doi: 10.1111/imig.12644 The Quagmire of Return and Reintegration: Challenges to Multi-Stakeholder Co-ordina- tion of Involuntary Returns Leander Kandilige* and Geraldine Adiku* ABSTRACT The institutional aspect of return migration has received little attention in the theoretical and empirical literature on return migration. This research fills the apparent lacuna by unearthing institutional challenges to multi-stakeholder coordination, at different spatial levels in crisis sit- uations and negative effects on reintegration of forcibly returned migrants. We use the evacua- tion of Ghanaian migrants from Libya who occupied very low socio-economic positions, experienced racism and discrimination, including physical attacks and arbitrary arrests in 2011, as a case study to understand institutional challenges to forced return when migrants’ carefully tailored plans are thrown into disarray and they are forced to return unprepared. This study employed mainly qualitative research methods among six different categories of actors and engaged an adaptation of Cassarino’s “returnee’s preparedness framework” to expand theoreti- cal understandings of return migration from the institutional perspective and to highlight what can go wrong when institutions are unprepared for involuntary returnees. INTRODUCTION In this article, we interrogate the return preparedness of not only migrants, which is the common approach in migration scholarship (see for example Cassarino, 2004; Mensah, 2016), but also insti- tutional preparedness, that is, the level of preparedness of the state and other stakeholders in a crisis situation, based on data from an EU-funded research project entitled ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis’ (MICIC).1 The key question addressed in this paper is: what is the differential effectiveness of local non-state actors, the state and international actors in managing involuntary returns and rein- tegration in crisis situations? Historically, return migration to Ghana has taken the form of both vol- untary (autonomous) and involuntary (forced) return. IOM (2011) defines voluntary return as “the assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit, or another third country based on the free will of the returnee” whereas forced return is the “compulsory return of an individual to the country of origin, transit or third country, on the basis of an administrative or judicial act”. In this article, we focus on the forced return of low-skilled Ghanaian migrants from Libya during the politi- cal crisis in that country. The article adopts the European Reintegration Network (ERIN) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) conceptualization of reintegration. ERIN perceives * University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana The peer review history for this article is available at https://publons.com/publon/10.1111/imig.12644. © 2019 The Authors International Migration © 2019 IOM International Migration Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. ISSN 0020-7985 2 Kandilige and Adiku reintegration as the re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or a process in his or her country of origin or habitual residence with the aim of facilitating their self-sufficiency. Accord- ing to UNHCR, successful reintegration requires ‘access to reasonable resources, opportunities and basic services to establish a self-sustaining livelihood in conditions of equal rights with other resi- dents and citizens’ (Dimitrijevic et al., 2004). Discourses on Ghanaian international migration and return have been predominantly focused on returns from the Global North. This has been largely explained by the increased role of interna- tional remittances in national development planning. According to the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief (2018), remittances to Ghana amounted to $3.8 billion and the volume is expected to reach $4 billion by the end of 2019. This represented 7.4 per cent of the country’s GDP in 2018. The bulk of remittances sent through formal channels to Ghana have originated from countries in the Global North,2 thus shaping discourses on the return of migrants from these regions compared with returnees from the Global South, especially African countries. For instance, the United Kingdom, the rest of Europe, USA and Canada together remarkably accounted for between 90 per cent and 97 per cent of total remittance receipts by Ghana between 2004 and 2008 (Bank of Ghana Data, 2010). More recent data from the World Bank (2017) suggest that over 70 per cent of total remittance receipts by Ghana still emanate from countries in the Global North. The overwhelming focus on return migration from the Global North is in spite of the fact that the majority of migrations from sub-Saharan African countries are to destinations within the sub- Region (Awumbila et al., 2013). We argue that this lop-sided focus meant that state and non-state stakeholders were ill-prepared for the return and reintegration of Ghanaian migrants from an Afri- can country (Libya). Quagmire is used to denote the dilemma embedded in the experiences of for- cibly returned migrants amidst institutional unpreparedness. Migrants are conflicted because it was not their desire to return; unforeseen circumstances forced them to return home. After return life became difficult, due largely to institutional failures, and many were torn between having to stay or to re-emigrate. Some indeed re-emigrated. The next section outlines our theoretical approach. We adapt Cassarino’s (2004) returnees’ pre- paredness framework and highlight the structural aspect which is relevant for the institutional lens this study adopts and emphasizes. We then discuss the history of Ghanaian migration to Libya to provide context for the study, followed by our research methods. Findings from the empirical research are then presented. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and policy relevance of our findings to return migration research and literature. CONCEPTUALIZING RETURN IN CRISIS SITUATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL PREPAREDNESS In this article we highlight the institutional aspect of return migration. We focus on institutional pre- paredness, which has received little attention in return migration literature and theorization by drawing on Cassarino’s (2004) returnees’ preparedness approach. In his review of the theoretical basis for return, Cassarino questions the adequacy of the main economic theories of migration (e.g. neoclassical, new economics of labour migration, transnationalism) in explaining return beyond a narrow view of the tim- ing as well as reasons underlying return decisions by individuals. In these analyses, the economic, social and political contexts in the countries of both origin and destination are not sufficiently analysed (Cassarino, 2004). Cassarino, therefore, advocates a broader examination of how the decisions and strategies adopted by returnees are situated within the social and political environments at the destina- tion and contextual factors at home (Cassarino, 2004). In this regard, the institutional approach to explaining return migration, which is more beneficial to our analysis as it privileges social and contex- tual issues over the personal ones and highlights the impact of situational and structural or institutional factors in determining return decisions and strategies. © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM Involuntary return and reintegration 3 We do not focus on return decision-making of migrants. This has been extensively explored else- where (Cassarino, 2004; Mensah, 2016; Kandilige, 2017). We are concerned with the institutional approaches by the Ghanaian state and other stakeholders in response to a crisis situation where thousands of Ghanaians were forced to return home from Libya. What were the crucial steps taken by stakeholders and what more could have been done to ensure the smooth transition into life in Ghana? Adopting an institutional approach makes it possible to assess the effects on the returnees of the realities of home countries’ preparedness. It highlights the challenges that these institutions encountered during the forced return of migrants and the possibilities of re-emigration when reinte- gration fails. The distinction between institutional and personal factors in explaining return migra- tion is, however, not cast in stone as the two entities flow into each other as a spectrum and are both crucial for “successful” return. We, however, focus on institutional preparedness when personal return plans are thrown into disarray. The institutional approach presents a framework for analysing return migration by stressing the institutional factors in the home country in relation to return. The institutional factors in this study include the role of government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, civil society organiza- tions, private sector actors, community leaders and household or family members who provided financial, logistical, psychosocial and moral support for migrants. Providing this institutional support for returnees is not without its challenges. Various institutions and organizations face challenges in their bid to support the return and reintegration of forced retur- nees. These challenges include economic and non-economic ones (i.e. budgetary constraints, lack of accurate data, logistical and personnel shortfalls, policy incoherence and trust deficit). IOM (2017), Lewis and Williams (1986) and Gmelch (1980) note that when situational and structural conditions are favourable, returnees are more likely to experience sustainable reintegration and reach levels of economic self-sufficiency, social stability within their communities and psychosocial well-being,that allow them to cope with (re)migration drivers (IOM, 2017). What happens when this is not the case and what can be done to improve the preparedness of these institutions and structures? Cassarino (2004) contends that successful reintegration on the part of returnees depends on the degree to which they have mobilized resources and are prepared to return home (Cassarino, 2004). Thus, the absence of resource mobilization, which requires time and a level of preparedness, makes the case of involuntary return in crisis situations peculiar. Involuntary returnees are forced to return home amidst little or no preparation on their part (Table 1). This, coupled with unpreparedness at the institutional level makes reintegration efforts, especially formal assistance, much more difficult to plan and implement (Haour-Knipe and Davies, 2008). While some empirical research on return migration has been shown to contribute positively to devel- opment (Wahba, 2015), others have shown mixed results (Nyberg–Sørensen et al., 2002). Involuntary return can have significant long and short-term consequences for home countries, but this depends on a number of factors in the home communities. The challenge for origin countries, therefore, is managing such return to ensure positive developmental results. One way of doing this is through the provision of effective reintegration strategies (Wahba, 2015). Many developing countries, however, rarely have rein- tegration policies for forced return migrants, and even where they exist, they are a reaction to emergen- cies (Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2009). This poses significant challenges for returnees and ultimately makes forced return migration more of a developmental challenge than an opportunity and this may further foster migrants’ re-emigration. Borrowing from Cassarino (2004), we therefore analyse the forced return of low-skilled Ghanaian migrants from Libya and the reintegration attempts by the Ghanaian state and other stakeholders. We attempt to show how forced returnees’ return experiences and reintegration are intrinsically linked to the provision of a maximum enabling environment (which includes economic and non- economic support), by multiple stakeholders and how failure of support at different spatial levels makes re-emigration more likely. © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM 4 Kandilige and Adiku © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM TABLE 1 RETURN IN CRISIS SITUATIONS AND STAKEHOLDER PREPAREDNESS Level of Stakeholders in >Degree of Level of Returnee Types of Wealth/ Resource Length of Reintegration support by Stakeholder Preparedness Returnees Assets Status Motivation Mobilisation Stay Process stakeholders Preparedness Low level of Regular Labour May possess Implicated in Limited sav- 6 Months to 3 Involuntary Government Uneven spread Low Level of prepared- Migrants tangible and a crisis situ- ings Years return agencies, inter- from minimal Prepared- ness Irregular intangible ation Poor access migration governmental to maximal ness or No or Labour assets at (Return of to banking organizations, support Prepared- No pre- Migrants destination failure): Due system civil society ness paredness Regular/Irregu- country to political Abandonment organizations, Difficult condi- (Involuntary