

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

**PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF
TEMA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY.**

BY



**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF
MPHIL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DEGREE**

JULY 2013

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this work is the result of my own research and has not been presented by anyone for any academic award in this or any other university. All references used in the work have been fully acknowledged. I bear sole responsibility for any shortcomings.

.....

AMANYO VENATIUS

(10107786)

.....

DATE



CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this thesis was supervised in accordance with procedures laid down by the University.

.....
THOMAS BUABENG, PhD.
(SUPERVISOR)

.....
DATE



DEDICATION


This research work is dedicated to my wife and daughter I also dedicate it to my entire extended family especially to my mother Beatrice Sosu.



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I am indebted to the many individuals and organizations without whose help this research would not have been successfully completed. I wish to acknowledge with sincere thanks their contribution to the success of this work.

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The logo of the University of Ghana is centered on the page. It features a shield with a blue and gold design, topped with three golden spikes. Below the shield is a golden banner with the Latin motto "INTEGRI PROCEdamus".

I also extend my acknowledgment to the officials and the administrators of the Tema Metropolitan Assembly (T.M.A), Tema west and east sub-metro officials and Assembly members for offering me valuable information and assistance during my data collection, I thank you. I would also like to express my profound appreciation to my boss Hajia Zenabu Abdullai the metropolitan NADMO coordinator for Tema and to all my colleagues for their support and encouragement.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	African Development Foundation
AVRL	Aqua Vitens Rand Limited
BOO	Build Own Operate
BOOT	Build Own Operate and Transfer
BOT	Build Operate and Transfer
CONIWAS	Coalition of NGOs in Water and Sanitation
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DPHASM	Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	German International Cooperation
GNA	Ghana News Agency
GTZ	Deuche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarb
GWCL	Ghana Water Company Limited
IDA	International Donor Agencies
IGF	Internally Generated Funds
ILGS	Institute of Local Government Studies
ISODEC	Integrated Social Development Center
LG	Local Government
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP	New Patriotic Party
PA	Public Administration
PFI	Private Funding Initiative

PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PS	Private Sector
PSP	Private Sector Participation
PURC	Public Utilities Regulatory Commission
ROT	Refurbish Operate and Transfer
SFDR	Support for Decentralization Reform
SOEs	State Owned Enterprises
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
TMA	Tema Metropolitan Assembly
TUC	Trades Union Congress

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure: 1.1	Structure of Local Government System in Ghana-	-	-	15
Figure: 2.1	A Model of the Policy Implementation Process (Meter and Horn, 1975) -	-	-	42
Figure: 2.2	The Linear Model of Policy Implementation-	-	-	46
Figure: 2.3	An Interactive Model of Policy Implementation-	-	-	48
Figure: 2.4	The Implementation Model of PPP in TMA-	-	-	57

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	i
Certification-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	ii
Dedication-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	iii
Acknowledgements	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	iv
List of Abbreviations--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	v
List of Figures-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	vii
Table of Contents-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	viii
Abstract-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	xii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
1.1 Background of the Study--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
1.3 Objectives of the Study-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
1.4 Research Question-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
1.5 Significance of the Study--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
1.6 Scope and Limitation(s) of the Study-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
1.7 Definition of Terms-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11
1.8 Organization of the Study-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
2.1 General Studies on PPPs-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
2.1.1 Meaning and Characteristics of PPP-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
2.1.2 Types of PPP-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20
2.2 Privatization and Public Sector Reform-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23
2.3 Implementing PPP in Local Governance--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27
2.4 PPP in Local Governance in Advance Countries-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29
2.5 PPP in Local Governance in Developing Countries-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
2.6 PPP in Local Governance in Ghana-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
2.7 Review of Public Policy Implementation -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
2.7.1 The “Top-down” versus “Bottom-up” Debate-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39
2.7.2 Public Policy Implementation Models-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43
2.7.3 Implementation Challenges in the Developing World-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49
2.8 Developing a Framework for the study - -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51
2.9 Framework for the Analysis of the Implementation of PPP-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52
2.9.1 The Dependent variable: “The Implementation Performance of PPP” -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	53
2.9.2 The Independent (Explanatory) variable of the study-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	53
2.9.3 An Overview of the Model-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57
2.10 Conclusion-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	59
3.1 Research Paradigm-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	59
3.2 Research Method--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60

3.3 Unit of Analysis-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61
3.3.1 Study Area--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62
3.3.2 Sources of Data-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68
3.3.3 Target Population-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	69
3.3.4 Sample Size -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70
3.3.5 Sampling Technique-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70
3.3.6 Instruments of Data Collection -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71
3.4 Data Management-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	72
3.5 Ethical Considerations-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73
3.6 Challenges and Lessons Learnt-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75

CHAPTER FOUR: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN WASTE COLLECTION

4.0 Introduction -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	77
4.1 Policy Standards and Objective-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	77
4.2 Communication and Enforcement Activities-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84
4.3 Resources--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	86
4.4 Administrative Structures-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	91
4.5 Conclusion-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	93

CHAPTER FIVE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN REVENUE

MOBILIZATION

5.0 Introduction -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	94
5.1 Policy Standards and Objective-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	94
5.2 Communication and Enforcement Activities-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	101
5.3 Resources--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	103

5.4 Administrative Structures-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	107
5.5 Challenges to the Implementation of Public- Private Partnerships-	-	-								109
5.6 Conclusion-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	111

CHAPTER SIX: COMPARISON OF WASTE MANAGEMENT AND REVENUE

MOBILIZATION:

6.0 Introduction-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	112
6.1 Similarities in the Implementation Performance -	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	112
6.2 Variations in the implementation Performance-	-	-	--	-	-	-	-	-	-	115
6.3 Conclusion-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	116

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.0 Introduction-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	118
7.1 Summary --	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	118
7.2 Recommendations-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	132
7.3 Conclusion-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	137

REFERENCES-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	139
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APPENDICES

Appendix: 1 Interview Guide-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	147
Appendix: 2 Revenue Pattern of Tema Metropolitan Assembly-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	154
Appendix: 3 Expenditure Pattern of Tema Metropolitan Assembly-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	155
Appendix: 4 TMA Organizational chart-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	156

ABSTRACT

This study focused on Public-Private Partnerships in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. The main objective of the study was to investigate, describe and explain the factors that influenced the implementation of public-private partnership in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. Specifically the study focused on waste collection and revenue mobilization. Effective implementation of public-private partnership in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly depends on a number of factors which includes Policy Objectives, communication and enforcement activity, policy resources and administrative structures. To achieve the above objective the study adopted the qualitative method and a case study approach to interview eighteen (18) respondents using an in-depth interview technique. The study found that Public-private partnerships in waste collection and revenue mobilization have been generally successful although there is more room for improvement. Implementation challenges such as poorly assigned responsibilities for household registration, fee-fixing, lack of effective communication and weak enforcement of sanitation bye-laws, inadequate resources, etc and the lack of better and additional monitoring capacity involving the use of Information Technology, the inability to reevaluate properties and assets in the metropolis and the lack of proper data covering tax payers in the metropolis constitutes the Achilles-heel to the partnership. The findings revealed that implementation performance of PPP depends on policy standards and objectives, communication and enforcement of regulations and contract terms as well as resources and administrative structures employed. The study recommends the need to clarify policy documents, increase transparency, improve resources and manpower training as well as enforce regulations on sanitation.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

The focus of this study was to investigate, describe and explain the factors that enhance or impede the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. This chapter provides a general overview to the entire thesis. It starts by giving the background to the study and identifies the research problem and the objectives of the research. It also presents the research questions, significance of the study, the scope and limitation as well as the organization of the study.

1.1 Background of the Study

The concept of Public- Private Partnership (PPP) has gained much currency in the sphere of modern day globalization through entities like the United Nations Global Compact and Global Health Funds, various United Nations (UN) summits and commissions, and the activities of organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). In other words the UN has emerged as one of the principal proponents of PPPs (Utting and Zammit, 2009).

In Africa, the concept of Public-private partnership is spreading very fast, just like “errand-bushfires” across the face of the continent. However the concept has received several interpretations, where as some see it as a new governance tool for contracting for public services through competitive tendering. Others also see PPPs as a new expression in the language of public management, one intended to include older established procedures of involvement of private organizations in the delivery of public services (Linder, 1999). Yet others view PPPs as a new way to handle huge capital infrastructural

projects such as building tunnels and renewing harbors (Savas, 2000). Then there are also a number of people who seem to use the terms "contracting" and "public-private partnership" almost interchangeably (Hodge and Greve, 2007).

The above notwithstanding, In Sub-Sahara Africa in general and Ghana in particular, Public-private partnerships has become a policy mantra that is being touted by government at all levels, development partners, the private sector and some segments of the media as a panacea to addressing the myriad of developmental and infrastructural needs of the country. Such partnerships it has been argued, leads to an improvement in poverty reduction and sustainable development (DANIDA, 2004). In a similar vein, the UNDP Commission for Private Sector Development has argued that public-private partnerships (PPPs) can facilitate access to broader financing options, assist skill and knowledge development, and make possible sustainable delivery of basic services, particularly energy and water (UNDP, 2004, p.4).

PPPs are contractual arrangements between the Public sector and the private sector for the delivery of certain public goods and services by the private sector, for the public's consumption, and for their mutual benefits. Stakeholder partnerships between the private sector and public/non-profit institutions are often portrayed as "win-win partnerships with measurable benefits and results" that accrue to all actors involved (Lund-Thomsen, 2009). The idea of PPP's is an offshoot of Privatization and Private Sector Participation (PSP) which are variants of the New Public Management (NPM) Ideology and that encourages the Private sector to contribute personnel and capital in the delivery of public goods and services.

Public administration reforms and New Public Management ideologies since the late 1970s and early 1980s is argued to drive PPPs and also emphasize the reshaping of state

boundaries and responsibility especially through privatization and reforms aimed at introducing cost reduction in expenditure, promote efficiency and accountability into public administration and governance. However, approaches to development interventions, and in particular the role of the private sector, are now said to be driven by "what works" and less by ideology (Minogue et al., 1998).

According to a World Bank study (Minogue et al., 1998), privatization is a fact of life almost everywhere in the world. This attests to the pervasiveness of the term and its practice. However a UNDP report (UNDP, 1995, p. 35) asserts that 'privatization lies at the heart of the market based approach to public management', while another by the World Bank declares that 'public provisions must become the exception rather than the rule, and that state intervention is justified only when markets fail. These assertions points to a form of partnership that the private sector can enjoy with the Public sector in meeting the need of their citizens

Since the 1980's, Public Administration (PA) have undergone a profound restructuring process in order to revamp organizational, managerial and administrative processes in the Public Sector as a whole and local government in particular. The purpose of these reforms is to assist the government to translate its strategies into action by promoting informed decision-making and accountability mechanisms through decentralization and local participation which is aim at promoting a responsive, effective and efficient public sector. (Minogue et al., 1998)

The traditional goal of the public sector has been to maximize the attainment of the social welfare of its populace, as well as providing essential services such as which are arguably beyond the individual private means of her citizens in spite of their ability or inability to pay. The public sector also exist to ensure equity, equality and fairness but has

unfortunately been eroded and rejected as inefficient, inflexible and too regulatory and procedurally oriented and replaced by the introduction of business models into administration with an emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness and cost cutting and has further resulted in the use of such terms as; downsizing, contracting out, privatization (Barzelay, 2001; Hood, 1991).

In contemporary times, the public sector has partnered extensively with the private sector to provide essential utility in the forms of goods and services to their citizens in several areas including; post and telecommunications; security, road construction, electricity and water provision, transportation, sanitation, waste management and even in the area of revenue collection. Public-private partnership in the field of social welfare services such as education, health, water, electricity, sanitation and waste management aids in the reduction of social deficit. In other words public institutions do not have the needed manpower, financial and technical resources to deliver public goods and services. However most of these partnership arrangements in developing countries have been at the central or national levels.

Tema metropolitan assembly (T.M.A.) represents a modern microcosm of local government institution and presents within its territory a huge industrial hub that has several private organizations and institutions with a sophisticated population that needs to be reached with goods and service from the metropolis. The involvement of private companies (sector) in the collection of local government revenue for the metropolis and the management of waste constitutes an important component of public-private partnership within the metropolis which deserves scrutiny and as such forms the central theme of this study.

It has been argued that these types of partnerships are the results of dwindling public resources and poor quality of services (Hulme and Turner, 1997). Perhaps the collection of waste and revenue for the Tema Metropolitan Assembly by private firms may be as a result of dwindling resources or poor quality of service by the TMA's own revenue collectors and waste collectors?

In Ghana, several studies on public-private partnerships have turned to focus on public enterprises and the private sector, for instance reforms within the water sector that saw the management contract between Aqua Vitens Rand (AVR) limited and the Ghana water company. Again other studies have focused on the divestiture of state enterprises that came under the erstwhile Divestiture Implementation Committee (DIC) under the PNDC government prior to the fourth republic and during the first and second governments of the fourth republic where over 300 companies were diversified. This study is focused on public-private partnerships in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly (T.M.A.) with an emphasis on revenue mobilization and waste collection by private companies.

The above notwithstanding, there exist a gap in the current literature as not much study have been conducted with respect to local governance waste collection and revenue mobilization by use of public-private partnership within the developing country context, such as Ghana and for that matter the Tema Metropolis in particular. Hence this study is to fill that gap by use of implementation models with respect to how waste collection and revenue mobilization are undertaken by the Tema Metropolitan Assembly through the use of Public-Private Partnership.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Central governments all over the world are decentralizing fiscal, political and administrative responsibility to lower level governments as such the onus of municipal

service delivery rest on the initiative of local governments in their respective jurisdictions. Since the early 1980's local governments have embraced the market approach to service delivery in the delivery of essential services such as water, transportation, post and telecom, sanitation services, policing and security to mention but a few. In other instances the private sector has partnered the public sector in the delivery of such essential services. In recent times inadequate financing of local government service in the area of sanitation and revenue mobilization is of important consideration. Sanitation refers to a range of interventions designed to improve the management of excreta, sewage, drainage and solid waste (WHO, 2005). The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include a target to reduce by half the proportion of people without access to basic sanitation by 2015. In December 2006, the United Nations General Assembly declared 2008 'The International Year of Sanitation', in recognition of the slow progress being made towards the MDGs sanitation target. The year aimed at developing awareness and action to meet the target. Particular concerns were to removing the stigma around sanitation, so that the importance of sanitation can be more easily and publicly discussed. To highlighting the poverty reduction, health and other benefits that flow from better hygiene, household sanitation arrangements and waste water treatment.

The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and Environment (2003) indicated in the Ghana Poverty and Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) report that inconsistencies in the declaration of revenue generated at the district level are likely to be a reflection of the poor mobilization of and administration of internally generated revenue. That notwithstanding, the audit reports of 2010 and 2011 further unearthed the inconsistencies and inefficiencies in Internally Generated Revenue declaration (Ghana Audit Service, 2012). This, the above reports have affirmed, have emanated due to the use of manual processes and outmoded ways of mobilizing and generating local revenue.

Experiences of revenue generation in developing countries reveal a glaring weakness in the revenue and expenditure administration by local bodies for effective programme implementation. There is therefore a gap in revenue administration in the district assemblies which are attributed to problems relating to fragile revenue collection system due the use of outdated techniques and methods (Kokor and Kroes, 1990)

In Ghana, local governments are faced with a myriad of difficulties in their attempt to raise funds locally, even when their own revenue collectors are involved. The challenges that most local governments face in addressing the sanitation menace cannot be underestimated. The disposal of solid and liquid waste attracts significant amount of resources and as such most local governments now welcome the private sector as partners in resolving the conundrum of providing essential service of refuse collection and revenue mobilization for local development. The private sector has been attracted through such local initiatives of contracting out and franchising together with the other PPP forms.

The study examined factors that enhance or impede the implementation of PPPs in local governance, the case of TMA with specific focus on waste collection and revenue mobilization, it is asserted that in many countries the public sector has failed to be the engine of national development; in some countries it is even the main barrier to development (Minugue et al., 1998). Public bureaucracies, it is claimed, are not capable of managing effectively utilities such as electricity supply or telecommunication; civil services (local governments) are seen as too inflexible and rule-bound to respond to changing needs, so that, for example, industrial policy is more likely to obstruct enterprise development than promote it (Minugue et al., 1998).

Increasingly, it is the private sector which is seen as having the managerial capacity, flexibility and competitive drive essential for the efficient and effective provision of many

activities previously assumed to be the province of the public sector (Minugue et al., 1998). Some of these activities include post and telecom, security, waste collection, and general infrastructure. Coupled with the need to downsize the over bloated bureaucracy in the public sectors of most developing countries and stream line government expenditure, reduce “ghost” names and ensure that government receives value for its money, the public sector is involving the private sector in several approaches including; contracting out, joint venturing, outsourcing and privatization in order to tackle the eminent challenges.

Public administration reforms over the past three decades have been towards the direction of the market economy with major proponents arguing that the public sector would be more efficient and effective if it were more like the private sector (Niskanen, 1971). According to Guy Peters (2010), introducing market based reforms has meant privatizing activities that had been under the direct ownership and control of the public sector, in this sense PPP's has become imperative.

In Ghana, a few studies on public-private partnerships have been carried out, however most of them focused on public enterprises and the private sector. For instance, reforms within the water sector that saw the five years management contract between Aqua Vitens Rand (AVR) limited of South Africa and the Government of Ghana in the management of the Ghana water company in June 2006 to May 2011 (Abubakari et al., 2013a and 2013b). Others have focused on the divestiture of state enterprises that came under the Divestiture implementation committee (DIC) under the PNDC government prior to the fourth republic and during the first and second governments of the fourth republic, where over 300 companies were diversified. Presently only a few studies have focused on local governance PPPs. The 56th state of the nation address was under the theme “Partnership and innovation for building a new and a better Ghana”. In his state of the nation's address

the president John Dramani Mahama touted the importance of PPP as a new strategy to bridge the financing gap of most local initiative (Daily Graphic, 7th March 2013). Again the President appointed Honorable Rashid Pelpuo as minister of state in charge of Public-Private Partnership at the presidency. This serves as a clear attestation of the importance the government of Ghana attaches to PPPs.

The Public sector of Ghana goes beyond the Private enterprises, according to the 1992 constitution; chapter 14 stipulates four types of organizations within the Public sector; (a) Public services; (b) regulatory agencies; (c) Public enterprises; (d) regional and local government units (Ayee, 2005), This study is a case study of Public-Private Partnership in the TMA and focused on revenue mobilization and waste collection. The central problem that the researcher intends to study is what implementation challenges were faced by the main actor (T.M.A.) in the implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolis in the area of waste collection and revenue mobilization.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study was to investigate, describe and explain the factors that influence the implementation of public-private partnership (PPP) in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. Specifically, the study aims to:

1. Identify TMAs objectives for entering into PPP agreements
2. Examine the extent to which communication and enforcement activities between the main actor and other stakeholders affect the implementation of PPPs
3. Find out the role of resources in the implementation of PPPs in the Tema metropolitan Assembly.
4. Investigate the extent to which administrative structures affect the implementation of PPPs in the Tema metropolitan Assembly.

5. Explore the prospects of PPP's in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly.

1.4 Research Questions

To achieve the above objectives, the study was guided by the question “What factors affect the implementation of public-private partnership in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly?” Specifically, the study aims at finding answers to the following research questions:

1. What factors led the Tema Metropolitan Assembly to the adoption of PPP?
2. To what extent does communication and enforcement activities between the main actor and other stakeholders affect the implementation of PPP?
3. What is the role of resources in the implementation of PPP in the Tema metropolitan Assembly?
4. To what extent did administrative structures affect the implementation of PPP in the Tema metropolitan Assembly?
5. What are the prospects of PPP's in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study is particularly significant for several reasons including the following. Firstly, the study provides an insight into the factors that influence the implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. It also contributes to the understanding of public policy Implementation in Ghana and in decentralized local government unit like the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. The study would add to the understanding of the numerous challenges local governments face in mobilizing revenue and in collecting waste.

The study identified various prospects of PPPs in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly and would serve as a useful guide to policy makers in the future. By comparing findings on

revenue mobilization and waste collection, the study would help to explain the unique similarities and differences in the implementation of PPPs in both areas and the challenges they present.

In addition findings from the study would add to existing literature on PPP in local government. It would also serve as a useful guide in future research into policy implementation especially as it relates to factors explaining the successful or otherwise of implementation of public policies in developing countries.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

Due to time and other resource constraints, the study was limited to the Tema Metropolitan Assembly as a single case study. The use of a case study method is a limitation because it is been argued that findings from case study research cannot be generalized beyond the scope of the study, that not withstanding it can provide insights into the implementation challenges of PPPs mainly in societies that share a similar characteristics as those of the study area.

Another limitation that was encountered by the researcher included the inability to collect data early due to the closeness of the 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary elections that made it practically difficult for most bureaucrats and Assembly members to respond to interview appointments.

1.7 Definition of Terms

For the purposes of avoidance of all forms of doubt, the following concepts, as used in this work have been extensively defined below to facilitate comprehension and grasp of their

usage in the study; Service delivery, Sanitation and waste management, Revenue Collection or Revenue Mobilization and local government.

Service Delivery

Service delivery refers to the provision of municipal or metropolitan services to citizens and businesses directly or indirectly through external service providers, both public and private. This includes services provided on behalf of other spheres of government as a result of delegation (ILGS, 2004). It is important to note that local government service provision for citizens vary from one jurisdiction to the other and may includes; water, education, sanitation services, policing or security, post and telecommunication, infrastructure provision such as roads, schools, hospitals and markets. This study focuses on revenue collection and waste collection or sanitation services provision.

Sanitation and Waste Management

In the study the terms “sanitation” and “waste management” has been used interchangeably to refer to the same thing. Sanitation generally refers to the provision of facilities and services for the safe disposal of human urine and feces. Inadequate sanitation is a major cause of disease world-wide and improving sanitation is known to have a significant beneficial impact on health both in households and across communities. The word 'sanitation' also refers to the maintenance of hygienic conditions, through services such as garbage collection and wastewater disposal (WHO, 2012)

Waste management is the collection, transport, processing or disposal, managing and monitoring of waste materials. The term usually relates to materials produced by human activity, and the process is generally undertaken to reduce their effect on health, the environment or aesthetics. Waste management is a distinct practice from resource recovery which focuses on delaying the rate of consumption of natural resources. All

waste materials, whether they are solid, liquid, gaseous or radioactive fall within the remit of waste management. Waste generation encompasses those activities in which materials are identified as no longer being of value and are either thrown away or gathered together for disposal (Momoh and Oladebeye, 2010).

Waste management practices can differ for developed and developing nations, for urban and rural areas, and for residential and industrial producers. Management of non-hazardous waste residential and institutional waste in metropolitan areas is usually the responsibility of local government authorities, while management for non-hazardous commercial and industrial waste is usually the responsibility of the generator subject to local, national or international authorities.

