominator of these perspectives is that institutions matter in that they structure political life and decision making in their respective contexts (North, 1990; Peters, 2011; Peters, 1999). Sociological institutionalists view institutions as comprising formal rules, procedures, norms, symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that offer “frames of meaning” that guide human action (Hall and Taylor, 1996:947; Scott, 1995; Jenson and Mérand, 2010:82; Hall, 2010; March and Olsen, 1995:21-25).

As Hall and Taylor (1996:947-948) observe, the conceptual divide between institutions and culture is broken down within this definition. Rather, institutional explanations anchored on organizational structures are blended with cultural explanations that view culture not only as affective values and attitudes, but also as a network of symbols, routines, and scripts that provide a template for behaviour. The theory emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the pioneering contributions from Meyer and Rowen (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in the study of organizations and institutional development.



²⁶ The other two perspectives are historical and rational choice institutionalism. A fourth and complementary perspective, namely, discursive (neo)institutionalism focusses on the flow of discourses and ideas.

The argument is that institutional forms and procedures are culture-specific practices of many societies that are incorporated into organizations through the transmission of cultural practices (Hall and Taylor, 1996:947; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Bandelj and Morgan, 2015). Sociological institutionalism thus homes in on how cultural norms, routines, habits, symbols, myths, and ceremonies influence people's actions in an organization and the diffusion of these practices across institutions and countries (Bandelj and Morgan, 2015; Hall and Taylor, 1996:947; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Its postulations therefore explore how external influences create or shape institutions and the ongoing social interactions in institutions including the values and cognitive forms that constrain individual action (Saurugger, 2013; Peters, 2011; Beckert, 2010; Schofer et al., 2012).

The theory considers striking similarities in organizational form and practice among institutions such as armed forces and nations across the world, notwithstanding their differing local conditions (Beckert, 2010:150; Hall and Taylor, 1996; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). It predominantly focuses on institutional homogenization expressed in the concept of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Beckert, 2010). The thinking around isomorphism is that as organizational forms become institutionalised, they diffuse and cause organizational structures to become homogenized, that is, they become alike (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Beckert, 2010). Within this thinking, sociological institutionalism is sometimes considered on a global scale as a world society or world polity approach (Meyer et al., 1997; Schofer et al., 2012; Hadler, 2015; Beckert, 2010:150). This approach forges the understanding that cognitive scripts that are legitimized as global community perspectives become guiding principles to the rest of society, be they near or far.

Meyer et al. (1997:150), advancing this perspective, argued that nation-states are exogenously constructed and that internal and external actors engaged in state formation and policy formulation enact scripts that are not their own. Sociological institutionalism is therefore an explanatory tool for institutional development, including institutional change and global processes of socio-political transformations (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer et al., 1997; Beckert, 2010:150).

The idea of the global influencing the national is one part of institutional theory. However, local and regional dynamics contribute to the processes of transforming institutions and society and not only what is tenable at the level of the international community. The focus on homogenization of institutional models has also been scrutinised by various fields of inquiry. As Huntington (1996) shows, civilisations can clash. Eisenstadt (1998:42, 2000) adds that societies do not always merge into a singular path, nor are institutional responses to patterns of structural differentiation and integration the same across societies. These realities are tenable at both global and institutional levels.

It is understandable, however, that societal norms shape the formation of institutions and some initial guiding principles might formalize rules creating them. Exogenous factors can therefore shape the processes of establishing institutions. For example, the colonial antecedence of the formation of the Ghana Armed Forces and its counterparts in erstwhile colonized parts of Africa show European-type organization (Nkrumah 1968; Baynham, 1988; Gutteridge, 1970). Over time, the institution may however assume or evolve together with the norms of the host society and might borrow from endogenous and exogenous currents that work together or oppose each other and contribute to institutional transformation. Ghana's national security strategy, for example, is framed around domestic, regional and global threats, risks, and challenges that the country faces

ranging from crimes, ethnic violence, terrorism and insurgencies in the West African sub-region, conflicts within Africa and wars outside the continent but having geopolitical and economic repercussions for the country (Ministry of National Security, 2020). The critical assessment of the country's security profile underpins the participation of Ghana, GAF and other security apparatuses in various counterterrorism exercises, security force assistance programmes, and shapes the training regimes of the Armed Forces. Similarly, Ghana's affirmative action drive has culminated in a requirement that female representation in public institutions and decision-making spaces should be thirty per cent or more. The Affirmative Action bill which will become an Act in Oct 2024, will further the gains in female representation across the country that have included female vice chancellors and chancellors of public universities, to heads of other critical institutions such as the Judiciary, Electoral Commission, Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), and vice presidential candidate (female vice president upon the winning of the opposition political party in the 2024 elections). These gains put pressure on the Ghana Armed Forces to reconsider its general outlook towards females, even if different services have responded differently to these currents over the years (Amoo-Welsing et al., 2019).

Individuals and collectives may also initiate or transport structures and norms to the institution under influence. The accumulation of micro or personalised experiences becomes a significant factor in institutional change. Thus, all changes are necessarily local, if even the source is exogenous to the institution, and no action is too small to contribute to change. Great change can emerge from the margins where the individual and collective are located within highly structured institutional spaces. The theory, however, hardly highlights the active roles of person(s) and groups in the processes of institutional change.

Some studies (Orru et al., 1988; Nichols, 1998; Berglund, 2006; Baskerville and Grossi, 2019; Jenson and Mérand, 2010; Miller and Banaszak-Holl, 2005; Bodnieks, 2020) have used sociological institutionalism to explain various social and political phenomena. Orru et al. (1988) applied the theory to study organisational isomorphism in East Asia. Nichols (1998) has used the theory to analyse the embeddedness of the World Trade Organization in culture. Berglund et al. (2006) have used it to study the transposition of directives in the European Union (EU). Berglund and colleagues found delays by member states beyond the EU's 1.5 per cent threshold in transposing directives.

However, EU directives pose self-imposed constraints on member states in their national policy-making as these directives are transposed into national laws. The consequence is the 'Europeanization' of the EU members as they accept EU laws as supreme and agree to the body's directives. Baskerville and Grossi (2019) have also employed the theory to study standard setting in New Zealand and the adaptation of international public sector accounting standards. These works are important contributions to the applicability of the theory. Nonetheless, they are silent on the actors (individual and collective) as active vectors of the change process.


Tenets of Sociological Institutionalism

There are two main tenets of the theory, namely the logic of appropriateness and institutional change. The logic of appropriateness presents the understanding that members of an institution think of their actions as their conformity to the norms rather than what the consequences are for them.

Their actions are thus based on rules, not in the sense of the outcome for (dis)obedience but the extent of conformity to cognitive dimensions guiding the institution (Peters, 1999; Hall and Taylor, 1996). The functioning of established institutions thus emphasises cognitive dimensions such as the norms, beliefs, rituals, and conventions that provide the boundaries for acceptable behaviour. These rules also provide the cognitive script for legitimacy among peers through collective accession to what is appropriate or inappropriate behaviour instead of the consequence to expect from particular action(s). Individual and collective action in an institution is therefore expected to occur and to be interpreted within this frame.

Thus, the logic of appropriateness is oppositional to another logic of individual and group action, that is, the logic of consequence.²⁷ With the logic of consequentiality, individuals as rational agents make decisions with the objective pay-off in view and act with the outcome in mind (Peters, 1999:29).

Institutions, from the sociological institutionalist viewpoint, tend to have the logic of appropriateness rather than the logic of consequence in influencing behaviour or shaping individual action. While the logic of appropriateness explains actor behaviour and interpretive frames within institutions, institutional change is the most defining tenet of the theory. The concept provides an analytical lens for the study.



²⁷ Logic of consequence, logic of consequentiality, and logic of instrumentality are used to explain this rational choice approach to action and interpretations.

2.3.2 Institutional Change

The central concern of sociological institutionalism is institutional development and how societal processes bring changes to bear on institutions. Institutional change, therefore, embraces the evolutionary and transformative emphasis of the theory. The argumentation here is that institutions evolve and transform through exogenous influences they willingly embrace or come to accept through normative pressures, imitations, coercion, and competition (Holberg and Alvinus, 2019; Norheim-Martinsen, 2016; Beckert, 2010). The changes can occur in the structures and character of the institution as well as in the attitudes and behaviour of actors (Agyekum, 2021b:14; Asante, 2020). Initially preoccupied with homogenization across institutions, the changes were viewed as path dependent. Legitimated organisational models, it was argued, diffuse across industries and borders, and lead to convergence in organisational forms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meye et al., 1997; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pretorius, 2008; Beckert, 2010). The armed forces are considered one of the institutions that demonstrate isomorphic change. Some studies suggest, however, that in the process of implementation, institutional models can be edited, ‘bricolaged’ – that is, innovatively recombined with other elements to create new forms-, or hybridized (Campbell, 1997, 2005; Carstensen, 2011, 2017).

Institutional models can also be translated, that is, reconfigured into new models as they move from their birthplace (Czarniawska and Sèvon, 1996, 2005; Czarniawska and Joeges, 1996). As Beckert (2010:151) observes, however, these concepts take it as given the diffusion of institutional forms and pressures towards isomorphism. Beckert (2010) however challenges the one-sided view on institutional development and argues that the processes that create institutional change can result in homogenization or divergence. Thus, a learning institution can develop a model that is calculatedly different from the institutional form it observed.

Institutions therefore might not necessarily assume the structures and character of the sources of change. The analysis in this study follows the integrative perspective of Beckert (2010) and argues that changes can occur in the form of homogenization, divergence, or both.

How do these changes occur? Four mechanisms have been identified. Normative pressures are one of the ways through which institutional change occurs. These pressures include conditionality and extension of legal regulations. The United Nations, for example, requires TCC governments to ensure that pre-deployment trainings promote the 'proper discharge' of personnel's responsibilities, discipline, and order among contingents.

These requirements and overall troop behaviour must be by (1) the UN code of standards, (2) mission standards of conduct, and (3) local laws and regulations (UN, 2006:6). The revised model of the UN's memorandum of understanding (MoU) for peacekeeping further requires governments of TCCs to issue and promulgate UN Standards of conduct and integrate them into their laws or 'relevant disciplinary code' (UN, 2006; Passmore, 2020). Armed forces desiring continuing participation in peacekeeping will therefore have to comply or risk losing out. Learning processes that promote these ideals can therefore entrench the values specified. Alternatively, an institution and/or its personnel can reject what has been learnt or refuse the pressures. Recipients of the exogenous norms, however, may not strictly apply the imported model but rather, as Mallard and Paradeise (2009) note, integrate them into traditional processes to create a hybrid.

The socio-political context of the society within which the institution is located also infiltrates the latter and affects its behaviour and outlook as a professional entity. Baynham (1988) and Adekson (1976), for example, found that the Ghana Armed Forces had been largely influenced by ethnic leanings. The ethnic cleavages, while not viewed as the most important factor, have been significant in contributing to coup organisation in Ghana.

Agyekum (2021a:1) also contends that cultural practices such as “dwan toa” (begging by proxy), have infiltrated the GAF as well as forms of political influences and cronyism. These have negative consequences for soldier professionalism.

Mimesis is another means by which institutional change can occur. Through this process, perceived attractive models are imitated through professional training and other exposures. As Beckert (2010:151) affirms, imitation might not result in an identical copy. The new information, nonetheless, provides cognitive and normative frames that shape views on means to specific goals. The pattern emulated is later diffused. The imitation of advanced military practices and organisation is an example of mimesis. Through contact with Norwegian peacekeepers in 1982-1983, for example, peacekeepers of the GAF came back and helped establish the peacekeeping pre-deployment training camp of the Ghana Armed Forces.²⁸

Coercion is also used as a means to enforce change. For it to work, an external force connects accessibility to desired resources to compliance with certain rules or demands (Beckert, 2010:153). The receiving institution then can only access the resources through compliance with certain demands directly or indirectly placed on it. This process occurs for some armed forces. Zaman and Biswas (2014), for instance, observed that fear of being denied peacekeeping participation made the Bangladeshi Armed Forces return the country to civilian rule after it took over in 2007-2009 following the 2006 elections in that country.

The Ghana Armed Forces and the outcomes of its peacekeeping operations can therefore be situated within the institutional change dynamics. The theory and the analytical framework drawn from it are therefore helpful for this study.

²⁸ KII, MSOX, June 2022, Accra,

It provides the context to connect personnel experiences with the practices and cultures of the Ghana Armed Forces. It thus helps to appreciate the professional and medical influences of peacekeeping on the GAF and its personnel.

Within the broad frame, peacekeepers, as individuals, and groups become a medium to transport lessons, experiences, and practices to their institutions where their experiences from mission theatres contribute to shaping institutional structures and practices as well as personnel behaviour.

In a study of GAF, Clune (2014: iii-iv) concluded that through international travel of the military elites and potential elites be it through military education or international peacekeeping, an advancement can occur in corporate transformation after individual transformation.


Put differently, the peacekeeper can serve as a medium through which changes can be brought to bear on GAF as they are exposed to external training environments and peacekeeping mission theatres.

According to Henry (2015), the military capital acquired in PKOs shapes personnel's activity and behaviour. Arguably, this influence is observable not only in the mission area but also upon return to the home state. Agyekum's (2020) study of the GAF, for instance, shows that peacekeeping experience diffuses across the barracks through introspection as peacekeepers recount their stories. Peacekeepers' narratives, Humphrey Agyekum finds, are "framed as deterring examples for home society" and this potentially impacts their behaviour and actions. Thus, not only do lessons and experiences from missions stay with peacekeepers but they are also shared with colleagues. The experience sharing contributes to or can contribute to adjustments in behaviour and expectations of the peacekeeper and the hearers.

The psychological effects of peacekeeping on personnel also require a new approach to mental health among the armed forces. Additionally, the presence of diseases like Ebola, HIV/AIDS, Lassa fever, and COVID-19 requires institutional action to forestall possible infection. This deepening of health practices in the security sector is described as the medicalisation of security (Elbe, 2010). It is therefore possible that peacekeepers and their group as micro and meso elements can serve as mediums to transfer ideals, demands, and pressures to the Armed Forces and contribute to its transformation.

This possibility is, however, not much highlighted in the theoretical literature, and it provides a space to contribute to the theory. The seeming absence of the micro and meso in the transformative processes results from the macro-level conceptions of sociological institutionalism. The theory is preoccupied with changes exerted by the external macro-level activities on institutions and states elsewhere.

At the individual level, the emphasis has mostly been on how institutions provide the frame that shapes behaviour. However, as has been shown, the individual and collective experiences from peacekeeping can be harnessed to bring about change in GAF and other forces. The theory is, nonetheless, useful for the study given the realities that changes occur through demands of the UN on Ghana and GAF, as well as personal and group experiences. The individual and collective elements thus contribute to help appreciate other means through which institutions uptake external experiences to shape, in part, their transformational processes.



2.3.4 Conceptual Flow of Peacekeeping-Institutional Change Nexus

The conceptual framework in Figure 2.2 below is deduced from the review of the literature. The framework suggests that global and local socio-political events influence the Ghana Armed Forces whose operations in turn affect Ghanaian society. The influences include Ghanaian culture, conflict situations at home and especially abroad, and government foreign policy. The activities of the Armed Forces and its personnel are also shaped by the institution's standard operation procedures, code of conduct, GAF regulations, GAF norms, military training, history of the Armed Forces, and security force assistance. The Ghana Armed Forces are also influenced by the UN and regional and subregional organizations in Africa. The rules and regulations of these multilateral bodies affect the Armed Forces, particularly on the peacekeeping front. The UN and the regional bodies also learn from GAF's activities and incorporate their peacekeeping approach and their practices. At the very least, GAF on its part contributes a subculture to UN and regional missions they participate in within the constraints set by the respective PKOs. These interactions occur before peacekeeping deployments. On the mission field, GAF personnel as individuals or troops are exposed to professional and medical influences.

Upon return to Ghana after the mission or tour, there is uptake of the professional experiences including using these experiences and disseminating same. Peacekeepers also introspect on mission experiences and spread narratives about their observations and activities when they served on the PKOs. They also draw from in-mission exposures to press demands for structural changes and undertake individual initiatives in the spaces where they have the power to effect changes within the limits of GAF rules. Psychological and other health exposures also engender exploring of new ways to manage them. The uptake, demands, initiative, introspective narratives, and ways health outcomes are managed contribute to changes at the personnel and institutional levels.

These include, at the personnel level attitudinal changes and career choices, to name two; and for the Armed Forces, changes in organisation, recruitment, creation of new (sub) institutions, and institutional outlook on women deployment. This framework thus encapsulates the essence of the study.




Figure 2.2 Conceptual Framework for Peacekeeping Experiences-Institutional Change Nexus. PhD Thesis (Author's construction, 2023).



2.4 Chapter Summary

The discussions on peacekeeping and the various principles and frameworks that have guided peacekeeping operations over the years have shown the dynamics and shifting boundaries of peacekeeping activities. The processes through which missions are decided, and the rationale, benefits, and perils of peacekeeping to peacekeepers, TCCs, Armed Forces and host communities have varied across space and time. It has been clear that the decision to keep peace is an outcome of multilevel stakeholder discussions at the multilateral, regional and national levels. Multifaceted reasons on the part of the UN Security Council and/or their regional counterparts, TCCs and peacekeepers influence such decisions. The intended and unintended outcomes of PKOs are also mixed whether viewed from the perspective of the mandate or the interest of the troop contributors.

The unintended consequences of peacekeeping as it relates to soldier professionalism and health were isolated and discussed to help put the influences reported by participants of this study into perspective. This is also key in identifying surprises from the field discussed in subsequent chapters. The analytical concept, institutional change, has also proven useful tool for explaining the influences of peacekeeping on the Ghana Armed Forces. A key limitation had been the active role individuals and collectives play in the transformation of institutions. This less explored space has been a ground to contribute to the theoretical framings of sociological institutionalism. The discussions in the chapter yielded a conceptual guide that depicts the process of change and the elements contributing to institutional transformation in GAF over the years. The guide shows that peacekeeping operations and the consequent experiences is a significant contributor to the changes occurring in the Armed Forces.


CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCHING THE GHANA ARMED FORCES: METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodological procedures and processes employed in conducting this study, as well as the philosophy that underlies them. It describes and explains how data was gathered, processed, and analysed to generate the knowledge. Ethical issues in the study and the author's reflections on the fieldwork experience are also documented to highlight some of the challenges encountered in the field and ways they were overcome. The chapter begins with the study area and proceeds with philosophical considerations, research approach, study design, methods, unit of analysis, ethical issues, and reflections on the research process.

The researcher employed the qualitative approach and used multiple methods within a case study design. Key informants and in-depth interviews, information conversations, focus group discussions, and observations were used to gather primary data while document review proved useful in obtaining data from archives and material culture. Transcripts of audios and fieldnotes were manually coded and subsequently transferred to NVivo software for further coding and analysis. Emerging themes formed the basis of discussions of the research findings.



3.1 Study Sites

The study was undertaken in Accra and Takoradi, respectively, in the Greater Accra and Western Regions of Ghana. These representations meant that the research covered Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) personnel operating in the Southern Command. Nonetheless, some of the study participants have served in the middle and northern belts of the country.

The Accra site consisted of Teshie, Burma Camp, 37 (Military Hospital), and Legon. The national capital is home to several military units, offices, and some retired (ex) personnel. Teshie is home to Whistler and Otu Barracks, which host GAF training institutions, including Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), and Southern Command Headquarters (Camp). As tri-service units, personnel in the training institutions at Teshie are drawn from units across the country. Burma Camp houses Arakan Barracks of the Fifth Battalion of Infantry (5BN), the General Headquarters of GAF, and the respective superior headquarters of the Ghana Army, Ghana Navy, and the Ghana Air Force, as well as the headquarters of support units. Personnel in these offices are closely involved in both the routine administration and reform initiatives within GAF. The 37 Military Hospital provided access to health personnel. The University of Ghana (UG) and Legon environs provided the space to access some of the veterans of the GAF. Access to the Public Records Administration and Archives Department, and the prevalence of security hotspots in Accra during politically charged periods, coupled with the GAF's involvement in maintaining internal security, also justified Accra's selection as a crucial study site.

Takoradi is a key military hub and home to all three branches of the GAF: the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Personnel in the three Services were engaged within the Takoradi garrison. The Takoradi site comprised Aprembo, which houses the Myohaung Barracks of the Second Battalion

of Infantry (2BN), and the Air Force Base. The 2BN, in collaboration with other forces, manages the western borders of the country and the southcentral parts of Ghana.

Personnel in Takoradi undertake a considerable number of internal operations, especially in the Western Region, which hosts installations of national interest (e.g., oil fields). The region has also been at the forefront of campaigns against illegal mining and lumbering. The Takoradi site thus provided insights into how changes in GAF are viewed in the light of peacekeeping experiences by personnel outside the superior headquarters in the national capital.

Figure 3.1 below presents a map of the study sites in Accra and Takoradi.




Figure 3.1 Map of study areas in Accra and Takoradi (Author's construction).

3.2 Philosophical Underpinnings of the Research

Researchers have different views on the nature of reality (existence of phenomena), what constitutes knowledge, and how knowledge is generated. The research philosophy stipulates the beliefs, values, and paradigm that guide design and methods for conducting the research (Ryan, 2018:2; Killam, 2013). Creswell (2007) and particularly Creswell et al. (2007: 238) highlight the relationship between research philosophy and methodology, thus:

Researchers should begin their inquiry process with philosophical assumptions about the nature of reality (ontology), how they know what is known (epistemology), the inclusion of their values (axiology), the nature in which their research emerges (methodology), and their writing structures.

The ontology highlights the study's perspective of truth (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Alharahsheh and Pius, 2020; Çelik and Köksal, 2019:191). While many ontological assumptions exist, researchers primarily view reality as context-free and objective (realism), or context-bound (relativism) (Killam, 2013).²⁹

This study proceeded from ontological relativism, as it examined institutional change through the subjective views and perspectives of GAF's soldiers and other informants. The relativist ontology perceives reality through intersubjectivity by examining meanings and understanding through social and experiential components (Saunders et al., 2012; Alharahsheh and Pius, 2020). The perspectives of the study participants are therefore understood within the context of GAF, and shared interpretations of peacekeeping experiences by peacekeepers and the researcher in the light

²⁹ Other ontologies have been identified between realism and relativism. These include direct realism, critical realism, and historical realism (Saunders et al., 2012; Ryan, 2018)

of changes in the Armed Forces. Thus, viewpoints, experiences, and perceptions shared by research participants were claims about knowledge and truths.

In this study, the meaning peacekeepers offered to professional and medical experiences in peacekeeping differed among the interlocutors. Additionally, perceptions varied on whether or not peacekeeping experiences have contributed to changes in structure and personnel outlook³⁰ in the GAF. The relativist perspective thus provided space for diversity and depth of experiences, meanings, and behaviour emanating from various research participants. This allows for “multiple mental construction of reality” that are based on the context of the study participants (Killam, 2013:7). Ontological relativism helped to amplify the differences in experiences and meanings to explore the relationship between peacekeeping exposures and institutional change in GAF. The research, thus, followed the traditions of studies such as Edwards et al. (2022), Hodder (1997) in varied fields.

Epistemologically, the study employed subjectivism as its perspective on knowledge. Subjective epistemology (Saunders et al., 2012) is one of two main epistemologies that guide research.³¹ Using subjectivism, I view the relationship with interviewees and their responses as subjective and anchored on (re)constructions of participants’ experiences in peacekeeping and ongoing changes in GAF. Interviewees and discussants, thus, constructed and interpreted interactions between their experiences and changes in GAF. The study thus takes a path to knowledge rooted in the context of peacekeeping as relived or recounted by the study participants.

³⁰ Outlook involves personnel’s perspectives and attitudes, including their interpretation of peacekeeping experiences, events, and future possibilities.

³¹ The other is objectivism. Similar to the ontological continuum, however, there is an epistemological continuum between objectivism and subjectivism. Social constructionism and constructionism are versions of or used interchangeably with subjectivism (e.g., Killam, 2013: 44; Narh, 2015).

Based on the outlined ontological and epistemological beliefs, the study is situated within the interpretivist paradigm. Paradigm, for this study, followed usage in Saunders et al. (2012:140-141), that is, a way to examine social phenomena to draw particular understandings and offer explanations. It is thus viewed as a pattern or model deriving from the ontology and epistemology which inform the study approach and methods (Alharahsheh and Pius, 2020). Contrary to Mark Saunders and colleagues' treatment of interpretivism as an approach and paradigm, however, the research differentiated interpretivism from the study approach derived from it. The reason is that, though used interchangeably with paradigm, it flows from the foregoing discussions that the approach or strategy is more fitting as a connector of the research philosophy and the methodology. Additionally, as the paradigm provides a model to design and undertake the research, it is more helpful to separate it from the approach, which shows how the pattern manifests or is implemented in real research situations (method). It is therefore unsurprising that more often the qualitative approach is described as qualitative design or qualitative method.³²

Interpretivism advocates that the researcher enters the social world of the study participants and understands the latter's world and experiences from research participants' viewpoints (Saunders et al., 2012:137).³³ The interpretive paradigm, therefore, allowed for examination of personal contributions, narratives, and textual information for meaning so that inferences could be drawn from research data. The paradigm provides workable grounds to study and interpret the multiple realities, descriptions, viewpoints, and experiences of study participants.

³² The quantitative and mixed methods approaches are no exceptions to this reality.

³³ The constitution and meaning of paradigms differ across studies. Saunders et al. (2012:140-141) draw from Burrell and Morgan (1982) and identify four paradigms. They make interpretivism appear as a paradigm and an approach.

3.3 Qualitative Approach to Research

The research used the qualitative approach to guide the study design and methods. The qualitative strategy values diversity of views, social context, and the use of words in the study of social phenomena, and meanings are sourced from those experiencing the phenomena (Creswell, 2007; Norman and Lincoln, 2005; Alharahsheh and Pius, 2020). As noted by Rossman and Rallis (2017:176), the author, as a qualitative researcher, engaged directly with study participants to understand their perspectives and worldviews.

Following Barnhill and Barnhill (2015), the qualitative research approach enabled the exploration of personal perspectives and voices of personnel in GAF, as well as experiential presence as components of meaningful inquiry. This avenue helps describe and explain the connection or otherwise between peacekeeping experiences and changes in GAF.

3.4 Case Study Design

The study employed the case study design to obtain and analyse data. Case study research focuses on social groups, cultures, actions, and interactions of individuals within their context (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The emphasis of the study design, therefore, was on “contextual understanding, human agency, egalitarian research relationships, and researcher empathy” (Krause, 2021:329). In this sense, the author’s research participants were not ‘subjects’ or ‘objects,’ but humans situated in social contexts with whom knowledge was co-produced while the researcher shared in the former’s world, at least for the study period.

A case study, like most qualitative designs, uses one or more interpretative procedures in data collection and analysis, including varied techniques such as observation, participation in the activities of the research participants, interviews, conversations, and group discussions.

The researcher focussed on people and their personal and collective accounts for several months over three years, observing and interacting with research participants to gain an in-depth understanding of GAF and answer the research questions to realise the study objectives.

The case study does not require the researcher to stay with the study participants in their environment for a long period. The short-term nature of the research, however, does not diminish rigour and validity. Hammersley (2006:4) warns that short-term fieldwork can lead to ahistorical perspectives. Indeed, the historicization of perspectives is important to understanding the complexity and trends in data. Nonetheless, with increased access to historical data in published and unpublished sources, especially through the internet, the researcher can minimize, if not eradicate, gaps in historicizing participants' perspectives. As Beaulieu (2004) argues, internet technology provides a source of data collection that might not require the researcher to be physically present in the field.

The task was to study the GAF in as much detail as allowable to gather rich data and deepen contextual understanding. While extended field stays may generate thick descriptions, rich and high-level data can be accumulated as the research achieves saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1975; Parker-Jenkins, 2018). That is, where perspectives from study participants begin to show increasing similarity or convergence and no “new ideas or themes emerge from the data” (MacPhail, 2015:173). Furthermore, prolonged field presence serves to cultivate trust, credibility, and respect through sustained face-to-face interactions (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Miller and Bell, 2002; Parker-Jenkins, 2018).

Researchers require levels of acceptance from the researched community and study participants, as the author has experienced in the field. The author's experience corroborates studies such as Parker-Jenkins (2018:28). Notably, however, acceptability and trustworthiness from study participants and the research community are not always a function of time. As Parker-Jenkins (2018:27) notes,

Interestingly, the ability to be accepted as a trustworthy interviewer to whom respondents may feel comfortable in divulging personal views is not contingent on time spent in the field, for example in the sense of traditional ethnography... but on the personal skills of the researcher.

Later sections of the chapter will confirm that the researcher's positionality in relation to the participants, networking, and ethical clearance greatly contributed to gaining acceptance by and access to research participants.

The research was nonetheless undertaken in the natural settings of the Armed Forces, including Barracks, Military Camps, and Units. The researcher, however, was not domiciled within military barracks or GAF outposts for the study period. The author visited the study sites for weeks and months in 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024 to interact with research participants.

The researcher engaged study participants primarily within the confines of the military establishment, including offices, barracks, and homes. The author also participated in military ceremonies such as cadet graduation and padre hour³⁴ and observed intakes perform marching within the premises of the military academy.

³⁴ Padre hour is a time that the religious authority in various units of GAF (Chaplains and/or Imams) interact with personnel in the unit before or after a brief presentation. Soldiers have the opportunity to talk about issues that border them during padre hour discussions.

The researcher heard routine sound signals and music that marked both daily activities – such as padre hour and the start and close of the workday – and occasional ceremonies like honour salutes, and observed moments of weapons display. However, the researcher did not participate in patrols and military exercises.

Through this procedure, techniques, and instruments, the researcher gained insights into participants' peacekeeping experiences and their connection or otherwise to structural and behavioural changes in GAF. It also helped to understand, to a necessary extent, how GAF operates as well as the internal environment that shaped the viewpoints of the interviewees. The study design was, therefore, appropriate for the research and helped answer the research questions to realise the study objectives.

3.5 Research Methods

Methods relate to technical rules, means, or tools for collecting and analysing data to generate knowledge (Brewer, 2000:2; Madden, 2010; Alharahsheh and Pius, 2020:40). It considers the procedure, techniques, and instruments employed in gathering and processing data to develop and advance scientific knowledge. Multiple methods within the qualitative approach were engaged for the research. The multi-method approach helped to generate data from varied sources and was useful for corroborating or challenging findings from one method with alternative data from another.

Qualitative data sources include research participants, observations, and material culture such as documents, records, and artefacts, including framed institutional texts, plaques, and insignia

(Polkinghorne, 2005; Rossman and Rallis, 2017:247). These were primary sources used to obtain field data for this study.

The sources yielded data such as audio records of interviews from study participants, autobiographic materials (written piece and curriculum vitae (CV)), and field notes and observations made while doing fieldwork.

Secondary data sources comprised documents obtainable from archives, published or unpublished articles, and reports accessible on digital platforms, libraries, and offices. The multiple data sources helped obtain diversified data and enhanced the triangulation of the findings.

3.5.1 Selection of Research Participants

As Shively (2011:51) noted, sampling decisions had to be made about “who, how, and how many” individuals (sample elements) to study. Sampling is thus the means by which sections of the target population are recruited and enrolled to generate the data required to produce knowledge about the group. This research used a subgroup (sample) drawn from GAF personnel with peacekeeping experiences (sample frame). The sample included 88 serving soldiers, 8 retirees, and 5 Defence Civilian Staff.

Pre-targeted information-rich cases were purposively sampled based on the author’s prior knowledge of the relevant participants in the research. The rationale for this choice is that the study required the selection of participants who can “purposefully inform understanding of the research problem” and are willing to share their stories (Creswell, 2007:125,133). Purposive sampling, as Polit and Beck (2012:739) describe, is a non-probabilistic technique whereby I used personal judgment to select the most informative participants.

The purposive sample included heads of GAF units relevant to the research, officers of Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) rank or higher, and soldiers of Warrant Officer (WO) rank and above. Officers and soldiers of the identified ranks have had over 20 years of experience in GAF, mostly serving in decision-making roles in various units, and have participated in two or more peacekeeping missions.

In addition to the purposive sample, the snowballing technique was used to select other research participants. Snowballing or contact sampling, as Shively (2011) explains, involves selection of an initial contact(s) or key informant(s) who in turn provide(s) names of potential participants. Additional participants are then accumulated through leads provided by successive interviewees. Comparably, the author was directed by interviewees (initial contacts/key informants, hereafter leads) to potential participants. Leads introduced the researcher to potential interviewees via phone call or in person. Occasionally, the researcher obtained contact details of potential participants and reached them on phone calls or in-person to establish rapport and request participation in the research. In these cases, the author mentioned the lead. Alternatively, leads hinted on possible information rich participants who have had significant experiences with peacekeeping missions. The researcher then traced the named person(s) and enrolled those willing to participate in the study.

Research participants in the services were drawn from the Department of International Peace Support Operations (IPSO), Joint Operations, Directorate of Army Peacekeeping Operations (DAPKOP), Defence Intelligence (DI), Army Headquarters (Army HQ), Naval HQ, Air Force HQ, and General Headquarters (GHQ). Other discussants were selected from the Department of Medical Services (DMS), 37 Military Hospital, and 2BN Medical Reception Station (2MRS).

Some dialogists were personnel of the Ghana Military Academy (GMA), Military Academy and Training Schools (MATS) – now part of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Army Peacekeeping Operations Training School (APOTS), GAF CSC, KAIPTC, Southern Command Camp, 5BN, 2BN, and 2 Garrison (Air Force Base), and 66 Artillery Regiment. Retired officers and ex-soldiers were drawn from the Ghana Legion.

3.5.2 Data Collection Techniques and Instruments for Primary Data Sources

Interviews, informal conversations, personal notes of interviewees, observation, focus group discussions, and document reviews were the techniques used in collecting field data. Among these, interviews were the primary technique.

Interviews

A total of 67 interviews were conducted across the study sites. The interviewees comprised soldiers in active service or retired, and civilians working with the Ghana Armed Forces (Defence Civilian Staff). Females constituted nearly thirty-six percent of the dialogists. Table 3.1 below summarises the interview participation for the research.

Table 3.1 Research Participants Interviewed

	Serving Soldiers		Retired Soldiers		Civilians	All
	Officers	Other ranks	Retired Officers	Ex-Other Ranks	Defence Civilian Staff	
Males	28	8	3	3	1	43
Females	14	7	1	1	1	24
Total	42	15	4	4	2	67

The officer group included Male Senior Officers (SMOs) and Female Senior Officers (FSOs) of the Lieutenant Colonel Rank or higher.

Male Officers (MOs) and Female Officers (FOs) are of the Major Rank or below. Unlike the Senior Ranks, the officers, in the conception of this study, reach their highest rank through promotional examinations and other criteria. The Senior Ranks, thus, do not require PROMEX for subsequent progression in the hierarchy in the Ghana Armed Forces.³⁵ Similarly, Male Senior Soldier (MSS), Female Senior Soldier (FSS), Male Soldier (MS) and Female Soldier (FS) are divisions among the other ranks. The prefix “Ex” is used to qualify a retired service person (other ranks), and “R” indicates a retired officer. Defence Civilian Staff (DCS) are also grouped into male and female. Table 3.2 summarises the number of interview participants for each group.

Table 3.2 Further Differences Among the Interview Participants

MSSO (n=23)	MO(n=5)	MSS (n=7)	MS (n=1)	ExMSS (n=3)	ExFSS(n=1)	MDCS(n=1)
FSO (n=11)	FO (n=3)	FSS (n=5)	FS (n=2)	RMSO (n=3)	RFO (n=1)	FDCS (n=1)

As Turner (2010:754) noted, the interviews offered in-depth information about the experiences and viewpoints of participants on a given topic. The interviews were thus a significant way to gather data for the study. Interviews took two main forms, namely in-depth and key informant which were had face-to-face and via mobile phone conversations. The interviews were sometimes co-conducted with a colleague undertaking a related project.

In-depth interviews (IIs) were conducted with officers and soldiers (serving and retired) who have served on at least one peacekeeping mission. These interviewees possess relevant knowledge about the subject and shared views on their experiences during and after peacekeeping operations.

³⁵ In the Ghana Armed Forces, senior officer ranks start from Major which for this study is considered officer rank. The senior ranks hold command positions at the Battalion level and comparable units. Majors are commanders of companies or serve as second in command.

More importantly, they discussed whether or not their professional and medical exposures during the missions contributed to changes at personal level or in the structures of GAF.