lar Highly instability/ of few sav- private sector tions at return in a Skilled Labour war/conflict ings and actors, commu- home, thus crisis situa- Migrants in the desti- property nity leaders and frustrating tion) nation coun- during flight family members reintegration try from conflict provide finan- Re-emigra- cial, logistical, tion might be psychosocial envisaged and moral sup- port Rejected Asy- None None Less than 6 Relatives attempt Maximal sup- lum Seekers Months to provide port needed Detained or financial, logisti- but minimal imprisoned cal, psychoso- support pro- irregular cial and moral vided migrants support Source: Authors’ adaption of Cassarino (2004) Involuntary return and reintegration 5 THE HISTORY OF GHANAIAN MIGRATION TO LIBYA Rather than abject poverty, a degree of access to economic and social resources, combined with intrinsic global inequalities in income and development, have driven Ghanaian international migra- tion to countries such as the United Kingdom but also oil-rich countries in North Africa such as Libya. Since international migration is characterized by substantial costs and risks, it is important to note that Ghanaian migrants are not typically from the poorest households in society (Skeldon, 1997; de Haas, 2005). This assertion is, however, dependent on the mode of migration as well as the distance involved. This article suggests that Ghanaian migrants who migrate to Libya through the Sahara Desert are actually mostly among the poorest in society, who scrape together the little resources they have in order to realize their migration aspirations and to enhance their socio-eco- nomic livelihoods. Libyan oil exploration and production, together with its mines and farms served as pull factors for most immigrants mostly from the country’s immediate southern neighbours (Mali, Chad and Niger) prior to the 1990s (Spiga, 2005). Post-1990s saw increased participation in immigration by other sub-Saharan African countries such as Ghana (de Haas, 2007). Libya was not a preferred des- tination for many Ghanaian emigrants until the mid-1980s (Akyeampong, 2000; Bob-Milliar, 2012). This was necessitated, however, by the expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 with the majority of emigrant Ghanaians migrating to other parts of the continent including Libya (Akyeampong, 2000). There was also a budding relationship between Ghaddafi and Ghana’s president at the time, Jerry J. Rawlings. It stemmed from their common interest in Pan-Africanism (Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar, 2013). Ghanaian migration to Libya was also boosted by bilateral agreement entered into between the Libyan and Ghanaian governments to send Ghanaian teachers to teach English in Libya (Bob-Mil- liar, 2012). In all, 200 teachers were sent in two different batches between 1983 and 1984 but the agreement was abrogated in 1986 due to varied but unofficial reasons (Bob-Milliar, 2012). How- ever, both skilled and unskilled Ghanaian migrants continued to migrate, on their own, to Libya to seek other opportunities (Bob-Milliar, 2012). Even though at the initial stages the Libyan authori- ties offered employment only to highly skilled Ghanaian immigrants, the awareness of the availabil- ity of livelihood opportunities for other low-skilled migrants increased the number of Ghanaians entering Libya through formal and informal routes such as the Sahara Desert (Akokpari, 2000; Anarfi et al., 2003). This practice continued but Libya later transformed from a destination country into a transit country to Europe for some Ghanaian migrants (Bredeloup and Pliez, 2005; de Haas, 2008; Lucht, 2012). Also, in response to the United Nations sanctions against her between 1992 and 2000, Libya attracted sub-Saharan African nationals by removing impediments such as residence permits or visas for non-citizens entering Libya (Global Detention Project, 2009; de Haas, 2006). These were TABLE 2 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS DURING FIELDWORK IN GHANA Respondent Number completed 1. Return Migrants 11 2. Family members of migrants 11 3. Inter-governmental organization 2 4. Community leaders and Private Actors 3 5. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 1 6. Government Authorities 4 Total 32 © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM 6 Kandilige and Adiku replaced with a Medical Certificate, as the only requirement (de Haas, 2006). Although the govern- ment of Libya relaxed its stringent immigration laws, irregular migration into the country was on the increase. As a result, the Libyan authorities intensified the implementation of immigration con- trol policies by clamping down on irregular migration (de Haas, 2006). Thus, before the 2011 Libyan political crisis which was part of the Arab Spring and led to a civil war and the death of the country’s long-term leader, Col. Ghaddafi, the Libyan authorities were already dealing with irregular immigrants through forced repatriations. Between the period 2000 and 2012, for instance, 12,201 Ghanaians were deported to Ghana from Libya (Bob-Milliar, 2012). The 2011 political agitation and the subsequent unrest, therefore, coincided with these immigration practices. The Ghana Immigration Service reported that in 2014 alone, Ghanaian deportees from Libya reached 1,415, making Libya the country that deports Ghanaian migrants the most (Kleist, 2017). Our research reveals cases of racism, discrimination, name-calling, robberies and casual attacks by Libyan youths, arbitrary arrests and detentions, lack of access to rental accommodation, inability to access the formal banking system and lack of protection by Libyan security services (Harmmod, 2006; Global Detention Project, 2009; Lucht, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2017; Kle- ist, 2017). Ghanaian migrants, like many sub-Saharan African migrants, in Libya, mostly occupy very low socio-economic positions relative to the native population partly due to their irregular migration statuses and differences in cultural, religious and linguistic characteristics (Naik and Laczko, 2012). This article is focused on these migrants and the coordination attempts of multi- stakeholders in their return and reintegration processes. It also explores the various challenges these multi-stakeholders faced in carrying out their duties. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY The study adopted mainly qualitative research methods (in-depth interviews and focus group discus- sions) among thirty-two participants (Table 2) from six categories of actors (return migrants, family members, civil society organizations, community leaders, intergovernmental organizations, government authorities). Return migrants included predominantly male Ghanaian returnees from Libya during the 2011 conflict. Family members of return migrants were interviewed to share their views on the return process and impact of return on their households. Community leaders and civil society organizations were selected on the basis of their provision of services to returnees from Libya. Government agencies that actively participated in the evacuation, repatriation and reintegration of returnees from Libya were also interviewed. Additionally, representatives of intergovernmental organizations that provided logisti- cal, technical, financial or advisory support to the evacuation, repatriation and reintegration of returnees from Libya were interviewed. The data collection took place in Accra and the Bong Ahafo3 Region of Ghana (especially Nkoranza) between March and September 2016. Accra was selected because it hosts the head offices of almost all government agencies as well as those of inter-governmental organizations. The Bong Ahafo Region represents the region with the largest number of Ghanaian migrants to Libya and also returnees to Ghana in 2011 (Bob-Milliar, 2012). RETURN AND REINTEGRATION AMIDST UNPREPAREDNESS The role of state agencies The role of the Ghanaian state involved making arrangements for the safe return of Ghanaians from Libya and reintegrating them into their communities. The lack of a policy and institutional frame- work for the evacuation and repatriation of migrants from countries in conflict, however, meant that © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM Involuntary return and reintegration 7 Ghanaian migrants were among the last sub-Saharan African migrants to be evacuated from Libya. The Ghana embassy in Libya and the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO) were ill-prepared for the extraction of migrants from Libya. After trapped migrants resorted to social media and live radio appeals, the Ghana government was eventually compelled to organize char- tered flights to evacuate migrants. The Ghana government, through its diplomatic mission in Libya, belatedly liaised with international partners to provide transportation and relief services to trapped Ghanaian migrants in Libya. As a former senior diplomat at the Ghana Embassy in Libya indicated, the mission relied heavily on international organizations to provide and pay for the cost of trans- portation and healthcare during the evacuation: The major evacuation when people were going to the border, UNHCR, the Red Cross and IOM were instrumental in getting us the buses. They had an office arranged so people could go there [Tripoli]; people at the verge of dying, people who had their hands cut could go there and they will pay their hospital bills for them. We always relied on them; they will send people to the border and airlift them to Ghana. (Former Ghanaian senior diplomat to Libya) Beyond the cost that was borne by international organizations, the Ghana embassy in Libya had to pay for the feeding of nationals who congregated at designated airports awaiting evacuation. Due to the ad hoc nature of the evacuation process, the embassy was forced to expend funds that were earmarked for administrative expenses and salaries for diplomatic staff. The former senior diplomat highlights the opportunity cost of the emergency expenditure: It denied resources for daily administration expenditure such as servicing of vehicles at the work- shop. To a large extent it also affected payment of salaries. For example, for two months we were not paying ourselves. We requested for US$100,000 to cater for the trapped Ghanaians but nothing came. We finally spent about US$30,000 of our meagre funds on feeding the people because we had created a shelter at the airport. (Former Ghanaian diplomat to Libya) When the Ghana government finally agreed to evacuate its nationals from Libya, three Liaison Posts were established in Salum on the Libyan-Egyptian border; Ras Ajdir on the Libyan-Tunisian border and Tripoli, and these were managed by the Ghana embassy in Libya to aid the evacuation process (Bob-Milliar, 2012). The embassy arranged chartered flights to airlift Ghanaian migrants from Tripoli airport to the Kotoka International Airport in Accra (Former Ghanaian diplomat to Libya). According to a former senior diplomat, these charter evacuation flights extracted trapped migrants over a nine-day period and the number evacuated specifically from the Tripoli airport was about 6,631 migrants (Former Ghanaian diplomat to Libya). Other research (Bob-Milliar, 2012) indicates that in total, 70 evacuation flights were organized from Cairo, Tripoli and Djerba and that about 97 per cent of evacuees returned by air, with just three per cent returning by road from Libya. According to statistics from NADMO, by July 2012, a total of 18,445 nationals had returned home (NADMO, 2012 cited in Bob-Milliar). The total figure could be greater than reported since it does not include those who returned home without government or institutional support. Consistent with our own findings, statistics in Bob-Milliar’s (2012) work show the vast majority of Ghanaian returnees from Libya were males, between 20 and 40 years old. Some 132 returnees were females, 96 minors, 2 adult males described as mentally ill as well as over 90 freed prisoners (Bob-Milliar, 2012). These diverse categories of returnees had low or no return preparedness and almost all lost property and savings during their flight from the conflict. Freed detainees and prisoners typically had no assets and no return preparedness. As a result, these returnees required maximal reintegra- tion support from a range of stakeholders. © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM 8 Kandilige and Adiku The embassy in Libya also faced major challenges around a trust deficit between migrants and embassy staff. Some migrants contested claims by the embassy to have coordinated assistance to support the evacuation and repatriation of trapped Ghanaians from Libya. Abraham (a 52-year-old return migrant) described officials at the Ghana embassy as ‘useless, they don't help anybody. The officials in Libya do not help at all’. NADMO has a direct mandate to coordinate all disaster management activities in Ghana. The coordinating role of NADMO encompassed services such as health and immigration screening of returnees, profiling and tailored