CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GHANA: THE CASE OF THE DAGBON CONFLICT BY AHIAVE EDWIN CARSCIOUS THIS THESIS IS PRESENTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MPHIL POLITICAL SCIENCE DEGREE JULY 2013 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh i DECLARATION This is to certify that this thesis is the result of research undertaken by AHIAVE EDWIN CARSCIOUS under the supervision of DR KUMI ANSAH-KOI and DR ALIDU SEIDU towards the award of the Master of Philosophy in Political Science in the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. ........................................... Ahiave Edwin Carscious (Candidate) Date …………………… ……………………………. Dr Kumi Ansah-Koi (Principal Supervisor) Date ………………………….. …………………………….. Dr Alidu Seidu (Co-Supervisor) Date ……………………………. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ii ABSTRACT The African continent has witnessed a number of bloody conflicts since the end of the cold war leading to serious consequences including political, social, economic and humanitarian problems. Although Ghana enjoys considerable peace compared to Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and others, it is venerable to intermittent communal violence as well as ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts. The Northern Region, in particular has witnessed protracted conflicts over chieftaincy such as the succession dispute between the Abudu and Andani Royal Families of the Dagbon Kingdom. Analysing data from both primary and secondary sources, the study found that although unemployment, particularly among the youth, has caused social upheavals, the conflict in Dagbon is directly linked to chieftaincy. The two Royal gates, Abudus and Andanis have failed to abide by the laid down framework on succession to the skin. These have evoked tension, mistrust and suspicion among the two families thereby slowing development programmes in the area. Given the dynamics of the conflict, only an independent body particularly, non-state actors such as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have the wherewithal to instigate a peaceful solution to the conflict. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh iii DEDICATION To the memory of my late father, Ahiave David. Gone too soon to see the exploits of your son. And my daughter, Makafui, be challenged to achieve greater heights. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I am thankful to all those, whose varied contributions have led to the writing of this thesis. I am particularly grateful to my supervisor, Dr Kumi Ansah-Koi, who even though had a busy schedule, found the time to supervise my work. I acknowledge sincerely his encouragement, guidance and tolerance throughout the period. I also am indebted to Mr A.K.D. Frempong, who did not only encourage me to pursue a course in conflict studies but also guided my steps and placed valuable materials at my disposal. Sir, thanks for the encouragement, the useful suggestions and comments that made this work a success. To Prof Kwame Boafo- Arthur whose suggestion, at a critical moment, culminated in the topic. I cannot forget Mr Awusi-Braimah for his invaluable assistance. I am indebted to all my teachers at the various levels of my education for the knowledge they impacted to me. I am equally grateful to all, who in one way or the other contributed to my education especially to my Mom and Siblings; for their prayers and support. A special thanks to my lovely wife and friend, Wilhemina Ghartey and my daughter, Makafui for the sacrifices they made and the inconveniences they had to endure during the time and also proofreading the draft. I also thank my intermediaries who assisted me to get to the communities where I did my fieldwork to collect data for the study. My sincere thanks go to Mr Adams Ibrahim of Tamale Girls School , Mr Djimah of YMA, Bishop Vincent Sowah Boi-Na and Mr Peter Atia his Secretary, for linking me to my respondents. To all my respondents who provided me with pieces of information, I say thank you. Finally to my colleague, friend and brother, Francis Aziati, I appreciate your support, encouragement and the ‘cover-ups’ you did for me at work while I pursue my studies. God richly bless you all. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh v TABLE OF CONTENT DECLARATION ……………………………………………………………………………. i ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................. ii DEDICATION......................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………………. v LIST OF MAPS AND FIGUERS ………………………………………………………….. ix LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………... x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ………………………………………………………………. xi CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………….. 1 1.1 Background to the Study …………………………………………….. 1 1.2 Statement of the Problem ……………………………………………. 4 1.3 Research Questions ………………………………………………….. 5 1.4 Research Objectives ………………………………………………..... 6 1.5 Theoretical Framework ……………………………………………… 6 1.5.1 General Theory of Conflict ………………………………………….. 7 1.5.2 Relative Deprivation Theory ………………………………………… 8 1.5.3 Emic and Etic Approaches …………………………………………. 10 1.6 The Study Site - Dagbon …………………………………………… 13 1.7 Operational Definition of Concepts ………………………………... 14 1.7.1 Conflict/Crisis …………………………………………………….... 14 1.7.2 Violence …………………………………………………………… 15 1.7.3 Ethnicity …………………………………………………………… 15 1.7.4 Chieftaincy ………………………………………………………… 15 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh vi 1.7.5 Conflict Resolution ………………………………………………… 16 1.8 Significance of the Study …………………………………………... 16 1.9 Scope and Limitation of the Study ………………………………… 17 1.10 Organization of the Study ………………………………………… 17 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW …………………………………………... 19 2.0 Introduction ……………………………............................................ 19 2.1 Ethnic Conflicts …………………………………………………….. 19 2.2 Chieftaincy Conflicts ………………………………………………. .24 2.3 Conflicts in Northern Ghana ……………………………………… ..30 2.4 The Dagbon Conflict ………………………………………………... 35 2.4.1 Succession to Yani …………………………………………………. 35 2.4.2 Colonial Politics ……………………………………………………. 36 2.4.3 From Independence to 1993 ………………………………………... 37 2.4.4 The Fourth Republic ………………………………………………... 41 2.4.5 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms …………………………………... 43 2.5 Conclusion ………………………………………………………….. 51 CHAPTER THREE METHODDOLOGY ……………………………………………….. 52 3.0 Introduction ………………………………………………………… 52 3.1.0 Research Method …………………………………………………… 52 3.1.1 Qualitative Research Method ……………………………………... 53 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh vii 3.1.2 Quantitative Research Method ……………………………………... 55 3.1.3 Mixed Research Methods …………………………………………... 57 3.2. Data collection ……………………………………………………… 58 3.3 Data Analysis ………………………………………………………. 60 3.4 Conclusion ………………………………………………………….. 61 CHAPTER FOUR ANALYSES OF THE DAGBON CONFLICT AND THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS…………………………………… 62 4.0 Introduction ………………………………………………………… 62 4.1 Emergence and Escalation of the Conflict …………………………. 62 4.1.1 Interruption of Succession to Yani ………………………………… 63 4.1.2 Politicisation of the conflict ………………………………………... 64 4.1.3 Evil Work for Idle Hands …………………………………………... 66 4.2 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Their Implementation ………. 66 4.2.1 Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Dagbon …………... 67 4.2.2 Managing the conflict before the 2002 violence …………………... 70 4.2.3 Measures Adopted to Resolve the Conflict Since 2002 ……………. 72 4.2.3.1 Military/Police Intervention ………………………………………... 72 4.2.3.2 Wuaku Commission of Inquiry …………………………………….. 72 4.2.3.3 Third Party Mediation by the Committee of Eminent Chiefs ……… 76 4.2.3.4 The Role of Civil Society Organisations …………………………… 79 4.3 Reasons Why the Conflict Remains Unresolved…………………… 80 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh viii 4.3.1 Lack of justice ……………………………………………………… 80 4.3.2 Mistrust among the Two Gates …………………………………….. 81 4.3.3 Lack of Confidence in the Peace process …………………………... 83 4.3.4 The Role of Spoilers ………………………………………………... 86 4.4 Conclusion ………………………………………………………….. 87 CHAPTER FIVE RECOMMENDATION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION …….. 89 5. 0 Introduction ………………………………………………………… 89 5.1 Summary of Findings ………………………………………………. 89 5.1.1 Causes of the Conflict ……………………………………………… 89 5.1.2 The Conflict Resolution Mechanisms ……………………………… 92 5.1.3 Intractability of the Conflict ………………………………………... 96 5.2 Conclusion……... …………………………………………………. 97 5.3 Recommendation………………………………………………….. ...98 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................101 APENDICES.........................................................................................................................108 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ix LIST OF MAPS AND FIGUERS Fig. 1.1 Map of Northern Ghana …………………………………………………………… 14 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh x LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Conflicts in Northern Ghana between 1980 and 2002 …………………………………… 32 Table 3.1: Table of interviews ……………………………………………………………… 59 Table 5.1: committees/commission and legal instruments …………………………………. 94 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh xi LIST OF ABREVIATIONS AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council BNI Bureau of National Investigations CDRs Committees for the Defence of the Revolution CI Constitutional Instrument CID Criminal Investigation Department CLIP Community Life Improvement Programme CPP Convention People’s Party CSOs Civil Society Organisations DCC Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict DISEC District Security Committee DSC Dagbon State Council EI Executive Instruments FOMWAG Federation of Moslem Women Association of Ghana GA Great Alliance GDCA Ghana Danish Community Association GNA Ghana News Agency LI Legislative Instruments MMDAs Metropolitan, Municipal and Districts Assemblies University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh xii MP Member of Parliament NAL National Alliance of Liberals NDC National Democratic Congress NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations NHC National House of Chiefs NLC National Liberation Council NLCD National Liberation Council Decree NPI Nairobi Peace Initiative NPP New Patriotic Party NRC National Redemption Council NRCD National Redemption Council Decree NSU Northern Students’ Union PNDC Provisional National Defence Council PNDCL Provisional National Defence Council Law PNP People’s National Party PP Progress Party PPNT Permanent Peace Negotiation Team REGSEC Regional Security Committee RHCs Regional Houses of Chiefs University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh xiii SMC Supreme Military Council UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UP Unite Party YMA Yendi Municipal Assembly YPC Yendi Peace Centre University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background to the Study The African continent has witnessed a number of bloody conflicts since the end of the Cold War, leaving in their tracks serious consequences including political, social, economic and humanitarian problems. One can cite examples from Nigeria (1967-1970), Liberia (1989- 1997, 2000-2003), Sierra Leone (1992-2002) Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2010), Uganda (1979), Somalia (since 1991), Rwanda (1994), and Kenya (2007) among others. (McGowan, 2005). While few of these conflicts have been inter-states, majority of them have been intra-state conflicts. From independence through 2004, the sixteen West African states have experienced forty-four successful military-led coups; forty-three often bloody failed coups; at least eighty- two coup plots; seven civil wars and many other forms of