Key informants, as noted by Jagger and Angelsen (2011:96), had a high level of awareness and have (or had) been active politically and formally or otherwise engaged in governance and hold/held key positions in the establishment. Key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with officers, senior non-commissioned officers (SNCOs), and soldiers (serving or retired) who contribute(d) to decision making or make decisions in their current position in GAF.

The researcher obtained detailed, in-depth information through the IIs and KIIs. Thus, the lines between the interview types were blurred as the researcher also interviewed key informants in depth to arrive at meaningful details.

The interviews lasted anywhere from 30 minutes to 120 minutes where they were co-conducted with another colleague on the wider research project. The interviews were semi-structured. As de Chesnay (2015: XIX) suggested, there were few general questions but the interviewees were allowed to digress along preferred lines while the interviewer moderated the interviews to keep the discussions within the research focus.

With few exceptions, the interviews were face-to-face and conducted in a context that was mutually convenient to the study participant and the researcher. Mostly, however, the researcher preferred locations that were convenient to and selected by the interviewee. Telephone interviews were used as a means of follow-up and ways to obtain 'quick' information that might have been missed during the interview and to seek clarity on some aspects of the data where it was not feasible to revisit the interviewee. Nonetheless, some study participants were visited two or more times for similar purposes. Two Ex-service persons were, however, entirely interviewed via the telephone.

The interview guide contained semi-structured open-ended questions and spanned the scope of individual stories and collective views. The guide was thus shaped by studies such as Creswell et al. (2007:238), which suggests the importance of this nature of questions to guide interview conversations. Interviews were audiotaped using a voice recorder or phone as a backup. The audio files were later transferred onto a passworded personal laptop, and interview dates were used to trace the interviewees. Phone records, however, had names of some study participants, and these files were subsequently renamed so that study participants are not easily traceable in case any third party accessed the laptop.

Some study participants preferred giving their CVs and/or written pieces about their peacekeeping experiences to complement interview discussions. The author accepted the materials and asked other questions that had not been answered by these autobiographic materials. The two documents, within Rossman and Rallis's (2017:247) framework, combined with archival records, constituted aspects of material culture used in this research.

Informal Conversation

Informal conversation interviews (ICI) involved mostly unplanned discussions with study participants and did not proceed on pre-set guidelines or a particular structure. The ICI occurred at luncheons, graduation parties, on the walkway from the Military Academy, on the bus, at random meetings at common spaces, church services at GAF, and outside the military. I began discussions with acquaintances and persons within my social network about the military and peacekeeping. These topics became points of friendship and a springboard for delving into the questions that guided this research.

Informal conversations in this sense had semblance with unstructured interviews except in planning and name. Interviews are underlain by elements of formality or are at least perceived as such by the interviewers and/or the interviewees. As the name suggests, informal conversations though a form of interview strive to avoid elements of interviews such as pre-planning and at the very least occur within an informal atmosphere.

In most cases, informal conversations were precursors to appointments for formal interviews. Participants in this category were subsequently enrolled for interviews. The conversations usually begin with topics of common interest to the researcher and the dialogist.

The author mostly introduced aspects of the project and research objectives to the potential conversationist as a primer and requested a prospective participant's convenient time for a subsequent interview. One retired officer, four ex-service persons, five soldiers, and fifteen officers participated in this study through this joint mechanism (ICI followed by Interviews).

The informal conversations also provided insights into some areas of the research that further shaped the focus of the study. Sometimes the conversations interlaced sets of interviews and provided a deeper understanding of previous or subsequent responses from interviews. The dialogues were also used to obtain a deeper understanding of the structure and workings of the Armed Forces. It also served as the basis for framing sections of the semi-structured interviews for the study.

Eleven (11) informal conversations were had with participants who were not included in the formal interviews. They include MSOs (2), MOs (2), FOs (2), MS (1), FS (1), FDCS (1), and MDCS (2). Conversations with these dialogists provided the ICI data obtained from the Defence Civilian Staff, academics, officers, and soldiers working with the Ghana Armed Forces.

Observations

Observations were made during visits to military units and installations to appreciate some of the activities of the Armed Forces in their natural setting. From the military police posts at Burma Camp entrance, and other security posts in various study sites, to the Squares and offices, the researcher observed aspects of the daily lives of GAF personnel.

Observations also focussed on non-verbal cues during interviews and discussions to put responses into perspective. Some more restricted information could also be only observed. The researcher made notes on these observations during and after field visits.

Focused Group Discussion

Focus group discussions (FGDs) were interactions with three or more personnel across different ranks. The researcher facilitated discussions and encouraged collective reflection among GAF personnel. Five FGDs were conducted. Three of these were conducted at Burma Camp, Accra. There was an FGD for male soldiers (NCOs, sergeants and above) at Support Services Brigade Camp; one for female soldiers (NCOs, sergeants and above) at Arakan Barracks; and one for male officers at the General Headquarters (GHQ). The FGDs for the other ranks involved six soldiers in each case and that of the officers had four senior officers. Two others were conducted at Whistler Barracks (3 male senior officers) and Teshie environs (4 senior female soldiers). The researcher facilitated the sessions with a co-facilitator and we took notes during the deliberations and further discussed emerging issues from the FGDs. An FGD guide with open ended questions guided the interactions with the discussants. The FGD guide gave structure to the discussions but the moderators followed the natural course of stories and narratives with follow-up and probing questions not necessarily envisaged by the guide.

The group discussions generated interactions among the participants. Members of the group shared ideas and views on their peacekeeping experiences and areas in GAF and personnel behaviour where changes are partly attributable to influences of PKO exposures. The data obtained from the FGD provided a group understanding of events on peacekeeping missions and their impacts on GAF. It was also useful for triangulating the research findings from other methods of data collection.

Documented Sources

The documented sources used for the study comprise material culture and scholarly and grey literature. Material culture comprising autobiographic materials (written pieces and curriculum vitae (CV)) of study participants was analysed and helped to fill gaps in responses from some study participants. The information included peacekeeping mission tours, positions held in the GAF, and civilian qualifications, among other contents.

These aspects of material culture and records from the archives such as Nkrumah's communications during the Congo peacekeeping mission in the 1960s, Defence Committee Memos, Armed Forces budget in the 1970s³⁶, Armed Forces Newspaper (AFNews), Command Instructions, for instance, mandatory pre-deployment testing for substances, and other Newsletters and magazines of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, provided information missing in the oral interviews, enhancing the depth of data sources and cross-validating interview findings.

Artefacts such as insignia, plaques, and framed institutional texts deepened the researcher's understanding of the research context.

³⁶ A list of archival documents which informed the study is provided in the bibliography (see page 308)

Document review

Document review comprised a systematic collection and analysis of these documents to gather data and deepen understanding around the research questions. The documents, physical and digital, including personal journals, public records, reports, and other archived materials were analysed and interpreted to identify themes, insights and patterns which provided new data, challenged or corroborated data from direct interactions with study participants.

Archival Records

Records from the Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD) archives and the Public Relations Directorate of GAF were obtained by tracing titles and catalogue containing information on GAF based on a set of research questions. The details of all relevant documents in searched catalogues at PRAAD were noted on a paper and later transferred to an Excel worksheet. Subsequently, the documents were called based on the details and scanned or the piece of necessary information recorded in a fieldnote and sometimes directly unto sections of the thesis. At the GAF Public Relations Directorate, newspapers and magazines publications were of interest to the author.

Data from the archives helped to triangulate some of the findings in the study. Sometimes, they were the only source of detail for evidence that had emerged in previous data obtained for this study. One example is the support of the German Armed Forces Technical Advisory Group (GAFTAG) in the establishment of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC). GAFTAG also provided logistics to the 48 Engineer Regiment which helped the latter deploy as the first engineer unit with the United Nations Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Mission in Mali

(MINUSMA) (AFNews, 2023:2). This information was obtainable in the Armed Forces (AF) News, a newspaper of the GAF.

Scholarly and Grey Literature

The secondary sources included scholarly (peer-reviewed) articles, published books, and grey literature on the research topic. Grey literature comprised unpublished information such as research theses, some official documents on the Ghana Armed Forces, and ECOWAS, AU, and UN documents.

These documents were explored to deepen understanding of peacekeeping, and institutional change as well as the linkages between peacekeepers' experiences and changes in the Armed Forces. The documents were obtained from libraries, PRAAD Accra, digital archives, and online databases. Five libraries in Accra, Ghana, and one in Copenhagen, Denmark were visited to obtain materials for the thesis. At UG, the Institute of African Studies (IAS) Library, and UG Balme Library were visited. KAIPTC Library, and Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSC) library housed in the Peacekeeping Building at Otu Barracks, at Teshie, were also accessed for data collection. Burma Hall Library at GAF General Headquarters, Burma Camp, was another Library utilised in the study.

The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Library, Copenhagen was also visited to obtain materials for this research. Digital platforms such as Google Scholar, JSTOR, Cambridge Core, ugspace, UN.org, and Internet Archive provided materials that informed this study.

Titles, authors, themes, keywords, and search questions were entered on search engines and online catalogues to access relevant documents. Book titles and subject area searches complemented online catalogues searches and helped to navigate accession numbers in various libraries visited.

Abstracts and introductory sections of books and articles were mostly scanned through after using keywords in the research topic and study objectives as preselection guides. Key references were automatically included in addition to texts where the abstracts pointed the author to information that was relevant to the study.

3.5.3 Units of Analysis

Based on the research questions, two loci of interest formed the units of analysis for the study. First, the individual's experiences and perceptions. GAF peacekeepers, as individuals, have experiences that inform their professional outlook and/or contribute to structural changes in the Armed Forces. Second, the group and its collective experiences. That is, Ghana Armed Forces peacekeepers, as a collective with shared experiences, have contributed to structural and behavioural changes of its personnel. It also involved GAF as an institution experiencing changes. The two layers of interest thus align with two of Rossman and Rallis' (2017:174-175) questions: "Is it the individual and his experiences and perspectives? Is it a group—an organization or a program—and its structures and processes?" It also follows two of Gall et al.'s (2007) three types of classifications of studied phenomena as presented in Rossman and Rallis' (2017:175), namely individuals, their experiences and perceptions, and the group and its culture which was limited to GAF structures from the viewpoint of this research.

By focusing on peacekeepers as individuals and as a group, the researcher's understanding was enhanced on how individual experiences shape personal and collective processes of change. Additionally, the influence of collective experiences on GAF structures and personnel behaviour was also better appreciated. Thus, the study observed mutual influences between the units of analysis.

3.5.4 Data Processing and Analysis

Data captured on audio tapes were transcribed manually and with a “notta ai” artificial intelligence transcription platform. Verbatim and intelligent transcriptions were used. Fieldnotes were also transferred unto Word files. After processing the data into these formats, transcripts were carefully read to enhance familiarity with the data.


I followed Strauss and Corbin (1998:43-46) when diving into the data by proceeding line by line and mostly considering sentences, paragraphs, and complete texts to identify the main ideas flowing through these collections of words. Coding, “the actual assignment of codes (categories) to sections of the data,” (Kuckartz, 2014:61), was done concurrently with fieldnote taking and reads of transcripts as part of this dive. Coding allowed the researcher to categorize the data gathered to identify themes that correspond with the research questions. Some of the themes used in the analysis are “historical,” “structural changes,” “personnel outlook,” “professional experiences,” and “medical exposures.” These themes shaped the outline of the empirical chapters. Various sub-themes such as “administrative change,” “Africanization,” “new institutions,” “welfare,” “pre-independence,” “trauma,” “attitudes,” and “post-service career” provided the basis for second and third-level (sub) headings for the empirical chapters. Four rules, identified by Kuckartz (2014:74) guided the coding process: (a) units of meaning were complete thoughts or full sentences; (b) multiple sentences or even paragraphs, constituting units of meaning were coded together; (c) interview questions or clarifications were included in the codes if they furthered understanding of interviewees’ views; (d) passages were understandable when taken out of contexts.

I therefore select a line(s), and paragraphs that are meaningful and make sense though they are sometimes taken from among a string of text that constituted pieces of interviewees’ narratives.

A statement such as “ECOMOG was war” from a senior officer (MSO4, June 2022, Burma Camp) is a unit of meaning and is coded under the theme “testing standard,” and “attitudinal change.” This code shows that units of meaning may be coded multiple times. Where alternative codes fit into a theme, the alternatives are used to minimize the repetition of the same phrases, clauses, and paragraphs from a single interview or FGD across the thesis.

Themes were created based on emerging patterns in the data and formed the basis for the presentation of results, findings, and conclusions of the research. Initially, the author coded units of meaning of select transcripts into themes under relevant chapters of the thesis. Subsequently, the researcher inputted interview data and themes into NVivo software to continue the coding and development of patterns and categories. Studies like Eduful et al. (2020: 6) employed consensual coding, where two persons independently coded interview transcripts in NVivo for comparison and use of recurring codes as the basis for analysis. Kuckartz (2014:75,102), however, maintains that though consensual coding is very important and beneficial, in thesis and dissertation situations, “analysts must work alone.” When feasible, however, a second person can help double-check the work. The author worked alone in this thesis situation.

Quotes from research participants are used to support the themes that emerged under the chapters of the study. To ensure anonymity, codenames and not participants’ real names and ranks are used in the analysis. The codename “MSO4,” for example, is used for a male senior officer, “RMSO” for retired male senior officers, and “MS” and “FS” respectively for male and female soldiers.



3.6 Engaging Research in Ghana's Military Setting: Reflections

Preliminary fieldwork (interviews) was done in late 2019. The interviews primarily set forth the basis for subsequent discussions which contributed to the current scope of the research. In 2020-2021, I focussed mostly on understanding the peacekeeping literature and GAF to properly situate the research. While at it, I got married barely a week before the Christmas of 2020 and became a father by October of the following year. The journey required balancing necessary pauses to answer crucial family calls and need to enhance clarity about the direction of the thesis. Counsel from those who had had to manage such a scenario during their doctoral journeys and my supervisors helped to carve out an appropriate balance between the young family and research demands.

Fieldwork was intensified from June to October 2022, and April-May and November-December, 2023, January-March 2024. These months were mostly times for interviews, group discussions, and observations during visits to GAF units. Informal conversations however occurred at opportune moments such as unplanned meetings with civilian employees of GAF, and participation in GAF events, and DSIP workshops between December 2020 - March 2024.

At the outset of the study, I was a civilian outsider negotiating access in a military space. This came with its challenges. The military setup presents a closed environment that is seldom open to the civilians they protect.

Although the Ghana Armed Forces have initiated steps to reduce this appearance, characterisation as an 'outsider' leaves a new entrant to research in the Forces with the considerable struggle in seeking approvals for research and obtaining information from members of the service.

The challenge is heightened by the bureaucratic and hierarchical nature of the military which provides the institutions its structural outlooks and beauty in seniority and departmentalization. Bureaucracy and checks, however, considerably delayed processing of requests. At some point, it was difficult to follow up on letters to the level of the hierarchy where the approval request was reached.

Some personnel were also ambivalent about sharing their experiences with a civilian for fear that “it could land them into trouble”. Some officers and soldiers were more careful and sometimes unwilling to participate in the interview. Where they did, the same fear of their responses being traced to them and subsequent repercussions made some interviewees avoid giving direct answers to some research questions. In informal conversations to establish rapport for recruiting study participants for a subsequent interview, it became obvious that personnel are careful not to engage in any discussions that could be viewed unfavourably by their superiors or the establishment. This in their view could take them off the force or subject them to some form of punishment. The fear was sometimes viewed from the silent lens of the growing politicization of sections of the Force. A court case about alleged coup plotting which began in 2021 and was concluding at a High Court in 2024 also made some other ranks uncomfortable about group-based discussions.

Senior officers and seniors among the soldiers were more willing to share their experiences than those of lower ranks among the officer corps and soldiers. When the ‘old man or woman’ (head), that is commanding officer (CO) of a unit, whatever the rank, introduced the research team to members of the unit, it was easier to obtain information from participants.

More importantly, partner institutions and institutional support for the project came to the rescue. The mention of ‘a PhD candidate’ from the University of Ghana accorded some acceptability and respect among interviewees.

This was particularly so with officers who have had civilian qualifications from universities in the country or abroad. Many officers had had forms of university education with some receiving post graduate education or at least with aspirations to do so as soon as practicable. Some of these personnel had a better appreciation of the research process and were sometimes more open to sharing their views and contributed to refocusing the study in the current direction.

While candidature at the University of Ghana offered some context to obtain information from some participants, it did not matter much for others. For the latter group, the association with the KAIPTC presented the researcher as ‘one of our very own.’ Not least because the KAIPTC is a military institution though open to civilian students and academics.

It is worthy of note that introductory letters from the Institute of African Studies had made inroads and nearly reached the topmost offices charged with the responsibilities of granting access to data collection in GAF. It however sometimes became difficult to follow up on the letter across the bureaucratic ladder as earlier intimated.

This trend motivated discussions with the Director of Academic Affairs at KAIPTC which culminated in a request from the Commandant of KAIPTC to GAF. The letter requested permission for the researcher and a colleague to conduct our respective studies on GAF.

The sight of a letter from KAIPTC coupled with networking became a linchpin and reference for following up on letters in offices charged with the responsibility of granting permission for the conduct of this research.

Personal connections in GAF played an important role in the acceleration of the processes for the receipt of approval to undertake the study. Networking and social capital garnered were therefore useful in securing clearance and recruiting participants.

The researcher relied on colleagues at the Military Academy and their networks across departments in the military. This provided significant leverage in obtaining access to interviewees and having them freely and comfortably share their perspectives on the study questions.

Sermons at Padre hour by a Priest and Imam and ensuing discussions projected a unique practice in the Ghana Armed Forces in its attempt to achieve religious harmony and tolerance across all the ranks. The Bugles sound indicates morning roll call, or change in time, and by its sound at about 1330hrs some staff officers leave for their residences but some key officers and soldiers remain for a while. These arrangements prevail within the understanding that the Ghana Armed Forces is a 24-hour institution though unless security needs require, soldiers also rest.

3.7 Ethical Considerations of the Research

Studies involving human participants require that efforts are intentionally made to prevent harm and ensure that they are treated with respect and dignity. Consequently, the University of Ghana's institutional review board (IRB) for humanities, namely the Ethics Committee for Humanities (ECH) provided ethical guidance for the research. The ECH reviewed the study protocol and research instruments to ensure that fieldwork was conducted within acceptable ethical standards.

Having fulfilled the UG requirement, I obtained permission from the Ghana Armed Forces Personnel Administration (PA) and ethical clearance from DI. Additionally, permission was given by DMS followed by endorsement by the 37 Military Hospital Command.

The approvals from these units assured research participants of protection and the researcher's knowledge about boundaries that should exist in presenting views expressed by interviewees and discussants. Often, participants enquired about clearance from PA and DI or hinted at the necessity

of those approvals before they participated in the study. Copies of the formal approvals were therefore shown to some participants but others only required verbal assurance about completion of those steps.

Consent and withdrawal of consent

Oral consent was obtained from research participants before the commencement of interviews and group discussions. This consent type was more acceptable to participants, as most of them wanted to avoid any possibility of direct attribution or link to comments and views expressed in the study.

Interviewees and discussants were duly informed about their rights to refuse to answer particular questions and that they could withdraw from the interview at any time. Interviewees were informed that withdrawal from the study has no consequences for their profession or person.

Recording of interviews was done with the consent of interviewees and dialogists. Sometimes, the knowledge of being put on a record made some participants too careful in answering some questions. Recorders were also paused whenever participants felt certain views should be off the record. Not all participants were comfortable with recording. In those few cases, the researcher relied on field notes from the interactions.

Sensitivity and Respect

I respectfully listened to and documented the views of each interviewee. When interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with any situation in the Force but preferred it not to appear in any academic discourse, such information was excluded from the analysis.

Interviews conducted while interviewees were on duty expectedly had some distractions and necessary pauses making real interview time longer. The pauses were, however, necessary to ensure that views expressed by dialogists stayed within the interlocutor and the researcher except where the latter required the third party to clarify an issue. In two cases, interviews were rescheduled as interviewees had to perform some duties.

Occasionally, some participants discussed issues that were not particularly related to the study question. In such cases, I chose to hear whatever participants determined to share with me. This was one of the ways to show respect for their views and what they considered important to the story they had decided to share.

Silence, empathy, and smiles were used whenever any participant discussed issues that seemed politically charged. In one scenario, when commenting on the peacekeeping effects of coup d'état, an interviewee noted “Is it not you [pointing the finger towards me] who push us to undertake coups?” While I remained silent yet listened attentively, the interviewee continued, “It has been you civilians who push us to engage in coups...” (KII, MSO24, July 2022, Whistler Barracks). The discussions subsequently resumed with other interview questions.

I have been intentional in reducing bias by limiting intrusion into the responses elicited. This has been possible through maintaining comments and narratives as is and ensuring that any edits did not affect the views expressed by study participants.

A psychologist with the GAF (GMA) was on standby in case it became necessary to refer a study participant for care. However, the interactions did not record any medical conditions that made it ethically imperative to refer any of the research participants for psychological or psychiatric care.

Confidentiality and anonymity

Codenames are used to identify participants to ensure anonymity. Responses have been kept confidential and not accessible to anyone outside the supervisory team and the researcher. Views and opinions of interviewees and discussants are also used only for academic purposes including in the writing of this thesis and future publications in peer-reviewed journals, briefs, books, and/or book chapters.

3.8 Limitations of the Study

The study was based on a section of the Ghana Armed Forces personnel with responsibility for the southern part of Ghana, GAF General Headquarters (GHQ), Army Headquarters (AHQ), Navy Headquarters (NHQ), Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ), and other Armed Forces institutions in Accra and Takoradi. This suggests that there is a need for some caveat in generalizing the findings to cover officers and soldiers in the central and northern parts of the country. Nevertheless, some of the study participants have served in these parts of the country.

In Accra, tri-service units such as the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSC), Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPCT), Ghana Military Academy (GMA), Directorate of Religious Affairs, and Department of Medical services house personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The personnel come from various units across the country and in most cases study participants drew from their experiences in their organic units and tri-service posts in answering the research questions. Follow up questions and probing in particular helped elicit responses that connects study participants to their experiences in their mother units before arriving at the tri-service units.

Additionally, decisions from the GHQ, and Services HQs affect the various commands. Furthermore, personnel from these sectors are trained at the pre-deployment training camp and undertake peacekeeping lessons as those from the southern sector. Moreover, changes emanating from peacekeeping experiences which are harnessed by the Military High Command can affect all units. For example, as GAF switched to using Outlook following, mostly, its effective use for communication purposes in peacekeeping areas (MSO28, ICI, February 2024, Accra), this change can be seen across the divisions and various units of the Force.

While limited cases and their inherent particularities impose obvious limitations on the generalizability of findings, this study on GAF offers important lessons about the changes in the Armed Forces as an institution and in the behaviour of its personnel resulting from peacekeeping engagements.

Notably, most personnel interviewed were drawn from the Army. This focus makes the study biased towards the views of personnel in the Ghana Army. Nonetheless, the choice is reflective of the fact that the Army is at the core of peacekeeping deployments. Additionally, though official numbers are not available, it is known from the inception of GAF that the Army contains the largest force as is observable across the world. Nevertheless, efforts were made to include voices from the Air Force and Navy as some of its personnel serve on missions in infantry and support roles or as observers and staff officers. Besides, the Air Force has experience as an aviation unit on peacekeeping missions in the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), while the two forces had a joint operation with the Army in the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission (1990).

The study also involved more male than female participants. While this has implications for gendered analysis, the participation in the research reflects the character of the GAF as a male-


dominated institution. The analysis, however, consciously included female voices from serving and retired personnel. This helped minimize the gender bias in the data.

Taken together, the general validity of the findings is based on the rigorous methodology used to collect and analyse data and discuss the findings to arrive at various conclusions.

3.9 Chapter Summary

The methods used in this study were anchored on a qualitative research approach that drew from the interpretivist paradigm. The study design and the methods were fitting for the research and helped answer research questions to realise the study objectives. Adherence to ethical guidelines and the method described shows the general validity and trustworthiness of this study.

In negotiating access for research on GAF, ethical clearance was as important as personal connections and networking in the establishment and some affiliation with any of the military institutions.



CHAPTER FOUR


GHANA ARMED FORCES: EVOLUTION AND PEACEKEEPING

CONTEXTS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter undertakes a historical overview of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). It examines the sociopolitical contexts within which the GAF engages in peacekeeping deployments abroad. It starts by outlining the evolutionary trajectory GAF had undergone before Ghana's independence. The composition and functions of GAF are subsequently discussed. The political epochs of the country are then divided into three to appreciate the nature of GAF regarding the Ghanaian state and the civil populace.

I argue that the Ghana Armed Forces has some roots in the traditional politico-military arrangement of Ghana. But its formation as a professional force draws from the colonial establishment which also shapes(d) its current traditions and command and control structure. As the institution evolves, its functions remain as the protection of the territorial integrity of Ghana, developmental duties, and foreign policy manifest in peacekeeping operations. The character of the GAF is also influenced by the chequered political history of the institution, its peacekeeping endeavours, and others. However, participation in peacekeeping does not depend on regime type.



4.1 Traditional Security and the Evolution of the Ghana Armed Forces

Before the birth of the Ghanaian state and the subsequent formation of the Ghana Armed Forces, the territory consisted of kingdoms and chiefdoms. Some of these kingdoms have endured but undergone various transformations within the state. Kingdoms such as the Asantes (in the middle belt of Ghana) and Gonja (northern Ghana) had centralised political structures. Others like the Tallensi have been described as acephalous due to the absence of centralised political arrangements (Goody, 1990:3-4). Similar compositions existed across Africa. Kingdoms such as Dahomey (now the Republic of Benin), Wolof (Senegal), and Kongo (part of now Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo) had centralised states, and the Maasai (spread across Kenya and Tanzania) is also known for its acephalous political system. Within these polities, there were politico-military arrangements such as the female (Amazon) warriors of Dahomey, scouts, and militias that engaged in the art of warfare and provided internal security (Aboagye, 2010; Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson, 2013:8; Hochschild, 1998; Alpern, 1998).

The armies of these various groups comprised territorial and provincial contingent quotas from parts of the kingdoms, freelance soldiers, and militias designated by the respective communities and polities for securing internal stability, territorial defence, conduct of raids, wars, and expansionist or expeditionary campaigns (Aboagye, 2010:247, 1999a; Goody, 1990:4). States with centralised structures such as the Akan polities – for instances, Asante, Akyem, and Fanti – had divisions in the security forces. The division includes the Asafo (warriors), Adonten (main guard), Nifa (right guard), Benkum (left guard), Gyaase (king's administrative division), and Kyidom (rear guard), under their respective military leaders called 'asafohene'- war commanders (Sanders, 1979; Johnson, 1932; Roberts, 1983; Wilks, 1993; Addae, 2005; Aboagye, 2010: xxiii-xxv).

In this security arrangement, policing and soldiering are mixed, although the Asafo, for example, is primarily for fighting external wars, while “akwanserefo” (community scouts) performs policing tasks. The various politico-military divisions had a core standing army around which mobilizations – of conscripts, quotas – were done for warfare in addition to the use of mercenaries and slave soldiers. Aboagye (2010:122) observes that banditry, guerrilla, terrorist warfare, and panyarring are evident in the military strategies employed by the various security groups to secure diverse ends.

As part of the colonisation agenda, however, the diverse ethnicities and the political-military arrangements were regrouped into the Gold Coast Colony, Asante, and Northern Territories by the British colonists and constituted the Gold Coast with a later addition of Trans Volta Togoland. This was to aid the seamless administration of the territory. In making and maintaining the Gold Coast as its colony, the British formed a couple of forces involving local elements to meet its security needs. These forces are not necessarily from the traditional security forces of the conquered or allied polities of the Gold Coast (Killingray, 1979:436, 1986; Aboagye, 1999a, 2010; Anderson and Killingray, 2017). They were largely drawn from the ‘so-called’ martial races of the northern parts of Nigeria and Ghana. The British sought unquestionable obedience and loyalty they deemed attainable by employing ‘clean slates,’ people who had not been formally educated. These recruits were mostly from the northern parts of the territory which had been excluded from the education opportunities available to southerners of the colonies. Consequently, southerners were the point of call when colonial policy began to prepare African officers for roles in the GCR. An attempt at establishing a colonial army occurred in 1821 with the formation of the Royal African Colonial Corps of Light Infantry (RACCLI) used in the battle with Asante in 1824.

As Aboagye (1999a) maintains, the Gold Coast Corps established in 1852 was another attempt but the Corps mutinied and was subsequently disbanded in 1863. A third attempt was the Gold Coast Rifles raised in 1873 and officered by natives. The Gold Coast Rifles were deployed for the Sagrenti war between colonist Britain and Asante and disbanded in 1874 (Aboagye, 1999a:1-3; Baynham, 1994a). These forces were largely drawn from the Northern territories and involved predominantly men without formal education but there were later additions of some educated men from the southern colony (Killingray and Matthews, 1979; Killingray, 1978, 1983a, 1983b; Aboagye, 1999a; Clifford, 1920).

The Gold Coast Constabulary (GCC) was then formed with the Lagos Hausa contingent as its core (Aboagye, 2010, 1999a:2; Goody, 1990:9; Ukpabi, 1966). The Hausa forces brought to the Gold Coast were infamous for rough and ruthless policing tactics in enforcing orders and ensuring compliance with imperial ordinances. The establishment of the GCC was quintessential, in part, to the creation of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) in 1897. WAFF was a federated imperial black force of British West African colonies used on the coast of West Africa (Ukpabi, 1966; Killingray and Matthews, 1979; Killingray, 1979). In 1901, the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR) was formed from the GCC as a contingent of WAFF which later morphed into the Royal West African Frontier Force (Haywood and Clarke, 1969; Ekoko, 1979; Killingray, 1983a; Aboagye, 1999a; Addae, 2005). The Royal West African Frontier Force and its predecessor were the armies of colonial Britain raised, maintained, and utilized by Britain from its erstwhile colonial posts in West Africa for military expeditions and defence of colonial assets within Africa and elsewhere (Haywood and Clarke, 1969; Ukpabi, 1966; Ekoko, 1979; Killingray, 1979, 1982; Aboagye, 1999a; Deflem, 1994).

These Forces formed the core of Britain's campaign in the world wars from the Western coast of Africa such as the Burma (Myanmar) expedition against Japan, and the battle of Alamein in Morocco against Germany (Aboagye, 1999a). The GCR was particularly known for Britain's campaigns in then-German Togoland, Cameroun, and East Africa in 1912-16, among other operations (Clifford, 1920; Haywood and Clarke, 1969; Aboagye, 1999a).

When GAF was formed, the force initially comprised only the army it inherited from the GCR (Gutteridge, 1962; Baynham, 1994a).³⁷ The GCR however underwent some transformations and on 1 July 1956 became the Gold Coast Military Forces which remained part of the RWAFF until its severance from the latter in March 1959 (Baynham, 1994a; Aboagye, 1999a:3).³⁸ The Army was bequeathed to Ghana, comprised an Army Headquarters, a Brigade Group of 3 Infantry Battalions and Reconnaissance Unit, Field Engineers, Signals Unit, Ordnance Unit, Supply and Transport Unit, Medical Corps, Provost, Workshop, Pay Services, Education Unit, Training Schools and a Band (Aboagye, 1999a; Addae, 2005). These units have remained albeit expanded since independence for Ghana's security and its foreign policy responsibilities.

The Navy traces its roots to 1936 when the Gold Coast Naval Volunteer Defence Force Ordinance established a Naval Volunteer Force to defend the territorial waters of the colony, conduct seaward patrols, and maintain mines-free coastal waters (Addae, 2005; Yakubu et al., 2019; Yakubu and Adam, 2019:17-48). With subsequent recruitment of ratings (other ranks in the Navy), the Naval Volunteer Force comprised 60 ratings in Accra and 120 in Takoradi and formed the nucleus of the Navy established in 1959.

³⁷ An act for raising and maintaining the Army, Navy, and Air Force (ACT 105) entitled The Armed Forces Act, 1962 was however established on February 21, 1962.

³⁸ In 1957 the Gold Military Forces became Ghana Military Forces (Aboagye, 1999a; Addae, 2005:608)

The Air Force was started on facilities that had been used by the Royal Air Force in Takoradi and the American Air Force in Accra for their 1940s WWII operations against the Germans in North Africa. The British Royal Air Force (RAF) established an air force garrison at Takoradi in the early 1940s to help defend Takoradi harbour in the event of a French attack (Addae, 2005:592). Before the battle of Alamein between Anglo-America and Hitler Germany in October 1942, the British had established a staging post between West Africa and Egypt to ferry aircraft to North Africa. Consequently, Stephen Addae notes, the Takoradi airfield was further developed into a Royal Air Force Base where RAF technicians and engineers reassembled aircraft parts shipped from Britain to Takoradi harbour. The aircrafts were then test-flown in the Takoradi airfield before journeying across the Sahara into Egypt.

In Accra, there was a small airport used by the West Africa Airways Corporation for commercial activities in the 1940s. The Accra airfield was however required to host American bombers and Pan American aircraft for the Alamein operation. Consequently, the USA expanded the airport into an air force facility to carry its personnel and materiel enroute for North Africa and a military barracks (the American Lines) to accommodate its soldiers. After the war, the West African Command of the RWAFF purchased the military facilities, airport, and barracks from the USA and renamed American Lines as Giffard Camp (Addae, 2005:592-593). Giffard Camp is now the Burma Camp where I engaged most of the interviewees and conducted the group discussion for the field component of the study.

Unlike the army, no Gold Coasters were serving as airmen on the Gold Coast. In 1943, however, officers of the RAF were sent to West Africa to investigate the possibility of establishing a West African Auxiliary Unit (WAAU) to replace European ground personnel and to provide clerks, labourers, and domestic servants for RAF (Addae, 2005:594).

By this time, some Gold Coasters had become aircrews of RAF, but none served in the colony. By February 1944, the proposed WAAU officially became the West African Air Corps (WAAC). Civilians already employed by RAF, tradesmen unwilling to serve in the army, and men with physical standards lower than required by the army were to be recruited through the army establishment to avoid conflict with army needs for the Burma campaign (Addae, 2005:595-596). It is not improbable that men who enlisted in the WAAC joined the Ghana Air Force at its formation in 1959.

4.2 Composition and Functions of the Ghana Armed Forces

Since 1959 when the Ghana Army was expanded and the Navy and Air Force were created, the Ghana Armed Forces comprises the General Headquarters, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The Army, Navy, and Air Force referred to as the Services are respectively responsible for providing security and developmental services on land, sea, and air (Ministry of Defence, 2019; Measuring Opportunities for Women in Peace Operations [MOWIP], 2020; Yakubu et al., 2019). The Commander in Chief (C-in-C) is the President of Ghana who determines the overall policy, function, and direction of the Force. The GHQ is under the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and coordinates, monitors, and evaluates GAF activities and programmes (MOWIP, 2020:11). MOD provides policy direction for the GAF.

The administrative head of GAF, however, is the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the highest-ranking officer in the Armed Forces with established rank of Lieutenant General (Army) or Naval and Air Force equivalent, respectively Vice Admiral and Air Vice Marshal. These are 3 Star Generals. The office of the CDS is at the GHQ in Burma Camp, Accra from where s/he directs the GAF to achieve security policy objectives.

Administratively, the CDS is assisted by the Chief of Staff at the GHQ, the Military Secretary, the Gender Policy Advisor, Director Generals (DGs) of the Departments and Directorates under GHQ (Brigadier Generals – One Star), and Commandants of tri-service training institutions (Major Generals – Two Star).

General Headquarters (GHQ) exercises command and control of the Ghana Armed Forces and tri-service training and support units that offer services to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The units comprise the National Defence University (NDU), Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSC), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC), and Ghana Military Academy. GHQ also oversees the Defence Advisors and the Support Services Brigade Group³⁹. The Departments and Directorates under the supervision of GHQ include the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA); Personnel Administration (PA), Department of Medical Services (DMS) which manages the Military Hospital; the Forces Pay Regiment (FPR); the Education Directorate; Legal Affairs (LA); Defence Civilian Establishment (DCE); Defence Intelligence (DI), and Department of International Peace Support Operations (IPSO). The tri-service units have professional experts drawn from the three Services and serve all the employees of GAF.

As Huntington (1957:11) observes, armed forces contain a variety of specialists comprising engineers, doctors, nurses, intelligence experts, ordnance experts, personnel experts, and pilots among others.