support to the vulnerable (the aged, children, the infirm and women) and feeding, temporarily accommodating and facilitating returnees’ transportation to their hometowns and villages. NADMO provided token amounts of between ¢25 to ¢30 Ghana Cedis (equivalent to €6 to €7.32 Euros, respectively) to returnees to cater for the cost of their internal transportation to their villages and towns from Accra. This amount given was woefully inadequate to cover the immediate costs borne by returnees (most of who had lost everything in Libya). NADMO draws its funding from government subvention. Though the organization’s role was evident during the 2011 unrest in Libya, the lack of adequate financial support for returnees and misinformation exposed some staff of NADMO to the risk of physical attacks when returnees erro- neously perceived them as hoarding relief money that they were entitled to. Yes, some of the returnees even slapped our staff. They were aggressive towards our staff because some alleged that Ghaddafi had given us money to give to them but we were trying to keep it from them. Some said the Nigerian returnees received US$1000 each and that the Ghanaians too were also given US$1000 each by Ghaddafi. (A director at NADMO) Part of the agitation by returnees emanated from what returnees reported as broken promises by international institutions, working jointly with the Ghana government. Some return migrants claimed that they were promised US$500 each upon return by IOM officials and others were pro- mised support towards a sustainable reintegration into their communities. When we were in Tunis, we were told by IOM that once we arrived in Ghana we would be given US$500 each to get to our destinations. However, GH$30.00 (€7.32 Euros) was what was given to those of us from Brong Ahafo. (Kwasi, 30-year-old returnee from Libya) Also, the existing disaster management organization (NADMO) does not have a mandate to evacuate trapped nationals from abroad. This limits the organization’s ability to provide effective support until such nationals have physically arrived in Ghana. Fundamental challenges faced by NADMO were com- pounded by the lack of a formal reception centre for the purpose of receiving large numbers of dis- tressed individuals and the completion of immigration, healthcare and security assessments. This necessitated the hosting of returnees in a military sports stadium (Elwark Stadium) that is largely exposed to the elements, especially in cases of adverse weather conditions. Logistical challenges con- strained thorough assessments of returnees against the effects of trauma and the delivery of therapies for psychosocial and post-traumatic stress disorders. The health of staff of NADMO was also compro- mised because of prolonged exposure to very ill returnees who were not diagnosed quickly. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS Community leaders and some civil society organizations played a critical role during the return and reintegration phase for returnees from Libya. Their level of preparedness is judged to be higher © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM Involuntary return and reintegration 9 than key state agencies. The director of Dormaa FM station,4 for instance, used the medium of radio to establish regular communication between migrants in Libya and their families in Ghana before their arrival in the country. This was achieved through phone-in programmes where migrants shared their distressing experiences with the local community. Trapped migrants also lobbied their members of parliament and government officials by phoning into live broadcasts at the peak of the crisis and making direct appeals for help in evacuating them. Their harrowing stories helped galva- nize public opinion in favour of government action to charter aircrafts to extract them from a coun- try in crisis. Open communication channels were also maintained throughout returnees’ journey from their arrival at the national airport until they returned to their various towns and villages. The local radio station at Dormaa also run sensitisation programmes to help the community appreciate the circumstances surrounding the unplanned return of their relatives. This was meant to minimise incidents of rejection, feeling of humiliation and possible tensions between community members and returnees. Community leaders coordinated a range of other services for returnees. One area of concern for community leaders was the provision of health screening and health inter- ventions for newly arrived returnees. This was partly to ascertain their health status but also to sug- gest and arrange treatments for returnees, if need be. They facilitated interactions among government healthcare providers, return migrants and non-governmental organizations. When we get the information through the newspapers that some Ghanaians are being repatriated to Ghana, we use the radio to inform the District Assembly about the situation then we ask for the list containing their names. Later we make announcements on air for the Ghana Health Service to come and screen them [for] certain diseases like HIV/AIDS etc. So, we make the announcement for the returnees to assemble at the FM station here and then invite the health service personnel and other interested organizations to come here to give them the necessary support. (Community leader/direc- tor of local radio station) Why was health screening important to them? Tanle (2012) notes that migration to Libya via the Sahara Desert poses serious health risks for migrants including dehydration, HIV/AIDS and even death. Community leaders were concerned about the health of the returnees to ensure that they were in good health and to prevent the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS (Anarfi et al., 2003). However, targeting returnees for health screening had the potential for stigmatizing them as carriers of HIV/AIDS. Although laudable, focusing attention on HIV feeds into the predominant narrative among Ghanaians that migrants, especially female migrants to Libya, engage in prostitution and are likely to be infected with HIV. It is not obvious that community leaders protected the confidential- ity of returnees during their health screening programmes. In addition to health screening, the community leader used his radio station to solicit support from the community towards the provision of humanitarian relief to returnees. We also made appeals for support for the returnees and people brought “second hand” clothes, money, food etc. for the returnees. I