political conflict (McGowan, 2005). The results of these conflicts are loss of lives, failed states, hunger and poverty. Many people, displaced as a result of these conflicts, become refugees in other countries. Some scholars have cited scarcity of resources, the fragility of the African states, bad governance, ethnicity, and colonialism, among others, as the root causes of these conflicts. Ghana, in this turbulent region, has to a large extent, been spared violent conflict at the national level. However, she has witnessed four successful coup d’états and countless coup attempts since attaining independence from British colonial rule in 1957. Apart from these coups, the country has experienced numerous inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts, chieftaincy conflicts and land related conflicts. Notable among them are the prolonged conflicts between Peki and Tsito; Nkunya and Alavanyo in the Volta Region (Gati, 2008); Mamprusi and Kusasi in Bawku, in the Upper East Region; as well as Konkomba and Nanumba; and the Abudu and Andani in Dagbon, (Mahama, 2002) in the Northern Region of University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2 the country, among others. The causes of these conflicts are embedded in historical, socio- economic and political conditions, which motivate the protagonists in the early phases and in later conflict escalation. Additionally, ethnicity plays a considerable role and sometimes becomes a dominant factor in these internecine conflicts (Gati, 2008). The chieftaincy institution is a very important establishment in the Ghanaian society. Before the advent of colonial rule, governance was organised around this institution. In the traditional Ghanaian society, chiefs performed and continue to perform a number of roles such as being military leaders and defenders of their people; as chief priests who perform religious roles within their jurisdictions; as symbols of identity; as sources of honour; and as sole custodians of stool lands and unifiers. Indeed, it must be indicated that chiefs played an important role in the struggle against colonial rule (Prah & Yeboah, 2011). It is therefore not surprising that in postcolonial Ghana, successive governments have been working closely with chiefs. It is in light of this that the 1992 Constitution devotes a whole chapter to chieftaincy. The Constitution states in Article 270(1) that “the institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is here by guaranteed.” It goes further to create National and Regional Houses of Chiefs in Article 271 and 274 respectively (Republic of Ghana, 1992). However the chieftaincy institution in Ghana has been bedevilled with numerous conflicts. According to Prah and Yeboah, these conflicts are not recent developments and neither are they restricted to only one traditional area - almost every traditional area has encountered a chieftaincy dispute in one way or the other. Some of such conflicts recorded in recent times include the Ga Mantse succession dispute, the Anlo chieftaincy conflict, the Adoagyiri crisis, Princess and Aketekyi towns’ troubles, the eruption of the Tuobodom chieftaincy conflict University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3 (Prah & Yeboah, 2011) among many others. Whereas some of these conflicts have been successfully resolved, others tend to be protracted. While admitting that chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts are not restricted to only one part of the country, the three northern regions 1 of the country have undoubtedly witnessed the majority of these conflicts. To quote Mr Issahaku Ibrahim, a former president of the Northern Students’ Union (NSU), addressing a news conference in Accra in the aftermath of 2002 Dagbon clashes; “ethnic and factional conflicts have become monthly occurrence in the North.” He cited conflicts in Bawku, Bunkurugu and Yendi, among others, as examples (Daily Graphic, 2002). Similarly, Awedoba observes that the number of chieftaincy disputes in the Upper West Region is equal to the number of paramountcies in the region. He writes: “…there are seventeen (17) paramountcies in the Upper West Region and there are seventeen (17) chieftaincy disputes pending before the Judicial Committee of the Upper West Regional House of chiefs.” Of the Upper East Region, he notes: “This region … is now experiencing several chieftaincy and land problems – small and large.” For the Northern Region, he remarks: “this region has experienced a number of conflicts, new and old, small and large. These conflicts include religious, chieftaincy and land conflicts. These are both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts” (Awedoba, 2009). In the year 2002, an aged long chieftaincy conflict between the two ruling gates of Dagbon, the Abudu and the Andani, led to violent clashes resulting in the death of the overlord of the area, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and several others. The events leading to this conflict and the successes or failures of conflict resolution mechanisms put in place to resolve it form the subject matter of this study. 1 Ghana has been divided into ten regions. These are Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra, Northern, Upper East, Upper West, Volta and Western. The three northern regions refer to the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 4 1.2 Statement of the Problem The news of Ya-Na’s assassination was widely reported in the Ghanaian media. Reporting under the caption ‘YA-NA KILLED’, both The Daily Graphic and The Ghanaian Times reported on Thursday 28 March 2002 that Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, King of Dagbon, had been reportedly killed in renewed clashes between the factions in the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute on Tuesday night. Whereas The Daily Graphic reported that twenty-four (24) others were killed with him, The Ghanaian Times put the figure at twenty-five 25 (Daily Graphic, 2002; Ghanaian Times, 2002) Earlier, on Tuesday 26 March 2002, both papers 2 reported that a dusk to dawn curfew had been imposed on Yendi and its environs on Monday for the fear that the celebration of the annual Bungum (Fire) Festival at Yendi could lead to clashes between members and supporters of the chieftaincy divide. Citing a police source, the report indicated that as the time approached for the celebration of the Bungum Festival at Yendi, the seat of the Dagbon kingship, Ya-Na and his elders received threats from unidentified groups of people to the effect that they (the unidentifiable group) were planning to disrupt the festival scheduled for Monday night. As a result of this, tension started mounting in the Yendi Township thereby prompting the Yendi District Security Committee (DISEC) to hold an emergency meeting at which it was decided to impose a curfew to avert any unrest. However, following a meeting between the Ya-Na and the Regional Minister, Prince Imoro Andani, at Yendi on Sunday, the Regional Security Committee (REGSEC) allegedly revoked the curfew. According to The Ghanaian Times, on Monday morning, one of the factions allegedly attacked a young man from the rival camp and destroyed his bicycle. This resulted in exchange of gunfire leaving two people injured and admitted at the Yendi Government 2 The Daily Graphic and the Ghanaian Times are state owned news papers and are the largest circulated news papers in Ghana. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 5 Hospital. The Northern Regional Security Council deployed armed soldiers and police to the area and banned the celebration of the Bungum (Fire) Festival at Yendi, which was expected to come off on Monday night. The presence of the security agencies notwithstanding, there was violent clashes resulting in the demise of the King and his elders. Since then the murderers have not been found neither could the conflict be resolved. When conflict breaks out, there must be a resolution but the Dagbon conflict seems to have defied every attempt to resolve it. The conflict between the two Gates 3 dates back to pre- independence era and virtually every post independence government had been drawn into it either to solve the problem or take political capital out of it. The first Republic of Dr Kwame Nkrumah passed the Legislative Instrument 59 in a bid to resolve the problem, however, the law was repealed shortly after his overthrow, and since then several committees formed by various governments to resolve the problem have not been successful. In 1978, the Supreme Court gave a ruling on the issue by which the two gates have been following until recently when the pressure started (Yakubu, 2005), (Ghanaian Times, 2002) and eventually resulted in the violent clashes that saw the death of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani and several others. That the conflict could not be resolved and the 2002 violence could not be averted remains a mystery that needs to be unravelled. The question to ask is why did the conflict between the two Gates escalate in 2002 and became so protracted in spite of the efforts made to resolve it? This question among other things is what this study seeks to find answers to. 1.3 Research Questions The research is premised on the following questions: 3 Members or supporters of the two royal families between whom the Ya-Na kingship rotates in Dagbon. They also referred to as Abudu Yali or Andani Yali. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 6 1. What factors accounted for the emergence, escalation and protracted nature of the dispute between the Abudu and the Andani Gates of the Ya-Na skin of Dagbon? 2. What efforts have been made to resolve the conflict and how have they been implemented? 3. Why does the conflict remain intractable notwithstanding attempts made to resolve it? 4. How can the conflict be settled? 1.4 Research Objectives The general aim of the study is to find out why the Dagbon conflict seems to be intractable. The specific objectives are to: 1. investigate the causes of the conflict; 2. assess the various conflict resolution mechanisms adopted to bring the conflict to an end; 3. examine why the conflict remains unresolved despite the various efforts made to resolve it; and 4. make recommendations for resolving the conflict. 1.5 Theoretical Framework To be able to understand why certain phenomena occur and the environment in which they exist, social scientists use tools such as theories, models and concepts. Silverman, (2005) differentiates theory from other research terms like model, concept and methodology and defines it as ‘a set of concepts used to define and/or explain some phenomenon’. This section discusses the theoretical perspectives within which the data for the study will be analyzed. The study draws inspiration from two theories, namely: General Theory of Conflict and the Relative Deprivation Theory as to explain the cause of the conflict and adopts the anthropological approaches of Emic and Etic to account for its intractability. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 7 1.5.1 General Theory of Conflict In this section, the focus is on some general definitions and explanations for the existence of conflicts in human societies. Conflict occurs in human societies when different social groups are rivals or when they are in competition with each other (Barash & Webel, 2002, p. 26). Lewis Coser defines conflict as a struggle over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired value but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals (Frempong, 1999). To Frempong, this definition emphasizes the destructive nature of conflict as parties try not only to neutralize, but also to injure and even eliminate opponents. Citing Gurr, Brecher notes that conflict phenomena are the overt, coercive interactions of contending groups (Brecher, 1993). This means that conflict is characterised by incompatibility of purposes as well as by parties engaged in mutually hostile actions and the use of coercion to injure or control opponents. Some psychologists and philosophers explain conflict as an inherent nature of man. The psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud, believes that the genetic material that codes the chromosomes of human beings makes them prone to conflict. So he writes “there is no likelihood of our being able to suppress humanity’s aggressive tendencies” (Bloomfield & Moulton, 1997). Similarly in his “Leviathan”, Thomas Hobbes argues that man by nature is violent, seeking power upon power. He notes: So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 8 their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name (Hobbes, 1651). Writing on man in his natural unrestrained environment without any authority to make and enforce rules, he states: Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. …and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651). Sigmund and Hobbes as well as many others seem to conclude that conflict is simply built into the DNA of man. However this perception of man fails to take into account environmental and other factors that can influence man to act violently. This is therefore a major weakness of the General Conflict Theory. Consequently, there is the need for a more specific theory to analyse the emergence and escalation of communal conflicts such as the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict. 1.5.2 Relative Deprivation Theory 4 Karl Max once wrote: “A house may be large or small; as long as the neighbouring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirements for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social position at all to maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighbouring palace rises in equal or even in greater measure, the occupant of the relatively little house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied, more cramped within his four walls” (Walker & Smith, 2001). 4 Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relative_Deprivation. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 9 Relative deprivation is the experience of being deprived of something to which one believes oneself to be entitled to have (Walker & Smith, 2001). It refers to the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to others and realise that they have less than them (Bayertz, 1999). Schaefer defines it as “the conscious experience of a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and present actualities” (Schaefer, 2008). It is a term used in social sciences to describe feelings or measures of economic, political or social deprivation that are relative rather than absolute. In one of the first formal definitions of the relative deprivation, Walta Runciman notes that there are four preconditions of relative deprivation: 1. Person A does not have X 2. Person A knows of other persons that have X 3. Person A wants to have X 4. Person A believes obtaining X is realistic (Runciman, 1966). The concept of relative deprivation has important consequences for both behaviour and attitudes; including feeling of stress, political attitude and participation in collective action. Therefore, when expectations do not meet attainment, there is a high tendency for people to confront those, who they hold responsible for depriving them of their ambition. It is relevant to researchers studying multiple fields in social sciences. Social scientists, particularly political scientists and sociologists, have cited ‘relative deprivation’ (especially temporal relative deprivation) as a potential cause of social movements and deviance, leading in extreme situations, to political violence such as rioting, terrorism, civil wars and other instances of social deviance such as crime (Merton, 1938), (Gurr, 1970). For example, some scholars of social movements explain their rise by citing grievances of people who feel University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_science http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavior http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attitude http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_sciences http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_movements http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deviance_%28sociology%29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rioting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_wars http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_deviance http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crime http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_movements 10 deprived of what they perceive as being entitled to (Rose, 1982). Similarly, individuals engage in deviant behaviours when their means do not match their goals (Merton, 1938). In the political realm, the lack of the right to vote or to be voted for is more likely to be felt as a deprivation by people who had it once than by the people who never had the opportunity to vote or be voted for. Taking the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict into account, using the Relative Deprivation Theory, it could be argued that the conflict erupts when one faction feels deprived of the skin. 1.5.3 Emic and Etic Approaches Broadly speaking, there have been two main ways of conceptualizing an approach to culture that has relevance for conflict and conflict resolution. These strategies correspond generally to a distinction between emic and etic approaches to socio-cultural phenomena. Emic and etic are terms used by anthropologists and by others in the social and behavioural sciences to refer to two kinds of data concerning human behaviour. In particular, they are used in cultural anthropology to refer to kinds of fieldwork done and viewpoints obtained (Avuruch, 1998). The emic approach investigates how local people think - how they perceive and categorize the world; their rules for behaviour; what has meaning for them; and how they imagine and explain things (Kottak, 2006). A feature of the emic approach is the identification and use of native terms or institutions as the key organizing concept for description and analysis. The major advantage of the emic approach is that it roots the analyst more or less deeply in the relevant cultural context. It brings with it all the strengths of ethnography - the attention to context and detail and nuanced translation (Avuruch, 1998). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_vote 11 By contrast, the etic approach shifts the focus from the native’s observations, categories, explanations, and interpretations to those of the analyst’s. In etic theorising, native categories or thinking are collected as data and analysed but are not treated as ends in themselves as in emic studies (Avuruch, 1998). The etic approach realises that members of a cultural domain are often too involved in what they are doing to interpret their cultures impartially. When using the etic approach, the researcher emphasises what he or she considers important (Kottak, 2006). The aim of an etic analysis is to systematise data from different emic domains in order to construct or discover categories that work trans-emically (trans-culturally). The underlying characteristic of the etic approach is the identification of underlying, structurally deep, and trans-cultural forms, expressed in terms of certain descriptors that are putatively capable of characterising domains across all cultures. The advantage of the etic approach is that it permits comparison across cases and thus the possibility for building theory (Avuruch, 1998). Jingfeng, (2013) argues that, although emic and etic are sometimes regarded as inherently in conflict and one can be preferred to the exclusion of the other, the complementarily of emic and etic approaches to social research has been widely recognized, especially in the areas of interest concerning the characteristics of human nature as well as the form and function of human socio-cultural systems. Since the Dagbon conflict is a chieftaincy one and all chieftaincy conflicts have culture underpinnings that are peculiar to the conflicting parties, neglecting these cultural elements in fashioning out resolution has serious implication for resolving the conflict. The emic and etic approaches thus provide the researcher the opportunity to appreciate the difficulty and tension in the numerous attempt to resolve the conflict. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 12 1.5 The Study Site - Dagbon Dagbon is a ‘Kingdom’ found in the Northern Region of the Republic of Ghana. The people are called Dagomba, an English corrupted word for Dagbamba. The Dagombas speak Dagbani, which belongs to the Mole-Dagbani sub-group of Gur languages. The overlord of the ‘Kingdom’ is called Ya-Na. Yendi, the scene of the current conflict is the seat of the ‘Kingdom’. It lies between latitudes 9 and 10 north; and have a land size of about 9,611square miles (Ibrahim, 2009). It is arguably the largest Kingdom in the Northern Region with have twelve (12) out of the twenty-six (26) administrative Metropolitan, Municipal and Districts Assemblies (MMDAs) in the region. These are the Chereponi, Gushiegu, Karaga, Kumbungu, Mion, Saboba, Savelugu/Nanton, Tatale/Sangule, Tolon and Zabzugu District Assemblies; Yendi Municipal and Tamale Metropolitan Assemblies (ghanadistricts.com). Even though chieftaincy is a male dominated institution among the Dagbon people, females are the recognized chiefs in three towns and when she (chief) dies, customarily, another female is confined to succeed to the skin. The chiefs of Kukulogu, Kpatuya and Gundogu are all females. The Gundo-Na (Chief of Gundogu) is the senior amongst them. All the female chiefs in the three towns happen to be the daughters of the Ya-Na, the overlord of Dagbon (Boafo-Arthur, 2003). Apart from the Dagomba, there are also other tribes like the Kokomba, Anufo, Basari, Bimoba, Zantasi, Kotokoli, Kabre and Gonja (Mahama, 2009). The 2010 Population and Housing Census estimated the population of Dagbon at 1,254,476 out of the total population of 2,479,461 in the Northern Region; representing 50.59% of total population of the Northern Region (G.S.S., 2010). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 13 The Economy of the people is largely subsistence with Agriculture being their main occupation. Over 80% of the people depend on Agriculture for their livelihood. They are involved in the cultivation of cereals, tubers and rearing of animals. The major crops cultivated include maize, rice, sorghum, millet, cowpea, groundnuts, soya bean, yam and cassava. Animals reared include cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry birds for domestic and commercial purposes. Other economic activities include weaving, agro-processing (shea butter extraction), meat processing, fish mongering, wholesale and retail of general goods, transport and many others. A good number of the populace are engaged in small to medium scale manufacturing business. They include smock weavers, blacksmiths, bakers, mechanics, shea butter extraction and groundnut oil extraction (ghanadistricts.com). Before the advent of both Western and Eastern Religions, the Dagombas were mostly atheists. Their culture was deeply enshrined in their customs and beliefs. This is still manifested in the numerous traditional festivals still practised in the area. The first foreign religion to reach Dagbon was Islam, brought to the region by Arab traders from the North, between the 12th and 15th centuries. As a result, Dagomba culture is heavily influenced by Islam. It is therefore not surprising that almost 90% of ethnic Dagombas are Muslims. Christianity, on the other hand, arrived later from the South and is mostly practised by non- Dagomba ethnic groups. Important festivals include the Damba, Bugum (Fire festival) and the Islamic Eid-ul-Adha and Eid-dul-Fitr Festivals (Wikipedia/ghanadistricts.com). Inheritance in Dagbon, like in many parts of Ghana, is patrilineal. It is common, but not restricted, of the Dagomba people to have large families. This practice until recently was to get more ‘hands’ to help on family farms. It is considered a great pride among the Dagombas to marry more than one wife. The number of children one had was one of the indicators for University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_holidays 14 measuring one’s wealth (Wikipedia). The practice certainly has serious repercussion for the conflict in the area as we shall see in the subsequent chapters of this study. Fig. 1.1 Map of Northern Ghana Source: www.ghanadistricts .com 1.7 Operational Definition of Concepts Concepts, according to the (Microsoft) Encarta Dictionary (2009), are broad abstract ideas or general guiding principles or the most basic understanding of something. They have the tendency to be understood and employed in various domains. Consequently, there is the need to elucidate and operationalise the concepts used in this study so as to avoid ambiguity. 