³⁹ The Military Academy and Training Schools (MATS) was restructured by August 2022. This restructuring established the Ghana Military Academy as a separate unit under a Commandant (Informal conversation, DCS1, September 2022) The Rest of MATS are currently under Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

The medical corps, legal corps, and engineer corps are some of the specialist areas in the GAF. These experts perform support functions in the Services as a whole and their detachments serve contingents on the battlefields or peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The experts are spread across the various departments and units under GHQ and the three Services.

The Services are decentralised forces with respective headquarters at Burma Camp, Accra. Service Headquarters have administrative, command, and control responsibilities over personnel and structures in the respective services. There are Service Chiefs for each of the Services with the established rank of Major General (Army) and its equivalents, Rear Admiral (Navy), and Air Vice Marshal (Air Force).

The Ghana Army comprises three commands, the Special Forces Brigade,⁴⁰ and the Army headquarters (AHQ). The AHQ is headed by the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) and has administrative, command, and control responsibilities over Army personnel. Each Command is overseen by a General Officer Commanding (GOC) with the established rank of Brigadier General (one star general). The three Army Commands are Southern, Central, and Northern, respectively headquartered in Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale. There are six infantry battalions and other divisions, for instance, Artillery, Armour, Signal, and Engineer Regiments each led by a Commanding Officer (CO). Each command has various brigade detachments, companies, and units that work separately and sometimes together to enhance soldiering, defend the country on land, and fulfil, in part, requirements for mission deployments (Aboagye, 1999a; MOWIP, 2020:11, Addae, 2005).



⁴⁰ The Special Forces Brigade was established in July 2021 amidst Army reorganisation to ensure preparedness against emerging security threats such as terrorism. 59 Airborne Force and 64 Inf Regiment form the core of the unit. The Special Operations Training School in Daboya, capital of North Gonja District in the Savannah Region of Ghana.

The Southern Command (S/COMD) comprises the 2 Infantry Battalion (2 Inf Bn) garrisoned at Myohaung Barracks in Takoradi; 5 Inf Bn at Arakan Barracks- Burma Camp, 64 Infantry Regiment at Gonda Barracks at Burma Camp in Accra. These are also supported by the 155 Reconnaissance Regiment, 49 Engineers (Engr) Regiment, 48 Engineer Regiment. The S/COMD has security responsibility for the Western Borders of Ghana, Central, Western, and Western North Regions of Ghana.⁴¹

The units in the Northern Command (N/COMD) include 6 Inf Bn at Kamina Barracks in Tamale, Airborne Force at Barwah Barracks- Tamale; and 10 and 11 Mechanised Battalions respectively at Upper West and Upper East regions. The N/COMD also oversees 2 Independent Reconnaissance Squadron, 2 Signal Squadron, 2 MT Coy, 4 Supply Depot, 2 Field Ordnance Company (2 FOC), an Army Band, and an Armed Forces Museum. The N/COMD has responsibility for the northern regions of Ghana.

The Central Command (C/COMD) consists of 1 Inf Bn stationed at Michel Camp in Tema; 3 Inf Bn located at Liberation Barracks, Sunyani, and 4 Inf Bn at Uaddara Barracks in Kumasi. It also includes 154 Reconnaissance Regiment and Armour Training School all at Sunyani. Administratively, the C/COMD also manages 2 Signal Squadron, 2 Mechanical Transport Company (MT Coy), 4 Supply Depot, 2 FOC, an Army Band, and an Armed Forces Museum. The C/COMD has security responsibility for the middle belt of the country.

The Ghana Navy comprises the Naval Headquarters (NHQ) at Burma, under the command of the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), the Eastern Naval Command located at Tema, Greater Accra Region, and the Western Naval Command stationed in Sekondi Takoradi in the Western Region of Ghana

⁴¹ The numbers in the names of units do not indicate the quantity of the particular unit per se. It is however a naming tradition that uses dates, counts, and other figures as codes to identify the units.

with their respective naval bases, fleet detach, forward operating bases, riverine dets, and forward repair workshops. Camp (Yakubu et al., 2019).

The operational command of the Navy also includes the Naval Training Command in Sogakofe, Volta Region of Ghana. The location of the Navy commands is based on proximity to the sea and riverine areas. Notably, Ghana's southern border, the Gulf of Guinea (Atlantic Ocean) stretches over 320 nautical miles from New Town on the western border with Cote d'Ivoire to Aflao on the eastern border with Togo. From the continental shelf, the territorial waters cover an Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles which yields a maritime area of about 64,000sq nautical miles (Yakubu et al., 2019). There is a Naval presence in major rivers in the country such as River Volta, Ankobra, Densu, and Pra. There is a Naval detachment on the Volta Lake at Yeji in the Bono East Region of Ghana. The Navy protects the integrity of these waters and the resources in them through sea (river) patrols and search and rescue operations. Search and rescue tasks at sea are sometimes done in conjunction with the Ghana Air Force (GHF).

The Air Force implements the aerial component of Ghana's defence mechanism by protecting the airspace of the country. The Air Force is under the command of the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) and comprises GHF Headquarters in Burma Camp, Air Force bases in Accra, Takoradi, and Tamale (Northern Region) of Ghana, an Equipment Depot in Accra, and Flying Training School.

Aside from a Training Command, the Ghana Air Force has four main branches, namely, Operations (Flying), Engineering, Supply/Logistics, and Administration (Addae, 2005:663-678). The Training Command further trains officer cadets, and recruits (airmen) through its various training facilities. Operations manage flight responsibilities which is the core duty of GHF and occur at the Bases where the assets provide the airpower required to achieve core mandate and developmental tasks. The Engineering Wing has mechanical and electrical engineers who

respectively service aircraft and ground support equipment, and electricals, instruments, radios, navigational aids, and photographic equipment.

Supply/Logistics integrates procurement activities for GHF, storage, distribution of resources, and management of their utilization. The Administration branch is responsible for personnel issues including recruitment, works services, and assisting the CAS in policy and project implementation (Addae, 2005). There is an Air Secretary who assists CAS directly in personnel management outside of the Administration Branch. The Training Command and the four branches as headed by Principal Staff Officers (Addae, 2005:676-677). The management of the 3 Air Force Stations mirrors the four-branches structure.

More generally, for its traditional fight and defence roles as well as promotional examinations, the Ghana Armed Forces are organized into three main categories: A, B, and C. Category A is the Teeth Arms comprising Infantry, Artillery, Armour, Engineers, Signals and Military Police. This category is the main combat and combat support regiments. Category B is Logistical Services and made up of Supply and Transport, Ordnance, and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. They fall under Combat Support. Category C, which is Personnel Services includes Pay Regiment, Public Relations, Legal, Education, Medical, Physical Training, Religious Affairs, Defence Information Technology, and Military Records. The third category falls under Combat Support Services. It is the soft arm of the military. The various trades and categories are represented in each command and/or battalion. Categories A and B are male-dominated, while Category C has become female dominated. GAF, like militaries across the globe is predominantly male. Until May/June 2021, female officers serving in categories A and B were considered part of category C (ARMY/5000/1/G/TRG, 2021:1; KII, RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

In terms of settlements, military installations, and troop stationing, GAF is organized into 7 garrisons: 1 Garrison (Tema), 2 Garrison (Takoradi), 3 Garrison (Sunyani), 4 Garrison (Kumasi), 5 Garrison (Accra), 6 Garrison (Tamale), and 7 Garrison (Ho) (MOD, 2019:8, 2020:8-14).

The Garrisons comprise Barracks and posts of all Forces within the catchment of the identified capital towns. Two Garrison, for instance, includes Barracks and other facilities of the Army, Air Force, and Navy in Sekondi-Takoradi and environs who provide security in their separate spheres and sometimes engage in joint tasks. Senior officers among the Forces in the particular area command the Garrisons.

Apart from the core mandate of protecting the borders of the country, the GAF performs other duties. Three main areas can therefore be delineated as encompassing the various functions of GAF namely territorial security (core mandate), developmental roles, and foreign policy. GAF is the main security apparatus charged with the defence of the territorial integrity of Ghana against internal and external adversaries (Ghana Const. 1992, art. CCX, 3; MOD, 2020:1-4; Yakubu et al., 2019). The Armed Forces defend the state against threats – national security concerns, for example - in collaboration with other intelligence agencies and can use maximum force to achieve their objectives (MOD, 2020:1-4; Greener-Barcham, 2007; Weiss, 2011; Dean, 2006; Nkrumah, 1973:370-317; Aning and Lartey, 1995). GAF also engages in internal operations to preserve public order. Operation Calm Life (2017-date, to combat robbery and violent crime); Gong-gong (1994-date, to manage ethnic and chieftaincy clashes in northern parts of Ghana), Operation Cow Leg (2000-date, to combat farmer-herder conflicts) and border patrols (Operation Conquest Fist (2019-date) on the north, and Sit Down Look on eastern border) are all ways to provide internal security (Edu-Afful, 2022; Alhassan and Asante, 2022; Albrecht and Sukanya, 2020; Albrecht et al., 2021;

Aboagye, 1999a:172-173, 178; MOD, 2020). Internal security operations are mostly undertaken by joint task forces with the police and other security agencies.

These are emergency forces comprising the military and the police that are formed to manage local situations that are seen as having forms beyond traditional policing but perhaps do not also merit military-only intervention.⁴² Joint military-police patrol is a major tactic used to achieve the objectives of these joint operations.

GAF is also sometimes required to perform other duties that contribute to socio-economic development as will be prescribed by the President, the Commander in Chief of GAF (Ghana Const. 1992, art. CCX, 3; Aboagye, 1999a:2). The developmental duties have spanned protection of bullion vans, manning of oil fields, relief in cases of emergency such as rescue operations during disasters usually in collaboration with the National Disaster Management Organization on rescue operations during disasters, and protection of forests and waterbodies expressed in anti-galamsey⁴³ and anti-lumbering campaigns (Alhassan and Asante, 2022; Eduful et. al, 2020; Hilson, 2017). Internal (joint) operations such as Operation Vanguard (to combat galamsey and its environmental impacts), and Operation Halt (to combat lumbering) (Edu-Afful, 2022; Alhassan and Asante, 2022) can be categorized under the developmental functions of GAF. Many interlocutors for this study believed however that continuing performance of these roles is undermining the respect the military has earned because of its increasing visibility in the society. The military is mostly criticised for the brutal approach used to conduct some of these internal issues and the complex web of alleged corrupt practices that have surrounded them, including Vanguard.

⁴² A detailed review of the activities of the joint task forces is outside the purview of this study. Suffice to note, however, that where these operations connect with peacekeeping experiences they are duly referenced within the study. Galamsey is a Ghanaian term used to reference unregistered artisanal and small-scale mining.

⁴³ Galamsey is an indigenous coinage for unregistered artisanal/small-scale mining in Ghana.

The foreign policy functions of GAF manifest primarily in peacekeeping and related international deployments. At its formation in 1959, the Ghana Armed Forces had not been deployed for foreign missions nor suffered any threats of violence. It had not also been tested for war by its immediate neighbours. Threats of attack from the geopolitical scene of the Cold War were also not evident as a cause for concern. These realities were in keeping with what prevailed largely across Africa in the early years of independence. Some exceptions of the trend however were the southern part of the continent where the South African Army under the apartheid regime, and its neighbouring states engaged in wars, for example, during the liberation struggles for the independence of Mozambique and Angola (Henriksen, 1977; Henk, 2004; Yates and Cottle, 2006; Meneses et. al., 2017). Ghana had also been spared civil wars such as occurred in Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and other parts of Africa and elsewhere.

For GAF, peacekeeping deployment is an arena to test the newly constituted force for peaceful purposes. As Orth (1996:308) notes, Ghana is one of the few countries in Africa – Senegal and Nigeria are additional examples – that have a long history of troop contribution and have had the largest African participants to United Nations (UN) military missions across the world.

Personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces have served in over thirty missions and diverse capacities under the UN, African Union (AU), UN-AU missions, and ECOWAS since the DR Congo Mission (ONUC) in 1960 (Prouza and Horák, 2015:205). Some of the notable peace operations are ONUC, ECOMOG, UNAMIR, and UNIFIL. GAF's peacekeeping contribution has risen steadily since the year the 2000s and has won global admiration for its peace mission activities (Aning, 2001, 2007; Aubyn and Aning, 2013; Edu-Afful et al., 2019; Passmore, 2020). The peacekeepers of the force have included mission experts, military observers (milobs), staff officers, and troops (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2017; Simm, 2011; Erskine, 1989; Afrifa, 1966).

In UNEF I, a Ghanaian General, Emmanuel Erskine, was one of the founders and Force Commander for the mission in 1978 (Erskine, 1989; Aning and Aubyn, 2013; Prouza and Horák, 2015:215; Aboagye, 1999a). General Henry Anyidoho was also an Assistant Force Commander for UNAMIR when Ghana fielded troops to contribute to the resolution of the Rwandan civil war (S/RES/872, 1993; Anyidoho, 1997; Aning and Aubyn, 2013). GAF peacekeepers undertake diverse activities in the performance of their roles and peacekeeping mandates. Prouza and Horák (2015:206) assert that GAF troops perform activities typical of the military professions such as “patrolling, mine clearance, monitoring of ceasefires, training of army and police, maintenance of calm and order” in mission areas. In essence, peacekeeping for the GAF is one of the spaces where the military profession finds expression.

Troops for peacekeeping missions number anywhere from 600s to 800s and are drawn from the three services. In 2020, UNMISS had 696 Ghanaian personnel comprising 594 males and 102 females and UNIFIL had about 850 Ghanaian troops including 115 females and 735 males (United Nations Peacekeeping, May 8, 2020). In 2022-2023, UNIFIL Ghanbatt 89 also had 859 personnel (AFNews, 2023:6). The nucleus of soldiers and officers for peacekeeping is however mostly drawn from an infantry unit (Army) while the remaining numbers are spread across other units by quotas according to mission demands. This practice reflects Henry Lloyd’s idea which is highlighted in Huntington (1957:29), that the Army is the primary instrument used to perform “every species of military action.” In peacekeeping, the various service categories (A, B, and C) are represented in the troop, and this is reflected in a command or a formation. The GHF provides Aviation Units, Logistics Resupply, and Rotation of Contingents on peace support operations.

Troops sometimes undertake peace mission tours in rotations within 6 to 12 months of deployment (Henry, 2015:373; Henk, 2004). Currently, the rotation is possible for mandates such as UNIFIL

which stretch more than a year. We observe that troops deployed in late 2022 for that mission represent the 89th Ghana Battalion (Ghanbatt 89) (KII, MSO5, June 2022, Burma Camp). That is, eighty-nine separate troop contingents have taken turns to tour UNIFIL. Personnel from various battalions stationed in the respective commands, and personnel from the Navy, Air Force, and support services form a Ghanbatt and take turns to tour UNIFIL and such peacekeeping theatres. Expectedly, soldiers and officers could participate in peacekeeping at least once in their respective 35 years or more service lifetime. As Henry (2015:373) notes, some peacekeepers tour missions numerous times to work in diverse capacities during their career life. This trend is observable in GAF as well (Erskine, 1989; Kotia, 2015). Through such arrangements, the beneficiary peacekeepers earn more dollars and vast experiences from differing sites. However, prolonged or perennial periods of absence created family challenges for officers and other ranks in marriages. The evidence from the interviews shows that suspicions emerge about spouses in Ghana and their counterparts abroad. The clergy (Christian and Islamic) in the force have therefore had to settle marriage-related misunderstandings between some peacekeepers and their spouses after mission tours. As a clergy notes, in one instance:

a false alarm had been raised to the peacekeepers that the wife was being 'taken care of' by a comrade. I had to invite all the parties to the issue to the office for peaceful discussions before the peacekeeper disembarked at his home. The facts of the issue made it clear that it was a mere allegation that would have escalated the issue but pre-emptive steps were taken to resolve the matter amicably (KII, MSO21, August 2022, Burma Camp).

In another scenario, it was reported to the wife of a peacekeeper that the husband might be having amorous relations with someone else on the mission field.

While some of the allegations had been true, others have been misinformation. It is however documented that prolonged periods of absence exposed soldiers within sexually active brackets to engage in intimate activities to overcome stress and respond to other hormonal demands. Together, they highlight the negative effects peacekeeping tours continue to have on marriages and family life in GAF.

Other consequences of peacekeeping tours include misgivings from personnel with fewer deployment opportunities, pressure on COs for deployment opportunities, and allegations that some prospective peacekeepers could pay some amount to be allowed to travel.

Soldiers and officers of GAF have also been deployed as task forces or a company with a specialized sub-mandate in some missions. A Ghanaian Engineer Company (GHANENCOY), for example, was deployed to undertake engineering works under the UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in support of the political process and stabilization of the West African country (KII, MSO15, July 2022, Otu Barracks). Before the deployment of GHANENCOY, Germany through the German Armed Forces Training Advisory Group (GAFTAG) provided facilities that prepared the team for the mission (AFNews, 2023:2). The German inputs increased capacity in providing engineering services in conflict zones and combined with the field experience of the Ghanengcoy on MINUSMA to constitute a form of institutional change in the peacekeeping context.

The Ghana Armed Forces also contributes to the management of civil wars. In the West African subregion, the Ghana Armed Forces made its debut in the peace enforcement mandate that contributed to the management of the Liberian civil war in the 1990s (Kotia, 2015; Aboagye, 1999b). That mission combined the Naval Forces, the Army, and Air Force in a coordinated operation to fulfil Ghana's duty under the ECOMOG mandate in Liberia.

GAF has also deployed on ECOWAS missions in Gambia (ECOMIG), and Cote D'Ivoire (ECOMICI) (GAF Measuring Opportunity for Women in Peace Operations (MOWIP), 2020:11-12). These peacekeeping deployments have yielded diverse outcomes which have had varied implications on the evolution of GAF. Some of the outcomes include adjustments in recruitment numbers, the establishment of new units, increased awareness of personnel health, increased awareness of gender issues, and decreased appetite or distaste for the coup which are discussed in the subsequent two chapters.

4.3 Ghana Armed Forces in the Independence and First Republican Years (1957-66)

The Ghana Armed Forces has evolved since its formation on the eve of independence in 1957. In 1959, the Gold Coast Military Forces were expanded, and the Navy and Airforce were established to form modern components of soldiering required of independent and sovereign states (Baynham, 1985a, 1994a; Aboagye, 1999a; Frinjuah, 2016; Yakubu et al., 2019).

The internal security tasks of the Army in 1957, and GAF from 1959 covered a population of between 6 million and 8 million initially domiciled in 5 regions which increased to 8 by 1960 (Penu, 2022; Commission of Inquiry, 2018). The significance of these developments is the need for increased GAF presence and other security forces to match population growth and demands of sub-national governance.

Up until 1962, the GAF still had seconded and contracted British officers. It was largely a non-African officered force because it lacked sufficient trained Ghanaian officers and non-commissioned officers (Nkrumah, 1968:39-40; RG17/2/542; RG17/2/542. DC15(161)).

Nkrumah (1968:40) notes that the bulk of the infantry came from the north, where education was not a priority during the colonial period. This colonial heritage coupled with the absence of colonial policy on training of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for a future Gold Coast (Ghana) Army therefore required that GAF be manned by British officers temporarily. Notably, however, some Ghanaian officers were trained in Sandhurst, Britain through force assistance programmes (Nkrumah, 1968:47-48; GMA, 2017). Until 1959-1960 none of them had reached the requisite years of service and ranks to manage any of the Battalions. Even by this period, as Baynham (1988:73) documents, only three had obtained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel through political considerations to help them command three Infantry Battalions (Inf BN). Given the insufficiency of African officers and the low officer ranks of the few that were commissioned, Ghana recruited British technical and professional personnel and received others on loan through the United Kingdom's Technical Assistance programme (Nkrumah, 1973:364).

Force training was offered by foreign military training schemes and missions by the USA, West Germany, France, and Britain across Africa. Some personnel from Ghana and other parts of the continent who participated in these trainings are said to have imbued ideas and traditions of the West (Nkrumah, 1968:48-49). For Pan-African purposes, then, these personnel were not particularly useful for the liberation struggle and anti-imperialist postures of the period. Ghana later opted for Canada as the less imperialistic state in further developing its army and used Israeli technicians and instructors as well as Indian Air Force personnel to build the Ghana Air Force (Federal Research Division, 1994; Nkrumah 1968). The Yugoslavs offered naval expertise and constructed a naval base at Sekondi (1962-1967) in the Western Region while Russia trained some officers, and China and Russia offered training to emerging parallel militias (Yakubu and Adam, 2019:49; Alexander, 1966: 103, 106-107; Nkrumah, 1968; Baynham, 1988).

The Nkrumah government was ultimately aiming to abolish the European-type armed forces bequeathed by the British for a people's militia by creating new armies and splitting existing ones (Baynham, 1985a:89, 1985b:623; Nkrumah 1968:50). This mechanism and form of diversification is said to have contributed in part to the 1966 coup (Nkrumah, 1968; Baynham, 1985a:89, 1985b:623; Afrifa, 1966). The argument stems from the viewpoint that the traditional forces viewed these competitions unfavourably. Some interviewees however opined that by the time of the coup, the President's Own Guard Regiment was better trained but that they had graduated from the same military academy and decided not to fight their comrades to stall the coup.

Within the period (1957-1966), the Nkrumah regime began an Africanization of the GAF. By this process, the foreign officers and NCOs of GAF were replaced with Ghanaians. The use of foreign military instructors however continued beyond the period through the technical assistance training programme with Britain. The Africanization process was to be completed as soon as a sufficient number of Ghanaian personnel were trained to undertake all roles and responsibilities of officership and military training in GAF. The drive to Africanize the officer corps and expulsion of the British officers is also explained as an important factor in the deterioration of the internal solidarity of the army and the form of objective control by civilian power that had been inherited before 1961 (Baynham, 1988; Kraus, 1990: 582). The corollary of these developments and the increasing power of the Nkrumah regime in the military was resentment and fear for military autonomy (Afrifa, 1966; Baynham, 1988).

GAF made its first peace mission debut in 1960. Ghana's contingent arrived in the Congo on 15 July 1960 and concluded its participation on 25 September 1963. It was one of the first to arrive and participate in the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) (Erskine, 1989; Afrifa, 1966).

The Congo crises (1960-1964) occurred at the height of Pan-African struggles for independence and unity. Ghana's participation thus occurred within this understanding. Although Ghana had assumed a non-aligned position in its international affairs, the ideological battles over the country by the USA and the Soviets in the Cold War context combined with the US and Western strategic interest in the Congo somewhat frustrated the objectives of the peacekeeping mission (Akurgo, 2018; Gibbs, 2000; Mullenbach, 2005). The extent of the Pan-African engagement however had it that a section of the Ghanaian army protected Prime Minister Lumumba while the battalion under the command of General Alexander served under the auspices of the UN mission. On this point, one interlocutor asseverated that:

if there was this force protecting the Prime Minister in the Congo mission, it was more likely a detachment within the wider battalion. This will not be different from, say, ECOMOG where a Ghanaian company was charged with the protection of the then Liberian president (KII, MSO53, May 2023, Burma Camp).

Alexander (1966:85, 141) confirms that there were Ghanaian troops in the city who were deployed by the Ghana Brigade headquarters to Leopoldville “on ad hoc unauthorised basis” in the absence of a military commander at first for the UN operation. The Ghanaian Forces in the city were charged to protect then Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba. Understandably, the company of peacekeepers was responsible for providing security for the political leadership as can be observed in other PKOs during civil conflicts.

Another development in GAF was the infiltration of societal cleavages into the Forces. Tonah (2009:244) contends that in an attempt to create harmony across ethnicities and national unity, the Nkrumah government downplayed the significance of ethnic affiliations.

While ethnicity and ethnic identity are not destructive per se, the cleavages in Ghanaian society, as visible in arbitrarily demarcated post-colonial states, reminisced inter-ethnic rivalries and struggles for superiority that had sometimes prevailed before colonialism. Kraus (1967) highlights a challenge in the management of ethnic belongingness that confronted Nkrumah's government. The contention from that study is that political control over "widely diverse peoples with varying allegiances" is an elusive phenomenon in the quest for political authority, establishing order and promoting change (Kraus, 1967:42). Arguably, however, political control over hitherto independent groups can be elusive to that extent that the establishment of forms of government that centralizes power in full or partially has sometimes involved civil wars and bloodshed as exemplified by the formation of the United States. Thus, to add to Kraus' argument, insecurity on the part of the prospective leadership does not only sponsor "impulsive and arbitrary, if unsystematic, displays of authority to render organized" opponents impotent. The ambitious goal of unity can lead to forms of brutality and subversive practices through the coercive apparatus of the state.

The complexity of the Ghanaian situation was perhaps more deepened with the involvement of the security apparatus. The military seemed not to have been spared from the divisive tendencies that draw from ethnic belongingness. Baynham (1988) and Adekson (1976), for example, found that the Ghana Army had been largely influenced by ethnic leanings. Arguably, such posturing is an aberration of the ethos of professional soldiering which implies serving beyond parochial interests such as employing all means to support a favoured ethnic group for political office. Works such as Kraus (1990) however critique the salience of ethnicity in the rank and file of the military. In Kraus' view, the existence of officer ranks from a particular ethnic group did not necessarily play a significant role in the processes that led to the overthrow of Nkrumah.

Earlier, Kraus (1966) suggested that the February 1966 coup stemmed from a disregard for the professional autonomy and interests of the military, amid shared belief among the perpetrators that Ghana's internal political and economic situation was rapidly deteriorating. Biswal (1992) also observed the importance of economic decline in Ghana as a key contributor to the 1966 coup. Taking the observations of Baynham, Kraus, and Biswal together, it is fair to view the coup within the complex interplay of factors and a plausible mix of ethnic leanings and economic circumstances as trump cards of the military intervention.

Observably, contemporary militaries often refer to themselves as 'people's armies' to underscore their closeness to the populace, in contradistinction to defence forces that function merely as an instrument of regime security (Ngoma, 2006:101; Quantson, 2006). Arguably, in this posture, local events and popular dissatisfaction coincide with discontent in the military and resentment towards the attitudes of the ruling elites which portend tense civil-military relations and coup d'état. In this case, the Congo mission and the growing opposition in the military against the Nkrumah regime were phrased as 'saving' the Ghanaian populace but perhaps more precisely redeeming the future and image of the military establishment. In the postulations of Denis Austin:

The first coup, which ended Nkrumah's fifteen years of office, was led by Sandhurst-minded officers whose arguments for what was needed were very British-based: go in, clear up the mess, put things right, then withdraw in an orderly fashion after handing over to responsible leaders. A mimicry of colonial order and good government, plus decolonization recast as demilitarisation. That comes through clearly when one reads the accounts put out by the two principal actors, Afrifa and Ocran. The belief they shared was in the limited corrective nature of their task (Austin, 1985:90-91).

Austin (1985) reinforces the ambivalence that surrounded the training of officers at Sandhurst and the fear that they leaned towards the West, and sought to maintain the features they had come to admire about European-type armed forces.

Seemingly, the Congo mission could not be exempted from the calculus of the coup entrepreneurship that had begun with the Nkrumah regime. Alexander (1966:87), for example, recalled that doubts about the purpose of the deployment, the “lack of clear orders,” and the inability to use force, when necessary, undermined the morale and reliability of the soldiers. Consequently, Henry Alexander believed that all contingents who participated in the Congo mission had troubles with their troops in the mission area or back home. This explanation reinforces the argument that peacekeeping may erode civilian control over the armed forces. GAF did not participate in any other peace mission within this period.

4.4 Ghana Armed Forces in a More Turbulent Period (1966-1991)

Beginning with the 1966 coup, this period arguably represents the most chequered phase in Ghana’s political history. It also marks the era during which the military’s professionalism was consistently brought into question. The epoch was characterised by alternating military and democratic regimes. The population in the period (8-16 million) was domiciled in 8 regions until 1982-1983, when two more regions including Greater Accra (formerly Accra Capital District) were created (Penu, 2022; Van Gyampo, 2018). With this development, the internal security duties of GAF expanded and the forces could expect more widespread security challenges involving Ghanaians.

This epoch of alternating coups d'état and civilian rule witnessed the establishment of the Second and Third Republics in 1969 and 1979, respectively, as well as four military takeovers in 1972, 1978, 1979, and 1981 (Agyeman-Duah, 1987; Austin, 1985; Oquaye, 1980, 2004; Biswal, 1992). The National Liberation Council, which overthrew the Nkrumah government, ruled from 1966 until October 1, 1969, when it ceded power to Busia's Progressive Party at the outset of the second democratic republic (Baynham, 1978; Oquaye, 1980; Agyeman-Duah, 1987; Biswal, 1992). The military briefly returned to the Barracks, but once the appetite for political intervention had been whetted, elements within the force were poised to re-enter the political arena when opportunity arose. A putsch in 1969 had failed, but a successful one followed in its trail.

In 1972, a coup d'état led by Acheampong deposed the Busia regime (Baynham, 1978; Oquaye, 1980; Goldsworthy, 1971; Goldschmidt, 1980; Biswal, 1992). Baynham (1978) observed that ethnic divisions characterized the processes of demilitarization and re-civilianization of the Ghanaian army. It found that the ethnic sentiments had become ingrained across the ranks in the barracks as the officers receded from three years of tasting political power. A corollary of this development was the proliferation of counter-coups, as officers from rival ethnic groups sought to unseat those who had come to dominate the political sphere. The frustrations within these contests, and the attendant mismanagement and corruption, provided sufficient impetus for the 'palace coup' and subsequent overthrow by junior officers.

The beginning of a cycle of coups mirrored the political atmosphere across West Africa. The growing military taste for political power led Smoak (1972) to predict that the political life of Ghana and three other West African countries (Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta) would be indefinitely subjected to military intervention and blackmail.

While the phrase ‘indefinitely’ is viewable as an overstretch of the predictions, most West African countries continue to be plagued by military intervention into 2022, and Ghana fulfilled this prediction until the last regime of Rawlings which ushered in the 4th Republic.

The early part of this unstable period did not witness the participation of Ghanaian troops in PKOs. It remains unclear, however, whether the instability had an immediate adverse effect on Ghana’s participation in peacekeeping. A study in Bangladesh by Zaman and Biswas (2014), for example, shows that the military can fear taking over the government to keep their peacekeeping status and avoid blacklisting from participating in PKOs.

In Ghana’s case, however, if there was any such fear, it lasted for only two years. Arguably, therefore, stability of some sort and not necessarily a return to civilian democratic rule determined the country’s resumption of participating in peacekeeping. Following the passing of UN Resolution 338 in 1973, which demanded a ceasefire in the Middle East, Ghana’s infantry battalion and staff officers were invited by the UN Secretary-General to participate in the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) mission in Cairo (Erskine, 1989; Aboagye, 1999a). Consequently, on January 3, 1974, Ghana’s first contingent to UNEF II was deployed to Cairo in what is known in the country’s military circles as “Operation Sunrise” (Erskine, 1989). In keeping with UN peacekeeping practice, which allocates one senior staff appointment at Force Headquarters, Ghana further received the appointment of Chief of Staff of UNEF II (Erskine 1989:2). UNEF II (1974-1979) witnessed rotation of over 6,600 troops in 11 battalions (Aboagye, 1999a:286).

While UNEF II straddled the military rule of Acheampong, participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 1978 to 1999, continued after the coup-within-coup, the palace coup.

Peacekeeping missions of Ghanabatts also persisted across the first and second advents of Rawlings and the brief civilian democratic rule of Limann's People's National Party, what Hutchful describes as the failed democratic transition (1979-1981) (Aboagye, 1999a; Austin, 1985; Hutchful, 1997b:535). Within these developments, fairly arguably, Ghana's position as a troop contributor to peacekeeping was unaffected notwithstanding the murky political situation that bedevilled the country (Frinjuah, 2016; Aboagye, 1999a).

Hutchful (1997b) observes that militants and sympathizers of Rawlings' Armed Forces Revolutionary Council were either purged or deployed out of Ghana in the restructuring initiated by the Limann government. Jon Kraus (1983) also affirms this attempt at purging dissident members of GAF by the civilian regime of the 3rd Republic. In a Tunisian study, Holger Albrecht confirmed the instrumentalization of peacekeeping for sending off perceived troublemakers of a regime (Albrecht, 2020). It is plausible therefore that peacekeeping served as one of the avenues to send off perceived troublemakers of the failed transitioning democracy. Some scholars such as Agyekum (2019) trace the planning for the 31 December 1981 coup to the UNIFIL mission. The argument therein was that the troops were dissatisfied with the Limann administration and found the UNIFIL theatre as a ground to coordinate a coup.

In the aftermath of the coup, the public image of GAF was considerably sullied amidst allegations of brutalities towards civilians, involvement in black market trading, and confiscation of private property. A study of the phenomenon is presented by Kraus (1983:119) in the following words:

The military presence is palpable in the major cities, at roadblocks, during night-long curfews. It has been assigned responsibility for the distribution of essential commodities, the enforcement of price controls, the pursuit of hoarders, anti-smuggling exercises, and border control. These activities led elements of the military

into repeated instances of brutality against civilians throughout 1982, giving rise to continuous public criticism. Officers at the borders (especially at Aflao, on the border with Togo) and the airport confiscate on all pretexts the possessions of returning Ghanaians; those protesting are frequently beaten. Military personnel who have confiscated hoarded goods have engaged in kalebule (selling at black market prices) to Ghanaians after curfew.

The reemergent indiscipline and decline in soldier professionalism did not only affect civilians whose assets were looted at the outbreak of the coup, and frequently corralled for public exercise, but also GAF personnel. In an equally disturbing event in February 1982, a congregation in Kumasi, a key city in the country, was commanded by a Major to interrupt service and engage in pothole filling exercise. Jon Kraus records that the incensed congregants murdered the officer and as a retribution, soldiers allegedly shot a police congregant and killed the minister of that congregation. Additionally, churches were torched and Kumasi police station was besieged by military personnel.

Commendably, Rawlings had decried the use of militaries as coercive instruments against the common man in Africa and sought to prevent its recurrence in Ghana. Nonetheless, the politicization of the other ranks and NCOs further threatened the erosion of authority in GAF in the command, control, and administration of the forces. As Kraus (1983:119) found, the coup unleashed violence between officers and other ranks which culminated in the murder of three naval staff officers in Sekondi (the twin capital of the Western Region) by their junior ranks.

In the geopolitical space, Kraus (1994) observed an extraordinary restructuring of the global economy in the late 1980s. Prominent among these events is the end of the Cold War.

While peacekeeping in the pre-cold war, except the Congo, has targeted resolution of inter-state wars, post-cold War deployments largely focussed on intra-state conflicts (Lipson, 2007). The Liberian conflict is one example. Struggles over control of government had turned Liberia into a civil war theatre by 1990. It was at this time that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) employed its forces, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to enforce a ceasefire in Liberia (Olonisakin, 1997; Aboagye, 1999a). Ghana's military deployed contingents to contribute to the restoration of order in Liberia. The civil war context within which the deployment occurred has been described as peace enforcement. In the view of some interviewees who toured that mission, 'Liberia was war,' it had considerable trauma scenes and occurred under very constraining circumstances such as inaccessibility to rations while at duty stations away from force headquarters. These outcomes highlight some of the peacekeeping experiences that have contributed to aspects of the changes visible in GAF.

4.5 Ghana Armed Forces in the Fourth Republic (1992-2023)

By 1992 onwards, the GAF personnel who had been involved in the 1981 coup and subsequent military rule either transformed soldiers into civil politicians or retired from the Force (KII, RMSO1, June 2022, Accra). The GAF had generally improved relations with civilians who numbered from over 16 million in 1992 to over 34 million in two decades and were (are) spread across 10 regions since the 1990s and 16 regions from 2018 onwards (Penu, 2022; Commission of Inquiry, 2018). Nevertheless, some clashes have been recorded between civilians and soldiers, and between police and soldiers in these decades. There are also allegations of increasing politicization of the colours, use of brute force, and corrupt practices among some members involved in internal security operations.

