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LEGON CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS                                    
AND DIPLOMACY 
 
 
 
VICTIM OR VILLAIN: ITALY’S RESPONSE TO                                          
THE INFLUX OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS FROM                                          
NORTH AFRICA? 
 
  
 
BY 
NANETTE ESENAM KONUTSEY 
(10316048) 
 
 
 
 
THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY                       
OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS OF                                  
ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
 
LEGON                                                                                               JULY 2015 
 
 
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DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that, apart from the sources cited in this work which are duly acknowledged, 
this study is the result of an original research conducted under the supervision of Dr Amanda 
Coffie and that this research has not been presented either in part or in whole for any other 
purpose. 
 
 
 
 
………………………………………..                               ..………………………………….. 
          Dr. Amanda COFFIE                                                    Nanette Esenam KONUTSEY 
              (Supervisor)                                                                               (Student) 
 
 
 
          Date:…………………………                                            Date……………………….. 
 
 
 
 
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DEDICATION 
 
This work is dedicated to the Almighty God who has brought me this far and my beautiful 
mother for her ever present support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First and foremost, thanksgiving goes to the Almighty Father for granting me the grace to 
complete this dissertation. 
 
Second, my deepest appreciation goes to my godfather, Rev. Jerry Tempong, for his advice 
and guidance throughout my course. 
 
Finally, I am ever grateful to my supervisor, Dr Amanda Coffie, for her patience, guidance 
and invaluable advice throughout this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AU                           African Union 
CIEs                         Centre for Identification and Expulsion Stay and Assistance 
CPTAs                      Centre for Temporary Stay and Assistance 
CPRTIs                     Territorial Commission for the Recognition of International Protection 
EBF                          External Border Fund 
ECHR                       European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR                      European Court on Human Rights 
EU                            European Union 
FRONTEX                European Agency for the Management of the External Borders of the   
                                Member States of the European Union   
HRW                        Human Rights Watch 
IOM                         International Organisation for Migration 
MRCC                      Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
NAMCs                    North African Mediterranean Countries 
NTC                         National Transitional Council 
NATO                      North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OMN                        Operation Mare Nostrum 
TCNs                        Third Country Nationals 
SAR                          Search and Rescue 
SBC                          Schengen Border Code 
SPRAR                     Protection System for Asylum-seekers and Refugees 
UDHR                      Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UNHCR                    Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION - - - - - - - - - i 
DEDICATION - - - - - - - - - ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT - - - - - - - - iii  
ABBREVIATIONS - - - - - - - - - iv    
TABLE OF CONTENTS - - - - - - - - v 
ABSTRACT - - - - - - - - - - viii
  
 
CHAPTER ONE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.1 Background to Statement of Problem - - - - - - 1 
1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - - - 3 
1.3 Research Objectives - - - - - - - - 4 
1.4 Objectives of the Study - - - - - - - - 4 
1.5 Scope of the Study - - - - - - - - 5 
1.6 Hypothesis - - - - - - - - - 5 
1.7 Rationale of the Study - - - - - - - - 5 
1.8 Conceptual Framework  - - - - - - - - 6 
1.9 Literature Review - - - - - - - - - 7 
1.10 Sources of Data - - - - - - - - - 15 
1.11 Research Methodology - - - - - - - - 16 
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1.12 Conceptual Definitions - - - - - - - - 16 
1.13 Chapter Arrangement - - - - - - - - 17 
         Endnote - - - - - - - - - - 18 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
EUROPE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST IRREGULAR MIGRATION 
2.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - - 20 
2.1 Overview of EU Border Policies towards Irregular Migrants from North Africa 20 
2.1.1 Cooperation with Libya - - - - - - - - 21 
2.2 Overview of Italian Border Policies towards Irregular Migrants from North Africa 23 
2.3 Europe Response to the Influx of Irregular Migrants from Libya - - 26 
      2.3.1 The EU’s Response to the Influx of Irregular Migrants from Libya - 27 
      2.3.2 Italy’s Response to Irregular Migrants from Libya in 2011 and 2012 - 29 
2.4 European Response after Increasing Migrants Deaths in the Mediterranean - 32 
      2.4.1 Italy’s Operation Mare Nostrum - - - - - - 32 
      2.4.2 EU Border Policies during 2013 to 2014 - - - - - 35 
      Endnotes - - - - - - - - - - 38 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
ITALY AS A VICTIM OR VILLAIN IN EUROPEAN BORDER POLICIES 
3.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - - 41 
3.1 The Opus and Achievements of Mare Nostrum - - - - - 41 
      3.1.1 Reception Conditions After Rescue  - - - - - 44 
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3.2 Detention Conditions in Libya - - - - - - - 46 
3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights - - - - - 48 
3.4 Comparison of 2011-2014 Italian Policies to Human Rights Standards - - 49 
       3.4.1 Policies of Interception and Push-Back versus Search and Rescue - 51 
       3.4.2 Policies of Reception and Detention - - - - - 55 
       3.4.3 Policies of Expulsion and Readmission - - - - - 58 
       Endnote - - - - - - - - - - 60 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
4.0 Introduction - - - - - - - - - 63 
4.1 Findings - - - - - - - - - - 63 
4.2 Conclusion - - - - - - - - - 67 
4.3 Recommendations - - - - - - - - - 68 
      Endnotes - - - - - - - - - - 72 
      Bibliography - - - - - - - - - 74 
      Appendix - - - - - - - - - - 81 
   
 
 
 
 
