Politikon
South African Journal of Political Studies
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The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on voter
behaviour in Ghana’s 2020 general election: a case
study of the Greater Accra region
Seidu M. Alidu
To cite this article: Seidu M. Alidu (2023): The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on voter
behaviour in Ghana’s 2020 general election: a case study of the Greater Accra region, Politikon,
DOI: 10.1080/02589346.2023.2172532
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2023.2172532
Published online: 10 Feb 2023.
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POLITIKON
https://doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2023.2172532
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on voter behaviour in
Ghana’s 2020 general election: a case study of the Greater
Accra region
Seidu M. Alidu
Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I seek to evaluate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on voter behaviour in
the 2020 general elections in Ghana using survey data compiled in Greater Accra between
July and August 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic became a major campaign issue in last
year’s election prompting varied responses and support from both the government and
the main opposition parties. Though a majority of the electorate were satisfied (83.5%)
and grateful (82%) for the relief items they received, only 3 out of every 10 of the
respondents think the intervention had an effect on the way they voted. Using the rally-
effect theory, the paper finds that the political leadership and incumbent government
were able to rally support for their campaign as a result of the social intervention policies
implemented in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, yet were unable to sustain and
translate that support into electoral victory in the Greater Accra Region, a major swing
region with the highest number of Covid-19 cases and one of the only two regions that
witnessed a lockdown during the height of the pandemic.
Introduction
The impact of economic performance on voter behaviour in national elections has been
widely studied. Scholars (Downs 1957) agree that there is a positive correlation between
good economic performance and the popularity of incumbent governments and their
ability to retain political power in a competitive democratic election. This is rightly so
because voters mostly attach significant importance to their economic welfare, referred
to as ‘bread and butter’ issues, in determining who to vote for in national elections. In
this sense, the rational average voter examines the prevailing economic conditions in
the country and decides to either reward or punish the incumbent government in the
manner they vote. In the dominant literature on political economic cycles, rational gov-
ernments that seek to retain political power either engage in expansionary economic pol-
icies and social interventions programmes; sometimes spending excessively, in the run up
to elections or will go to the extent of manipulating the economy for electoral purposes.
The rationality exhibited by voters in the ‘reward or punish’ hypothesis and political
parties’ generosity in programming, even to the adverse effect of the economy or in
manipulating the outcomes of economic conditions, has been one of several explanations
for voter behaviour in democratic elections.
CONTACT Seidu M. Alidu smalidu@ug.edu.gh Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, P. O. Box LG
64, Accra, Ghana
© 2023 South African Association of Political Studies
2 S. M. ALIDU
Studying this rational behaviour is compounded by environmental factors, including
pandemic situations. The recent Covid-19 pandemic that has ravaged global economies
witnessed several competitive democratic elections held globally. While some countries
decided to either postpone or cancel completely scheduled elections, others went
ahead, including Ghana. Emergencies have served as rallying point for nations across gen-
erations. This unavoidable convergence has happened in terms of wars, disasters, pan-
demics, or terrorist attacks and has often resulted in popular support for leaders and
the initiatives put in place to combat and prevent a future occurrence of the phenom-
enon/crisis of concern. Indeed, Nathalie Tocci (cited in Steven 2020, 1) notes that ‘[I]n a
warlike situation, you want to trust who governs you, and that goes for bad leaders
and competent ones’ (Steven 2020, 1). Though theories of the rational choice tradition
have done some justice to this phenomenon, exploring the inclination of individuals to
act rationally to mitigate the impact of a crisis or prevent its future occurrence, the
most constitutive theory that seeks to explain the behaviour of citizens in the event of
an emergency, is the ‘rally around the flag effect’, hereinafter referred to as the ‘rally
effect’. The ‘rally effect’ is used to account for the popular, albeit ephemeral support
enjoyed by governments and political leaders in times of crisis such as wars, economic
depression, or pandemics (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2008). In essence, the theory
suggests that citizens or members of a group tend to support their leaders or govern-
ments when faced with a crisis that threatens their common interests. This support is
influenced by interventions (i.e. political, economic, social, and environmental) embarked
by the leaders to deal with the crisis at hand and may translate into higher approval
ratings for the incumbent government and in the event of an election will result in
victory. Introduced by Mueller (1970, 1973), the ‘rally effect’ has become the mainstay
in the literature on public opinion and foreign policy. More significantly, it has become
popular for its explanatory power of the relationship between national emergency/
crisis and higher approval ratings enjoyed by governments and political leaders.
Mueller’s (1970) initial conceptualisation of the ‘rally effect’ was narrow in both utility
and explanatory power. It was originally applied to events that are ‘international’ in char-
acter, ‘involves the United States and particularly the presidency directly’ and very
‘specific, dramatic and sharply focused (Mueller 1970). The concept was later expanded
in geographical scope, partly due to its appropriateness in accounting for the behaviour
of citizens and electorates towards their leaders and governments during the crisis. Not-
withstanding, its popularity and wide usage, the precise sources, significance and dur-
ation of the rally effect is still under so much contention. However, scholars point to
several possible sources worth noting. Parker (1995), for instance, attributes the source
of the rally effect to the surge in patriotism during periods of crisis. According to
Parker, crisis enables governments or leaders to harvest patriotism by focusing or refocus-
ing the attention of the country away from issues considered peripheral to the threat at
hand. Others, such as Barody and Shapiro (1989), argue that criticism of government falls
to its nadir during crisis, prompting a surge in popular support and hence the rally effect
(Barody and Shapiro 1989). Barody (1991), on his part, underscores exclusive media public
relations as a key source of the rally effect. According to him, governments and, in some
instances, leaders, become the primary source of information in periods of crisis which
could induce a rally effect to the benefit of the government or president. Others such
as O’Neal, Lian and Joyner have found evidence to suggest that the surge in bipartisan
POLITIKON 3
support during crisis situations in the United States of America accounts partly for the
popular but ephemeral support that governments or leaders do enjoy (O’neal, Lian,
and Joyner 1996).
