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FINANCING POLITICAL PARTIES UNDER THE
FOURTH REPUBLIC OF GHANA
BY
KINGSLEY S. AGOMOR
(10045973)
Thesis submitted to the University of Ghana, Legon, in partial
fulfilment of the requirement for the award of PhD in Political
Science degree
June, 2015
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Declaration
I, Kingsley Senyo Agomor, do hereby solemnly declare that apart from documentary and other
sources of material cited and acknowledged in this work, I am entirely responsible for the
authorship and any errors which may be found in this work despite the advice and suggestions I
received from my supervisors.
I also declare that this work has never been submitted by me or any other person to the University
of Ghana, Legon or any other University for the award of any degree.
……………………………..
Kingsley S. Agomor
(STUDENT)
SUPERVISORS
………………………………… ………………………………….
PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR
EMERITUS PROF. K. A. NINSIN DR.MOHAMMED K. ABDULAI
DEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
LEGON LEGON
…………………………………….
SUPERVISOR
DR. ZIBLIM IDDI
DEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
LEGON
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Dedicated to:
Becky, Joshua, Philip and Michael
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Acknowledgement
‘God has made me to laugh and everyone who hears about this will laugh with me ’
(Genesis 21:6). I thank the Almighty God for the gift of life and knowledge, which enabled
me to complete this thesis.
My special gratitude goes to Professor Joseph R.A. Ayee, who started with the supervision
of this thesis before his international appointment as the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Head,
College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa.
To reach the pinnacle of academic height, I have had to stand on the back of academic
giants to see my way clear. I therefore owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Emmanuel
Gyimah-Boadi for his invaluable contributions and Professor Kwame Boafo-Arthur who
stood by me when I needed his guidance. I lack the words to express my heartfelt
appreciation to my principal supervisor, Professor Kwame A. Ninsin who read the draft
and offered insightful suggestions. I pray that God will give me grace to extend the same
passion with which he worked to my students. I am also grateful to the other members of
the supervisory committee: Dr. Mohammed K. Abdulai and Dr. Ziblim Iddi for their
patience, encouragement and advice that contributed to the completion of the thesis.
I wish to express my profound gratitude to two officers from the Bureau of National
Investigation (BNI) who provided me with the baseline information for my data collection.
I cannot forget Mr. David Kanga, the immediate past Deputy Chairman of the Electoral
Commission (EC) (Operations) for his immeasurable support in the collection of data at
the headquarters of the EC.
A note of thanks goes to the former Rector of GIMPA, Professor Yaw Agyeman Badu, as
well as to Dr. Nicholas Amponsah, Dr. Nicholas Nii Okai, Professor E.K. Sakyi and Dr.
Daniel Appiah for their academic interactions with me and inputs. A special word of
gratitude also goes to Professor Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, Professor Samuel Adams, Mrs Love
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Ankora, Mrs Patience Attoh, Mr. Noah Aguh, Mr. Joseph Tawiah, Mr. Felix Ntumi and
Mr. Atua Willington, who all, in diverse ways, supported me during the time of writing
this thesis.
I am grateful to Dr. Emmanuel Debrah, the Head of Department of Political Science,
University of Ghana, Legon, and all the staff of the Department who always responded
promptly to my call for assistance.
Finally, I am extremely grateful to my wife, Ellen, for her support, warmth and
forbearance, and to my children, Joshua, Philip and Michael for their prayers during the
difficult task of writing this thesis. I must, however, hasten to add that the persons
mentioned are not responsible for the lapses and omissions of this thesis.
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TABLE OF CONTENT
Content - - - - - - - - - Page
Declaration - - - - - - - - - i
Dedication - - - - - - - - - ii
Acknowledgement - - - - - - - - iii
Table of Content - - - - - - - - v
List of Tables - - - - - - - - x
List of Figures - - - - - - - - xiii
Acronyms - - - - - - - - xiv
Abstract - - - - - - - - xviii
Chapter One: Introduction and Theoretical framework
1. 0 Introduction - - - - - - - - 1
1.1 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - 3
1.2 Hypotheses - - - - - - - - 7
1.3 Objectives of the Study - - - - - - 7
1.4 Research Questions - - - - - - 8
1.5 Operationalization of Key Variables - - - - - 8
1.6 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - 18
1.7 Literature Review - - - - - - 26
1.7.1 Democracy and Political Participation - - - - 26
1.7.2 Political Parties and Democratic Politics - - - - 29
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1.7.3 Political Party Financing and Democratic Politics - - - 35
1.7.4 Party Financing and Democratic Politics in New Democracies - 40
1.7.5 Political Party Funding and Democratic Politics in Ghana - - 47
1.8 Research Methodology - - - - - - 52
1.9 Significance of the Study - - - - - 67
1.10 Limitation of the Study - - - - - - 68
1.11 Organization of Work - - - - - - 70
Chapter Two: The Historical Analysis of Political Party Funding In Ghana
2.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - 72
2.1 The Evolution of Political Parties in the Gold Coast: 1948-1957 - 72
2.2 The Development of Party Politics: 1957-1966 - - - 76
2.3 The Development of Party Politics: 1969-1972 - - - 78
2.4 The Development of Party Politics: 1979-1981 - - - 79
2.5 Party Funding under the CPP Government - - - - 82
2.6 Party Funding under the Second Republic - - - - 88
2.7 Party Funding under the Third Republic - - - - 90
2.5 Conclusion - - - - - - - - 97
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Chapter Three: The Legal and Institutional Framework for Party Financing in
Ghana
3.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - 100
3.1 The Institutional Framework of the State - - - - 100
3.2 The Matrix of Political Finance Law - - - - 102
3.2.1 Regulations on Limits - - - - - - 103
3.2.2 Regulations on Bans - - - - - - 108
3.2.3 Regulations on Disclosure - - - - - - 114
3.2.4 Regulations on Reporting and Enforcement - - - - 125
3.3 Conclusion - - - - - - - - 129
Chapter Four: Sources of Funding to Political Parties under the Fourth Republic of
Ghana
4.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - 132
4.1 Analysis of the Sources of Party Funding - - - - 133
4.2 The Major Sources of Funding - - - - - 135
4.3 Other Relevant Sources - - - - - - 161
4.4 Utilization of Party Funds - - - - - - 166
4.5 Conclusion - - - - - - - - 168
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Chapter Five: Contextual Variables and Financing of Political Parties in Ghana
5.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - 170
5.1 Political Patronage: Clientelistic and Neopatrimonial Politics - 170
5.2 Political Victimization - - - - - - 174
5.3 Socio-Economic Factors - - - - - - 177
5.4 Lack of transparency and accountability - - - - 181
5.5 Organizational capacity of political parties - - - - 183
5.6 Religious and cultural beliefs - - - - - 186
5.7 Conclusion - - - - - - - - 188
Chapter Six: The Impact of Party Funding on Internal Party Democracy
6.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - 190
6.1. Descriptive Analysis of Dependence on Party Financial Contributors 190
6.2 Influence of Wealthy Members of Political Parties - - - 195
6. 3 Internal Rules of Party Membership and Election - - - 197
6.4 Payment of Membership Dues for Delegates - - - - 202
6.5 Imposition of Candidates on the Party - - - - 204
6.6 Condoning Vote Buying - - - - - - 205
6.7 Test of Hypothesis - - - - - - - 206
6.8 Party Funding and Internal Party Democracy - - - - 211
6.9 Conclusion - - - - - - - - 226
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Chapter Seven: Summary and Conclusions
7.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - 228
7.1 Summary of Key Findings - - - - - - 228
7.2 Implications of the Findings for Democratic Party Politics - - 236
7.3 Recommendations - - - - - - - 237
7.4 Conclusion - - - - - - - - 242
Notes - - - - - - - - - 245
Bibliography - - - - - - - - 272
Appendix “A” List of Registered Political Parties - - 292
Appendix “B” Survey Questionnaire - - - - - 294
Appendix “C” Interview Guide - - - - - 298
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List of Tables
Table 1.1: Interviewees from political party card holding members and politician 55
Table 1.2 Relevant Public Institutions - - - - - 56
Table 1.3 Civil Society Organizations - - - - - 56
Table 1.4: Membership Status of Respondents - - - - 63
Table 1.5: Membership positions and Political Parties - - - 64
Table 1.6: Regional Distribution of Respondents - - - - 65
Table 3. 1: Law to limit the contribution of individuals and companies - 105
Table 3. 2 Disclosure of income by Political Parties - - - - 117
Table 3.3 Disclosure of income by Members of Political Parties - - 117
Table 3. 4. Disclosure of Expenditure by Political Parties - - - 118
Table 3. 5 Disclosure of Expenditure by Members of Political Parties - 118
Table 3.6: Political Parties Compliance with Disclosure Rules - - 120
Table 4.1: Source of Political Party Financing (2005 – 2012) - - - 134
Table 4. 2: Major sources of income by Parties (cross tabulation) - - 138
Table 4.3: Major sources of Income by Position in Parties - - - 139
Table 4. 4: Suggestions by Respondents to Improve Party Financing - 150
Table 4.5: Allocation of State-owned Vehicles to Political Parties, 1992-2012 156
Table 4.6: State Funding of Political Parties - - - - - 158
Table 4.7: Rates Charged by Political Parties from 2008 to 2012 - - 163
Table 4.8: Trends in Party Expenditure - - - - - 167
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Table 5.1 Wealthy people offer gifts to maintain relationship - - 173
Table 5.2 Political Victimization - - - - - - 174
Table 5.3 Ordinary members are poor - - - - - 177
Table 5.4: Lack of Transparency and Accountability - - - - 181
Table 5. 5: Organizational Capacity by Positions - - - - 184
Table 5.6 Presidential Election Results 2004 – 2012 - - - 185
Table 6.1 Party depends on the financial contributions of wealthy members 191
Table 6.2 Party depends on the financial contributions of wealthy members 192
Table 6.3 Party depends on the financial contributions of ordinary members 193
Table 6.4 Party depends on the financial contributions of ordinary members 193
Table 6. 5: Wealthy People Influence Elections by Party of Respondents - 196
Table 6.6 Wealthy People Influence Elections by Position of Respondents - 197
Table 6. 7 The Wealthy Members Fixed High Filing Fees - - - 199
Table 6. 8: The Wealthy Members fixed High Filing Fees by Positions - 200
Table 6.9: The minimum daily wage in Ghana 2008-2014 - - - 201
Table 6.10: Filing Charged by Political Parties in 2008 and 2012 - -- - 201
Table 6.11: The Wealthy members pay dues for potential delegates by Parties- 202
Table 6.12: The Wealthy Members Pay Dues for Potential Delegates by Positions -203
Table 6. 13: The imposition of Candidates on the Party by Party - - 204
Table 6.14: The Imposition of Candidates on the Party by Positions - 205
Table 6.15: The wealthy Buy Votes with Cash and Gifts by Party - - 205
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Table 6. 16: They buy votes with cash and gifts by positions - - 206
Table 6.17: Descriptive statistics of financial contributors and internal democracy
measures - - - - - - - 208
Table 6.18: Results of regression analysis - - - - - 209
Table 6.19: Respondents perception on influential party contributors - 210
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List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Gender of Respondents - - - - - - 66
Figure 1.2 Level of Education of Respondents - - - - 67
Figure 4.1 Weighted Average of Source of Funding for Parties - - 136
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ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS
ACP Action Congress Party
APRP All People’s Republican Party
AR Ashanti Region
AU Africa Union
AYO Anlo Youth Organization
BA Brong Ahafo Region
CDD-Ghana Ghana Center for Democratic Development
CDP Consortium for Development Partnership
CDU Christian Democratic Union
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CHRAJ Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice),
CMB Cocoa Marketing Board
CODESRIA Council for Scientific Development of Social Science Research in
Africa
CP Construction Pioneer
CPC Cocoa Purchasing Company
CPP Convention People’s Party
CR Central Region
DACF District Assembly Common Fund
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DFP Democratic Freedom Party
DFP Democratic Freedom Party
DPP Democratic People’s Party
DPP Democratic People’s Party
EAC Economic Commission for Africa
EC Electoral Commission
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EGLE Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere
ER Eastern Region
FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiffing
FYO Federation of Youth Organization
GAR Greater Accra Region
GBC Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GCP Ghana Congress Party
GCPP Great Consolidated Popular Party
GCPP Great Consolidated Popular Party
GDP Gross Domestic Products
GDRP Ghana Democratic Republican Party
GFP Ghana Freedom Party
GH¢ Ghana Cedi
GNP Ghana National Party
GTV Ghana Television
IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDEG Institute for Democratic Governance
IEA Institute of Economic Affairs
INDEP Independent Candidate
INGOs International Non-Governmental Organizations
IPP Independent People’s Party
MAP Moslem Association Party
MP Members of Parliament
NADECO National Development Company
NAL National Alliance of Liberals
NCCE National Commission for Civic Education
NDC National Democratic Congress
NDP National Democratic Party
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NDP National Democratic Party
NEC National Executive Committee
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NIMD Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
NLC National Liberation Council
NLCD National Liberation Council Decree
NLCD National Liberation Council Decree
NLM National liberation Movement
NPP New Patriotic Party
NPP Northern People’s Party
NR Northern Region
NRP National Reform Party
NRP National Reform Party
NVP New Vision Party
PAP People’s Action Party
PDA Preventive Detention Act
PDCs Peoples’ Defence Committees
PFP Popular Front Party
PHP Peoples Heritage Party
PNC People’s National Convention
PNDC Provisional National Defence Council
PNDCL Provisional National Defence Council Law
PNP People’s National Party
PP Progress Party
PPP Progressive People’s Party
RPP Reformed Patriotic Party
SDF Social Democratic Force
SMCD Supreme Military Council Decree
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SMCD Supreme Military Council Decree
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SSNIT Social Security and National Insurance Trust
TC Togoland Congress
TFP Third Force Party
UDSP United Development System Party
UER Upper East Region
UFP United Front Party
UGCC United Gold Coast Convention
UGM United Ghana Movement
ULP United Love Party
UNC United National Convention
UNP United National Party
UP United Party
URP United Renaissance Party
USA United States of America
UWR Upper West Region
VAT Value Added Tax
VR Volta Region
WB World Bank
WDC Workers Defence Committees
WR Western Region
YPP Yes People’s Party
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Abstract
The way political parties mobilize funds for their activities is recognized as an essential
determinant of their internal democratic politics. This study examines the financing of
political parties in Ghana. It is based on the hypothesis that the dependence of political
parties on some wealthy members of society for funding affects their capacity to achieve
internal democracy.
The study obtained primary data from a total sample of 1,111. This was made of a survey
of 1,006 card holding members of four political parties, (the National Democratic
Congress, New Patriotic Party, People’s National Convention and Convention People’s
Party), which are consistently represented in Parliament; 105 interviews conducted with
ordinary and executive members of political parties, public institutions and civil society
in Ghana; and the relevant financial records of political parties provided by the Electoral
Commission. The data analysis was guided by the rational choice institutional theory which
sees members of political parties as rational political actors who provide funding to, or
withhold funding from, political parties based on their calculation of the potential political
and economic benefits.
Three key findings were uncovered by the study. First, contextual variables including the
political environment, the economic status of citizens, the socio-cultural environment, and
organizational factors have accounted for the inability of political parties to mobilize
resources from their grassroots members. Second, party financing has, therefore, relied
heavily on some wealthy members of society who use their power to control, to their
advantage, the internal democratic politics of the parties. Third, neopatrimonial politics has
emerged within political parties, where poor members sell their votes to wealthy politicians
during the election of party representatives.
Based on the findings, the study recommends some form of state support, building capacity
for effective party organization and enforcement of the rules and regulation governing
funding of political parties to enhance democratic politics in Ghana.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Political parties lie at the heart of representative democracy. Mainwaring1 recognizes the
importance of political parties in the building of democracy as the main channel through
which representation in parliament can work in the third wave of democratization.
Consensus also exists among scholars such as Gunther and Diamond2, Sartori,3 and Ware4
that political parties are essential for sustainable democracy and good governance. Randall
and Svasand,5 describe political parties as teachers of civic education, while Lipset 6
emphasizes their indispensability in any modern democratic politics. Political parties are
therefore vital for the organization of modern political polity and they perform a variety of
functions among which are the following:
(i) They organize political campaigns in order to mobilize voters to
participate in elections;
(ii) They recruit political personnel by selecting and nominating candidates
who stand for public office;
(iii) They aggregate a plurality of interests into a reasonable number of
political alternatives or policy options, and normally add an important
element of stability to the political system by legitimizing the
individuals and institutions that control political power; and
(iv) They encourage partisan attachments, and engage in campaigns and
civic/voter education.7
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The undertaking of all these activities inevitably requires substantial finance. The
availability or lack of finance is a critical element that directly impacts on the extent to
which political parties can shape democratic politics.
Money is very crucial in democratic politics and its role in consolidating strong democratic
governance cannot be over-emphasized. As the International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (IDEA)8 points out, money is vital to run any healthy democratic
institution. Nassmacher9 considers funding the main driving force for a modern
competitive political party system. Pinto-Duschinksy10 invariably describes money as the
engine of politics and the political resource that matters most. According to CDD-Ghana11,
finance is vital to build vibrant and competitive political parties. Money is, therefore, the
lifeblood of political activity and, as Clare Ettinghausen 12 sums it up, money buys the
access, goods and services, favours and skills that are essential to effective political party
activity. However, financial resources alone do not guarantee competitive political party
activity, in much the same way as multi-party politics is also not a guarantee for
development. Nevertheless, there is a strong correlation between financial resources,
competitive political parties and democratic governance.13
The relationship between money and politics has been a contentious issue in both old and
new democracies. A healthy multi-party democracy requires strong political parties, but
money to pay for multi-party activities can place undue power in the hands of some wealthy
individuals. It can also result in the abuse of state resources and in political corruption. It
can influence the outcome of elections and the democratic process in general.14 The debate
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on the appropriate ways of funding of political parties is therefore a concern for the quality
of democratic governance. This study explores the contextual variables and how funding
affects the capacity of political parties to achieve internal democracy.
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In recent years, many African countries, including Ghana, have succumbed to both internal
and external pressures and have returned to multi-party democracy after long periods of
military rule.15 Ghana has demonstrated her commitment to a multi-party system by
conducting six successful general elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012
with the third and fifth (ones) witnessing power alternation from one political party to
another. There is no doubt that Ghanaian political parties have helped by seeking power
through democratic means and have discouraged seeking power through any undemocratic
means. Specifically, they have contributed remarkably to electoral competition and
reassured the legitimacy of elections by contesting presidential and parliamentary
elections.16 They have recruited political leaders, organized civic education and stimulated
voter participation. More importantly, by seeking power through democratic means,
political parties have helped to discourage seeking power through any undemocratic
means.17 By law, party politics should not feature during district assembly elections, but
political parties are often active trying to get ‘their’ candidates elected. 18
Competitive political parties in Ghana and elsewhere need financial resources to effectively
discharge their democratic functions. They need to acquire and properly staff their offices,
organize themselves, undertake research to continuously communicate with the people, and
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mount effective election campaigns. Some political parties in Ghana have branches
nationwide as required under the Political Parties Act, Act 574 of 2000 and some of these
parties manage to operate throughout the year. All these require adequate financial
resources.
As in many democratic countries, political parties in Ghana are regarded as non-state
political institutions with rights of independent funding. The sources of funds to political
parties is regulated by certain laws. For example, in Ghana, foreigners and foreign
companies, by law, are not allowed to make any contributions or donations or grant loans,
whether in cash or in kind: directly or indirectly, to fund political parties. Governments and
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) are allowed to contribute to party
funds, but they can only do so through the Electoral Commission, and such funds will be
for the benefit of all political parties. Foreign governments and International Non-
Governmental Organizations (INGOs) are not allowed to contribute directly to any specific
political party.19 Even though the laws have always sought to control the financing of
political parties, it is poignant to indicate that the Ghanaian Fourth Republican Constitution
and the Political Parties Act, Act 574 of 2000 which outlines political party rules and
regulations have neither prescribed their sources of income nor placed any limitation on
such contributions.20 Act 574 is silent on state funding. It is only the disclosure provision
of the Act that suggests two main private sources, namely, membership dues and donations
in cash or kind.21 In reality, this simple classification conceals a complex system of rules
and regulations that govern party finance.
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Private financing of political parties can embrace everything from a trivial contribution
from an individual to a large donation from an organized crime syndicate. While private
financing of political parties is desirable and necessary, it is often associated with a lot of
problems. 22 Lack of proper regulation on private contributions may exert inappropriate
and undue influence on the political system and pose a real danger of undermining
democratic values.23 As Rose-Ackerman24 rightly puts it:
the worry is favouritism. Groups that give funds to elected officials expect help in
the legislative process. They may also expect special treatment on individual
problems in dealing with the bureaucracy or in seeking contracts and concessions.
If the interest of such groups or individuals conflicts with those of the general
public, this undermines democratic values.
In Ghana, the media headlines have been full of stories that express concern about how
funds are mobilized for political activities. For example, one night of fund-raising activities
yielded 13 billion cedis ($18.4m) from 13 people who were reported to have donated the
amount to Mr. John Alan Kyeremanten, a contestant for the 2008 presidential candidate
slot of the then ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP).25 In contrast, however, the late Dan
Lartey, the presidential candidate for the Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP) was
unable to raise registration fee to contest in the 2008 presidential election.
In 2010, the media pointed out that the NPP was indebted to the extent that it might not be
able to organize its presidential primaries slated for August 2010.26 Consequently, the
contestants were asked to contribute additional money to the mandatory registration fees
in order to have successful primaries. The news further suspected that the national
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chairman of the party had to sell his personal property to pay off some of the debts. This
media report revived the debate about how political parties should be funded in the country.
While some called for state funding to avoid the possibility of rich people taking over
political parties in our democratic system, others asked political parties to solicit more
financial contributions from their grassroots supporters to fund their activities.27
The Political Parties Act 574, does not provide any limit or guidelines regarding donations
to political parties and politicians. Yet, the fundamental question that keeps agitating the
minds of many concerned citizens, researchers and supporters of democracy is: To what
extent has donations to candidates and political parties been able to promote democratic
politics? What motivated the national chairman of the NPP to sell his personal property to
pay off political party debts? Why should the Chief Justice, Her Lordship Georgina Wood28
call for a sustained crusade against the infusion of money into politics at all levels in the
country? What should be done to encourage grassroots-financing and, possibly, prevent
plutocratic donations to political parties in Ghana?
The private source of financing political parties often influences the degree of open
political competition and equality party members enjoy. 29 According to Butler 30, in South
Africa and the Global South, the poor who are unable to contribute to party funds are left
to languish voiceless in poverty, increasingly enraged by their exclusion from the political
equality that democracy has promised the people. More importantly, party financiers
influence the character of internal party democracy, and the growth and character of
internal factions. The way political parties are funded is, therefore, one of the key factors
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that influences the overall political development in both developed and developing
countries.
In the light of the enormous controversy the issue of party financing has generated amidst
a growing democratic development, this study examines the contextual variables that have
influenced the financing of political parties, the various sources of financing political
parties, how the rules and regulations of political party financing are enforced and their
implications for internal democratic party politics in Ghana.
The hypotheses of the study, research objectives, research questions and analytical
framework (theoretical approach, conceptual tools, and methodology) are outlined below.
1.2 HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis of this study is that:
i. The dependence of political parties on some wealthy members of society for
funding affects their capacity to achieve internal democracy.
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The study has a three-fold objective. It seeks to:
i. Identify and examine the contextual variables that have influenced the dependence
of political parties in Ghana on some wealthy members for funds;
ii. Assess how the financial dependence of political parties on some wealthy
members of the society affects the internal democratic order of political parties;
and
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iii. Suggest alternative measures for financing political parties that would promote
internal democratic politics in Ghana.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the above objectives, the study is guided by the following questions:
1. What is the institutional framework of the state and the political parties that governs
political party funding?
2. What are the sources of funding for political parties?
3. What are the contextual variables that have influenced the financial dependence of
political parties in Ghana on some wealthy members?
4. How does the dependence of political parties on their wealthy members for funding
affect the capacity of political parties to achieve internal party democracy?
5. What are the implications of the findings for democratic politics in Ghana?
1.5 OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY VARIABLES
Three key concepts that underpin the study are political party financing, the political party
and institutions. These key concepts and the associated contextual variables are defined
below.
1.5.1 Political Party Financing
The concept of political party financing refers to the manner in which political parties and
individual candidates who seek to get elected to assume political office gather funds for
electoral campaigns, and in the case of political parties, seek to maintain themselves as
organizations.31 In this study, therefore, political party financing involves all the means
through which political parties and individual political actors mobilize resources for the
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execution of their electoral, political and party organizational agenda. The term ‘party
finance’ applies to parliamentary systems where political parties are the most powerful
actors, while ‘campaign finance’ is most frequently used in the presidential systems, where
political parties operate in the background and the focus is shifted onto the individual
candidates.32 The governance principle of the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution is a hybrid of
presidential and parliamentary systems. It follows, therefore, that the term, political
finance, party funding, financing of political parties, campaign finance can be used
interchangeably to mean the same thing in this study. The private sector and the state are
the two main sources of funding to political parties.33 However, for the purpose of this
study, the main sources of political party funding are placed into three different categories.
These are:
i. Private financing
Political parties are independent political institutions, and they are basically supposed to
generate income from private sources. The private source of funding can further be divided
into internal and external sources. It is difficult to draw the line between internal and
external financing of political parties, particularly when donations are made at fundraising
rallies and where individuals, party sympathizers and companies contribute. It is even more
difficult because the Political Parties Act, Act 574, states that the two sources of funds to
political parties are membership dues and donations. Many scholars have identified
membership dues, candidate filing fees, income from investments, small individual
donations from party members and supporters through party rallies and similar events and
the sale of party newspapers, party manifestos, paraphernalia and other publications as
genuine internal sources of income.34 External sources of funding are contributions from
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non-party members such as sympathizers, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),
companies and foreigners. State funding can be considered as an external source but
because it is compatible with democratic ideals, it is discussed under separate heading.
ii. State Funding
State funding is the provision of resources by the state to political parties on a regular basis,
or funding that is only election campaign related.35 Nassmacher36 notes that state funding
is the allocation of public funds to political parties to bridge the gap between insufficient
money generated from private financing and their expenditure State funding can be direct
or indirect. Direct state funding is a distributive policy to support political parties on a
regular basis with some form of criteria. Indirect state funding is a support in the form of
subsidy in kind: free media time, special taxation status, free use of public buildings, free
or subsidized postage and free transportation, among others. It has become a necessary cost
of democracy. Supporters of public funding of political parties argue that the wealthy
individuals and people with special interests often contribute by far a larger amount of
money to the ruling party because of the immediate returns which come in the form of
award of contracts and other benefits as a direct result of their contributions. This apart,
the incumbent party has access to state resources and this does not create a level playing
field for opposition parties.37 The term public funding, state support, and state funding in
this study are used interchangeably to mean the same thing.
iii. Illegitimate or undemocratic financing
These are contributions from political entrepreneurs or people who contribute for the
purpose of getting contracts or influencing political activities for selfish gains. In spite of
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the formal democratic rights of all, some people abuse the process through the rule of what
Gyimah-Boadi calls ‘interested money’.38 This kind of financial contribution to political
parties undermines the democratic ideal, and it is unacceptable to society.39
1.5.2 Political Party
Howard 40 defines political parties as ‘organizations formed to win elections and influence
public policy’. This definition is not far from how a political party is legally defined under
the Fourth Republic of Ghana. A political party is defined in Section 33 of the Political
Parties Act as:
… a free association or organization of persons, one of whose objects may be to
bring about the election of its candidates to public office or to strive for power by
the electoral process and by this means to control or influence the actions of
government.
This definition is what is deployed in the study to address issues concerning the funding of
political parties under the Fourth Republic of Ghana. The formation of political parties in
Ghana, however, goes back to the late 1940s when the United Gold Coast Convention
(UGCC) and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) were formed. Therefore, generally, a
political party is conceptualized in this study as an organization of persons that is formed
with the purpose to win local or national elections and influence public policy choices.41
Michels42 points out that the core objective of a political party, which is to win elections
means that ‘the political party is founded in most cases on the principle of the majority,
and is founded always on the principle of the masses’. It is not possible for a political party
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to achieve its core objective without first winning the support of voters. Mass membership
of a political party is sine qua non to winning elections.
Political parties do not simply seek to win elections. More importantly, they aspire to use
state power to influence public policy choices. To ensure that political parties that win
elections use state power to fairly distribute national resources and to promote public
policies that are of a national character, Article 55(4) of the 1992 Constitution states, that
‘Every political party shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based
on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions.’ Towards the creation of a
political party with a national character, Section 9 of the Political Parties Act, Act 574 of
2000 further requires political parties to have branches in all the regions of Ghana and
‘organised in not less than two-thirds of the districts in each region.’ Political parties are
also prohibited from choosing their name, emblem, colour, motto or any other symbol
based on ethnic, regional, religious or other sectional connotations. In the context of the
Fourth Republic of Ghana, a political party is appropriately conceptualized as a national
organization of persons formed with the purpose to win elections and influence public
policy. The national character of a political party is an important requirement for the legal
registration and functioning of the party.
In the context of Ghana’s Fourth Republic, the membership of a registered political party
should be national in character. Article 21(3) of the 1992 Constitution and other legal rules
governing the formation of political parties emphasize that only Ghanaian citizens of
voting age have the right to form and join a political party in Ghana. Moreover, the right
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to join a political party is voluntary. However, the laws do not define who is a member of
a political party. For the purpose of this study, a political party member refers to a person
of voting age who has formally registered with a political party as a member. Members of
political parties are given identification cards as evidence of their membership. This study
showed that political parties have different categories of members such as founding
members, patrons, elders, officers and ordinary members. Members of political parties are
required to make periodic (monthly or yearly) financial contributions towards the
organizational activities of the parties. The periodic financial contributions of some fixed
amount to the party by the card bearing members are referred to in the study as membership
dues. The payment of membership dues demonstrates a sense of ownership, commitment
and participation of party members.43
This study is concerned with how the funding of political parties affects the capacity of
their members to influence internal democracy. Michels44 argues that ‘the life of political
parties, whether these are concerned chiefly with national or with local politics, must, in
theory, necessarily exhibit an even stronger tendency towards democracy than that which
is manifested by the state.’ This study therefore emphasizes that a strong internal party
democracy is the pillar of national democratic politics.
If a country’s political parties lack internal democracy it would become impossible to use
them to promote a democratic state. However, the funding of political parties is an
important factor that affects the internal democracy of parties. The study argues that the
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financial dependence of political parties on some wealthy members is capable of affecting
the internal democracy of parties.
i. Political Party Internal Democracy
In the context of the study, how can one define the terms ‘political party internal
democracy’, ‘wealthy members’ of a political party and ‘non-wealthy members’ of a
political party? Democracy, simply defined, is the rule by the majority. Indeed, one of the
key features of democracy is the principle of equality where each member of the society
has the same weight. In this case, the members of the political party have the same right to
vote, stand for an election, pay dues, and participate in decision making. Article 55(7) of
the Constitution of Ghana requires, that a party member should not be discriminated against
on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, wealth, economic or social
status.
Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution emphasizes that ’the internal organization of a
political party shall conform to democratic principles.’ The specific nature of the
democratic principles is not specified. Under the Fourth Republic of Ghana, there are two
types of elections that political parties contest, namely, parliamentary and presidential
elections. It could be argued that the 1992 Constitution prioritises the selection of
parliamentary and presidential candidates by political parties through popular elections,
prioritises these over other processes such as popular acclamation or appointment by party
leaders. Apart from the parliamentary and presidential elections, political parties also elect
members into internal leadership positions to shape decisions. For the purpose of this study,
the internal democracy of a political party is, therefore, defined as the situation where all
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members of a political party are offered equal opportunity irrespective of wealth, status
and power to contest election as parliamentary candidate, as presidential candidate, as party
leader or for other party positions.
The study showed that the election of candidates or leaders within political parties is
usually determined by the wealth of the party members rather than simply by their
association with the party as members. Financially, wealthy party members are those who
are usually elected or appointed by the political parties, either to contest public office, or
to assume internal leadership positions. The distinction that this study makes between
wealthy and non-wealthy political party members is explained below.
ii. Wealthy Members and Non-Wealthy Members of Political Parties
The Ghanaian state does not provide funding to political parties. Moreover, political parties
are legally debarred from soliciting for funds from non-citizens of Ghana. Political parties
are therefore left on their own to mobilize funding from citizens. It is within this context
that the financial contributions of party members become very important.
For the purpose of the study, ‘wealthy members’ of political parties refers to three
categories of party members. First, it refers to those who pay membership dues above the
monthly or yearly dues paid by the ordinary members. Second, it refers to those who pay
huge fixed sums of money in order to contest leadership positions within the party. And
third, it refers to those who pay huge fixed sums of money in order to contest the election
as parliamentary or presidential candidates. The study showed that almost all political
parties in Ghana have these three categories of wealthy members. These are national,
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regional and constituency executives, presidential and parliamentary aspirants and rich
individuals who donate large amounts of money to political parties. Non-wealthy
members of political parties refer to all those members who are only able to pay the
minimum membership dues paid by all ordinary members.
In theory, all members of political parties have equal opportunities to contest internal
leadership positions or be elected as party candidates. In practice, however, only the
wealthy members of political parties have this opportunity. Consequently, as already
indicated above, one of the hypotheses of this study is that the dependence of political
parties on wealthy members for funding is capable of affecting their capacity to achieve
internal democracy. Contributions from wealthy members to political parties attract greater
concern from advocates of democratic governance.45 The study showed that the
dependence of political parties on some wealthy members is influenced by many factors
including the nature of the institutional framework of the state that regulates political party
funding.
1.5.3 Institutions
It has become trendy for many political scientists to follow North46 in defining institutions
as humanly devised rules that enable and constrain social, economic and political
interaction.47 For the purposes of this study, institutions are defined as the rules that
regulate the actions of political parties as well as members of political parties. The study
focuses on two main types of institutions. First, it focuses on the legal rules of the state that
regulate the behaviour of political parties. Second, it focuses on the internal rules of
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political parties that regulate the organization of members and political processes such as
the election of leaders and candidates. Political parties are conceived as the ‘players’ in the
game of parliamentary and presidential elections. The Electoral Commission is the
‘referee’ created by the state to enforce the rules of the game of elections.
The study showed that both the legal rules of the state governing political parties and the
internal rules of political parties combine to help political parties become dependent on
wealthy party members. As already indicated, the institutional framework of the state does
not allow political parties to mobilize financial resources from non-citizens. This rule
encourages political parties to become formally dependent on internal resources while they
secretly raise funds from external sources. Meanwhile, the internal rules of political parties
affect the ability of all members to be elected as party leaders or as party candidates. The
institutions of the state do not prevent political parties from creating internal financial
barriers concerning the election of party leaders or candidates. This helps political parties
to ignore the political interest of ordinary members by creating internal electoral rules that
favour wealthy members. The study explains the financial behaviour of political parties by
using the rational choice institutional theory in political science.
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1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE RATIONAL CHOICE
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The theoretical framework of this study is based on the Rational Choice Institutional
Theory.
1.6.1 The Rational Choice Institutional Theory
The rational choice theory itself assumes that all political actors, whether they are voters,
candidates standing for election, bureaucrats, interest groups, the government, political
parties, and so on, seek to maximize their personal benefits in politics as in the market
place.48
Saffu49 has pointed out that one major reason for the absence of public funding of political
parties is the partisan interest of the ruling party. The ruling party that refuses to endorse a
national policy on the state financing of political parties also does so in maximizing the
self-interest of the party. This is because it enjoys incumbency advantage over the
opposition parties.50 Recent developments in Ghana, where in spite of public outcry,
Members of Parliament (MPs) awarded themselves end of service benefits— a package
that did not exist in the conditions of service of ordinary workers in Ghana, attests to the
fact that politicians seek their own interest.51 This study showed that some wealthy party
members donate to political parties in the pursuance of their selfish interest while, at the
same time, non-wealthy members refrain from funding political parties because they are
unlikely to derive direct benefit from political parties.
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The theory emphasizes that ‘specific patterns of relationship and interaction within
institutions and or social processes encourage or persuade a given actor to develop a
particular type of preference’. 52 Katznelson and Weingast53 point out that the theory
focuses on the interaction between the preferences of actors and institutional contexts. The
theory improves on the classical rational choice theory that presents the preferences of
actors in behaviourist explanations without much concern about the institutional structures
in which the interaction takes place. In the view of the classical rational choice theory,
according to Shepsle, the rational man as ‘an atom unconnected to the social structure in
which he or she is embedded’54 has now changed, emphasizing that institutions matter in
shaping the preferences of actors in social, economic and political interactions.55 In other
words, institutional contexts such as the constitutional rules of states influence the
preferences of actors in their actions and in the formulation of strategies to achieve
objectives.
The application of the rational choice institutional theory to the study of the behaviour of
actors works best within institutional frameworks where the rules are formalized and
known to the actors. When ‘the rules of the game’ are clearly known to the actors, the
actors, in turn, are able to formulate and implement well-ordered strategies for achieving
their goals in the optimal way. Rational choice institutionalism is well suited to the analysis
of the behaviour of political parties because the rules of the game of elections in democratic
countries are well-known to all the primary players involved – that is, the political parties
and the electorates or voters. The policy preferences of political parties are relatively
known to the electorate through party manifestoes or campaigns. This enables the
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electorate to form and select their preferences. Furthermore, the preferences of the
electorate also are known to political parties and those who contest for leadership positions
to enable them design their strategies to win votes.
The rational choice institutional theory is therefore well suited to the analysis of the
behaviour of political parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic with regards to the financial
dependence of political parties on wealthy party members. The Fourth Republic has
witnessed six elections and alternation of power between the two main political parties,
namely, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The
rules of the electoral politics, the challenges and opportunities of funding political parties
are known to both the incumbent and the minority or opposition parties at least after two
successive general elections in 1992 and 1996. Furthermore, the preferences of the
electorate about the type of candidates that they want to have elected as Members of
Parliament or as President are known to the political parties. For instance, the study showed
that many of the electorate preferred candidates who were wealthy enough to help them
overcome poverty as well as to undertake infrastructural development in the constituency.
The electoral experience from 1992 afforded political parties the opportunity to perfect
their strategies of mobilizing funds from members and sympathizers to conduct better
campaigns in the hope of winning elections.
Furthermore, at least after three successive general elections in 1992, 1996 and 2000,
political parties became aware of the extent to which the Electoral Commission would
enforce the rules governing the funding of political parties. Depending on the knowledge
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about the commitment of the Electoral Commission to enforce the rules of party funding,
political parties might decide to either play within the rules that constrain parties from
seeking financial support from non-Ghanaians or flout the rules. This reinforces Shepsle’s
view that ‘repeat play allows for “history contingent” strategies’ by political actors.56
Rational choice institutionalists such as Ostrom,57 however, recognize that the theory
cannot offer a complete explanation of human behaviour, because actors do not always
have complete and well-ordered preferences. As John58 indicated, the theory generally
explains action by assuming a set of preferences; and has great difficulty in showing where
preferences come from, though this is not impossible. The rational choice theory is good
at explaining what actors do once the objectives of a policy are set, but is often silent on
why decision-makers select a particular course of action.59
For the purpose of analysis, this study assumed that political parties have complete
information about the rules governing political party funding. It is, however, not possible
for political parties to have complete information about the preferences of each voter.
Moreover, it is impossible for members of political parties to have complete information
about the candidates of political parties. Therefore, under norms of rationality, political
parties are assumed to form their preferences and strategies based on satisfactory
information, knowledge and resources. In the real world, it is not possible for anyone to
possess complete information, knowledge and resources to make rational decisions. The
criticism of the rational choice in the light of the role of voluntary or philanthropic
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institutions is catered for by the fact that some people donate to political parties, vote for
politicians and engage in active politics without necessarily expecting any reward.60
In addition, Moe61 argues that much of the insights into political behaviour in institutional
contexts suggested by rational choice institutionalists have been found to be extraordinarily
productive, valid and important. Howard62 also maintains that the rational choice
institutional theory seems best suited for analysis of issues related to the electoral process
and party institutions. This is because the theory provides a framework in which the rules
are known and strategies for achieving goals can be formulated and implemented.
Therefore, it is not by chance that many of the influential rational choice studies deal with
party politics.63
The rational choice institutional theory is considered to be appropriate for this study
because the preference of political parties in the mobilization of funds within Ghana’s
political environment is influenced by many factors.
We applied Gierzynski’s64 model for the study of campaign finance to complement the
rational choice institutional theory. This study hypothesized that the dependence of
political parties on some wealthy members for funding in Ghana affects their capacity to
achieve internal democracy. The study showed that there are environmental factors that
have the potential of undermining internal democratic politics. Gierzynski’s model for the
study of campaign finance helped explain the contextual variables that affect funding of
political parties and their internal democracy in Ghana.
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Gierzynski observes that the behaviour of people who finance political parties is a function
of different environmental factors; therefore a study of their behaviour or participation in
a particular setting should be carried out with different environmental factors. His model
is based on four main environmental factors, namely, (i) Political; (ii) Legal; (iii)
Structural; and (iv) Electoral. These are discussed below.
i. Political Factors
Political factors are the nature of the political environment and institutions that have impact
on the finance system. These are the level of party competition, political culture, legislative
professionalism, interest group strength, political organizational strength, the importance
of elections, and the degree of decentralization in the policy-making process. Such factors
affect the behaviour of citizens directly or indirectly. For example, in systems where parties
are strong, money tends to be more equitably distributed. Where there are strong parties,
they may create more freedom for their own fund-raising and contribute to the practice. A
factor such as the political culture of a state may indirectly affect some of the legal factors
in a political finance regime. For example, political cultural norms that expect clean politics
have to adopt tight regulations on political party financing, including a system for public
funding of political parties.65
ii. Legal Factors
Legal factors refer to the laws regulating political party finance in terms of contribution
limits, expenditure limits, state funding, and reporting requirements. These factors also
include laws setting electoral practices such as the length of the general election season,
term limits, registration and laws regulating party endorsements. Finance systems that do
not limit contributions from corporations, labour union, trade unions, individuals, etc., may
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encounter different behaviour from systems that ban or limit certain types of contributions.
The absence of limit on contributions will encourage higher levels of political party
spending since it is easier to raise funds and spend them anyhow. State funding may lead
to more equity in the distribution of funds provided by the public. It reduces candidates’
dependence on private money, weakening the possible link between party funding and
policy decisions. It can also affect the levels of spending in a race.66 In the case of the
electoral laws, they have some influence on party or campaign finance behaviour. Short
election seasons make it difficult for non-incumbent candidates, especially those who have
been in a divisive primary, to use door-to-door campaigning because they have less time
to reach the electorate. The need to reach the electorate quickly increases the value of
publicity or media costs which is an important cost in an election.67
iii. Structural factors
The pool of money available to a political party, the wealth of citizens and the wealth of
people willing to contribute, the geographical size of a constituency and the party history
of the constituency are some of the structural factors that will determine the amount of
money raised and spent. The geographical size of a constituency, much like the population
size, can be a factor that drives up costs and makes campaign spending more important. In
constituencies that cover a large territory, the cost of reaching the electorate is higher
because voters are far apart.68 In this connection, Saffu69 has rightly observed that to reach
a preponderantly rural population in Africa which is usually dispersed over large territories
with poor roads, political parties are obliged to buy four wheel drive vehicles and keep the
campaign team longer in the field. This means payment of higher allowances, food and
accommodation expenses which the poor cannot support.
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Another important structural factor is the partisan nature of a constituency. The normal
pattern of vote in a constituency will affect party financing behaviour in a number of ways.
Constituencies where voters are predominantly from one party will not be as competitive
from year to year and, consequently, will be less expensive. For example, electoral results
in some constituencies in the Ashanti and Volta regions of Ghana indicate an over 90
percent voting pattern in favour of one particular political party over the years.70 All things
being equal, the impact of money has in voting is likely to be less in such lopsided
constituencies.
iv. Electoral factors
Electoral factors are aspects of legislation that vary from a country to country. Electoral
factors include the incumbency status of the candidates, the expected competitiveness of
the race, the quality of challengers, and the demographic characteristics of the candidates,
that is, gender, race and ethnicity. In this case, the social and demographic groups which
candidates belong to affect donation patterns, depending on the resources those groups can
mobilize. Women candidates, for example, receive contributions from organizations that
promote women’s participation in politics. Candidates running against incumbents find it
difficult to raise money because, with the close-to-perfection success rate of incumbents,
most contributors see challengers’ campaigns as lost causes. Incumbents, though they have
little trouble raising large sums of money, rarely spend it since competition is often
minimal.71
The model served as useful guide to identify variables that need to be considered in any
study of internal democracy of political parties and behavioural issues on financing
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political parties. The key issue is to identify how the party financing system affects
behaviour and recognizing those aspects that should operate in all party finance systems.
1.7 LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review is divided into five sections; namely, literature on:
i. Democracy and Political Participation;
ii. Political Parties and Democratic Politics;
iii. Political Party Financing and Democratic Politics;
iv. Political Party Financing and Democratic Politics in New Democracies; and
v. Political Party Financing and Democratic Politics in Ghana.
1.7.1 Democracy and Political Participation
Dahl,72 Diamond,73 Gyimah-Boadi and Oquaye,74 assert that the linchpin of internal
democracy is citizens’ participation in the decision-making process. Political participation
refers to the involvement of citizens in the political process of the country or society. When
people vote in a general or local election they participate in politics. In the same way, when
people contest elections to a district assembly or for a party office, they participate in
politics. Participation in democracy covers a wide range of activities on the part of the
citizens of the state. It entails such activities as voting, joining political parties and interest
groups, payment of taxes, writing to elected officials, demonstrations for a political cause
and giving money to candidates and political parties. It is a virtue that is seen as a civic
duty, a sign of a healthy democracy, as well as the best method of ensuring that one’s
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private interests are not neglected. In short, citizen participation is a better alternative to
tyranny or oligarchy.75
According to Lippmann76, democratic societies are distinguished from non-democratic
ones by their emphasis on citizen participation in politics. A political system that claims to
represent the interest of the people must give opportunities to citizens to participate in the
process of decision- making to give meaning to democracy. Rosenstone and Hansen77 point
out, that the extent to which citizens contribute in diverse ways toward the political process
is a measure of how democratic a society is perceived. How much the people contribute is
a critical question to address in participation. Schumpeter78 considers voting as an
unrivalled form of citizen participation and influence. On his part, voting is a form of
political participation - a sharing in activities designed to influence public policy and
leadership selection. He argues that free, fair and open elections are features of democratic
politics, and hence voting should be regarded as the most basic duty of citizens.
In a multi-party system, governments can only win power and survive through competitive
elections between (or among) political parties. In fact, the organization of political parties
is dependent on the extent to which resources are mobilized. This is because many scholars
including Pinto- Duschinksy;79 and Mathisen and Svasand80 believe that money is the
lifeblood of political activity. Indeed, one of the essential elements of political
participation is the financial contribution provided by the members of the society.
Nassmacher 81observes that in a modern democracy, the principle of ‘one man one vote’
coexists with the concept of the legitimate use of money for political purposes. The
argument that political action should be paid for by those who take a voluntary interest in
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ideologies, issues and candidates, has led to emphasis on the idea of grassroots financing
participation.
If citizens decide to contribute their own money to party coffers and campaign chests, a
political link of grassroots support for party politics is maintained. In this case, the political
finance regime takes special care to make sure that politicians will continue to seek
donations from supporters. Political fund-raising provides a linkage between grassroots
support for a party and ownership. This may find expression in various ways or acts by
individuals or groups of citizens. The financing of party activity is one of those means
which provides and sustains a linkage between leaders and supporters. If a particular
segment of society that supports a party happens to be more affluent, individual members
of this stratum will be able to donate freely from personal income or wealth. If grassroots
supporters are less well-off, they need to collect ‘big money in little sum’.82 This was
demonstrated during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when working-class parties in
Western Europe collected ‘big money in little sum’ to promote their political cause. In like
manner, the process of raising big money in little sum helped to fund political movements
working for the independence of many African states.83 An example of this is how
President Barack Obama and his Democratic Party raised ‘big money in little sum’ to
support political activities in the 2008 elections. They created a grassroots movement that
was funded by a broad base of ordinary people through the Internet.84
The study of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady85 correlates political participation with
independent variables such as education, family income, job level, non-political
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organization, political efficacy, partisan strength, citizenship, civic skills, political
information, religious attendance, and political interest. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady flip
the standard question and ask ‘Why don’t people participate?’ Their response is in
threefold: because people cannot – they do not have the resources; because people do not
want to – they do not have the motivation; and because no one asked – they were not
mobilized.
From the above discussion on political participation, it is striking that: First, ordinary
members, generally, are likely to devote little by way of time and resources to participate
in politics. Second, political participation is not a natural act; it is an unnatural act.86
Finally, the nature of participation in democratic politics is influenced by different factors.
The factors can render participation and behaviour high or low, legal or illegal, democratic
or anti-democratic. Gierzynski’s87 argues that since political finance behaviour is
influenced in different environments by different environmental factors, a study of political
party finance behaviour or participation in a particular setting should be carried out with a
combination of environmental factors.
1.7.2 Political Parties and Democratic Politics
Studies on political parties and democratic politics cannot be meaningfully understood
without first putting the term democratic politics in the right perspective. This is basically
because the precise nature of democratic politics has been the subject of a fierce ideological
and political debate. The underpinning assumptions of all democratic politics are that they
offer the possibility of ensuring happiness for a larger number of people in the society.
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Perhaps a more helpful way to understand the nature of democratic politics is to consider
Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg’s address delivered in 1864 in which he defined democracy
as ‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people’88. This sums up the concept
of democratic politics. The people may in practice be taken to mean ‘the majority’. Such a
view of democratic politics tends to reinforce Rousseau’s theory of ‘general will’ or
‘collective will’ rather than ‘private will’89. This extols the virtue of participation where
every citizen is able to achieve satisfaction by having an equal say in the decisions that
shape his or her life. This is accomplished through the promotion of openness and
accountability within a community or society. At the heart of Rousseau’s argument is the
notion of ‘grassroots participation’, that is, the belief that political power should be
exercised at the very lowest possible level.90
Thompson91 has argued that the citizen is too busy living his own life to participate in the
minutiae of government. That apart, modern society is far too complex to be governed
directly by the people. Participation as it was practised in classical Greece is no longer
feasible. As a result, citizens collectively select representatives of their choice to rule on
their behalf. Based on this premise, it is difficult to imagine democratic politics without
political parties.
Proponents of the one-party state in Africa argue that it is more democratic than a multi-
party system. For example, Wanyande92 points out that the vast majority of African
countries practised one party systems with their own set of justifications. The proponents
further claim that democratic politics flourishes in a state which identifies all the people
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with the nation. In contrast, political parties represent sectional interests. To them, the
multi-party system is foreign to Africa and is therefore incapable of addressing the complex
socio-political realities of the African state and society. Furthermore, in an underdeveloped
and multi ethnically divided society, the multi-party system will exacerbate ethnic tensions.