The Armed Forces have however remained in the Barracks despite occasional rumours about possible coups or rare demands by sections of the population for the Rawling years before the current republic. Consequently, Ghana numbers among the most stable democracies in Africa notwithstanding the five coups, failed coup attempts, and years of military rule (Levine, 2016). The fourth republic has gone through the turnover test and can be arguably described as a period of consolidated democracy.⁴⁴

The period has witnessed an increase in the number of Ghanaian troops serving on various missions across the world. In the 1990s, the Ghana Armed Forces participated in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, Cambodia, Liberia, Croatia, Rwanda, Iraq/Kuwait, Somalia, and the Western Sahara (Hutchful, 1997a; Aboagye, 1999a). Amid dwindling military budgets, meagre wages for service personnel, and limited access to some desirable household commodities, UN peacekeeping served as a panacea. Not least because Government earnings from the missions subsidized military spending, while troops' income supplemented their salaries received in Ghana (Hutchful, 1997a). Additionally, missions provided the window to access household goods not obtainable in Ghana. Furthermore, the mission provided valuable training to Ghanabatts and exposed the military to a variety of countries and cultures.

In 1992-1993, Ghana's troops served in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and followed on in 1993-1996 with participation in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (Aboagye, 1999a).

⁴⁴ Ghana has passed Huntington's (1991a) known two turnover test which suggests that consolidated democracies must have witnessed alternation of political power to different parties in three consecutive phases. Ghana has had 3 turnovers in 4 consecutive phases: 1992 -2000 (National Democratic Congress/NDC rule), 2001-2008 (New Patriotic Party/NPP rule), 2009-2016 (NDC rule), and 2017-2024 (NPP rule). Critique of the test and affirmation of its usefulness could be started respectively from studies such as Schedler (2002); Huntington (1991b) and Cho and Logan (2009).

In a study of the Ghana Armed Forces regarding these PKOs, Levine (2016) indicates a possibility of relations between two phenomena, namely peacekeeping and harmonious civil-military relations. That study contends that:

Ghanaians who served in international peacekeeping missions, particularly in the 1990s, seem to have developed conflict resolution skills and horror of internal conflict that help support harmonious civil–military relations (Levine, 2016:81).

A similar finding has been elicited by Agyekum (2020) who observes that introspection from PKOs influences military personnel to have a distaste for forms of violence that could trigger atrocities witnessed in some mission fields.

While the ECOMOG mission in Liberia presented a mission theatre that evoked traumatic memories, the enabling environment provided by the mandate ensured that Ghanbatt and participation troops could stop, or at least limit, civilian casualties by using force (Aboagye, 1999a). The mandate of UNAMIR however strictly barred troops from using force or directly intervening in the conflict. This mandate presented many dilemmas for the peacekeepers in the face of the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Dallaire, 2003). Olonisakin (1997) asserts that the Ghanaian army has a peacekeeping specialization rooted in traditional peace mission principles that do not favour the use of force. That study maintains that this training and doctrine determined the posturing of Ghanbatt in the ECOMOG mission. Ghanbatt has, however, demonstrated that when conflict escalates and negotiations fail, the use of force becomes indispensable. During the early missions in the Congo, for example, Ghanbatt returned fire when its personnel and the mission itself came under attack (Afrifa, 1966; Alexander, 1966:66). A similar pattern emerged in Liberia, where violations of ceasefire agreements and protocols by warring factions underscored the necessity of force in achieving mission objectives (Aboagye, 1999a).

Thus, the nature of the mandate and options available is perhaps a more plausible explanation for the posturing of Ghanbatt in the observed missions.

While the UNAMIR mandate remained, the unwillingness of the UN to change the mandate to rescue the many Rwandese who were massacred in the genocide, despite the available intelligence, was quite problematic. A significant psychological impact is the powerlessness of the peacekeepers as observers of the genocide, becoming both victims and perpetrators for their inaction. It is Dallaire's (2003) book that helps to grasp the extent of the trauma that confronted peacekeepers on UNAMIR. The GAF is, however, commended for its bravery and contributions in saving many Rwandans from the scourge of the genocide.


Not all PKOs of GAF in this epoch have been inter-state or intra-state, however. UNIFIL II, for example, resulted from the conflict between Hezbollah, an Islamic militant group, and Israel. This conflict had affected northern Israel and Lebanon (Ruffa, 2013; Aboagye, 1999a). Ghana had previously participated in UNIFIL, the latter part of which coincided with the country's re-democratisation process that began in the early 1990s. Ghanbatt continued its peacekeeping engagement in UNIFIL II in 2007-2008 when the mandate for UNIFIL1 changed from monitoring of ceasefire to accompanying and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, providing humanitarian access to civilians, and facilitating 'voluntary and safe returns of displaced persons' (Ruffa, 2013; UNSC, 2006; Aboagye, 1999a). The varied types of missions provide similar and sometimes different experiences for GAF peacekeepers. As will be apparent in subsequent chapters, the influences of these collective and individual experiences on changes in structure and personnel outlook in the GAF also differ.

4.6 Chapter Summary

The Ghana Armed Forces has undergone considerable evolution. The history of the Force however starts from the indigenous and colonial factors that shaped the nature, structure, and outlook of the GAF at its personnel. The transformation is manifest in forms of expansion and reorganization that have occurred since the country's independence despite relatively enduring elements such as the command, control, and administration mechanisms bequeathed by colonial Britain.

The context within which peacekeeping activities have been undertaken by GAF has been differing at the peace support operations. It has involved moments of professionalism and positive civil-military relations as well as times of contestations about soldier professionalism, integrity, and loyalty to the country.

Many lessons have been learned from peacekeeping missions across the years and these have coupled with internal expansion projects to shape some of the changes visible in the Ghana Armed Forces.



CHAPTER FIVE

PEACEKEEPING AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE GHANA ARMED FORCES

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents findings and analysis of changes that have occurred in the structures of GAF and how peacekeeping experiences have led to these changes or contributed to their evolution. Issues discussed include the organisational or administrative changes, creation of new or sub institutions, changes in recruitments, deployment of women, and training and operational readiness.

I argue that peacekeeping has been instrumental in the Africanisation of the officer corps of the Ghana Armed Forces in the 1960s, and the ongoing staff system used by GAF. New units such as the Army Peacekeeping Training School, increasing deployment of women to traditionally male domains, and some emphasis on the training of soldiers are also outcomes of peacekeeping experiences. But there are adverse effects also, some of which have led to the establishment of some structures, and others hinder group-based activities in some units.

5.1 Organisational/Administrative Changes

The organisational and administrative outlook of GAF has changed since its establishment. Among the administrative components, however, changes related to the Africanization of the officer corps, logistic planning, (re)designation of ranks, and aspects of promotional exam (PROMEX) for officers are critical to this study.

5.1.1 Africanization of GAF (Officer Corps)

Africanization is the replacement of foreign strategies, policies, technology, and personnel in institutions in Africa with African forms. Up until the 1960s, GAF was predominantly officered by British personnel who numbered over 200 (Baynham, 1988:47; Aboagye, 1999a). In the 1960s, however, the preoccupation of most African leaders was independence struggles, Pan-Africanism, the fight against imperialism, and negotiating the geopolitical tensions between the USSR and the West. The Nkrumah government in Ghana was at the forefront of these struggles and embraced both the rhetoric and actions that sought to project Africa's capacity to manage its affairs including resolution of security challenges on the continent. Consequently, it became intolerable to reconcile the championing of African independence and an end to imperialism with the utility of British personnel at the helm of the military and other public affairs in Nkrumah's Ghana (Nkrumah, 1968; Alexander, 1966; Baynham, 1988:86). The solution, therefore, from the viewpoint of the Nkrumah regime was the Africanization of the officer corps and NCOs in GAF. By this process, expatriate officers were replaced with African, specifically Ghanaian, counterparts. The process had been started at a slow pace by the late 1940s but gained a new impetus after independence (Baynham, 1988:33-34,39).

The GAF's peace operation in the Congo [1960-1963] contributed considerably to the Africanisation of the Armed Forces. Baynham's study of GAF, for example, found that the role of the Ghanaian troops in the Congo triggered the new phase of Africanization of the officer corps and dismissal of British officers and NCOs (Baynham, 1988; Kraus, 1990). General Henry Templer Alexander, the then-British General in charge of GAF, also observed that:

Throughout the Congo crisis, Nkrumah was under constant pressure to withdraw all the British officers from the Ghana contingent (Alexander, 1966:107).

Henry Alexander attributes these pressures to the USSR and countries in the Eastern Bloc of the Cold War. The factors were however more than pressures from the East. Nkrumah had a fallout with the British and Americans for their inaction against, if complicity with, Belgian forces and factions in the Congo conflict. Additionally, Nkrumah's Pan-African aspirations and conviction that Africans could manage their affairs were in high steam (Nkrumah, 1965; Biney, 2011). It must have therefore been embarrassing, or contradictory at least, for Nkrumah that British officers were commanders of Ghanaian units and when these units were deployed abroad on a mission serving a Pan-African interest (Baynham, 1988; Kraus, 1990; Aboagye, 1999a:117; Addae, 2005:230).

Ghana had fewer than thirty indigenous officers by 1957, and these officers were below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel required to command a brigade (Aboagye, 1999a:119; Addae, 2005:231)⁴⁵. Additionally, the country had experienced an unsuccessful putsch involving Captain Awhaitey, a Ghanaian officer, in 1958 (Baynham, 1988:34,87-92). Nkrumah had therefore been pragmatic in maintaining expatriate officers as a stabilizing force and providing professional leadership until the country could have more than 208 well-trained Ghanaian officers by 1965 (Nkrumah, 1968:39-40; Aboagye, 1999a:113; Clune, 2014:111; Addae, 2005:230). That the foreign policy plans trumped this gradual approach indicates how Nkrumah's ambitions towards the liberation struggle and the Pan-African cause mingled with suspicions about British officers during the Congo crisis to hasten the indigenization of GAF officers.

Instructively, the Africanization of GAF was accelerated during the Congo mission. Thus, many of the major appointments within the Ghanaian contingent on ONUC could be transferred to Africans (Ghanaians), middle and junior commands back home would be localised, and all British

⁴⁵ Baynham (1988:33) records 29 Ghanaian officers for 1947-1957. Aboagye (1999a) puts the figure at 28 between 1953-57 while Addae (2005:228) documents 28 officers by 1957 but on pages 236-237 lists 29 officers for 1947-1957. The counts exclude emergency commissions such as was given to Seth Anthony in 1941.

officers were dismissed in 1961 (Baynham, 1988:86-87). Additionally, the Congolese had teased, “booed”, and “hooted at” the Ghanaian troops and were joined by other African troops in questioning the presence of white officers in the Ghana Army while Nkrumah advised dismissal of Belgian officers from Kinshasa’s forces (Ocran, 1968:6-7; Afrifa, 1966:65; Addae, 2005).

Furthermore, General Alexander had had a conflict of loyalty as CDS of the GAF, and the British felt unease and sometimes sabotaged Nkrumah’s actions that went contrary to the interests of Britain. This ‘mental conflict of loyalty’, as Templer Alexander put it, and the subsequent actions contrary to Ghanaian interests were heightened during ONUC. Alexander (1966:99) admits that “I often found it difficult to act on Nkrumah’s orders without feeling that I might be hurting British interests.” Nkrumah and his political allies were not oblivious to the conflict of interest sometimes manifested by Alexander and sometimes bypassed the General, for instance, in the purchase of weapons. Moreover, the Ghanaian officers observed reluctance to forward reports from field commanders to Brigade headquarters in the Congo and felt it was due for Ghanaians to lead the army (Addae, 2005:228). Besides, as Addae (2005:231) notes, there were 200 Ghanaian officers in GAF by 1961 although of lower officer ranks.

The abrupt, instant, and colossal dismissal of the white officers in September 1961 and the accelerated promotions of Ghanaians to take over the duties of the expatriate officers indicate that the indigenization was done in a hurry and not within the agreed date for transitioning into a full-fledged Africanized or ‘Ghanaianised’ force. To this end, the collective experience of soldiering on the Congo mission [ONUC] triggered, or at least hastened, the Africanization of GAF personnel in the 1960s.

5.1.2 Logistics Planning

Military logistics is a significant support system for operational units across armed forces. It encompasses the producing, acquiring, storing, transporting, distributing, maintaining, evacuating and disposing of materiel and overall processes of planning and undertaking the “movement and maintenance of forces” (Addae, 2005; NATO, 2012:20). As McGinnis (1992:22) notes, logistics connects industrial base of materiel with military needs, and ensure adequacy of materiel to maintain force position and survival in “cycles of mobilization, warfare, and demobilization.” Effective logistic planning and execution therefore requires that stocks and capabilities such as supplies for food, ammunition, water, vehicles, and fuel are built up and weapons and forces are sustained (NATO, 2012, 2007; Skoglund, 2012:5). The building of reserve stock is therefore a necessity for logistic support to be effective. This necessity has been re-echoed in GAF through its peace operations, especially in the 1990s. Peacekeeping operations of GAF have thus contributed in part to changes in the planning and management of logistics.

Experiences from the ECOMOG mission (1990) suggest that the mission spurred urgency in building reserve stock for operations. A senior officer involved in planning the deployment noted,

You find out that we were... we didn't keep any reserved stock of anything at the time before we were to go to Liberia; reserved stock of uniform, reserved stock of ... were vehicles put aside for operations – nothing, when we were faced with the situation in Liberia (KII, RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

Ghana, as Aboagye (1999a:121) notes, had suffered economic decay, especially in the 1970s and the 1980s and the size of the Services had commensurately reduced even into the early 1990s.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Additionally, GAF was no more instrument of foreign policy in the African liberation struggle or at the centre of the pursuit of the African High Command to continue the expansion project begun by Nkrumah (Aboagye, 1999a:121).

There was famine in 1983 and the structural adjustment programmes further constrained financial allocations to various sectors of the economy. GAF and its various tours on ECOMOG were not exempted from these economic realities. By the 1980s, reserves that must have been built by Nkrumah had been used up and/or inadequately replenished.

The evidence suggests that some later Ghanabatts who had sufficient uniforms were sponsored by American benevolence towards Ghanbatt 13. A retired non-commissioned officer who toured ECOMOG more than twice insisted that:

the only time I realised that we did not have extra uniforms was on my second tour. We were two Ghanabatts and Ghanbatt 13 came to join us. They were sponsored by the United States, so they had more equipment and uniforms. So, along the way, they had to seed off some of their things, especially uniforms, to us. So, we got entirely different uniforms from the traditional Ghanaian camouflage (KII, ExMSS3, December 2023, Takoradi).

Clearly, after the Nkrumah years, there was hardly intentionality in building up stocks of uniforms and vehicles in anticipation of missions before ECOMOG (1990-1998). Building reserves requires considerable finance and GAF had to deploy with available logistics within funding limitations. The absence of reserves therefore did not mean that GAF was completely oblivious of reserve stocks. As one veteran states:



The Army had 14600 soldiers by 1966, Navy had 1000 and Air Force had 1250. By 1992 these were respectively 8000, 850 and 1000.

Not that we didn't know before. It was just that er... finances of the state did not make it possible for us to... otherwise, we have always known of reserved stock

(KII, RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

ECOMOG however re-echoed the necessity of reserve stocks and “thereafter we built stock for unexpected operations” (KII, RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

Sourcing of materiel for reserves is a complex task during external operations given the uniqueness and unpredictability of operational areas. Additionally, when no deployments are apparent, the type of materiel that can be stocked up can only be generic at best and not necessarily fitted for specific operations. The operational needs of GAF were therefore necessarily determined by its available resources, and ad hoc sourcing was done particularly for ECOMOG. The evidence suggests that ECOMOG was an emergency that hardly permitted up-stocking of materiel before deployment. Noting the necessity of reserves, the senior officer further stated that,

Troops never go on a mission without reserves if things are going well. So, they will keep something there which they are not touching them. That's why they say you will use that one to influence the situation. If you don't have a reserve, you cannot influence the situation. So, we learnt a lot of lessons from that (KII, RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

The contributions of the collective experience expressed as “So we learnt a lot of lessons from that” and “thereafter we built stock for unexpected operations”, however, suggest ways logistical challenges in peace operations have contributed to modifications in logistic planning and reserve store management in GAF. The evidence thus indicates that though economic constraints

remained, the lessons from ECOMOG were a ‘wakeup call’ and spurred more interest in the prioritization of extra stores for subsequent deployments undertaken by GAF.

5.1.3 Redesignation of Ranks

Another structure that has been shaped by peace operation involvement is ranks in depicting administrative positions (staff system). Ranks have been used in armed forces to ensure clarity about hierarchy and designate roles and supervisory responsibilities throughout history (Mattila et al., 2017:361). The ranks and titles for field offices and administrative responsibilities further away from the field, including staff officer, principal staff officer, and director, have therefore evolved. The British-type established ranks for the other ranks begin with Private and end at Warrant Officer Class 1. In Janowitz and Little (1974), these changes are seen as emanating from the interactions between the military and wider society.

Traditionally, GAF’s ranks and administrative titles follow the legacy bequeathed by colonial Britain and have been considerably shaped by continuing interaction with the European system of military administration. This study gathered that the British legacy of ranks in GAF has however been shaped further by events in the peacekeeping field. The data suggest that the NATO classification system for ranks designating supervisory responsibilities is used by the UN at various offices in mission headquarters. Subsequently, GAF has adopted these standard rank scales to designate its staff offices to enhance deployments of its personnel into staff officer roles on UN missions. In the view of a senior officer:

...to me, what I have seen has changed is administratively. With the UN, we work with the NATO structure such as G1, G2, and G3 and eventually, we’ve come to use that here (KII, MSO27, August 2022, Burma Camp).

The Ghana Armed Forces has integrated the UN administrative procedure into its structures. Office roles at the single Service level, for instance Ghana Army, use the “G” series (G1-G8), while positions at the joint level, for example, General Headquarters offices, use the “J” series (J1-J8) (KII, MSO35, July 2022 GHQ Burma Camp). MSO35 further notes that:

Now we have the NATO staff system. The NATO staff system is what is used in the UN sector, so we are trying to bring that. It has started but not fully implemented. I know that if you go to Army Headquarters now, some of the appointments have changed to Chief G1, it used to be Director Administration (KII, MSO35, July 2022 GHQ Burma Camp).

We observe at the Army Headquarters (AHQ) that the Director DAPKOP is redesignated as “G3 PSO” and a staff officer at a training section of AHQ is “General Staff Officer 1” [GSO1 or G1]. The staff titles have thus been renamed to “conform to trends so that when you are posted to the mission area you know your job title there” (KII, MSO6, August 2022, AHQ Burma Camp).

The redesignation of supervisory responsibility ranks is a form of institutional change occurring through mimesis as admirable features of the UN system are adopted by the GAF. The change is equally a form of competition (Beckert, 2010) as the interlocutors find it as one of the means for GAF to follow global trends and stay modern. The other ranks now include USA higher rank Chief Warrant Officer (CWO), Master Warrant Officer (MWO), and Senior Warrant Officer (SWO) Class II and I. Regimental Sergeant Majors (RSM) mostly wear SWOI, Service Sergeant Majors wear MWO, while the Forces Sergeant Major holds CWO rank. The Navy and Air have their equivalents. These ranks have been operational since 2019. We observe that, for the USA Army, established ranks for the WOs above WO1 use CWO2 to CWO5 while SWO and MWO are staff appointments. Thus, a CWO5 (CW5) can be Army Staff Senior Warrant Officer (ARSTAF SWO).

The GAF's use of SWOs, MWO, and CWO as substantive and staff appointment ranks is an innovative recombination to create a new set of higher ranks for an expanding Force. In sociological institutionalist (institutional change) analysis, it constitutes a bricolage or hybrid attributable to the GAF's local practices (Campbell, 1998, 2005; Carstensen, 2011, 2017; Mallard and Paradeise, 2009). As Beckert (2010) notes, the change does not show isomorphism per se but a degree of homogenization and divergence.

The British bequeathed ranks indicating hierarchy, command, and authority coexists with changes in administrative and other rank designations. While these changes aim to make GAF staff appointments reflective of global military scales, 'global' is coterminous with Western and shows the continuing influence of neocolonial structures on institutions of the developing world.

5.1.4 Peacekeeping in Promotional Examination

Promotional examination (PROMEX) is a key consideration for the promotion of junior officers. Lieutenants pass PROMEX to become Captains, and the latter must pass the exam to be Majors. As peacekeeping has become part of the core peacetime activities of GAF, knowledge about the phenomenon is one of the exam requirements for promotions. A training officer expressed the development:

We have one of our examinations we call admin and morale; we have peacetime, and we have a wartime administration. So, in some of the wartime administration morale we add peacekeeping questions. These days we ask peacekeeping questions there for officers (KII, MSO15, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

It can be noted in this response that peacekeeping is managed within wartime mechanisms by the armed forces though it is peacetime activity where GAF is not necessarily at war with an enemy nation. Its feature on the promotion exam signals the changes peace operations have brought to bear on PROMEX content in GAF. In effect, personnel with peace operation experiences may be better placed to appreciate related PROMEX contents and use field experiences from peacekeeping to answer questions about operations, tactics, and other soldiery activities.

5.2 Establishment of New Institutions

GAF has also been undergoing expansion in part by (re)forming commands, units, and departments from existing units or building entirely new structures. In these expansions, peacekeeping has contributed to the creation of sub-structures across the Forces and some units. These structures include peace operations departments and commands, a department for managing psychological and psychiatric outcomes of missions, and welfare schemes.


5.2.1 Peacekeeping Departments and Related Commands in the Ghana Armed Forces

It was elicited from a Veteran Senior Officer that a peacekeeping office was established in the Ministry of Defence in July 1980,

Once I established it there, then we made sure that of the Army, Air Force, and Navy were also established later on. General Headquarters was issuing instructions to the Army first because they contributed the largest number of troops for peacekeeping operations. So, the Army established its own peacekeeping office, and then later on the Navy and Air Force also established theirs (KII, RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

The Army therefore has the Department of Army Peacekeeping Operations (DAPKOP). At the GAF General Headquarters (GHQ) however, peacekeeping was part of Joint Operations as Directorate of International Peacekeeping Operations (DIPKOP) until the early 2000s. MSO53 intimated that the Department of International Peace Support Operations (IPSO) was formed out of DIPKOP and separated from Joint Operations in 2005 with a focus on peacekeeping operations in GAF and international travels.

It seems interactions with Norwegian troops during peacekeeping however contributed to the establishment of two commands in GAF. The development began when a company of Ghanaian contingent was attached to the Norwegian troops. In the recollection of the Retired Senior Officer,



we visited and they found out that the Norwegians knew certain techniques because they had a school, a training centre where they prepared their officers and men for peacekeeping operations. So, we also came to establish – this place they call Bundase [a military training camp near Accra] to the field which manifested later on in Kofi Annan [KAIPTC]. It was from the Norwegians that we saw that training before being deployed to peacekeeping operations was so useful. So, we shall also establish one, and then we started. We put up some observation posts in the field somewhere for troops to see how you can be on an observation post and observe far away; how you can challenge people at a checkpoint. That is how we started it (KII, RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

It can be seen from the response therefore that two military commands, namely, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) referred to by the interviewee as Kofi Annan, and the Army Peacekeeping Operation Training School (APOTS) at Bundase, the Battle Training Camp of the armed forces are products of GAF's peacekeeping participation.

This finding corroborates with works such as Aboagye (1999a) and Frinjuah (2016) that KAIPTC is one of the impacts of peacekeeping on GAF, and a desire to honour the former Ghanaian Secretary General of the UN, His Excellency Kofi Annan. KAIPTC is a regional centre established in September 1998 to provide training for prospective peacekeepers, mission-oriented units, and specialists earmarked for peace support operations (Aboagye, 1999:201). The KAIPTC currently undertakes training in conflict management and trains senior and middle/operational level personnel and security sector practitioners across the sub-region.

In a Senior Officer's opinion, the KAIPTC is the only direct structural package that has accrued to GAF as a result of UN missions, aside from the economic gains. He stated in an FGD that:

The only benefit I may say is, that the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Centre was also established because of our involvement in peacekeeping. Even though it serves other nations the reason they brought it to Ghana was particularly because Ghana participated in a lot of peacekeeping missions. So, it will not be wise to establish it in a nation that does not contribute much to peacekeeping (FGD, MSO7, July 2022, Whistler Barracks).

Though KAIPTC is perceived as a UN package, a closer examination shows that it is rather an outcome of the Ghana Government's initiative and contributions from bilateral partners than the UN. The German Armed Forces Training Advisory Group (GAFTAG), for example, is a major partner in the establishment of the Centre (AFNews, 2023). Thus, it has established connections with peacekeeping but not as a UN package per se.

APOTS is another structural development in the Armed Forces directly resulting from peacekeeping. My dialogists saw this development as significant to building a structure that does streamlined mission-oriented training for troops readying for deployments to mission areas. In a male officer FGD, an officer put it:

Kofi Annan [KAIPTC], I say is not for only Ghanaians, it's an international institution. So, they even bring people from missions to come and train. Kofi Annan even though if you go there it is headed by a Ghanaian leader, it is not solely a Ghana Armed Forces institution. But APOTS is purely a Ghana Armed Forces institution (FGD, MSO7, July 2022, Whistler Barracks).

Seemingly, APOTS, established in June 2021, is conceived as a Ghanaian and GAF-only pre-deployment training institution. In February 2023, however, the institution secured UN approval to run courses in peacekeeping operations for peacekeepers. A senior officer involved in peace operation planning and deployment stated that:

The school was awarded the United Nations Training Recognition Certificate on 11 February 2023 to run peacekeeping pre-deployment courses for members of GAF (KII, MSO53, May 2023, Burma Camp).

With this change through normative pressures to comply with UN standards, APOTS is certified to train peacekeepers from across the world. Consequently, it cannot be described as a “purely GAF institution.” Nonetheless, APOTS is under the Army Training Command, and its establishment evolved from the pre-deployment camping site at Bundase. APOTS and KAIPTC thus differ because the former focuses on pre-deployment training while the latter considers a broad spectrum of peace support operations and security research on the continent.

5.2.2 Establishment of Therapy and Wellness Department at 37 Military Hospital

The Therapy and Wellness Department at the 37 Military Hospital was established in 2020 to manage psychological and mental health issues among soldiers and the GAF community. Before the creation of this unit, “signals from routine checks showed that those deployed for the mission have developed posttraumatic stress disorder” (KII, FSO14, August 2022, 37 Military Hospital, Accra). The evidence suggests that psychological trauma from peacekeeping had adversely affected some personnel. In the view of one interviewee:

In Rwanda, when I came back, each time I spoke to a group of people, I felt like I was breaking down before the audience. It almost happened to me one day in the church. I was talking to a church group in Kumasi because it was like events were playing right in front of me, you know. For a long time, I couldn't put meat in my mouth because I had seen human beings dead and dogs peeling the flesh all over the street. And that would have an impact on your mind for a very long time (KII RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

The trauma expressed by the Veteran Officer shows some of the mental and psychological outcomes of peace operations recorded in works such as Dallaire (2003). Corroborating this view, another officer noted that there has been a gap in the management of the health of personnel who have been exposed to stress and trauma in some mission areas. The officer highlighted that:

People linked to drinking and became drug addicts, but we did not pay attention. We need institutionalization of the psychologists into the system. The clergy cannot take the place of the psychologists. A lot of good soldiers have either died or been sacked from the military, not because of their problems but the failure

of the system to recognise their health needs. When we recruited the man, he was not a drunkard. What made him so? What welfare issues have we put in place to manage their welfare? (KII, MSO4, June 2022, AHQ Burma Camp).

The response of Senior Officer⁴ recognises the existence of a religious infrastructure in GAF comprising priests and Imams from the two major religions in Ghana. The Christian and Islamic clergy offer counselling and spiritual services to GAF personnel and their families. The activities of the clergy however do not address the psychological and psychiatric challenges such as trauma from peace operations. A senior nursing officer highlighted that:

Over the years we witnessed cases of trauma and other mental health cases. These were usually found when we follow up after the diagnosis of some disease was negative while symptoms persisted. Many of such cases involved people who had returned from peacekeeping missions. This was one of the key reasons why we established the Therapy and Wellness Department (KII, FSO14, August 2022, 37 Military Hospital, Accra).

While the birth of the department defers to the post operation clinical manifestations of exposures to stress and trauma, in-mission medical impact on personnel are also referred to the unit for management. The mental health nurse notes an observation in this regard:

I have not witnessed a case of post-mission manifestation, or clinical manifestation of mental issues. What we have seen are cases that happen during the mission. Maybe the person is about 6 months or so and is manifesting these things then they repatriate the person and bring him to us. It is when they come that we determine whether this will benefit from a psychologist or this will

benefit from psychiatric care. For post ops [operation] unless the person reports to the health centre in their unit and the Doctor deems fit to refer the person to us if not, I have not seen cases of mental health post ops [operations] (KII, MDCS1, August 2022, 37 Military Hospital, Accra).

The Wellness and Therapy Department thus partly addresses the psychological and psychiatric needs of GAF personnel resulting from peace operations and other engagements. The Department mirrors activities of wellness and fitness centres such as those of the USA military, but has psychiatric functions like those performed by the UK Army's Psychiatric Hospital for its military deployed overseas.⁴⁷ It, however, does not admit psychiatric patients but refers them to the Pantang Psychiatric Hospital situated a few kilometres from Accra. The practice is similar to that of most armed forces that do not have a psychiatric hospital.

5.2.3 Welfare Scheme

In parts of GAF, peace operation is viewed as a welfare mechanism as it offers economic benefits to the peacekeeper and TCC. Senior Officer⁷ (Whistler Barracks) strongly affirmed, “Yes the allowances we take from the missions in a way is like a welfare for the soldier.” Admittedly, UN remuneration as local allowances and earned dollars from peacekeeping, cushions the financial lot of the soldiers. It is also the known soldiery space where officers and ORs are given equal pay thereby reducing disparity in the economic progression of the other ranks. A tour on peacekeeping is thus a chance to better financial standing while contributing to peace. The economic returns also shape various welfare practices in GAF.

⁴⁷ The UK's Duchess of Kent's Psychiatric Hospital (DKPH) in Catterick Garrison has been operational since 1995 and provides mental health services to soldiers (Hughes, 2017).

Within some units, there is an internal arrangement where peacekeepers contribute to a financial pool from which resources are used to support internal events and developments. Peacekeepers cede a day or two days' allowance or a fixed amount as their contributions towards such needs in their units. As a Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM)⁴⁸ noted:

I think in every unit we have traditions and customs of every unit. So maybe if you go for operation and come contribute \$50 to the welfare of the unit. Yes, that one we have been doing. We make it a day's salary. Sometimes we use it to do certain projects (KII, MSS1, July 2022, Burma Camp).

Another Sergeant Major from a unit corroborated that:

There was a criterion that if you travel to peacekeeping you'll come and pay one day allowance to the unit that you belong to. But now you have to pay 2-day allowance, so if you are taking \$10, you'll come and pay \$20 to the unit. And the unit uses it for welfare like these books, maintaining the place, for some petty stuff like TV, air conditions. At the payroll...the officer will take it from everybody there and when he is back reports to the officer and make account (KII, MSS5, July 2022, Whistler Barracks).

The RSM then goes to the G1, the personnel manager of the unit, who receives the money and pays it to a coffer for subsequent disbursement towards unit needs. The G1 then informs the “...RSM this soak away is not good, so let's buy cement 10 bags, then we pay. So, we use the money but account for it” (KII, MSS5, July 2022, Whistler Barracks). Some of these contributions

⁴⁸ The RSM is the unit's administrator. As the right-hand of the commanding officer, and a senior non-commissioned officer, s/he embodies the unit's traditions and ethos, and oversees the welfare, administration, standards, morale, and discipline of the unit (regiment, battalion, or command). RSMs are liaisons between officers and the other ranks in the respective units, and act as a parental figure (“mother of the unit”) to the soldiers and junior officers.

have therefore paid for unit washrooms, recreational assets like television, air conditioners, and books, and maintaining places commonly used by personnel of the unit.

Given the bureaucratic procedures that can surround requests for minor repairs, these contributions have been innovative ways to keep staff convenience at a level that is appreciable to the peacekeepers and their colleagues. The evidence exposes one of the weaknesses in public service provision in Ghana.

Not every unit engages in this form of welfare, however. As one officer intimated:

I can't speak for any other unit, but for this unit, we don't contribute. I took over in February, and since I came, there hasn't been any rotation, but I have been in this school. I was here before I left, and I came back. There is nothing like that; we don't contribute anything like that for the school (KIL, FSO3, August 2022, Accra).

The unit seeks to avoid possible complaints from welfare contributors. Where the phenomenon is practiced, however, personnel hardly complained about the decision.

Welfare also exists through voluntary contributions by peacekeepers to help non-deployed colleagues in their units who have financial needs. As a Senior other rank notes in a male soldier FGD:

Sometimes we use it to do certain projects, and then sometimes the personnel who are not able to travel due to certain circumstances, we normally have some token for them out of that (FGD, MSS1, July 2022, Burma Camp).

Such contributions are underlain by reciprocity, where colleagues can expect help from comrades when in need. While the practice is an informal arrangement, it has become a norm policed by the offer or denial of support during need. It is, however, not peculiar to GAF but an observable phenomenon within Ghanaian public and private spaces. To this end, peacekeeping dollars are enhancing the manifestation of this cultural practice in the armed forces.

In another welfare arrangement, a soldier or officer can be nominated to serve in place of an indisposed colleague who is due for a mission but cannot deploy due to ill health or unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. In this case, the replacing nominee has a responsibility towards the indisposed colleague while he earns the peacekeeping allowances. Studies such as Salihu and Aning (2023) highlight that GAF peacekeepers have been exposed to human suffering in mission areas. It seems therefore that these experiences engender sympathy and combine with reciprocal expectations to make these forms of welfare function in GAF.

Personnel experiencing financial constraints are sometimes nominated for peacekeeping as a welfare mechanism to help them find respite through the extra earnings UN peace operations offer.

It was gathered from a senior officer, for instance, that:

You are given a personal allowance (local allowance), and then you are paid back in Ghana [earned dollar]. So, your welfare is your welfare, and as a unit, when it is time for people to be deployed, people are given slots for the soldiers. So, when they go out, whatever they get is for them and not for the unit. But it helps to bring down people's family issues, and unfortunately, we get money from people's blood, but that is it. Unfortunately, you get money from it, and that can cushion you (KII, FSO3, August 2022, Accra).

The practice helps some indebted soldiers defray their debts while reducing pressures and burdens that could be placed on commanders by members in financial distress. The Senior Office noted therefore that:

In the unit, a soldier who is in debt, always crying and coming to you for financial assistance, I don't know how many COs can support soldiers financially because you also take your salary and occasionally you get some maintenance grants. Those grants are supposed to maintain the unit and you know we have limited resources so it can't be that much that you can set aside to be given to soldiers to sort out their financial problems. So, occasionally when they get these missions, and they go it is a sort of relief for the unit as well because at least they can cater for themselves and their families (KII, FSO3, August 2022, Accra).

Peace operation in this context serves as a welfare mechanism despite the risks that the nominee may be exposed to. As one participant indicated:

If we survive it and of course we run through it, the gains are a lot: the finances and the allowances that you got; but if you don't survive it, we leave your life to be taken care of on how much money you get, so that is the other side of the coin. But if you make it successful and you come then you can now say new stories about what transpired (KII, MSO10, July 2022, NHQ Burma Camp).

A Senior Female Officer put a caveat however that “It doesn't always work like that, mind you, most of the time we have a schedule and they look at you if it is your turn, you'll go” (Female Officer10, GAFCSO).

The practice is therefore not done “Unless the individual has encountered a special issue or difficulty, such that may be a commander sees that going on a peacekeeping mission can help solve the problem. But it is not always” (KII, FSO10, July 2022, Otu Barracks). Thus, to the extent that financial distress can be established, this welfare approach might be implemented.

Another sense in which welfare is used is the fielding of personnel for troop deployment or a taskforce that requires more than specialized units. A naval officer stated, for instance, that:

If it is deployment that is just peacekeeping, or taskforce and the taskforce requires Ghana Armed Forces and not like specialized units, then they may give the navy and air force some percentage to nominate some men to join. But traditional peacekeeping that we do have, normally the battalion's strength is about almost 1000 numbers. So, the battalion strength even if the army is to provide 1000 units to go, they'll not be able to do that requirement so of course it has become like our welfare. So at least some portion in the navy and air force
(KII, MSO10, July 2022, NHQ Burma Camp).

The percentages for nominations requested across the forces for peacekeeping battalions (Ghanbatts) are therefore seen as welfare. This welfare assertion is in line with the financial returns the personnel obtain during their tours on peace operations. Peacekeeping is viewed in this sense as equal opportunity for soldiers and officers across the three forces to earn extra income to cushion their salaries. The views on salary support provided by peace operations thus resonate with Hutchful (1997a) that peacekeeping earnings are a buffer for soldiers and officers of GAF.