In what could be a more comprehensive, though not dissimilar account of the sources,
effect, and duration of the rally effect, is the emergence of two schools of thought that
explain Mueller’s theory (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). These are the Patriotism
School of Thought and The Opinion Leadership School of thought, respectively. While
the former champions the view that, in the event of crisis, the president or leader is per-
ceived by the public as the embodiment of national unity, the latter posits that criticisms
against the president or the governments from especially opposition parties diminishes in
times of crisis since all efforts are geared towards finding solutions out of the crisis. For
example, the media reports less on the faults of the incumbent government and opposi-
tion parties tend to support the government to overcome the crisis. Hetherington and
Nelson (2003) cite US congress as frequently exhibiting this aspect of the rally effect.
However, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has witnessed more opposition
parties across the globe cooperating with their governments and help in mobilising
support to overcome the pandemic.
Empirically, several studies are consistent with the rally effect thesis. Jordan and Page
(1992) and Lian and Oneal (1993) have both established that presidents over the years
and across several jurisdictions have enjoyed spikes in their public approval rating
because of sudden high-profile foreign policy events. For instance, a Gallup poll con-
ducted prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre
showed an approval rating of 51% for President Bush’s job performance. However,
similar polls in the aftermath of the attacks, saw the President’s performance rating
jumped 350 basis points from 51% to 86%, representing the largest rally-round-the
flag-effect in history. Similarly, the ABC News poll on 13 September 2012 recorded 86%
ratings for the President, while the CBS news poll recorded an 84% post-attack approval
rating on a 13–14 September 2001.
Recent studies have also noted an increase in voter turnouts alongside increases in
government approval ratings in the face of crisis. For instance, Loumeau and Tommaso
(2020) analysed voting behaviour in France during the Covid-19 pandemic and found
that voter turnout increased remarkably because of containment measures put in place
by the government to limit the spread of the virus (Loumeau and Tommaso 2020). In
the specific case of the Covid-19 pandemic, there is ample evidence to evince that gov-
ernments and political leaders across the world have gained substantial amount of
support, with some being retained in offices for the second term as a direct or indirect
result of the rally effect (Bahegot 2020). For example, Silver (2020) observed that in
spite of the unimpressive economic performance of Donald Trump, his approval rating
saw a moderate increase during the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, reflecting the
rally around the flag effect in times of national crisis (Silver 2020). Others have also
cited governments and leaders of countries such as France’ Emmanuel Macron, Italy’s Giu-
seppe Conte, Netherland’s Mark Rutte and Britain’s Boris Johnson, as having gained
increased popular support weeks into the pandemic (Steven 2020).
The surge in approval ratings under the rally-round-the-flag effect is often short-lived
(Silver 2020). In spite of its explanatory power, the theory is criticised for being applicable
only to short-term approval ratings of governments or political leaders. Rallies do not last
4 S. M. ALIDU
and as opined by former NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, ‘People do rally
around, but it evaporates fast’ (Steven 2020). Rallies may last for up to a year or more,
but others may also just last for a week or a couple of weeks. This explains partly the
reason rallies do not necessarily translate into election victories or increase in the
number of votes an incumbent candidate polls in an election. This may be due to the
time factor, especially when the time between the rally and the election is too wide.
For example, despite the moderate rally gained by President Donald Trump during the
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, he lost the elections to an opposition candidate,
Joe Biden. Similarly, a 2019 study by Kuijpers (2019) showed that voters temporarily
support governing parties during periods of crisis, but soon start to punish them even
as their interventions are still alive, suggesting the ephemeral nature of the rally effect.
There is also the notion, especially from the diversionary theory of war perspective,
that presidents could misuse the rally effect to their advantage (Tir 2010). According to
this critique, presidents may create international crisis or magnify the effect of an existing
threat to shore up their approval ratings through a rally effect. Presidents or governments
may also do this to avoid dealing with domestic problems and divert the attention of the
public and tame opposition parties from speaking up about a domestic challenge. This is
particularly so when leaders or governing parties notice that their approval rating is on
the decline (Tir 2010).
The Ghanaian case
Ghana became the first country in the world to receive its first batch of vaccines of
600,000 doses through the COVAX initiative on 24 February 2021. The intention of the
government was to secure vaccines for 20 million Ghanaians to attain herd immunity
by the end of 2021. Ghana’s current Covid-19 cases stand at 171,099 with 1462 deaths
(GHS 2023). A total of 24,091,591 Covid doses have been administered since the begin-
ning of the pandemic and 9,183,560 people, representing about 30.3% of the total popu-
lation, have been fully vaccinated (GHS 2023). Ghana recorded its first Covid-19 case on
March 12, 2020. The first confirmed cases were two individuals within the Greater
Accra region. Within the month of March, and as of 31st March, the total number of
cases stood at 161. There were three major peaks within March on 26th when 41 cases
were recorded, followed by 25th when 38 cases were recorded and on 24th when 26
cases were recorded (GHS 2020). Similarly, within the month of April, and as of 30th
April, the total confirmed cases were 1638. The month of April, unlike March, witnessed
higher spikes with three-digit daily rise. On 30th April alone, the country recorded 403
cases, more than the total figure for the month of March. On 26th April, the total recorded
cases were 271, then 208 on 20th April, 158 on 12th April; 125 and 121 on 24th and 28th,
respectively (GHS 2020).