1.7.1 Conflict/Crisis Experts in conflict studies have the propensity to differentiate between conflict and crisis. According Frempong (1999), Zartman used conflict to describe the underlying issues in a dispute and crisis to refer to the outbreak of armed hostilities. To Frempong therefore, crisis University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh http://www.ghanadistricts/ 15 is the violent expression of conflict. In this study however, both terms, conflict and crisis, are used interchangeably to describe the open hostility between the Abudu and Andani Gates of Dagbon. 1.7.2 Violence Violence connotes the use of force to effect decision against the will or desires of others. It constitutes a violation of the basic human rights of the person through physical actions like beating, burning of property, rioting, shooting and evening killing. In brief, it is physical attack on another person. It is employed with the intent of injuring, damaging or destroying opponents (Marck & Snyder, 2009). It is the manifestation of conflict or conflict behaviour at the highest point. In this study, violence is used to qualify all acts that resulted in physical injury, destruction of property, loss of lives and any other form of human sufferings. 1.7.3 Ethnicity Ethnicity comes from the word ethnic, meaning a person or a large group of people who share a national, racial, linguistic, or religious heritage, whether or not they reside in their countries of origin (Encarta Dictionnaries, 2009). Almost all African states are made up of multiple ethnic groups. Ethnicity, in this study, is used to refer to the various heritage and linguistic groupings in Ghana. 1.7.4 Chieftaincy Article 277 of the 1992 Fourth Republican constitution of Ghana defines a chief as a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskined or installed as a chief or queenmother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage. According to (Awedoba, nd), the term chieftaincy University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 16 derives from the word chief and refers to the office and the institution of which the chief is the principal operator and stakeholder. Chieftaincy may comprise among other things: the personnel holding offices such as chiefs, queenmothers, counsellors and staff; rituals, symbol and other paraphernalia. Chieftaincy, in this study, is used to mean the law, custom, practice and process of electing or selecting and installing chiefs in Ghana as well as the legitimacy and exercise of power of the chief so installed. 1.7.5 Conflict resolution Conflict resolution in this work essentially refers to a set of mechanisms adopted to bring the conflict situation in Dagbon to an end. These range from such peaceful means as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication or litigation, to violent confrontation –war. In the context of this study, conflict resolution refers to all the efforts made and the actions taken to resolve the Dagbon conflict. 1.8 Significance of the Study Though a lot of work has been done on international conflicts and their resolution, little attention has been paid to local conflicts. Scholarly work on internal conflicts tends to concentrate on those conflicts that involve the state and a sub-group(s). In the specific case of the Dagbon conflict, much scholarly work has not been done on the intractability of the conflict. Meanwhile, “in recent decades, ethno-political conflicts have been at the forefront of international security agenda and the desire to understand and contain ethno-political violence has been a priority for academics, policy-makers, and peace practitioners. These conflicts typically transcend state-centric issues, yet have the capacity to internationalise and thereby affect regional as well as national stability” (Kaye & Béland, 2009). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 17 The findings of this study will therefore provide input to systematic studies of intra-ethnic conflicts, and important lessons for the policy community advising on how to deal with internal rivalry in order to avoid bloodshed. 1.9 Scope and Limitation of the Study The objective of this study is to find out why the conflict between the Abudus and Andanis of the Ya-Na skin in Dagbon remains intractable in spite of the efforts made to resolve it. Admittedly, a study of this nature cannot be conducted without reference to historical facts. This study therefore made reference to historical facts relating to the causes of the conflict and its resolution. However, in view of the sensitive nature of the issues involved and the stretch of time it has travelled, this study might raise more questions than it can answer. 1.10 Organization of the Study In terms of structure, this study is divided into five chapters. Chapter One, which is the introductory chapter, sets out the background of the study, the statement of the problem, the research objective, research questions and theoretical framework for the study. It also indicates the study site, the significance of the study, scope and limitation of the study and finally presents the organization of the study. Chapter Two operationalises key concepts and discusses relevant literature. Literature is reviewed on ethnic conflicts, conflicts in Northern Ghana, chieftaincy conflicts and literature on the Dagbon conflict. There has also been Literature review on conflict resolution mechanisms in Ghana. In Chapter Three, the methodological framework within which the study is carried out is presented. The chapter focuses on the types of data collected for the study, methods and procedures used in the data collection and steps taken in processing the data. It also discusses the sources from which data are collected. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 18 Chapter Four analyses the causes and dynamics of the conflict. It explores the efforts made to resolve the conflict. It takes a look at initiatives taken before and after the 2002 violent clashes between the two sides. An analysis of those conflict resolution mechanisms employed in a bid to end the conflict is also carried out in this chapter. The discussions are based on the empirical facts gathered from the various sources of data. Finally, Chapter Five summarises the principal findings from the empirical analysis, provides some policy recommendations, and conclusion for the study. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 19 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 2.0 Introduction Although hailed as a haven of peace and a beacon of democracy within Africa, Ghana remains vulnerable to intermittent communal violence and inter-ethnic conflicts that harm its governance and security structures. These conflicts arise from—and, in turn, exacerbate—the state’s inability to control elements normally perceived as falling within its remit. While the whole of Ghana is susceptible to civil strife, the northern half of the country has been the main hotbed of conflicts that often pivot around land ownership, chieftaincy, religious intolerance, and ethnocentrism. Finding a lasting solution to the conflicts in Northern Ghana has proven largely futile (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). This chapter reviews literature on ethnic conflicts, conflicts in Northern Ghana, chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana and literature on the Dagbon conflict. 2.1 Ethnic Conflicts The literature available shows that ethnic conflict is not a recent phenomenon. It however gained prominence in social science literature in the 1960s and 1970s. As observed by Tambiah, it seems that the sudden resurgence of the term ethnicity in the social science literature of the 1960s and early 1970s took place not only to describe certain manifestations in the third world, but also in reaction to the emergence of ethnic movements in the industrialized and affluent world; especially in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe (Tambiah, 1989, p. 336). Before we proceed, it is important to take a brief look at the terms ethnic (group) and conflict. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 20 The term “ethnic” can be interpreted in two different ways. In the narrower understanding of the term, “ethnic” groups mean “racial” or “linguistic” groups. This is the sense in which the term is widely understood in popular discourse, in Africa and elsewhere. In Indian for example, scholars, bureaucrats, and politicians since the time of the British have used the term “communal,” not “ethnic,” reserving the latter term primarily for linguistically or racially distinct groups (Varshney, 2001). There is, however, a second, broader definition. Citing Horowitz, Varshney argues that all conflicts based on ascriptive group identities - race, language, religion, tribe, or caste - can be called ethnic. Similarly, referring to Horowitz and Kaufman, (Sambanis, 2001, p. 6) notes that ethnicity “is close to Max Weber’s conception of a ‘subjective belief’ in ‘common descent’… ethnicity embraces groups differentiated by colour, language, and religion; it covers tribes, races, nationalities, and castes. Ethnic identity connects individuals through perceived common past experiences and expectations of shared future ones (Ross, 2001, p. 157). Ghana, like many other African countries, is made up of people from many tribes, who speak many languages and adhere to several religious practices. This seems to have made the country prone to ethnic conflicts, especially in the North. Conflict on its part, depicts a situation in which two or more parties pursue incompatible, but from their individual perspectives, entirely just goals (Wolff, 2006, p. 2). Wolff asserts that ethnic conflicts are those in which the goals of at least one of the parties are defined in absolutely ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. Whatever the concrete issues over which conflict erupts, at least one of the conflict parties will explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms—that is, one party to the conflict will claim that its distinct ethnic identity is the reason why its members cannot realise their interests; why they do not have the same rights; or why their claims are not satisfied. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 21 Thus, ethnic conflicts are a form of group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies along an actually existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide (Wolff, 2006, p. 2). Drawing on Horowitz’s and Kaufman’s definition of ethnicity, (Sambanis, 2001, p. 6) emphasizes that ethnic wars are wars among communities (ethnicities) who are in conflict over the power relationship that exists between those communities and the state. Furthermore, he argues that opposing communities in ethnic conflicts hold irreconcilable visions of the identity, borders, and citizenship of the state. According to (Varshney, 2001), in this broad usage, ethnic conflicts range from the Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland and the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India; to black-white conflict in the United States and South Africa; the Tamil-Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka; and Shia-Sunni troubles in Pakistan. Ethnocentric conflict is therefore identity based conflict. Identity is concerned with group judgments and judgments about groups and their motives. Ethnic conflict is often bitter and prolonged (Ross, 2001, p. 157). Though not all these elements are present in ethnic conflicts in Ghana, these conflicts are caused and fuelled by religious fanaticism, tribalism, competition for power (chieftaincy), boundary disputes, among others and often protracted. The Dagbon chieftaincy dispute for instance has prolong and travelled over centuries (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). The bigger question for analysis is the motivation for groups to engage in violent ethnic conflict. It is important to bear in mind that ethnic conflicts do not just exist or come into being. They are the product of deliberate choices of people to pursue certain goals with violent means. Neither ethnicity nor nationalism in itself causes ethnic conflict. Rather, the stakes in ethnic conflicts are extremely diverse, ranging from legitimate political, social, cultural, and economic grievances of disadvantaged ethnic groups to predatory agendas of University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 22 states and small cartels of elites, to so-called national security interests, to name but a few. As organized ethnic groups confront each other, minorities and majorities alike, with and without the backing of state institutions, an important question is to what extent ethnic conflicts are actually about ethnicity and to what extent ethnicity is merely a convenient common denominator to organize conflict groups in the struggle over resources, land, or power (Wolff, 2006). There are several theoretical perspectives on the causes of ethnic violence. Primordialists view ethnicity as an exceptionally strong affiliation that charges interethnic interactions with the potential for violence. Believers in ancient group hatred argue that ethnic conflict is rooted in old sources of enmity and memories of past atrocities that make violence hard to avoid. Proponents of primordial sociality theory argue that the strength of kinship ties promotes altruism in favour of the genetic evolution of the group (Sambanis, 2001). Citing the clash of cultures (or civilizations) theory Sambanis suggests that irreconcilable differences due to cultural gaps cause fear and conflict that beget violence. He further notes that fear is also at the heart of the theory of the ethnic security dilemma, which suggests that territorial intermingling and mutual vulnerability exacerbate assurance problems that may lead to preventive wars by ethnic minorities who want to secede to increase their security. Modernization may also cause conflict as economic and social changes can accelerate and intensify group competition for scarce resources. This explanation may be particularly relevant where class cleavages and ethnic cleavages overlap. Finally, ethnic conflict may be the result of mobilization of ethnic groups by ethnic entrepreneurs or elites pursuing private interests and capitalizing on the availability of ethnic networks –i.e. ethnically defined groups that reduce transaction costs and uncertainty with respect to the enforcement of contracts. Elites may also socially construct ethnic identities or reinforce racial, religious, or linguistic University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 23 cleavages in such a way as to produce new sources of friction and conflict. Sambanis (2001) concludes that while none of these perspectives can fully explain the causes of every ethnic war, each of them can help shed light on one or more wars. Together, they all share a conviction that ethnicity is a critical variable in explaining civil violence. The nature of contemporary violent ethnic conflict is increasingly dirty. From Algeria, Sri Lanka, to Rwanda, the principal weapon of war is terror. Not only do warriors target civilians, and especially children, systematically, but they employ control through the creation and manipulation of fear. Their strategies include scorched earth tactics to starve populations and destroy infrastructures; sexual torture and mass rape, ethnic and social cleansing, and even genocide. Once violence becomes fuelled by hyper-politicized identity, an insidious logic kicks in. This raises the stakes beyond the more negotiable issues such as territorial control or the redistribution of political and material resources. In identity-based conflicts, the very existence of a community is thought to be under threat. An opposing identity group is labelled as the source of the threat and the battlefield expands to include homes. An individual comes to be targeted because of his or her membership in a particular community. The physical, psychological and moral violence inflicted on individuals is meant to affect the community as a whole – specifically, the identity group of which that individual is a member (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). As groups are mobilized on the basis of identity, such traits as ethnicity, religion, language and caste become organizational resources in the political and economic arenas (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000). Bush and Saltarelli note that this process of mobilisation is facilitated by the permeative character of ethnic identity, which is described by the foremost scholar of ethnic politics, Donald Horowitz, as having a tendency to ‘seepage’. The ethnicization of social, political and economic life coincides with the politicization of ethnicity, which together serve University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 24 to crank up the tensions between identity and conflict, and raise the stakes sharply in all confrontations. It adds volatility to every social, political and economic interaction across identity boundaries. One may therefore ask whether identity politics is the key to deciphering disorder in Africa. In some cases, it is clearly central, as in Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan, where there is an underlying war of visions pitting sharply different imaginings of the virtuous polity against one another. Even in the many cases where ethnicity or religion is not per se the precipitant of disorder, violence inevitably incorporates discourses of difference. Ethnicity armed escalates mutual fears, anxieties, and insecurities; communally targeted violence inscribes memories of ineffable loss of kin and fellow ethnics, and inspires dreams of vengeance. Thus the dangers of protracted disorder should not be underestimated (Young, 2002, p. 556). This study focuses on the cause(s) of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict (as an ethnic conflict) and examines why it has been so protracted. The discussion above, vis-à-vis the issues and nature of the Dagbon conflict, provides a fertile ground for understanding the cause(s) and the protracted nature of the conflict. 2.2 Chieftaincy Conflicts Chieftaincy could be defined as the office and the institution of which the chief is the principal operator and stakeholder. It may comprise among other things: the personnel holding offices such as chiefs, queenmothers, counsellors and staff; rituals, symbol and other paraphernalia (Awedoba, nd). The 1992 constitution of Ghana defines a chief as a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskined or installed as a chief or queenmother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 25 Chieftaincy is the oldest political system in African. Dankwa (2004) argues that “chieftaincy institution in Ghana emerged from the social fabric of the land… it is nobody’s creation and cannot be easily destroyed.” The institution has played and continues to play significant roles in the governance system in Ghana. However, it is bedevilled with myriad of conflicts. To be able to understand and appreciate the sources of these chieftaincy conflicts, it is important to take a brief look at the history of chieftaincy in Ghana from the pre-colonial period through the colonial to the post-independence eras. Before the advent of colonialism in Africa, the chief was the political, social, economic, legal and military head of the traditional state. As political head, he was responsible for the maintenance of good order in his state. He was the guardian of the fundamental values of his people and mediated between them and the spiritual forces. He administered tributes, court fines, market tolls, and other revenues. He was also the final arbiter in the administration of justice. It can thus be seen that in the pre-colonial era chiefs commanded a great deal of autonomy. However, the chief ruled with the advice of a council that has been variously termed an Inner or Privy Council. Where the system functioned well, these institutional checks as well as the queenmother safeguarded against dictatorial tendencies. The chief had to keep strictly the injunction that he was to act only on the advice of his elders. He ruled by consensus and, indeed, he could be destooled or dethroned for violating the trust, sanctions or taboos of the state as well as for incompetence (Boafo-Arthur, 2003), (Prah & Yeboah, 2011). Adjaye & Misawa, (2006) espouse that in the process of instituting the British colonial administration, chiefs and their councils, especially in southern Ghana and Northern Nigeria, came to dominate local administration. The colonialists strengthened the powers of some chiefs they chose and created new chiefs where none existed. Once put into practice, the policy of indirect rule led to the entrenchment of the powers of indigenous rulers and their University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 26 growth beyond the limits traditionally assigned to them. They note, however, that the autonomy of action referred to here was only in serving the colonial masters and circumventing tradition, and not in relation to the pre-colonial status of chiefs. As a result, chiefs were branded as imperialist collaborators. As I shall demonstrate later, this policy is a major cause of chieftaincy dispute in Ghana and other countries in Africa. The roles some chiefs played in the entrenchment of colonial administration, where some gave undiluted support to the colonialists and were enlisted as implementers of colonial policies, convinced modernization theorists that chieftaincy structures would wither away with time (Boafo-Arthur, 2003). Even though the institution has survived contrary to this prediction, the numerous problems - including conflicts - that have plagued it could be attributed largely to the colonial association with chieftaincy. Boafo-Arthur considers efforts to curb the powers of chiefs, especially in the immediate post- independence period could be seen as a way of revenge for the solid defence of the colonial system by chiefs. To him, it was a way of ensuring that no pockets of political power centres capable of rivalling the authority of the post-colonial state existed. The power of the post- colonial state must be absolute so the autonomy of chiefs should be subverted and thereby reduce their influence on the politics of the period. Their integration in colonial governance during the time of indirect rule, either by omission or commission, set them on a collision course with nationalist