

**AN INTERROGATION OF THE ECONOMIC
MOTIVATIONS OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA: THE
CASE OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA**

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DECLARATION

I, **SETH AHENKAN MANFUL** , do hereby declare that this dissertation is the end product of my own research under the supervision of DR. DANIEL DRAMANI KIPO-SUNHEZI and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no materials which have been accepted for the award of any other degree by this or any other university except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.



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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the Almighty God for his blessings and grace and to Mr. William Akwasi

Appiah for the life time opportunity given me. Thank you, “The Grand Master 1”.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACSC	African Center for Security and Counter-Terrorism
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GAFCSC	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
GSPC	Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ITI	International Terrorism Index
IMN	Islamic Movement of Nigeria
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISWAP	Islamic State of West Africa Province
JTI	Jama'atulTajdidi Islam
KA IPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center
MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NAF	Nigerian Armed Forces
PCNI	President's Committee for the Northeast Initiative
UIC	United Islamic Courts
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WACCE	West African Center for Counter-Extremism
WANEP	West African Network for Peace-building

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ABSTRACT

For a decade now, the Boko Haram terrorist organization has continuously caused insecurity within the northeastern part of Nigeria where it emerged and other areas around the Lake Chad Basin. The motivations for the group's uprising and persistence continuous to be a source of academic debate. Religion, politics and economics have become the main factors which many have used to explain the complex phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism. This research specifically interrogates the economic motivations of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria to find out how economic factors and conditions in the country's northeast impact on the sect. The research based on the Rational Choice Theory to assess the motives of the group based on its actions and decisions. Data for the research were obtained from primary sources, mainly interviews, as well as secondary sources including books, reports, journal articles and the internet. The research finds that, while there are contending explanations for the motivations of Boko Haram, grievances of the dire economic conditions and underdevelopment of Nigeria's northeast relative to the south, gave impetus for the emergence and persistence of the sect. Particularly, poverty was found to be the single biggest contributor to the local support for the group. Religion was however found to be only a vehicle through which leadership of the sect stoked the sentiments of the aggrieved Muslim majority. Elements of economic crimes introduced to the sect was also observed to have turned the group into a criminal organization benefiting from "war economy". The research concludes that it will take both hard and soft approaches to deal with the threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria, but in the long-term, terrorism must be prevented from the community rather than being fought on the battlefield.

Keywords: Nigeria, Boko Haram, Terrorism, Economic Motivations.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the Problem

At the dawn of the new world order in 1990, few theorists thought that the fear of terrorists' attacks would dominate the security agenda of most nations for the unforeseeable future (Gastrow & Hübschle, 2006). Terrorism has become a global concern and its impact on world security is very immense, such that blocs and regions are increasingly collaborating to find appropriate counter measures. In Africa, terrorism has been growing due to the continent being home to both a facilitating and target rich environment for terrorists that are seeking global influence (Schuurman, 2018). Among the nations of the world, the Sub-Saharan region of Africa is more popular for terror, with 16 countries having high terror risk ratings. These countries are chiefly clustered in an adjoining block stretching from West to East Africa, such as Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, Mali, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Chad, among others. (Aon, 2015).

The two (2) deadliest terror groups in Africa, according to the 2018 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), which are Boko Haram and Al-Shabab, both operate along the sub-Saharan belt, rendering the sub-Saharan region a high-risk prone area in Africa. Since about the year 2009, Boko Haram, a territorial terrorist organization, has wreaked havoc on communities in northeast Nigeria and beyond. Significant debate has ensued about the reasons for the Boko Haram insurgency and their objectives. Questions about what motivates terrorists have been asked for a long time and the answers have varied enormously. This is largely so because terrorism has appeared in many different guises and has varied greatly in character from age to age and from country to country. Any explanation that attempts to account for all of its many different manifestation is therefore

bound to be either exceedingly vague or altogether wrong. Njoku, Okeniyi, Ayara, and Akoth (2018), therefore agree that terrorists are diverse in terms of their activities, motivation, networks, financing, security implications and results.

Martin (2017) asserts that terrorism takes several forms depending on who engages in the act and on which premise. Martin accounts for five (5) main forms of terrorism including; State-Sponsored terrorism, which consists of terrorist acts on a state or government by another state or government; Dissent terrorism, which is an act by terrorist groups which have rebelled against their government; Political or ideological terrorism which is rooted in political ideology; Religious terrorism, which are terrorist groups which are extremely motivated by religious doctrines. The last form of terrorism according to Gus Martin, and which this study mainly reflects on, is Criminal Terrorism, which are terrorist acts used to aid in criminal profit (Martin, 2017). From a correlative angle, Mair (2003) also explains the motivations for terrorism, as he indicates that terrorism is founded on the interaction of a lack of economic perspectives, social deprivation, a loss of cultural identity, political repression and a dysfunctional state (Mair, 2003).

Several research works have been conducted on most terrorist groups in Africa, particularly on Boko Haram, Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to reflect the reasons or motivations given by both Martin and Mair, for carrying out terrorist acts. However, the religious, political and ideological reasons seem to have dominated research works in terrorism, with relatively less emphasis on the economic dimension which is believed by many as a very important driving force for terrorists. Economist and Journalist, Loretta Napoleoni, for instance maintains that, terrorism is extremely expensive and there are unexpected ways that it drives the world economy (Napoleoni-TEDGlobal, 2009). Napoleoni asserts that there is a surge in the shadow

economy which she calls “the rogue economics of terror and criminal networks”

It is therefore important to conduct a thorough research in the realm of terrorist typologies, particularly on the forms which aid in economic benefits to those who plan and execute such acts. Knowledge in such dimension of terrorism forges understandings of how terrorists behave and plan destruction towards their ultimate economic advancements, in order to help governments, develop effective counter-terror measures.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The field of terrorism studies has explored many different aspects of terrorist organizations. Various studies have employed strategic, organizational, and psychological frameworks to understand the motivations behind the formation and decision making of terrorist groups. Terrorism, no matter how alarming, does not just happen, the perpetrators usually and always do have reasons or motives, regardless of how harmful or meaningless the motives may appear to persons outside the group. Given that Boko Haram make public advocacy for the strict implementation of Islamic Sharia law, the sect has mostly been viewed through the prism of religion. Many research works have hence explored religion as the main factor to explain the basis of terror activities of Boko Haram. However, this has arguably less emphasized its socio-economic facade. Indeed, there is a growing believe that the group’s activities essentially stem from some economic factors and motivations. It would therefore be misunderstanding to reduce the impetus of Boko Haram to religion, considering its massive support base in the teeming uneducated, jobless and poor northern youths. These underlying forces to the group suggest a reasonable economic root to its uprising.

It is against this background that this research sought to investigate more into the economic

motivations for Boko Haram terrorism. The study specifically explored the economic dimension of the terrorist sect on a two-level analysis; the economic motivations of recruits and fighters; and the organizational economic activities which advance the course of terrorism on its targets.

1.2 Research Questions

The research study sought to provide answers to the following questions:

- What is the level of economic disparity between North and South Nigeria and what accounts for such inequality?
- How has the economic conditions in north eastern Nigeria been a catalyst for the Boko Haram insurgency?
- What economic factors motivate individual recruits into the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria?
- What economic activities does Boko Haram engage in and how does it benefit the group?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study are to;

- Find out the depth of the South-North economic disparity in Nigeria and the attributed reasons.
- Understand how the economic situation in north eastern Nigeria has contributed to the insurgency of Boko Haram.
- Explore the economic factors that motivate individual recruits into Boko Haram.
- Find out economic activities that Boko Haram engages in and how it advances the group's course.

1.4 Scope of the Study

Various accounts have been given by some scholars and security experts in efforts to explain why Boko Haram engages in terror activities, but this research mainly focused on the economic dimension of the organization's activities, to understand its economic motivations and activities and how they inform their actions. Most works on Boko Haram usually begin analysis on the group from the year 2009, particularly because it is regarded as the time when the group became violent and gained global attention. However, in order to understand the group and how it has evolved over the years, this research goes far into history to establish traces of the group in earlier movements, in order to create a linkage to the year 2002 when the group was formed as a non-violent sect by its founder Mohammed Yusuf. The research limited itself to Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, although there are Boko Haram factions in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The reason for this choice is for an in-depth analysis of Boko Haram based in Nigeria.

1.5 Rationale of Study

This research provides a broader insight into the often less highlighted economic motivations and activities which subtly drive the Boko Haram terrorist group. The research would hopefully also provide a guide in the formulation of counter-terror measures, especially regarding breaking the business models of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

1.6 Hypothesis

This study posits that the rising and persistence of Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria is predominantly caused by economic factors.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Although terrorism has been linked to the theory of deprivation, the extent to which terrorism is an economic good can be explained using a rational choice model of economic agents. The study is therefore situated within the framework of the Rational Choice Theory. The theory provides the avenue to introduce terrorists' behaviour into economic models, bearing in mind the terrorists possible motivations.

1.7.1 Rational Choice Theory

The Rational Choice Theory is an economic model pioneered by Sociologist George Homans, through his basic framework for exchange theory. The theory was later expanded in its framework by Blau, Coleman and Cook, to a more formal model of rational choice. The theory explains behaviours as rational individual decisions. It regards rationality as very necessary, to be able to assert that changes in certain variables of the model will make possible changes in individuals' behaviour or vice versa. Thus, terrorists' motivations are translated into economic language by saying that they aim to maximize their benefits, subject to some restrictions. In this context, individuals or groups can be stated to be rational, but in themselves, the results of their actions do not appear to stem from a rational mind. An economic view on terrorism assumes that terrorists are rational actors and the average terrorist behaves more or less as a *homo economicus*¹, considering their response to incentives, their narrow self-interest and the rationality of their expectations (Caplan 2006). As rational actors, they commit terrorist actions in order to maximize their utility, given certain benefits, costs and constraints linked to these actions (Sandler and Enders, 2004).

¹ A *homo economicus* or *economic man* is a term which denotes a view of humans in the social sciences, particularly economics, as self-interested agents who seek optimal, utility-maximizing outcomes.