The voters’ registration exercise commenced on June 30 to August 6, 2020, from 7 am
to 6 pm daily after the Electoral Commission (E.C) won a case at the Supreme Court filed
by the opposition NDC and selected CSO aimed at stopping the process. Even though the
rationale behind the suit was to contest the qualification criteria set out for the regis-
tration process in the new Constitutional Instrument (C.I. 127), the issue of the spread
of the COVID-19 pandemic was roped in to strengthen the case of the petitioners. The
Electoral Commission had already made provisions for the pandemic in the registration
POLITIKON 5
exercise by proposing to organise it in a Cluster System where each Cluster would have
five registration centres in five phases with each phase lasting for three days. This would
then be followed by three days mop-up of the entire process. All these took place within
the strict observation of the COVID-19 protocols, including the provision of Veronica
buckets for handwashing, the provision of hand sanitisers, the wearing of face mask
and always maintaining social distancing in queues. The E.C. introduced new strategies
with the issuance of chits and the digital queuing system, which comparatively controlled
the mass of voters at the registration centres. Apart from the registration process, which
saw new modalities for registration, the E.C also rolled out a digital voter exhibition and
verification mechanism which required the use of a short code to identify one’s name and
the polling station which was designated for one to vote in, which replaced the in-person
method of voter verification. The registration process was criticised for lacking the enfor-
cement of some COVID 19 precautionary measures, including social distancing, checking
of temperature, cleaning, or wiping registration materials periodically, and handwashing
at the registration (CODEO 2020).
During the registration exercise, the number of cases of covid-19 infections continued
to rise within the voters’ registration period, infecting high-profile individuals and govern-
ment officials and prompting the Chief Justice and the President to take precautionary
self-isolations. However, the registration exercise and the campaign for the 2020
general elections continued uninterrupted. Prior to the pandemic, the idea of partici-
pation in elections evoked wider academic debate. While some favoured elevated level
of participation, arguing that citizens’ involvement in elections could lead to greater rep-
resentation (Vowles 1995), others favoured low participation, noting that too much par-
ticipation would overwhelm and cripple the democratic system (Vowles 1995). The
COVID-19 pandemic increased the vulnerability of political participation across the
world. The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) argued that the pandemic
created an opportunity for governments to either cancel or circumvent the integrity of
elections, noting that about 40 countries had postponed their election dates in 2020
alone (IFES 2020). In cases where elections were allowed, there was the tendency of
incumbent governments riding on the back of emergency powers passed because of
the pandemic to target opposition parties, the media and civic groups that are thought
to be overly critical of government business (Akuamoah 2020). The effect of these
measures could lead to a collapse in democratic practice and the erosion of democratic
principles. The implication of this on good governance is grave. First, the passage of emer-
gency powers because of the pandemic could lead to power centralisation and abuse.
Second, through fake news and repressive cyber security regulations, governments
may censor the internet and tighten their grip on the flow of information. Finally, the pan-
demic may create an opportunity for corruption and the strengthening of social cleavages
through the management of the pandemic and other related emergency funds and relief
packages (IFES 2020).
While Scientists were still trying to understand the pandemic and governments were
struggling with policy responses that could help halt the spread, there was a consti-
tutional duty to allow the people of Ghana to vote to elect their President and 275
Members of Parliament. Ghana conducts its elections once every four years. It is noted
as one of the most successful electoral democracies since the return to multi-party
democracy in 1992 after almost 10 years of military rule (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh
6 S. M. ALIDU
2018; Alidu and Bukari 2020; Abdulai and Sackyefio 2020). The 2020 election was the
country’s eighth election in the Fourth Republic. The COVID-19 pandemic therefore
became a major campaign issue prompting varied responses and support packages
from both the government and the main opposition party. There is quite a sizeable litera-
ture on the impact of the pandemic on the socio-economic lives of urban people (Asante
and Mills 2020), on poverty and living standards (Bukari et al. 2021), on businesses in the
transport sector (Bonful et al. 2020; Dzisi and Dei 2020), the preparedness of the African
state in dealing with the pandemic (Amoah 2020), on political support for government
(Bol and Giani 2020), on the impact on parliamentary oversight (Bar-Siman-Tov 2020)
and on the rights of citizens (Gostin, Hodge, and Wiley 2020; Grogan 2020). However,
little has been done to examine the direct impact of the pandemic on voter behaviour
in Ghana. This paper seeks to fill that gap by evaluating the impact of the pandemic
on voter behaviour in the 2020 general elections using survey data compiled in the
Greater Accra between July and August 2020. The Greater Accra region is a significant
case because it is not only the capital of the country but the second most populous
after the Ashanti region and a microcosm of the country’s diversity. Politically and electo-
rally, it is a swing region and political parties that have won Greater Accra Region ended
up being the eventual winners of the national elections. In terms of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the region recorded the highest number of cases and deaths and was one of
the two regions that witnessed a lockdown and the strict enforcement of the COVID-19
protocols.1
Methodology
The target population for the survey was all residents of Greater Accra Region who were
18 years or above on the day of the interviews. A multistage probability sampling tech-
nique was employed to select 5722 respondents in the 34 constituencies in the Region.
The sample size, using an estimated voter population of 4,239,1872 for Greater Accra
Region, together with a confidence interval (error margin) of two and a confidence
level of 99%, is 4156. However, because of observed increases in the voter population
in the registration exercises that preceded the main election, especially in Amasaman,
Adenta, Ningo-Prampram and Bortianor-Ingleshie-Amanfrom, a margin error of one
and a confidence level of 99% were used to enhance the precision of the results.
A proportionate sampling technique was then used to distribute the 4156 sample size
among the 34 constituencies in the region. Cluster sampling technique was further
employed to select respondents in each constituency. Each constituency was clustered
into three groups of five electoral areas as follows: two most developed electoral areas,
one medium-level electoral area, and two most deprived electoral areas. The total
number of respondents in each constituency was proportionally distributed among the
selected five communities. Upon entry into a constituency, the core demographic charac-
teristics such as ethnicity, religious affiliation, occupation, age, and educational attain-
ment guided the random selection of respondents to reflect the character of the
constituency. The data was collected by selected graduate students from the Department
of Political Science at the University of Ghana between the period of July and August
2020. They were made up of nine teams consisting of five researchers and monitored
by three faculty members (including the author) throughout the data collection period.