Revenue Collection or Revenue Mobilization

Revenue mobilization and revenue collection have been used interchangeably in this study. Revenue mobilization is defined here as all amounts of money received from sources outside the government entity, including all forms of arrangements geared towards the raising of local government funds. These sources include taxation, fees, fines, rates and rents inter-governmental grants or transfers, securities sales, mineral rights, and resources rights, plus any sales that are made. The Revenue from these sources is appropriated for the payment of the public expenses in provision of public infrastructure and services.

Kessey and Gunter (1992) stated that primarily internal revenue mobilization is made up of two aspects, which are policy formulation and administration. With regard to policy formulation, it deals with the physical goal determination and formulation of laws and rules for the attainment of such goals. The administration on the other hand deals with the executions of the physical policies formulated. Though equally important in

revenue mobilization, policy formulation and administration do not receive equal attention both in theory and practice (Kessey and Gunter, 1992).

Revenue administration is linked with the execution of physical policies through the registration of tax payers and assessment and collection of charges. Local revenue administration is said to be the assessment, collection, recording and verification of taxable amounts (Ter-Minassian, 1999).

Local Government

Local government or “grass root” government is that sphere of government within which local bodies are permitted to adopt variations in administration (Tayagi, 2004). In other words it refers to the process of transferring political and economic power through political and administrative structures from the seat of national governance to sub-national government (Buabeng, 2010). The first local government system in Ghana was introduced in 1878, through the “indirect rule” system (Buabeng, 2010). However it was the Local Government Law in 1988 that initiated the implementation of a major programme of local government and administrative reforms that introduce decentralization into the Ghanaian local government system. For the first time District Assemblies held elections in 1988 and subsequently every four years (Buabeng, 2010). The various Metropolitan, Municipal and District assemblies are hierarchically below the ten administrative regions of Ghana. There are 147 Metropolitan, Municipal and District assemblies in Ghana currently. In figure 1.1 below, is the diagrammatic presentation of the local government system of Ghana.




Figure 1.1. Structure of Local Government System in Ghana

Source: Local Government Law (Act 492)

1.8 Organization of the Study

The research has been organized into seven chapters. The first chapter discusses the introduction and background to the study, the statement of the problem, the objectives and questions that guided the research, the significance of the study, the scope and limitation of the study as well as the definition of terms and the organization of the study. The second chapter presents a literature review on privatization, public-private partnership, public sector reform. It also discussed various perspectives on public policy implementation, implementation models, and the theoretical frame work to the study.

Chapter three deals with the research methodology and comprises of seven parts namely the introduction, research paradigm, research method, unit of analysis, data management, ethical consideration and experience from the field. Chapter four is devoted to the analysis

and discussion of findings on waste collection and has been titled “PPP in waste collection”. Chapter five is also devoted to the analysis and discussion of findings on revenue mobilization and has also been titled “PPP in revenue mobilization”. The sixth chapter compares findings on waste collection and revenue mobilization with a view to review the similarities and disparities between the two areas. Finally chapter seven provides a summary, conclusion and recommendation to the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the relevant empirical literature and theories on policy implementation. It also discusses the theoretical framework for the study. The chapter is divided into two main parts; the first part reviews empirical literature while the second reviews theoretical literature. The first part reviews literature on the concept of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and public sector reform, implementing PPP in local government and PPP experiences from advanced countries, developing countries and Ghana.

The second part also reviews some of the issues that guided the theoretical review on implementation as well as discussions on the theories and models of implementation as postulated by various scholars in the area of public policy implementation in the developing world. The chapter concludes with identification of dependent and independent variables that guided the study and a presentation of the framework for the study.

2.1 General Studies on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)

This section gives a general overview on public-private partnerships (PPPs), it reviews the meaning and characteristics of PPP, forms or types of PPPs, conditions for the successful implementation of PPPs, potential benefits of PPP and ends with some Constraints to the implementation of PPPs.

The term “Public-Private Partnership” has gained much usage over the past years especially starting from the 1980’s. One of the main triggers was the development of the “Private Funding Initiative” (PFI) by the Conservative Government in Britain after the massive privatization program of the Thatcher years had wound down and private capital

had been attracted to fund the construction of public infrastructure facilities such as roads, bridges, tunnels, schools, hospitals and prisons, with the construction enterprises then contracted to maintain and operate them for a stipulated period into the future say 20 or 30 years. The private “partners” would recover their capital outlays and earn their financial rewards through fees charged for the use of these facilities over a stipulated period. Eventually the facilities would revert to the state. Subsequently when Tony Blair’s New Labour Government was elected in 1997, it embraced this system enthusiastically but, found a new name for it that is “Public-Private Partnerships” (Wettenhall, 2007).

Again, when the Australian government introduced the “financial engineering” schemes around the 1980s which showed how “off balance sheet financial arrangements” could be used to refinance existing properties or develop new ones through leases and sale-and-buy-back arrangements, and to give government-underwritten streams of cash flows to private sector financiers to provide new public infrastructure assets (Walker and Walker, 2000). This arrangement was very similar with BOOT schemes (Build Own Operate and Transfer) and has several variants like, BOO and BOT, which usually depends on the type of partnership that was entered into between the government and the private partner (Wettenhall, 2007). Here after several state governments also began to adopt the very slippery term of PPP very easily to mean private funding for infrastructure assets along lines similar to the British PFI scheme.

2.1.1 Meaning and Characteristics of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)

There are several definitions of Public- Private Partnerships, Awortwi (2004) has defined PPPs as contractual arrangements in which actual delivery of services is the responsibility of the private sector where as the public sector is ultimately responsible for service provision. Government retains ownership of the service in that they are essential and non-

excludable, while Private enterprises are allowed to introduce investment and efficiency into the production and provision of public services. Public Private Partnerships “refers to the sharing of powers and responsibilities” between the Public sector and the private sector.

According to Savas (2005), Public-Private Partnership is an arrangement in which a government and a private entity, for-Profit or non-Profit, jointly perform or undertake a traditionally public activity. In other words, it is a complex relationship often involving at least one government unit and a consortium of private firms created to build large, capital intensive, long-lived public infrastructure or to undertake a major civic redevelopment project. Private capital and management of the design, construction, maintenance and long term operation of the infrastructure and capital cost are characteristics of such projects, along with eventual public ownership.

According to Mihm (1999) Under a Public- Private Partnership, a contractual arrangement is formed between Public sector and Private sector Partners. These arrangements typically involves a government agency contracting with a private partner to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and or manage a facility or system, in whole or in part, that provides a public service. Under these arrangements the agency may retain ownership of the public facility or system, but the private party generally invests its own capital to design and develop the properties.

From the above definitions, PPPs can be seen as a form of partnership, agreement or contract involving the private and the public sector in the production of goods and services for the public’s consumption, and that would inure to their mutual benefits. The main reason for such partnerships is due to the fact that both private and public sectors have certain unique characteristics that provide them with advantages in specific aspects of

service or project delivery. The most successful partnership arrangements draw on the strengths of both the Public and Private Sectors to establish complementary relationships (Ministry of municipal affairs 1999).

It is important to note that there are certain distinguishing features of PPPs from privatization. From the point of view of the Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS) in Accra, the main features of PPPs include the following. Firstly, PPPs are not Privatization because the government entity involved in the agreement retains control and ownership of the project. Again as partners, each party shares in the potential risk and rewards inherent in the delivery of the goods or services, including financial risks and responsibilities, and quality assurances for the tax payer. Further more the cooperation can result in some new and better products or services that no single organization either the public or the private could produce better alone, lastly, it often involves a longer- term commitment which can continue for a number of years, example 10 to 30 years (ILGS, 2011).

Another implication for the application of PPP is whether it is a management or government tool, a development strategy or a language game, the actual challenge is how PPPs are tailored to meet the various area of application (ILGS, 2011).

2.1.2 Types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)

There are several well defined models of Public- Private Partnerships, with different purpose, service scope, legal structure and risk sharing. Specific forms of PPP are often referred to by special names however new forms or types may emerge from time to time. Some more specific forms of PPPs have been described below with strengths and weaknesses;

I) Contracting out

Government maintains control of the service but contracts out delivery to the private sector. Government maintains responsibility for determining the quality, timing and quantity of service to be provided. For example; street lighting, maintenance of public facilities, parks, gardens, engineering services, legal services, etc. Contracting outs are less risky and can improve monitoring as LGs' double roles of providing and delivering is split- up. The main weaknesses are it does not attract significant private capital into the system; quality is usually over looked as concentration is usually on the lowest bidder (Awortwi, 2008; ILGS, 2011).

II) Franchising

Here local government (LG) grants a private firm an exclusive franchise or right to deliver service in a particular defined locality and to collect fees directly from the users. The local government then taxes the firm and maintains control over the fixing of prices for the service. For example waste collection, water distribution, gas and electrical power distribution.

The advantages are high recovery rates and income generation, cost of provision and maintenance are saved, users will refuse to pay for poor services as such high quality services. The disadvantages include; user fees can be very high and it may defeat the principle of "Publicness" or meeting the needs of low income earners. Private sector inefficiencies may also be added to the consumers (Awortwi, 2008; ILGS, 2011).

III) Leasehold

This is a contractual arrangement whereby a private operator rents the assets of the Local government to deliver a service for a certain period of time. Leaseholders pay the rental fee while local government retain the sole ownership of the assets and are responsible for expansion, upgrading, debt servicing and financing of the asset. The advantage is that,

many of the maintenance cost are transferred to the private sector. But a disadvantage is that local government still bears the initial costs of the Asset or technology and may not recover the initial cost after the lease period (Awortwi, 2008; ILGS, 2011).

III) Concessions

Local governments (LG) give the private contractor (concessionaire) full responsibility for the provision of infrastructure services in a specific area, including all related capital investments, operational, maintenance, and collection and management functions for a specified period of time. The local government is responsible for fixing the fee, performance standards and ensuring that the concessionaire meets them. BOT, BOOT and ROT may fall under concessions and examples would include Building hostels, Public Toilets, Land Banks and Car Parks, affordable housing, Agro Processing centers and business incubators.

The main advantages are; Private firms make efficient investment decisions and develop innovative technological solutions. Less prone to Political interference than local government operated services are. The disadvantages includes; long term concessions are vulnerable to bribery and corruption, difficulty in setting bidding and contractual frame work for long term concessions, can be politically controversial, local government are generally reluctant to adjust tariffs when necessary, as contract nears termination operators are unlikely to invest in the facility (Awortwi, 2008; ILGS, 2011).

There are other PPP models including management contracts, affermage–leases, concessions and divestitures (Saghir and Shukla, 2006). Again Corriekost (2001) lists the following as the different types of PPPs that we can have and this includes: Operation and Maintenance; Design-Build; Turnkey Operation; Wrap Around Addition; Lease-Purchase; Temporary Privatization; Lease-Develop-Operate; Buy-Develop-Operate; Build-Transfer-Operate; Build-Own-Operate-Transfer; Build-Own-Operate. Management and Service

contracts are both contracting out options. Management contracts involve contractual arrangement that reposes the entire management of an organization or a specific function of the organization to a private operator to manage on behalf of government for specific renewable periods based on performance. Service contract on the other hand involves the outsourcing of certain functions or services to a private operator, while local government retains the responsibility for determining, quality, timing and quantity of services provided.

The collection of solid and liquid waste by private operators in the Tema metropolis combines both contracting out and Franchise strategy, where as revenue mobilization or collection is a form of service contract between the TMA and its partners. Public Private Partnerships as a strategy or a form of privatization has many advantages that states can benefit from if only the implementation is properly carried out.

2.2 Privatization and Public Sector Reform

This section reviews privatization as a form of public sector reform. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Ghana in particular, in the 1970's to mid-1980's government policies has almost an exclusive focused on public sector provision and funding of basic services, however in recent times this is no longer the case as there is a paradigm shift in service delivery and provision strategies, that is a positive involvement between local government, the private sector and the citizens in service provision (ILGS, 2010). The new wave of reform has redefined the role of the state in the economy reviewing the role of the state in terms of the provision of goods and services (Farazmand 2001).

According to Ayee (2007) the public sector can be defined as an organization charged with providing services for the public, although increasingly, their roles are being

transformed from actual production to provision using a variety of public and private entities. He also notes that the public sector has enormous impact on all citizens in Ghana and other African countries for the following reasons: it provides goods and services (sanitation, water, electricity) that are important for development; it seek to promote the general welfare of citizens; it spearheads economic policy making and management and it is responsible for the maintenance of law and order (Ayee, 2007).

The public sector has undergone several reforms all aimed at introducing efficiency, economy, accountability, transparency and participation in both local and the private sector. Reforms are basically attempts to change the manner in which things are done for the better. In broad terms, “restructuring the Public sector” can be conceived as systemic, that is, decentralized reforms; or as internal, that is, re-engineering forms of civil service organization. In order words it refers to shifts in the boundary away from the state and towards the private sector, or privatization (Minogue et al., 1998).

Privatization as a phenomenon is no more limited to the economics or business lexicon, thanks to ‘new institutionalism’ and ‘new public management’ ideologies it has since the 1990s been admitted into the sphere of governance and public administration. Privatization has been variously defined, by different scholars; for Edadan (1997) “in a broad sense privatization means relying less on government to provide societal needs and to allow the market forces to meet the society’s needs for goods and services” and “in a narrow sense privatization means selling the state owned enterprises (SOEs) and other government activities to the private sector. Young (1991) also defines privatization in two ways. Narrowly, he conceived privatization as a shift of productive activities or services being undertaken by the public sector to private ownership or control. Such transfers can occur through direct sales of assets or the sale of part or all of the equity, leasing, management contracts, or the contracting out of functions. But privatization can also be

understood in a broader term- as referring to a process by which the state's role within the economy is circumscribed while at the same time, the scope for the operation of private capital is deliberately extended (Young, 1991).

A number of reasons may spell out why privatization has become popular among other alternatives to public sector reforms, most especially as a choice in Public Administration and for that matter local governance. Aylen (1987) argues that it is pragmatism and expediency, rather than politics, that are the main motives of privatization in developing countries, and that outside pressures and force of circumstances are more important than domestic pressure and ideologies. It has also been held by Heald (1992) that the international dissemination of privatization is sometimes characterized by a combination of aggressive ideology and of naïve managerialism. He also remarks that privatization should not be seen as a free-standing policy, but rather as one set of instruments within a package of policy.

Some Scholars have strongly opposed the use of the word "Partnerships" to describe funding arrangements by the Private sector. "Public-private partnership" abbreviated as PPP, was created to present the same forms of involvement of the private sector as a collaborative, technical exercise rather than an aggressive transformation of relations. A similar term, "private sector participation" (PSP) has also been widely used, especially by the World Bank and others in the context of developing countries. In both cases, the term is not a legal or technically exact phrase, but rather are placement for the old general 'Thatcherite' use of the word "privatization". The vast majority of PPPs, for example, are not partnerships in any legal sense, but simply contractual relationships (Hall et al., 2003, p. 2).

According to a World Bank study (Gala and Shirley, 1994), Privatization is now a fact of life almost everywhere in the world. A UNDP report (UNDP, 1995, p.37) asserts that

‘privatization lies at the heart of the market-based approach to public management’. Cook and Kirkpatrick (1994; 1995) observed that in general there is no evidence attesting the superiority of private over public enterprises and as such mixed and inconclusive, and that the real issue is monopoly and its associated inefficiencies rather than ownership, and that the link between privatization and economic growth has not been demonstrated, privatization should rather be seen as one of a bundle of measures necessary to successful economic reform strategies. This is also shared by the World Bank (1996) and also, Profitability and efficient public enterprises exist in all types of economy, and that there is no reason why efficiency goals cannot be attained through the rehabilitation or corporatization of public enterprises, ensuring commercial operation under public ownership (UNCTAD, 1992)

In Africa, like most developing economies restructuring the public sector is not a mere managerial process but rather it is primarily interwoven with political factors and considerations. This notwithstanding the public sector is still in need of reforms and it has been observed that the very characteristics which make such reforms important such as excessive staffing, large financial subsidies, corruption, inept management etc. also constitute the very basis for failures of reforms and this is because reforms assume political structures and relationships (Cook and Minogue, 1990). Bayliss (2003) writes that privatization is normally part of a larger reform process whose aim is to improve performance. Farazmand (2001) have noted that current public sector reforms unlike those of the 20th century have been in the opposite direction reversing the traditional role of government, the state and public administration institutions into one that promotes a private, corporate-driven market place dominated by big business elite.

2.3 Implementing Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Local Governance

To better implement Public-Private Partnerships between local government units and the private sector it would be important if not imperative to set out certain pre-conditions to PPP agreements. Wettenhall (2004) spelt out his list of ‘desiderata’ for genuine PPPs as a number of conditions that need to be met before a mix can be said to be a genuine partnership, and these conditions included;

A collaborative, interactive form of mixing; Horizontal, non-hierarchical relationships between the parties; Consensual decision-making; No single “superior” capable of invoking closure; An organizational structure such as a partnership board or forum; An ability to achieve synergies between involved persons and organizations; and the use of respect and trust as major forms of social capital.

Other important criteria would be value for money; risk allocation; affordability; clear objective and output requirements; accountability; transparency; local content and technology transfer; competition; contracting authority, ownership and commitment; and safeguarding public interest and consumer rights (ILGS, 2011).

Several benefits could be derived from using PPPs as development strategies for local government’s infrastructural development and service provision. The benefits include the following: Improvement in the quality of service delivery; Infusion of private capital and technology; Cost savings to local government and value for users money; Reduction in the size of local government work force, thus profitability; Improvement in managerial efficiency and effectiveness; Sharing/ transfer of risk from local government to multiple actors; Promotion of good governance; Accelerated delivery of needed infrastructure and public services on time and within budget; Increased international and domestic investment; Technology transfer and capacity building; Provision of innovative design, technology and financing structures; Financial benefits such as reduction in capital outlay

by local government, better utilization and allocation of public fund (Awortwi, 2008, ILGS, 2011).

Some constraints to the implementation of Public-Private Partnerships have been identified by Wettenhall (2007) he argues that governments do not have sufficient financial and commercial expertise to match the involved corporate enterprises – in bigger projects, and in ensuring that the public sector is treated fairly in contract negotiations needed to get a project under way. He again argues that when risks are taken into account, it often emerges that the public sector bears most of them, and has to bail out the private “partner” when costs escalate or less-than-expected revenues are earned. Wattenhall also stresses that the big private “partners” have huge political clout so that processes designed to monitor their performance are compromised. In his view although the facilities are notionally still “public”, more traditional forms of accountability no longer operate (Wettenhall, 2007).

However, the following are some more general disadvantages or challenges to the implementation of public-private partnership in local government: Ideological drive and unpreparedness of the environment; Unrealistic expectations of the private sector; Blurring of boundaries and responsibilities; Collusion and corruption; Contract formulation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for good quality delivery; Private sector’s capacities to provide questionable; Government capacity to regulate is questionable; There are no short cuts in PPPs, they are quite laborious processes; Prolonged litigation; Difficulty in identification and selection of fairly representative stakeholders; Social and political pressure from interest groups to influence selection and participation of stakeholders; Resistance from existing employees for fear of losing their jobs under PPPs (Awortwi, 2008, ILGS, 2011).

2.4 Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Local Government in Advanced Countries

Privatization has been an important aspect of local government reform for several decades. Local governments mainly face changes of institution reform however privatization is by no means a panacea (Savas, 2000). Available empirical literature on local government privatization point out that very little privatization has actually occurred at the local government level in Portugal. Of the 308 local governments in Portugal, 269 have transferred services to municipal corporations since the reform allowing municipal corporations was adopted.

Tavares and Camoes (2007) use a transaction costs theoretical framework to understand this transition. While traditional transaction costs models look at the costs of contract specification and monitoring (Williamson, 1999). Tavares and Camoes expand this concept to address the challenges of political transaction costs as well. In addition to the typical measures of asset specificity and measurability of the service, their model of 278 municipalities includes variables on labour force, size of government, fragmentation and ideology.

While the literature normally considers asset specificity not physical dimension, they describe it in terms of human assets (skilled labour pool) and find that services that require an asset-specific labour pool are less likely to be transferred. Municipal corporatization is more common in services with user fees, and in fragmented districts with greater service needs. Corporations are most common in recreation, economic development, culture and science, and parks and landscaping services. Political transaction costs are important, but not always as we would expect. They find that governments are more likely to transfer services with heterogeneous preferences – thus avoiding the political costs of decision making within government itself (Tavares and Camoes, 2007).

Hefetz and Warner (2007) look at the dynamics of the privatization decision process in the US like Tavares and Camoes (2007) they argue that transaction costs offer only a partial explanation. They present a new theoretical framework – social choice – that combines new public management (Hood, 1991), transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1999), and communicative planning or deliberative democracy concerns (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Frug, 1999; and Sager, 2001). They model privatization as a dynamic process and look at both new contracting out and reverse contracting over two time periods 1992–97 and 1997–2002 using a national sample of US municipalities. New contracting out has fallen over the decade, while reverse contracting has increased substantially and is now 50 per cent greater than new contracting out. What explains this shift away from privatization? Hefetz and Warner’s models use a social choice theoretical framework that measures market characteristics (transaction costs, fiscal stress and efficiency), management, and political process variables (place characteristics, citizen voice). They find a managerial learning process over the decade where managers reduce new contracting out of asset-specific services and bring these services back in house. Rural areas and core metro governments are more likely to experience market failure than suburbs (Warner and Hefetz, 2003; Warner, 2006), and they show lower rates of new contracting out and higher rates of reverse contracting over the decade. Attention to citizen voice, which was insignificant at the beginning of the decade, is associated with less new contracting and more reverse contracting at the end of the decade. Government managers use a sophisticated market management process that includes new contracting, reverse contracting and mixed public or private delivery. Hefetz and Warner argue that local government contracting should be viewed as a complex management process which combines managerial, transaction costs and democratic management concerns in a social choice theoretical framework (Hefetz and Warner, 2007).

Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007) explore the degree of concentration in the market for solid waste collection in the Netherlands, and estimate the effect of concentration on costs. Using a wide sample of Dutch towns and cities, they elaborate indicators of concentration and competition at the regional level. They find solid waste collection by private firms or publicly owned firms does not significantly differ on costs, although both organizational forms are less costly than direct production (bureaucracy) by the municipalities. Their models show savings with private production are significantly higher when the regional market is competitive. Private firms are more cost-effective when publicly owned firms operate in the same territorial area. Thus, market management by local governments is a critical element to ensure privatization success. Whether government engages directly in the market to enhance competition or achieve economies of scale, or uses its regulatory and oversight authority to track and control costs, the clear message from empirical research is that government must stay in the game as a market manager (Bel and Costas, 2006; Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2007; Warner and Bel, 2007; and Warner and Hefetz, 2007).

2.5 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in Local Government in Developing Countries

There are several experiences of Public-Private Partnerships and Privatization initiatives in local governments across Africa, a few have been explored here. Cointreau-Levine (1994) made a particularly pertinent study of private sector involvement in the provision of municipal solid waste services. She discussed the question of whether to involve private providers in solid waste management in the context of efficiency, accountability, reliability, coverage, cost and economies of scale. None the less she excessively concentrated on how to involve the private sector that is appropriate approaches to privatizing municipal solid waste services. She analyzed contracting, franchise, concession

and open competition. She concluded that the private is not a panacea to municipal solid waste management crisis. It is only an opportunity (Cointreau-Levine, 1994).

