A fi 1 d o d r © J K 1 m e d n i b t f e e M 2 h A ( h 1 HOSTED BY Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 Does development finance pose an additional risk to monetary policy? Haruna Issahaku a,∗, Simon K. Harvey b, Joshua Y. Abor b a Department of Economics and Entrepreneurship Development, Faculty of Integrated Development Studies, University for Development Studies, Ghana b Department of Finance, University of Ghana Business School, Legon, Ghana Available online 3 August 2016 bstract This study investigates whether remittances entail extra risk for macroeconomic policy management and examines the role (if any) that the nancial system can play in the interaction between remittances and monetary policy. Employing panel data for 106 developing countries from 970 to 2013, the results from our panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model reveal that remittance volatility reduces macroeconomic risk in eveloping countries while simultaneously stimulating a reduction in domestic interest rates. This finding remains robust to alternative specifications f remittance volatility and monetary policy risk and to variations in the degree of financial development. The key lesson from this study is that eveloping countries can leverage the positive impact of remittances in reducing macroeconomic instability by implementing policies that induce emittances. 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. EL classification: F33; F34; F35; O11 eywords: Remittances; Monetary policy; Developing countries; Financial development; Panel vector auto regression (PVAR) m r m 2 a 2 d m p p s w b H t A R . Introduction Remittances have become an important source of develop- ent finance. Thus, it is not surprising that remittances have ngaged the attention of researchers, policy makers, global evelopment financial institutions and other development part- ers. While policymakers continue to look to researchers for deas to use remittances more effectively, research in this area has een clustered around the microeconomic implications of remit- ances (Ncube and Brixiova, 2013). These micro-level studies ocus on the role of remittances in poverty reduction (Acosta t al., 2008, 2007; Adams, 2004; Adams and Page, 2005; Gupta t al., 2009), child growth (Antón, 2010; Carletto et al., 2011; ansuri, 2006), employment (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 006; McCormick and Wahba, 2000; Taylor, 1999), and house- old expenditures and investment (Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010; dams, 2006; Yang, 2008), to name a few.∗ rCorresponding author. E-mail addresses: iharuna@uds.edu.gh (H. Issahaku), sharvey@ug.edu.gh b S.K. Harvey), joshabor@ug.edu.gh (J.Y. Abor). ( Peer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute. t ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2016.06.001 879-9337/© 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. AThus, a gap remains in the empirical literature regarding the acroeconomic implications of remittances. Even the limited esearch on the macro-level impact of remittances has focused ainly on remittances’ impact on growth (Barajas et al., 009; Chami et al., 2012; Fayissa and Nsiah, 2010; Ncube nd Brixiova, 2013; Nsiah and Fayissa, 2011; Pradhan et al., 008; Waheed, 2004). Nonetheless, for policymakers in both eveloping and emerging economies, gaining insight into the acroeconomic influence of remittances is fundamental for utting their countries on the path towards accelerated and pro- oor growth (Ncube and Brixiova, 2013). In particular, the impact of remittances on monetary policy eems to have eluded the attention of empirical researchers, hich has resulted in a limited understanding of the relationship etween remittances and monetary policy (Vacaflores, 2012). owever, economists have recently begun to test the existence of he link between remittances and monetary policy (Adenutsi and hortor, 2008; Chami et al., 2008; Mandelman and Zlate, 2012; uiz and Vargas-Silva, 2010; Vacaflores, 2012). As limited as the esearch in this field is, the evidence that has been uncovered has een rather contradictory. For instance, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2010) examine the Mexican context and find no significant rela- ionship between remittances and domestic monetary policy, ll rights reserved. 9 velop a v s i r c w R t s f i c n w i n p w i t s p 0 t M m G s d m c e E t V a P o t u g v a c c i c f o ( c w t r m o l v m t d a t e w r e m m s c s R s f k t a m m a t w o a C l r P v o p o d d d h a d r 2 H. Issahaku et al. / Review of De lthough Adenutsi and Ahortor (2008) had earlier revealed a ignificant relationship between monetary policy variables and emittances in Ghana. This confusion has been exacerbated by the proposition by uiz and Vargas-Silva (2010, p. 174) that remittances that are mall relative to the size of the economy will not have an mpact on monetary policy. ‘If these flows are not large and/or ot significant given the total size of the economy, then their mpact on variables such as inflation, exchange rates and out- ut will be minimal’. However, if the size of remittances is so mportant, then why would they matter to monetary policy in a mall economy, such as Ghana’s, in which they constitute only .4% of GDP and why would they be rather insignificant in exico where remittances add up to approximately 2.0% of DP? Furthermore, the previous literature on the interaction of onetary policy and remittances consists mostly of single- ountry studies: El-Sakka and McNabb (1999) focused on gypt, Adenutsi and Ahortor (2008) on Ghana, Ruiz and argas-Silva (2010) on Mexico, and Mandelman (2013) on the hilippines. The problem with single-country studies is that hey do not allow for wider applicability of the knowledge they enerate. The previous literature on the subject on the whole lso does not allow for the potential moderating effect of finan- ial development in the remittance-monetary policy nexus. For nstance, financial markets are known to play an intermediary unction in the link between capital flows and economic growth Agbloyor et al., 2014; Osabuohien and Efobi, 2013). However, ill this moderating role hold in the case of the monetary policy- emittance link? This question is one of the unresolved issues n the topic. Notwithstanding the perceived linkages among macroecono- ic policy, remittances and the financial system, financial and evelopment economists have been largely silent on this tripar- ite nexus. In our literature search in connection with this study, e have yet to encounter a study that examines the interactive ffect of monetary policy and remittances on financial develop- ent and the interactive effect of remittances and the financial ystem on monetary policy efficiency. Thus, we have been pre- ented with a fertile opportunity for research, and the present tudy exploits this opportunity and fills this void. In this paper, we employ panel vector autoregression (PVAR) o overcome endogeneity problems; to establish causality among onetary policy, remittances and other macroeconomic vari- bles; and to generate orthogonalised impulse responses. We hen use generalised impulse responses to identify the effects f remittance shocks on monetary policy. Unlike the usual holesky impulse responses, the use of generalised impulse esponses helps us generate shocks that do not vary with the ariable ordering. We employ country-level panel data (annual) from 106 devel- ping countries to analyse the dynamics of monetary policy ecisions and remittance inflows. In the main, we investigate ow remittance volatility affects monetary policy volatility. We a rgue that if remittances flows are indeed countercyclical to the r omestic economy, then remittance volatility must be negatively w elated to the monetary policy rate and to monetary policy rate tment Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 olatility. In addition, a contractionary domestic monetary pol- cy must trigger a remittance inflow that is consistent with the ountercyclical view of remittances. To test the first hypothesis, e compute the five-year rolling standard deviation of