The urgent task for African states is to focus on nation building and economic development.
The single party system is the rallying point for the politics of development and national
unity. Kwame Nkrumah, for example, dismantled the multi–party system in Ghana because
he declared this system to be politically and socially divisive; Houphouet–Boigny did
likewise in Cote d’Ivoire on the grounds that no opposition actually existed. Julius Nyerere
favoured the one–party state because he considered it the most appropriate way to build a
genuine African democracy in Tanzania.93
Salih’s94 observation of the nature of political parties in Africa is relevant to our analysis.
According to him, while political party membership in the West is based on ideology and
interest and they accommodate different opinions and group interests, in Africa the
influence of ethnicity became more apparent particularly after independence. Ethnicity
became so important that ethnic groups sought to protect their interests through specific
political parties, thinking that they are for them, and that only these parties are capable of
giving them protection and security. Similarly, political parties share ideologies of diverse
types often based on a myth of ancestry, collective memory, history and culture, and often
reside in a claim of ownership of a specific territory.95
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Another important feature of African political parties is the strong presence of patron-client
relations between party leaders and party operatives. Clapham96 laments that political
leaders at the national level look around for local leaders who command appreciable
influence within their own areas. They offer the local leader or whoever he recommends a
place in the party as a candidate in his constituency. If the party of the local leader wins an
election, the national leader delivers benefits to the local leader in the form of economic
allocations from the centre to the constituency. This may take the form of roads, water
supply, government support in local conflicts or a purely personal pay-off. Clapham calls
this clientelism and describes it as ‘a relation of exchange between un-equals’97.
Nevertheless, Burnheim98 contends that a patron-client relationship is better than a
politician-follower relationship. He argues that people may be better served by those who
are looking for clients than those looking for followers. In reality, the leader sacrifices
something for his or her survival.
Thompson’s99 assessment of the one-party state in Africa reveals that the ruling class
employs its control of state institutions to advance its individuals or group, and often
parochial interests. The ruling class also manipulates and controls the masses of the people.
It sees the attempt by the people to demand freedom and enforcement of their rights as
subversive and capable of undermining the security of the state. The influence of the party
is pervasive and tends to dominate the entire political life of society. This situation
forecloses the existence of political alternatives and the right to make free choices.
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Diamond100 discusses the importance of competitive multi-party politics in development.
First, he debunks the notion that the one-party system is more democratic. He identifies
competitive, free and fair elections as the sine qua non of democracy, and second as the
minimum threshold for democracy. If free and fair elections are held regularly within a
constitutionally stipulated time frame, and in particular, where regime change occurs
through such elections, a country is branded democratic. Multi-party competition, as
opposed to one party democracy, has become the most acceptable mechanism for achieving
this type of democracy. In fact, the literature on emerging democracies singles out elections
as the ultimate measure of the level of democracy in a country. The work by the Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA)101 reiterates election as an important measure of democratic
governance in Africa. In assessing the democratic governance situation in 27 African
countries, the ECA report indicates that the continent recorded significant positive trends
in democratic governance, as several African states entered their third successive era of
democratic change of power. Africa’s political dispensation is increasingly embracing
electoral participation from all social groups that matter and invariably contributing to
political stability and development.102
Apart from considering competitive multi-party elections as democratic, Diamond103 again
makes a cogent case for the need for sustained efforts toward building democratic processes
and institutions throughout the world. According to him, there is a correlation between the
principles of democracy -- such as the equality of human beings, competitiveness,
transparency, participation and responsiveness – and development. He refutes the notion
that China and the Asian tigers (Singapore, Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan); developed under
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authoritarian rule so Africa could also do so. In his view, this is a fallacious comparison
because their miraculous development took place in a historic and regional context that is
unlikely to be repeated. Diamond points out that there are empirical evidence and statistical
research on Botswana and Mauritius within Africa which demonstrate the inseparable link
between democracy, good governance and development. Africa cannot develop without
multi-party democracy, and democracy in Africa ultimately cannot be sustained without
development.
Studies by the World Bank corroborate the above findings. The World Bank Report104 has
emphatically pointed out that the problem of persistent underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) is mainly due to the deterioration in governance; that is, perversions in the
exercise of power in managing national affairs. In the words of the Report, ‘Underlying
the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance’.105 It is the failure
to establish a stable democratic party system in post-independence Africa that brought to
light a rethinking on the nature of party systems in Africa. 106
The work by Aminou107 which concentrates more on the third wave of democratic politics
in Africa shows that most African constitutions after 1990 have established multi-party
systems and sanctioned the preponderant role of political parties in the democratic process.
Indeed, the constitutions of most countries assigned political parties some fundamental
roles. Political parties are supposed to participate in the electoral process, engage in
political socialization, recruitment, formulation and execution of policies, interest
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aggregation, political education, training, the creation of political awareness and a debate
on issues of national development.108.
Iyare109 contends that the nature of the African party systems has been considerably shaped
by post-colonial authoritarian states. The experience of the third wave of democratic
politics in Africa suggests the re-institution of authoritarian rule in the guise of multi-party
democracy. In addition, the alternative party programmes that make the race competitive
are increasingly absent where they are needed most. Most political parties in Africa are
alive only for elections and go back to slumber after elections. In spite of their claim that
their membership consists of several millions, most of them are poorly funded, devoid of
any vision and the lack of democratic ethos. He points out that virtually all of them are
open to the vagaries and manipulation by a few ‘money bags’ and a few godfathers. His
work oils the debate on the possible survival of democracy in a poverty stricken
environment.
Thus, the literature reinforces the positive relationship between sustainable development,
multi-party democracy and good governance. Evidence around the world, especially from
the established democracies, and also from Mauritius in Africa, affirms this fact. Although
the particular historical and cultural environments within which the discussions are situated
differ from the Ghanaian perspective, they are nonetheless relevant. The role of political
parties in the present democratic politics in Ghana as means of articulating popular will,
participation and equality should now be evaluated in terms of the financing and the
internal democracy of the parties. This present study links the discourse to the Ghanaian
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experience by examining the extent to which financing parties has influenced internal
democracy.
1.7.3 Political Party Financing and Democratic Politics
The problem of financing political parties is a global one and as old as the organization of
a political party itself. A critical analysis of the literature shows that the problem of
undemocratic financing of political parties poses one of the greatest threats to economic
growth, political stability and democratic governance. It has a devastating impact on public
confidence in political, economic and social systems. Studies on democratic development
clearly show that money is important for democratic politics. However, the flow of money
need not necessarily become tainted with unethical and corrosive influence with which
politicians promote their personal interest. The problems of party financing is, therefore,
at the heart of the debate on political corruption.
Ewing,110 K-H Nassmacher111 and Pinto-Duschinsky112 examine the legal framework in
which political parties operate. Ewing notes that different problems posed by money in
politics have necessitated different individual systems of regulation the world over. To
promote a healthy relationship between money and politics, Ewing advocates universal
standards that can establish a framework of principles to which all can be encouraged to
subscribe, and by which all could be judged. He argues that while regulation prevents
illegal and corrupt practices, it is not a panacea to the problem. He notes that a country
such as Germany, that has tough regulations, still experience evasion of their laws. For
example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was forced to resign as honorary chairman of the
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Christian Democratic Union (CDU) over allegations of illegal donation to his party. The
problem with Ewing’s proposal is that universal standards cannot be applied to all
circumstances. There may be some universal standards such as disclosure, as well as a
ceiling on income, expenditure and donation, etc., but the determination of these rules and
regulation should address country specific problems based on research.
Nassmacher,113while elucidating the importance of effective strategies to control the
influence of money in democratic politics, categorizes various approaches of regulating
political finance into two typologies of public policy. These include regulatory and
distributive policies. According to him, regulatory policies are used to impact on the
funding policies to determine the rules and practice of enforcement. Bans and limits
generally restrict anonymous sources, trades unions, government contractors, foreign or
corporate sources of funds, and enforces the ceiling on donations and spending.
Nassmacher provides the central argument for banning some sources from funding political
parties. According to him, there is the risk of political parties losing contact with their rank-
and-file, or the grassroots of its membership if party leaders do not need them for financial
support. The literature on political parties clearly shows that parties provide a link between
citizens and government: they are considered as builders of social capital. To lose contact
with the grassroots or ordinary members can compromise the quality of democratic
governance in the sense that the political party may not be well institutionalized and cannot
provide a competitive framework to perform valuable political and social functions.114 This
is what seems to be missing in Ghanaian democratic politics.
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Nassmacher asserts further that the disclosure and reporting rules for parties and candidates
aim at ensuring transparency in the management of political party money. However, Pinto-
Duschinsky disagrees with this view, because if the disclosure rule is carried to the extreme
it would mean that even the smallest amount will have to be disclosed. This will make the
rules almost impossible to enforce, and render the information useless to the public, due to
the large amount of information a person would have to go through to get a picture of the
sources of funding. Pinto-Duschinsky’s argument sounds a good warning; but he fails to
provide the benchmark for the things to be disclosed. If one follows this line of reasoning,
then the rich people are likely to dominate in politics. This is because small contributions
or donations which are well-suited for democratic participation will not be accorded the
needed recognition.
On the other hand, Nassmacher’s caveat on distributive policies provides public support in
different forms. According to him, the introduction and encouragement of state funding in
various countries is largely due to the insufficiency of the income generated by political
parties through their genuine fund-raising activities. It is also intended to achieve equal
opportunities in political competition, and restrict the influence of undemocratic funding
sources. Many democratic countries, both old and new, have introduced cash subsidies,
and subsidies in kind, such as free media time, special taxation status, free use of public
buildings, free or subsidized postage and free transportation, among others, as support and
incentives to parties and candidates.
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Walecki115 examines the practice of party financing in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
He points out that a fragmented and non-institutionalized party system in the region
encourages big businesses to form client circles and establish their own political parties,
set up parliamentary factions or become media owners. Examples from Ukraine
demonstrate how informal political actors, such as financial or industrial groups and
political oligarchs can dominate the political space by forming business oriented parties.
The classical examples of such parties include the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine,
Party Democratic Union, Party Labour Ukraine, Ukraine’s Green Party, and Party of the
Regions. These parties, according to Walecki, have a clear majority in the Ukrainian
parliament. That apart, these parties control most of the national media, including major
television channels and the national newspapers. Politics in CEE is to a large extent a
combination of business projects run by powerful oligarchs enjoying political immunity
and individuals using office as a means for gaining wealth. Parties receive large donations
from a few wealthy donors while party accounts at the national and local levels are
inaccurate or incomplete. His work reveals illegal funding and political corruption as
prominent issues in the region. However, Walecki has failed to address the ways in which
parties and politicians involve their party membership and the electorate as a matter of
profound importance to the quality of democracy.
According to Sobel,116 the Watergate affair in Washington produced a series of trials and
investigations that revealed repeated abuses of election campaign rules ranging from
political espionage and sabotage to the misuse of campaign funds. Alexander117 observed
that in the United States of America, the laws remained in the books for more than 50 years
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but were not enforced until the incredible and shocking news of Watergate in 1972. The
excesses of party bosses and the corporations can fuel muckraker movements. He stressed
that the system of party financing with private funds contributed largely by wealthy
individuals and organized groups had been criticized by Theodore Roosevelt already in
1905. Bribery, kickbacks, and payoffs are illegal but not uncommon. The aim of any
reform must be to insulate the electoral system from abuses while ensuring fairness and
equity. According to Alexander, even the most stringent legislations will not wipe out
corruption entirely, but independent commissions to enforce the laws will bring hope for a
more durable improvement in the election-law atmosphere.118
One’s inference from all these studies is that the socio-cultural and economic environment
must be critically considered and factored into the policy guidelines on the financing of
political parties. This is missing in most of the literature. It is also evident that the issues
of political party finance laws and regulations are complex and still evolving. Issues of
political party finance are now moving onto the political agenda in several countries. It is
absolutely clear that there are no perfect solutions and that no one model of regulation can
be applied to fit all circumstances. Some countries are beginning to address the financing
issues, while others are working on revising their regulations, based on years of experience.
This present study reviewed the policy framework on political party funding in Ghana in
order to assess its intent and effectiveness.
1.7.4 Political Party Financing and Democratic Politics in New Democracies
Political parties in both developed and new democracies are regarded as one of the major
democratic institutions which often abuse their position to extol bribes, provide members
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with lucrative positions in the public sector and channel public resources into the hands of
party financiers. Indeed, people have increasingly pointed to political party corruption as
an essential focus for anti-corruption efforts.119 The Africa Union’s (AU) concern for the
global fight against unethical money in politics led to the enactment of the Convention on
Prevention and Combating Corruption (2003). Article 10 of the Convention states that
‘each state party shall adopt legislative and other measures to (a) proscribe the use of funds
acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties; and (b)
incorporate the principles of transparency into funding of political parties’.120
Saffu121 identifies the lack of a comprehensive legal regime as one of the major problems
facing democratic development in Africa. He notes that less than 20% of African countries
have comprehensive rules and regulations governing how party funds are raised,
prohibitions, ceilings and specified sanctions. The law on disclosure of sources of party
funds and audited accounts, the most important requirement to fight undemocratic issues
associated with party funding is almost absent on the continent. He could not find any
pattern or trend in legal provisions on party financing on the continent.
He points out that the cost of political activities on the continent is very high because of
the low levels of income, literacy and technology as well as large rural populations, usually
dispersed over large territories with only poor road networks. Politicians take advantage of
this environment to circumvent the weak rules and regulations governing party finance. He
also notes that the phenomenon of a candidate owning a party as a businessman owns a
firm is fairly common, and the differences in getting financial resources between governing
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and opposition parties seem to be greater in Africa than elsewhere in the world. According
to Saffu122 one major reason for the relative absence of public funding is the partisan
interests of the ruling parties. The opposition which stands to benefit the most from the
adoption of regulations that enhance transparency and limit funding and spending has
usually been too divided and weak to strongly influence the adoption of such regulations.
A significant source of income for political parties in Africa comes from private donations,
and all parties depend on it to varying degrees. Donations from citizens living abroad are
very important for opposition parties.123 Saffu argues that the law and practice are a matter
of an unregulated self-help which gives ample room for undemocratic practices. The
practice where resources are mobilized from the rank and file of the party has not been
encouraged by the existing legal frameworks.124
Gueye125 observed that the political finance regime in Senegal is relatively under-regulated
and the raising of funds is a matter of unregulated self-help.126 There is no specific
regulation on the use of money by candidates and parties during campaigns. The existing
legislation, however, makes reference narrowly to the funding of activities of political
parties thus giving priority to party electioneering campaigns. However, the legislation is
silent on the sources of funds to political parties. This omission on the part of the
Senegalese law maker shows his reluctance at transparently managing the funding of
political activities to ensure accountability and democratic control.
Ilo,127 Harneit-Sievers,128 Emelonye129 and Omuoha130 are among the scholars who have
conducted studies on party funding in Nigeria. Though these studies are similar in their
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content and analysis, they nonetheless exhibit some differences. Ilo highlights the
inadequacies or deficiencies in legislation on public disclosure of financial information on
parties. The disclosure rule requires parties to publish their returns in two national
newspapers. In practice, these regulations are not enforced. The laws on party funding
overlook peculiar inclination of politicians who often place selfish and party interests
above that of the country.131 Harneit-Sievers buttresses the point that most parties are noted
to be instruments in the hands of political entrepreneurs who invest huge amounts of money
and expect concurrent rewards on their investments. This practice impedes the
development of a party system that focuses on issues and policies rather than
personalities.132 In a similar vein, Emelonye asserts that, in Nigeria, party finance is a
secretive affair; it is shrouded in mystery and silence. The politics of splits, defections,
violence and subterfuge which it generates have become the dominant feature of
governance in Nigeria. Political finance has been responsible for shifts in political alliances
throughout the country, and it has been responsible for ideological defections,
embarrassing resignations, corruption, and scandals and, in the extreme, anarchy in
Nigerian politics.133
Omuoha argues that, in spite of the huge government financial commitment to political
parties in Nigeria, their operations have been disappointing. This has led to the overall
problem of lack of institutionalization of a democratic political culture and the inability of
political parties to operate within democratic rules that govern the larger society.134
Obiorah,135 points out that the democratic consolidation and the evolution of accountable
governance in Nigeria are impeded by systemic political corruption including political
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finance malpractices. The political finance regulatory regime in Nigeria is weak and rarely
enforced. ‘Political entrepreneurs’, who are mostly wealthy former military officers and
their civilian business cronies, dominate Nigeria’s politics using their ill-gotten wealth to
control the major political parties. The structures and institutions of the major parties are
unrepresentative, weak and ineffective; the parties are essentially grand agglomerations of
the respective electoral ‘machines’ of the leading political financiers. To him, the
dominance of unrepresentative ‘electoral machine’ parties, controlled by political
entrepreneurs, alienates and does not empower the mass of the Nigerian people, and also
prevents the evolution of accountable governance in Nigeria.136
In Kenya, Mwangi137 observed that the multiparty system has opened up a democratic
space that intensifies intra-party and inter-party competition which invariably has increased
opportunities for corrupt political financing. He used the Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing
mega-scandals in Kenya to provide insights into the relationship between corrupt party
financing and democracy. According to Mwangi, the money obtained from the state
through Goldenberg was used to buy large amounts of food and cars for voters and
candidates of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) during the electioneering period,
and concluded that the pursuit and use of illegal campaign finance pose serious threats to
democracy in Kenya.138 Corrupt political campaign financing is also highlighted in a study
conducted by Jolobe.139 In his work, Financing the ANC: Chancellor House, Eskom and
Dilemma of Party Finance, Jolobe finds that the negative effects of campaign-finance
related corruption on representative government are particularly worrisome in new
democracies. He focusses on the relationship between ruling parties and public enterprises
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and on the scandal surrounding the business vehicle of the African National Congress
(ANC) of the Republic of South Africa: Chancellor House of South Africa. The ANC
investment vehicle, Chancellor House, gradually accumulated stakes in minerals,
energy, engineering, and other companies tendering for state contracts. The party is noted
to be one of the wealthiest political parties in Africa. Jolobe points to the conflicts of
interest that arise when parties engage in business, and to the hazards that perceived party
influence poses to a fragile democracy.
Fambom140 throws light on party funding issues in a number of countries in Africa. Some
states such as Botswana, Lesotho, and Mauritania do not grant any financial assistance to
parties thus forcing them to depend entirely on private funding. On the other hand, some
states such as South Africa, Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe directly fund political parties
most often based on their electoral performance. In many African countries, the conditions
for political parties to qualify for public funding are ambiguous. In Morocco and
Cameroon, the prime minister and president respectively decides whether or not there will
be any subsidies at all. In Benin and in Tanzania, the law regulating subsidies to political
parties is partially or not implemented at all. The support for candidates and parties
sometimes does not necessarily mean that it is available before electoral campaigns.
Equatorial Guinea is a case in point; here all the candidates were given US$20,000, but this
was distributed very late. Then four days before the election they were given an additional
US$ 10,000. The next day the opposition candidates withdrew from the electoral race
rendering the election non-competitive.141 Recent developments in Ghana reinforce
Fambom’s observation of late provision of support for election campaigns. Close to two
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weeks to the general elections, the Electoral Commission distributed vehicles to political
parties for the elections.142 According to Fambom, the existence of public funding does not
make a significant difference for opposition parties in Africa. The problem is that during
transitions, constitution- making periods and in the passing of electoral laws and
regulations, the incumbent has used its position to entrench itself against weak opposition
political organizations and civil society.143
Mathisen and Svasand144 observe that, sometimes, it seems that the government introduces
public subsidies in a way that does not encourage the institutionalization of the political
party system. They support this claim with the illustration of the situation in Gabon where
more than 70 self-declared parties were formed. Each party was granted 20 million franc
CDA (around US 34,700) and a four-wheel drive for the electoral campaign. Most of the
parties disappeared after receiving state funds. Where there is legislation, parties have been
inclined to circumvent them. In countries that have provisions for public funding, there are
inconsistent or incomplete regulations regarding their implementation.145
One unique feature about Mozambique’s party funding is that the law does not allow direct
private funding. All financial supports from private sources have to be channeled through
the National Electoral Commission for proportional allocation to all parties. In contrast,
the law allows political parties in Malawi to obtain funds from any quarters. Parties even
own businesses in Malawi.146
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In our view, political financing is both the object and the result of the political context and
process. The consolidation of multi-party democracy in Africa depends, to a large extent,
on the provision of clean and adequate finance to the key democratic institutions such as
the political parties. This fact has renewed both a donor and a scholarly debate on financing
political parties. Experience with six successive multi-party elections that have been
organized in Ghana manifested a great deal of issues, especially, regarding legislation on
party financing as well as resource acquisition and utilization. This present study
contributes to the debate on party financing which has always remained a major concern
when equity and a level playing field come up for consideration. We examine the
contextual variables that have influenced the financial dependence of political parties on
wealthy members, and how the dependence of political parties on wealthy members
impacts on internal party democracy in Ghana.
1.7.5 Political Party Financing and Democratic Politics in Ghana
Ayee’s147 exploratory work in 1993 on party funding provides the historical background
for party financing in Ghana during the post-colonial period. He discusses the main features
of laws regulating funding of parties in Ghana. He shows that the link between corruption
and party financing in Ghana started with Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party
(CPP). He notes that governmental and non-governmental agencies such as the Cocoa
Marketing Board (CMB), A.G. Leventis and the National Development Company
(NADECO) were some agencies which financed the activities of the CPP and its
supporters. Donations to the party, whatever form it took, led to demands in the form of
contracts, the appointment of persons of their choice to top government positions, and the
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granting of import licenses. The present study examines various forms of financing of
political parties to establish the trend in contemporary Ghanaian politics.
A study conducted on party financing by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development
(CDD-Ghana)148, identifies four principal sources of funds for parties in Ghana. They are
seed money provided by the founding members of the party; membership dues; donations
from well-wishers; and fundraising activities. The study notes that political parties
recognize inadequate funding as the main problem facing them. According to CDD, the
desire by Ghanaians for state support for political parties has been increasing and by 2004,
the majority (53%) of respondents supported state funding for political parties. Even
though the study opened the floodgate for the debate on state funding for parties in Ghana,
it failed to address the relationship between various sources of funds and their implication
for democratic governance in Ghana.
Boafo-Arthur149 observes that from 1993 to 1996 most of the members of the ruling NDC
party who were used to undertake party organization and political activities were on the
government pay roll According to him, ‘The District Chief Executive and other
government functionaries in between elections periods relentlessly carried out propaganda
and other organizational activities on behalf of the NDC.’150 This shows that state resources
were used to support the party organizational work of the ruling party. Opposition parties
do not have such an opportunity. Boafo-Arthur further identifies two broad constraints for
party financing in Ghana. The first concerns the limitations for donations in PNDC Law
281 that set the initial legal framework of political parties under the Fourth Republic. The
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principle underlying the limitation on donation is sound, since it forestalls the possible
hijacking of political parties by the rich. However, according to Boafo-Arthur, a legal
restriction does not augur well for the running of political parties in a country where the
minimum wage at the time was $2 (GH¢2.00) and the larger proportion of citizens was
poor. Although, the Political Parties Act, Act 574 of 2000 is silent on the ceiling of donation
and spending, Boafo-Athur seems to advocate party financing by the rich. Apart from the
legal shackles, he notes that government manipulations, internal factors within parties, also
contributed to ineffective mobilization of financial resources by the political parties. He is
aware that effective mobilization of financial resources is important, but does not make
any attempt to encourage mobilization of such resources from ordinary party members to
promote internal democracy.
Kumado’s151 advocacy work mainly argues for public funding of political parties. The
premise on which his argument was based is the provision in the 1992 Constitution which
enjoins political parties to play a public role in the democratic process. He points out that
the state has a stake in the viability of political parties and must support them. It is only
fair that the state which imposes these requirements should pick part of the bill arising from
their activities. This would ensure that political parties are independent of financial
pressure and undemocratic means of resource mobilization, the very concern which is used
to justify the ban, disclosure, limitation and reporting regulations. His work fails to discuss
direct and indirect costs of state funding to the nation. The actual costs and benefits as well
as the risks associated with them are much broader and deeper than the narrow financial
and political perspectives he offered.
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The limitations in Kumado’s work give credence to the work of Gyimah-Boadi. Gyimah-
Boadi152 rejects state funding and brings to the fore, the contradictions in the support of
state funding of political parties in Ghana. In his view, it is not state funding of political
parties that makes democracy work. He describes the move to pass a bill for state support
of political parties as a cartel-like dealing by a self-interested political class. In his view,
the fact that the proposed bill was the product of an extra-parliamentary collaboration and
among political parties themselves with the exclusive help of self-selected civil society
collaborators makes the process not sufficiently transparent, participatory and deliberative.
Gyimah-Boadi identifies four main unresolved challenges in party finance. The first
concerns the adequate finance for ruling parties and the scarcity of finance for opposition
parties. Second, the sources of party finance for both ruling party and opposition are
shrouded in secrecy. The third is all about the unequal playing field in party finance
mobilization. Finally, he laments the ad-hoc and unregulated nature by which party funds
are mobilized.
A critical analysis of the literature on party finance in Ghana shows that the approach to
financing political parties in Ghana is not systematic, scientific and sustainable. This does
not encourage consolidation of democratic governance. In addition, there are two pertinent
questions that the proponents of state funding fail to address. Should the support be routine
or restricted to election campaigns? Should the state finance all categories of expenses such
as salaries, services, investment and administration? If the state chooses to be selective to
pay for staff salaries regularly but the party is not able to raise supplementary resources,
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the party concerned cannot develop the capacity to function effectively. The exclusive
concentration on the monetary aspects of state funding of political parties runs the risk of
overstating the cost and understating the benefits. A balanced assessment that deals with
net benefits is preferred. Indeed, this study sets out to provide information that could help
balance the equation on state funding in Ghana.
In another related study, Saffu,153 suggests that scarce resources for political parties and
inequality among them are some of the reasons why the state should support political
parties. He is of the view that if one party emerged virtuous, competent and popular,
donations would be given to support it. In such a case, democracy in Ghana would be
threatened. This development increases the possibility of injecting unwholesome and
tainted money into Ghanaian politics. There has to be a strong presumption that if ‘Mafia
money’ or ‘drug money’ is channeled into politics through political parties, there is the
likelihood that the drug barons will capture power to aid criminality and therefore
undermine democracy.154
Ayee, Anebo and Debrah155 think that resources have affected the sustainability of party
organization such as the structure, campaigns and activities of political parties. According
to them, political parties are not able to sustain their organizations because they lack
financial resources. They also observe that political corruption is endemic in party politics.
This assumes the form of kickbacks and awards of contracts even though there are other
manifestations. Such a good study did not provide empirical evidence on how party
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financing negatively influenced inter-party democracy. This present study seeks to fill this
important lacuna.
Studies on party financing in Ghana are dominated by discussions on state funding of
political parties.156 State funding of political parties is not the only democratic source of
funding. Other sources such as membership dues, small donations, returns on investments,
among others, from the grassroots are more important sources and need special attention.
The fact is that lack of transparency, kickbacks, influence of money, abuse of incumbency,
corruption, and so on, keep occurring in the daily discourse in Ghanaian politics, and this
calls for in-depth studies to address the issues. Why are people not complaining about
elections and the electoral process? It could be that scholars on democratization in Ghana
have devoted their attention to party organizations, state funding of political parties,
elections and the electoral process; and little or no attention has been focused on the
undemocratic sources of party funding with their implications for democratic governance.
This study seeks to fill the gap in the literature. It identifies and discusses sources of
funding political parties in Ghana and their implication for internal democracy of political
parties. It also examines the contextual variables that influence party financing.
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study focuses on the funding of political parties in the Fourth Republic. The main
reason is that the Fourth Republic has witnessed six elections and alternation of power
between the two main political parties. In addition, the Fourth Republic has lasted the
longest, compared to the previous three republics. The First Republic lasted for six years
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while the Second and Third republics lasted for two years and three months, respectively.
The empirical observations made about the behaviour of political parties concern the
Fourth Republic. This is because it has enjoyed continuity since 1992 compared to the
others; and during this period the debate on funding of political parties has become more
pronounced. Moreover, the six general elections that were conducted under the Fourth
Republic are adequate for one to analyze how the historical interactions between parties
and voters within the stable institutional environment have influenced the preferences and
strategies of the political parties in the mobilization of financial resources.
The study relies on a triangulation of methods involving primary and secondary data.
Silverman157 supports a combination of techniques to investigate the social problem under
investigation. The techniques should abandon the spurious choice between qualitative and
quantitative data, but rather be concerned with the combination of both, which makes use
of the most valuable features of each. Therefore, to obtain fairly accurate data, we depended
on both qualitative and quantitative data techniques to gain complementary advantages of
words and numbers in the analysis. Qualitative data was necessary to understand the nature
of party funding and how it affects internal democracy of political parties. Quantitative
data was useful in measuring the responses and degrees of associations between
independent and dependent variables. Having explained the reasons for combining
qualitative and quantitative data, we now turn to discuss specific techniques adopted for
the study.
1.8.1 Qualitative Data Collection
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Qualitative data is the type data that does not use any statistical measure to produce its
findings. It is often generated through interviews, discussion and observation. Qualitative
research methods are generally inclined towards an interpretive paradigm which views a
world in which reality is socially constructed, complex and dynamic. Qualitative research
can provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of the phenomenon under investigation than what
can be obtained from a purely quantitative research158. Qualitative research methods were
used for the study because the issue of party financing behaviour is complex, context-
bound, requiring a holistic form of analysis and explanation. Its substantial flexibility
allowed us to undertake the study within the local context where party activities occur. The
qualitative data for the present study was gathered through in-depth elite interviews and
observations. These methods are discussed in turn.
i. Elite Interviews
Elite interviews were conducted with an interview guide159 from rural and urban areas. For
the elite interviews, the study purposively selected the national treasurers of the four
political parties represented in parliament, namely, the National Democratic Congress
(NDC), New Patriotic Party (NPP), People’s National Convention (PNC) and the
Convention People’s Party (CPP), and interviewed them. Other key political party
executives such as the general secretaries, the founding members, patrons, national women
organizers, youth organizers, candidates who contested for political office (unsuccessful
presidential and parliamentary candidates), ministers, Members of Parliament (MPs), party
executives in the previous republics, were interviewed, using the snowball sampling
technique where referrals were made by word of mouth to contact other political party
executives. Indeed, those contacted through referral spoke with the higher level of
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confidence than those approached by the interviewer’s own efforts. At least the national
treasurer, one Member of Parliament, and three executive members of the four political
parties were interviewed to gain a better insight into the sources of funding, whether legal
or illegal from a party’s official viewpoint or perspective.
That apart, the general secretary of the People’s National Party (PNP) under the Third
Republic, one independent candidate in Parliament, one executive member of the
Democratic Peoples’ Party (DPP) and the presidential candidate of the DPP and an
unsuccessful candidates were also interviewed. Due to the limited time and resources we
conducted one-on-one interviews with 105 people. This is made of 84 political party card
-holding members and 21 elites from relevant state institutions and civil society
organizations. The sample distribution of political party members and relevant state
institutions and civil society organizations is presented in Table 1.1-3.
Table 1.1: Interviewees from political party card holding members and politician
PNC CPP ND NPP PNP DPP Ind Total
C
Executive Party Members 5 7 10 13 1 2 - 38
Members of Parliament 1 1 10 10 - - 1 23
Ordinary Card-bearing 2 2 9 10 - - - 23
Members
Total 8 10 29 33 1 2 1 84
Source: Fieldwork, 2014
Other elite respondents included stakeholders such as development partners, the Electoral
Commission, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), theCentre for
Democratic Development-Ghana (CDD-Ghana), Institute of Democratic Governance
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(IDEG), the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), academics, the media and some religious
bodies. These stakeholders have contributed in diverse ways to democratic politics under
the Fourth Republic. This category of interviewees is made up of 21 people. Tables 1.2
and 1.3 provide the list of relevant stakeholders who were interviewed.
Table 1.2 Relevant Public Institutions
Institution No. of
People
Electoral Commission 5
National Commission for Civic Education 2
Tertiary Institutions 2
TOTAL 9
Source: Fieldwork, 2014
Table 1.3 Civil Society Organizations
No. of
people
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 1
Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) 1
Ghana Institute of Governance and Security (GIGS) 1
Centre for Democratic Development-Ghana (CDD-Ghana) 1
Friedrich Ebert Foundation 1
Christian Mother’s Association 1
The Media/Journalist 3
Religious Institutions 3
TOTAL 12
Source: Fieldwork, 2014
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Ten interviewees wished to remain anonymous. All these groups of interviewees provided
answers to pertinent questions related to political party funding. Political party executives,
for example, provided information on party financing issues, challenges and policy
measures to ensure a more equitable system of party financing. More especially for the
officials of political parties, the interview sought to help explain the contextual factors that
had influenced party financing, how funds were raised and spent on political campaigns
and on the support of routine operations of the parties. Similarly, interviews with Members
of Parliament (MPs) focused on their contributions to party funding and organization, how
they gained access to the resources and how they were utilized. The views on the legal
frameworks and state funding of political parties were sought from all the officials because
of the vexed nature of these issues. Unsuccessful candidates and dissenters shared their
experiences on elections of party officials and internal democratic issues. This group of
informants provided useful information because of their bitter experiences. Officials of the
Electoral Commission provided the financial statement of various political parties and
insights of the Commission’s oversight role. It is important to state that two officers from
the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI) provided the researcher with baseline
information on money and electoral politics among the parties which guided the interview.
Political parties also provided information about how their rival acquired funds but the
information provided is validated through interview with the party involved.
ii. Observation
Mustafa160 points out, that observation is cardinal for information gathering on issues that
are sensitive in nature. He notes that science begins with observation and it is a method
used to collect reliable primary data. In the case of this research, the researcher observed
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activities at some party rallies, fundraising programmes, meetings and congresses to elicit
information on how some party funded activities were carried out. The interviews and
observations provided the opportunity to develop a descriptive, rich understanding and
insight into individuals' behaviour, beliefs, culture, concerns and motivations regarding
political party financing.
iii. Validation Seminar
The bulk of the qualitative data was collected in 2007 and 2008. To be able to use the data
for generalization in 2014, the information was updated through a validation seminar. A
one-day seminar was organized on November 27, 2013 at Adu Complex, GIMPA, for key
stakeholders such as political parties, civil society and public servants to make inputs.
Specifically, participants in the seminar included the national treasurer and one national
executive of the NDC, the PNC and the CPP. The national executives of the NPP could not
attend this seminar but one unsuccessful 2012 NPP parliamentary contestant was in
attendance. Other participants were dons from the University of Ghana and the Ghana
Institute of Public Management and Administration (GIMPA), public servants and
graduate students of GIMPA. The preliminary findings of the study were presented to the
participants, and the discussions at the seminar were used to update information on the
nature and challenges of funding of political parties in Ghana.
1.8.2 Quantitative Data Collection
Quantitative data is by nature a numeric approach, reducing data to numbers, and a typical
technique is a survey and a closed-ended questionnaire. Its advantage is that it is scientific;
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the research is based on objective laws rather than the researcher’s values; and presentation
of findings is numerical, using tables and charts. Quantitative data helped us to test the
hypothesis and generalize the findings of the study. It has several weaknesses. It can
amount to what Silverman161 referred to a ‘quick fix’, involving little or no contact with
people or the field. The emphasis on the use of statistical correlation may be based upon
variables that in the context of naturally-occurring interaction may be arbitrarily defined.
Dependence on hard data for explaining social phenomena with no regard to people’s every
day sense-making can turn out to be a mirage. 162 Quantitative data for the study was mainly
generated from the yearly audited financial statement of political parties to the Electoral
Commission and through the survey administration. These are discussed below.
i. Financial Statement of Political Parties
The Political Parties Act 574, 2000 requires a political party to submit to the Electoral
Commission a statement of its assets and liabilities in such form as the Commission may
direct. The reporting requirement (Section 21 of Act 574) specifies that within six months,
from 31st December of each year, a political party shall file with the Electoral Commission,
indicating ‘the state of its accounts; the sources of its funds; membership dues paid;
contributions or donations in cash or in kind; the properties of the party and the time of
acquisition; and such other particulars as the Commission may reasonably require.’ The
Act also states that any person, on payment of a fee determined by the Commission, can
inspect or obtain copies of the returns and audited accounts of a political party filed with
the Commission.
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The audited financial statements submitted to the Electoral Commission, although not
easily accessible and sketchy, have helped to validate what was collected from the political
party officials. For example, as of July 2014, the latest financial statement from the NPP
was in 2006. Ideally, the financial statements between five to ten years (2004-2013) of the
four political parties should have been used for analysis, but the study had to generate data
from disjointed records for the analysis thereby reinforcing the opaque nature of political
party financing.
ii. Survey Administration
A survey was undertaken of all the four political parties (the National Democratic Congress
(NDC), New Patriotic Party (NPP), People’s National Convention (PNC) and the
Convention People’s Party (CPP)) under investigation. The development of a survey
questionnaire, its administration, sampling methods, the sample size and its characteristics
are discussed below.
Questionnaire Development
The study depended on a structured questionnaire to collect the survey data. The
development of the questionnaire was informed by the objectives of the study. Twenty
questionnaires were pre-tested on party members from March 24-26, 2014 in Accra and its
surrounding communities. Responses from the pre-test were used to finalize the survey
instrument. The instrument comprised three sections. The first section of the questionnaire
collected information on party affiliation membership status. The second section of the
questionnaire was devoted to the nature of sources of funds and challenges of party
funding. It also sought to find out the extent to which wealthy financiers influence the
internal democracy in the election of party executives. The final section of the
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questionnaire collected information on the background of the respondents with respect to
age, sex, education, occupation, income level and place of normal residence163 (region and
constituency)
Questionnaire Administration
The administration of questionnaires took place at party offices, homes, congresses and at
party programmes. On Saturday April 5, 2014, the CPP held its National Executive
Congress at Tamale. Permission was sought at the congress where 60 questionnaires were
distributed and 55 questionnaires representing 91.6 percent response rate were completed
and returned. More than 50 percent of the CPP total questionnaires (102) were
administered at the National Executive Congress. The following Saturday, which was April
12, 2014, the NPP also organised a congress at Tamale to elect the national executives of
the party. The researcher went to this congress with six party insiders as Research
Assistants to administer questionnaires. A little more than two-thirds (280) of the 400 NPP
questionnaires were administered at the congress.
The NDC between April and May, 2014 organized several party programmes for their
members at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA), the
Accra Polytechnic, the Methodist University and the Pentecost University, all in the
Greater Accra region. I was given the opportunity to administer questionnaires at these
programmes. The PNC did not hold any public programme at this time, but I took
advantage of the Tamale congresses to contact PNC members in the Upper West Region,
the strong-hold of the party. The administration of the questionnaires was done in the
language of the respondent’s choice. The survey data was collected from April 5 to June
30, 2014.
Sampling and Sample Size of Survey Respondents
So far, 23 political parties have registered with the Electoral Commission.164 For the
purpose of this study, the four political parties, namely, National Democratic Congress
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(NDC), New Patriotic Party (NPP), Convention People’s Party (CPP) and People’s
National Convention (PNC), which are consistently represented in Parliament, were
purposively selected and interviewed. The selection of these political parties was done
based on the fact that the NDC and the NPP were the two strongest parties that had
alternated political power under the Fourth Republic, while the CPP and the PNC were
weak parties but had representation in parliament. Another factor that influenced the
selection was the fact that the Institute of Economic Affairs has also selected and supported
these four political parties since 2002. Finally, Ayee, Anebo and Debrah165 have also used
these four political parties to conduct a study on party financing in 2007.
Kwabia166, in his work Elements of Social Statistics asserts that a sample size of 100
respondents is good for any academic exercise. It is important to note that Lindberg and
Morison used a sample of 690 voters to examine voting behaviour in the 1996 and 2000
elections in Ghana167. Similarly, the Centre for Democratic Development in Ghana (CDD-
Ghana) selected 600 household heads to undertake a nationwide survey on party financing
in 2005168. Ayee, Anebo and Debrah 169 used 405 respondents made up of 192 card holding
members and 213 non-party members from only 10 constituencies to conduct a study on
party financing in Ghana. Due to time, availability of resources and past experience, this
study considered 1,006 party card holding members statistically adequate to give ample
scope for a detailed sub-group analysis, and thereby making it possible to draw reasonable
inferences about the population. This study differs from the previous ones in that it used a
larger sample size of 1,111. The total sample for the study is made up of 105 interviews
(ordinary and executive party members, public servants and civil society in Ghana) and
1,006 respondents who are card holding members of the four political parties from all the
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ten regions in the country. The results are therefore likely to be more representative than
the previous studies earlier on mentioned.
Data Analysis
Field data were coded and analyzed. Word-Excel and the Statistical Product for Service
Solutions (SPSS) version 20.0 were the computer softwares used for analyzing the data.
Word-Excel was used to develop tables, figures and charts. The statistical results are
presented in the form of percentages, frequency tables and cross-tabulations. The SPSS
was also used to conduct reliability test, regression analysis and one sample chi-square test
of significance. The recorded interviews were transcribed and analysed according to the
research questions of the study. These influences the analysis and where possible, the
interview responses were quoted verbatim to support a point.
Characteristics of Survey Respondents
The sample shows that out of 1,006 card holding members, 841 (83.6%) respondents were
executive members while 165 (16.4%) of the sample were ordinary members of the four
political parties (see Table 1.4). The rationale for focusing on card holding members and
more on party executives is that political party members are more likely to have insider
information about the nature of funding of political parties as compared to the non-party
members. This strengthens our confidence about their knowledge concerning the funding
of their parties.
Table 1.4: Membership Status of Respondents
Item Frequency Percentage
Executive members 841 83.6
Ordinary members 165 16.4
Totals 1 0 0 6 100.0
Source: Survey Data, 2014
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The study sampled 400 card holding members from each of the two major political parties
and 102 from the CPP as well as 104 from the PNC. The NPP had the highest constituency
executives (212) while the CPP had the highest regional executives (28) in the sample. This
is because most of the questionnaires were administered at their national delegate
congresses. The sitting Members of Parliament (MPs) mobilized and spent funds for
political activities. They were consequently represented enough in the sample. Out of 275
MPs of the sixth Parliament of the Fourth Republic, 102, representing 37 percent, were
sampled in proportion to their seats. It is important to emphasise that the representation of
MPs in the study suggested that at least 102 constituencies representing 37% of all the
constituencies were sampled. The NDC had 147 members (54%), the NPP had 122 (44%),
the CPP and the PNC had one each (see table 1.5). This high profile sample provided a rich
understanding of the factors that drove party financing and electoral politics in Ghana.
Table 1.5: Membership positions and Political Parties
Membership Positions NPP NDC CPP PNC Total
Member of Parliament 44 56 1 1 102
National Executive 2 3 3 1 9
Regional Executive 19 14 28 7 68
Constituency Executive 212 103 20 30 365
Polling Station Executive 26 144 14 32 216
TESCON / TEIN Executive 42 29 0 0 71
Council of Elders 5 0 2 1 8
Overseas Branch Executive 0 0 1 0 1
Any other 0 1 0 0 1
Ordinary Member 50 50 33 32 165
Total 400 400 102 104 1006
Source: Survey Data, 2014
Most of the questionnaires were self-administered. Therefore, there were many non-
responses to some of the questions. For example, over 30 questionnaires returned from
Parliament did not provide information on their regions and more than 70 refused to
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indicate their constituencies. Given that we had only one MP from each constituency, such
information would have compromised the anonymity of the respondents. However,
respondents who failed to indicate their party affiliation and the major source of funding
to their parties were not included in the sample. This is because the main aim of the study
was to identify major sources of funding to political parties in Ghana. The regional
distribution of the respondents is shown in Table 1.6 below.
Table 1.6: Regional Distribution of Respondents
Regions Frequency Percentage
Non- Responses 40 4.0
Western region 15 1.5
Central region 50 5.0
Greater Accra Region 282 28.0
Volta Region 83 8.3
Eastern Region 76 7.6
Ashanti Region 91 9.0
Brong Ahafo Region 22 2.2
Northern Region 172 17.1
Upper East Region 91 9.0
Upper West Region 84 8.3
Totals 1,006 100.0
Source: Survey Data, 2014
Survey results as found in Figure 1.1 show more males (67%) than females (27%). Six
percent did not indicate their sex. This is consistent with many studies in which males
dominate political party leadership.170
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Figure 1.1 Gender of Respondents
Gender of Respondents
6%
27%
N/R
Male
Female
67%
The survey gathered information on the highest educational level of the respondents at the
time of interview. Over 95% of the respondents had some form of formal education, while
4% had no formal education. Among those who had formal education, 20.6%, 15.7% and
46.9% the total respondents attended senior secondary, teacher training school and tertiary
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institutions respectively (see figure 1.2). If we assume that these educated party members
were informed, then it is logical to assume that over 80% of our respondents were familiar
with basic party funding issues in Ghana.
Figure 1.2 Level of Education of Respondents
Level of Education of Respondents
60
50
50
40
30
18.6
20 14.7
8.9
10
1.6 4 2.2
0
N/R No formal Primary JHS SHS Teacher Tertiary
education education training
1.8.2 Secondary Data Source
This work also benefited from secondary data derived from the existing literature. The
works of civil society organizations such as the International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Centre for Law and Social Acting (CLASA) in Nigeria,
Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), Institute for Democratic
Governance (IDEG). Government documents and publications, books, journal articles and
theses on party financing in Ghana and Africa in general were all consulted to loot at best
practices in other parts of the world.
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1.9 Significance of the Study
The study is significant for four reasons.
First, the study fills the gap in the literature on the nature of political party financing in
Ghana and its effect on democratic politics within the parties.
Second, it contributes to the attempts by rational choice institutional theorists to
empirically test the propositions that political actors are, first, self-interested in their
actions, and second, create institutions that enhance that self-interest.
Third, it contributes to the literature and ongoing debate on the appropriate and viable
means of financing political parties in Ghana.
Finally, the study provides broad guidelines and recommendations regarding mechanisms
of improving transparency, accountability and a participatory approach to financing
political parties to build public confidence in democracy in Ghana. This will invariably
advance the course of democratic development through awareness creation about funding
other key democratic institutions as it provides a platform for the rethinking of new modes
of financing democracy by strengthening the capacity of the institutions that perform core
functions of democratic governance.
1.10 Limitation of the Study
The study had some practical limitations, which should be acknowledged. The qualitative
data collected through interviews, discussions, and observation have important limitations
in this research. There was no sample frame; therefore, the sample was small and not
randomly selected. Because the issue under investigation is very sensitive, we relied on a
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snowball sampling technique where referrals were made by word of mouth to acquire more
respondents. In effect, we did not have full control over the selection process. Some
respondents tended to express views that were consistent with social standards and tried
not to say anything negative about their political parties. In fact, it took friends, school
mates, students and church members to disclose the reality on the ground. About ten
percent of these people wanted to remain anonymous.
Furthermore, the issue on financing political parties required numeric data which the
interviewees were either not prepared to disclose or were unable to disclose because they
could not remember the exact figures. The audited financial statement submitted to the
Electoral Commission could have helped to validate what was collected from political
party official, but these financial statements were not regularly submitted to the Electoral
Commission. Ideally, the financial statement of 2004-2013 of the four political parties
should have been used as one of the major sources for analysis, but the study had to rely
on inadequate records for the analysis. This notwithstanding, there was no remarkable
evidence of changes in trend for political parties which submitted their accounts from 2005-
2009 (the PNC), from 2005-2010 (the NDC), and from 2005-2006 and 2012 (the CPP).
In addition, the Electoral Commission, the custodian of the accounts, was only prepared to
indicate whether political parties have submitted the accounts in a particular year or not.
The Commission was not willing to release the details of the accounts to researchers or any
interested people to use. In effect, it took an informal arrangement to obtain the accounts
from the Electoral Commission for the four political parties analyzed in this study –
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something which in most jurisdictions should normally have been a public record or
document.
It is instructive to point out that, notwithstanding the limitations pointed out above, the
limitations do not in any way affect the validity and the reliability of the findings, because
the results were interpreted with caution and circumspection. In short, the limitations do
not compromise the academic rigour and findings of the study.
1.11 Organization of the Study
The study is organized into seven chapters; Chapter One, ‘Introduction and Conceptual
Framework’ has outlined the research problem, research objectives and questions. It has
also outlined the theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework of the study.
Chapter Two, ‘The Historical Analysis of Political Party Funding in Ghana’, undertakes a
historical analysis of political party funding in Ghana from 1957 to 1992. It examines the
various sources of financing political party activities in the First, Second and Third
Republics. This helps us to better understand the dynamics of change or stability in how
political parties finance their activities under the Fourth Republic.
Chapter Three, ‘The Legal and Institutional Framework for Party Financing in Ghana’
discusses the institutional rules of the Fourth Republic in regulating the financing of
political parties. Understanding the nature of the rules governing party financing and how
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the rules are enforced enables us to examine the extent to which political parties play within
or outside ‘the rules of the game’ to generate funds for their electoral activities.
Chapter Four, ‘The Sources of Funding for Political Parties under the Fourth Republic of
Ghana’, discusses the sources of funding of political parties under the Fourth Republic. It
examines the strategies and modalities employed by political parties to finance their
political activities. The aim is to examine the extent to which the rules of the state
governing party financing enhance or constrain political parties in generating funds for
their activities.
Chapter Five, ‘Contextual Variables and Financing of Political Parties in Ghana’ discusses
the political, economic, socio-cultural and other factors that have accounted for the
insignificant contribution of ordinary members to political party funds.
Chapter Six, ‘Financing Political Parties and Internal Party Democracy in Ghana’,
examines patterns of participation, and discusses how the nature of financing political
parties affects the capacity of political parties to promote internal democratic politics
concerning the election of parliamentary and presidential candidates.
Chapter Seven, ‘Summary and Conclusions’, summarizes the findings of the study and
highlights some recommendations for improving party financing in Ghana. It also
discusses the implications of the findings for the literature on party financing and internal
democracy.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTY FUNDING
IN GHANA
2.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a historical background to political party organization and funding
strategies. The chapter discusses the development of political parties from the era of the
nationalist movement to the Third Republic. It then proceeds to examine the major sources
and strategies of funding political party activities after independence in 1957 to the Third
Republic of Ghana. Party financing has often been shrouded in secrecy. This might account
for the inadequate literature on the subject in Ghana. It is important to state that because of
the paucity of literature on party financing during the pre-independence era, in particular,
the discussion on party financing in this chapter has mainly concentrated on the ruling
parties under the three republics of Ghana.