Many local government authorities in Tanzania have reformed their tax collection systems in recent years in order to increase their revenue. Odd-Helge et al. (2009) made a study on privatized revenue collection in seven urban and rural councils in Tanzania, with particular focus on the outsourcing of revenue collection to private agents. Odd-Helge et al. (2009) concluded that privatized collection offers no “quick-fix” to increasing a local government authority's revenue, as well as easing administrative problems with the revenue collection. While collection has increased and become more predictable for some council which has outsourced revenue collection, others have experienced substantial problems with corruption and exceptionally high profit margins for the private agents at the expense of accomplishing a reasonable return to the local government authority. However, when appropriately managed and monitored, the outsourcing of revenue collection can establish a platform for more effective and efficient local government revenue administration (Odd-Helge et al, 2009).

In a research paper by the Makerere Institute of Social Research in 2008 titled "What makes markets tick?, Local Governance and Service Delivery in Uganda” the authors gave another privatization experience on local governance service delivery in Uganda, which was in line with the 1964 Market Act, until 1993 the authority and control over Jinja market was delegated to Jinja municipality which managed and administered the affairs of the market through its departments of public health, law enforcement and treasury. Simultaneous with decentralization, the administration of Jinja Central market became devolved function of Jinja Central Division and further to the Lower Councils where the vendors are located.

In the light of poor and inefficient system of revenue collection, Jinja Central Division decided to "privatize" (through contract) the collection of market dues and rents as it was considered the best possible way to increase revenue and decrease local authorities recurrent expenditure. GOKAS a private firm manages the collection of revenue on behalf of the Council, without committing its capital and accepting full risks. Thus, the current system of market administration and management now involves more stakeholders than before. These stakeholders include: Jinja Municipality, Jinja Central Division, GOKAS, and the vendors with each playing its assigned role and responsibility. The two major factors that contributed to the success of the Jinja market are first Participation of vendors in the management of the market and the presence of a strong and legitimate partnership between the local council, vendor association, and the contractor.

Main Lessons revealed that: Privatization of management has significantly contributed to positive changes in specific areas of revenue collection and generation, market management, sanitation and security; the market's organizational format is comprised of the vendors associations and departmental committees. This facilitates participation in all stages of decision making; the privatization of market management has enhanced the power of the vendors association in protecting the vendors from unfair treatment by other groups; improved service delivery to a large extent can be attributed to the decentralization of the market. Thus good governance facilitated by the implementation of the decentralization scheme has contributed to the stability and reliability in employment and incomes (Makerere Institute of Social Research Kampala Uganda, 2008).

Both the Tanzania and Uganda experience are clear testaments that public-private partnerships and for that matter privatization, are not panaceas to successful outcomes for PPPs. They are only a means to an end not an end in themselves, however with the will

power to make them work and with proper supervision and monitoring and the assistance of stakeholder groups they are likely to be successful.

2.6 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Local Government in Ghana

In Ghana, there have been several attempts at PPPs in local government a research paper by Obirih-Opareh et al. (2000) provided a clear insight into socio-economic outcomes of privatization of solid waste collection in Accra, between 1999 and 2000. Although solid waste privatization became part of Accra Metropolitan Assembly's (AMA) official policy in 1995 the first experience with privatized collection started in 1977, when a west German aid worker initiated donkey-cart collection in Apenkwa- Tesano-Abeka. Most importantly they found mixed impacts of privatization of solid waste collection in Accra. Whiles efficiency and effectiveness had improved, unattractive remuneration was rife among private solid waste workers, and it was again not financially viable. AMA couldn't pay Private contractors as cost sky rocketed due to lack of accurate data on the number of houses to pay user charges as well as public resistance. Their study is of the view that the ability of the private sector to deliver services in an effective and efficient manner depends on the capacity of the state to build safe guard, to ensure compliance with standard and fairer competition which this study concerns with. Obirih-Opareh and Post (2002) in an article by the Habitat International presented a similar finding.

Writing on Public Private Partnerships and Sanitation, Aryee and Crook (2003) revealed the impact of partnerships between Public authorities and Private Citizen- based Organizations on Public toilets in Accra and Kumasi. Their study answered question on why partnerships to run public toilets have not accrued the much romanticized productivity gains and spillovers of PPPs. According to Aryee and Crook (2003) it seemed unlikely for large scale, technically sophisticated private operators to have much

incentives to provide better services to poor communities or much understanding of how to operate in those context. Their chief finding was that Public Private Partnerships to run public toilets has so badly failed due to political conflict which resulted from political patronage. Metropolitan Chief Executives and Assembly members use public toilets to reward their supporters and party faithful (Ayee and Crook, 2003).

Oduro and Van Dijk (2008) assessed the performance of fifteen private companies involved in solid waste management in Accra, Kumasi and Tema in a survey entitled “Performance of Private waste companies involved in Urban Solid waste management: Evidence from three Cities in Ghana,” they did performance evaluation in terms of vehicle productivity, utilization and market share. Their study reveals that productivity depends on how the companies organize their operations to utilize the vehicles in terms of the number of trips made in a day and the vehicle load. Therefore the productivity of a particular vehicle differed from one company to another. However there was low vehicle productivity and utilization, irrational route planning and how supervision was partly responsible (Oduro and Van Dijk, 2008).

The Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS) has compiled some case studies of Partnerships between Metropolitan Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDA’s) and private sector or non state actors developed through expert research and case writing under its District private partnership project and supported with donor funding from German International Cooperation (GIZ) through its Support for Decentralization Reform (SfDR), and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). Three of such cases have been highlighted here.

The first is the KojoKrom Market sheds Project of the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly; this project involves the construction of stores, stalls, warehouses, cold stores,

transport terminals and other ancillary services. Market sheds component, which is the focus for this project involved the construction of six (6) Market sheds containing forty (40) and Twenty (20) stalls in phases. The partnership exists between the Metropolitan Assembly and the Kojokrom Market Women Association (KMWA). The Assembly provides the land, design and supervision while KMWA, with the support of City-Wide Settlement Upgrading Fund (STMA-CSUF) provided funding for the Project with an additional loan facility from the Amalgamated bank. The partnership has offered Members of the Association who hitherto were operating in an unhygienic environment an opportunity to display their wares in lock-up stalls which provides safety for their wares (ILGS, 2011).

The second example is for the Capacity Enhancement of Sub-National Structures through the Transparent, Accountable, Participatory and Sustainable Management of the Extractive Resource Revenue for Development by the Birim North District Assembly. The overall goal of the intervention is to help build more responsive, transparent and accountable management of natural resource revenues. The project has facilitated the relationship between the District Assembly, the mining company (Newmont Ghana limited), traditional authorities and communities with the support of an external facilitator (a local non-governmental organization, ISODEC) to foster willing, the sustainable and equitable management of the resources. The PPP arrangement is a tripartite arrangement involving the District Assembly, the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC) and Newmont Ghana Limited (ILGS, 2011).

The third example is the Offinsoman Rural Bank Project by the Offinso Municipal Assembly. This project is a community based unit bank established for the purpose of promoting small and micro enterprises within the municipality. The PPP arrangement is

between the rural bank and the municipal assembly. The Assembly has provided building for use by the bank and assembly is a share holder of the bank. The Bank's involvement has ensured the availability of credit facilities to the community members. The partnership arrangement has resulted in multiple positive effects on other projects in the community. It has, for instance, enhanced the school feeding project (ILGS, 2011). The preceding examples are pleasant examples of PPP's in local government in Ghana, however not all PPP's end up in success like these ones.

2.7 Review of Public Policy Implementation

The term "Public" generally refers to "public ownership" or control for "public purpose". The public comprises that domain of human activity which is regarded as requiring government intervention or common action. However there has always been a conflict between what is public and what is Private (Sapru, 2004). Policy denotes among other elements, guidance for action. Policy may be defined as a purposive course of action taken or adopted by those in power in pursuit of certain goals or objectives. Public policies are therefore the policies adopted and implemented by government bodies and officials (Sapru, 2004). Easton (1957) defines Public Policy as "the authoritative allocation of values for the whole society". Gordon and Milakovich (2007) refer to policy implementation as "program implementation" which they consider as "general political and governmental process of carrying out programs in order to fulfill specified policy objectives, a responsibility chiefly of administrative agencies, under chief-executive and /or legislative guidance; the activities are directed toward putting a policy into effect".

It is generally believed that the study of policy implementation was popularized by Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky in the early 1970's. Implementation starts after the decision to adopt a particular course of action is made and ends successfully when the

goals sought by the policy are achieved and costs are within reasonable expectations. Thus implementation can be referred to as the directed change that follows a policy adoption. A policy may take the form of: (i) a declaration of goals; (ii) a declaration of course of action; (iii) a declaration of general purpose; and (iv) an authoritative decision (Sapru, 2004). The term 'Implementation' has been variously defined by different scholars. According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) cited in Sapru (2004), it is "a process of interaction between the setting of goals and the actions geared toward achieving them". Again "implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired results"

Meter and Horn (1975) also define policy implementation as encompassing those actions by public and private individuals or groups that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions. For Meter and Horn (1975) the act of implementation can be generally pursued by all and sundry, as such it is not restricted to local government bodies or private institutions and that implementation is only directed at predefined objectives that has been already set out in some policy decision or goals and objectives or in the visions and missions of an organization. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) on their part argues that implementation is the carrying out of basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions. Here legal documents like the constitution, acts and court decrees or rulings and orders by people in authority have been espoused as policy decision and form the basis of implementation and must be carried out by people.

One can conclude from the above review that implementation starts ideally where policy stops and that it follows a series of logical steps- a progression through conception of an idea/ intension through decision to action. It also means that implementation involves both

one time effort to transform decisions into operational terms, as well as continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes mandated by public decisions. Finally, human beings or institutions are the sole agents of implementation of policies; they make decisions, identify the problems to be addressed, stipulate the objectives to be pursued, and in a variety of ways structure the implementation process.

Public policies are basically implemented by administrative agencies or bureaucracies however there are a number of other actors and institutions that are also involved in the process. These include the executives, the legislature, the courts, pressure groups, NGO's, the media, civil society and community organizations. Anderson (1994) observes that, such agencies perform most of the day to day work of government. In this respect they affect citizens more directly by their actions than do other government units. Again Anderson considers the classical views on the strict separation between politics and administration in which administration is concerned with implementing the decisions of the political branches and regards them as a thing of the past. Consequently administrative agencies have so much discretion in drafting regulations in support of legislation.

2.7.1 The “Top Down” versus “Bottom-up” Debate

Traditionally, there are two main established approaches to the study of implementation. These are the “Top down” and “Bottom up” approaches. The top-down model of policy implementation was foremost developed by Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn in 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian in 1980 and George Edwards also in 1980. According to Sabatier (1986) the “Top Down” model starts with a policy decision by central government officials and then asks four main questions which can be summarised as; to what extent were the actions of officials and stakeholders consistent with the objectives

and procedures outlined in the policy document; to what extent were the objectives attained over time; What principal factors affected outputs and impacts; and how was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience?. Various factors affecting policy implementation have been identified under this approach.

Van Meter and Van Horn's model posited six variables of policy implementation which is believed to shape the linkage between policy and performance. Their variables include Policy standards and objectives; Policy resources (i.e. funds and other resources); Inter-organizational activities; characteristics of implementing agencies (e.g. staff size, degree of hierarchical control, organizational control, organizational validity, etc.); economic, social and political conditions; and disposition of the implementers (Meter and Horn, 1975). Arguably, the most comprehensive list of factors was provided by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) who provided seventeen independent variables under three major categories; the tractability of the problems; the ability of the statute to structure implementation; and non-statutory variables affecting implementation.

Another "top-down" model was developed by George Edwards (1980), he identified four factors believed to affect implementation, these are Communication; resources; disposition of the implementers; and bureaucratic structure. The last variable of bureaucratic structure or the bureaucracy is very imperative, in that the bureaucracy is in charge of implementing most public policies in the public sector and for that matter administrative agencies in local governments have been criticised for being too bureaucratic.

The "top down" model has been criticised for failing to identify which variables are likely to be more important and under what circumstances (Ingram, 1987). In addition to this, others criticise the top downers for assuming that framers of the policy decision (e.g. the people who drafted the statute) are the key actors while all others are basically

impediments. This in turn leads the top-downers to neglect strategic initiatives coming from the private sector, from street level bureaucrats or local implementing officials and from other policy sub-systems. Also much attention is given to the objectives and strategies of central actors while important roles played by other actors in the implementation process are ignored. Because it focuses on the central objectives; and ignores not only the adaptive strategies of implementers but also the unintended consequences of government action.

As a response to the criticisms of the “Top-down” Model, a competing model of policy implementation often termed “Backward mapping” or the “Bottom-up” approach was developed by a number of writers working independently. They include Elmore (1978; 1979); Lipsky (1971); Berman (1978) and Hjern and Potter (1978). The “bottom-up” model starts by identifying the network of actor’s involved in service delivery in one or more local areas and asks them about their goals, strategies, activities and contacts. These contacts are then used as a means for developing network technique to identify the local, regional and national actors involved in the planning, financing and execution of the government and non governmental programmes (Sabatier, 1986). The essential difference between this and other models is its suggestion that the most important activity on policy implementation takes place at the lowest level of organization, rather than from the top. As such, programmes must be compatible with the wishes and aspirations or at least the behavioural patterns of those lower echelon officials.

Bottom-up perspective has also received several criticisms. The first is that, if implementation is being determined largely by the lower echelons in organization as a prescriptive statement, then one would need also to question many ideas about control in democratic political systems since control in such systems is exercised by higher level officials. Another criticism, discussed by Aye (1992:26) centres around what happens

when one tries to tailor policies to values and operational patterns in the lower levels of public organization. In this case policies come to be modified to suit what can be done by existing organisation with minimal disruption. This implies that goals for policy-making therefore evolve from what can be done within the existing organizational framework. Furthermore, Sabatier (1986a: 35-36) pointed out that advocates of the “bottom-up” model are not primarily concerned with implementation, but with whether or not a decision is carried out, but “with understanding actors interaction in a specific policy sector”. Below is a diagrammatic illustration of Meter and Horns (1975) model on policy implementation.




Figure: 2.1 A Model of the Policy Implementation Process

Source: Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), P.470

2.7.2 Public Policy Implementation Models

This section reviews other policy implementation models in addition to the Top-down and Bottom-up models, The main models of implementation that has been reviewed here include the “Complexity of Joint Action” by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973); The Linear and the Interactive Models of Implementation by Thomas and Grindle (1991) and last but not least, the Evolutionary model by Majone and Wildavsky (1984).

Complexity of Joint Action

This model’s prominent proponents include Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). In summary the model refers to the number of actors, in addition to the main principals, whose agreement, either explicit or implicit, must be secured before a policy can be successfully implemented. The points of consensus between the actors have been described as “Veto points”. In their study of the Economic Development Administration (EDA) Programme, which was a job creation programme for minorities in Oakland, California, Pressman and Wildavsky found that the programme was complex and convoluted because of the “changing actors, divers perspectives and multiple clearances” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984:93), also it was a seemingly “innocent” programme, with no large scale political pressures or lack of funds, which ran into substantial difficulties demonstrating the fact that implementation may be flawed based on certain trivial circumstances.

A number of variables are important in the implementation process in the model: Multiplicity of participants and perspectives, meaning that in order to carry out a policy or programme a large number of government organizations and individuals eventually become involved in the process of implementation; In addition each of the participants has his own distinctive perspective and “when perspectives differ, so also is the measure of success” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984) and lastly “Decision points” and “clearance”

isolate each decision in which a major participant has a discernible opportunity to make choices, while there are a number of “decision points” along the way at which clearance has to be received if the policy being implemented is to continue. Playing mathematically with a network of “decision points”, “clearance” and “agreements”, they conclude that:

In order to get by all the decision points, the programme requires dozens of clearance action by a wide range of participants. In situations where high controversy and mutual antagonism exist, there is little probability that these actions would be favourable or taken in a reasonable time might be quite small. In other words, when a programme depends on so many actors and participants, there are numerous possibilities for disagreement and delay.

The model of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) is very insightful and instructive in offering us with some variables that can be used to study or understand how public policy is implemented. Some of these variables include; the number of actors involved in the implementation process, the decision points, clearance, and the importance of time and the anatomy of delay.

The model by pressman and Wildavsky (1973) is imperative to policy in that implementation must not be conceived of as a process that takes place after, and independent of, design of policy. Secondly, at an analytical level, the study of implementation requires the understanding that apparently simple sequence of events depends on complex chains of reciprocal interactions (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Again the complexity of joint action reveals the organised complexity of the policy sphere, in which each actor struggles to impose his definition of the situation, and consequently appeals for co- ordination may be next to useless, since “each wants coordination in his own terms” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).

Their model has been criticised for using the multiplicative model from probability theory that leads us to predictions of failure in all implementation scenarios, even when the odds associated with success at every stage are high. The model fails to characterise in a moderately abstract and systematic way the interactions that routinely link the different kinds of institutions or roles normally involved in a process of “programme assembly” (Bardach, 1975).

The Linear and Interactive Models of Implementation

These models were developed by Grindle and Thomas (1991). They argue that to enable policy makers to better manage implementation, they developed an interactive model of implementation that contrasts with the linear model that is frequently implicit in efforts to bring about changed policy and institutional contexts for development. Central to their argument is the assertion that the characteristics of particular reforms determine the type of conflict and opposition that surround their implementation.

The linear model usually views policy implementation as a linear process which is implicit in many proposals for reform. According to this view a proposed reform gets on the agenda for government action, a decision is made on the proposal and the new policy or institutional arrangement is implemented either successfully or unsuccessfully (Grindle and Thomas, 1991).

The linear model conceives implementation in three phases: the agenda phase, the decision and the implementation phases respectively. It also views decision as the critical choice and becomes the focus of policy makers and donor attention and concerns about appropriate policy analysis, while implementation is either ignored or considered the responsibility of another group, the managers (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). In this model, implementation is seen to be a matter of carrying out that which has been decided upon,

and successful implementation is viewed as a question of whether or not the implementation institution is strong enough for the task. In this vein if implementation is unsuccessful, the remedy is to call for greater efforts to strengthen institutional capacity or to blame failure on lack of political will, an explanation often cited by external analysts and donors who sees countries not carrying out reforms they consider desirable (Grindle and Thomas 1991).

Grindle and Thomas view the process of implementation different from the linear model. They argue that implementation is often most crucial aspect of the policy process and that the outcomes of implementation efforts are highly variable, ranging from successful to unsuccessful, but it also includes an almost limitless number of other potential outcomes. The range of outcomes they believe results from the fact that implementation is an interactive and ongoing process of decision making by policy elites and managers in response to actual or anticipated reactions to reformist initiatives. They proposed an alternative model known as the interactive model which they believe can structure such an analysis. Figure 2.1 below is a diagrammatic presentation of the linear model of policy implementation by Thomas and Grindle (1973).




Figure: 2.2 The Linear Model of Policy Implementation

Source: Adopted from John W. Thomas and Merilee S. Grindle (1991), *Public Choice and Policy change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries*, the John Hopkins University Press Baltimore and London.

The interactive model on the other hand views implementation as critical point in the policy process. The model begins with the assumption that a state of equilibrium surrounds an established policy set. The equilibrium results from the acceptance of existing policy or institutional arrangements by those who are affected positively or negatively by it. According to them efforts to alter the existing policy upsets the equilibrium and will elicit some response or reaction from those affected by the change. Reaction to policy change may come at any point in the process of decision and implementation (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). The central element in this model is that a policy reform initiative may be altered or reversed at any stage in its life cycle by the pressure and reactions of those who oppose it. Unlike the linear model, the interactive model views policy reforms as a process, in which interested parties can exert pressure for change at many points. Some interests may be more effective at influencing high level officials in government, others at affecting the managers of the implementation process or those who control the resources needed for implementation. Understanding the location, strength, and stakes involved in these attempts to promote, alter or reversed policy reform initiatives is central to understanding the outcomes (Grindle and Thomas,1991).

They argued that pressure to put reform issues on the policy agenda come from many sources, including frequent “reform-mongering” by policy elites, and the agenda represents a stockpile of proposed changes. Some items on the agenda are acted upon, but many are not, often because of the preferences, perception and actions of policy elites and their appreciation of the economic and political environment they face (Grindle and Thomas, 1991).

They also argue that some issues receive active consideration by policy makers, but the point of actual decision is hard to determine precisely. The authorisation process may move through one or more stages of the bureaucracy and may have to be confirmed at

some level or at some point in the implementation process, and the issues may be returned to the agenda. Thus, the decision process needs to be envisaged as a series of formal and informal stages, with numerous actors who have distinct interests and concerns (Grindle and Thomas 1991). Figure 2.2 below illustrates the interactive model as presented by Thomas and Grindle:




Figure: 2.3 An Interactive Model of Policy Implementation

Source: Adopted from John W. Thomas and Merilee S. Grindle (1991), Public Choice and Policy change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries, the John Hopkins University Press Baltimore and London.

The Evolutionary Model

This model is closely related to the “bottom-up” approach and is developed by Majone and Wildavsky (1984). The basic point of this approach to implementation is that, as Heraclitus said long ago, we cannot step into the ‘same’ river twice. In the words of Majone and Wildavsky, “when we act to implement a policy we change it” (Majone and Wildavsky, 1984). As in the bottom-up approach, policy evolves during the process of being imposed by central policy makers. According to Linder and Peters (1987), “policy has no life of its own but is a construct emerging from interactions. This ignores goals of central political decision makers in favour of developing understandings and bargains among actors involved in implementation”. The model characterises implementation as a learning process, exploratory and hypothesis testing, during which an organization can utilize implementation failures as a route to implementation success. According to them in the evaluation of the implementation of policies, an organisation should consider not only the achievements of stated objectives, but also discoveries made during implementation (Majone and Wildavsky, 1984).

2.7.3 Implementation Challenges in the Developing World

Before the discussion on implementation is brought to an end, it will be critical to expatiate on the challenges of implementation in the developing world. It is much more difficult to ensure successful implementation in the developing world than in the developed world because it is unusual to have according to Ayee (2000) progressive and committed politicians and bureaucrats in the developing world, for him, a major challenge to policy implementation in Africa is the lack of good leadership who will be ready to shoulder and champion the risk of formulating and implementing public policies no matter how unpopular they may be. Grindle (1980) also raises a similar point that attitudes of

political leaders and administrative officials contribute to the difficulty of implementation. She argued that third world leaders and bureaucrats view participation as delay to the policy process which draws back social and economic development. Finally, Ayee (2000) explains that policy failure must be considered within the overall political and societal contexts.

The UN (1993) and Ayee (2000) laments over the fact that decision making in many countries separate social, economic and environmental factors at the policy, planning and management levels. It goes further to argue that an adjustment in light of country specific conditions may be necessary if environment and development are to be put at the center of economic and political decision making, in effect achieving a full integration of these factors.