remember in one of our appeal(s) for support programmes, a chop bar [local restaurant] owner who operates near our FM station was touched and gave free food to any Libya returnee [returnee from Libya] who went there to eat. We also commended her benevolence on the radio. Others also did their best in various ways for the returnees (Community leader/director of local radio station) In addition, the community leader used his social networks to access educational opportunities for the children of some returnees. Unplanned returns are associated with loss of income, which has the potential to jeopardize retention rates in education for the wards of returnees. For instance, he appealed to a successful voluntary returnee from Libya who owned a private school to admit © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM 10 Kandilige and Adiku children of returnees who had been impoverished by their unplanned return. He subsequently mobi- lized funds to pay their heavily subsidised fees by instalments (Community leader/director of local radio station). The quantum of support rendered helps to paint a picture of the critical role of com- munity leaders in facilitating return and reintegration of migrants returning from countries in crisis. Civil Society Organizations (CSO) such as ‘Scholars in Transit’ collaborated with IOM and UNDP to deliver limited reintegration support to returnees but the support tended to be ad hoc and on a limited scale. For instance, only fifty beneficiaries out of nine hundred registered returnees in Nkoranza benefited from a training and distribution of start-up kits (CEO of a Civil Society Organi- sation; Staff of IOM, Ghana). Though laudable in its intentions, ‘Scholars in transit’ was accused by some returnees of favouritism because of the formula it applied in selecting the few beneficiaries of the reintegration support package. The organization gave ten percent of support to poor commu- nity members who were not returnees. This angered many of the returnees considering that resources were already scarce. The rationale behind such an action is to minimise the likelihood of stigmatisation of returnees and antagonism between returnees and non-migrants. This approach is increasingly being adopted by most institutions that implement community interventions (See Giles, 2018). Given the fact that civil society organizations tend to have in-depth local knowledge as well as presence, there is the need for them to be better resourced to enable them play a more prominent role in reintegration programmes and be able to reach out to the community at large. The role of intergovernmental organizations Intergovernmental organizations such as IOM and the UNPD [in Ghana] were constrained in their ability to help evacuate and reintegrate return migrants due to challenges with accurate data on the number of Ghanaians in Libya and limited access to financial resources. This inhibited their ability to prepare adequately to receive returnees. Without knowing the scale of the mass return, it was difficult to envisage the numbers of people returning and the sort of support they might require. The magnitude of this challenge is captured in what some staff of IOM (Ghana) had to say: When we were first putting together those contingency plans, to assist these Ghanaian nationals to return, I think MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] came up with the figure of close to 5,000. . .Then they made us scale it up to 8,000, then they said to be on the safe side let’s expect up to 12,000. That would be the maximum. Now, as you know close to 19,000 did arrive. Not to talk about those who did not arrive, those who went to other countries. So, the issue of data and statistics, we need to really look at. It was a major, major challenge. (Staff of IOM, Ghana) Nonetheless, IOM played a leading role in supporting the evacuation of Ghanaian migrants from Libya. IOM routinely has return and reintegration programmes in Ghana that are outside conflict scenarios and are voluntary in nature. These peacetime programmes mainly aim at assisting espe- cially skilled and semi-skilled Ghanaians to return from the diaspora either permanently or on a temporary basis in order to contribute to national development. Upon return, IOM provided training and equipment towards business start-ups in agriculture and trading activities to returnees from Libya. Reintegration packages did not include direct cash payments but rather logistical support, partly as a means of dissuading beneficiaries from possibly using such cash to fund a return trip to Libya (CEO of a Civil Society Organisation; Staff of IOM). The IOM initiated two reintegration projects aimed at promoting the socio-economic reintegration of returnees, using vocational and micro-business skills training, business counselling, provision of basic start-up kits and access to health insurance. In order to avoid possible frictions between host community members and returnees, these projects extended beyond returnees to include vulnerable community members in high migrant-sending areas such as Nkoranza. Moreover, the IOM and its partners, such as © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM Involuntary return and reintegration 11 NADMO and ‘Scholars in Transit’, spearheaded educational activities and advocacy work. The forma- tion of returnee associations as a conduit to mobilise returnees to receive reintegration support as well as to educate aspiring migrants against irregular migration was also led by NADMO and its implement- ing partners in Ghana. The second project run by the IOM was known as the “emergency reintegration assistance for Ghanaian migrants affected by the 2011 Libyan crisis” and it was funded by the Japanese government. As part of the project, IOM commissioned a study of key communities in the Bong Ahafo and Northern regions of Ghana in order to measure the “difficulties and vulnerabilities, positive beha- vioural practices, partners or local institutions and livelihood strategies, including alternative livelihoods in host or return communities that can reduce future vulnerability to emergencies such as the massive return of migrants” (IOM, 2013c). One key finding from this IOM study is that migrant-hosting families belong to lower well-being categories in the Bong Ahafo and Northern regions and that these regions are characterized by “subsistence farming, low level of education and skills base, low employability levels, large family sizes, low income and assets base, little or no entitlements and limited livelihood