The rational choice theory connects with Gary Becker's Economic Theory of Criminal Behaviour developed in 1968. Becker's economic theory of crime indicates that potential criminals are economically rational and respond significantly to the deterring incentives by the criminal justice system. They compare the gain from committing a crime with the expected cost, including risk of punishment, the possibility of social stigma. Terrorism is a criminal act, and the conscious planning and execution of strategies towards desired goals, bearing in mind potential hazards, make terrorists rational actors. For instance, Brandt and Sandler (2009) found that terrorist kidnappings are sensitive to whether or not the host country of those being kidnapped make concessions. This explains that, such act is premised on a rational determination of some benefits.

The decisions of the many frustrated unemployed northern Nigerian youths and the many kidnapping and hijacking acts by the Boko Haram group for ransom, could be explained by the rational choice theory as satisfying a self-interest, through weighted options of costs and benefits. If terrorism reflects a solution to a problem with identifiable costs and benefits that accord with the behavior assumed in economic theory, then it may be possible to contain terrorism by altering those costs and benefits. In this sense, deterrence, as advocated by Thomas Hobbes, becomes an important factor in the rational decision-making process of a terrorist. McLaughlin (2009), explains 'deterrence' as a philosophy of punishment that aims to prevent criminal activity through the development and application of effective and efficient sanctions. It involves demonstrating to both the citizenry and the reasoning criminal that the pains and losses associated with apprehension and punishment will overshadow the possibility of criminal gain or profit' (McLaughlin, 2009, p.125). Deterrence, according to McLaughlin, requires three key elements: (i) the certainty of apprehension, conviction, and punishment; (ii) the severity of the punishment to be greater than the potential benefits of the criminal act; and (iii) the clarity of punishment to ensure that the

offender is in a position to make a link between his or her punishment and he or his criminal behaviour. The case of Boko Haram in Nigeria presents a test to the validity of McLaughlin's claims on rational decision making of criminals amidst the prevailing deterrent mechanisms-whether the persistency of the sect is a case of weak deterrence or non-correlation.

The application of the rational choice theory to terrorism has been criticized by some scholars who argue that terrorists are sometimes driven by some psychological and social factors which do not appeal to rationality. Crenshaw (2000), for example, maintains that the goals of terrorists are sometimes implausible. Their acts, therefore, will not fulfill their goals-and, thus, cannot be regarded as a rational attempt to pursue these objectives. Also, on the grounds of suicide bombing by terrorists, rationality, as suggested by the rational choice theory is challenged.

A counter argument to the reservations of the scholars who oppose the rational choice theory on the basis of suicide bombing is that, in some situations, the suicide bombers take such decision haven considered what such sacrifice would mean for the life of their family or for the course of the religion which they believe in. On that basis, it could be said that the decision to make a life sacrifice was preempted by thoughts of losing one's life (cost) and the aftermath gains for the family or religion (benefit). These reservations notwithstanding, the theory is a useful tool for this study to situate the economic behaviours and motivations of the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria.

1.8 Literature Review

The field of terrorism has received more attention over the years, particularly after the events of the 9/11 attack. A number of research works have inquired into the history, causes, motivations,

effects and the dynamics of terrorism, making the field one of the most researched areas in modern times. This study looks at some of these research works, particularly relating to the causal and motivating factors of terrorism, to appraise what scholars generally converge on and areas still in contention. The section also looks out for gaps in the general literature which this work could build on.

1.8.1 The Definitional Problem of Terrorism

According to Combs (2013), terrorism is an act with deep historic roots, and one that has evolved over time like the individuals, groups, and systems that commit it. Combs believes that the fundamental characteristics of a terrorist act have not, perhaps, changed, but the associated tactics, targets, weapons, support systems, and even motivations have substantially changed in recent years (Combs, 2013, p. 18). Despite broad consensus that the threat of terrorism needs to be addressed urgently, the positions adopted by individual states, regional and international organizations have resulted in a patchwork of approaches, particularly because of how terrorism has been conceptualized in varying and sometimes opposing forms. The definition problem of terrorism continues to divide the international community primarily due to diverging views on what constitutes terrorism, as opposed to exercising peoples' right to self-determination, as enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter. (Pawlak, 2015).

According to Schmid (2004), the strongest indication that terrorism is a contested concept is expressed in the saying that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." He adds that, while such a statement undoubtedly reflects widespread political praxis, its moral relativism is highly unsatisfactory from an ethical and intellectual point of view, and would open the doors wide for double standards. In efforts to situate the definition problem in its right context, O'Neill (2002a)

argues that while some states considered defining terrorism to be important, given their quest to address the causes, others considered such attitude as recognizing and justifying terrorism. Hence, the definition impasse is arguably rather political than semantic, given its connectedness to “root causes” debate on terrorism. (O’Neill, 2002a, p. 5). Laqueur (2003) concluded that, after going through literatures, it could be safely said that there is no universal agreement on the concept of terrorism. Laqueur indicated that there are well over 100 diplomatic and academic definitions of terrorism, with some focusing solely on non-state actors while others incorporate and emphasize state actors alongside non-state actors. Laqueur observes however that, these definitional differences notwithstanding, the basic conclusion is that terrorism involves not just violence, but the threat of violence as well.

Männik (2009) maintains that the task of defining terrorism is complicated, but absolutely necessary in order to develop a sufficient understanding of the phenomenon and to deal with it effectively. Amidst the inconclusive debate on the definition of terrorism, the UN, in 1999, as cited in Vázquez, PérezSales and Hervás (2008), defined terrorism as any act carried out in a bid to cause death or serious injury to the body of a civilian, or to other persons that hitherto do not take active part in the hostilities. The objective of such terror acts, by their very nature or context, is geared towards intimidating a group of people or to coerce the government or an international organization to do or not to do an act. Later in 2004, the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 clarified that, all acts which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature (UN Resolution 1566, 2004).

There are however some experts who still maintain that the definitional problem of terrorism may not be over yet. Cited in Schmid (2004b), Schlesinger contend that the definition problem which has been referred to as the "Bermuda Triangle of terrorism", is one which may not be resolved. He argues that "no commonly agreed definition can in principle be reached, because the very process of definition is in itself part of a wider contestation over ideologies or political objectives" (Schmid, 2004b, p.375)

Walter Laqueur (2004) of the International Research Council at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is more confident in his prediction that the disputes about a detailed, comprehensive definition of terrorism will continue for a long time but will not result in a consensus, and that they will make no noticeable contribution towards the understanding of terrorism. In a rather simplistic approach, other scholars argue that the debate about the definition of terrorism is not necessary, but the denunciation of the associated violence. For example, Schmid (2004, p.397), quotes R.E Rubinstein as saying that, "a definition of terrorism is hopeless" and that "terrorism is just violence that you don't like". It has been argued therefore that, perhaps, a workable definition of terrorism accepted globally is bound to be explicitly subjective, thus violence one does not support. Bovard (2004) summarizes it simply by indicating that, terrorism is what bad guys do.

1.8.2 Terrorism in Africa

The terrorism situation in Africa is a dire one and Alexander (2012) paints the level of insecurity in the region as he indicates that, in the last ten years, the Sahel and the Maghreb areas have

witnessed an increase in terrorist attacks by more than 500 percent from a low point of 204 experienced in the year 2009.

The event of 9/11 has greatly impacted global discourse on terrorism. Most discussions on terrorism in Africa are often preceded by recognizing the impacts that this landmark event in terrorism has had on the security scene of the continent. But much earlier before this historic event, there were evidence of terrorism in Africa, and most authors have captured it differently.

An account of terrorism in Africa given by Smith (2016) in her book *Securing Africa: Post 9/11 discourses on terrorism*, offers a rather in-depth genealogy of terrorism in Africa. When terrorism is viewed as an ideology of fear and socio-political weapons, Smith (2016), describes the genealogy of terrorism in three phases; Afro-oriental, Afro-occidental and Afro-global. According to Smith, the Afro-oriental phase marks the traceable roots of terrorism in the 12th century where Africans served in slavery under dehumanizing conditions to the Arabs. Similarly, the Afro-occidental phase was marked by the period of slavery within the 20th century. Jalata (2013) indicate that slavery perpetrated violence in different forms by taking away able-bodied men and resources of the indigenous people. According to Jalata, African families were shattered all in the name of extraction of wealth and capital. Also, the act of enslaving Africans involved the use of warfare, banditry, kidnappings, torturing and destroying communities, which according to Jalata, qualify as terrorism (Jalata, 2013). Following the colonization of sections of the continent by the Europeans, the Afro-global phase was initiated within the colonies, and the reported inhumane treatment by the Europeans, spewed terror within states (Smith, 2016).

The problem of terrorism in Africa is very much active and deadly. Many states in Africa continue to record terrorist acts in all forms and magnitude. In the words of the former Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Attalla Bashir, Sub-Saharan Africa

is the most terrorism-prone area, with East and West Africa being the most vulnerable to terrorist activities. According to Bashir, nearly all the countries in East Africa have been hit by one act of terror or another, and could be attributed to the presence of Western tourists who see the region as a ripe tourist destination (Apronti, 2017).

The work of Gow, Olonisakin and Dijkhoorn (2013) *Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Religion, Politics and Radicalism*, attempts to find the link between terrorism in Africa and other parts of the world. The authors concluded that, it is generally accepted that local factors, instead of external influences, were the major factors causing radicalization in West Africa. Their work establishes causal factors such as unemployment, poverty and other economic and social challenges as critical to terrorism in West Africa. The authors indicate that the existence of large young and unemployed population in West African has created a generation who are easy target for extremist recruiters (Gow, Olonisakin and Dijkhoorn, 2013).

However, the claims of Gow, Olonisakin and Dijkhoorn (2013) on the weight of external influence on local terrorism is problematic. For instance, the shift in tactics by Nigeria's Boko Haram, which now includes suicide bombing and coordinated attacks against military targets and civilians could be cited as evidence that Boko Haram is now part of a broader global Islamist terror network involving Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Moreover, Boko Haram now has a faction which has declared its allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), called the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP). This is an indication that there are some connection between terrorism in Africa and other parts of the world.

In Africa, one of the main causes of terrorism is religious ideologies. Often, religious militants are motivated by an absolute belief that the violence they propagate is solely a commandment of their deity and in its will. In his view, Alexander (2012) profess rather that, terrorism in Africa is driven

by two factors. Firstly, he believes the unresolved West Sahara conflict has provided an avenue for AQIM to expand and recruit members from the refugee camps in Algeria. Second is the Arab spring which he indicates was quite dramatic and unprecedented and led to civil war in Libya. This, according to Alexander, provided opportunity for terrorist groups in North, West and Central Africa to take advantage of unstable events to further destabilize the region (Alexander, 2012). While Alexander makes a relevant point towards understanding the events that has impacted on terrorism in Africa, his submission appears to discount the factors which already existed. These events could rather be seen as other factors which gave more impetus to the terrorism problem in Africa, recognizing that there were fundamental issues for terrorism and that the effects of these two events only exacerbated the problem.