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ABSTRACT 
The year 2011 witnessed a massive influx of irregular migrants from North Africa, using the 
central Mediterranean to cross into Europe. Libya, which had a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the southern European country Italy, suffered a civil crisis, creating a 
vacuum of authority, which failed to prevent journeys from the coasts of Libya into Italy. The 
Italian government on the other hand reacted by policing its waters to locate irregular sea 
migrants, sending boats back to places of departure, and ignoring distress calls made by 
migrants at sea. After several deaths and missing persons, the international community 
including European neighbouring states, protested against Italy’s responses, pointing out the 
humanitarian concerns they had caused. In 2013 Italy, through its Operation Mare Nostrum, 
decided to address the humanitarian concerns by rescuing irregular migrants and reducing 
deaths in the central Mediterranean. This however did not sit well with some EU neighbours 
who accused Italy of encouraging irregular migration into Europe. Italy as an EU member, is 
vilified unfairly for first honouring the wider European policy of controlling the European 
border and preventing irregular migration, and second, for dealing with the humanitarian 
emergency the European Union and the international community criticize Italy of. This 
dissertation outlines first and foremost, European policies towards irregular migrants from 
Libya as well as Italy’s independent responses in the period 2011 to 2014. Second, the study 
determines if Italy through its individual responses violated the human rights of irregular 
migrants from Libya. This is done by comparing the effect of Italy’s policies on irregular 
migrants to its regional human rights convention, the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The study, in conclusion, points out that though Italy through its individual responses 
had violated the rights of irregular migrants from North Africa, these policies were a wider 
representation of the EU and its member states. Thus, vilifying Italy individually for 
mistreating migrants during 2011 - 2014 was unjust. The study recommends a long term, 
well-thought solution and organized cooperation among EU member states and source and 
transit countries to better solve issues pertaining to irregular migration, especially, from 
North Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CHAPTER ONE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.1     Background to the Problem Statement 
Irregular migration from Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean is no new phenomenon. 
Europe, for decades, has been the destination for most migrants from Africa in search of 
better employment opportunities, hopes for family reunions or simply fleeing harsh living 
conditions in their countries. North Africa not only serves as an entry and transit country for 
most sub-Saharan Africans but has a long standing history of sending migrants to Europe. 
Irregular migrants because of challenges associated with the regular means of travelling or 
the costly means of illegal travel such as the use of forged documents, resort to unseaworthy 
1 
means of transport endangering their lives to clandestinely enter Europe.
To prevent migrants from the south of the Mediterranean from entering, Europe as a Union 
employs restrictive policies that range from internal border arrangements to external 
measures. The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) is one internal arrangement requiring members 
2
with external frontiers to perform border control activities.  Likewise external arrangements 
consist of joint border checks and patrols such as the European Agency for the Management 
3
of the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex).  The Union 
also cooperates with North African Mediterranean Countries (NAMCs) in projects such as 
the Global Approach to Mobility and Migration (GAMM). These policies however have 
failed to attain their objective of preventing and reducing considerably clandestine arrivals, 
rather irregular migrants and their facilitators have found alternative routes, further 
engendering the lives of undocumented sea migrants. 
Italy, a southern Europe state, is one of the four countries – Greece, Spain, Malta – that face 
4
irregular migration pressures.  Apart from efforts made in cooperation with the EU, Italy 
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th
employed other means such as the Friendship Agreement of 30  August 2009 with Libyan 
5
leader Muammar Ghaddafi since Libya had become the favoured point of departure.  Some 
of the strategies under this agreement involved stopping migrants at sea and returning them to 
the place of departure (interception), the use of coastal patrols to stop journeys from taking 
place and Libya as a holding centre for returned migrants (externalization), all push-back 
6
polices.  In 2011, the Arab Spring resulted in the on-going civil crisis in Libya. The death of 
Ghaddafi during the crisis created a vacuum of authority; increasing clandestine journeys 
across into Europe. Italy renewed the pact in 2012 with the then unofficially recognized 
authority, the National Transition Council (NTC), with the aim to stop smuggling operatives 
and prevent migrants from sea crossings into Europe. 
Italy’s agreements with states like Libya sought to prevent an influx of irregular migrants 
from entering into Europe. These agreements are criticized by the International community 
including neighbouring EU states as violating the fundamental rights of irregular migrants, 
particularly in the event migrants are returned to unsafe places of departure such as Libya, 
7
with inadequate human rights provisions.  Meanwhile the non-refoulement principle in 
Article 33 of the Geneva Refugee Convention forbids states from returning refugees or 
asylum-seekers to places where their lives and freedoms would be threatened as a result of 
8
their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion.   
The principle includes persons for one reason or the other seeking entry into another state. It 
is captured in various regional, sub-regional, agreements such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) of 1950 also known as the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) of 1948. The ECHR, a pre-requisite of EU member states provides minimum 
safeguards requiring parties take measures to effectively prevent human rights violations 
against vulnerable persons such as irregular migrants. The return process of irregular 
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migrants according to the ECHR should be carried out respecting fully the right to dignity of 
returnees, taking into account, inter alia, their age, sex, state of health, while coercive 
9
measures during expulsions should be kept to an absolute minimum.  It is imperative to note 
that push-back policies are inconsistent with the non-refoulement principle which seeks first 
to prevent a person’s return to a place where he or she would face persecution, and to prevent 
the ill-treatment of persons. Italy, pushing back irregular migrants to Libya which lacks 
instituted migration protection policies is inconsistent with the non-refoulement principle. 
In 2013, following the disasters in the Mediterranean, particularly the 366 African migrants 
including infants that drowned near the island of Lampedusa, Italy emerged with a Search 
and Rescue (SAR) initiative – Operation Mare Nostrum - attempting to solve the 
humanitarian concerns of the international community over its previous responses. Critics 
however have described operation Mare Nostrum (OMN or Mare Nostrum) as a continuous 
10
security operation, which merely “saves lives”  neglecting the actual needs of migrants upon 
11
arrival at European shores.  Other EU member states describe it as a pull-factor encouraging 
migrants to engender their lives; while advocates of the initiative dubbed it a model which the 
12
EU should emulate.  This highlights contested views of Italy’s response to the influx of 
irregular migrants, particularly those travelling from Libya since its civil crisis in 2011. Due 
to this, it is important to determine if Italy, through its border policies, has violated the rights 
of irregular migrants by assessing its state policies with that of the broader regional EU 
policies. The study seeks to ascertain if Italy is vilified for rights violations without 
considering wider factors that may inform its policy responses such as the Union it is party 
to. 
1.2     Statement of the Research Problem 
13
The European Union, which is a regional bloc founded on human rights principles  has made 
several provisions to ensure the protection of human lives, freedoms and equality. The 
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European Convention on Human Rights is one of the many human rights conventions 
governing and guiding member-states in decision-making to avoid rights violations. However 
migration policies in Europe do not always consider the rights of migrants.  
The EU has been criticized for supporting policies of member-states that violate migrant 
14
rights, a contrast to the founding principles of the Union.  Italy, one of the countries at 
present addressing the increasing flow of irregular migrants is criticized for adopting push-
back policies that infringe on migrants’ rights, yet, after rising concerns of deaths and 
criticism from the international community, Italy responded by setting up an initiative 
attempting to manage the humanitarian challenge as opposed to previous set policies. Mare 
Nostrum however is dubbed as a pull-factor by the same community that condemned 
previous restrictive policies and insists that Italy strengthens borders control to prevent 
crossings. For this reason, it is important to ascertain if indeed policies adopted by Italy 
breach the rights of migrants. The study further seeks to determine if the exclusive 
vilification of Italy is justified without considering Italy’s borders policies as a broader 
representation of the European Union. 
1.3     Research Questions 
Research questions guiding the study include: 
1. How has Italy addressed the influx of irregular migrants since the Arab Spring? 
2. Has there been a significant policy shift and does this new policy violate the rights of 
irregular migrants? 
3. What has been the role of the European Union in shaping policies adopted by Italy 
that violate irregular migrants’ rights? 
1.4     Objectives of the Study 
The study seeks to  
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1. Ascertain border policies adopted by Italy since the Arab Spring in controlling the 
influx of irregular migrants from Libya. 
2. Determine if Italy has significantly modified its border policies and if this policy 
violates the rights of irregular migrants. 
3. Determine the European Union’s role in shaping border policies adopted by Italy that 
violate irregular migrants’ rights. 
1.5     Scope of the Study 
The study focuses on Italian border policies that dealt with the influx of irregular migrants 
from Libya since the Libyan crisis in 2011 till the end of Mare Nostrum in 2014. The study 
also seeks to compare Europe’s border policies with those of Italy since 2011 till 2014 to 
determine Europe’s role in shaping Italy’s policy responses. 
1.6     Hypothesis 
While Italy has significantly modified its border policies and has been accused of violating 
the rights of irregular migrants, this study contends that the shift is consistent with European 
Union’s policies on border protection.  
1.7     Rationale of the Study 
Italy is under pressure especially from northern European states to strictly control its borders, 
at the same time Italy has been criticized by the international community, including 
neighbouring EU countries for implementing strict policies without consideration for the 
fundamental rights of irregular migrants. This research, first, is to ascertain if Italy has indeed 
by its policy responses since the Libyan crisis of 2011 till 2014 violated the rights of migrants 
and if this is or otherwise a broader representation of European policies.  Second, the study 
highlights the blame game that ensues among EU member states, particularly, in rescuing and 
hosting irregular sea migrants.  
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Confidently, the findings of this study will encourage the Union to collectively make more 
efforts to factor human-centered responses, not as written laws only but to act on them in 
dealing with irregular sea migrants. This research will also serve as existing knowledge for 
further research.  
1.8     Conceptual Framework 
This research adopts International Cooperation as its conceptual framework to analyze both 
Italy’s and the EU’s policy responses to irregular migration during the Arab Spring. 
According to Keohane, International Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to 
15
the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.  
The term policy coordination as used by Charles E. Lindbloom refers to an adjustment of a 
set of decisions such that the adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions 
are, to a degree, and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or counter-balanced or 
16
overweighed.  In this view states will alter policies when there is the need to coalesce with 
others to attain a common objective which eventually culminates in harmonizing domestic 
policies. Keohane also notes that to achieve shared objectives it is essential in cooperation to 
establish principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that keep states in line, 
guiding state activities to successfully attain set objectives. Axelrod explains cooperation as 
17
an act that can only take place in a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests.  
Thus cooperation ensues as a response to divergent goals of actors as and when those goals 
are converged by emphasizing on the mutual gains actors stand to benefit by engaging in 
cooperation.  
However, the concept of cooperation has its negative implications. In Keohane’s After 
Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy he acknowledges the 
shortcomings of cooperation. Though a valuable instrument in attaining collective goals, it is 
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18
a challenge regarding policy organization.  For example, the realists view cooperation as a 
tool to further self-interest which usually poses as a hindrance to coherent policy 
organization. According to Axelrod, cooperation as an outcome of incompatible interests 
19
does not make it necessarily good from a moral point of view.  He notes that in state 
cooperation, it can be designed to benefit a few parties at the expense of others highlighting 
20
the injustice of an imperfect world.  Again this criticism supports the realist assertion of 
states using cooperation to further self-interest.   
These criticisms notwithstanding, the current study adopts the concept for the following 
reasons. First, international cooperation helps the study to explain the necessity of joining 
forces and coordinating policies with regards to irregular migration. Since the act of 
migration is trans-national, it is imperative that in addressing issues and concerns that arise 
countries harmonize individual policies to attain solutions. Thus, Susan Martin notes that in 
21
solving migratory issues state cooperation is inevitable.  This attests to Italy and the EU’s 
adoption of cooperation as a tool to address unauthorized entry into Europe among other 
internalized policies. Second, Cooperation defined by Keohane as an adjustment of policies 
enables the study to explain the coordination of policies made within the EU and its member 
states as well as between the EU, member states and NAMCs to prevent clandestine journeys 
in the central Mediterranean. Lastly, Cooperation as an outcome of conflicting interests 
enables the study highlight the varied national interests within European states that time and 
again serves as a challenge in achieving a common European policy to prevent irregular entry 
into Europe.  
1.9     Literature Review 
In “Policing Migration in the Mediterranean” Derek Lutterbeck notes the change in the 
significance of the Mediterranean from a militarized zone dividing the west and the east 
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during the Second World War to a sea experiencing security concerns involving irregular 
migration, smuggling of persons and trans-national terrorism. The sea dividing Northern 
industrialized well-developed countries from its Southern less-developed neighbours serves 
as a means for accessing better employment opportunities thus the inflow of irregular 
migrants from neighbouring poor countries to Europe. Due to this, southern European 
countries with the Union’s assistance have set up measures involving semi-militarized (the 
use of state police) and militarized (the use of air and naval forces and their logistics) to 
counter and prevent irregular migration and its effects. For instance, the Italian Police also 
considered partially as a military force, the Guardia di Finanza, has become one of the tools 
22
used to fight against clandestine movements since the 1990s.  For militarized counter-acts, 
Lutterbeck notes the Italian Navy as the significant example since its role in the first 
23
Albanian refugee crisis.  He further discusses how European states as a Union have 
coalesced with neighbouring source and transit countries in programmmes such as the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) to deter crossings. Other forms of cooperation have been 
bilateral, between member states and source or transit countries such as the various Italy-
Libya arrangements. The arrangement involves repatriating migrants to Libya, intercepting 
migrants on the high seas by Italy-Libya joint patrols and with Germany’s assistance a pledge 
24
to establish holding centres in Libya.  This pact however was contested by France, Spain and 
25
Sweden due to inadequate provisions made for persons in need of international protection.   
Lutterbeck further argues that military counter-strategies have not achieved their goal but 
rather, triggered humanitarian challenges encompassing migrants opting for longer and 
unsafe routes since such routes are not policed, leading to drowning in addition to the 
growing market for people smugglers. According to Lutterbeck, intense patrols and 
interceptions have led to the operation of small gangs working from places of departure with 
groups in destination countries finding unidentified routes for clandestine travelling. 
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Consequently migrants pay higher fees because of increased monitoring at sea. Moreover 
changing migratory routes is noted by the author to first extend patrolling activities of 
destination countries, as Italy polices from the Adriatic area, Sicily expanding to Lampedusa.  
26
He also notes the human cost of diversifying migratory routes  and concludes that even with 
these challenges the EU continues to opt for militarized measures in controlling clandestine 
crossings on the Mediterreanean.  
In Lutterbeck’s analysis of the adverse effect of border control policies by the EU and its 
member states, he fails to consider the importance of the incompatibility of individual 
policies adopted to address irregular migration. Therefore Italy in its quest to control irregular 
migration and secure the EU from clandestine entry is vilified for its efforts at times by the 
very Union it seeks to protect. This study seeks to determine whether criticisms leveled 
against Italy are justified concerning border policies it has adopted towards irregular migrants 
from 2011 to 2014. 
In Thomas Spijkerboer’s article “The Human Costs of Border Control”, he argues that the 
border policy discussion on the intensification of the EU’s external border has only 
succeeded in leading irregular migrants to use alternative and increasingly dangerous 
27
routes.  He observes that as Europe kept tightening its external frontiers, it did not achieve 
the desired results of decreasing arrivals rather it ensued in loss of lives. From 1990 to 2005, 
Spijkerboer observes through non-governmental organisations, the increasing number of lives 
lost as irregular migrants attempt to reach Europe. Spijkerboer argues about the relevance of 
lost lives pertaining to the EU’s consistent trend of external border regulation. According to 
the International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, states cannot be held legally responsible for fatalities that 
result indirectly from controlling their borders because border control, in itself, is not a 
28
wrongful act.  According to Spijkeboer European states must safeguard human lives in their 
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jurisdiction by sanctioning authorized persons who breach human rights norms.  Pertaining 
to border control, it is the responsibility of states to enact policies that consider minimizing 
the loss of lives. He reiterates that as states make policies based on the fact that human lives 
deserve to be preserved in other sectors, same should apply in migration. He then 
recommends that available and accessible information on border related deaths can shape 
decisions of European governments and the relevance of human cost should be considered in 
policy formulation.  
Spijkeboer like Lutterbeck dwell on the harmful consequences of border control but delves 
into the aspect of human cost. Accordingly he cites Italy as one of the EU states that 
contribute to the human cost in the Mediterranean.  EU member states respond to irregular 
30
migrant influxes by setting up restrictive border policies that risk the lives of migrants.  
However Italy’s individual policies against irregular migration have been criticized by its 
own neighbours for violating human rights. In determining if Italy has indeed breached its 
regional human rights standards through its border policies, the study will ascertain if Italy 
should individually be held accountable for its actions, considering its national policies are 
consistent with the broader EU. 
“Deterrence and Protection in the EU’s Migration Policy” by Anna Triandafyllidou and 
Angeliki Dimitriadi focus on the strategies Europe as a union adopts to manage irregular 
migration and pressure from asylum seekers. Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, study measures 
used in managing mobility within, across and outside the Union. The authors observe that 
adopted measures culminate in deterring migrants but not protecting their lives. Furthermore 
the Union struggles to acquire a sense of balance between deterrence and protection due to 
different policies adopted by member states. The authors suggest the Union considers 
deterrence as the optimal tool in protecting the lives of irregular migrants since they will be 
prevented from beginning the perilous journey in the first place however, the authors note 
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policies of deterrence rather violate migrants’ rights. Three spaces of control used by the EU 
for border control are indicated in the form of externalization, internal and external border 
31 
surveillance and internal border management.
Externalizing the European border include partnership with eastern European and African 
countries to stop migrant movements since they serve as countries of origin and or transit. 
Externalization include compulsory readmission agreements leading to development aid or 
trade relations, short-term visa schemes or even visa-free travel for citizens of countries 
32
assisting with managing irregular migration.  In readmission, irregular migrants rejected are 
repatriated to their countries of origin or places of departure blurring the line between 
deterrence and protection as some readmission countries fall short of human rights values. 
The next space of control involves internal and external border surveillances by border 
patrols and digital and biometric technologies such as Frontex, among others to foster a 
common European policy on external border control integrated in Article 67 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ensuring the union’s safety as a demarcated 
33
space.  With operations like Frontex, Europe contradicts its duty of rescuing migrants at sea 
as it fails to distinguish persons in need of international protection. Third is securing Europe’s 
external borders by controlling the borders of member states challenged with the freedom of 
movement due to employment, studies, tourism and relocation. One way is the Smart Border 
System (SBS) which takes fingerprints and biometric data of visa applicants and information 
on TCNs and visa-overstayers. These measures however, may obstruct freedom of movement 
34
within the EU, which is a key requirement for integration.  To conclude, the authors reiterate 
the gap between the policy of deterrence and human protection. Deterrence restricts access to 
member states and is itself an inadequate measure for managing irregular migration and 
asylum.  
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The article points out that Europe fails to have a coherent migratory policy since member 
states implement differing policies but it fails to focus individually on EU states to determine 
the effectiveness or otherwise of their border policies. Singling Italy out the research seeks to 
examine its policies in tandem with the EU and its member states, determining the role of the 
Union in shaping Italian border policies to ascertain if Italy’s violation of migrant rights, 
when determined, is a broader representation of the Union or a sole act for which Italy is 
responsible for. 
In Anna Triandafyllidou’s article “Multi-levelling and Externalizing Migration and Asylum: 
Lessons from the Southern European Islands”, she highlights the strategic importance of four 
southern islands - Canary Islands of Spain, Lampedusa of Italy, Malta, and Aegean Islands of 
Greece - to both irregular migrants and European states. These islands according to 
35
Triandafyllidou are “stepping stones” into Europe for migrants  and at the same time serve 
36
as externalized borders for Europe.  To achieve this, these islands engage in border checks 
and repatriations, that is, returning migrants to their places of departure. In this article, the 
author explains further externalization by classifying it into two categories namely gate-
keeping and fencing.  
Gate-keeping refers to restricted access via visa policies to Third Country Nationals (TNCs) 
and readmission procedures while fencing refers to the measures actively targeting illegal 
37
migrants in order to arrest and then expel them  such as border checks, coast patrols, 
surveillances and the like. According to Triandafyllidou, the Union to prevent clandestine 
movement from extending to the north adopts measures of externalization such as the “first 
safe country” principle of Dublin II and III, where migrants are to apply for asylum in the 
country they first come ashore, which are mostly in southern European states. Southern 
European states also seeking to prevent the rising pressure of arrivals on its territory because 
they act as borders, further externalize to NAMCs. The practice of externalization raises the 
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author’s argument of “a wider web of multi-level governance schemes that engage EU and 
38
non EU actors, at different combinations and for different types of policies”.  The author 
then notes the challenge of externalization, that is, its inability to prevent irregular migration 
into Europe. Triandafyllidou explains through practical examples given on the four southern 
islands. For example, Triandyfillidou notes that fencing has led to migrants opting for 
alternative accessible routes. The author also notes the humanitarian challenges 
externalization poses to persons seeking and in need international protection. 
Triandafyllidou in her article underlines the use of externalization both outside the EU and 
within. According to Triandafyllidou European member states often use southern European 
states as borders to prevent irregular migrants from entering. The article however fails to 
consider that in the North’s attempt to externalize to the South, countries like Italy are bound 
to adopt strict and severe border policies that may violate the rights of migrants in order to 
manage the flow of increasing irregular entrants. Thus the question arises, in the event that 
adopted policies violate human rights principles, should Italy take sole responsibility 
considering that the wider EU may inform border decisions it takes.  
The article “Border Politics, Right to Life and Acts of Dissensus: Voices from the 
Lampedusa Borderland” by Raffaela Puggionia, adds to the border policy discourse on the 
role of public opinion in shaping decision-making. The author argues that in the International 
Community’s polemic against Italian border policies towards irregular migrants much 
attention has not been given to the public’s protests against the stringent decisions of their 
own officials. Puggionia notes the objections by Lampedusa inhabitants on the increasing 
border-related deaths at their shores due to the constant borderization of the isle, particularly, 
after the tragic event of the 366 drowned African migrants in 2013. Borderization refers to 
the various measures taken with the intent of keeping migrants out such as surveillances, 
39
holding centres among others.  According to the author, the people of Lampedusa create a 
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dissensus, which is not a mere protest but a “manifestation of a distance” in opinions 
40
according to Jacques Rancière between the public and its officials.  The author notes the 
effort by the people to radically change the status quo in Lampedusa. A protest where the 
people called on legislation to prioritize human life by acknowledging the importance of the 
equal right to life was intended to transform security concerns into a duty to render assistance 
41
to sea arrivals.  Puggionia notes that the protests by the Lampedusa people is qualified as a 
dissensus because this time around objections to border-related decisions were not staged by 
irregular migrants but by the very people the Italian government seeks to secure. 
This article highlights criticisms against Italy in its efforts to secure both its borders and the 
larger European frontier from the increasing arrival of irregular migrants. However it fails to 
consider the role the region as a union has in shaping Italian border policies that are every 
now and then criticized for breaching migrant rights. In this study, by determining if Italy has 
violated migrants’ rights, it will further uncover if the vilification of Italy concerning the 
rights of irregular migrants is justified, as its actions has been consistent with the EU policy 
of preventing irregular migration.  
In Todd Landman’s article “Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy” he 
notes that the international community has established standard human rights obligations 
states follow. According to Landman, there are increasing numbers of state ratification to 
internationally recognize human right conventions however states’ actions in reality 
contradict stipulated rights obligations. Academics, human rights practitioners, policy-makers 
and non-governmental organizations in order to improve and promote civil treatment of 
persons, attempt to determine existing gaps between “rights in principle” and “rights in 
42
practice”.  According to Landman, human right is measured to determine the contextual 
description of violations for monitoring and documentation. Measuring rights also helps to 
classify different types of rights violations, to map and follow patterns of violations across 
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countries to perform secondary examinations explaining why violations occur, and to seek 
policy solutions to decrease chances of violations. Policy solutions can be attained through 
sanctions, conditionalities, amending institutions and practices, and by focusing domestic 
funds to promote rights on violators. Violation of irregular migrants’ rights can be examined 
through gathered international human rights laws with ideal standards on how such rights 
should be protected, while information and testimonies of the gathered, is reported through a 
standard pattern for accuracy.  
Rights according to the author can be measured in principle as stated in national and regional 
documents, in practice as experienced in reality and from the outcomes of government policy. 
Landman explains this by measuring civil and political rights in countries using events-based 
data reporting descriptive and numerical summaries of violations, standards-based data of 
quantitative scales translated from events touching on how often, to what degree violations 
43 44
occur  and survey-based data which asks standard questions from random samples  to 
determine violations. Concluding, the author restates the importance to continue monitoring 
abuses, and conducting cautious documentations in order to efficiently examine different 
categories of human rights. 
This article informs the study’s choice of the procedure to be used in comparing Italy’s 
response in curtailing irregular migration from 2011 to 2014 to its regional human rights 
standards, the ECHR. Thus, the use of events-based data covers the impact of Italian border 
policies on irregular migrants from Libya to Italy since the Arab Spring.  
1.10    Sources of Data  
Secondary sources of data were used in collecting data. Sources include data from books, 
articles, ranging from journals to in-depth newspapers articles, policy documents, reports and 
the ECHR convention documents for content analysis. 
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1.11    Research Methodology 
The study used qualitative data collection method. This entails the use of secondary sources 
such as books, journals, newspapers and policy documents to obtain border policies 
implemented by Italy, the EU, its members-states and NAMCs to address irregular migration 
from 2011 to 2014. Also, data collected on Libya, gives an in depth understanding to the 
crisis and its effect on irregular migrants. Events-based data from reports, newspaper articles, 
journals and books is used to obtain the impact of Italian border policies from 2011 to 2014 
on irregular migrants. A comparison of these policies to human rights standards applicable to 
irregular migrants crossing the central Mediterranean, in the ECHR, was used to answer the 
study’s questions such as whether Italy’s border policies were in violation of both the 
regional policy and or the rights of migrants.  
1.12    Conceptual Definitions 
The following definitions are chosen to explain the following concepts in this study: 
Irregular migration: It is the clandestine and unauthorised movement, in this case the sea  
45 
                                 movement of persons from one country to another.
Irregular migrant:   Persons making unauthorised entry into Europe by use of the central  
                                Mediterranean. This includes refugees, asylum seekers, and economic 
                                migrants.        
Push-Back Policy:  Policies made by Italy that include stopping migrants at sea and  
                                landing migrants at shore for immediate returns, towing migrant  
                                boats to shores of departure, putting migrants onboard patrol boats 
                                and returning them to places of transit and using NAMCs to obstruct  
                                migrant movement into Europe.   
Non-refoulement:   Principle of prohibiting from returning migrants in need of international  
                                protection to places where their lives are threatened either due to their 
                                sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
46
                                social origin, association with a national minority, birth or status.  
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Smugglers:              Persons who facilitate the transfer of irregular migrants by use of the  
                                Mediterranean in exchange for fees.                             
                                  