POLITIKON 7
A Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) technique was employed in the data
collection. The CAPI is an interviewing technique in which the interviewer uses a compu-
ter to electronically record responses to questions provided by the respondents. Immedi-
ately after the field work, the data collected were cleaned, after which charts, tables and
cross-tabulations were used to analyse the data.
Effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on businesses and the economy
The Ghana Statistical Services (GSS) study on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic indi-
cated that both businesses and households were affected in several ways, including
demand, supply, and financial shocks, as well as continued uncertainty. The study
notes that between May to June 2020, almost 36% of businesses had to close during
the partial lockdown imposed in the country and 16% remained closed after the easing
of the lockdown. Of this figure, businesses in the accommodation and food sector were
gravely affected with 24% in the sector closed permanently. Also, 46% of businesses
had to reduce the wages of their employees for almost 26% of the workforce; an esti-
mated 770,124 workers (GSS 2020). Only 4%, corresponding to 1.4% of the workforce
(an estimated 41,952 workers) were laid off, the study indicated. The good aspect of
the study is that businesses were compelled to adapt to innovative and digital means
of reaching out to their customers because of the pandemic. More than 38%, almost a
third of the firms surveyed, began, or increased their use of digital tools, including
mobile money payments, for their sales and about 9%, a tenth of the businesses surveyed,
began, or increased their use of digital sales via the internet. Businesses in the country
expressed uncertainty in future sales and employment, with about 24% worried of
sales in the future and 15% concerned about employment in the future (GSS 2020).
The impact on the economy was expressly clear as it led to the revision ‘in GDP growth
for 2020, from 6.8% to 0.9%, and later to 1.9% to reflect significant slowdown in economic
activities as a consequence of the effects of COVID-19 on lives and livelihoods’ (State of
the Nation Address 2021). It also affected government revenues with a sudden shortfall
of GH¢13.6billion and an unexpected rise in expenditures of GH¢11.7billion (Budget
Statement 2021). The government undertook several policy interventions [about 26 of
them], which will be discussed later in this paper, to revitalise and transform the
economy. Through support from development partners such as the World Bank, Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the European Union and the African Development Bank, govern-
ment also rolled out the Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan (EPRP I and II) and
the Coronavirus Alleviation Programme (CAP).
The results of these interventions, without mentioning the political controversies that
surrounded their implementation, seem to be effective. The second round of the GSS
survey conducted in August and September 2020 indicates that 8% of businesses
reported closed, a figure much lower than the 36% during the partial lockdown in
March/April and the 16% reported in May/June the same year (GSS 2020). Again, in the
second round of the survey, 28% of businesses reported reducing their wages, an
improvement compared to the 46% figure in May/June. Also, 1% of businesses reported
laying off their staff compared to the 4% recorded in May/June. This result corresponds
with the number of businesses that reported receiving government support during the
time, about 9%, compared to the number of businesses that received support at the
8 S. M. ALIDU
time of the first survey, that is, 3%. Following from the above, the average expectation in
sales and employment of the businesses surveyed improved significantly in the last study
compared to the first. In the 2021 budget, the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, who read
the budget on behalf of the finance minister-designate, notes, that the results of the
measures put in place by government as ‘being vital in preventing social dislocations,
deeper economic scarring and damage to our economic prospect’ (Budget Statement
2021).
Mitigative measures undertaken by government
Governments worldwide were forced to act in the face of these catastrophic losses to the
economy. The responses, in themselves, had triggered further challenges and debates
since they revolved around restrictions on certain fundamental rights of the citizens,
including border closures, isolations, lockdowns and general restriction on movements,
gatherings and associations (Ogendi 2020; Chesterman 2020; Gostin, Friedman, and
Wetter 2020). The level of economic activities in the country was reduced by increased
healthcare expenditure and the unpredictable effects of containment measures under-
taken by the government (Zetzsche 2020). The initial cost of preparedness and response
strategy towards the fight against Covid-19 in Ghana was 570 million Ghana Cedis (Econ-
omic Commission for Africa 2020; Deloitte Ghana 2020); enough to throw the economy
off gear. In the throes of the rise in infection and recorded deaths, the government
was compelled to roll out measures to contain the spread of the virus. The Government
of Ghana, therefore, instituted several measures aimed at achieving five-pronged objec-
tives; limiting and stopping the importation of the virus into the country; containing the
spread of the cases that the country had already recorded; providing adequate care for
the sick and limiting the impact of the virus on social and economic life. In the attempt
to achieve these objectives, the following measures were undertaken by the government
of Ghana under the five stated objectives:
Limiting and stopping the importation of the virus into the country
In line with the first objective, the Government, on the 21st of March 2020, authorised for
the closure of the borders of the country by land, sea and water to human traffic, auth-
orised a mandatory quarantine and testing for all arrivals into the country before the
closure date; increased contact tracing and testing for people who have come into
contact with infected persons; call back retired healthcare professionals to augment
the health system in anticipation of a possible surge of cases, and promise support for
local pharmaceutical companies to produce more hand sanitisers and face mask.3
Containing the spread of the virus
In order to achieve the second objective of limiting and stopping the importation of the
virus into the country, the government, on 15th March 2020, suspended all public gather-
ings (except private burials for only 25 people); closed schools from the Basic to the Uni-
versity levels; prescribed social distancing for businesses and the use of alcohol-based
sanitisers and face mask; authorised the Ministry of Local Government and Rural
POLITIKON 9
Development to ensure that markets across the country remain in highly hygienic con-
ditions.4 The government also passed the Imposition of Restrictions Act, 2020 (Act
1012) on the 21st of March to help reduce the movement of people in order to reduce
the spread of the virus. The government also employed additional 24,285 health pro-
fessionals between March and June to help fight the pandemic and expanded the
capacities of laboratories to increase COVID-19 testing as well as establish isolation
centres in all regions and districts in the country.5
The government further provided 3.6 million reusable face masks, 50,000 medical
scrubs, 90,000 hospital gowns and head covers to health facilities as at June 2020.6 It
also gave 50% of the basic salary as allowances for frontline health workers, waived
Income Tax for all healthcare workers and waived Income Tax on the 50% additional
allowances paid to frontline health workers.7 Public markets, schools and lorry terminals
in almost all 16 regions were cleaned and sprayed and some markets in Accra and Kumasi
were closed down for flouting the social distancing protocols.8
Providing adequate care for the sick
To achieve this objective, the government procured and distributed 17,000 coveralls,
350,000 masks, 17,000 goggles, 2400 non-contact thermometers, 350,000 gloves,
25,000 sanitisers, and 30,000 tests kits to healthcare personnel and those undertaking
contact tracing and testing.9 Also, the government recruited 1000 community health
workers and an additional 1000 volunteers to help in taking care of the sick. The govern-
ment further procured 100 pick-up vehicles and 2500 tablets for the exercise.
