South African Journal of International Affairs
ISSN: 1022-0461 (Print) 1938-0275 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsaj20
Ghana's elections of 7 December 2016: A post-
mortem
Joseph R.A. Ayee
To cite this article: Joseph R.A. Ayee (2017) Ghana's elections of 7 December 2016:
A post-mortem, South African Journal of International Affairs, 24:3, 311-330, DOI:
10.1080/10220461.2017.1378124
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2017.1378124
Published online: 06 Nov 2017.
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SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2017
VOL. 24, NO. 3, 311–330
https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2017.1378124
Ghana’s elections of 7 December 2016: A post-mortem
Joseph R.A. Ayee
University of Ghana, Legon, and Institute for Democratic Governance, Accra, Ghana
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Ghana went to presidential and parliamentary polls on 7 December Ghana; elections; Mahama;
2016, leading to the defeat of President John Mahama and the Akufo-Addo; National
National Democratic Congress government by the opposition, the Democratic Congress; New
New Patriotic Party led by Nana Akufo-Addo. The outcome of the Patriotic Party
elections therefore followed in the same vein as those held in
Ghana in 2000 and 2008, in which the incumbent party lost to the
opposition. This article is based on a desk study review of the
2016 elections. There is a brief overview of the state of affairs in
Ghana’s electoral politics, followed by a discussion of Ghana’s
electoral reforms, the organisation and management of the
elections, the candidates and the campaigns, and the outcome of
the elections, as well as some of the challenges that faced the
transition process.
Introduction
Since Huntington’s1 treatise on the ‘third wave’ of democratisation in the 1990s, elec-
tions have been regarded as the right and acceptable means through which regimes
are changed in Africa. Frequent and competitive elections are considered central to
democracy because they provide opportunities for citizens to either endorse or reject
the performance of an incumbent government. In other words, the opportunity to
choose through periodic and competitive elections who will govern a country is
widely held as the hallmark of representative democracy.2 Elections are an essential
part of the democratic development and consolidation of every state; they represent
a major means of increasing citizen participation in political life and achieving the
twin objectives of poverty alleviation and human development.3 Some of the grounds
for justifying the holding of elections include the capacity of citizens to influence the
conduct of politicians, the compensation for private inequalities by public or state
resources, the distribution of power in society, the consolidation of new democracies
and the promotion of their legitimacy. In short, frequent and competitive elections
are designed to supply legitimacy and to solve principal–agent problems (ie, the
voters as principals holding their representatives as agents in check), as well as to
ensure governmental responsiveness.4
Against this backdrop, this article based on a desk study examines the 7 December
2016 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana, a state which has been identified
CONTACT Joseph R.A. Ayee jraayee@gmail.com
© 2017 The South African Institute of International Affairs
312 J.R.A. AYEE
as part of the ‘third wave’ of democratisation in the 1990s. The country has held seven
elections since that time (in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016). Notably, the
elections of 2000, 2008 and 2016 resulted in alternation in power from one political
party to another. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) wrested power from the incumbent
National Democratic Congress (NDC) in 2000, while the NDC came back to power after
winning the 2008 elections from the NPP. In 2016, however, the NPP soundly defeated
the ruling NDC, which was very sure that it would win the elections.
There are two reasons that made the 2016 elections perhaps unique even though the
country has successfully held several peaceful elections over the last 24 years. The first is
the appointment of a new chairman for the Electoral Commission (EC) and the perception
of her being inexperienced for the role and therefore subject to manipulation.5 The second
is that it has been emphasised that the 2016 elections took place in a more challenging
context than the past six elections. The political stakes were widely perceived to be
higher than in previous presidential elections, as the incumbent president sought re-elec-
tion after his party had been in office for two terms and, conversely, the main opposition
candidate pursued his third and perhaps final run for office. Public confidence in election
administration was heavily tested during the protracted petition challenging the 2012
presidential results, and the EC had its first new chairperson since 1993. In this highly
charged political environment, the need for inclusion, transparency and accountability
was heightened, especially as procedural disputes became politicised, further fuelling
tensions and raising fears of election-related violence.6
Following this introduction, there is a brief overview of the state of affairs in electoral
politics in Ghana. This will be followed by a discussion of the electoral reforms
implemented before the 2016 elections. The organisation and management of the elec-
tions, the candidates and campaigns, the outcome of the elections and the transition
process will be put under the microscope. The paper then concludes by highlighting
some lessons.
Electoral politics in Ghana: The state of affairs
Much ink has been expended on electoral politics in Ghana since the return to consti-
tutional rule in 1993. The studies have focused variously on outcomes and challenges of
the elections, voter alignments and rationality, ethnicity, legal and institutional frame-
works, voting patterns, campaign issues, party financing and abuse of incumbency, elite
consensus, candidates’ selection, election management, management of conflicts, ideol-
ogy, manifestos and the transition to and consolidation of democracy, progressing
through the seven elections held in 1992,7 1996,8 2000,9 2004,10 2008,11 201212 and
2016.13 A few of the studies, however, were comparative as they focused on the numerous
political, economic, social and other environmental factors, both local and international,
that have mediated electoral politics, thereby affecting the processes that have led to elec-
toral outcomes and the meaning of representation in the six elections.14 In addition, some
of the studies were based on responses to questionnaires by respondents.15 This article
contributes to the burgeoning literature on electoral politics in Ghana by examining the
2016 elections with specific reference to electoral reforms, organisation and management
of the elections, the candidates and campaigns, and scrutinising the outcome as well as
the transition process.
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 313
Electoral reforms before the 2016 elections
Ghana is considered one of the most resilient democracies in West Africa, having
consolidated as a democratic society after two and a half decades of military rule and
political instability. Since 1992, political governance, a necessary crucible for sustaining
economic governance, has steadily improved.
The period of multiple coups during the post-independence era has given way to a
stable multi-party democracy. Seven elections have been held from 1992 with peaceful
transfers of power between the country’s two main political parties, namely, the NDC
and the NPP.
A number of electoral reforms were implemented after 1992 to enhance the transpar-
ency and credibility of the electoral process and outcome. They include the replacement of
opaque ballot boxes with transparent ones and thumb-printed ID cards with biometric
registration and verification processes; the replacement of the Political Parties Law
(PNDCL 281) of 1992, which was seen as obstructive to competitive party politics and
democratic progress,16 with the Political Parties Act 574 of 2000 to guarantee greater par-
ticipation of the citizens; and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections on
the same day. In spite of the reforms, elections in Ghana have been characterised by
some malpractices and alleged rigging.
The December 2012 elections were won by the ruling party, the NDC under the leader-
ship of John Mahama, by an overall national vote of 50.7%. The NPP under Nana Akufo-
Addo secured 47.7% while the remaining candidates had an aggregate of 1.6%.17 The elec-
tion results were challenged at the Supreme Court (SC) by the opposition NPP, which
alleged election irregularities and the cancellation of over 1 million votes. On 29 August
2013, the SC dismissed the case and upheld Mahama as the legitimately elected president.