leaders even though some chiefs were highly supportive of the struggle for colonial emancipation. The Convention People’s Party (CPP) government never completely forgave the chieftaincy institution for hobnobbing with the colonialists. He presumes that Nkrumah’s position with regards to the chiefs could be explained by these factors. Nkrumah is on record to have stated: “Those of our chiefs who are with us … we do honour … those … who join forces with the [British] imperialists … there shall come a time University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 27 when they will run away fast and leave their sandals behind them” (Quoted in Boafo-Arthur, 2003). According to (Boafo-Arthur, 2003) the major challenges of the chieftaincy institution over the years have being attempts by the central government to erode the seemingly powerful position of chiefs in the country. From 1951‐1966, it was up to Kwame Nkrumah to call the tune. Contrary to his initial belief in the continuity between African ‘communalism’ and modern ‘communism’, he eventually changed the whole structure of chieftaincy by making sure that virtually all paramount chiefs in Ghana were party stalwarts (Knierzinger, 2011). Measures to facilitate the absolute dominance of the post-colonial state over the chiefs were completed with the enactment of the Chiefs (Recognition) Act of 1959 that gave power to the government to accord recognition to, or withdraw same, from any chief (Boafo-Arthur, 2003). The manipulation and curtailment of chiefly authority by central government has continued in the post-Nkrumah era in Ghana. NLC Decree 112, for instance, reversed chiefs who had held their positions thanks to the CPP (Adjaye & Misawa, 2006). The following regimes with K.A. Busia and Edward Akufo‐ Addo as the leading proponents of the chiefly elite again started a sweeping programme of conversion. In spite of the descent of these leaders, the way they instrumentalised chiefly power remained the same (Boafo-Arthur, 2003). The PNDC initially perceived chiefs as elitists who should not be allowed to play any significant role in the 31st December 1981 revolution. The class connotations of the revolutionary principles meant the conscious or unconscious nurturing of conflictual relations between chiefs and the revolutionaries, especially the so-called revolutionaries at the grassroots — the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). There were several University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 28 clashes between chiefs and the revolutionaries across the length and breadth of the nation. Whereas the chiefs regarded the revolutionaries as mere upstarts, the revolutionaries perceived the chiefs as the embodiment of the arrogance associated with traditional power (Boafo-Arthur, 2003). As a result of central government’s interference in chieftaincy, some chiefs were actually removed and new ones, who might not necessarily be royals, installed following the passage of these acts and decrees. However, following “the removal of the right that the government had reserved for itself in recognizing or derecognizing newly appointed chiefs, following the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution” (Adjaye & Misawa, 2006), some of those chiefs who were removed by the central government, or their lineage, now context their removal and the customary appropriateness of their successors who they regarded as intruders and rivals. Indeed, some of the current chieftaincy conflicts could be traced to the situation described above. There are several documentations about government interference in the conflict that is the case study of this work – the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict – since colonial period to date. It must be stressed that within the institution itself, there have been succession disputes following the death of an incumbent chief, some of which defied solution and lingered on in various forms to date (Awedoba, 2009; Boafo-Arthur, 2003). Similarly, Larbi, (2009) indentifies four sources of chieftaincy conflicts. He opines that chieftaincy is associated with political power, which also translates into the control of economic wealth in the form of stool properties such as land, mineral deposits, regalia and servants who work for the chief. The pomp and pageantry that accompany the position of the chief make the institution so attractive that, both royals and non-royals desire to use every means to ascend to the throne, thus leading to conflict. He also cites misappropriation of University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 29 communal resources, such as royalties paid to the royal house, by incumbents as a cause of these chieftaincy disputes. The third source of chieftaincy conflict adduced by Larbi is that most of the disputes in chieftaincy occur in Ghana due to lack of documentation on the mode of selection of chiefs. He argues that the wealth and dignity that go with the chieftaincy institution in Ghana has attracted many young aspirants to contest the stool/skin. On the demise, abdication or destoolment of the incumbent, there emerge various competing groups with their candidates for the stool (Larbi, 2009). Ironically there appears to be enough documentation on chieftaincy in Dagbon, especially succession to Yani, yet the conflict which, according to the literature is primarily succession conflict, is the most protracted in the North, if not in the whole country. Finally, Larbi, (2009) contends that the appointment of non-royals to stools/skins in the country provide the grounds of chieftaincy conflicts. He observes that some of these people are foreigners who are recognised as a result of their immense contribution to the state in terms of infrastructural development. In the past, slave who rendered dedicated services to their masters were sometimes incorporated into the family. Some of them were rewarded with women in the community with whom they had children. The descendants of these slaves who are now part of the royal lineage could one day emerge as at the forefront to contest the vacant position of the stool. Problems occur when some members of the royal family try to discriminate against this crop of people, sometimes referring to them as ‘intruders’ or ‘foreigners’. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 30 Boafo-Arthur, (2003) indicates that new forms of succession challenges have also emerged. He points to the growing tendency towards direct and indirect encouragement of absentee chiefs as another challenge that has cropped up as a result of the high education of chiefs and the varied expertise they possess which make it impossible for them to stay in their palaces in their areas of jurisdiction. Thus chiefs with expertise of any form practise their professions in the cities and this implies leaving their palaces for long periods. In effect, they become absentee chiefs and the problems inherent in this practice is quite enormous even though the practice cannot be halted given the demands of modern development and sound educational background required of aspirants to chieftaincy status. The most pronounced response of chiefs in this category is reliance on stool fathers or council of elders to take charge in their absence (Boafo-Arthur, 2003). The result is that the absentee chief is sometimes seen as ineffective and this creates the opportunity for others to usurp his authority and thus creating conflict situation. 2.3 Conflicts in Northern Ghana Northern Ghana refers to the three northernmost administrative regions of the country. It comprises the Northern Region, the Upper East Region and the Upper West Region. Northern Ghana shares international boundaries with Burkina Faso to the North, Togo to the east and Cote d’Ivoire to the southwest. To the south, Northern Ghana shares regional boundaries with the Brong Ahafo and the Volta Regions. During the colonial era, it was administered as one administrative region of the Gold Coast with its headquarters in Tamale and was called the Northern Territories. Upon independence, the upper region was carved out of the Northern Region with Bolgatanga as its regional capital. The Upper Region was subsequently divided into Upper East and Upper West. While the former retained Bolgatanga as its capital, the latter is headquartered in Wa (Awedoba, 2006). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 31 The three regions of the North cover a land size approximately 97702 kilometre square or 60721 square miles. The 2010 population and housing census estimate the population of the three northern regions at four million, two hundred and twenty-eight thousand, one hundred and sixteen (2,228,116) (GSS, 2010). The three northern regions are unified by shared history, culture and language; ecology and geography and are the least developed of the regions in Ghana, even if they are not the least endowed. Much of the area which is drained by the Volta River and its tributaries is dry savannah; rainfall is erratic, and without irrigation facilities, the traditional grains and some tuber crops could only be cultivated seasonally. Fertile and arable land is not evenly distributed in the North and in some parts the topography is rocky and the soil is lateritic. This arguably explains the perennial conflicts in that part of the country since conflict arguably stems from competition over scarce but valuable resources (Awedoba, 2009). A disturbing phenomenon in the political landscape of Northern Ghana during the last several decades has been the intermittent eruption of either intra- ethnic or inter-ethnic conflicts. Indeed, there have been twenty-two such conflicts between 1980 and 2002. Within the period under review, Gonja attacked and destroyed a Battor village at Kafaba in 1980 and again destroyed Tuna in that same year. Gonja was involved in wars with the Nawuris and Nchumurus in 1991, 1992 and 1994. Gonjas fought among themselves at Yapei and Kusawgu in 1992 and at Daboya in 1994. Nanumbas fought against Konkombas in 1980, 1994 and 1995. In 1991, Dagombas fought among themselves at Voggu and Zabzugu and fought Konkombas in 1995. Between 1980 and 1986 Mamprusis and Kusasis fought three times in the Bawku area. In 1988 and 1994 the Bimoba also went to war with the Kombas. Between 1999 and 2001, the Kombas fought twice among themselves. In March 2002, Dagombas University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 32 fought among themselves at Yendi during which Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, the overlord of Dagbon, together with some 40 others, lost his live. (Brukum, 2006). Table 2.1: Conflicts in Northern Ghana between 1980 and 2002. Ethnic Groups Fighting Another Battle field Year Gonja Against Battor Kafaba 1980 Gonja Against Tuna Tuna 1980 Gonja Against Nawuri, Nchumuru 1991 – 1994 Gonja Against Gonja Yapei, Kusawgu 1992 Daboya 1994 Nanumba Against Konkomba 1980,1994,1995 Dagomba Against Dagomba Voggu, Zabzugu 1991 Dagomba Against Konkomba 1995 Mamprusi Against Kusasi Bawku 1980 – 1986 Bimoba Against Konkomba 1988, 1994 Konkomba Against Konkomba 1999, 2001 Dagomba (Abudu) Against Dagomba (Andani) Yendi 2002 Source: Adapted from Brukum, 2006 Even though the immediate causes of these conflicts differ, the remote ones are similar if not the same. (Brukum, 2006) remarks that they stem from several decades of relegation of certain ethnic groups, so called “minority groups” to second rate citizens in the traditional and political administration of the Region or attempts to by-pass some “gates” in the system of rotation to the chiefship. As stated earlier, the three northern regions are the least developed of the regions in Ghana, even if they are not the least endowed. Awedoba observes that poverty and economic and social deprivation engender despondency and desperation and invariably call for coping and survival strategies of