2.1 THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE GOLD COAST: 1948-
1957
The development of political parties in the Gold Coast dates back to the nineteenth century,
and their progress towards independence in 1957 have been the subject of extensive
scholarly study and analysis. One of the most comprehensive accounts of the development
of political parties in the Gold Coast is Dennis Austin’s, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960. To
Austin, the factors involved in the rise of nationalism and the subsequent formation of
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political parties were complex and sometimes very difficult to classify. Austin identified
economic considerations and the emergence of a new class as some of the actors
contributing to the rise of nationalism. In the case of economic consideration, Austin
argued that there was a discrimination against local merchants, because they were not
getting licences for the importation of their goods.171 In his view, the Gold Coast, during
the same period, saw the emergence of new classes, which were the educated elites and the
merchant class.172
Political factor was another crucial issue that led to the formation of political parties in the
Gold Coast. Austin pointed out that the lack of political representation created an
atmosphere of discontent in the colony. The ordinary citizens were the least represented in
the Joint Provincial Council, which, among other things, approved loans and took decisions
for the Gold Coast colony.173 The councils of state gave a strong preference to the chiefs
(the claim of natural rulers) to speak for the people of Gold Coast.174 As Rathbone argued,
the exclusion from significant influence of such citizens as the educated elites, and in some
cases the wealthy men by the colonial government led to the formation of the UGCC.175
The leadership of the UGCC was dominated by the wealthy individuals who wanted
political influence for economic gains.
Maxwell Owusu’s book, Uses and Abuses of Political Power is the linchpin of all the
accounts on the development of nationalism and political parties in the Gold Coast. He
contended that political power during the colonial era was not sought for its own sake. That
was the reason why Nkrumah said ‘seek ye first the political kingdom’ and the good
materials shall be added unto. 176 Owusu identified four main factors that led to the
formation of the nationalist political parties. These are: (i) actors saw a political movement
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in economic terms; (ii) the national poverty created a form of political consciousness in
which people identified the control of wealth with political power; (iii) any political
ideology which did not produce economic improvement was irrelevant; and (iv) political
relations seem to have had no meaning except in terms of poverty and wealth.177
The leadership of the UGCC wanted government power to be handed over to the people in
the ‘shortest possible time’.178 Due to the nature of their professions (i.e., these were
practising lawyers, businessmen, and doctors), the leaders of the UGCC took politics as a
part-time job and not as a vocation and consequently failed to devote their full energies and
time for party organization and like activities. Meanwhile, political party organization and
management were and still are an arduous enterprise that requires full attention for the
design, a strategy formulation and an effective implementation. The leadership of the
UGCC, therefore, thought it expedient to recruit a full time political manager to run the
affairs of the party. As a result, Dr Kwame Nkrumah was appointed the general secretary
of the UGCC and was expected to initiate programmatic political activities aimed at
popularizing the UGCC throughout the country.179
We have already pointed out that the UGCC leadership represented an older class of the
Western- educated elite largely made up of lawyers, doctors, businessmen and senior civil
servants who pressed for political independence through negotiation. Their objective was
that the colony should achieve ‘independence within the shortest possible time’.180
Nkrumah’s youthful enthusiasm coupled with his earlier anti-colonial experience brought
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him into conflict with the UGCC leadership over the appropriate strategy in the struggle
for independence. For Nkrumah, the Gold Coast should be granted ‘independence now’181.
Furthermore, he believed that the independence struggle should no longer be restricted to
a few businessmen, lawyers and educated elites; rather the struggle must involve the entire
colonial people and their chiefs. This approach was too radical for the UGCC leadership to
accommodate, and after several unsuccessful attempts to convince their general secretary
to tone-down his radical ideas and strategy, the UGCC leadership and the youthful
Nkrumah had no option but to part company.182
Dr. Nkrumah formed the Convention People’s Party (CPP) in 1949 with the support of the
broad masses of the people such as farmers, fishermen, petty traders, market women, and
low-level civil servants. 183 The UGCC was presented to the public as standing for the
selfish interest of lawyers and powerful and wealthy traditional rulers.184 The CPP
strategically played on a somewhat self-created image of opposing class and material
interest by reiterating that the CPP stood for the masses as against the wealthy members of
the society, who were not sure whether to ‘swim with the people’ or to ‘drown with
imperialism’.185 Apter186 specifically saw the rise and popularity of the Convention
People’s Party (CPP) in terms of a single variable, the ‘personal charisma’ of Nkrumah
acting as a primary functional vehicle for the formation and institutionalization of the CPP.
It is important to emphasize, that notwithstanding the differences in political strategy, both
the UGCC and CPP were formed on nationalist platforms and they were represented and
recognized nation-wide as political organizations. 187
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Competitive political party organizations and concomitant mass mobilizations against
colonial rule blossomed following the political rift between the UGCC and Kwame
Nkrumah. It opened a floodgate for the formation of many other political parties, some of
which were of an ethnic, a regional and a religious background.188 The political parties
formed during the period 1947-1957 included the Anlo Youth Organization (AYO),
Federation of Youth Organization (FYO), the Ghana Congress Party (GCP), the Moslem
Association Party (MAP), Northern People’s Party (NPP), Togoland Congress (TC),
National Liberation Movement (NLM), United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and
Convention People’s party (CPP).189 The weakness of most of the political parties reduced
the electoral competition into a contest between the UGCC led by J.B. Danquah and the
CPP led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. The CPP won the 1951, 1954 and 1956 elections and
led the country to independence in 1957.190
2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY POLITICS: 1957-1966
The struggle for independence was characterized by fierce conflicts based on ideological,
ethnic, religious, regional and sectional considerations. These intensified in the immediate
post-independence era and violence was regarded as an instrument for settling ethnic,
sectional and personal scores.191 These developments posed challenges for unity and nation
building. Consequently, the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) was passed in December,
1957 as a reaction to the conduct of the opposition. The law permitted the government to
detain without trial anyone suspected of engaging in acts that, in the reckoning of the
government, undermined the security of the state.192 Furthermore, Section 5 of the
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Avoidance Discrimination Act of 1957, No 38 also prohibited organizations, including
political parties, to use or engage in tribal, regional, racial or religious propaganda to the
detriment of any other community, or secure the election of persons on the account of their
tribal, regional, or religious affiliations.193 The passage of these laws eventually caused
the UGCC and other opposition parties such as the Northern People’s Party, the Muslim
Association Party, the Anlo Youth Organization, the Togoland Congress, the Ga
Shifimokpee and the National Liberation Movement to merge as one party under the banner
of the United Party (UP). Thereafter, the UP became the main opposition party under the
leadership of Professor K.A. Busia in 1958. 194 The Avoidance of Discrimination Act,
1957 also enjoined the Minister responsible for Local Government to supervise the
activities of political parties.195
In 1960, the country drew up a Republican Constitution which gave wide discretionary
powers over national issues to the first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Section 8 (4) of
the 1960 Constitution states that ‘the President shall act on his discretion and shall not be
obligated to follow advice tendered by any other person’.196 The literature on Ghanaian
politics showed that the president could appoint and dismiss judges at his pleasure.197 The
1960 Constitution also made the CPP the only national political party mandated as the
vanguard in building a socialist society.198 The opposition party was weak; hence,
political activity during this period was reduced to praising and cajoling President
Nkrumah. The CPP demonstrated its superiority in the creation of a one-party Parliament
in 1961 and a one-party state in 1964. Through concerted efforts, popular political
participation by the dissenters was suppressed.199 The cumulative effect of these
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developments was the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah’s government in a military coup on 24th
February, 1966. A decree dissolved the CPP and the 1960 Constitution was proscribed.200
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY POLITICS: 1969-1972
Ghana witnessed the first transition from civilian to military rule when the National
Liberation Council (NLC) which took over power from the CPP. The NLC handed over
power to a constitutionally elected political party in 1969. The 1969 Constitution was a
departure from that of 1960. The 1969 Constitution placed particular emphasis on a multi-
party system, on limitations on executive powers, on the constitutionality of political
activity and on civil rights. It prohibited a one-party state and endorsed official opposition
parties. These measures were meant to promote popular participation and equally prevent
the excesses during the Nkrumah years.201 Given the diversity of tribes, religion, culture
and regions in Ghana, the Political Parties Decree, the National Liberation Council Decree
(NLCD) 345 of 1969 {section 2 (10), sought to prohibit political organization based on
sectional lines. 202
In May 1969, when the NLC lifted the ban imposed on political party activities, twenty
political parties were formed. Five political parties including the Progress Party (PP), the
National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), the United National Party (UNP), the People’s Action
Party (PAP), and the All People’s Republican Party (APRP) satisfied the requirements to
operate and contest in the 1969 elections.203 As Manu noted, only two political parties
seemed viable during the Second Republic. These were, the Progress Party (PP) led by
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K.A. Busia, and the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), led by K.A. Gbedemah. The
remaining political parties lacked substantial following.204 The leader of the NAL, the PP’s
main challenger, was a former CPP stalwart who broke up with Nkrumah in the 1960s.
As Chazan205 pointed out, the resounding victory of the PP in the 1969 elections could be
attributed to, among other things, the anti-CPP sentiment coupled with organizational
advantage enjoyed by the PP through the good offices of the NLC. The outcome of the
1969 elections also showed that the party mobilization and strategy of both the PP and the
NAL owed a good deal to ethnicity that reflected Akan-Ewe tribes.206 The leader of NAL,
K.A. Gbedemah hailed from the Volta Region which is predominantly Ewe, while the
leader of the PP, K.A. Busia and the party itself traced their roots to the Akan tribe. Since
Akan ethnicity encompassed a relatively large population, participation in the election
favoured the PP. The NAL and other smaller parties were relegated to the bench of
opposition. According to Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, the Busia-led PP government was
perceived as an Akan hegemony and hence other-tribal exclusion. The NAL and other
opposition parties waged a war against tribal politics. Consequently, the atmosphere of
ethniticy-based party politics, among other things, brought down the 27-month old
government of Busia’s PP in a coup d’etat in 1972.207
2.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY POLITICS: 1979-1981
The period of 1972 to 1978 could be described as the era of stagnation and
underdevelopment of political parties and democracy. Ghana experienced four different
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military regimes. The rapid flow of events during this short period highlighted the vagaries,
inconsistencies and severe fluctuation that have dominated Ghanaian politics and political
party history.208 However, in January 1979, the ban on political party activities was lifted
once again. A lot of political parties surfaced, but six survived the test to participate in the
1979 general elections. These were the People’s National Party (PNP) led by Dr. Hilla
Limann; the Popular Front Party (PFP) led by Victor Owusu; the United National
Convention (UNC) led by William Ofori-Atta; the Social Democratic Force (SDF) led by
Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama; the Third Force Party (TFP) led by Dr. John Bilson; and the
Action Congress Party (ACP) led by Colonel Bernasko.209
Unlike the 1969 Constitution that returned the country to the parliamentary traditions of
the British, the 1979 Constitution put the country on the path of the American type of
presidential government.210 As it was in 1969, the old political constellations, namely, the
UP and the CPP political traditions re-emerged in 1979 to pitch camp against each other.
The PNP was an assembly of surviving Convention People’s Party stalwarts. 211 The PNP,
among other things, sought to promote national unity and safeguard the freedom of the
people. It stressed the need to have state enterprises, enterprises owned jointly by the state
and foreign private businessmen, co-operatives and Ghanaian private enterprises.212 In fact,
the PNP’s victory in the 1979 elections was attributed to the unity in the front of the
Nkrumahists. The PNP was noted to be a replica of the CPP in mass mobilization of
membership. Membership of the Popular Front Party (PFP), the main opposition, was
drawn from the erstwhile Progress Party (PP). The General Secretary of the PP, B.J. da
Rocha maintained the same post in the PFP. 213 The underlying values of the PP (the desire
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for personal liberties, freedom of the press, better social security etc.) were also reflected
in the manifesto of the PFP.214 This was an obvious continuity of political traditions.
The smaller parties tended to revolve around personalities. The UNC, for example, was a
splinter group from the PFP and it revolved around William Ofori Atta, a veteran politician
who was a member of the ‘Big Six’ of the UGCC. The UNC also drew under its banner
some members of K.A. Gbedemah’s NAL, including its General Secretary, Dr. Obed
Asamoah. The Action Congress Party was under the chairmanship of a very energetic ex-
military officer Colonel George Bernasko. He was one of the few people who left I.K
Acheampong’s military government.215
The forces opposed to multi-party democracy found an opportunity again to stage a coup
d’etat on 31st December 1981 to derail the third attempt at multi-party democracy in Ghana.
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) under Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings
was formed, and as it was after the coups of 1966 and 1972, the 1979 Constitution was
suspended and party political activities banned.216
Having provided an overview of the evolution of political organizations in Ghana, the next
subsection explores party funding under the various republics, which is the main concern
of the current chapter. The discussion focuses on political parties that captured power and
major opposition parties under the First, Second and Third Republics of Ghana.
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2.5 PARTY FUNDING UNDER THE CPP GOVERNMENT: 1957-1966
The problem of raising funds to support political party activities dates back to the early
days of the nationalist movement and post-independence. According to Awoonor, the rich
merchant class was among the few families who could afford to send their children to
school at that time, and therefore, produced the educated elites of which lawyers formed a
majority.217 Awoonor argued that there existed a strong link between the merchant class
and the intelligentsia. It was the merchant class that financed the political activities of the
educated elites by paying for their deputation to England on the issue of land with the
Queen.218 Thus, the rich merchant class and their educated colleagues formed the United
Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), the first political party in the then Gold Coast, in August
1947.219 Austin220 indicated that one George Paa Grant, a wealthy Sekondi merchant, was
the brainchild and financier of the UGCC. The leading figures of the UGCC included
Awoonor-Williams, R.S Blay and Joseph Boakye Danquah. These men were all friends of
George Grant. They provided the main campaign funds and materials for the UGCC.
Austin221 observes that nothing was more obscure in the operation of the CPP than the
raising of funds for its numerous political activities at the early stage of operation. Nkrumah
found himself among a non-business class, particularly, middle school leavers, peasant
farmers and the youth. This group of people did not have a regular and solid financial
standing to sponsor major political activities. The situation was more serious in the remote
rural areas where he had most of his followers. This was one major challenge for the CPP
leadership. 222
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Initially, the CPP relied mainly on dues and membership subscriptions as its funding
sources, which, in fact, were very inadequate.223 As Austin notes, the financial statement
of the CPP presented at their first annual conference in July 1950, was very discouraging:
‘It included Accra £40. 17s., Winneba £6, Obuasi £3. 18s., Prestea £10, Bogoso £6. 1s.,
and smaller amounts from other districts’.224 The CPP could not even rely on financial
support from its working class members in Accra, the capital. In 1952, Nkrumah again
lamented, at the third annual conference held at Secondi, that funds did not come in
commensurate with the growth of the party’s membership. The flow of money into party
coffers was very slow. At this time, some party members working in the National Assembly
promised to contribute a percentage of their salaries to the party.225
The CPP struggled to raise funds from its members to finance election campaigns.
Commenting on how the CPP financed its election campaign in the early 1950s, Austin
states that ‘one fact was very clear: it raised very little through regular membership
subscriptions.’226 The CPP leadership appealed for financial support from the people.
Particularly, the CPP branch secretaries appealed to the people to register as members and
contribute to the ‘Fighting Fund’.227 The ‘Fighting Fund’, as it was codenamed, became
very popular and significant. The rate was later fixed at five (5) Shillings per man and three
(3) Shillings per woman. Party organizers also took advantage and introduced rally
attendance dues which also became a source of money for the CPP. One (1) Shilling or six
pence was charged for attendance at rallies.228 Besides, money for party activities was
obtained from other sources such as an attendance fee for dances. The party organized the
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sale of party flags, handbags, cloths, belts made in party colours, framed photographs of
Nkrumah and other party paraphernalia.229
Another strategy the party adopted was the organization of what was called ‘Harvest
Festival’.230 The Harvest Festival was an occasion when an appeal for funds was made for
voluntary donations by individuals and organizations. This mass-based appeal for
generous contributions yielded over 100 pounds at the Nsawam Methodist Church alone
in December 1950.231 That apart, the local branches of the CPP were made to pay a
voluntary contribution of five (5) pounds per branch; this and other generous contributions
helped to build the party at the national level. As the party could not raise sufficient funds
to pay for political activities, much of the propaganda was carried out at the expense of the
local people. People such as engine drivers, lorry and taxi drivers, traders, fishermen and
farmers offered considerable voluntary support. Travelling to villages and towns to
campaign for voter registration and for elections was done voluntarily and in the spirit of
nationalism.232
At a point in time, the CPP asked party officials through a newsletter to educate and register
members for the election. With this directive, twelve party members volunteered and spent
one week in the service of the party to explain procedures designed by the government for
the general election. At Oda alone, 238 new members were enrolled for the party with 150
men and women paying for their registration. A CPP branch secretary in Nkawkaw, in the
Kwahu area, registered over 200 people, and similar reports came from other districts.233
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The CPP’s 1951 electoral victory can be attributed to the mass mobilization of members
through the efforts of unpaid party officials.
Until 1952, the CPP generated income from the proceeds of functions (dances, football
matches etc.), voluntary subscriptions, appeals, donations, sale of literature, badges and
other activities approved by the National Executive.234 However, from 1953 onwards, as
the CPP began to establish its presence in government, the party drew on more lucrative
sources than the contributions of its members. According to Austin, a wealthy individual,
Aksor Kassardjian told the Korsah Commission in 1953 that he gave 200 pounds to the
CPP.235 Mr. J.A. Braimah of the CPP, a northern territorial assemblyman and Minister for
Transport and Communications admitted receiving Two Thousand (2,000) pounds from
the Armenian contractor, Kassardjan.236 Evidence from Awoonor237 showed that Mr.
Krobo Edusei, the Ministerial Secretary under Nkrumah’s regime was often accused of
bribery and corruption. Many of these transactions were, of course, gifts to influence party
members in the hope of receiving government favours.238
By 1956, the financial story of the CPP began to improve, not because the grassroots
members increased their commitment and contributions, rather, the party switched to
corrupt practices to the extent that a company known as the National Development
Company Limited (NADECO Ltd) was established to serve as a clearing-house for bribes
paid to the CPP or to Kwame Nkrumah personally.239 The Jibowu Commission that
investigated the affair found out that the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC), a subsidiary
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of the Cocoa Marketing Board, was part of an organization of the Convention People’s
Party. Nkrumah was the master brain that devised the CPC, and ran it so cleverly that it
could be used as a political weapon.240 He made Messrs A.Y.K. Djin and M.A. Danquah,
acting Managing Director and Director of the CPC respectively. Djin was the general
secretary of the CPP and Danquah was a member of the finance committee of the party.241
The CPP consequently used CPC vehicles for political party activities in the 1954 elections.
Some of the loans given by the CPC to farmers were used to secure their votes. In short,
the funds from the CPC were used for political purposes directly and indirectly.242 As
Awoonor pointed out, there was corruption in the early life of some of the CPP members.
As a result, Ohene Djan and Atta Mensah, ministerial secretaries were sentenced to prison
terms.243
The dust raised by the storm around the Jibowu Commission Report did not settle when
arrangements for the formation of the National Development Company Limited
(NADECO) began. Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the establishment of
NADECO showed that the company was established by Kwame Nkrumah.244 Evidence
given by Mr. Krobo Edusei before the Commission of Enquiry into the NADECO affair
stated that at one of the cabinet meetings, Kwame Nkrumah said he had been told by an
American friend that political parties in America were financed by companies.245 Nkrumah
further directed that all contracts negotiated by Ministers, public corporations, and
Principal Secretaries should attract a commission ranging from 5 to 10 percent of the
contract price. According to Krobo Edusei, when bribes started flowing into the party,
NADECO was formed as directed by Kwame Nkrumah. Edusei told the Commission that
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he paid some commissions into the account of NADECO as a result of contracts he
signed.246
Kwame Nkrumah exercised all the rights of a real owner in relation to the company’s
business, and NADECO was established to secretly finance the CPP.247 The bribes were
demanded (by either Kwame Nkrumah himself or by the members of the CPP) from
Western European companies operating in Ghana and from Ghanaian building contractors.
Kwame Nkrumah, for example, collected a-60,000 pounds bribe from A.G. Leventis, who
was contracted to buy Mercedes Benz buses in Germany for the Ministry of Transport and
Communications. 248 Leventis was also asked to supply the CPP with 24 Fiat cars of various
sizes to be used during the referendum in 1964.249 The payment of these bribes (5 to 10
percent of the contract price as commission) was sometimes made a condition for the award
of government contracts. Those who refused to pay were black-listed, and never got
government contracts any more.250 Public funds were indirectly diverted into the coffers of
the CPP through NADECO. At times Kwame Nkrumah could authorize payment of public
funds directly to the CPP. A case in point was when the directors of the Cocoa Marketing
Board (CMB) were asked to pass a resolution which granted an annual subvention of 400
Pounds to the CPP.251 This secret diversion of public funds had serious economic
consequences on farmers and the performance of the CMB during a time of an unfavorable
world price for cocoa.252 This notwithstanding, it was executed to achieve the political
ambitions of the politicians. These discussions are supportive of the studies of Mwangi253
in Kenya and Jolobe254 in South Africa where political parties used business houses to
channel corrupt funds into party coffers.
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2.6 PARTY FUNDING UNDER THE SECOND REPUBLIC: 1969-1972
During the Second Republic, there was no law preventing the maximum amount of money
members and people should contribute to political parties. However, the political parties’
law required that the actions of political parties should be consistent with the Constitution.
255 There were several strategies adopted by political parties to mobilize funds under the
Second Republic. For example, the constitutions of both the National Alliance of Liberals
(NAL) and the Progress Party (PP) provided that a subscription fee and annual dues were
to be payable by registered members as may be determined by the Annual Congress.256
Consequently, membership registration fees and the regular payment of membership dues
and the sale of party cards were some of the major sources of income to both the Progress
Party and the National Alliance of Liberals. A person was recognized as a member of the
PP in particular, if only he or she had registered and paid the membership dues. 257
The PP encouraged its members, persons, organizations, firms or companies which
preferred the principles of the party to make donations. The party generated income from
donations and affiliation fees that were imposed not only on their key members but on
organizations, firms and companies which agreed with the objectives of the party.
According to Debrah,258 the Progress Party drew much of its funds from the payment of
affiliation fees. The party imposed 10 cedis on organizations that affiliated themselves with
the party. Any organization or firm, whose application for affiliation was approved by the
National Executive of the PP, was made to pay the first subscription fee. On the other hand,
if any person or organization ceased to be a member or affiliate of the party, the fee was
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forfeited to the party. Companies were prepared to donate to the party because they were
in favour of the manifesto of the PP. Debrah further observes that the PP adopted a method
of revenue generation which was unusual of political parties during the pre-independence
period. The PP’s close association with the NLC regime that supervised the 1969 general
elections might have influenced some of the bold decisions taken. The PP was able to
impose a levy such as an ‘affiliation fee’ on companies and private businesses to generate
funds. The National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) and other parties did not have the leverage
to impose similar fees to raise campaign funds such as the ‘affiliation’ fees on the
companies and other private businesses that the PP had.259 Thus, unlike the PP, the NAL
and other parties lacked the capacity to generate funds because of the fear of, or
intimidation by the NLC government.260
Political parties under the Second Republic also depended on support from secret
financiers. According to Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, Busia and Gbedemah claimed that
they generated much funds during their sojourn in exile.261 But it was believed that most
ex-CPP functionaries deployed their accumulated wealth to support the NAL. The PP was
also believed to have generated funds from resources it mobilized abroad and from its
close associates in the NLC regime.262
In spite of the dependence on the a few wealthy people to finance party activities during
the Progress Party administration, there was no disgraceful act that defiled the PP regime
as had happened during the administration of the CPP. Ayee263 attributes this to the fact
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that the ministers of the PP were allowed to hold profit-making positions in both the public
and the private sectors so long as their motives were deemed genuine. Public office holders,
such as ministers of state, could support a political party financially.264 K.A. Busia won
the 1969 elections with his Progress Party defeating the National Alliance of Liberals
(NAL), the major opposition party led by K.A Gbedemah. The NAL which traced its roots
to the CPP was financially weak. Most of the party financiers during the Nkrumah regime
had left the country. The military regime had also caused to collapse the businesses of the
few CPP stalwarts who were left.265
2.7 PARTY FUNDING UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLIC: 1979-1981
The law under the Third Republic prohibited contributions beyond a certain amount of
money to political parties. Section 20 of the 1979 Political Parties Decree (SMCD, 229)
did not allow citizens of Ghana to contribute more than GH¢1,000 per annum to party
funds. Also, the regulation on sources of funds under the Third Republic emphasized that:
no alien and no company, firm or business house not wholly owned by citizens of
Ghana shall directly or indirectly make any contribution or loan (whether in cash
or kind) to funds held or to be held by or for the benefit of any political party and
no political party or person whatsoever shall demand, obtain or accept any such
contribution or loan from any alien or company, firm or business house not wholly
owned by citizens of Ghana.266
The law further provided that the accounts of every political party were to be audited once
in a year by an auditor approved by the Registrar, and a copy of the audited account was to
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be filed with the Registrar. Besides, the records of the political party had to include a list
of its membership and a statement of its accounts, showing the sources of its funds,
membership dues paid, donations in kind or cash received, and of all other financial
transactions of the party.267 The legislation (SMCD 229, Section 19) further required
political parties to indicate the names of any person who contributed to the party funds.268
Political parties under the Third Republic equally depended on traditional sources of party
funding such as membership dues and donations. In 1979, the PNP, the PFP and other
political parties obtained their funds from membership registration fees. The PNP, for
example, fixed the registration fee at GH¢3 while the PFP charged membership registration
fee at GH¢ 4.269 The PNP monthly dues was 50 pesewas per month as against GH¢ 1.00
charged by the PFP.270
An interview with the general secretary of the PNP indicated that the party generated funds
from the sale of party cards and membership dues.271 A party member who was based in
London bought 20 megaphones at the cost of 5 pounds each for the party.272 At every
political rally, funds for the party were mobilized. At the regional rallies, these funds were
given to the regional office for the payment of stationery and full time workers such as
typists and security officers.273 The usual donations to the chiefs and traditional rulers were
provided by local party members voluntarily. 274 One big fund-raising dinner was
organized by the PNP at the Ambassador Hotel. This fund-raising activity also yielded a
lot funds to the party. As the party waved the banner of the first president, Kwame
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Nkrumah, it attracted a lot of sympathizers who donated to the party.275 The executives of
the party also worked on part-time and voluntary bases. For instance, Ivan Addae-Mensah,
the General Secretary of the PNP from 1979-1981, was a full-time lecturer at the University
of Ghana and, at the same time, served at the party office on a part-time and voluntary
basis. There was no form of state support until the elections were close to being held,
then, the state offered Peugeot cars to political parties, and these were distributed based on
the number of candidates fielded to contest the 140 seats in Parliament.276
Awoonor noted that the PNP was formed and came under the leadership of a group of
successful CPP businessmen.277 According to Awoonor, the house of Nana Okutwer
Bekoe, the Chairman of the PNP was both a warehouse and a money market. One of the
main financiers of the PNP, Krobo Edusei, the self-confessed bribe collector for the CPP
once described by the Korsah Commission as unfit to hold public office, was a founding
member of the PNP.278 There was also Kofi Batsa, who was a former editor of the CPP
newspaper, The Spark. Mr. Batsa, the chairman of the publicity committee was noted to
have influenced political activities of the PNP.279 Mr. Imoro Egala, a financial broker,
barred from holding public office after the 1966 coup produced Dr. Hilla Limann who was
endorsed at the party congress in Kumasi. 280 Similarly, Shillington observes that the PNP
electoral machinery moved into top gear when wealthy patrons such as Nana Okutwer III,
party chairman, Kojo Botsio, Dr. Ayeh-Kumi, Imoro Egala and many others provided
substantial money for party activities.281
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Egala and Batsa, for example, became self-appointed spokespersons when the party won
the general elections. They were also in charge of the sale of import licences and so-called
‘essential commodities’.282 The black market boomed and foreign currency was largely
available to those who were connected to the ruling party283. The little that was produced
was absorbed into the officially sponsored profiteering network of party members. 284 It is
evident from the funding arrangements of the PNP, that the financial brokers invested in
political parties and expected to recoup their investments when the party they promoted
was voted into power. An interview with the former president Rawlings revealed that Dr
Hilla Limann lost control over his corrupt party members and the economy. 285 As a result,
there were indiscipline and moral decay in politics and in the economy. Politicians paid
tribute to integrity while a few rich political leaders milked the economy to build fine
personal houses and to acquire properties for themselves. According to Rawlings, his 1981
coup d’état was a political appeal on behalf of the suffering ordinary soldier and the
ordinary man on the street who were deprived of their share of the national cake.286 He
stressed that the main objective of the coup was to restore discipline, accountability and
popular participation in the country.287 This, he said, was evident in the formation of
Workers Defense Committees (WDC) at every work place and Peoples’ Defense
Committees (PDCs) in each town to help bring sanity into Ghanaian society. The WDCs
and PDCs would not only monitor the performance at the work place and communities, but
would also create a forum for the expression of popular power by the ordinary workers and
ordinary people in the communities.288
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The PNP also received funds from an Italian businessman called Chiavelli, who had ties
with a Saudi oil prince. The funds received contravened the 1979 Political Parties Decree
which forbade foreign sources of funding for political parties in Ghana. As a result of this,
five (5) prominent members of the PNP, including Krobo Edusei were sentenced to various
terms of imprisonment in 1982.289
The general secretary of the PNP and other members of the party identified a number of
challenges encountered in mobilizing funds for the party. According to them, the PNP was
formed in February 1979 and was inaugurated on 9th March 1979. Elections were scheduled
for 18th June, 1979. The problems with the short period for party organization and
mobilization of funds for political activities were huge. The businesses of most CPP
supporters had collapsed. The Political Parties Law placed a limit on the amount
(GH¢1,000 a year which an individual could donate to a political party). The 1979 ‘house
cleaning’ June 4 revolution led by Flt. Lt. John Rawlings scared people from active politics.
The Soviet Union, the backbone of Nkrumah’s CPP, did not expect a resurrection of the
CPP.290 The PNP was, therefore, faced with a huge financial problem. Consequently,
candidates contesting parliamentary seats had to travel on public transport to do party work.
At some places, speakers were mounted on hired taxis.291 The problem of party funding
was not peculiar to the PNP alone. Both the PNP and the PFP lamented that their political
parties lacked proper records on membership lists, let alone the regular payment of
membership dues.292
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The PFP, the major opposition political party was a successor of the PP of Dr. K.A. Busia.
The party and its predecessors had always attracted the more articulate members of the
Ghanaian society - lawyers, university dons, doctors, and successful businessmen.293 The
PFP made it clear in its constitution that individual donations should not exceed one
thousand (GH¢1,000) cedis.294 Yet individual party members donated more than
GH¢1,000.00 to the fund of the party. Interviews with some former PFP members disclosed
that the party generated the bulk of its money from the founding members and individuals
members who donated huge sums of money apart from their membership dues.295 This
category of extraordinary contributors from wealthy members was honoured with special
certificates.296 This seemed a clever way to circumvent the law on the disclosure of the
names of people and the amounts contributed to party funds.
Coup makers often cite inflation, unemployment, poverty and many social, economic and
political grievances of the people as reasons for their actions.297 The December 1981 coup
that removed the Third Republican government from office was no exception. However,
as pointed out earlier, president Limann was brought into office by a party financier, Imoro
Egala. Dr.Limann did not have a personal power base within the party. He himself became
captive to those powerful party interests who engineered his election, and they expected
some returns on their investment.298
Commenting on the role the June 4 coup played in the Ghanaian political history, Limann
remarked: ‘all of us have to be judged by our performances and integrity.’299 He, therefore,
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called for the setting up of non-partisan vigilante committees to provide a safeguard against
a revival of the abuses of hoarding, smuggling, corruption and moral decay in the country.
Ironically, the idea received total condemnation from Limann’s fellow politicians,
especially, the lawyers among them; who saw it as a dangerous abrogation of power to the
people. The idea was consequently dropped.300
There were several challenges that engaged the attention of the PNP government when it
assumed office. The prominent one was a concealed threat in the hand-over speech
delivered by the Chairman of the June 4 revolution, Jerry Rawlings. 301 Another was the
taking over from seven years of military rule and the arduous task of creating legitimacy
for a civilian government.302 Just at the time when President Limann needed to settle down
to address national challenges, he was plagued by internal squabbles in the party leading
to his overthrow by Flt Lt Rawlings on December 31, 1981. There was a revelation that a
senior party member of the PNP had received a commission worth 2.7 million pounds
sterling on a currency printing contract in Britain.303 The party hierarchy made up of the
Chairman, Nana Okutwer Bekoe III, General Secretary, Dr. Ivan Addae-Mensah and the
Publicity Chairman, Kofi Batsa were also ordered to account to the treasurer of the party
within twenty-one days for all monies received on behalf of the party.304 On Wednesday
30th December, 1981, a member of the PNP’s National Executive Committee, Samuel
Addae-Amoako revealed to a small group of newsmen that he had been appointed by the
PNP’s acting national organizer and tasked to pull the party out of the morass of corruption,
greed and dictatorship into which it had been dragged by a few people who thought they
owned the party. But then, this was far too late. Within twenty-four hours, a group of
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military officers who had handed over power to the PNP government had returned to power
under the pretext of a ‘house cleaning’ exercise.305
2.8 CONCLUSION
The formation of political parties gained momentum after the Second World War, but mass
political mobilization and participation increased following the activities of the United
Gold Coast Convention and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party. Both
the UGCC and the CPP were parties founded upon an anti-colonial political platform. The
difference was the strategy, the style of leadership, the caliber of political organization and
the political actors involved. Of all the pre-independence political parties, the CPP had the
strongest foundation in mobilizing funds from ordinary party members.
From the early post-independent years to the end of the Second Republic, the sources
through which a party could mobilize funds for its political activities were not properly
regulated. Political parties could, therefore, secure funds from foreign businesses,
Ghanaian businesses, and party members. This environment favoured the CPP and the PP
more than the opposition parties. The use of the government machinery by the CPP and the
PP to mobilize funds from foreign businesses and governments subsequently influenced
military governments and political actors to support the enactment of decrees and laws that
proscribed political parties from sourcing funds from foreign sources. From the Third
Republic, the financing of political parties in Ghana was largely restricted to citizens and
the nature of funding also became more regulated.
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Notwithstanding the legal regulation of political party funding during the Third Republic,
political activities depended on both legal and illegal sources of funding. Membership dues,
small donations and official contributions through fund-raising activities emerged as the
legal and transparent sources of funding, although these were inadequate to support party
organizational activities. Political parties, particularly, those that captured political power
under the various republics also depended on wealthy members for political survival. Quite
apart from that, a review of the Ghanaian experience in regard to party funding indicates
that there is a link between awards of contract, appointment to public offices, among others,
and party financing; and this strategy started with Kwame Nkrumah’s CPP.
Furthermore, whereas individual and corporate contributions formed the legally accepted
sources of funding to political parties, state funding did not feature significantly under the
three republics. Finally, rich individuals with political ambitions played a pivotal role in
political party financing. This practice dates back to the pre-independent nationalist
activists of George Paa Grant. The CPP, which was noted to be a mass party, depended on
wealthy individuals more than on membership subscriptions. Top executive members of
the CPP, who were also the directors of some state institutions such as the Cocoa
Purchasing Company (CPC), used their positions to appropriate funds into the CPP. 306
Political parties under the Second Republic also depended on support from secret
financiers, while wealthy patrons such as Nana Okutwer III, the party chairman, provided
substantial money for the PNP during the Third Republic. As Ayee307 noted, the history of
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party financing revealed that campaign and organization funds were not raised from the
rank and file of their members but rather from substantial contribution from men of means.
The over-dependence on few wealthy members to finance political parties gave much
power to the few wealthy members who often influenced party activities to maximize their
selfish interests. This practice has negatively impacted on the institutionalization of
political party financing in Ghana. Having discussed the sources of funding of political
parties before and after independence up to the Third Republic, the next chapter examines
the legal and institutional framework of party financing in the Fourth Republic to which
we now turn.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING IN GHANA
3.0 INTRODUCTION
Every democratic system has to regulate the flow of money into politics. This is because
legal regulations on the flow of funds for political party activity protect the integrity of the
democratic system from potential corruption from wealthy individuals and groups.308 This
chapter examines the legal and institutional framework for political party financing under
the Fourth Republic. Specifically, it examines the regulatory frameworks of party financing
and the challenges of enforcement of the regulations. The discussion is largely informed
by interviews conducted with some officials of the Electoral Commission (EC) and
political parties, survey data and secondary data from the EC.
3.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STATE FOR POLITICAL
PARTY FINANCING
The adoption of the 1992 Constitution in a nationwide referendum on 28 April 1992
marked the third transition from military rule to constitutional rule in Ghana. While Article
55(1)309 of the 1992 Constitution guarantees the right of citizens to form a political party,
Section 3 of Article 55 enjoins a political party to freely participate in shaping the political
will of the people and disseminate information on political ideas. It provides that a political
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party’s social and economic programmes should be national in character; and it should
sponsor candidates for election to any public office other than to the District Assembly or
local government elections.310 The Constitution prohibits the formation of political parties
based solely on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional consideration. It requires the
national executive committees of a political party and the founding members of a political
party to be national in nature. For instance, the Constitution requires that at least one of the
founding members should come from each district of the country.
A review of the 1957, 1960, 1969 and 1979 Constitutions of Ghana shows that political
parties were only considered as social organizations reflecting the exercise by the people
of their freedom of association.311 All the four Constitutions were silent on the financing
of political parties either by the state or non-state actors. The inclusion of rules and
regulations on multi-party financing in the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic is,
therefore, a novelty.
During preparations for Ghana’s return to multi-party democratic governance under the
Fourth Republic, the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) made some
attempts to get ordinary citizens involved in democratic politics within political parties. In
1992, the PNDC promulgated the Political Parties Law, PNDCL 281, which placed a
limitation on financial contributions made by individuals to political parties. The PNDCL
283 later replaced PNDCL 281 by increasing the limit of individual contribution from
¢200,000 to ¢1,000,000 because the earlier contribution was found to be inadequate after
complaints from the political parties. After eight years of democratic experience,
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Parliament enacted the Political Parties Act, Act 574, in February 2000 to replace PNDCL
281 and 283. The 574 is silent on individual contribution to political party fund.
3.2 THE MATRIX OF POLITICAL FINANCE LAW
The matrix of political parties finance laws and regulations differs from country to country.
Tjernstrom and Katz312 divided the matrix of party finance into nine main areas. These are:
1. Regulation and enforcement
2. Disclosure of Income
3. Ceiling on Income
4. Bans on sources of Income I
5. Bans on sources of Income II
6. Disclosure and ceiling on expenditure
7. Direct public funding
8. Indirect public funding I: Media Access
9. Indirect public funding II: Taxation status
Nassmacher313 summarized the variety of approaches into two main types of legislation.
These are regulative and distributive public policies. The emphasis is on rules for the
financial conduct of parties, their candidates and supporters to avoid illegal money and
incidents of corruption. The desire to deal with lack of funds for political parties and the
levelling of the playing field stimulated distributive measures such as direct or indirect
public or state funding. The scope of rules on party finance and the procedures for their
implementation depend on the details of the rules. The 1992 Constitution and Act 574 are
silent on direct state funding but it is discussed under sources of funding in the next chapter.
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In view of this, the assessment of the legal framework in this study covers the essential
outlines of the pieces of legislation concerning:
i. Regulations on Limits;
ii. Regulations on Bans;
iii. Regulations on Disclosure; and
iv. Regulations on Reporting and Enforcement.
3.2.1 Regulations on Limits
Section 20 of PNDCL 281 of 1992 prevented citizens from contributing more than
¢200,000 (both in cash and kind) to political parties, and required the publication of the
size of contributions and the names of contributors. This, according to a former minister of
the PNDC regime, was to ensure that ordinary citizens owned political parties by way of
contributing only small amounts of money to the funds of the political parties.314 It was
the belief of the PNDC that the placing of a limitation on individual contributions would
prevent corruption and the possible ‘hijacking’ of political parties by the rich in society.
The basis for the proposal of the contribution of small amounts to political party funds was
informed by the effectiveness of the Workers’ Defence Committees (WDCs) and Peoples’
Defence Committees in the communities which ensured that money was not a key factor
in organizing the people for public education and political participation.315
A former head of state was also of the view that corruption associated with party financing
impeded democratic development and negatively affected the achievement of the
development goals of succeeding governments, and undermined the stability of regimes.316
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It was recognized that the corruption of political party leaders was one of the main reasons
behind the overthrow of the Third Republican PNP-led government in December 1981.
PNDCL 281 was, therefore, designed to compel political parties to solicit financial
contributions from ordinary members of the party to promote popular participation in
politics. In his view, democratic politics should not be too much influenced by a few
wealthy people in society. He pointed out that poor classroom teachers, butchers and
farmers had won non-partisan District Assembly elections which they contested with rich
lawyers and businessmen. It should not take money to win an election, he emphasized.317
However, in 1992, Komla A. Gbedemah, a Minister under the first president, Kwame
Nkrumah and 28 other prominent opposition figures, contested the amount of individual
contribution to political parties at the Accra High Court.318 They argued that the limitation
on individual contribution imposed by PNDCL 281 was an infringement on the
fundamental rights of individuals.319 They further pointed out that the law failed to take
into account the cost of living, the high inflation and exchange rates which impacted on the
cost of maintaining a competitive political party. Political parties themselves proposed an
alternative limit of contribution which ranged from ¢10 million to ¢20 million. This led to
the promulgation of the Political Parties (Amendment) Law, PNDCL 283, of 1992. This
law raised the limit of individual contribution from ¢200,000 ¢1 million.320
The disclosure of a donor’s identity and the amount of individual donations were meant to
monitor the flow of private money into political party coffers. Unfortunately, when the
Political Parties Act, Act 574, was enacted to replace PNDCL 283, it did not require
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political parties or candidates to specify individuals and companies that donated money.
The Act also failed to set a limit to what parties and candidates can generate; and there was
no limitation on their spending. The study consequently sought to find out from the survey
of 1006 card-holding members of four parties whether the state should limit the
contribution of individuals and companies to party financing. There was a mixed response
to this issue. However, as shown in Table 3.1, almost half (49.8%) of the total respondents
disagreed with the issue of the state limiting the contribution of individuals and companies
and almost a quarter (23.3%) of them were neutral. The study found that only 26.9% of the
respondents agreed that the state should limit the contributions of individuals and
companies to party financing.
Table 3. 1: Law to limit the contribution of individuals and companies
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
NPP 25.2% 25.8% 25.5% 14.8% 8.8%
NDC 26.0% 27.5% 24.2% 13.5% 8.8%
CPP 8.8% 22.5% 24.5% 28.4% 15.7%
PNC 24.0% 25.0% 9.6% 24.0% 17.3%
Total 23.8% 26.0% 23.3% 16.6% 10.3%
Source: Survey Data, 2014.
This finding is consistent with a world-wide trend in party regulation. Out of 111 countries
in the world surveyed in 2003 by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA) 27% of the countries had a ceiling while 73% did not have a ceiling on
how much a donor could contribute. The study indicated that in the United States of
America the law allows a donor to contribute up to USD 25,000. In contrast, the United
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Kingdom does not have any ceiling on how much a donor can contribute to a political
party.321
Our survey, which was based on the party affiliation of the respondents, showed that the
disagreement over limitation of contribution varied. In Table 3.1, respondents from the
NDC had the highest disagreement rate (53.5%) and those from the CPP had the lowest
(31.3%). About half of the respondents from all parties disagreed, with the exception of
those from the CPP (51% of respondents from the NPP disagreed and 49% of respondents
of the PNC disagreed. On the other hand, much more than a third of the respondents from
the CPP (44.1%) and the PNC (41.3%) agreed to the issue while less than a quarter of those
from NPP (23.6%) and NDC (22.3%) were in favour (see Table 3.1). It is, therefore, clear
that the major political parties (the NPP and the NDC) did not agree with the issue that the
state should limit the contributions of individuals and companies to party financing. The
wealthy individuals might, therefore, play a significant role in the financing of these
parties.
An interview with an election analyst and journalist disclosed that if the state should place
a limit on contributions it would make monitoring very difficult because political parties
would always circumvent the law. 322 In contrast, another interview with some Members
of Parliament indicated that placing no limitation on the amount which an individual could
contribute to a political party would give wealthy people the opportunity to dominate party
operations.323 The Director of Public Affairs of the Electoral Commission (EC) also
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supported some form of limitation on a citizen’s contribution to a party fund because it
could go a long way to control some problems emerging from the way political parties are
funded in Ghana.324
On the other hand, the Director of Finance of the EC pointed out that the reformers might
have cogent reasons why they moved away from the ceiling regime to a non-ceiling regime.
There might be an understanding, that the ceiling was not helping political parties to raise
funds. Meanwhile, political parties needed huge sums of money to carry out their activities.
Even in political parties which had a large following, more than 50 percent of members
were not ready to support the parties by paying their voluntary membership dues. This is a
major problem with party membership in Ghana. In the words of the Director of Finance
of the EC:
In a situation where we get less than 50% of the members contributing, whether
you have a ceiling or no ceiling, you will not get enough money. And that is why
almost always it becomes the responsibility of the few wealthy ones, because the
parties’ activities have to be undertaken and the parties will need money to
undertake those activities, and if the generalities of our members cannot pay, then
the few who have money are expected to pay and when they pay then they control
the party. To me this is as simple and natural as that. Until we sensitize people, until
we position our people economically to appreciate that they have the capacity to
support party funding, the situation will continue to remain as it is.325
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The examination of the laws on political party financing showed that initial attempts by the
state to limit the financial contributions of citizens to political parties were rolled back
under the Fourth Republic. SMCD 229 of 1979 and PNDCL 281 of 1992 prohibited or
limited contributions from certain sources. Aliens, companies, partnerships, firms or
business enterprises were all barred from contributing to the funds of political parties. The
basic explanation for the prohibition is that large financial contributions from aliens and
business interests were usually made in expectation of political and economic rewards that
had the tendency to undermine democratic governance.
3.2.2 Regulations on Forbidden Sources of Funds
Political parties are forbidden by law to receive funding from some sources. Forbidden
sources of funds to political parties are certain sources that are generally restricted or
banned. Such sources, according Nassmacher,326 included anonymous contributors,
contribution from trades unions, contribution from government contractors, foreign or
corporate sources.
In the case of Ghana, the 1992 Constitution forbids political parties from receiving
financial contributions from non-citizens. Article 55(15) of the Constitution states that
‘only a citizen of Ghana may make a contribution or donation to a political party registered
in Ghana.’ In line with the constitutional rule, Act 574 of 2000 prohibits contributions in
kind or cash from non-citizens of Ghana and foreign companies.327 Sections 23 and 24 of
Act 574 reiterate the constitutional provisions:
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Only a citizen of Ghana may contribute in cash or kind to the funds of a political
party. A firm, partnership, or enterprise owned by a citizen or a company registered
under the laws of the Republic at least seventy-five percent of whose capital is
owned by a citizen is for the purposes of this Act a citizen. A non-citizen shall not
directly or indirectly make a contribution or donation or loan whether in cash or in
kind to the funds held by or for the benefit of a political party, and no political party
or person acting for or on behalf of a political party shall demand or accept a
contribution donation or loan from a non-citizen.328
It is clear from the above legal rules that non-citizens are forbidden from directly or
indirectly contributing, donating or granting loans in either cash or in kind to the funds of
a political party.329 Accordingly, the Political Parties Act makes it a criminal offence for a
political party to demand or accept financial contributions from non-citizens. As a deterrent
for non-compliance of these rules, Section 25 of Act 574 stipulates the following sanctions
for non-citizens and political parties that contravene the law:
1. Where any person contravenes Section 23 or 24, in addition to any penalty that may be
imposed under this Act, any amount, whether in cash or in kind paid in contravention of
the section shall be recovered from the political party as debt owed to the State. The
political party or person in whose custody the amount is for the time being held shall pay
it to the state.
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A non-citizen found guilty of contravention of section 24 shall be deemed to be a prohibited
immigrant and liable to deportation under the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160). Section 25(3) of
Act 574, however, does not make it a criminal offence for non-citizens to channel their
financial or material contributions to political parties through the Electoral Commission.
This is because “the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 do not preclude of any country or a
non-governmental organization from providing assistance in cash or in kind to the
Commission for use by the Commission for the collection benefit of registered political
parties.”
A number of countries such as China, Holland, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom and
United States of America have supported Ghana in the development of political parties in
diverse ways. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) together with the Electoral Commission
and the political parties had facilitated a dialogue on public financial support for political
parties which would hopefully lead to new legislation on the issue. The international
community had provided tremendous financial support to enhance the consolidation of
multi-party democracy in Ghana. 330
Interestingly, we noted that a strong relationship existed between the two major political
parties, the NPP and the NDC with the Republican Party and the Democratic Party of the
United States respectively. The NPP and the Republican Party in the United States share a
common emblem (the elephant) and a common ideology of liberal democracy. The NDC,
on the other hand, sees itself as a social democratic party and therefore shares a common
ideological platform with the Democratic Party.331 This was why some NDC members
apparently thinking that the 2008 elections would be rigged by the incumbent NPP
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indicated, ‘we will use President Barack Obama of the Democratic Party to neutralize the
rigging.’332 One interviewee pointed out that the close relationship between former
President John A. Kufuor and former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and the
relationship between former President John Jerry Rawlings and Colonel Muammar
Gadhafi of Libya, had something to do with the material and financial support to their
respective political parties.333 This fact is difficult to substantiate or verify, at best it can
only be considered as anecdotal evidence.
However, the study found that foreigners donated directly to political parties under the
Fourth Republic. It was reported by the media that the NDC received US$40,000 worth of
computers and technical support from the Communist People’s Party of China towards the
training of the party polling agents.334 According to Mr. Kofi Adam, the deputy general
secretary of the NDC, the US$40,000 worth of computers received by the NDC party from
the Chinese Communist People’s Party was not in violation of any law governing political
party funding in Ghana.335 He indicated that the NDC is a social democratic party and a
member of the Socialist International, just as is the Communist People’s Party of China,
and that the donations received were technical support from a member of the Socialist
International to help train its election officers such as polling agents, in various areas.336
Kofi Adam said that the NDC neither received any donations from a firm, a company nor
from an individual. He said that the donations came from a political party, which the NDC
considered as fraternal. He noted that the main political parties with representation in
parliament sought assistance by way of donations from their sister branches abroad in
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undertaking such programmes. Adam asked the EC to prove that the NDC flouted the law.