The NPP candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo, conceded defeat and indicated that he and the NPP
were not going to seek a review of the verdict of the SC in the interests of the country.
The peaceful arbitration of the election petition with both political parties accepting the
ruling further consolidated Ghana’s democracy. The court case no doubt largely divided
the country on political lines. This notwithstanding, the risk of instability was muted by
calls from civil society, the clergy and the National Peace Council for peace and order to
be maintained in the country.
The outcome of the petition highlighted some weaknesses in aspects of electoral
administration, including doubts about the integrity of the voters register, high incidence
of invalid or rejected ballots and random instances of electoral irregularities, among
others, and therefore the need for electoral reforms. These reforms were recommended
by the SC and were to be initiated and implemented by the EC, or more specifically,
the election management body. It is to these reforms that we now turn.
Post-2012 reforms
Following the 2012 presidential election petition, there were numerous calls for reform
and improvement in the electoral process for Ghana’s nascent democracy. Accordingly,
the EC in 2013 set up a Special Reform Committee (SRC), which was tasked with synthesis-
ing the various reforms proposed by the panel of justices of the SC and political parties.
Membership of the SRC included representatives of the political parties, governance
314 J.R.A. AYEE
institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs). The SRC recommended 29 reforms,
which first went to the Inter Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) for discussion and thereafter
were all accepted by the EC with the exception of two, namely,
. membership of the IPAC should be expanded to include CSOs; and
. there should be no voting without biometric verification.
The first was rejected by the EC on the grounds that the IPAC should remain the platform
for engaging political parties only. The CSOs may continue to attend the IPAC meetings as
observers but not as members. On the second, the EC maintained that, in the event of a
false rejection of a voter by the biometric verification devices, provision should be made
for manual verification to prevent disenfranchisement of voters by the equipment.18
The 27 reform proposals which were accepted by the EC and implemented before and
during the 2016 elections were meant to make the polls more transparent, inclusive, cred-
ible, uncontested and acceptable to all the stakeholders.19 All 27 reform proposals with the
exception of three were fully implemented. Those implemented include the setting up of a
national collation centre to replace the ‘strong room’ perceived as non-transparent by
party agents, a reduction in the number of voters per polling station from 1000 to 850,
institutionalisation of the IPAC, and capacity building and improved remuneration for
EC staff. The three reform proposals not implemented were the publication of the presi-
dential election results per polling station on the website of the EC, the change of election
month from December to November, and electronic voting. The latter two were beyond
the EC, as they involved the collaboration of other institutions and the country as a
whole. For instance, when the EC put the constitutional amendment bill calling for a
change in the election date before Parliament, it was rejected largely on partisan and prac-
tical grounds. Electronic voting, on the other hand, was not adopted on the grounds that
the population lacked adequate general literacy and computer literacy. Publication of the
presidential election results per polling station on the website of the EC was not under-
taken because of technical challenges, including the hacking of the website of the EC
during the December elections.20
The reforms resulted in the preparation of a new set of public elections regulations, cap-
tured in Constitutional Instrument (CI) of 2016, which regulated the registration of voters
and the conduct of the elections after it was passed by Parliament. This gave the political
parties some assurance that the outcome of the elections would be credible and therefore
contributed to the acceptance of results by all the parties in spite of one or two reser-
vations by the losing NDC which could not be supported with evidence.
Organisation and management of the 2016 elections
The preparedness of the EC to organise and manage the 2016 elections was initially
doubted on largely operational and legal grounds.21 First, the appointment of Charlotte
Osei as the new Chairperson of the EC in June 2015 by President Mahama created a per-
ception of inexperience and manipulation from the minority political parties, particularly
the NPP, with some calling for her resignation ahead of the polls when her performance
was benchmarked against that of her predecessor, Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, who had success-
fully overseen five elections since 1996.22 Matters were not helped much by the public
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 315
performance of the new chairperson, nor by some of her actions which seemed to convey
that she was the sole electoral commissioner and not the chair of a collective EC made up
of seven members, of which she was primus inter pares. The EC was chastised for launching
at the end of April 2016 a five-year strategic plan (2016–2020), including a change of logo
and the goal of becoming the benchmark in Africa for conducting ‘independent, trusted,
world class democratic elections for citizens and candidates alike’.23 This launch was con-
sidered unnecessary, ill-timed and demonstrating a lack of seriousness on the part of the
EC when it was still grappling with elections-related activities.24
Even though the launch of a strategic plan was a good thing in itself, the criticisms
stemmed from the inability of the EC to communicate well with the public on the state
of the 27 electoral reforms and its election time-table, even though they were discussed
at IPAC meetings to improve transparency.25
The EC did not have a communication strategy until it launched an 88-page first-ever
communication strategy at the end of August 2016, with support from the United
States Agency for International Development. This strategy sought to transform the
image of the EC and improve its relationship with stakeholders.26
The launch of the communication strategy led to improved communication by the EC
with the public and the engagement of political parties in more open discussions. In
regular meetings with the IPAC, the EC developed consensus on revisions to the adminis-
tration of the electoral process. For example, political parties observed the procurement
process of newly designed ‘pink sheets’ – the results sheets given to party agents at
polling stations – adopted as a consequence of the litigation over the 2012 polls.27
Second, the challenge of a clean voters register has always dogged Ghanaian elections
since the return to constitutional rule in 1993, even though it has been recognised that
one of the prerequisites for a credible electoral process is the production of an accurate
voters register, as it guarantees that all eligible voters are provided with the opportunity
to vote.28 The voters register was the subject of contention in the 2016 elections as stake-
holders raised concerns about the inclusion of unqualified people such as under-aged
voters. Some stakeholders called for the creation of a new voters register, but the SC dis-
missed the request as it found it not necessary to have a new register.29 The SC ruled
instead that there should be an update of the existing register. A limited voter registration
exercise for first-time voters was therefore conducted from 28 April to 8 May 2016, during
which 1,031,356 voters were added to the register. This was followed by the public display
of the voters register for objections for 21 days from mid-July to mid-August 2016.30
Concerns were also raised about registrants included on the register based on the
national health insurance scheme cards, which had become invalid as proof of identity
for registration with the repeal of the Public Elections (Registration of Voters) Regulations
CI 72 of 2012. In July 2016, the SC ordered the EC to delete the names of individuals who
had registered using the national health insurance scheme card from the voters register.