1.13    Chapter Arrangement 
Chapter one provides the research design which includes the background to the problem 
statement, the problem statement, research questions, research objectives, scope of the study, 
hypothesis, rationale of the study, the theoretical framework, the literature review, sources of 
data, the research methodology, conceptual definitions and the organization of the study’s 
chapters. 
Chapter two presents an overview of European policies employed to address irregular 
migration from North Africa and Italian policies adopted since 2011 till 2014 to control the 
influx of irregular migrants caused by the Arab Spring. 
Chapter three focuses on a comparison of border policies adapted by Italy from 2011 to 2014 
against its regional human rights convention, the ECHR, to determine if there has been a 
violation of rights and if Italy is solely responsible for rights violations. It also provides an 
account of operation Mare Nostrum, the reception of migrants during its implementation, and 
the experience of irregular migrants in Libya returned from Italy. 
Chapter four presents the study’s findings, conclusion and recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Endnotes  
________________________ 
1
Amnesty International. (2014). Lives Adrift: Refugees and migrants in peril in the Central Mediterranean. EUR 
05/006/2014. London. Amnesty International Limited available at http://www.sos-europe-amnesty.eu (accessed 
06/06/2015) 
2
Triandafyllidou, A & Dimitriadi, A. (2014). Deterrence and Protection in the EU’s Migration Policy. The 
International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs. 49:4. 146-162 
DOI:10.1080/03932729.2014.956280 
3
Ibid., p.154-155 
4
Triandafyllidou, A. (2014). Multi-levelling and externalizing migration and asylum: lessons from the southern 
European islands. Island Studies Journal. Vol. 9. No. 1, 2014, pp.7-22 
5
Monzini, P. (2007). Sea-Border Crossings: The Organization of Irregular Migration to Italy. Mediterranean 
Politics. 12:2. 163-184. DOI:10.1080/13629390701388679 
6
Beltramini, F. Italy and the Push-Back Policy: the case of the forced repatriation and application of the 
principle of non-refoulement, Unplished Master Thesis http://www.kaluinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/attachments/FabioBeltramini/ItalyAndThePushBackPolicy.pdf (accessed 05/01/2015) 
7
Ibid., p.9 
8 th
The Refugee Convention of 1951. (28  July 1951) http:www.unhcr.org/4ca34be29.pdf (accessed 02/09/2015) 
9 th th
Assembly Debate. (27  June 2006). Resolution 1509 (18  Sitting) http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Xref/Xref-
XML-en.asp?fileid=17454&lang=en (accessed 02/02/2015) 
10
Martin, M. (2014). Prioritising Border Control over Human Lives: Violations of the rights of migrants and 
refugees at sea. Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, June 2014, Copenhagen 
11
Cuttitta, P. (2014). From the Cap Anamur to Mare Nostrum: humanitarianism and migration controls at the 
EU’s maritime borders in Matera, C and Taylor, A. The Common European Asylum System and human rights: 
enhancing protect ion in times of emergencies. Centre for the Law of EU External Relations Working Papers 
2014/7. The Hague 
12
Patalano, A. (2015). Nightmare Nostrum? Not Quite. The RUSI Journal. 160:3, 14-19, DOI: 
10.1080.03071847.2015.1061253 
13
Richey, M. (2013). The North African Revolutions: A Chance to Rethink European Externalization of the 
Handling of Non-EU Migrant Inflows. Foreign Policy Analysis. Vol 9, 409-431 
14
Aggestam, L. (2008). Introduction: Ethical Power Europe. International Affairs. 84 (1): 1-11 
15
Keohane, R.O. (1984). After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton. 
New Jersey. Princeton University Press 
16
Ibid., p.51 
17
Axelrod, R & Keohane, R.O. (1985). Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. 
World Politics. Vol 38, 226-254 
18
Keohane, R.O. After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 50 
19
Axelrod, R & Keohane, R.O. Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 226 
20
Ibid., p.246 
21
Martin, S. (2007). An Overview of International Cooperation Over Migration. American Society International 
Law. 306-311 
22
Lutterbeck, D. (2006). Policing Migration in the Mediterranean. Mediterranean Politics. 11:1, 59-82, 
DOI:10.1080/13629390500490411 
23
Ibid., p.65 
24
Ibid., p.72 
25
Ibid., p.73 
26
Ibid., p.77 
27
Spijkerboer, T. (2007). The Human Costs of Border Control. European Journal of Migration and Law. Vol 9. 
127-139 
28
Ibid., p.136-137 
29
Ibid., p.138-139 
30
Ibid., p.131-134 
31
Triandafyllidou, A & Dimitriadi, A. Deterrence and Protection in the EU’s Migration Policy, 151 
32
Ibid., p.146-162 
33
Ibid., p.154 
34
Ibid., p.157-158 
35
Triandafyllidou, A. Multi-levelling and Externalizing Migration and Asylum: Lesson from the Southern 
European Islands, 7-22 
36
Ibid., p.9 
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______________________________________________________________________________________ 
37
Ibid., p.10 
38
Ibid., p.20 
39
Cuttitta, P. (2014). ‘Borderizing’ the Island Setting and Narratives of the Lampedusa ‘Border Play’. ACME: 
An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies. 13(2), 196-219 
40
Puggioni, R. (2015). Border Politics, Right to Life and Acts of Dissensus: Voices from the Lampedusa 
Borderland. Third World Quarterly. 36:6. 1145-1159. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2015.1047199 
41
Ibid., p.1154 
42
Landman, T. (2004). Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy. Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 
26. Number 4. pp.906-931 DOI:10.1353/hrq.2004.0049 
43
Ibid., p.41 
44
Ibid 
45
International Organization for Migration, Key Migration Terms http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms 
(accessed 02/09/2015) 
46
The Refugee Convention of 1951 op.cit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EUROPE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST IRREGULAR MIGRATION 
2.0 Introduction 
The chapter presents an overview of adopted policies of the EU and its member states to 
address irregular migration from Libya. The chapter then presents strategies employed by the 
EU and Italy in efforts to control the inflow of irregular migrants from Libya before and after 
the Libyan civil crisis. It further highlights Italy’s response to the influx of irregular migrants 
from Libya since the Libyan crisis of 2011 to 2014, while noting the concurrent polices 
adopted by the EU and member states during this period.  
2.1 An Overview of EU Border Policies towards Irregular Migrants from North Africa 
The 1990s marked the gradual increase of African inflow into Europe. As Europe sought 
ways to reduce the inflow of African migrants through strict visa regulations like the Visa 
Information System, such actions resulted in migrants finding illegal ways to enter Europe by 
land, air or sea. Clandestine migration by sea to Europe, across the Mediterranean, eventually 
made North Africa Mediterranean Countries (NAMCs) the hotspots for departure. Thus, 
neighbouring European states realized the need to coalesce among themselves and with 
NAMCs to prevent irregular migrants from using unseaworthy boats to cross the 
Mediterranean into Europe. Some policy frameworks adopted by the EU and its member 
states to guide policies addressing clandestine crossings include the Tampere Program of 
1999 to 2004, the Hague Program of 2005 to 2009 and the recent Stockholm Program of 
2010 to 2014. These frameworks were implemented through the authorization of the Justice 
1
and Home Affairs also known as the Area for Justice, Liberty and Security.  The Justice and 
Home Affairs entail a broad grouping of policies which allows member states to cooperate 
2
and make legislative output.   
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The Tampere Program like the Hague Program sought to join forces with NAMCs to prevent 
illegal migration, however, the former considered the fair treatment of irregular migrants 
while the latter focused on solutions for security issues raised by illegal migration such as 
3
trans-national terrorism, human trafficking among others.  From these policy frameworks 
emerged initiatives such as Frontex, the Global Approach to Migration (GAMM) and the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The Stockholm Program however, prioritized 
collaboration with southern Mediterranean countries above previous programs. Regarding 
illegal migration, it worked towards more suitable means for returning irregular arrivals 
4
through readmission procedures with transit and origin countries.  The Stockholm framework 
also offered a more human-centric approach to dealing with irregular migrants particularly, 
the vulnerable among them. 
Policies guided by the frameworks mentioned above include; 
i. the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2004 and the Barcelona Process 
established under the Tampere Program  
ii. the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) of 2005 and the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) of 2006 under the Hague Program 
iii. the Lisbon Treaty under the Stockholm Program  
Policies created under one framework could function and go through modifications to be in 
accordance with other frameworks. These policies served as tools for cooperation between 
EU member states and eastern and southern Mediterranean countries. Their primary focus 
was on border management tasks such as police cooperation, return processes, economic 
programs and developmental aid with source and transit countries in order to deter 
clandestine migration. 
2.1.1 Cooperation with Libya 
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On building cooperation with Libya, the EU made significant progress after EU sanctions 
were lifted from Libya in 2004. The then Barcelona Process, now Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) also known as EUROMED, provided the EU, its member states and third 
5
party countries access to bilateral arrangements through the Bilateral Action Plans.  The 
Bilateral Action Plan with NAMCs such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt was to 
expedite amicable state relations with the purpose of addressing issues concerning irregular 
migration. Libya on the other hand, had observer status during such meetings. Though, 
cooperation between the Union and the Jamahiriya was not always cordial, both parties 
managed to attain a consensus on issues pertaining to irregular crossings in the central 
Mediterranean. For instance, Libya, since it signed up to Operation Aeneas in 2004, which 
provides financial and specialized aid to countries of transit and origin to better control illegal 
6
migratory flows, received rationed funding from Europe.  There was also a council 
agreement for the Council of Justice and Home Affairs to coalesce with Libya, to strengthen 
a “systematic operational cooperation between the respective national services responsible for 
7
sea borders,”  by attaining a shared goal for sea operations through the deployment of vessels 
and aircraft contributed by EU member states. Under this initiative, the EU and its member 
states concentrated on training Libyan officials on suitable practices for handling 
8
repatriations of irregular migrants from Libya.  Also, the EU and Libya, under the ENP, 
concerted efforts in the area of visa facilitation and readmission practices, whilst contributing 
th 9
funds and technical support through the “guidance program” signed on the 8  of June 2009  
to assist in Libya’s developmental activities.  
Due to complexities encountered in the cooperation process with Libya, most of the EU’s 
council decisions were not realized. Libya’s leader Ghaddafi felt these programs would 
interfere with Arab and African relations; moreover, he had little faith of the effectiveness of 
10
these programs benefitting Libya.  The EU’s council decisions included strengthening 
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cooperation and Libyan capacity to protect refugees and controlling irregular migration 
11
according to international standards.   Though Libya sometimes declined to engage with the 
EU in initiatives such as Frontex and other border management activities, Libya in 2008 
opted for bilateral borders control activities with Italy. 
2.2 Overview of Italian Border Policies towards Irregular Migrants from North Africa 
th
Once a country of emigrants till the 20  Century, Italy began experiencing migrant inflow in 
12
the 1970s due to its economic progress and open informal labour markets.  Italy’s first 
official migration policy was instituted in the 1990s, a period that coincided with the increase 
13
of North African migrants, majority being Moroccans and Tunisians.  North Africans were 
attracted by the informal labour needed in Europe, specifically Italy. Another factor 
contributing to the increasing inflow was the Moroccan tradition marrying their offspring to 
14
spouses from source countries.   
One of the laws of this period was ‘The Martelli Law of 1989’ which main objective was to 
15
specifically deal with the increasing arrival of non-nationals.  Another significant policy was 
the Turco-Napolitano Law of 1998 which focused on preventing illegal entry and integrating 
16
non-nationals into Italian society.  A major preventive measure under this law sought the 
detention of undocumented foreigners for 30 days and later their expulsions without trial. 
Though the rights of non-nationals, particularly, the principle of non-discrimination was 
considered under this Law, in reality directives failed to protect immigrants, especially third 
17
country nationals subjected to discriminatory treatment based on their nationality.    
The Bossi Fini Law of 2002 and the “Security Package” of 2008 were laws that directly 
addressed illegal migration. The Bossi Fini Law centered on coastal patrols, inspecting and 
seizing vessels suspected of transporting irregular migrants, and detaining persons believed to 
18
aid clandestine entrants.  The Security Package was directed at criminalizing unauthorized 
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19
border-crossings punishable by a fine of between £5,000- £10,000 , and a maximum of 6 
months to a year of detention at Centres for Identification and Expulsion Stay and Assistance 
20
(CIEs) for foreign nationals.  However in 2006 a collaboration with IOM (the Praesiduim 
Project), in Italy included giving medical aid, legal counseling on consequences of 
clandestine entry, identifying the vulnerable (victims of traffickers, unaccompanied minors, 
the disabled etc.), monitoring reception conditions and migrant treatment among others to 
21
entrants.  
Since 1998, Italy, adopted measures in cooperation with NAMCs such as Morocco and 
22
Tunisia, and in the 2000s with Algeria, Egypt, and Libya to curtail clandestine crossings.  
Focusing on Libya, Italy and Libya engaged in a series of agreements before the significant 
pact of 2008. Though relations between both states was strained before due to Italy’s 
colonization of the Jamahiriya since 1911 till 1943, on the issue of irregular migration, Italy 
th
and Libya joined forces to deter journeys from Libya to Italy. On 13  December 2000, both 
states signed the Memorandum of Intent to manage concerns of drug-trafficking, terrorism, 
23
organized crime and unauthorized migration.  This included information gathering and 
sharing on changing practices of smugglers, favoured routes, and information on specialized 
24
groups forging documents for illegal travelling.  To achieve this, the Italian Ministry of 
Interior was attached to the Italian embassy in Tripoli in 2003, consisting of the Department 
of Immigration and Border Police and Department of Criminal Police, which were to report 
organized crimes related to irregular migration while building holding camps in Libya to 
25
accommodate irregular migrants.  In building holding camps in Libya, Italy since 2003 
arranged to fund the Gharyan, Sebah, and Kufrah detention camps to house irregular 
migrants. In July of the same year unofficial arrangements were made between both states to 
26
assist Libya survey and patrol its land and sea borders.  
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As at October 2004 to March 2006, over 3,000 TCNs were returned by air to Libya from 
27
Italy.  In addition, Italy funded the return of migrants to source countries from Libya, either 
by air or land. Between January 2003 and August 2006, about 8,899 persons were sent from 
Libya to countries of origin with Italian funding, however, since 2006, returns to Libya by 
flight have been stopped by pressure from the ECtHR and human rights organizations such as 
28
Amnesty International which question the legitimacy of these proceedings.  Multilaterally, 
Italy financially supported the IOM by instituting on 9th August 2005 in Tripoli, to assist 
29
stranded migrants in Libya.  These measures however, did little to reduce the number of 
30
arrivals. By 2006 more than 20,000  (the highest since 2000) irregular migrants arrived in 
Italy.  
By December 2007, Italy and Libya agreed to a joint patrol of the coasts and ports of Libya 
such that Italy was to offer 6 patrol boats to Libya with funding of £6 million allotted in 
31
January 2008.  Three of the six boats under this agreement were delivered to Libya in May 
32
2009.  These joint patrol arrangements came into full effect during the 2008 agreement 
between Silvio Berlusconi and Muammar Ghaddafi. The construction of the detention centres 
in Gharyan, Sebah, and Kufrah was also ongoing in 2007, though later in July the 
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior announced that the Gharyan centre was to be used 
as a training centre for Libyan officials whilst one of the two centres in Kufrah was to be used 
33
as a health facility.   
The significant agreement though, which earmarked the most active and effectual liaison 
th
between the heads of Italy and Libya began with the 30  August 2008 “Friendship 
rd
Agreement”. The agreement was later recognized by the Italian Parliament in 3  February 
34
2009.  In this agreement Libya willingly obliged to the demands of the then Italian 
35
government concerning irregular migration unlike similar agreements before it.  Both 
leaders endorsed the agreement to expedite amicable relations during which Italy pledged 
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US$5 billion spread over 25 years among projects such as oil exploitation and building 
36
infrastructure to make amends for violations during the colonial period.  This marked the 
first visit of Ghaddafi to Italy after Berlusconi’s trip to Tripoli since the beginning of his 
th th
leadership in 1969. The pact made it possible to (between 6  and 10  May 2009) effectively 
intercept on the high seas about 471 irregular migrants who were shipped back to Libya by 
37
Italian police. Another 89 irregular migrants were pushed back to Libya in July 2009.  
During this agreement, arrivals in Italy (Sicily) reduced from about 36,951 in 2008 to about 
38
9,573 in 2009 and about 4,406 in 2010.  Italy experienced a 90% drop in arrivals precisely 
from Libya that is about 3,185 in December 2009 compared to the previous year’s 31,281 in 
39 
the same December.  Return activities between Italy and Libya raised concerns such that the 
th
EU Commissioner on 15  July 2009 on the request of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) High Commissioner requested Italy to adhere to 
40
human rights norms regarding its return processes to Libya.  
2.3 Europe’s Response to the Influx of Irregular Migrants from Libya 
The year 2011 saw a rippling effect of uprisings against repressive leaders in the Middle East.  
In mid-February 2011, growing demonstrations and protests in Tripoli expanding to Benghazi 
demanded that Col. Ghaddafi step down as Libya’s leader making popular his opposition, the 
National Transitional Council (NTC). The IOM described the 42 year rule of Ghaddafi as one 
41
filled with inequality and bad human rights practices  which led to the Libyan crisis. 
However, this statement may prove inadequate as Libya practiced direct democracy and an 
economic democracy where revenue acquired is used for social welfares such as free health 
42
and education benefits for all citizens.  The Colonel’s refusal to step down eventually paved 
way for rebel hostilities and the NATO intervention. The Libyan crisis could however, have 
been avoided if, the Western countries that proposed military intervention at the time, had 
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backed the AU to exploit all appropriate avenues available in the negotiation process for a 
43
smooth transition as some AU member states had then suggested.  
In the end, the NATO-led intervention in March 2011 resulting in Ghaddafi’s death, 
exacerbating the instability in Libya, consequently, increasing an outflow of more than a 
44
million persons – about 400,000 Libyans and 700,000 non-Libyans -  into neighbouring 
45
NAMCs (Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria) and Europe  (Italy and Malta ).   
Europe, because of its proximity to Libya experienced a daily arrival of boat people at its 
shores. The IOM in October 2011 estimated approximately 27,465 migrants – a percentage of 
46
1% -  making their way to Europe. Among those arriving in Europe, about 10,946 persons 
47
and 1,106 persons were reported to have arrived in Italy and Malta respectively.  These 
48
numbers consisted mostly of foreign nationals in Libya.  The foreigners in Libya mostly fled 
to Europe perhaps because of persecutions they faced as foreigners, since most were 
perceived as pro-Ghaddafi. There was also the fact that, most foreigners intended to transit to 
Europe but stayed on in Libya due to comfortable and available working conditions or 
probably because the south of Libya was blocked by ongoing rebel activities.  
It is important to note that sometimes data of arrivals on Italian shores are more than what is 
stated because it includes migrants crossing from North Africa and not just from Libya.    
2.3.1 The EU’s Response to the Influx of Irregular Migrants from Libya 
In times of crisis, particularly in the event of civil unrest, international law obligates 
neighbouring countries serve as a haven for persons seeking protection from militarized 
conflicts. Europe’s fears of an “exodus” triggered emergency policy implementations by EU 
institutions and member states. As the EU already had in place collective asylum frameworks 
such as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) coupled with external border 
49
provisions, it suggested member states address the current emergency as a Union.  
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Initial responses adopted include intensifying border control policies and surveillances of 
th
Europe’s coasts. The 20  of February 2011, Frontex’s Joint Operation Hermes which was to 
end in 2012 was extended to monitor the Mediterranean. The Operation, which was called for 
50
by Italy, was to “assist Italy control vessels transporting irregular migrants”,  “detect and 
51
prevent irregular border crossings to the Pelagic Islands, Sicily and mainland Italy”,  
screening intercepted migrants, and collating figures on arrivals, facts on route changes and 
other details for risk analysis. EU member states such as France, Germany, Denmark, Malta 
and Spain contributed experts, naval personnel, and aerial logistics to support the operation of 
which Italy played the supervisory role. A commission from the European Police Office 
(Europol) was tasked to assist Italy’s Guardia di Finanza in detecting smugglers passing off 
52
as irregular migrants upon disembarkation.  The EU contributed about £30 million to 
53
facilitate Operation Hermes.  Negotiations, between NAMCs particularly Libya, were 
scheduled to further plan for effective operations concerning joint patrols. 
A significant act by the EU and member states was restricting internal movements between 
and among member states. The act of constricting internal movements was to prevent inland 
European states from external migrant pressures. Following this act, member states appealed 
for amendments to be made regarding the Schengen Border Code (SBC), and to expedite the 
ongoing proposal for modifying visa regulations, to obstruct the movement of irregular 
migrants within Europe. The diplomatic disagreement between France and Italy, where 
France blocked its borders not long after Italy temporarily admitted 30,000 Tunisian 
migrants, allowing them to access any neighbouring EU country, led to some modifications 
in the border code such as, introducing some level of internal restriction in the event of 
54
increasing external border crossings.  This amendment is however, to be effected only on the 
grounds that a said member state can justify that there are possible internal threats to its 
public due to voluminous external border crossings. Another significant amendment subjects 
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member states which unsatisfactorily manage their external borders to internal border 
restrictions as and when evidence is found that the former’s actions are a possible threat to 
public security. 
Finally, the EU and its member states agreed to initiate in December 2011, the Regional 
Protection Programme (RPP), to externalize to NAMCs the management of a refugee crisis, 
an initiative that prevents Europe from dealing with refugee crisis on its territory. It was 
further to see to the relocation of refugees into Europe and at the same time to promote 
55
capacity-building in terms of aid to source and transit countries.  Thus, the EU Commission 
fused with the Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
introduced RPP to first Tunisia, Egypt and then ultimately Libya.  However, the program had 
little impact in resettling affected migrants into European Countries, as most countries were 
reluctant to host and attend to the needs of migrants. Among EU member states, eight 
pledged about 700 placements for affected migrants, though the UNHCR had estimated about 
56
7000 persons in need of shelter from Libya and other affected Middle East countries.  
2.3.2 Italy’s Response to Irregular Migrants from Libya in 2011 and 2012 
After calling the increasing crossings of migrants from Libya a state of emergency, Italy 
wrote to the EU, appealing that Frontex further extend its coastal activities to border control, 
57
aa well as the identifying and deporting of clandestine entrants.  Italy, also sought for an 
effective and coherent asylum framework between member states by 2012, at the same time 
proposing that member-states consider the fair sharing of arrivals according to the EU’s 
58
principle of burden-sharing.   
Italy, additionally called for the European Patrol Network (EPN) Hermes Extension 2011, a 
59
joint effort scheduled for June in February 2011, to operate in the central Mediterranean.  
Operation Hermes was to secure the EU’s external border in the central Mediterranean zone 
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from migrants using Libya and Tunisia as transit hubs. Since the operation was requested by 
Italy, Operation Hermes was placed under Italian supervision to provide personnel, marine 
equipment, etc. to undertake the exercise. The specifics of Operation Hermes included; 
 Gathering intelligence for analysis,  
 Detecting the nationalities of migrants 
 Predicting and preventing probable vulnerabilities faced at the external border and 
 Repatriating migrants to their source countries.  
Member states supporting the operation included France, Germany, Malta, Spain and 
Switzerland which was partaking for the first time. Due to the continuous numbers arriving in 
Italy, the operation which was scheduled to end in March, extended to August and expanded 
its patrol range to a wider zone than was previously required. It is also important to note, the 
60
operation was backed by other initiatives such as Frontex and Europol.  
Another act carried out was to ensure suitable accommodation for estimated arrivals. An 
estimated tens of thousands were expected to arrive in Italy, however, available housing 
could host about 7,000 – 8,000 persons. These reserved facilities were to be used as and when 
61
any person was in need of being housed.  However, since these facilities were limited, it 
reduced access to housing provisions made for arrivals. Arrangements made also included 
housing migrants with resident permit holders, particularly, those staying on humanitarian 
conditions. Without a stay permit and evidence indicating that an irregular migrant was in 
need of protection, that migrant was likely set for deportation if he or she refused to 
st 62
voluntarily return. As of 31  July 2011 about 23,000 persons had been returned to Libya.  
th
On the 6  of April, municipalities, provinces, regions and the Italian government 
implemented a policy to ensure these divisions equally shared in the management of 
63
arrivals.  These were the arrangements made for Italy’s estimated 50,000 TCNs from North 
64
Africa of which about 13,000 were returned to their places of departure.  
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At the behest of Italy, the European Commission (EC) called for the principle of burden-
sharing among member states. Italy, along with Malta called for the implementation of the 
EU Directive on Temporary Protection of 2001 to see to the relocation of irregular migrants 
after they have arrived at shore to promote burden-sharing. The directive offers displaced 
persons brief protection by member states in cases of an influx on the basis of solidarity 
65
between member states.  This directive is implemented in the event that member states are 
confronted with an emergency situation such as an influx of irregular migrants into a 
particular member state due to its proximity to a conflict zone. The directive also ensures 
member states act promptly, showing solidarity by mobilising existing EU programmes 
reserved to address such emergencies. Moreover, it seeks to promote, on a voluntary basis 
and organized manner, the sharing of persons in need of international protection from 
receptive member states to others, as well as making sure that existing asylum procedures are 
not abused by authorities. A shortcoming however, with this directive is that in practice, 
member states may volunteer to partake in burden-sharing. 
th
On 17  June 2011 Italy renewed cooperation with the NTC of Libya. The agreement, named 
the “Cooperation Accord”, was to revive and honour the previous agreement with Colonel 
66
Ghaddafi on the returns of irregular migrants without documentation.  Thus, between 
67
January and July 2011, saw the return of about 13,000 irregular migrants.  The Accord also 
obligated both parties to share information, importantly, about smuggling operatives and 
rd
cooperation on readmission processes. By 3  April 2012, an MoU was signed between Italy 
and the NTC to obstruct and decrease unauthorized departures. This offered Libyan police 
forces with training and technical tools for controlling Libya’s borders, proposed mechanisms 
for information sharing on irregular migrants and smuggling networks, and a proposed 
68
construction of a detention centre in Kufrah.  It further stated the importance of having the 
69
support of the European Commission to revive the Kufrah holding camp.  
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2.4 Europe’s Response after Increasing Migrant Deaths in the Mediterranean 
The Italy-Libya cooperation of 2011-2012 saw a decrease in the number of crossings, as 
according to the Italian Ministry of Interior, clandestine crossing from NAMCs on maritime 
routes to Italy in 2012 was less than about 10,000 compared to the peak in 2011 which was 
70
over 50,000.  However, 2013 saw signs of increasing migrant journeys across the central 
Mediterranean with Italy facing sometimes daily arrivals. Nationals making these crossings 
are Eritreans, Syrians, Somalis, and sub-Saharan Africans. As Italian policies at the time still 
centered on strict border control, it is noted to have contributed to the deaths of many 
irregular migrants. It was estimated that around 31,000 persons reached Europe via the 
71
central Mediterranean between January 2013 and September 2013.  Though there were 
many reported fatal tragedies along the Italian coast, the 366 sub-Saharan Africans who 
drowned at the coast of Lampedusa in October 2013 had a significant influence on Italy’s 
response towards irregular migrants from 2013 to 2014. 
2.4.1 Italy’s Operation Mare Nostrum 
The use of stringent border control policies and fewer efforts to engage in rescue operations 
have led to many sea deaths and missing migrants in the Mediterranean. More than about 500 
persons were reported to have died or gone missing at sea in 2013, according to Fortress 
72
Europe.  The Lampedusa incident in October 2013 caused an international uproar unlike 
previous disasters, perhaps, because this time women and children were involved. The 
nearness of the incident to the isle such that the migrants could have been rescued was 
another issue that emerged. This international protest, particularly, from the EU and member 
73
states, with less concerns raised by African Union member states,  marked a shift in Italy’s 
border policies. Italy, hence sought to address the humanitarian concerns of its border 
policies with attempts to prevent irregular migration. 
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74
The “maritime response”  known as Operation Mare Nostrum, “our sea” (hereinafter OMN 
or Mare Nostrum), was instituted in the leadership of Enrico Letta in October 2013 exactly 
75
two weeks after the drowning of the 366 migrants.  Mare Nostrum, had two principle 
objectives, first, was to deter clandestine journeys into Europe by targeting human smugglers, 
and second, to rescue persons on unseaworthy transport on the high seas. Mare Nostrum was 
to patrol in a search area of 70,000 sq. Km in the Strait of Sicily, due to its presentation as a 
paramilitary exercise about 900 military were deployed, as well as 32 naval units and 2 
76
submarines to run shifts in over 45,000 hours of active operation.  With regards to personnel 
in Mare Nostrum, the Italian Navy, the Army, Air Force, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, and 
the Coast Guard were all under the command of Italian Navy Operations, controlled by the 
77
Command in Chief of the Naval Squadron (CINCNAV) of Santa Rosa base, in Rome.  
A more detailed composition of the operation involves; 
i. An amphibious vessel with specific command and control features 
ii. Medical and shelter facilities for the rescued  
iii. One or two frigates and a two second line high seas units – either patrollers or 
corvettes – with wide range and medical care capabilities  
iv. Helicopters onboard (to be deployed to Lampedusa or Catania)  
v. A SAN MARCO Marine Brigate team in charge of vessels inspections and the safety 
of migrants onboard  
vi. A Coastal radar network and Italian Navy AIS (Automatic Identification System) 
shore stations  
vii. An ATLANTIC 1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) based in Sigonella for Maritime 
Patrol   
viii. An Air Force PREDATOR A+ based in Sigonella for maritime patrol  
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ix. One MM P180 aircraft equipped with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), based in 
Catania  
x. An S-100 unmanned aerial vehicles onboard ITS San Guisto  
xi. One Forward Logistic Site (FLS) in Lampedusa for logistical provision to units 
employed under Mare Nostrum. 
xii. And aerial vehicles and helicopters unmanned, provided to the Carabinieri Corps by 
rd 78
the Air Force till 23  June of 2014.  
Though OMN is a significant change of border policy to what Italy is used to, it is no novelty 
to the European coast. Mare Nostrum was authorized through activities of the Migration 
79
Flows Control (CFM)  in already established operation Constant Vigilance. This operation 
80
run by the Italian Navy since 2004,  was instituted to address the rising discourse on the 
indifference of Europe’s external border policies that cause migrants’ deaths. According to 
Cuttitta, there is no significant difference between Constant Vigilance and Mare Nostrum, but 
a matter of increment in quantity, funds and deployment of logistics. With regards to 
quantity, there was an increase in logistics supply for OMN compared to Constant Vigilance. 
In funding, 9.5 million Euros per month was given to OMN whilst Constant Vigilance 
received 1.5 million Euros per month. In deployment, that is, the space of operation, both 
operations cover the Strait of Sicily, however, OMN can extend searches into Libyan Search 
81
and Rescue (SAR) waters unlike its predecessor.  Thus, activities carried out in OMN and 
Constant Vigilance involves both rescue and security missions in capacity. 
In order to attain set objectives, it was necessary for the naval and air divisions under OMN 
to centre on improving maritime security in order to patrol sea routes, counter-act illegal 
activities, specifically human trafficking, and on the other hand tackle the humanitarian 
82
emergency in the central Mediterranean.  Under this initiative, submarines were a means of 
gathering intelligence of vices happening at sea. It is imperative to point out that Mare 
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Nostrum was assisted by only one EU member (Slovenia) which lent a Navy patrol boat with 
83
40 officers for rescues in December 2013.  However, during the implementation of Mare 
Nostrum appeals were made to the EU and member states to financially assist the operation. 
The EU Commission therefore offered Italy £1.8 million from the emergency support budget 
under the European Border Fund (EBF), estimated to cover just about a month’s operating 
84
costs of the Mare Nostrum.  
2.4.2 EU Border Policies during 2013 to 2014 
As Italy individually adopted measures to deal with the increasing number of deaths in the 
central Mediterranean, the EU and its member states concurrently made arrangements to fight 
illegal migration. The Union’s goal concerning illegal migration during the period between 
2013 and 2014 included efforts to reduce in number the drowned and missing persons in 
addition to the long term goal of preventing clandestine journeys. 
The EU in 2013 upon the appeals of Italy financially assisted Mare Nostrum with a sum of 
£1.8 million from the emergency actions under the EBF. In supporting the rescue mission, 
debate among member states particularly, the British government’s description of OMN as a 
pull-factor discouraged neighbouring states from supporting the initiative with the exception 
85
of Slovenia.  The Union however, continued to run Frontex security coordinated activities, 
Operation Hermes and Aeneas, along the Italian coast. Both operations received an annual 
86 
budget from member states of about £5 million.  
The EU, to support the operations of Frontex, officially authorized European Border 
Surveillance System (Eurosur) in 2013, a testing project of Frontex since 2011. The operation 
was for information sharing among EU member states as well as with NAMCs on data such 
as vessels located at sea using unusual routes not conversant with normal maritime passages. 
Such vessels are likely trafficking illegal stock or migrants or both. In coordination with 
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Maritime Response Coordinated Centres (MRCCs), Eurosur seeks to prevent unauthorised 
crossings, cross-border crimes and crises situations at Europe’s external borders through 
87
intelligence sharing.  In the beginning, the idea was met with resistance because of its 
inability to consider a people-centered stance, however, it became operational on December 
nd
2  2013, at the Southern and Eastern borders of Europe before expanding in December 2014. 
Pressure from undertaking Mare Nostrum weighed on Italy such that, it called for assistance 
from the EU and other member states. The Frontex led Operation Triton to support Mare 
Nostrum, was suggested by the EU and member states, particularly, those which dismissed 
OMN as a pull-factor. The Operation Triton, implemented in November 2014, is a joint task 
to be run in a more restricted SAR area in the central Mediterranean compared to Mare 
Nostrum. About 21 EU member states originally joined the operation with Italy as the host 
88
state upon its request.  Members contributed both personnel and logistics to facilitate tasks. 
A detailed composition includes about 65 guest officers and technical equipment entailing 4 
fixed Wing Aircrafts, 1 Helicopter, 4 Open Shore vessels, 1 coastal Patrol Vessel, and 2 
89
Coastal Patrol boats.  For the operation to begin, funding of £2.9 million was accrued from 
90
the Internal Security Fund and the Frontex Agency as a monthly budget.  Discussions among 
EU and member states at the time, focused on supporting the Frontex budget, gather funds 
purposely to maintain the monthly level of funding. According to the European Commission, 
91
Operation Triton is based on the specific request of the Italian government  to support Italy’s 
national efforts in managing its coasts. Though Triton will engage in rescue activities, it will 
do so in a limited SAR zone, that is, in Italy’s territorial waters, which lessens the chances to 
save migrant lives in other SAR zones close to Italy.  
Other long term goals suggested by the EU to curb irregular migration include an accessible 
92
means for asylum application.  Thus, asylum seekers will be given access to visas to prevent 
them from entrusting their means of crossing to smugglers who engage them purposefully for 
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gains without considering their safety. Channels for irregularities such as sea crossings 
increase because of inaccessibility to legal means of travelling. The EU therefore, suggests a 
93
more open-door policy to save lives,  however, a major concern of EU member states is 
mixed migration, where it is almost impossible differentiating between persons in need of 
international protection and economic migrants. 
The suggestion of European burden-sharing as opposed to the practice of burden-shifting was 
also recognized during this period. Coastal EU states such as Italy complain of rescuing 
migrants with the limited resources they possess, and hosting them with limited reception 
facilities, making it difficult to properly care for guests. Yet, inland countries such as 
Germany and Switzerland also complain of receiving more applications from asylum seekers 
94
and experience about 90% of clandestine crossings through mainly land transports.  It is 
known fact that often migrants entering Italy use it as a means to getting into more 
economically comfortable European states. Thus, the issue of burden-sharing among member 
states remains a debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Endnotes 
____________________ 
1
Collete, E. (January 12, 2010). The European Union’s Stockholm Program: Less Ambition on Immigration and 
Asylum, But More Detailed Plans available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/european-unions-
stockholm-program-less-ambition-immigration-and-asylum-more-detailed-plans accessed 19/08/2015 
2
Ibid 
3
Jaulin, T. (2010). The Impact of EU Migration Policy in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance available at 
http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/jaulin_low_2.pdf accessed 19/08/2015 
4
Collett, E. The European Union’s Stockholm Program: Less Ambition on Immigration and Asylum, But More 
Detailed Plans 
5
Ibid., p.10 
6
Paoletti, E. (2009). ‘Externalization and Visa Policies and in the Relations between Italy, Libya and the EU: 
Where Do We Go From Now?’ Paper presented at the seminar “The Four Seas Basins and the Global Economy: 
Do the EU 4 Freedoms Work?” – European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme 
7
Ibid 
8
Ibid., p.11 
9
Ibid., p.14 
10
Ibid., p.12 
11
Ibid., p.15 
12
Rusconi, S. (2010). From a Sending Country to a Country of Destination, Italy’s Migration Experience, 
Network Migration in Europe, available at http://www.migrationeducation.org accessed 19/03/2015 
13
Ibid., p.2 
14
Haas, H.D (March 19, 2014). Morocco: Setting the Stage for Becoming a Migration Transition Country? 
Available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/morocco-setting-stage-becoming-migration-transition-
country accessed 03/09/2015 
15
Totah, M. (2002). Fortress Italy: Racial Politics and the New Immigration Amendment in Italy. Fordham 
International Law Journal. Vol. 26. Issue 5 1438-1504 
16
Ibid., p.1473 
17
Ibid., p.1474 
18
Ibid., p.1498 
19
Martino, A.D et al. (2013). The Criminalization of Irregular Immigration: Law and Practice in Italy. Pisa 
University Press, Pisa 
20
International Organization for Migration. (2011). Migration in Italy: Current Situation and Perspectives. Idos 
Study and Research Centre available at http://www.dossierimmigrazione.it/docnews/file_2012_OIM_1951-
2011_EN.pdf 
21
International Organization for Migration. (2006). The Praesiduim Project: Consolidating Reception Capacities 
in Respect of Migration Flows Reaching the Island of Lampedusa and Other Strategic Points on the Sicilian 
Coasts available at 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/mainsite/microsite/IDM/workshops/managing_return_migration_0421
08/presentations_speeches/sequenza_diapo_simo.pdf accessed 20/04/2015 
22
Cuttitta, P. (2006). Il Controllo Dell’Immigrazione tra Nordafrica e Italia, in N.Dentico and M. Gressi, Il Libro 
Bianco, I Centri di Permanenza e Assistenza Temporanea in Italia available at 
http://www.comitatodirrittiumani.org/LB.htm accessed 28/04/2015 
23
Paoletti, E. ‘Externalization and Visa Policies in the Relations between Italy, Libya and the EU: Where Do 
We Go From Now?’, 5 
24
Ibid., p.6 
25
Ibid 
26
Paoletti, E. (2011). Power Relations and International Migration: The Case of Italy and Libya. Political 
Studies. Vol 59. 269-289 
27
Ibid 
28
Ibid 
29
Ibid., p.276 
30
Bruycker, P.D, Bartolomeo, A.D, Fargues, P. (2013). Migrants Smuggled by Sea to The EU: Facts, Laws and 
Policy Option. MPC RR2013/09, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): 
European University Institute 
31
 Paoletti, E. ‘Externalization and Visa Policies in the Relations between Italy, Libya and the EU: Where Do 
We Go From Now?’, 8 
32
Ibid 
38 
 