various kinds, including those that are questionable. It makes the poor resentful of the property owning sectors, while at the same time, paradoxically subject to the control of the wealthy. Thus for a pittance, youth and others in not too favourable circumstances can be induced to break custom and law rather than listen to reason. They may University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 33 indulge in behaviour risky to themselves and their neighbours because with very limited prospects, there is not much to live for anyway. The result may be real, such as death, injury, poisoned social relations, increased poverty and the like; or perceived such as spiritual mishaps. Whichever is the issue, the deprived arguably feel they have nothing to lose (after all, life is like been dead and death cannot be worse than living) and sanction, whether secular or spiritual, could not perceivably be worse than one’s current unhappy existence. Thus people who are not oblivious to the fact that their claims fly in the face of traditional norms and the canons of justice have nevertheless had no fear of consequences of their unjustified or even sacrilegious behaviours or actions, so long as there is an immediate benefit, however minute, in sight (Awedoba, 2009). Chieftaincy conflicts have been one of the main sources of communal conflicts in northern Ghana. These conflicts have been characterised by the wanton destruction of life and property, development reversals, serious abuse of human rights, suffering, especially among the vulnerable, and the relentless internal migration to the periurban periphery of Southern Ghana (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). These disputes arise over succession to a chieftaincy office as a result of the death of an incumbent chief, pitting contending royal families or lineages against each other. Sometimes too, the right of the sitting chief to continue holding himself out as the legitimate traditional ruler comes under question either due to circumstances surrounding his accession to the throne, his relationship with his people or, as stated above, due to political interference (Awedoba, 2009). Furthermore, Awedoba (2009) points out that land and boundary disputes are other common source of conflict in the northern part of Ghana. They occur over the right of ownership to land on which a communal resource stands or is to be sited. Citing as an example, he recounts that the conflict between Kandig and Nirigu in the Navrongo District was fought over what University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 34 name the health centre sited in the area should be called. He stressed that traditional leaders may be deemed to have known their boundaries but difficulties crop up when that knowledge is put to the test by the application of modern scientific measures and devices. Apart from chieftaincy and land, Awedoba, (2009) identifies religious differences, partisan politics and disagreement between communities about ‘Order of Precedence’ and abuse or over use of communal resources as conflict triggers in the North. He notes that conflicts have erupted between people holding different political views, especially during electioneering. It may begin with youths from opposing political faction or womenfolk, and then spread to others. He argues that partisan politics have usually exploited local differences, as some politicians use whatever means to achieve their objectives. On the religious front, Awedoba observes that conflict erupts between worshipers of different faiths and denominations. Each group may be persuaded that it is on the right religious path while the others are lost souls in the wilderness. He cited the conflict between the ‘Orthodox and Ahmaddist sects in Wa and its environs; the Mpaha-Kpabuso inter religious conflict among Gonjas of Kpabuso (between Al-suna and Tijjaniya Islamic sects); and the Pentecostal churches and adherents of traditional religion in some parts of the North. The tolls in terms of lives lost, injuries to residents, destruction of property including the loss of critical social and economic infrastructure that the conflicts have caused has been staggering. What is more, scarce national resources have been used to maintain peace. For instance in 1994 alone, the government of Ghana claims to have spent six billion cedis (₵ 6,000,000,000) or six hundred thousand Ghana cedis (600,000) in maintaining peace when the most devastating of the conflicts broke out (Brukum, 2006). Although much has been said about ethnic conflict in the North, little has been done to bring about lasting peace and security to that part of the country. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 35 2.4 The Dagbon Conflict To be able to understand the cause(s) of the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict, it must be situated within historical milieu of accession to Yani (the Ya-Na skin), specially from the period 1824 when Ya Na Yakubu I became Ya-Na, and in the context of political history of Ghana. 2.4.1 Succession to Yani The Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict (DCC) predates modern Ghana and its current political institutions. The conflict revolves around the two royal family lines, or ‘gates’, to the kingship: the Abudu and Andani families, which have pitched children from the same royal ancestry against each other in an internecine conflict for well over one hundred (100) years (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). Until the period 1824–1849, succession to the Ya-Na Skin was primogenital tradition of unilateral family. This however changed to an alternation of succession between the Abudu and Andani families (gates). This was done to incorporate the male descendants of Ya-Na Yakubu I’s two wives as a result of the following reason. When Ya-Na Yakubu I promoted his younger brother to the Karaga skin, a position which might enable him (his younger brother) to succeed him, his two sons, Abudulai and Andani, rebelled against their father. The princes prevailed in the war but spared the life of their father and allowed him to remain Ya- Na until his death. Princes Abudulia and Andani upon their victory seized and ascended the royal skin or kingship, of Mion and Savulgu skins, respectively and appointed their cousin, Kari Naa Adams, to the Karaga skin. After the death of Ya-Na Yakubu I, Mion Lana, Abudulia, became Ya-Na from 1849–1876 and was succeeded by his brother, Savulgu Naa, Andani from 1876–1899. Thus succession to the throne was limited to the Abudu (offspring of Naa Abudulai) and Andani (progenies of Naa Andani) families, otherwise known as Yani University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 36 gates, between whose descendant’s kingship has been rotated since the death of Ya-Na Andani in 1899. The emergence of these gates marked a pivotal era in the history of Dagbon. It is the beginning and the birthplace of the current crisis and Yani struggles in Dagbon (Mahama, 2009), (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). 2.4.2 Colonial Politics According to writers like Yakubu, (2005), Ibrahim, (2009), Awedoba, (2009), Ahorsu and Gebe (2011) and others, government interference in the Dagbon conflict started right from the first year of colonisation to date. In 1930, the British colonial government convened a conference in a bid to document Dagbon history and customary rules, particularly with respect to succession to the throne in Dagbon, and to stem the recurrent Ya-Na succession conflict. In Dagbon custom and tradition, the selection of a new Ya-Na was the responsibility of a committee of kingmakers made up of Zohe-Naa, Kuga Naa, Tugri Nam, and Gagbindana. The kingmakers consulted oracles and soothsayers to determine which of the eligible candidates’ (occupants of Yani gate skins) reign as Ya-Na would bring peace and prosperity to Dagbon. However in 1948, a Select Committee of eleven chiefs was established, as replacement for the previous tradition of four kingmakers, with the influence of the colonial authorities, after they had tried various ways of getting literate princes to succeed deceased chief without success. The Selection Committee was made up of seven divisional chiefs in addition to the four kingmakers. These were Gushie Naa, Yelzoli Lana, Nanton Naa, Gulkpe Naa, Sunson Naa, Tolon Naa, and Kumbun Naa. In spite of the changes, the two royal families alternated the succession until 1954 when the Gbonlana (regent) Abudulai, a member of Abudu family, was selected by the committee to succeed his father Ya-Na Mahama III. Under the Selection University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 37 Committee the old system that limited candidates to the occupants of the three-gate skins of Kraga, Savelagu and Mion was abolished (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011), (Yakubu, 2005). 2.4.3 From Independence to 1993 The conflict between the two Gates dates back to pre-independence era and had drawn virtually every government, since the colonisation of Dagbon, into it either to attempt to solve the problem or take political capital out of it. Following the installation of Ya-Na Abudulai III, the Andani family felt marginalised by the Selection Committee scheme and sought redress at the Dagbon State Council to no avail. After independence, the Andani family - a traditional ally of the ruling Convention People’s Party (CPP) government - petitioned against the perceived injustices by the Abudu family. The Andani family, under the House of Chiefs Act 1958, filed an appeal against the ruling of the Dagbon State Council (DSC). They called for the deskinment of Ya Na Abudulai III for not being properly enskined according to Dagbon traditions (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). The CPP set up the Justice Opoku-Afari Commission to investigate the crisis. The Commission upheld the submission of the Andani gate and advised that Na Abudulai III be deskined but, upon further consultations and for political expediency, the government rather passed, in 1960, the Legislative Instrument No. 59 (1960 LI 59) that, among other things, restored the Abudu–Andani rotational succession system. It also recommended that in addition to the chieftaincy rotating to the Andani on the death of Na Abudulai III, the Andani should have two successive chieftaincy terms to rectify past irregularities in the rotations that favoured the Abudu Gate (Yakubu, 2005), (Mahama, 2009). The LI stated trhat: “….it is hereby directed with immediate effect from the date hereof that: University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 38 1: Succession to the Yendi skin shall be in rotation among the Abudulai and the Andani ruling families. 2: Persons who are eligible to occupy the Skin shall be the sons of the deceased or former Ya-Nas and who occupy one of the Skins of the towns of Mion, Savelugu, and Karaga; and accordingly sons of deceased or former Ya-Nas occupying skins other than those specified in this paragraph shall not be eligible for appointment to the Yendi Skin. 3: Whenever the present occupant of the Yendi Skin ceases to occupy the skin by reason of his death or any other customary cause, the person holding the title of Mion Lana at the date of this Order and who hails from the Andani family shall be the next Ya-Na. In the event of the present Mion Lana predeceasing the present Ya-Na, the next Mion Lana who shall be from the Andani family shall occupy the Ya-Na Skin. 4:Whenever the present Mion Lana dies his sons shall be regarded as the sons of a former Ya-Na and thereby qualified for the Ya-Na Skin in the terms of paragraph(2) herein irrespective of whether or not he occupied the Ya-Na Skin before his death. 