In another vein, Cohen (2013) also attributes the rise in terrorist activities in Africa over the years to external influences. Cohen indicates for instance that, the presence and influence of Al-Qaeda in Africa which increased with zero influence in 2005 to a three established franchise in 2013, could be seen as important turning point for terrorism on the continent. The author adds that, repressive regimes in mostly Muslim populations and economic underdevelopment have provided a niche for Al Qaeda to infiltrate (Cohen, 2013).

In terms of actors of terror in Africa, there are several groupings which resort to the use of violence and acts of terrorism to achieve their diverse aims which could be religious, socio-economic or political. In West Africa, acts of terrorism continue to occur through many organizations. The very active groups whose actions have caused a stir on regional peace and security includes; Boko Haram, the world's deadliest terrorist group in 2015 according to the Global Terrorism Index, the Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa, better known as Ansaru in northern Nigeria. In Mali also, three Islamist terrorist groups – Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar al dine, continue to wreak havoc and instability in the sub-region (Jalata, 2013). According to Arieff (2013), the rise in the terrorist activities in Mali along with other countries in the Sahel region was a result of the fall of Ghaddafi and the subsequent collapse of Libya which enabled rebels to loot arms cache to arm terrorist groups across the region.

The eastern part of Africa has often been described as the hotbed of Africa because of the conflict in the region (Demeke and Gebru, 2014). Terrorism in the area is predominantly carried out by Somali-based *al-Ittihad al-Islami al Shabab*. The Al-Shabaab militant group traces its roots to the “*Al Itihad Al Islamia*” (“Islamic Unity”) group in the 1980s which transformed in the 2000s to become the United Islamic Courts (UIC) movement, but got defeated in Mogadishu in 2006 (Ostebo, 2012). According to Ostebo, the defeat of the UIC in 2006 subsequently gave rise to the Al-Shabaab which represents a new generation of Islamic militancy. Demeke and Gebru (2014) describes the group as the deadliest in the region that is able to carry out attacks beyond Somalia up to Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. The Uganda-based Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on the other hand, although causes acts of terror, is a more domestic terror group that is fighting the Uganda government.

The northern part of Africa is also an area which suffers from terrorist activities. North Africa harbours groups such as Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a Salafist group that propagates Islam and engages in Jihad. The group used to be known as the Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) and has linkages with the Al-Qaeda global (Filiu, 2009). Also, there is MUJAO in Algeria which seeks to wage Jihad or Holy war against Western interests in the country.

Although the motivations for terrorism in Africa could be said to be multi-faceted, it could however

be observed in many of the situations that economic factors have either been a major factor or a catalyst which has sustained insurgency. Often, religion and politics serve as the sentimental lines on which terrorist elites have mobilize support for a cause. Elmi and Barise (2006) for instance attribute Al-Shabab terrorism to struggle and competition for resources and power, repressive state and a colonial legacy. The contributing factors to the group's activities, according to the authors, have been the politicized clan identity, Somali culture and the large number of unemployed youths (Elmi and Barise, 2006).

The underlying economic factors of terrorism in Africa is therefore an important aspect for the study of terrorism in the region. As captured by Newman (2007), most terrorist organizations thrives on the weak or failed state capacity and poor service delivery of basic needs of the people.

1.8.3 The “Root Cause” Debate

The scholarly field of terrorism is divergent on what constitute the root cause of terrorism and whether or not there is one root cause of terrorism. In some writings on causes of terrorism, writers tend to focus on factors that aid terrorism instead of falling into the line of controversy to address root causes. However, Newman (2006) in *Exploring the Root Causes of Terrorism*, tried to provide an insight into the root causes of terrorist activities. Newman classifies the causes of terrorism into root causes and precipitant causes.

The root causes, according to Newman, are the conditions that provide a social environment and widespread grievances that, when combined with certain precipitant factors, result in the emergence of terrorist organizations and terrorist act (Newman, 2006). According to Newman, factors such as poverty, demographic factors, social inequalities and exclusion, dispossession and political grievances are some main underlying causes of terrorism (Newman, 2006, p.750). Thus,

if terrorism is considered a dependent variable, then these root causes form the background independent variables. The underlying causes are further grouped into Permissive Structural Factors and Direct Root Causes. Newman noted poverty, demographic factors and urbanization as permissive structural factors. He argues that at the individual level, "poverty can breed resentment and desperation and support for political extremism" (Newman, 2006, p.751). At the state level, Newman suggested that, poor societies often make for weak states, which may not have the capacity to prevent terrorist activity or recruitment. They also lack the capacity for the type of educational programmes that might help reduce support for terrorism. Newman asserts also that urbanization, compounded by poverty and worsened by unemployment, can adversely influence dissatisfied society. This disaffection could then be exploited by extremist groups to enable them recruit and mobilize in deprived urban communities (Newman, 2006).

Regarding direct root causes, Newman considered a number of factors including human right abuses, alienation, exclusion and social inequality. The author also mentions of dispossession, humiliation and 'clash of values', which in his view is as a result of globalization, where there is increasing interaction among value system, resulting in tensions between some value systems (Newman, 2006). This study observes that, in the case of Boko Haram, both permissive structural factors and direct root causes are at play, resulting in the situation where most people often tag the group and its activities as either emanating from religious, socio-economic or political factors.

These diverse perspectives would continue to be upheld by those who see them as such, so long as the group's activities in various situations point to all or some of them. Although scholars and policy makers have made notable efforts, a particular determinant (root cause) of terrorism remains to be found, due among other reasons to the complexity of the phenomenon itself. Maleckova, (2005) indeed cautions on the tendency to imagine that there is a single root cause behind an act

of terrorism. Such imagination, he believes is certainly reductive, if not erroneous (Maleckova, 2005, p. 100). Newman (2006) therefore comes in with key indicators including poverty, political freedom, economic dislocation, unemployment, population growth, urban migration and social change, to help understand the many facet of factors of terrorism. The "root causes" argument therefore centers around the fact that structural factors, while they may not be of any explanatory value on their own, provide essential insight into the emergence of terrorism when combined with trigger factors" (Newman 2006, p.751).

In his book, *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, BjØrgo, (2005) contributes to the debate on the root cause of terrorism by analyzing the difference between preconditions and precipitants of terrorism. He refers to the factors that set the stage for terrorism in the long run as the preconditions and the specific events or phenomenon that immediately precede or trigger outbreak of terrorism as precipitants. BjØrgo identifies in his work four levels of causation to terrorism which are:

Structural cause: This includes demographic imbalances, globalization, rapid modernization transitional societies, increasing individualism with rootlessness and atomization, relative deprivation, class structure, among others. They are the causes which affect people's lives in ways that they may or may not comprehend at a rather abstract macro level.

Facilitators (accelerators): These are factors that make terrorism possible and attractive, without being the primary cause. Examples include the evolutions of modern news media transportation, weapons technology, and weak states control of territory, among others. Proponent of the so-call "ecology of terrorism" thesis even claim that international terrorism occurs because modern circumstances and have made it exceptionally easy to employ terrorism methods.

Motivational cause: These are the actual grievances that people experience at a personal level, motivating them to act. Ideologues and political leaders are sometimes able to translate cause from a structural level up to motivational level, thereby moving people to act. The role of ideology as rhetoric is to explain how things really are, and persuade individual and groups to take actions. Motivational causes may also be seen as concentrate ‘symptoms’ of more fundamental structural causes.

Trigger causes: These are the direct precipitants of terrorist acts. They may be momentous or provocative events, or some other events that calls for revenge or actions. Even peace talks may trigger opponents of political compromise to carry out terrorist actions, in order to undermine negotiations and discredit moderates (BjØrgo, 2005, p. 3-4).

Newman, (2006) supports BjØrgo analysis on the causes of terrorism by advancing that, leadership, funding, state sponsorship and political upheaval are just precipitant factors, and are only catalysts that trigger terrorism (Newman, 2006, p 751). He argues therefore that emergence of terrorist groups and their activities could be viewed as being dependent upon the root causes. He cautions finally that, no matter how prepared a society is militarily, it will not be immune from terrorism until the sources of terrorism are appreciated and appropriate mechanisms put in place to combat them. The submissions of both Newman and BjØrgo are relevant to this research on terrorism because it give a broader exposition on the causes of terrorism, and in many ways help to understand terrorism in Africa, especially the Boko Haram insurgency.

1.8.4 Boko Haram Terrorism- Religious, Political or Economic?

Lanshima (2018) believes that the Boko Haram phenomenon could be better understood from a more comprehensive explanation which inculcates what he believes are the three main connected themes - religion, politics and economy- by which the organization’s motives revolve.

Lanshima contends that such comprehensive explanation lies within the frameworks of the Sub-Cultural Theory. According to Albert Cohen (1955 & 1979) cited in Joyce (2009, p.22), Sub-Cultural Theory surmise that an individual or individuals may be members of a sub-culture within a larger culture and certain acts carried out by members are considered normal in the sub-culture, however, the larger society finds the particular behaviour reprehensible and punishable by criminal law standards. Sub-cultures exist in almost all socio-political organizations and institutions including the religious – which deals with beliefs and spiritual aspect of human existence. Lanshima's (2018) argument is that the members of the Boko Haram sect have been socialized into believing that they have 'divine right' to murder, destroy lives and properties, reject the social, political, economic, legal or educational norms and values of the Nigerian State. Since they were convinced that such structures are 'western' and against their beliefs'. Combs (2013) solidifies this assertion by pointing out that the Boko Haram organization claims to be acting as 'divine instrument of justice' by donning the robes of martyrdom and thus have been acting as judges, jury and executioner. Combs adds that members of the group assure themselves and others that their appointment to act in such manner was not made by them but by a 'higher' will or 'authority' (Combs, 2013). Juergensmeyer, (2001) and O'Connor (2011) make similar observation that recruitment into the terrorist group is generally followed by a reeducation programme that changes the way a person thinks about good and evil. Anything foreign, western, secular, or modern without question becomes evil; and anything supporting an all-out, uncompromising struggle with the enemy, including the killing of innocents, becomes good (Juergensmeyer, 2001; O'Connor, 2011).