This led to the deletion of the names of 56,900 citizens, who were offered the opportunity
to re-register with a different document. The registration of prisoners and the special
voting exercise for election officials, accredited media personnel and security agencies
was seen as promoting inclusion.31
The final voters register for 2016 had 15,713,499 registered voters in contrast to the
14,031,793 recorded in 2012.32 In total the 2016 figure statistically represented more
than 57% of the estimated total population of Ghana, which stood at 27.4 million
316 J.R.A. AYEE
people in 2015 according to the latest Population and Housing Census (2010). With an esti-
mated national growth rate of 2.5%, however, it is argued that a voting population of 15.7
million out of a population of 27.4 million is ‘statistically unacceptable’.33 This supports
claims that Ghana’s voters register is bloated.
The inaccuracy of the voters register, it is believed, largely contributed to some of the
unrealistic projections of the NDC and NPP in the collation of their election results from
their constituencies, providing them each with a false sense of hope of being in a ‘comfor-
table lead’ as the results trickled in.34
A third factor in managing the 2016 elections arose as legal challenges against the EC
by some political parties and individuals sought to undermine its integrity and prepared-
ness. Indeed, Osei’s short term in office as chairperson of the EC was plagued with a litany
of court disputes and controversy, most of which were lost. In fact, the entire electoral
process was highly litigious. This includes the legal challenge of the People’s Progressive
Party (PPP) over the EC’s increase of filing fees for presidential and parliamentary candi-
dates and the disqualification of aspiring presidential candidates by the EC.
Two of the legal challenges deserve some space given their implications for the elec-
toral process. The first was the EC’s disqualification of 13 out of the 17 presidential candi-
dates on grounds of errors and omissions on their presidential nomination forms,
especially the number of subscribers, which did not meet the minimum required by law
as the EC challenged some of the signatures. The disqualification of the presidential can-
didate of the PPP was nullified by the SC, which ordered the EC to allow the candidates to
make corrections on their nomination forms. After the EC re-examined the forms, it
approved the names of the presidential candidates of the PPP, NDP and PNC.
While the EC lost this case, it achieved two very important things. First, all outstanding
cases were brought to an end, avoiding a multitude of cases going through the courts,
which was especially important given the need for the electoral process to move
forward and for the printing of ballots. Second, because the EC has no power to reduce
the time between the end of the nomination period and the day of election, which
should be not less than 30 days, the SC ruling gave the EC legal cover for holding elections
29 days after the nomination period, rather than at least 30 days as required.35
A second legal challenge concerned the EC’s increase in filing fees36 for candidates, on
the grounds of lack of consultation of the political parties. The PPP filed a case at the High
Court to seek interpretation of Article 296 of the Constitution to determine on what basis
the EC set the new fees. The lawsuit was, however, dismissed by the High Court on 7
October 2016. Even though the EC won, the case further confirmed the perception
among the minority parties that the EC did not consult them through the IPAC and that
the EC was being manipulated by the ruling NDC to give the party an advantage over
others.
In short, the organisation and management of the elections by the EC were by and
large successful in spite of the doubts, perceived lack of neutrality of the EC, its unpre-
paredness and administrative lapses, the bloated register and the legal challenges,
which did not affect the outcome of the elections as the polls were seen by both dom-
estic and international observers as free and fair.37 Unlike the 2012 elections, the results
of the 2016 elections were not challenged in court. The political parties, voters, civil
society organisations and the security forces also contributed to the peaceful and
orderly nature of the polls.
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 317
The candidates and the campaigns
Seven presidential candidates contested the 2016 elections, with six of the candidates
nominated by political parties and one an independent (see Table 1). Of the seven candi-
dates, only one was a woman, the wife of the first president of Ghana’s Fourth Republic, J.J.
Rawlings. The low number of women candidates at the presidential and parliamentary
levels in the 2016 underscored the continuing gender imbalance in the country, in spite
of democratisation efforts. International observer missions subsequently recommended
measures to address this lingering weakness.38
For the parliamentary elections, candidates were elected from 275 single-member con-
stituencies on the basis of first-past-the-post. A total of 1144 parliamentary candidates
competed, having been nominated by 15 political parties out of the 24 political parties
registered by the EC, while some stood as independent candidates. The figure of parlia-
mentary candidates is a slight drop from the 2012 elections figure of 1330.39 As in the
2012 elections, only the two major parties, the NDC and NPP, fielded candidates in all
of the 275 constituencies in the 2016 elections. They were followed by the CPP and PPP
with 216 and 164 candidates, respectively. The remaining fielded insignificant numbers
ranging from 1 to 65. It is instructive to note that 65 independent candidates, who
were unhappy over primaries in the NDC and NPP, contested various seats but lost. This
is in contrast to the 2012 elections in which three independent candidates won their
respective seats with one each in the Volta, Northern and Upper West regions.40
The campaign was intensive and vibrant although more subdued than the campaign
environment of 2012. Political parties and candidates campaigned freely and basic free-
doms of association, movement and assembly were respected. The campaign was domi-
nated by the two major parties, the NDC and NPP, although campaign events of
presidential candidates of the PPP, and to a lesser extent, the CPP, also attracted fairly
large crowds.41 The candidates conducted more constituency tours and fewer big rallies
in comparison with previous elections. The campaigns were largely issue-based even
though most of the political parties launched their manifestos between six and eight
weeks before the elections.42 In addition, the campaigns were, as usual, full of invectives
despite the public disquiet expressed by some CSOs such as the National Peace Council,
Catholic Bishops Conference, Christian Council of Ghana and Media Foundation for West
Africa, which ran a project under the banner ‘The Issues, not Insults’.43
The vilification and insults during the campaigns were symptomatic of the highly
polarised and partisan nature of politics in the country. This disturbing trend has been
bemoaned by all the past four presidents. For instance, President Mahama in his last
Table 1. Presidential candidates and their running mates for the 2016 elections.
Presidential candidate Running mate Political party/other
John Dramani Mahama Paa Kwesi Amissah-Arthur National Democratic Congress
Nana Akufo-Addo Alhaji Mahammadu Bawumia New Patriotic Party
Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings Kojo Mensah Sosu National Democratic Party
Ivor Kobina Greenstreet Nana Gabby Nketia Convention People’s Party
Papa Kwesi Nduom Brigitte Dzogbenuku People’s Progressive Party
Edward Mahama Emmanuel Amenuvor Anyidoho People’s National Convention
Jacob Yeboah Daniel Wilson Torto Independent candidate
Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana.
318 J.R.A. AYEE
state of the nation address on 5 January 2017, two days before he handed over, lamented
that:
Partisanship for its own sake, in the end, is no better than dictatorship. If we look around the
world, we can so clearly see the deep divide that blind partisanship is creating in nations with
democracies far older than ours. We can see, too, the divide that it is threatening to create in
ours if we are not careful. Already, it has taken a toll on our morale and our sense of optimism.