5: Candidates from the Abudulai family having twice in succession occupied the Ya-Na Skin, candidate from the Andani family shall occupy the skin twice in succession beginning with the death of Ya-Na Abudulai III and thenceforth the customary law of succession by rotation shall proceed in the normal way: that is to say from the Abudulai family and thence from the Andani family. 6: In order to facilitate the application of the rule of the alternation between the two ruling families of the Abudulai and Andani, there shall at any one time be at least one member from either family on one or other of the three skins of Mion, Savelugu and Karaga. Whenever two candidates from either family become eligible simultaneously for appointment to the Yendi Skin, the senior one (i.e. the one who first occupied the skin of a ‘Gate’) shall be nominated for the skin.’’ (Quoted from Yakubu, 2005) University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 39 Unfortunately, the CPP government of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was deposed in a military coup d’état on February 24, 1966 by the National Liberation Council (NLC). In November 1968, the Mion Lana Andani was reported unanimously selected by the Selection Committee to be enskinned as Ya-Na Andani III following death of Ya-Na Abudulai III in September 1967. It appeared that the rotational succession system had been upheld and that the crisis was finally resolved. However, fourteen chiefs of the Dagbon State Council (DSC) later countered that they had actually chosen the Abudu Gbonlana as king. Nevertheless, Ya-Na Andani III was enskinned. A petition was presented to the NLC on behave of the DSC for the revocation of L.I. 59. It is suggested that after two successive Abudu Kings with the advantage of appointing chiefs, it appeared the DSC was dominated by pro-Abudu chiefs. The NLC set aside the LI 59 and commissioned the Mate-Kole Committee to inquire into the crisis (Yakubu, 2005; Mahama, 2009; Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). Ya-Na Andani III died in March 1969. Under LI 59, he would have been succeeded by an Andani, but instead the matter was to be resolved pending the completion of the Mate-Kole Committee’s enquiry. The Mate-Kole Committee’s report which was made public on 4th September 1969 a day after the Progress Party (PP) government assumed power, and following from the report, reversed the LI 59 of 1960 and declared the enskinment of Na Mahama Andani null and void. The Mate-Kole Report resulted in fighting between the two families. On 9th September 1969, the Abudu family, aided a heavily armed police and military contingent, forcibly ejected the Andani family members, who were in the Gbewaa Palace to perform the funeral rites of Ya-Na Andani III. According to the records, over twenty-three (23) members of the Andani family were killed. This was followed by the enskinment of a member of the Abudu gate, Mahamadu Abudulai, as Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV (Yakubu, 2005). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 40 The National Redemption Council (NRC) overthrew the PP government in 1972. The new military government, after receiving petitions from the Andani Gate, instituted the 1972 Ollenu Committee to probe the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute and determine the legitimacy of the enskinment of both Ya-Na Andani III and Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV. The 1974 Ollenu Committee’s report called for the recognition of (the deceased) Andani III as the rightfully enskined Ya-Na and the deskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai IV. The committee’s report supported the rotational procedure of succession. The NRC government later passed a decree, NRCD 299 that prohibited all courts from adjudicating issues pertaining to the Dagbon Chieftaincy, especially the deskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai IV. The decree appeared to have laid the Dagbon Crisis to rest by gagging the Ghanaian public (Ahorsu & Gebe, 2011). Following a palace coup that brought Supreme Military Council (SMC) II to power in 1978, Abudu Yili presented a petition to the government in May, 1979. The government granted them the right to appeal the findings of the Ollennu Committee of Inquiry. However, on June 4 th , 1979, the SMC II of Lieutenant General F. W. K. Akuffo was toppled by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawlings. On September 24 th , 1979 the AFRC handed over to the People’s National Party (PNP) led by Dr. Hilla Limann during which time (in 1981), the Abudu Yili won the right to appeal the findings of the Ollennu Committee and subsequently won the appeal in the Appeals Court of Ghana. The PNP government was ousted in a coup d’état on December 31 st , 1981 by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by J.J. Rawlings. The court case on the Yendi Skin Dispute, however, continued in the courts. The Appeals Court found that the selection of Ya- Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV by the selection committee was valid and legitimate according to the constitution and tradition of University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 41 Dagbon; and that the findings of the Ollennu Committee of enquiry which recommended the deskinment of Ya-Na Mahamadu Abudulai IV be abrogated. Andani Yili then, appealed the decision of the Appeals Court in the Supreme Court of Ghana. The Supreme Court ruled, in 1986 by a vote of six to one, in favour of Andani Yili setting aside the ruling of the Court of Appeal. The PNDC then repealed NRCD 299 and set up a tripartite committee made up of representatives of the two families and the government. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Ghana brought the twists and turns involving the Yendi Skins to an end at least, during the revolutionary period of the 1980s (Wikipedia, 2013). 2.4.4 The Fourth Republic The Abudus and Andanis are believed to be close allies of either of the pre-independence political traditions in Ghana - Nkrumaist tradition represented by the CPP and the Danquah/Busia tradition represented by the UP. While the Abudus have been traditionally associated with the UP, the Andanis are pro-CPP. It is alleged that anytime either of the traditions is in power 5 , each of the gates finds reasons to be apprehensive or to advance their cause. However, the relative long period of the PNDC regime, the apparent melange of both traditions in the regime and the position adopted by the regime on the Dagbon issue left either gate no clear opportunity to openly agitate. When the ban on partisan politics was lifted in 1992, the Danquah/Busia club of the UP tradition formed the New Patriotic Party (NPP) while Eagle Club of the PNDC transformed itself into the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Unlike the NPP, the NDC had no pre- independence political root and therefore had to draw support from the two main traditions, thus had their followers from both the Abudus and Adanis. This obvious break in the Abudu 5 Though military regimes do not openly declare the alliance or membership to/or of any of these political traditions, their perceived or real alliance with either of the traditions is seen in the tradition they overthrow or the tradition which their civilian members belong. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 42 and Andani fronts by the NDC helped to smother the chieftaincy crisis for a while. The NDC therefore had no party position on the Dagbon chieftaincy and this attitude effectively contained the crisis during the first two terms of their rule in the Fourth Republic (Yakubu, 2005). The NPP on the other hand, had the main Abudu faction who were already with the Danquah/Busia club in their folks and, as was in the 1979 elections, picked Mr R. Alhassan (an Abudu) as their presidential running mate. This, according to Yakubu (2005) gave tacit recognition to the Abudus (or better still Dagombas) as the second force in the party after Ashantis or Akans. All this while, the Dagbon chieftaincy crisis was relegated to the background and most people thought it was forgotten (Yakubu, 2005). As a result of the Great Alliance (GA) the NPP formed with other opposition parties including CPP and NCP (National Convention Party). The NCP leader Mr. K. N. Arkaah was chosen to partner their presidential candidate. However, in the 2000 elections, there was no alliance and the NPP return to the practice of choosing an Abudu as their running mate. The ‘ax’ fell on Alhaji Aliu Mahama. During the presidential run-off between the NDC and NPP that year, the CPP in Dagbon, led by Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama (an Andani) threw their weight behind the NPP. In fact, it was reported that Alhaji Ibrahim and Alhaji Aliu Mahama were together on Savanna FM encouraging Dagombas to vote for the NPP. Everybody at this point thought chieftaincy was a thing of the past in Dagbon, except of course, one young NDC supporter who continued to warn that “every vote cast for the NPP amounted to a bullet short at the Ya-Na” (Yakubu, 2005). The Abudu family became a different group of people when their traditional political allies, the Danquah/Busia tradition, represented by the NPP came to power. Nonetheless, the Vice University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 43 President, Alhaji Aliu Mahama, kept his word and brought both the Abudus and Andans very close to himself. It was rumoured that some of his close Abudu associates were not very comfortable with the way he was so close to the Andanis, some of whom were always found in his entourage at functions. In the one year that the NPP was in power before the violence at Yendi, they had managed to get the Andanis to feel very much at home in the NPP government. Most of the prominent Andanis in the CPP actually applied for NPP founding members’ card (Yakubu, 2005), (Mahama, 2009). However some cracks started to appear when the Bolinlan, the Regent of the deceased former Ya –Na Mahammadu Abudulai IV, decided to celebrate the Eid-ul-Adha festival in Yendi for the first time since he became the Regent after the death of his father in 1988. Ya-Na Yakubu II was taken aback by this development and resolved to resist any such challenge to his authority in the future. Around that same time the issue about the funeral of the Bolin Lana’s father also began to emerge (Yakubu, 2005). Tension therefore started to brew between the two families and resulted in violent clashes that culminated into the murder of the Ya-Na and forty others. Since then the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict has become a topical issue in the Ghanaian politics with both the NDC and the NPP making political capital out of it. The measures taken to resolve the conflict and how they tend out are the subject matter of chapter four of this study. 2.5 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Ghana In his analysis of theoretical perspective on conflict transformation, Reimann, (nd) identifies three distinctive but interrelated approaches to conflict management: conflict settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. He argues that for a proper understanding of these three approaches, it is crucial to realise that they should not be viewed as distinct, single University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 44 and all-comprehensive theoretical systems. He wonders whether such isolated systems would even be attainable given the multidisciplinary and heterogeneous underpinning of all three approaches. Rather, they are more fruitfully understood as interrelated. Reimann defines conflict settlement as outcome oriented strategies for achieving sustainable win-win solutions and/or putting an end to direct violence, without necessarily addressing the underlying conflict causes. Although violent fighting is suppressed, the underlying causes of the violence remain largely unaddressed. Moreover, conflict settlement approaches typically focus on mediations betw