5.3 Changes in Recruitment

GAF has been recruiting men and enlisting officers through annual and special recruitments into the three forces of GAF to meet its personnel needs. Several reasons account for the recruitment. To start with, more units have been created and more garrisons have been established across the country over the years. Additionally, the creation of more regions (from 5 in 1957 to 10 in the 1990s and 16 since 2018) requires detachments from the force to maintain security in collaboration with other security agencies.

This need also requires setting up garrisons and fielding soldiers to take up some regional tasks. Retirees will also have to be replaced to maintain existing numbers. Among these demands, troop deployment for a peace mission requires the addition of numbers back home to sustain the functioning of units. Peace operations field a considerable number of armed forces. Commands therefore do not deploy their full strength to maintain forces to manage local situations should circumstances require. As Baledrokadroka (2012) notes, recruitment and enlistment of soldiers become fundamental for TCCs. Peacekeeping demands and those of the identified duties require the recruitment of more personnel to undertake various duties in GAF. In order to meet these demands, the armed forces have increased enrolment over time. According to a study participant,

They [High Command] have decided to increase the number of personnel now because it appears that peacekeeping will not go away and in Ghana, we have accepted peacekeeping as part of our contribution to global peace and security so the numbers which are being recruited now are far higher than before... We are hoping and the internal commitments are quite a lot so we are hoping that with these increased numbers in recruitment now we believe it will help the situation (KII, MSO3, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

For the officer corps, prospective officers are enlisted into regular career courses, short service commission/special duties Courses, and special medical intake (GMA, 2017:10,14).

5.3.1 Special Intakes Towards Peacekeeping Needs

GAF has had to engage in specialized skilled personnel recruitment to meet its numerical needs. The Ghana Military Academy offers two courses: the Regular Career Course (RCC) and the Short Service Commission/Special Duties Course (SSC/SD) (GMA, 2017:14).

The RCC enlists degree holders who then undergo fifteen months of training before commissioning as regular officers. The SSC and SD course runs for six months and targets professionals such as nurses, medical officers, engineers, and lawyers who are commissioned as specialist officers (Short Service/Special Duties Commission) in GAF.

As with the general demands for more numbers to undertake expanding responsibilities, peacekeeping has been one of the core areas where personnel such as those in the medical corps have been employed to mitigate shortfalls. The enlistment of these personnel has been done through special medical intakes (SMI) by GAF which runs for less than 6 months.

GMA (2017) affirms that the special medical intake (SMI) seeks to meet the medical demands of peacekeeping and other internal needs. It is therefore run occasionally to meet “shortfalls in the strength of the medical establishment” of GAF (GMA, 2017:14).


In the first two decades of the millennium, GAF has increased recruitment of psychologists and mental health nurses to care for the psychological and mental wellbeing of the personnel. It was elicited from a senior officer in the medical corps that,

We have employed more psychologists and we are working towards adding more so that they can be sent to work in the various medical outposts. But for now, the few we have are at the 37 military hospital (KII, MSO2, June 2022, AHQ Burma Camp).

The essence of peace support operations in the SMI is further highlighted by a Commandant of the Military Academy and Training Schools (MATS). In his speech to the graduating cadets of SMI 3, the Acting Commandant of MATS emphasized that,

The need for training in Special Medical Intake arose out of the high demand for officers in the Medical Corps to man the 37 Military Hospital, the Medical Reception Stations in the various garrisons of the Ghana Armed Forces, the upcoming military hospital in Kumasi, and also to meet the demand for international Peace Support Operations (GMA, 2017:11).


UNIFIL Ghana Battalion [Ghanbatt] 89 which deployed in 2022 was the first time GAF deployed a psychologist on a peacekeeping tour in that role. The deployment was seen as overdue given the growing recognition of the psychological and mental health needs of personnel in mission areas and back home. These recruitments are therefore important in improving the capabilities of GAF and augmenting staff numbers in managing medical outcomes of soldiering. Nonetheless, the special recruitments do not meet the demand for psychologists and other health workers in the armed forces to provide medical services at the various medical facilities across GAF garrisons.



5.3.2 Increase in Female Recruits and Officer Cadets

From childhood, society presents the girl child with dolls and the male child with toy guns, vehicles, and machinery. Girls are thus thought to possess soft skills akin to femininity, while boys are favoured for the masculine spirit that rests in martial arts, toughness, and aggression. The military, with its stress on martial skills, was thus a natural space for boys. When girls were accepted into the domain, the respite was found in a replay of constriction, if preference, for secretarial and ‘wife’ duties corresponding to the societal gendered roles.⁴⁹ Recruitment advertisements mirror these realities but require similar academic qualifications for males and females. Though recruitment of females started under Nkrumah in 1958, it was put on hold after 1964.

It was resumed briefly in the early 1990s and closed again until the 2000s. The ambivalence in retaining or increasing female numbers reflects the myth that ‘females can’t fight’ (MacKenzie, 2015) and perceptions about the female as ‘bad luck’ (Amoo-Welsing et al., 2019:117). The female was perceived as a burden in the face of war, needing protection from the male, cherished sister, mother, wife, lover, not expected to witness horror, and perhaps a ‘distraction’ to the male warrior. Their numbers were thus as minimal as the then ideals of the military could tolerate. The trend in the recruitment of females reflected social norms about the place of females in male-dominated domains. There is an indication, for instance, that there were two females in the 1996 intake. An officer recalled:



⁴⁹ Before females entered the domain, and when they were absent, male soldiers served as performed the ‘wife’ duties. Male soldiers as butlers performed domestic and personal services to higher-ranked officers. The enlisted aide also oversees the daily routines and coordinates events to enhance the officer’s efficiency and comfort. In GAF, there is hesitation to employ female Butlers. With few exceptions, most male study participants preferred male butlers to avoid suspicions of intimate relations.

In my time we had only two females. One of the female officers was the first female to be in the mist at that time because they were not taking women... I was rather taken aback to see that there were few women in my institution (KII, MSO27, August 2022, Burma Camp).


The late 1990s onwards have witnessed an increase in female recruitment in GAF. The “*increase in the number of women is a reactive measure*” mostly attributable to peacekeeping pressures from the UN (Senior Female Officer 7, Accra). While the Army has been a latecomer in welcoming females, the Navy has recorded increasing female recruits and officer cadets at a considerable pace. It, for example, had four female recruits in 1995 and fifteen in the 1996 intake, and for the first time, as corroborated by Amoo-Welsing et al. (2019:117), had a female platoon commander. The recruitment trend in GAF in the late 1990s onwards reflects events across the globe, such as an increase in female representation in the US armed forces (Moore, 2016; Nagel et al., 2021). Women, however, comprise only 14% of the US Armed Forces, although they constitute over 50% of the American population.

While GAF’s general outlook does not differ markedly from the USA statistics, there has been a deliberate attempt or plan by the Ghana Navy and Armed Forces to increase the number of females participating in the military since the 2000s. An officer, a former instructor at the Military Academy, noted that,

When I came in 2015, I had almost about 38 females out of about 200. And then the next group that came after them I had 59 females, so the number more or less added and I think the subsequent recruit that came the number is almost the same. Almost about 20%, so the female recruitment in the Ghana Armed Forces has been encouraging, I believe all that is a result of the advocacy that is going on with gender issues (KII, MSO10, July 2022, NHQ Burma Camp).

In the Ghana Air Force, about 28% of the officer corps and other ranks are female (Senior Female Officer15). The feat, however, has less to do with gender advocacy from UN circles than with local initiatives and Air Force Command decisions. Additionally, the Air Force, like the Navy, does not provide the largest numbers for peace support operations and is less affected by advocacy undertaken by the Elsie Initiative. Notably, women are best suited for certain roles and have performed well in some male-dominated fields.

During CIMIC activities similar to those of the US Female Engagement Team of Marine Corps in the Iraqi and Afghan wars (Moore 2006; 2014:58), female soldiers are welcomed by fellow women and GAF sees them as great assets in intelligence gathering in mission areas. Nonetheless, some GAF women have distinguished themselves as Mechanical Transport Officers, Military Observers, and Force Commander on peace operations. Thus, as female roles in male-dominated areas expand, future advertisements for recruitment will include direct applications from women to the traditionally male domains.



5.4 Women Deployments

5.4.1 Changing Roles and Status of Women in Ghana and GAF

Consequent to traditional conceptions about womanhood in Ghanaian society and in many parts of the world that the woman requires protection, there is hesitancy about deploying women to combat zones and particularly frontlines of war. In one elicitation, it was intimated that,

You won't send your sisters and mothers to the war front. You protect them. We cannot present a picture of female body bags from mission areas. It will be unacceptable to the Ghanaian society. This is one of the likely reasons why women didn't use to be deployed to the front lines or infantry duties (KII, MSO4, June 2022, AHQ Burma Camp).

Indeed, during violent conflicts, women, children, and the aged bear the brunt of the effects of war. Women double in most cases as victims of the conflict as well as burden bearers as they take care of the other vulnerable groups. However, these women are not trained to fight and cannot be comparable to the female soldier who is trained in the art of war. Nonetheless, the idea of the female soldier needing protection coexists with the reality that soldiering has predominantly been a male business. Historically, some females such as Yaa Asantewaa of Asante (Ghana), and the Amazon of Dahomey (Benin), have demonstrated outstanding soldiery performances (Addae, 2005; Aboagye, 2010; Alpern, 1998). However, these have been exceptions to the norms that have prevailed across societies in Ghana, Africa, and other parts of the world. Female soldiers, both officers and other ranks, have been mostly confined to non-combat arms. The US Armed Forces, for example, reversed its policy on the exclusion of women from combat duties only in 2013 (MacKenzie, 2015). Similarly, from the 1990s through the first decade of the 2000s,

Some of them [GAF women] were cooks, radio operators, that. But then the females were not in the system (KII, MSS5, July 2022, Whistler Barracks).

In most units of GAF, females served as nurses, clerks, radio operators, testing operators, waitresses, caterers, cooks, and storekeepers (Senior Officer Veteran 1, Accra; Senior Officer 9, Burma Camp). Females who had infantry units such as military police as their organic units were considered as a non-infantry category for promotional exams and aligned senior officer duties until 2021, though their male colleagues remained in the infantry category. A senior female officer traced the start of the changes in the trend to the year 2018. In the officer's evaluation,

In 2018, the first time they posted a female to the battalion. I think it is the gender advocacy over the years. People were pushing buttons once in a while or one step at a time and so I think we got there (KII, FSO1, August 2022, Burma Camp).

Gender advocacy over the years is not restricted to women in GAF per se. Within Ghanaian society, there have been calls for affirmative action towards women to increase the number of females in predominantly male positions. Additionally, there have been strides by women in legal practice where some women have become chief justices of the country. Similar developments have been recorded in academic leadership across some public tertiary institutions in the country. Within GAF, advocacy, and command decisions have also seen females making strides in reaching ranks that had hardly recorded female officers or other ranks. It was elicited from the interviews that,

Now we have many female Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels, and even a female Brigadier General. It did not use to be so (KII, FSO9, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

Significantly, there has been an increase in the number of female Commanding Officers (COs) since 2022. There are female COs for the School of Ordnance and Defence Mechanical Transport Unit (Def MT) in Accra, 89 Signal Regiment in Kumasi, and a Naval Ship (GN Blika and later GNS Ankobra). The newly established Medical Emergencies Unit is also commanded by a female Brigadier General. There are also female heads in Supply and Transport and Def MT. These developments signal the steadily changing status of women in GAF reflective of societal changes, advocacy within GAF, and exposure to and demands from peace operations. The drivers of these changes are akin to normative pressures highlighted in institutional change (sociological institutionalism). The changes mean that women are moving into roles that were traditionally male.

5.4.2 Women in Non-Traditional Roles in GAF

Increasingly, women in GAF are being deployed to domains and units that have been principally male-dominated. This development has included posting female officers and other ranks to infantry roles in infantry units such as the various battalions within the three commands of the Ghana Army. The change has occurred because of advocacy by personnel, the willingness of the Command, and UN demands. A female officer, for instance, stated that advocacy and UN demands have combined to drive the deployment of women in male-dominated operations.

Both, because I started fighting for my unit on the UN operation issue, which is why I said both because everybody is fighting from somewhere. Before UN is also calling for some percentage so you think you should push people there. Let's say now we have the opportunity of going as a force commander or something, it is about capacity building (KII, FSO1, August 2022, Burma Camp).

The UN requires that all troops have at least 15% females and 25% of observers and staff officers should be females by 2028. Capacity building therefore demands positioning women in male-dominated areas to keep them ready for roles in the UN. GAF has already reached the 15% threshold ahead of schedule but can rarely meet the 25% staff officer requirement. The experiences of the females deployed on operational tours abroad are however strengthening the drive to meet the 25% female staff officer target. The experience of the female personnel in peace operations also stirs in them a passion to challenge their exclusion from activities that were mostly undertaken by their male counterparts. In the observation of an officer:

It is exposure because we travel, we go for peacekeeping, and they see other countries that have had female components integrated in their deployment. So, when they go for peacekeeping and they see females playing the role of a guard doing other guard duties, they are not only limited to the cook option. They are motivated that they can do it. So, when they come back, the females are pushing not to be taken off certain ceremonial duties. In some of our trades, we have female contingents, so they want to showcase. They want to show what the men can do, we also can do, based on what they saw in the UN theatre or peacekeeping operations (KII, MSO10, July 2022, NHQ Burma Camp).

The demand of the UN within the last decades has therefore challenged the high command to ensure the availability of women in the various roles that are specified in the call to contribute troops. Peacekeeping is “the main driver behind a lot of these changes that we are seeing because the UN is making it mandatory for women to be involved in a lot of things” (KII, MSO3, July 2022, Otu Barracks). MSO3 elaborates that:

It is a requirement that the unit's countries are supposed to meet. So, I think is one that is challenging the high command to look at it. I will say that peacekeeping has been a blessing to the Armed Forces in a way because the UN wants the women in the field, the women to be given the opportunity and not kept backstage, and once they're doing that, we all see them do that effectively in the mission, then it means that when they come back, they can do it as well. As to whether we are doing that is something else. But at least every officer that has gone on peacekeeping now is aware that when it comes to these things that we're supposed to do as duties, the women can do it and do it perfectly as the men do it; and so, for me I think yes, peacekeeping is a very important factor that is influencing the change in the armed forces. And if we want to remain relevant to the UN in some of these things then it means we should give opportunities to the women (KII, MSO3, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

A Senior Other Rank (OR) corroborated the performance of women in mission fields and its implications for female roles back home. The sergeant major recounted that:

I remember this UNOCI that I was talking of, I was in Abidjan... Rebels attacked our camp in Bondouko; who raised the alarm? It was a female sentry who was on post, who raised that alarm and they repelled the attack. So, as I said earlier if we employ them as rifles, they can sometimes do better than the men. What I am trying to say is that we shouldn't specify them to a particular unit. Maybe as a woman, we should put them in the kitchen; and train them (KII, MSS1, July 2022, Burma Camp).

The consensus from peace operation experience is since the females do infantry duties on mission fields, they can do it at home. Corroborating this view, FO2 notes that her performance at the peace mission field equipped her for a similar role back home (KII, July 2022, Burma Camp). She was therefore not surprised when Command asked her to oversee her unit. Women perform similar leading roles in other peace operations. In 2007, for instance, a female quartermaster was deployed on a peace operation for the first time. The beneficiary of that breakthrough put it thus:

My first operation, I had been dropped twice, so, the excitement was great. Also, in about 20 or 30 years, no female had gone as a quartermaster. So, at that point, I was the first female to travel as a quartermaster in 2007. They had a female quartermaster back in the 80's but she didn't travel outside so I was the first female in a long time to travel as a quartermaster, so there was a lot of expectation. And secondly, I was a second lieutenant so there was a lot of expectations because they thought I was too young to hold stores (KII, FSO3, August 2022, Accra).

Air Force women had however been in traditionally male functions well before the UN made demands for women in peacekeeping through the Elsie Initiative ((KII, FSO15, May 2023, AFHQ Burma Camp). In the Air Force's sole peace mission in Cote d'Ivoire, as she recalled, there was a female pilot and female engineer both in the mission area and in the force. There had to be females for their first deployment to be possible. Similar feats were recorded in 1964 when GAF had its first female pilot, in the 1970s when Somalia had the first female fighter pilot, and in the USA in 1993 when it had its first female fighter pilot. Since these trailblazers, women in the Air Force like their Navy counterparts continue to make considerable strides in the male domain as the Army gradually catches up.

5.4.3 Readyng Females for UN Roles

The UN call to contribute troops, mission experts or observers sometimes requires the nomination of a female officer of specific ranks. In this case, as elicited from a Senior Female Officer, “if you don’t have them, you can’t deploy them.” The UN demands thus shows one of the ways global structures and institutions shape and condition local context. The senior female officer puts it more succinctly thus:

If we have the opportunity to go as a force commander or something, it is about capacity building. If you don’t build the person from the beginning, how do you get there? If all the women are in 37[Military Hospital] then I bet you we will not win everything, we will not pass. Because they’ll be asking you operational stuff and you’re not used for operation or better still you’ll go there, and you’ll goof, you can’t do the work. So, they have to build the capacity from the beginning. If you want to send females as platoon commanders, officers commanding and then battalion commanders in the future you need to build the capacity from the beginning (KII, FSO1, August 2022, Burma Camp).

The recognition of the need for capacity is accentuated by specific demands from the UN to deploy women in leadership roles during some deployments. When deploying UNIFIL Ghanbatt 89 in 2022, for example, a senior officer recalled that requests for females in leadership roles could not be fully met. The interviewee indicated that though the medical corps hosts several females in leadership positions they were not enough to satisfy the call made by the UN.

Recently, during our deployment that we are preparing for Lebanon, they wanted to have females in leadership positions. Do you get it? and females in leadership positions which position can they get female leadership? They turn to the medical because we have the

majority of the females. They wanted a doctor, the head nurse and these are the top hierarchy of the medical deployment, to be females. We were able to satisfy some but not all. We must balance it with our policy and then the roster of deployment (KII, MSO22, June 2022, DMS, Burma Camp).

Most of the interviewees strongly affirmed the demands of highlighted transfer back home such that GAF positions itself to groom women to be in leadership positions. *GAF will therefore most likely increase capacity building for female personnel to take up roles that will help fulfil mission requirements.* The UN specification for missions is thus contributing to building the capacity of female officers and other ranks in ways that will make them ready for opportunities in UN peace operations.

Within the GAF however, women have been involved in male-dominant areas at different speeds in the three forces. Women have turned out to be more in these domains in the Navy and the Air Force than in the Army. For the Naval Force, a senior training officer highlights that females are now in all trades.

The Navy has the three main branches that are the executives, the technical, and the suppliers. The suppliers are like the logistics and administration chain. Initially, majority were in the logistics and administration chain but as time went on the policy was reformed for trade grouping and I think that was in the late 2000s so there was a policy for equipment usage and maintenance. It means we could have more than one trade. We used to have a driver and mechanic but the policy was changed. So, mechanics are supposed to drive and drivers should have some knowledge in maintaining vehicles. Two trades can be taken together and that gave the opportunities to some females. For instance, like [name

withheld] Fleet officer, she is one of the highest rankings in the other ranks. Fleet officer, she was a Cook Steward but now she is the Cozy, the RSM of BNT, which is the Basic and Nursing Training School now the Leadership Training School at Tema (KII, MSO10, July 2022, NHQ Burma Camp).

In the Air Force, females have also taken up some male-dominated roles, such as flying helicopters and engineering aircraft parts. For example, during the Air Force peacekeeping mission in Cote d'Ivoire, a female flew the Helicopter (KII, FSO15, May 2023, AFHQ Burma Camp). She therefore protests that capacity building in the Air Force is less shaped by the demands of peace operations. The officer contended that the Ivorian mission is the only mission the Air Force has embarked on and that Air Force women had made such inroads before the UN made affirmative demands on TCCs.

5.4.4 Establishment of the Gender Desk through the Elsie Initiative.

In the quest to increase women's participation in peacekeeping operations, Canada has championed the Elsie Initiative, which, through the UN, makes affirmative demands on TCCs to provide a percentage of female personnel within battalions deployed for peacekeeping. Using Beckert (2010:153), this change is driven by coercion. To spearhead this initiative, GAF has established Gender Advisory Desks across many of its commands and units.

Among other duties, the Gender Advisors are required to champion the interests of women in their respective units. They also advocate for the inclusion of women in internal and international appointments, exercises, training, and deployments by the various units in GAF to fulfil the UN demands.

5.5 Changes in Training and Operational Readiness

GAF engages in required training for the men and officers. The process is continuous across various units. These trainings include both academic and physical components that are required for promotion to higher ranks and the determination of physical fitness. A senior officer at the Physical Training unit noted that there are standards that are expected in males and females during routine monthly tests. The test also varies with age. The senior officer stated about physical that:

It depends on firstly the age, and then we have the basic test for everybody when they come every month, they are tested. And we want to see that every month they are improving, and the standards differ in age and sex, so the standards are pretty high and with training, everybody can meet them (KII, MSO27, June 2022, Burma Camp).

Training is therefore required for each personnel. The various units in GAF also required regular training of their force as a team. GAF's peacekeeping commitments, however, harm unit training.

5.5.1 Influence of Peacekeeping on Training within Units

The availability of personnel is crucial to undertake group-based exercises and training. Peacekeeping deployments negatively affect group-based training in the units. A former commanding officer finds that many personnel deployed from a unit lowers the effectiveness of training, and affects duties back home, as well as the operational readiness of the affected unit. Senior Officer³, for instance, expressed the concern thus:

I think it affects us, though we get exposure to training that will make us professional, it also affects unit training... Training is seriously affected when we

talk to those who were in the military before we joined. They tell you what they were doing, and what we are doing now, we are getting some aspects of training. All these battalions that go out get training, but for different purposes. It affects our training and duties back home...The adverse effect is that there are a lot of your troops out on peacekeeping duties, and so the unit training at home isn't that effective... Back home, they are not able to train because they don't have the personnel. Most of them are out on peacekeeping. We are hoping, and the internal commitment is quite a lot...it has affected the operational readiness of the Ghana Armed Forces (KII, MSO3, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

As the response admits, international training acquired through peacekeeping contributes to soldier professionalism. As another senior officer indicated, “training is a continuous process for the force during deployments” (Senior Officer4, Burma Camp). The training bordering deployments aids peacekeeping performance and exposes the GAF to global military practices. Paradoxically, however, Clune (2014:200) found that decennaries of international military training suppressed GAF’s potential to renew itself organically. That study further cited Hutchful (1998: 248-251, 212) to indicate that Ghana’s “complete dependence on international circuits of military production and training” consequently inhibited the advancement of junior ranks in GAF. The constraint to rank and file progression resulting from lack of organic renewal, Clune (2014) notes, contributed to grievances that provided the basis for Rawlings’ stand-off against the military hierarchy.

Arguably, corresponding international training for the other ranks might have reduced the potential for grievances. Nonetheless, training across all units notwithstanding peacekeeping deployments will enhance operations readiness in the various units of GAF.

5.5.2 Swimming Across the Congo: Emphasis on Water-Related Skills.

Peacekeeping incidents have also shaped aspects of training in the armed forces. The collective experience of GAF in the 1960s peace operation in the Congo challenged the military establishment to review its training protocols. The review led to an emphasis on skills in navigating water bodies to enhance personnel security in such environments. The review was triggered by an incident on November 24, 1961, where some soldiers drowned while swimming across the Congo River (KII, MSO53, May 2023, Burma Camp). MSO53 explained that:

The Congo River incident occurred on November 24, 1961, during the ONUC mission. A group of Irish soldiers, who were part of the peacekeeping force, drowned in the Congo River while attempting to rescue other troops who had come under attack. This tragic event highlighted the challenging conditions and risks faced by peacekeepers in the Congo at that time (KII, May 2023, Burma Camp).

A Veteran Officer corroborating the story added that there were Ghanaian soldiers and those from other nations who constituted the force that suffered the incident. However,

swimming was part of the training of officers and other ranks. There was a swimming pool in Kumasi where recruits trained and another one in Accra, at Next Door, Teshie before the 1960s where officers trained (RMSO1, June 2022, Accra).

The Congo River incident nonetheless had a profound impact on GAF's training of the officers and men about swimming and safety precautions. As a senior officer recalls:

In terms of the impact on swimming training in the Ghana Armed Forces, it is difficult to provide specific details without more information. However, incidents

like the Congo River tragedy prompted GAF to review training protocols and emphasize water-related skills and safety measures. Such incidents led to an increased focus on swimming and water survival training for personnel serving in GAF (KII, MSO53, May 2023, Burma Camp).

While the specific change in the emphasis on water-related skills was not quite obvious, the assertion of Senior Officer53 is in keeping with the trend in the data and shows that GAF sometimes modifies its training contents and structures in response to factors such as peacekeeping outcomes.

5.5.3 Introduction of Psycho-Social Course

Survival training for GAF personnel has also occurred in the area of psychological and mental health of peacekeepers. Birenbaum (1994) has stressed the need to do things differently in managing personnel's mental wellbeing. Along this line, GAF has introduced a psychosocial programme to help personnel negotiate the mental and psychological effects of peace operations. A senior officer at KAIPTC indicated that *“the psychological part of peacekeeping is very important. Recently we have introduced a psycho-social training for the peacekeepers”* (ICI, MSO17, August 2022, Teshie). The course, *“Mental Health and Psycho-Social Support (MHPSS) to Peace Support Operation Personnel”* was introduced by the KAIPTC in collaboration with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

The Course aims to equip military, police, and civilian staff officers operating in high-intensity Peace Support Operations and Humanitarian Assistance Missions with the foundational individual and collective well-being and resilience factors essential to the overall development, maintenance, and sustenance of a peace culture (Corporate Affairs, KAIPTC, March 2021).

The MHPSS training programme is deemed by KAIPTC as the first in Africa to help personnel of peace support operations and humanitarian assistance negotiate exposures to the effects of war. Notably, however, not all peace mission involves war contexts, and many interlocutors found stress a significant psychological outcome. The focus on ‘high-intensity theatres (whatever the criteria), while important is therefore limiting. The MHPSS or new programmes should more helpfully cover these other aspects to improve the management of the varied psychological dimensions.

Notably, military training emphasizes strength and resilience in the face of exposure to stress and trauma. It is imperative, however, for the Command to consider training commanders and other leaders in psychological and psychiatric skills that can provide first-level support to personnel who may be exposed to mental health risks on peace support missions.

5.5.4 Soft Skills in the Face of Training in the Martial Force

Primarily, military training stresses martial arts. Peacekeeping engagements however require that troops blend soft skills and martial force to execute assigned mandates.

The soft skills are mostly applied during civil-military cooperation⁵⁰ (CIMIC) where the armed forces engage civilian entities such as local authorities, non-governmental organisations, government agencies, and international organisations during peace operations (Ankerson, 2008:1-6; de Coning, 2007:1-4; Roman, 2015; Esler, 2020). Through these interactions, peacekeepers gather information from communities and build rapport with the civil domain of the operational theatre through humanitarian and developmental efforts to facilitate the success of the mandate (Ankerson, 2008:5; Rinelli and Duyvesteryn, 2018; de Coning, 2008; NATO, 2012).

⁵⁰ CIMIC is presented as Civil-military Coordination in studies such as de Coning (2007).

The GAF combines traditional military preparation and cultural awareness of areas of operational responsibility with elements of Ghanaian culture when visiting stakeholders in operational areas as a form of community entry and a sign of respect in their CIMIC activities. Thus, CIMIC models are bricolaged, translated, and hybridized as they diffuse partly towards homogenization and divergence. Explaining the GAF CIMIC endeavours, MSO3 notes that:

The Ghanaian peacekeeper wants to quickly learn the language, and wants to identify with the people. When he gets to a place the first thing he wants to do is to go round and say hello to opinion leaders, who is the chief here, the priest here, the Imam here. He wants to know all of them and interact with them...These are some of the things we do when we go out there, so our culture plays a very important role. We want to always relate with our community, we understand it so the Ghanaian hospitality we carry everywhere and so when Ghanaians are living, they say no they don't want the Ghanaians to leave because we get along well with them (KII, MSO3, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

Thus, peacekeeping reinforces courtesy calls, community, and hospitality in GAF. The finding corroborates Janowitz's (1976) observation that ideal soldiers share in society's nonmilitary values and confirms Agyekum's (2021a) study that societal factors influence the activities of GAF. The cultural element noted by Humphrey Agyekum (apologising by proxy) however differs from those observed by this study. Interviewees also noted that there has been an increase in CIMIC components of GAF's internal operations in Ghana given the observed efficacy of the practice in peace operation theatres. The following elicitation exemplifies this mimetic process of institutional change:

In peacekeeping doing medical outreach programs, especially in dental care and other screenings has helped us to embark on similar activities in Ghana. For instance, in Shai Hills the communities in the Doryumu and its surroundings come for medical care. At that time, we didn't have national insurance cards, so they came for free medical care. Sometimes when we go for some exercises, we see people in need, and our medical staff can administer first aid to the people in need who are not part of the Force (KII, MSO15, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

Observably, however, 37 Military Hospital of GAF is open to the civil populace in Ghana and serves as a referral facility. The open-door policy in GAF's medical services is thus arguably endogenous and reinforced by lessons from CIMIC outreaches in peace operation theatres. Taken together, exposure to cultures in peace mission fields has added to lessons acquired before deployment and influences from the Ghanaian society to shape social components of military activities of GAF in peace operation theatres and its internal operations in Ghana.

5.5.5 Marrying Up

During peacetime, the units of GAF practice on their own and might engage in inter-unit competitions such as shooting. Some interviewees opine that there is hardly a combination of troops from differing units observed for peacekeeping deployments. Pre-deployment training which brings members of different units to “*Bundase helps to marry up with colleagues from other units*” (KII, MSO11, September 2022, Air Force Base -Takoradi). Mission area further enhances collaboration with colleagues from other units. Taken together, the integration of soldiers from the Army, the Navy and Air Force enhances cohesion, group solidarity and capacity for collective action. Olonisakin (2000:189) and Janowitz (1964a:64) identify the three factors as key features

of the military's need for its effectiveness. The integration of forces that occur at Bundase Training Camp and the peace operation theatre is thus useful for any eventuality that might require working with members from other units.

Another outcome of marrying up of the forces is inter-services exchanges through which the three services learn from one another in the mission field. In the view of a senior naval officer,

There is a reason for discipline, command, and control but for us, it is team work. So, in the Navy we have that kind of interpersonal relationship because you the navigation officer are the leader of the navigation team... we have a very unique relationship with our men, in fact very cordial relationship. That is why we can even take each other after sailing and go and sit, eat together, and come back to the ship (KII, MSO10, July 2022, Naval HQ, Burma Camp).

The officer contrasted the cordial relationship in the naval force with that of the Army, and the infantry specifically. The commander or officer of an infantry unit hardly mingles with the men. The exchanges between officers and men from other services thus provide an informal means for learned behaviour that can improve the relationship between officers and other ranks in another service. The elicitation below represents the knowledge exchanges:

But it is not the same for the infantry or the army and most of the peacekeeping is army heavily weighted. So, when they also see this relationship and see when we go the way we relate with other ranks and men. It also helps them to reform because somebody who'll be nagging at his officer, you'll realize a navy officer is politely talking to you and so definitely they'll also reform and these are some of the positives (KII, MSO10, July 2022, Naval HQ, Burma Camp).

The experiences from marrying up during pre-deployment, and troop participation in peace operations are thus increasing the bond among the three services and personnel across GAF. This development has positive gains for team building and collaboration during joint operations. Given that effective cooperation is required for combined land, air, and naval operations, opportunities for marrying up the forces in the service could improve general performance during such joint tasks.

5.6 Chapter Summary

The GAF has been undergoing considerable evolution. Within the ongoing changes, Ghana's peacekeeping participation contributed to or accelerated some of the structural changes that have occurred in GAF. The discussions show that the deployments to the Congo triggered or at least hastened the Africanization process in GAF. Opening of some commands such as IPSO, KAIPTC, and APOTS, and the establishment of some departments are a result of peacekeeping engagements. Increases in recruitment, changes in the deployment of women, the administrative rank system, logistic planning, and training regimes also have a connection with peacekeeping demands, roles, and lessons.

However, most of the changes either accelerate developments engineered endogenously within GAF itself or by political activities in the country as exemplified by the Africanisation drive. Others nonetheless are brought to bear by peacekeeping necessities such as the establishment of training centres and the incorporation of peacekeeping training in the activities of the armed forces. The processes of the changes show normative pressures, mimesis, coercion, and competition as well as varying combinations of these factors.

CHAPTER SIX

PEACEKEEPING INFLUENCES ON GHANA ARMED FORCES

PERSONNEL

6.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses ways peacekeeping has influenced the outlook of the personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF). It examines attitudinal changes, post-service career choices, readiness for eventualities, and effects on the practice of trade and other soldiery paths. Adverse consequences of peacekeeping duties as related to soldiers' attempts to negotiate medical outcomes of peacekeeping are also investigated to appreciate the impact of professional and medical experiences of peacekeeping operations on peacekeepers' behaviour in Ghana.⁵¹

I argue that peacekeeping experiences have reduced most personnel's interest in coup making and tendency towards brutality against civilians. This development does not mean coup plotting and brutality from elements of the Ghana Armed Forces are completely cured across the rank and file. Peacekeeping also shapes the career choices of some personnel and enhances the practice of trade and functioning in assigned duties. While professional experiences prepare officers and soldiers for eventualities, and medical screenings help ensure deployment of physically fit personnel, traumas, stress and exposure to transmissible diseases in mission areas negatively impact personnel.

⁵¹ Where interviewees' narratives and views are quoted in the analysis and discussions, author's insertions to clarify the participants' comments are presented in square brackets “[].”

6.1 Peacekeeping Experiences and Attitudinal Changes of Personnel

Personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces have a history of coup d'états and even brutality towards civilians.⁵² However, during the Fourth Republic, there are changes in GAF's relations with Ghanaian civilians. Most interviewees indicated disinterest in putsches. Observably, the coup avoidance rule is a key marker of military professionalism partly showing objective civilian control. Studies (such as Nkrumah, 1968:48-49, 1973:370-371; Sarvas, 1999:108) however maintain that, as guardians of national interest and shield a country's sovereignty, the professional soldier may be compelled to intervene in politics to secure these ends.

Yet, coups are not always, if at all, altruistic, borne out of devotion to duty and service to the nation. Nonetheless, Ghana has been spared notable coup attempts since 1993. The Republic v. Mac-Palm et al. (2024) reveals that a coup plot has been ongoing since 2018. Earlier, coup events occurred in 1994, 2001, 2003, and 2004 (Amnesty International, 1995; Marshall and Marshall, 2016; Songhai Advisory, October 2019).⁵³ These coup events are a few incidents in the public sphere, and the country has remained under democratic governance for the last three decades. Ghanaians and many Africans have faith in democracy. However, they are willing to rid themselves of purported democratic regimes that do not deliver on basic promises of a democracy (Ero and Mutiga, 2023), such as the rule of law, freedom of expression, and opportunities for economic advancement.



⁵²Coups: 1966, 1972, 1978, 1979, 1981 and many failed attempts (Hutchful et al., 2021; McGowan, 2003:363-364). Some civilians have also perpetrated violence against military personnel, including the murder of an officer in Denkyira, and the mob assassination of a soldier in Ashiaman, respectively, in the Central and Greater Accra Regions of the country.

⁵³ Coup events comprise successful coups, attempted (failed) coups, coup plots (discovered), and alleged coup plots (Marshall and Marshall, 2016).

Notably, public support for coups in Ghana has declined; electoral disputes are increasingly resolved through the courts; economic disillusionment has not provoked nationwide protests aimed at toppling regimes; and political candidates have, through mediation efforts, accepted either defeat or judicial rulings on electoral outcomes. These internal dynamics in Ghana have limited the fertile grounds that have partly spurred coups in neighbouring countries. GAF also has a highly suspicious atmosphere about political discussions to such an extent that interviewees were wary of any politically laden discussions that might implicate them in any way. While this attitude is partly shaped by the military intelligence apparatus's discovery of the coup plotting in *The Republic v. Mac-Palm et al.* (2024), it combines with other factors to provide some context to explain the ongoing democratic stability in Ghana. These factors, among others, are also important in understanding how democratic stability is sustained outside of peacekeeping activities.