remit- ances and the monetary policy rate and model them in a PVAR ramework. To test the second hypothesis, we simulate monetary ontraction following the Mundell–Fleming–Dornbusch model ithin the framework of Cholesky innovations and orthogo- alised generalised impulse response functions. In so doing, e document a significant negative relationship between remit- ances and remittance volatility, on one hand, and monetary olicy rate and monetary policy volatility, on the other. In addi- ion, controlling for the level of financial development and the agnitude of remittances does not nullify this relationship, thus upporting our claim that remittance volatility reduces both omestic interest rates and monetary policy risk. Our paper contributes in a number of ways to the financial conomics discipline. First, the use of PVAR helps us to analyse he dynamics of domestic monetary policy and remittances, in ddition to country-specific fixed effects at the same time. Sec- nd, the use of orthogonalised impulse responses enables us to niquely isolate the impact of shocks from each of the system ariables on the other variables, one at a time. Our paper further extends the frontiers of knowledge in finan- ial economics by presenting new evidence showing that a ontractionary domestic monetary policy will activate the inflow f remittances. We also add to those recent panel data studies that onfirm a causal connection between monetary policy and remit- ances (see, Termos et al., 2013; Vacaflores, 2012). Although ost previous studies focus on remittances and monetary policy evels, we take the step further to examine the dynamics in the olatilities of the two variables. In particular, we find that remit- ances and remittance volatility reduce the domestic interest rate nd monetary volatility. Our results are in line with Craigwell t al. (2010) and Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011), who find that emittances reduce receiving countries’ macroeconomic risks. Our paper also contributes to the recent debate on the inter- ediary function of financial development in the link between apital flows and growth (see, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; amirez, 2013). This literature shows that remittances substitute or financial markets in economic growth when capital mar- ets are shallow. Our results are consistent with this literature nd scales up the analysis to cover how finance enhances the itigating impact of remittances on economic policy risk. This paper is also related to Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011), ho analyse the impact of remittances on output volatility. These uthors employ an instrumental variable approach to estab- ish causality between the two variables. Unlike Bugamelli and aternÒ (2011), however, we explore the effects of remittances n interest rates and monetary policy risk. We argue that out- ut is only an objective of monetary policy and that a more irect assessment of the effect of remittances on monetary con- itions is therefore required. In addition, whereas Bugamelli nd PaternÒ (2011) focus on remittances, we examine both emittances and remittance volatility. In terms of measurement, hereas Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011) measure volatility in erms of deviations from the mean, we employ five-year rolling velop s m l t r b a f d e a t s t e i m t i m e e m a t f b t t d u m J i a d t l g fi s s f D r i e i d a p a v t P a r m Y S 2 w i 2 a p 2 e D s a Y l c s k a t o t q b ( H. Issahaku et al. / Review of De tandard deviations to diminish the distortionary impact of out- iers. Craigwell et al. (2010) also assess the association among emittance, output, investment and consumption volatility using panel fixed effects methodology. However, their methodology oes not allow them to generate impulse responses, which we see s critical for separating the effects of remittance shocks from hocks related to economic fundamentals. Unlike Craigwell t al. (2010) we interact remittances with financial develop- ent to assess remittances’ impact on macroeconomic policy mpulses. Within this framework, we uncover a potential mod- rating role of financial markets in reducing volatilities in both onetary policy and remittances. We are further able to simulate he influence of contractionary monetary policy on remittance ehaviour. Lastly, from a theoretical standpoint, this study lays the foun- ation for the development of theory on the tripartite nexus of onetary policy-remittances-financial development. Uncover- ng the theoretical underpinnings of this tripartite nexus will help eveloping countries’ policymakers to devise policies that will et them get the most out of monetary policy, remittances, and nancial development for socio-economic advancement. The tudy seeks to answer the following three main questions. (1) o remittances pose additional macroeconomic (monetary pol- cy) risk in developing countries? (2) Do monetary conditions n the recipient country affect remittance inflows? (3) What role oes the financial system play in the link between monetary olicy and remittances? The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sec- ion 2, we specify our panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model nd describe the variables used. In Section 3, we present our esults and a discussion on diagnostic exercises, PVAR esti- ates, and the Cholesky and generalised impulse responses. ection 4 concludes the paper. . Methodological approach .1. The model Economists model economic issues in multilateral interde- endency settings in two main ways (Canova and Ciccarelli, 013). The first option is to develop dynamic stochastic general quilibrium (DSGE) models. However, although well-specified SGE models provide precise solutions to policy questions and implify the welfare implications of economic policy (Canova nd Ciccarelli, 2013), their restrictive assumptions make them argely unsuitable for analysing economic issues in a developing ountry context. In particular, assumptions such as optimal risk haring, consumption smoothening, homogenous labour mar- ets, full employment, complete markets and rationality that nchor a typical DSGE model are largely untenable in the con- ext of developing countries (Senbeta, 2011). Moreover, certain f the restrictions of the DSGE are often not consistent with he distributional characteristics of the dataset, with the conse- uence that policy recommendations from such models might m e misleading (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). e The second option is to develop panel vector autoregressive u PVAR) models that avoid most of the restrictive assumptions [ment Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 93 ade in the DSGE models. The PVAR advantage derives from he advantages of mother VAR models. First, all variables can e treated as endogenous, but there is also the added flexibility or including truly exogenous variables. Thus, PVARs resolve ndogeneity, one of the most serious problems of econometric ime series and panel data analysis. Second, PVARs facilitate he analysis of the impact of innovations, making room for nteractions among variables and thus producing dynamic solu- ions that are not often attainable via OLS and other standard odels (Li et al., 2012). The set of restrictions required in mod- lling dynamic interdependencies using PVARs is not so limiting s in DSGE models (Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). Forecasts rom VAR models are often more accurate than forecasts from raditional structural models. PVARs can accommodate mul- iple cointegration vectors, as opposed to Johansen (1988), nlike the maximum likelihood cointegration procedure and the ohansen and Juselius (1990) test for co-integration (Ericsson nd Irandoust, 2004). PVARs permit the inclusion of fixed effects hat capture country-specific time-invariant effects as well as lobal time-invariant effects, and they can effectively handle hort time dimensions due to extra degrees of freedom gained rom the inclusion of cross-sections; moreover, by using impulse esponse functions, PVARs can show delayed effects on (and of) ach variable in