On the role of religion in the uprising and persistency of the Boko Haram sect, Fwatshak (2012), submits that Boko Haram had the strong desire to reform the society along Islamic lines, with the believe that all the problems of society were the results of deviation from Islamic pattern of

governance. This resonates with Adbu's (2003) account that there was public disenchantment with the government and legal system which the people in northern Nigeria say failed them in many respects. The terror group therefore, in 2009 when it became radicalized, had an agenda to establish a puritanical government (caliphate) based on Shari'a law, a perfect and just society, to rid society of infidelity and immorality and privileged the establishment of family values based on decency (Fwatshak, 2012, p.154). The radical quest of the Boko Haram reformers to propagate the Shari'a law led to a desire to force the adoption of Shari'a law nationwide (Fwatshak, 2012, p.167). But, as Laremont (2011) indicates, the sect's attempt disregarded the fact that Nigeria is a multi-religious society which according to the 2010 official national data, 50% are Muslims, 40% Christians and 10% belonging to indigenous traditional religions. It was therefore expected that any such attempt could face resistance and subsequent violence. For Onuoha (2011), the *raison d'être* of the sect is emblematic of Islamic extremism, given the steady rise of religious fanaticism and intolerance in Nigeria through the activities of the Maitatsine and Izala movements (Onuoha, 2011).

On the area of terrorism and economics, it is interesting to note that some western researchers such as Krueger & Maleckova (2003) and Krueger (2007), find no correlation with terrorism and economic status, education and poverty. They argue that members of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas are neither poor nor uneducated, and are therefore able to effectively plan attacks which tend to have severe economic damage. The researchers believe that the motivations of such esteemed individual terrorist may be more ideological or religious. This position is directly counteracted by Barros, Faria, and Gil-Alana (2008), whose study which premised on Africa, found that poverty in Africa is associated with terrorism, and is mediated through condition of low

political and economic freedom (Barros, Faria & Gil-Alana, 2008, p. 727).

The economic deprivation of the northern Nigeria, according to some scholars and people close to the region, is believed to have also played crucial role in the formation and mobilization of the Boko Haram sect. Olofinbiyi and Steyn (2018) challenge the widespread assumptions across the globe that the root cause of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria is religious. They contend rather that, the root cause of the Boko Haram phenomenon in northern Nigeria stems more from socio-economic factors which are prompted by the violation of fundamental human rights, corruption, poverty, unconstitutional and undemocratic practices in the northern part of the Nigerian state (Olofinbiyi and Steyn, 2018).

In their work *The Inordinate Activities of Boko Haram: a Critical Review of Facts and Challenges*, Ogbonna, Jiménez and Ángel (2017) also put forth that the activities of every terrorist group is prompted and sustained by certain factors, and in the case of Boko Haram factors such as economic deprivation and want, poverty, illiteracy, inequality and corruption play a huge role in the activities and deeds of the sect. The resulting harming effects, according to Fwatshak (2012), have been that the reputed poorest and least educated northeast geo-political zone in Nigeria became a fertile ground for Islamic radicalization. Linked to the theory of Relative Deprivation, Kim (2014) explains that the situation in northeast Nigeria sets the tone for terrorism. Kim defines relative deprivation as the experience of being deprived of something to which one believes oneself to be entitled. Thus, a contrary feeling held by a person, resulting from a perceived dichotomy between the deserved and actual entitlement values. Such perceived contrast and discontent usually arise when people compare their positions to others and realize that they have less of what they believe themselves to be entitled to (Kim, 2014).

Runciman (1996) demonstrate it better as follows: “we can roughly say that [a person] is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X; (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X, (iii) he wants X (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X” (Runciman, 1966). In simple terms, Mazrui (2002) summarizes the economic deprivation situation of northern Nigeria as follows, “if in global terms Nigeria as a whole was economically the periphery, Northern Nigeria was the periphery of the periphery” (Mazrui, 2002, p. 66).

Olojo (2013) argues in his article *Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram* that, the economic deprivation of the north is one significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment and support for this insurgent group (Olojo, 2013). Also, Adesoji, (2011) argues that marginalization and unequal distribution of public resources are the main cause of poverty in Nigeria, whilst poverty made recruitment undemanding for the sect. The failure of Nigerian leaders to advance economic policies to ameliorate the well-being and the living standards of Nigerians through job creation, created a vacuum of unemployment, poverty and illiteracy among youths, and evidently contributed to the emergence of the faction. The grievances emanating from poverty, unemployment and illiteracy enabled the terror group to mobilize support and sustain the recruitment of youths, mainly for insurgency and terrorist violence purposes. Francis (2014), one of the first western reporters to cover the group’s actions affirms that, “most of the foot soldiers of Boko Haram aren’t Muslim fanatics; they’re poor kids who were turned against their corrupt country by a charismatic leader” (Francis, 2014, p. 92).

Most literature on Boko Haram that sought to establish the nexus between terrorism and economic factors appear to have concluded on such factors being either the ‘root cause’ or a catalysts to the organizations’ activities. While recognizing the efficacy of such submissions in their own rights, this research submits that the economic motivations and activities of Boko Haram could be seen as serving both an ‘end’² in itself and a ‘means to an end’³.

From a different angle, other literature also points to political factors as reason for the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Uzodike and Maiangwa (2012), argue in their work *Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Causal Factors and Central Problematic* that, since the group focuses on the Nigerian government as well as other local targets, it appears that the grievances from which Boko Haram originates are highly localized and emblematic of the conditions of state failure in Nigeria (Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012, p.91).

Informed by the state fragility and the Human Needs frameworks, the authors are convinced that Boko Haram terrorism is “triggered by the cocktail of bad governance in Nigeria, including the widespread failures of state policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatals and endemic corruption...” (Uzodike and Maiangwa, 2012, p.91). According to Uzodike and Maiangwa, the resulting security conditions have been worsened by the spectacular failure of government intelligence and security apparatus. After examining the state responses to Boko Haram, the authors conclude that, the menace is unlikely to dissipate unless the Nigerian government alters significantly the conditions of the state failure. Political failures and state mismanagement in Nigeria have a direct connection with high level of corruption. The negative effects are aptly

² As an *end*, the study considers the desire of the Boko Haram sect to confront and address the source of deprivation which spurs animosity and a feeling of neglect.

³ As a *means to an end*, the study sees the economic activities of the sect as acts which seeks to advance, support and finance the carrying out of their activities. For instance, kidnapping for ransom, arms, drugs and human trafficking, money laundering, illicit trade in natural resources and armed robbery are identified as means by which the sect mobilizes funds and support in furtherance of its course.

captured by Ihonvbere and Shaw (1998), who argue strongly that:

“corruption has reduced the legitimacy of the state, eroded the credibility of political leaders, replaced merit and hard work with strong and complex patron-client relations, accentuated inefficiency, ineffectiveness and general disorder in the bureaucratic apparatuses and led to mismanagement, waste and, ultimately, economic crisis.” (Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1998, p.151)

The study of Iyekekpolo (2018) on Boko Haram insurgency also deviates from the economic, religious ideology and the historical north-south identity fractionalization reasons advanced by some scholars. Using the state-centric approach, Iyekekpolo argues that the structural vulnerabilities and the political elites in Nigeria have mobilized and given political relevance to the Boko Haram group. The author makes four propositions to back his claim.

First, he argues that when factions of political elites compete for political power at the national level on identity basis, identity groups emerge at the sub-national level in defense of these identities. Secondly, identity groups gain political relevance when factions of the political elites ascribe such relevance to them in the process of competing for political power. Thirdly, when a fundamentalist identity group becomes political relevant, it makes fundamental demands which spark antagonism between it and the political elites. Finally, insurgencies based on fundamentalist identity claims go unchecked in a partial democracy with political elites factionalized along identity lines (Iyekekpolo, 2018). These propositions, Iyekekpolo believes, are the political explanation to the case of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

While Iyekekpolo’s study makes helpful contributions to the literature, it is difficult to accept it in whole because he centers all of his argument on ‘identity’. If the Boko Haram crisis is a sole case of identity, then it becomes difficult to understand issues like why Boko Haram causes violence and deaths on its own people. There is evidence in reports and news coverage to support the fact

that Boko Haram continues to wreck and besiege communities in the North which share same identity. The lingering question for Iyekekpolo is why Boko Haram will kill the people of the very identity it seeks to protect?

This study submits that, the Boko Haram crisis is a complex one, therefore any attempt to unravel this complexity must not be done in a manner to overlook the other dots which could be joined to make a complete meaning. As BjØrgo (2005) suggests, both the preconditions and precipitants of terrorism are essential in understanding terrorism cases. In this light, while this research focuses on the economic factors and motivation of the Boko Haram activities, it takes cognizance of the related issues which contribute to the group's persistency. Indeed, Iyekekpolo (2016) himself recognises this complex Boko Haram phenomenon as he observes that, "economic issues are framed in a religious ideological light and then given opportunity and incentive to evolve into an insurgency by the political environment" (Iyekekpolo, 2016, p.2213)

1.9 Research Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design

According to Goddard and Melville (2004), a research method has to do with the methods adopted by the researcher to collect data in relation to the issue or problem being investigated. Kothari (2004) makes a brief distinction between research method and research methodology by explaining that, research method involves those techniques used in conducting a research whereas research methodology, refers to the logical and practical ways of tackling a research question. Kothari adds that, the scope of research methodology is much wider and covers research methods. The logic of a research method is supported by the research methodology, and explains why a particular method or technique is used instead of another (Kothari, 2004).

The research method gives a clear-cut idea on what methods or processes the researcher is going to use in the research to achieve the research objectives. Yahaya (2015) divides research methods into three parts; (i) the methods associated with the collection of data, (ii) the process of establishing relationships and (iii) the methods of evaluating the results obtained and their accuracy.

This research adopted a qualitative research method or approach, due to the nature of the subject matter under study. A qualitative research design, according to Sumner (2006), is essentially based upon three pillars namely; interpretivism, constructivism and inductivism. Thus, it is aimed at exploring the subjective meanings and interpretation of the world and the construction of reality. It involves methods such as case study, comparative studies, process tracing, among others (Sumner, 2006).