337 The EC did not take any action against the NDC party.
Tony Oteng-Gyasi, Managing Director of Tropical Cable and Conductor Limited, also
indicated that some political parties received direct funding from countries such as Nigeria,
Cote d’Ivoire, Congo and Dubai.338 In addition, the general secretary of the NDC, Johnson
Asiedu-Nketia, admitted that some political parties received foreign funding.339 However,
he would not say if his party was a beneficiary from such sources, but pointed out: ‘This is
like the 11th commandment, thou shall not be caught.’340 The national treasurer of the PNC
in an interview indicated that some political parties were getting foreign support secretly.
Apart from the support from the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), the PNC never
received any donation from any other foreign sources. The PNC treasurer was of the view
that the political crisis in Ukraine had something to do with foreign support to the citizens
and non-governmental organizations. They succeeded in overthrowing the president of the
country. 341
If political parties are getting support from foreigners, then the practice is not only
inconsistent with the Constitution and the Political Party Act 574, it also poses a threat to
the country’s nascent democracy. As Nassmacher342 noted that there is the risk for political
parties to lose contact with their rank-and-file, or the grassroots of its membership if party
leaders do not need them for financial support. The literature on political parties clearly
shows that parties provide a link between citizens and the government: they are considered
as builders of social capital. To lose contact with the grassroots or ordinary members can
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compromise the quality of democratic governance in the sense that the political party may
not be well institutionalized to provide a competitive framework to perform valuable
political and social functions.343
The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in partnership with the Netherlands’ Institute for
Multiparty Democracy funded four political parties, namely, the NDC, the NPP, the CPP
and the PNC.344 Apparently, in the absence of state funding of political parties, the IEA
saw the need to mobilize resources to support political parties represented in Parliament.345
According to the IEA, political parties in Ghana could not effectively mobilize adequate
funds for their operations and if political parties failed, democracy would fail in Ghana.346
This notwithstanding, the presidential candidate for the DPP in the 2004 and 2008 elections
was of the view that the donation from a non-citizen by law should be channeled through
the Electoral Commission. He argued that even if the IEA distributed the support for the
benefit of all political parties, it is still a donation directly to registered political parties in
Ghana.347 The presidential candidate for the DPP maintained that direct donations to
political parties by foreign bodies through any agency other than the Electoral Commission
should be considered foreign funding and a in contravention of the political party law.348
The practice of political parties receiving direct support from foreign sources remains a
serious concern to many Ghanaians. However, it appears the rules on foreign donations to
political parties are not very clear, that is why there are debates on the practice. A clear
Legislative Instrument on the matter is desirable.
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The Political Parties Act 574 allows Ghanaian companies to support political parties and,
by extension, this enables a political party to solicit funds from Ghanaian companies. Sub-
section 23(2) of the Political Parties Act defines a citizen of Ghana for the purpose of
making donations to a political party to mean ‘a firm, partnership, or enterprise owned by
a citizen or a company registered under the laws of the Republic at least seventy-five
percent (75%) of whose capital is owned by a citizen is for the purposes of this Act a
citizen.’349 The financial statements submitted by political parties to the Electoral
Commission did not include details such as the amounts and the names of individuals and
companies who supported political parties in various ways. As pointed out by the Director
of Finance of the Electoral Commission, ‘we cannot assess who contributed what’.350
Therefore, the Electoral Commission does not have the capacity to determine whether
companies, that made donations to political parties, fell within or outside the category of a
firm, partnership, or enterprise owned by a citizen of Ghana.
3.2.3 Regulations on Disclosure
The term ‘disclosure’ suggests that citizens receive information on the various financial
activities of political parties through public exposure.351 Section 21(1) of Act 574
prescribes the financial disclosure and reporting rules for political parties. According to the
disclosure and reporting rules, within six months from the end of each year, a political party
is supposed to submit to the Electoral Commission a statement of account. The statement
of account should disclose source of funds, membership dues paid, contributions or
donations in cash or kind received, and properties of the party and when they were
acquired.352
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The threshold beyond which parties should disclose contributions received in the United
States of America and in the United Kingdom are USD200 and GBP5000 respectively.353
In Ghana, the disclosure and reporting rule are silent on the name of the donor and the
amount received. The law itself seems to be a recipe for plutocratic funding. Therefore, the
rich people are likely to dominate in party politics. The risk for political parties to lose
contact with their rank-and-file, or the grassroots of their membership because of their
participation in terms of financial support is high. To lose contact with the grassroots or
ordinary members can compromise the quality of democratic politics in the sense that a
political party may not be well institutionalized to provide a competitive framework to
perform its vital political and social functions.
The study also found that different financial accounts were often prepared by the political
parties for their internal administration. One account contained detailed information on the
donors, and especially on those donations that were coming as kickbacks from government
contracts and from the real party entrepreneurs who actually donated large sums of money.
This account was meant for the top executives of the party. Another account was designed
to satisfy the requirements of the Political Parties Act. This multiple accounting procedure
was justified by a former chairman of the NPP who argued as follows:
As companies prepare financial statement to satisfy different users, the political
parties do the same. Different accounts with different information are prepared for
the Electoral Commission; another set with detailed information is prepared for the
party leadership, while a third set is prepared to satisfy other party members who
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may (party members don’t even ask) want to know about the financial status of the
party.354
The former NPP chairman’s point was corroborated by the presidential candidate of the
Democratic People’s Party (DPP), who argued as follows:
Political party accounts are in two folds. One is transparent and the other one is
non-transparent. If one is not a leading member of the party, there is no way he or
she could know the details of the non-transparent sources. …the money spent on
sacrifices and spiritual consultations from Mallams, fetish priests and prophets are
often not covered with receipts.355
He further argued that the component of expenditure spent on ‘sacrifices and spiritual
consultations’ constitutes about one-third of total expenses.356 The role played by spiritual
consultations in Ghana’s electoral politics is difficult to assess empirically.
The study also found out that the respondents’ levels of agreement with the issue of full
disclosure by political parties of their sources of income vary. Most respondents supported
full disclosure of the sources of income (about 73.2% of the respondents). However, this
differed among the respondents from the different political parties. The percentage of CPP
respondents (88.3%) and PNC respondents (95.2%) who were in favour of full disclosure
was much higher than it was for those in the NPP (61%) and the NDC (75.7%) (see Table
3.2).
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Table 3. 2 Disclosure of income by Political Parties
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
NPP 3.0% 16.2% 19.8% 31.0% 30.0%
NDC 3.2% 9.2% 11.8% 37.5% 38.2%
CPP 0.0% 7.8% 3.9% 36.3% 52.0%
PNC 1.0% 2.9% 1.0% 31.7% 63.5%
Total 2.6% 11.2% 13.0% 34.2% 39.0%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
A further synthesis of the data obtained showed that although most of the respondents
supported a full disclosure of political parties’ sources of income, the picture was different
with MPs. Not up to half of MPs interviewed (46.1%) supported it. Most MPs were either
neutral (30.4%) or disagreed (23.5%). On the contrary, most of the party executives and
ordinary members interviewed supported the issue of full disclosure (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3 Disclosure of income by Members of Political Parties
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Neutral Agree
Disagree Agree
Member of Parliament 5.9% 17.6% 30.4% 27.5% 18.6%
National Executive 11.1% 0.0% 11.1% 33.3% 44.4%
Regional Executive 1.5% 2.9% 5.9% 42.6% 47.1%
Constituency Executive 2.5% 11.8% 12.3% 39.2% 34.2%
Polling Station 1.4% 9.7% 11.1% 37.0% 40.7%
TESCON/TEIN 2.8% 11.3% 12.7% 38.0% 35.2%
Any other 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Ordinary 2.4% 11.5% 10.3% 18.2% 57.6%
Total 2.6% 11.2% 13.0% 34.2% 39.0%
Source: Survey Data, 2014.
As it was with the support for the full disclosure of party sources of expenditure, most
respondents were of the view that parties need to disclose their expenditure. This position
was supported by 73% of the respondents. Only 13.3% disagreed and 13.7% decided not
to agree or disagree. Again, consistent with the support for disclosure of incomes, the PNC
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(93.3%) and the CPP (85.3%) respondents supported this position more than those from
the NDC (76.8) and the NPP (60%) (see Table 3.4).
Table 3. 4. Disclosure of Expenditure by Political Parties
Strongly
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Disagree
NPP 2.0% 16.0% 22.0% 33.2% 26.8%
NDC 3.2% 9.0% 11.0% 40.8% 36.0%
CPP 0.0% 8.8% 2.9% 36.3% 52.0%
PNC 1.9% 1.9% 2.9% 30.8% 62.5%
Total 2.3% 11.0% 13.7% 36.3% 36.7%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
Furthermore, a little more than half (51.9%) of the MPs interviewed were not in favour of
full disclosure of expenditures. This shows that MPs were split on the issue of whether
political parties should disclose their incomes and expenditures. However, this was not the
case with the other executives and members of the various political parties. They mostly
supported the issue (see Table 3.5).
Table 3. 5 Disclosure of Expenditure by Members of Political Parties
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Neutral Agree
Disagree Agree
Member of Parliament 3.9% 18.6% 29.4% 29.4% 18.6%
National Executive 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 55.6% 33.3%
Regional Executive 0.0% 1.5% 4.4% 54.4% 39.7%
Constituency Executive 1.9% 11.0% 12.3% 41.9% 32.9%
Polling Station 2.3% 9.7% 11.1% 38.0% 38.9%
TESCON/TEIN 5.6% 8.5% 15.5% 36.6% 33.8%
Any other 0.0% 30.0% 10.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Ordinary 1.8% 12.7% 13.9% 18.2% 53.3%
Total 2.3% 11.0% 13.7% 36.3% 36.7%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
Table 3.6 shows the extent to which the four political parties represented in parliament
(under the Fourth Republic) complied with the reporting rules of Act 574 of 2000 as at July
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2014. The Act requires two main regular reporting rules or declaration by political parties.
First, Section 14 of the Act requires political parties, within twenty-one days before a
general election, to submit to the Commission a statement of its assets and liabilities in
such form as the Commission may direct. In an interview with the Director of Finance and
Director of Public Affairs, it was disclosed that since the passage of the law in 2000, no
political party had complied with the reporting rules that required political parties within
twenty-one days before a general election to submit to the Commission a statement of its
assets and liabilities to the EC.357
The second reporting requirement (Section 21 of Act 574) also specifies that within six
months, from 31 December of each year, a political party shall file with the Electoral
Commission, indicating ‘the state of its accounts; the sources of its funds; membership
dues paid; contributions or donations in cash or in kind; the properties of the party and the
time of acquisition; and such other particulars as the Commission may reasonably
require.’358 For the first three years (2000-2), all the four political parties have been
relatively consistent in their submission of audited accounts to the EC. According to the
rules, all the parties were supposed to submit their accounts to the EC 15 times. However,
the study found out that the CPP failed to submit its accounts for eight (8) times (2004,
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014) while the PNC failed to comply with the
disclosure rule for 7 times. The PNC’s last submission, in April 2010, included financial
statements for the 4 previous years (2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009). Similarly, in January
2010 the NDC submitted accounts for two previous years (2007 and 2008). In July 2012,
the NDC again submitted a two-year account covering 2009 and 2010. It showed that the
accounts were not submitted to EC within six months from the end of each year. The NDC
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failed to submit the account four (4) times. The NPP failed to comply with the rules for
eight years, from 2007 – 2014. The reporting rules are clear but enough evidence showed
that all the four political parties failed to observe them. The EC pointed out that if it wanted
to enforce the Act, all the political parties will no longer operate. It is clear that the EC is
condoning this illegality or doing so to support democracy in spite of the rules not being
respected or enforced.
Table 3.6: Political Parties Compliance with Disclosure Rules
Year NDC NPP PNC CPP
2000
2001
2002
2003 *
2004 * *
2005
2006
2007 * *
2008 * *
2009 * *
2010 * * *
2011 * * * *
2012 * * *
2013 * * * *
2014 * * * *
Source: Compiled from the Electoral Commission, 2104.
Compliance * Non-compliance
The Deputy Chairman in charge of Finance at the Electoral Commission (EC), David
Adenze Kanga, cautioned in September 2011 that the EC would no longer accommodate
political parties which played truant in submitting their financial reports.359 The general
secretary of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), Kwadwo Owusu Afriyie,360 confirmed that the
NPP had for some years (2007-2011) failed to submit its audited report to the EC as
required by law. He conceded that it was bad for the NPP to flout the disclosure directive.
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However, he explained that some factors accounted for the party’s failure to submit its
financial reports regularly. According to him, ‘in 2008, we were engaged in a very serious
electioneering period and certain expenditures were incurred between 2008, 2009
thereabout and therefore we had to be sure that we got all the receipts and all the documents
very well. . . . We wanted to take our time to ensure that nothing went missing and that
everything had been captured’.361 The General Secretary of the National Democratic
Congress, Johnson Asiedu-Nketia, on the other hand, said that the party had no money to
hire a competent accountant and auditor to conduct a thorough audit of the party's finances.
Hence, the failure of the NDC to live up to its constitutional duty of submitting its annual
audited accounts to the EC . He urged the EC to consider the failure by the parties to submit
financial reports as ‘issues of capacity rather than the intention of any political party
wanting to hide information from the system.’ 362
Notwithstanding the above disclaimers by the political parties on their failure to
consistently submit audited accounts to the EC, it is clear that the political parties
established financial committees not only to raise funds but also to prepare accounts for
submission to the EC. The finance committees of the NDC, the CPP and the PNC were
supposed to prepare statements of accounts which will be audited by appointed officers
and presented to their highest decision-making bodies for consideration before the
statements of accounts are forwarded to the EC. Even though the political parties had
finance and accounting structures, interviews with political party officials revealed that the
preparation and submission of accounts to the EC was difficult to obey in a real situation,
in view of the time, procedure and work involved.363
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An interview with the national treasurer of the PNC painted a gloomy picture of the
situation in the PNC. According to its constitution, he was supposed to be a signatory and
keep the value books, but he was not introduced to the bank as a signatory. For the first
four years that he was in office as a treasurer, he never signed any cheque. It was during
his second term in office that he was allowed to become a signatory to the account and
could sign cheques. Even with this arrangement, bad blood developed between the
chairman and the secretary, and so they could not come together to transact business. He
pointed out that the party did not have any official cash book. They only signed the cheques
and indicated the names of the payee on the counterfoil of the cheque book. As for a
payment voucher, it was out of the question. At the end of the year, one party executive
member (not even an accounts clerk) would be asked to use the names in the cheque book
to prepare the accounts for the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) to reflect the amount
which the IEA gave them. The party would be denied support if the financial statement
was not submitted for vetting. The party did see the obligation to prepare and submit an
audited account to the EC as essential.364
The Vice Chairman of the PNC acknowledged in an interview that the accounts that were
submitted to the EC did not reflect what was on the ground, but that there was no way the
EC could trace other sources of funds.365 In his view, the expensive manner in which some
of the political parties conducted activities should give a clue to the EC that the parties
spent more than what they declared. He explained that one trip from the southern to the
northern part of the country involved three or more cross country vehicles, fuel, hotel
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expenses, food and per diem for the team members. The expenditure for such trips alone
was more than what his party used to declare as annual expenditure to the EC. He pointed
out that, most of these expenses were paid for by friends and individuals; therefore, the
accounting processes did not capture them.366 It is reasonable to state that the financial
records provided by political parties to the EC were sketchy and did not represent the
reality.
Similarly, an interview with one of the CPP national executive members was revealing and
interesting. According to him, the money that people spent on the party without passing it
through the party coffers was very huge. He could not quantify the amount. Some people
spent money on the party but not through the party office. He noted that as they were
thinking of how to get money to hire the International Press Centre to hold a press
conference to mark the 65th birthday of the party, a party executive member voluntarily
paid the full cost of GH¢700 for hiring the Centre. Yet the person who paid the amount
did not bring the money to the party office. Sometimes, some people spent money on the
party without telling the office to keep records of such expenditure. He recalled a situation
when two people paid the office rent for one of the constituencies for the same period to
the same landlord. These receipts and tenancy agreement did not come to the party office.
This normally happened when it was getting close to the congress for the election of
officers. The payments for some of these expenditures were ways to canvass for votes.
According to him, the party benefited from these donations, but when the EC came around,
it did not know who paid for what and for how much was paid. 367
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The CPP official admitted that the audited accounts were mostly not a reflection of the
reality for all political parties in Ghana:
I will confess that for all political parties, what they send to the Electoral
Commission, the Electoral Commission itself knows that it cannot be correct. For
example, we know candidates who get a lot of monies not from the party. They
have friends, brothers, and they hear that they are contesting parliamentary seats,
and my brother in London has sent me 1000 pounds, who am I going to tell? Will
he declare it to the EC that ‘my brother in London has sent me one thousand
pounds’? It is difficult. My relatives might have met somewhere and decided to
give their brother about fifty million cedis to support him, he is fighting for this
position, for the image of the family. Those things - who are you going to declare
it to? So our candidates and all other candidates use a lot of resources that are not
documented.368
If political party accounts were published, there would be transparency and perhaps the
allegations about narcotics money being used to fund political parties could be empirically
examined effectively by the EC and other stakeholders. Public disclosure of the sources of
political party funds can be used both as the basis for the enforcement of bans on the
sources of party income and as an alternative to bans. The idea is that transparency will not
only build public confidence but also stimulate a public debate, thereby putting public
pressure on political parties to voluntarily abstain from the kind of sources that could
compromise democratic politics and would otherwise have to be banned. When sources of
income to political parties are made public, voters are more likely going to make better
decisions about which party or candidate they want to support.369
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The constitutional requirement for political parties to annually publish their accounts is a
mandate which the EC must enforce but has woefully failed to do effectively. The nature
of the commitment of the EC to enforce the rules of the political game is further discussed
below.
3.2.4: Regulations on Reporting and Enforcement
Many countries, the world over, have legislation on political party finance. The
administration and enforcement of the laws and regulations are a critical step in a long
process of regulating multi-party democratic politics. Many democracies have ignored the
issue of enforcement until a scandal provokes political action.370 Some countries such as
France and the United Kingdom have created impressive enforcement agencies, but their
level of success and achievement depended on a number of factors.371 The task can be
given to different public bodies. The most common approach among countries is to give
the national election management body that responsibility, either alone or in cooperation
with other state institutions.372 In Ghana, the Political Parties Act, Act 574, has mandated
the Electoral Commission (EC) to regulate party financial activities.373 Therefore, the
powers that have been vested in the EC to regulate the formation and operations of the
political parties are not exceptional.
The EC was perceived as lenient in the enforcement of the disclosure rules and
regulations. In spite of the well-known fact that non-compliance by the political parties in
the submission of their annual financial accounts was common and persistent, the EC had
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never sanctioned any political party for non-compliance.374 According to the Director of
Finance of the EC, the Commission had only been cautious in applying sanctions because
there was ‘no enabling environment’ for the parties to do so.375 He also indicated that the
reason for the inability of the Electoral Commission to apply sanctions against the
defaulting parties was that it found the action of political parties to be the normal practice
within the state. In his words:
Our inability to act is borne out of the recognition that first and foremost, almost
every public institution in Ghana is guilty of the disclosure rules and regulations
because the internal and external systems do not work well. The realities of life on
the ground render most regulatory bodies (Standard Board, Food and Drugs Board,
Revenue Authority, etc.) ineffective and they have limited revenue mobilization
agencies as well. 376
The Director of Finance further indicated that most of the political parties could not
generate funds to operate throughout the year. Offices in the constituencies functioned for
a short period during election years. To sanction or cancel the registration of these political
parties would mean 377no political party would be in existence in Ghana.
This finding confirms Sheplse’s view that repeated play allows for history contingent
strategies by political actors.378 This is to say political parties were aware that after three
successive general elections under the Fourth Republic of Ghana the Electoral Commission
could not constrain parties to comply with the rules governing the funding of political
parties. This awareness of the inability of the Electoral Commission to enforce the rules
has motivated political parties to flout the rules governing the funding of political parties.
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Afari-Gyan,379 the Chairman of the EC, laid the blame of the inability of the Commission
on the state for not funding political parties to level the playing field for all political parties.
According to him, the abuse of incumbency which he considered as the denial of funds for
legally mandated electoral tasks was rife in Ghana. Ruling parties had demonstrated abject
lack of principle in relation to the abuse of incumbency. When political parties were in
opposition they complained profusely against it, but when they gained power they saw
nothing wrong with it.380 Afari-Gyan was of the opinion that public support for political
parties would not only contribute to a levelling of the playing field, but the beneficiaries
could then also be held to strict accounting procedures for the use of the campaign
money.381
An interview with the treasurer of the PNC reinforces Afari-Gyan’s position. According to
him, the requirement to submit audited account to the EC is in order because it is a practice
in most democracies. This should not be too difficult for them to comply with. However,
the EC cannot enforce the rules because the state does not support political parties. He
stressed that state support alone was a good tool to exact the submission of accounts. In the
past, the state used to solicit support from donor organizations to provide vehicles and other
materials. The purpose for the support is to help political parties discharge their democratic
functions. However, this assistance was withdrawn, and this made it seemed morally wrong
to ask political parties to submit audited accounts.
An interview with a Director of the EC revealed that the EC is expected to supervise the
operations of political parties, however, the electoral law is the law of the country and not
different from other laws. Therefore, action on the violation of any law of the country is
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the responsibility of the law enforcement authorities, especially the police and the law
courts; and not the responsibility of the EC alone. 382 In his view, the onus of enforcement
lies with citizens and some civil society groups which owe it as a civic duty to take political
parties that contravened the rules to court.383 The reasons adduced by the EC for lack of
enforcement can best be described as a manifestation of a weak institution.
With regards to the nature of the financial statement submitted to the EC, the Director of
Finance made it clear that the EC was fully aware that audited accounts presented by
political parties did not reflect the reality of their financial operations; yet the EC always
accepted the accounts in the manner they were presented.384 One national treasurer of the
NDC lamented that the disclosure policy was not effective because the majority of private
contributions were given directly to the candidates and not to the party.385 Even though the
law enjoined the EC to release the financial statements submitted by political parties for
public consumption, we noted that it was difficult for the public and researchers to gain
access to the financial statements provided by political parties. The only official records
the EC was willing to make public was the number of times the political parties submitted
their audited accounts. For a disclosure policy to be effective, the information should be
timely, accurate, accessible to the public and understandable to the potential user.
The Commission’s failure to sanction parties for the persistent violation of the Act, or
enforce compliance by political parties does not only undermine its credibility but it also
compromises the principles of the rule of law and ultimately defeats the very purpose of
the law. The public is entitled to demand transparency. Indeed, the inclusion of the
reporting rules in the Political Parties Act is to improve public confidence in the system.
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However, evidence from the EC and political parties suggested that transparency was
compromised. This has the potential of undermining public confidence and trust in the
political system. This finding is consistent with Nassmacher’s assertion that a party finance
regime is vague if it cannot be enforced and recommended that party finance regimes must
have the possibility of sanctions in the event of violations.386 In America, Alexander387
observed that the political party laws were not enforced until the incredible and shocking
news of Watergate in 1972. The fear that tainted money may enter Ghanaian politics is a
real one. A former national chairman of the NPP indicated that party funds came from the
sky; nobody knew the source.388 Arthur Kennedy, who was one of the contestants for the
NPP presidential flagbearer position, lamented that the way politicians splashed money on
campaigns showed that some illegal sources of funds might be entering Ghanaian
politics.389 The arrest and imprisonment of a party financier390 who was member of
Ghana’s Parliament, Mr. Eric Amoateng, in New York for carrying 62 kilograms of heroin
demonstrated that a political party could have access to questionable sources of money.391
Narcotics money in politics has the potential of being a recipe for violence, distortion of
economic activity, corruption of the rule of law, and a serious threat to the political stability
of the country. This trend is likely to destroy the confidence that people have in politicians,
political parties and multi-party democracy.
3.3 CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the legal and institutional framework of political party financing
in Ghana. Political party financing law in Ghana has become complex, delicate and
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sensitive to deal with. Legislation on political party financing and activities have generally
sought to regulate the powers and activities of political parties to conform to democratic
principles, prevent the formation of political parties on sectional basis, and regulate their
sources of income and expenditure in order to inject some level of transparency and
confidence in the operations of political parties.
The 1992 Constitution and the current Political Parties Act, Act 574 place no limitation on
the contribution of citizens to political parties. Lack of rules to limit contributions by
individuals may encourage some wealthy people to bear the financial responsibility of the
parties. Act 574 allows Ghanaian citizens to contribute to the funds of political parties
without requiring the political parties to disclose the names of contributors and the sums
of amount contributed.
Political parties have always been unwilling to abide by the rules regulating their finances.
However, it is almost impossible for the EC and other stakeholders to verify the
authenticity of the audited financial statements submitted by political parties. Financial
statements submitted to the EC took different forms and thereby creating the perception of
lack of transparency and accountability.
The essence of submitting different financial statements to the EC is to hide the actual and
dominant sources of income from the Commission and the public at large. It could be
argued that this is done because, firstly, the sources of party financing are very
questionable; secondly, to avoid public condemnation; and thirdly, to avoid the political
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victimization of contributors. The major sources of money to political parties in Ghana
remain, to a large extent, unknown to the general public, to the ordinary members of the
political parties, and to the EC.
Apart from the clause on enforcement, the EC had indicated that if it wanted to enforce the
rules, then all the political parties would be de-registered. The EC is not enforcing the rules
because it wants to keep the political parties in existence as they are important for
democracy. However, failure to enforce the law on the financing of political parties has
given political parties room to operate according to their preferences. If political parties are
to play their roles effectively in Ghana’s multi-party democracy, then the rules and
regulations on their funding, as well as the enforcement of the rules, should be of greater
concern to the state and its citizens. The funding system should be transparent and be
subject to the full scrutiny of the regulating body in order to ensure sufficient public support
and promote public confidence in the political system. The rules should be workable and
efforts should be made to attract a consensus among the major political parties. The legal
framework should be informed by the principle that the main purpose of political parties is
to be a vehicle for public activism and engagement, and this framework should
subsequently be focussed on and thereby make political parties fit for this purpose.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SOURCES OF FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES UNDER THE
FOURTH REPUBLIC OF GHANA
4.0 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter discussed the institutional and legal framework under which political
parties in Ghana generate income for their activities. To continue the discussion, this
chapter explores and analyses how political parties under the Fourth Republic of Ghana are
funded. The chapter presents the major sources of funding to political parties with
particular attention to the four parties that have had Members of Parliament (MPs) under
the Fourth Republic. These political parties are the National Democratic Congress (NDC),
the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and the People’s
National Convention (PNC). The NDC and the NPP are the two strong political parties that
had alternated power in the Fourth Republic, while the CPP and the PNC have remained
weak opposition parties. The focus of this chapter is to answer the following questions:
i. What were the main sources of funding to the NPP, NDC, PNC and CPP?
ii. Did the parties get their major income from ordinary members or wealthy members?
iii. What strategies did the parties use to mobilize funds?
iv. How were the funds utilized?
Ghana’s Political Parties Act, Act 574, does not list the sources of income to political
parties, but its disclosure provision alludes to membership dues and contributions and
donations either in cash or in kind.392
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4.1 ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES OF PARTY FUNDING
The analysis in this section is largely based on documented data obtained from the Electoral
Commission and interviews with political party members and other relevant key political
actors, and quantitative survey data from 1006 card holding members of the four political
parties. These are discussed below.
Financial Statement from Electoral Commission
The discussion on the sources of party funding in this section shall be based largely on the
audited yearly financial accounts submitted by political parties to the Electoral
Commission (EC) between January 2005 and July 2014. As of July 2014, the NPP
submitted their audited accounts up to 2006. The CPP submitted for 2005, 2006 and 2012.
The PNC submitted from 2005 to 2009 while the NDC submitted from 2005 to 2010. A
summary of the accounts of the four parties is presented in Tables 4.1 below.
The yearly audited financial reports submitted by the four political parties to the EC from
2005 to 2012 clearly proves that incomes from membership dues constituted less than 6%
of their total revenue. The lack of uniformity in the presentation of the accounts to the EC
made it difficult to establish the percentage of contributions from the wealthy individuals.
For example, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) had supported all the four political
parties since 2003, but only the CPP and the NDC had showed receipt of such funds in
their accounts. However, it is evident from Table 4.1 that more than 80% of the income of
the NPP came from special contributions from members.
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Table 4.1: Source of Political Party Financing (2005 – 2012)
Political Party/Sources 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
of Income % % % % % % % %
CPP
Party membership 0.9 0.58 - - - - - 1.628
card/Dues
Contributions founding 6.8 15.6 - - - - -
members
Fundraising activities 8.1 - - - - - - 90.368
Grants from IEA 84.16 83.6 - - - - - 7.055
Interest received 0.04 0.02 - - - - - 0.011
Totals 100 100 - - - - -
NPP
Membership dues 1.8 0.4 - - - - - -
Special Contribution 82.5 98.24 - - - - - -
from Members
Profits from Cards 2.8 0.2 - - - - - -
Fundraising activities 12.9 - - - - - - -
Donations - 0.11 - - - - - -
Sundries - 0.1 - - - - - -
Totals 100 100 - - - - - -
PNC
Sale of Party 1.04 0.74 0.3 0.41 - - - -
Cards/Souvenir/Dues
Contributions 12.31 8.14 11.16 0.97 11.77 - - -
Donations 32.17 55,99 51.51 78.13 73.31
Rally collections 15.46 10.46 11 9.46 - - - -
Pledges 31.71 19.01 15.81 10.54 12.01 - - -
Founding Members fees 7.07 5.66 9.87 0.44 - - - -
Loans 0.24 - - - 2.23 - - -
Interest on investment - - 0.35 0.04 0.68 - - -
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 - - -
NDC
Membership dues 1.46 1.39 1.24 0.3745 1.54 5.41 - -
Donation/ Fundraising 75.38 78.5512 81.57 92.7493 93.9712 64.2 - -
Electoral Grants 22.78 20.05 - 1.5343 4.01 13.61 - -
Filing Fees - - 17.19 5.3419 0.47 - - -
Investment Income 0.38 0.0088 0.00001 0.00007 0.0088 16.78 - -
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 - -
Source: Compiled by the Author from the EC, July 2014.
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Similarly, the NDC recorded between over 60% and 90% from donations and fundraising
while the PNC mostly had over 50% from donations. Interestingly, the table showed that
the CPP largely depended on the support from the IEA. Over 80% of its income came from
the IEA. Apart from the CPP, the financial statement of political parties shown in Table
4.1 underscores the fact that most political parties relied largely on donations to support
their political activities. This has undermined internal party democracy.
4.2.0 THE MAJOR SOURCES OF FUNDING
We considered the respondents as rational and responsible party members who were
knowledgeable about the sources of funds to their parties. The first set of substantive
questions was aimed at evaluating the opinions of 1006 card-holding members in respect
of the sources of funds for their parties. The sources of funds listed included: ordinary
members; rich individuals of the party; founding members of the party; local businessmen
and businesswomen; members of Parliament; state funds; executive members of the party;
contribution from overseas and foreign businesses. In each case, the card-holding members
had to rate on the scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) how each of these
sources of funds contributed to their party funds. The rated results are presented in Figure
4.1.
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Figure 4.1 Weighted Average of Source of Funding for Parties
The mean of the results of the rating showed the rich individuals (4.52), founding members
of the party (4.17), members of Parliament (4.14), and executive members of the party
(4.11), as the four major sources of party funds. All these categories of people are defined
by the study as the wealthy members of political parties. This was followed by the
contribution from overseas (4.07), local businessmen and women (4.02), and foreign
businesses (3.31), as the other important main sources of funds to political parties. It was
clear from the rating that card holding members disagreed with contribution from ordinary
members (2.53), and state funding (2.27), as the major sources.
The respondents (1006) were further asked to select one out of the nine financial
contributors they considered as the major source of funding to their parties. Responses to
this question were interesting and consistent with the rating of sources. Indeed, 82.5% of
the total respondents indicated wealthy members of political parties as the major source of
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contribution to their parties. This is made up of the rich individuals, 38.1%, members of
Parliament, 19.2%, party executives, 18.1%, and founding members, 7.2%. It is worth
pointing out that members of Parliament and founding members were equally regarded as
party executives by all the four political parties. It is, therefore, logical to assert that
political parties largely depended on the rich individuals and party executives for the
funding of political activities. In contrast, only 2.2% of respondents indicated ordinary
members as the major source of funding. There is no significant difference between the
percentages of income (less than 2%) submitted to the EC and the survey results of 2.2%
(see Table 4.2) However, the respondents indicated that the rich individuals in their parties
were the major contributors to party funds. This position was taken by 38.1% of the
respondents as shown in Table 4.2.
The contribution of rich individuals was very much felt in the NPP as 42.8% of all NPP
respondents indicated them as major financiers. A large percentage of respondents from
the NDC (38.8%) and the CPP (29.4%) also mentioned rich individuals as the major source
of party financing. However, the situation with the PNC was slightly different. Although
responses showed that rich individuals constituted an important source of funding (as
indicated by 26% of respondent from the PNC) a greater percentage of all PNC respondents
mentioned that their party was mostly funded by party executives (32.7%) (see Table 4.2).
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Table 4. 2: Major sources of income by Parties (cross tabulation)
Sources Political Parties
NPP NDC CPP PNC Totals
# % # % # % # % # %
Ordinary 3 .8 4 1.0 6 5.9 9 8.7 22 2.2
Rich 171 42.8 155 38.8 30 29.4 27 26.0 383 38.1
Founders 22 5.5 17 4.2 13 12.7 20 19.2 72 7.2
Local Bss 44 11.0 42 10.5 10 9.8 9 8.7 105 10.4
MPs 88 22.0 93 23.2 8 7.8 4 3.8 193 19.2
State 3 .8 5 1.2 1 1.0 0 0 9 .9
Executive 54 13.5 61 15.2 33 32.4 34 32.7 18 18.1
s 2
Overseas 5 1.2 5 1.2 1 1.0 1 1.0 12 1.2
Foreign B 10 2.5 18 4.5 0 0 0 0 28 2.8
Totals 400 100 400 100 102 100 104 100 1006 100
Source: Survey Data, 2014.
A further analysis to obtain the views of party executives and ordinary members shows a
similar response. It was found out that a greater percentage of party executives and
members of Parliament, as well as ordinary members of the four parties, considered rich
individuals in their parties as an important funding source. In the case of Tertiary Education
Institution Network of the NDC (TEIN) and Tertiary Students Confederation (TESCON)
Executives of the NPP (TEIN/TESCON),393 the majority of the respondents (52.1%)
considered rich individuals as the major financiers of their various parties (see Table 4.3).
However, the case of regional executives of the four parties was slightly different. A little
over a quarter (26.5%) of the regional executives mentioned rich individuals as the major
funding source, while a third (33.8%) of them considered party executives as the major
source. It is evident from the survey results that the members of Parliament who mobilized
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and spent funds for political activities considered the contributions of the rich individuals
to stand at 50%, members of Parliament at 32%, party executives, 5.9%, and founding
members, 1% . It is reasonable to conclude that the overwhelming majority (89.3%) of the
members of Parliament considered wealthy members as the major source of funding for
political parties. Clearly, they never considered ordinary members, state funds and
contributions from overseas branches as significant at all because none of them mentioned
these sources (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Major sources of Income by Position in Parties
OM394 RI FM LB MP SF PE CO FB
Members of Parliament 0.0% 50.0% 1.0% 7.8% 32.4% 0.0% 5.9% 0.0% 2.9%
National Executives 0.0% 44.4% 22.2% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Regional Executives 0.0% 26.5% 4.4% 13.2% 17.6% 0.0% 33.8% 1.5% 2.9%
Constituency Executives 3.3% 35.9% 6.8% 12.6% 21.1% 0.0% 15.9% 1.4% 3.0%
Polling Station 4.6% 33.3% 7.9% 10.6% 16.7% 1.9% 19.4% 2.3% 3.2%
TESCON/TEIN 0.0% 52.1% 7.0% 2.8% 21.1% 1.4% 14.1% 0.0% 1.4%
Other Executives 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 30.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Ordinary Members 0.0% 39.4% 11.5% 7.9% 11.5% 2.4% 24.2% 0.6% 2.4%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
4.2. 1. Donations to Political Parties
The term donation defies clear cut definition in the financing of political parties. Donations
to party funds draw a greater attention of the public. The motives of those who make
substantial contributions to political parties are often the subject of controversy. Some
people may legitimately wish to protect their identity. They are concerned that the public
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disclosure of their contributions would provoke public debate and, possible, disapproval.395
Political parties in Ghana received donations through fund-raising activities, kickbacks,
companies and non-governmental organizations.
Fundraising from members and public
Party officials and candidates said they normally hired singing groups or brass bands, food
sellers and invited the general public to a meeting place where they appealed to the people
for funds and support. The people at such meetings donated cash, fuel, T-shirts, bill boards,
drinking water, food, assorted drinks, vehicles etc. to the parties and the candidates.
Political parties also approached party sympathizers, companies and individuals (either in
writing or by engaging in one-on-one consultations) to solicit funds. Usually donations
from this category came in small quantities and the contributors did not ask for any favour
for the contributions.396
Rich Individuals of the Party
A national treasurer of the NDC in an interview said some rich party members willingly
donated either cash or material things to the party and individual candidates without being
approached.397 Some MPs and political party executives interviewed intimated that some
of the donations they received were offered in secrecy.398 In such cases, the donations were
not disclosed to the party executives, sometimes, not even to the rank and file of the
party.399 As the MPs for the Afram Plains South and for the Kintampo North constituencies
indicated:
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People willingly approach prospective or contesting MPs (including them) to give
money for their campaigns so that when they come to power the MPs would
reciprocate with contracts and positions. Most of these people do not want their
names to be disclosed at all. They really offer big sums of money and support.400
A Member of Parliament and executive member of the NDC disclosed that a contractor
(one of the party financiers) demanded that the contract for the cleaning of Accra to mark
the 100 days of the NDC administration in 2009, be given to him. He was awarded the
contract to clean Accra before the procedures for the award of contracts were regularized.
401 One NPP National Executive member narrated an interesting story of how they
mobilized funds for the party. He said they approached a very rich party member in 1996
to, among other things, ask for financial support from him. The rich man gave them a date
and time (around 6:30 p.m. when darkness was setting in) to meet his boys at a certain
place. A private car would be parked along the road with the hazard lights on. The boys
would be working on the tyres with the car boot open. The rich man asked them to just stop
behind the car and pick the carton from the boot without talking to the boys. They followed
the instructions of the rich and went for the carton. When they opened the carton, they
found to their surprise that the man had given them ¢51 million. 402 A National Executive
member of the NDC who served in the position of national organizer for eight years said
that what one rich man of the party offered would be more than what the party could realize
from two million membership dues a year. These groups of people were promoted to patron
positions of the party and they were always consulted about the directions of the party.403
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The NDC had four different card-holding members. These were gold, silver, bronze, and
ordinary. If the party had any government contracts to award, the members who held gold
cards would be considered first before those who held silver, bronze and ordinary cards in
that order.404 It is usually the ruling party that had the informal mandate to award
government contracts of any kind. During the award of such contracts, it was often made
clear to the contractors of government projects that they would have to pay some money to
the party. Some contract projects were assigned a specific percentage of the contract
money, while others attracted some amount of money that went to the party or individuals.
Both the NDC and the NPP admitted having a list of members who were awarded
government contracts. The NDC and the NPP governments exploited this avenue to
mobilize resources for their political parties.405
Some party executive members affirmed the pervasiveness of kick-backs. A former deputy
minister of the NDC lamented the deplorable financial situation of the party while it was
in opposition and indicated that when the party was in government, contractors donated a
lot of cash and materials to run the party.406 Similarly, a former national chairman of the
NPP is on record to have had an open confrontation with those charged to collect kick-
backs for the party but then refused to deposit the monies collected into the party coffers.407
He indicated that Ghanaians had given him the nick-name ‘kick back’ because he was bold
to raise an issue of misappropriation of kick-backs meant for the party. He disclosed that
the NPP, as a party, demanded compulsory contributions from those who were awarded
government contracts. The party, however, was very flexible on the issue of the percentage
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of the contract sum, but had a list of those who were awarded contracts and often pursued
them to pay up.
Local Businesses
Some respondents to the survey also indicated that contributions from foreign (2.8%) and
local (10.4%) businesses were major sources of income to political parties (see Table 4.2).
It is no wonder that 10.4% of respondents indicated local businesses as the major source.
The paradox is that some party executives were the owners of many local companies. One
may ask, was it the companies or the owners of these companies that donated to party
funds? Since the names of the contributors were not disclosed, it was difficult to answer
the question. It is, however, clear that donations to political party funds came from party
members who were offered contracts, rich individuals who donated willingly and those
who influenced their companies to provide financial support to the political parties. This
assertion is supported by the fact that 38.1% of the respondents indicated the rich
individuals in their parties to be the major contributors to party funds as shown in Table
4.2.
Foreign Businesses
The survey results showed that 2.8% of the total respondents and 2.9% of Members of
Parliament considered foreign businesses as the major source of funding. This notion is
further buttressed by a member of a party’s executive in this interview:
Both international and local contractors such as Construction Pioneer Company
(CP), Taysec Company and PW Ghanen in the Upper West Region made big
donations to both the NPP and the NDC. When the NDC is in power, one sees
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certain construction firms working on the road. When the party is not in power the
construction firm is also off the road. The reverse holds true for the NPP.408
Thus, international businesses made donations to the main political parties, the NPP and
the NDC governments, perhaps to assist them win government contracts. The problem is
that the Political Parties Law, Act 574, proscribed international businesses or companies
from making financial contributions to the political parties. Political parties hid such
donations from the audited financial records that they sent to the EC.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Different parties had different notions of contributions from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). For example, the NPP and the PNC considered and treated financial
support from the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) as donation in their financial
statements submitted to the EC, while the CPP and the NDC captured them as grants from
the IEA and electoral grants respectively. For the purpose of this study, we consider these
grants as donations because they cannot be separated from other donations.
Some non-governmental organizations which were committed to the promotion of
democracy in Ghana supported political parties to enable them operate effectively. For
instance, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), which served as a conduit for foreign
government support to political parties, is one of the non-governmental organizations that
demonstrated its commitment through financial and material support to political parties in
Ghana. First, the Institute in 2008, printed for the parties 3,000 copies of the manifestos of
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each of the political parties represented in Parliament.409 Secondly, the Institute had a
special programme for only parties represented in Parliament. The package of this
programme involved the supply of basic office equipment such as computers and furniture,
among others. Thirdly, the four parties represented in parliament were requested to draw
up quarterly programmes on capacity building which the Institute funded. Finally, the
Institute paid the monthly allowances of five party officials as follows:
The General Secretary - GH¢100.00
Policy Analyst - GH¢70.00
Two Coordinators - GH¢35.00 each
Administrator - GH¢15.00410
One interviewee pointed out that it was the allowance from the IEA that sustained the head
office of the party because even though the allowance was meant for specific officers, it
was usually agreed that it was to be distributed among most of the workers in the party
office.411
The 31st December Women’s Movement and ABANTU for Development are the other
local non-governmental organizations that supported specifically the NDC. It should,
however, be noted that the 31st December Women’s Movement is an NGO largely managed
by Nana Konadu Agyeman, wife of former President Rawlings of the NDC. According to
NDC party officials, the 31st December Women’s Movement often offered logistical
support, particularly, to the women’s wing of the party, while ABANTU for Development
was interested in affirmative action to train and pay filing fees for women who had applied
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for political positions. ABANTU for Development organized several seminars and
workshops for the party members, particularly women.412 Clearly, this support from the
NGOs did not have any direct influence on the internal democratic politics of the parties.
4.2.2 Membership Dues and Levies
Membership dues are the periodic (monthly or yearly) contributions of a fixed amount of
money paid to the party by the card-bearing members. Membership dues have been one of
the traditional sources of funding for all political parties under successive civilian regimes.
In contrast to the practice in some countries where party membership cards are sold
periodically to both new and old members,413 in Ghana, all political parties issue a
permanent membership card in which they record annual contributions. The rate of
membership dues varies from party to party. Generally, all the four political parties are
very circumspect about the amount fixed as dues because of the general economic
difficulties of the members.414
In Table 4.1 a critical analysis of the financial statements submitted to the EC by the CPP,
NPP, NDC and PNC in 2005 and 2006 confirm that grassroots membership contribution
to political party funds (through the payment of membership dues) was insignificant. In
terms of the percentage of total income, funds generated from the grassroots were less than
2 percent for all the four political parties. In 2005, the NPP recorded the highest (1.8
percent) contribution from the grassroots members of the party. The CPP and the PNC
never had up to 1 percent of total income as membership dues. This is also exemplified in
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2. As we shall later see, the insignificant grassroots financial
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contribution of less than 2 percent reflects the voice of the ordinary members in party
decision making.
All the parties admitted that membership dues could not pay for one month’s normal
administrative expenses of their operations.415 The operational expenses refers to payment
of only salaries of the regular staff working at their offices, rent, electricity and telephone
bills of the political parties. The NDC, in particular, lamented that it was a serious
indictment on it as a party for failing to honour the payment of social security deductions
of the staff to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT).416 Interviews with
the deputy general secretary and the treasurer of the NDC showed that the membership list
and dues, investments and candidate filing fees were not recognized as an essential source
of funding to the party at the time of its formation. The party resorted to these sources of
funds when it came into opposition from 2001.417
The study found that the NDC sold its ordinary card at GH¢5.00 to all members while
membership dues of 20 pesewas per month was charged. In addition, it imposed a special
levy in the form of three different kinds of cards which were sold to its members. The
highest of these cards was called ‘gold card’ and cost GH¢100.00 with monthly dues of
GH¢10.00. The ‘silver card’ cost GH¢50.00 with monthly dues of GH¢5.00. The ‘bronze
card’ cost GH¢5.00 with monthly dues of GH¢2.50. The type of card a person held in the
NDC showed his or her class, with its associated privileges in the party.418 These were
some of the rich individuals who contributed funds to the party.
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The PNC and the NPP on the other hand, sold their membership cards at GH¢1.00 each
with one-fifth (20 pesewas) of the cost of the card as the minimum membership dues to its
ordinary members. With respect to the special levy, the PNC was rather inclined to levy its
patrons GH¢5.00 every month for the running of the party.419
Membership in the NPP was stratified into three categories. These are first, the founding
members who paid the prescribed fees for registration. The second category of members
is the patrons who contributed to the national fund to support the running of the party from
time to time. The patrons and founding members are in addition expected to hold the
ordinary membership card in their respective constituencies.420 Both the patrons and the
founding members bought their cards at GH¢1.00 and as of 2008 paid the minimum yearly
dues of GH¢50.00. The price for the patron card was increased to GH¢50.00 with yearly
dues up to GH¢100.00. The third category is the ordinary card bearing members who were
found mainly at the constituency level. They bought a card at one cedi and paid a minimum
of 20 pesewas dues per month in 2008. In 2012, the price for the card increased to GH¢8.00
with monthly membership dues of one cedi (GH¢1.00).421
The CPP, on the other hand, had two categories of membership. The card for the first
category was free of charge with a minimum of 10 pesewas monthly dues in 2008. In 2012,
the card was sold at two cedis (GH¢2.00) with membership dues of one cedi
(GH¢1.00).The second category paid GH¢20.00 for their cards, that is, two times the cost
price of the card for a patron in the NPP in 2008. The individuals in this category
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voluntarily determined their own monthly dues which were higher than what the ordinary
party members paid as dues.422
It is difficult for most political parties in Ghana to have a membership list with regular
payment of dues. It was only the CPP that could boast of a list of 60,000 members in
November 2008.423 The NDC, NPP, and PNC could only estimate the membership strength
of their parties. Most of the members of the executive of political parties interviewed
indicated that incomes from the payment of membership dues were irregular, insufficient
and very discouraging.424 Indeed, a former chairman of the NPP put it this way, ‘a
membership due to the party is just a paper work to satisfy legal requirements.’425 Another
interviewee concluded that their party could not access membership dues from the
constituencies because the commission on the transfer of the money from the constituency
to the party’s national office in Accra made it worthless to call for it.426
Ghanaian political parties have shown little interest in developing a mass source for
financing party activities. The main reason is that the internal sources are insignificant in a
country of largely poor citizens. It is important for political parties to derive their major
income from internal sources, primarily through membership dues and membership
donations in order to deepen popular participation and democracy within them. This
finding supports Ninsin427 who noted that registered membership of the political parties in
Ghana is generally insignificant and even where it is substantial, poverty among Ghanaians
limits the amount that the ordinary members can pay as dues to their respective parties.
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The importance of a membership drive and of membership dues is recognized by 1,006
respondents. Each respondent was asked to offer at most two suggestions to help improve
party financing and democratic politics in Ghana. Out of the total of 1,752 suggestions
offered, 488 suggestions representing 27.8% indicated a membership drive and the
payment of dues as the way forward (see Table 4.4).
Table 4. 4: Suggestions by Respondents to Improve Party Financing
Frequenc Percentage
Responses
y
Educate or Encourage members to pay dues 409 23.3
Membership Drive 79 4.5
Party should Invest in business 93 5.3
Innovative payment methods and mobile phone texting 95 5.4
Appeal for funds from Local business and public 109 6.2
Party Executives, MPs, and Rich individual should 172 9.8
contribute funds
Proper Accountability and Transparency 261 14.9
Build organizational capacity of parties 47 2.7
State support 180 10.2
Foreign support 30 1.7
Economic empowerment of members 146 8.3
Active participation of members in party activities 74 4.2
Contract money 21 1.2
Decentralize mobilization of Funds 16 0.9
Others 20 1.2
Totals 1752 100
Source: Survey Data, 2014
4.2.3 Contributions from Members of Parliament
Another notable source of funding for political parties is the contribution from their
Members of Parliament (MPs). The survey results showed that the contribution from MPs
was the second major source of income to political parties. Almost one out of every five
respondents mentioned this source. A further analysis showed that 32% of MPs indicated
this source as the major source of funds and none of them considered ordinary members as
a major source (see Table 4.3).
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Most of the MPs interviewed indicated diverse contributions to the running of their
constituencies and national offices.428 They paid allowances to some political party office
workers, bought fuel to organize programmes in the constituency and so on.
Particularly, opposition MPs stressed that the running of the constituency offices had been
to a large extent their responsibility.429 They also used a share of the District Assembly
Common Fund (DACF) to develop their constituency structures. For some of them this
fund had become an indirect source of income and expenditure for partisan programmes.430
It is, therefore, not surprising for one PNC executive member to assert that ‘if our party is
able to get 10 MPs in parliament, the resource base of the party would ameliorate
considerably.’431 The party had benefitted considerably from their two MPs who had been
in parliament to develop the party organization and political activities.432
As noted above, some MPs or prospective MPs alone provided funds in support of their
parties’ constituency organization. This type of funding, where the candidates are the
principal agents, raising and spending money on behalf of themselves and the party, raises
a fundamental question regarding the candidates’ financial accountability. It affects the
internal democracy of the party at the constituency and national levels.