In order to ensure adequate care is provided to the sick, government further provided
an insurance package, with a sum of GHS350,000 (USD 65,789)10 for each health person-
nel and allied professionals at the forefront of the fight against the pandemic, with a daily
allowance of GHS 150 (USD 28) being paid to those doing contract tracing.11 Health
workers were also exempted from paying tax on their emoluments for the months of
April, May and June 2020, and all frontline health workers received an additional allow-
ance of 50% for their basic salary per month for the months of March, April and June.12
Finally, the Ministry of Transport made available for free, the ‘Aayalolo’ buses to convey
health workers in Accra, Tema, Kumasi and Kasoa to and from work during the lockdown
period. 13
Limiting the impact of the virus on social and economic life
Government took various measures to achieve this fourth objective, including the estab-
lishment of a COVID-19 Fund, to be managed by an independent board of trustees, and
chaired by former Chief Justice, Sophia Akuffo, to receive contributions and donations
from the public to assist in the welfare of the needy and the vulnerable; the establishment
of a GHS 1,000,000,000 (UDS 187,969,924) Coronavirus Alleviation Programme and a GHS
3,000,000,000 (USD 563,909,774) facility, to support industry especially in the pharma-
ceutical, hospitality, service and manufacturing sectors.14 Government also provided
additional reliefs, including the extension of the tax filing date from April to June for
business and 2% reduction of interest rates by banks. It further granted banks a 6-
month moratorium of principal repayments to entities in the airline and hospitality
10 S. M. ALIDU
industries, i.e. hotels, restaurants, car rentals, food vendors, taxis, and uber operators. The
government further allowed mobile money users to send up to GHS 100 for free; and a
100% to 300% increase in the daily transaction limits for mobile money transactions. 15
In addition, the government provided food for up to 400,000 individuals and homes in
lockdown areas and absorbed water bills for all Ghanaians throughout the year, initially
starting in the months of April, May, and June. Water tankers, both privately and publicly
owned, were mobilised to supply water to vulnerable communities without running
pipes. The government also fully absorbed electricity bills for the poorest of the poor,
that is, for all lifeline consumers who consume 0–50 kilowatt hours a month for this
period. The government further absorbed 50% of the electricity bill for consumers, resi-
dential and commercial, for the months of March, April, and May, using the March
2020 bill as a benchmark.
The government, in collaboration with the National Board for Small Scale Industries
(NBSSI), the Business and Trade Associations and the selected Commercial and Rural
Banks, rolled out a soft loan scheme of up to a total of GHS 600,000,000 (UDS
112,781,955) with a one-year moratorium and a two-year repayment period for micro,
small and medium businesses.16
Support provided by the opposition national democratic congress
The NDC and its flagbearer, John Mahama, did not just leave the fight of the COVID-19
pandemic to government alone, given the fact that it was an election year and a cam-
paign issue. The party started by unveiling a 13 member COVID-19 team17 made up of
professionals to guide the party’s effort and response to the pandemic.18 The former Pre-
sident and flagbearer of the NDC also submitted a 13-point proposal to the NPP govern-
ment to help it fight the pandemic.19 These included developing a National Infectious
Disease Response Plan; building an Infectious Disease Centres for the three ecological
areas in the country, establishing an additional medical research centre in Northern
Ghana to supplement the Noguchi Medical Research Institute, an expansion of the
capacity of the 37 Military Hospital; reduction in telecommunication tariffs, extending
the deadline for tax returns submission for businesses, support and expand Covid-19
testing centres across the country, expanding the Livelihood Empowerment Against
Poverty (LEAP) programme to cover more poor households under lockdown. The rest
of the initiatives included the distribution of food supplements to the poor and vulnerable
in the country, reduction in direct taxes for essential Covid-19 related goods such as sani-
tisers, disinfectants, among others. Finally, the opposition NDC urged the government to
provide insurance cover for frontline health workers and the need to partner with supra-
state institutions such as ECOWAS and the AU to manage the movement of people across
the sub-region.20
The opposition NDC and its flagbearer also embarked on PPE donations across the
country, at the time, many health workers were complaining of inadequate or shortage
of these essentials. He donated 40 sets of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to the
health workers at the Greater Accra Regional Hospital, including 10 gum boots, 120
doctor scrubs, 50 patient gowns, 30 theatre gowns and 400 packs of water. 21 Similar
donations were made at the Korle Bu Teaching hospital.22 These donations continued
at the Ho hospital, the South Tongu district hospital, Ketu South Municipal hospital23 in
POLITIKON 11
Sogakope and the Aflao hospital24, all in the Volta region. The Sogakope and Aflao hos-
pitals got 4000 nose masks, 4000 hand gloves, 60 boots, 60 pieces of goggles, 60 overalls,
60 sanitisers and 60 scrubs.25 The Tamale Teaching Hospital in the Northern region also
benefitted from the generosity of the NDC and its flagbearer26; the Upper East Regional
Hospital got its share as well.27 The Eastern Regional Hospital at Koforidua and the Hawa
Memorial Hospital at Akyem Osiem all got their share28; the Effia-Nkwanta Hospital in the
Western region29 and the Cape Coast Hospital in the Central region30 all benefited.