It has given way to a cynicism that is as dangerous to the incoming political party as it was to
ours.44
The use of hate speech during the campaigns, largely by a few NDC and NPP politicians,
raised the political temperature in the country; a pervading fear of the potential for vio-
lence persisted throughout, which was not helped by the presence of vigilante groups
associated with the NDC and NPP. In a rare public action, the chief of defence staff
came out to warn that trouble makers would be dealt with if they did not desist from
their actions. Prior to the elections, the EC and state security agencies identified 81
(30%) constituencies and some 5000 polling stations out of the 28,992 as ‘hotspots’ or
‘flashpoints’ with the potential for election violence. Various initiatives and statements
on the need for peace were made, including the signing of the Accra Peace Declaration
by presidential candidates, which was facilitated by civil society organisations on 1 Decem-
ber 2016 and included calls for a peaceful election from national and international person-
alities and organisations. However, most of the campaign activities passed without
incident and attracted large numbers of people. A small number of isolated incidents –
predominantly clashes between the supporters of the NDC and NPP – did occur, with
some deaths largely owing to police inaction against the perpetrators.45
Notwithstanding the rising political temperature and the concern for security, Ghanaian
civil society played an active role in monitoring the election process, and contributed to
identifying and mitigating emerging tensions. Organisations and networks, including
the Coalition on Domestic Elections Observers and the Institute for Democratic Govern-
ance, deployed an estimated total of 12,000 citizen observers, including large numbers
of women, across the 275 constituencies on election day. In addition, a majority of the
media practised responsible, objective and issue-oriented election reporting, although a
few did not responsibly verify information received before broadcasting, thereby at
times contributing to rumours spreading.46
Perhaps one of the darkest aspects was the abuse of state resources and incumbency
leading to an un-level playing field, a recurring problem from past Ghanaian elections. The
campaign period was not regulated by any specific law and no measures to regulate these
issues were introduced. Resources of sub-national units such as employees, vehicles, build-
ings and other assets were used for the NDC campaign.47 There were also several reports
of the president using the official inaugurations of state projects for campaigning, leading
to his nickname ‘commissioner general’. Vote buying through distribution of money and
goods by the parliamentary candidates – an electoral offence punishable by law – was a
widespread phenomenon in the campaign.48
Another disturbing feature of the campaigns was the uncharacteristically high spate of
public endorsements of the presidential candidates of the NDC and NPP, either by some
traditional rulers or religious leaders or celebrities in the arts, for obvious gains or benefits
should their candidates win. These endorsements were condemned by CSOs and, in the
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 319
case of traditional rulers, are in fact unconstitutional; traditional rulers are barred by the
1992 Constitution from taking part in active party politics unless they abdicate. It is,
however, difficult to show if there is a correlation between the endorsements and the
votes obtained by the presidential candidates of the NDC and NPP.
In spite of the hiccups and challenges, there is general agreement among election
observers, CSOs and the majority of Ghanaians that on balance the elections were peace-
ful and orderly and considered free and fair. The EC was commended for organising cred-
ible and successful elections, in spite of the initial hiccups in the special voting exercise
which was conducted for the security agencies and the media for two days prior to elec-
tion day, and in spite of the breakdown of the electronic transmission system for the elec-
tion results. There were some sporadic incidents at a number of polling stations across the
country, including the case of Jaman North constituency in the Brong Ahafo Region; there
elections were postponed to the following day because of some disagreements by the pol-
itical parties over the voters register for the constituency.
The outcome of the 2016 elections
Before the official results were released, both the NDC and NPP had claimed victory by
holding press conferences while supporters rallied outside of the houses of their presiden-
tial candidates to declare their continuing support. The NDC as the ruling party claimed
that it was in a ‘comfortable lead’ and at one point its general secretary assured followers
that the party would devise a strategy to govern the country in case the party lost the par-
liamentary elections and won the presidential elections. The EC did not help matters as it
delayed the announcement of the results, thereby coming under criticism from supporters
of some political parties and CSOs. At a press conference held a day after the elections, the
EC chair pointed out that the electronic system the EC was using for compilation of results
had been compromised, thereby compelling officials to do the exercise manually and
hence causing delay. She emphasised that ‘this is not the first time results declaration
has gone beyond 24 hours after the close of polls… the 2008 and 2012 elections
results were announced about 72 hours after voting had ended.… The duty we owe to
Ghana is not to declare results quickly. Rather, it is our duty to declare accurate results’.49
When the EC finally declared the 2016 elections results after more than 48 hours after
the close of polls, they showed that the presidential elections had been won by Nana
Akufo-Addo, the 72-year-old flagbearer of the opposition party, the NPP. He defeated
the incumbent president, John Mahama of the NDC, by taking 53.9% of the vote while
Mahama had a 44.44% share of the vote. These figures contrast with those of the 2012
elections in which Mahama obtained 50.63% as winner while Akufo-Addo had
47.81%.50 The result represented an increase of 6.2% for Akufo-Addo and a reduction of
6.3% for Mahama in contrast to the 2012 elections.51 Significantly, both leaders won in
their home regions, Akufo-Addo in the Eastern Region and Mahama in the Northern
Region52 (see Table 2).
The voter turnout was 69.28%, which is lower than the 2012 figure of 80.15%. This is
reflected in the difference in the total votes cast for both the 2012 and 2016 elections,
which stood at 10,995,262 and 10,881,083, respectively, in spite of the 1.7 million more
voters listed in the voters register for the 2016 elections.53 The decrease in actual votes
cast has been attributed to voter apathy,54 which the NDC cited as one of the reasons
320 J.R.A. AYEE
Table 2. Presidential elections results in 2016 by region (percentage of vote per candidate).
Nana Nana
Akufo- J.D. Dr P.K. I.K. E.N. Agyeman Jacob
Region Addo Mahama Nduom Greenstreet Mahama Rawlings Yeboah Remarks
Ashanti 75.7 23.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 NPP retained
Brong 54.1 44.6 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 NDC lost
Ahafo
Central 53.2 43.4 2.7 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 NDC lost
Eastern 63.9 35.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 NPP retained
Greater 51.8 47.3 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 NDC lost
Accra
Northern 42.3 55.4 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 NDC retained
Upper 34.2 59.3 3.5 0.6 1.5 0.5 0.6 NDC retained
East
Upper 36.6 58.1 1.6 0.5 1.4 0.3 1.6 NDC retained
West
Volta 15.8 82.5 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 NDC retained
Western 52.4 45.4 1.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 NDC lost
National 53.9 44.4 1.0 0.24 0.21 0.16 0.15 NDC defeated
Total
Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2016.
for its defeat particularly in its stronghold, the Volta Region, which is referred to as its
‘World Bank’.55
In addition to winning the presidential elections, Akufo-Addo and the NPP also won 169
of the 275 parliamentary seats, while the NDC took the remaining 106 seats (see Table 3).
The NPP won the majority of seats in six of the 10 regions of Ghana, namely, the Ashanti
and Eastern regions (strongholds of the party) and the four swing regions of Brong Ahafo,
Central, Greater Accra and Western. Mahama and the NDC, however, won in the Volta,
Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions, albeit with reduced votes compared
with the results in the 2012 elections. The NPP gained 46 seats while the NDC lost 44
seats. The results of the elections were, indeed, an emphatic victory for the NPP – some-
thing that the party itself never anticipated.