the system (Grossmann et al., 2014). The PVAR model is a mixture of the conventional VAR pproach – in which all variables are considered endogenous priori – and the panel data approach in which unobserved indi- idual heterogeneous effects are accommodated. The baseline VAR model is represented below. ∑p it = B0i(t) + αitYit−k + uit (1) k=1 here Yit is a vector of K endogenous variables for each country, = 1, . . ., N over t = 1, . . ., T time periods. In this study, Yit is given s: ⎡ ⎤ σ ⎢ r MPRit ⎢ ⎥⎢ σrREMIT ⎥⎢ it ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥ REER ⎥ ⎢ it ⎥⎢ TRADE ⎥⎢ it ⎥ = ⎢⎢ ⎥ FDI it ⎢ it ⎥ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥LCPI ⎥ ⎢⎢ it ⎥⎥ ⎢⎢ DCPS⎢ it ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎣⎢ LGDP ⎥it ⎦ GDPgit All variables are defined in Table 1. Boi(t) captures all deter- inistic components (including constants, seasonal dummies, tc.), Yit−k are lagged values of the endogenous variables, and it is a K × 1 vector of random disturbances given by uit = u1t , u2t , . . ., uNt]′∼iid(0, Σ). αit and Boi(t) are allowed to be 94 H. Issahaku et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 Table 1 Description of variables. Variable Notation Description Data source Economic openness TRADE Total trade as a ratio of GDP WDI Financial development DCPS Domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP WDI Remittances (2) LREMITT Logarithm of total remittance receipts WDI Remittances (1) REMIT Personal remittances as a ratio of GDP WDI Monetary policy rate MPR The central bank’s policy rate IFS Lending interest rate LRATE Logarithm of the lending interest rate WDI Inflation rate LCPI Logarithm of the consumer price index (CPI) WDI Market size LGDP Logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) WDI Economic business cycles GDPg Growth rate of GDP WDI Foreign direct investment FDI Foreign direct investment as a ratio of GDP WDI Macroeconomic (in)stability (1) σrLCPI Five-year rolling standard deviation of the CPI WDI Macroeconomic (in)stability (2) σrLCPI Standard deviation of the CPI calculated in the standard manner WDI Macroeconomic (in)stability (3) σ2 r LCPI Five-year rolling variance of remittances as a ratio of GDP WDI Macroeconomic (in)stability (4) σ2 s LCPI Variance of remittances as a ratio of GDP calculated in the standard manner WDI Monetary policy risk (1) σrMPR Five-year rolling standard deviation of the monetary policy rate WDI Monetary policy risk (2) σsMPR Standard deviation of the monetary policy rate calculated in the standard manner WDI Monetary policy risk (3) σ2r MPR Five-year rolling variance of the monetary policy rate WDI Monetary policy 2 risk (4) σs MPR Variance of the monetary policy rate calculated in the standard manner WDI Monetary policy risk (5) σ2r LRATE Five-year rolling variance of the lending interest rate WDI Remittance risk (1) σrREMIT Five-year rolling standard deviation of remittances WDI Remittance risk (2) σsREMIT Standard deviation of remittances calculated in the standard manner WDI Remittance risk (3) σ2r REMIT Five-year rolling variance of remittances as a ratio of GDP WDI Remittance risk (4) σ2s REMIT Variance of remittances calculated in the standard manner WDI Monetary freedom MONEY FREEDOM Heritage Foundation’s (HF) measure of monetary freedom HF M broad N rs; H c 2 a i Y a e M w o R fi c i σ c v a i p a a Y ( W v d oney supply LBMS Logarithm of ote: IFS, International Financial Statistics; WDI, World Development Indicato ross-sectionally dependent. In the event that exogenous vari- bles are present, Eq. (1) becomes: ∑p it = B0i(t) + αitYit−k + Di(l)Rt + uit (2) k=1 here Di,j are K × M matrices for each lag j = 1, . . ., q, and t is an M × 1 vector of exogenous variables common to all ountries i. Eqs. (1) and (2) have three main distinguishing character- stics. First, they have Dynamic Interdependencies, which are aptured by incorporating the lagged values of the endogenous ariables. Second, they have Static Interdependencies, where uit re allowed to be correlated with the cross-sectional dimension . Cross-sectional Heterogeneity, where the intercept and slope arameters and the variances of the shocks are permitted to vary cross units (countries). Alternatively, based on Love and Zicchino (2006), we might lso specify the PVAR in reduced form as follows: ∑p it = αitYit−k + τ2Ri + fi + dc,t + eit (3) k=1 The inclusion of exogenous variables (Ri) differentiates Eq. 3) above from the specification by Love and Zicchino (2006).hereas fi captures fixed effects – country-specific unobser- able time-invariant effects, dc,t captures country-specific time i ummies that represent macro shocks specific to each country. i money supply as a ratio of GDP WDI F, Heritage Foundation. .2. Empirical specification of the model Based on Eqs. (1) and (2), we specify the model equations nvolving remittance and monetary policy in this section, as they re the two most important variables in this study. The model quations involving these two variables are specified below. onetary policy risk can be specified as a function of the lags f endogenous variables while controlling for country-specific xed and time specific effects as follows: ∑p ∑p rMPRit = ∅1jσrMPRit−j + ∅2jσrREMITit−j j=1 j=1 ∑p ∑p + ∅3jLGDPit−j + ∅4jTRADEit−j j=1 j=1 ∑p ∑p + ∅5jGDPgit−j + ∅6jLCPIit−j j=1 j=1 ∑p ∑p + ∅7jDCPSit−j + ∅8jREERit−j j=1 j=1 ∑p ∑p + ∅9jMPR.FDit−j + ∅10jREMIT.FDit−j j=1 j=1 + fi + dt + eit (4) is the country subscript while t is a time subscript; σrMPRit s the monetary policy risk for country i at time t; σrREMITit−j velop i o r i o i l i i G i fi m fi i a a R c fi a c m d p u d t c a σ n r y t fi t a C r ( t f v T 3 w m m 2 s c i o v n R ( t i o t p i b p 4 W T s ‘ i H. Issahaku et al. / Review of De s the lag of remittance volatility; REERit−j is the lag of the eal effective exchange rate; TRADEit−j is the lag of economic penness, proxied by the share of trade in GDP; LCPIit−j is the ag of inflation, proxied by the logarithm of the consumer price ndex; LGDPit−j is the lag of the log of real GDP; LGDPgit−j s the lag of the real GDP growth rate; DCPSit−j is the lag of nancial development, proxied by total credit provided by the nancial sector as a proportion of GDP; MPR.FDit−j is an inter- ction term between monetary policy and financial development; EMIT.FDit−j is an interaction term between remittances and nancial development; fi captures the country i-specific inter- ept representing country-specific fixed effects; dt captures time ummies; and eit is the noise error term. Similarly, remittance volatility can be specified as the main ependent variable as follows. ∑p ∑p rREMITit = θ1jσrMPRit−j + θ2jσrREMITit−j j=1 j=1 ∑p ∑p + θ3jREERit−j + θ4jTRADEit−j j=1 j=1 ∑p ∑p + θ5jLGDPit−j + θ6jGDPgit−j j=1 j=1 ∑p ∑p + θ7jLCPIit−j + θ8jDCPSit−j j=1 j=1 ∑p + θ9jMPR.FDit−j j=1 ∑p + θ10jREMIT.FDit−j j=1 + o fi + do o t + eit (5) here all variables are as defined under Eq. (4) above. .3. Data and variable selection Apart from the monetary policy rate (MPR), which was btained from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Inter- ational Financial Statistics (IFS), and Monetary Freedom MONEY FREEDOM), which was obtained from the Her- tage Foundation (HF), all other variables were sourced from he World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). We nclude 106 developing countries around the world in our sam- le, and these countries are listed in Table A1 in the appendix. e use an unbalanced panel (annual data) from 1970 to 2013. wo main factors informed our selection of countries for the tudy. First and foremost, in deciding which countries are in the 3 Developing Country’ category we used the IMF list of develop- ng countries,1 which is the most widely accepted classification U ( 1 We used the list captured in the 2013 World Economic Outlook reports. iment Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 95 f countries. Secondly, for a country to be selected for the study, t must have sufficient data for the main variables for the study, ncluding remittances, monetary policy rate and/or the lending nterest, and financial development (private credit as a