Grindle (2000) also argued that public policy implementation is much more difficult to achieve in the third world because of the nature of the political system. She maintains that policy making is remote and inaccessible to most individuals and extensive competition propelled by wide spread needs and scarce resource. In the developing world, political parties, interest groups and individuals see the implementation process as means of promoting group and individual interests. Therefore the policy implementation process in the developing world is more often considered as an arena where self-interest is advanced (Grindle, 2000). With different stakeholders considering what there is in a policy for them, instead of considering the general good that encapsulates the collective good of society as a whole.

2.8 Developing a Framework for the study

To develop an appropriate theoretical framework to guide the study, the researcher combined variables from the models adopted from Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and George Edwards (1980), Grindle and Thomas (1991). Other models used include the complexity of joint action by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). Although these variables were very useful in developing a conceptual framework for the study they have to be modified to reflect the context of the research. In all four (4) main variables were developed namely (I) policy objective and standards, (II) communication and enforcement activities, (III) Resources, and (IV) administrative structures. The variables have been termed as explanatory or descriptive variables and it would help explain the implementation performance or outcome of PPP in the T.M.A.

Application of the Model to the Study

The study adopts the “top down” models of Meter and Horn (1975), Edwards (1980) as well as the “complexity of joint action” model of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) as ideal models in the formulation of its theoretical frame work. The choice of the top-down model and for that matter Meter and Horns model is because it is very straight forward and easy to understand, more so, it offers some meaningful variables for the analysis and explanation of effective implementation of Public-Private Partnerships in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly in terms of revenue mobilization and waste collection. The study also adopted the model of George Edward’s (1980) his additional variable of “Bureaucratic structure” is of immerse significant to the study and has been operationalized as “administrative structures”, this is because the study is focused on the Tema Metropolitan Assembly which is a modern bureaucratic institution, hence a justification for its addition.

The study also made use of the complexity of “Joint action model” by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) as an analytical model to analyse the implementation challenges that may arise as a result of numerous actor and stakeholder involvement in the implementing of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. The interactive model on the other hand emphasises the role of bureaucrats and politicians in the implementation process. It focuses on the conflict and reactions that arise in an effort to introduce policy reforms as well as challenges faced by policy makers in generating adequate resources to undertake the reform.

Consequently the various perspectives have only been used to enable me develop my own framework for this study. As such I therefore argue that “the implementation performance of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly is dependent on four main factors which are namely, policy standards and objectives; communication and enforcement activities; resources and administrative structures.” The study therefore concludes that each of the four factors or a combination of them if not given the needed attention will constitute implementation challenges in the implementation of public-private partnership in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly.

2.9 Framework for Analysis of the Implementation of PPP

Several models were combined to arrive at the theoretical framework for the study, although these models provided useful variables for developing a conceptual framework for the study they had to be modified to reflect the context of the research. The models of implementation espoused Meter and Horn (1975), Edwards (1980), the interactive models by Grindle and Thomas (1991) as well as the complexity of joint action by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) have been used.

2.9.1 The Dependent variable: “Implementation Performance of PPP”

Since the research aims at finding an answer to the research question “What factors affect the implementation of public-private partnership in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly” the dependent variable has been defined as “the implementation performance of PPP in TMA.” In other words the dependent variable is what the researcher is trying to explain, therefore the outcome of the implementation of PPP is what is termed the dependent variable in the study.

2.9.2 The Independent (Explanatory) variables of the study

The independent variable in the study consists of the factors that influence the implementation of public-private partnership in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. These factors are responsible for the implementation performance of PPP in the TMA. The independent variable is also called the explanatory variables. In all, the study identified four factors and concludes that the Implementation performance of PPP in the TMA can be explained by the four main factors, namely: policy standards and objective; communication and enforcement activity; resources and administrative structure.

Policy Standards and objective

The study of implementation requires that goals and objectives be identified and be clearly understood by the implementing agency. This is because implementation cannot be said to have succeeded or failed without a specific goal against which to judge it, it is expedient if not crucial to define such goals and objectives in the contract document. Without an objective that is clear, policy is most likely to fail. According to Meter and Horn (1975) performance indicators are usually used to assess the extent to which the policy standards and objectives are realized. Standards and objectives elaborate on overall goals of the policy decision as well as to provide concrete and more specific standards for assessing

programme performance. This means that the objective must be 'SMART'. In other words the objective must be simple and not too difficult to comprehend, it must be measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound. Implementation may fail due to goal ambiguity, contradictions and inconsistency. Lack of understanding by policy implementers may result in implementation challenges.

The performance of PPP in the TMA is highly reliant on whether the officials of the TMA understand the main reasons, objectives and nature of agreement they have reached with the private sector in either waste collection or revenue mobilization. A well spelt out policy standard and objective would help the parties to be able to achieve accountability, transparency and efficiency in performance. The clearly spelt out policy objective would also affect communication and enforcement as well as instruct administrative officials to the source and allocation of resources.

Communication and Enforcement Activities

Effective communication and enforcement activities refer to the extent to which the standards and objectives have been clearly stated and the accuracy with which it is communicated to the implementers and stakeholders. This will ensure that stakeholders and partners understand their roles and responsibilities. If there are difficulties, conflicting and inconsistent interpretation of policy objectives and standards implementers will have difficulties in implementing the policy decision or objectives.

There is also the need to maintain a good working relationship between the TMA and all its partners in revenue mobilization or waste collection. This means that information that is communicated to the partners must be accurate, relevant, realistic, timely and appropriate to the needs of the parties together with feed backs that will ensure a good working relationship. In the event of any form of misunderstanding both partners must

show commitment by collaborating to resolve the grievance. In the event that dialogue won't bring any solution, a party will need to begin to enforce the terms, conditions and clauses within the agreements including resorting to the law courts. According to Van Meter and Van Horn, there are two ways by which enforcement can be achieved, these are: Technical advice and assistance can be provided and superiors can rely on a wide variety of sanctions both positive and negative.

Resources

Resources, according to Meter and Horn (1975) refer to those things which facilitate the policy administration. These resources may include funds or other incentives in the program that might encourage or facilitate effective implementation. This means that for implementation to be successful there is a need to have adequate financial resources and human resources or manpower and the logistical or material resources to facilitate implementation. In other words, this research uses resources to mean: financial, human and logistics. Specifically it is the direct financial and other material resources as well as the personnel who are directly and indirectly involved in the implementation process.

Administrative Structures

Administrative structure is very important in explaining the implementation performance of public-private partnership in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. I have defined it to mean the formal interaction or interface between the implementing agency and the actors or organizations and processes employed in the implementation of the public private-partnership. In other words it relates to the formal organizational structures and the attributes of their personnel. it also relate to both the overt and covert administrative rules

and process employed by the administrative class of the TMA in the implementation of PPP policies.

Meter and Horn (1975) observed that the following are some characteristics that may impinge on the organizations capacity to implement policy. These are the competence and size of an agency's staff, the degree of hierarchical control of subunits decision and processes within the implementing agencies; an agency political resources (for example support among legislators and executives); the validity of an organization; the degree of open communications(that is network of communication with free horizontal and vertical communication, and a relatively high degree of freedom in communications with persons outside the organization) within an organization; and the agency's formal and informal linkages with the "policy-making" or "policy-enforcing body".

In other words, how the TMA operating as a local government unit carries out its activities in the provision of public goods and service to the public and how each unit within the TMA is organized is very important. In accordance with the local government Act 462 of the 1992 Constitution the local government structure must operate a fully decentralised structure in the formulation and implementation of all policies and programmes. The TMA has two decentralized sub-metropolitan assemblies which are Tema East and Tema West respectively. Figure 2.3 below is a model that depicts the diagrammatic illustration of the relationship between the variables.




Figure: 2.4 The Implementation Model of PPP in TMA

Source: Model illustrating the relation between the independent variable and the Implementation performance of PPP

2.9.3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL

Figure 2.3 above shows the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The independent variables in the model are: Policy standards and objectives; communication and enforcement activity; resources and administrative structure. The dependent variable in the model is the implementation performance of PPP in TMA.

The implementation of public-private partnership starts with a well defined goal and objective either initiated by the central government or the decentralized authority and this constitutes policy standards and objectives. The policy is then transmitted to the administrative class who in turn acts upon the policy by adding flesh to the skeleton that is termed the policy document. The administrative structure also ensures that there is

agreement on the policy document by so doing there will be alterations and finally an agreement may be reached by all stakeholders and partners. The use of effective communication and enforcement activities hinges on the policy document and the activities of the administrative class or structure and also depends on the amount of resources allocated for that purpose and this directly influences the implementation performance of PPP. Resources are crucial to the implementation performance of PPP to the extent that they have been identified and allocation by the administrative structure. It is also worth noting that resource has a greater influence on the communication and enforcement of PPP in the TMA as well as a direct influence on implementation performance.

The inherent characteristics of the administrative structure also show that there is a direct influence on the implementation performance of PPP and this is depicted by the direct arrow that links the two. Also policy standards and objectives also have a direct linkage to implementation performance of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly.

2.10 Conclusion

In conclusion the implementation performance of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly depends to a greater extent on the variables discussed above. The standards and objectives, the availability of resources with which to implement the service contracts, the extent to which proper communication and enforcement activity are adhered to including redress of concerns and punitive measures and the facilitative role the administrative structure plays is important in the implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. The implementation performance of PPP has also been depicted in a diagram.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

The purpose of the study was to investigate, describe and explain the factors that may influence the implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. This chapter gives a detailed account of the procedures and processes employed in conducting this research. In other words, the chapter discusses the methodology the researcher followed to reach the research findings. It is sub-divided into six main areas, namely; the research Paradigm, the research methods, unit of analysis, data management, field experience and ethics.

3.1 Research Paradigm

There are two main paradigms in carrying out social science research are namely; qualitative and quantitative. In order to achieve the main objectives of the study, I adopted the qualitative paradigm. The choice was because it is the method that best serves the purpose of explanation and helps to describe the challenges of public-private partnerships (PPP) in the Tema metropolitan Assembly from the perspective of the interviewees. Qualitative research usually involves in-depth investigation of knowledge, through strategies like observation, interviewing technique, archival or other documentary analysis and ethnographic study. Qualitative research is especially effective in obtaining culturally specific information about the values, opinions, behaviors, and social contexts of particular populations. In other words it seeks to understand a given research problem or topic from the perspectives of the local population it involves (Ragin, 1994 in J. Grix, 2004), in this instance the Tema metropolitan Assembly.

Qualitative methods are typically more flexible because, they allow greater spontaneity and adaptation of the interaction between the researcher and the study participant. For example, qualitative methods ask mostly “open-ended” questions that are not necessarily worded in exactly the same way with each participant. With open-ended questions, participants are offered the opportunity to respond in their own words, and these responses tend to be more complex than simply “yes” or “no”.

In other words the choice of the qualitative approach presents us with a better understanding of how the implementation of PPP in the Tema metropolitan assembly has brought about effectiveness and efficiency in local government (LG) service delivery, in terms of revenue collection and improvement in sanitation. The choice of qualitative paradigm allowed the interviewed participants to express themselves on issues relating to PPP in the Tema Metropolis and the researcher was able to engage in an intensive interaction with the participants and finally it allowed for a better description and explanation to be given to the issues by the respondents.

3.2 Research Method

The study employed the case study method within the qualitative approach. A case study approach was adopted and it focused on a single unit of study which is the Tema Metropolitan Assembly (T.M.A.). This is because T.M.A. forms the main study area and therefore the nucleus around which the research took place. A case study is a restriction or a narrowing of focus to one or more towns, individuals, organizations, etc., which are studied in great detail (Grix, 2004). In other words case studies are mostly based on qualitative research strategies which permit the researcher to explore in-depth into a programme, event, activity, processes or one or more individuals. I choose to use the case

study method because my study was limited to one district where the implementation of the public-private partnership was explored in detail.

In accordance with the research objective the case study method enabled me to analyse the factors that influence the implementation performance of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly in particular and to focus on revenue mobilization and waste collection. Another advantage of the case study compared to other strategies according to Yin (2003) was its ability to deal with full variety of evidence – document, artefacts, interviews and direct observation. The multiple sources of evidence available in the case study strategy helped me in the manipulation of the data as well as in dealing with the problems of reliability and validity of findings. This flexibility allowed me to collect data from various sources such as interviews and to use secondary sources of data like documentary reports, the internet and others.

3.3 Unit of Analysis

The study was undertaken in three months duration between the periods of November, 2012 to March, 2013. The researcher spent a lot of time in the study area. The Tema Metropolitan Assembly was the main unit of analysis. Tema is situated in the Greater Accra region of Ghana. The objective of the study makes it imperative for the study to be undertaken in the TMA's headquarters and the two of its sub-metro offices; Tema West and Tema East. The study also focused on revenue collection and waste collection in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. Four private companies were also interviewed in the study. The choice of these institutions was informed by their roles in the implementation process and their contributions to understanding the research problem and questions respectively.

3.3.1 Study Area

This section reviews the profile of the Tema Metropolitan Assembly (TMA). It is important to localize the study and situate it within its appropriate environment in order to better understand the topic under consideration. This covers the Profile of Tema Metropolitan Assembly, economic activities, political structure, sanitation and waste management and revenue mobilization pattern and finally tourism, education, health and water in Tema.

Profile of Tema Metropolitan Assembly

The 2000 population and housing census tagged the population at 298,432 with males and females forming 49% and 51% of the population respectively. Current Population: 387,045 with a growth rate of 2.6% the population is estimated to reach 418,444 by the end of the planning period (2013). Tema Metropolitan Assembly is 30 kilometres east of the capital of Ghana, Accra. It share boundary with the Dangme West District Assembly (DWDA), Ledzekuku Krowor Municipal Assembly, Adentan Municipal Assembly and the Ga EAST Municipal Assembly (GEMA), the Akuapem South district Assembly and the South by the Gulf of Guinea. The Greenwich Meridian (i.e. Longitude 0⁰) passes through the metropolis. (www.ghanadistricts.com/districts1on1/tma).

The allodia owners of Tema land are the people of Tema, Kpone and Nungua. Portions of their lands were acquired by government and vested into Land Commission, through Ministry of Lands and Housing form Tema Development Corporation (TDC). The legal instrument (LI 1929) that established Tema Metropolitan Assembly gave it the mandate as the overall Planning authority in the Metropolis. However, when TMA was established, the law that makes TDC in charge of permitting for the acquisition area was not repealed and this is a source of conflict

Economic Activity

Economic activity in the metropolis are varied, they include the manufacturing, Agriculture and service sectors, with over 500 industries in areas such as Chemical, Textile, Food processing, Engineering, Paints, Fish Cold Stores, Printing and Woodwork Industries with some located within the Free zone and the Light industrial areas. The industrial and service sector forms the backbone of the economy as it employs majority of the labour force. A significant number of the people are also engaged in agriculture especially farming and fishing, such as livestock farming focused mainly on poultry, ruminants and rearing of sheep and goats. It is worth noting that the service sector is growing at a faster rate and employs more women than men. This can be attributed to low skills and education required before getting into the sector. Other economic activities include mining and quarrying.

A major economic resource in the metropolis includes the Tema Harbor which opened to traffic on February 1962, it is composed of the main harbor, Ship yard and Dry-dock. The port serves as an entry and departure point for a wide range of goods to and from other parts of the world and is used by some inland countries for clearing goods and services.

Statistics on employment and labour force reveals that 62.6% of the population falls within the economically active group (15-64 years). 81.2% of the economically active population are economically engaged, while 16.0% are unemployed. Migration is a key cause of rapid population growth in the metropolis. The metropolis can also boast of several markets, the most vibrant is the central market at community one, community Nine Bulk Breaking market, Manhean Fish Market and the Texpo Market, located on the Spintex road.

Political Structure of the Tema Metropolitan Assembly

Ghana's current programme of decentralization was initiated prior to the National Democratic transition in the early 1990s. In 1988, the PNDC government introduced a major piece of legislative reform, the local government law (PNDC Law 207). This created 110 districts within Ghana's ten regions, with non partisan District Assembly (DA) elections held initially in 1988 and 1989 and subsequently every four years (1994, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2012). In addition to the two thirds of DA members elected on an individual, non party bases, one-third were appointed by central government along with the chief executive for each district.

The LG act 462, 1993 and LG legislative instrument LI 1929, established the TMA on the 1st day of November 2007 under the Decentralization system to take control of the day today running of the city. TMA was empowered by the law with deliberative, executive and legislative responsibility. The assembly was tasked to make laws, including the rules and bye-laws which give legal effect to decisions and also mobilize resources to undertake developmental programmes and activities.

The general assembly is the main body in the Assembly responsible for formulating laws and policies in the District. The membership in the general Assembly stands at sixty (60). The Assembly meets at least three times in a year. The members are drawn from the metropolitan Chief Executive, the fifty-six (56) Assembly members of which thirty-seven are elected and nineteen appointed by the president in consultation with the traditional authorities and other opinion leaders and the three members of parliament from the Tema West, Tema East and Tema Central electoral areas. However the three members of parliament don't have voting rights during voting at Assembly meetings.

The Assembly members are elected every four years through the universal adult suffrage. These members are expected to keep close contact with their electoral areas, consult their

people on issues discussed at the Assembly and collate their views and opinions and present to the assembly. However lack of finance makes it difficult for the Assembly members to carry out this responsibility. As a result of this, there is absence of grass root participation in local government at the metropolis. This has resulted in lack of community acceptance and ownership of projects thus making these projects not sustainable.

The Assembly members elect one representative among them to serve as Presiding member, who presides over the general Assembly meetings. The presiding member is elected once every two years and is eligible to stand for re-election. Appendix: 4 for the TMA organizational chart

The choice of the study area was obvious for the following reasons: Study such as this on the TMA is very limited, if any (to the best of my knowledge); also there appear to be limited research and literature on public policy implementation of PPPs in local government; The recent social, political and economic viability of the TMA and its contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and national development is a booster for the research; finally, the researcher has lived and worked in the metropolis for about four years and is very familiar with the languages spoken and can speak them. I understand the plurality of the area in terms of religion, culture and language dynamics. Also having lived and worked in the TMA, I personally know some of the main actors within the metropolis, which served as an advantage in the aspect of data collection.

Sanitation and Waste Management

The TMA has the general responsibility of ensuring proper disposal of both liquid and solid waste in the metropolis. It does so through the Waste Management Department (WMD) and the Environmental Health Department (EHD). In respect of liquid waste, Tema has a central sewerage system that was established in 1960. The water borne

sewerage system connects communities 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and parts of communities 3, 10, 11, 12. The system however experience frequent blockage which discharge effluent onto the streets and into open drains. Tema has 65 public toilets which are located at vantage points in the Metropolis however, these are inadequate.

The Metropolis has an organized system for collecting solid waste which involves the private sector. Solid waste collection in the following Communities: 3, 5, 6, 13, and 14, 18, 19, 20 is carried out on franchise bases. Service beneficiaries pay user fees which are determined by the TMA. Solid waste collected is finally disposed of at the newly constructed Engineering Sanitary landfill site at Kpone. Most inhabitants dispose off their refuse indiscriminately irrespective of health Hazards Associated with such practices. This may be attitudinal or due to the absence of dustbins at vantage locations where people can easily dispose of refuse. This have created opportunity for some unemployed youth called “Boola-boola Boys” to move from house to house with wheel barrows, four wheeled trucks and ‘tricycle motor Cars’ (E.g. Motor King).

Revenue Mobilization Pattern

In articles 245 and 252 of the 1992 Constitution and, and the Local Government Act of 1993, Act 462, local government revenue may be classified under the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), ceded revenue, and their own revenue-raising powers through local taxation. The DACF is the main source, providing a constitutionally guaranteed minimum share of Government revenue and thus some financial independence. Yet evidence of its workings is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, annual monies distributed by the DACF have increased quite significantly from 38.5 billion cedis in 1994 to 165 billion cedis in 1999 in actual amounts without taking inflation into account (Nkrumah 2000). The ceded revenue is collected by the Ghana revenue authority and transferred to the Das through the Ministry of local government and rural development (Crawford,

2004). The internally generated fund (IGF) refers to own revenue raised through local taxation and this are mainly fees and fines, rates and rent, and licenses includes property rate and Business operating permits (BOP). The table showing the revenue and expenditure pattern of the TMA has been captured under appendix 2 and 3 respectively.

The DACF and the IGF both decreased substantially in 2006. However in 2007 to 2009 there was an increase in revenue making revenue generated over the period for only IGF to GH ₵36.2 billion and that of the DACF to GH ₵36.4 billion making total revenue for the four year period GH ₵73.2 billion. This means that in the TMA the IGF is 50% which is a good performance as compared to other districts where grants far exceed the IGF. The expenditure profile in appendix 2 also depicts a very rapid reduction in expenditure from 2006 to 2009. Total revenue exceeded expenditure in 2009 leaving a surplus close to GH ₵ 120, 000. Interestingly the DACF average growth rate was -12% with the highest inflow being in 2006 (TMA, 2010).

Tourism Education Health and Water

The Tema Metropolis has a number of tourist sites like: the Meridian Stone, the Greenwich Meridian, the Penkwan Forest (katamanso), the Tema Harbour and Sakumono beach. Tourism in the Metropolis has the potential of diversifying the district economy if the sector is given the needed support and attention, as well as generating employment and revenue for the metropolis. In Tema educational concerns are addressed by the Metropolitan Education Directorate. The metropolis has both tertiary and pre tertiary institutions which can be found in both the Public and Private sectors. Tema has both Private and Public health facilities that are spread across the entire metropolis based on their functions and the range of service they provide. Public health facilities numbers 67, private health facilities number 46 while Industrial Health facilities number 16. Most of these facilities accept NHIS card bearers. There are 978 medical officers in the metropolis.

The Tema Metropolis is served with a network of water connections from the Kpong water works. The 2000 population census report estimates that about 85.6% of Households in Tema have access to pipe borne water (TMA, 2010).

3.3.2 Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary sources of data were used in the study. The primary sources of data consist mainly of data collected from the study area through in-depth interviews of respondents from the study area. The face to face interviews enabled more information to be obtained per research participant. The advantage of this method is that the researcher is able to ask the key respondents for their opinion and experiences about the issue.

Guided by the research objective and the nature of the cases under study, a total of eighteen respondents including eight officials from the TMA, six assembly members and four officials from the private sector who have partnered the TMA in either waste collection or revenue mobilization were interviewed. These categories of interviewees were purposively chosen because they represented the relevant group of actors involved in the implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. Also because they were involved in implementation of the policy they had the relevant information about the issues involved that I needed.

Secondary sources of data refer to information that was not directly obtainable from the respondents it comprises the review of already documented literature and information. They are made up of various published and unpublished documents such as books, technical and research reports, news papers, journals and periodicals. Another source of data that was useful in the study was the internet, unpublished documents from the TMA and other agencies whose work relate to the subject under study were also used. The

secondary sources were used as a guide in the formulation of the research problem, review of literature and the presentation of the findings in the work.

3.3.3 Target Population

Within the study area of the TMA the researcher conducted an in-depth interview that targeted the following personalities within the three months duration of the study; the Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE), The Metropolitan Co-coordinating director (MCD), the two sub-metro directors, the Metropolitan Revenue Head and Revenue heads in each of the two sub-metros, the Head of waste management department, Representative of the people; the two sub-metro chairmen, two sub-metro committee chairmen for Finance and Administration and Development and Services committee respectively. Four Private companies two in revenue mobilization and two in waste management were targeted. Also the Ministry of local government and rural development, Institute of Local Government studies.