By this defeat, Mahama became the first sitting president to lose an election in the
Fourth Republic which began in 1993 and, at the same time, the first to have served for
only one term in office. It also confirmed the two-term regime cycle of change since
1993. He graciously conceded defeat on the evening of 9 December, when he called
Akufo-Addo before the official declaration of results by the EC. By then most of the
Table 3. Parliamentary results 2016 elections in Ghana (seats gained/lost).
Region NDC NPP Total Seats gained/lost by NPP
Ashanti 3 44 47 1
Brong Ahafo 9 20 29 7
Central 4 19 23 12
Eastern 6 27 33 1
Greater Accra 13 21 34 7
Northern 18 13 31 3
Upper East 12 3 15 1
Upper West 6 5 11 5
Volta 25 1 26 1
Western 10 16 26 8
Total 106 169 275 46
Source: Electoral Commission, 2016 Parliamentary Election Results, January 2017.
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 321
media, which had done very well in terms of voter education and empirical compilation of
results, had earlier called the elections for Akufo-Addo. In his concession speech, Mahama
said that he respected the will of the people of Ghana and promised to cooperate with the
president-elect to ensure a smooth transition. He did note that the results were not what
his party had expected and that, although he accepted the results of the elections, there
were some irregularities. One such irregularity which the EC itself pointed out was over-
voting in some of the constituencies, which was not, however, enough to influence the
outcome of the elections.56 In his victory speech, Akufo-Addo promised to be the presi-
dent of all Ghanaians without discrimination, malice or ill-will to any ethnic group or pol-
itical or religious affiliation.
It is worth noting that the smaller parties, namely, the PPP, PNC, NDP and CPP, and the
independent candidate took only a paltry 1.75% of the votes and failed to win a single seat
in parliament. With this poor performance of the smaller parties, Ghana is becoming a pol-
itical duopoly, that is, a two-party state as seen in countries like the United States and,
possibly, the United Kingdom. It also reinforces the view that the EC was not enforcing
some of the provisions of the Political Parties Act, 2000 (parties should have branches
in all the regions, being present in not less than two-thirds of the districts in each
region and provide information to the EC as is reasonably required); if it had done so,
the smaller parties would not have contended the elections. This view had been disputed
by the EC because if it had acted to ‘crack the whip’ the smaller parties would have ceased
to exist, thereby undermining the EC’s commitment to promote a culture of political party
pluralism.57
Factors in the NPP victory
What accounts for the crushing defeat of the NDC? A plethora of factors account for it.
First, it is obvious that the campaign message of the NDC did not resonate well with the
majority of the electorate. Mahama campaigned on ‘continuity’, ‘unprecedented infra-
structure achievements’ and ‘changing lives and transforming Ghana’. These failed to
excite the electorate. A campaign message on infrastructure was in itself problematic
and self-defeating; in 2008, the NPP had campaigned on infrastructural development
but the NDC vice-presidential candidate at the time, John Mahama himself, said that it
was no message because it is the responsibility of every government to provide such
development and therefore using this criterion to solicit votes was an exercise in
mediocrity.58
On the other hand, the NPP communicated well with its crisp and segmented messages
and slogans such as ‘one district, one factory’, describing a programme which targeted the
youth and business community; ‘one village, one dam’, which targeted the rural poor; the
‘USD1 million for every district’, targeting community leaders; the ‘Zongo Development
Fund’ for the Zongos or poor Muslim communities scattered around the country; and a
message of reduced taxes for the business community. Akufo-Addo campaigned on
‘change, job creation hinged on the industrialisation of the economy and the
modernisation of agriculture’ and on the ‘incompetence of Mahama’. The Ghanaian elec-
torate adopted an instrumentalist approach to politics and therefore the NPP’s message of
job creation, industrialisation and modernisation of agriculture was more appealing than
the message of the NDC. Even the slogan of the NDC, that is, ‘Forward ever, backwards
322 J.R.A. AYEE
never’59 was not as appealing as the NPP’s ‘Ghana must work again’ and ‘Arise for Change’.
In addition, the NDC did not package itself well in terms of communicating its message
and ideas. Rather than concentrating on the issues, the NDC spent a significant part of
its time assassinating the character of Akufo-Addo – without any evidence – leading to
a perception of empty propaganda.
One of the campaign messages of the NDC was that, since the inception of the Fourth
Republic, every president had been given two terms by the electorate, hence the NDC
expected Mahama to enjoy a similar privilege at the polls. However, the NPP had
parried the assertion and labelled Mahama as an incompetent and corrupt leader who
did not deserve another term in office, and so Mahama’s ‘Toaso’ (continue) slogan was
met with the NPP’s ‘Twaso’ (end it). In short, the NDC’s message was perceived, in the
words of one commentator, as ‘highfalutin and flowery… lacking visceral resonance
and coherence, while the NPP’s was sparse and simple’.60
Second, even though Ghana had been a lower-middle-income country since 2010, the
economy had remained lackluster and faced challenges such as macroeconomic instability
and microeconomic inconsistencies. These eroded business confidence, helped depreci-
ate the currency (the Ghana Cedi), underlay the high wage cost – which consumed
about 57% of tax revenue – and exacerbated youth unemployment.61 In addition,
although urban poverty had decreased, rural poverty had increased during Mahama’s
term, while Ghana’s record in achieving the Millennium Development Goals was mixed;
targets such as halving extreme poverty or decreasing the proportion of people without
access to safe drinking water and universal primary education were attained, while slow
progress had been made towards the targets of achieving full and productive employ-
ment, reducing maternal mortality, improving sanitation and reversing the loss of environ-
mental resources.62
Third, there was still a high incidence of corruption which the NDC had struggled to
deal with despite launching the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (2015–2024). The
NDC government itself was hit by some corruption scandals, including the Ford vehicle
saga following revelations in 2016 of a Ford vehicle given to President Mahama in 2012
from a Burkinabe contractor. Even though the President was exonerated by the Commis-
sion on Human Rights and Administrative Justice for a conflict of interest, he was, however,
found guilty of breaching government rules on the acceptance of gifts.63
As a result of the corruption scandals, Ghana’s score in the corruption perception index
of Transparency International dropped from 47 to 43 (out of a clean score of 100) in 2016.