The choice of qualitative method in this research is to allow for a more open in-depth analysis and interpretation of the problem. Qualitative research approach provided an avenue for a detailed description, narrations, and explanations of events surrounding terrorism in this study, and are probed and analyzed from a constructivist point of view. The qualitative method in this research involved gathering of expert opinions, ideas and judgments, close reading of texts, taking notes, reflecting on the data and writing down interpretations to reach conclusions on the empirical findings. As indicated by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), issues of the changing social world and its associated information cannot be subjected to quantitative methodology. Social science requires comparison based on value judgments which are a qualitative methodology. (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994)

The research utilized mainly qualitative data and employed qualitative method of data analysis due to factors such as geographical restraint and some dangers for direct contact with the terrorist group; the clandestine nature of terrorism itself; and the consequent difficulty with engaging terrorists directly through face to face interviews. To counter such challenges involving direct access to the terrorist groups, the researcher chose to interview experts in terrorism and make good use of textual analysis of the subject qualitatively.

1.9.2 Sources of Data

The research made use of both primary and secondary sources for data collection. Thomas (2004) provides a basic distinction between primary and secondary data as he indicates that the former is constructed by the researcher in the context of his or her own research project, while the latter is been constructed by others, who may or may not be fellow researchers, for purposes which may or not be research. Similarly, Hox and Boeije (2005) describe primary sources of data as firsthand information collected from the original sources for the users' express purpose. Such data are usually obtained from the field through interviews, questionnaires, surveys, planned experimental observations or recording of official transactions, among others. In this research, face to face semi-structured interviews were used to collect primary data from Nigerian diplomats and military officials in Ghana, as well as experts working in international security research institutions in Ghana. The research also sourced knowledge and views from private security experts as well as views of academic experts in terrorism.

Interview, according to Easwaramoorthy (2006), is an appropriate method when there is a need to collect in-depth information on people's opinions, thoughts, experiences, and feelings. Interviews are useful when the topic of inquiry relates to issues that require complex questioning and

considerable probing. The complex nature of terrorism and its accompanying debate on causal factors and motivations required this research to adopt interview method, to be able to explore in detail the views of identifiable persons and institution with relevant expertise.

Since the subject under study in this research is a Nigerian phenomenon, expert opinions from the country were also sourced. The research considered the sources in Nigeria as very relevant because of their proximity to and familiarity with the Boko Haram group and their activities. The views from Nigeria presented an avenue to discuss and compare with those expressed by sources in Ghana, to be able to determine where they converge and diverge. Respondents in Nigeria were given a structured interview guide on which their responses revolved. The use of structured interview was necessary because the researcher could not have direct contact with the respondents and could therefore not ask related, spontaneous and follow-up questions. A standardized set of questions developed out of the research questions were put to all external respondents to elicit divergent or convergent views on same issues.

In all, the research sourced views from twelve (12) experts from Ghana and Nigeria. The number of respondents used in the study reflects the experts who were available and willing to speak or respond to the subject under study. The table below further explains the composition of the respondents.

Table 1.1 Lists of Respondents

Institution	No. of Respondent	Code Names
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KA IPTC), Accra.	3	Research Fellow Research Fellow

		Nigerian Armed Forces Officer
Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSC), Accra.	1	Nigerian Armed Forces Officer
West African Network for Peace-Building (WANEP), Accra.	1	Security Analyst
The Nigeria High Commission, Accra	2	Army Officer Senior Embassy Staff
West African Center for Counter-Extremism (WACCE), Accra	1	Executive Director
African Center for Security and Counter-Terrorism (ACSC), Accra	1	Security Analyst
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nigeria	3	ISS Experts on Boko Haram
Total	12	

Source: Researcher's compilation.

The research also made use of secondary data which were sourced from books, academic journals, and published reports from newspapers and organizations, as well as conference papers.

As Hox and Boeije (2005) indicate, secondary data are data originally collected by a particular researcher for a different purpose and are reused by other researchers for another research question or purposes. Secondary data could therefore be seen as data which have already been collected for purposes other than the problem at hand. The importance of secondary data to this research, as explained by Ajayi (2017) is that, it enabled the researcher to analyze and interpret primary data collected by other researchers on the subject matter. This research therefore utilized reports and other researches (including video interviews of defected Boko Haram members as recorded or conducted by some security organizations). Additionally, credible and useful internet websites of

relevant organizations and scholarly databases were sourced to give a wide array of data sources which provide appropriate base for addressing the key questions in this research.

1.9.3 Sample and Sampling Technique

Barreiro and Albandoz (2001) describe sample size selection as a process of selecting a proportion of the population considered adequate to represent all existing characteristics within the target population for the purpose of generalizing the findings from the sample about the sample itself, the target population and to any other population(s) having characteristics with the target population (Barreiro & Albandoz, 2001). The authors add that, a sample is the subset of the population that is selected for the study, and could also be called subjects or respondents of the study. The sample or respondents for this research were taken from Ghana and Nigeria. Seven (7) relevant institutions from both countries were consulted and experts within the organizations were interviewed. Other individual experts' opinions were also sourced.

The research used the purposive sampling technique to select the interview participants. Purposive sampling, also known as judgmental, selective or subjective sampling, is a type of non-probability sampling technique where the units or persons are selected based on the judgment of the researcher on who poses the required knowledge to address the research objectives and the problem under investigation (Saunders *et al*, 1997). The purposive sampling technique used in this research ensured that the researcher acquired a wealth of information for a detailed study from the right persons and institutions, rather than randomly selecting respondents who may not have been able to provide adequate information and expert explanation. As Saunders *et a*, (1997) indicate, purposive sampling enables researchers to have a pool of knowledgeable professionals on the subject matter who have access and could provide relevant information to the questions under consideration. The purposive sampling technique enabled the researcher to identify and approach

relevant institutions and individuals, both in Ghana and Nigeria to speak to the economic dimension of Boko Haram terrorism.

1.9.4 Data Analysis

The study used a thematic analytical approach to aid analysis and interpretation of the diverse data gathered. This approach, according to Mills et al (2010), allows for qualitative data to be systematically analyzed “by identifying themes or patterns of cultural meaning; coding and classifying data, usually textual, according to themes; and interpreting the resulting thematic structures by seeking commonalties, relationships, overarching patterns, theoretical constructs, or explanatory principles” (Mills et al., 2010, p. 2). This research therefore used relevant themes pertaining to the Boko Haram sect and the Nigerian north and south economic divide to provide the basis for analyzing the views of the respondents. For instance, socio-economic variables such as poverty, education, unemployment, social developments among others, are used in a thematic structure to demonstrate the causal and motivating factors regarding the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram.

1.9.5 Ethical Consideration

The study made some provisions in adherence to ethical issues in a sensitive research study as this one. Full confidentiality of all information and the anonymity of participants were maintained. Participants were informed of any potential limitations to their confidentiality of any information supplied. Ethical measures such as seeking the informed consent of each respondent were adhered to before being interviewed, explaining the purpose of the research as well as the role of the respondents. Also, the researcher strictly adhered to seeking prior consent of interviewees before recording the interviews. The researcher engaged the respondents solely for the objectives of the

research and respecting the views of the respondents by not asking any biased question. Additionally, to secure the credibility of the research, no portion of the information collected was falsified or distorted.

1.10 Arrangement of Chapters

The research work is presented in four chapters;

- Chapter one gives introduction to the research problem;
- Chapter two looks at the body of Boko Haram sect and the Nigerian political economy;
- Chapter three provides an analysis of the relationship between the economic conditions in northern Nigeria and the motivations and activities of Boko Haram;
- Chapter four gives summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

BOKO HARAM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA

2.0 Introduction

Nigeria has had a long and unfortunate history of communal conflicts and ethno-religious violence. For example, in Plateau state, in Nigeria's "middle belt," there have been many outbreaks of bloody violence between different communities since the return of democracy in 1999. There have also been riots in the urban centers of Kaduna and Kano, and for several decades there has been a simmering conflict in the Tafawa Balewa district of Bauchi (Walker, 2012). Northern Nigeria in particular continue to suffer from prolonged violence, especially from the activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group. The violent nature of the group and its concentration on the northern part of Nigeria make it imperative to understand the sect in terms of how it originated, evolutions over

the years, the body nature of the group and why its focuses on the northern region. The political economy of Nigeria also presents an avenue to place and understand the interplay of politics and the economy as factors that drive the persistence of the Boko Haram insurgent group.

2.1 Historical Overview of the Boko Haram Sect

The origin of the Boko Haram sect is a matter that has generated divergent views among scholars in the field of terrorism and the international landscape. According to Onuoha (2012), the exact date of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect is mired in controversy, especially if one relies on media accounts. For instance, while most local and foreign media trace the origin of the sect to 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as the leader, the Nigerian security forces go back on time to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* sect at the University of Maiduguri, Borno State (Onuoha, 2012). Although the account by the Nigerian security forces is seen as the official government position and is as well shared by some scholars including Connell (2012), others believe that the emergence of the sect actually goes far back in time, during Nigeria's colonial era and early period of the country's independence.

Marchal (2012) for instance provides a deep historical perspective, more detailed and comprehensive analyses of the origin of Boko Haram. He describes the emergence of Boko Haram as the by-product of 'a long-term history of radicalism' (Marchal, 2012, p.3). According to Marchal, the Sokoto Caliphate established by Usman dan Fodio ruled parts of what is now northern Nigeria, Niger and the northern Cameroon in the late 19th century. Azumah (2015) supports this account and add that, Fodio led a violent resistance against the political class of his day, whom he accused of un-Islamic vices whose consequences were death. He therefore declared *jihad* against them, resulting in the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate, from where he superintended over northern

Nigeria. Following the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate under British control in 1903, Muslims in the area have consistently resisted Western education. Marchal therefore argues that Boko Haram was conceived on the basis of previous Islamic revivalist experiences in Nigeria, and that the sect's main affiliation is to the *Jama't Izalat al Bid'a Wa Iqamat as Sunna* (Society of Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of the Sunna), known as Izala or Yan Izal (Marchal, 2012). The psyche of Fodio as a reformer dominates the present-day narrative of his deeds, as it guided the Maitatsine sect led by Muhammad Marwa. Similarly, as pursued by Fodio, the Boko Haram sect has also advanced the message of reform and purification of the Nigerian political system against Western values and culture, which it argues are the cause of corruption and economic hardship (Iyekekpolo, 2016).