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
33
Paoletti, E. Power Relations and International Migration: The Case of Italy and Libya, 275 
34
Cuttitta, P. Il Controllo Dell’Immigrazione tra Nordafrica e Italia, in N.Dentico and M. Gressi, Il Libro 
Bianco, I Centri di Permanenza e Assistenza Temporanea in Italia, 44 
35
Paoletti, E. ‘Externalization and Visa Policies in the Relations between Italy, Libya and the EU: Where Do We 
Go From Now?’, 8 
36
Ibid  
37
Paoletti, E. Power Relations and International Migration: The Case of Italy and Libya, 276 
38
Beltramini, F. Italy and the Push-Back Policy: The Case of the Forced Repatriation and Application of the 
Principle of Non-Refoulement, Master Thesis available at http://www.kaluinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/attachments/FabioBeltramini/ItalyAndThePushBackPolicy.pdf accessed 05/01/2015 
39
Borelli, S & Standford, B. (2014). Troubled Waters in the Mare Nostrum: Interception and Push-Backs of 
Migrants in the Mediterranean and the European Convention on Human Rights, Uluslararasi Hukuk ve Politika 
Cilt:10, Sayi: 37, ss.29-69 
40
Paoletti, E. ‘Externalization and Visa Policies in the Relations between Italy, Libya and the EU: Where Do We 
Go From Now?’, 9 
41
International Organisation for Migration. (2011). Migrants Caught in Crisis: The IOM Experience in Libya. 
Geneva. International Organisation for Migration available at http://www.iom.int 
42
Chengu, G. (October 19, 2015). Libya: From Africa’s Wealthiest Democracy under Gaddafi, to US-NATO 
Sponsored Terrorist Haven available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/libya-from-africas-wealthiest-democracy-
under-gaddafi-to-us-nato-sponsored-terrorist-haven/5482974 accessed 15/12/2016   
43
DeWaal, A. (December 19, 2012). The Africa Union and the Libya Conflict of 2011 available at 
https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african-union-and-the-libya-conflict-of-2011/ accessed 
15/12/2016 
44
Carrera. S. (2012). EU Migration Policy in the Wake of the Arab Spring, What prospects for EU-Southern 
Mediterranean Relations?, MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15/August 2012 available at http://www.medpro-
foresight.eu 
45
Nita, S. (2013). Regional Responses to Forced Migration: The Case of Libya, Analytical and Synthetic Note 
2013/03 Summer School 2012 – Best Participants’ Essays Series, Migration Policy Centre (MPC) 
46
Ibid 
47
Ibid 
48
Ibid 
49
Ibid 
50
Ibid., p.4 
51
Ibid 
52
Ibid., p.5 
53
Ibid 
54
Ibid., p.7 
55
Ibid., p.8 
56
Ibid 
57
Nascimbene, B and Pascale, A.D. (2011). The Arab Spring and the Extraordinary Influx of People Who 
Arrived in Italy from North Africa. European Journal of Migration and Law. Vol 13, 341-360 
58
Ibid., p.344 
59
Ibid 
60
Ibid., p.345 
61
Ibid., p.357 
62
Ibid., p.358 
63
Ibid., p.357 
64
Ibid., p.358 
65
European Commission. (March 4, 2015). Towards a Comprehensive European Migration Policy: 20 years of 
EU Action, MEMO/15/4544. Brussels available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-15-
4544_en.htm.pdf. accessed 30/04/2015 
66
ABC News. (17 June, 2011). Italy Signs Immigrant Accord with Libya Rebels available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13868194 accessed 30/04/2015 
67
Al Jazeera. (June 17, 2011). Libya -jun 17 2011- 19:05. available at http://blogs.aljazeera.net/topic/libya-jun-
17-2011-1905 accessed 30/04/2015 
68
Fargues, P & Fandrich, C. (2012). Migration After the Arab Spring. MPC RR No.2012/09. Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute. 
69
Ibid 
 