ratio of DP). The central bank’s monetary policy rate (MPR) is used as the ain measure of monetary policy. We use this variable because t reflects the reactions of the monetary authorities to domestic nd international economic conditions. The policy rate is also onsidered the indicative interest rate in the domestic economy, nd all other interest rates are fixed with respect to it. To capture onetary policy risk we compute the standard deviations of the olicy rate (σrMPR) with a five-year rolling window and also se the normal standard deviation (σsMPR) (deviations from he mean) for robustness checks. Further robustness checks are onducted later using the five-year moving variance (σ 2 r MPR) nd normal variance (σ 2s MPR) in the MPR. We measure remittances (REMIT) as the share of total inter- ational remittance inflows in GDP. Analogously, we measure emittance risk (volatility) in four similar ways – as the five- ear moving standard deviation of remittances (σrREMIT), as he normal standard deviation of remittances (σsREMIT), as the ve-year rolling variance 2 of remittances (σr REMIT), and as he normal variance of remittances (σ 2s REMIT). Standard devi- tions of remittances have been employed in previous studies by raigwell et al. (2010) and Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011). Inflation is proxied by the log of the CPI, and the five-year olling standard deviation of CPI is used to proxy for economic in)stability. We use the log of GDP to measure market size and he growth rate of GDP as a measure of changes in economic ortunes (business cycle effects). The description of all of the ariables, data sources and associated notations are reported in able 1. . Results and discussion Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. Because the ean is susceptible to distortions from outliers, we use the edian of the distribution for our discussion. Median con- umer inflation (CPI) is quite high (46.44%), which signals high ommodity prices in developing countries. The measure of the nterest rate, the monetary policy rate (MPR), has a high median alue, indicating the high cost of funds in the developing world. emittances as a percentage of GDP is 1.86, which signals he increasing significance of remittances as a source of devel- pment finance in developing economies. When channelled roperly, these receipts could facilitate economic development y increasing GDP growth (GDPg) above the median value of .28%. .1. Model selection and estimationThe criteria for model selection is presented in Table 3. sing the model selection criteria suggested by Andrews and Lu 2001), the preferred model is a first-order panel VAR because t yields the minimum values for MBIC, MAIC and MHQ. On 96 H. Issahaku et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 Table 2 Descriptive statistics. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev. Jarque–Bera Prob. Obs. CPI 48.64 46.44 288.65 0.00 37.59 119.66 0.00 3471 DCPS 30.06 23.72 165.72 0.80 23.89 6464.97 0.00 3727 FDI 3.10 1.62 53.81 0.06 5.05 90,601.72 0.00 3608 MPR 12.62 8.99 200.00 0.020 16.33 111,015.40 0.00 654 REMIT 4.69 1.86 106.48 0.00 9.02 247,713.10 0.00 3197 GDPg 3.85 4.28 88.96 -5.0E + 01 5.84 69,195.00 0.00 3902 TRADE 75.26 68.59 375.38 6.32 40.12 2080.32 0.00 3715 Note: MPR, monetary policy rate; REMIT, remittances; GDPg, gross domestic produ total trade; DCPS, domestic credit provided to the private sector. Table 3 f Selection order criteria. o Lag MBIC MAIC MHQ 1 −273.4472 −85.9615 −161.5667 3 2 −184.3375 −59.3469 −109.7505 3 −94.8601 −32.3649 −57.5666 N v c e r p t d w i p s c 3 t ( 3 d r p e o t a t T a m t r t l p B ( s s a i v m t f e h d a e p e s r s t I s r e tively related to remittances, which suggests that FDI acts as an a p l ote: MBIC, modified Bayesian criteria, MAIC, modified Akaike information riteria; MHQ, modified Hannan–Quinn information criteria. he basis of the results of the model selection criteria (Table 3), e fit a first-order panel VAR. Our PVAR models are all exactly identified, and for that rea- on, Hansen’s J statistic of over-identifying restrictions is not omputed. Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 repetitions is used o produce 5% error bands for impulse response functions. .2. Results of panel unit root test In time series and panel data analyses, it is important to xplore the order of variable integration. The stationarity sta- us (the order of integration) of the variables helps to choose he appropriate model for estimating the coefficients. There are dvantages to deploying panel unit root tests over individual ime series-based unit root tests. First, panel data-based unit root ests have more statistical power than their univariate counter- arts. In a panel setting, the traditional Augmented Dicky–Fuller ADF) has low power identifying stationarity, particularly in hort panels. Second, panel unit root tests are less restrictive nd allow for fixed effects at the country level as well as time ariations in the parameters across panels. Moreover, panel data echniques provide a suite of estimation options ranging from stimation with no trend and no constant, to estimations with a eterministic trend and a constant, and testing for common time ffects. These techniques provide a high degree of flexibility in stimating parameters. The results from Table 4 show that, apart from the Con- umer Price Index (CPI), all variables are integrated of order (0). The CPI is integrated of order I(1). In addition, the loga- ithmic (logs) transformation of CPI is stationary at level. We mploy the logs of CPI in our estimation, which implies that ll variables used for our estimations do not follow a unit root a rocess and suggests that it is unlikely that a unique state of fl ong-run equilibrium for the system variables exists. The results bct growth; CPI, consumer price index; FDI, foreign direct investment; TRADE, rom unreported cointegration tests confirm the non-existence f a unique long-run relationship. .3. Monetary policy and remittances We present the results of the PVAR in Table 5. The dependent ariable for Model 1 is remittance as a ratio of GDP; the depend- nt variable for Models 2–8 is the central bank’s monetary policy ate (MPR) used to capture the monetary policy stance and the revailing interest rate. We include the five-year rolling standard eviation of consumer inflation instead of the CPI, as we view t as a better measure of macroeconomic (in)stability. Table 1 rovides the description of variables. .3.1. Macroeconomic determinants of remittances Model (1) in Table 5 reveals that financial development DCPS) is negatively related to remittances. This finding oes not necessarily imply that financial development reduces emittance inflows. We offer two interpretations. The first inter- retation is that a financial sector that is not well developed bstructs the flow of remittances by increasing both the monetary nd non-monetary costs of sending and receiving remittances. he second interpretation is that remittances and financial arkets play substitute roles in growth, which occurs when emittance recipients rely on migrants for ‘credit’ instead of the ocal financial system. This latter interpretation concurs with rown et al. (2013). Remittances are largely self-driven, which is shown by the ignificance of the lag of remittances. Once migrants start send- ng money home, they have the propensity to continue sending oney because they feel obliged to promote the welfare of the amily and friends they left behind. In addition, monies sent back ome to undertake projects are usually delivered incrementally nd not in bulk. We further find that the size of the economy ositively impacts the flow of remittances. In addition, our mea- ure of economic business cycles, growth in GDP, has an inverse elationship with the inflow of remittances supporting the coun- ercyclical view of remittances. However, this coefficient is not ignificant. Our alternative measure of foreign inflows, FDI, is nega-lternative source of international finance in reality. These two ows are underpinned by different characteristics, as described y Chami et al. (2008). Unlike other capital