Tanchum (2012) also traces the emergence of the Boko Haram sect to the pre-independence anti-colonial struggle among the Kanuri in asserting their ethnic interests. Tanchum recounts that, Boko Haram originated in Yobe and Borno, two of northern Nigeria's twelve Muslim majority states. Among the twelve Muslim majority states in Northern Nigeria, ten are predominantly Hausa ethnic group, leaving two; Yobe and Borno as the home to the Kanuri, having been part of the great medieval Kanuri Empire of Bornu. According to Tanchum, prior to Nigeria's independence in 1960, a pan-Kanuri nationalist movement based in Borno sought to assert Kanuri interests as part of the broader anti-colonial struggle. The movement's maximalists called for a 'Greater Kanowra,' an approximately 534,460 km² territory that included Cameroon's Extreme North Region (Région de l'Extrême-Nord), Niger's Departments of Zinder and Diffa, and the prefectures of Lac and Kanem in Chad. In contemporary times, this greater Kanuri region – North-eastern Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, South-eastern Niger, and South-western Chad – constitute the extended base of the activities of Boko Haram. The Kanuri regions of Chad provide the group with a corridor to

Sudan and from there to al-Shabaab in Somalia. Similarly, the Kanuri regions of Niger provide Boko Haram with a northern corridor to the Touareg region of Niger and the adjacent Touareg regions of Mali, southern Libya, and Algeria (Tanchum, 2012, p.75-76). Tanchum notes however that, although present-day Boko Haram networks revived an old pre-colonial map rooted in Kanuri ethnic identity, Boko Haram does not represent a movement to redress latent ethno-nationalist grievances through religious revival. Instead, Boko Haram's quest for a Salafist represents the transformation of both ethno-nationalist aspiration and traditional religious revival, and a process of replacing the values rooted in local African Muslim traditions with the Salafi values spread by al-Qaeda's global jihadist discourse. Consequently, it has brought together elements from various Muslim ethnic groups – alienated Kanuri, disaffected Hausa, and beleaguered Fulani – into a pan-Islamic movement (Tanchum, 2012, p.76)

Shuaibu and Salleh (2015) link the establishment of Boko Haram as an extension of Maitatsine sect which was established in 1945 by Muhammadu Marwa, an Islamic scholar who migrated from the town of Marwa in Northern Cameroun to the city of Kano, Nigeria. The Maitatsine sect, led by Marwa was concerned with the purification of Islam, as he believed that Islam had been corrupted by modernization (Westernization) and the formation of the modern state. According to Danjibo (2009), Marwa's constant preaching became very abusive and provocative, especially against established institutions like the emirate and the political class to the extent that the then Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi Lamido, expelled him from Kano. Later in 1966, Marwa found his way back to Kano, presumably after the death of Alhaji Sanusi. Between 1972 and 1979 Marwa was detained in prison several times for his provocative preaching and acts of lawlessness against the state (Danjibo 2009). The continuous propagations of the controversial Maitatsine sect led to the religious conflict in 1980s known as Maitatsine crisis, which caused havoc in major cities of

northern Nigeria (Shuaibu and Salleh, 2015). According to Walker (2012), Boko Haram is an Islamic sect just like Maitatsine sect of the 1980s, based on their common believes that northern politics has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. They therefore see the need to wage a war against “them”, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by Sharia Laws (Walker, 2012). Boko Haram also follows in Marwa’s seed of discord based on a promise to reduce social disparity between the rich and the poor using Sharia law. Boko Haram’s war with the Nigerian government could be seen as bearing traces of the Maitatsine movement’s confrontation with government in the 1980s which gave rise to thousands of deaths; five thousand in Kano, three thousand in Maiduguri and Kaduna and over a thousand in Yola under the resurgent leadership of Mallam Makaniki (Daily Trust Editorial, 2014).

Although the origin and the exact date of the emergence of Boko Haram remain a subject of contention in the academic arena, this research work upholds the 2002 account. This is because, in the years that preceded 2002, the sect was largely a low-profile movement until the emergence of Mohammed Yusuf. Agbiboa (2014) indicates that Yusuf founded the group in the city of Maiduguri, with the aim of establishing a Shari’a government in Borno State in northern Nigeria. The group may have officially been formed in 2002, but as earlier accounts suggest, its origin could be attributed to ideologies and objectives which could be traced to some persons and movements which existed earlier.

2.1.1 Peace -Violence Transition

Boko Haram has evolved over the years with certain significant turning points, particularly the years 2002 and 2009. Shuaibu and Salleh (2015) indicate that these evolutions and developments of the insurgent group in north eastern Nigeria can be divided into two phases; initial peaceful

stage and the second stage of violent movement. At the initial stage, the group propagated goals of peaceful movement and mainly organized lectures and charity to the needy. This stage, according to Shuaibu, Salleh and Shehu (2015) covered the period from 2002 to 2009. The group initially operated under the name *Shabaab* Muslim Youth Organization under the leadership of Mallam Lawal (Chothia, 2012). In 2002, following the departure of Mallam Lawal to continue his education at Medina, Saudi Arabia, *Jama'ah al-Ahlu al-Sunnah Li al-Da'wah wa al-Jihad*, known as *Boko Haram*, which means Western education is forbidden, was created as a peaceful local Salafist by a radical Islamist cleric, Mohammad Yusuf, in Maiduguri, Borno state, in North Eastern Nigeria (*ibid*). The controversial Yusuf, who had been expelled from two mosques in Maiduguri by Muslim clerics for propagating his radical views, came to set up a religious complex called *Markaz*. The complex, according to Chothia, included a mosque and an Islamic school where many poor Muslim families in northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries sent their children to get proper education. But as Chothia indicates, the center had ulterior political goals to create an Islamic state and impose Sharia Laws, and it soon became a recruiting ground for future jihadist to fight the state (Chothia, 2012). Yusuf's Leadership opened the group to popularity and political influence which enabled him to conduct peaceful activities for seven years, except for the 2004 scuffles in Kanamma (Cook, 2011).

The second phase of the group, as indicated by Shuaibu and Salleh (2015), is the period when the group became a violent movement, starting from 2009 to date. In 2009, the Nigerian government instituted a new legislation which made it mandatory for all motorcycle riders to wear helmet. Pursuant to this legislation, the government of Borno state gave the police order to enforce the use of helmet as part of "operation flush out" (Murtada, 2013). Following this order, some members of the sect went out on motorcycles for a funeral without wearing helmet for which the police

stopped them. The incident resulted in a clash between the police and the sect members, which led to the death of four members of the sect and about eighteen others injured. According to Murtada (2013), this development angered Yusuf and made him to write his famous tirade entitled ‘An open Letter to the Federal Government’, in which he threatened the government and urged them to respond within forty days with the view to a resolution between the government and the group, and if not then ‘*jihadi*’ operation would begin in the country which only Allah can stop it. The Nigerian government failed to respond to the group’s forty days ultimatum and consequently members of the sect started preparing strategies and plans for violent confrontations. Leadership of the sect intensified their preaching for Jihad and confrontation of the army, as well as regarded the government an enemy (*ibid*). Umar (2011) recounts that the group became offensive following the Nigerian Army’s five-day attack on the sect and its leader, which claimed the lives of about a thousand people with over seven hundred killed in Maiduguri, Borno state capital. This violence between Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces spread to Kano, Yobe and Jigawa states. Murtada (2013) indicates that the violence led to the killing of the leader of the sect, Muhammad Yusuf, while in police custody, and appeared to have tamed the group’s uprising. After the end of the military offensive, the activities of the group appeared to have been dissipated, but as VOA reported in 2010, the sect recovered and re-surfaced in 2010 under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau. The rise of the new leadership escalated the attacks in terms of frequency and intensity. The group carried out its first attack when it orchestrated a large prison break in September 2010 in Bauchi which led to the escape of more than 700 inmates including its members (Voice of America, Hausa, 2010). Ever since, the Boko Haram sect has been driven by a desire for vengeance against politicians, police, and Islamic authorities for their role in a brutal suppression of the group. (Walker, 2012). According to a 2019 Defense Post report, since 2009, Boko Haram has claimed the lives of over thirty-thousand people, and displaced over two million (Defense Post, 2019).

2.2 Understanding the Boko Haram Terrorist group

The Boko Haram terrorist group has become a major source of instability for Nigeria and its West African neighbours. The group continues to cause havoc and distractions to lives and properties, and has become one of the terrorist groups that have attracted a growing number of literatures on terrorism. Yet, a complete and uncontested understanding of the sect and its activities still remain a challenge in the academic discourse. According to Adibe (2012), the much-needed comprehensive understanding of the sect is yet to be discerned as virtually everything about it is contested, including the meaning of its name, the reasons for its emergence, radicalization, and its international links and scope (Adibe, 2012). This section therefore provides a general description of Boko Haram, in relation to its objectives and ideology, membership and leadership, *modus operandi* (mode of operation) and targets, scope of operation, external linkages and support. Such general overview helps in understanding the very nature of the group and its underlying motivations, which is essential in finding counter-measures to the problem of terrorism.

2.2.1 Ideology and objectives of the group

According to As-Salafi (2015), Boko Haram was initially a Salafist local movement in Borno state of north eastern Nigeria but was turned into an insurgent group in 2009. *Salaf*, according to As-Salafi, means the devout people from amongst the past generation of the Islamic community of believers who are the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) and their followers, i.e. the first three generations of Muslims and those who followed their way in belief and deed. A *Salafi da'wah* therefore means being called to the truth, preaching and propagating Islam which is pure and free from any additions, deletions and alterations.

This call require adherence to the path of the Prophet and the faithful and pious believers of the past generation of the Islamic community and all those who followed in their footsteps in belief, actions and morals (As-Salafi, 2015). Bartolotta (2011) however notes that, the group misinterpreted some parts of Islamic teachings in which they consider interaction with Western society as a sin. Therefore, the group is against the activities of orthodox Islamic scholars who they call corrupt and false Muslims (Bartolotta 2011). According to the Oxford Islamic Studies (2016), Boko Haram, just like other Salafist groups, seek to exemplify the community of Muslims (*salafs*, or ancestors) who lived during and immediately after the time of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. In this regard, the group's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, trained to be a Salafist preacher and adhered to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya, a 14th century scholar who preached tenets of Islamic fundamentalism (Sergie and Johnson, 2014). After the death of Yusuf in 2009, the group took up the practice of *takfir*, whereby a Muslim is able to exclude and kill other Muslims whom they deem to be non-believers (Thurston, 2014).