39 
 
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_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
70
Bruycker, P.D, Bartolomeo, A.D, Fargues, P. (2013). Migrants Smuggled by Sea to The EU: Facts, Laws and 
Policy Option, 4 
71
Coppens, J. (2013). The Lampedusa Disaster: How to Prevent Further Loss of Life at Sea? The International 
Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety at Sea Transportation. Vol. 7. Number 4. 
DOI:10.12716/1001.07.04.15 
72
Bruycker, P.D, Bartolomeo, A.D, Fargues, P. (2013). Migrants Smuggled by Sea to The EU: Facts, Laws and 
Policy Option, 5 
73
Ohene, E. (April 28, 2015). Mediterranean Migrant Crisis: Why is Africa Silent? available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-3480410 accessed 26/06/2015 
74
Patalano, A. (2015). Nightmare Nostrum? Not Quite. The RUSI Journal. 106:3. 14-19. 
DOI:10.1080/03071847.2015.1061253 
75
Fargues, P & Bonfanti, S. (2014). When The Best Option is a Leaky Boat: Why Migrants Risk their Lives 
Crossing the Mediterranean and What Europe is Doing About It? MPC RR2014/11. Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies. European University Institute (EUI).  
76
Marina Militaire Italiana, Operation Mare Nostrum available at 
http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx accessed 01/06/2015 
77
Ibid 
78
Ibid 
79
Ibid 
80
Cuttitta, P. (2014). From the Cap Anamur to Mare Nostrum: Humanitarianism and EU’s Maritime Borders in 
Matera, C and Taylor, A. The Common European Asylum System and Human Rights: Enhancing Protection in 
Times of Emergencies. Centre for the Law of EU External Relations Working Papers 2014/7. The Hague  
81
Ibid 
82
Marina Militaire Italiana, Operation Mare Nostrum 
83
Carrerra, S & Hertog, L.D. (2015). Whose Mare? Rule of Law Challenges in the Field of European Border 
Surveillance in the Mediterranean. Working Paper No.79 CEPS available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE_79.pdf accessed 06/07/2015 
84
Ibid., p.3 
85
Patalano, A. Nightmare Nostrum? Not Quite, 16 
86
European Commission, (October 31, 2014). Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’. MEMO/14/609 Brussels 
available at http://www.memo-14_609_EN.pdf accessed 26/06/2015 
87
Bruckyer, P.D. et al. Migrants Smuggled By Sea to The EU: Facts, Laws and Policy Option, 9  
88
European Commission Memo pot.cit 
89
Ibid 
90
Ibid 
91
European Commission, (October 7, 2014). Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’ – Concerted Efforts for Managing 
Migratory Flows in the Central Mediterranean. MEMO/14/566. Brussels available at http://www.memo-
14_566_EN.pdf accessed 26/06/2016 
92
Bruycker, P.D, Bartolomeo, A.D, Fargues, P. (2013). Migrants Smuggled by Sea to The EU: Facts, Laws and 
Policy Option, 11 
93
Ibid 
94
Finotelli, C. (2009). The North-South Myth Revised: A Comparison of the Italian and German Migration 
Regimes, West European Politics. 32:5. 886-903. DOI:10.1080/0140238090304747 
 
 
 