4.2.4 Contributions from the Founding Members of the Party
The 1992 Constitution requires that a political party shall be founded by members who
should come from each district of the country. Usually, the founding members of political
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parties provided crucial financial support for their parties especially during the embryonic
stage of party organizational development.
The NPP, at its early stages and during its time in opposition, generated most of its funds
through contributions from the founding members. Most of the founding members were
lawyers and businessmen. For example, the former President J.A Kufuor and Nana Akufo-
Addo the 2008 presidential candidate were among the prominent lawyers who founded the
party. Much of the financial burden of the NPP was taken over by the business community
and sympathizers when the party won the elections in 2000.433 It is worth noting that the
NPP founding members’ role in the financial contribution to the party did not depart from
that which existed at the time of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) as we saw in
Chapter 2. The parties in the past depended on the founding members and the wealthy in
society.
With regard to the NDC, the party was formed by the leading members of the Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC), a military regime that supervised the transition, into
the Fourth Republic.434 Whereas the NPP and other smaller parties struggled at the initial
stages of their formation to mobilize funds for their political activities, the NDC had
enough seed money which was made available for political activities by the leading
members of the ruling military regime. 435
In the case of the CPP and the PNC, the financial contributions for most party activities
remained the burden of the founding members and party executives. This is because these
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parties had never won political power to enable them to develop strong links with the
business community. As one PNC executive member put it ‘we do not have an
entrepreneurial class in our party to offer big money because we have not captured political
power yet.’436 Apart from the NPP that regularly collected a minimum amount of
GH¢50.00 as dues per year from its founding members, the NDC, CPP and PNC did not
have any specific amount that was collected periodically from their founding members.
The founding members of these parties donated to the party as and when the need arose.437
4.2.5 Contribution from Overseas Branches
All the four political parties had overseas branches that provided financial and material
support for the development of the parties in Ghana. The external branches of the CPP
often donated either in cash or in kind to the party.438 Some of the items donated to the
CPP included bicycles, motorbikes T-shirts, cell phones, cameras, computers and other
office equipment. PNC executive members were also able to attract a lot of support from
the party’s overseas members during the elections in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008.439 This
support took the form of cash, equipment, computers, and fax machines. The party had
branches in Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Canada and the U.S.A., among others.
The NDC had external branches in the United States, Sweden, Germany and some
European countries. In 2008, these branches sent about 300 Euro every month to the
party.440 Those in the United States sent their donations directly to the presidential
candidate of the party.441 They also supplied belts, bags, badges, curtains, tables and office
equipment to the party.
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The NPP had a different approach in dealing with its overseas branches. Apart from
receiving similar donations from overseas branches, the NPP had a register of members of
its overseas branches. The cost of the membership card was five dollars for those living in
North America, five pounds for those living in the UK and five euros for members living
in other parts of Europe. Party members paid dues as they deemed fit, and the money
collected was either sent in cash or in kind to Ghana.442
4.2.6 State Funding of Political Parties
The 1992 Constitution requires the state-owned media to provide a fair and equal
opportunity to all political parties to present their programmes to the public.443 The
Constitution also provides for all presidential candidates the same amount of time and
space on the state-owned media to present their programmes to the people. Article 167 of
the Constitution charges the Media Commission to insulate the state-owned media from
the control of government. Also, the Electoral Commission, the Inter-Party Advisory
Committee (which comprises the registered political parties, the Electoral Commission and
some donor agencies) and the Media Commission have worked together to arrive at a
procedure and allocation of time and space acceptable to all political parties.444
Some political party officials (from the NDC, NPP, PNC, DPP and CPP) who were
interviewed agreed that their political parties in several ways had access to the state
media.445 The Ghanaian Times offered them space for only a token fee that was 30% of
the normal cost. The state electronic media, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC)
and Ghana Television (GTV) offered free airtime to the political parties to broadcast their
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campaign messages.446 This is in compliance with Article 55(11) and (12) of the
Constitution, under which the state is enjoined to ‘provide opportunity to all political
parties to present their programmes to the public by ensuring equal access to the state-
owned media’.447 In a country where there are perceptions and allegations that the ruling
government has more access to the state-owned media than opposition parties, the
constitutional directive relating to equal access to the state own-owned media is, indeed,
very important. It ensures that all political parties are given equal access to present their
programmes to the public.
Every registered political party received vehicles from the state on the basis of the number
of candidates they fielded to contest the elections. In Table 4.5, it is indicated that the state,
between 1992 and 2012, donated a total of 168 vehicles for distribution to parties that met
the approved criteria. This gesture is not new in Ghana’s political history. Some
interviewees recalled similar support during the Third Republic.448 Some political parties
did not receive any vehicle because they did not meet the criteria. The allocations were
meant for the registered political parties and not for individual or independent
candidates.449
The provision of vehicles to the registered political parties was irregular. There was no
allocation of vehicle to any party in 1996 and 2012. Even though the state could not give
any reasons for not supporting political parties with vehicles in 1996 and 2012, no
political party could take the state to court because the decision to give or not to give had
no legal basis.450
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Table 4.5: Allocation of State-owned Vehicles to Political Parties, 1992-2012
# Party 1992 Seats 96 Seats 2000 Seats 04 Seats 08 Seats 2012 Seats
1 PNC 8 185 - 127 4 155 6 125 7 127 - 102
2 NPP 8 200 - 179 6 199 10 226 12 229 - 275
3 NDC 8 200 - 200 6 200 10 229 12 229 - 275
4 CPP * * - 118 6 188 7 172 10 205 - 146
5 EGLE 3 54 - 8 0 1 1 30 - - -
6 DPP 1 - - 6 0 - 1 30 2 50 - 16
7 GCPP - - - 1 2 3 0 10 - 2 - 2
8 NRP * * - * 6 170 0 5 - - - -
9 UGM - - - - 3 103 - - - - - -
10 PHP 7 158 - - - - - - - - - -
11 GDRP 1 - - - - - - - - - - -
12 DFP * * - - - - - - 6 108 - -
13 RDP - - - - - - - 1 11 - -
14 NIP 8 - - - - - - - - - - -
15 NCP 6 137 - 68 - - - - - - - 3
16 GNP - - - * - - - - - 1 - -
17 NVP - - - * - * - * - 5 - -
18 IND - 12 - 56 - 59 - 126 - 95 - -
19 PPP - - - - - - - - - - - 212
20 NDP - - - - - - - - - - - 154
21 UFP - - - - - - - - - - - 8
22 URP - - - - - - - - - - - 5
23 IPP - - - - - - - - - - - 5
24 GFP - - - - - - - - - - - 2
25 YPP - - - - - - - - - - - 1
Total 50 1131 0 763 33 1078 35 953 50 1062 0 1206
Source: Compiled by the Author from the Electoral Commission of Ghana, July, 2014
Even though elections are held on December 7th of each election year, the Electoral
Commission sends the invitation for the request for the distribution of vehicles to the
political parties late. For example, letters for the allocation of vehicles in 2004 and 2008
were sent on November 9th 2004 and November 21st 2008 respectively; this meant that the
vehicles were delivered less than a month to the elections. Though political parties
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appreciated the effort of the state to support them, they lamented that the late allocation of
the vehicles defeated the very purpose for which the vehicles were supplied. Furthermore,
in addition to the vehicle allocation to political parties, the state, through the Electoral
Commission, gave a number of computers and accessories, and also organized training to
all registered political parties. In addition, the political parties were given a tax concession
on their imports. However, the value of these tax exemptions could not be assessed by the
researcher.451
In Ghana, some people had called for state funding of political parties to avoid the
possibility of some rich people taking over political parties; others asked political parties
to solicit more financial contributions from their grassroots supporters to fund their
activities.452 It is, therefore, necessary to examine the opinion of the respondents on the
issue of state funding of political parties. The respondents, (1006 in number) were asked
to indicate their level agreement or disagreement on whether the state should fund political
parties in Ghana or not.
The findings showed that a large percentage (45.2%) agreed on state funding. Nevertheless,
the disagreement rate was equally high at 32.9%. A lesser percentage (21.9%) neither
agreed nor disagreed. A further investigation showed that the agreement rate was highest
among respondents affiliated to the NDC (48.7%). Ironically, the percentage of NDC
respondents who disagreed to the issue was also high (34.5%). The situation was similar
to that of NPP respondents (42.7% agreed and 36.7% disagreed) (see Table 4.6). The high
disagreement rate in both parties might be due to the fact that the respondents perceived
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the parties as big, and that it can survive without state funding. However, the story of
respondents belonging to the CPP and the PNC was different. Although, as with the NDC
and the NPP respondents, a greater percentage of respondents from these parties supported
state funding of political parties, those who disagreed (CPP = 19.6%; PNC = 2.6%) in these
parties were significantly smaller than what pertained to the NPP and the NDC. A higher
percentage of the CPP and the PNC respondents (CPP = 37.3%; PNC = 31.7%) preferred
to be neutral (see Table 4.6). This finding is consistent with similar research findings of
CDD-Ghana453 in 2004 and Ayee et al 454in 2007, where most respondents (53%) and
(63%) respectively supported state funding.
Table 4.6: State Funding of Political Parties
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
NPP 15.2% 21.5% 20.5% 21.5% 21.2%
NDC 14.5% 20.0% 16.8% 24.2% 24.5%
CPP 3.9% 15.7% 37.3% 20.6% 22.5%
PNC 12.9% 20.0% 21.9% 22.4% 22.9%
Total 12.9% 20.0% 21.9% 22.4% 22.9%
Source: Survey Data, 2014.
The contributions of the elites of society to the debate on state funding of political parties
is quite interesting. According to Mike Oquaye,455 who was a Member of Parliament and
a cabinet minister in the NPP government of President J.A. Kufuor, the nation should be
careful not to open the Pandora’s Box because it would have a snowballing effect on the
country. The impression should not be created that people can form political parties for
personal interests; otherwise people would leave their jobs to form a political party.456 Dan
Botwe, the immediate past general secretary to the NPP, said he personally supported state
funding of parties. He added that in spite of the fact that some African countries such as
Nigeria and Tanzania funded political parties, (Tanzania in particular allocating 2% of
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Gross Domestic Products (GDP) to political party funds), his party did not consider state
funding of parties as an immediate priority.457 This was, however, in contrast to the stance
in 1998 and 2000 where the party at the national consultative meeting supported state
funding.458 The MP for the Afram Plains North constituency also indicated that politics
was a venture, and therefore, if one wanted to enter into it, the candidate must save money
towards it without thinking of state resources.459
Individuals such as Professor Adzei Bekoe460 (Chairman of the Council of State in 2008),
Kwesi Jonah461 (then Head of Governance of IEA in 2008) and Felix Anebo (then Lecturer
in the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana)462 were some of people who
supported the proposal for state funding of political parties. Bekoe stated that a law for
state funding of political parties would create a more friendly, liberal and flexible
environment for the country’s political parties, for democracy to flourish. Anebo on his
part argued that in Ghana, just like any new democracy, the majority of the people were
poor. It was, therefore, difficult for the political parties to raise sufficient funds from their
members. State funding of political parties would encourage the parties to have a stake in
the country’s democratic process.463
Jos Anyimah-Ackah, a regular columnist of the Ghanaian Times, associated himself with
those who argued against state funding of political parties. He was of the view that state
funding of political parties is inexpedient as it involved problems of the choice of
appropriate criteria. According to him, state funds should rather be used to improve social
services, discourage proliferation of political parties and avoid an undue burden on tax
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payers.464 Nii Moi Thompson added that the calls by sections of the Ghanaian public for
state funding of political parties would cause direct and indirect costs to the nation. The
actual costs and benefits, as well as the risks associated with them, were much broader and
deeper than the narrow financial and political perspectives people offered. The popular
assessment of both benefits and costs was often limited to the financial costs and the
political benefits of providing a level playing field for the nation’s political parties. The
eventual magnitude of this cost, however, depended, to a large extent, on how the financing
was structured.465 Thompson raised some pertinent questions: Should the support be
routine or restricted to election campaigns? Should the state fund all categories of expenses
such as salaries, services, investment and administration? If the state chose to be selective
and paid staff salaries regularly, but the party was not able to raise supplementary
resources, its capacity to function effectively would remain impaired. An exclusive
concentration on the monetary aspects of state funding of political parties, therefore, runs
the risk of overstating the costs and understating the benefits and vice versa. An assessment
that deals with net benefits is preferred, although the lack of data may not permit analysts
to do so.466
Professor Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, a political scientist and Executive Director of the
Centre for Democratic Development (CDD),467 placed his argument on the attempt to push
the state to fund political parties within a broader perspective. According to him, if Ghana’s
political parties face a funding crisis their predicament is hardly unique and exceptional.
Almost all the key constitutional institutions of democratic governance and horizontal
accountability, notably Parliament, the judiciary, Commission on Human Rights and
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Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Audit Service and the Electoral Commission, had
consistently been grossly under- funded by the state. Since 1992, Ghana had not been able
to fund any of its general elections entirely from its own internally-generated resources. In
effect, the most basic process that underpinned Ghana’s democratic project suffered from
a recurring funding deficit. Despite such chronic under-funding of key democratic
institutions, the political class did not deem it fit to propose legislation to earmark sufficient
funds annually to support any of these institutions. Political parties, while important as
agents of popular representation in democracy, should not enjoy a priority or a special
status in the funding of public institutions over bodies such as Parliament, the Judiciary or
CHRAJ. To propose state funding of political parties in this regard amounted to ranking
political parties above all other rivals for public funding which fell short of a
comprehensive and an all-inclusive approach.468
4.3.0 OTHER RELEVANT SOURCES
Apart from the rating and the selection of one out of nine financial contributors to assess
the respondents’ knowledge about the sources of funding, the respondents were also asked
to indicate and rate any other contributions to their party funds. The respondents stated the
candidate’s filing fees, the investment by the party and loans which reflected in their
financial statements.
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4.3.1 The Rate of Candidate Filing Fees and Dues
The parliamentary and presidential candidates who contested election had to pay a specific
amount of money as filing fees to their parties before they could engage in the electoral
contest. The amount the candidates paid varied from party to party. For example, in 2008,
the NPP and the NDC parliamentary candidates paid GH¢120.00 and GH¢100.00
respectively. While the PNC did not charge any amount, the CPP’s rate varied from
constituency to constituency ranging from GH¢200.00 to GH¢ 1000.00. Similarly, in 2008,
the NPP, NDC, CPP and PNC presidential candidates paid GH¢2,500.00, GH¢1,000.00,
GH¢1,000.00, and GH¢500.00 respectively (see Table 4.7).
From Table 4.7, it can be seen that the CPP charged the highest rate for parliamentary
candidates while the PNC chose to make the filing free of charge; yet both parties could
not attract people to offer to represent the PNC in all the 230 constituencies.469 Apart from
the NPP which compromised one seat in the Ellembele constituency in the interest of an
alliance with the CPP and the NDC having a court case against one parliamentary
candidate, the NPP and the NDC both produced 229 candidates each. The PNC and the
CPP managed to sponsor 127 and 205 candidates respectively out of 230 to contest the
2008 elections.470
In 2008, the ruling NPP charged the highest amount (GH¢2,500.00) as filing fees for the
position of presidential candidate, yet as many as 17 people vied for the position.
Meanwhile, 6, 4, and 3 candidates contested for the same position within the CPP, the NDC
and the PNC respectively. The NPP made a tremendous gain in this area of revenue
mobilization.
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Table 4.7: Rates Charged by Political Parties from 2008 to 2012
Sources of Income CPP PNC NPP NDC
GH¢0.00* GH¢0.00 GH¢0.00 GH¢0.00
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Presidential candidate (men) 1,000 20,000 500 22,000 2,500 25,000 1,000 20,000
Presidential candidate (women) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 10,000.
Parliamentary Incumbent 200 1,500 NA 500 120 16,000 100 5,000
Parliamentary (women) 200 750 - - 5,000 100 2,500
Parliamentary Orphan 200 - - 1,500 100 2,500
Chairman 500 10,000 100 2,000 20 5,000 100 1,000
Vice Chairmen 300 7,500 Free Free 20 5,000 60 500
General Secretary 300 7,500 100 1000. 20 3,000 50 1,000
Deputy General Sec. - 7,500 - - - - 30 500
National Treasurer 200 7,500 10 500 20 3,000 50 500
Deputy Treasurer - - - - - - 30 300
Women Organizer 100 7,250 10 500 20 1,500 50 300
National Organizer 100 2,500 10 500 20 3,000 50 500
Youth Organizer 100 2,500 10 500 20 1,500 50 500
Membership Cards Free 2.00 1 2 1 8 1 5
Ordinary Membership Dues 0.20 1 0.10 1 0.20 1 0.2 1
Gold NA NA NA NA NA NA 100 200
Silver NA NA NA NA NA NA 50 100
Bronze NA NA NA NA NA NA 2.5 50
Founding member: Cards NA NA NA NA 10 50 NA NA
Founding member yearly due NA NA NA 5.00 50 100 NA NA
Source: Compiled by the author from interviews with Party Officials, November 2014.
* The figures are rounded up to 1 cedi. Instead of GH¢4.50 we put GH¢5
** NA Such payment does not exist.
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The NPP generated more than GH¢97,700.00, which was made up of GH¢42,500.00 from
presidential candidates and a little more than GH¢55,200.00 from parliamentary filing fees.
As the NPP national treasurer intimated, the revenue the party generated from the
presidential and parliamentary recruitment fees in 2008 alone was enough to sustain the
administration of the party for at least one year.471 The NPP also charged the highest filing
fees of GH¢25000.00 and GH¢85,000 in 2012 and 2014 respectively for their presidential
candidates. Whereas the CPP and the PNC472 lacked funds to pay off their administrative
bills, the NPP could boast of generating enough revenue to run its operations. This is
because the majority of those who stood were ministers and they were likely to benefit
from state largesse. This was a pragmatic way of making the party dependent on
contributions by wealthy individuals. 473
It is also instructive to note that the fees for all the executive positions such as the MP, the
presidential candidate, the chairman and the general secretary were always increased by
the executives by more than 100 percent. The continuous increase of filing fee beyond the
means of average members of the parties reinforces the rational choice institutional
theorists’ propositions that political actors are, first, self-interested in their actions, and
second, create institutions that enhance that self-interests.
4.3.2 Investment Income
Investment in this context largely refers to petty trading in party materials and publications.
All the four parties were, in one way or the other, engaged in selling their party
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paraphernalia. Party organizers under the Fourth Republic generated income from the sale
of party flags, handbags, party cloths, belts made in party colours, the sale of framed
photographs, etc.474 The constitution of the NPP was sold for GH¢ 10475 and that of the
NDC was GH¢ 4.476 Political party officials were not ready to reveal the income generated
from various sources. However, the NDC, in particular, remarked that it hadmade a little
profit from the sale of party paraphernalia.477 Its financial statement of 2005 and 2006
equally reflected 0.38% and 0.01% as income from investment in those years. In 2005 and
2006, the CPP also made 0.04% and 0.02% as interest from the bank respectively (see
Table 4.1). It is encouraging to note that out of 1006 respondents, as many as 93 (see Table
4.4) recommended that parties should invest in the establishment of industries, party
cooperative farms and other businesses to support political parties.
4.3.3 Loans
Loans have been identified as one of the sources of funds in the financial statements
presented by some of the parties to the EC. The PNC’s financial statement indicated that
the party obtained loans for its activities. The other parties claimed that they did not
sanction the acquisition of loans. However, interviews with party executives suggested that
parliamentary candidates usually took loans from banks to finance their activities.478 For
instance, a contestant for the seat of MP who raised a loan to pay the GH¢16,000 charged
as the filing fees complained that there was too much influence of money in the conduct
of the primaries.479 He lamented that paying back the loan with his monthly salary of less
than GH¢2,000 a month was a problem.480 Some officials in the NDC admitted that the
party obtained loans from undisclosed sources during crucial times, even though this did
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not reflect in their financial statements to the EC. 481 It is not clear why political parties hid
the information of obtaining loans to support their political activities from the EC.
The membership dues for political parties were insignificant and unstable (see Table 4.7).
This trend had resulted in most political parties in Ghana falling on loans from the rich
members which are not usually disclosed. In the current system where there is an ever
increasing amount of money being spent on campaigns and elections, loans from the rich
individuals will invariably reduce the direct contact with ordinary members, increase the
possibility of using money to buy power and influence, and thus erode public confidence
in political parties.482
4.3.4 UTILIZATION OF PARTY FUNDS
With regard to spending on party activities, all the four political parties had a similar pattern
of spending. The regular expenses incurred included the payment of salaries and
allowances of party workers, rent for premises, audit fees, vehicular expenses (purchase of
vehicles, fuelling, maintenance and depreciation) general expenses ( bank charges, legal
charges, repairs & maintenance, medical expenses, funeral expenses, entertainment, public
relations, office equipment and machinery), payment for stationery, telephone and postage
charges and election-related expenses. Expenses on research and professional development
did not feature in how the funds were utilized. While a greater percentage of expenditure
of the NPP (43.43% in 2005 and 72.82% in 2006) and the NDC (43.0% in 2005 and 55.65%
in 2006) was spent on election-related activities, the CPP spent a small percentage of funds
on elections (6.15% in 2005 and 15.26% in 2006) (see Table 4.8).
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Elections are characterized by high levels of expenditure and the bulk of the money goes
into advertising in the media and party rallies.483 Media in this respect includes television,
radio, newspapers, magazines, billboards, brochures and leaflets. Expenditure on party
rallies includes transportation, printing of T-shirts, rally clothing, provision of food,
organization of conferences and meetings aimed at policy development, and the public
presentation of policies and politicians.484 Training and payment to party agents on
elections day and the hiring of political thugs to intimidate voters are all part of party
expenses. In addition, traditional authorities and influential opinion leaders in the
communities were offered cash, bottles of schnapps, kola nuts, soap and other ‘gifts’.485
Table 4.8: Trends in Party Expenditure
Expenditure CPP PNC NPP NDC
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
% % % % % % % %
Salaries & Allowance 0.06 28.00 3.7 1.8 11.04 8.12 15.27 7.00
Office rent 2.60 4.31 26.9 11.6 0.04 0.44 5.30 4.06
Utility 0.56 1.70 8.5 5.8 2.82 2.27 5.77 5.61
Vehicle Expenses 34.90 32.50 20.8 34.7 17.13 9.17 23.90 20.65
Election Expenses 6.15 15.26 10.3 30.2 43.43 72.82 43.00 55.65
Audit Fee 0.43 0.38 - - 0.21 0.37 0.85 0.71
General Expenses 30.42 17.86 29.8 15.9 25.10 6.78 5.90 6.09
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Compiled by the Author, 2104
All political parties incurred some expenses to get their parties registered. The PNC had to
pay the registration fees for its parliamentary candidates to enable them stand for election
as Members of Parliament.486
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The founder and the leader of the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) 487 intimated that there
was a lot of expenditure that could not be accounted for. For example, a lot of money was
spent on spiritual consultations with mallams, fetish priests, prophets, visits to Benin, to
India and other countries that were purported to be spiritually powerful. The real
competition for political power, according to him, was done in the spiritual realm. In the
estimation of the leader of the DPP, over a third of party income went for spiritual
consultations. The point here is that a percentage of party expenditure is used for spiritual
purposes.488
4.4 CONCLUSION
The chapter has identified a number of sources of income for political parties under the
Fourth Republic. These include income from the selling of membership cards and payment
of membership dues, contributions from founding members and patrons, donations, special
fund- raising activities, Members of Parliament’s district development fund, and income
from party investments and the business community. Funds are also mobilized from
Ghanaians in the diaspora, private individuals in the country, loans, state support,
international and local non-governmental organizations. When we compared the strategies
used by political parties to mobilize funds under the Fourth Republic with those employed
in the past there seems to be no significant difference. The sources of income to political
parties remain almost the same.
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In the past, there were volunteers who undertook political party activities without being
rewarded either in cash or kind. Today, political activities do not attract many volunteers.
Nobody wants to do voluntary work, partly because politics has been monetized. The
parties have to pay for traveling expenses, food, and hotel and sometimes per diems to
those who avail themselves to work for them. This makes party organization more
expensive now than it was in the past. The chapter has shown that the sources of party
finance continue to be very complex. The public and private sources are the two main
sources of funding to political parties. Most democracies acknowledge that both are needed
for political parties to have enough money to discharge their democratic tasks.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES AND FINANCING OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN GHANA
5.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the key factors that have accounted for the insignificant financial
contribution of ordinary members to political party activities. The analyses are based on
secondary data, survey data and the opinions of some members of Parliament (MPs), party
executives and card holding members of the four political parties (the NDC, NPP, CPP and
PNC), which are represented in Parliament since the Fourth Republic.
The study identified challenges such as political patronage, political victimization,
economic factors, lack of transparency and accountability, the organizational capacity of
political parties, ethnic and tribal politics, and religious and socio-cultural beliefs. How
these factors have impacted on the mobilization of funds from members of political parties
are discussed below.
5.1 POLITICAL PATRONAGE: CLIENTELISTIC AND NEOPATRIMONIAL
POLITICS
Ordinary party members in Ghana largely see their political parties as money-making
machines rather than as avenues for democratic decision-making. Arthur Kennedy, the
Communications Director of the NPP’s 2008 campaign, who contested the NPP
presidential candidateship and lost, also confirmed the strong influence of money in
Ghanaian politics. Arthur Kennedy admitted that he gave out money to party functionaries
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in a bid to influence his election 489 He summed up the experiences in the NPP camp during
the 2008 elections campaign as follows:
As money flowed from the candidates to party functionaries based on who
supported who, the party became more divided and interested in money. Party
executives stopped building the party and took to trooping to Accra for
contracts or hand-outs from big party men.490 Mr. Alan John Kyeremanten
who has been one of the leading NPP presidential aspirants since 2008 is
noted to have adopted the majority of constituency executives in the Volta
Region as his clients within the party. Interviews with some constituency
executives indicated that Mr. Kyeremanten often provided financial support
to these potential delegates to retain their seats.491 Mr. Kwabena Agyapong
had supported many, including Ishmael Ashitey to retain his seat as the
Greater Accra regional chairman of NPP.492 Similarly, the Ashanti regional
chairman of the NPP complained that the shameful act of influence of money
has crept into the party’s internal politics.493
It is not surprising, therefore, that poor ordinary party members visit the homes of rich
party executives to seek financial assistance. According to the spouse of a president of
Ghana, since her husband entered politics, people always saw them as rich politicians who
could solve their financial problems. People asked for school fees, money for food, money
for rent, money to pay hospital bills, among others. In her words, ‘the financial demand on
us from the people is just too much for us to bear because of politics.’494 The important
point is that political parties are viewed by poor ordinary party members as financial
patrons that supply free material resources to poor clients.
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Since the constitutions of political parties stipulate that certain office holders are delegates
(party members who are eligible to vote), aspiring contestants often worked ahead to pay
the membership dues for some party members in order to meet the constitutional
requirements to stand as party officials.495 One NPP member who left the party to stand as
an independent parliamentary candidate said he realized that less than 10% of the delegates
in his constituency were likely to vote for him because the former MP packed the Electoral
College with members whose dues he used to pay.496 An interview with an NDC contestant
for the MP position at the Dzodze Constituency also disclosed that to win an election at the
primaries, one needed to pay the membership dues of the potential delegates of the party.497
One NPP MP contestant who lost at the Tano North Constituency in the Brong Ahafo
Constituency in April, 2011, alleged that he lost the primaries because he did not work on
the delegates early enough. Although he gave money to the delegates on the voting day, he
realized after voting that he should have nurtured the delegates by taking care of their needs
including the payment of their dues, and by attending funerals and other social activities in
their areas.498
The survey result showed that the offering of gifts is common in all parties. This was
indicated by the majority of their members interviewed (81.6% of NPP respondents; 79.7%
of NDC respondents; 76.4% of CPP respondents; 68.3% of PNC respondents) (see Table
5.1).
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Table 5.1 Wealthy people offer gifts to maintain relationship
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
NPP 0.80% 3.20% 13.80% 44.80% 36.80%
NDC 2.80% 4.00% 13.50% 63.70% 16.00%
CPP 1.00% 2.00% 19.60% 57.80% 18.60%
PNC 2.90% 3.80% 24.00% 47.10% 21.20%
Total 1.80% 3.50% 15.30% 53.90% 25.00%
Source: Survey Data, 2014.
This finding supports Linberg’s499 observation that politicians in Ghana are rational actors
who supplied clientelistic goods to voters as the efficient means to achieve their end. Also,
Clapham500 described this phenomenon as ‘a relation of exchange between un-equals’. He
lamented that political leaders (patrons) in third world countries offered economic
resources to local leaders (clients) who command appreciable influence within their own
areas to support the patrons. This mechanism of representation and participation in politics
helps patrons to entrench their positions.501
The public perception about the role of political parties in national development is likely
to influence how ordinary people make financial contributions towards the running of
political parties. Ordinary members of political parties who are poor usually perceive
politicians and political parties as entities which have money and resources to disburse in
return for votes. The ability of political parties to mobilize funding from such ordinary
party members for political activities is likely to be seriously undermined. This situation
also does not give any opportunity to the party members to demand accountability from
their patrons. In this way, participation by grassroots members for party internal democratic
politics is weakened.
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5.2 POLITICAL VICTIMIZATION
Political victimization is one factor that is likely to hinder people’s willingness to make
financial contributions to political party activities. As shown in Table 5.2 below, a little
more than half (58.7%) of the total respondents attributed their various parties’ inability to
mobilise enough funds from the ordinary members to the fact that they (ordinary members)
were afraid of political victimisation. This perception was more common among the small
parties than the major parties. More CPP and the PNC respondents (CPP – 75.5%; PNC –
84.6%), supported this view while a little more than half (57.6%) of NDC respondents and
a little less than half (49%) of NPP respondents shared this view.
Table 5.2 Political Victimization
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
NPP 6.2% 19.2% 24.0% 27.5% 21.5%
NDC 8.0% 13.0% 21.2% 32.8% 24.8%
CPP 2.0% 12.7% 9.8% 40.2% 35.3%
PNC 2.9% 4.8% 7.7% 27.9% 56.7%
Total 6.2% 14.6% 19.8% 30.9% 27.8%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
According to an MP, he was victimized because in the year 2000 he gave GH¢200.00 to
one of the two candidates contesting the primaries in his constituency.502 The person to
whom he gave the money lost the election and the other candidate became the MP. The
one who won the election told him that he would beg for food because he gave money to
his opponent to fight him. Consequently, the MP was removed from three District
Assembly Committees on which he used to serve without any apparent reason.503 Banks
also stopped giving him loans. In addition, he was not allowed to stand for elections during
the party primary elections in 2004.
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There was also a strong conviction among some party executives of the NDC that the
imprisonment of Mr. Daniel Abodakpi, Member of Parliament for Keta, Mr. Kwame
Peprah, former Minister of Finance, and Mr. Victor Selormey, former Deputy Finance
Minister, by the NPP government was political victimization. According to a National
Treasurer of the NDC, the NPP government was under the impression that some funds
from the transaction that led these politicians to prison were used to finance the NDC.504
Indeed, one former NDC MP and Deputy Minister reiterated the views of the National
Treasurer of the NDC. According him, some ministers, particularly, Mr. Daniel Abodakpi,
and Mr. Kwame Peprah thought that the ruling party would retain power at all cost, hence,
their negligence. The former deputy minister was of the view that part of the money went
into campaign activities. 505
The ruling parties sometimes frustrated companies who contributed to political party funds.
For example, during the NDC rule under former President Jerry Rawlings, a soap
producing company (Apino Soap) owned by Mr. Appiah Menka was banned and
eventually crippled. The alleged reason was that Appiah Menka was the Ashanti Regional
Chairman of the opposition NPP.506 A similar thing happened to Mr. B.A. Mensah who
owned International Tobacco Company and Mr. Siaw then owner of Tata Brewery.507 The
NPP retaliated when it took power in 2001.508 The company of Mr. Eddie Annan, Masai
Developers Limited, was nearly destroyed because he donated a vehicle to the founder of
the NDC.509 Ato Ahwoi’s Cashpro Company was grounded by the NPP government.510
Former President Kufuor stopped the operation of the Nsawam Cannery belonging to Nana
Konadu Agyemang Rawlings and left it to rot because he claimed the she had not made the
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full payment for the industrial property.511 Instead of the five years that had already been
agreed upon, the Merchant Bank and some government functionaries under the NPP regime
forcibly pushed a three-year repayment of US$57 million loan facility clause down the
throat of Engineers and Planners, which was owned by Mr. Ibrahim Mahama, a brother of
current President John Mahama of the NDC.512
An interview with members of the national executive of the PNC indicated that the party
had a lot of contractors in the early years of its formation. They had to abandon the party
to join the ruling parties because they were no longer getting contracts.513 A CPP national
executive member observed that citizens with business interests wanted to support more
than one competitive political party to avert victimization and reduce the risk of their
investment in politics.514 He said that he and some of his friends possessed membership
cards of more than two political parties for strategic reasons. Apart from the CPP card
which he acquired willingly, the rest of the two membership cards were donated to him by
his friends from the NDC and the NPP.515 An interview with a former (NPP) District Chief
Executive (DCE) confirmed this when he narrated that a businessman who claimed he
belonged to the NPP donated some party T-shirts to the party. The DCE and party
executives went to the donor’s house to thank him only to discover bundles of NDC T-
shirts in his hall. The businessman jokingly admitted that he was going to donate the T-
shirts to the NDC as he had donated T-shirts to them.516 This action is likely to secure his
investments and interests by supporting more than one political party. Ghanaians are
conscious of political victimization, especially when it comes to the funding of political
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parties. This dreadful challenge in Ghanaian politics makes it unattractive for non-members
of political parties to contribute to political party funds.
5.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
The economic status of a person, i.e., whether the person is rich or poor, is a key variable
that influences the willingness of the person to make financial contributions to a political
party. The problem of poverty among ordinary party members was also mentioned by the
survey respondents as a factor limiting the ability of parties to mobilise funds from them
(ordinary members). Generally, less than two-thirds (60.2%) of the respondents supported
this view. This was also in all parties although the proportion of NPP (64%) and NDC
(59.5%) respondents was slightly more than that of CPP (53.9%) and PNC (57.8%) (see
Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Ordinary members are poor
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
NPP 6.0% 14.0% 15.0% 24.8% 39.2%
NDC 8.2% 10.8% 21.2% 26.5% 33.0%
CPP 2.9% 19.6% 23.5% 30.4% 23.5%
PNC 5.8% 12.5% 26.0% 12.5% 43.3%
Total 6.6% 13.1% 19.5% 24.8% 35.6%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
The Vice Chairman of the PNC disclosed that the PNC was poor because the party did not
have many entrepreneurs and contractors. . The majority of party members were illiterates
and mainly concerned with their survival. To expect these people to pay dues with their
low income to political parties was a mirage.517 An NPP card bearing member posed the
following question during an interview on funding of political parties: ‘How do I give my
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meagre income to politicians who display so much of wealth?’518 All the four national party
treasurers indicated that the low amount of money they fixed as membership dues was in
consideration of the economic situation of the ordinary members. Also, the payment of
dues was irregular and insignificant.519 One important reason why some Ghanaians did
not want to help in financing political parties is based on the fact that some politicians
displayed their material wealth during their election campaigns. A party member said:
The kind of vehicles some politicians use, the expensive way they organize
programmes with display of affluence create the impression that politicians are rich
and therefore they do not need any support from ordinary members.520
Citizens and members of political parties did not see why they should give their meagre
resources to very rich politicians who displayed material comfort. A party delegate stated,
‘I do not give money to political parties but I take from them.’521 The perception is that
political parties had money because politicians such as MPs, Ministers of State and
presidential candidates were rich actors who did not need external financial support.
The lifestyle of politicians can sometimes serve as a deterrent to ordinary party members
from committing their funds to political party activities. One MP said in an interview that
‘… if you do not have money to distribute and display, don’t come near electoral politics
in Ghana.’522 As Arthur Kennedy (2009) pointed out, the NPP had very expensive
parliamentary primaries such that parliamentary candidates did not have enough money for
the general elections. He noted that many Ghanaians regarded the NPP presidential
primaries as a display of opulence.523
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Participating in party programmes and standing for an election are both ways of involving
members in democratic politics. The participation fee charged can affect the level of
participation of the people in any party programme and the preparedness of ordinary
members to pay the fees. For instance, the NDC charged GH¢500.00 gate fee for
fundraising activities organized to generate income to build an office complex in March
2009. Comparing the gate fees of GH¢500.00 with the monthly dues of 20 pesewas which
came in irregularly, it stands to reason that only wealthy members could afford this amount
of money as gate fee. According to a card-bearing member who was a senior public servant,
he could not attend the fundraising programme because the gate fee was about 40% of his
monthly salary.524 Two other card bearing members shared a similar sentiment. They said
they did not dream of attending the function because of the high gate fee.525 In 2007, the
NPP also charged a $3,000.00 gate fee for a dinner dance, but only a few businessmen
attended.526 If the gate fees were made affordable, such occasions could have offered an
opportunity for the rank and file of the parties to interact with their party executives to
share ideas that would encourage members to have a sense of belongingness and
commitment to the parties. At such functions, party executives often lost the opportunity
to get in touch with the ordinary members; instead, only the rich who can afford the high
gate fees attend the functions. The rich who can afford high fees had their views regularly
heard by the political office holders. In this way, the rich had more influence and this
subverted popular participation without the slightest sign of illegality.
High financial demands made by political parties from political contestants might help
explain why ordinary members did not make financial contributions to parties. A lecturer
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and registered member of the NPP said he was willing to serve his constituency as an MP
but he could not afford the registration fees of GH¢16,000.00, which was eight times more
than his monthly salary.527 Also, a contestant for an MP position complained that there was
too much influence of money in the conduct of primaries.528 According to him, he raised
a loan to pay the GH¢16,000.00 filing fees to contest the MP position. His total expenditure
at the end of the primaries which he lost was GH¢45,000.00. To him, it was difficult to
repay this debt from his monthly salary of less than GH¢2,000.00. He admitted that it
was impossible to avoid influencing the delegates with money while other contestants
engaged in the practice. According to him, the decision by the NPP to increase the filing
fees from GH¢120.00 in 2008 to GH¢16,000.00 in 2012 as well as the increase in the
number of delegates prevented some ordinary party members without money from vying
for the position of MP. Another contestant, an NDC card-bearing member said he could
also have contested for the MP slot, but the lack of money to pay filing fees deprived him
of the opportunity.529 He felt he was more capable in terms of education and ability to
mobilize the people but he had to allow the opportunity to go to those who could afford to
pay the filing fees.530
These findings are consistent with Ninsin’s531 assertion that poverty among the majority of
Ghanaians has impaired their capacity to exercise the will to act in political affairs. Thus,
economic insecurity, which poverty engenders among people, produces a sense of despair
over their political, social and economic environment, and makes them feel vulnerable in
the face of the powerful political forces. It is, therefore, logical to assert that Ghana faces
a new challenge: democracy without effective citizen participation for large sections of the
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political community. It is largely the wealthy members of society who are capable of
exercising their political rights.
5.4 LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Another challenge that is likely to affect ordinary party members’ willingness to donate to
political party is the issue of lack of transparency and accountability in the use of party
funds. The study sought to ascertain the level of agreement on the issue of transparency
and accountability in party organization. Survey results obtained indicated that the problem
of the lack of transparency runs though all political parties in their administration. First of
all, about 83.7% of the respondents indicated that there were problems with transparency
and accountability in their various parties and this had affected their ability to mobilise
funds. The parties that seemed to be suffering more from this challenge were the CPP, PNC
and NDC. About 96.1% of CPP, 93.1% of PNC and 87.7% of NDC members surveyed
attested to this fact. It is also an issue of concern in the NPP, as indicated by almost three
quarters (74%) of their members surveyed (see Table 5.4).
Table 5.4: Lack of Transparency and Accountability
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
NPP 2.5% 13.5% 9.5% 35.8% 38.2%
NDC 2.0% 5.0% 5.0% 33.2% 54.5%
CPP 0.0% 1.0% 2.9% 42.2% 53.9%
PNC 1.0% 1.0% 4.8% 32.7% 60.6%
Total 1.9% 7.6% 6.6% 35.1% 48.6%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
One card-bearing member complained that political parties did not give them information
on the financial status of the party as they did for election results, yet they always appealed
for funds.532 Another party member pointed out that they saw politicians and party officials
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spend money, but they did not know how much of the money was coming from the party
coffers or from the politician’s own pocket.533
When the General Secretary of the NPP, Mr. Kwabena Agyapong, was accused of having
taken decisions and sacked party executives without involving the rest of the executives in
the party, he strongly refuted the accusations and openly declared at a press conference that
the newly-elected executives came to meet corrupt practices among the old executives. 534
Among other things, he indicated that the party had opened seven different accounts and
that the old executive failed to properly explain how the accounts were managed.
Therefore, the new executive’s efforts to instil discipline in the management of the funds
of the party should not be misconstrued.535 Similarly, as already pointed out the national
treasurer of the PNC disclosed that he served a four-year term of office as national treasurer
of the party without seeing any financial statement nor the accounts of the party. It was
during his second term of office, that he became one of the signatories to the party accounts
because the chairman had a personal problem with the accounts officer.536
The chapter also found that many executives of the political parties were uncomfortable
with the lack of transparency in the financial transactions of their parties. An NDC MP
said, ‘There is little transparency or accountability in the management of party funds.’537
Another NDC MP also said that ‘…many faithful party members have problems with
accountability and openness in the party.’538 In the camp of the NPP, an MP said that
ordinary party members did not want to donate to party activities because of the lack of
transparency in financial operations.539 Other MPs complained that the fundraising
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activities were handled by a small group of individuals with poor procedures for recording
financial transactions.540 This can undermine the very purpose of the disclosure rule which
aims at ensuring transparency in financial transactions of political parties.
5.5 ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Another issue which makes it difficult for political parties to mobilise funds from the
ordinary members is their weak organisational capacity. A party’s organizational capacity
shapes mass participation in politics in various ways. A successful mass mobilization of
funds is inconceivable without an effective party organization. The financial strength of a
party depends on its organizational capacity.
The organisational capacity of the various parties seems to be a major problem at every
level of their administration. Most of the executives at every level, both at the higher level
(e.g. MPs 84.3%), National Executives (88.9%), Regional Executives (92.7%)) and those
at the grassroots level (e.g. Constituency Executives 83.3%, Polling Station Executives
80%) attested to this fact (see Table 5.5).
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Table 5. 5: Organizational Capacity by Positions
Strongly
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Disagree
Member of Parliament 2.9% 8.8% 3.9% 16.7% 67.6%
National Executive 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 66.7% 22.2%
Regional Executive 0.0% 0.0% 7.4% 51.5% 41.2%
Constituency Executive 1.6% 6.0% 7.9% 48.8% 34.5%
Polling Station 2.3% 6.9% 8.8% 38.9% 43.1%
TESCON/TEIN 4.2% 2.8% 7.0% 57.7% 28.2%
Any other 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 50.0% 40.0%
Ordinary 1.8% 3.6% 8.5% 34.5% 50.9%
Total 2.0% 5.4% 7.8% 42.0% 42.3%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
Many parties, however, did not have effective organizational structures beyond the national
and regional levels to mobilize funds from members. Indeed, 47 suggestions from the 1,006
respondents were directed towards the need to build a strong capacity of party executives
(see Table 5.5).
A Member of Parliament said:
Political party structures exist in my constituency but they cannot be found on the
ground. The party at the constituency level does not have proper records on
members and payment of their dues. Meetings are held when something is needed
to be done for the MP or for the party head office. Funds are raised from a few
wealthy people as and when the need arises to undertake a certain course of action
for the party. Planning is out of the question. But when it comes to elections, the
party executives are good at whipping up the interest of the electorates to vote.541
Looking at the past three presidential general election results (Table 5.6 below), large
political parties such as the NDC and NPP should be able to generate considerable amounts
of money from their large number of members and sympathizers who voted for them.
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Table 5.6 Presidential Election Results 2004 - 2012
No. Party Votes cast
2004 % 2008 % 2012 %
1. NPP 4,524,074 52.45 4,159,439 49.13 5,248,898 47.74
2. NDC 3,850,368 44.64 4,056,634 47.92 5,574,761 50.70
3. CPP 85,968 1.00 113,494 1.34 20,323 0.18
4. PNC 165,375 1.92 73,494 0.87 24,617 0.22
Source: Compiled by the author from Electoral Commission, July, 2014.542
A Reverend Minister, however, pointed out that ‘…poor citizens donate money in their
churches because the churches have a message for them. It should not be difficult for
political parties to mobilize funds from the poor members if they have a clear message for
them.’543 Many will agree that if parties have an attractive message for the over four million
voters who will be prepared to contribute an average of one cedi each every year, the NDC
and NPP are likely generate over four million Ghana cedis a year. The total amount spent
by the NPP in 2005 and 2006 were GH¢4,719,563.00 and GH¢5,371,227.00 respectively
while that of the NDC for the same period were GH¢1,997,303.00 and GH¢2,657,731.00
respectively.544 All things being equal, the NDC should have had surplus funds, while the
NPP would need a little extra donation to break even.
To generate some funding for political parties, the editor of Daily Dispatch newspaper
suggested that mobile phone companies could collect monies for political parties through
SMS texting using a code number to avoid a lot of paper work. Contributing money in
such a way will also ensure that the contributor does not feel the pinch of payment. It comes
like an indirect tax payment.545 As many as 95 responses were captured from survey
respondents on the idea of innovative payment methods and mobile phone texting (see
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Table 4.4). As many as 95 responses captured this idea. In 2008, when President Barack
Obama of the United States of America only placed an appeal on the internet for financial
support of one dollar donation from individuals, he had more than enough for his campaign
activities.546 The situation in Ghana is different, but the paucity of funds, particularly from
the grassroots members, should be blamed on the weak organizational capacity of the
political parties.
One can, therefore, infer that lack of organizational capacity and a clear message for party
members affected the extent to which ordinary members contributed resources for party
organization. The apathy to contribute to political party funds on the part of the ordinary
members and sympathizers should, therefore, be blamed on the political parties themselves.
5.6 RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL BELIEFS
Some Christian leaders and pastors shunned partisan politics and also preached to their
followers to also avoid partisan politics. An Elder of the Jehovah’s Witnesses disclosed
that his church doctrines did not permit them to vote in general elections or participate in
political activities at all.547 According to the MP for Prestea-Huni Valley, he advised his
sister who was well educated to join and stand for an executive position in his political
party. She ignored the advice on grounds that politics was a dirty game, full of insults and
acrimony.548 A woman MP stressed that women who made some strides in politics had
bitter experiences to share with the up-coming ones.549 She argued that women were found
to be trustworthy in Ghanaian society that is why they were normally given the treasurer
position in political parties. In spite of their trustworthiness, some men would not like to
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vote for female candidates. The MP further indicated that the fear of accusation of sexual
impropriety and incidences of sexual harassment constrained women from investing in
party politics and standing to be elected for political party offices.550
This point is reinforced by the belief that men in some parts of the country, notably
Northern Ghana, did not want their wives to get near anything that had to do with
politics.551 The interviewee stressed that so many men refused to allow their wives to attend
advocacy workshops designed to encourage women to contest non-partisan District
Assembly elections. She maintained that there was a strong perception that women in
politics were considered witches, disrespectful and prostitutes. Such people with a deep
dislike for politics were unlikely to donate to political activities. The MP for Talensi
Constituency was of the view that political parties did not encourage women to stand for
positions such as the presidential and parliamentary positions. He intimated that women
were good but if they stood for these positions in the party the party was likely to lose
floating voters in general elections.552 An interview with one NDC lady disclosed that she
left the NPP, joined and financially supported the NDC in 2008. She said she was motivated
to join the NDC because of the 40 percent women leadership quota the party provided.
This finding reinforces that of Allan-Mensah553 who argues that if the issue of women
representation in politics is to gain any significant attention, then political parties have a
critical role to play. She asserts that political parties should partly be blamed for the
imbalance intra-party gender representation.
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5.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the effect of contextual variables on financing political parties
in Ghana. It found out that the mobilization of money from members of political parties in
Ghana is weak largely because of political patronage, lack of transparency and
accountability, lack of effective organizational capacity, and the poor economic situation
of most party members.
The chapter also found out that the inability of ordinary members to contribute to party
funds has weakened their power to influence democratic politics within political parties.
This has contributed to weak party attachment, commitment, political participation,
equality, transparency and accountability. Lack of financial support from the rank and file
of political parties has serious implications for democratic politics. It drives political parties
to depend on a few wealthy people who are likely to exert considerable influence over the
internal activities, the decision-making, and the organization of the political party for their
private interests. Of greater concern are the dependency, collusion and political corruption
that have emerged, and are perceived to involve those who donate money and those who
spend it. These have eroded the confidence of the citizens in their political parties and
threatened the stability of the political system.
At the heart of any political party organization are its members. Membership is important
to mobilize financial resources to support the activities of parties and to provide candidates
for various positions. In the Ghanaian context, however, the dependence of most of the
political parties on a few financiers seems to have broken the link between ordinary
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members and the leadership of the parties, and at the same time made them to lose touch
with the majority of members.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE IMPACT OF PARTY FUNDING ON INTERNAL PARTY
DEMOCRACY
6.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets out to discuss how the financing of political parties has impacted on the
internal democratic politics of the NDC, NPP, CPP and PNC. . The analyses in this chapter
are based on secondary data, mass survey data and interviews with Members of Parliament
(MPs), party executives and ordinary card-holding members of the four political parties
represented in Parliament since the Fourth Republic. The chapter argues that there is a link
between party financing and internal democracy and that the dependence of political parties
on some wealthy members for funding affects their internal democracy.
6.1. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF DEPENDENCE ON PARTY FINANCIAL
CONTRIBUTORS
The Political Parties Act, Act 574 states two sources of funding for political parties. These
are membership dues and donations. Membership dues are the periodic contributions of
fixed amounts of money to the party by card-holding members. The Political Party Act,
Act 574 does not define a donation. However, it is widely understood as the contribution
to a political party outside membership dues.554 The nature of the various sources of
contributions, namely, membership dues and donations have been discussed in Chapter
Four. For the purpose of the discussion in this chapter, ‘wealthy members’ of political
parties refers to those who are able to pay huge sums of money in order to contest
leadership positions at national, regional and constituency levels within the party, and rich
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individuals who donate large sums of money to the political party. ‘Ordinary members’ of
political parties refers to all those members who are only able to pay the minimum
membership dues. All the four political parties have these categories of party members.
Political parties are independent political institutions and they are basically supposed to
generate income to perform their democratic functions. However, the way political parties
mobilize funds for their activities is recognized as an essential determinant of a functioning
democracy.555 It is, therefore, important to ascertain the degree of financial dependence of
political parties and examine the relationship that exists between the financing of political
the parties and their capacity to achieve internal democracy in Ghana. To do this, the survey
respondents of 1006 card-holding members of the four political parties under study were
asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement ‘The party is more dependent
on the financial contributions of wealthy members.