The country was ranked 70 out of 176 countries globally, worse than countries such as
Rwanda, Namibia and Senegal. The drop in ranking showed that the fight against corrup-
tion had not been effective even though the NDC’s national organiser was quick to point
out that Mahama could not be ‘held responsible for the development because he fought
corruption during his tenure’.64
Fourth, the NDC was seen as more opulent than the other political parties through the
abuse of incumbency such as the mounting of expensive advertisements in the media, the
erection of huge billboards and vote-buying. The huge portrait of Mahama and some of his
candidates sent a wrong message of ‘obscene wealth as against the promise of an equal
and fair society… Juxtaposed against Mahama’s larger-than-life posters are Nana Akufo-
Addo’s tiny black and white faded pictures’.65
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 323
Fifth, there was a perception of arrogance, rudeness and disrespect on the part of some
ministers and officials of the NDC. An undue confidence, and the creation of an aura of
impunity, invincibility and complacency, caused the party to disregard pre-election predic-
tions of a loss for the NDC by some reputable institutions such as the Economic Intelli-
gence Unit.66 Survey after survey projected Akufo-Addo as the likely winner. However,
while the NPP said that these surveys were just a morale booster and that the party
was not going to be complacent, the NDC in its over-confident self-deception dismissed
them as not credible and therefore not worthy of consideration or attention.
Sixth, the role of the presidential running mate of the NPP, Mahamudu Bawumia, in the
campaign was key. Bawumia’s incisive analysis of the economy was devastating to the
NDC’s campaign while the Mahama’s running mate, Amissah-Arthur, even though an
economist, was reactive and therefore not able to match Bawumia’s articulation. In
addition, Bawumia possessed great oratorical skills, and was assertive and visible in the
NPP campaign while Amissah-Arthur was largely seen as dull and uninspiring. Bawumia
was therefore seen as a ‘mortal threat’ to the NDC.67
The retention of Amissah-Arthur (as the running mate of Mahama in the 2012 elections
and vice president in that administration) and Bawumia (as running mate of Akufo-Addo in
2008 and 2012 elections) by the NDC and NPP, respectively, was designed to balance the
south–north dichotomy whereby a presidential candidate from the north picks a running
mate from the south and vice versa. In addition, the retention was a campaign strategy to
save the two parties from spending resources marketing their running mates to the
electorate.
Even though it is difficult to link the outcome of the elections directly to the perform-
ance of the running mates, it is possible that the increase in the votes of the NPP in the
three northern regions (Northern, from which Bawumia hails, Upper East and Upper
West) and the loss of the NDC in the Central Region from which Amissah-Arthur comes,
might be due to the performance of the two running mates in the campaigns.
Finally, the NDC shot itself in the foot by taking some unpopular decisions. They include
the August 2016 presidential pardon granted to three people (popularly known as the
Montie Three) – an Accra FM station radio host and two panellists – who were jailed for
four months by the Supreme Court for criminal contempt (scandalising the Supreme
Court) and released barely a month after being in jail, and the withdrawal of teacher/
nursing trainee allowances, which the NPP had promised to restore if it won power.
The defeat of the party led the Functional Executive Committee of the NDC with the
approval of the Council of Elders to establish a 13-member committee at the end of
December 2016 to investigate the cause(s) of the party’s abysmal loss to the NPP in the
elections and recommend the way forward. In its 455-page report, the committee ident-
ified some of the causes for the defeat of the NDC. They include divisions in the party,
especially among the top echelon, the party’s internal biometric registration of
members, a profligate campaign, diversion of campaign cash and materials, public percep-
tions of corruption and complacency and a weak ‘intellectual and research base’.68 Some
of the recommendations include the undertaking of a peacemaking and healing tour to
mend all broken fences with constituents, the independent collation of elections results
from the polling stations by the party itself, reconnection of the party with its social demo-
cratic philosophy and efforts to attract to the party more critical thinkers.69
324 J.R.A. AYEE
Transition matters
The inauguration of the new president, Nana Akufo-Addo, and his vice, Mahamudu
Bawumia, took place before parliament and the public on 7 January 2017, after MPs
were themselves sworn in at midnight of the same day. The government of Akufo-
Addo started work in earnest to fulfill some of its campaign promises. However, despite
aiming for a smooth transition without acrimony, without any doubt the 2016 transition
was as contentious as the previous ones, even though the level and intensity of the
rancour were somewhat subdued.
The 2016 transition had some advantages over previous ones. They include the exist-
ence of a Presidential Transition Act (Act 845 of 2012), which was amended in November
2016 providing a longer transition period of about one month after the elections, com-
pared with previous transitions in 2001 and 2009 which were afforded a week or less.
The Transition Act was to deal with the causes of the rancorous transitions of 2001 and
2009, which lacked a legal and institutional framework. Some of the hiccups which
made the 2016 transition contentious include the resettlement of the former president,
who wanted to stay in the house he was occupying as president even though it used
to be the residence of the vice-president; some high-profile appointments (such as the
auditor-general and commissioner for human rights and administrative justice) that
were considered late as they were made a week or two before the handing-over from
the NDC to the NPP government; the forcible takeover or seizure of public assets such
as the offices of some state institutions, toll-booths and public toilets by operatives sus-
pected to be NPP supporters; loan agreements approved by parliament a week before
the NPP took over the reins of government; the disappearance of over 200 vehicles
from the office of the president; and the dismissal and resignation of the chief executives
of some parastatals and subnational governments, among others.
The rancorous transition process amplifies two things. First, the transition act needs to
be amended to tighten the loopholes in assets registration, while the office of the admin-
istrator general of the Presidential Estates Unit, who is not even a member of the transition
team, should be strengthened to reduce some duplicative functions. A review of the act
should also include detailing out political, financial and administrative actions including
loans, procurements and recruitments, on which an outgoing government may choose
to take counterproductive decisions before leaving office since some of those actions in
its last days may affect the programmes of an incoming administration. Second, there
are mistrust and suspicion among NDC and NPP politicians, which may be the outcome
of a lack of transparency and accountability on the part of both sides, thus fuelling the
excessive polarisation and tension of the body politic.
Conclusion
This paper examined the 2016 elections in Ghana. It found that the elections, in spite of
some hiccups, were adjudged to be free and fair. The legal and institutional framework
worked well in sync with the democratic institutions in place.
The defeat of the NDC has shown that the views of the electorate cannot be taken for
granted. The message of the NDC did not appeal to the majority of voters while they were
not in any way enthused about the performance of the party in government during the
eight years it was in power.
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 325
If the message of the NDC was not appealing to the electorate, then there is a need for
political marketing to be taken seriously by the political parties as they are competing in an
election market place where their products such as performance, manifestoes, candidates
and messages must be appealing to discerning voters.
The issue of trust among key players such as between political parties and the EC and
among the political parties is important. The minority parties did not trust the EC as they
perceived most of its actions as being in favour of the ruling NDC. Similarly, the acrimo-
nious transition shows that members of the political elite in Ghana do not trust each
other. There seems to be no shared interests among the political elite, particularly those
from the two major parties, that is, the NDC and the NPP – a trend that does not bode
well for national cohesion and future transitions. Accordingly, repairing the trust gap
among the political elite should be the priority of all the political parties if they have a
genuine desire to reduce the excessive politicisation and polarisation and undue
tension in the country, particularly in the run up to elections.