flows, remittances H. Issahaku et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 97 Table 4 Panel unit root test. MPR REMIT LREMITT σ 2s REMIT LGDP CPI FDI Level LLC −11.00*** 7.97*** −10.65*** −46.66*** −0.49828 47.57*** −11.18*** IPS −6.80*** −4.8*** −2.53*** −15.64*** 12.2972 54.97*** −13.35 ADF 185.24*** 330.44*** 349.76*** 476.36*** 158.073 39.76*** 619.74*** PP 204.75*** 372.82*** 342.32*** 743.92*** 194.544 37.34*** 609.03*** First difference LLC −33.94*** −12.32*** IPS −34.29*** −14.65*** ADF 1525.28*** 770.79*** PP 1529.36*** 971.55*** LRATE REER RIR LCPI TRADE Level LLC −17,646.2*** −6.51*** −32.34*** −20.15*** −3.74*** IPS −3707.32*** −5.17*** −28.03*** −19.35*** −4.87*** ADF 959.38*** 219.44*** 1048.70*** 1445.44*** 330.57*** PP 1115.92*** 225.12*** 1132.33*** 1143.66*** 337.35*** Note 1: LLC, Levine–Lin–Chu statistics; IPS, Im, Pesaran and Shin statistics; ADF, Augmented Dickey Fuller Fisher Chi-square statistics; PP, Phillips Perron statistics. N N e 5% i 2 m o t i i r i 3 m e p a t r s fi l i T i r l t 3 t v r n a t w a m M o r A a r 1 t a r i y i n n t t t m v ote 2: All variables are described in Table 1. ote 3: *** shows significance at the 1% level, and ** shows significance at th gnite family bonds. Second, these ignited familial relationships ake remittances respond more to the needs of family members han standard private capital flows, which are largely driven by nvestment motives. .3.2. Remittances and monetary policy – dissecting the vidence There is strong confirmation of a negative impact of remit- ances on the monetary policy rate that is evidenced by the tatistical significance as well as the negative coefficient of the ag of remittances in models 2, 3 and 5, as shown in Table 5. here are two explanations for this finding. First, an increase in emittances boosts the quantity of loanable funds available for ending in the economy, which may then lead to a decline in he interest rate. Second, when households receive remittances, heir demand for formal credit will decline if the remittance eceived is large enough to meet their welfare and investment eeds, which will cause interest rates to decline. This revela- ion is consistent with the prevailing wisdom based on single- nd cross-country studies. For instance, using a DSGE model, andelman (2013) finds that remittance inflows reduced interest ate in the Philippines. In addition, Vacaflores (2012) employs DSGE model and comes to the same conclusion in a panel of 1 Latin American countries. Our finding that remittances reduce domestic interest rate emains robust when remittances are measured in terms of five- ear rolling standard deviation, normal standard deviation, and ormal variance. This finding implies that the volatility of remit- ances helps to ease domestic interest conditions thereby helping o stabilise the macroeconomy. h The ability of remittances to ensure output and macroecono- b ic stability stems from the capability of remittances to reduce t olatilities in consumption and investment (Craigwell et al., mlevel. 010). We will further discuss the macroeconomic implications f remittances in the next section. As expected, a rise in each of the following causes the pol- cy rate to fall: financial development, real effective exchange ate, economic openness and size. This finding suggests that f developing countries can improve and sustain macroecono- ic gains, they can improve the effectiveness of their monetary olicies. An effective monetary policy will promote the growth nd income of the populace. As the income of the citizenry ises, their demand increases for goods and services, including nancial assets, which opens up more space for monetary pol- cy management. In addition, a more favourable exchange rate s conducive for monetary policy management. .3.3. Does monetary policy volatility affect remittance olatility? The volatility of monetary policy or interest rates has an dverse impact on economic growth. Therefore, central banks orldwide seek to stabilise monetary conditions to ensure acroeconomic stability. Model 1 under Table 6 shows the effect f policy rate volatility on the variation in remittance inflows. n increase in monetary policy volatility tends to decrease emittance volatility. This finding is consistent with the coun- ercyclical properties of remittances, which are derived from the ltruism theory of remittance. When macroeconomic conditions n the receiving country are unfavourable, we expect an increase n remittance inflows, and we expect the reverse when macroeco- omic conditions improve. Migrants are considered sensitive to he plight of their families back home and often offer a helping and when conditions in the home country hit their family mem- ers hard. This finding also confirms the widely held view that he macroeconomic environment in the receiving country affects igrants’ remitting behaviour. The countercyclical properties 98 H. Issahaku et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 Table 5 Monetary policy and remittances. REMIT (1) MPR (2) MPR (3) MPR (4) MPR (5) MPR (6) MPR (7) MPR (8) REMIT(−1) 1.0208*** −0.1671*** −0.1075* −0.2456 −0.1783*** (0.0148) (0.0572) (0.0601) (0.0484) (0.0498) MPR(−1) −0.0093 0.2364*** 0.2235*** 0.1906*** 0.1748*** 0.6806*** 0.1330*** 0.1872*** (0.0078) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0256) (0.0251) (0.0363) (0.0258) (0.0253) σrLCPI(−1) 0.3623 −4.4956** −5.5559*** −4.1206*** −5.3386*** 1.7243 −0.0510*** 0.0005** (0.5232) (2.0267) (2.0303) (1.6930) (1.6674) (2.0462) (0.0158) (0.0003) DCPS(−1) −0.3778** −3.0653*** −2.9369*** −5.4937*** −5.3942*** −1.5309*** −4.0263*** −5.1504*** (0.1433) (0.5551) (0.5484) (0.5244) (0.5083) (0.3973) (0.5339) (0.5107) TRADE(−1) 0.0093*** −0.0304*** −0.0242** −0.0140 −0.0065 −0.0061 −0.0073 −0.0112 (0.0028) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0059) (0.0083) (0.0087) REER(−1) −0.0005 −0.0023 −0.0022 −0.0039*** −0.0039*** −0.0005 −0.0042*** −0.0042*** (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0014) GDPg(−1) −0.0264 −0.0007 −0.0519 −0.0954 −0.1565* −0.0366 −0.0337 −0.0531 (0.0292) (0.1129) (0.1127) (0.0948) (0.0931) (0.0605) (0.0897) (0.0940) LGDP(−1) 0.1109** −0.6886*** −0.7199*** −0.9090*** −0.9497*** −0.5200*** −0.7170*** −0.9086*** (0.0450) (0.1744) (0.1721) (0.1473) (0.1430) (0.0934) (0.1465) (0.1482) FDI(−1) −0.0716*** −0.0767 −0.0013 0.0279 0.1172 0.0080 0.1376* −0.0075 (0.0243) (0.0943) (0.0966) (0.0794) (0.0801) (0.0504) (0.0799) (0.0807) REMIT.FD −0.0597*** −0.0689*** −0.01625 −0.0477*** 0.7545*** (0.0210) (0.0173) (0.0109) (0.0168) (0.0771) MPR.FD 0.7021*** 0.7163*** 0.2858*** 0.5865*** (0.0718) (0.0687) (0.0508) (0.0759) σrREMIT −0.2685* (0.1454) σsREMIT −0.1212*** (0.0508) σ 2s REMIT −0.0064*** (0.0019) R-squared 0.9609 0.4939 0.5115 0.6486 0.6720 0.8788 0.6705 0.6252 Adj. R-squared 0.9594 0.4735 0.4896 0.6328 0.6558 0.8725 0.6545 0.6087 F-statistic 612.1135*** 24.2859*** 23.3487*** 41.1511*** 41.3551*** 138.4670*** 41.8167*** 37.8723*** Note 1: Remittances is the dependent variable for model (1), while the central bank’s monetary policy rate is the dependent variable for models (2) to (8). Note 2: MPR, monetary policy rate; REMIT, remittances as a ratio of GDP; GDPg, growth rate of GDP; σrREMIT, five-year rolling standard deviation of remittance inflows; σsREMIT, the (normal) standard deviation of remittances; 2 σs REMIT, the (normal) variance of remittances; LGDP, the log of gross domestic product; σrLCPI, the five-year rolling standard deviation of the consumer price index; FDI, foreign direct investment; REER, the real effective exchange rate; TRADE, total trade as a ratio of GDP; DCPS, domestic credit to private sector; REMIT.FD in an interactive term between remittances and financial development; MPR.FD, an interaction term between monetary policy (MPR) and financial development; σrMPR, five-year rolling standard deviation of MPR; σsMPR, (normal) standard deviation of MPR; and (−1) placed after a variable indicates the lag of the variable. N ures i o fl B p b r i n a H ( i r v 3 s m i i p ( a v 2 o e p i r ote 3: ***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Fig f remittances have been confirmed