The dependence on wealthy members was common to all political parties. As shown in
Table 6.1, below, 89.3% of survey respondents indicated that their various parties were
dependent on wealthy individuals. Also in all parties, more than three quarters of the
respondents (NPP – 89.5%; NDC – 88.8%; CPP – 88.3%; PNC 93.2%) attested to the fact
that their parties were more dependent on the wealthy members than on ordinary members.
Table 6.1 Party is more dependent on the financial contributions of wealthy members
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
NPP 59.50% 30% 5% 4.80% 0.70%
NDC 54% 34.80% 6.80% 4.20% 0.20%
CPP 61.80% 26.50% 5.90% 2.90% 2.90%
PNC 61.50% 31.70% 3.80% 2.90% 0%
Totals 57.80% 31.50% 5.70% 4.20% 0.70%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
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A further analysis of dependency on wealthy members by focussing on the membership
status revealed similar results (see Table 6.2). More than three quarters of the members of
the executive at the various levels within the parties were of the view that their parties were
more dependent on the wealthy members. Among the members of the National Executives
of the parties, while no one among them disagreed with the fact that their parties were
dependent on wealthy members, as much as a third of the members of the National
Executives decided to remain neutral, with the remaining two-thirds agreeing with the
statement.
Table 6.2 Party is more dependent on the financial contributions of wealthy
members
Strongly Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree
Agree Disagree
Member of Parliament 35.4% 43.1% 8.8% 12.7% 0%
National Executive 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0% 0%
Regional Executive 60.3% 29.4% 4.4% 4.4% 14.3%
Constituency Executive 60.8% 30.4% 4.1% 3.8% 42.9%
Polling Station EX 57.4% 34.7% 4.6% 2.8% 14.3%
TESCON/TEIN 56.3% 35.2% 4.2% 2.8% 14.3%
Other Executives 60% 30% 0% 10% 0%
Ordinary Members 66.1% 23% 8.5% 1.8% 14.3%
TOTAL 57.8% 31.7% 5.7% 4.2% 0.7%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
With respect to the issue of dependence of the various parties on the financial contribution
of ordinary members, the results showed that the parties did not depend much on the
financial contributions of ordinary members. As indicated in Table 6.3 less than a third
(31.2%) of the total respondents said that their respective parties were financially more
dependent on ordinary members.
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Table 6.3 Party is more dependent on the financial contributions of ordinary
members
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
NPP 9% 25.50% 13.80% 34% 17.80%
NDC 9.20% 21% 16.80% 25.50% 25.50%
CPP 13.70% 18.60% 16.70% 25.50% 25.50%
PNC 4.80% 16.30% 11.50% 32.70% 34.60%
Totals 9.10% 22.10% 15% 35.40% 18.40%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
Viewed from the membership status perspective, about a third of all respondents who held
one position or the other indicated that their parties were not dependent on the financial
contribution of ordinary members. The position of MPs is quite interesting. Most (63.7%)
MPs were of the view that the parties were more dependent on the financial contribution
of ordinary members. In contrast, the majority (78.2%) of ordinary members disagreed that
their parties were more dependent on the financial contribution of ordinary member. It was
only a minority (9.7%) of ordinary members that supported the assertion that their parties
were financially dependent on the ordinary members (see Table 6.4).
Table 6.4 Party is more dependent on the financial contributions of ordinary
members
Strongly Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree
Agree Disagree
Member of Parliament 22.5% 41.2% 16.7% 12.7% 6.9%
National Executive 0% 33.3% 22.2% 33.3% 11.1%
Regional Executive 5.9% 27.9% 10.3% 36.8% 19.1%
Constituency Executive 9.6% 26% 12.3% 34.2% 17.8%
Polling Station Ex 12% 16.7% 18.1% 38.4% 14.8%
TESCON/TEIN 2.8% 12.7% 25.4% 40.8% 18.3%
Other Executives 0% 40% 30% 20% 10%
Other Members 1.2% 8.5% 12.1% 46.1% 32.1%
TOTAL 9.1% 22.1% 15% 35.4% 18.4%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
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Interviews with the executive members of the four political parties supported the survey
results. An interview with a CPP National Executive member revealed that the wealthy
members of the party often bore the financial responsibilities of the party. He pointed out
that as the party was thinking of how to get money to hold a press conference at the
International Press Centre to celebrate the 65th birthday of the party, a wealthy member of
the party’s executives went to voluntarily pay the full cost of GH¢700 (seven hundred
cedis). According to him, rich party members sometimes spent money on the party and
gave money to delegates when it was getting close to congress for the election of officers.
They used this approach to canvass for votes.556
A National Treasurer of the NDC in an interview said some rich party members willingly
donated either cash or material things to the party and to individual candidates without
being approached.557 Another member of the national executive of the NDC who served
for eight years said what one wealthy man of the party offered would be more than what
the party could realize from two million membership dues a year.558 An NDC MP indicated
that the rich party members willingly approached him to give money for his campaign.
Most of these people would not want their names to be disclosed at all. They really offered
big sums of money and support.559 Some party members identified key financiers of the
NDC. Many NDC MPs disclosed that if one needed more materials for campaigns, there
were some financiers who could readily provide them.560
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An NPP national executive member disclosed in an interview, that a wealthy member
offered the party 51 million cedis in 1996. This is equivalent to GH¢5,100.00 today. The
membership dues at the time was ten pesewas (GH¢0.10) per month. 561 Granted that
2,834,878 people voted for the NPP in 1996, it is logical to assert that this rich party
member alone donated more than one year’s membership dues to the party. In October
2014, the NPP wanted to postpone its presidential primaries to elect its flagbearer because
of paucity of funds to organize the election. One of the contestants who did not want the
election to be postponed single-handedly offered the party six hundred thousand cedis
(GH¢600,000.00) so that the party could proceed with the organization of the primaries.
This donation benefited all the 275 constituency offices and the 10 regional offices. The
person who donated the money won a landslide victory of 94/5% of the votes ahead of the
other four candidates who also contested. Even though his victory could also be attributed
to his popularity, his donation also provided the necessary fillip.562 The situation of
financial dependence of political parties on wealthy members is not different in the PNC.
The patrons of the party were levied between GH¢5.00 to GH¢100.00 every month for the
running of the party.563 It is evident from our discussion so far that political parties in Ghana
are dependent on the financial contributions of their wealthy members.
6.2 THE INFLUENCE OF WEALTHY MEMBERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
The hypothesis of the study is that ‘wealthy people who provided money for the party
tended to influence the outcome of elections within the party.’ The study, therefore, sought
to ascertain whether the wealthy individuals influence the outcome of party elections. As
shown in Table 6.5, the majority of respondents (81.3%) indicated that the wealthy
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financiers of their respective parties influenced the outcome of elections within the party.
This was a concern to respondents from all the political parties. More than three quarters
(NPP -80.8%; NDC – 78.8%; CPP – 91.1%; PNC – 82.7%) of the respondents from each
of the parties attested to this development.
Table 6. 5: Wealthy People Influence Elections by Party of Respondents
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
NPP 38% 42.8% 8.8% 6.5% 4%
NDC 35.3% 43% 9.2% 6.8% 5.2%
CPP 52.9% 38.2% 2.9% 3.9% 2%
PNC 63.5% 19.2% 9.6% 5.8% 1.9%
Totals 41.3% 40% 8.4% 6.3% 4.1%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
The findings were further analysed based on the position of members within the party. The
analysis revealed that although most of the party executive members at different levels
were of the view that wealthy financiers of their parties influenced the outcomes of party
elections, the MPs thought otherwise. The MPs were divided on this issue (45.1%
disagreed; 13.7% were neutral; and 41.2% agreed). For the remaining executives and the
ordinary members of the respondents, more than three-quarters indicated that wealthy
financiers of their respective parties influenced the outcome of party elections (see Table
6.6).
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Table 6.6 Wealthy People Influence Elections by Position of Respondents
Strongly
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Disagree
Member of Parliament 15.7% 25.5% 13.7% 19.6% 25.5%
National Executive 33.3% 55.6% 11.1% 0% 0%
Regional Executive 52.9% 29.4% 7.4% 7.4% 2.9%
Constituency Executive 40% 46.6% 8.2% 3.8% 1.4%
Polling Station Ex 41.7% 42.1% 9.3% 4.6% 2.3%
TESCON/TEIN 32.4% 46.5% 8.5% 11.3% 1.4%
Other Executives 50% 40% 0% 10% 0%
Other Members 58.2% 32.1% 5.5% 3% 1.2%
TOTAL 41.3% 40% 8.4% 6.3% 4.1%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
6. 3 INTERNAL RULES OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND ELECTION
All the four political parties had internal rules that governed their membership and
elections. The basic membership qualification of all the four political parties is the payment
of monthly membership dues. According to their constitutions, a person ceases to be a
member of the party if he or she fails to pay membership dues for a period of more
than one (1) year.564 The rules regarding the rights of party members to stand for election
for any party position do not discriminate against ordinary and wealthy members. They all
have equal rights to stand for election for any party position provided they are of good
standing; that is, where he or she has paid in full and up to date all dues or levies he or she
is liable to pay as a member, and has discharged all his or her duties as a member565
The study found out that more than half of the executives members at all levels do not
regularly pay their membership dues.566 Only members who wanted to contest for
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executive positions in the party are able to pay their membership dues. Although, the dues
are not paid on a monthly basis, or regularly as enjoined by their constitutions, they make
sure that all dues are fully paid up to make them eligible to contest for a position in the
party. Some members could owe more than two years’ membership dues but so long as all
arrears are fully paid up, the person would not be disqualified.567
In respect of who determines the membership dues and filing fee for various political
parties, Article 10 of the PNC constitution indicates that the membership dues and fees
shall be as may be determined from time to time by the National Executive Committee568
while Article 11 of the constitution of the CPP states that the admission fee and
membership dues shall be as determined from time to time by the Central Committee of
the party.569 Similarly, Article 9 of the constitution of the NPP mandates the National
Finance Committee to determine various fees which shall be approved by the National
Executive Committee.570 Article 8 of the constitution of the NDC also indicates that a
subscription fee and annual dues, shall be determined from time to time by the National
Congress.571 The review of the constitutions of the four political parties shows that the
membership of all these committees and national congress are executives at the
constituency, regional and national levels. The ordinary member does not feature in any of
these committees. It is clear that they are not part of the determination of membership dues
and filing fees. The nature of the fixing of fees is further is discussed below.
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The payments of dues and filing fees are some of the main conditions for contesting an
election in the four political parties in Ghana. The study sought to find out whether the
fixing of fees had any impact on the internal democracy of parties in Ghana. Respondents
were asked to agree or disagree with the statement: ‘the wealthy members of parties fixed
high election filing fees to influence the electoral process.’ Some respondents indicated
that one method the wealthy individual financiers used to influence party election outcomes
is the fixing of high filing fees. The fixing of high filing fees was a concern to more than
one-third (NPP – 46%; NDC – 42.5%; CPP – 51%; PNC – 48%) of the respondents (see
Table 6.7).
Table 6. 7 The Wealthy Members Fixed High Filing Fees
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
NPP 13% 33% 25.5% 18.2% 10.2%
NDC 14% 28.5% 20.8% 17.8% 19%
CPP 23.5% 27.5% 28.4% 16.7% 3.9%
PNC 28.8% 19.2% 27.9% 15.4% 8.7%
Totals 16.1% 29.2% 24.2% 17.6% 12.9%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
A further analysis of the data showed that this issue was of concern mostly to MPs and
national executives of the various parties. As much as 67.6% of MPs and 66.6% of the
members of the regional executives indicated that wealthy members who occupied
executive positions fixed high filing fees to deter ordinary members from contesting
leadership positions in their parties. Forty percent of the ordinary members surveyed also
saw high fees as an impediment (see Table 6.8).
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Table 6. 8: The Wealthy Members fixed High Filing Fees by Positions
Strongly Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree
Agree Disagree
Member of Parliament 2.9% 64.7% 14.7% 15.7% 2%
National Executive 44.4% 22.2% 22.2% 11.1% 0%
Regional Executive 23.5% 16.2% 13.2% 33.8% 13.2%
Constituency Executive 17.3% 28.5% 23% 17.3% 14%
Polling Station Ex 13.9% 29.6% 18.1% 16.2% 22.2%
TESCON/TEIN 12.7% 22.5% 28.2% 21.1% 15.5%
Other Executives 20% 0% 70% 10% 0%
Other Members 21.2% 18.8% 40.6% 13.9% 5.5%
TOTAL 16.1% 29.2% 24.2% 17.6% 12.9%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
An interview with a card holding member of the NPP indicated that he was approached by
some concern party members to contest for the position of MP in his constituency, but he
could not afford the filing fee.572 It is worth pointing out that one NPP MP contestant
complained that not only the filing fee was too high for average party member, but also
there were too much of financial demands in the conduct of the party’s primaries.573
Similarly, interview with an NDC card-bearing member revealed that the member felt he
was more capable in terms of education and ability to mobilize the people, but he could not
raise the money to pay the high filing fee. He was therefore deprived the opportunity to
serve as an MP.574 In an interview with NNP MP, it was disclosed that six party members
including him initially expressed the interest to contest for the 2012 MP position in one of
the rural areas in the Northern part of the country. Four of the people had to withdraw from
the race because they could not raise the money after they collected the registration forms.
Interestingly, the fifth person who was his relative approached him to borrow money to
register. He promised him because he was a relative but he delayed to give him the money
until the time for the registration elapsed. He stood for the election alone and won. 575 The
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high filing fees charged by political parties to contest for a position might help explain why
the wealthy members dominate executive party positions.
The minimum wage in Ghana from 2008 to 2014 is depicted in Table 6.9, while the filing
fees charged by various political parties in 2008 and 2012 are depicted in Table 6.10.
Obviously, some party members earned the daily minimum wage of two cedis, twenty five
pesewas (GH¢ 2.25); but then, in 2012, the CPP, the NDC, the PNC, and the NPP charged
presidential filing fees of GH¢20,000; GH¢20,000; GH¢22,000 and GH¢25,000
respectively. Consequently, it is difficult to determine how many citizens in this category
of income could afford the filing fees for the presidential candidate slots? The same
question applies to fees charged to access all the positions in the parties, and by extension,
the payment of gate fees charged for party programme. It is evident that low income earners
can only sing political party songs at rallies. The requirements to contest political party
positions have technically denied this group of people the opportunity.
Table 6.9: The minimum daily wage in Ghana 2008-2014
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GH¢ GH¢ GH¢ GH¢ GH¢ GH¢ GH¢
2.25 2.65 3.11 3.73 4.48 5.42 6.01
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2014
Table 6.10: Filing Charged by Political Parties in 2008 and 2012
Sources of Income CPP PNC NPP NDC
GH¢0.00 GH¢0.00 GH¢0.00 GH¢0.00
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Presidential 1,000 20,000 500 22,000 2,500 25,000 1,000 20,000
Parliamentary 200 1,500 NA 500 120 16,000 100 5,000
Chairman 500 10,000 100 2,000 20 5,000 100 1,000
General Secretary 300 7,500 100 1000. 20 3,000 50 1,000
Source: Compiled by the author from Interviews with Party Officials, November 2014
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It is evident from the discussion that the wealthy members of the parties fixed high fees to
deprive ordinary members of the capability of contesting for party position. This finding
supports rational choice institutional theorists’ propositions that political actors are self-
interested in their actions, and they create political institutions that enhance their self-
interests.576
6.4 PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP DUES FOR DELEGATES
Wealthy individuals influenced the outcome of party elections through the payment of
membership dues for potential delegates and aspirants. The respondents to the survey were
consequently asked to indicate their agreement with the statement that ‘wealthy members
paid membership dues for potential delegates and aspirants.’ This was confirmed by 65.9%
of the total respondents. Responses show that this practice was common in the four political
parties. Indeed, more than half of party members (CPP,73.6%; NDC, 68%; NPP, 64.3%;
PNC, 56.8%) mentioned the practice as an important tool used by wealthy members to
influence their election outcomes (see Table 6.11).
Table 6.11: The Wealthy members pay dues for potential delegates by Parties
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
NPP 27.5% 36.8% 16% 14.5% 5.2%
NDC 26.8% 41.2% 17.5% 9.8% 4.8%
CPP 31.4% 42.2% 21.6% 3.9% 1%
PNC 23.1% 33.7% 27.9% 10.6% 4.8%
Totals 27.1% 38.8% 18.4% 11.1% 4.6%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
Most of the party executives interviewed indicated as common knowledge the payment of
membership dues for potential delegates. Constituency executives (70.7%) and Polling
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Station Executives (66.4%) who were close to the grassroots were aware of this practice.
Most Ordinary members (67.9%) also had knowledge of the practice. As much as 34.3%
of MPs neutral, 29.4% disagreed while 36.3% agreed (see Table 6.12).
Table 6.12: The Wealthy Members Pay Dues for Potential Delegates by Positions
Strongly Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree
Agree Disagree
Member of Parliament 8.8% 27.5% 34.3% 23.5% 5.9%
National Executive 33.3% 22.25 22.2% 22.2% 0%
Regional Executive 29.4% 42.6% 16.2% 7.4% 4.4%
Constituency Executive 28.2% 42.55% 14.2% 10.7% 4.4%
Polling Station Ex 26.4% 40.3% 18.5% 10.7% 5.1%
TESCON/TEIN 23.9% 47.9% 7% 14.1% 7%
Other Executive 30% 40% 10% 10% 10%
Other Members 37% 30.9% 23.6% 6.1% 2.4%
TOTAL 27.1% 38.8% 18.4% 11.1% 4.6%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
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6.5 IMPOSITION OF CANDIDATES ON THE PARTY
The study showed that some individuals who contributed substantial amounts of money to
finance party activities also wielded substantial influence on the electoral process. Aside
payment of membership dues for potential delegates and aspirants, and fixing of high
election filing fees, the wealthy imposed candidates on the party. As indicated in Table
6.13, the majority (70%) of respondents confirmed this in our survey. The imposition of
candidates was also known by the majority of respondents (NPP – 65.7%; NDC – 66.0%;
CPP – 85.3%; and PNC – 86.5%).
Table 6. 13: The imposition of Candidates on the Party by Party
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
NPP 28.7 37 12.2 14.5 7.5
NDC 36.5 29.5 10.2 13.8 10
CPP 58.8 26.5 4.9 5.9 3.9
PNC 66.3 20.2 4.8 4.8 3.8
Totals 38.8 31.2 9.9 12.3 7.8
Source: Survey Data, 2014.
The most concerned were the ordinary members of the parties. As much as 86.6% of the
ordinary members surveyed expressed the view of imposition of candidates on their
political parties.
Apart from a little more than a third (37.2) of the MPs that saw imposition of candidates
as an issue to be concerned about, more than two thirds of most of the executives (National
Executives 77.8%; Constituency Executives 7102%; Polling Station Executives 72.7%;
Tertiary Education Institution Network (TEIN-NDC) Tertiary Students Confederation
(TESCON-NPP) Executives 67.6%; and Other Executives 80%) indicated that the
imposition of candidates was an issue in the parties (see Table 6.14).
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Table 6.14: The Imposition of Candidates on the Party by Positions
Strongly Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree
Agree Disagree
Member of Parliament 17.6% 19.6% 13.7% 32.4% 16.7%
National Executive 22.2% 55.6% 22.2% 0% 0%
Regional Executive 32.4% 30.9% 11.8% 17.6% 7.4%
Constituency Executive 34.2% 37% 11.2% 11.5% 6%
Polling Station Ex 38.4% 34.3% 8.3% 8.3% 10.6%
TESCON/TEIN 46.5% 21.1% 9.9% 15.5% 7%
Other Executives 50% 30% 10% 0% 10%
Other Members 61.8% 24.8% 5.5% 4.8% 3%
TOTAL 38.8% 31.2% 9.9% 12.3% 7.8%
Source: Survey Data, 2014.
6.6 CONDONING VOTE BUYING
The responses indicate that the wealthy individuals or financiers of the various parties
often influenced election outcomes through vote buying as indicated by 78.9% of the
respondents.
The responses in Table 6.15 show that the offering of gifts and money to buy votes was
common in all parties, as indicated by the majority of the respondents (NPP, 81.6%; NDC,
79.7% CPP, 76.4% and PNC, 68.3%)
Table 6.15: The wealthy Buy Votes with Cash and Gifts by Party
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
NPP 36.8% 44.8% 14.5% 3.2% 0.8%
NDC 16% 63.7% 13.5% 4% 2.8%
CPP 18.6% 57.8% 20.6% 2% 1%
PNC 21.2% 47.1% 25% 3.8% 2.9%
Totals 25% 53.9% 15.8% 3.5% 1.8%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
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The MPs were the most concerned about the use of gifts in cash and kind to influence
election outcomes in their parties. In all, about 93.2% of the MPs expressed this view. The
issue was equally of much concern to other members of the executives of the various
parties. For instance, 88.9% of the members of the National Executives, 86.7% of the
Regional Executives interviewed and 81.1% of Constituency Executives surveyed were all
concerned about the buying of votes in their respective parties (see Table 6.16). This shows
that the buying of votes was wide-spread. This undermines the capacity to achieve internal
democracy of the parties.
Table 6. 16: They buy votes with cash and gifts by positions
Strongly Strongly
Agree Neutral Disagree
Agree Disagree
Member of Parliament 6.9% 86.3% 5.9% 1% 0%
National Executive 22.2% 66.7% 11.1% 0% 0%
Regional Executive 38.2% 48.5% 8.8% 1.5% 2.9%
Constituency Executive 31% 50.1% 13.7% 4.1% 1.1%
Polling Station Ex 18.1% 59.3% 13.4% 5.1% 4.2%
TESCON/TEIN 21.1% 46.5% 25.4% 7% 0%
Other EX 20% 60% 20% 0% 0%
OM 29.1% 39.4% 28.5% 1.2% 1.8%
TOTAL 25% 53.9% 15.8% 3.5% 1.8%
Source: Survey Data, 2014
6.7 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS
The nature of funding of political parties and internal democracy were measured using a
set of variables. There were nine sources of funding that were used to account for the
financial contributions to political parties in Ghana. Similarly, the variables that described
internal democracy were five. These variables were based on responses on a five point
Likert scale representing the level of agreement with the statements making up the
dimensions of political party funding and internal democracy. Reliability tests were
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measured using the Cronbach alpha coefficient where a coefficient value of 0.7 or more
was recommended as a true measure for internal consistency.577
Out of the nine variables representing sources of political party funding, the reliability tests
retained seven of the variables. These variables were ordinary members; rich individuals
of the party; founding members; local businessmen or women; Members of Parliament;
State funds; and executive members of the party. Two sources of funding (contribution
from overseas branches and foreign businesses) were not internally consistent with the rest
of the sources, and were therefore not good measures of political party financing (α=0.69).
The five variables relating to internal democracy were all internally consistent (α=0.68)
and hence all the five items were used in the study (see Table 6.17). Having found internally
consistent values for the two dimensions (that is, financial contributors and internal
democracy), variables were averaged out to generate a single composite value for the two
dimensions.
6.7.1 Results
Descriptive statistics of the two main items describing party financing and internal
democracy are as given in Table 6.17. The descriptive statistics reveal that the items with
the least mean scores were related to ordinary members and state or government funds as
financial contributors. The highest mean scores were the rich individuals of the party,
founding members, MPs and executive members of the party. These financial contributors
were considered the wealthy by the operationalization of the study.
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Table 6.17: Descriptive statistics of financial contributors and internal democracy
measures
Variables Mean Std. Deviation
Financial Contributors
Ordinary members 2.53 1.283
Rich individuals of the party 4.52 0.692
Founding members 4.17 0.808
Local businessmen/ businesswomen 4.02 0.913
Members of parliament 4.14 0.971
State/ Government funds 2.27 1.103
Executive members of the party 4.11 0.947
*Contributions from overseas branches 4.07 0.837
*Foreign businesses 3.31 1.122
Internal democracy measures
They impose candidates on the party 3.81 1.282
They pay membership dues for potential
3.73 1.113
delegates and aspirants
They provide economic and social incentives 3.86 0.843
They buy votes 3.97 0.842
They fix high filing fees 3.18 1.264
* Internally inconsistent items taken out
6.7.2 Regression analysis
Table 6.18 produces the results of the regression analysis using internal democracy as a
dependent variable and party contributions in addition to other demographic variables as
independent variables. The results produced a well fitted model which explained over 63%
of the total variation (R square = 0.634, p>0.01). Significant associations were found to be
between financial contributions and the internal democratic variable. Other significant
indicators were related to political party affiliation, level of education and, lastly, average
monthly income.
Standardised coefficients are given to ascertain the predictive power each of the
independent variables. The variables with a higher absolute value of the standardised
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coefficient refer to the variable with the highest predictive power of the dependent
variables. The results of the regression analysis showed that the independent variable on
party financing has the highest absolute standardised coefficient (0.787) and hence it is the
best predictor for internal democracy among the identified variables.
Table 6.18: Results of regression analysis
Unstandardized Standardised
Variables p value
coefficients coefficients
(Constant) 0.373 0.001
Party Financing 1.081 0.787 0
Age -0.013 -0.024 0.242
Gender 5.69E-05 0 0.998
Political party affiliation -0.042 -0.073 0
Average monthly income -0.023 -0.052 0.015
Level of education -0.02 -0.056 0.005
Dependent variable: Internal democracy
6.7.3 Influential financial contributors
In assessing the influential financial contributors, respondents were made to respond to
three major statements. The variables were based on two premises: the fact that the political
party was more dependent on the contributors of wealthy members and, secondly, the party
was more dependent on the contributions of ordinary members. The third part measured
whether the rich individuals within the party had influence over the outcome of the
elections within the party. The values are indicated in Table 6.19. It shows that more of
the respondents were of the view that the party is more dependent on the contributions of
the wealthy members than the contributions of the ordinary members. In addition, most of
the respondents were in agreement with the view that the wealthy members within the party
had tended to influence the outcome of elections within the party.
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The one sample chi square test was employed to test for the significance of the difference
of these proportions. The test was conducted with the null hypothesis of equal proportion
among each level of response. The test yielded substantial difference and therefore led to
a rejection of the null hypothesis (p< 0.01). That is to say that the test proved that a larger
proportion of individuals were in agreement with the fact that the party was more
dependent on the financial contributions of wealthy members than on the contributions of
ordinary members.
Table 6.19: Respondents perception on influential party contributors
Variables % disagree % undecided % agree p value
The party is dependent on financial
contribution of wealthy members. 5 5.7 89.5 0.00
The party is dependent on financial
contribution of ordinary members. 54 15.0 31.2 0.00
Wealthy people who provide money for the
party tend to influence the outcome of
elections within the party 81.2 8.4 10.3 0.00
Source: Survey Data, 2014
The descriptive statistics show that there is a significant relationship between financial
resources and internal democracy of political parties. Furthermore, most of the respondents
were in agreement with the view that the wealthy members within the party have influenced
the outcome of elections within the party. Interviews with party officials and Members of
Parliament (MPs) corroborated the findings from the card-bearing members about the
influence of party funding on the internal democracy of a party. How the wealthy members
who are the major financial contributors have influenced their internal democracy is
discussed below.
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6.8 PARTY FUNDING AND INTERNAL PARTY DEMOCRACY
Political parties form the bedrock of the present representative democracy in Ghana. They
mobilize voters to participate in elections, form the government at the national level, recruit
leaders for our democratic institutions and fulfil a critical role in making and implementing
public policy.578 Michels argues that since political parties are concerned with national
and local politics, they must necessarily exhibit a stronger tendency towards democracy
than that which is manifested by the state.579 This study, therefore, emphasizes a strong
internal party democracy as the pillar of national democratic politics. If political parties in
Ghana lack internal democracy, it will be impossible for them to promote a democratic
state.
Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act, Act 574 emphasize that
‘the internal organization of a political party shall conform to democratic principles.’ The
specific nature of the democratic principles is not specified. However, Article 55(7) of the
Constitution of Ghana requires that a party member should not be discriminated against on
grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, wealth, economic or social status.
For the purpose of this study, the internal democracy of a political party is, therefore,
defined as the situation where all members of a political party are offered equal opportunity
irrespective of wealth, status and power to contest elections as a parliamentary candidate,
a presidential candidate, a party leader or a candidate for any other party positions.
It could be argued that the 1992 Constitution prioritises the selection of parliamentary and
presidential candidates by political parties through popular elections, that it prioritises
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elections over other processes such as popular acclamation or appointment by party leaders.
The election process is one supreme event in which citizens speak for themselves. It
enables citizens to affirm themselves as the source of the ruling power of candidates. Much,
therefore, depends on the ways in which elections are conducted. As Diamond argues, if
the process of election fails, democracy also fails.580 The literature on emerging
democracies generally regards elections as the ultimate measure of the democratic
credentials of a country. It follows that internal democracy can be measured by the election
of party officials.
The focus of this study is on how the dependence of the parties on the wealthy members
for funding affects their internal democracy. The discussion on how the dependence of the
parties on the wealthy members for funding affects their internal democratic processes is
organized as follows:
Election of Party Officials;
Election of Presidential Candidates; and
Election of Parliamentary Candidates.
6.8.1. Selection of Party Officials
How candidates are selected to run for office in the political party is both a cause and an
effect of the power dynamics within the party.581 The democratic internal organization of
a political party is partly based on how the party leaders are chosen to run the affairs of the
party and to contest national general elections.582 Political parties have resorted to different
methods of internal election to periodically choose their national and local leaders as well
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as their presidential and parliamentary candidates. In all cases, the methods of election of
candidates restrict participation and voting to a relatively small number of party insiders
and ‘ex-officio’ delegates, many of whom represent no one but themselves. As one NDC
constituency executive indicated:
The small number of delegates who vote in electing leaders are often handpicked
by financiers from the constituencies. It is the only way financiers are sure of either
being elected or their nominees are elected. These things are done in collaboration
with key members of party executives.583
Interviews with members of NDC and NPP party executives showed that party positions
are often offered to the highest bidder: that is, the one who paid the highest amount.584 At
the constituency level the highest bidders would stand for election without anyone
competing against then, in what they termed: unopposed candidates. This was one of the
reasons why some poor party members who appeared to be qualified and competent for
some positions were eventually overlooked or disqualified by the vetting committee. Their
disqualification smoothened the way for those who paid big money to the political party to
stand unopposed.585
While on a bus bound for the NPP National Congress venue at Tamale in 2014, one of the
delegates openly reiterated his appeal to other delegates to vote for the person who had
provided them with food and accommodation when they converged at the regional capital.
In his statement, he pointed out that the accommodation provided them at the regional
capital was far better than the camp the entire party provided them at Tamale. He further
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argued that the financier was likely to work to promote party members’ interests.586 This
is consistent with the views of Downs587 who argues that voters choose a party or candidate
on the basis of the benefits that they are likely to enjoy when that party or candidate takes
power.
I also chanced on a debate among some delegates from the Volta Region who were fighting
over the sharing of money which one contestant had given them. Some of the delegates
argued that the money should be shared among only those who attended the congress. Other
delegates were of the view that the money should be given to all the executives as directed
by the contestant who gave them the money to share.588 Discussions with delegates at the
congress also revealed that one of the contestants for the 2014 party chairmanship race
gave GH¢100.00 to each delegate.
An aspiring Ashanti regional chairman of the NPP, Mr. Kwame Osei Prempeh decried
what he termed as a ‘moneycracy’ creeping into the party’s internal politics. He claimed
party officials openly endorsed buying of positions in the NPP. Mr. Osei Prempeh’s grief
was aired when he observed that his opponent, Mr. Bernard Antwi-Boasiako, popularly
known as Chairman Wontumi, was using money to influence delegates. Mr. Antwi-
Boasiako paid for nomination forms of some candidates vying for polling station and
constituency positions. 589
The issue became murkier when Chairman Wontumi donated an office complex to the
party less than a week ahead of the NPP regional elections. Justifying his philanthropic
actions, Mr. Antwi-Boasiako said ‘it is God who directs me’ and that his largesse was not
because of the impending regional elections. However, Mr. Osei Prempeh590 bemoaned the
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‘manipulation of the system’ to favour one candidate: ‘It is shameful; tolerating vote
buying in the party is officially endorsing corruption of the system,’ he added. The former
Deputy Attorney General and Member of Parliament for Nsuta-Kwamang-Beposo said if
‘money-politics’ is not nipped in the bud to enable responsible people contest positions,
‘the NPP will be a laughing stock’.591 This is a clear indication that the rich use their money
to buy votes and influence internal democracy.
The NPP and the NDC tried to improve upon participation by increasing the number of
delegates to elect their presidential candidates. In 2010, the NPP expanded the size of the
Electoral College from 2,340 delegates to 115,000.592 The amendment of the constitution
of the NPP extended the franchise for the selection of a presidential candidate to 105,170
ordinary members from the 21,034 polling stations and to over 9,000 top officials across
the country.593 The NPP MP for Prestea-Huni Valley594 and the one for Fanteakwa595 were
of the view that the expansion of the Electoral College would minimize the influence of
money and deepen democracy within the party. Those who opposed the expansion of the
Electoral College were of the view that the party could not raise enough money to fund the
expansion.596
Similarly, the NDC saw the need to increase the Electoral College from two (2) members
to four (4) members per polling station while retaining the constituency functional
executives.597 The initial two (2) members were the chairman and the secretary of a polling
station. The new additions were the youth organizer and the women organizer who will
then constitute the total delegate from a polling station.598 Even though the constitution
provides for 4 people per polling station, the MP for the Saboba constituency informally
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increased the number of delegates from four (4) to ten (10) members per polling station
and paid for their expenses.599 The MP was of the view that the larger the number of
delegates that participated in the primaries, the more likely the delegates who participated
in the primaries would have the sense of ownership, remain loyal members and enhance
internal democracy.
In Ghana, all registered voters, whether poor or rich, are given the opportunity to vote in
general elections to select their leaders. In this way, all citizens are offered the chance to
participate in taking crucial decisions for the country. In contrast, no political party in
Ghana has ever used an all-member primaries’ system to choose its national leaders,
presidential or parliamentary candidates, or even to choose delegates who would constitute
the ‘electoral college’ in party elections. The right of some party members to choose their
presidential and parliamentary candidates and leaders is denied them. This undermines the
principle of universal adult suffrage and citizenship and undermines the promotion of
internal democracy within political parties. If an election is regarded as the hallmark of a
democratic society, as Ninsin600 observed, then participation in political party elections
should be seen as a prerequisite for a well-functioning democratic party. Members of a
party are more likely to contribute funds to support party activities if they take part in the
election of party officials. This will invariably promote effective participation in party
activities and enhance internal democratic development.
Findings regarding the imposition of presidential candidates and vote buying during
presidential elections are discussed below.
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6.8.2: Election of Presidential Candidates
The election of presidential candidates of political parties in Ghana has occurred through
diverse processes including voting by delegates and party acclamation of sole candidates.
The role of funding in shaping diverse forms of selection of presidential candidates across
the four political parties represented in parliament under the Fourth Republic is discussed
in turns.
Former President Dr. Hilla Limann who led the PNP in the Third Republic broke away
from the CPP to form the PNC when he discovered that the financiers of the CPP family
nominated someone else and would no longer give him the opportunity to stand as
presidential candidate in the 1992 elections.601 In 1992, the PNC went to congress to
approve Dr. Hilla Limann as the presidential candidate for the party. Similarly, the PNC
election of its presidential candidate for the 2008 election was by popular acclamation.602
The selection of a presidential candidate for the 2012 elections, however, occurred through
elections. Dr. Edward Mahama, the four-time presidential candidate of the PNC lost
narrowly to the little known Mr. Hassan Ayariga – with 426 votes to 483 votes respectively.
Dr. Mahama’s loss to Ayariga was attributed largely to widespread disenchantment within
the PNC, and that Dr. Mahama had not been able to build on the electoral legacy inherited
from Dr. Hilla Limann.603
An executive member of the CPP observed that vote buying is one of the major challenges
facing the unity of the party because the party was divided into camps of vote buyers.604
Mr. George Aggudey retrieved his property and withdrew the facilities he had offered the
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CPP when the party failed to re-endorse him as the presidential candidate for the 2008
election. His successor Dr. Paa Kwesi Ndoum, the party’s 2008 presidential candidate paid
the filing fees for all the 226 parliamentary candidates who contested the 2008 general
elections.605
The process leading to the election of the party’s presidential candidate for the 2012 polls
was a thorny and contentious issue, culminating in the resignation of Dr. Nduom.606 In
January 2012, Nduom formed the Progressive People’s Party (PPP).607 A card holding
member of the CPP said he wanted to leave the CPP party and join the PPP because most
of his friends who followed Dr. Nduom were resourced with bicycles, motor bikes and
other materials. He also pointed out that a CPP member employed at the Coconut Groove
Hotel owned by Dr Ndoum, left the CPP to join the PPP for fear of losing his job.608 A
Constituency Secretary of the CPP said that in 2007 the two main presidential contestants,
namely, Mr. George Aggudey and Dr. Paa Kwesi Ndoum warned the delegates not to allow
anyone to influence them with money to vote for either of them. However, at the end of
their individual meetings in the constituency, they both gave money to the delegates to
influence them to vote for them.609
In 1992 and 1996, the NDC endorsed the founder of the party, John Jerry Rawlings as the
presidential candidate.610 Another evidence to support the imposition of candidates in the
NDC is what is known as the ‘Swedru Declaration’. In 2000, President John Jerry
Rawlings, a wealthy member of the party, handpicked Professor John Evans Atta Mills, his
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Vice President, to succeed him when he finished serving his term of office. Professor Atta
Mills was subsequently endorsed at a party national congress at Swedru.611
But in 2004, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, former Finance Minister in the NDC, challenged
Professor Atta Mills for the NDC presidential slot and lost. This, however, opened the
floodgate for future aspirants to contest the presidential candidate position in the NDC. In
2008, therefore, the four aspirants who contested the position were Professor Atta Mills,
Dr. Ekow Spio-Garbrah, former Minister of Education and Minister of Communications,
Mr. Eddie Annan of Masai Group and Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu, former Minister of Defense
in the NDC government. Professor Atta Mills was elected. Two members of the party
contested the 2012 presidential candidate slot. These were the sitting president Professor
Atta Mills and Mrs Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings, wife of former President Rawlings.
Mrs Rawlings made history for being the first person to contest a sitting President in the
primaries, and the first Ghanaian woman to aim at the presidency through multi-party
politics.612 Even though the selection of the 2012 presidential candidate for the NDC
seemed to be democratic, it created some internal problems. The defeat of Mrs Rawlings
at the NDC national congress led to the formation of a new political party called the
National Democratic Party (NDP) to fight social injustice according to the founders.613 Mrs
Rawlings was subsequently made the Presidential candidate of the NDP.
Nii Marma alleged that delegates were moved into voting for President Mills rather than
Mrs Rawlings. 614 He pointed out that former President Rawlings said that Nana Konadu
Agyeman Rawlings would have pulled out of the flagbearership contest race if she had
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realized that President Mills and his camp had bribed the delegates with heavy sums of
money.615
The NPP, however, had demonstrated a stronger tendency towards electoral democratic
politics in the selection of presidential candidates. Seven and four candidates contested for
nomination as presidential candidate in 1992 and 2000, respectively. The sitting president
Kufuor, a wealthy member of the party, was elected unopposed in 2004. In 2008, as many
as seventeen (17) members contested for the presidential candidate slot, while five
contested for the 2012 presidential primaries. Seven people filed for the 2016
flagbearership slot but the number was reduced to five after the initial election. The NPP
usually allowed all interested presidential candidates to tour the country to canvass for
votes. A party congress was then organized for the delegates from all the constituencies in
the country to choose the presidential candidate.616 Notwithstanding the tendency of the
NPP to ensure internal democracy in the election of its presidential candidate, contesting
candidates usually accused one another of using their financial power to influence, or to
buy votes. For instance, at the 2007 NPP national congress at the University of Ghana to
elect a presidential candidate, one Mr. Paul Afoko, a member of the NPP finance committee
and an agent of one of the leading contestants, Mr. Alan Kyeremanten, was reported to
have been caught doling out money to delegates.617 Arthur Kennedy,618 one of the
contestants during the 2007 NPP presidential primaries, admitted in his book Chasing the
Elephant into the Bush: The Politics of Complacency, that he gave money to delegates to
vote for him.
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During a discussion with a former District Chief Executive (DCE) at the Tamale NPP
Congress, he disclosed that the 2007 NPP Congress at the University of Ghana, was the
most financially rewarding he had ever experienced. According to him, one Constituency
Treasurer from the Volta Region collapsed when he saw the huge piles of money meant
for the delegates. In his estimation, no delegate from the Volta Region had less than
GH¢3,000.00. He lamented that the Tamale Congress was not financially rewarding,
perhaps because the party was in opposition. In another interview with a Constituency
Chairman who was a delegate during the NPP Presidential election held in October 18,
2014, it was confirmed that there was distribution of money to the delegates by the
presidential aspirants.619 He admitted collecting money from agents of Nana Akufo-Addo
and Mr. Alan Kyeremanten. Nana Akufo-Addo personally gave GH¢2,000.00 to all the
chairmen, but Mr. Alan Kyeremanten was cautious this time. He gave those he strongly
believed would vote for him between GH¢3,000.00 and GH¢4,000.00 and those he was
not sure of only GH¢200.00.620
Evidence of vote buying was also reinforced by interviews with some party delegates. An
NPP delegate stated, ‘we snapped the ballot paper and we destroyed it because we collected
money from many contestants.’621 Two other delegates also intimated that the best way
they thought they could satisfy their conscience was to vote for all the people who gave
them gifts.622 The cause of the alarming rate of rejected ballots among party delegates
could partly be attributed to the fact that some voters collected gifts and money from many
contestants and decided to waste the ballot paper for the sake of their conscience. Voting
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in a democratic society should not be for voting’s sake; it should rather be based on the
understanding and acceptance of the rationale behind electoral politics.
The role of money in shaping the outcomes of elections of presidential candidates appears
to be more pronounced within the parties that were in government under the 4th Republic
of Ghana, namely, the NDC and NPP, than those which were not in government. It seems
that the greater the likelihood of a party winning national presidential elections, the greater
the likelihood of contestants, as rational political actors, making financial investments in
party politics. Parties with the higher electoral appeal therefore need to put in place
effective mechanisms to minimize the influence of financial investors in their internal
electoral politics.
6.8.3: Election of Parliamentary Candidates
The influence of money in elections within parties is not limited to the national level of
presidential elections. It is also pronounced at the level of parliamentary elections. Many
politicians aspiring for election as MPs use money to try to influence their electoral
fortunes.
Within the NPP, at the Abirem constituency in the Eastern Region, a delegate admitted
receiving a television set and GH¢1,000.00 cash from a former NPP Minister who
contested for the parliamentary primaries. He camped them at a hotel at Nkawkaw to
distribute the items and the money.623 An interview with an MP from the region
corroborated the story of the vote buying at the Abirem constituency. According to the
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respondent,a businessman, it was not only the former Minister who donated such items to
delegates. The MP stated that his shopping mall at Nkawkaw supplied the former NPP
Minister and other contestants with some of the items used to canvass for votes. He
supplied 50 television sets to the former NPP Minister, 60 refrigerators to another
contestant at Koforidua and 150 television sets to an aspirant at Kibi for the purpose of
influencing the delegates. He stated that both the Abirem and the Koforidua contestants
won the primaries. But the Kibi contestant who lost the primaries returned most of the
items that were supplied to him because he had some challenges with the distribution to
the delegates.624
Similarly, an NPP MP from Nkawkaw offered GH¢500.00 to each delegate to vote for him.
Even though vote buying is a crime in Ghana, the MP did not hide his intention and action
at all. He lodged the money with a member of the constituency executive who operated a
local restaurant. Those who collected the money (GH¢500.00) to vote for the MP had to
swear an oath to affirm their obligation by ‘throwing an egg’; (a form of swearing an oath
by smashing a raw egg on the ground). It is believed that the failure to vote for the one
whose money had been collected would result in spiritual afflictions on the receiver or on
his immediate family members.625
In 2007, the NPP issued a directive that all its incumbent MPs should continue to stand
unopposed except in the case where the incumbent did not want to stand again for election
into parliament . The chiefs at the Nkawkaw traditional area, in protest, wrote a petition
against the directive and demanded that primaries be held for all interested party members
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to contest at least within their constituencies. In an interview with an NPP party executive,
it emerged that the chiefs took that action because the incumbent MP for Nkawkaw was
alleged to have misappropriated monies allocated to him for use to build a lorry park at
Nkawkaw.626 The vetting committee managed to disqualify a popular contestant for no
apparent reason to pave the way for the incumbent MP to stand.627 Some members of the
party persuaded the disqualified contestant to stand as an independent candidate.
According to the disqualified contestant, some wealthy party members of the constituency
mobilized funds, provided vehicles, paid his registration fees to the Electoral Commission
and campaigned for him. On the day of the general election, he also paid the allowance of
the polling agents.628 It is important to recognize the role played by the disgruntled political
financiers in ensuring his electoral victory.
In the camp of the NDC it was disclosed, that in January 2011, NDC delegates were
induced with cash ranging from between GH¢100.00 and GH¢500.00, and, in extreme
cases, motorbikes and tractors to influence some delegates to vote in favour of certain
parliamentary aspirants during the primaries.629 On 21st January, 2012, I observed the
parliamentary primaries of the NDC in the Afram Plains South constituency. The
discussion among the delegates was striking. Some of the delegates considered the
primaries as their harvest season or the time to get rich. They claimed they received roofing
sheets, outboard motors, fishing nets and cash from various contestants. They, however,
pointed out that the one who won the parliamentary primaries won partly because he
supported the construction of a school building and provided bore-hole water for many
communities, which the sitting MP had been unable to do.
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At South Tongu, former president Rawlings was seen sharing cloth to delegates in support
of Mr. Kobby Woyome as the parliamentary candidate against Hon. Kenneth Dzirasah’s
630. Social commentators said this incidence has always made former president Rawlings
and Hon. Dzirasah not see eye to eye.631
In an interview with an NDC MP, he indicated that ‘As the political game becomes more
competitive, the contest turns into an economic competition. Politicians offer gifts such as
cash, mobile phones, television sets, fridges and promise contracts and jobs to win
election’.632
An NDC MP shared an illuminating experience on how he got to Parliament. According to
him, the national executives had a way of imposing candidates on the party. In 2008, he
was vetted with the incumbent and one other person, who was living outside the country.
The outsider was interviewed on phone. He and the incumbent contested the process as
unconstitutional but the executives did allow him to contest. The incumbent gave money
to the delegates and won the primaries and parliamentary election. The executives were
not interested in the incumbent. The outsider could also not come down to Ghana.
Therefore, they appointed him as a DCE and asked him to start nurturing ambitions for the
parliamentary seat or recommend someone else. The wealthy members of the executive of
the party organized themselves against the incumbent, influenced the delegates with gifts
and he the DCE won the 2012 parliamentary seat.633
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The buying of votes and the imposition of parliamentary candidates on constituencies by
financiers and wealthy people were not so serious in the PNC and CPP because they are
small parties which had not been in government before and therefore did not have
incumbency advantages and largesse to give out. While many candidates competed on
the tickets of the NPP and NDC, the PNC and CPP had to entice candidates, by making
the recruitment fee-free. Even with this offer, the PNC, for instance, had to beg people to
stand.634
6.9 CONCLUSION
The study found that more of the respondents were of the view that the party is more
dependent on the financial contributions of the wealthy members other than on the ordinary
members. In addition, most of the respondents were in agreement with the view that the
wealthy members within the party have influenced the outcome of elections within the
party.
Vote buying or the use of money to influence delegates is a major challenge to the election
of party officers, parliamentary and presidential candidates in the major and some minor
parties in Ghana. Vote buying has become a significant component of election campaigns
of those vying for leadership positions in political parties in Ghana. This is reminiscent of
elections in Kenya and Nigeria as shown in the studies of Mwangi 635 and Obiorah636
respectively. Like the Kenyan and Nigerian cases, the Ghanaian case has shown that the
use of money by wealthy individuals has stifled voluntary democratic participation, a
political culture necessary to sustain democracy. Indeed, regardless of how many outlets
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party members and voters may have to express themselves, the use of money and gifts to
buy votes remains an egregious violation of the notion of the popular will of the people.
The growing lack of internal democracy within the major political parties in Ghana has
many ramifications for democracy. First, it is one of the reasons why aggrieved
parliamentary aspirants contest parliamentary seats as independent candidates. This has
often allowed opposition parties to win an election in the strongholds of other political
parties. The NDC and the NPP have been victims of this development.637 Second, it is the
cause of apathy among some members of political parties. Some party members had
refused to vote in an election to register their protest. No matter the size of such members,
the party’s total votes were affected at national elections. Since party politics is all about
numbers, political parties need to be constantly alert to the possibility that some members
are being left out. The lack of internal democracy is also the cause of ‘skirt and blouse
voting’638 during general elections.639 This does not ensure the commitment of party
members and the party’s ability to mobilize funds from such members.
In sum, the financial weakness of the grassroots of political parties largely accounted for
the lack of democratic methods in selecting political party leaders. The influence of money
in political parties in Ghana weakens democracy and threatens to erode the relevance of
political parties in democratic politics if nothing is done to check it.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.0 INTRODUCTION
This study was undertaken to examine the contextual, legal and institutional variables that
have influenced the financing of political parties and their implications for the internal
democracy of political parties in Ghana. The hypothesis that underpinned the study is that
the dependence of political parties on some wealthy members of the society for funding
affects their capacity to achieve internal democracy. The purpose of this chapter is to
summarize the key findings and discuss their implications for democratic politics. The
chapter also makes some recommendations aimed at improving party financing.
7.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
The key findings of the study are summarized below.
7.1.1 Impact of Political Party Financing on its Internal Democracy
Robert Michels640 held the view that regardless of the formal rules of political parties to
elect their leaders regularly, political parties have a strong tendency towards the
centralization of power, of the creation of an oligarchy and of a decline of internal
democracy. Political party leaders tend to retain and increase their power. This study found
that, notwithstanding the legal rules governing political parties in Ghana to ensure that
there is democracy in their internal operations, political parties manifest oligarchic and
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undemocratic tendencies largely due to the inability of ordinary party members to make
significant financial contributions. This finding is further explained below.
First, the study clearly showed that political parties depended on wealthy members of
society for funding. The descriptive statistics reveal that financial contributors with the
least mean scores were the ordinary members (non-wealthy members) and state and
government funds. The contributors registering the highest mean scores were the rich
individuals of the party, founding members, members of parliament (MPs) and executive
members of the party. These financial contributors are considered wealthy by the study.