 
 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ITALY AS AVICTIM OR VILLAIN IN EUROPEAN BORDER POLICIES 
3.0 Introduction 
Chapter three presents a detailed account of the activities of Mare Nostrum and its aftermath 
on Italian shore pertaining to migrant reception. Further discussion on the experiences of 
irregular migrants in Libya, is made to understand the reason behind migrant crossings and 
criticisms levelled against Italy for breaching the non-refoulement principle. The chapter also 
compares the border policies of Italy since 2011 till 2014 to Italy’s regional human rights 
standard, the European Convention on Human Rights to determine if indeed Italy’s policies 
have been detrimental to irregular migrants.  
3.1 The Opus and Achievements of Mare Nostrum 
The maritime response of Italy in 2013 was estimated for its entire operation to save about 
1
3,000 lives, however, the operation was found to have rescued that same number per week,  
since a trip by Italian vessels could disembark about 1000 migrants. In both 2011 and 2012, 
rescue missions undertook a total of 20 and 24 respectively, saving about 5,000 lives in both 
years; however 2013 alone undertook more than 90 rescue missions salvaging approximately 
2 3
11,499 lives.  The Italian Navy boasts of about 421 rescue operations  while reports of more 
4
than a thousand migrants in January 2014  a day, attests to the increasing numbers risking 
their lives to cross into Europe. To appreciate more the maritime responsibility of Mare 
Nostrum, the search and rescue activities of the Italian vessel, the San Guisto, an amphibious 
assault carrier intended to transport military vehicles and armoury was documented in 2014.  
The Italian Navy’s vessel had a captain and 300 crew members, comprising of sailors, 
marines, police, medical personnel, voluntary persons from international, national and non-
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governmental organizations, and occasionally the media. The documentation covers a routine 
of the crew, which could rescue about 1,700 with one trip, with Eritreans and Syrians forming 
5
majority of rescued persons.  Search and rescue activities the crew undertook on the vessel 
involved; 
 Policing the high seas  
 Locating migrant vessels for rescuing 
 Processing migrants, that is, medical screening to determine health conditions  
 Identifying migrants  
 Recording accounts of journeys (to investigate human smuggling operations and for 
risk analysis)  
 Sorting migrants in the garage of the vessel to await landing 
In the vessel, migrants also underwent treatment if wounded or were quarantined if need be, 
6
particularly, migrants from Africa who may have communicable diseases like Ebola.  
Specific care was also given to the vulnerable among migrants, such as minors, by providing 
professionals from organisations like Save the Children to access information, support, and 
7
give legal counselling and cultural mediation for minors.   
The San Guisto (Italian vessel) on the day of coverage, made three trips in about two days at 
8
sea. The first trip rescued around a 103 African men.  It is imperative to note that these illegal 
journeys were mostly by men however, increasing numbers of women and children have been 
9
observed embarking on sea journeys.  A smaller vessel from the San Guisto was dispatched 
to transfer migrants from their dinghies into the vessel. The crew deployed for that rescue, 
had to be prudent in distributing life jackets, as most of these migrants cannot swim. After 
they were safely aboard the San Guisto, the African migrants went through the systematic 
stages outlined above.  
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The second alert was given later in the evening, a confirmation of the risks crew members 
face on the job. A Norwegian merchant vessel called on the San Guisto to recover salvaged 
migrants from sea. There were about 230 migrants of Syrian origin consisting of men, women 
10
and children on the Norwegian vessel.  The third batch consisting of about 300 men, before 
boarding the San Guisto, were rescued by a navy frigate also belonging to the Italian Navy 
under Mare Nostrum. With these large numbers rescued, the crew and some migrants 
complained of heat, however both groups seemed to prefer the heat to the experience of 
drowned persons. 
Mare Nostrum secondly, boasts of about 156,362 persons with about 9,300 migrants as the 
11
greatest figure salvaged per week  during its functioning. A Naval base in Sicily, was known 
to single-handedly prevent approximately 52,000 persons from drowning, a total of half the 
12
migrants rescued during Mare Nostrum.  Above all, the operation was seen to effectively 
track smugglers, such that about 366 smugglers were detained by Italian authorities, and are 
13
currently undergoing judicial proceedings.  Monitoring and apprehending smugglers under 
Mare Nostrum was an arduous task, which took the use of submarines to gather evidence on 
smuggler’s activities through filming. The Italian police deployed from the Ministry of 
Interior obtained information from rescue missions assisting in the identification of 
14
smugglers or potential terrorists by interrogating migrants.   
15
On the other side, the British government labels the operation as a migrant pull factor.  The 
British government further blames Mare Nostrum as the cause of the more than 3,000 deaths 
reported in 2013. Statistics from UNHCR further buttresses the argument of the British 
16
government by indicating increasing numbers of crossings during Mare Nostrum.  Frontex’s 
former Interim Executive Director Gil Arias affirmed the initiative as a pull-factor in 2014, 
by observing that smugglers exploited the operation by sending boats indiscriminately and at 
once, with little food, water and fuel, certain that migrants will be rescued by Italian 
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17
vessels.  On the other hand, scholars like Patalano disagree, since events in Libya already 
drive migrants to the decision of sea crossing. Scholars like Cuttitta also raise concerns about 
the operation’s humanitarian services. He notes that interrogations by police centre solely on 
information that can assist apprehend smugglers, ignoring information on the dead and 
18
missing among salvaged migrants.  A major concern also noted, is the operations inability to 
provide suitable reception conditions for rescued migrants, leading to congestion once 
disembarked. 
3.1.1 Reception Conditions after Rescue  
Rescued migrants upon entering Europe, are lawfully detained at Centres for Identification 
and Expulsion Stay and Assistance (CIEs). Migrants’ stay should last for 30 days at most 
however, migrants awaiting documentation for asylum processing can be detained for an 
19
additional 18 months.  Even in such cases, there are no guarantees migrants will gain asylum 
documents and can be detained till expulsion. During Mare Nostrum, a major concern was 
hosting the salvaged, particularly the minors amongst them. In 2014, five out of the thirteen 
CIEs were functioning, the others closed down due to riots caused by migrants, neglect by 
20
management or mismanagement.  In 2013, about 60,000 irregular migrants from NAMCs 
21
were detained in Italy.  Detainees constituted both sea arrivals and immigrants who entered 
Italy legally but overstayed. The concentrating of both groupings in CIEs gradually promotes 
overcrowding and puts pressure on reception facilities. The inability of CIEs, such as those in 
Rome and Sicily, to house migrants due to overcrowding has led to migrants lodging the 
streets of Italy. Reports showed that by February 2014 about 3,000 migrants were occupying 
22
vacated buildings, informal squats known as “hotspots”, and the streets.  Also, the laborious 
processes asylum seekers go through in order to access asylum protection when these 
sentiments have been expressed right from the beginning of their arrival, was another concern 
23 
highlighted by the UNHCR’s Special Rappoteur to Italy in 2014.
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Generally, Italian reception centres have been criticized for their unsatisfactory conditions. 
Revelations of African and Arab migrants undergoing demeaning treatment (lined up in 
24
mixed company, unclothed and being hosed with water)  was captured in the media. 
Disturbing accounts of riots at detention centres, escapes, self-harm and suicide attempts have 
been reported. About 900 detainees were reported to have escaped from their centres in 2013, 
and in Ponte Galeria, a group of migrants sewed their lips in protest to poor conditions and 
25
delays in asylum documentation at the centre.  Health workers at centres are also known to 
26
sedate migrants in order to calm violent situations which may often result in suicides.  
Again, complaints include using centres that provide asylum aid as crude detention centres. 
Reception centres such as the Contrada Imbriacola, are also forced, because of increasing 
27
arrivals, to operate as holding camps though lacking adequate facilities to act as such.   
In spite of ongoing criticisms and reports, Italy has been quite progressive regarding the 
hosting of sea arrivals. Improvement on asylum applications and treatment of detainees at 
public reception centres was observed, as opposed to privately owned centres. The Italian 
government continues to stress on centres acting on set standards to ensure appropriate 
28
detention of migrants.  The introduction of a triennial project from 2014 to 2016, to 
construct additional 8,000 Protection System for Asylum-seekers and Refugees (SPRARs) 
centres which will shelter specifically, migrants in need of international protection is 
29
underway.  Territorial Commission for the Recognition of International Protection (CTRPIs) 
centres set up, have also received commendation from the UNHCR on their efforts in 
complying with the Qualification Directive (a directive addressing the effective applicability 
of asylum procedures to asylum seekers) which is appropriate for irregular migrants. 
Similarly, the Trapani Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers (CARA) was lauded for 
30
enhancing its reception conditions to suitably lodge and integrate its guests into society.  
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Furthermore, a CTRPI is to be established in Palermo to accommodate sea migrants rescued 
31 
in Sicily.
3.2 Detention Conditions in Libya 
In the practice of interception, migrants apprehended crossing to Europe, returned to places 
of departure, may encounter mistreatment particularly, in transit countries like Libya. Libya, 
without instituted human rights provisions especially, in its present state of chaos where two 
factions – the House of Representatives and the political group in Tripoli – struggle for 
leadership, poses harm to TCNs. Agreements between Libya and Italy ensure that irregular 
migrants captured at sea, be returned to Libya, which acts as a personal holding container for 
the whole of Europe. To facilitate such operations, Europe spends at least £12 million to 
assist with the rehabilitation of some centres in Libya, as well as supporting NGOs that assist 
32 
these centres.
In Libya, detention centres are operated both by government and private groups. With the 
current situation in Libya, persons in charge of detention centres may be the militia, rebel 
33
groups or smugglers (these three groups can also be ascribed to a person).  In Libya, no 
distinction is made between an economic migrant and persons seeking asylum, thus, detained 
persons are often denied access to courts, denied the right to challenge detention or expulsion 
34
verdicts, or detained for an unlawful period of time (could be years) without judicial review.  
Though Libya has ratified to various human rights conventions, – such as the UN Convention 
Against Torture (CAT), the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
and the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa – it has 
failed to ratify the Refugee Convention of 1951. As such, there is an inexistent asylum 
framework and an official disregard for the UNHCR in Libya.  
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Since the civil crisis, irregular migrants, particularly sub-Saharan Africans, are at a risk of 
being mistreated or have been. According to Libyans, foreigners during Ghaddafi’s reign 
were favoured by the former leader or were mercenaries belonging to him, therefore pro-
Ghaddafi. This mistreatment is also extended to the detention centres. In 2013 reports of 
35
Libyan prisons and detention centres subjecting migrants to life threatening situations  
inconsistent with international standards, was discovered by U.S State Department. A report 
in 2013 by Human Rights Watch (HRW), to determine the detention conditions of irregular 
migrant’s, uncovered evidence of overcrowding, where 60 men and boys were cramped in a 
36
space of 30 square meters,  leading to poor sanitary conditions such as blocked and 
overflowing latrines.  
Some of these so called holding centres were in actual fact shipping containers, abandoned 
government offices, vacated veterinaries, schools and at times private houses. At these 
centres, migrants undergo series of abuse, among which being beaten with iron rods, sticks, 
37
rifle butts, cables, metallic wires, hose pipes among other items were disclosed.  Guards in 
charge of centres are reported to burn persons with cigarettes, kick and punch persons in the 
torso, sometimes the head, give electrical shocks, hanging migrants upside down on trees, 
38
etc.  Male migrants are likely to experience being stripped bare for occasional searches than 
women, however, women interviewed by HRW representatives reported intrusive searches 
39
conducted by guards.   The use of abusive language; swear words, threats and racial insults 
40
by officials when addressing detainees were also disclosed.   
Even though such events occur, Libya allows international and non-governmental 
organizations assist with health care services, sanitation, refugee registration and counselling 
41
of detainees from time to time,  however, a concern is that it may not cut across all holding 
centres, particularly those operated by smugglers. 
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3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights 
The callous repercussions of the Second World War prompted farsighted politicians of 
Europe in 1949 to draft a regional human rights treaty, guided by the 1948 United Nations 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), to strengthen freedom and democracy in 
42
European states, and to safeguard against repression and extremism,  such as was witnessed 
in World War 2. The European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR or the 
Convention) also known as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
th rd
Fundamental Freedoms, was created on 4  November 1950 and implemented on the 3  of 
September 1953. The Convention is a standard, by which European states adhere to, in order 
to safeguard the rights and freedoms. It also ensures equality amongst persons in European 
jurisdiction. For the Convention to work, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was 
set up in 1959, to primarily interpret the Convention and ensure state adherence. Since its 
inception, the Convention has seen many amendments and additions. At present, it has 16 
Protocols in addition to its main draft. It is important to note that interpretations and verdicts 
from the ECtHR are inconsistent due to these additional protocols.  
The Convention, as mentioned before, not only protects the rights of European nationals but     
also foreigners within European jurisdiction who wish to enter into Europe. Primarily, 
jurisdiction refers to territory, as in land, but with the introduction of the principle of 
extraterritoriality, wherever a state holds effective control and pursues its foreign relations is 
43
that states jurisdiction.  The central Mediterranean where Italian naval operations take place 
is therefore an area of control for Italy, of which it is responsible for.  
For the purposes of this study, the minimum rights irregular migrants, entering Europe via the 
central Mediterranean, are to benefit according to the ECHR will be explained in simple 
terms. These provisions include;  
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1. The basic right to life, enjoyment and respect,  
2. Prohibition of the use of unreasonable force by authorities to prevent irregular 
migrants,  
3. The duty to save the lives of irregular migrants seeking entry,  
4. Protection from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,   
5. The duty of authorities to detain irregular migrants lawfully without an unlawful 
extension of detention periods, 
6. The right for irregular migrants to communicate with their consuls upon detention 
should be guaranteed  
7. The right to asylum and to challenge detentions or refoulement procedures through 
fair trials by the appropriate authorities 
8. Authorities shall desist from collective expulsions  
9. Authorities shall avoid discrimination against irregular migrants in authorising stays 
or expulsions on the basis of race, ethnicity, religious affiliations, or social or political 
44
affiliations.   
However, an essential provision made by the Convention requests that all domestic remedies 
in European member states be exhausted before reference to the Convention and its court is 
45
made.  This perhaps, accounts for the Conventions inability to achieve strict compliance 
from member states. The Convention then serves as a guide and can only be enforced via its 
court, thus, the duty of preserving the rights of persons entirely dwells on member states 
because, they are present on the ground and in most cases, are able to prevent violations as 
46 
well as to promptly remedy them.
3.4 Comparison of 2011- 2014 Italian Policies to Human Rights Standards 
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th
Italy signed to the Convention in 1955 October 25  as one of the first ten member states to 
47
ratify the Convention.  It has since been state party to the Convention and all its protocols 
with the exception of Protocol No. 12 (which expands the principle of non-discrimination), 
Protocol No. 15 (which offers measures to enhance the capacity of the Convention), and 
Protocol No. 16 (offering the possibility for domestic courts and tribunals to obtain advisory 
opinions from the ECtHR on questions pertaining to interpretation or application of the rights 
and freedoms stipulated in the ECHR). According to international law, a state party to a 
convention is bounded by its stipulations however; a signatory is not legally answerable or 
constrained by a convention if it has not ratified that convention. Then again, some 
conventions are regarded as customary laws thus, should be adhered to by all states whether 
ratified or not. These same declarations apply to member states that ratify or not to the 
ECHR, yet it is unclear if all principles stated in the Convention are universally applicable to 
all European states without ratification. 
Italy’s initial EU collective response to irregular migration and as an individual state has 
continually been to deter migrants from beginning the risky journey in the first place. Yet, 
such policies remain futile as migrants keep crossing. At the same time, deterrent policies 
infringe on the human rights of migrants as persons first and second as migrants. For this 
reason, criticisms levelled against Italy on human rights violations informed a humanitarian 
approach (Mare Nostrum) to making border policies. This said policy also received criticisms 
because of its inability to primarily see to suitable reception conditions for rescued migrants. 
In order to determine these assertions, policies from 2011 to 2014 will be assessed using 
principles and stipulations applicable to the treatment of sea migrants to examine reported 
events of rights violations as a result of Italy’s policies. Articles 2, 3, 5, Protocol No. 4 
Article 4 and Protocol No. 12, the extension of Article 14 will be used to assess Italy’s 
policies. 
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3.4.1 Policies of Interception and Push-Back versus Search and Rescue 
The de facto agreements between Italy and Libya since 2000 till later accords, sought to 
return migrants to Libya and later to their source countries without screening to determine if 
migrants needed international protection. Through the policy of interception, which is 
stopping migrants at sea and returning migrants to the place of departure or simply ignoring 
to rescue them, the Italy-Libya agreements were able to reduce crossings. In so doing, their 
actions became detrimental to migrants such that their human rights were violated.  
On the policy of interception, under the Italy-Libya accord, significant inadequacies by the 
Italian authorities on safeguarding the rights of irregular migrants were highlighted. An 
th
example was the 26  of March 2011 incident, when about 72 migrants in a dinghy from 
Tripoli journeyed towards Europe. Usually, with the right equipment, journeys from Libya to 
Italy should take about two to three days, however, since these boats are not seaworthy, lack 
a good compass for appropriate navigation and a trained captain, migrants find themselves 
manoeuvring the Mediterranean longer than is needed. Migrants in March 2011 travelling 
from Tripoli to Europe spent about 15 days at sea. In their distress they contacted a priest in 
Italy who in then alerted the proper authorities (the Italian Maritime Rescue Coordination 
48
Centre) for rescue.  The Italian MRCC in turn signalled Malta MRCC and a NATO vessel in 
the area where the migrants were located at the time for rescue however, no attempt was 
made. Malta later explained that these migrants were not stranded in its search and rescue 
th
area hence, their inability to rescue them. On the 10  of April, the dinghy washed up on 
Libyan shore with 11 survivors however, a woman was later reported to have died on arrival 
49
to the Zliten coast and another passed during detention due to untreated wounds.  Once 
ashore, migrants were seized by Libyan coast guards along with whatever personal 
belongings remained, then imprisoned without proper medical care, leading to the death of 
50
one migrant.    
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In this case, the actions meted out to migrants by Italian authorities were inconsistent with the 
standards in Article 2, 3 and Protocol No.12. The right to life as stated in Article 2 is one of 
the two fundamental principles governing European states. It outlines the importance of 
protecting lives and stipulates exceptions by which the right to life can be taken. In simple 
terms, authorities are to first protect individuals from unlawful killings; this should consider 
51
threats posed by others or the environment.  Article 2 instructs authorities to refrain from 
unlawful killings, which are stated in paragraph 2 of the article, to take steps in safeguarding 
life, especially that which results in the loss of life, and a duty to investigate suspicious 
52
deaths.  In Article 3 lies the Prohibition of Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment which prohibits an affront to a person’s physical integrity through inflictions of 
53
pain and other acts that may cause severe mental suffering.  It also forbids states and their 
agencies (whether acting in state capacity or of their own accord) from engaging in this 
breach of right. Thus, states are expected to ensure accessible processes by which complaints 
can be made and sanctions on responsible agencies can be administered. The Italian 
authorities’ inability to rescue migrants even when alerted violated the right to protecting 
lives as in Article 2. Furthermore, debating among themselves (Italy and Malta) which state 
was responsible for rescuing migrants resulted in ignoring the distress calls, and leaving 
migrants at the peril of nature’s elements without water, food and fuel. Such acts were a 
violation of Article 3, as they subjected migrants to an affront to their physical integrity. Both 
states explained that migrants were located in Libya’s search and rescue zone at the time 
however; counter arguments suggest that in Libya’s state of chaos at the time, it was left to its 
54
able neighbours to take up search and rescue missions.    
Overall, Italy was found to have breached the non-discrimination principle of Article 14, 
th
expounded in the 12  protocol of the Convention. It prohibits the discrimination of persons 
based on their sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or social affiliation, national or 
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social origin, association with a national minority or other status.  This means, persons 
should not be treated differently in a situation based on a particular characteristic possessed 
by such persons rather; all persons, regardless of what defines them should experience similar 
th
treatment in similar situations. Paragraph 2 of the 12  protocol further prohibits 
discrimination by authorities on any grounds such as mentioned above in paragraph 1 of 
Protocol No. 12. Italy’s decision not to rescue migrants so they could be screened to 
determine if any were in need of international protection violated the principle of non-
discrimination. This is because distress calls made by migrants were ignored by Italian 
authorities who dismissed migrants as simply being ‘migranti’ (an Italian term making no 
distinction between an economic migrant, an asylum seeker or a refugee). During the 
assessment of the Hirsi Jamaa and others versus Italy case, it was established there was the 
need to protect a “de facto refugee” as a “de jure refugee”, since both categories share the 
56
same need for international protection,  considering the events in Libya at the time. 
Therefore, a difference in treatment will end in refugees being subject to a discriminatory 
57
regime.  Moreover, it is imperative to note that a refugee is not acknowledged as a refugee 
by recognition but because he or she is, a refugee. Thus, migrants who have not expressed 
58
wishes to be protected, upon realising that they are endangered, fall within this category.  
However, since Italy has not ratified to Protocol No. 12 it may not be legally answerable to it 
though, it remains a fact that its actions were inconsistent with the principle of non-
discrimination. 
Contrary to this, in 2013 and 2014 during Mare Nostrum, the operation not only adhered to 
the Convention of Search and Rescue but to most parts of Article 2, Article 3, and Protocol 
No. 12 of the Convention. The purpose of the operation itself, which is to salvage migrants’ 
lives in the Mediterranean, observes the stipulations in Article 2 of the ECHR. Moreover, as 
it salvaged lives, it prevented migrants from undergoing experiences that can be characterized 
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as torturous, inhumane, degrading or punishable treatment. This task of Mare Nostrum is also 
consistent with stated provisions in Article 3, as it discourages migrants from experiencing 
events that offends their physical integrity at sea. Also, considering the situation in Libya, 
returning migrants to a place where their lives are engendered amounts to subjecting migrants 
to torturous, inhumane, degrading or punishable treatment, which Mare Nostrum prevented 
by rescuing migrants. However, it is imperative to note that the challenge of Mare Nostrum 
officials ignoring investigations which may lead to knowledge of drowned or missing persons 
is incompatible with Article 2’s provision of the authority’s duty of investigating suspicious 
deaths. 
In adherence with Protocol No. 12, Mare Nostrum rescued all persons found at sea regardless 
of their origin or status. Often, the nationality of migrants was used to determine their status 
as labour migrants, asylum seekers or refugees. Also, during Mare Nostrum, migrants were 
screened to determine those in need of protection. At the same time officials gathered 
information that may assist officials apprehend smugglers unlike previous policies. Allowing 
voluntary organisations assist with medical treatment, food and clothing among other 
59
supplies  for rescued migrants, while providing additional care upon arrival for migrants 
with severe medical conditions, affirmed Italy’s determination to address the humanitarian 
concern in the central Mediterranean. It is further compatible with Article 3 particularly, and 
Protocol No. 12, because crew members meted our similar treatments to all rescued migrants. 
Upon being interviewed a Syrian migrant rescued, expressed gratitude to the Italian crew for 
being rescued. Such statements attest to the humanitarian nature of Mare Nostrum, and under 
this initiative, Italy can be said to have adhered to the appropriate principles applicable in 
such situations. 
 