While Ghana's democracy remains (whatever the form), and the GAF has mostly remained in the Barracks, perceptions and experiences of peacekeepers, however, serve as one of the key explanations for the absence of notable military interventions in the country. In the view of the personnel, peacekeeping provides an avenue for soldiers to look outward rather than being preoccupied with the country's challenges and their own economic situation. Additionally, the financial incentives from peacekeeping outweigh the material benefits of participating in a coup d'état. Some personnel estimate the benefits to be about one to three in favour of participating in peacekeeping. Observably, participating in peacekeeping and the financial benefits have not necessarily prevented coups in other countries, as studies such as Baledrokadroka (2012) have shown. In Ghana's case, personnel view the remuneration as an alternative source of income that compensates for promises of coup plotters and alleviates, in part, the financial challenges of some soldiers, while discouraging participation in coup events.

Beyond material considerations, exposure to the causes and consequences of coups in mission areas, combined with Ghana’s own history of military interventions, has fostered among personnel a professional and normative aversion to the use of coups as instruments of political or institutional change.

Table 6.1 below presents some quotations from study participants regarding the connections between peacekeeping and coup-making in Ghana.

Table 6.1 Quotations on peacekeeping and coup

Themes	Quotations
Civilian influence	“You can’t do coup d’état without civilian involvement.” (MO8, Male Officers FGD, July 2022 Whistler Barracks); “You [civilians] push us to undertake coup and go back and blame us” (MO8, Male Officers FGD, July 2022 Whistler Barracks)
Deployment for stability	“Coup d’états correlate with the number of peacekeeping Ghana had” (KII, MSO18, August 2022 AHQ, Burma Camp); “If you decrease your peacekeeping for your armed forces, you are at risk” (KII, MSO18, August 2022 AHQ, Burma Camp); “if you keep your dog focused on people outside, he’s always aggressive towards intruders” (KII, MSO18, August 2022 AHQ, Burma Camp).
Rewards/incentives	“Was not Sierra Leone’s [coup] issues at the end motivated by the quest for money?” (MO8 Male Officers FGD, July 2022 Whistler Barracks). “Peacekeepers make more money than coup offers and so the soldier will prefer to go for peacekeeping” (KII, MSO18, August 2022 AHQ, Burma Camp); “I will get the opportunity to go on peacekeeping and receive thrice the promised money for coup participation, so I will not follow you” (KII, MSO35, July 2022 GHQ Burma Camp).
Lessons from Mission	“Rebels used clashes in Liberia and Sierra Leone to stage a coup” “We [peacekeepers] derive lessons and information from coup operations during missions and use them to prevent a coup in Ghana,” “So we have experience [from missions] that we are using to counter coup” (KII MSS1, July 2022, Burma Camp).

The evidence aligns with other findings on civil-military relations in Ghana and the effects of years of peacekeeping experiences on GAF (examples: Hutchful, 1997b; Salihu, 2020; Levine, 2016; Aubyn et al., 2019; Banini et al., 2020; Salihu and Aning, 2023). While previous studies (e.g., Agyekum, 2019) present mixed evidence on the relationship between peacekeeping participation and coup tendencies in Ghana, the analysis indicates that the sustained engagement of GAF personnel in peace operations has substantially contributed to the stability of the country's Fourth Republic.

Though democratically stable, interpersonal relations between soldiers and civilians are not constantly harmonious. Within the last six years, there have been cases of soldier brutality against civilians. Commenting on the recurrence of this phenomenon, a retired Senior Warrant Officer notes in an interview that lower-ranking soldiers predominantly commit acts of indiscipline (ExMSS4, May 2023, Accra). The ex-serviceman argues that senior other ranks and officers are not interested in any acts of indiscipline in public. This view arguably discounts moments of coups d'état and the role of some officers and men in brutalities during the general breakdown of discipline in the barracks. Though officers and senior non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) are rarely noted for such acts of indiscipline in the Fourth Republic of Ghana, their reactions influence the (in)discipline of the soldiers.

In the protection of territorial integrity, however, peacekeeping experiences have given the interviewees a stronger perception about ensuring the security of the country. Interviewees reflected on the horror, human suffering, and general conditions in some peacekeeping theatres such as Liberia (ECOMOG and UNMIL), South Sudan (UNISFA), Rwanda (UNAMIR), and DR Congo (MONUC and MONUSCO) to highlight that war and conflict must be prevented at all

costs. The Liberian and Rwandan experiences provided a perspective to some peacekeepers who participated in peacekeeping in the 1990s. One peacekeeper recounts that:

you see human beings dead and not buried. As someone from our culture which offers some decency to corpses, it was not a comfortable scene at all. The sight of the amputees and the fact that women have to descend to offering sex for food; you will not want to see your sister or daughter going through such because of war. It is nothing any of us should wish to happen to our country and we must do all possible to secure the peace of Ghana (KII, MSO3, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

Thus, scenes of civil war and the effects of war on children, women, and aged, “encourage the officer to ensure Ghana does not descend into civil war” (MSO11, September 2022, Air Force Base-Takoradi). For female officers and soldiers, the scenes which were common in the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL)⁵⁴ evoked humiliation: “They [civilian women] could trade sex for any penny. As a woman, this was humiliating for me. It made me feel so bad. I never want any country to go through this at all” (KII, FSS11, March 2024, Teshie). The war contexts thus yield similar conclusions for male and female soldiers, namely, “secure the peace of Ghana.”

Indeed, several studies have noted peacekeeping economies as spaces where women and young girls are sexually exploited (Jennings, 2014, 2010; McGill, 2014; ElMorally, 2017; Tasker, 2023). The evidence from the interviewees thus confirms the assertion in Salihu and Aning (2023:303) that peacekeeping operations expose GAF personnel to “horrors of state collapse” and human suffering. Consequently, peacekeepers conversant with the destructive outcomes of wars and

⁵⁴ Similar events are reported across several missions including MONUC and MONUSCO in DR Congo.

internal conflicts through years of peacekeeping activities in varying conflict theatres want to avoid war and its consequences.

GAF peacekeepers who had toured ECOMOG in the early or late nineties also corroborate that before the war, Liberia had considerable infrastructure, but it had been destroyed by years of civil war. Therefore, one officer strongly insists that “We must be careful to stop any moves that could plunder our country into such mess” (SMO8, FGD July 2022, Whistler Barracks). The posture of these peacekeepers resonates with arguments in Levine (2016:81) that Ghanaian peacekeepers, particularly of the 1990s, “seem to have developed conflict resolution skills and a horror of internal conflict.” These experiences should help improve the deteriorating civilian-soldier relations of the past few years.

Agyekum (2020) has observed that introspection from peacekeeping influences military personnel to have a distaste for forms of violence that could trigger atrocities witnessed in some mission fields. Through introspection and citing of mission experiences as examples in the delivery of military courses, the GAF soldiers who have not toured the named mission areas are considerably informed about the many consequences of war. They also know the proximate and distant causes of the conflicts. Such knowledge has informed the firm stand of some officers and soldiers against internal conflict and forms of violence which should extend to brutalities against unarmed civilians.

The conflict resolution skills are however apt in equipping soldiers to manage group-based conflicts. Peacekeepers have gained professional experience in investigating the needs of fighting factions and striking compromises to promote peace. In a senior female officer’s view about MINUSMA:

you are learning despite it not being normal peacekeeping, that you go and sit there and just observe. Sometimes you may have to do negotiations, have meetings with all these different forces, try to understand their needs, negotiate, and try to come to a compromise. So, these are things that we do on peacekeeping missions (KII, SFO10, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

These experiences have the potential for soldiers' management of internal conflicts and applying them to different situations in Ghana. It is however not explicit in the responses how this experience has helped in the management of internal conflicts in the country such as farmer-herder and protestor-joint task force clashes in Ejura in the Ashanti Region of Ghana in 2021.

Increasingly, however, study participants view civilians as partners in the provision of security. Interviewees highlight the complexities of the peacekeeping arena and the role of civilians in accessing intelligence to ready troops against any attack, resolve conflicts, and ensure the security of Ghanaian battalions and companies. This view corroborates Friis' (2010:63) assertion that peacekeeping requires intelligence about spoilers and the protected. We observe that rebels, resistance forces, militias, and guerrilla forces are best identified through peaceful relations with the civilians in the areas of operational responsibility. Consequently, as a female officer (SFO5, August 2022, Burma Camp) notes, Ghanaian peacekeepers strive to win the hearts and minds of the community in areas of their operational responsibility.

In these areas, Ghanbatts offer necessary assistance, including providing food, free healthcare, and engaging in other developmental activities. This finding corroborates Bove and Ruggeri (2019) and Thakur et al. (2007), suggesting that essential local support and small-scale food distribution play a critical role in strengthening engagement with local communities in mission areas. A male officer also recounts that:

In peacekeeping, we clear the hearts and minds of the locals first, so they won't attack us, for our safety. Also, to help the people in the deplorable situation for their survival. I think that has also helped us here in Ghana; whenever we are deployed, we try to help the communities (KII, MSO15, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

The most practical way such “hearts and minds” outreaches are evident in Ghana is the provision of free medical care for communities near military posts of the GAF. For example, in Shai Hills, where GAF has an outpost,⁵⁵ members of the surrounding communities are given free medical care, including first aid, when soldiers go for exercises. Practices in peacekeeping operational areas reinforce these outreaches. Officer MSO15 puts it thus:

Medical outreach programs in peacekeeping, especially in dental care and other screenings, have helped us embark on similar activities in Ghana. All the units that are deployed in our various communities open their gates to the communities in which they operate, even without national insurance cards (KII, MSO15, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

In peacekeeping missions and in Ghana, military medical outreaches illustrate a medicalisation of security. As Neuhaus (2008) observes, military medical support during operations is primarily directed toward conserving the strength of military personnel and managing combatant casualties in high-intensity warfare. However, the complex emergencies characteristic of peacekeeping contexts compel the military to broaden its role beyond combat operations and internal security functions to humanitarian assistance, notably the provision of medical services to civilian

⁵⁵ Shai Hills is home to the Army Recruits Training School of the Ghana Armed Forces in the Shai Osudoku District of the Greater Accra Region of Ghana

populations. A similar pattern is evident in the Ghana Armed Forces, where military healthcare also extends to civilian patients—a gesture of goodwill and a strategy to win hearts and minds, echoing tendencies Neuhaus identifies in Western militaries. In complex emergencies, this convergence suggests a homogenization of medicalisation of security, as military healthcare increasingly merges combat-oriented care with humanitarian medical assistance.

The path dependency in this medicalisation process does not, however, indicate diffusion from the global North per se, but rather a shared response that has emerged as both Western militaries and African armed forces navigate complex emergencies. In Western and other African contexts, military hospitals extend care to civilian patients during domestic emergencies such as public health crises and natural disasters. In Ghana, an open-door civilian access to military medical facilities has been operational since 2000. The 37 Military Hospital in Accra has been providing care to civilians, while a 60-bed mobile field hospital established in Tamale in 2024 serves military personnel and the surrounding communities (Mensah et al., 2014; Ghana News Agency, 2024).⁵⁶

Winning hearts and minds through medical care outreaches has the potential to enhance collaborative security practices. While these outreaches are helpful in Ghana, collaborative security provision with Ghanaian civilians will require considerable improvement in soldiers' attitudes towards civilians and a reduction in suspicions about military personnel among civilian counterparts. On that journey, both parties have several more miles to travel.

At the interpersonal level, however, interviewees note a generally positive change in attitude towards people. For some soldiers: “It has helped me to become a good person, learn to be good.

⁵⁶ Civilians, in this case, does not refer to defence civilian staff, or civilian-dependent beneficiaries who, as spouses, children, and dependents of military personnel (serving or retired) have access to military hospitals in Ghana and other parts of the world.

Respect and not talking anyhow to people, you feel for people” (II, MSS4 July 2022, Whistler Barracks). Indeed, the research team experienced good relations with most of the study participants. Nevertheless, our experiences must be considered not only from the perspective of the attitudes learned from peacekeeping but also our positionality as affiliates of a unit within the Ghana Armed Forces.

Within the GAF, however, lessons on soldier behaviour help officers and NCOs to manage their personnel. In this regard, a former Operations Warrant Officer and Company Sergeant Major (CSM) of a peacekeeping mission notes that the opportunity to work with many troops helps to know the behavioural patterns of soldiers and ways to manage them. He puts it thus:

So anytime there is anything, I know how to handle it. It helped me positively because I had the opportunity to work with many troops, and I got to know all kinds of behaviours. That is it. And then my social work background also helped me. I came to understand that every behaviour has a course (KII Ex-MSS3, November 2023, Takoradi).

As Ex-MSS3 shows, however, some soldiers possess training in human behaviour that helps them relate better at home or on peacekeeping operation fields. Such persons have a better understanding based on their professional duties in peacekeeping to forge good interpersonal relations within the barracks.



6.2 Career Choice and Aspirations

Professional development is built into career progression in the Ghana Armed Forces. During active service, soldiers also make career choices to better their chances for opportunities available to serving and retired personnel within and outside the GAF. They engage in this capacity building by undertaking military and civilian courses beyond what the GAF internally provides towards this end. In the past decade, personnel's capacity-building drive has increased, and the younger generation of officers and soldiers is determined to remain actively engaged after service and avoid depending solely on retirement salaries.

According to one soldier, most soldiers retire in their fifties, and it is needful to make effective use of the remaining working years (KII, ExMSS2, May 2023, Accra). I argue that peacekeeping also shapes the professional development, career choices, and routes GAF soldiers take regarding career progression and retirement.

We observe that economic gain, prestige and knowledge of some soldiers who have served with the United Nations and other international bodies influence personnel to aspire for opportunities with these organizations, especially the UN.

The evidence presented in Table 2 below summarises the observations.



Table 6.2 Themes with supporting categories on career choices and aspirations

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Supporting sub-categories</i>
<p>Sample Career Aspirations with UN: <i>“I retire from the UN where I served as consultant, envoy, Force Commander some months after retiring from the Ghana Armed Forces (KII RMSO, June 2022, Accra).</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force Commander • UN envoy • UN Consultancy • Chief of Staff • Leader of Assistance Missions • Staff Officer
<p>Security Consultant: <i>“Many of the experts in security matters are civilians” (KII MSO 53, May 2023, GHQ Burma Camp).</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leveraging peacekeeping experiences for consultancy • Private security • International agencies
<p>Performance Effectiveness: <i>“Peace keeping pushes us to take career courses. You must take these courses to be effective in your role in the Ghana Armed Forces and abroad” (KII MSS 12, March 2024, Teshie).</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Career courses that enhance peacekeeping duty • Effectively represent GAF and Ghana in missions
<p>Promotions: <i>“Peacekeeping earnings inform trade-off between promotion and deployment” (KII MSS12, March 2024, Teshie).</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delayed promotion for peacekeeping purposes • Career courses for promotion postponed
<p>Triggers for UN aspirations: <i>“UN has better conditions of service and remuneration. My peacekeeping allowances are several times my salary in Ghana” (KII FSO5, August 2022, GHQ Burma Camp).</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better financial remuneration • Better general work conditions • In-mission courses • Knowledge of former UN consultants from GAF • Prestige
<p>Targeted Civilian courses: <i>“When I have a doctoral qualification, I have better chance to use my experience as a soldier to engage in security related activities than civilian experts” (KII MSO53, May 2023, GHQ Burma Camp).</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leadership degrees • Human resource management • Logistics and supply chain management • Administration • Professional qualifications • Doctorate (PhD)

Late Lieutenant General Emmanuel Erskine (Ghana's/Africa's first UN Force Commander), Major General Kwami Anyidoho (rtd) (former Leader of UN Assistance Mission for African Union and Special Representative of AU/UN hybrid Mission in Darfur – UNAMID), and Major General Delali Johnson Sakyi (rtd) (former Force Commander of UN Mission in South Sudan – UNMISS) are names soldiers note in their aspiration for duties with the UN. These aspirations influence the choices some military personnel make about further studies and life after retirement.

Alternatively, peacekeeping missions provide soldiers access to UN courses and nurture in some personnel the desire to work with the organization. Notably, during UN mission tours, officers have access to free online courses. A female senior officer notes that she, like other personnel, explored UN courses as one of the pathways to build interest in future roles in the UN (KII, FSO5, August 2022, Burma Camp). Even in the absence of future UN opportunities, ex-soldiers and retired officers continue to focus on other post-service considerations. Employment aspirations with the UN could be an initial focus for some soldiers, but personnel explore options if this target does not materialize. An ex-WO recounted:

Initially, I taught as much, but along the way, it was becoming difficult to get a UN job. So, I decided to venture into the mining field. Yes. Maybe I would have gotten a UN job. I tried twice. In both cases, they wrote to me. The first one was the Hague. They wrote to me that somebody was more qualified than me; they picked the person. Another one too told me that my application was reviewed, but, sorry, next time. So maybe if I had gone on trying, I would have gotten it. But I decided to venture into the mining field (KII, ExMSS3, December 2023, Takoradi).

The soldier's experience mirrors job-seeking behaviour in contexts where multiple options exist, even if some are more strongly preferred than others.

Based on the GAF establishment, peacekeeping experiences do not directly determine whether or not a soldier is promoted, but they play an important role in personnel's professional development.

The influence of peacekeeping on promotion occurs in three main ways. First, some soldiers observe that peacekeeping deployments sometimes delay the promotion of officers due to the postponement of written and practical exams for officers deployed. Where promotional examination (PROMEX)⁵⁷ coincides with pre-deployment training and other preparations, soldiers have to choose the mission or undertake the exam. Similarly, an officer on tour may miss a PROMEX and have to wait for the subsequent one after the mission (MSO18, FGD July 2022, Whistler Barracks). Ordinarily, soldiers have one month of leave, which, if mission and internal arrangements allow, can be scheduled to coincide with PROMEX (ICI, FO4, March 2024, Arakan Barracks). But uncertainties of the operational terrain determine the granting of leave even if the peacekeeper has PROMEX. Thus, often peacekeepers have to choose between obedience to command, field experience, and peacekeeping allowances, or deferring participation under a "tangible excuse" to prepare for a promotional exam and timely promotion.

Second, again for officers, peacekeeping operations provide some of the capacity to respond to some of the PROMEX questions on field experiences that can count for the personnel. The third is that other ranks require courses for promotion and some soldiers sometimes defer taking the required courses (KII MSS12, March 2024, Teshie). The deferment is partly done to embark on peacekeeping and benefit from the economic rewards of keeping peace.

⁵⁷ PROMEX is required for progression from Lieutenant to Captain and from Captain to Major.

Thus, GAF has its established system of promotion based on seniority, career courses (to some extent), recommendations of superior soldiers, board interviews, establishment, and vacancy. But peacekeeping influences some of these considerations.

Peacekeeping also provides one of the spaces where officers and soldiers strive to prove themselves in their roles and effectively project the Ghana Armed Forces as well as the country. The determination has yielded results such as the UN Military Peacekeeper Award-2022 granted to Captain Cecilia Erzuah who commanded Ghana's first battalion on the United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA). Soldiers therefore take courses relevant to their duties to achieve effective performance at home and especially abroad (KII MSO53, May 2023, GHQ Burma Camp).

Increasingly, schools of the GAF that train soldiers in technical trades are affiliated with some of the public institutions in Ghana. The School of Ordnance, for example, is affiliated⁵⁸ with the Accra Technical University (ATU) since 2019, and jointly offers Bachelor of Technology (B-Tech) and Advanced Diplomas in procurement and supply chain management for soldiers. A similar arrangement also exists between the Navy's Supply Application School and Ho Technical University in the Volta Region of Ghana. Soldiers who perform logistics duties in GAF and peacekeeping, for instance, employ this and other avenues to enhance their effectiveness in their assigned roles. GAF sponsors some soldiers to take courses in their specialties with the affiliated institutions. Others also explore routes outside the official sponsorship.

Within the tertiary education space, universities have extended their campuses to different regions of the country and increased distance education options through the harnessing of internet

⁵⁸ The same is true for tri-service units such as the KAIPTC affiliated with Ghana's Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) and GAFSC is affiliated with the University of Ghana all in Accra.

communication technologies. The University of Education, Winneba, for instance, has a campus at Whistler Barracks, Teshie which offers weekend modules to officers and soldiers (KII Female DCS1, November 2023, Accra). Other universities also offer evening sessions as part of the regular academic calendar. Soldiers of all ranks can thus pursue academic and professional degrees depending on the internal arrangements in their units. Correspondingly, we observe internal changes in the GAF towards the pursuit of civilian qualifications. Officers and soldiers are pursuing civilian professional courses in areas such as supply chain management, logistics, human resource management, leadership, and registering membership with chartered certification bodies. Appetite for doctoral and other advanced education has also increased as a means to better chances in the service and retirement opportunities.

These opportunities help to partly address concerns, especially about the future of the infantry soldier that, the Navy, Air Force, and those practising trades within GAF, are better positioned during retirement but the same cannot be said of the infantry:

The Naval officer, he's given additional training as a navigator and the same principle these seamen do. So today if a person does not want to be an officer and retires, he can go and practice whatever after retirement but the infantry man apart from security there is hardly any alternative. The army is not giving me anything that is marketable when I leave the service as an infantry officer (MSO7, FGD July 2022, Whistler Barracks).

An Ex-WO shared in this sentiment and opined that for those in the specific trades such as catering, driving and others, there are specialisations in training including certifications (KII, Ex-MSS3, December 2023, Takoradi). Security work is the obvious option for the infantry soldier but is also a last resort for some ex-servicemen. In fact, one WO disliked the security option since the idea of

wearing green reminds the soldier of those moments of stress, regimented life, and traumas that the soldier wants to forget (KII, Ex-MSS2, May 2023, Accra). The serving officer (MSO7), Ex-MSS3 and others therefore determine to undertake courses at their own behest and motivate other ranks within their units to pursue degrees and civilian qualifications while in active service.

When soldiers are granted official leave or sponsored on a career course by the GAF, they are exempt from deployments as staff officers, observers, commanders of formed troops, and secondments for foreign duties. They can also miss a promotion to administrative offices of higher ranks if a vacancy occurs within the study period (KII, MSO3, June 2022, Otu Barracks). Consequently, some soldiers avoid the official processes and rely on unit-based arrangements in their academic pursuits to avoid losing out on the named opportunities. We observe that some soldiers who explore this route sometimes experience setbacks when academic commitments clash with the responsibilities of soldiering. One officer recounts that he “*actually started a degree in human resources in Legon and reached level 300, and I travelled to Liberia and the CO [Commanding Officer] did not allow me to come and write the end of semester exams*” (SMO8, FGD, July 2022, Whistler Barracks). The demands of the mission or other factors hindered granting the leave for an “unofficial” educational pursuit.

Regardless of the academic path pursued, some interviewees believe that soldiers with higher academic qualifications can enrich security discourses by contributing more practical dimensions and nuanced perspectives as consultants in local and global fora. In one officer’s view:

Many of the experts on security matters in this country and Africa are civilians. They do not have the field experience the soldier has acquired. But they have the qualification so they are the ones invited to speak on security matters. When I have a doctoral qualification, I stand a better chance to draw from the firsthand

experiences as a soldier to engage in some of the presentations and other security-related activities that the civilian security experts are doing across the globe (KII, SMO53, GHQ Burma Camp).

This posturing presents an opportunity to examine security matters from the viewpoint of the soldier who experiences it directly, and the civilian who studies it as an informed academic. It will thus enrich security discussions in Africa. Given that security is increasingly a collaborative undertaking between civilians and soldiers, it will be unnecessary to assume that the military practitioner has absolute knowledge about the security discourse or that civilian assessment necessarily misses practical realities. At best, a marriage between the two practitioners will ensure complementarity that furthers understanding of security matters in the country and beyond.

6.3 Enhancement in the Practice of Trade

Various trades are practiced within the units of GAF in Ghana, within formed troops and staff appointments in peacekeeping deployments abroad. Soldiers in these trades gain professional experiences that improve their functioning in the specific units and positions of responsibility through peacekeeping. A Cook of a Ghanbatt notes that:

When I was on the peacekeeping mission, I learnt a lot about mixing spices. The ingredients were there so you could learn varieties. The lessons improved my cooking upon return. I bake cake learnt from the mission area for parties (KII, FSS3, September 2022, Myohaung Barracks).

Peacekeeping influences thus reach the kitchen but also extend to staff duties in various offices.

We observe that lessons learnt from military observer duties in team sites, observation posts and patrols, and staff officer roles at Force Headquarters are utilized in office work in the GAF. Through these influences, the GAF has embraced the use of Outlook to enhance its internal communications (ICI on Phone, MSO28, January 2024, KAIPTC). Additionally, records management has also improved. One observer highlights the impact this way:

The staff work, like record keeping. Due diligence to staff work, in particular. Because these days you could just take decisions without keeping records. But the UN system is in such a way that every action or incident that occurs must be documented so I think that has helped improve most of our working environment (KII, SMO10, July 2022, NHQ Burma Camp).

Similarly, based on the perspective of a senior female officer, her skills in planning logistics on peace operations (UN Logistics, UNSOS)⁵⁹ further equipped her for logistics duties in GAF. She notes “*That place [UNSOS] they call it logistics and planning officer and it is also sea and air movement but I did most of the air movement. And everything comes to you, everything that they did comes to you*” (KII, FSO4, August 2022, GHQ Burma Camp).

FSO4 worked with a head of the UNSOS mission in Somalia and managed logistics when the direct boss went on leave:

It is not like he's going to give it to another UN staff to manage it, and he is a Ghanaian and also a retired officer. When he is leaving for mission, he'll tell you do this and go here. By the time you finish you tell him sir we have finished

⁵⁹ UNSOS – United Nations Support Office in Somalia

and I send him the mission accomplishment report to UN headquarters for him. He taught me well because we were alone and if you don't teach me when you go on your R&R [Rest and Recuperation] you'll still be thinking about the work in Somalia so I need to know. I just came to be soldier; my mind was made up, I am learning (KII, FSO4, August 2022, GHQ Burma Camp).

This view reflects the tenacity and readiness of the personnel of GAF to learn while on duties abroad. It can be surmised into the clause “I just came to be soldier; my mind was made up, I am learning.” Two other female officers - a staff officer (KII, FO2, July 2022, Burma Camp), and a commander of a unit (KII, FSO3, August 2022, Accra) - also expressed the curiosity they showed while on peacekeeping tours to challenge themselves, learn by doing and undertake tasks effectively. This outlook has been crucial, in their view, in promoting more efficient performance of their current duties in GAF. The male officers are not left out in this eagerness to acquire knowledge and experience while deployed. In the interviews, however, the females expressed these desires more openly than their male counterparts.

Within the logistics planning and implementation space, professional experiences become useful also for non-UN missions where GAF personnel have full responsibility for the planning and implementation.

We observe similarities in the planning process: “*Yes, it is the same thing and the movement of troops, the movement of logistics*” (KII, FSO4, August 2022, GHQ Burma Camp). On an ECOWAS deployment to Guinea-Bissau in July 2022, FSO4 notes that:

Just recently we had to send about 100 troops. That was about last month to Guinea Bissau, the ideas were just flowing from what my boss and I were doing

in Liberia [Somalia]. And that is the same thing I implemented, the questions I asked contractors, whatever I did was what we were doing. Because though it was a mission it was not a UN mission so we had to send the troops ourselves. Normally if it is UN, UN does all the CN and GT [counter-narcotic and global threat operation and logistic support] but if it is AU or ECOWAS, we do it (KII, FSO4, August 2022, GHQ Burma Camp).

For Army personnel not operating in additional trade, professional lessons from peacekeeping are mostly applied in the provision of domestic security. In earlier studies, such as Edu-Afful (2022) and Albrecht and Sukanya (2020), peacekeeping skills have been found to help soldiers in domestic security management. The finding from the current study thus aligns with those of the previous studies referenced. The professional insights gained from peacekeeping range from man management and relations with members of other services to cultural awareness and sensitivity towards communities within the areas of operational responsibility.

Professional lessons from peacekeeping are applied in command and administrative functions as well as in collaborative operations with security services, including the police. We observe that peacekeepers enhance their understanding of people in the operational areas, strive to meet the security expectations placed on them by host communities, and cooperate with the police in mission areas (KII, MS035, August 2022, Burma Camp). Peacekeeping thus imparts transferable skills applicable to the management of domestic security situations and joint task force operations in Ghana. These lessons can underpin enhanced cooperation among soldiers and police, and reduce the sporadic inter-agency (police-soldier) clashes witnessed in this decade.

Some of the peacekeeping skills are also applied in the implementation of the GAF's standard operating procedures. Insights from the command of a Ghana Battalion (Ghanbatt) on

peacekeeping inform functioning in similar roles in internal operations and command appointments after UN command duty. An interlocutor notes: *“For me, the opportunity to command. I was not a commanding officer back home. I was made the commander of a whole battalion in a peacekeeping area”* (KII, MSO35, August 2022, GHQ Burma Camp). For some personnel, this experience constitutes the most profound professional impact. MSO53, a male senior officer, asserts that:

The experience of managing soldiers, living with soldiers, understanding soldiers, I got a lot more as the commander in MONUSCO. And it helped me when I was the commander of Operation Vanguard. The command experience in the commando operation also helped in the Vanguard duties. So, living with, understanding soldiers, and solving soldiers’ problems. I had a lot of that experience as commander of the battalion in Congo (KII, MSO35, August 2022, GHQ Burma Camp).


The leadership training that command roles in peacekeeping provide personnel also emerges as most notable for some female officers. A female officer who headed a battalion after performing that role on a mission field espoused a similar view. In her case, the peacekeeping experience helped to minimize the learning curve in the new role as the officer commanding of her unit (KII, FO2, July 2022, Burma Camp). The command experience abroad is thus useful for similar duties back home, including leading battalions, companies, and platoons in the GAF.



6.4 Preparedness for Countering Emerging Threats

The preparedness of the Ghana Armed Forces for eventualities is another marker of professional soldiering. Soldiers are required to be ready to prevent and combat threats to the state. This idea manifests through constant training and regimental traditions that concern combat and war.

Most of the interviewees observe that consistent training in modern warfare and the nature of parties involved in conflicts make it more important to take peacekeeping more seriously. Peacekeeping offers a platform for training in modern methods and equipment required for combat readiness and effectiveness against emerging threats. One study participant puts it aptly:



peacekeeping is a form of training and definitely, once you go, the training you go through, and given the experiences you gather in peacekeeping, you should be in a very good state of readiness to combat any threat that you face. In terms of equipment, you have better equipment at the peacekeeping area than back home, because the UN standards are very high. So, you have a lot of things that will make you very combat-ready in the peacekeeping arena but those experiences when we come back, we can use them (KII, MS035, July NHQ Burma Camp).

The perspective aligns with findings from studies such as Albrecht (2019), which demonstrate that peacekeepers are exposed to modern military technologies as they interact with advanced militaries during peacekeeping operations.

For an intelligence officer, peacekeeping offers an invaluable opportunity to refine skills in gathering intelligence on groups and individuals operating in terrains similar to active operational

fronts, including terrorist groups (KII, MO5, July 2022, Burma Camp). The skills gained in such duties make the officer more effective as a soldier in Ghana.

At home, the GAF personnel engage in planned exercises and training aimed at preparing them for eventualities. These include counter-terrorism and internal security exercises such as Exercise Koudanlgou where GAF joined armed forces of Ghana's immediate neighbours (Togo, Burkina Faso, and Cote d'Ivoire) to manage miscreants along the borders (Ministry of Defence, 2019:3). In June 2022, officers from the Ghana Army and Air Force participated in "Exercise African Lion 2022," a multinational counterterrorism training exercise in Agadir, Morocco. The African Lion 2022 was the 18th Episode of the exercise and Ghana's first involvement since 2002. Troops from Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, and the United States of America (USA) use the exercise to improve planning and conduct of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) operations, air-to-ground integration, and increase force interoperability.

Most of the significant training and skills used in peacekeeping emanate from regular exercises and experiences personnel gather from peace operation activities. As one military instructor put it:

when soldiers are back from the training school, you don't normally have some training or exercises to do. So anytime you are sent on a mission, you come for them to prepare you so you will be in that readiness. So that has always kept us going. So, you remind yourself of what you learnt in the training school and whatever is new in the system (KII, MSS4, July 2022, Whistler Barracks).

Thus, at a minimum, peacekeeping deployments serve as a reminder of the training GAF personnel have received over time, as well as a means to update military skills essential to combat current threats. In Wisner's (2003) study of US peacekeepers, he notes that skill decay occurs when

training is not practiced over time, and retention rates for peacekeeping tasks vary as early as two months into the deployment. If this is the case for peacekeeping training, the situation could be worse for home-based training. Constant training, exercises, and task performance in mission areas therefore help retain and upgrade soldiery knowledge and practice.

As much as peacekeeping influences internal security, the local experiences are also taken to the peacekeeping operations. The GAF personnel also gather experiences through internal deployments. The Mechanized Battalions, Field Workshop, and Transport Company on the anti-terrorism operation on Ghana's northern border, codenamed Conquered Fist, for instance, have experience in neutralising terrorist threats on that border (Ministry of Defence, 2023:11, 2020:4, 2019:3). These experiences are however gathered within the logistical constraints that have confronted GAF for years. The internal lessons subsequently help effectiveness in the peace operation theatres where logistical challenges are almost non-existent. Learning is not one-way traffic but goes several ways. Peacekeeping experiences help to perfect experiences acquired locally by personnel. As one personnel noted:

the same way the experiences that we garner in our local operations when the facilities are not that top-notch. When you are able to manage with that when we moved to peacekeeping it makes you very efficient. Similarly, the internal operations are rather helping mission effectiveness (KII, MSO35, May 2023, Burma Camp).

The relationship between contributions of internal activities and peacekeeping experiences to combat readiness against emerging threats is thus best explained as mutually reinforcing. That is to say, they inform and shape each other.

This assertion aligns with studies such as Albrecht et al. (2021), which find that international peacekeeping and internal security operations influence each other.

Practiced and Tested Training Standards

Soldiers are trained for war, and they often look forward to the experience of the same. The war and battle experience is the most practical way to test the efficiency of training standards and military might. Since 1960, Ghanaian peacekeeping troops have exchanged fire with non-state forces, including during Operation ONUC. The ECOMOG mission of the late 1990s, however, presented peace enforcement dynamics that allowed the use of force to enforce peace. Interviewees who served on ECOMOG mostly view the mission as a war moment that provided a ground for participating Ghanaian personnel to practice soldiering and evaluate the training standards they have been subjected to over the years. A senior officer and peacekeeper who served on ECOMOG puts it thus:

Yes, ECOMOG was war, it wasn't peacekeeping mission. When you train as a medical officer and you don't have patients to treat, you will not have any self-fulfilment. If I train as a driver and I don't drive in a car, what is the use? Therefore, it is the dream of every soldier to have that war experience because that is the only way you will know yourself whether your training standards are good (KII, MSO4, June 2022, AHQ Burma Camp).

The ECOMOG mission thus served as one of the main references some of the soldiers use to discuss the field effectiveness of GAF. Kotia (2015) draws from his experience from the mission to highlight a similar point.

With subsequent successes and fewer casualties among GAF personnel in most peacekeeping operations, Ghana's soldiers have a strong sense of comparability with advanced militaries in other parts of the world. The peacekeeping experiences add to GAF's increasing joint training with foreign troops and education in foreign military institutions. But all of these are also against the backdrop of internal training standards and institutional memory of pre-independence battle prowess of GAF and its predecessors, including campaigns in Burma, Abyssinia, Alamein, and Cameroons (Addae, 2005; Aboagye, 1999a; Haywood and Clarke, 1969; Killingray, 1983a, 1983b).

In peacekeeping operational areas atypical of ECOMOG, peacekeepers fight too. A senior female officer narrated similar experiences from MINUSMA, a decade-long (2013-2023) mission that sought to stabilize Mali and support the country's political processes⁶⁰:

First of all, it has helped. Because some of the soldiers get first time experiences. Mali [MINUSMA] is a typical example of it. In fact, our soldiers deployed in the area, it's like every battalion that gets there kind of has the experience of being shelled (KII, FSO10, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

The shelling either resulted in peacekeepers running to the bunkers to take cover, or if close to the firing line, had to respond with fire to protect themselves or their comrades.



⁶⁰ The UN Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 after the 2012 coup d'état to support the transitional processes, and (after Resolution 2164 of 25 June 2014 expanded the duties) ensure security, protect civilians, and assist security sector rebuilding, national dialogue, etc. See <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minusma>.

MONUSCO and UNIFIL have also exposed soldiers to “life firing,” and one soldier notes that “I saw what I never thought I would see” (KII, MSS12, March 2024, Teshie). Soldiers, therefore, attach significant value to these warlike experiences.