The choice of the above respondents was because they are the key actors in the implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly and as such are more informed and experienced. However on the field the researcher used purposive sampling method to interview the following personalities; eight (8) respondents from the T.M.A. made up of the Assistant Director in charge of Administration, the sub-metro director for Tema East, the Metropolitan Finance Officer (MFO), the Metropolitan Budget Officer (MBO), the Metropolitan Revenue Head, the two Sub- metro Revenue Heads for Tema East and Tema West and the Liquid Waste Manager from the waste management department.

3.3.4 Sample Size

In all eighteen (18) respondents were interviewed. Those interviewed included eight (8) officials from the TMA. this group consisted of the Assistant Director in charge of Administration, the sub-metro director for Tema East, the Metropolitan Finance Officer (MFO), the Metropolitan Budget Officer (MBO), the Metropolitan Revenue Head, the two Sub-metro Revenue Heads for Tema East and Tema West and the Liquid Waste Manager from the waste management department. Six (6) assembly members were interviewed, and this is made up of the Presiding Member (PM), two (2) chairmen of Tema East and Tema West Sub- metros respectively, the chairman of the Development and Services committee at Tema West and each of the two (2) chairmen of Finance and Administration committees from Tema East and Tema West respectively. For the Private sector, a total of four (4) respondents were interviewed, with two (2) each involved in waste management and the other two (2) in revenue collection. The two waste management companies are Zoom Lion Ghana limited and Teriwhite waste company. The two revenue mobilization companies are A5- Consult in the collection of Property rate and Cool Brothers limited also in the collection of parking tolls. In all eight (8) females and ten (10) males were interviewed.

3.3.5 Sampling Technique

The sampling technique that was used for the study was predominantly purposive sampling. Purposive also referred to as judgmental sampling technique enables one to use personal judgment to select cases which best answer the research questions and meet the research objectives (Saunders et. al. 1997). Using the purposive sampling technique in this study ensured that the researcher acquired a wealth of information for a detailed study. The TMA, the Assembly members and the four private companies were selected because they were directly or indirectly part of the implementation process of public-private

partnerships in the areas focused by the study namely waste collection and revenue mobilization in the Tema metropolitan Assembly as such qualify as key respondents who can contribute to answering the research question.

The six assembly members interviewed were also purposively selected from the two sub-metros on the basis of their leadership roles as chairpersons of the two sub-metros and the two committees namely the Development and service Committee and the Finance and Administration committee in each sub-metro respectively. Out of the five waste management companies involved in waste collection for the TMA, I purposively selected two and interviewed them because they were accessible and had office locations in the TMA while the others did not have any office in Tema. For revenue A5 consult responsible for the collection of Property rates and Cool Brothers also responsible for the collection of parking tolls in front of the TMA were interviewed.

3.3.6 Instruments of Data Collection

The researcher used in-depth interviews as the main instrument for data collection. This method was chosen because it affords the opportunity to do a one on one in-depth questioning or interrogation with the respondents. To ask open-ended questions and to interrogate the respondent in a way to elicit answers to all the questions with the aid of an interview guide. The advantage here is that it allowed for a certain degree of flexibility and for the pursuit of unexpected lines of enquiry during the interviews. The method is appropriate for case study type of research because it affords the opportunity to investigate a real life situation. The interview method also enables the researcher to probe further on issues that required further clarification without necessarily following any specific, predetermined order.

As such an interview guide was designed which took into consideration the research questions and objectives for the study. The purpose of the interview guide was to ensure that the researcher is guided so that he does not deviate or get carried away but rather is able to complete the interview with the salient points in each session. The interview guide was divided into five parts in addition to the background information of respondents. Other parts on the interview guide are the Objectives for entering into PPP agreements, communication and enforcement activity, resources to ensure effective implementation of PPP, Bureaucratic structures and the Prospects of PPPs. In all there was a total of thirty-three (33) including 'Yes' and 'No' questions.

The interview conversations were recorded using a digital voice recorder and at the same time handwritten to serve as backup. The researcher kept an interview schedule in which he indicated date, place, time, position, duration, appointments etc. to ensure that he kept track of the respondents and to be on schedule. The interviews took place over a period of three months. It began on November 17, 2012 and lasted till early February, 2013.

3.4 Data Management

The fieldwork was conducted over a period of three months between November and February, 2013. In conducting the in-depth interviews I employed a digital voice recorder to record the information from the respondents. In addition I took detailed field note with pen and paper to serve as a back up incase the voice recorder fails or becomes unclear. After checking to ensure that all questions on the interview guide have been well answered, I manually transcribed the interviews and typed them together with the handwritten ones. The next step involved the sorting of the data into various categories. Here the classified data were labeled under various themes taken from the research objectives to

allow for easy analysis. The main themes for the analysis were policy standards and objectives, communication and enforcement activities, resources and last but not least administrative structures.

The analysis and discussions of the research findings involved a detailed description and interpretation of data using narratives and direct quotations from the research participants. Through the analysis the researcher was able to identify the main findings inherent in the study using the main themes identified earlier and was further organized into various chapters. The first chapter focused on waste collection, the second on revenue mobilization. The third focused on comparing the findings inherent in the study while the final stage of the analysis focused on presenting my personal analytical interpretations in the form of opinions and judgments of the meanings of findings, summary conclusion and recommendations to the study.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

This section discusses the ethical considerations that were observed by the researcher in the conduct of this research, particularly on the field of data collection. The essence of ethical consideration in social research is to ensure quality and integrity in the research process as well as the findings and conclusion. This is crucial because social science research involves human beings with feelings and emotions. The researcher being fully conscious of the above observed the following ethical considerations.

Informed Consent

This refers to the right of individuals to either participate or not to participate in the research. I always offered an introductory letter and read out the informed consent part of my questionnaire to participants and then sort their consent before the interview

commenced. I followed the same procedure with all the participants and in the case of the Tema metropolitan Assembly I foremost introduced myself to the director in charge who issued a memo to all the target participants. At the sub-metros the director was my first point of call and who in turn introduced me to the target participants. None of the participants was coerced, forced or intimidated to participate. Some of the interviews were rescheduled to meet participant's convenience. In all three people refused to participate in the interview. The first instance was a senior official of the TMA who refused to participate because he preferred a closed ended questionnaire. The other two persons refused with the excuse that they did not have any information to offer.

Confidentiality Privacy and Anonymity

Another important ethical consideration was the issue of confidentiality, privacy and anonymity. All the participants were assured that whatever they said will be kept in confidentiality and trust. And that their personality or their positions would not be used or exposed. As such participant's names or their designations have not been referenced in any part of the study. I will continue to keep their information out of public domain and not disclose them to any other person or for any reason than for the purpose of the research.

Language

Last but not least the issue of language was given careful consideration. The research was conducted in the English language this was because all participants communicated in English. The target participants were public servants, Assembly members and business people who were wholly conversant with the English language and willingly communicated in the English language. All the participants consented to being interviewed in

the English language as such I did not require any translator since I was also conversant with the local languages spoken in the research area.

3.6 Challenges and Lessons Learnt

The researcher encountered numerous challenges in the process of undertaking this research work, especially during the period of data collection. This section discusses some of these challenges, how they were handled and lessons learnt from them. First data collection for the work started quite late than the originally scheduled date and was interrupted due to the 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary elections that took place on the 7th and 8th of December, 2012. the outcome of the presidential election results also generated controversy which finally lead to court litigation.

Another challenge was the fact that the year was almost ending and public sector institutions were particularly busy rounding up activities for the year. Assembly members were mobile and campaigning for their election candidates, it was difficult making appointments with them. The researcher mainly used the opportunity to introduce the subject to them and arranged to come back later for the interview. And in some cases made telephone calls or visited until the interview was granted.

Besides, some of the respondents interviewed were initially not willing to answer certain questions, especially questions on revenue and mostly pretended not to have the answers or were not willing to disclose certain information for fear of it being used against them. Some were quick to ignore some of the questions. They were careful to show their opposition for some of the contracts that was awarded. To overcome this challenge, the researcher had to remind them, reassure them and even read again the informed consent or the anonymity part of the interview guide to them.

There were other challenges to do with transcription of the interviews. Some of the interviews were long and posed challenges during data transcription and analysis. Some of the interviews lasted well over an hour, some of the interviewees were busy and would have to attend to other people in the course of an interview and return soon afterwards.

Some of the people interviewed, especially those in the private companies category initially perceived the researcher as a journalist, even though they were presented with an introductory letter and an Identity card, some still doubted. In such situations they are likely to turn you down or ask you to come another time. However with perseverance and determination the researcher was able to explain to them that the work was purely for academic purposes and finally conduct such interviews. Other challenges were financing the project and the times wasted before meeting the respondents constitute a worth of research experience.

CHAPTER FOUR

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN WASTE COLLECTION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter discussed the data obtained from the field. The analysis and discussions were presented in five main themes, namely; Policy standards and objectives, communication and enforcement activities, resources and administrative structures. In all eighteen (18) respondents comprising different stakeholder groups were interviewed using purposive sampling techniques. Their views on the various subjects are presented and analysed based upon the various policy implementation models discussed in chapter two. This include Edwards (1980); Meter and Horn (1975) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) which form the theoretical underpinning of the study is made. In order to give a theoretical interpretation to the data, secondary data is also used to complement the primary data for the analysis. The analysis and discussions here is centred on Waste collection.

4.1 Policy Standards and Objective

The study of implementation requires that goals and objectives be identified and measured since implementation cannot be said to succeed or fail without a goal against which to judge it (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Under this section the respondents were asked whether they were aware of the TMAs objectives for entering into PPP agreement and whether they were aware of any contractual arrangements between the TMA and any Private organization in the area of waste collection and revenue mobilization. The aim of this and subsequent questions under this heading were to assess the extent of clarity of goals and objectives for entering into PPP agreements.

From the data gathered almost all the participants were quick to answer “Yes” to show that they were either aware of contractual arrangements between the Tema Metropolitan

Assembly (TMA) and other Private waste management organizations or whether they were in a contractual relationship with the TMA for the purposes of waste collection. Six (6) assembly members were able to name a maximum of four waste collection companies, eight (8) of the bureaucrat working in the TMA were also able to mention at least two (2) of the waste management companies in contractual relations with the TMA.

The companies in waste collection include: Amanie farms and waste; Asibod; J. Stanley Owusu; Teriwhite and Zoom Lion Ghana limited, of this waste collection companies only Zoom Lion maintains a contracting out and franchise agreement the others have migrated from contracting out to franchising, they explain that under the “contract out” agreement:

“The TMA maintains control of the service but contracts out delivery to the Private sector. The TMA maintains the responsibility for collecting fees from house holds; determine quality, timing and service to be provided. They ensure that they pay the Private contractor for collecting the waste in the assigned area of the metropolis.”

The above remarks are in agreement with Awortwi’s (2008) definition for contracting out. They also agreed that the franchise is entirely different from the contracting out, here they explain:

“The waste contractors have been given the exclusive right by the TMA to collect waste in a defined locality and also to collect fees directly from the users or households and to pay 6% to the Tema Metropolitan Assembly and in addition they also pay their Business Operating Permit (BOP).”

Liquid waste collection was not part of these contracts and this is because the Tema Metropolis has a central sewage system that links most part of the metropolis, from community one (1) to twelve (12) and the users pay annual fess to the Assembly. The other communities contract their own liquid waste collectors. Again, the private waste collection companies admitted they were in contractual relationships with the main actor the TMA in sanitation service delivery. One respondent from a private waste collection company said:

“Yes, we use to be in a contractual relationship with the TMA for as long as twenty-three (23) years however we now have a franchise agreement under which we work. Under the franchise we have been zoned and given specific boundaries.”

Another informant from Zoom Lion Ghana limited gave a vivid description of their contract with the TMA. From their point of view the contract is a project that Zoom lion is pursuing together with various District Assemblies to ensure improved sanitation in the country at large which they call Sanitation Improvement Package (SIP). He said in his statement thus:

“Yes the contract says that we provide the Trucks, pay the drivers and workers, do maintenance, provide our own fuel and spare parts. All that the Assembly has to do is to supervise us daily and to make sure that we are able to lift the waste containers for them. The most important thing is that we make sure that the refuse are picked up daily. This contract is what we call the Sanitation Improvement Package (SIP) which is different from the franchise.”

Again the respondent gives a splendid explanation to what the contract entails under the franchise. He explains thus:

“Under the Franchise you do your own revenue collection, get your own equipments, the TMA gives you the area (franchise area) you buy your dust bins, do distribution, you have to talk to the client, individuals, do public education and take your revenue as well. The Assembly comes in when you are not performing or in case the residents are not paying. The assembly comes in to send them to court, but as at now we have not sent any one to court.”

The views expressed above are clear testament of what waste management contracts entails in the Tema Metropolis. There are two forms of waste management agreements in the Assembly. These are “contracting-out” and “franchise”. The TMA is shifting focus from contracting out to franchise, that is most of the companies were previously in a form of contract with the TMA, it is only Zoom Lion that still has a contracting- out relationship.

The difference between the contracting out and the Franchise is that (1) for the contracting out the TMA is involved in monitoring and evaluating which is daily; (2) the TMA

collects the revenue from the residents and pays a percentage to the waste collection companies at the end of every month; (3) the TMA fix the levy alone; (4) the TMA conducts public education; (5) The TMA does not give any form of financial support it only pay the agreed sum (capitation); (6) the contractors were in charge of their own maintenance, fuel, wage bill, spare parts; (7) when the contractor's vehicle breaks down the TMA comes in to support and (8) if the contractor fails to collect for a particular day it is deducted from their pay.

When it comes to franchising (1) The contractor is in charge of educating the public; (2) the contractor collects revenue; (3) Fixing fees involve the TMA, the contractors and the peoples representatives, Assembly members; (4) the contractor is to be capitated by the TMA to enable it to start educating and registering of house holds and collecting the refuse; (5) The contractor is expected to provide dustbins to the house holds that they register; (6) if their performance was not good the public or Assembly members complain to the TMA to have their contracts abrogated; (7) the contractor is also expected to report defaulting house holds to the TMA to be taken to a sanitation court which is also stated in the sanitation and environmental bye-laws and (8) They only pay a percentage of what they collect to the TMA.

Reasons for Entering into Public Private Partnerships in Waste Collection

Respondents came out with several reasons that propelled the Tema Metropolitan Assembly to enter into PPP in waste collection. Some of the reasons given by the respondents included the following. One respond gave his view as follows:

“Tema is a big place; the TMA can not do everything alone; the private sector is able to enforce work better and to ensure that its employees work hard as compared to the public sector; the private sector works with targets and is able to achieve those targets.”

The above opinion asserts the notion that the private sector performs jobs better than the public sector however Cook and Kirkpatrick (1994; 1995) observed that in general there is no evidence attesting the superiority of private over public enterprises and as such mixed and inconclusive, and that the real issue is monopoly and its associated inefficiencies rather than ownership, and that the link between privatization and economic growth has not been demonstrated. although that may not necessarily be the case it appears to be self ingrained since the colonial days that the public sector was viewed as government work as such no mans work. Another respondent who is an assembly member also added his view:

“The TMA alone can’t handle the issue of waste management; the TMA does not have the vehicles; TMA does not have the logistics.”

An informant from a waste collection company also made a salient point that has to do with capacity and efficiency, he explains that:

“The TMA lacks the capacity to collect waste in the entire metropolis as such the need to engage private collectors. Efficiency required that they would involve the private sector because they are more efficient than the TMA. Although the TMA has some reasonable capacity as a result of central government assistance they still need to involve the private sector due to increasing population.”

The various views expressed for the Tema Metropolitan Assembly’s goal for entering into public private partnerships could be summed up as follows: There are inadequate personnel; the private companies have the capacity and equipment to do the job; people are reluctant to pay required levies to the Assembly, posing as collection difficulties; PPPs would enable the TMA to focus more at monitoring and supervision at the local level. Other issue had to do with the size of the metropolis which according to most of the people interviewed is very big and as such required the assistance of private waste companies; others also claim that engaging the private sector was a way of encouraging private initiative and increasing employment in the metropolis, since the private sector will also in turn employ more people to ensure that actual delivery is achieved.

Inadequate resources were also prominent in the proposed reasons why the Assembly needed private assistance; the Assembly lacks logistics such as vehicles, fuel, equipments etc. The issue of lack of funds or financial resources was also adduced; lack of well trained staff. When participants were asked whether indeed the private sector was able to bring in the needed logistics, resources, expertise, etc and whether in practice these actually affected the implementation of PPPs. Out of the eighteen (18) people interviewed twelve (12) of them absolutely believe that the coming in of the private sector brought about efficiency and lead to the achievement of the objectives though the goals had been achieved they still believe that there are more rooms for improvement, that is the private sector still has a lot to do though they are already doing well and two (2) also expressed the view that they really did not see much difference with the inception of the private sector.

Achieving Public Private Partnerships success in waste management

Implementation success in the context of policy implementation and public private partnerships has to do with concerted efforts to ensure that objectives are achieved. The various respondents gave their opinion and measures adopted by the main actor, the Tema Metropolitan Assembly to ensure that the PPP in sanitation became a success. Some of the measures outlined by the (8) eight bureaucrats include the following; Firstly, proper supervision, monitoring and evaluation on the part of the TMA greatly contribute to achieving policy success in the implementation of the public private partnerships. Public education is also important, it said that the TMA carried public education by holding community durbars, used the media and reached the people through town hall meetings.

The contract document itself can be seen as a measure to ensure that the private companies delivered. It had sections on sanctions and benefits; there were clauses that defaulters

would have their contracts abrogated. The process of entering the contract was also a measure since the Assembly requested for the submission of a detailed technical and financial proposal by the private companies, one respondent stated that:

“Proper supervision of the contracts, quarterly reports and the contract terms and conditions are some of the measure that the Assembly put in place for the accomplishment of the objectives of the public-private partnership in waste collection.”

The above information reflects the extent to which the Tema Metropolitan Assembly put in place measures to ensure that implementation success was achieved in relation to its partnership agreement with the private sector in waste collection.

Clarity of Goals in Waste Management

Based on the information obtained from the respondents they were asked to ascertain whether the TMA’s objectives for entering into public-private partnerships were clear and easy to understand by the implementers and all the stake holders involved. Interestingly sixteen (16) of the respondents answered “Yes” one answered “no” and the remaining one answered “Yes” but at the same time expressed reservations. One respondent remarked that:

“Yes, the objectives are clear, the issue is always with the Assembly and all the assembly members understand the issue at stake. The private companies going through the bidding process also understand.”

Therefore from all the ensuing discussions it is understandable that the policy objective on the privatization of waste collection was clear, at least from the perspective of the implementers, the private companies themselves and the peoples representatives, the assembly members. The point of departure here is that the private contractors have still not registered the various households or provided them with any dust bins; they have also attempted to increase their fees without the TMA’s agreement, why hasn’t the TMA taken

any one to court and why does it still owe the contractors a lot of money if the understanding is that the agreements are clear?

4.2 Communication and Enforcement Activities

Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argue that for a policy to be successfully implemented there is usually a large number of governmental organizations and individuals who must become involved in the implementation process. They also said that each participant has a distinctive perspective and “when perspectives differ so also is the measure of success”. This infers that to achieve success in any implementation involving diverse actors or stakeholders there is a need to ensure that there is effective “communication and enforcement activities” between the parties involved.

In a similar vein Public- Private Partnerships in waste management involves several actors or stakeholders, most respondents were of the view that the major stakeholders in the implementation of PPP in waste collection includes the following: The Tema Metropolitan Assembly (TMA) as the main actor on one side and acting through the waste management department (WMD); environmental health department; the Metropolitan Budget Officer (MBO); the metropolitan chief executive (MCE) and the coordinating director; the Assembly members; the house holds and residents association; traditional leaders (very strong in Tema East); and then the contractors or Private sector service providers.

The TMA through the lead departments of waste management and environmental health and the others sees to the implementation of the contract, including the monitoring and supervision. When it comes to the daily monitoring and supervision of private waste collection companies, the head of waste management department is in charge. The communities report all their grievances to the TMA through their Assembly members and also ensure that they pay for fess or other levies to the collectors or the Assembly. The

contractors or private service providers on the other hand are expected to deliver under the contract.

On the field it was revealed that both formal and informal communication channels were used in the implementation of PPP between the main actor and the stakeholders and their partners. The formal channels of communication include; letter writing or communiqués, memorandums, community durbars (when open forums affords residents the opportunity to put their grievances across), meetings at the instance of either party. The public relations and grievance committee in the Assembly also comes in when they receive complaints from the implementers and this committee is chaired by the presiding member (PM). The informal channel of communication includes; e-mail, Telephone, face-to-face conversations, some times the media is resorted to or the information services department use information van to disseminate information to the public one respondent put it this way:

“This is documented, it is a contract and the specific thing to do is stated in the contract.”

The distinct role of the assembly members can be found in the following comments thus:

“In respect of the collection of waste the assembly members are involved they are required to go to their areas and tell them who their collectors are.”

Communication and enforcement activities go hand in hand with the enforcement of PPPs. It is important to note that without the enforcement of contracts, clauses and established protocol having to do with waste management laws and bye-laws implementation would be bound to fail. For enforcement to be accomplished there must be the legal aspect of any business contract. It must be legal and at least enforceable in the law courts. In the PPP agreement between the TMA and the Private companies the TMA has always found itself on the defaulting side than on the offensive, however as the main actor, grave actions have

not been taken against it, it has equally not gathered enough courage to take any private company or individuals who default by transgressing the sanitation bye- laws of the Assembly or the PPP agreement to court. It appears letter writing and abrogation of contracts is some of the ways in which the TMA enforces its compliance to PPP agreement. A respondent with a private waste collection company noted that:

“Through letter writing they draw your attention and they may send you warning letters on termination of contracts. In the past they have given us warning letters and that made us wake up and that is why we are in business to make our customs happy.”

When it comes to enforcement most of the private firms do not have serious grievances with the TMA except for the fact that the sanitation bye-laws is not enforced at all:

“They are not enforcing sanitation bye-laws for instance there are areas that when you desilt, it also get filled with refuse immediately. The bye-laws will ensure that people own a dustbin and that defaulters are sent to a sanitation court.”

The above represent the view of a respondent who is into waste collection for the Assembly. In other jurisdiction the local government authorities have been taken to court for late payment of contract benefits due the private companies, however the TMA enjoys good relations with its partners. It was expressed during the interview by an informant that:

“The contract document spells out everything including the abrogation of contracts and in case of non-payment they can take the TMA to court as spelt out in the contract.”

The truth of the matter is that although the contract documents spells out court action against the TMA, it remains a fact that ‘one can never bite the hand that feeds him’, which means that most private companies harbor the fear of being victimized by the TMA.

4.3 Resources

Another objective of the research was to inquire if there was adequate resource to ensure effective implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolis. Meter and Horn (1975) stated that Policy resources may include funds or other incentives in the programme that can

enhance effective implementation of public policies. According to Grindle and Thomas (1991) resources also include political, managerial and technical resources needed to sustain the implementation effort. However under this study resources have been grouped into financial Resources, Human Resources and also logistics and infrastructure.