Further donations were made by the party and its flagbearer to the Bono Regional
health centre in Sunyani31 and across the length and breadth of the country.
The fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in Ghana was therefore not just about saving
lives but it also became serious political and campaign issue between the governing NPP
and the opposition NDC. The implementation of government intervention programmes,
including the hot meals during the lockdown period, the disbursement of the COVID-19
Relief Fund, the NIBSS support for businesses in the country were all praised and criticised
for political reasons. These interventions in an election season in Ghana raise several ques-
tions. Did these actions sway voters at all? What did Ghanaians think about all these and
how did that affect the manner they voted? The next section provides the answers.
The effects of COVID-19 pandemic on voter behaviour
The Covid-19 pandemic affected the organisation of election campaigns in the 2020 elec-
tions. Political rallies are mostly organised in large gatherings amidst funfair, where party
leaders interactively present their messages and make justifications for why they should
be elected. However, social distancing rules and other protocols related to the prevention
of the spread of the virus influenced the choice of campaign strategy. The discussion in
this section pertains to the opinions of respondents on the impact of Covid-19 on their
lives, livelihoods and voting choice. The study first sought to find out whether the respon-
dents had experienced any adverse consequences because of the pandemic. As shown in
Figure 1, about nine out of every 10 individuals interviewed were negatively affected by
the pandemic. The variation between male and female is not too obvious.
Respondents were asked to indicate the key component of their lives that were hardest
hit by the pandemic and about eight out of every 10 of them mentioned livelihood (see
Figure 2). This is not too surprising because businesses in the Greater Accra were affected
by the pandemic especially when government announced a two-week lockdown of the
city from between March and April.
Mindful of the adverse consequences of the pandemic on both lives and livelihood, the
Government began the implementation of social intervention policies as discussed earlier
in this paper with the aim at mitigating the impact of the pandemic on citizens. Respon-
dents were asked about their opinion on the interventions started by the government and
as much as 83.5% of the respondents praised the Government for that initiative. This
response is illustrated in Figure 3.
Respondents were asked to specifically indicate whether the interventions put in place
by the government to ameliorate the effect of the virus will affect their decision to vote for
the Government and only 3 out of every 10 of them think the intervention will have a posi-
tive effect on their decision to vote for the Government. There is, however, not much vari-
ation between the males and females (Figure 4).
12 S. M. ALIDU
Figure 1. Have you been adversely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic? Source: Field work – July/
August, 2020.
Figure 2. In what ways have you been affected by the Covid-19 pandemic? Source: Field work – July/
August, 2020.
Overwhelming majority of the respondents (82%) indicated that they are satisfied with
how the Government has so far handled Covid-19 pandemic (Figure 5).
Similarly, respondents were asked to assess the interventions made by the opposition
NDC led by its flagbearer, John Mahama, in relation to the pandemic. This is illustrated by
Figure 6, with 6 out of every 10 respondents indicating their satisfaction with the opposi-
tion NDC’s initiatives.
POLITIKON 13
Figure 3. What is your opinion on the decision of the Government to absorb cost of utility (electricity
and water) for both households and businesses? Source: Field work – July/August, 2020.
Figure 4.Would you vote for the Government particularly because of the social interventions? Source:
Field work – July/August, 2020.
Discussion and implication of findings
The electorate in the Greater Accra region was incredibly grateful for the provision of
COVID-19 relief items and the generous donations of hot meals, free water, and subsi-
dised electricity from the government – 83.5% of the respondents praised the Govern-
ment for that initiative. Also, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (82%)
indicated that they are satisfied with how the Government has so far managed the
Covid-19 pandemic in the run-up to the elections. Yet, these same respondents were hesi-
tant in voting for the government despite their gratitude and satisfaction with the policy
interventions introduced; only three out of every 10 of the respondents think the inter-
vention will have a positive effect on their decision to vote for the Government. And
there was not much variation between the males and females’ responses.
This study was done between July and August, four clear months to the 2020 general
elections. The election results in the Greater Accra region reflected the sentiments
14 S. M. ALIDU
Figure 5. What is your overall impression about how Government has handled the crises? Source:
Field work – July/August, 2020.
Figure 6. What is your impression about NDC and John Mahama on the Covid-19 response initiative.
Source: Field work – July/August, 2020.
expressed in the study. For the first time in the electoral history of the country under the
Fourth Republic, a political party won the presidency without winning the Greater Accra
region. At the presidential level, the President and his party got 1,253,179 votes represent-
ing 48.10%, while the NDC and its candidate got 1,326,489 votes, representing 51.04% of
the valid votes cast. Compared to the 2016 general elections where the NPP’s Nana Addo
got 1,062,157 votes representing 52.4% and the NDC’s John Mahama got 946,048 votes
representing 46.7%. The NDC and its candidate improved strongly in their performance in
the region in the 2020 general elections relative to 2016 one.