by Craigwell et al. (2010), ugamelli and PaternÒ (2011), and Adenutsi (2014). We further find that an advanced financial system reduces emittance volatility. In addition, an increase in economic open- ess tends to decrease the variability in remittance flows. owever, as the domestic economy expands, remittance volatil- ty also increases. .3.4. Do remittances constitute an additional acroeconomic risk? We report the impact of remittance uncertainty on monetary olicy risk (measured as the rolling and normal standard devi- tion of the policy rate) in Table 6. The results from models to 6 are provided with monetary policy risk as the depend- nt variable. Remittance volatility tends to reduce 9 monetary olicy e riskiness. The finding is fairly consistent in the major- ty s of our models and is consistent with one of the established egularities in the empirical literature, that unlike other capital fln parentheses are standard errors. ows such as official development assistance, FDI and private ortfolio flows, remittances are countercyclical and can act as a uffer for macroeconomic stability for that matter. By smoothen- ng consumption, for instance, remittances help raise economic ctivity during hard times and reduce business cycle effects Singer, 2010). The macroeconomic risk-mitigating impact of emittances remains robust, whether we measure remittance olatility as a five-year moving standard deviation or as normal tandard deviation. Previous research on the macroeconomic mplications of remittances reached similar conclusions. For nstance, in a study of 69 economies, Bugamelli and PaternÒ 2011) confirm a negative link between remittances and output olatility. In addition, Craigwell et al. (2010) support the role f remittances in taming macroeconomic shocks in a panel of 5 countries. The ability of remittances to ameliorate macro- conomic risk arises from the low procyclical nature, increasing ize and stability of remittances relative to other types of capital ows. H. Issahaku et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 99 Table 6 Remittance risk and monetary policy risk. σrREMIT (1) σrMPR (2) σrMPR (3) σrMPR (4) σrMPR (5) σsMPR (6) σrREMIT(−1) 0.8961*** −0.1939** −0.1002 −0.1923** −0.1016 (0.0374) (0.0929) (0.0921) (0.0937) (0.0927) σrMPR(−1) 0.0417*** 0.0022 0.0106 0.0019 0.0111 (0.0133) (0.0331) (0.0318) (0.0333) (0.0319) σrLCPI(−1) −0.7117 4.1068** 2.4999 4.1168** 2.4803 (0.7613) (1.8898) (1.8558) (1.8965) (1.8639) DCPS(−1) −0.1798** −0.6976*** −0.7489*** −0.6779*** −0.7719*** −4.0262*** (0.0858) (0.2131) (0.2045) (0.2436) (0.2346) (0.5339) TRADE(−1) 0.0049*** −0.0008 0.0035 −0.0008 0.0036 −0.0074 (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0083) REER(−1) 2.70E−05 −0.0012** −0.0012* −0.0012** −0.0011* −0.0042*** (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0013) GDPg(−1) −0.0077 −0.0767* −0.1155** −0.0758** −0.1167*** −0.0337 (0.0163) (0.0405) (0.0399) (0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0897) LGDP(−1) 0.0536** 0.1078 0.0942 0.1079 0.0939 −0.7171*** (0.0276) (0.0685) (0.0657) (0.0687) (0.0659) (0.1465) FDI(−1) −0.0194 −0.0187 0.0242 −0.0197 0.0256 0.1376* (0.0144) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0363) (0.0366) (0.0799) σsREMIT(−1) −0.1212*** (0.051) σsMPR(−1) 0.1330*** (0.0258) σsLCPI(−1) −0.0510*** (0.0158) REMIT.FD −0.0293*** −0.0295*** −0.04767*** (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0168) MPR.FD −0.0055 0.0064 0.5865*** (0.0328) (0.0316) (0.0759) R-squared 0.8327 0.2922 0.3545 0.2922 0.3547 0.6705 Adj. R-squared 0.8234 0.2526 0.3142 0.2481 0.3100 0.6545 F-statistic 89.0788*** 7.3838*** 8.7877*** 6.6082*** 7.9447*** 41.8167*** N ors ar 3 t r fi a e e a a v i I T d n t s t t n m 3 m r w t t s d i t i r e r u n T e ote: Refer to notes under Table 5 for the description of variables. Standard err .3.5. Dissecting the role of financial development in the emittance-monetary policy nexus Financial markets contribute to economic progress by nhancing efficiency and risk sharing, monitoring managerial ctions to prevent fraud, harnessing and channelling savings to iable projects, and by reducing the cost of access to financing. f these properties of financial markets hold, then our financial evelopment variable must be negatively related to the mone- ary policy rate or to the domestic interest rate. Table 5 shows hat the financial development variable (DCPS) is consistently egative and significant for models 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, which eans that a well-developed financial sector will lead to a lower onetary policy rate and hence a lower domestic interest rate. A ell-developed financial system offers a wider scope for mone- ary policy than an immature system. This finding dovetails with he findings by Krause and Rioja (2006) that financial market evelopment promotes monetary policy efficiency. Table 6 fur- her shows that financial development lessens macroeconomic isk by reducing volatility in the policy rate. This result is quite obust, as it is consistent in all of the model specifications.Additionally, the remittance-finance interactive term is sig- a ificant and has a negative sign in models 3, 5, 7 and 8 in t able 5, which means that finance complements the stabilising i ffect of remittances on macroeconomic variables. According ae in parentheses. o Agbloyor et al. (2014) and Osabuohien and Efobi (2013), nancial markets play a moderating role between capital flows nd growth. In doing so, financial markets augment the positive ffects of capital flows on the economy while hindering any neg- tive impact. This finding highlights the need for policy reform n developing countries to make financial markets more efficient. he interactive term between remittances and finance is also sig- ificant in minimising macroeconomic risk (policy volatility) as hown in the results presented in Table 6. The robust nature of his finding should be of consequence to macroeconomic policy. .4. The effects of a contractionary monetary policy on emittance inflows A key unresolved issue in measuring monetary shocks is the pecification of a contractionary or expansionary monetary pol- cy. Conventionally, a rise in the short-term interest rate or a fall n monetary aggregates is interpreted as a contractionary mon- tary policy. In this regard, the recursive Cholesky approach is sed to identify monetary shocks. However, Ho and Yeh (2010) rgue that this identification may be suitable only with respect o a closed economy. They argue that in a closed economy, the nterest rate is the main instrument of monetary policy, such that policy tightening may cause the short-run interest rate to fall. 1 velop H a v s a c Y c t t c s s c t t r t s L t s a p T c i t i 00 H. Issahaku et al. / Review of De owever, for an open economy in which there are large inter- entions in the forex market, a tight policy may be captured by rise in interest rates or a reduction in foreign reserves. A sign restriction methodology, as proposed by Uhlig (2005), an be employed to identify different contractionary mone- ary policy identification schemes. Alternative sign restrictions chemes have been implemented with varying degrees of suc- ess. First, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) implement a scheme hat assumes that when there is a contractionary monetary shock, he short-term interest rate will not fall. Second, Gordon and eeper (1994) use a scheme based on the assumption that a con- ractionary monetary policy will not lead to a rise in monetary ggregates. A third identification scheme combines the first two. he fourth scheme views monetary contraction as innovationsn both the interest rate and the exchange rate. The fifth alterna- f ive scheme captures monetary policy innovations as a decrease m n money supply, an appreciation of the domestic currency, and t Respo nse of REMIT_ to Cholesky One S.D. In novatio ns 6 6 5 4 4 2 3 2 0 1 -2 0 -4 -1 -2 -6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 REMIT_ MPR REER TRADE LCPI DCPS GDP_GROWTH LBMS LGDP Fig. 1. Response of remittances to co Ac cumulated Response of REMIT_ t o C holesky One S.D. In nova tions 