choices” (IOM, 2013a). The report also highlights the main challenges faced by migrant-sending families during unplanned return of their family members from Libya to include “the stretching of the household income and related effects on food, shelter and clothing”. The ensuing financial pressures are said to have subsequent negative effects on family nutrition, education and health. The project, accord- ing to IOM Ghana (2013b), strengthened the capacities of 161 returnees and vulnerable community members by providing them business development and management training and also in-kind sup- port to start-up businesses. In addition, 2,108 returnees, their families and sending community members were provided national health insurance cover. A total of 152 returnees also received psy- chosocial counselling. In a similar way, the UNDP participated in the reception and reintegration of Ghanaian returnees from Libya even though that is not its core mandate in Ghana. The main challenge was that fund- ing towards such interventions was not centralised and had to be raised from donor agencies (Pro- gramme Specialist at UNDP). On a whole, intergovernmental organizations seemed better prepared and resourced than state agencies in managing return and reintegration challenges, even though the breadth of coverage was minimal due to funding constraints. The role of family members and private actors Family members are both beneficiaries of remittances and bearers of the burden of hosting forced retur- nees. Unplanned returns from countries in crisis abruptly curtail sources of remittance income and sometimes exact expectations of unaffordable reciprocal benevolence on family members. Adverse effects, recorded in this study, on families included loss of social standing and respectability, being sad- dled with caring for mentally and emotionally distressed returnees, sharing limited family resources with persons who no longer generated income and coping with the stigma associated with ‘return of failure’ (Cerase, 1974). Some of these concerns are captured in what two family members had to say: When he was there, we had made up our minds to buy a car but we couldn’t because of the con- flict. If he was still there, we would have bought it. And now life is not like before, the money we earn has gone down. . .our children would have gone to good schools but now it’s the government school they attend. (Akosua, 36-year-old spouse of a return migrant from Libya). I advised her to thank God for her coming home safely because one of her friends she travelled to Libya with never came back [was killed] . . . But my dignity in the community has been affected. She used to remit us and I was using some of that to make myself appear good, but it’s no more like that. (Pomaa, 60-year-old mother of return migrant) © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM 12 Kandilige and Adiku Akosua’s lamentation about her inability to access private school education for her children due to the sudden curtailment of remittance receipts highlights the fragility in constructions of remit- tance-dependent social statuses. Also, Pomaa’s account of how she previously used remittances to ‘make herself appear good’ feeds into Nieswand (2013:10) conceptualisation of how migrant remit- tances are used to enhance their own and their family’s status at home by sponsoring life-cycle rites and by supporting relatives with consumer goods or money. In this study, family members served as critical stakeholders in the reintegration process. They pro- vided accommodation (especially for returnees who had not stayed in Libya long enough to have accu- mulated substantial resources), shared parcels of farmlands with returnees to be used for subsistence farming as an alternative source of livelihood and negotiated relations between returnees and the local community in order to minimise incidents of rejection and stigmatization. The curse of returning home empty-handed brought psychological and emotional stresses to both returnees and their families. Nies- wand (2013) and Akyeampong (2000) discuss the toll on migrants who return empty-handed and how their relatives strive to keep up appearances in the face of stinging social judgement because they are unable to meet expectations associated with being a “burger 5”. These feelings are exacerbated by the socio-cultural expectations, in Ghana [largely a patriarchal society], of a man being head of household and having to provide for the needs of the family. Anita’s account represents how families’ hopes and plans were disrupted by unplanned returns during the conflict: The situation over there forced him to come back. It has even messed him up and he is depressed because he can’t take care of his own family. He is no longer happy. It’s a worry because he is a grown-up man with his burdens on other people. He is expected to take care of the family, but lack of money has brought lots of hardships and worries which isn’t good for his health. (Anita, 42- year-old spouse of a returnee from Libya) Additionally, some telecommunications companies (MTN and Vodafone-Ghana) donated free mobile phones and registered Sim cards to returnees. Beyond the facilitation of communication, the rationale behind the registration of Sim cards was to help humanitarian agencies track returnees later on in order to deliver more targeted reintegration support (Director at NADMO; Staff at IOM; Community Leader). Though seemingly altruistic, the gesture by the private companies accrued substantial publicity to them under the guise of social corporate responsibility. Some return migrants were, however, not appreciative of this gesture because they linked it to failed promises to deliver follow-up reintegration programmes. Kwabena (34-year-old return migrant from Libya) describes the gifts from the mobile phone companies as “useless” partly because he did not benefit from any programmes linked to the registration process apparently geared towards facilitating his reintegration into his community of origin: Oh, when we got to the airport, it was those who work at the airport who brought a bus to pick us from the plane and then took us to the immigration service and they asked us a lot of questions and they gave us transportation money, about 25 Ghana Cedis, and some useless phones and Sim cards, that was all. RE-EMIGRATION DUE TO INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES The absence of a policy and institutional framework in Ghana for the evacuation, repatriation and rein- tegration of migrants from