In terms of its objectives, Onuoha (2012) indicates that the fundamental objective of the group, is to overthrow the Nigerian secular state and establish a strict Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Onuoha's assertion may well explain why the group initially targeted state security establishments and agencies. Sampson (2013) shares similar opinion as he indicates that the major causes of the group's resort to violence include agitations for a return to puritanical Islam and a rebirth of Islamic values. Sampson adds that the extra-judicial execution of the group's former leader, Sheik Mohammad Yusuf, as well as the mass arrest and detention of its members, have been an essential driving factor. According to Walker (2012), the sect also seeks to rid Nigeria and Africa at large from all forms of Western influences and adulterations. The group therefore advocates against such Western influence in Africa and has allied with several militant organizations to fight

government forces in Mali and Nigeria. As evidenced by the increasing number of attacks against educational targets, Boko Haram also seeks to free Nigeria from any Western education, including schools for girls (Walker, 2012).

2.2.2 Membership and Leadership

Boko Haram sources its members from various places and background. The northern regions of Nigeria in particular have become a wider pool from which prospective members are recruited. According to Onuoha (2010), apart from the 19 states in northern Nigeria, membership of Boko Haram is drawn from and spread across Niger, northern Cameroon, Chad and Sudan, amongst other countries in the Sahel region. Though the members are mostly disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, and the *Almajiris* who serve as foot soldiers, the group also has some intellectuals and retired uniform officers who provide the needed intellectual capacity and support for its operations. The group has also received assistance in terms of membership, training and logistics from al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, AQIM in Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, and Somalia's Islamic militia, al-Shabaab, amongst others (Onuoha, 2010, p.59).

The United Kingdom (UK) Home Office report on Country Policy and Information Note on Nigeria's Boko Haram (2019), indicates that the membership size of the group is difficult to track. However, U.S. intelligence officials estimate that the terrorist group has between four and six thousand hard-core militants. Other analysts however believe that the group's membership could be three times that of the U.S estimate (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).

The leadership of the group has seen some changes over the years. The group was initially led by Salafist preacher Mohammed Yusuf, from the year 2002 until his death in 2009. According to

Gargon and Bean (2010), Yusuf's appointment to leadership by a committee of *Shaykhs* in 2002, must have been motivated by a number of factors. Yusuf was a charismatic speaker and well versed in the knowledge of the Qur'an, and had acquired a remarkable profile at the time. For instance, Yusuf was associated with the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) under the leadership of Ibrahim el-Zakzakky prior to 1990, and eventually decamped to the *Jama'atulTajdidi Islam* (JTI) led by Abubakar Mujahid, due arguably to his discomfort with the influence of Shi'ia Muslims in the former group. Yusuf gained an outstanding profile and recognition in the latter group and was made Amir of the JTI (Gargon and Bean, 2010). Waldek and Jayasekara (2011) add that, Yusuf was also a member of the Borno State Sharia and his rise to Boko Haram leadership could be tied to his oratory skills and Islamic knowledge, with which he spoke openly and preached on radio stations (Waldek and Jayasekara, 201, p.170).

Following Yusuf's death in police custody during the July 2009 riots, the leadership mantle was first given to Mallam Sunni Umaru, who publicly stipulated the objectives and intent of the sect (Ojochenemi, 2013). In July 2010, Abubakar Shekau emerged as the leader of the group (Aljazeera, 2010), and gave the group a new focus and approach by ordering attacks on mosques as well as using children as suicide bombers (Gaffey, 2016). The leadership of Boko Haram divided in 2012, when a group calling itself Ansaru, or "The Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa," broke away from Boko Haram after citing disagreements with the group's indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians (Vanguard, 2012). According to the U.K Home Office (2016), the break-away group led by Khalid al-Barnawi, portrayed itself as the "humane" alternative to the gory Boko Haram, and said it would focus attacks on Christians and the Nigerian government. Although the leadership remained divided, some analyst like Zenn (2014) suggests that Boko Haram and Ansaru were operationally linked. Zenn argues that Ansaru acts as an

“external operations unit” of Boko Haram towards a common goal. Zenn also suggests that in working alongside Boko Haram, Ansaru’s militants have prioritized operational success over ideological disputes with Abubakar Shekau (Zenn, 2014). After the capture of Ansaru’s leader, Khalid al-Barnawi, in April 2016 by the Nigerian authorities, the group has been relatively “quiet,” though Nigerian security authorities report indicate that the group is still active (Zenn, 2016). Although Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, the leadership of the group is now split into two factions. Just about a year and half of affiliation with ISIS, Boko Haram suffered fragmentation in August 2016. The terror group split into warring factions: one loyal to Abubakar Shekau, usually been referred to as Boko Haram and the other loyal to ISIS-appointed leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi, as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (Postings, 2019). The various factions in the group appear to have their own set of internal disputes over leadership style, tactics, civilian death toll and lenient dealings with the Nigerian government. These internal rift between leadership and followers has resulted in the execution of some of the group’s own top military chiefs such as Mamman Nur and Ali Gaga by their own men in 2018 (Zenn, 2016). According to Antigha (2018), these internal incidents suggest an emerging confidence crisis and fundamental problems with leadership and followership.

2.2.3 Organization of the Sect

According to Titus, Fadeyi and Aminu, (2017), Boko Haram is organized in a hierarchical structure with one overall leader. The authors explain that the sect is a diffuse group with a disjointed structure. Titus (2016) states that the terrorist group has its core committed followers who participate directly in violent activities, and in addition, enjoys wide-ranging support among a large number of sympathizers in the northeast, where the group is most active, including some

politicians in the region (Titus, 2016). The Counter Extremism Project (2019) also reports that Boko Haram is a fractious terrorist group with a decentralized organizational structure.

The increasing fragmentation in the structure of the group has transformed the group into a collection of thirty autonomous cells governed by a thirty-member “Shura Council,” with each Council member in charge of a cell. This Council, according to the Counter Extremism Project, serves as the decision-making body that commands the group’s regional cells. The U.S State Department (2016) indicates that, the various cells differ by location and tactical specialization, ranging from combat troops, explosives experts, welfare service providers, intelligence and surveillance, and a medical committee.

Although, as explained by Titus, *et al* (2017), decisions are made by the Council whose members keep in touch only via mobile phones, the general leader of the organization is however said to have the power to make unilateral decisions. It is evident that the organizational structure of the sect has since 2012 encountered some internal problems, but the argument that Boko Haram is prone to splintering is disputed by some who argue that the group’s decentralized and autonomous cell structure nullifies fissiparous tendencies. (Titus *et al*, 2017). For example, Walker (2012) and Oriyommi (2011) are in agreement on the argument that, the level of coordination of operations and sharing of resources between Boko Haram and Ansaru support the claim that the group may be structurally fragmented but they work in collaboration during operations. This may suggest that the decentralization and the autonomy of the various cells by themselves do not make the group disjointed in its activities.

2.2.4 External Linkages

Although the Boko Haram terrorist group started in a small part of north eastern Nigerian, the sect has grown over the years to exert influence across national borders and has gained the attention of

other major international terrorist groups. As reported in 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS, indicating that the group has external affiliation with powerful terrorist groups. For scholars like Ajayi (2012), Onapajo *et al* (2012) and Umar (2013), Boko Haram shares similar ideology with other Islamist movements like the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

The Vanguard (2009) indicates that, based on the sect's own statement, Boko Haram is just a version of the al-Qaeda, a group Boko Haram aligns and respects. The sect declared its support for Osama bin Laden, by stating that "we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah" (Vanguard, 2009). Ajayi (2012) again indicates that a link was established between the Algerian Salafist Group and Boko Haram. This, according to Ajayi, enabled Boko Haram members to have access to training opportunities, especially technical training including the making and using of the IEDs and "dirty bombs" as well as training for combat.

Dearn (2011) believes that the capabilities and the sophisticated tactics used by the group in confrontation suggest that such prowess could not have merely emerged from domestic training. Onapajo *et al* (2012) illustrate this belief by arguing for instance that, the outcome of the forensic analysis of the August 2011 attack on the UN building in Nigeria's capital Abuja reveals that the sect used large quantities of the "highly powerful and volatile plastic explosives pentaerythritol tetranitrate and triacetone triperoxide", an indication of international links and expertise (Onapajo *et al*, 2012, p. 347). Also, Boko Haram's use of the prototype of the deadly bomb known as "shaped charged" in its insurgencies in Nigeria, gives an indication that the sect could be in high connection with other international terrorist groups.

According to a report by a US bomb expert, John Myrick, as cited in Onapajo *et al* (2012), the "shaped charged" bomb was used exclusively in the 2003 Iraq war, and its traces to Boko Haram

suggest a link between the Nigerian insurgent group and some Iraqi insurgent groups. This claim is reiterated by the claim of the then Nigerian Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Onyeabor Azubuike Ihejirika, who indicated that:

It is definite that the groups that call themselves Boko Haram or terrorists receive training and possibly funding from elements abroad. This was evident from the type of weapons we have captured from them; the type of communication equipment we have captured from them; and the expertise they have displayed in the preparation of improvised explosives and these are pointers to the fact that there is foreign involvement in the terrorism going on in Nigeria (cited in Onapajo *et al*, 2012, p.347)

In terms of external financial support, there appear to have been limited knowledge and evidence and about the dealings of the terrorist group for its operations. In recent times, however, there seem to be emerging knowledge and robust financial systems to trace international terrorist financing. For instance, scholars like Salkida (2013) provide information about how Boko Haram receives donation from likeminded jihadist group around the world, with other assurances of human support promise (Salkida, 2013). Other external financiers, as cited in Ajayi (2012, p.105), include an Algerian terrorist sect which was said to have transferred 40 million Naira to Boko Haram. Also, Umar (2013, p.21) indicates that there are other suspected funders of Boko Haram including the *Al-Muntada al-Islami*, an England-based agency “associated with Saudi Arabia charity and Da’awa institutions as well as other institutions that have been classified as terror financing agencies.” Titus, Fadeyi and Aminu (2017) also report that the Boko Haram terrorist group had received some early seed money from Osama bin Laden in 2002, through a disciple named Mohammed Ali, whom bin Laden sent to Africa with \$3 million (N493, 650,000) for like-minded militant organizations. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (2014), also reveal that members of the radical Islamist sect, Boko Haram operating in Nigeria, as well as the al-Shabab operating in East Africa, get their funding from outside Africa.