The annual audited financial reports submitted by the political parties to the Electoral
Commission also clearly indicated that incomes from membership dues and profit from the
sale of membership cards constituted less than 6% of their total revenue, while donations
accounted for an average between 70-75% of income. The study argued that wealthy
financial brokers, both before and after independence, bank-rolled political parties.
Wealthy members of political parties commanded power to create internal rules that
favoured their pursuit of party and state power. This tendency affected internal democracy,
because wealthy members called the shots in the decision-making process and the
recruitment for public office, while non-wealthy members were, literally marginalized and
disadvantaged.
Second, poverty among the majority of Ghanaians had impaired their capacity to stand for
political office within, and on the platforms of, political parties. Ghana, therefore, faces a
new challenge of democracy without effective citizen participation by large sections of the
political community. Only those who fulfilled some social and economic prerequisites are
capable of exercising their political rights effectively. Party financiers and contestants for
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party offices paid membership dues for delegates who were eligible to vote in order to
influence them on how to vote. Financiers sometimes nominated party members and
colluded with key party executives to get their party members elected for party positions.
Financiers also paid delegates to vote for them, and this amounted to vote-buying.
The monetization of politics has been a source of great worry for well-meaning citizens.641
Money has been a vital ingredient of electoral success; the rich have always enjoyed
material advantage. As Paul Nugent642 pointed out, there have always been ‘big men and
small boys’ in Ghanaian politics. The study found out that the monetization of politics
affected the internal democracy of political parties. It has also directly and indirectly led to
the emergence of three kinds of politicians at the constituency level, namely, (a) the rich
individuals who seek political office to maximize their interest; (b) those sponsored by the
rich to serve as proxy when elected; and (c) individuals who sell their votes to the highest
bidder (wealthy politicians) during the election of party officials.
In theory, every member of a political party qualified to stand for election to a party office.
The dependence of political parties on wealthy members enabled political entrepreneurs to
capture elected offices. Wealthy members of parties who had been elected into party offices
continued to make financial rules that made it unlikely for poor ordinary members to be
recruited into elected offices. Practically, poor ordinary members of political parties in
Ghana had voting rights but little or no political authority. The poor valued their votes as a
commodity for sale to the highest bidder of political entrepreneurs.
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The study found that the formal rules within political parties did not prevent those
contesting a political office from giving out gifts to the voters. Some contestants who had
money offered gifts to voters prior to elections, and this often compromised the electoral
process. Thus, inadequate formal rules governing aspirant-voter relations affected free and
fair elections within political parties. The rational choice institutional theory draws our
attention to the limit of formal institutional design within political parties. Therefore,
inadequate formal institutional framework enables political actors to select informal
mechanisms that enhance their political benefit. The next section discusses our findings
concerning the contextual variables that have impacted on party financing in Ghana.
7.1.2 Contextual variables affecting Political Party Financing
The study showed that a number of contextual variables affect financing of political parties
in Ghana. We applied Gierzynski’s643 model for the study of campaign finance to
complement the rational choice institutional theory to explain the contextual variables that
affect the funding of political parties. In the Ghanaian case, the contextual variables are the
legal and institutional framework, the organizational and administrative capacity of
political parties, and the neopatrimonial and clientelistic electoral politics.
i. Legal and Institutional Framework of Political Party Financing
The rational choice institutional theory assumes that if the rules benefit actors then actors
will comply with the rules. However, the statutory rules created to govern political party
are not intended to serve the interest of individual actors, but rather to serve the collective
interest of citizens. For this reason, a third party known as the Electoral Commission – a
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regulatory agency – has been given the authority to enforce the rules of party financing to
ensure that the rules enhance the collective interest in democratic politics. The study found
that all political parties defaulted in the submission of their yearly audited accounts, but
that the Electoral Commission could not punish any of them. The Electoral Commission
was unable to enforce compliance with the regulations because of its assertion that rigid
application of the relevant rules would kill all political parties and defeat the very purpose
of multi-party democracy. The failure of the Electoral Commission in enforcing
compliance weakened the motivation of the actors to follow the rules.
Furthermore, the legal rules of political party financing covered disclosure of income,
disclosure of general expenditure (including election expenses) and a ban on some sources
of income. Also, foreign financial and material supports for political parties were to be
channeled through the Electoral Commission. This notwithstanding, the Netherlands
Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) supported political parties since 2003 through
the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). The IEA used the NIMD resources to directly
support political parties represented in Parliament. The inability of the Electoral
Commission to enforce compliance with the rules and regulations of party financing,
coupled with the fact that the disclosure rules did not apply to individual candidates or
politicians have also led to the majority of private contributions going directly to some of
the candidates rather than to the political parties.
The rules and regulations on party funding did not specify exactly how the parties should
be accountable to their members. There was also no standard format of accountability that
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should be used by political parties in the preparation of their audited accounts for the
Electoral Commission. Political parties, therefore, submitted their audited accounts in
different formats to the Electoral Commission. Political parties gave different
interpretations to the same formal rules of accountability. In tune with the claim of the
rational choice theory, the uncertainty of the rules of accountability offer the opportunity
to political parties to evade accountability in areas that have the potential to limit their
political benefits.
ii. Organizational and Administrative Capacity of Political Parties
Political parties had shown little interest in developing mass-based sources of funding.
They did not seem to have compelling messages and strategies to generate enough
membership dues. It was evident that the constitutions of political parties had provisions
on membership, procedures for disqualification of members, the rights, obligation and
privileges of members. However, they lacked the capacity to keep proper records on their
members. They had sympathizers not in the sense of membership; these were people who
voted for the party during general elections. Some political parties also distributed
membership cards free of charge to attract members just to fulfill the legal requirement for
running a political party. Many voters possessed more than one political party membership
card that they used to obtain material benefits from the different parties. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the financial contributions from memberships were generally insignificant
(less than 6% of total revenue) for the NPP, NDC, PNC and CPP. The organizational
weakness of the parties, particularly the lack of convincing messages, had affected their
ability to mobilize substantial financial resources from their ordinary members.
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iii. Neopatrimonial and Clientelistic Electoral Politics
The study concurs with the studies by Weghorst and Linberg644, Linberg645 and Clapham646
that neopatrimonialism and clientelism have eaten deep into the fabric of Ghanaian
electoral politics. The study by Weghorst and Linberg647 on voters in Africa showed that
ballots were won by clientelism rather than by the performance of the candidates, thus,
undermining the quality of democratic accountability. Linberg648 demonstrated that
politicians in Ghana are rational actors who supplied goods to voters as an efficient means
to achieve their end. Clapham649 on his part considered this phenomenon as ‘a relation of
exchange between un-equals’ in Third World countries. In the context of studying the
extent to which financing of political parties affects their capacity to achieve internal
democracy in Ghana, this study study reflects what neopatrimonialism and clientelism
really means in the Ghanaian context. The study showed that the dependence of political
parties on wealthy members for finance promoted a culture of vote-buying. Many instances
were given by Members of Parliament and political party officials to support this assertion.
The analysis of a survey of members of the political parties also suggested that many
members considered vote-buying as a problem that affected the internal democracy of their
parties. The rich bought the conscience of poor voters and by so doing compromise internal
democracy.
An important question is why do political parties continue to depend on wealthy members
for funding in spite of the widespread recognition by all stakeholders that the practice
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affected the internal democracy of the parties? In other words, why do political parties
depend on wealthy members for funding in spite of its negative repercussions? There are
several answers to this question. One answer is that the ordinary members of political
parties were unable to make financial contributions due to a number of reasons, including
the lack of transparency and accountability of political parties in their financial
management. The extravagant lifestyle of some politicians also gave negative impressions
about politics leading to the unwillingness of poor people to contribute their quota to the
operational costs of political parties. The study also found that the existing rules provided
no ceiling regarding how much money a wealthy individual or actor can contribute to a
political party. The absence of prohibitive rules that limited financial contributions without
any threshold and in which donors must disclose their names had promoted the dependence
of parties on wealthy members. Thus, the dependence of political parties on wealthy
members was due partly to weak democratic institutions within both the political parties
and the state. The study found that in the absence of state funding of political parties, the
opposition parties were disadvantaged because business entities were reluctant to finance
them for fear of victimization. As a result, they tended to rely on a few wealthy members
and extremely limited state support in the form of vehicles, other equipment, and access to
state media.
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7.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR INTERNAL PARTY
DEMOCRACY
The findings of the study confirm the view that poverty and inequalities continue to be the
Achilles heel of meaningful democracy. Inclusiveness of the poor in the democratic
processes of party politics in Ghana has been an illusion due to the hijacking of party
politics by the wealthy in society. In other words, so long as the monetization of Ghanaian
politics continues, neopatrimonialism and clientelism will remain. Money lies at the heart
of politics and power in most countries650. However, as Clapham651 has argued, corruption,
neopatrimonialism and clientelism undermine the credibility of democratic institutions,
such as political parties, and weaken the trust of citizens.
The study shows that the legal and institutional framework to regulate political party
financing exists not only to eliminate the scandalous capacity of the wealthy to buy political
outcomes; it is also to encourage competition and increase popular participation in
democracy. This notwithstanding, the compliance by political parties is poor and the
enforcement by the Electoral Commission is weak. Consequently, some wealthy members
of society have inappropriately influenced internal party decisions. Fair competition and
popular participation in decision making in Ghana’s political parties are weak. Wealthy
party members control political power because they have the money, and they get the
money because they control political power. Internal democracy of political parties in
Ghana shows that it is not always open and inclusive of the poor, but has on many occasions
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served the interest of the rich to the neglect of the poor. Democracy has become the
preserve of a few rich people.
Money has come to be closely associated with holding political party office in the country.
Apart from the high filing fees charged for presidential and parliamentary positions, the
rich have influenced the outcome of elections with money and gifts. The obvious
implication is that the influence of money and gifts make the political process very
expensive, undemocratic, and neopatrimonial. This is likely to prevent poor but morally
upright citizens from getting involved in party politics. The use of money is, therefore,
undermining the development of a political culture necessary to sustain an open and
democratic society. Indeed, regardless of how many outlets party members and voters may
have to express themselves, the use of money and gifts to buy votes is a violation of the
sovereign right to choose.
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made:
7.3.1 Strengthening the Legal and Institutional Framework of Party Financing
The effectiveness of a political party’s financial contribution and expenditure controls
depends in a large part on the effectiveness of disclosure systems.652 The United Kingdom
(UK) currently limits expenditure, but does not limit donations, while in the United States
of America donations are limited, but party expenditure is not.653 Both the UK and the US
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have thresholds beyond which parties must disclose contributions received654. Therefore,
placing a slightly more onerous administrative burden on political parties to disclose details
of sources of funds seems a small price to pay for ensuring that the public knows the
sources of funds for political parties. As long as the public is kept in the dark about the
identity of large contributors or special interests and the extent of their involvement, it will
be difficult for the public to isolate cases in which the influence on government by the
wealthy can be related to donations made to political parties. Legislation to insist on full
disclosure of names and amounts donated could help to control the adverse influence of
wealthy members on political parties. If political parties are not forced to disclose names
and amounts donated, the interest of the few wealthy members will continue to overshadow
that of the ordinary people.
Effective oversight depends on access to information by stakeholders such as regulators,
ordinary citizens, civil society groups and the media. It has been noted that the Electoral
Commission (EC) and the political parties undermine efficiency, accountability and
transparency in party politics by their refusal to disclose information which may lead to the
detection of illegal and corrupt funding practices. The funding system should be transparent
and be subject to full scrutiny by the regulating body in order to ensure sufficient public
support and promote public confidence in the political system. The regulatory regime
should be workable, and efforts should be made to ensure a consensus among the major
political parties. The legal framework should be informed by the principle that the main
purpose of political parties is to become a vehicle for public activism and engagement, and
should subsequently be focused on making political parties fit for this purpose.
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A law should ensure easy access to the financial statements of political parties to help
research organizations and civil society monitor how political parties generate and spend
their income. The passage of the Freedom to Information Bill which can address some of
the concerns about the accessibility of information has been in the corridors of Parliament
and other stakeholders for about ten years now in spite of assurances by previous and
current governments of its expeditious passage.
7.3.2 Strengthening the Capacity of the Electoral Commission in Monitoring Political
Party Finances
The Electoral Commission (EC) accepts statements of accounts presented by political
parties without re-auditing and analyzing such statements. The EC should undertake an
independent audit of statements of accounts submitted by political parties to minimize the
possibility of fabricated accounts. We noted that the implementation of the reporting rules
fails to promote transparency because of the way party accounts are presented to the EC.
Lack of uniform accounting practices makes it difficult to analyze the income and
expenditure of political parties. The EC should produce a user friendly and uniform
accounting format to political parties. Evidence suggests that the EC is unable to monitor
the accounts of political parties. The state can build its capacity to help it become an
effective watchdog with appropriate powers of enforcement. The EC should also be
committed to sanctioning political parties that flout the financial regulations. As Alexander
655 asserts, any system of regulating politics is only as good as the machinery to administer
and enforce the rules.
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7.7.3 Building Capacity to Improve Income Generation of Ordinary Members
The lack of effective mass mobilization of funds for political parties can best be attributed
to the lack of organizational capacity. As multi-party democracy takes roots in Ghana,
political parties, civil society, citizens and donors expect not only fairness in elections, but
also competence in the management of political parties. Building the capacity for political
party management can adequately fulfill this legitimate expectation. This recommendation
was identified by many survey respondents and in elite interviews.
Political parties should broaden their internal sources of income in order to improve on
their internally generated funds and reduce their overdependence on wealthy members. As
practised in Malawi656, political parties in Ghana can also undertake productive ventures
to generate income and also economically empower members. They need to update their
data on members and develop innovative payment strategies such as mobile phone texting
through a code and other electronic means to facilitate the collection of membership dues.
The development of regular internal sources of income from grassroots members will not
only help political parties to plan their activities but also promote greater participation in
decision making by the rank and file, as well as transparency and accountability. In
addition, efforts to broaden internal sources may result in canvassing for new members and
reducing the chances of few wealthy donors hijacking the administration and appointment
of their favorites to leadership positions in the party. Fund raising activities are usually
undertaken at the national level. In this connection, a decentralized machinery functioning
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at the constituency level should be vigorously pursued to ensure a vibrant link with
members at the constituency or ward levels.
Well-informed citizens are a vital ingredient for democratic development.657 No doubt,
23.3% of the recommendations from the survey respondents on improving party funding
focused on educating and encouraging ordinary members to pay their membership dues
regularly. To achieve this goal it is imperative for political parties, civil society and the
state to improve the civic education delivery by encouraging the media, particularly local
radio stations which are available in almost all districts, to develop and disseminate
democratic citizenship education programmes. Civic education should have two
dimensions which are essential for a healthy democracy. The first dimension should cover
an understanding of, and commitment to the fundamental principles and processes of
democracy. The second dimension should promote the development of civic disposition of
citizens which encompasses both the willingness and the capability of citizens to
participate effectively (contribute to party fund, vote in elections, stand for election, resist
influence of money to buy, avoid display of wealth and demand accountability) in a
democratic society.
7.3.4 Encouraging State Support for Political Parties
The study found that the lack of internal democracy is exacerbated by economic inequality.
If democracy is to be sustained, the state must promote conditions necessary for the
effective exercise of citizenship, starting from participation in political party activities. It
must mobilize public savings and coordinate resource allocations to correct the effect of
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economic inequality on the internal democracy of political parties. In other words, there is
the need for increased financial and material support from the state to political parties. The
state can support political parties to build and develop their internal capacity in areas such
as policy development and training. State support should however be conditioned upon
sufficient evidence of fully satisfying statutory obligations, including financial disclosure
and reporting obligations under existing laws.
The state can match funds raised by political parties. Political parties must show proof of
raising a certain amount of funds from their members across the country, particularly
membership dues before they are considered eligible for state funding. This will encourage
the growth of mass based political parties with strong links to their grassroots members at
the constituency and ward levels. This will invariably deepen democracy and
accountability within political parties.
To ensure that state funding of political parties does not burden the Consolidated Fund, the
state can create what may be called a ‘Political Parties’ Fund’ into which individuals,
companies, the state itself and development partners can contribute money. The Fund
should then be distributed annually to all registered political parties which meet certain
statutory conditions. The EC may be given the responsibility to administer this fund in
order to dispose political parties to complying with the electoral rules of the country.
7.4 CONCLUSION
The study has shown that wealthy party members influence the internal politics of political
parties in Ghana and undermine internal party democracy. The non-wealthy members of
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the political parties are incapable of articulating their interests within the party and to
effectively exercise their citizenship rights and duties. The study has further shown that
social, economic and political factors are the cause of the non-wealthy members’ inability
to effectively participate in internal party activities such as voting for party candidates and
being voted for. Therefore, the internal democracy of political parties is largely influenced
by their wealthy members.
Ghanaians have recognized political parties as non-state political institutions which
constitute the hub around which democratic political activities evolve. Political parties
perform very important functions of governance in the state and society. They encourage /
inspire ordinary people to participate in governance through town meetings, constituency
level meetings, press conferences, demonstrations, and radio discussion programmes. They
mobilize the electorate and contest elections. Money is essential for every political
organization; therefore, the competing parties need adequate resources for their activities.
But the challenge is to find the best ways of matching the need for a sustainable financial
base for parties with the wider public interest by curbing corruption and avoiding the undue
influence of a few wealthy members.
Excessive reliance on a few wealthy members of political parties is unhealthy for
democratic politics and the development of the society. Democracy involves pluralism in
all things, including sources of funds for political party activities.658 Political parties which
generate more grassroots contributions are likely to have strong links with their supporters
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in their representational functions, in the aggregation of interest, policy formulation, and
in the recruitment of candidates much more effectively than those which do not.
Money and power will forever remain intertwined. Therefore, an effort to make rules and
regulations about party financing to promote a more democratic party system is essential.
The rules and regulations of party financing should be simple to understand and should be
easily adaptable to the changing environment. Disclosure and reporting rules of party
financing and their effective implementation will ensure adequate transparency of party
financing and promote internal democracy. Indeed, democratic politics is the key to a
successful poverty reduction in Ghana as it would provide the poor the channel to
participate in making decisions that would improve their material conditions. Financing
political parties and candidates should therefore be made an issue of continuous public
debate.
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NOTES
1 Scott P. Mainwaring, Rethinking Party System in the Third Wave of Democratization:
The Case of Brazil, Standford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999, p.11.
2 L. Diamond, and R. Gunther, “Introduction”, in L. Diamond and R Gunther (eds.)
Political Parties and Democracy, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University
Press, 2001.
3 G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
4 A. Ware, Political Parties and Party System, London: Oxford University Press, 1996.
5 Vicky Randall and Lars Svasand, “Introduction: The Contribution of Political Parties to
Democracy and Democracy Consolidation” Democratization, Vol. 9 No. 3 Autumn, 2002,
pp 1-10.
6 S. M. Lipset, ‘Indispensability of Parties’ in Journal of Democracy, 11 (1): 2000 pp. 48-
55.
7 Ware, Political Parties and Party System, 1996.
8 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Funding of
Political Parties and Election Campaigns, Handbook Series, Stockholm: International
IDEA, 2003.
9 K-H, Nassmacher, “Introduction: Political Parties and Democracy”, in International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Funding of Political Parties and
Election Campaigns, Handbook Series, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003, p. 5.
10 Michael Pinto-Duschinksy, Political Financing in the Commonwealth, London:
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001.
11 Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD, Ghana), Political Party Financing in
Ghana, Survey Report, Accra: CDD Ghana Research Paper No. 13, 2005, p.5.
12 Clare Ettinghausen, Paying for Politics: The Principles of Funding Political Parties,
London: Hansard Society, 2006, p.51.
13 K. Boafo-Arthur, “Party Organization, Finance, and the Democratic process: The Case
of the Opposition Parties,” in J.R.A. Ayee, (ed) The 1996 General Elections and
Democratic Consolidation in Ghana, Accra: Gold Type Ltd., 1998, p.77.
14 Anthony Butler. “Introduction: Money and Politics” in A. Butler (ed), Paying for
Politics: Party Funding and Political Change in South Africa and Global South, Dunkeld,
South Africa: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2010, p. 1.
15 Edward R. McMahon. Catching the “Third Wave” of Democratization?: Debating
Political Party Effectiveness in Africa since 1980, in African and Asian Studies, Vol 3 no.
3-4, 2004, p.295.
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16 E. Gyimah-Boadi. State Funding of Political parties in Ghana, Critical Perspective No.
24 Accra: CDD-Ghana, 2009, p.2.
17 Ibid. p. 2.
19 Republic of Ghana, The Political Parties Act, 574 of 2000, Accra: Government Press, p.
10.
20 Ibid. p10.
21 Ibid, p.10.
22 Butler, “Introduction: Money and Politics” in A. Butler (ed), Paying for Politics.2010,
p. 1.
23 A.P. Fenny, “Party Finance and Political Corruption”, The New Legon Observer, Vol.
2 No. 4, February 21, 2008, p .25.
24 S. Rose-Ackerman, Democracy and Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Reform
http://www.idasa.org.za/gbOuyputFiles.asp 1999. p.133. Date accessed: April 1, 2008.
25 The Ghana Palaver October 16; and the Daily Guide October 15, 2007.
26 www.Ghanaweb. Funding Political Parties in Ghana: Whose responsibility? Date
accessed: Tuesday, 13th July 2010.
27 Ibid.
28 Daily Graphic, October 10, 2012
29 Butler, “Introduction: Money and Politics.” in A. Butler (ed), Paying for Politics 2010,
p.9
30 Ibid, 9.
31 S. Fambom, S. Public Funding of Political Parties in Africa:. A Paper Submitted at the
Africa Conference on Election, Democracy and Governance, South Africa, Pretoria 7-10
April 2003, p.2.
32 K. Weissenbach and K-R Korte, “Analyzing party Finance Regimes: Best Practice for
dominant multi-party systems in new democracies, in Paying for Politics: Party Funding
and Political Change in South Africa and Global South, Dunkeld, South Africa: Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, 2010, p. 142.
33 Butler. “Introduction: Money and Politics” in A. Butler (ed), Paying for Politics. 2010,
p. 2.
34 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, “Funding Political Parties since 1945”, in Anthony Weldon
(ed.) United Kingdom Parties since 1945, London: Philip Alan 1990, p. 95.; K. Boafo-
Arthur. “Party Organization, Finance, and the Democratic process: The Case of the
Opposition Parties,” in J.R.A. Ayee, (ed) The 1996 General Elections and Democratic
Consolidation in Ghana, Accra: Gold Type Ltd.1998, pp. 82-84.; IDEA, Funding of
Political Parties, 2003, pp 21-28.
35 Weissenbach and Korte, “Analyzing party Finance Regimes”. p. 142.
36 K-H, Nassmacher, “Introduction” in IDEA, Funding of Political Parties, 2003, p. 8.
37 Gyimah-Boadi, State Funding of Political Parties, 2009, p. 27.
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38 Ibid, p. 10.
39 Y. Saffu, “The Funding of Political Parties and Campaigns in Africa”, in International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Funding of Political Parties and
Election Campaigns, Handbook Series, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003, p.22.
40 Reiter L. Howard “The Study of Political Parties, 1906-2005: The View from the
Journals”, America Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 4 November 2006, pp. 614.
41 Robert Michels, Political Parties, Kitchener, Ontario Batoche Books, 2001, p.8
42 Ibid. p. 8.
43 Gyimah-Boadi, State Funding of Political parties in Ghana,2009, p. 10.
44 Michels, Political Parties, p.8.
45 The Ghana Palaver October 16; and the Daily Guide October 15, 2007. Also see A.P.
Fenny, “Party Finance and Political Corruption”, in The New Legon Observer, Vol. 2 No.
4, February 21, 2008, p .26.
46 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
47 Michael Bratton, “Formal Versus Informal Institutions in Africa”, Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2007, pp. 96-110. Goran Hyden, “Institutions, Power and
Policy Outcomes in Africa”, Africa Power and Politics Programme Discussion Paper, No.
2, 2008. Leftwich, Adrian. ‘The Political Approach to Institutional Formation,
Maintenance, and Change.’ Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth Discussion Paper, No. 14.
2007
48 J.R.A. Ayee, Public Sector Management in Africa, African Development Bank
Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 82 November, 2005, p. 128.
49 Saffu, “The Funding of Political Parties and Campaigns in Africa”, p. 28
50 Ibid, p. 22.
51 Daily Graphic January 17, 2008 pp. 1&3.
52 K. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism”, in R. A. W Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder,
and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 23-38.
53 Ira Katznelson and Barry R. Weingast, “Intersections between Historical and Rational
Choice Institutionalism”, in Katznelson and Weingast (eds.), Preferences and Situations:
Points of Intersections between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism, New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007, pp. 1-26.
54 K. A. Shepsle, “Studying Institutions: Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach,”
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1989, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.134. For criticisms against the
classical rational choice approach; see Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional
Diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
55 Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism”, 2005, pp. 23-38.
56 Ibid. p. 32.
57 E. Ostrom, “Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis
and Development Framework”, in P. A. Sabatier (ed), Theories of the Policy Process,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1999, p.44.
58 P. John, Analyzing Public policy, London: Continuum, 2002, p.116.
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59 Ibid. p.116.
60 Ayee, Public Sector Management in Africa, p.129.
61 Terry M. Moe “Power and Political Institutions” in Perspectives on Politics” Vol 3. No.
2 June 2005 APSA, p. 215.
62 Howard, “The Study of Political Parties”, in America Political Science Review, pp. 613-
619.
63 Ibid. p.614.
64 A. Gierzynski, “A Framework for the Study of Campaign Finance” in J.A. Thompson
and G.F. Moncrief (ed), Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections Washington
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1998, p.20.
65 Ibid, p. 21.
66 Ibid, p. 23.
67 Ibid, p. 23.
68 Ibid, p. 24.
69 Saffu “The Funding of Political Parties and Campaigns in Africa”2003, p.21.
70 Electoral Commission of Ghana. Election Results 1992 -2008, Accra: Electoral
Commission, 2009.
71 Gierzynski, “A Framework for the Study of Campaign Finance”, p. 26.
72 R. Dahl. Modern Political Analysis 5th edition, New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India 1995.
73 Larry Diamond ,Democracy, Development and Good Governance: The Inseparable
Links, The “Kronti ne Akwamu Series No. 1, Accra: CDD-Ghana, 2005.
74 E. Gyimah-Boadi and M. Oquaye Civil Society and Domestic Policy Environment in
Ghana Accra: Centre for Democracy Development, 2000.
75 M. Mazi Foundations of Political Science, Nimo: Rex Charles & Patrick Limited, 2007,
p.145.
76 Walter Lippmann “Voting and Participation” in Thomas E. Patterson (ed), We the
People: A Concise Introduction to American Politics, New York: The Mcgraw-Hill
Companies, Inc. 1998 pp. 202-227.
77 Steven J Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation and
Democracy in America, New York: Macmillan, 1993.
78 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper Torch
books, 1950, p. 269.
79 Pinto-Duschinksy, Political Financing, 2001.
80 H. Mathisen and Svasand L, Funding political parties in emerging African democracies:
The Role for Norwary, Posttenminalen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002.
81 K-H. Nassmacher, Introduction, in Funding of Political Parties, 2003, p5.
82 Ibid. p.5.
83 Ibid.p. 6.
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84 https://donate.barackobama.com/page/outreach/view/main/TracieB date accessed 10th
August 2009.
85 Sidney Verba, K. L. Schlozman, and H. E. Brady, Voice and Equity: Civic Voluntarism
in American Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 19.
86 Morris P. Fiorina. “Parties, Participation, and Representation in America: Old theories
Face New Realities” in I. Katznelson and H. V. Milner (ed), Political Science: The State
of the Discipline, New York: Norton & Company 2002. p.526.
87 Gierzynski, “A Framework for the Study of Campaign Finance”, p. 20.
88 Ibid. p. 66.
89 Ibid. p. 67.
90 Ibid. p.73.
91 Thomsom An Introduction to African Politics, p.229.
92 P. Wanyande. “Democracy and the one party state: The African Experience” Walter
Oyugi, et al (eds), Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa, London: Currey Press,1988,
pp. 71-85.
93 Thompson, p.110.
94 Mohamed M.A. Salih, “Introduction The Evolution of African Political Parties,” in M.A.
Salih (ed), African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance,
London: Pluto Press, 2003.
95 Ibid. p. 6. .
96 C. Clapham. Third World Politics: An Introduction, London and Sydney:
Crookhelm1985, p.56.
97 Ibid. p.59.
98 J. Burnheim, Is Democracy Possible? Berkeley: California University Press, 1985,
p.98.
99 A. Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics, London: Routeledge Taylor & Francis
Group, 2005, p.110.
100 Diamond. Democracy, Development and Good Governance 2005.
101 The Economic Commission for Africa, African Governance Report 2009, Addis Ababa:
Economic Commission for Africa, 2009, p. 1.
102 K.Y. Amoako, “Foreword” in African Governance Report 2005, Addis Ababa:
Economic Commission for Africa, 2005, p. xv.
103Diamond, Democracy, Development and Good Governance, 2005.
104 The World Bank Report Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,
Washington DC: World Bank, 1989, p.60.
105 Ibid, p. 60.
106 Petr Kopecky and Peter Mair, “Political Parties and Government” in M.A. Salih (ed)
African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance, London: Pluto
Press,2003, p. 291.
249
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
107 T.W. Aminou, “The Financing of Political Parties and the Success of multi-party
Democracy: The Case of Francophone Africa”, in Kumado (ed), Funding of Political Party
in West Africa, Accra Gold Type Press, 1996, p. 45.
108 Ibid, p. 46.
109 T. Iyare. “An Overview of Political Parties in Nigeria”, in Sylvester Odion-Akhaine
(ed) Governance: Nigeria and the World, Lagos, Centre for Constitutionalism and
Demilitarization (CENCOD), 2004, p.79-98.
110 K. Ewing, Corruption in Party Financing: The Case for Global Standards, in Global
Corruption Report, http://www.idasa.org.za/gbOuyputFiles.asp, 2001, p. 12. Date Accessed,
April 1, 2008.
111 Nassmacher. Introduction, in Funding of Political Parties, 2003, pp 9-12
112 Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, “Financing Politics: A Global View”, Journal of
Democracy, 13, 4, pp. 69-86.
113 Ibid. p.9.
114 Ibid. p.15.
115 M. Walecki, “Money and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe”, in International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Funding of Political Parties and
Election Campaigns, Handbook Series, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003, pp 71-94.
116 Lester A. Sobel (ed) Money and Politics: Contributions, Campaign Abuses and the
Law, New York: Facts on File, Inc.1974, P.41.
117 Herbert E. Alexander “Introduction” in H.E. Alexander (ed.) Campaign Money:
Reform and Realities in the States, New York: The Free Press, 1976, p .1.
118 Ibid. p.12.
119 Verena Blechinger, Corruption and Political Parties: Sectorial Perspectives on
Corruption, MSI November, 2002,p.3.
120 African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating Corruption,:
th
http://www.idasa.org.za/gbOuyputFiles.asp 2003, Accessed, 5 August, 2008.
121 Saffu, “The Funding of Political Parties and Campaign Finance in Africa” 2003, p 21.
122 Ibid, p. 21.
123 Ibid, p.22.
124 Ibid, p. 22
125 B. Gueye “Regulations on the Funding of election in Senegal” in K. Kumado (ed)
Funding Political Parties in West Africa, Accra: Gold Type Press, 1996 pp 137-167.
126 Ibid, p. 138.
127 U. Ilo “Political Finance Regulation in Nigeria: The legal framework” in N. Obiorah
(ed) Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria: Prospects and Strategies for Reform,
Lagos: Centre for Law and Social Action, 2004 pp 24-42.
128 A. Harneit-Sievers, “Foreword”, in N. Obiorah (ed) Political Finance and Democracy
in Nigeria: Prospects and Strategies for Reform, Lagos: Centre for Law and Social Action,
2004.
250
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
129 J. U. Emelonye, “Political Finance in Nigeria: A policy Agenda for reform” in N.
Obiorah (ed) Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria: Prospects and Strategies for
Reform, Lagos: Centre for Law and Social Action, 2004, pp 43-78
130 B. Onuoha “Multi-party democracy and party finance in Nigeria”, in Kumado K (ed)
1996 Funding of political parties in West Africa, Accra Gold Type Press 1996 pp 24-44.
131 Ilo, Political Finance and Democracy, p.31.
132 Harneit-Sievers, “Foreword”, in N. Obiorah (ed) Political Finance and Democracy, p.v.
133 Ibid, p.v.
134 Onuoha, “Multi-party democracy and party finance in Nigeria”, in Kumado K (ed)
1996 Funding of political parties in West Africa, p. 24.
135 N. Obiorah “Preface” in N. Obiorah (ed) Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria:
Prospects and Strategies for Reform, Lagos: Centre for Law and Social Action, 2004, pp
vii-xi
136 Ibid. p. ix.
137 G. O. Mwangi “Political Corruption, Party Financing and Democracy in Kenya”
Journal of Modern African Studies, 46, 2(2008) p.267.
138 Ibid. p.273.
139 Z. Jolobe, “Financing the ANC: Chancellor House, Eskom and dilemma of Party
Finance” in Anthony Butler (ed). Paying for Politics: Party Funding and Political
Change in South Africa and Global South, Dunkeld, South Africa: Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, 2010.pp 201-217.
140 Fambom Public Funding of Political Parties in Africa:, p.2.
141 Ibid, p.2.
142 Daily Graphic November 19, 2008, pp1&3.
143 Fambom, Public Funding of Political Parties in Africa, p.3.
144 H. Mathisen and Svasand L, Funding political parties in emerging African
democracies: The Role for Norwary, Posttenminalen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002, p.4.
145 Ibid, p. 8.
146 Deji Olaore, “Comparative Experience in political Party Finance Reform in Africa”, in
N. Obiorah (ed), Political Finance Reform Handbook, Lagos: Centre For Law and Social
Action (CLASA), 2005 pp. 3-4.
147J. R. A. Ayee, “Financing of Political Parties in Ghana: An Exploratory Study”, in
Kwame A. Ninsin and F.K. Drah (eds), Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana’s
Fourth Republic. Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1993, pp. 246-257.
148 Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), Political Party Financing
in Ghana, Survey Report, Accra: CDD Ghana Research Paper No. 13. 2005.
251
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
149 Boafo-Arthur, “Party Organization, Finance, and the Democratic process”, 1998, pp 77-
91.
150 Ibid p.82.
151 K. Kumado, “Multi-Party Democracy and Political Financing: The Anglophone West
Africa Experience, in Kumado (ed) Funding of Political Party in West Africa, Accra Gold
Type Press, 1996 pp. 1-23.
152 Gyimah-Boadi, State Funding of Political Parties 2009.
153 Y. Saffu, “Enhancing and regulating the Financing of Political Parties”, in The New
Legon Observer, Vol. 2 No. 4, February 21, 2008, p .27.
154 Ibid, p. 7.
155J.A.R. Ayee, F.G. Anebo and E. DebrahE. Financing Political Parties in Ghana.
www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/2007.p.11
156 Kumado, Multi-Party Democracy and Political Financing, 1996; Gyimah-Boadi,
State Funding of Political Parties 2009.
157 D. Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data (3rd edition), London: Sage Publications,
2006. P.51
158 Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative 2006.
159 Refer to Appendix “C” for the Interview Guide
160 A. Mustafa. Research Methodology, India: A.I.T.B.S. Publishers, 2010 p. 163.
161 Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative 2006
162 Ibid
163 Refer to Appendix “B” for the Survey Instrument
164 Refer to Appendix “A” for the list of registered political parties under the Fourth
Republic of Ghana.
165J.A.R. Ayee, F.G. Anebo and E. DebrahE. Financing Political Parties in Ghana.
www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/2007.p.11
166 K. Kwabia. Elements of Social Statistics. Accra: GertMash Publishers, 2006 p. 113
167 Lindberg and Minion Morrison. “Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic?
Survey Evidence from Ghana.” Political Science Quarterly 123 (1)(2008) 95–122.
168 Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), Political Party Financing
in Ghana, Survey Report, Accra: CDD Ghana Research Paper No. 13. 2005.p1.
169J.A.R. Ayee, F.G. Anebo and E. Debrah. Financing Political Parties in Ghana.
www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/2007.p.11
170 B. Allah-Mensah, “Political Parties, Gender and Representation: The case of Ghana’s
Election 2000” in Ayee, J.R.A. (ed), Deepening Democracy in Ghana: Politics of
the 2000 Elections. Accra: Freedom Publication, 2001.p.132.
171 D. Austin. Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960, London: Oxford University Press, 1964. p. 51.
172 Ibid, p. 49.
173 Ibid, p. 51.
174 Richard Rathbone, “ Businessmen in Politics: Party Struggle in Ghana, 1949-57” in
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 9 Issue 3, 1973, p.393.
252
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
175Ibid, 393.
176 Maxwell Owusu Uses and Abuses of Political Power, Accra: Ghana University Press,
2006, p 199.
177 Ibid, p. 171.
178 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 52.
179 Ibid, p. 54.
180 K. Boafo-Arthur “Political Parties and Democratic Sustainability in Ghana, 1992-2000”
in M.A Salih (ed) African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and
Governance, London: Pluto Press. 2003, p.210.
181 Ibid, p. 211
182 Ibid. p 211.
183 Ibid, p.210.
184 Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, p. 200.
185 Ibid, p. 200
186 David Apter, “Nkrumah, Charisma and the Coup”, in Daedalus, vol. 97. No. 3. 1968, p.
777.
187 Boafo-Arthur, “Political Parties and Democratic Sustainability in Ghana”, p.210.
188 Ibid, p. 215.
189 Ibid, p. 215.
190 See Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 354.
191 E. Gyimah-Boadi and E. Debrah, “Political Parties and Party Politics” in B. Agyeman-
Dua (ed) Ghana, Governance in the Fourth Republic, Tema, Digibooks Ghana Ltd, 2008,
p 129.
192 The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Democracy Consolidation Strategy Paper,
Accra: IEA, 2008, p.2 0.
193 Republic of Ghana, The Avoidance of Discrimination Act, 1957 No. 38 Accra: State
Publishing Corporation, 1957, p.2. .
194 Boafo-Arthur, “Political Parties and the Prospects for National Stability” in K. A. Ninsin
and F. K. Drah (eds.) Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, Accra:
Woeli Publication, 1993, p.227.
195 See Republic of Ghana, The Avoidance of Discrimination Act, p.4.
196 Republic of Ghana, The 1960 Constitution of Ghana, Tema: Ghana Publishing
Corporation, 1960, p. 7.
197 IDEG, Ghana Democracy and Popular Participation, Dakar: OSIWA, 2007, p. 17
198 Republic of Ghana, Constitution of the Republic of Ghana,1960, p.6.
199 Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, “Political Parties and Party Politics” , pp 131-132.
200 Ibid, p.131.
201 N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession,
1969-1982 Boulder and Colorado: West-view Press, 1983, p.221.
202 Republic of Ghana, The Political Parties Decree (NLCD) 345, Accra: Ghana Publishing
Corporation, 1969, p. 1.
203 Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, “Political Parties and Party Politics” p.132.
253
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
204 Yaw Manu. “The Party System and Democracy in Ghana” in Kwame A. Ninsin and
F.K. Drah (eds) Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, Accra:
Woeli Publishing Services, 1993, p. 122.
205 Chazan An Anatomy, p. 222
206 Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, “Political Parties and Party Politics” 2008, p. 133.
207 Ibid, p. 133.
208 N. Chazan, An Anatomy, p.2.
209 Manu , “The Party System and Democracy” p.125.
210 A. Essuman-Johnson, “The Politics of Ghana’s Search for a Democratic Constitutional
Order 1957-1991” in Kwame A. Ninsin and F.K. Drah (eds) Ghana’s Transition to
Constitutional Rule Accra: Ghana University Press 1991, p. 55.
211 Awoonor, Ghana a Political History 1990, p 240.
212 Manu, “The Party System and Democracy”, p.127.
213 Ibid, p.127.
214 Ibid, p. 127
215 Awoonor, Ghana a Political History, p. 240.
216 Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, “Political Parties and Party Politics” , p. 135.
217 Kofi Awoonor, Ghana a Political History from Pre-European to Modern Times,
Accra: SEDCO Publication Ltd. 1990, p.136.
218 Ibid p.136.
219 Ibid p.136.
220 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 52.
221 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 126.
222 Ibid p. 126
223 Ibid p. 126
224 Ibid, p. 126
225 Ibid, p. 171
226 Ibid. 126
227 Ibid. 126
228 Ibid. p. 126.
229 Ibid, p.127.
230 Ibid, 127
231 Ibid, p. 127.
232 Ibid, p.113.
233 Ibid, p.113.
234 Ibid, 172
235 Ibid, 172
236 Awoonor, Ghana a Political History .p.152.
237 Ibid, p.153.
254
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
238 Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 172
239 Republic of Ghana. Report of the Commission appointed under the Commission Enquiry
Act, 1964 (Act, 250) to Enquire into the Affairs of NADECO Ltd. Accra-Tema, State
Publishing Corporation, 1966, Chairman Samuel Azu Crabbe. p. 8.
240 Ibid, p. 3.
241 Gold Coast, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa
Purchasing Company, 1956 (Jibowu Commission report), Accra-Tema, State Publishing
Corporation, 1956, p.3.
242 Ibid, p.3.
243 Awoonor, Ghana a Political History, p.152.
244 Gold Coast, Jibowu Commission Report, p.11.
245 Ibid, p. 7.
246 Republic of Ghana Enquire into the Affairs of NADECO, p. 7.
247 Ibid, p. 5.
248 Ibid, p. 36.
249 Ibid, p. 36.
250 Ibid, p.44.
251 Ibid, p. 33.
252 Ibid. p.34.
253 G. O. Mwangi “Political Corruption, Party Financing and Democracy in Kenya”
Journal of Modern African Studies, 46, 2(2008) p.267.
254 Z. Jolobe, “Financing the ANC: Chancellor House, Eskom and dilemma of Party
Finance” in Anthony Butler (ed). Paying for Politics: Party Funding and Political
Change in South Africa and Global South, Dunkeld, South Africa: Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, 2010.pp 201-217.
255 Republic of Ghana, The Political Parties Decree (NLCD) 345, p. 1.
256 NAL, The Constitution of the NAL, p. 3.; PP, The Constitution of the Progress Party, p.
2.
257 Emmanuel Debrah, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana, PhD
Thesis submitted to the Political Science Department, 2008, p. 73.
258Ibid.p73.
259 Ibid, 73.
260 Ibid, p73
261 Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, “Political Parties and Party Politics” p. 137
262 Ibid, p. 137
263 Joseph Ayee, “Financing Political Parties in Ghana: An Exploratory Study”, in K.A.
Ninsin & F.K. Drah (eds.) Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana’s Fourth Republic,
Accra: Woeli Publishing, 1993, p. 248
264 Ibid. p.248
265 Interview with Alhaji Abdul Moomin, Vice Chairman for the PNC in November, 2008.
255
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
266 Republic of Ghana, The Political Parties Decree (NLCD) 345, p. 5.
267 Ibid, p. 4.
268 Ibid, p. 6.
269 PNP, Constitution of the PNP (Unpublished), p.3.; PFP, Constitution of the PFP
(Unpublished), p.3; UNC, Constitution of the United National Convention (Unpublished),
p.2;
270 Debrah, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana, p. 99.
271 Interview with I. Addae-Mensah in September 2008. He was once the General
Secretary to PNP from 1979 to 1981.
272 Ibid,
273 Ibid
274 Ibid
275 According to Addae –Mensah, one Goil station owner (name withheld because the man
is still alive) credited fuel to the campaign teams of the party. He was fully paid back when
the party won the election. Most people willingly gave money to the party because of the
love they had for Kwame Nkrumah.
276 Ibid.
277 K. Awoonor, The Ghana Revolution: Background Account from a Personal
Perspective, Bronx Oases Publishers, 1984, p. 121.
278 Awoonor Ghana a Political History, p. 244
279 Ibid p. 244.
280 Ibid, p. 243.
281 K. Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor, London: Macmillan Press, 1992, p. 64.
282 Ibid, p. 243.
283 Ibid, 244
284 Ibid, 244
285 Interview with the former President of Ghana; Jerry John Rawlings on 15th December,
2007. The interview was conducted with one Antoinette Handley, Assistant Professor of
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto who was conducting a study into
the domestic and international factors in Ghana’s transition to democracy. Jerry John
Rawlings was military and political leader who twice (1979, 1981) overthrew the
government and seized power. He was returned to office by election in 1992 and 1996 and
stepped down from the presidency in 2001.
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.
289 Awoonor, Ghana a Political History, p. 154.
290 Interview with I. Addae-Mensah PNP General Secretary in September 2008.
256
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
291 Interview with Mr. Owusu Gyimah in January 2009. He is an elder in the present day
CPP. He was a registered CPP member in 1958, a registered member of the PNP during
the Third Republic and a vice chairman of the Nkrumah Revolution Guard in 1983.
292 Interview with Dr. Kwaku Osei-Akom in May 2011. He was the NPP MP primaries
contestant who lost at Tano North Constituency in the Brong Ahafo constituency in April
2011. He was also member of the PFP during the Third Republic (1979-81).; Interview
with Mr. Owusu Gyimah in January 2009.
293 Rathbone, Business in Politics. p. 394.
294 See PNP, Constitution of the PNP, p.5.
295 Interview with Dr. Kwaku Osei-Akom,
296 Interview with Haruna Esseku April, 2009. Haruna was a member of the PP and
Member of Parliament during the Second Republic (1969-1972). He was an active member
of the PFP during the Third Republic. He served as the National Party Chairman for the
NPP between 2000 and 2004.
297 See Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor,; Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian
Politics.; and K. A. Ninsin (ed.), Ghana Transition to Democracy, Dakar, Council for the
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESIRA), 1998.
298 Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor, p.64.
299 Ibid, p.78.
300 Ibid, p.66.
301 Ibid, p. 65.
302 Ibid, p. 65.
303 Ibid, p.78.
304 Ibid, p.78
305 Ibid, p.78.
306 Ayee, Financing Political Parties in Ghana, p. 248
307 Ibid,p. 248.
308 Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) Review and Analysis of Draft
Bill, Accra: CDD-Ghana, 2008, p. 5.
309 Ibid. p.47.
310 Ibid. p. 47.
311 Republic of Ghana, The Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1957. Accra:
Government printer, Assembly Press 1957, pp. 1-39. Also see the Republic of Ghana,
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1960, Accra: Government printer, Assembly Press
1960, pp 1-26; Republic of Ghana, Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1969, Accra:
Government printer, Assembly Press 1969, pp 1-156; and Republic of Ghana, Constitution
of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, Accra: Government printer, Assembly Press 1979, pp 1-
182.
312 M. Tjernstrom and A. Katz “Introduction to the Matrix”, in International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Funding of Political Parties and
Election Campaigns, Handbook Series, Stockholm: International IDEA,
2003.p.181.
257
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
313 K-N Nassmacher, “Introduction: Political Parties and Democracy”, in International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Funding of Political
Parties and Election Campaigns, Handbook Series, Stockholm: International
IDEA, 2003 p9.
314 Interview with Professor Kwamena Ahwoi in January 2009. He was the longest
serving minister under the PDNC regime and PNDC Secretary (Minister) of Local
Government from 1988 to 1993. He chaired the Inter- Ministerial Task Force that
prepared the first major legislation on decentralization, that is, the Local Government
Law on 1988, PNDCL 207, and served as a member of the Inter- Ministerial Task Force
that prepared the Political Parties Law, PNDCL 281, and many others.
315 Ibid
316 Interview with the former President of Ghana; Jerry John Rawlings in December, 2007.
The interview was conducted with one Antoinette Handley, Assistant Professor of
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto who was conducting a study into
the domestic and international factors in Ghana’s transition to democracy. Jerry John
Rawlings was military and political leader who twice (1979, 1981) overthrew the
government and seized power. He was returned to office by election in 1992 and 1996 and
stepped down from the presidency in 2001.
317 Ibid
318 K. Boafo-Arthur, “Party Organization, Finance, and the Democratic process: The Case
of the Opposition Parties,” in Ayee, J.R.A. (ed) The 1996 General Elections and
Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Accra: Gold Type Ltd, 1998, p. 84.
319 Ibid. p. 84. .
320 Ibid. p. 84.
321 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Funding of
Political Parties and Election Campaigns, Handbook Series Stockholm:
International IDEA, 2003.p.195.
322 Interview with Mr. Ben Ephson, Editor, Daily Dispatch in June 2009.
323 Interview with Honourable Joseph Agbenu NDC MP for Afram Plains North
constituency in November 2008; Interview with Hon. Albert Kwaku Obbin, the NPP MP
for Prestea-Huni Valley, June 2009; Interview with Hon. Kwabena Ashiama, NPP MP for
Fanteakwa, January 2011.
324 Interview with Mr. Christian Parry-Owusu, the Acting Director of Public Affairs of the
Electoral Commission in June 2009. He is a member of a committee Electoral Commission
has asked to review the Political Parties Law, Act 574.
325 Interview Samuel Aidoo, Director of Finance, Electoral Commission, in July 2014.
This is the second interview him.
326 Nassmacher. “Introduction” in Funding of Political Parties, 2003, pp 9-12
327 Ghana, Political Party Act 574, p.10.
328 Sections 23 and 24 of Act 574 (2000).
258
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
329 Ibid. p 10.
330 Interview Samuel Aidoo, Director of Finance, Electoral Commission, in June 2009.
331 J.R.A. Ayee “The Evolution of the New Patriotic Party in Ghana” in South African
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2. December 2008, p. 209.
332 Opinion expressed by some NDC members in November 2008.
333 Interview with B.A. Effah, NDC member in November, 2008
334 The Chronicle, April 23, 2010
335 www.myjoyonline.com “The NDC flouted no Law”, accessed April 5, 2012
336 Ibid
337 Ibid
338 Ghanaian Times, March 30, 2011, p.11.
339 Francis Kokutse, “Ghana Political Parties Urged to Come Clean” www.ipsnews.net
accessed September 3, 2011
340 Ibid,
341 Interview with Mr. David Apasera the national treasurer of the PNC in July 2014.
342 Nassmacher. “Introduction” Funding of Political Parties, 2003, pp 9-12
343 Ibid. p.15.
344 Interview with Mrs. Jean Mensa, Administrator, IEA in June 2009
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid
347 Interview with Mr. T.N.Ward-Brew, DPP 2004 and 2008 presidential candidate in
November 2008.
348 Ibid.
349 Republic of Ghana, The Political Parties Act 574, p. 10.
350 Interview with Mr. Samuel Y. Aidoo, Director of Finance, Electoral Commission in
June 2009.