I) Human Resources

Among the various factors of production, it is arguably true that the human factor situated in labour is the most essential, because it is the human being that combines the other factors to ensure that productivity takes place. Consequently the importance of human resource in the PPP can not be under estimated. An analysis of the field data showed that most respondents were of the view that there was adequate human resource with the appropriate skills to deliver the policy. In comparison twelve (12) respondents were of the view that the private sector possesses adequate human resources as compared to the TMA. Some of the views sampled are as follows:

“Yes, the TMA is well staffed” and on the part of the private companies “the tender board will consider their staff strength, SSNIT contribution for staff before awarding the contract.”

From the above it can be observed that the TMA also needs to be well staffed since it is still responsible for performance monitoring and evaluation again the TMA comes in to support the private companies and serves as backup and prevent spillages at dumping sites whenever the private contractors experience equipment breakdowns. The TMA is responsibility for lifting the refuse of public institutions like schools and hospitals as such it still maintains it capacity. It also stands to reason that when the private waste collectors are at full post TMA staffs will become redundant, and some of them will need to be redeployed or laid-off, the issue is does the TMA have the power to employ and to lay off

its staffs, it can not do so entirely by itself therefore the result is that government pay people who do not work or who do little work.

The private sector was hailed by majority of respondents to have adequate human resource, one of such respondents tries to justify this with the fact that once they have succeeded in winning a contract they automatically have the human resources he justifies it this way:

“Yes, because as part of the evaluation process before a contract is won it is part of the bid document that the number of people or staff to the job would have to be evaluated.”

The above notwithstanding some other respondents have also alleged that political patronage and influence also played a role in the award of contract.

II) Financial Resources

Financial resources for implementation and sustainability of PPPs are crucial. In the past, prior to the implementation of the franchise in waste management the TMA was always indebted to the private waste collection companies. This worrying trend could be attributable to the late arrival of the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). Other sources of funding such as the internally generated fund (IGF) which accounted for about 50% of revenue inflows were used to finance recurrent expenditures and Donor Funding usually were programme specific.

It is important note that even though a portion of the district assembly common fund was earmarked to sanitation and environmental issues. Opinions sampled from the respondents showed that the TMA is financially under resourced taking into consideration the fact that sanitation requires a huge financial outlay, on the other hand most respondents believe that the private companies were adequately resourced. Most of the respondents feel that to be given the contract that is passing the assessment stage of the contract process guarantees

financial capability. Though that may not necessary be the case, they argue that both technical and financial proposal presented by the private companies is the basis of the award of the contract. One informant explained it this way:

“Yes both the technical and financial proposals enable us to know whether they can do the mobilization of funds and whether they can pay their workers.”

Another respondent attests that:

“The tender board awards contracts to business with the requisite financial capability to do then work.”

A private waste collector puts it practically to show that they indeed possess the financial resources to deliver sanitation services:

“Yes, we have workers and drivers who we pay we provide fuel which amounts to about GH 52,000 per month.”

One Assembly member thinks the TMA does not have adequate resources but the contractors do:

“Yes and No. this is because on the part the private companies it is yes, but on the part of the TMA it is No. The TMA is supposed to collect (waste) from public institutions also when it comes to capitation to the contractors the TMA is wanting. That is why a percentage of the common fund is ear marked for sanitation.”

It is a fact that inadequate financial resources constitute a major upset to PPP in waste collection. A private waste collector attributes financial resources as a major challenge, he states that:

“Yes; as for money, if you don’t have you will need to borrow to finance your work, but finance is the major challenge that we face in this business.”

III) Logistics and Infrastructure

Policies and contracts by themselves do not avail much unless combined with the right kind of resources in the form of logistics and infrastructure aside finance and human

resources. The delivery of sanitation services cannot be undertaken without the use of appropriate and adequate logistics. Most of the respondents agree that logistics is available for the achievement of the contract in waste management. Most of the bureaucrats agree that inadequate logistics and infrastructure were some reasons why the TMA decides to enter into such PPP agreement:

“Yes the TMA does not have adequate but the private sector does.”

It does not have all the vehicles the skip containers for collecting the refuse. There is also the need to ensure that waste management staffs are rightfully attired. If there is a default in any of these logistics then you can be sure that no matter the amount of funds available and the quality of human resources there will not be work done. To explain this point further an informant from the waste collection company had this to say:

“Yes, we have the logistics though not 100% and for infrastructure we are still improving our offices and increasing them.”

Although most assembly members were satisfied with the provision of logistics and infrastructure by both the TMA and the partners one person expressed dissatisfaction and put it this way:

“No, this is because they are not able to provide the people with waste bins as they were supposed to have done.”

In line with the provision of waste bin a private waste collector had this to say:

“Yes, we have the logistics, but it is not easy to supply waste bins. For instance if you have a community of three thousand(3,000) households to collect and one bin cost two hundred Ghana cedis (200) how would you be able to do that.”

An assembly member had this to say when asked:

“Yes, they have the trucks, for instance you can not doubt zoom lions capabilities as far as logistics are concerned.”

To conclude, resources was a very crucial aspect of the PPP agreement in waste collection and as such it was generally agreed by most of the respondent that resources are satisfactory though not 100%. They also contend that the TMA does not have enough logistics as compared to the private sector and as such that was a reason for the PPPs. Moulton et al (2001) argue that a major impediment to the implementation of policy plans was inadequate resources.

4.4 Administrative Structures

Grindle (1980) considers the attitude of political leaders and administrative officials as contributing factors to the difficulty of implementation. She argues that third world leaders and bureaucrats view participation as delay to the policy process which draws back social and economic development. All the eighteen (18) informants mentioned one form or the other of bureaucratic bottlenecks to the successful implementation of the PPP in waste collection in the Tema metropolis;

According to the data gathered from the field, delay in signing contract documents under the Franchise constituted a major upset, the bidding process started in 2010 but the contracts were awarded in November 2011. However in Ashiaman it took a total of six (6) months to award the contract and start working.

Also delays in payment of contractors by the Assembly. Defaults and late payments by the Assembly are likely to affect the contractors in the delivery of their contracts such as the provision of dust bins, early disposal of waste and increasing their borrowing. Also the contractors complain of some interference with their work by some stakeholders including Assembly members, who come in to give instructions and ask questions when the Assembly is to do that. Some of them refuse payment to the contractors.

Some of the respondents believe that the procurement law constituted a hindrance to the award of contracts, for instance, it says you can not do sole sourcing; you should advertise for people to pick up bid documents and apply which is likely to takes a lot of time. The local government laws also states that the Assembly has to consult and seek permission from the regional-co-ordinating council (RCC) before embarking on some agreements and they are supposed to sign some parts of the contracts; this can lead to documents getting lost. For instance in taking loans to a certain tune. From the field, majority of respondents answered in the affirmative that they had the fullest support from the staff and workers of the TMA including the administrative, implementation monitoring and evaluation staffs of the assembly. However some of the respondents do not agree to receive enough support from the assembly one person responded like this:

“Yes and no; I believe it is only about 30% of the officials that are supportive, the rest are not helping at all.”

A senior official of the Assembly explained that the implementation usually lies with the top hierarchies of the assembly and that not every body is likely to be involved, this is how she puts it

“It is not everybody that is involved it is usually done at the top level.”

Again majority of respondent agreed that the Assembly members themselves and the general public lend their support and co-operation to the implementation of the contract. For instance fifteen respondents answered “Yes” whiles the rest answered “Yes” but expressed some other reservations. Some asked questions bordering on the ability of some assembly members to understand the issues at stake they were only used as rubber stamps in the process:

“Yes, the assembly members have been supportive, if the contractors are not performing, they inform the TMA to change them.”

Also, some of the respondents were quite to add that were political interference in the process of awarding the contract as politicians brought on board their favorites. An administrative officer expressed the point this way:

“They don’t give us the free hand to do what is expected to be done they rather give their own preferences.”

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a detailed description and analysis of the role that policy standards and objectives, communication and enforcement activity, resources and administrative structure play in the implementation performance of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. The chapter focused on waste collection efforts of the TMA and brought various perspectives to bear on the implementation challenges of PPP in waste collection and sanitation. Some of the challenges were clarity of objectives, weak communication and enforcement activities, poor resource allocation and administrative bottlenecks.

CHAPTER FIVE

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN REVENUE MOBILIZATION

5.0 Introduction

This chapter offers explanation on the main factors that facilitate or impedes the implementation of public-private partnership in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly with particular emphasis on revenue mobilization. It is my position that four main factors are central to the effective implementation of public-private partnerships. In the ensuing discussions and analysis I postulate that policy standards and objectives, communication and enforcement activities, resources and administrative structures are the major determinants of whether the implementation performance of PPP in the TMA would realize its set objectives. In other words the chapter is devoted to the detailed presentation of the findings on the role of the four variables above in the effective implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly with a focus on revenue mobilization.

5.1 Policy Standards and Objective

On revenue collection and companies collecting revenue on behalf of the Tema Metropolitan Assembly (TMA) it was revealed that almost all the Assembly members were aware of contractual arrangements, but only three (3) of them could name at least one of the companies involved and the type of the arrangements. The senior public officials on their part were also aware and could name some of the companies collecting revenue for the TMA. However quite ironically, little information and awareness was depicted about private revenue collection companies by informants. For instance one revenue head was quick to show denial:

“I don’t know any private company collecting revenue, go and ask the budget office, am sure he will be able to answer you.”

All the explanations offered were not able to convince that respondent, so that was the end of that interview. Some of the revenue officials themselves who were interviewed repeatedly tried to avoid mentioning these private companies and were quick to say:

“I didn’t know about them, we were not informed before they began working, we were only informed after we went to the field and we were told that they (the private companies) have come for the revenues.”

One public official successfully named all the private waste collection companies, but when it came to the revenue collection companies he said blatantly that:

“I know there are some companies, just that I do not know their names.”

On the part of Assembly members interviewed, an Assembly member expressly remarked:

“Yes, I am aware of two companies collecting revenue for the TMA just that I can not mention their name.”

A senior public official at the Budgets and Rating department gave a classification of the revenue collection companies in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly, according to him there are three main types of revenue collection companies, and he puts it in this way:

“There are corporate bodies, commission collectors and Associations. There are two corporate bodies, these are A5 Consult and Skymont limited; there is one Association which is the Advertisement Association of Ghana and finally the commissioned collectors who are over hundred in number.”

The two (2) revenue collecting companies interviewed admitted having contractual relationship with the TMA for collecting revenue on behalf of the TMA, one of them pointed out that:

“Yes, we collect revenue at the car park and account daily to the revenue head at the Assembly, this is to facilitate their work as such we earn a commission of 30% on our collections.”

Another respondent from a revenue collection company in the collection of property rates for the TMA commented by saying:

“We take money on behalf of the TMA, precisely Property rates.”

These companies collect money on behalf of the Tema Metropolitan Assembly and earn commissions so the more they collect the more they earn. They ensure that they account daily to the Assembly or pay daily into designated bank accounts of the Assembly at agreed intervals, they use the TMA’s receipt book and they are paid their share of the revenue they generate monthly. In all the Tema Metropolitan Assembly has over hundred commission revenue collectors who are into the collection of rates, fees, licenses, tolls etc. however the Tema Metropolitan Assembly is also into public- private partnership with Skymont limited and A5 Consult for the collection of Business Operating Permits (BOP) and Property rates respectively. Cool Brothers limited is also into the collection of parking tolls in front of the Assembly premises. The advertisement Association of Ghana also collects advertisement income for the Assembly.

Reasons for Entering into Public Private Partnerships

Respondents came out with several reasons that propelled the Tema Metropolitan Assembly to enter into PPP in revenue mobilization. Among the reasons given for revenue collection Privatization are numerous. One respond gave his view as follows:

“Tema is a big place; the TMA can not do everything alone; the private sector is able to enforce work better and to ensure that its employees work hard as compared to the public sector; the private sector works with targets and is able to achieve those targets.”

The above opinion asserts the notion that the private sector performs jobs better than the public sector although that may not be the case. Also the size of the metropolis relative to

the number of revenue collectors is also an issue to contend with. Another informant, an assembly member was of the view that:

“The TMA lacks adequate personnel. The integrity of some revenue staff was in question; some of them do not bring in the required revenue.”

A respondent from one of the revenue collection companies put it quiet blatantly that:

“People do not know the value of what they do by themselves until someone takes them over, the TMA wanted to try and see what an outside party can bring on board.”

One senior bureaucrat on his part explained the reason and how the various public- private partnerships in revenue mobilization came about in the Tema metropolitan assembly:

“The commission collectors were brought in to replace our own collectors. This is because we realized that the cost of collection was becoming extremely expensive, For instance we had health concerns; the cost of collection was high, there is the need to pay their social security, some were attacked on the way, therefore a decision was taken to replace our permanent staff with commission collectors, that was around 2002.

For the corporate bodies (A5-consult and sky Mont), we realized that there was a need to improve the collection, this was because the commissioned collectors- most of them did not have the requisite qualification, they could not articulate themselves properly, weak communication making them incapable of marketing the assembly to the private sector, they had to interface with big companies, people who are lawyers. They were also untrainable, so we engaged the corporate bodies, A-5 consult and Skymont limited.

The Associations were brought in because of their professional background, to offer us consultancy in 2002, on technical support, Training and software development. They helped us with property revaluation and collection of advertisement levy in the metropolis. They are doing the billing and collection of advertisement levy.”

Other issues that came up had to do with employee motivation, it was argued that as compared to the public sector, the private sector is more profit oriented and as such they are motivated to work hard to ensure that they achieve their profit objective, high rewards serves as an incentive for them to achieve targets, especially since the more you collect the more your commission.

Others also claim that engaging the private sector was a way of encouraging private initiative and increasing employment in the metropolis, since the private sector will also in turn employ more people to ensure that actual delivery is achieved. Inadequate resource was also a prominent reason why the Assembly needed private assistance. They lack logistics such as vehicles, fuel, equipments etc. the issue of lack of funds or financial resources was given, lack of adequate and well trained staff.

The conventional Ghanaian attitude that seems to suggest that the public sector is “government work” and as such lateness to work, pilfering and stealing at the work place and the use of official time for private purposes which all result in low productivity may have contributed to the notion that the private sector enforces work better and as such a panacea to public sector challenges (Hall, Savas, etc.).

It was discovered from respondents that the private sector was able to bring in the needed logistics, resources, expertise, etc which in practice actually impacted on the implementation of public- private partnerships and resulted in increased revenue and service delivery in the Tema Metropolitan assembly.

Achieving Public-Private Partnerships Success in Revenue Collection

Implementation success in the context of policy implementation and public private partnerships has to do with concerted efforts to ensure that objectives are achieved. Some of the measures used by the TMA to ensure that PPPs’ in revenue mobilization became a success from the respondent’s point of view include.

Firstly, proper supervision, monitoring and evaluation on the part of the TMA greatly contributed to achieving policy success in the implantation of the public- private partnerships.

Public education is also important, it said that the TMA carried public education by holding community durbars, used the media and reached the people through town hall meetings.

The contract document itself was a measure to ensure that the private companies delivered. It had sections on sanctions and benefits; there were clauses that defaulters would have their contracts abrogated. The process of entering the contract was also a measure since the Assembly requested for the submission of detailed technical and financial proposals.

On measures put in place for successful achievement of the objective one bureaucrat stated that:

“To start with, there is always a dialogue, for revenue a target is given, even though we pay them on commission. Also a monitoring measure for performance monitoring and assessment, they are made to sign a contract so that the contract holds them as well as they have to meet certain bench-marks.”

One respondent was also of the view that:

“Proper supervision of the objectives, quarterly reports and the contract terms and conditions are some of the measure that the TMA put in place for the accomplishment of the objectives of the PPP in revenue mobilization.”

Again on the measures put in place regarding the collection of revenue for the Assembly one administrative staff from the TMA observed that:

“The agreement has been signed with each party having a specific duty to perform. For example you do not collect for us without our receipt books; they bank the money as established by the financial Administrative Act and pay into dedicated bank accounts. Also auditors go in to audit them.”

The information obtain reflects the obvious facts that the TMA has put in place certain measures to ensure that implementation success in revenue mobilization was achieved.

Clarity of Goals

Based on all the information obtained from the respondents they were asked to ascertain whether the TMA objectives were clear and easy to understand by the implementers and all the stakeholders involved. Interestingly sixteen of the respondents answered “Yes “ , one answered “no” and the remaining one answered “Yes” but at the same time expressed reservations.

Some of the quotes are as follows:

“Yes, the objective is clear, the issue is always with the Assembly and all the assembly members understand the issue at stake. The private companies going through the bidding process also understand.”

One of the revenue heads interviewed had the following to say:

“Yes but my expectation was that they would be given the difficult areas, so I don’t understand why they were brought in at all.”

The above statement shows dissatisfaction and disappointment concerning why the Private companies responsible for the collection of revenue were brought in by the Assembly. Unfortunately however some of the respondent expressed similar worries that instead of difficult to collect areas or “hard areas” the private companies have been given easier areas to collect. The companies they collect from are big companies that pay huge sums of money to the TMA and these companies are not difficult to collect from. This also attest to the fact that revenue heads were not well consulted or factored in the decision making process regarding the private revenue collection companies and that decision making was not participatory but strictly “Top-down” (Edwards, 1980; Meter and Horn, 1975) making TMA revenue collectors simple implementers.

5.2 Communication and Enforcement Activities

Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argue that for a policy to be successfully implemented, there is usually a large number of governmental organizations and individuals who must become involved in the implementation process. They also said that each participant has a distinctive perspective and “when perspectives differ so also is the measure of success”. This infers that to achieve success in any implementation involving diverse actors or stakeholders there is a need to ensure that there is effective “communication and enforcement activities” between the parties involved. In a similar vein Public- Private Partnerships in revenue mobilization involves several actors or stakeholders, most respondents were of the view that the major stakeholders in the implementation of PPP in revenue mobilization includes the following;

The TMA as the main actor acting through its lead departments and heads of departments: metropolitan and sub-metropolitan revenue heads; metropolitan finance officer (MFO); metropolitan budget officer (MBO); metropolitan chief executive (MCE); the coordinating director; the assembly members; the private sector revenue heads

Revenue heads, the Metropolitan Finance Officer (MFO), Metropolitan Budget Officer (MBO) Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) and the Co-ordinating Director sees to the implementation of the agreements, including the monitoring and supervision. When it comes to the daily monitoring and supervision of private revenue collectors, the heads of departments are to be in charge.

The communities report all their grievances to the TMA through their Assembly members and also ensure that they pay for fess or other levies to the collectors or the TMA the contractors or private service providers on the other hand are expected to deliver under the contract. On the field it was revealed that both formal and informal communication

channels were used in the implementation of PPP between the main actor and the stakeholders and their partners. The formal channels of communication include; letter writing or communiqués, memorandums, community durbars (when open forums affords residents the opportunity to put their grievances across), meetings at the instance of either party. The public relations and grievance committee in the Assembly also comes in when they receive complaints from the implementers and this committee is chaired by the presiding member (PM). The informal channel of communication includes; e-mail, Telephone, face-to-face conversations, some times the media is resorted to or the information services department use information van to disseminate information to the public. One respondent puts it this way:

“Revenue collectors ... are to collect the revenue that they have been assigned and to report to the TMA, however this is documented, it is a contract and the specific thing to do is stated in the contract.”

Communication and enforcement activities go hand in hand, it is important to note that without the enforcement of contract clauses and established protocols having to do with revenue collection laws and bye-laws, revenue mobilization would is likely to fail. Again for enforcement to be accomplished there must be the legality aspect of any business contract, it must be legal and at least enforceable in the law courts. In the PPP agreement between the TMA and the private companies the TMA has always found itself on the defaulting side than on the offensive, however as the main actor, grave actions have not been taken against it, it has equally not gathered enough courage to take any private company or individuals who default by transgressing the to court. Again the revenue companies, who are apt to misconduct themselves without recourse to the financial administration act, also escape the grips of the law.

When it comes to enforcement most of the private firms do not have serious grievances with the TMA except for the fact that the various law and acts governing revenue mobilization. In other jurisdiction the local government authorities have been taken to court for late payment of contract benefits due the private companies, however the TMA enjoys good relations with its partners. It was expressed during the interview by an informant that “the contract document spells out everything including the abrogation of contract” the same respondent said in case of non payment they can take the TMA to court as spelt out in the contract.

5.3 Resources

Another objective of the research was to inquire if there were adequate resources to ensure effective implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolis. In the view of Meter and Horn (1975) Policy resources may include funds or other incentives in the programme that can enhance effective implementation of public policies. To Grindle and Thomas (1991) resources also include political, the implementation effort. However under this study resources have been grouped into financial Resources, Human Resources and logistics and infrastructure.

I) Human Resources

Among the factors of production, namely, land, capital, labour and entrepreneur, the human factor that can be found in labour is the most essential because it is the human being that combines the other factors to ensure that productivity takes place. Consequently the importance of human resource in the PPP can not be under estimated.

An analysis of the field data showed that most respondents believed that there was adequate human resource with the appropriate skills to deliver the policy. Majority of

respondents believe that the private sector possess adequate human resources as compared to the TMA. Some of the views sampled are as follows:

“Yes; the TMA is well staffed” and on the part of the private companies “the tender board will consider their staff strength, SNNIT contribution for staff before awarding the contract.”

The private sector has been hailed by majority of respondents to have adequate human resources in addition to the above another respondent had this to say about the private sector:

“Yes; because as part of the evaluation process before a contract is won it is part of the bid document that the number of people or staff to the job would have to be evaluated, their human resource Personnel are also assessed to ensure that they have the men to do the job.”

The issue here is that, it is one thing having the personnel and another having the personnel with the required skills to do the work. Some of the people interviewed were not satisfied with the revenue collectors, some of them have a very low educational background, poor appearance, bad communication and reputation which inadvertently raises serious questions on how they were recruited, whether they have been given the needed training. Another issue is that it appears that although they are commissioned collectors they are poorly remunerated which has serious implications on corruption. Those who oppose privatization and public- private partnerships argue that it only makes a few people rich at the expense of their workers. It is a common practice among some revenue collectors who underwrite payments, who print fake receipts and re-issue receipts to rate and fee payers. One of the revenue heads who expressed dissatisfaction with the adequacy of skills of the private revenue collectors put it this way:

“Yes, but not the skills, their training is in serious question, how are they trained, how do they rate the people they collect from. Also their education is in question.”

The above information points to the fact that revenue heads were not adequately informed or that they may be opposed to the privatization of revenue by the TMA the TMA respondent from Budget and Rating department, explained that, the budget and rating does all the rating and not the private revenue collectors.

II) Financial Resources

Financial resources for implementation and sustainability of PPPs are crucial. Findings from the field shows that the financial resources needed for the implementation of the public- private partnerships were adequate. Opinions sampled from the respondents showed that the TMA is financially under resourced whiles most respondents believe that the private companies were adequately resourced.