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3.4.2 Policies of Reception and Detention 
Usually, undocumented immigrants are held at detention centres to await deportation, but 
with the increase in sea arrivals, detention centres are being used frequently as reception 
centres, to house irregular migrants arriving from sea. The policy of reception normally deals 
with accommodating and caring for rescued migrants while they await decisions made by 
authorities to offer international protection or to expel them.  Article 5, of the Convention 
states the right to liberty and security which ensures the safeguarding of an individual’s 
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physical liberty against arbitrary detention.  It is not only applicable from the beginning of a 
person’s detention, but during the detention process till a verdict is given. Notably, it exists in 
tandem with the prohibition of discrimination however; there are exceptions to which it is 
lawful for a person to be detained. One of such is, “the lawful arrest or detention of a person, 
to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom 
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action is being taken, with a view to deportation or extradition”.  Thus, it is lawful to detain 
irregular migrants upon entry to determine their fate; on the other hand, these actions must be 
carried out within certain provided stipulations to avoid violating the rights of irregular 
migrants. This includes detaining persons as a final resort, when all other alternatives have 
been exhausted; or an officially recognised detention for a reasonable period of time, with an 
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independent scrutiny when further detention is necessary.  Upon detention, migrants must be 
notified of the rights and provisions available to them in a language they can comprehend 
during which contact with their consuls should also be made to report the location 
63
detainees.  Detaining of vulnerable persons (minors, pregnant or lactating women, the 
elderly and the disabled) should be avoided when possible, if not, such detention should be 
brief. Adults who are not parents of minors, example female adults and male minors or vice 
versa, should be separated at centres, also migrants should be allowed contact to any person 
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of their choice (lawyers, family members, NGOs or the UNHCR), to access medical care, an 
64
interpreter, and free legal aid.   
th
Ever since 30  September 2008, under the provisions of the Security Package, it was lawful 
to detain migrants indefinitely at the isle of Lampedusa till they were given asylum or 
65
deported.  This event also witnessed delays in asylum processing, leading to overcrowding 
at reception centres such as the Contrada Imbriacola, one of the two centres in Lampedusa. It 
66
had the capacity to house 804 migrants but was accommodating up to about 1560 migrants.  
The delay in processing asylum documents by the Italian government was believed to have 
th
caused the violent episode of 20  September 2011, where agitated Tunisian descent migrants 
67
set fire to a centre due to uncertainties of their fate.  At the second reception centre, Loran, 
68
about 380 migrants lodged in a 180 capacity facility.  The mattresses provided for migrants 
were in direct contact with the ground. Uncovered reports showed inadequate sanitary 
conditions, such as a five provisional unit which had 3 showers each, 3 toilets and 3 
69
washbasins.  Also, available for migrants were a landline for communication purposes, 
70
however, with the phone signal in the area being weak, migrants had little use for the line.  
There was also dangerous electrical circuiting in the building which posed as a risk while fire 
71
alarms at the centre were not functioning.   
In Ponte Galeria’s largest CIE, there are no reports of overcrowding but a visit in 2012 by the 
non-governmental health organisation Medici per I Diritti Umani, reported the centre 
72
resembled a penal institution under surveillance from security personnel.  Areas in the centre 
were demarcated by bar fences, and sanitation was in a deplorable state. For instance, toilets 
in the centre had no doors for privacy sake, whereas partitions in washrooms were done by 
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large black garbage plastic bags.  Migrants also complained about the lack of a heating 
system especially during the winter time. The centre was at the time, providing migrants with 
limited equipment for medical treatment besides the limited number of medical personnel 
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available. For instance, the medical staff consisted of 2 female volunteer doctors, an 
74
oncologist and a gynaecologist in addition to the 6 member team provided to the centre.  
75
There were also about 7 volunteer nurses in addition to the 5 nurses at the centre.  In view of 
these reports, it is evident that Italian authorities were in breach of the stipulations set in 
Article 5 however; Italy has defended its actions by stating that the said violations are as a 
result of the limited resources available, which cannot adequately meet the needs of the 
increasing number of irregular arrivals. Scholars like Cuttitta disagree with this assertion and 
have indicated that the action of detaining migrants in Italy, especially on the isle of 
Lampedusa, which causes overcrowding at centres is as a result of Italy’s persistent border 
policy to socially “borderize” the isle by concentrating entrants at the borders, preventing 
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their entry into mainland Italy.
With Mare Nostrum, reception and detention conditions in Italy were revealed to be 
inadequate in accordance with international standards. During the period of Mare Nostrum, 
many people were salvaged, but the inability of the Italian government to establish suitable 
reception conditions resulted in concentrations and overcrowding at centres. Overcrowding 
and concentrating migrants at centres promotes limited staff and resources to guests, 
subjecting migrants to inhuman and degrading treatment. Taking health care for instance, the 
figures of irregular migrants arriving outnumber the available personnel. In order to control 
migrants, medical personnel resort to sedatives to calm down migrants which occasionally 
lead to suicide attempts. Also, reports of female and male migrants mixed up, or adults and 
minors who may not be parents of minors lodging together, is inconsistent with the detention 
principle of segregating men from women who are not spouses as well as minors from adults 
who are not their parents. Moreover, extending detainees’ detentions, by reason of limited 
functioning detention and reception centres, the increasing number of irregular arrivals 
tending to delay asylum applications and the fact that neighbouring EU member states have 
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chosen to ignore the emergency of the situation, promotes Italy’s violation of the principles in 
Article 3 and 5 of the Convention.  
Such actions and more of Italian authorities have led to undignified treatment of persons, 
which violate Articles 3 and 5. However, occasionally some migrants have been allowed to 
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cross the Italian border into neighbouring countries right after disembarkation , though this 
doesn’t happen often.  
3.4.3 Policies of Expulsion and Readmission 
Upon irregular migrants being intercepted at sea or disembarked ashore, entrants detained 
and denied asylum are returned to their place of departure, which could be a transit country 
(in this case Libya) or a source country. With the Italy-Libya accord, Libya gradually became 
a holding centre for Italy and Europe as a whole. According to the pact, Libya was duty-
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bound to coordinate its policies with that of Italy to assist Italy in repatriation processes.  
th
Under Article 4 of the 4  Protocol, in order to conduct appropriate expulsions and 
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readmissions, the irregular migrant must have access to an effective remedy.  The migrant 
also has the right to argue before a competent, impartial authority, represented by a legal aid 
and an interpreter if necessary, the claim of his or her life being at risk upon expulsion. 
Migrants also have the right under the Convention to argue their case by the ECHR under 
Article 34 of the Convention. The ECHR also clearly bans states from conducting collective 
80 
expulsions.
In 2011, the Italian government expelled about 13,000 irregular migrants between January 
and July when the Libyan crisis was on-going. In the same year, the migrants from Libya 
who left only to drift at sea till they washed up back on the Libyan shore, amounts to a 
violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. This is because, Italian authorities were obligated to 
intervene by rescuing migrants however, leaving them to return to a place which was 
58 
 
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evidently a risk to their right to life, breached the principle of non-refoulement hence, Article 
4 of Protocol No. 4.  
In 2013 and 2014 however there was a general decrease in expelling irregular migrants to the 
northern part of Africa, in this case Libya. By the discretion of Italian authorities, these places 
were harmful to persons due to their race, religion, nationality, and membership to a 
81
particular social group or political opinion.  Thus, in this period Italy was consistent with the 
non-refoulement principle and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Endnotes 
___________________ 
1
BBC World Service, The Inquiry. (2015). http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0293990x/episodes/downloads 
(accessed 06/07/2015). Transcripts from the broadcast are available in the article BBC News, ‘Can Europe Stop 
Migrants Dying in the Mediterranean?’, 25/02/2015 
2
Marina Militaire Italiana. ‘Mare Nostrum – Riepilogo Attivita’, Ministero della Difesa, available at 
http://www.marina.difesa.it/cosafacciamo/operazioni-in-corso/Documents/Dati%20Statistici%20Nostrum.pdf 
accessed 06/07/2015 
3
Marina Militaire Italiana. Operation Mare Nostrum available at 
http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx accessed 01/06/2015 
4
BBC News Europe. (2014). ‘Italy Rescues 1,000 Migrants off Lampedusa Inside 24 Hours’ 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25582933 accessed 06/07/2015 
5
Journeyman Pictures. (2014). Italy- The Italian Solution available at 
http://www.journeyman.tv/67901/shortfilms/the-italian-solution.html, Transcript available at 
http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2014/s4106724.htm accessed 26/06/2015 
6
Ibid 
7
Marina Militaire Italiana, Operation Mare Nostrum 
8
Journeyman Pictures. Italy- The Italian Solution 
9
Sea Arrivals to Italy available at http://www.unhcr.it/risorse/statistiche/sea-arrivals-to-italy accessed 
10/07/2015 
10
Journeyman Pictures. Italy- The Italian Solution 
11
Marina Militaire Italiana, ‘Mare Nostrum – Riepilogo Attivita’ 
12  
Patalano, A. (2015). Nightmare Nostrum? Not Quite. The RUSI Journal. 106:3 14-19
13
Marina Militaire Italiana, ‘Mare Nostrum – Riepilogo Attivita’ 
14
Patalano, A. (2015). Nightmare Nostrum? Not Quite, 17 
15
Ibid., p.16 
16
Taylor, J. (October 30, 2014). ‘Amid Record Waves of Refugees, Italy Finding Limits to Its Compassion’ 
available at http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/special-features/2014/10/141031-italy-immigration-crisis-
human-trafficking/ accessed 10/07/2015 
17
Carrerra, S & Hertog, L.D. (2015). Whose Mare? Rule of Law Challenges in the Field of European Border 
Surveillance in the Mediterranean. No. 79. Working Paper. CEPS available at 
18
Cuttitta, P. (2014). From the Cap Anamur to Mare Nostrum: Humanitarian and Migration Controls at the EU’s 
Maritime Borders in Matera, C and Taylor, A. The Common European Asylum System and Human Rights: 
Enhancing Protection in Times of Emergencies. Centre for the Law of EU External Relations Working Papers 
2014/7. The Hague 
19
Chope, C. (2014). The Large-scale Arrival of Mixed Migratory Flows on Italian Shores available at 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=20941&lang=en accessed 
09/01/2015 
20
Ibid 
21
Ibid 
22
Ibid., p.13 
23
Ibid., p.12 
24
BBC News. (December 18, 2013). Lampedusa: Migrants stripped on Secret Footage available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25425196 accessed 10/07/2015 
25
 Chope, C. (2014). The Large-scale Arrival of Mixed Migratory Flows on Italian Shores, 12 
26
Medici Per I Dittri Umani. (2013). The CIE Archipelago, Inquiry into the Italian Centres for Identification and 
Expulsion Summary, May 2013 available at http://www.mediciperidittriumani.org/CIE_Archipelago_eng.pdf 
accessed 16/07/2015 
27
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population. Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the Large-Scale Arrival of 
th
Irregular Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees on Europe’s Southern Shores, 30  September 2011 
28
Chope, C. The Large-scale Arrival of Mixed Migratory Flows on Italian Shores, 13 
29
Ibid 
30
Ibid 
31
Ibid 
32
Human Rights Watch. (June 22, 2014). Libya: Whipped, Beaten, and Hung from Trees, Detained Migrants, 
Asylum Seekers Describe Torture, Other Abuse in Detention, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/22/libya-whipped-beaten-and-hung-trees accessed 10/07/2015 
33
Ibid 
34
Ibid 
60 
 