The Greater Accra Region has 2 metropolitan areas, 4 districts and 23 municipal assem-
blies, a total of 29 local Assembly units. Of these 29 units, 27 of them were part of the dis-
tricts that the President imposed a lockdown at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic.32
The governing NPP held 21 out of the 34 seats in the region and the opposition NDC had
POLITIKON 15
13 seats. After the 2020 elections the NPP lost 8 out of these 21 seats33 and captured a
seat (Amasaman) and retained 13 seats.34 Of the eight constituencies that the NPP lost,
seven of them were under the lockdown imposed by government at the peak of the
first wave of the pandemic, except Krowor. All 13 seats that the NPP retained were
under the lockdown and the only seat that the party captured was also under the lock-
down imposed by government. It, therefore, confirms that it may not necessarily be
the lockdown specifically, or the COVID-19 pandemic, which might have caused the
defeat of the party in these constituencies or at the presidential election. This conclusion
is supported by the data presented earlier. An overwhelming majority of respondents
approved of the government’s response and the contribution of the opposition party
to the pandemic. Yet, they maintained that it will not affect their voter behaviour and
pattern. If the pandemic did not affect the manner electorate in the Greater Region
voted, what then did and what does that say about the kind of voters they are? In the
same study conducted last year, respondents were asked to state the reasons why they
will vote for a party or its candidate. Their reasons are captured in Figure 7.
Four issues stood up as important to the electorate in the Greater Accra region, cam-
paign message (31.9%), party affiliation (27.3%), competence and experience (19.3%) and
trustworthiness (11.3%). These four issues are grouped into two widely known voter
behaviour theories in political science, the party identification theory, and the rational
choice theory. In the party identification theory, the electorate considers their long-
term association to a specific party and cast their votes (Heywood 2017; Alidu and
Aggrey-Darkoh 2018; Alidu 2016). Voting behaviour is less informed by the qualification,
capacity, competence, or experience of the candidates contesting; voting is construed as
a ‘partisan’ affair. This partisan sense of attachment shapes the electorate attitude towards
their party leadership, policies, and the interpretation of everything related to elections
(Heywood 2017). The rational choice model, on the other hand, assumes that electorates
elect a specific candidate or political party in anticipation of the benefit that will accrue
from their decision (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh 2018). When using this voter behaviour,
Figure 7. Reasons for choosing a presidential candidate in an election. Source: Field work – July/
August, 2020.
16 S. M. ALIDU
electorate considers all other variables (qualification, competence, trustworthiness,
experience, ethnicity, religion, gender, geography, etc.) as only relevant when it can be
used to achieve a specific benefit (i.e. dispense patronage to them).
As Figures 3 and 4 have shown, the rally effect kicked in at the point of intervention
when the government announced several relief and stimulus packages as well as the
implementation of restrictive measures aimed at addressing the pandemic. In terms of
voting, the rally effect could not influence the decision of voters to accept voting for
the governing party. This disposition is reflected in Figure 4 where only 3 out of every
10 Ghanaians agreed to vote for or consider voting for the governing party. This is in
sharp contrast to the proportion of electorates who endorsed the government’s Covid-
19 interventions, particularly the economic interventions such as the absorption of the
cost of utilities and stimulus packages for both households and businesses. Consistent
with Mueller’s postulations and a host of other empirical finding, the government of
Ghana can be said to have enjoyed approval rating for its Covid-19 intervention.
However, the rally did not translate into an increase in votes for the president and his
party in proportional or percentage terms during the presidential elections (Steven
2020). As shown by the data, the governing party saw decline in votes in the 2020 elec-
tions despite the Covid-19 interventions that prompted a rally indicating about 90%
approval rate. For example, in the Greater Accra Region the governing party polled
48.1% votes, with a 4.3%-points slump from the 2016 figure of 52.4%. Conversely, as
shown by the same data, the main opposition candidate garnered 51.04% of the votes,
showing approximately 4% points jump from the 2016 share of 46.7%.
Several other factors could account for the failure of the rally effect in the case of
Ghana. Firstly, time factor or duration. In explicating the core features of the rally
effect, Mueller argues that the rally effect is ‘specific, dramatic, and sharply focused’
(Mueller 1970). This means the rally, in terms of the support for the presidential initiative,
would not automatically influence the choice of the voter. The rally, in that case, was
specific to the interventions. Additionally, and as also supported by Kuijpers (2019),
rallies are usually dramatic and sharply focus lasting on for a brief time and having extre-
mely limited effect.
Again, apart from the rise in patriotism, rallies, as opined by the Opinion Leadership
school of thought, are sustained by the lack of criticism of the government by opposition
parties and other political and social commentator (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). This
was not the case in Ghana. The government came and indeed remained under constant
criticism from various angles and especially from the opposition party right from the out-
break of the pandemic to the period of the elections. Thus, a key variable – lack of criticism
of the rally - was missing in the case of Ghana, contributing to its short duration. Relatedly,
Baum (2002) found that the principal sources of the rallies are members of the opposition
and independents, who shift their support during crisis. To draw from Baum’s conclusion,
it means the governing party missed the principal sources since the government was
always under criticism from these sources.
As emphasised by the Opinion Leadership school of thought, information, and the
source of same, are quintessential for the sustenance of the rally effect (Hetherington
and Nelson 2003). The government tried to control information on the pandemic by insti-
tuting a national broadcast within regular intervals to update Ghanaians on the pandemic
and to show measures taken by the government so far to address it. There were close to
POLITIKON 17
30 such broadcasts at the height of the pandemic. However, the prevalence of social
media and the availability of multiple channels of information made it impossible for
the government of Ghana to have exclusive control over the sources of information on
the crisis. For this reason, the government did not enjoy the increasing attention from
the public. It also made it possible for people to quickly verify the president’s messages,
diminishing any potential windfall the regular updates as instituted by the president
might have. Though a surge in patriotism led to support from various groups, including
the main opposition, this support did not last long enough to warrant a positive change in
voter behaviour.
Conclusion
This study presents a new test case on the efficacy of both the dominant party identifi-
cation model and the rational choice model of voter behaviour in Ghanaian elections.