Some of these experiences arise when parties to the conflict test the resoluteness of the Ghana battalions or companies. Highlighting events in UNISFA, another officer notes that:

Of course, every peacekeeping when you go the people will test you to see how resolute you are, so I believe because it is a new unit there have been one or two instances that people have tried to open fire and they have responded in equal measure. And I believe that for about 3 months I’ve not heard that they will test you. Once they test you, and they know these people you cannot joke with them they will stop (KII, MSO35, May 2023, Burma Camp).

This assertion confirms Olonisakin's (1997) view that the GAF operates within a peacekeeping understanding of the use of force.

In missions such as ECOMOG (Aboagye, 1999a) and ONUC (Afrifa, 1966; Alexander, 1966:66), the GAF is ready to return fire for fire once any faction tests Ghana’s troops. Such a show of force becomes a deterrent to war factions about the resoluteness of the Ghana battalion.

Based on the experiences at the peacekeeping operation, the Ghanaian soldiers have a high sense of competence and capability to address (in)security situations in Ghana. As a Senior Officer notes, the Ghanaian soldier has “affirmation and reassurance about their competence through interactions with other militaries, some of which are advanced forces” (KII, MSO11, September 2022, Air Force Base Takoradi). Some personnel, however, suggest that the security infrastructure must be taken more seriously, including the security of the barracks by providing surveillance tools beyond

the guard post at the entrances of the various camps. The suggestion underscores the need for increased thoroughness in security provision, including for the soldier who protects, as security threats are becoming increasingly complex.

6.5 Managing Trauma and Mission-Related Health Risks

In the performance of peacekeeping duties, some GAF personnel have been directly exposed to traumatic events, know someone who has, have historical information or knowledge of comrades whose health has been adversely affected by such missions. Predominantly, peacekeepers on UNAMIR and ECOMOG report such traumatic cases.

One of the interviewees recounts manifesting posttraumatic stress disorder after a tour on the ECOMOG mission. The officer recalls that:

I went to Sierra Leone, met the civil war, and took part in the civil war as part of ECOMOG. When I came back, that one was very traumatic. I can sleep and still hear firing and bombs exploding. I can still hear guns being shot. When I wake up and sit down, my wife will be asking what is wrong. And I will go like can't you hear that people are firing? She then starts crying that my husband has gone mad, so sometimes when it tickles me, I will sit down quietly (KII, MSO18, August 2022, AHQ Burma Camp).

As the officer's situation highlights, the effect of these psychological or psychiatric experiences extends beyond the affected personnel to their relatives and families. A comprehensive examination of the family dimension of trauma is outside the scope of this research. But it is inferable from the narrative that as some personnel witness relive or replay traumatic events, their behaviour change. The behavioural shifts not only increase the healthcare burden on relatives,

families, and communities but also affect family and other social interactions. Withdrawal, quietness, and other isolation mechanisms become coping mechanisms that harm close social bonds and communal living. For instance,

Sometimes I will be sitting down like this and we had a place where people died so much that we had to evacuate the place. When I came to Ghana, I will be sitting down then the floor will open and you see some of the people who died trying to come out of the ground. I will be sitting down quietly because of the reaction my wife gave, I don't want to shout but I will be sitting down and I will be sweating (KII, MSO18, August 2022, AHQ Burma Camp).

The sweating noted by the officer, though a symptom of the trauma, can be seen as a coping mechanism in the context of the reaction received from the partner. The finding agrees with Butler et al. (2011:177) who suggest that symptoms of trauma clients may be an effort at coping in the “context of their life experiences and cultures.” MSO18 sitting down quietly and sweating helped him cope with the posttraumatic stress experience in a family setting and military culture that expects soldiers to be strong and resilient. Supportive family and friends immensely help recovery from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The emotional numbing while helping affected personnel shield themselves from painful memories and feelings, and anger is symptomatic of PTSD that negatively affects familial relations (Ray and Vanstone, 2009) as family members experience (perceive) rejection, isolation, emotional distress, and/or develop vicarious trauma through indirect exposure to the traumatic experiences and empathy for their loved ones suffering PTSD.⁶¹

⁶¹ Vicarious trauma, secondary traumatization or secondary traumatic stress, describes the psychological impact of listening to trauma survivors' descriptions of traumatic events while working with them as a therapist or support network, including populations of loved ones indirectly exposed to interpersonal traumas (McCann and Pearlman, 1990; Bux et al., 2015; Gregory et al., 2017; Mangold et al., 2021; Sparks and Stopa, 2022; Willcott-Benoit and

Another officer who witnessed the death of a senior colleague in a UNIFIL deployment reportedly began “behaving someway.” The superior officer who experienced the event with the then-young officer recounts that:

When we were in the mission area and the thing happened and we came back, my ADC's [Aide de Camp] attitude changed. He was behaving someway. Sometimes you will see him sitting down quietly. When you ask him something he started becoming unaware of himself. So, we were all suspecting that the thing really impacted him. Maybe he was younger and I was using my old age to hold myself up though it was not easy. But it had a serious effect on both of us (KII, MSO25, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

The senior officer had training in psychology and seemed to have more effectively minimized the impact of the shock and the aftermath when they returned to Ghana. He notes that, “for me, I am managing myself with my own knowledge of psychology” (KII, MSO25, July 2022, Otu Barracks). However, as the senior officer rightly admitted, the exposure indeed had an impression on him, and this was evident in the emotions that surrounded the conversation as he narrated the incident. Upon return, interviewees exposed to traumatic scenes live with posttraumatic stress for years, although the manifestations wane with time. Until that time, these personnel show avoidance behaviour, becoming uncommunicative, withdrawn, and paranoid. The evidence agrees with assertions of Butler et al. (2011:177-179) that survivors of trauma can be “quite down,” withdrawn, experience nightmares, refuse to eat, bathe, or communicate, and when they do, “voice paranoid

Cummings, 2024). Families of survivors may also experience vicarious growth or vicarious posttraumatic growth (VPTG) – positive changes across cognitive, emotional, interpersonal, and/or spiritual domains – after indirect trauma exposure (See Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004; Manning-Jones et al., 2015; McCormack et al., 2011).

and suicidal ideation.” My interlocutors, however, did not report refusal to eat, bathe, or suicidal ideations.

Studies such as Dallaire (2003) and Sheynin et al. (2017) show that the propensity towards avoidance behaviour is expressed by civilians and veterans who manifest posttraumatic symptoms. The current study, however, shows that both veterans and those still in military service who have experienced traumatic events can show these withdrawal tendencies. Admittedly, the two studies cited focussed on veterans, while my research interests involved personnel in active service and the retired. The study thus shows the possible continuity of traumatic stress symptoms from days after exposures throughout the remaining part of service years to retirement. One veteran noted the continuity of posttraumatic symptoms during and after years of active service, sometimes when he heard funeral-related music (KII, RMSO1, June 2023, Accra). Some, however, do recover from the symptoms as the veterans did after some years. This shows that depending on the period of recovery, personnel could manifest posttraumatic symptoms for considerable years.

Some of the health experiences in peacekeeping are informing local health practices of the GAF. For institutional management to be possible, personnel who have experienced traumatic exposures are required to self-report or are identified through secondary diagnosis after the persistence of certain clinical symptoms that prompt the medical officers to investigate for PTSD symptoms. The focus on martial spirit and resilience in military service, however, combines with the stigma attached to psychological and psychiatric care and poor health-seeking behaviour among soldiers to minimize voluntary access to healthcare by personnel. Civilians who do not subscribe to military ethos, however, show similar dispositions toward mental and psychological health. This trend confirms Ben-Zeev et al.’s (2012) assertion that the military is a microcosm of society. A proactive

measure can therefore help personnel better manage traumatic exposures. One interviewee suggests that:

If the system has a way of knowing when things like this happen, you don't need an officer to come and tell you that this is what I'm going through. And the system should have a way of knowing what the people had gone through, whether in mission or after, help the people and invite them to stabilize their psychological being (KII, MSO25, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

The officer's suggestion is apt, as the personnel interviewed did not have any motivation for voluntary visits to a health facility to seek medical attention. In the meantime, battalion and company commanders, as well as heads of units deployed for peacekeeping, can be trained in psychological and psychiatric approaches to managing personnel's psychological and mental health. This approach could be a necessary measure in the presence of shortfalls in the number of psychologists and mental health nurses in the GAF (KII, FSO17, 37 Military Command). It can serve as first aid in assisting soldiers, as commanders are, in most cases, the first point of contact when challenges arise in the mission field and the units back home. The training can help build officers' and NCOs' capacity to actively identify people with such medical needs for referral to the medical reception stations or the wellness and therapy centre for medical assistance.

In the absence of a proactive approach to identify and support personnel who were exposed to traumatic events, personnel continue to employ self-styled management tactics to overcome the effects of posttraumatic stress and exposure to trauma during peacekeeping tours. One of such means is religious practices such as prayer. For many personnel who were exposed to near-death situations on mission fields, came under gunfire, handled casualties (body bags), and/or

experienced posttraumatic stress symptoms, a major mechanism was deferring to prayers. For one key informant, the experience lasted:

over a long period and it was disappearing until there is a particular occasion like the Rwandese for the past two years have an occasion at the conference centre, remembering the occasion. And if they play certain type of music, their music and somebody narrating what happened... then suddenly, it will come back to me... Nobody [psychologist or counsellor] in that category here. I prayed to God; I prayed over it. Because I think the whole thing when I look back but for God, we would have all perished (KII, RMSO1, June 2023, Accra).

The psychological exposures and risk of death in soldiering during peacekeeping thus reinforced religious behaviour among some personnel. The evidence corroborates with studies such as Decker (2007), Israel-Cohen (2016), and Harris et al. (2011), which find that prayer and general religious behaviour are therapeutic measures in the management of PTSD. Pearce et al. (2018) are thus apt in arguing for a combination of spiritual resources with psychological resources for a more effective treatment of PTSD, especially among theistic-inclined soldiers and veterans. The principles used in such therapies are accessible to personnel of diverse faith inclinations.⁶²

Another situation in the self-style treatment has been substance use and addiction. Substances such as drugs and alcohol, according to a senior medical officer, are some of the means through which traumatic exposures are managed. These substances are ingested by personnel during the experience and/or after the trauma. During the UNAMIR mission, the UN gave alcohol, cigarettes, and chocolates to peacekeeping soldiers to help manage traumatic exposures of the Rwandan

⁶² For some of the therapies see Koenig et al. (2017), Sherman et al. (2015), Usset et al. (2021), Bormann et al. (2008), and Harris et al. (2018), among others.

genocide (KII, MSO2, June 2022, Burma Camp). Generally, these items help persons exposed to stress and traumatic events to manage the aftermath (Jones and Fear, 2011; Smith et al., 2009; Russell et al., 2014). In a male officers FGD, one officer recalled a moment when he experienced a casualty of one of his soldiers and how he handled the situation of the soldier dying in his arm: *“So, your soldier died in your arm and how did you handle it? I managed it with white horse [a whisky], I cured it with alcohol”* (MSO8, FGD, July 2022, Whistler Barracks).

Alcohol is thus a major substance used to ‘cure’ the effects of traumatic exposures among some GAF personnel. Some officers can manage the extent of intake of alcohol and cease its usage before or after their end of tour, but others become addicted. An interviewee notes that, *“I was not used to drinking or smoking. But I resorted to drinking to manage the situation”* (KII, MSO2, June 2022, Burma Camp). Ben-Zeev et al. (2012:265) suggest that the comorbidity (occurrence) of *“PTSD with substance abuse is salient in the military context.”* It is thus not uncommon to find some GAF personnel manifesting PTSD symptoms and addicted to alcohol. Some *“go overboard and continue when back to Ghana”* (KII, MSO2, June 2022, Burma Camp). Such an incident has contributed to some personnel being relieved of their duty in the armed forces. A General, for instance, decried the effect of addiction on once promising soldiers and the role GAF could have played in preventing these personnel from ‘going overboard’ and consequently getting sacked from the force. The officer remarked that *“people linked to drinking and became drug addicts but we did not pay attention”* (KII, MSO4, June 2022, AHQ Burma Camp).

From the General’s perspective, the addiction, which leads to dismissal, is not entirely the fault of the soldier, but also systemic loopholes that fail to identify affected personnel and offer them the needed attention.

The Ghana Army, which is the linchpin for peacekeeping, has noted an increase in the use of illicit drugs among personnel in some mission theatres.

The trend is attributable to stress, the increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations, and other mission outcomes. Traumatic exposure is on the list of ‘other mission outcomes.’ Peacekeeping pre-deployment screening is consequently used as a major means to discourage the use of or addiction to illicit drugs in the Ghana Armed Forces. Peacekeeping is therefore becoming a tool for discipline in GAF through the medicalisation of security as the Armed Forces expand medical activities to manage adverse outcomes of peacekeeping missions.

6.6 Medical Screening in the Ghana Armed Forces

Medical screening is one area where peacekeeping significantly influences the Ghana Armed Forces. The GAF requires recruits to undergo medical examination before joining the force, similar to requirements for employment positions in private and public institutions. GAF personnel annually undertake basic fitness tests after passing out or commissioning (KII, FO2, July 2022, Burma Camp). This test comprises exercises such as sit-ups, push-ups, running for some kilometres, and others.

As peacekeeping tours do not necessarily coincide with timelines for basic fitness tests, personnel have become more conscious of their weight and fitness to avoid losing out on a peacekeeping ticket if they do not pass these basic tests. Peacekeeping, thus, helps to keep the soldiers in check, as they should be healthy most of the time for such eventualities.

Ordinarily, individual and mass medical screening is not a routine in GAF. Soldiers are required to attend the military hospital and satellite facilities for health screening based on their personal medical needs. Until then, “You undertake a medical exam when you are seconded for a position, or you are going on a peacekeeping mission. The comprehensive examination is expensive” (KII, FSO5, August 2022, GHQ Burma Camp). The financial burden associated with comprehensive medical examinations makes it nearly prohibitive to conduct routine screening for all the soldiers.

Medical screening of the battalion before peacekeeping deployment helps to know the health status of personnel in the absence of routine medical screening (KII, MSO4, June 2022, AHQ Burma Camp). This trend, partly attributable to financial constraints, represents a critical gap in GAF’s medical service provision. It portends the danger of an outbreak of transmissible diseases before it might be detected by pre-deployment screening. It is thus needful to provide the 37 Military Hospital adequate financing to undertake such preventive measures. Pending the prioritization and routine implementation of comprehensive medical examinations, such assessments are primarily conducted to fulfil the medical requirements for international duties, including staff secondments and peacekeeping. A senior medical officer mentioned a few tests that prospective peacekeepers within a deploying Ghanbatt go through:

A full blood count will be done, HIV, diabetes, your kidney functions, liver functions will be tested, your heart will be examined properly, and we do basic X-rays, so if all these it is done and you’re fine, that’s it. We will do a few dental tests, then you go (KII, MSO2, June 2022, Burma Camp).

Personnel who fail these tests are dismissed from the troops. GAF Command and the Army Command add other tests they find necessary at any particular time. In the experience of an ex-service soldier:

So, in 2001, when I was going to Liberia, Congo, we did it. And at that time, they will take your blood sample and after some time before the result will come and you do not even know, you go for pre operational training. Then they'll come and be calling people. Then they will go and return no more. Then you hear that it's HIV or it is this or it is that. Then sometimes two people have failed and they want to argue. They retested them. Some passed, some failed. So later, they introduced the instant one. Where you stand there for it to be done. Then you see your result instantly. So, from, let's say, 99 or 98 coming, there was an HIV test. It used not to be there (KII, MSS3, December 2023, Takoradi).

The medical examination and basic fitness test (BFT) have been the means to ensure that only medically and physically fit soldiers are deployed on peace operations. Thus, such personnel can manage the complexity of the operational environment and the stress and strains of peacekeeping (Army/3020/1/G/D14, 2020). The implication for the soldiers yet to travel remains that they should keep fit and ready to qualify for future deployment opportunities.

The medical exams of internal significance added to the pre-deployment tests are in response to observations from peacekeeping missions and are funded by international organisations. Command instruction Army/3020/1/G/D14 of 16 January 2020, for instance, directed the inclusion of Drug Test in the pre-deployment screening requirements. The directive noted that there had been increasing cases of narcotic drug use in some mission areas and aimed to preclude “users of illicit drugs from participating in international peace support operations to curb the security and health implications associated with it.” The random drug test began with UNIFIL Ghanbatt 87 and is used as a means to avoid international embarrassment to Ghana and GAF.

The disappointment that comes with exemptions from peacekeeping deployments is thus combining with mission outcomes to help control illicit drug use among soldiers in Ghana.

Peacekeepers, however, do not undergo repeat medical screening when they return to Ghana, owing to the absence of an institutional mechanism that mandates compulsory retesting. Although retesting was a standard practice for most of the COVID-19 period, it has not been extended to medical tests conducted at the concentration and pre-deployment training camp. Soldiers are deployed in good health, and must be retested to ensure that they are returning in good health (KII, MSO25, July 2022, Otu Barracks).

While many personnel agree on the helpfulness of such return tests, a few do not see any testing as necessary. The disagreement is mostly based on the conviction that not many soldiers engage in harmful or unhealthful habits during peacekeeping deployments. Nonetheless, the secrecy that surrounds the few who might have participated in unhealthful activities makes it difficult to isolate and screen everyone within that small subset.

The argument, however, does solve a question on how mass retesting of peacekeepers should be approached and its financial feasibility. Most soldiers disagree on re-camping after peacekeeping operations for testing. While some viewed it as necessary to help personnel better manage post-deployment outcomes, for others, it is too expensive for the system and unhelpful for soldiers who are eager to see their loved ones after a prolonged period of absence. With few exceptions, however, most interviewees agree on the need to retest personnel on mission areas before they embark on the return journey to Ghana. Others prefer compulsory testing at their respective units back home after disembarkation. The retest will help identify and isolate cases needing treatment, as well as rule out the presence of diseases among the soldiers.

Re-camping can be considered if the system has the resources to finance it. This way, health challenges that could affect peacekeepers' families and communities can be promptly identified and managed more effectively. Whichever the option, GAF can explore post-operation screening and/or counselling to help personnel better navigate the adverse impact of peacekeeping experiences on soldiers.

Condoms for Missions

Often peacekeepers comprise soldiers who are within the sexually active population (aged 15-49 years). Risky sexual behaviours such as unprotected sex by some soldiers manifest in HIV/AIDS infection and other sexually transmitted diseases in the GAF. These incidences occurred during ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s.

Over the years, GAF has increased emphasis on the necessities of abstinence and non-sexual involvement, especially with the locals in peacekeeping operational areas. These instructions are echoed during pre-deployment trainings, utilizing UN guidelines for avoiding sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in peacekeeping. There is a cliché among the GAF peacekeepers that warns that “if you don't take care and the SEA gets you, you will drown” (KII, MSO3, July 2022, Otu Barracks). This clause references UN demands about SEA and the consequences offenders could face as well as its effects on the image of the GAF and Ghana. Apart from repatriation from the mission area, the personnel will also be charged back home for indiscipline and indiscretion. Yet, some personnel are able to conceal escapades in mission areas and evade the punitive measures. But mission related HIV/AIDS cases become known within barrack communities through rumours, grapevines and official warnings against getting infected.

With a history of personnel with no previous STI record who are diagnosed positive after a particular mission, personnel are given condoms as a protective measure before embarking on peacekeeping tours. One officer in the medical corps opined that the need has been necessary because:

you warn them of sexual involvement in peace operations theatres, but sadly few people have previously been culprits and this only came to the open after they tested positive. It was therefore necessary to prevent unwanted consequences of risky sexual behaviours should any personnel decide to do their own thing (KII, MSO5, June 2022, Burma Camp)

The move, which began about 1991 (ExMSS3, KII December 2023, Takoradi), thus serves as a secondary mechanism to GAF's stand against sexual encounters between personnel and civilians in peace operation areas of responsibility. Bing et al.'s (2008) study on Angola shows that condoms are useful in preventing AIDS among Angolan male soldiers. The distribution of condoms by the GAF to its peacekeepers, "blue condoms" as Bratt (2002:67) notes, is thus a precautionary measure in the face of insufficiency of HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns in preventing sexually transmitted diseases. Blue condoms are a tool through which peacekeepers contribute to the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmissible diseases in host communities and their home countries.



6.7 Chapter Summary

The Ghana Armed Forces has gone through attitudinal change from coup-loving to coup-averse, particularly in the Fourth Republic. I argue that peacekeeping experiences are a major part of the explanation for the anti-interventionist posturing of GAF. The professional experiences about the effects of war on human lives and property instil in most soldiers a disinterest in violence and conflict. While this outcome is combined with increasing realisation about collaborative security provision between soldiers and civilians as pertained in peacekeeping, civil-military relations in Ghana are not persistently harmonious. There have been rumours of coup plotting and a court judgment on one of such cases. There is also occasional recurrence of violence between soldiers and civilians, which shows that, impact of peacekeeping has not fully found expression in soldiery or that some personnel have yet to imbibe and practice these lessons. Similarly, some of the civilians are yet to appreciate legal processes in the armed forces regarding soldiers who use the uniform to terrorize nonmilitary persons.

Peacekeeping operation experiences have been showed to be a major space where post service career with the UN is nursed and one of significant influences driving officers and men to pursue civilian qualification including terminal degrees.

Traumatic experiences from mission areas render some personnel addicts to alcohol, illicit drugs and other substances while others are exposed to HIV/AIDS, especially during peacekeeping tours in the 1990s. Medical screening serves two purposes: providing insight into health of some personnel, and to limit the use of illicit drugs.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS MAXIMIZING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THROUGH PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCES

7.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the study findings and provides conclusions from the research. The study's contributions are outlined. Some recommendations for research and policy are then offered for the consideration of researchers, the academic community, and policymakers interested in peacekeeping, security research, military affairs, the Ghana Armed Forces, and institutional changes from these phenomena.

In this study, I examined professional influences and effects of medical exposures during peacekeeping on the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) structures and the military personnel. The study investigated structural and behavioural changes as variables of institutional change, which are shaped through the harnessing of collective and individual experiences of GAF's peacekeepers. The evolutionary path of GAF and the sociopolitical context in Ghana is intertwined with the peacekeeping activities of GAF to help historicise institutional transformations. The literature on peacekeeping and institutional change provides the theoretical foundation for the study.

Three main objectives and corresponding questions guided the research. First, I review the evolution of the GAF in the context of its peacekeeping operations. The second analyses the professional and medical influences of peacekeeping on GAF structures. Thirdly, I examine the professional and medical influences of peacekeeping on the structures of GAF and personnel. The study findings follow the objectives and questions outlined.

7.1 Historical and Institutional Contexts of Ghana Armed Forces' Peacekeeping Activities

The first research question focuses on “What historical and institutional contexts have shaped GAF engagement in peacekeeping?” I argue that the Ghana Armed Forces is shaped by various local and international factors in its evolution. Among these factors are traditional antecedents of militarism that characterised the polities that have endured in Ghana into the present millennium. But the most crucial factors that have informed the origin and continuity of the Ghana Armed Forces are the colonial arrangements upon which its foundations were laid (Addae, 2005; Baynham, 1985; Killingray, 1983a). The colonial administration bequeathed to GAF its characteristic European-type Force, including ranks, command, and control.

Since its formation, the roles of GAF have involved three primary broad functions: protection of territorial integrity, development, and foreign policy purposes. The core function is the protection of Ghana's territorial integrity on land, sea, and air, as reflected in the respective duties of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Some of the developmental functions entail search and rescue operations, securing oil fields, medical services, and bullion van duties. On the foreign policy front, the Air Force transports VIPs for official overseas assignments.

However, the primary manifestation of GAF's foreign policy roles is evident in peacekeeping, which is largely undertaken by the Ghana Army. The Air Force has, however, undertaken an aviation unit peacekeeping tour, the first in Africa, during the UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI). And ECOMOG (1990) comprised the three Services – Army, Navy, and Air Force. Thus, as peacekeeping becomes more complex, the composition of those embarking on the missions has also become multifaceted.

The study finds that GAF's peacekeeping deployment occurred in varied local and international contexts. It is therefore not restricted to regime type nor affected by the complex political history of the GAF and Ghana. Deployments are a function of the availability of missions and the willingness of regimes to maintain deployed troops and/or deploy new contingents, staff officers, and military observers.

GAF's peacekeepers have toured conflict zones involving internal (intra-state) actors, international (inter-state) parties, and state versus non-state players domiciled in another country. Respective examples are ECOMOG, UNEF II, and UNIFIL (Kotia, 2015; Erskine, 1989; Clune, 2016; Ruffa, 2014). The peacekeepers, therefore, gain experiences as deployed troops, staff officers, and/or military observers. There are differences, however, in the tours personnel undertake. Some peacekeepers receive more tours than others, and such disparity generates misgivings from those with fewer tours. It also results in allegations that some personnel 'pay their way' for peacekeeping deployments.

GAF's peacekeeping operations sometimes occur under financial and logistical constraints reflective of the economic difficulties persistent in Ghana (Aboagye, 1999a; Prouza and Horák, 2015). Peacekeeping missions occur under reimbursement mechanisms (UN missions) or self-financing (for some regional deployments, for example, ECOMOG (1990-1998 in Liberia). The resources (human and materiel) contingents deploy with are therefore paid after the troops and equipment are in the operational area and in the course of the mission. A country's defence planning in terms of troop and materiel deployable for peacekeeping, thus, determines the financial returns of contributing to global peace. There is an unwavering commitment by Ghana, however, to continue peacekeeping in line with the country's foreign policy objective of contributing to global peace and security, and good neighbourliness.

I argue that, unlike the 1960s mission, GAF's participation in subsequent peacekeeping operations is less underlain by Pan-African consideration or neocolonial struggles. While some deployments have been borne out of sub-regional and continental commitments, GAF's peacekeeping engagements are mostly under the UN umbrella with negligible, if any, Pan-African undertones.

In this objective, I argue that the evolution of the Ghana Armed Forces is shaped by its colonial past and interactions with international, regional, and national factors and structures. Peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool and practice has remained unaffected by regime type. The Ghana Armed Forces' participation in peacekeeping is therefore a function of the availability of missions, requests from multilateral organisations, and Ghanaian President's assurances to such organisations. Though peacekeeping has contributed to GAF's evolution, the outcomes of the peacekeeping missions are varied for the Ghana Armed Forces and personnel.

7.2 Peacekeeping Influences on Ghana Armed Forces Structures

Within the transformation processes of the Ghana Armed Forces, considerable structural changes have been shaped by the professional and medical experiences acquired through peacekeeping. These changes answer the question of how the professional and medical experiences from peacekeeping influence structural changes within the GAF.

The study argues that peacekeeping experiences have contributed to structural changes in GAF in five ways. These include organisational or administrative changes, creation of new units, adjustments in recruitment practices, the deployment of women, and training and operational readiness.

Administratively, the study finds that GAF's peacekeeping experiences from the Congo provided impetus for the accelerated Africanization of the officer corps. The summary dismissal of British expatriate officers in 1961, while the Congo mission (1961-1964) was underway, provided opportunities for the Africans to assume key officer roles. Even before the dismissal event, findings resonate with several studies (e.g., Nkrumah, 1965, 1968; Baynham, 1988; Aboagye, 1999a; Kraus, 1990; Alexander, 1966; Addae, 2005; Biney, 2011), which indicate that a complex set of factors was at play in the indigenisation of GAF in the 1960s.

Ghana had about 200 Ghanaian officers by the 1960s, but that is not the proximate rationale for localising GAF's officership in 1961. The immediate reasons are directly related to the Congo mission crises. The Ghanaian troops were reportedly teased about the duplicity of the country retaining expatriates while calling on Congo to sack its white officers, and Nkrumah's relationship with Britain deteriorated during the Congo crisis. Additionally, middle-level command expatriates reportedly demonstrated hesitancy in forwarding field reports, alongside suspicions of sabotage involving the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), a British expatriate. Moreover, some Ghanaian officers on that mission believed that the Congo experience provided enough grounds for the local officers to assume management of the GAF. The Congo mission, therefore, accelerated the indigenisation of the GAF officer corps in 1961.

Logistics and supplies are another administrative component that is impacted by peacekeeping activities. Studies such as Hutchful et al. (2021:10-11) and Aboagye (1999a:121) note a general deterioration in the Ghana Armed Forces' assets and service conditions by the 1980s.

Referencing the Erskine Commission of Inquiry (1988), Hutchful and Colleagues indicate how materiel challenges rendered GAF incapable of launching fully equipped operations by a battalion or a company between the late 1970s and 1980s. Shortages, especially in stocks, had not been much resolved by the 1990s.

The study finds that shortages, particularly in military uniforms during ECOMOG (1990-1998), served as a wake-up call for prioritising reserve stores despite the financial constraints that weigh on GAF. That reality, which depicted the country's economic situation and the decline in military assets, required GAF to reprioritise extra stores for subsequent peacekeeping engagements.

Promotions and appointments, as one of the important features of the Ghana Armed Forces, have evolved as GAF interacts with internal and external forces. The expansion of the GAF requires the creation of new offices and higher ranks at the apex of the officer corps and soldiers. Peacekeeping practices and structures of other advanced militaries have also influenced GAF's rank system. The study finds changes in staff appointment ranks for officers and extension of senior rank structures for soldiers. The Director of the Department of Army Peacekeeping Operations (DAPKOP) and similar staff roles now use the General Staff Officer One (GSOI) designation. The changes reflect the NATO classification adopted for peacekeeping staff duties, and the GAF changed its staff officer titles to ensure seamless reference for peacekeeping and other purposes. Similarly, the American type structure for soldiers (other ranks) has been adopted to expand the British peak rank of Warrant Officer Class I (WOI) to the American Chief Warrant Officer (CWO). Thus, normative pressures and competition have combined to shape these titles and ranks in GAF. These changes, however, show that modernity may sometimes be coterminous with neocolonial influences.

Furthermore, as peacekeeping has become a significant operation for GAF, it has a component on promotional examinations (PROMEX) for junior officers (lieutenants and captains). Peacekeepers, all else equal, are better equipped to answer peacekeeping-related questions on the PROMEX. More broadly, peacekeeping operations provide practical experiences for peacekeepers to engage more effectively with issues relating to field experience, leadership, and tactics.

New units and other institutional arrangements have also emerged in response to professional and medical experiences from mission areas. The study finds that through interactions with Norwegian peacekeepers, the GAF recognised the usefulness of pre-deployment training and started a similar project at Bundase Battle Training Camp, a few kilometres from the capital. The pre-deployment training camp has evolved into the Army Peacekeeping Operation Training School (APOTS). The unit is a new command established by GAF in June 2021 and was given the United Nations Training Recognition Certificate on 11 February 2023 for the training of prospective peacekeepers. This development highlights how ideas and institutions can diffuse across space and time.

A peacekeeping office has been established in the Ministry of Defence since July 1980, while the Army established the Department of Army Peacekeeping Operation (DAPKOP). At the General Headquarters (GHQ), the Directorate of International Peacekeeping Operations (DIPKOP) was established as part of the Department of Joint Operations until its severance in 2005 to form the Department of International Peace Support Operations (IPSO). These structures evolved in response to peacekeeping exposures and the drive to enhance GAF's effectiveness in conducting peacekeeping operations abroad. These changes reflect competition and adaptation of mimicked structures from other peacekeeping contingents.

Though the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC), a separate command, is touted by some officers as a peacekeeping package from the UN, a closer examination reveals that the Centre owes its existence more to two bilateral and local factors. First, bilateral support from institutions such as the German Armed Forces Training Advisory Group (GAFTAG). Second, the drive of the Government of Ghana to honour the contributions of His Excellency Kofi Annan, a Ghanaian former Secretary of the UN, towards global peace. The UN package claim rather fits the UN Level IV hospital near the Air Force Base, Accra, which was transferred to GAF in 2023 in accordance with UN-Ghana arrangement. The Level IV hospital, which is now the Emergency Services Unit of GAF, is, however, describable as a peacekeeping package with a caveat, namely, Ghana's provision of land cannot be ignored in that consideration. Thus, it is best to refer to it as a Ghana-UN partnership (investment) and not a UN package per se.

More directly, a Therapy and Wellness Department (TWD) was established at the 37 Military Hospital in 2020 to manage psychological and mental health outcomes of peacekeeping and other operations. The establishment of the department was informed by “cases of trauma and other mental health cases,” which “involved people who had returned from peacekeeping missions” (FSO14, KII August 2022, 37 Military Hospital). The medical outcomes of peacekeeping are therefore one of the key reasons for the creation of the TWD.

Peacekeeping deployments also serve as a welfare mechanism to cushion salaries and alleviate the financial suffering of some personnel. The study further finds that institutional arrangements in some units ensure personnel contribute part of their local allowances or earned dollars from peacekeeping to a financial pool (MS10, II March 2024, Teshie). The arrangement helps finance maintenance of common facilities in the face of financial constraints and bureaucratic delays in securing funds for such purposes. The mechanism coexists with monthly welfare contributions in

some units, while other units combine it with voluntary contributions on a need-basis, founded on principles of reciprocity.

There is an increase in recruitment, including specialised skilled personnel through special medical intakes. The additional numbers result from demands to undertake expanding responsibilities such as joint internal operations and security duties in Ghana's sixteen regions. Peacekeeping at the current deployment involves nearly 2,000 soldiers outside Ghana, and has considerable medical outcomes that require specialist attention. These demands from peacekeeping operations are a major variable in the recruitment arrangements of the Ghana Armed Forces. The recruitment has also brought in more women, partly to fulfil peacekeeping demands for females. GAF has established a gender desk and is one of the few contingents that have met the UN projection of 15% female in all troops, and 25% female military observers and staff officers by 2028, ahead of schedule.

GAF has observed women in other contingents perform creditably, and seen the same about the few women it has deployed in various operational tours abroad. The growing consensus, therefore, is that if they could do it abroad, they can do it at home. Consequently, through advocacy, mission roles reserved by the UN for women, and High Command policy amidst growing gender strides in the broader Ghanaian society, GAF deploys females in combat roles that have hitherto been the preserve of men. These currents of institutional change reflect coercion, mimicry, and normative pressures from peacekeeping, as well as endogenous influences to increase the numbers and space for women in a traditionally male domain. While the Army has been a latecomer in fielding women in key positions, this has not been the case for the Air Force and the Navy, which have seen women make considerable strides in numbers and reduced gendering of certain roles for females (Amoo-Welsing et al., 2019; FSO15, KII May 2023, AFQ-Burma Camp).

Peacekeeping, however, presents a paradox for professional training of personnel. Negatively, it affects group-based training in units deployed as few personnel are available back home for such activities. This shortfall could have adverse effects on the operational readiness of that unit. Yet, the operational tours help personnel from differing units to marry up and share cross-service experiences. Additionally, peacekeepers are exposed to advanced weapons, battle, and soft skills in managing rebels and warring factions of differing nature (Levine, 2016; Riley and Balaram, 2013; Clune, 2014). These skills contribute to continuity in training and enhance the operational readiness of GAF. Events such as a river crossing accident in the Congo (1960s) and stress and trauma in mission areas have also helped emphasize swimming lessons and psychosocial training in the Ghana Armed Forces, which also further the operational readiness of GAF and its personnel. Thus, peacekeeping is a two-edged sword as far as the training and operational readiness of GAF's unit is concerned.

7.3 Professional and Medical Influences on Personnel

At the personnel level, the study finds attitudinal change towards professionalism, such as non-interventionism and avoidance of putsches or military rule. Having emerged from the shadows of a force previously seen as a 'coup entrepreneur,' the GAF has remained in the Barracks while Ghana remains under democratic governance since 1993. Perceptions and experiences of peacekeepers about the horrors of state collapse, the evils of soldier indiscipline, conflicts, and economic gains from peacekeeping are major explanations for the absence of military interventions in the country.

Although these normative pressures make some personnel disinterested in putsches, Salihu and Aning (2023) and *The Republic v. Mac-Palm et al.* (2024) show that coup plotting is not completely absent from Ghana's Fourth Republic. The experiences from peacekeeping, therefore, do not entirely rule out any possibility of or susceptibility to coup intervention from some elements of the Force. Domestic political developments such as sustained faith in democracy among Ghanaians, acceptance of defeat by political candidates, and absence of mass uprisings in the face of economic deterioration, thus, remain significant in sustaining democratic gains beyond peacekeeping influences on personnel.