countries in crisis, as illustrated by the above examples, resulted in poor reintegration outcomes for returnees, demonstrated by six out of eleven returnees interviewed re-emi- grating to Libya at least on one occasion since 2011. Notwithstanding the fact that re-emigration is not © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM Involuntary return and reintegration 13 necessarily an anomaly in practice, unemployment and attendant poverty have compelled returnees (with the blessing of their family members) to consider re-emigrating to a country in conflict as a viable alternative to resettling in to their home country. Ernest’s and Adwoa’s accounts are quite instructive: In fact, if I get some money right now, I won’t hesitate to return to Libya even though I know the country is not safe at the moment because of the war. I really mean it because I have no peace of mind at home at the moment. Things are really bad for me. I returned home with some of my colleagues, but some of them have since gone back to Libya. (Ernest, 33-year-old returnee from Libya) We started everything from scratch, I mean the two of us. No support from the church, no support from the community, no support from government, no support from the Assembly, no support from anywhere. . .Now the major challenge is that he is unemployed. Aside farming he does not do any- thing. . .I would like him to go back [to Libya]. You can see from his demeanour. Everything shows he is not a happy man. (Adwoa, 36-year-old spouse of a returnee from Libya) Akin to the accounts by Ernest and Adwoa, an analysis of problems faced by return migrants and their families by Lepore (1986) demonstrates that the antecedent of migration and the level of success or failure that migrants experienced abroad often serve as incentive for re-emigration. A similar argument could be made for these migrants. Having returned abruptly and faced with lack of socio-economic prospects, many returnees regarded re-emigration to Libya as a livelihood strat- egy of last resort, in spite of the physical attacks, racism and discrimination they experienced. CONCLUSION The article concludes that even though trapped Ghanaian migrants were eventually evacuated, there was, to a large extent, institutional failures involving both Ghanaian state agencies, inter-govern- mental organizations and local non-state actors who were ill-prepared to assist migrants on their ‘forced return’, thus frustrating their reintegration into various communities in Ghana. The collation of credible migration data and real time access to migrant stock as well as migrant flow figures are critical to international responses to crisis situations where migrants are implicated. In addition, the evacuation, repatriation and reintegration of return migrants are shown to be collaborative tasks that need to be executed by diverse stakeholders at different spatial levels. This study, therefore, contributes to return migration literature and theorization by highlighting the institutional aspect of return migration. This approach complements earlier theorization of return migra- tion which focused on the returnee’s preparedness, his/her resource mobilization capabilities and circum- stances at both the host and origin countries (Cassarino, 2004). We argue that there should be clear cut institutional policies, strong and well-resourced institutions and structures to assist migrants in their rein- tegration efforts. This is all the more important when migrants are compelled to return because of crisis situations at the destination country which leave migrants in vulnerable positions, as this study shows. When migrants leave destination countries unprepared, they need immense support from state, intergov- ernmental organizations, civil society, private actors and families to ensure successful reintegration (Table 1). In the absence of these, returnees face a dilemma which makes real the possibility of re-emi- gration to conflict-ridden destinations as a viable alternative to resettling in their home country, despite the physical attacks and discrimination as this study has demonstrated. POLICY IMPLICATIONS This study, therefore, highlights the need for a clear national policy on evacuation of migrants implicated in crisis situations abroad. Such a policy needs to be costed and budgeted for, with © 2019 The Authors. International Migration © 2019 IOM 14 Kandilige and Adiku clearly delineated mandate assigned to relevant stakeholders and adequate training provided to facilitate quick and efficient response in these situations. Also, in order to enhance the efficacy of NADMO, the organization needs to work closely with the security attache to each Ghanaian mis- sion abroad, to coordinate the management of disaster incidents. Moreover, a well-resourced local disaster management organization, with access to funding sources beyond government subvention, would greatly improve its operational capabilities. Also, critical to the construction of a purpose- built reception centre, comprising among other things a reception unit, a psychosocial orientation unit, a temporary camp and offices for medics in order to facilitate the process of screening, profil- ing and record taking of returnees from countries in crisis, in a more humane manner. The study shows that families play important roles in the lives of returnees and should be suffi- ciently supported to cater for returnees who may be considered vulnerable because of the circum- stances surrounding their return. As breadwinners for their families, sudden change in circumstances of returnees not only affects households’ livelihoods but also traumatises them emo- tionally and psychologically. Adequate subventions, emotional and psychological support should, therefore, be provided to aid migrants and their families who may have been distressed by these events. Post-traumatic stress has been found among some returnees leading to various misde- meanors and anti-social behaviours including alcoholism, depression and suicide (Arowolo, 2000). Providing reintegration support will lessen, if not eliminate, the trauma faced by returnees and their relatives. NOTES 1. MICIC is the research component of a European Union-funded project “Migrants in countries in crisis: Sup- porting an evidence-based approach for effective and cooperative state action”. This project aims at provid- ing accessible, methodologically robust and policy relevant data on the migration implications of crisis situations in host countries. 2. 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