This worrying drift could however be attributed to the fact that the common fund usually arrived late tying up most of the assembly activities including revenue collection. Other sources of funding such as the ceded revenue and the internally generated fund (IGF) according to Nkrumah (2000) do not amount to much as the lucrative tax fields all belong to the central government. Contrary to the views of Nkrumah (2000), the TMA is able to generate almost 50% of total revenue internally however these amounts are expended on recurrent expenditure of which waste and sanitation constitute substantial figures (Tema Metropolitan Shared Growth and Development Agenda 1 (2010-2013), 2010)

The central issue here is that at the sub-metro levels revenue heads complain of revenue lying in the fields and not being collected due to lack of vehicles and fuel as they claimed is being claimed by the transport officer. This has consequences for revenue collection and also raises the question of adequate remuneration and motivation of revenue collectors. In Tema west night tolls collection has stalled for along time due to unattractive commissions on night tolls.

Most of the respondents interviewed are of the view that the private companies have the needed resource by the cheer fact that they have been awarded contracts. Though that may not be necessary the case since bank loans and political patronage are contributing factors, they argue that both technical and financial proposal presented by the private companies is the basis of the award of the contract:

“Yes both the technical and financial proposals enable us to know whether they can do the mobilization of funds and whether they can pay their workers”.

Another respondent attests that:

“The tender board awards contracts to business with the requisite financial capability to do then work.”

In respect of the private revenue collectors companies, a senior official of the TMA explained how financial evaluation comes in to assess continuous capability.

“Yes, this is a service contract, so here we look at performance which is stated in the agreement. Each year you make sure they collect and if you are satisfied you give them the go ahead.”

The comment above reveals that contract renewal depends to a large extent on performance of the private companies. However none of the agreements in revenue mobilization have been abrogated over the periods for which these companies were involved in revenue collection for the TMAs.

III) Logistics and Infrastructure

Policies by themselves do not avail much unless combined with the right kinds of resources in the form of logistics and infrastructure they will not inure to any good result. Revenue mobilization cannot be undertaken without the use of appropriate and adequate logistics. Most of the respondents agree that logistics is available for the achievement of the contract in waste management and revenue mobilization. Most of the bureaucrats agree

that inadequate logistics and infrastructure were some reasons why the TMA decides to enter into such PPP agreement they claim the TMA does not have adequate but the private sector does. The TMA does not have all the vehicles for collecting the revenue. Revenue collectors need to be rightfully attired as well with the requisite logistics such as I.D cards, dresses or dressing allowance to facilitate revenue collection. If there is a default in any of these logistics then you can be sure that no matter the amount of funds available and the quality human's resources there will be no work done one revenue head remarked:

“Yes, for the logistics I know they have it.”

A senior administrator at the TMA also remarked

“Yes; they have their set up and logistics to enable them perform. Individual commission collectors are also bonded to ensure that they are of the right attitude.”

To conclude, resources was a very crucial aspect of the PPP agreement in waste collection and revenue mobilization and as such it was generally agreed by most of the respondent that resources are satisfactory though not 100%. They also assert that the TMA does not have enough logistics as compared to the private sector and as such that was a reason for the PPPs Moulton et al (2001) argue that a major impediment to the implementation of policy plans was inadequate resources.

5.4 Administrative Structures

Grindle (1980) considers the attitude of political leaders and administrative officials as contributing factors to the difficulty of implementation. She argues that third world leaders and bureaucrats view participation as delay to the policy process which draws back social and economic development. The findings show that there was not much bureaucracy in the implementation of the public private partnership in revenue mobilization. The eighteen

informants interviewed mentioned the following among other; Delays in payment of contracts by the Assembly; Interference with work by stakeholders like Assembly members and TMA staff, they think they can give instructions, ask questions and sometimes they want to stand in the way of revenue collectors by asking them to over look some rate or tax payers or asking for reduced rates including evasions and sometimes challenging the revenue collectors.

Also the law, for instance, it says you can not do sole sourcing for contractors you should advertise which takes a lot of time; the regional-co-ordinating council must sign some parts of the contracts; this can lead to documents getting lost. Majority of the respondents answered in the affirmative that they had the fullest support and cooperation from the administrative staff and implementation monitoring and evaluation staff of the assembly. However from one private sector respondent's point of view, most of the TMA's work force and administrative officers were not supportive, he describes it in the following way:

"Yes and no; I believe it is about only 30% of the officials that are supportive, the rest are not helping at all."

Again majority of respondent agreed that the Assembly members themselves and the general public lend their support and co-operation to the implementation of the contract:

"Yes, the assembly members have been supportive, if the contractors are not performing, they inform the TMA to change them."

Some of the respondents were also of the view that there was political interference at the contract award stage one official puts it this way:

"Political interference – they don't give us the free hand to do what is expected to be done; they rather give their own preferences."

Though the study did not focus on political interference, it appears to have filtered through finding on the implementation effectiveness of the administrative structure. The political

structure of the district Assembly might be responsible for this kind of political interference with administration structures and laid down procedures. The TMA is headed by the Chief Executive officer who is the political head of the metropolis and represents the president in the metropolis as such the politics of patronage, gift giving and returning of favors is very likely to penetrate through the administrative structures of the TMA due to the partisan nature of the occupancy of the position of Chief Executive and the power it wields.

5.5 Challenges to the Implementation of Public-Private Partnerships

Challenges to Implementation from the TMAs Point of View

From the information gathered from the field respondents were able to identify some of the challenges that the TMA faces in the implementation of the public-private partnerships in waste and revenue collection. From the point of the TMA respondents identified some of the following challenges. First from the waste management perspective there is Haphazard developments such as poor house numbering, poor layout and unauthorized structures in some of the peri-urban parts of the Assembly such as Tema New town and Adjei-Kojo hampers easy identification and free movements of waste collection vehicles to collect refuse from the households. Another challenge is the issue of poor public education which makes it difficult for fee collection. Again some people become hostile towards revenue collectors. Also unwillingness by some households to register with new contractors constitutes a serious challenge. High charges by some contractors exceeding the ability of the people to afford are also some challenges that have been identified. Supervision and monitoring challenges, lack of motivation and lack of fuel on the part of the assembly is a serious constraint.

In the field of revenue collection they identified some of these challenges lack of appropriate technology for monitoring revenue collected by the private revenue collectors. Lack of information base and valuation systems for real estates and property taxation in the metropolis is also another challenge. Inadequate electronic data on tax payers, the TMA needs to up-date its data. This is expensive to do though it will improve or increase revenue. Also end of term reconciliation for bill preparation is a challenge. It needs to be done on time so that bills can be distributed as early as possible. Political interference from politicians, unclear demarcation of revenue boundary, lack of transparency between the revenue heads and the metropolitan finance officer (MO) and budget officers (MBO), inadequate Resources (financial, personal, logistics, and infrastructure), poor advertisement in the event of changes in the rates at the commencement of the year- they should be able to inform the public, supervision and monitoring challenges and lack of motivation and fuel for revenue activities.

Challenges to implementation from the Private Sectors Point of View

From the waste management point of view they include; irregular payment of sanitation fees by the resident or households, lack of dumping sites in some areas resulting in complaints from residents, Low fee fixing by the Assembly- high income areas generates less refuse as compared to low income areas. Late release of funds by the Assembly affects private contractors they are unable to meet their financial obligation, resources challenges- equipment replacement, if funds delay they find it difficult to replace equipments that breakdowns which leads to inefficiencies by the contractors.

On the aspect of revenue mobilization, the provision of logistics for revenue collection staff such as I.D cards and uniforms. Some waste collectors under estimate the scope of work until they get the contract then they become overwhelmed by it, some of them over

state their capacity until they arrive on the field, also difficulties in registering the households due to poor house numbering and the sitting of unauthorized structures, bad work relations by some staff of the TMA and stakeholders such as assembly members.

5.6 Conclusion

The chapter presented the findings and discussion on revenue mobilization in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly as well as findings on the numerous challenges the Assembly faces and those confronting waste collection and revenue mobilization companies in the metropolis. From the ensuing discussions and analysis there emerged predominant implications and conclusions in understanding the kinds of implementation challenges that characterized the implementation of PPP in the Tema Metropolis.

CHAPTER SIX

COMPARISON OF WASTE MANAGEMENT AND REVENUE MOBILIZATION

6.0 Introduction

This chapter compares the implementation performance in waste collection and revenue mobilization in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. In other words it discusses the similarities and differences. As already mentioned in the study, the implementation performance of public-private partnership may be influenced by any of the four main factors discussed. The aim here is to discuss the findings along the key similarities and variations in the study.

6.1 Similarities in the Implementation Performance

There are several similarities between waste collection and revenue mobilization. The first is that both are the responsibility of the TMA. It is the role of the TMA to ensure that waste collection in the metropolis is regular and that the metropolitan area does not languish in filth and dirt that could further affect health and livelihoods of the people living in the TMAs jurisdiction. It is equally the responsibility of the TMA to ensure that enough revenue is generated internally to augment central government provision and to be able to meet its basic responsibility of providing essential goods and services to its constituents.

There are very similar and good objectives or reasons for entering into PPPs in both waste collection and revenue mobilization some of these are; improvement in the quality of service provision; infusion of private capital and technology, reduction in the size of local government work force, hence profitability, Economic growth and increased and wider employment possibilities, financial benefits; reduction in capital outlay by local

government and better utilization and allocation of public fund, sharing risk with the private sector among others.

Both policies lacked a certain degree of clarity. In the case of waste collection the private waste collection companies are yet to register various households and provide them with dust bins even though the contract document stipulates that they are to be provided by the private waste contractors. Again some private waste collection companies have made the attempt of increasing their waste collection fees in the communities without any consultation with the TMA. The TMA was also supposed to implement its own sanitation and environmental bye-laws under the contract but it has not been able to arrest anyone in this direction.

Similarly, lack of clarity in revenue collection has contributed to revenue heads lack of support for the implementation process they argue that instead of “difficult to collect areas” or “hard areas”, the private companies have been given easier areas to collect both property rate and business operating permit. The companies they collect from are big companies that pay huge sums of money to the TMA and these companies are not difficult to collect from. This also attest to the fact that revenue heads were not well consulted or factored in the decision making process regarding the private revenue collectors as such lack of participation in the implementation process.

Another similarity has to do with the mode of communication and enforcement in the implementation process. The TMA employs similar formal communication strategies to both waste management and revenue mobilization. However it also explores some form of informal communication in addressing some of the challenges faced in the implementation process, such as face to face communication. The modes of enforcement are also similar and are detailed in the contract and other statutory legislations and bye-laws between the

parties in both revenue and waste collection. The problem however has to do with enforcing these laws both parties have renege on their powers or rights to seek legal redress as well as other punitive act like fines in the contract.

Another area where one can find similarity is in the challenges faced in resource mobilization and allocation for waste management and revenue mobilization. The DACF and the IGF are undoubtedly the same sources of revenue for both waste and revenue collection. The late release of the DACF constitutes a major challenge for most Metropolitan Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDA). Revenue mobilization activities and projects including monitoring and supervision become halted especially in the first and second quarter of the year. The provision of logistics and fueling of vehicles including the field allowance of staff become stifled and ends up affecting the day to day activities of staff of the assembly. Similarly the TMA undue delayance in paying the private waste contractors and revenue mobilization companies

Administratively the Tema Metropolitan Assembly has two sub-metros who are to facilitate the work of the Assembly by bringing government closer to the people. It is regrettable however that the sub-metro structure is not strengthened and does not possess all the decentralized departments. Waste management department is not represented at both the Tema West and Tema East sub-metro offices. Although there are sub-metro revenue heads and officers at both sub-metros they have been allocated the collection of unproductive and “hard or difficult to collect areas” such as market tolls, parking tolls, fees and fines, BOPs, from residents and businesses in the metropolis. They also face the challenge of lack of vehicle and fuel to pursue rigorous revenue collection and mobilization.

6.2 Variations in the Implementation Performance

The level of openness, transparency, and participation between revenue mobilization and waste collection greatly differ in the implementation performance of the PPP in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly. Having standards and objective that are clear and easy to understand is as important as having the people to implement the policy able, willing and ready to participate in the accomplishment of such objectives right from the inception, conception to the delivery of the policy. Where as in waste collection all actors were part of the implementation from the inception to the delivery as well as participated at all levels of the implementation the opposite is the case for revenue mobilization. In waste management for instance, unsatisfied Assembly member through the development and services committees may request the waste management department to sermon all the waste collection companies to a round table meeting in order to discuss challenges of their constituencies and find ways of solving them. This is an ample demonstration in the level of transparency and openness in waste collection.

In revenue mobilization it is the reverse, it is only some few people who have information and are involved in the implementation. It is very sad that revenue heads from the metropolis to the sub-metros lament over not knowing the private revenue collectors, why they were brought in and the areas they operate and why they have been given the easy areas to collect. Most of the sub-metro revenue collectors claim they do not know the collection mandate of the private collectors. They only move to the field and are told that their people have already come to collect the revenue this is likely to affect employee morale as well as taxpayer confidence.

Similarly there are variations in the role played by actors and stakeholders in the implementation of waste collection and revenue mobilization. There are several actors

with more direct involvement in waste collection than in revenue mobilization and also actively involved in the day to day implementation of PPP. In waste management aside the administrative support from the TMA and the General Assembly, the Assembly members are involved in the day to day monitoring and evaluation at the grass root levels, also the citizens are also involved in the day to day monitoring in the performance of the waste collection companies and may report any form of neglect to their assembly member who is capable of making enquiries and also further reporting the issue to the waste management department of the TMA. However in revenue mobilization the Assembly members are only involved at the initial stages where the matter is referred to them, the indigenous people are not part of the agreement and are only expected to pay their taxes. The revenue heads at the sub-metros are cut off while the revenue head at the Assembly is only into issuing receipts and collecting returns from the private revenue collectors. The metropolitan finance and budget officers are the instruments here since they are the formulators and decision makers in this line. It is important to note that monitoring is done by both the revenue staff and the budget and rating staff, however evaluation is handled by the budget and rating department of the assembly.

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter tried to compare some similarities and variations or differences between the two focal areas of waste collection and revenue mobilization. It found that there are more similarities than variations in the implementation of PPP in both waste collection and revenue mobilization. That is waste collection and revenue mobilization has similar objectives and goals, both policies lacked some degree of clarity, communication strategies were similar, lack of enforcement characterized both policies, they both faced

challenges with resource mobilization, the sub-metro structure played a little role in the implementation of PPP.

The differences between the two factors mainly emanated from transparency, openness, and participation which is in variance between waste collection and revenue mobilization. Also there is a lot of actors involved in monitoring for waste collection than revenue mobilization.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.0 Introduction

The chapter presents a summary of the findings of the study and makes recommendations base on the findings. It also presents the conclusion of the research. The chapter is divided into three main parts the first part presents a summary of the main findings of the study under the main themes. Another part is on the various recommendations that have been made and the conclusions of the research.

7.1 Summary

This section presents a summary of the main findings in the study under the various themes already being used.

I) Policy Standards and Objective

The study was originally guided by five research questions. The first was “What factors led the Tema Metropolitan Assembly to the adoption of PPP?” Public-private partnerships in the Tema metropolitan assembly had the following broad objectives; improvement in the quality of service; infusion of private capital and technology, reduction in the size of local government work force, hence profitability, Economic growth and increased and wider employment possibilities, financial benefits; reduction in capital outlay by local government and better utilization and allocation of public fund, sharing risk with the private sector. According to Meter and Horn (1975), the prospects of effective implementation will be enhanced by clarity with which standards and objectives are stated and by the accuracy with which they are communicated.

Waste Collection

Although the findings reveals that the TMA's objectives for entering into PPPs in waste collection was clearly understood by all the stakeholders, however the findings reveals that at a certain point in the implementation stage some of the contractors resorted to their own fees without any form of consultation with the TMA or the Assembly members, even thought it was later redressed by the Assembly it raises questions as to whether the contractors fully understood the policy objective before the contract commenced and the various avenues to resolving conflict and fee-fixing within the agreement.

Also the issue of "cross subsidization" or "subsidizing the poor" was not better understood prior to the inception of the franchise. Contractors realize that high income residential areas generate fewer refuse but willingly pay their bills as compared to areas that have low income earners who however generate more refuse but find it very difficult to pay. In subsidizing the poor the intention is to charge the high income residential areas more to cover some part of the cost of collecting in low income areas. The issue is yet to be resolved although defaulters are increasing in low income areas which can be due to poor house numbering and haphazard developments.

Registration of households has also come up even though under the franchise the contractors are to do their own registration and collection of revenue only a few of them have been able to do that and some of them want the TMA to come in to assist them.

Also another issue has to do with the controversy surrounding the education of the public or households about their new contractors as a result of the re-zoning of the metropolis which was necessitated by the franchise agreement. Responsibility is still being tossed about because the TMA expects the Assembly members to do the education, the assembly members claim they have done the education whiles the private contractor are still having

challenges that has to do with households being acquainted to their previous contractors, for instance areas that had Zoomlion previously still find it difficult recognizing the new contractors. Whiles it is quite logical to think that the natural sequence should be that the contractor educates the households, registers them, collect refuse and also collect the revenue at the end of the month.

It can be inferred that policy implementation also rest on the outcomes of previous policies as noted by Grindle (2008) and that the policy process is an ongoing process that may depend on the challenges and opportunities that come up in the process of implementation.

Revenue Collection

The findings reveals that the TMA's objectives for entering into PPPs in revenue collection was clearly understood by all the stakeholders, however there appears to be some conflict of interest and lack of transparency having to do with revenue mobilization by the staffs of the TMA. Some public officials, assembly members and even some revenue heads claim not to understand why some part of business operating permits (BOP) and Property rate that is considered as "easy to collect areas" or "soft areas" have been given to the private revenue collectors. They think that the "juicy" part of the collection has been given to private revenue companies to collect from big companies and well organized residential areas that pay huge sums of money to the Assembly. These companies are easy to identify, willing to pay and easy to collect from and the amounts of money they pay are huge as such huge commissions arise from their taxes.

Another finding is that some of the revenue heads claim they do not know these private revenue collectors they equally do not see why they were engaged by the assembly instead of recruiting new revenue collection staff. These accessions go to show that there was not

enough inclusion and understanding at the policy formulation stage which is likely to affect participation and certainly the implementation of the contract.

II) Communication and Enforcement Activities

The second research question was “To what extent does communication and enforcement activities between the main actor and other stakeholders affect the implementation of PPP?” and the main findings in relation to this question are.

Waste Collection

Even though the findings showed that the TMA and the other stakeholders used several forms of communication which were mainly through; letter writing, the media, face to face communication, durbars etc. the findings also revealed that lack of effective communication is likely to affect the contract in diverse ways, since the contract involves several stakeholders such as the waste management department who monitors and supervises the day to day activities of contractors but have little power when it comes to fixing of rates, the budget and rating officer, who determines the rate, the assembly members, the General Assembly aside the chief executive and the co-ordinating directors who all play vital roles in the implementation of PPP in waste collection. There is likely to be delays in feedback information and that is likely to affect grievances and complaint or challenges resolution. Another challenges has to do with the existence of several stakeholders in the implementation process, this makes some officials of the TMA and especially the Assembly members to want to take decisions without recourse to the due process and as pressman and Wildavsky (1984) noted when a policy depends on several actors and participants there are numerous possibilities for disagreement and delay.

As mentioned earlier, some areas do not know their collectors there has not been any form of education either by the TMA or the private companies, most households have not been registered either by the TMA or the private companies resulting in difficulty in collecting fees from them.

Education has not been well done to ensure that the households understand that they are to be registered and is supposed to pay for refuse disposal and that it is the responsibility of the contractor to provide the dustbins to each household.

As a result of these communication gaps enforcement of the sanitation and environmental bye-laws have been affected to the extent that defaulters get away with their offences without being drag to any sanitation court as such the implication of communication failure on enforcement.

“Toothless Bulldog”

Lack of enforcement by the TMA is greatly affecting the implementation of PPP in the metropolis, the TMA as the main actor has monitoring and supervisory authority over the contractors. The private companies sometimes get away with their late collections, increasing fees without consultation or feedback from the TMA, not providing dustbins to households etc. the households also decide to default, people intentionally litter and create all sorts of filth in the communities and all that the Assembly does is to look on without prosecuting any one, not putting in place a task force to see to the enforcement of the sanitation and environmental bye- laws. As per the findings, the TMA usually sends warning letters, calls for meetings and still look on whiles such misconducts continue without taking any punitive action against either party. The lack of enforcement by the TMA may be due to the fact that since the inception of the contract it has always defaulted in paying the private companies and as such it lacks the moral authority to take action.

Also it may be wary of political witch hunt. The private waste collection companies also are unable to take the TMA to court for default in the contract terms because as the main actor the TMA wields more power. The result is that without effective communication and enforcement of public- private partnership terms and agreements implementation is likely to be greatly affected.

Revenue Collection

The study findings revealed that there were effective communication and enforcement activities between the TMA and the private revenue collectors. This can be justified against the fact that there is daily interaction and interface between the revenue collectors for the private collectors and the TMA revenue officers who are in charge of receiving daily accounts from property rate collectors and business operation permits collectors who pay into dedicated bank accounts or pay to the TMA. They are also able to express concerns and grievances through formal and informal means of communication.

The TMA also supervises and monitors activities of revenue collectors by issuing them with stamped receipt books which have special security serial numbers, individual commission revenue collectors are also bonded to be of good behavior, in addition commission collectors present two guarantors to stand surety for them. All the above checks and balances are in line with the financial administration act, 2003, act 654 and other regulations that ensure that there are few incidents of malpractices. However the challenges faced here has to do with internal communication challenges and boundary problems that has serious ramifications on internally generated funds (IGFS)

There are internal communication challenges between the revenue heads and the administrative officers of the TMA. The revenue heads and some of the assembly heads who are part of the implementation process claim they do not understand why the revenue

collection companies were brought on board and why they have been given the lucrative aspect of the collection that are easy to collect instead of the hard areas that they are having difficulties with collection. This goes to show that there was not enough participation and internal communication between the TMA staffs prior to the commencement of the contract.

The findings also reveal uncoordinated revenue collection resulting in crashes on the field of collection between the private revenue collectors and the TMAs revenue collectors, especially at the sub-metro level. This is as a result of lack of information on areas that have been assigned to the private collectors, they get there only to be told that the private company have already been there to collect.

Another issue affecting the revenue mobilization effort of the Assembly is the activities of revenue staffs from Ledzekuku and Ashaiman Municipal Assemblies who collect within the TMAs jurisdiction. Findings revealed that the TMA is usually late in presenting its invoice at the beginning of the year whiles the other Assemblies present their invoices early so the residents and households end up paying to them because they present far less charges than the TMA.

III) Resources

The third research question was “What is the role of resources in the implementation of PPP in the Tema metropolitan Assembly?” In the implementation of PPPs in the Tema Metropolis it was realized that whiles resources availability enhance implementation success its inadequacy also hindered the achievement of PPPs in waste collection and revenue mobilization. The following findings were made in respect of waste collection and revenue collection.