351 Marcin Walecki, Political Money and Corruption, 2003. p. 9.
352 Ghana, Political Parties Act 574, p. 10.
353 www.idea.int/publications/funding_parties/upload/matrix_intro.pdf date accessed,
September 23, 2014
354 Interview with Haruna Esseku a former NPP Chairman in November 2008.
355 Interview with N. Ward Brew, the Presidential candidate of the Democratic People’s
Party (DPP) in November, 2008.
356 Ibid.
357 Interview with Director of Finance and Director of Public Affairs in July 2014
358 Political Parties Act, p.
359 www.peacefmonline.com It Won’t Happen Again - NPP Assures EC, September 14,
2011.
360 Ibid.
259
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
361 Ibid.
362 Asiedu Nketia, NDC General Secretary “NDC has no money to hire accountant, auditor
to prepare reports” www.myjoyonline.com September 14, 2011.
363 Interviews with political party officials in November 2008.
364 Interview with Daivid Apasera
365 Interview with Alhaji Abdul Moomin, Vice Chairman for the PNC in November, 2008.
366 Ibid.
367 Interview with Mr. Attoh Jonathan, CPP National Administrator on June 11, 2014.
This was a follow up interview.
368 Ibid. Attoh Jonathan
369 K-H. Nassmacher, “Monitoring, Control and Enforcement of Political Finance
Regulation”, in International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, Handbook Series (Stockholm:
International IDEA), 2003 p. 142.
370 Ibid. p.139.
371 Ibid, p. 139.
372 Tjernstrom and Katz, “Introduction to the Matrix” in Funding of Political Parties,
2003 p. 181
373 Ghana, Political Parties Act 574, p. 10.
374 Interviews with the Director of Finance of the Electoral Commission, Mr Samuel Yorke
Aidoo in June 2009.
375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
378 Sheple, Rational Choice Institutionalism, p.25.
379 Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, The Challenges to conduct Free and Fair Elections in
Emerging African Democracies: The Case of Ghana, Accra: CDD-Ghana, 2009: p.13.
380 Ibid. p. 13.
381 Ibid. p. 12.
382 Interview with Mr. Christian Parry-Owusu, the Acting Director of Public Affairs of the
Electoral Commission in July 2014. I did interview him on the same subject five years ago
(June 2009)
383 Ibid.
384 Interview with Mr. Samuel Y. Aidoo, Director of Finance, Electoral Commission in
June 2009.
385 Interview with the NDC National Treasurer Madam Margaret Clarke-Kwesie,
November 2008.
386 Nassmacher, “Monitoring, Control and Enforcement of Political Finance Regulation”,
in Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, p.142.
387 Herbert E. Alexander “Introduction” in H.E. Alexander (ed.) Campaign Money:
Reform and Realities in the States, New York: The Free Press, 1976, p .1.
388 Interview with Haruna Esseku, former NPP national chairman, in November 2008
260
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
389 The Chronicle, Friday 28 September, 2007, p. 3.
390 Kwesi Aning, Global Crime, Are there Emerging West African Criminal Networks?
The Case of Ghana(http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title-content=t714592492) 2007 p.203.
Honourable Eric Amoateng, at the time of his arrest in November 2005, was the Member
of Parliament for the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) for Nkoranza North Constituency.
He played multiple roles in his community. He is a benefactor sponsoring about 100
students, Local chieftain, development-oriented person, a successful businessman and
contractor, and provider of soft loan without interest.
391 Dispatch, Tuesday August 1, 2006.p.4.
392 Ghana, The Political Parties Act, 574 of 2000, Accra: Government Press, 2000, p.10.
393 TEIN is the Tertiary Education Institution Network of the NDC while TESCON is the Tertiary
Students Confederation Executives of the NPP. These are student branches of the two main
parties in Ghana.
394 OM=Ordinary Members, RI= Rich Individuals; FM= Founding Members; LB= Local
Business; MP= Members of parliament; SF = State Funds; PE= Party Executives; CO=
Contributions from overseas branches; and FB= Foreign Business.
395 A.P. Fenny, “Party Finance and Political Corruption”, in The New Legon Observer, Vol.
2 No. 4, February 21, 2008, p .26.
396 Interview with Mrs Gifty A.A. Ayeh, National Treasurer of the NPP; Ms Margaret
Clarke-Kwesie, National Treasurer of the NDC; and the CPP National Treasurer Mike
Eghan; all in November, 2008
397 Ibid.
398 Interview with Hon Kofi Ahaliga, NDC MP for Afram Plains South; Interview with
Hon. Stephen Kunsu, MP for Kintampo North in November 2008.
399 Ibid.
400 Ibid.
401 Interview NDC MP and party executive member in November, 2008.
402 Discussion between me and one NPP National Executive (Name withheld because the
information is sensitive) in November 2013.
403 Interview with Honourable Samuel Ampofo NDC National Organizer for 8 years in
June 2014.
404 Interview with NDC Deputy General Secretary, Baba Jamal in November, 2008.
405 Interview with Ward Brew, the DPP 2004 and 2008 presidential candidate in November,
2008. In December 2012, it emerged that the Chief Executive Officers of many state
institutions made financial donations to the NDC’s ‘Heroes Fund’, see
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201212/98109.php. Date accessed: December 3, 2012.
This exemplifies how ruling parties illegally and undemocratically obtain funding from the
state.
406 Interview with one NDC member in November, 2008
407 Interview with NPP chairman, Haruna Esseku in November 2008.
408 Interview with Mr. Attoh Jonathan CPP National Administrator in November, 2008.
409 Interview with party executives in November 2008
410 Interview with CPP Administrator, Attoh Jonathan and other party executives
411 Interview with Party officials in November 2008
412 Interview with Baba Jamal Deputy General Secretary of the NDC in November, 2008.
261
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413 T.W. Aminou, “Financing Election Campaigns in French-Speaking Africa” in AAEA
Report on the Inaugural Meeting of the General Assembly of the Association of African
Election Authority, Accra: AAEA, 1998, p.27.
414 Interviews with the NPP, the NDC, the PNC and the CPP executives in November 2008.
415 Interview with Political Party Executive in November 2008.
416 Interview with party officials of the NDC, NPP, CPP and PNC in November, 2008
417 Interview with Mr. Baba Jamal, Deputy General Secretary of the NDC, and the National
Treasurer, Ms Margaret Clarke-Kwesie in November, 2008.
418 Interview with the NDC National Treasurer, Ms Margaret Clarke-Kwesie in November,
2008.
419 Interview with the PNC National Deputy Treasurer, David Nibi in November, 2008.
420 The Constitution of New Patriotic Party, amended on 29th August, 1998, p.5.
(unpublished).
421 Interview with Kwabena Essem , Press Secretary of NPP in November, 2008
422 Interview with CPP National Administrator Attoh in November 2008.
423Ibid.
424 Interviews with Political Party Executives in November 2008.
425 Interview with Haruna Esseku former chairman for the NPP in November 2008.
426 Interview with Attoh Jonathan, CPP Administrator,
427 K. A. Ninsin, Political Parties and Political Participation in Ghana, Accra: Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, 2007, p. 10.
428 Interview Wisdom Gidisu NDC MP for Krachi constituency in November, 2008.
Interview with John Tia Akologu, NDC MP for Talensi constituency in November 2008,
Interview with Albert Kwaku Obin, NPP MP for Prestea –Huni Valley constituency in
January 2011.; and Interview with Ayimadu-Antwi Kwame, NPP MP for Asante-Akin
North constituency in January 2011
429 Ibid,
430 Ibid.
431 Interviews with Mr. David Nibi, National Deputy Treasurer for PNC in November, 2008.
432 Ibid.
433 Interview with NPP former National Chairman, Haruna Esseku in November 2008.
434 Interview with NDC party executives in November, 2008.
435 Interview with Mr. Baba Jamal, Deputy General Secretary of the NDC, and the National
Treasurer, Ms Margaret Clarke-Kwesie in November, 2008.
436 Interview with PNC executive member in November, 2008.
437 Interview with party executives of the NPP, NDC, CPP and PNC in November, 2008.
438 Interview with the CPP National Treasurer Mike Eghan in November 2008
439 Interview with David Nibi the PNC Deputy National Treasurer in November 2008.
440 Interview with Margaret Clarke-Kwesie the NDC National treasurer in November, 2008
441 Interview with Margaret Clarke-Kwesie the NDC National treasurer in November, 2008
442 Interview with Essem Kwabena, Press Secretary of the NPP, November 2008
443 Republic of Ghana, The 1992 Constitution p.49
262
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444 Interview with Mr. David Kanga, Deputy Chairman of the Electoral Commission, in
November 2008.
445 See Appendix for the list of party officials who were interviewed.
446 Interview with the NPP, NDC, DPP, CPP and PNC party officials in November 2008.
447 Ghana, 1992 Constitution, p. 49.
448 Interview with the General Secretary of PNP of the Third Republic, September, 2008.
449 Interview with Samuel Aidoo, Electoral Commission of Ghana
450 Ibid,
451 Interview with Mr Attoh Jonathan CPP Administrator in November 2008; Interview
with Mrs Margaret Clarke-Kwesie, the National Treasure for NDC in November 2008; and
interview with Alhaji Abdul Moomin, Vice Chairman for PNC in November, 2008.
452 www.Ghanaweb. Funding Political Parties in Ghana: Whose responsibility? Date
accessed: Tuesday, 13th July 2010.
453 CDD-Ghana, Political Party Funding, p.17.
454 J.A.R. Ayee, F.G. Anebo and E. DebrahE. Financing Political Parties in Ghana.
www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/2007.p.28.,
455 M. Oquaye, “Oquaye Warns against proliferation of Parties” (Daily Graphic, April 8
2008, pp. 1&3).
456 Ibid. p. 3.
457 Ayee, “The Evolution of the New Patriotic Party in Ghana” in South African Journal
of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2. December 2008, p. 190.
458 The Electoral Commission of Ghana, Report on the Consultative For a on Financing
Political Parties, Accra: Electoral Commission of Ghana, 1998. p. 9
459 Interview with Hon. Joseph Agbenu, MP for Afram Plains North, November, 2008.
460 Adzei Bekoe, “State Funding of Political Parties Desirable” The Daily Graphic, March
13, 2008, pp.1&3
461 Interview with Kwesi Jonah September 12, 2008
462 F. Anebo, “The Case for Public Funding of Political Parties in Ghana” Daily Graphic,
April, 15, 2008, p. 9.
463 Ibid. p. 9
464 See The Ghanaian Times, March 26, 2008, p.3.
465 Nii Thompson “State Funding of Political Parties in Ghana: The Cost, Benefit and
Risks”, New Legon Observer, 21 Feb 2008, pp. 8-9.
466 Ibid, p. 9.
467 E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Debating State Funding of Ghana’s Political Parties” in Democracy
Watch, Vol. 8, August 2008, pp.2-3.
468 Ibid, p. 2
469. Interview with the PNC National Acting Vice Chairman, Alhaji Abdul Moomin in
November, 2008.
470 Interview with Mr. David Kanga, Deputy Chairman of the Electoral Commission in
November 2008.
471 Interview with Mrs Gifty A.A. Ayeh, National Treasurer of the NPP in November 2008.
472 Interview with NPP Treasurer in November 2008.
473 Ibid.
263
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474 Interview with Mrs. Gifty A.A. Ayey, National Treasurer of the NPP, November,
2008.; Interview with Ms Margaret Clarke-Kwesie, National Treasurer of the NDC in
November 2008.; Interview with David Nibi the PNC Deputy National Treasurer in
November 2008.; and Interview with CPP Administrator, Attoh Jonathan and other party
executives
475 Interview with Mrs Gifty A.A. Ayeh, National Treasurer of the NPP in November 2008.
476 Interview with Ms Margaret Clarke-Kwesie, National Treasurer of the NDC in
November 2008
477 Ibid.
478 Interview with party officials in November, 2008.
479 Interview with Dr. Kwaku Osei-Akom, May 2011.
480 Ibid.
481 Interview with the NDC National Treasurer, Ms Margaret Clarke-Kwesie in November,
2008.
482 The House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee Party Funding: First Report
of Session 2006-2007, London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2006, p.5.
483 Interview with the Treasurer of the CPP, NDC, NPP and PNC in November 2008.
484 Ibid
485 Interviews with Political party Officials in November 2008
486 Interview with Alhaji Abdul Moomin of PNC
487 Interview with Ward-Brew the DPP 2004 and 2008 presidential candidate
488 Ibid.
489 See Arthur Kennedy, Chasing the Elephant into the Bush: The Politics of Complacency,
Accra: AuthorHouse, 2009, p.viii.
490 Ibid. p.7.
491 Interview NPP constituency chairman and constituency secretary (Names withheld)
from Volta Region in October, 2014.
492 Interviews with some NPP constituency executives at Tamale NPP Congress in April,
2014.
493 wwww.myjoyonline.com: God Directs Me to Donate to NPP, Chairman Wontumi.
24th January, 2014. Date accessed August 12, 2014
494 Interview with a wife of a Vice President in June 2009.
495 Interview with Honourable Seth Adjei Baah , Independent Member of Parliament for
Nkawkaw
constituency in August 2009.
496 Ibid. 2009.
497 Interview with Mr. Steve Ahiawordor, contestant for MP for NDC Dzodze constituency,
February, 2011.
498 Interview with Dr. Kwaku Osei-Akom in May 2011. He was NPP MP primaries
contestant who lost at Tano North Constituency in the Brong Ahafo constituency in April,
2011. He was also member of the PFP during the Third Republic (1979-81).
264
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499 Staffan I. Linberg, Some evidence on the demand side of private-public goods
provisions by
MPs, London: Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) Working Paper No. 8
February, 2010, p.1.
500 C. Clapham. Third World Politics: An Introduction, London and Sydney:
Crookhelm1985, p.56.
501 Ibid. p.56.
502 Interview with Honourable Seth Adjei Baah, Independent Member of Parliament for
Nkawkaw
constituency in August 2009.
503 Ibid.
504 Interview with the NDC National Treasurer Madam Margaret Clarke-Kwesie, 2008.
505 Interview with former NDC Member of Parliament and Deputy Minister of State under
the first and second Parliament of the Fourth Republic in October 2008. (name with-held
as part of confidentiality agreement)
506 Interview with Hon. Albert Kwaku Obbin, the NPP MP for Prestea-Huni Valley,
January 2011.
507 Interview with Dr. E Agambila, NPP contestant who lost the primaries at Bolgatanga in
October, 2009. Dr. Agambila served as a Deputy Minister for Finance under NPP
administration.
508 Interview with Mr. Steve Ahiawordor, contestant for MP for NDC Dzodze constituency,
February, 2011.
509 Interview with Mr. Vincent Tawiah, NDC card bearing member and a Head of Banking
division of Barclays Bank Ghana, in June 2009.
510 Interview with Professor Kwamena Ahwoi in January 2009.
511 The Herald News Paper, Konadus Nsawan Cannery Rots Away 2nd August 2011, p1.
512 www.Ghanaweb How NPP victimized John Mahama’s Brother date accessed:
October 2, 2012
513 Interview with Mr. David Apasera the national treasurer of the PNC in July 2014.
514 Interview Attoh Jonathan, CPP National Administrator in November, 2008.
515 Ibid.
516 Interview with Mr Aoyi Emmanuel Chegeweh, a former District Chief Executive for
Tolon District in June 2009.
517 Interview with Alhaji Abdul Moomin.
518 Interview with Mr. Augustine Yaw Nti NPP card bearing member in June 2009.
519 Interviews with the NPP, the NDC, the PNC and the CPP national treasures.
520 Interview with Mr. Kweku Baah, NDC card bearing member, Tema West Constituency
in August 2009.
521 Interview with Mr. Paul Kpai, NDC card bearing member in Hohoe South Constituency
in June 2009.
522 Interview with Honourable Joseph Tsatsu Agbenu NDC MP for Afram Plains North
constituency in November, 2008.
523 Arthur Kennedy, p.2.
524 Interview with B.A. Effah, NDC card bearing member, in November 2008.
265
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525 Interview with Mr. Kweku Baah, NDC card bearing member in August 2009; and
Interview with Abrebesse Amponsah NDC card bearing member in June 2009.
526 Interview with Haruna Esseku former National chairman of NPP in November, 2008.
527 Interview with Dr. Augustine Siaw, is a card bearing member of the NPP and a Lecturer
at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) in May 2011.
528 Interview with Dr. Kwaku Osei-Akom, May 2011.
529 Interview with Mr. Paul Kpai, NDC card bearing member in Hohoe South Constituency
in June 2009.
530 Ibid.
531 K. A. Ninsin “Markets and Liberal democracy”, in K. Boafo-Arthur (ed), Ghana: One
Decade of the Liberal State, Dakar: CODESRIA Books, 2007, p. 94.
532 Interview with Foster Asante NDC Constituency Executive, Eastern region in June
2014.
533 Interview with Kweku Baah Card bearing member of the NDC in August 2009
534 Joy (FM 99.7) News, August 19, 2014, 7.00pm
535 Ibid.
536 Interview with Mr. David Apasera the national treasurer of the PNC in July 2014.
537 Interview with Honourable Nii Amasah Noamoale, NDC MP for Dade Kotopon, in
November 2008.
538Interview with Honourable Joseph Agbenu NDC MP for Afram Plains North
constituency in November 2008.
539 Interview with Honourable Frederick Opare-Ansah NPP MP for Suhum in November,
2008.
540 Interview with Honourable Alhaji Amadu Sorogho of NDC in November 2008; and
Honorable Samuel K. Obadia of NPP in November, 2008.
541 Interview with Hon. Albert Kwaku Obbin, the NPP MP for Prestea-Huni Valley,
January 2011.
542 These results do not include presidential run offs because the PNC and the CPP did
not participate in the run offs.
543 Interview with Reverend Eshun Ekow, the head pastor for Revival Christian Ministry
in June 2009.
544 Figures obtained from the audited accounts submitted to the Electoral Commission.
545 Interview with Ben Ephson, the Editor for Daily Dispatch in June 2009
546 https://donate.barackobama.com/page/outreach/view/main/TracieB date accessed 10th
August 2009.
547 Interview with Bernard Deh, an Elder of Jehovah Witness Church, Legon Branch, June
2009
548 Interview with Albert Kwaku Obbin, the NPP MP for Prestea-Huni Valley, January
2011
549 Interview with Hon. Juliana J. Azumah-Mensah, MP for Ho East Constituency in
November 2008.
550 Ibid.
266
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551 Interview with Madam Elizabeth Addai-Boateng, Executive Director for Christian
Mothers’ Association in January 2011.
552 Interview with John Tia, NDC MP for Talensi Constituency in November 2008.
553 Beatrix Allan-Mensah, “Political Parties, Gender and Representation: The case of
Ghana’s Election 2000” in Ayee, J.R.A. (ed), Deepenong Democracy in Ghana: Politics
of the 2000 Elections. Accra: Freedom Publication, 2001, p. 131.
554 A.P. Fenny, “Party Finance and Political Corruption”, in The New Legon Observer, Vol.
2 No. 4, February 21, 2008, p .26.
555 The House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee Party Funding: First
Report of Session 2006-2007, London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2006.p.5 and
Gyimah-Boadi State Funding, 2009, p1.
556 Interview with Mr. Attoh Jonathan, CPP National Administrator on June 11, 2014.
This was a follow up interview.
557 Ibid.
558 Interview with Honourable Samuel Ampofo NDC National Organizer for 8 years in
June 2014.
559 Ibid.
560 The names of interviewees and key financiers identified could not be disclosed
because this is very sensitive.
561 Discussion between me and one NPP National Executive (Name withheld because the
information is sensitive) in November 2013.
562 Interview with Mr. Ernest Atua , NPP Constituency Chairman of Ho in November,
2014.
563 Interview with the PNC National Deputy Treasurer, David Nibi in November, 2008.
564 The Constitution of the CPP, 2012, Accra, p. 10; The Constitution of the National
Democratic Congress, 1992, Accra, p. 6;. The Constitution of the NPP, 2009, Accra, p. 5;
The Constitution of the PNC 1992 p. 6-8.
565 Ibid.
566 Interviews with the NDC National Treasurer Mrs. Margaret Clarke in November
2008; NPP National treasurer Mrs. Gifty Aryeh in November 2008; CPP National
Treasurer Dr. Adolph Lutherdt in November, 2013; and PNC National Treasurer Mr.
David Apasera in July 2014.
567 Ibid.
568 See the Constitutions of the PNC p.7.
569 See the Constitutions of the CPP p.8.
570 See the Constitutions of the NPP p.39.
571 See the Constitutions of the NDC p.8
572 Interview with Dr. Augustine Siaw, is a card bearing member of the NPP and a Lecturer
at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) in May 2011.
573 Interview with Dr. Kwaku Osei-Akom, May 2011.
574 Interview with Mr. Paul Kpai, NDC card bearing member in Hohoe South Constituency
in June 2009.
575 Interview with NPP MP in July 2014. He wants his name to remain anonymous
576 K. A. Shepsle, “Studying Institutions: Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach,”
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1989, Vol. 1, No. 1, p.134; Ira Katznelson and Barry R.
267
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Weingast, “Intersections between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism”, in
Katznelson and Weingast (eds.), Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersections
between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism, New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 2007, pp. 1-26
577 Nunnally, J. O. (1978). Psychometric theory. New York: McGraw-Hill
578 Gyimah-Boadi, E. State Funding of Political parties in Ghana, Critical Perspective
No. 24 Accra: CDD-Ghana, 2009,p.1.
579 Michels R, Political Parties, Kitchener, Ontario Batoche Books, 2001
580 See Ghana, 1992 Constitution p. 198.
581 Ohman Magnus Determining the Contestants : Candidate Selection in Ghana’s 2000
Elections, Accra: CDD-Ghana, 2002, p. 9.
582 A. Essuman-Johnson, “The Democratic Ethos and Internal Party Democracy: The Case
of Parties in the Fourth Republic” in Ninsin &Drah (eds) Political Parties and Democracy
in Ghana, Accra: Woeli Publication, 1993, p. 198.
583 Interview with N. Agboada, Executive party member at Keta constituency in November,
2008.
584 Interview with some party executives of the NDC and the NPP in November 2008
585 Ibid.
586 This information was gathered when l boarded a chartered bus with delegates from
their residence to the NPP Congress venue during NPP Congress at Tamale on Saturday
April 12,2014. The delegates did not know that I was not one of them.
587 Anthony Downs A. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row,
1957.
588 A debate among some delegates drew my attention to the scene. When I drew closer
to follow the discussion, one of them cautioned them to stop the discussion because
someone was listening to them. Another snubbed him saying the person standing there
did not understand their language. One of them tried to greet me in the language they
were speaking but I pretended as if I did not understand him. The second one said, but I
told you he did understand our language. So they continued with the debate.
589 http://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2014/January-24th/monicracy-is-a-threat-to-
npps-democracy-osei-prempeh-asserts.php
590 This was discussed on Asempa FM’s Ekosii Sen programme Friday January 24, 2014,
591 http://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2014/January-24th/monicracy-is-a-threat-to-
npps-democracy-osei-prempeh-asserts.php
592 See The NPP, The Constitution of the NPP, Unpublished p.5.
593 Ibid
268
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594 Interview with Albert Kwaku Obbin, the NPP MP for Prestea-Huni Valley, January
2011.
595 Interview with Mr. Kwabena A. Asiamah, NPP MP for Fanteakwa Constituency in the
Eastern Region in January 2011.
596 Interview with Mr. Aoyi Emmanuel Cheweh former DCE for Navorongo under the NPP
regime in June 2011; Mr Klu Zakour, NPP Chairman for Etoe polling station in January,
2011.
597 Interview with Joseph Nikpe Bukari, NDC MP for Saboba in January 2011.
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
600 Ninsin, Political Parties and Political Participation in Ghana, p. 8.
601 Interview with Mr. Kwame Jantuah, CPP Deputy National Organizer and Spokesman
on Energy Affairs in May 2011.
602 Interview with Alhaji Abdul Moomin, the Acting Vice Chairman for the PNC in
November, 2008.
603 The grievances of some PNC party officials against Dr. Mahama’s inability to build
on the legacy of Dr. Hilla Limann was reported by newspapers prior to the presidential
elections. www.ghanaian-chronicle.com . Date accessed November 30, 2012.
604 Interview with Mr. Jantuah Kwame, May 2011
605 Interview with Mr. Ivor Greenstreet, the General Secretary for CPP in November, 2008.
606 www.graphic.com.gh accessed July 17, 2012
607 www.dailyguideghana.com accessed, July 17, 2012.
608 Interview with Mr Prince A. Joshua an ordinary card holding member of the CPP in
July 2014.
609 Interview with a Constituency Secretary of the CPP in October 2014.
610 Essuman-Johnson, Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana, p. 202
611 Opinion held by the NPP to undermine the democratic processes of the NDC
612 www.citifmonline.com accessed July 18, 2012.
613 www.grahic.com accessed July 18, 2012.
614 Nii Marma NDC will pay for what happened in Sunyani www.mijaku.com 22 July
2011 date accessed August 12, 2014.
615 Ibid.
616 Interview with Haruna Essuku; Mr. Antwi Agyei National Administrator for NPP in
November 2008; and Mr. Kwabena A Asiamah NPP MP for Fanteakwa, ER, August 2010
617 www. ghanaweb.net, The NPP Race Summary and Review, accessed July 6, 2012
618Arthur Kennedy K., Chasing the Elephant into the Bush: The Politics of Complacency
Accra; Author House, 2009, p. viii.
619 Interview with Mr. Ernest Atua NPP Constituency Chairman Ho, in November, 2014.
620 Ibid.
621 Interview Mr. Zakour Klu, (Etoe VR) NPP polling station chairman in June 2009.
269
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622 Interview with Mr. Vincent Tawiah, card bearing member in June 2009; and interview
with Amenyo Ntiri, (Odumansua ER) NPP polling station secretary, October 2011.
623 Interview with Kwabena Ayisi NPP constituency executive member, in June 2009.
624 Interview with Hon. Seth Adjei Baah, Independent MP for Nkawkaw constituency in
August 2009.
626 Interview with Mr. Kwabena Essem, NPP National Press Secretary in November, 2008.
627 Interview with Honourable Seth Adjei Baah , MP for Nkawkaw constituency in August
2009.
628 Interview with S.A Baah independent MP in January 2009.
629 See The Daily Guide, January 17, 2012, p. 1.
630 http://www.modernghana.com/news/170447/1/in-house-fighting-in-ndc-rawlings-is-tormenting-
me.html date accessed, August 12, 2014
631 Ibid.
632 Interview with Hon Jonathan Lackie-Komme NDC MP Odododiodioo, GAR in June
2009.
633 Interview with NDC MP (name withheld) in June 2014.
634 Interview with Alhaji Abdul Moomin, the Acting Vice Chairman for the PNC in
November, 2008.
635 G. O. Mwangi “Political Corruption, Party Financing and Democracy in Kenya”
Journal of Modern African Studies, 46, 2(2008) p.273.
636 N. Obiorah “Preface” in N. Obiorah (ed) Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria:
Prospects and Strategies for Reform, Lagos: Centre for Law and Social Action, 2004, p.
vii.
637 Interview with Dr. E Agambila, NPP contestant who lost the primaries at Bolgatanga in
October, 2009.; Interview with S.A Baah independent MP in January 2009,; Interview
with Hon. Juliana J. Azumah-Mensah, MP for Ho East Constituency in November 2008.
638 “Skirt and blouse” voting is a situation where a voter votes for a presidential candidate
of one political party and vote for parliamentary candidate for another political party.
639 Opinion expressed in interviews with the NDC and the NPP MPs and party officials in
November 2008.
640 Robert Michels, Political Parties, Kitchener, Ontario Batoche Books, 2001, p.6.
641 Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, The Challenges to conduct Free and Fair Elections in
Emerging African Democracies: The Case of Ghana, Accra: CDD-Ghana, 2009: p.12.
270
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642 Paul Nugent, Big Men and Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, ideology and
the Burden of History, 1982-1994, Accra: Asempa Publishers, 1996, p.5.
643 A. Gierzynski, “A Framework for the Study of Campaign Finance” in J.A. Thompson
and G.F. Moncrief (ed), Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections Washington
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1998, pp.20-46.
644 Keith R. Weghorst and Staffan I. Linberg, “Effective Opposition Strategies: Collective
Goods or Clientelism? Demoratization Vol. 18, No. 5, October 2011, pp.1193-1214.
645 Staffan I. Linberg, Some evidence on the demand side of private-public goods
provisions by MPs, London: Africa Power and Politics Programme (APPP) Working
Paper No. 8 February, 2010.
646 C. Clapham. Third World Politics: An Introduction, London and Sydney:
Crookhelm1985, p. 56.
647 Weghorst and Linberg, Demoratization, 2011, p.1193.
648 Linberg, Some evidence on the demand side of private-public goods, 2010, p.1.
649 Clapham Third World Politics, 1985, p.56.
650 A. Butler, “Introduction” in Anthony Butler (ed), Paying for Politics: Party Funding
and Political Change in South Africa and the Global South, Dunkeld: Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung, 2010, p.1.
651 Clapham Third World Politics, p.56.
652 A. Butler, “Conclusion: The opportunities and Challenges of Party Finance reform in
South Africa” in Anthony Butler (ed), Paying for Politics: Party Funding and Political
Change in South Africa and the Global South, Dunkeld: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,
2010, p 247.
653 The House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee Party Funding: First
Report of Session 2006-2007, London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2006.p.55.
654 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Funding of
Political Parties and Election Campaigns, Handbook Series, Stockholm: International
IDEA, 2003.
655Herbert E. Alexander “Introduction” in H.E. Alexander (ed.) Campaign Money:
Reform and Realities in the States, New York: The Free Press, 1976, p .7.
656 Deji Olaore, “Comparative Experience in political Party Finance Reform in Africa”, in
N. Obiorah (ed), Political Finance Reform Handbook, Lagos: Centre For Law and Social
Action (CLASA), 2005 p4.
657 National Commission for Civic Education, Civic Knowledge among the youth in
Ghana, Accra: NCCE, 2006, p.7.
658 K-H Nassmacher, “Introduction: Political Parties and Democracy”, in International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Funding of Political Parties
and Election Campaigns, Handbook Series, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003, p. 5.
271
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. PRIMARY SOURCES
INTERVIEWS
List of Members of Parliament Interviewed
No. Date of Name of MP Party Constituency/Region
Interview
1 7/11//2008 Kofi Ahaliga NDC Afram Plains South, ER
2 7/11/2008 Juliana Azumah-Mensah NDC Ho East, VR
3 7/11/2008 Stephen Kunsu NDC Kintampo North, BA
4 10/11/2008 Joseph Tsatsu Agbenu NDC Afram Plains North, ER
5 10/11/2008 John Tia Akologu NDC Talensi, UER
6 10/11/2008 Josephine H. Addoh NPP Kwadaso, AR
7 11/11/2008 Frederick Opare-Ansah NPP Suhum, ER
8 11/11/2008 James Appietu-Ankra NPP Lower East Akim, ER
9 12/11/2008 Samuel K. Obadai NPP Agona West, CR
10 13/11/2008 Kwadzo Opare-hammond NPP Adenta, GAR
11 13/11/2008 Wisdom Gidisu NDC Krachi, VR
12 15/11/2008 Francis Addai-Nimoh NPP Mampong ,AR
13 15/11/2008 John A. Ndebugre PNC Zebilla, UWR
14 30/01/2009 Samia Yaba Nkrumah CPP Jomoro, WR
15 12/06/2009 Jonathan Lackie-Komme NDC Odododiodioo, GAR
16 04/08/2009 Seth Adjei Baah Ind Nkawkaw, ER
17 02/08/2010 Tetteh, T. Chaire NDC Ablekuma, GAR
18 27/01/2011 Kwame Ayimadu-Antwi NPP Asante-Akin North Ash
19 28/01/2011 Kwabena A Asiamah NPP Fanteakwa, ER
20 28/01/2011 Albert Kwaku Obbin NPP Prestea –Huni Valley,
WR
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21 13/01/2012 Joseph Nikpe Bukari NDC Saboba, NR
22 12/06/2014 Dominic Napare NDC Sene B/A
23 13/06/2014 Kwadzo Baah Agyemang NPP Akim North
List of Political Party Executives and Card Bearing Members Interviewed
No. Date of Name Party Position
Interview
1 15/12/2007 H.E. J.J. Rawlings NDC Founder
2 15/10/2008 Prof. Ivan Addae-Mensah PNP Gen. Secretary
3 3/Nov/2008 Mr. Napoleon Agboada NDC Constituency Exe. Keta
4 17/11/2008 Mr. Mike Eghan CPP National Treasurer
5 18/11/2008 Mrs Margaret Clarke- NDC National Treasurer
Kwesie
6 18/11/2008 Mr. Baba Jamal NDC Dep. Gen Secretary
7 20/11/2008 Mr. B. A. Effah NDC Card bearing Member
8 20/11/2008 Mr Ivor Greenstreet CPP Gen. Secretary
9 21/11/2008 Mr. David Nibi PNC Dep. Treasurer
10 21/11/2008 Alhaji Abdul Moomin PNC Vice Chairman
11 23/11/2008 Mrs. Chriatiana Fugah PNC Administrator
12 23/11/2008 Mr. T.N. Ward-Brew DPP Presidential Flag bearer
13 24/11/2008 Mr. Haruna Esseku NPP Former Chairman
14 25/11/2008 Mr. Attoh Jonathan CPP Administrator
11/06/2014
15 27/11/2008 Mrs Gifty A.A. Ayeh NPP National Treasurer
16 28/11/2008 Mr. Kwabena Essem NPP Press Secretary
17 28/11/2008 Mr. Antwi Agyei NPP Administrator
18 28/11/2008 Mr. E. Tsay NPP NPP, Patron/ Card
19 3/12/ 2008 Mr. Atik Mohamed PNC Education Spokesperson
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20 10/01/2009 Dr. J.E. Oppong DPP Administrator
21 11/01/2009 Prof. Kwamena Ahwoi NDC Founding Member
22 16/01 2009 Mr. Owusu Gyimah CPP Elder, CPP, 1958
23 17/01 2009 Mr. Zakour Klu NPP Polling Station Chairman
24 02/06/2009 Mr George Opare Addo NDC DCE, Akropong/ Card
25 05/06/2009 Mr. Paul Kpai NDC Youth Organizer VR
26 05/06/2009 Kwabena Ayisi NPP Youth Organizer, ER
27 11/06/2009 Mr.Abrebesse Amponsah NDC Card Bearing member
28 12/06/2009 Mr. George B. Azumah NDC DCE, Tolon/ Card
29 12/06/2009 Mrs M. Opare-Hammond NPP Card Bearing Member
30 18/06/2009 Mr. Augustine Yaw Nti NPP Card Bearing Member
31 19/06/2009 A Second Lady NDC Card Bearing member
32 26/06/2009 Mr. Vincent Tawiah NDC Card bearing member
33 10/08/2009 Mr. Kweku Baah NDC Card Bearing member
34 15/10/2009 Dr. G. Agabila NPP MP contestant/Card
35 14/01/2011 Mr.Ludwig Hlodze NDC Nat. Youth Organizer
36 26/01/2011 Mr. Aoyi E. Chegeweh NPP DCE, Nanvorongo/ Card
37 04/02/2011 Mr. Steve Ahiawodor NDC Const. Executive, VR
38 15/05/2011 Dr. Augustine Siaw NPP Card Bearing Member
39 26/05/2011 Mr. Kwame Jantuah CPP Dep. National Organizer
40 27/05/2011 Dr. Osei-Akom Kwaku NPP MP Contestant Tano
North constituency, BA
41 09/09/2011 Mrs.Dorcas Amoa NPP MP Contestant/ Evalue-
Gwira constituency
42 07/10/2011 Mr.Amenyo Ntiri NPP Card Holding member
43 09/07/2014 Mr. David Apasera PNC National Treasurer
44 06/07/2014 Mr. Jabila Zakari PNC Card Holding member
45 06/07/2014 Mr. Habib Ahmed PNC Card Holding member
46 27/11/2013 Dr. Adoph Lutherodt CPP National Treasurer
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47 12/04/2014 Mrs. Joyce Atudu NDC Card Holding member
48 12/04/2014 Mr. Seth Awuku NPP Card Holding member
49 12/04/2014 Madam Gina Oduro NPP Card Holding member
50 14/04/2014 Mr. Prince Adobah CPP Constituency Secretary
51 15/04/2014 Joseph Addae NPP Card Holding member
52 15/04/2014 Mr. Paul Mantey CPP Card Holding member
53 17/04/2014 Mr. Oduro Mensah NPP Card Holding member
54 18/04/2014 Mr. Oduro Mensah NPP Card Holding member
55 18/04/2014 Mr. Oduro Mensah NPP Card Holding member
54 02/06/2014 Ms Joyce Appau CPP Card Holding member
55 02/06/2014 Mr. Foster Asante NDC MP Contestant ER
56 03/06/2014 Mr.Saeed Ahmed, NDC TEIN President GIMPA
57 03/06/2014 Mr.Minta Eyifah NPP TESCON President
GIMPA
58 06/06/2014 Mr Samuel Ampofo NDC National Organizer
61 04/11/2014 Mr.Ernest Atua NPP Constituency Chairman
VR
List of People from Civil Society and Public Institutions Interviewed
# Date of Name Position/Institution
Interview
1 12/09/2008 Mr. Kwesi Jonah IDEG
2 26/11/2008 Mr. David Kanga Dep. Chairman, E.C.
3 5/06/ 2009 Mr. Samuel Y. Aidoo Finance Director E. Commission
4 5/06/ 2009 Mr. Kofi Kye-Duodu Senior Electoral Officer, E.C.
5 5/06 2009 Mr. Anthony Amedzakey Principal Electoral officer
6 12/06/2009 Mrs. Jean Mensa IEA, Administrator
7 16/06/ 2009 Mr. Ben Ephson Editor Daily Dispatch
8 17/06/ 2009 Mrs Comfort Mensah GBC, Editor in Chief
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9 18/06/ 2009 Mad. Kathrin Meissner, Residence Director, Frederick
Ebert Foundation
10 19/06/ 2009 Mr. Papa Nketia Director Public Affairs, NCCE
11 19/06/2009 Mr. Kojo Tito Commission Secretary, NCCE
12 20/06/ 2009 Mr. Bernard Deh, Elder of Jehovah Witness Church,
Legon Branch
13 20/06/ 2009 Rev. Ekow Eshun Head Pastor, Revival Christian
Ministry
14 27/01/ 2011 Mrs. Elizabeth Addai- Executive Director for Christian
Boateng Mother’s Association
15 14/09/2011 Mr. Christian Owusu- Director, Public Affairs, E.C.
Parry
16 Mr. Kingsley Tettey TV3
17 14/08/2014 Mr Victor Brobbey Research Consultant, Centre for
Democratic Development-Ghana
(CDD-Ghana)
18 18/08/2014 Nana Banyin Lecturer, GIMPA
19 20/08/2014 Nana Asante Traditional Leader
20 11/09/2014 Dr. James Tufuor Lecturer (UPSA)
21 12/10/2014 Mr. David Agbee Executive Director, Ghana
Institute of Governance and
Security (GIGS)
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RADIO DISCUSSIONS
Discussion on Joy FM, 99.7 FM on Thursday January 8, 2009, 7.45 am
Discussion on Radio Gold, 90.5 FM on Saturday February 7, 2011, 9.30 am.
Discussion on Radio Gold, 90.5 FM on Saturday June 11, 2009, 10.30am.
Discussion on Radio Gold, 90.5 FM on Thursday January 15, 2009, 10.30 am.
Discussion on Radio Gold, 90.5FM on Saturday January 15, 2009, 10.20 am.
Discussion on Joy FM 99.7 News, August 19, 2014, 7.00pm
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APPENDIX “A”
LIST OF REGISTERED POLITICAL PARTIES IN GHANA UNDER THE FOURTH
REPUBLIC AS AT NOVEMBER, 2012
NAME OF LEADER/ GENERAL COLOURS EMBLEM SLOGAN/
PARTY CHAIRMAN SECRETARY MOTTO
1. National Dr. Kwabena Mr. Johnson Green, The Unity, Stability
Democratic Adjei Asiedu Nketia White, Black Umbrella and
Congress and Red with the Development
(NDC) Head of a
Bird at the
tip
2. New Mr. Jake Mr. Kwadwo Red, Blue Red White Development
Patriotic Obetsebi Owusu and White And Blue in Freedom
Party (NPP) Lamptey Afriyie background
with an
Elephant in
the middle
3. Convention Madam Samia Mr. Ivor Red, Green A Red Unity in
People’s Party Nkrumah Kwabena and White Cockerel Strength
(CPP) Greenstreet
4. Democratic Mr. T. N. Mr. Lawrence White and White Dove God is Great
People’s Party Ward Brew Hornu the Rainbow with Olive
(DPP) Branch in its
Beak flying
above the
Rainbow
5. Egle Party Ag. Chairman Mr. C. K. Red, Blue Coot Party of the
(EP) Mr. Henry Binewoatsor and White Landing in People for the
Gidi the colours People by the
o Red, Blue People
and White
6. People’s Alhaji Ahmed Mr. Bernard Red, Green Coconut Service with
National Ramadan Mornah and White Tree Honesty
Convention
(PNC)
7. Great Not available John Red, White A Bird at Caring for
Consolidated Thompson and Yellow Rest in the People
Popular Party Centre of 3
(GCPP) Concentric
Circles
8. United Nii Armah Mr. Erick Green and An Arm Grooming
Ghana Tagoe Dyienya Blue with People
Movement Two Fingers for Ghana’s
(UGM) Pointing Up Development
9.Ghana Dr. Kofi Mr. Kwakye Yellow, Blue A Group of Good
Democratic Amoah Yiadom and Black Ghanaians Democrats for
Republican Sitting in Real Progress
Party Council
(GDRP)
10. Democratic Dr. Obed Yao Mr. John White, Red, Service in
Freedom Party Asamoah Ameka Violet and Freedom
(DF) Green
11. Reformed Kwabena Charles Green, Stool and Youth in
Patriotic Party Adjei Boateng White and Bloom Service for
(RPP) Blue Development
12. National Mr. Peter Mr. Yellow, Blue A Rising Ghana First
Reformed Party Kpordugbe Kyeretwie and Red Sun
(NEP) Opoku
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Mr. Kobina Simon K. Blue, White Pilled Up Redeem
13. Ghana Amoo-Aidoo Dewotor and Gold Palms Ghana Now!
National Party Now! Now
(GNP)
14. United Mr. Kofi Alhassan Blue, White, Human Putting Ghana
Renaissance Wayo Saeed Green and Palm Wit First
Party (URP) Yellow Rainbow
Colours at
Background
15. New Vision Daniel Robert Kobby Mauve, Lamp and Development
Party Nkansah White and Star for All
(NVP) Gold
16. United Ramon Osei Ken K. A. Purple and Purple, Red United Eye
Love Party Akoto Amoah White and Heart Free
(ULP)
17. United Nana Agyenim Samuel Bekoe Red, White Golden Key Empowerment
Front Party Boateng Owusu and Black for
(UFP) Development
18.United Tetteh K. Henry Teye Yellow, Two Hands Unity the Best
Development Abraham Quarshie White and Bending full
System Party Blue Brown
(UDSP)
19. Kofi Percival Dr. Divine Orange, Blue Computer Putting
Independent Akpaloo Gabriel Brefo and White People’s Lives
People’s Party First through
(IPP) Technology
20.Progressive Nii Allotey Kofi Asamoah Red Sun on Red Sun Prosperity in
People’s Party Brew- Siaw White Peace
(PPP) Hammond Background
21. Ghana Madam Akua Kusi Collins Blue, White Cocoa Love and Unity
Freedom Party Donkor and Yellow
(GFP)
22. Yes Annin – Kofi Stephen Amo Gold, House, Te-Na-Fa
People’s Party Addo Dabanka Metallic Maize,Yam (Keep Profits in
(YPP) Black and and Fish Ghana)
Red
23. National Dr. Nii Armah Dr Joseph K. Green, Black White Dove Justice, Unity,
Democratic Josiah-Ayeh Manboah- and Red in Flight Peace and
Party (NDP) Rockson Position Progress
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APPENDIX B
POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING IN GHANA
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
We are collecting data on views of party members on political party finance. This study
seeks to understand the nature of political party financing in Ghana. The information
obtained is for academic use only. Your participation is voluntary. All responses are 100%
anonymous therefore your name is not necessary. It will help contribute to the on-going
debate on party financing and democracy in Ghana. It would be appreciated if you could
spare some time to answer the following questions as best as you can
SECTION A: PARTY AFFILIATION
1. Are you a card holding member of any political party? (1) Yes (2) No
2. If yes, which political party?
(1) NPP (2) NDC (3) CPP (4) PNC
3. [If Yes to question 1] How long have you been a member of the party?
(1) Less than 1 year (2) 1 - 5years (3) 6 -10 years
(4) 11 -15 years (5) 16 - 20 years (6) 20 years and above
4. What is your membership status? (1) Executive member (2) Ordinary member
5. Which of the following positions do you hold in your party?
(i) Member of Parliament (MP) [ ]
(ii) National Executive [ ]
(iii) Regional Executive [ ]
(iv) Constituency Executive [ ]
(v) Polling Station Executive [ ]
(vi) TESCON Executive [ ]
(vii) Council of Elders [ ]
(viii) Overseas Branch Executive [ ]
(ix) Any other, specify [ ]
(x) Ordinary member [ ]
SECTION B: POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING
6. Do you pay party membership dues? (1) Yes (2) No
7. Who pays your party membership dues? (please tick all that apply)
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(i) I always pay it myself [ ]
(ii) Other party executives sometimes pay for me [ ]
(iii) Some wealthy non-Executive members of the party pay for me [ ]
(iv) Some wealthy non-party members pay it for me [ ]
(v) Other (specify)…………………………………………………… [ ]
8. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement that your party obtains its major funds
from the following financial contributors.
Party Financial Contributors Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
1. Ordinary members 1 2 3 4 5
2. Rich individuals of the party 1 2 3 4 5
3. Founding members 1 2 3 4 5
4. Local Businessmen/Businesswomen 1 2 3 4 5
5. Members of Parliament 1 2 3 4 5
6. State / Government funds 1 2 3 4 5
7. Executive members of the party 1 2 3 4 5
8. Contributions from overseas branches 1 2 3 4 5
9. Foreign businesses 1 2 3 4 5
10. Any other, specify 1 2 3 4 5
9. Which one of the above financial contributors to the party would you say is the major
source of funding for your party?
……………………………………………………………..[ ]
10. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements.
1. strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral, 4. Agree 5 Strongly Agree
Party Financial Contributors
a) The party is more dependent on the financial 1 2 3 4 5
contributions of wealthy members.
b) The party is more dependent on the financial 1 2 3 4 5
contributions of ordinary members.
c) Wealthy people who provide money for the 1 2 3 4 5
party tend to influence the outcome of elections
within the party
d) The State should fund political parties 1 2 3 4 5
e) Political parties should fully disclose to the 1 2 3 4 5
public their sources of funds
f) Political parties should fully disclose to the 1 2 3 4 5
public their expenditure
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g) The state should limit the amount of money that 1 2 3 4 5
individual citizens and companies can donate to
parties
11. Are you aware of the practice where some individuals pay party dues for party
members?
(1) Yes (2) No
12. Apart from the payment of party membership dues, have you ever made other financial
contribution to the party? (1) Yes (2) No
13. What do you expect in return from your political party for the financial contributions
that you have made for its activities?
Expectations for making financial contributions Please tick as many that apply
Executive position in the party
A position in Local Government if the party wins
A position in National Government if the party wins
Award of government contract if party wins elections
Other (specify)
14. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement about how wealthy individuals who
finance your party influence the outcome of elections within the party.
1. strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral, 4. Agree 5 Strongly Agree
Party Financial Contributors
They impose candidates on the party 1 2 3 4 5
They pay membership dues for potential delegates 1 2 3 4 5
and aspirants
They provide economic and social incentives 1 2 3 4 5
They buy votes with cash and kind 1 2 3 4 5
They fix high election filling fees 1 2 3 4 5
15. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the following as factors that affect
the ability of your party to mobilize funds from ordinary members of the party?
Factors affecting mobilization of funds from
ordinary party members
Lack of transparency and accountability in the use 1 2 3 4 5
of party funds
Weak organizational capacity to mobilize funds 1 2 3 4 5
from ordinary members
Ordinary members are financially poor 1 2 3 4 5
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Ordinary members fear political victimization 1 2 3 4 5
16. What do you suggest should be done by your party to mobilize more money from the
ordinary members of the party?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………
SECTION C: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
17. Age (1) 18- 30 (2) 31-40 (3) 41-50 (4) 51-60 (5) 60
and above
18. Gender (1) Male (2) Female
19. Marital Status (1) Married (2) Never Married (3) Not married
20. Level of Education
(1) No formal education (2) Primary education (3) JHS (4) SHS (5) Teacher training
(6) Tertiary
21. Employment status?
(1) Artisan (2) Employed by the state (3) Employed by private business (4) Unemployed
22. What is your average monthly income?
(1) Less than 500 (2) 500 – 2,000 (3) 2,001 – 4,000 (4) 4,001 – 6,000 (5) Above 6,000
23. Which of the following religious groups do you identify with?
(1) Traditional (2) Christian (3) Islam (4) others (specify)…………….………………….
28. Region of your WR CR GAR VR ER AR BAR NR UER UWR
constituency 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
29. Name of your
Constituency
THANK YOU VERY MUCH
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APPENDIX “C”
INTERVIEW GUIDE
Issue 1: Nature of Sources Funding
F1. What is the major source of funding for your party?
F2: Are there any other sources?
F3: Will you agree that rich individuals are the main financiers of the party?
F4: Why do you think rich individual support the party?
F5: How do the party mobilize funds from rich individuals?
Issue 2: Dependence on wealthy few
D1: Will you agree that the party is dependent on the few rich individual financiers?
D2: To what extent do rich individual party financiers influence the internal
democracy in the election of constituency, regional, and national executives?
D3: How does the party’s reliance on rich individual for funding affect party’s the
capacity of the party to sanction or discipline such individual when they violet party
constitution/rules?
D4: How does the involvement of rich individual in party financing affect their
businesses?
D5: What are the expectations of rich individuals and businesses who make
financial contributions to the party?
D6: Is the party able to meet the expectations of the rich individuals and businesses
who finance the party? If yes, please give examples.
Issue 3: Challenges of funding and proposals for state funding
C1: What are the major challenges faced by the party in mobilizing funds?
C2: Concern raised by some party members about transparency in the use of the
party funds to the extent that it demotivates the concerned members from making
further financial contributions? Do you share such concern about transparency in the
use of party funds?
C3: What do you suggest should be done to enhance transparency in the use of party
funds?
C4: Does the party render account to members about how party funds are used?
C5: If yes, in what specific ways is such accountability rendered?
C6: Do you support the view that the state should fund political parties? Give
reasons.
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