Finally, the EC – and more specifically the election management body – will need to
continue to win the trust and confidence of the stakeholders, particularly the political
parties, through the implementation of its communication strategy and the strategic
plan. Furthermore, the EC will have to work harder to have in place a credible voters reg-
ister rather than the current bloated and contentious one, which is seen as the ‘Achilles
heel of election administration in Ghana’.70 This is important because a credible voters reg-
ister is one of the pillars supporting the legitimacy of elections.
Notes
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SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 327
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Graham & E Yobo, ‘Ghana’s 2016 general election: Accounting for the monumental defeat
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14. Ninsin KA (ed.), Issues in Ghana’s Electoral Politics. Dakar: CODESRIA, 2016; Frempong AKD, Elec-
tions in Ghana (1951–2016). Accra: Digibooks, 2017; Gyampo REV, E Graham & E Yobo, ‘Ghana’s
2016 general election: Accounting for the monumental defeat of the National Democratic
Congress’, Journal of African Elections, 16.1, June 2017, pp. 24–45; Ayee JRA, ‘Manifestos and
agenda setting in Ghana elections’, in Ninsin KA (ed.) Issues in Ghana’s Electoral Politics.
Dakar: CODESRIA, 2016, pp. 83–113; Ichino N & NL Nathan, ‘Crossing the line: Local ethnic
geography and voting in Ghana’, American Political Science Review 107.2, 2013, pp. 344–61;
Ichino N & NL Nathan, ‘Do primaries improve electoral performance? Clientelism and intra-
party conflict in Ghana.’ American Journal of Political Science 57.2, 2013, pp. 428–41; Lindberg
SI, ‘What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence
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elections: Processes and priorities of the electoral commission’, Africa Programme Transcript,
Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 4 November 2016.
15. Ayee JRA (ed.) The 1996 General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Accra:
Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 1998; Ayee JRA (ed.), Deepening Democ-
racy in Ghana: Politics of the 2000 Elections: Constituency Studies. Vol. 2. Accra: Freedom Publi-
cations, 2001; Boafo-Arthur K (ed.), Voting for Democracy in Ghana: The 2004 Elections in
Perspective. Constituency Studies, Vol. 2 Accra: Freedom Publications, 2004; Ichino N & NL
Nathan, ‘Crossing the line: Local ethnic geography and voting in Ghana’, American Political
Science Review, 107.2, 2013, pp. 344–61; Ichino N & NL Nathan, ‘Do primaries improve electoral
performance? Clientelism and intra-party conflict in Ghana’, American Journal of Political
Science, 57.2, 2013, pp. 428–41; Bob-Milliar GM, ‘Party youth activists and low-intensity elec-
toral violence in Ghana: A qualitative study of party foot-soldiers’ activism’, African Studies
Quarterly, 15.1, 2014, pp. 125–52.
16. See Ayee JRA (ed.) The 1996 General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Accra:
Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, 1998 for some of the reforms initiated.
17. Figures from website of Electoral Commission of Ghana, www.ec.gov.gh
18. Osei C, ‘Ghana’s 2016 elections: Processes and priorities of the electoral commission’, Africa
Programme Transcript, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 4 Novem-
ber 2016.
19. Osei C, ‘Ghana’s 2016 elections: Processes and priorities of the electoral commission’, Africa
Programme Transcript, Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 4 Novem-
ber 2016.
20. The EC chair broke her silence after 12 hours of elections with no confirmed or provisional
results with an excuse that the EC’s systems had been compromised for which reason she
could not continue with the electronic transmission of results and therefore relied on
manual process of results transmission. See Gadugah N, ‘EC makes u-turn: Our systems
were not hacked but… Ayuba’, Ghana/myjoyonline.com (accessed 22 March 2017).
21. Ayee JRA, ‘Ghana’s electoral commission is under scrutiny ahead of #GhanaDecides 2016’,
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/12/05/the-national-electoralcommission-is-under-
scrutiny-ahead-of-ghanadecides-2016/ (accessed 10 February 2017).
22. Frempong AKD, Elections in Ghana (1951–2016). Accra: Digibooks, 2017.
23. Electoral Commission, Strategic Plan for the People, 2016–2020: Gearing for Greatness. Accra:
Electoral Commission, 2016, p. 3.
24. Ayee JRA, ‘Ghana’s electoral commission is under scrutiny ahead of #GhanaDecides 2016’,
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/12/05/the-national-electoralcommission-is-under-
scrutiny-ahead-of-ghanadecides-2016/ (accessed 10 February 2017).
25. European Union, ‘Election Observation Mission – Ghana presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions’, Final Report, Accra, 30 December 2016.
328 J.R.A. AYEE
26. At the launch of the strategy, the US ambassador in Ghana, Robert Jackson pointed out that,
with over 100 days to the elections, communicating with the electorate was one of the most
formidable and consequential challenges facing the Electoral Commission. See Robert
Jackson, ‘EC launches Communication Strategy Document’, ghananewsagency.org (accessed
10 February 2017).
27. National Democratic Institute, ‘Preliminary statement of the National Democratic Institute’s
International Observer Mission to Ghana’s 7 December presidential and legislative elections’,
Accra, 9 December 2016.
28. Goodwill-Gill GS, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice. Geneva: Inter-Parlia-
mentary Union, 1994.
29. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, ‘Pre-election assessment mission
report’, Republic of Ghana, 25–30 September 2016.
30. Ibid.
31. European Union, ‘Election Observation Mission – Ghana presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions’, Final Report, Accra, 30 December 2016.
32. Electoral Commission, ‘Presidential results as of 10th December 2016. Results for 271 consti-
tuencies out of 275’, http://www.thumbsapp.com.gh/ (accessed 9 February 2017).
33. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, ‘Pre-election assessment mission
report’, Republic of Ghana, 25–30 September 2016.
34. See Frempong AKD, Elections in Ghana (1951–2016). Accra: Digibooks, 2017; Gyampo REV, E
Graham & E Yobo, ‘Ghana’s 2016 general election: Accounting for the monumental defeat
of the National Democratic Congress’, Journal of African Elections, 16.1, June 2017, pp. 24–45.
35. National Democratic Institute, ‘Preliminary statement of the National Democratic Institute’s
International Observer Mission to Ghana’s 7 December presidential and legislative elections’,
Accra, 9 December 2016; European Union, ‘Election Observation Mission – Ghana presidential
and parliamentary elections’, Final Report, Accra, 30 December 2016.
36. The filing fees for presidential candidates were increased from GHC10,000 (about US$2500) to
GHC50,000 (about US$12,500). For parliamentary candidates, the fees were increased from
GHC1000 (about US$250) to GHC10,000 (about US$2,500).