The human sufferings and general conditions in peacekeeping fields such as Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (ECOMOG and UNMIL), South Sudan (UNISFA), Rwanda (UNAMIR), and DR Congo (MONUC and MONUSCO) have instilled in GAF personnel a stronger desire to procure the security of the country. From the perspective of institutional change (sociological institutionalism), the sum of these exogenous exposures brings normative pressures to bear on the personnel, which contributes to aversion towards war and conflict. The apparent paradox for most personnel is that, though they are trained for war and relish opportunities to practice their training, they would rather live in peacetime than opt for war. This study reveals a strong conviction among most officers and soldiers that war and conflict must be avoided at all costs.

Some personnel view civilians as partners in the provision of security in the country. The view is linked to their CIMIC engagements in mission areas and reliance on civilians to gather intelligence through goodwill gestures. These perceptions (should) enhance harmonious military and civilian relations. Generally, peacekeepers affirm positive change in attitude towards people based on their experiences of war outcomes in various peacekeeping operational areas.

The study finds increased capacity building by personnel through military and civilian courses beyond what is internally available in GAF. This development, which has been particularly pronounced in the last decade targets career opportunities and roles within and outside GAF, particularly in international organizations such as the UN. Some senior officers aspire to pursue doctoral degrees to boost their curriculum vita in anticipation of higher positions within the force. Many of the officers have pursued postgraduate civilian qualifications in the hope of securing a future role with the UN. Some of the soldiers are not left behind in this career quest. The appetite to work in the UN partly emanates from the mission earnings and, more importantly, exposure to UN courses accessible in mission areas. Some personnel, however, explore other options during retirement when the UN dream does not materialise. Nonetheless, there are personnel who did not consider UN roles as a main option. They preferred to be with their families and find suitable roles in Ghana that will fit their retirement lifestyle and family responsibilities.

While the quest for academic qualifications remains, peacekeeping tours, in a few cases, delayed the progression of soldiers pursuing education outside the official sanctioning of their units. These soldiers either could not make it to the list of personnel officially permitted to further their education, or they preferred the alternative route to maintain opportunities for deployment and promotions that may not be available to personnel booked by Command for educational leave. Consequently, peacekeeping tours sometimes conflict with their academic responsibilities, requiring them to defer their studies until a future opportunity.

Although these educational avenues exist, some infantry soldiers are concerned that, aside from security roles, their future after active service is less bright than their counterparts in the trades, Air Force, and Navy. While infantry officers and ORs could be encouraged to consider the available educational opportunities, it might be helpful to include trade options for infantry soldiers

(1-5years) towards the end of their active service. The trade options can help improve their employability post military service.

Professional experiences from peacekeeping are also found to enhance the practice of trade and soldiering in Ghana. From the mixing of spices in the kitchen to record keeping and staff work, personnel have utilised lessons learned in their roles as cooks for troops or staff officers at peacekeeping force headquarters. Others have acquired leadership skills, including commanding companies and platoons while tasting battle as a test of training standards or collaborating with foreign troops (joint task forces) to achieve aspects of peacekeeping mandates. GAF soldiers have therefore obtained transferrable skills that are useful for managing domestic security situations in Ghana.

In line with the nature of modern warfare and parties in conflicts, peacekeeping, as some studies (Clune, 2014; Singleton and Holohan, 2017; Sigri et al., 2014; Banini et al., 2020) note, has offered the GAF personnel professional training in methods and equipment required for combatting terrorist groups. The skills have included intelligence gathering about activities of groups and individuals in such terrains, as well as investigating the needs of warring factions and striking a compromise to promote peace. These lessons combine with internal activities of GAF in a mutually reinforcing manner to prepare the personnel for emerging threats.

The evidence also reveals that personnel have become more conscious of their weight and fitness to avoid losing out on a peacekeeping ticket. Soldiers' health consciousness extends to other risky behaviours such as unprotected sex and substance abuse, as these habits come under scrutiny during pre-deployment screening.

Peacekeeping operation tours do not necessarily coincide with timelines for basic fitness tests that are quintessential to soldiery in GAF, as observable for other armed forces. The comprehensive medical tests required before operational tours abroad cover fitness, HIV, illicit drugs, full blood count (FBC), and diabetes, among others. Personnel who fail these tests are dismissed from the troops. The medical awareness and the screening thus help to know the health status of sections of the personnel and constitute a form of medicalisation of security. The danger here, however, is that transmissible illnesses may affect populations in the Force before screening is done, subject to deployment schedules.

Pre-deployment screening is nonetheless used as a major means to discourage the use of or addiction to illicit drugs in the Ghana Armed Forces. The attempt began on 16 January 2020, in reaction to the increasing use of illicit drugs among some personnel (Army/3020/1/G/D14, 2020), and is subject to similar limitations to screening for HIV/AIDS and other diseases. As exposures to stress and traumatic scenes in mission areas, including proximity to war, personnel casualties, and civilian deaths continue, some personnel are predisposed to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms.

In the attempts to manage these psychological outcomes, some of the personnel, as Ben-Zeev et al. (2012:265) observe, turn to substance abuse, including the use of alcohol and illicit drugs among soldiers affected by these events. The affected persons, however, differ in the time they recover from the experience, though there are occasional flashbacks for some when exposed to events that trigger memories of the traumatic scenario. The management of these outcomes, however, is not proactive. Personnel must self-report to the Wellness and Therapy Department at 37 Military Hospital, or manifest noticeable aggressive behaviour, and be referred to a Medical Reception Station or available medical facility in their unit.

This approach is, however, not workable for most personnel who manifest PTSD symptoms in light of the general mental health-seeking behaviour of soldiers and civilians. Stigma and stereotypes such as “incompetent, weak, blame malingering” (Rüsch et al., 2017:200), “dangerousness” (Mittal et al., 2013), and labelling as “psycho, the ill guy” “mentally ill” (Rüsch et al., 2017:203) are barriers to help-seeking among military personnel. A proactive approach, such as identifying affected persons based on situational reports, could be more helpful for such personnel. In the absence of sufficient structural mechanisms and proactive measures, many of the personnel who experience trauma largely draw from their religious beliefs and pray to overcome the psychological and psychiatric difficulties.

Professional interactions with other armies and training about gender equity, avoiding sexual exploitation, harassment, and abuse in mission areas have also increased the gender awareness of the Ghanaian soldier. These changes are occurring through mimicry, normative pressures, coercion, and competition. By combinations of these factors, male soldiers have a mostly positive view of the deployment of their female counterparts, arguing in part that, “We see them perform on those missions, so we think they can do it back home.” Female personnel are also further empowered to advocate for more roles for women in uniform, and males and females are better positioned to contest actions that would have been ignored though qualifying as sexual harassment.

These findings realise objective three, examining how professional and medical experiences of peacekeeping operations have shaped the conduct and outlook of GAF personnel. They also answer the study question: In what ways have peacekeeping experiences shaped personnel’s professional and medical behaviour in GAF?

Taken together, personnel-level changes are largely driven by normative pressures, competition, coercion, and imitation dynamics described in institutional change and sociological institutionalism.

The other factor is self-style management, which is sometimes informed by normative pressures from Ghanaian cultural practices and personnel's idiosyncrasies.

7.4 Contributions of the Study

The study makes empirical, policy, and theoretical contributions that are of importance to research and the making of policy about peacekeeping and the Ghana Armed Forces.

7.4.1 Empirical Contributions

This study is among the few that have examined how peacekeeping impacts the structures and personnel of the GAF. It contributes to our understanding of the background and times within which Ghana, like other troop contributors, has deployed its personnel to keep peace abroad. In studies such as Sahilu and Aning (2023), Passmore (2020), Asante (2020a), Levine (2016), Dwyer (2015), Baledrokadroka (2012), and Hutchful (1997a), Clune (2014), Prouza and Horák (2015), Caruso et al. (2017), Rolandsen (2015), Jennings and Bøås (2015), where such attempts were made, civil-military relations and economics have been the predominant focus.

In this thesis, I present evidence of structural changes resulting from professional and medical exposures of peacekeepers. The work is thus one of the few studies that have attempted to comprehensively assess the impact of peacekeeping on TCCs, and specifically GAF.

Additionally, by examining the uptake of professional experiences in current (previous) tasks and planning of post-mission career, I advance the debate on the influences of peacekeeping on professionalism in the Ghana Armed Forces. The medical outcomes of peacekeeping operations for GAF help to advance the debate on medical influences in security practice, namely, medicalisation of security. The establishment of a wellness and therapy centre, mental health week, and compulsory testing for substance abuse before deployment through advocacy by senior medical officers and initiative of command; trauma, stress, and transmissible diseases, and increased health consciousness among personnel are some of the mechanisms where medicalisation of security manifests at institutional and personnel levels.

I highlight the multiple means through which peacekeeping influences the Ghana Armed Forces and its personnel. Agyekum (2020) had showed that peacekeeping experiences spread in the barracks through introspection among officers and soldiers with subsequent impact on personnel behaviour. I have provided a nuance of several factors at work in shaping personnel and the structures of GAF. These factors include advocacy, uptake, personal initiatives, introspection, and attempts at managing medical exposures.

7.4.2 Policy Contributions

This study has implications for policy in professional development and medical practice in GAF. By highlighting individual and collective experiences, the study emphasizes the need for GAF and peacekeepers to document their peacekeeping experiences for the learning of the institution and other personnel. Some individual experiences are lost as they are not collated from individual peacekeepers during or after the missions. Gathering these experiences will strengthen

institutional memory and expand spaces of knowledge diffusion in GAF, such as classroom instructions, introspections, and ‘morale’.

The study also underscores the need for increased post-service prospects for infantry soldiers. Considering the reservation that “the army is not giving me [infantry soldier] anything to live on apart from security,” a space is opened for including crafts (trades) and increasing the slots for civilian courses options for the men and officers in the infantry. Thus, those disinterested in security activities during retirement could explore these fields at the end of active service.

Another policy contribution is the evidence regarding the usefulness of further training of battalion commanders in managing psychological issues, as they are the point of contact. Given the shortage of clinical psychologists and the closeness of commanders to their troops, equipping the commanders will serve as a first aid to meet the psychological and psychiatric needs of personnel during peacekeeping tours and between the end of the tour and disembarkation.

The study also underscores the need for proactive structures to identify individuals who have been exposed to traumatic scenes for counselling and therapy. Situational reports usually provide information on events in the mission area. Institutional reliance on incidence reports to identify affected personnel will be a more effective approach to ensuring the provision of appropriate psychological or psychiatric support than relying on self-reporting by the soldier. Additionally, it highlights the need for increased advocacy to de-stigmatize mental healthcare and soldiers who experience symptoms of PTSD. Though the military environment stresses resilience, manliness, and mental and emotional ‘strength’ as supposed antitheses to manifesting PTSD symptoms, destigmatising mental healthcare could improve access to psychiatric and psychological care.

The discussions on post-operation screening, especially in areas where particular illnesses are endemic, also open the space for policy considerations on the feasibility of screening to ensure that personnel are not only healthy pre-deployment but also at the end of their respective tours. As an officer (MSO25, KII, July 2022, Otu Barracks) puts it: ‘you sent me [soldier] out healthy, you must ensure that I am returning in good health.’


7.4.3 Contributions to Theory

The study has contributed to sociological institutionalism and discussions about medicalisation of security. The analytical concept – institutional change – and its theoretical roots (sociological institutionalism) scarcely highlight individuals and groups as vectors for the diffusion of change. It is silent on the mediums through which institutional change occurs. Additionally, the concept and underlying theory keep the analysis at the macro-level and therefore miss the micro-meso forces actively at work in initiating, facilitating, or constituting the changes. The macro focus was important in explaining the Africanization of the GAF officer corps in the 1960s, which occurred through the interplay of normative pressures and competition. Even here, advocacy from Ghanaian soldiers played a role in informing Nkrumah’s decision to indigenize the officer corps at that time. The evidence from the study has shown that soldiers as individuals or collective mediate aspects of the processes of institutional transformations in GAF through personal initiatives, advocacy, uptake, and introspection. Professional experiences such as in-mission leadership roles, observation of other troops, challenges during peacekeeping tours, fighting as peacekeepers in missions like ECOMOG, exposure to advanced weapons, witnessing the horrors of state collapse, conflict, and attendant human suffering provide grounds for the observed structural and

behavioural changes. GAF has, for instance, adopted the NATO staff classification system to stay modern and make local positions reflective of counterparts on UN missions.

Exposures to traumatic events and transmissible diseases by GAF personnel – individuals or contingents – in some missions, such as UNAMIR and MONUC, also influenced soldiers to undergo attitudinal changes, including exhibiting symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and substance addiction. The GAF has also established a unit to deal with recurring psychological challenges. It has introduced screening for illicit drugs, increased awareness of HIV/AIDS, and issue condoms to personnel readied for peacekeeping deployment. The further attention given to these health needs constitutes a medicalisation of security

Thus, mechanisms such as mimicry, competition, and endogenous influences permeate GAF as individual and collective experiences of personnel are harnessed in the process of personal and/or institutional learning. Ghana Armed Forces' peacekeepers are therefore active media who transport ideas from peacekeeping to GAF and shape the latter's structures and practices. The GAF soldier is a constituent and carrier of change, and a mediator of aspects of transformation in the institution. The highlight of the active role of the soldiers (individual and collective) in contributing to structural changes and modifications in personnel outlook, therefore, contributes to theoretical arguments about institutional change and sociological institutionalism.



7.5 Conclusions from the Study

The Ghana Armed Forces is not static but an evolving Institution with roots in local and colonial antecedents that guided its establishment. The history of the Force starts from the indigenous and colonial factors that shaped the nature, structure, and outlook of the GAF and its personnel. The transformation is manifest in forms of expansion and reorganization that have occurred since the country's independence, despite relatively enduring elements such as the command, control, and administration mechanisms bequeathed by colonial Britain.

The ongoing changes observable in this process of evolution are the outcome of the complex interplay of personal, local, and international factors. Among the international factors, peacekeeping is an important contributor to the transformative processes in GAF.

Peace operation engagement has offered personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces individual and collective experiences from professional and medical dimensions. The Institution and soldiers have harnessed these experiences through advocacy, uptake, personal initiatives, introspection, and attempts at managing medical exposures to change some structures in GAF and the outlook of some personnel.

The personnel of the GAF have thus been key in these processes of change in GAF. Professional experiences such as leadership roles during missions, observation of other troops, in-mission challenges, fighting as peacekeepers in missions like ECOMOG, exposure to advanced weapons, witnessing the horrors of state collapse, conflict and attendant human suffering provide grounds for the observed structural and behavioural changes.

Mimicry of structures and practices of other institutions, such as NATO, and Norwegian peacekeepers, respectively, influenced the modification of staff appointment titles and the

establishment of Bundase pre-deployment camp (consequently APOTS). The American system that has ranks above Warrant Officer I for senior other ranks (Master Warrant Officer, Senior Warrant Officer, Chief Warrant Officer) has also permeated the established rank structures of GAF through a similar mechanism.

Ghana Armed Forces' personnel have also gone through attitudinal change from coup-loving to coup-averse, particularly in the Fourth Republic. As has been seen in the discussions, peacekeeping experiences are a major explanation for the anti-interventionist posturing of GAF. The professional experiences about the effects of war on human lives and property have also instilled in most soldiers a disinterest in violence and conflict. While this outcome has combined with growing realisation about collaborative security provision between soldiers and civilians as learnt from the mission fields, civil-military relations in Ghana are not persistently harmonious.

The occasional recurrence of violence between soldiers and civilians indicates that positive gains from peace operations is yet to find full expression in soldiery and that some personnel of the lower ranks need to imbibe and practice these lessons.

Peacekeeping provide intelligence gathering and combat useful experiences which are applicable in local soldiering. Personnel however carry along lessons from internal engagements to enhance readiness for peacekeeping activities. Contributions of internal activities and peacekeeping experiences to combat readiness against emerging threats is thus best explained as mutually reinforcing.

The post-career choices of GAF soldiers (male or female) are considerably influenced by peace operation experiences. Peacekeeping is a major space where post-service career with the UN is

nurtured and one of the significant influences that drives officers and men to pursue civilian qualifications even towards terminal degrees.

Exposure to cultures in peace mission fields has added to lessons acquired before deployment and influences from the Ghanaian society to shape social components of military activities of GAF in peace operation theatres and its internal operations in Ghana. The social components include discussions about visiting traditional authorities in a new area, medical outreach, and an open-door healthcare policy towards civilian populations.

Peacekeeping has increased the medicalisation of security practices in the Ghana Armed Forces. Exposures to traumatic events and transmissible diseases by GAF personnel – individuals or contingents – in some missions, such as UNAMIR and MONUC, also influenced soldiers to undergo attitudinal changes, including exhibiting symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder and substance addiction.

Traumatic experiences and stress in mission areas render some personnel addicted to alcohol, illicit drugs, and other substances. Some soldiers also engage(d) in risky sexual behaviour during peacekeeping tours, especially in the 1990s, and contract(ed) HIV/AIDS, which burdens the military health system and families of affected personnel.


Medical screening helps to have insight into the health of some personnel and to limit the use of illicit drugs. A more proactive post-operation approach will identify and support personnel exposed to traumatic events and other health risks in mission areas. It will help soldiers effectively manage the negative effects of peacekeeping operations.

The contexts within which GAF has undertaken peacekeeping have differed, as have the peace support operations. It has involved moments of professionalism and positive civil-military

relations as well as times of contestations about soldier professionalism, integrity, and loyalty to the country. Many lessons have been learned from peacekeeping over the years, and these have coupled with internal expansion projects to shape some of the changes visible in the Ghana Armed Forces.

However, most of the changes either accelerate developments engineered endogenously within GAF itself or by political activities in the country, as exemplified by the Africanisation drive. Others, nonetheless, are brought to bear by peacekeeping necessities such as the establishment of training centres and the incorporation of peacekeeping training in the activities of the armed forces. In some of the changes, peacekeeping had a minimal role, but in others, the specific effects on the structures of GAF and the behavioural outlook of its personnel are noticeable. The processes of change show normative pressures, mimesis, coercion, and competition, as well as varying combinations of these factors.

While peacekeeping participation continues, it will be crucial to maximize the benefits for personnel and GAF while minimizing adverse impacts such as reduced group-based training opportunities and the psychological, psychiatric, and transmissible health outcomes for personnel.



7.6 Recommendations

While IPSO and the High Command receive mission reports, it will be needful for further institutional arrangements to collate experiences of peacekeepers. Doctoral work, such as this study and many others, is part of GAF's institutional memory. However, given the scope of academic work and its constraints, specific experiences of many soldiers that might be helpful to the institution are largely missed. The Research and Development section of GAF, along with its cells in GAF's academic institutions, can therefore conduct experience surveys to document information missing from situational reports (SITREP) and mission complete or handover notes submitted by commanders and observers.

Given the many years and wealth of peacekeeping experiences of GAF, there should be an initiative to create a structure to harness the benefits of these experiences to boost local security provision. One of the aspects of the structure should be how military and police peacekeepers, as well as other security agencies, collaborate and share mission experiences to strengthen domestic security delivery. Similarly, the concept of collaborative security provision should assume a more operational dimension by promoting civilian awareness of vigilance and encouraging prompt relay of information to the military regarding any suspicious activities that could threaten the country's peace. This awareness can be achieved through civic education.

Peacekeeping Day and celebrations should be widely publicised and improved in execution. In doing that, peacekeepers who have excelled on various missions should be recognised nationwide, as well as those who have fallen in the pursuit of peace. The benefits of peacekeeping to the country should also be communicated to the public.

The Ghana Armed Forces has achieved commendable progress, exceeding 15% female participation in peacekeeping and expanding the roles available to women in the Force.

There is, however, a need to increase female participation to maintain and further enhance GAF's position in supporting global peace and protecting women in conflict zones. Ghana's affirmative action regulations mandate that, from 2024, the minimum female representation must be 30% and aim to achieve gender parity by 2034. The national aspiration should inspire the GAF to deploy 30% or more females on its peacekeeping battalions. Conflicts continue to have a disproportionate impact on women and children, and the increased participation of female peacekeepers can enhance the capacity to address the needs of these populations.

Though GAF opens opportunities for personnel to further their education to enhance their prospects for service to the nation in the civilian contexts, it may be more helpful to offer options for infantry officers and soldiers towards the end of their career (last 1-5 years) to opt for a trade in the Armed Forces. This option will enhance their employability after service. Short courses in Agribusiness are a helpful initiative. The Retirement and Resettlement Directorate can expand the initiative to include a few weeks to one-year certification courses in areas such as artificial intelligence, web and content management, IT, and strategic management, among others, before retirement or just after. The short courses and certification can be paid for by the personnel, the Ghana Armed Forces, or shared between personnel and the Force. The training should be one to two years before retirement to ensure that skills acquired remain relevant to current demands in the civilian job market. These options can improve the lives of retired officers and ex-service personnel who served in infantry units during active service.

The Wellness and Therapy Department should extend its services to Command Posts and Garrison Headquarters to help meet the psychological and psychiatric needs of peacekeepers and other

personnel. Although mental health nurses are serving in various commands, it will be helpful to extend the offers of the TWD as soon as possible.

There should be a proactive identification and support for personnel exposed to traumatic events and other health risks in mission areas to help soldiers better negotiate the negative effects of peacekeeping operations. A structure will ensure that once reports of incidents on a mission have been received by command, they can be relayed to High Command, and Medical Services and Religious Affairs can guide the peacekeeper(s) on managing the trauma when they return to Ghana.

There should also be post-mission counselling for troops (battalions and companies) on life back home to enhance personnel's ability to negotiate being home after stressful duty.

Random post-mission screening should also be done for peacekeepers in mission areas with known Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC) such as Lassa fever, HIV/AIDS. The random screening can be conducted at the Units at the end of the tour, after disembarkation.

With the limited number of psychologists in GAF and space on mission deployments, not all companies or platoons can access GAF or UN specialists. Commanding officers could therefore be trained and equipped with skills to manage psychological issues as the first point of call before referral to a clinical psychologist.

Future research could explore how peacekeeping experiences in collaborative security provision with other security agencies and civil communities can be leveraged to improve domestic security practice in Ghana.

There should also be research on the role of peacekeeping in physical infrastructure developments in the Ghana Armed Forces. Another study could assess the role of peacekeeping in skill retention or skill decay among personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces.

Similarly, further research could study trauma management and posttraumatic stress disorder among retired officers and ex-service persons. A Comparative study of how serving officers and soldiers, as well as their retired comrades, manage trauma could also provide insights to inform policy on the differentiated management of medical outcomes of peacekeeping among personnel.

Another researchable area is the incidence and prevalence of diseases in the Ghana Armed Forces emanating from peacekeeping missions. Such work should also explore ways to improve the health-seeking behaviour of soldiers.



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
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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Research Instruments

A.

Interview Guide (Soldiers and Officers)

I am Peter Gyamponsah Bembir, a PhD Candidate at the University of Ghana. This interview is part of a doctoral research on the topic *peacekeeping experiences and institutional change in the Ghana Armed Forces*. The interview will last between 45 and 90 minutes. You are free however to opt out any time. Your responses will be strictly confidential and in no way be traceable to you. Information you volunteer will only be used for the purposes of this study. Thank you for agreeing to share your peacekeeping experiences.

Preliminaries: Years of service----- Rank----- Marital Status-----
Level of Education completed -----Year(s) of Service/Enlistment -----
Missions served-----Mission roles.....

1. Can you describe your first peace mission experience?
2. Kindly share your pre-deployment experience and what happens when you return
3. What personal experience(s) do you find striking from your peacekeeping missions?
Probe for
 - *the mission, (place) and year.*
 - *Why they find that experience striking*
 - *Effect of the experience(s) on their professional life*
 - *The benefits the experience(s) has for the military establishment*
4. Which changes in the Ghana Armed Forces would you attribute to peacekeeping influences?
Probe for
 - *Structural changes influenced by professional and medical experiences*
 - *Changes in personnel behaviour and outlook*
 - *Media through which the changes occurred*
5. In what way(s) has experiences of peacekeeping impacted you professionally?
Probe for
 - *Use of mission experiences in personnel's professional duties*
 - *Career decisions*
 - *Attitudinal changes*

6. How has peacekeeping experience shaped (your) perceptions about security in Ghana?

Probe for

- *Participant(s) views about internal operations in Ghana*
- *Security practices and security perceptions learnt from mission theatres*

7. In your view, in what ways has peacekeeping affected operational readiness, and preparedness against emerging threats such as terrorism?

Probe for

- *Impact on training and readiness for eventualities*
- *Security risks possible from peace missions*
- *Specific lessons drawn from peacekeeping experiences*

8. What mandatory institutional medical checks and screenings exist for military peacekeepers?

Probe for

- *Screening for: diseases transmissible via borders - Covid and Ebola (PHEIC – Public health issue of international concern);*
- *Post deployment medical practice towards peacekeepers*

9. How do you manage traumatic memories from peace mission(s) if you have had any?

Probe for

- *Where they go to when they have traumas*
- *Whether there is discussion at all about traumatic experiences*
- *Institutional mechanisms for managing traumatic memories*
- *Suggestions for improvement in current institutional practice*

10. What structures exist for disseminating personal experiences of peacekeepers?

Probe for

- *Formal and informal structures*
- *Forums for discussing peacekeeping experiences*
- *Advantages and disadvantages*
- *Suggestions for improvement*



B.

Interview Guide (Medical Officers, Priests, and Imams)

I am Peter Gyamponsah Bembir PhD Candidate at the University of Ghana. This interview is part of a doctoral research on the topic *peacekeeping experiences and institutional change in the Ghana Armed Forces*. The interview will last between 45 and 90 minutes. You are free however to opt out any time. Your responses will be strictly confidential and in no way be traceable to you. Information you volunteer will only be used for the purposes of this study. Thank you for agreeing to share your experiences.

Preliminaries: Years of service----- Rank----- Marital status-----

Level of Education Completed -----Missions served-----

1. What type of service(s) do you provide peacekeepers?

Probe for

- *Pre-deployment*
- *Service during missions*
- *Upon return of peacekeepers*

2. What changes have you had to make in your service provision due to peacekeeping?

Probe for

- *Modifications to counselling strategies*
- *Structural changes related to medical outcomes of peacekeeping*


3. What emerging case(s) from peacekeepers seeking your service has been most challenging for you?

4. Which institutional avenues exist to help manage traumatic memories from missions?

Probe for

- *Referrals*

5. What changes do you suggest should occur in the management of traumatic memories and health risks from peacekeeping?



C.

Focus Group Discussion Guide (Soldiers)

I am Peter Gyamponsah Bembir, a PhD Candidate at the University of Ghana. This interview is part of a doctoral research on the topic *peacekeeping experiences and institutional change in the Ghana Armed Forces*. This interview will last between 45 and 90 minutes. You are free however to opt out any time. Your responses will be strictly confidential and in no way be traceable to you. Information you volunteer will only be used for the purposes of this study. Thank you for agreeing to share your peacekeeping experiences.

Preliminaries: Years of service/enlistment----- Ranks----- Marital Status-----
Levels of Education completed -----Missions served-----Mission roles-----

1. Can you describe your first peace mission experiences?
2. Kindly share your pre-deployment experiences and what happens when you return
3. What personal experience(s) do you find striking from your peacekeeping missions?
Probe for
 - *the mission, (place) and year.*
 - *Why they find that experience striking*
 - *Effect of the experience(s) on their professional life*
 - *The benefits the experience(s) has for the military establishment*
4. How has peacekeeping experience shaped your perceptions about security in the military?
Probe for
 - *Participant(s) views about internal operations in Ghana*
 - *Security practices and security perceptions learnt from mission theatres*
5. Which changes in the Ghana Armed Forces would you attribute to peacekeeping influences?
Probe for
 - *Structural changes influenced by professional and medical experiences*
 - *Changes in personnel behaviour and outlook*
 - *Media through which the changes occurred*
6. In your views, in what ways has peacekeeping informed the preparedness of the military against emerging threats such as terrorism?
Probe for
 - *Security risks possible from peace missions*
 - *Specific lessons drawn for such purposes*
7. What mandatory institutional medical checks and screenings exist for military peacekeepers?
Probe for

- *Screening for: diseases transmissible via borders - Covid and Ebola (PHEIC – Public health issue of international concern)*
- *Post deployment*
- *medical practice towards peacekeepers*

8. How do you manage traumatic memories from peace mission(s)?
Probe for

- *Where they go to when they have traumas*
- *Whether there is discussion at all about traumatic experiences*
- *Institutional mechanisms for managing traumatic memories*
- *Suggestions for improvement in current institutional practice*

9. What structures exist for disseminating personal experiences of peacekeepers?
Probe for

- *Formal and informal structures*
- *Forums for discussing peacekeeping experiences*
- *Advantages and disadvantages*
- *Suggestions for improvement*



Appendix II: Ethical Approval



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)

P. O. Box LG 74, Legon, Accra, Ghana

My Ref. No...ECH 318/ 21-22 ...

June 16, 2022.

Peter Gyamponsah Bembir
Institute of African Studies
University of Ghana
Legon

ETHICAL CLEARANCE
(ECH 318/ 21-22)

The protocol title below has been reviewed and approved by the ECH Committee.

TITLE OF PROTOCOL: PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN GHANA'S MILITARY

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: PETER GYAMPONSAH BEMBIR


Please note that the final review report must be submitted to the Committee at the completion of the study. Your research records may be audited at any time during or after the implementation. Any modification of this research project must be submitted to ECH for review and approval prior to implementation.

Please report all serious adverse events related to this study to ECH within seven (7) days verbally and in writing within fourteen (14) days.

This certificate is valid till June 15, 2023. You are to submit annual reports for continuing review.

Please accept my congratulations.

Yours Sincerely,


Professor C. Charles Mate-Kole
ECH Chair

Cc: Professor Richard Asante, Institute of African Studies, UG
Professor Kwesi Aning, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
Dr. Pius Siakwah, Institute of African Studies, UG

Tel: +233-303933866

Email: ech@ug.edu.gh

INTEGRI PROCEDAMUS

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA



Official Use only
Protocol number

Ethics Committee for Humanities (ECH)

PROTOCOL CONSENT FORM

Section A- BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Title of Study:	Peacekeeping Experiences and Institutional Change in Ghana's Military
Principal Investigator:	Peter Gyamponsah Bembir
Certified Protocol Number	

Section B- CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

General Information about Research

The study investigates how professional and health experiences from peacekeeping are managed in the military. It examines individual and institutional avenues for managing these experiences and the institutional change that result from the uptake of these experiences by the military establishment. The professional experiences include perceptions about security and how lessons from missions affect soldiering in Ghana, while the health theme considers psychological outcomes and medical screenings akin to peacekeeping engagements.

This study uses interviews both person-to-person and focus groups discussions. Participation in the study will require 45minutes and not more than 90 minutes of your time. One-on-one interviews will be done in an environment where your views will not be heard by others. Participation in focus groups will involve 6-12 participants all of whom are either male or female other ranks.

Benefits/Risks of the study

Participants can expect their experiences will receive wider audience and contribute to institutional learning. Outcome of this study will help improve ways of managing professional and health experiences of peacekeepers in Ghana.

Sharing how traumatic memories from mission theatres are managed may involve reliving the specific experience. Should such observation be made, participants will be referred for counselling, and will be introduced to appropriate military authority and Psychologist Dr Juliet Tengey in the establishment for attention.



Confidentiality

Participants will be identified with codes and will not need to mention their names during the interview. Records from interviews and field work is be stored private space accessible to the investigator and not the public. In line with academic practice, records from this study will be destroyed within a decade and will only be used at any time for academic purposes only.

An exception will be made for supervisors of this study where they require verification of transcript and responses presented in the analysis of the study. Signing or thumbprint of the written consent form, by your or your representative or oral consent thus authorizes such access only for the purposes stated.

Compensation

There will be no compensation packages either in cash or kind available for participants of the study. Participants in the focus group discussions will however be refreshed to provide a relaxed and informal context that will facilitate discussions.

Withdrawal from Study

Participation is voluntary and you may withdraw at any time without penalty. You will not be adversely affected in any way should you decline to participate or stop participating during the interview.

You are hereby assured that you or your legal representative will be informed in a timely manner if information becomes available that may be relevant to your willingness to continue participation or withdraw.

In the case where the interviewer observes a health condition that requires medical attention and/or any emergency such as force majeure the study will be terminated.

Contact for Additional Information

Should you have need for answers to any questions about the research and in case of research-related injury please contact Peter Gyamponsah Bembir, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 73, Legon. You can contact me at pgbembir@stug.edu.gh and peterbem123@hotmail.com, or 0500190521/0249558009.

If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant in this study you may contact the Administrator of the Ethics Committee for Humanities, ISSER, University of Ghana at ech@ug.edu.gh or 00233-303-933-866.



Appendix III: List of UN Missions Toured by Personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces

<u>ACRONYM</u>	<u>MISSION NAME</u>	<u>START DATE</u>	<u>END DATE</u>
UNTSO	United Nations Troop Supervision Organization	May 1948	Present
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	January 1949	Present
UNEF I	First United Nations Emergency Force	November 1956	June 1967
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	June 1958	December 1958
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo	July 1960	June 1964
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea	October 1962	April 1963
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	July 1963	September 1964
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964	Present
UNEF II	Second United Nations Emergency Force	October 1973	July 1979
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	June 1974	Present
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978	Present
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	May 1988	March 1990
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August 1988	February 1991
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989	June 1991
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989	March 1990
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	April 1991	October 2003
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	April 1991	Present
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	June 1991	February 1995
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	October 1991	March 1992
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force	February 1992	March 1995
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March 1992	September 1993
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992	March 1993
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992	December 1994
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March 1993	March 1995
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	August 1993	June 2009
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993	September 1997

<u>ACRONYM</u>	<u>MISSION NAME</u>	<u>START DATE</u>	<u>END DATE</u>
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti	September 1993	June 1996
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October 1993	March 1996
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	February 1995	June 1997
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 1995	December 2002
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	June 1997	February 1999
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August 1997	December 1997
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	July 1998	October 1999
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	June 1999	Present
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	October 1999	December 2005
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	October 1999	May 2002
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC	November 1999	June 2010
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	July 2000	July 2008
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002	May 2005
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	May 2003	April 2004
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	September 2003	March 2018
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	May 2017
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	June 2004	October 2017
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi	June 2004	December 2006
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	July 2007	December 2020
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	September 2007	December 2010
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC	July 2010	Present
UNISFA	United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei	June 2011	Present
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	July 2011	Present
UNSMIS	United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria	April 2012	August 2012
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	April 2013	Present
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	April 2014	Present
UNMHA	United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement	December 2018	Present
UNSMIS	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Syria	April 2012	August 2012

Sources: IPSO; United Nations Peacekeeping (<https://peacekeeping.un.org/>)

Appendix IV: Established Ranks in the Ghana Armed Forces

GHANA ARMED FORCES RANKS STRUCTURE												
OTHER RANKS	NO INSIGNIA OF RANKS PRIVATE	Lance Corporal	Corporal	Sergeant	Staff Sergeant	Warrant Officer II	Warrant Officer I	Senior Warrant Officer II	Senior Warrant Officer I	Master Warrant Officer	Chief Warrant Officer	ARMY
	NO INSIGNIA OF RANKS Ordinary seaman	Able Seaman Class 1	Leading Seaman	Petty Officer Class 2	Petty Officer Class 1	Chief Petty Officer Class 2	Chief Petty Officer Class 1	Fleet Chief Petty Officer 2	Fleet Chief Petty Officer 1	Master Chief Petty Officer	Chief Warrant Officer	NAVY
	NO INSIGNIA OF RANKS Aircraft Man I Aircraft Man II	Leading Air Craftman	Corporal	Sergeant	Flight Sergeant	Warrant Officer II	Warrant Officer I	Senior Warrant Officer II	Senior Warrant Officer I	Master Air Warrant Officer	Chief Warrant Officer	AIRFORCE
OFFICERS	2nd Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General	General	FIELD MARSHALL	ARMY
	A/Sub Lieutenant	Sub Lieutenant	Lieutenant GN	Lieutenant Commander	Commander	Captain GN	Commodore	Rear Admiral	Vice Admiral	Admiral	ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET	NAVY
	Pilot Officer	Flying Officer	Flight Lieutenant	Squadron Leader	Wing Commander	Group Captain	Air Commodore	Air Vice-Marshal	Air Marshal	Air Chief Marshal	Marshal of the Air Force	AIRFORCE

Source: Brigadier General Frimpong (Rtd) (2023, July 2).