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 -10 0 -20 -10 -30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 REMIT_ MPR REER TRADE LCPI DCPS GDP_GROWTH LBMS LGDP Fig. 2. Response of remittances to monetaryment Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 n increase in the interest rate (Mountford, 2005). The sixth cheme posits that a tightening of monetary policy will not ause interest rates to fall or foreign reserves to rise (Ho and eh, 2010). Rafiq and Mallick (2008) use the seventh alterna- ive identification scheme by employing data for three European ountries, and the restrictions in this scheme are based on the tandard Mundell–Fleming–Dornbusch model, which stipulates hat tight monetary policy will cause interest rates to rise and the eal exchange rate to appreciate, while causing prices, money upply, and real output to fall. Ho and Yeh (2010) find that identification schemes one to five uffer from one or more of price, liquidity and/or exchange rate uzzles. The price puzzle arises when a tight monetary policy auses the price level to rise instead of causing the price level to all. In the case of the liquidity puzzle, positive innovations in onetary policy cause interest rates to rise instead of depressing hem. With the exchange rate puzzle, a tight monetary policy Res ponse of REMIT_ to Ge neralized One S.D. Innovations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 REMIT_ MPR R EER TRADE LCPI DCPS GDP_GROWTH LBMS LGDP ntractionary monetary policy. Accumulate d Res ponse of REMIT_ to Ge neraliz ed One S.D. In nova tions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 REMIT_ MPR RE ER TRADE LCPI LDCPS GDP_GROWTH LBMS LGDP contraction – accumulated response. velop s l t c ( fi r ( s t f e r o G 3 p g c m I p m m t i t a i t t m r a T R σ σ σ T F D R M D F C R A S S F L A S N D e r m H. Issahaku et al. / Review of De hock leads to a depreciation – instead of an appreciation – of he currency. Only schemes six (Ho and Yeh, 2010) and seven Rafiq and Mallick, 2008) avoid all of the puzzles. Based on the foregoing discussion, we follow scheme seven the Mundell–Flemin–Dorbusch model) and specify a contrac- ionary monetary policy as a one-unit positive shock to the inter- st rate (MPR), a one-unit positive shock to the exchange rate, a ne-unit negative shock to inflation, a one-unit negative shock to DP, a one-unit negative shock to money supply, and a one-unit ositive shock to GDP growth. The inclusion of a shock to GDP rowth is to control for supply shocks to prevent misidentifi- ation. The impulse responses from Cholesky and Generalised mpulse Responses are shown in Fig. 1. The associated accu- ulated responses are shown in Fig. 2. Both the Cholesky and he Generalised Impulse Responses in Fig. 1 show that a con- ractionary monetary shock leads to a steady rise in remittance nflows. This finding implies that remittances can frustrate con- ractionary monetary policies if not properly anticipated.If properly anticipated, remittances can serve as pseudo auto- b atic stabilisers and can substitute for monetary policy. This d esult is consistent with Singer (2010), who argues that in o trilemma policy framework, remittances can substitute for m able 7 emittances and monetary policy (lending interest rate). σ 2r REMITT σ 2 2 r LRATE σr LCPI TRADE 2 r REMITT(−1) 0.6066*** −0.2957* 4.93E−06 −0.030 (0.0294) (0.1559) (9.6E−05) (0.0510 2 r LRATE(−1) −0.0003 0.1620*** 4.45E−06*** −0.000 (0.0004) (0.0019) (1.2E−06) (0.0006 2 r LCPI(−1) −3.5819 17.9678 0.8603*** 7.4905 (4.6751) (24.7993) (0.0153) (8.1154 RADE(−1) 0.0183*** 0.0139 −8.46E−06 0.9749 (0.0058) (0.0307) (1.9E−05) (0.0100 DI(−1) −0.0159 −0.0199 9.26E−05 −0.000 (0.0429) (0.2275) (0.0001) (0.0744 CPS(−1) −0.0119 −0.5817 0.0005 −0.472 (0.4401) (2.3346) (0.0014) (0.7639 EER(−1) −0.0347*** −0.0798 −0.0001*** 0.0098 (0.0097) (0.0517) (3.2E−05) (0.0169 ONEY FREEDOM(−1) −0.0554 −0.8664*** 0.0006*** 0.0463 (0.0339) (0.1801) (0.0001) (0.0589 REMITM 1.5210*** −2.9587 −3.07E−05 −0.156 (0.4547) (2.4123) (0.0015) (0.7894 INCDEVM −0.9702 −7.3643* −0.0016 0.9350 (0.7151) (3.7933) (0.0023) (1.2413 6.6956** 88.5848*** −0.0349*** −0.590 (2.7809) (14.7516) (0.0091) (4.8274 -squared 0.6033 0.9411 0.9218 0.9628 dj. R-squared 0.5950 0.9399 0.9201 0.9620 um sq. resides 9501.0430 267,341.6 0.1018 28,629 .E. equation 4.4629 23.6741 0.0146 7.7472 -statistic 72.5522*** 762.1170*** 562.0185*** 1235.0 og likelihood −1416.839 −2231.098 1375.394 −1685 kaike AIC 5.8518 9.18893 −5.5918 6.9548 chwarz SC 5.9463 9.2834 −5.4973 7.0493 ote: σ 2s LRATE, the five-year rolling variance of the lending interest rate; REER, CPS, domestic credit to private sector; FINCDEVM, a financial development dumm xceeds the median level of financial development and zero otherwise (low financia eceiving country) when a country’s remittance receipts exceed the median level an onetary freedom; and (−1) placed after a variable indicates the lag of the variable. ment Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 101 oss of monetary independence based on their stabilising and ountercyclical properties and allow economies to implement xed exchange rate regimes. The results from the accumulated esponses in Fig. 2 are more definite. A contractionary monetary hock causes a persistent rise in remittance inflows. It is there- ore safe to conclude that monetary tightening causes a rise in emittance inflows. .5. Further robustness checks We performed further robustness checks against measure- ent error and misspecification. First, instead of the monetary olicy rate, we used the lending rate as an alternative proxy for onetary policy because the lending rate responds to changes n the policy rate. The correlation between the two variables is pproximately 73.54%. Second, we used the log of total remit- ances instead of remittances as a proportion of GDP. Using the logs helps reduce variability and minimises possi- le heteroscedastic tendencies. Third, instead of using standard eviation we used a five-year rolling variance as a measure f risk. Fourth, we included a dummy for financial develop- ent (FINCDEVM) based on the median level of financial FDI DCPS REER MONEY FREEDOM 4 0.0069 0.0015* 0.0153 −0.0266 ) (0.0255) (0.0009) (0.0727) (0.0257) 3 −0.0001 6.34E−06 −0.0006 0.00027 ) (0.0003) (1.1E−05) (0.0009) (0.0003) −0.7893 −0.1960 27.0516*** −33.6473*** ) (4.0479) (0.1374) (11.5601) (4.0783) *** 0.0074 0.0002 0.0046 0.0043 ) (0.0050) (0.0002) (0.0143) (0.0050) 9 0.58262*** 0.0001 0.201052* −0.0315 ) (0.0371) (0.0013) (0.1060) (0.0374) 1 −0.2016 0.9175*** −0.6407 −0.0559 ) (0.3811) (0.0129) (1.0882) (0.3839) −0.0005 0.0003 0.8319*** 0.00716 ) (0.0084) (0.0004) (0.0241) (0.0085) −0.0035 −0.0004 0.0762 0.6573*** ) (0.0294) (0.0010) (0.0839) (0.0296) 2 0.34435 −0.0158 −0.3477 0.4131 ) (0.3937) (0.0134) (1.1244) (0.3968) 0.5603 0.1056*** 0.6661 0.1823 ) (0.6192) (0.0210) (1.7682) (0.6238) 3 1.5654 0.2408*** 10.7789 25.4876*** ) (2.4079) (0.0817) (6.8764) (2.4259) 0.3804 0.9714 0.7407 0.7804 0.3674 0.9708 0.7352 0.7758 .31 7122.687 8.2044 58,091.36 7230.140 3.864228 0.1311 11.0356 3.8933 67*** 29.28925*** 1620.008*** 136.2276*** 169.4904*** .979 −1346.539 304.4558 −1858.629 −1350.192 5.56368 −1.2027 7.6624 5.5787 5.6581 −1.1082 7.7569 5.6731 the real effective exchange rate; TRADE, total trade as a proportion of GDP; y equal to 1 (high financial development) if a country’s financial development l development); DREMITM, a remittance dummy equal to 1 (high remittance d zero otherwise (low remittance receiving country); MONEY FREEDOM is The figures in parentheses are standard errors. 