Waste Collection

Although it came to light that during the bid assessment process prior to the award of contract there was an evaluation process that took cognizance of Technical and Financial proposals of the private companies which entailed an assessment of resources; adequacy of human resources, financial capability and the possession of adequate equipment and logistics. The actual findings revealed that the private companies are well placed in terms of resources than the TMA however in terms of financial, human, infrastructure and logistical resources for the accomplishment of the objective in waste management the resources do not match up to the requirements as such inadequate resources.

i) Human Resources

It was found out that the private companies have adequate human resources with the appropriate skills to deliver on time and that the TMA does not have adequate resources. The waste contractors have the right scheduling and time tables with which they deployed their workers. Challenges only exist when there are breakdowns.

The TMA plays a backup role when the private waste collectors have breakdowns or pull off their services unexpectedly. The TMA also collects for other public offices such as schools, hospitals, and the Assembly. This requires that they have adequate human back up to rise and do the work. It was revealed that the TMA lacks adequate human resource to do the work when ever they are confronted with such challenges. This may be due to redundancy, lay offs, and poor remuneration and motivation among others. It was revealed that zoom lion was more capable of all the private companies in waste collection.

ii) Financial Resources

It is the major challenge that they face though they borrow sometimes. It was revealed that prior to the Franchise the TMA spend a substantial amount of its revenue on waste collection alone, but with the Franchise, the amount spent of waste has reduced drastically. Since the various private companies have to find ways of collecting their revenues in the form of fees from the house holds and instead pay 6% to the TMA as franchise fees the TMA is merely a regulator and is interested in allowing a level playing field among all parties.

Even though the findings reveal that the private waste collection companies have adequate financial resources because they themselves attest likewise. On the flip side it appeared that they have low financial resources their workers were poorly paid not well motivated they maintained old vehicles, they are not able to provide dustbins for the household as prescribed by the contract documents. Some of them are not able to deploy their staff to do registration of households and to even collect their own revenues from them. Zoomlion Ghana limited is an exception to the description above they have zonal offices in the Assembly and the various sub-metros. Teriwhite also has an office in the metropolis but the other companies do not have offices in Tema.

It was revealed that the rate of indebtedness by the TMA is on the verge of bettering than previously when it operated solely on contract basis due to the fact that the TMA owned most of the waste collection companies which in effect rendered them incapacitated in terms collecting their own revenues, providing dustbins and paying employees well among others.

Lack of financial resources by the Assembly adversely affects the waste management department in that they are confronted with the challenge of lack of fuel, broken down

equipment which in turn affects monitoring and supervision. They equally have challenges that have to do with low motivation and inadequate logistics leading to low employee morale.

iii) Logistics and Infrastructure

When it comes to waste collection logistics and infrastructure are very crucial to ensure that work is actually accomplished. It was observed from the findings that the TMA and the waste collection companies have some logistics and infrastructure, however it was woefully inadequate.

With infrastructure the TMA, Zoomlion Ghana Limited and Teriwhite have identifiable offices from where they operate in the Tema metropolis, however the others such as Asibod, J Stanley Owusu and Amanie Farms do not have any office location in the Assembly.

With respect to equipment such as vehicles, skip containers, tools like rakes, shovels, wheelbarrows, safety and protective clothes the TMA as well as the contractors have been found to be lacking including fuel for vehicles which affects monitoring and supervision.

Revenue Collection

In general terms the findings revealed that the private revenue collectors have the needed resources to deliver service in revenue mobilization for the TMA. However the human, financial, logistics and infrastructure resources need to be generally improved to ensure effective revenue collection for the Assembly.

i) Human Resources

The findings revealed that there is insufficient human resources for revenue mobilization in the metropolis; over a hundred commissioned revenue collectors, several revenue

collectors working for private companies in the collection of property rate and business operating permit (BOP); Associations collecting advertisement levies and toll collection companies collecting revenue for the TMA. Yet revenue coverage is still low in the metropolis since most people are still not paying their rates, fees, property rates e.t.c to the Assembly.

The argument that has been made is that there is inadequate human resource for the collection of revenue for the Assembly however the focus rather needs to be placed on introducing efficiency and effectiveness in revenue collection by combining technology and the available personnel. This can be achieved by innovation in job scheduling and introduction of technology to eliminate pilfering and fraud in revenue collection thus seal of any loop hole in revenue mobilization.

Also effective monitoring and supervision is lacking on the part of the TMA due to lack of motivation, investment in equipment, fueling vehicles, technology and data on tax payers

Another finding has to do with poor work attitude and human relations, bad work ethics and low educational background of some revenue collectors including poor communication skills.

ii) Financial Resources

There are still challenges with paying revenue collectors on time, where as the TMA delays in paying the commissions due these companies, the revenue collectors are also a problem on their own. Some of them indulge in all sorts of financial malfeasance such as understating the amount collected to name but a few even though finance was seen as one of the challenges private revenue collectors face it was agreed that they have the financial resources to work successful they even borrow to meet all operations cost and they are seen to be above the challenge.

In effect the findings showed that they were adequately resourced financially. The TMA has limited possibilities of external borrowing because of strict government regulations and the perception of poor credit rating by lending institution.

iii) Logistics and Infrastructure

In terms of logistics and infrastructure it was also revealed that the private revenue collectors did not lack logistics since they collected with the TMAs receipt book. They provided their own transportation, uniform or attire in the discharge of their duties. Some challenges relating to the private revenue collectors have to do with their educational background which is arguably low. Some of them are shabbily dressed and proceeded to collect without I.D cards.

The findings from the field revealed that monitoring and supervision by the Assembly could be intensified by the use of information technology (I.T.), mobile technology such as mobile phones can also be employed to make monitoring easier also the lack of fuel, vehicles and other logistics has adverse effects on supervision which are usually done on the field of collection. Monitoring and supervision can enable the assemblies to increase revenue and to cut down on corrupt practices by some revenue collectors.

Aside the commission revenue collectors the various revenue collection companies do not have their main offices within the Tema metropolis their representatives uses the assembly premises as office.

IV) Administrative Structures

The fourth research question that the study sought to answer was “To what extent did administrative structures affect the implementation of PPP in the Tema metropolitan Assembly?” Bureaucratic structure of the implementing agency affected the public private

partnership agreements in waste collection and revenue mobilization. The research found that bureaucratic structures did affect the smooth implementation of PPPs in the Tema Metropolis.

Waste Collection

The findings revealed that the following bureaucratic structures affected the implementation of PPPs in waste collection. First of all there was a long delay in the award of the franchise which took almost two (2) years to complete the contract negotiation and award processes. This may be attributed to the fact that financial oversight and control is primarily with the central government and the ministries of local government and rural developments (MLGRD). Also there was undue delay in paying contractors. Also inability to implement the sanitation bye- laws is a clear case of bureaucracy and the dictates of bureaucratic structures. Again according to the findings there were unclear demarcation of revenue boundary and lack of internal communication channels are all bureaucratic bottlenecks.

There was political patronage in the process of awarding contracts. Patronage was used in the selection process although some of the contractors did not meet the award criteria they were allowed to participate, this assertion has been duly admitted to by some of the respondents

Revenue Mobilization

Similar to waste management, there are undue delays in paying revenue collectors what is due them in terms of commissions for the work that they have done. This eventually affects their business including motivating their employees to be able to deliver. There was also unclear demarcation of revenue boundary and internal communication challenge

that could not be resolved by the TMA a matter that is still pending determination by the Regional Coordination Council (RCC).

There is political patronage in awarding revenue mobilization contracts as some of the companies have been alleged by respondents to belong to political party faithful, they collect revenue and are given a huge percentage back as commission as a result of their boot licking activities towards the government of the day. The unfortunate outcome is that most of these companies are thrown out when there is a change in government.

Prospects of PPPs in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly

The final question the study attempted to answer was “What are the prospects of PPP’s in the Tema Metropolitan Assembly?” Most respondents were optimistic about the prospects of Public- Private Partnerships in local governance. The study found that PPP has a great future in the TMA in particular and local government in general. It was agreed that PPPs have the highest tendency to improving performance and efficiency, introducing capital and technology etc. into public administration. A summary of the areas agreed upon for the implementation of PPP in local government includes the following.

Firstly, PPPs should be introduced into the construction and provision of infrastructure such as schools, roads, hospitals, lorry parks, markets, office complex, conference centres, children play ground, container village, toilet facilities, waste recycle plant. Again other areas are Service Contacts such as; printing and photo copy service, security or task force sublet to private companies, transportation for workers can also be given to private companies to handle.

Other innovative ideas include the introduction of container markets or villages like the Odorna Market at Circle this will help decongest the cities off the haphazard and

indiscriminate location of containers. Again another innovative suggestion has to do with the introduction of private securities to take over the Task force or Securities of the various Assemblies. The assemblies are facing serious security challenges with their task force especially in the area of illegal sitting of containers and permit granting, some of these security men have made themselves into middle men endorsing and facilitating all sorts of illegalities in the various assemblies and an attempt to privatize them will relieve the assembly of such challenges.

Introducing PPPs into the provision of transport services to local government workers can go a long way to address the problem of lateness to work and early departure from the work place. Lateness to work and early departure from the work place is a contributing factor to low productivity in the public service and needs not only supervision and leadership to resolve but also mechanism like public-private partnership in the provision of transport services. PPPs are generally good when well planned and implemented.

7.2 Recommendations

In spite of the much romanticized idea of public- private partnerships, it still remains a policy mantra among developing countries in general and Ghana in particular. The implementation of public private partnerships in local governance and for that matter the public sector is not without challenges and opposition, usually emanating from employee associations, NGOs and vigilante groups, however there is the need to put in place the right policy frame work and capacity- building mechanisms to ensure that PPPs yield the desired outcomes of stakeholders in delivering the much expected goods and services. The following recommendations based on the research findings have been suggested.

Government should organize capacity- building workshops aimed at developing the conceptualization, planning, awarding and implementation of public-private partnerships among local government staffs and senior public officials. This will help in the identification of private interventions in terms of the provision of capital for the accomplishment of income generating projects that are self sustaining and rewarding.

Since the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development continuous to have an over sight responsibility over all District Assemblies they should ensure that PPPs in which ever form have the right legal frame work to ensure continuity even when there is change of government so that it does not suffer a similar faith as the City and Country Waste limited (CCWL) suffered in the year 2000 under the New Patriotic Party (NPP) when its contract with the previous administration was abrogated (Awortwi, 2004).

The district assemblies should also in turn maintain a level playing field acting as referees and regulators. That is they should show impartiality in the award of contracts and eschew all forms of corrupt practices, favoritism, partisanship and ineptitude in their dealing with the private sector. Again when there is the need the Assemblies should build their own capacities and that of the private sector contractors in tendering process and how to ensure that there is always value for money whiles at the same time not losing sight of the communities they hope to serve.

Although the majority of respondents maintained that the partnership has attained improved sanitation objectives the issues of poor sanitation habits, lack of proper monitoring and supervision for service quality, lack of capacity to enforce the assembly's sanitation bye-laws should be issues of serious concern to the Tema Metropolitan Assembly.

The assembly must endeavor to educate the general public and the house holds through sensitization programmes that are geared towards behavioral change and that elicits responsible conducts through the use of the media, information service van, and assembly members should intensify the use of community durbars to address issues of non payment, contractors, and offer explanations to the communities' problems. In a similar vain the assembly should encourage consultation, openness and participation by utilizing the local government structures including the unit committees system that are located at the grassroots of the community.

Additionally education must also be hygiene centered and there should be the formation of sanitation clubs in school like the Zoom kids in schools by Zoomlion limited.

The assemblies must also improve their resource base in order to serve as an effective back up and to be able to meet its financial obligations towards the private companies. They should make efforts to discover and improve upon their sources of revenue (IGF) and institute effective collection mechanisms to collect. Central government should ensure a speedy release of the district assemblies' common fund (DACF) to facilitate the implementation of Public- private partnerships.

The Assemblies must also invest more into resources and logistics such as equipment like compact collectors, protective clothes, refuse containers, vehicles for monitoring and the provision of fuel in a timely manner to facilitate work.

TMA should position itself to be credible in order to win the trust of private sector, it should pay for services rendered on it behalf otherwise the private sector will not be interested in conducting business with it. TMA should ensure that the house holds pay their fees regularly and promptly, they should maintain constant communication with the contractors and the house holds and enforce the sanitation and environmental bye-laws by

putting in place the sanitation Court to try people who break the bye-laws. Enforce Perform to contract terms, such as providing free dust bins to the households currently only zoom lion has been able to provide free dustbins to the households.

In both revenue and waste collection the TMA should employ and deploy the right people with the right educational backgrounds at the right places to do the work. Revenue collectors should also be well dressed and of good attitudes and a professional outlook which calls for better working conditions and incentives to serve as motivation to them.

As much as possible TMA should assist in registering the house holds. They should involve the private companies in fee fixing and allow cross –subsidization a situation where high income earners or areas pay more and low income earners pay less this will ensure affordability and accessibility to the poor.

On the part of the private revenue and waste collectors they should ensure effective service provision and be regular in collecting waste and revenue from the households and businesses. There should also build their capacities and ensure constant communication between the collectors, the households and the assembly.

Last but not least the Assemblies should invest more into technology and equipment, simple gadgets that can monitor and safeguard revenue for the Assembly. They should be able to undertake periodic update of their data base on tax payers and on properties and assets within their jurisdiction. They should also seek and employ experts who are capable of offering technical advice.

The study is of immense importance and has serious implications for theory, knowledge and future research. The significance of the study can be found in its contributions to future research, to theory and to knowledge.

Contribution to future research

The study focused on a single case study of the Tema Metropolitan Assembly which is a developed metropolis located in Accra as such when the study is replicated in other areas it is likely to produce a different outcome, especially rural communities. Future research can focus on a comparison of two or more metropolitan areas, or two or more districts to find out if there will be similar outcomes. It is also proposed that a comparative study of an urban and rural district be made to find out whether the same factors facilitated or impeded the implementation of Public-private partnership in waste collection or revenue mobilization

This study was focused on the policy implementation stage, however future research could be focus on other aspects of the policy cycle such as policy formulation, monitoring or evaluation in order to determine the actors and how they acted in the process.

Contribution to Theory

The study has much significance to theory in that it reviews several theories and models in implementation including the works of Meter and Horn (1975), Mazmania and Sabatier (1981), Pressman and Wildavsky (1984). It also presents a framework that explains implementation performance of PPP and also discusses the factors that enhance or impede the implementation of PPP and which can be applied in other studies.

Contribution to Knowledge

The study demonstrates several implications to knowledge in that it provides a good explanation of public-private partnership and how it can be harnessed by local government institutions. It also reviewed studies on public policy implementation and discussed

several implementation models which contribute modestly to knowledge. The study also offers an endless list of recommendation that policy makers, academics and students can learn from. The experience of the Tema Metropolis and importantly vary the lessons to their own situations

7.3 Conclusion

This study presents a balanced view of implementation of PPPs in local governance with specific emphasis on revenue mobilizations and waste collection and in addition it present the achievements made in local government service delivery which to a great extent is believed to have improved. Although the partnership has been successful so far it could have been better if the implementation challenges in the form of unclear objectives; weak communication and enforcement activities; inadequate resources and administrative bottlenecks were minimized.

Local government institutions are bureaucratic creatures just like the Weberian construct and are not profit oriented, the purpose of their existence is to render useful or essential services to the public whom they exists to serve. In other words local government institutions are under the direct supervision of central government and as such can not take independent decisions, they must rather rely on central governments laws and orders this may result in undue delayance in policy implementation at the grass root level.

The implementation of PPPs in the Tema metropolis has faced some of these challenges due to the fact that decentralization has not fully gained grounds. In Ghana although there have been significant strides in local government service delivery, much more needs to be done to harness external resources which calls for private sector involvement in service and infrastructure delivery.

Again despite the challenges enumerated above most of the respondents agreed that the implementation of PPPs in both revenue and waste collection was not a failure they recognized that a lot of progress has been made in both directions. In waste management it is agreed across board that the level of filth in the metropolis has actually reduced, dustbins has been provided to some households; collection is more regular than before although not a hundred percent of progress has been achieved it is assumed that the franchise and the zoning of the metropolis has contributed to this significant progress.

In the aspect of revenue mobilization, the TMA have increased its revenue in subsequent years after the introduction of private revenue collectors to the extent that the IGF has increased to almost 50 percent annually since 2006 (see appendix for revenue pattern and TMA GSGDA 1(2011-2013), 2011. pp.40). The cost of collection has also drastically reduce since it no longer has to worry excessively over staff welfare, pension contribution (SSNIT), as its focus is now more geared towards monitoring and supervision.

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APPENDICES

Appendix: 1

Interview Guide

The following is an interview guide in partial fulfillment of the award of Master of Philosophy (MPhil) in Public Administration. The topic under study is “Public Private Partnerships in Local governance: The case of Tema Metropolitan Assembly (T.M.A.)”. This exercise is strictly for academic purpose. The identity of respondents and responses shall not be revealed or used in any way that will be injurious to the personality of respondents. The researcher will therefore be very grateful if you would give the necessary assistance to facilitate the data collection.

BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENT

1. Institution of Respondent
2. Position of Respondent in the institution
3. Number of years respondent has been with the institution
4. Gender

I. Objectives for entering into PPP agreements/ Why did the T.M.A. enter into PPP agreements

1. Are you aware of any contractual arrangements between the T.M.A and any Private organization in the area of waste collection and revenue mobilization? Yes/ No

If yes, please name 3 Private organization?

a).....

b).....

c).....

2. Please give 3 reasons that influenced the T.M.A's decision to enter into PPP in waste collection and revenue mobilization?

a).....

b).....

c).....

3. Have the 3 reasons above been achieved?

a) Yes/ No Explain.....

b) Yes/ No Explain.....

c) Yes/ No Explain.....

4. Kindly outline 3 measures put in place for the accomplishment of the objectives of the PPP in waste collection and revenue mobilization

a).....

b).....

c).....

5. In your opinion, were the objectives clear and easy to understand? Yes/ No

Please Explain.....

.....
.....

II. Communication and enforcement activities between the main actor and other stakeholders

1. Who are the main actors in the implementation of PPP in the area of waste collection and revenue mobilization?

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2. State the roles of each actor mentioned above?

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3. State the responsibilities of each actor mentioned above?

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4. Explain how the T.M.A. communicates with the other actors in the implementation of the PPP?

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.....

5. Kindly, give 3 ways in which the T.M.A. enforces compliance to PPP agreements?

a).....
b).....
c).....

6. Kindly, give 3 ways in which the other actors also enforce compliance to PPP agreements?

a).....
b).....
c).....

III. Resources to ensure effective implementation of PPP

1. Would you say there was adequate financial resource for the accomplishment of the objective? Yes/ No

Please, give 2 reasons for your answer.

a).....
b).....

2. Would you say there was adequate human resource with the appropriate skills for the implementation of the objectives of the PPP? Yes/ No

Please, give 2 reasons for your answer.

a).....

b).....

3. Would you say that there was adequate logistics and infrastructure for the accomplishment of the PPP in the metropolis? Yes/ No

Please, give 2 reasons for your answer

a).....

b).....

IV. Administrative structures and the smooth implementation of PPP

1. Please mention 3 bureaucratic bottlenecks to the successful implementation of the PPP in waste collection and Revenue mobilization in the Metropolis?

a).....

b).....

c).....

2. What are the approved structures for resolving grievances under the PPP, how effective are they?

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.....

.....

3. Would you say the implementation process had the fullest support and cooperation of the officials and staff of T.M.A.? Yes/ No

Please, give 2 reasons

a).....

b).....

4. Would you say the implementation process enjoyed the cooperation and support of the general public or their representatives, Assembly Members? Yes/ No

Please, give 2 reasons for your answer.

a).....

b).....

5. Please give 3 main challenges to the implementation of PPP's on the part of the T.M.A?

a).....

b).....

c).....

6. Please give 3 main challenges to the implementation of PPP's on the part of the partners?

a).....

b).....

c).....

V. PROSPECTS OF PPP'S

1. What 3 things can the T.M.A. do to improve PPP's in the metropolis?

a).....

b).....

c).....

2. What 3 things can the other partners do to improve PPP's in the metropolis?

- a).....
- b).....
- c).....

3. In your opinion, which other areas can the T.M.A. consider for entering into PPP's?

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.....

4. What are your general impressions concerning the implementation of PPP's in the metropolis?

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Thank you.

Appendix: 2

Revenue Pattern of Tema Metropolitan Assembly								
REVENUE HEAD	2006		2007		2008		2009	
	AMOUNT ¢	%	AMOUNT ¢	%	AMOUNT ¢	%	AMOUNT ¢	%
<i>INTERNAL</i>								
1. Rates	1,350,302.05	36.7	965,195	26.0	1,395,907	31.5	1,052,940	26.7
2. Lands	-	-	12,607	0.3	-	-	-	-
3. Fees and Fines	1,350,818.76	36.7	1,440,539	38.6	1,696,904	38.3	1,489,727	37.8
4. Licenses	899,520.58	24.4	1,190,996	32.0	1,175,084	26.6	1,191,306	30.2
5. Rent	4,646.28	0.1	7,019	0.2	17,909	4.2	11,246	0.3
6. Investment	5,745.70	0.2	2,965	0.1	1,562	0.03	24,058	0.6
7. Miscellaneous	72,491.48	2.0	113,675	3.0	137,960	3.1	172,735	4.4
SUB-TOTAL (IGF)	3,673,524.85	50.3	3,732,996	53.3	4,425,326	50.5	3,942,012	41.0
Grants	3,634,842.27	49.7	3,276,844	46.7	4,339,786	49.5	5,672,696	59.0
GRAND TOTAL	7,308,367.13	-	7,009,840.	-	8,765,112	-	9,614,708	

Source: From the Tema Metropolitan Assembly Shared Growth and Development Agenda 1 (GSGDA I)

Appendix: 3


Expenditure Pattern of Tema Metropolitan Assembly

Expenditure Pattern of Tema Metropolitan Assembly for the period 2006-2009

	2006		2007		2008		2009	
EXPENDITURE HEAD	AMOUNT ¢	%	AMOUNT ¢	%	AMOUNT ¢	%	AMOUNT ¢	%
Personal Emoluments	1,926,359.23	24.2	2,269,643	32.7	2,213,306	24.6	2,628,072	27.7
Travel Transport	652,024.84	8.2	850,944	12.3	1,103,869	12.3	1,036,794	11.0
General Expenditure	372,346.77	4.7	369,109	5.3	840,842	9.3	748,139	8.0
Maintenance & Renewals	187,589.51	2.4	299,330	4.3	305,776	3.4	227,212	2.4
Miscellaneous	270,090.53	3.4	311,629	4.5	494,169	5.5	531,358	5.6
Capital Expenditure	3,227,150.52	40.5	2,726,312	39.3	3,966,075	44.1	4,327,420	45.6
Capital (Common Fund)	58,149.30	0.7	104,639	1.5	75,340	0.8	-	-
GRAND TOTAL	6,693,710.71	100	6,931,606	100	8,999,377	100	9,498,995	100

Source: From the Tema Metropolitan Assembly Shared Growth and Development Agenda 1 (GSGDA I)

Appendix: 4
T.M.A ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



SOURCE: Data received from the TMA