37. See National Democratic Institute, ‘Preliminary statement of the National Democratic Insti-
tute’s International Observer Mission to Ghana’s 7 December presidential and legislative elec-
tions’, Accra, 9 December 2016; European Union, ‘Election Observation Mission – Ghana
presidential and parliamentary elections’, Final Report, Accra, 30 December 2016; African
Union Election Observation Mission to Ghana 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Preliminary Statement, Accra, 9 December 2016.
38. See National Democratic Institute, ‘Preliminary statement of the National Democratic Insti-
tute’s International Observer Mission to Ghana’s 7 December presidential and legislative elec-
tions’, Accra, 9 December 2016; European Union, ‘Election Observation Mission – Ghana
presidential and parliamentary elections’, Final Report, Accra, 30 December 2016; African
Union Election Observation Mission to Ghana 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections.
Preliminary Statement, Accra, 9 December 2016.
39. See Frempong AKD, Elections in Ghana (1951–2016). Accra: Digibooks, 2017.
40. See Ephson B, 2012 & 2016 Elections. Accra: Allied News, 2014; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Elections
2012. Accra: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2014.
41. National Democratic Institute, ‘Preliminary statement of the National Democratic Institute’s
International Observer Mission to Ghana’s 7 December presidential and legislative elections’,
Accra, 9 December 2016.
42. See Frempong AKD, Elections in Ghana (1951–2016). Accra: Digibooks, 2017.
43. Ibid.; Gyampo REV, E Graham & E Yobo, ‘Ghana’s 2016 general election: Accounting for the
monumental defeat of the National Democratic Congress’, Journal of African Elections, 16.1,
June 2017, pp. 24–45.
44. State of the Nation Address delivered by HE John Dramani Mahama, President of the Republic
of Ghana to Parliament on 5 January 2017. Accra: Government Printer.
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 329
45. European Union, ‘Election Observation Mission – Ghana presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions’, Final Report, Accra, 30 December 2016.
46. African Union Election Observation Mission to Ghana 2016 presidential and parliamentary
elections. Preliminary Statement, Accra, 9 December 2016.
47. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, ‘Pre-election assessment mission
report’, Republic of Ghana, 25–30 September 2016.
48. National Democratic Institute, ‘Preliminary statement of the National Democratic Institute’s
International Observer Mission to Ghana’s 7 December presidential and legislative elections’,
Accra, 9 December 2016.
49. See Osei C, ‘Be patient with us – EC Chair’, http://vibeghana.com/2016/12/08/ghana-election-
2016-results-be-patient-with-us-ec-chair/ (accessed 13 February 2017).
50. See Electoral Commission of Ghana for results of the 2012 elections.
51. Gyampo REV, E Graham & E Yobo, ‘Ghana’s 2016 general election: Accounting for the monu-
mental defeat of the National Democratic Congress’, Journal of African Elections, 16.1, June
2017, pp. 24–45.
52. Frempong AKD, Elections in Ghana (1951–2016). Accra: Digibooks, 2017.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid; Gyampo REV, E Graham & E Yobo, ‘Ghana’s 2016 general election: Accounting for the
monumental defeat of the National Democratic Congress’, Journal of African Elections, 16.1,
June 2017, pp. 24–45.
55. Since 1992, the NDC had always won about 98% of the votes and constituencies in the Volta
Region even when they had lost the elections as it happened in 2000, 2008 and 2016. The term
‘World Bank’ was therefore coined to demonstrate the show of support in the form of votes
that the NDC received from the Volta Region.
56. See Frempong AKD, Elections in Ghana (1951–2016). Accra: Digibooks, 2017; Gyampo REV, E
Graham & E Yobo, ‘Ghana’s 2016 general election: Accounting for the monumental defeat
of the National Democratic Congress’, Journal of African Elections, 16.1, June 2017, pp. 24–45.
57. See Frempong AKD, Elections in Ghana (1951–2016). Accra: Digibooks, 2017; Ephson B, 2012 &
2016 Elections. Accra: Allied News, 2014; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Elections 2012. Accra: Friedrich
Ebert Foundation, 2014.
58. ‘Mahama’s tour glorification of mediocrity – Ashanti Group’, Starrfmonline.com (accessed 20
April 2017).
59. Even though this was a slogan of the CPP, it was used by the NDC to portray that if the NPP
was elected to power, it would send the country backwards rather than forwards. A vote for
the NDC therefore would be for progress and development.
60. Duodu M, ‘The campaign the cost JM his presidency’, https://www.graphic.com (accessed 14
February 2017).
61. Republic of Ghana, Consolidating Progress towards a Brighter Medium Term: Budget Statement
and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2016 Financial Year. Accra: Govern-
ment Printer, 2015.
62. United Nations Development Programme, Ghana: Millennium Development Goals 2015 Report.
Accra: UNDP, 2015.
63. Pulse Staff, ‘Election 2016 Seven scandals that rocked the NDC under John Mahama’, posted
on 15 December 2016, http://pulse.com.gh/politics/election-2016-seven-scandals-that-rocked-
the-ndcunder-john-mahama-id5894854.html (accessed 14 February 2017).
64. Adams K, ‘Ghana drops further in 2016 corruption ranking’, htpps://www.citifmonline.com
(accessed 15 February 2017).
65. Duodu M, ‘The campaign the cost JM his presidency’, https://www.graphic.com (accessed 14
February 2017).
66. See Gyampo REV, E Graham & E Yobo, ‘Ghana’s 2016 general election: Accounting for the
monumental defeat of the National Democratic Congress’, Journal of African Elections, 16.1,
June 2017, pp. 24–45; Ayee JRA ‘Ghana continues to be a beacon for democracy in Africa’,
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/12/12/ghana-continues-to-be-a-beacon-fordemocracy-
in-africa/ (accessed 11 February 2017).
330 J.R.A. AYEE
67. Prempeh HK, ‘Why Bawumia is a mortal threat to the NDC’, http://citifmonline.com/2016/11/
29/why-bawumia-is-a-mortal-threat-to-the-ndc (accessed 20 July 2017).
68. ‘Why NDC lost – The inside story as narrated in Botchway report’, https://www.ghanaweb.com/
GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Why-NDC-lost-The-inside-story-as-narrated-in-Botchway-
report-55072 (accessed 20 July 2017).
69. ‘Why NDC lost – The inside story’, https://business.com.gh/2017/06/20/ndc-lost-inside-story/
(accessed 20 July 2017).
70. Jockers H, D Kohnert & P Nugent, ‘The successful Ghana election of 2008: A convenient myth?’,
Journal of Modern African Studies, 48.1, 2010, pp. 95–115.
Notes on contributor
Joseph R.A. Ayee is Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, and
Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Democratic Governance, Accra. He is the immediate past Rector,
MountCrest University College, Accra, Ghana and Deputy Vice Chancellor, University of KwaZulu–
Natal. His current research interests include governance, leadership, public services and public
sector reforms in Africa.