The paper shows that governments mostly win sympathy from electorate in an election
season during a period of crisis and that could translate into electoral votes. The outcome
of the 2020 election in Ghana in the Greater Accra region showed, to the contrary, that the
long-held tradition of crisis-induced sympathy votes do not work in all cases. Though a
total of 89% of respondents indicated that they were adversely affected by the Covid-
19 pandemic and scored the government very high - 82% - in its response to the pan-
demic, the party of the government lost in the Greater Region that was worst hit by
the pandemic. The findings of this study also challenged the traditional rational choice
– particularly the egotropic rationality, which assumes that voters are self-centred and
demand instantaneous personal benefits in order to cast their ballot - voter behaviour
in elections in Ghana. The study found that the government implemented several pan-
demic-induced social intervention measures, including absorbing the cost of utilities
(water and electricity) for both businesses and households, to mitigate the impact of
the pandemic. People in the Greater Accra region were provided with daily hot meals
and other benefits, yet the governing party lost the elections to the opposition party.
This paper shows that four important issues stood up as important to the electorate in
the Greater Accra: campaign message (31.9%), party affiliation ore party royalty (27.3%),
competence and experience (19.3%) and trustworthiness (11.3%). These issues fit well
into two well-known voter behaviour theories in political science – the party identification
model and the rational choice model. Though this Ghanaian case disapproves of the ego-
tropic rational voter behaviour, it also supports the sociotropic rational voter behaviour,
which suggests that voters look beyond the instantaneous personal benefits that they
may get and focus on the competence, experience and trustworthiness of candidates
that seek to lead them. It also suggests a shift from party royalty to campaign messages
and party programmes for the citizenry and this has the potential to further deepen
democracy, especially electoral democracy in Ghana.
Notes
1. See ‘Coronavirus: Greater Accra lead Covid-19 infections for Ghana’ https://www.bbc.com/
pidgin/world-52510586
18 S. M. ALIDU
2. Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana. This was the voter population used for the 2019 Dis-
trict Assembly Elections.
3. President’s address to the nation on Covid-19; Update number 1 (15/03/2020) accessed at
https://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/speeches?start=30 on 23/03/2021.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. This is based on the 2020 exchange rate of 5.32 Ghana Cedis to the Dollar.
11. Ibid, President’s Updates on Coronavirus.
12. Ibid, President’s Update on Covid.
13. Ibid, President’s Update on the Coronavirus Pandemic.
14. Ibid, President’s Update on the Coronavirus Pandemic.
15. Ibid, President’s Update on the Coronavirus Pandemic.
16. Ibid, President’s Update on the Coronavirus Pandemic
17. The team members included Mr Alex Segbefia, Professor Margaret Kweku, Dr Grace Ayensu-
Danquah, Dr Vida Yarkong, Dr Jehu Appiah, Mr Prosper Bani, Mr Cassiel Ato Forson, Mr
Kwabena Mintah Akando, Dr Ezanetor Rawlings, Mrs Mawuena Trebarh, Dr Jonas Asamoah,
Dr Prosper Akanbong and Nana Kofi Quakyi.
18. https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/ndc-outdoors-covid-19-response-team.html.
19. https://www.pulse.com.gh/bi/politics/here-are-13-recommendations-by-ex-president-john-
mahama-on-ways-to-boost-covid-19/34j59vl.
20. https://www.pulse.com.gh/bi/politics/here-are-13-recommendations-by-ex-president-john-
mahama-on-ways-to-boost-covid-19/34j59vl.
21. https://www.johnmahama.org/news/john-mahama-donates-ppe-to-ridge-hospital-health-
workers.
22. https://kbth.gov.gh/ndc-donates-ppes-to-korle-bu/.
23. https://www.modernghana.com/news/996870/covid-19-mahama-donate-ppes-to-keta-
hospital.html.
24. https://www.ghanaiantimes.com.gh/ex-president-mahama-donates-ppe-to-sogakofe-ketu-
hospitals/.
25. https://www.myjoyonline.com/mahama-donates-ppe-to-sogakope-aflao-hospitals/.
26. https://citinewsroom.com/2020/04/mahama-donates-ppe-to-tamale-teaching-hospital/.
27. https://www.modernghana.com/news/995460/covid-19-mahama-donates-ppes-to-upper-
east-region.html.
28. https://mybrytfmonline.com/john-mahama-donates-ppes-to-two-hospitals-in-e-r-over-
coronavirus/.
29. https://www.kyfilla.com/04/ex-president-john-mahama-donates-ppes-to-effia-nkwanta-
hospital/.
30. https://kasapafmonline.com/2020/04/covid-19-mahama-donates-ppes-to-cape-coast-
teaching-hospital/.
31. https://liveghanatv.com/2020/04/10/mahama-donates-ppe-other-objects-to-bono-regional-
healthcare-facility/.
32. i.e. Accra Metropolis, Tema Metropolis, Tema West Municipality, Ledzokuku Municipality,
Krowor Municipality, Adentan Municipality, Ashiaman Municipality, La-Nkwantanang-
Madina Municipality, La-Dade-Kotopon Municipality, Okaikwei North Municipality, Ablekuma
North Municipality, Ablekuma West Municipality, Ablekuma Central Municipality, Ayawaso
East Municipality, Ayawaso North Municipality, Ayawaso West Municipality, Ayawaso
Central Municipality, Ga West Municipality, Ga North Municipality, Ga Central Municipality,
Ga South Municipality, Ga East Municipality, Korle-Klottey Municipality, Weija/Gbawe Munici-
pality and Kpone Katamanso Municipality.
POLITIKON 19
33. The parliamentary seats lost were Okaikwei North, Ablekuma Central, Ledzekuku, La Dade
Kotopon, Krowor, Tema East, Adentan, La Nkwantanang-Madina.
34. The parliamentary seats retained were Bortianor Ngleshi Amanfrom, Weija Gbawe, Anyaa
Sowotuom, Trobu, Dome-Kwabenya, Ayawaso Central, Ayawaso West Wuogon, Okaikwei
Central, Ablekuma West, Tema West, Tema Central, Ablekuma North and Okaikwei South.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
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