1 velop d m c m t ( t t e r k r 2 r n t t m m b c e i t d s i c c i o c f e b m h a d a o c t c T g s t ( s c i i o a t p fi m i n r ( c b t o t v p 4 a t i t o t n p r T b b m p fi l i r t i t A m r c c 02 H. Issahaku et al. / Review of De evelopment. FINCDEVM equals 1 (high financial develop- ent) when a country’s financial development is above the edian level of financial development and zero otherwise low financial development). In addition, we examined whether he amount of remittances received matters by including a emittance dummy (DREMITM). DREMITM equals 1 (high emittance receiving countries) when a country’s remittance eceipts exceed the median level and zero otherwise (low remit- ance receiving countries). Finally, we included a new variable, onetary freedom (MONEY FREEDOM), to test for possi- le omitted variable bias. We report the results of the PVAR stimation in Table 7. In the first column in which the variance of remittances is the ependent variable, the financial development variable (DCPS) s no longer significant after accounting for the level of finan- ial development. However, the financial development dummy s negative and significant. This finding remains robust after ontrolling for the amount of remittance received. This can be xplained by noting that in countries with shallow financial arkets–where the cost of credit in the formal circuit is high nd access is limited–households rely upon remittances as an lternative mode of finance. This understanding dovetails with ur previous conclusion that remittances can serve as a substi- ute for bank credit when the financial system is underdeveloped. he economic openness variable (TRADE) remains positive and ignificant as shown earlier. The real effective exchange rate REER) also remains significantly negative. In the second column in which the variance of the lending rate s the dependent variable, the variance of remittances is signif- cant and negative after accounting for the level of remittances nd the level of financial advancement. This result supports the revious finding that remittances help to mitigate macroecono- ic volatility. In addition, the remittance dummy is not signif- cant, implying that the macroeconomic smoothening effect of emittances pertains in both low- and high-remittance receiving ountries. From our robustness checks, we can fairly conclude hat the results of this study are robust to alternative specifica- ions of remittances, monetary policy and financial development. . Conclusions Remittances continue to play an increasingly important role n developing countries and are becoming a dominant source f development finance, which has implications for macroeco- omic policy. We find a complex web of relationships among emittances, monetary policy and financial markets. Notably, oth remittances and remittance volatility tend to reduce both the onetary policy rate and monetary policy volatility. First, this nding implies that in the presence of remittances, the domestic nterest rate becomes downward biased; in other words, remit- ance inflows will lead to favourable reductions in domestic nterest rates, thereby reducing financing costs. Second, remit- ances are countercyclical and have a smoothening effect onacroeconomic magnitudes, which means that the presence of emittances can reduce macroeconomic fluctuations, thereby reating favourable economic conditions for the pursuit of poli- e ies that deliver shared prosperity. mment Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 This paper highlights the important role played by the finan- ial sector in the remittance-monetary policy nexus. We find hat financial development helps to reduce monetary policy risk hrough its interaction with remittances. This finding supports arlier studies that endorse the moderating role of financial mar- ets in the finance-growth relationship (see, Agbloyor et al., 014; Osabuohien and Efobi, 2013). However, we establish a egative association between financial development and remit- ances. Our robustness checks help us explain this finding to ean that in countries with weak financial systems, the high ost of sending and receiving remittances obstructs remittance nflows. In addition, in undeveloped financial markets, domes- ic residents rely on their offshore benefactors as an alternative ource of income. Our simulation of contractionary monetary policy reveals that ontractionary monetary impulses engineer a persistent inflow f remittances. We believe this finding is relevant in terms of ormulating monetary policy. Central banks ought to factor this ehaviour of remittances into their policy decisions and may ave to think about sterilisation (when required) to achieve the esired policy outcomes. These findings imply that one of the ways developing ountries can diminish monetary policy risks is to pursue poli- ies that facilitate remittance inflows. Such policies should be eared towards reducing the cost of sending and receiving remit- ances by providing innovative financial products for remittance enders and recipients alike and by encouraging the use of formal hannels for transmitting remittances. Our findings are largely robust to an alternative specification f remittances and monetary policy, when additional explana- ory variables are included and after controlling for the level of nancial development and the level of remittances received. This work corroborates earlier studies on the finance-growth exus by Bugamelli and PaternÒ (2011) and Craigwell et al. 2010). However, although these studies establish a relationship etween remittance volatility and output volatility (an indirect utcome of monetary policy), we assess the impact of remittance olatility on a direct measure of monetary policy – the monetary olicy rate and its volatility. Our paper extends the literature on international capital flows nd macroeconomic stability by using a panel vector approach o establish the impact of remittance and its volatility on domes- ic monetary conditions. We contribute to the advancement of heory by simulating the impact of a contractionary monetary olicy based on the Mundell–Fleming–Dornbush hypothesis. he impulse responses generated allowed us to understand the ehaviour of remittances in the presence of domestic monetary olicy shocks. In conclusion, this study, while supporting ear- ier findings, offers new insights into the link between migrant emittances and macroeconomic stability. cknowledgmentsThe authors acknowledge very useful comments from the ditors of the Journal and two anonymous referees. Their com- ents have enriched the paper. A T L 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 R A A A A A A A A A A A A B B H. Issahaku et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 91–104 103 ppendix. able A1 ist of countries included in the study. . Algeria 21. China 41. Guyana 61. Moldova 81. Samoa 101. Uganda . Antigua and Barbuda 22. Colombia 42. Honduras 62. Mongolia 82. Sao Tome and Principe 102. Ukraine . Argentina 23. Congo Republic 43. Hungary 63. Morocco 83. Senegal 103. Vanuatu . Armenia 24. Costa Rica 44. India 64. Mozambique 84. Seychelles 104. Venezuela, RB . Azerbajan 25. Cote d’Ivoire 45. Indonesia 65. Namibia 85. Sierra Leone 105. Vietnam . Bangladesh 26. Croatia 46. Iran 66. Nepal 86. Solomon Islands 106. Yemen . Barbados 27. Djibouti 47. Jamaica 67. Nicaragua 87. South Africa . Belarus 28. Dominica 48. Jordan 68. Niger 88. Sri Lanka . Belize 29. Dominican Republic 49. Kazakhstan 69. Nigeria 89. St. Lucia 0. Benin 30. Equador 50. Kenya 70. Oman 90. St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1. Bolivia 31. Egypt 51. Kyrgyz Republic 71. Pakistan 91. Sudan 2. Bosnia and Herzegovina 32. El Salvador 52. Lao PDR 72. Panama 92. Suriname 3. Botswana 33. Ethiopia 53. Latvia 73. Papua New Guinea 93. Tajikistan 4. Brazil 34. Fiji 54. Lesotho 74. Paraguay 94. Tanzania 5. Bulgaria 35. Georgia 55. Macedonia, FYR 75. Peru 95. Thailand 6. Burkina Faso 36. Ghana 56. Malawi 76. Philippines 96. Togo 7. Burundi 37. Grenada 57. Malaysia 77. Poland 97. Tonga 8. Cabo Verde 38. Guatemala 58. Maldives 78. Romania 98. Trinidad and Tobago 9. Cambodia 39. Guinea 59. Mali 79. Russia 99. Tunisia 0. Cameroon 40. Guinea-Bissau 60. Mexico 80. Rwanda 100. Turkey eferences Brown, R.P.C., Carmignani, F., Fayad, G., 2013. Migrants’ remittances and financial development: macro- and micro-level evidence of a per- costa, P., Calderon, C., Fajnzylber, P., Lopez, H., 2008. What is the impact of verse relationship. World Econ. 36 (5), 636–660, http://dx.doi.org/ international remittances on poverty and inequality in Latin America? World 10.1111/twec.12016. Dev. 36 (1), 89–114. Bugamelli, M., PaternÒ, F., 2011. 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