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_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
35
US Department of State. (2014). 2013 Human Rights Report: Libya available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/2013/nea/220366.htm accessed 10/07/2015 
36
Human Rights Watch. Libya: Whipped, Beaten, and Hung from Trees, Detained Migrants, Asylum Seekers 
Describe Torture, Other Abuse in Detention 
37
Ibid 
38
Ibid 
39
Ibid 
40
Ibid 
41
Ibid 
42
Boillat, P. The European Convention on Human Rights at 60: Building on the Past, Looking to the Future 
available at http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/source/Article_Boillat_en.doc accessed 12/07/2015 
43
Interights Manual for Lawyers. (2011). The Right to Life Under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Article 2) available at http://www.interights.org/files/228/Article%202%20Manual.pdf accessed 29/07/2015 
44 th
Assembly Debate. (June 27, 2006). Resolution 1509 (18  Sitting) available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17454&lang=en accessed 02/02/2015 
45
Totah, M. (2002). Fortress Italy: Racial Politics and the New Immigration Amendment in Italy. Fordham 
International Law Journal. Vol. 26 Issue 5 1438-1504 
46
Bultrini, A. (2012).The Future of the European Convention on Human Rights after the Brighton Conference. 
Instituto Affari Internazionali. Working Papers No.12/13 
47
Soriano, M.C. (2008). Reception Process in Spain and Italy in Keller, H & Sweet, A.S. Europe of Rights: The 
Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems. Oxford University Press. New York. 
48
Strik,T. (March 29, 2015). Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is Responsible? Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Displaced Persons available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2012/20120329_mig_RPT.EN.pdf accessed 15/06/2015 
49
Ibid 
50
Ibid 
51
Interights Manual for Lawyers, The Right To Life Under The European Convention on Human Rights (Article 
2), 1 
52
Ibid 
53
Interights Manual for Lawyers. (2009). The Right To Life Under The European Convention on Human Rights 
(Article 3) available at http://www.interights.org/Article%203%20Manual%20Final%20March%202009.pdf 
accessed 29/07/2015 
54
Strik,T. (March 29, 2015). Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is Responsible?, 13 
55
European Convention on Human Rights. (September 3, 1953). Available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Convention_ENG.pdf accessed 12/02/2015 
56
CASE OF HIRSII JAMAA AND OTHERS v ITALY (Application No. 27765/09) available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{%22display%22:[0],%dmdocnumber%22:[%2859107%2
2]} accessed 10/07/2015 
57
CASE OF HIRSII JAMAA AND OTHERS v ITALY, 61 
58
Ibid., p.58 
59
Journeyman Pictures. Italy- The Italian Solution 
60 
61
Ibid 
62
Assembly Debate, Resolution 1509, 2 
63
Ibid., p.3 
64
Ibid., p.2 
65
Cuttitta, P. (2014). “Borderizing” the Island Setting and Narratives of the Lampedusa “Border Play”. ACME: 
An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies. 13(2). 196-219 
66
Committee on Migration. Refugee and Population. Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the Large-scale Arrival of 
Irregular Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees on Europe’s Southern Shores, 4 
67
Ibid 
68
Ibid., p.5 
69
Ibid 
70
Ibid 
71
Ibid 
72
Medici per I Diritti Umani. (2012). Behind the Fences, Report on the identification and deportation centre of 
Ponte Galeria in Rome available at 
http://www.mediciperidirittiumani.org/pdf/BEHIND_HIGHER_FENCES.pdf 
73
Ibid., p.7 
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__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
74
Ibid., p.9 
75
Ibid 
76
Cuttitta, P. “Borderizing” the Island Setting and Narratives of the Lampedusa “Border Play”, 199 
77
Journeyman Pictures. Italy- The Italian Solution 
78
Assembly Debate, Resolution 1509, 3 
79
Ibid 
80
Ibid 
81
US Department of State. (February 10, 2015). 2014 Human Rights Report: Italy available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper accessed 10/07/2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter consists of the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations of this 
study. 
4.1 Summary of Findings 
The Issue of Cooperation and Policy Incoherence in the EU 
It has been observed that sea arrivals in Europe make up a lesser number, that is, about 10% 
1
of irregular migrants clandestinely crossing into Europe.  Major clandestine journeys are by 
air, bus, and train especially, journeys to inland states that process more asylum applicants 
than southern states. Southern states like Italy are normally used as transits to more 
prosperous states like Germany and Switzerland. Thus, northern states are compelled to force 
the south to control their external borders and implement strict border policies.  
However, with criticism about the humanitarian effects of such policies some European states 
attempt to address these concerns, such states have been left on their own. Calls by Italy to 
assist with burden-sharing fall on deaf ears as according to northern European states they 
have to deal with about 90% of clandestine migrants attempting to cross their borders. 
Southern European states themselves disagree when it comes to issues concerning which state 
should take up rescues, in which zone and the country to receive rescued migrants. Italy and 
Malta normally have diverging views on such issues, leading to migrant deaths. Due to 
varying interests within the EU, states like Italy have to now and then coordinate national 
policies that deal with irregular migration to be consistent with the broader EU policy. Often, 
these policies violate the rights of irregular migrants for which Italy is blamed when in fact; 
Italy is adhering to reactionary policies adopted by other EU member states. 
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The Smuggling Network of Operatives 
Smuggling operatives facilitate irregular migration because using the sea is by far the 
cheapest way to cross into Europe. Smugglers are usually thought to be uneducated and 
2
uninformed  on the contrary; they are as knowledgeable of European policies as any other 
person. Through newspapers and any other media they can access information to ease their 
smuggling operations. Some are known to be multilingual; they therefore have a wider scope 
3
of gathering information on border policies.  They function in a network, that is, from source 
countries, to transit countries and destination countries in order to effectively counter the 
efforts of officials. Employing deterrence policies, does not deter smugglers from organizing 
trips across the Mediterranean but increases the pricing of boat fees, which can range from 
£1000 upwards.  
Smugglers awareness of the incoherence and disagreements among member states is used to 
their advantage. It is no wonder they are difficult to apprehend since they cooperate among 
themselves better than EU member states do, and are able to earn the trust of irregular 
migrants despite their callousness towards migrants. Italy, in order to track and arrest 
smugglers often resort to a security approach such as sea patrols and surveillances to track 
and apprehend smugglers through the use of military personnel and equipment. Such actions 
encourage restrictive policies since focus is shifted from saving lives, leading to the violation 
of rights of irregular migrants. 
The Situation in Libya 
Since the death of Colonel Ghaddafi, two main factions – House of Representatives in 
Tobruk and the Tripoli government - struggle to gain control of Libya. The instability caused 
by differences in tribe, religion and ideology developed into a state without a central 
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governing entity, a balance of power and a country where diverse rebel groups institute 
decisions that bring about uncertainty among citizens in terms of who and what to follow.  
Amid these, terrorists are taking advantage of the instability to facilitate their objectives. 
Moreover, these rebels are suspected to be involved in smuggling and trafficking persons 
using boat fees as funds for supporting their activities. However, the instability in Libya did 
not deter Italy from returning apprehended irregular migrants to Libya in 2011 and 2012. 
Italy’s response during this period not only breached the non-refoulement principle but 
endangered the lives of irregular migrants as their safety and care in Libya was uncertain, 
leading to the violation of irregular migrant rights.  
Challenges and the Issue of “Grey Numbers” in Mare Nostrum 
Though Italy’s adoption and implementation of Mare Nostrum helped save lives, like any 
other policy it had its share of challenges. Apart from serving as a pull-factor, during 
investigations among the migrants, Italian police avoided inquiring into deaths at sea and 
missing person which according to Cuttitta is inconsistent with the humanitarian approach 
adopted by Italy in Mare Nostrum. Death documentation is essential in order to account for 
migrant deaths and missing persons to determine the causes of deaths and establish policies 
and practices that will prevent such events from re-occurring. It is also essential for policy 
making sake to identify if there is a particular group facing such risks and to assist them. 
Moreover it is important for relatives to be notified of deaths to have closure or in some cases 
so inheritance proceedings can take place.  
Information on deaths at sea and missing persons for documentation and analysis can 
accurately be given by rescue officials. However, the Italian police avoidance of such duties 
and not publicizing deaths, conflicts with the humanitarian approach the operation adopted at 
the same time, inconsistent with Article 2 of the ECHR, which requires officials to 
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investigate deaths. Another shortcoming incompatible with the ECHR’s provisions in Article 
5 was the operation’s incapacity to suitably lodge the rescued, because of inadequate 
reception centres. However, Italy’s breach of Article 5 can somewhat be attributed to the 
unwillingness of neighbouring EU states. If the practice of burden-sharing could have been 
successfully carried out during Mare Nostrum, irregular migrants could have been well 
catered for as each member state would take on the number it could handle. 
Challenges of the ECHR and the Ineffectiveness of its Court 
The Convention, though safeguards the rights of persons, only plays a supervisory role to EU 
states. As mentioned before, states like Italy are primarily responsible for protecting the 
rights of persons to avoid threatening situations to persons and to remedy mistreatment. Often 
states fail to carry out verdicts by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) upon 
breaching the ECHR, resulting in repetitive applications. The applications are complaints of a 
particular state’s inability to fulfil the verdict of which the Committee of Ministers is to 
supervise.  
The fact that about 60% of repetitive cases are still unresolved in court indicates the 
Committee’s inability to see to this. Also because of the ever evolving nature of the 
Convention and its varied and demanding range of responsibilities states have to adhere to, it 
makes the principle unclear and at times difficult to comply with. Since EU member states 
fail to give prominence to the ECHR and its courts, the Union allows member states like Italy 
breach enshrined principles that violate irregular migrant rights. The fact that the Union fails 
to give the Convention the needed mandate so it can ensure the adherence and sanctioning of 
member states, encourages member states to violate the rights of irregular migrants, since 
member states are not held accountable for their actions.  
 
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4.2 Conclusion 
Italy as a state is responsible for the welfare and security of its citizens. Concerns arising 
from economic costs, social instability, terrorism and communicable diseases influence 
restrictive policies towards the entry of irregular migrants. With the Libyan crisis, many 
persons were forced to decide to make the journey to Europe seeking first, for protection but 
the of adoption deterrence policies caused a humanitarian crisis which resulted in Italy’s 
breach of  Articles 2, 3, 5, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and Protocol No. 12. Though the period 
of 2011-2012 made provision for human-centred initiatives, policies to discourage illegal 
journeys was the focus of the Italian government at the time and Europe as a union. 
In 2013, Italy shifted its policy from securing Europe’s borders to safeguarding lives. This 
was as a result of the International Community’s vocal disapproval of Italy’s previous 
restrictive policies towards irregular migrants. Mare Nostrum was lauded for its ability to 
save over 100,000 lives. However, its inability to provide suitable shelter for migrants 
constituted a violation of the principles prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, and most importantly, safeguarding the individual’s physical liberty against 
arbitrary detention.  On the other hand, the challenge of temporary housing of irregular 
migrants could have been solved if the responses of European states had been congruent with 
Italy’s and it had not been side-lined to cater for the rescued alone. Thus, this study notes that 
examining Italy’s violations from the sole perception of a deliberate adoption of restrictive 
policies is restricted, because, it does not address Italy’s commitment and responsibility under 
the EU cooperation arrangement. As observed in this study, the regional policy of EU 
member states towards irregular migration often influenced Italy’s national policy on 
managing the inflow of irregular migrants. Therefore, Italy is a victim of circumstance, as 
wider factors such as the varying interests of neighbouring EU states inform its border 
policies that violate migrant rights. Then, it is undeserved to accuse Italy individually of 
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violating the rights of irregular migrants when, the Union itself often fails to address the issue 
of irregular migration from a humanitarian perspective. 
In the case of Libya, persons in Libya will be forced to make the optimal choice of using the 
cheapest means of illegal entry into Europe (the sea route) to the best region of opportunities 
(Europe) through the nearest channel (Italy). Thus, it is important for the International 
Community, Europe, and Africa to acknowledge the gravity of the emergency, in order to 
formulate and implement coordinated, comprehensive and lasting remedies to reduce the 
human cost in the Mediterranean. In my opinion, irregular migration to Europe from North 
Africa cannot be prevented but minimized considerably if, stakeholders rather endeavour to 
minimize than deter, since the focus on prevention is one among many reasons why 
destination countries formulate deterrence policies. Policy-makers can hereby, attain effective 
migration policies over a prolonged period, through systematic policy-making instead of 
resorting to provisional policies which are most often reactions to irregular migratory 
concerns and are bound to have challenges that could lead to the loss of more lives. To attain 
effective policies, North African Mediterranean Countries and Europe, and especially Europe 
as a whole, must engage in activities that enhance cooperation. 
4.3 Recommendations 
Stakeholders should consider the suggestions below with regards to the issue of irregular 
migration and its minimization as well as the humanitarian concerns that arise. 
To the International Community 
It is clear that the International Community, being the United States and its western allies had 
erred in militarily intervening in the situation in Libya. The Security Council’s decision to 
assist in ousting Ghaddafi has caused more chaos and uncertainty in Libya to the extent 
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where no one is safe, particularly irregular migrants. In such civil uprisings, it would be best 
if NATO and its allies support the regional body, in which there is an uprising, instead of 
spearheading and facilitating military interventions. This is due to fact that, the regional body 
can better understand the intricacies of the situation, since they may share similar objectives 
and challenges, and can find feasible remedies with the support of other concerned states, 
together with international bodies like the United Nations. Preferably, the optimal choice will 
be to handle such emanating conflicts with as much precaution as possible, having in mind 
that a full-blown conflict will cause the displacement of people.  
In the case of Libya, the comfortable living standards and the agreement between Libya and 
Italy deterred irregular migrants from crossing to Europe. With the removal of Ghaddafi, 
there was no impeding factor preventing journeys but rather a push-factor, which was the 
2011 conflict. All the same, it is now the duty of the United States, Europe, and the UN to 
intervene by brokering a peace deal between the two factions in Libya. Perhaps, a peace-
keeping team can be present in Libya while the peace deal is ongoing to ensure the protection 
of citizens and irregular migrants especially, as a short term solution, till a consensus between 
the two factions is established. 
To the EU and Member States 
It is known knowledge that the national interest of a state influences its foreign policy. In the 
issue of irregular migration, European states are likely to protect their citizens and prioritise 
their well-being over third country nationals, hence, policing borders to discourage illegal 
journeys. In order to minimize the numbers, European states must bring to an end the 
pointing of fingers and agree to practise the principle of burden-sharing among states. Also, 
European states should consider an initiative like Mare Nostrum, where Italy can play the 
supervisory role and can train others to do same, as suggested by Alessio Patalano. Europe 
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must abandon reactionary responses and opt for well-framed, long term, coherent decisions. 
It is in the best interest of Europe to enhance cooperation amongst themselves, and with 
transit and origin countries on journeys across the Mediterranean, in order to be a step ahead 
of smugglers. Europe should however, continue with investigations and information 
gathering to facilitate the apprehension of smugglers, that can be another angle of tackling the 
issue of irregular migration, since apprehended smugglers will serve as a scapegoat to other 
smugglers. Also, there should be thorough screening of rescued migrants when and if 
countries decide to act on the principle of burden-sharing so as to sift out possible threats to 
the public. 
To Italy 
The medium term solution to irregular migration across the Mediterranean, under the Mare 
Nostrum initiative, was a step in the right direction. Italy should continue to establish and 
improve reception centres and detention centres, by making them better suited for housing 
irregular migrants till the appropriate authorities decide their fate. The Italian government 
should review its detention policy of extensively detaining irregular migrants. Practising 
proper screening will alert authorities as to who may need international protection and speed 
up asylum documentation. It is important that existing legal frameworks and processes for 
acquiring asylum documentation be amended and fast-tracked, particularly with cases where 
arrivals may be in urgent need of such benefits.  
Furthermore, since there are private detention and reception centres, there must also be the 
existence of working, independent, rights authorities put in place by the government, to 
monitor and serve as a watchdog to both public and private centres. This will create an 
accessible platform where, detainees can make complaints, complaints can be thoroughly 
investigated, and the appropriate sanctions be meted out. An important consideration is, Italy 
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must desist from repatriating irregular migrants to countries where their safety is not 
guaranteed, instead, it should make appeals on the ticket of trade or economic negotiations to 
the regional bodies where these transit and/or source countries are located, to take 
responsibility for their citizens. Undertaking these recommendations means Italy will be 
adhering to irregular migrant rights and will be in the good books of human rights advocates. 
To Libya and Africa Union Member States 
The African Union and its member states have been on the fence with regard to this issue for 
too long. Apart from Syrians, the rest found crossing to Europe are Africans, most coming 
from war torn countries. The AU must consider giving priority to irregular migration issues 
as it does with economic, trade, and other issues it perceives as urgent and crucial. African 
member states must take a critical look at the gravity of the emergency situation in the central 
Mediterranean, since the fundamental duty of a state should be safeguarding its citizens. The 
silence from African leaders in this situation, has led to the suggestion that, Africa must be 
heard commenting on this issue. In my opinion, Africa should not only be heard but be seen 
doing all it can to assist Europe remedy this situation. 
First, African leaders must assist the West and other concerned states to broker peace 
between the two factions through the ongoing peace deal. The active involvement of 
stakeholders to expedite the mediation process may compel the two groups come to a 
consensus and work at stabilizing Libya, consequently, finding solutions to ridding its coasts 
off smugglers. Meanwhile, the AU must first, through summits, work at finding remedies that 
can stabilize the region economically to enhance living standards. There is also the need to 
assist member states quell internal uprisings when necessary, to minimize the numbers that 
will, for security reasons travel illegally towards Europe. African states should additionally, 
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put more efforts to hosting displaced citizens during such uprisings, to minimize considerably 
the numbers who may want to make the journey across the Mediterranean. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Endnotes 
_____________________ 
1
Finotelli, C. (2009). The North-South Myth Revised: A Comparison of the Italian and German Migration 
Regimes. West Europen Politics. 32:5 886-903 
2
BBC World Service. The Inquiry. The Podcast is available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0293990x/episodes/downloads accessed 06/07/2015. Transcripts from 
broadcast are available in the article BBC News, ‘Can Europe Stop Migrants Dying in the Mediterranean?’, 
accessed 25/02/2015 
3
BBC World Service. The Inquiry. ‘Can Europe Stop Migrants Dying in the Mediterranean?’ 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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APPENDICES 
                                                  
APPENDIX I  
Arrival of irregular migrants at Italian border, 1998-2013 
 
Region Apulia Calabria Sardinia Sicily Total 
1998 28,458 873 - 8,828 38,142 
1999 46,481 1,545 - 1,973 49,136 
2000 18,990 5,045 - 2,782 26,817 
2001 8,546 6,095 - 5,504 20,143 
2002 3,372 2,122 - 18,225 23,719 
2003 137 177 - 14,017 14,170 
2004 18 23 - 13,594 13,635 
2005 19 88 8 22,824 22,939 
2006 243 284 91 21,400 22,016 
2007 61 1,971 1,548 16,875 20,455 
2008 127 663 1,621 34,541 36,951 
2009 N.A N.A N.A N.A 9,573 
2010 N.A N.A N.A N.A 4,406 
2011 N.A N.A N.A N.A 62,692 
2012 N.A N.A N.A N.A 8,717 
2013 N.A N.A N.A N.A 35,085 
 
Source: Table created based on data from Cuttitta, P. (2006). Il Controllo Dell’Immigrazione 
tra Nordafrica e Italia, in N.Dentico and M. Gressi, Il Libro Bianco, I Centri di Permanenza e 
Assistenza Temporanea in Italia, and Bruycker, P.D, Bartolomeo, A.D,  Fargues, P. (2013). 
Migrants smuggled by sea to the EU: facts, laws and policy option. MPC RR2013/09, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University 
Institute.  
 
 
 
 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Interactive Map on Irregular Migration Routes and Flows in Africa, the Middle East, and the 
Mediterranean Region  
 
Source: National Geographic Staff  
http://news.nationalgeographic.com 
 
 
 
 
 
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APPENDIX III 
Number of arrivals in Italy by sea since Operation Mare Nostrum 
 
 
Source: Jeffrey Taylor (October 13, 2015)  
http://news.nationalgeographic.com  
 
83