2.2.5 “Modus Operandi” and Targets

According to Onuoha (2013), during Boko Haram’s initially stage in the early 2000s, the group only used guns as its instrument of violence. However, in recent times, the group has varied its operational tactics to include the use of high explosive bombs, the placement of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings, and suicide bombings. Okoli *et al* (2014) add that the group uses other techniques such as arson, mass killing by gunfire, car bombs, early morning raid of villages and the killing of unarmed citizens, media propaganda and advocacy, recruitment of combatants through mass jail break, abduction and coercion, as well as issuance of ultimatum as a means of destabilizing social cohesion (The Guardian, 2014).

Since the terrorist group cannot obtain weapons and logistics legally to enhance its planning and attacks, it targets state security installations to loot essential equipment and vehicles. For instance, in 2018, the group attacked a military base in Borno state and looted weapons, equipment and vehicles, leaving more than a hundred soldiers dead (Reuters: Kingimi and Carsten, 2018). Onapajo *et al* (2012) also indicate that through Nigeria’s neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Sudan and Mali, Boko Haram smuggles bulk of weapons into Nigeria. The smuggling of these weapons has been possible due in parts to; the porosity of Nigerian borders; the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which facilitates easy migration among western Africans nations; and the ethno-linguistic and historical ties between these countries and northern Nigerians over the years (Onapajo *et al*, 2012, p.345).

Although the group initially focused and targeted the Nigerian government and state installations including police stations and public buildings, it has over the years expanded its targets to include places of worship, markets, schools, and media houses (Onuoha, 2013). The group now attacks individuals who are seen as supporting the government, including police, military and politicians; individuals seen as supporting “western” concepts including secular education; and Muslims that do not support its cause (DFA Nigeria report, 2018, para 2.38).

The resort to suicide bombing and placement of several explosive devices at public places has made casualties and impacts severe. According to a Defense Post report (2019), Boko Haram has, since 2009, claimed the lives of over 30,000 people, and displaced over two million. The group now appears to have lost any regard for the vulnerable in conflict situations including women and children. Aside being victims of the group’s violence, both women and children are now agents through which mass atrocities are carried out (Ibid). This is seen in reports where unsuspecting women and children have been identified with explosive vest with the intension of causing harm to gullible public.

In line with its aim of creating an Islamic State, the terrorist group also targets communities which have less state presence, to capture and run such ungoverned areas. Campbell (2016) indicates that, between 2011 and 2015, Boko Haram captured territory roughly the size of Belgium. However, since 2015, the Nigerian military has dislodged the group from almost all of the territory it previously controlled.

2.2.6 Scope of Operation

According to Liolio (2013), most of the sect’s early attacks were carried out in the Borno state capital, Maiduguri, and exerted influence and operation in the predominantly Muslim north-eastern

states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. The group later escalated its violence to the neighboring states of Gombe and Bauchi and some parts of Northwestern states of Kano and Kaduna. Liolio adds that, the entire northern region of Nigeria and the federal capital territory Abuja have been affected by Boko Haram violence (Liolio, 2013). The Counter Extremism Project (2019) indicate that Boko Haram is also active in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Due to the fluid security situation in and around Nigeria, the terrorist group has been able to cross into these countries, in order to evade Nigerian security forces and carry out regional attacks (ibid). As of June 2018, Campbell and Harwood (2018) reports that Boko Haram's geographic reach consists of Nigeria's northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, as well as to regions along the border with Cameroon, and around Lake Chad.

2.3 Nigeria's Political Economy and Terrorism

Introduction

It has been argued that the general state of Nigeria's political economy has been a considerable factor in many of the insurgencies against the government. In efforts to explain the concept of political economy and how it affects ordinary citizens, Titus, Fadeyi and Aminu (2017) state that Political Economy is the interactions of political and economic factors in administrative structures which help in understanding development and the dynamics in social formation. The study of political economy aims at determining what is happening to people's incomes, wellbeing and livelihood (Titus, *et al*, 2017). Literature suggest that the concept of political economy is not a new phenomenon in sociological and political discourse. Its origin could be traced to the 18th century where it was seen as the study of the economies of states or politics, thereby generating the term "political economy". According to Groenwegen (2008), political economy in contemporary times is either used as a synonym for economics or to refer to very different things including Marxian

analysis, applied public choice approaches which stems from the Chicago School and Virginia School or simply, the advice given by economists to governments and the public on general economic policy and on specific proposals (Groenwegen, 2008).

In some situations, governments' economic decisions tend to have some political underpinnings. Maier (2008) therefore suggests that political economy approach interrogates economic doctrines to unveil their sociological and political premises. In this regard, Maier believes that economic ideas and behaviours of states should not be regarded as just frameworks for analysis, but should be seen as deliberate actions that must themselves be explained.

The political economy of Nigeria therefore presents an avenue to analyze cases of insurgencies and terrorism in the country whose explanations have been attributed to the combined effects of unjust political and economic environment. For example, in the case of the Niger Delta rebellion, some authors situate the conflict within the grievances of the locals who felt that resource deposits in their lands were explored for developments in other areas to their disadvantage. In a similar vein, the case of Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast of Nigeria presents another case to test the validity of the claims by some scholars who attribute the uprising of the terrorist group to fundamental socio-economic grievances, which they believe are the negative effects of the injustice of politics and economics against the people of the northeast for several years.

As Aregbeshola (2011) indicates, the political economy of a country is pivotal to its economic dynamics and social system, it therefore becomes imperative to understand how states or governments influence the outcome of these processes. In the following sections, the research finds

out actions and decisions of Nigerian governments and the role it played in shaping the political economy of the country, and its relationship with insurgency and terrorism.

2.3.1 Overview of the Nigerian Economy and the Problem of Uneven Development

Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa and is blessed with a lot of mineral resources. But unfortunately, as Titus, *et al* (2017) indicate, its political economy is faced with contradictions ranging from lack of good governance, exploitation and stagnation, chaos and state of anarchy. Izah (2014) explains that, these problems have characterized Nigeria's post-colonial political economy and have led to missed opportunities; truncated development and frustrated hope. The failures of governance, according to Izah, manifested in poor socio-economic performance, causing suffering and unfulfilled expectations as well as facilitate insurgency, conflict and political instability.

As indicated by Luqman and Lawal (2011), the discussion on Nigeria's political economy would not be meaningful unless reference is made to its history of oil production. The authors account of Nigeria's oil production dates to the 1960 when the country gained her political independence. This major turn in Nigeria's political history came along with substantial amount of crude oil production which changed the dynamics of the Nigerian political economy. Oil production became the backbone of the Nigerian economy, to the detriment of other productive sectors of the economy, especially agriculture and mining which had sustained the economy in the past (Luqman and Lawal, 2011). This situation of oil production becoming the mono-economic fulcrum of the country, bears resemblance to what has been referred to as "Dutch Disease"⁴ or resource curse and its associated economic effects on an economy.

⁴ *Dutch Disease* is a term used in economic management referring to the overconcentration on one particular sector of an economy as a source of a country's development, focusing less or abandoning other sectors. The problem that

According to Osita-Njoku (2016), prior to Nigeria's oil boom, the country thrived on very productive sectors like agriculture and mining. Several agricultural produce and mineral resources such as iron ore, tin and coal, earned foreign exchange reserve for the economy. Osita-Njoku states that, each region in Nigeria had a comparative advantage through which it made its contributions to the development of the country. In northern Nigeria for instance, Osita-Njoku (2016) indicates that groundnut production, which was a major agricultural activity, coupled with other agricultural production enterprises, provided sources of livelihood and employment to the people and at the same time generated revenue to the states.

Walker (2000) narrates that Nigeria was the world's leading groundnut producer and majority of those produced came from the north. The western parts of the country also flourished in the production of cocoa, with the eastern parts equally successful in palm oil production. Walker (2000) again indicates that, Nigeria was the second leading producer of cocoa in the world as well as major exporter of rubber, hides and cotton (Walker, 2000, p.78-9). Ileso (2000, p.7) points to the fact that the agricultural sector became the backbone of the Nigerian economy and provided employment for over 75 percent of the population, especially in the northern region. The revenue from the resilient agricultural sector helped fund various national development projects (Ileso, 2000).

However, following the oil discovery, Nigerian's economic focus changed and seems to have overly relied on the oil sector to the detriments of other sectors. For instance, the agricultural

arise is that, over time, the less focused sectors will collapse and it becomes severe if the over concentrated sector experiences low turn. The term is coined from the experience of the Dutch who overly concentrated on the oil sector following the discovery in large quantities, but later suffered some economic effects in the other sectors, particularly when the oil sector took a down turn.

sector, which according to Walker (2000) accounted for 85 percent of the nation's total export, reduced significantly leading to negative growth in subsequent years. Agricultural exports for example dropped to a low five percent (Walker, 2000, p.86), while agricultural share in the non-oil GDP which peaked at sixty percent during the 1960, also dropped to thirty percent between 1978 and 1981. Annual growth rates of agricultural production and real output for food crops also declined to an average of -2.6 percent and -5.6 percent respectively between 1970 and 1980 (Ileso, 2000). The effect of the oil boom on Nigeria's political economy is that it made the south the center of government's economic focus in terms of developments and industrialization. This shift to the oil sector drew labour from other productive areas to the new found area where most economic efforts and policies were directed at (Ileso, 2000).

As with every country, the discovery of resources comes with heightened expectations of well-being among the people. The case of Nigeria's oil discovery has been one that Walker (2000) describes as "curse" rather than a "blessing" for the country's economy, whereby the contribution of the sector to development and improvement of the living standards of Nigerians remain doubtful. As Osita-Njoku (2016) captures it, "the Nigerian case is simply a situation of poverty amidst plenty. Instead of reinvesting the resources from excess crude oil sale into development of infrastructure like power, education, health, public transportation, water, housing and national security, among other sectors, what we witnessed is a political class deeply entrenched in corruption" (Osita-Njoku, 2016, p.9). As Walker (2000) indicates, being in government became an attractive avenue for sharing the "national cake", thereby attracting political elite who pursue their own economic interest at the expenses of the masses. This reinforces Forest's (2012) assertion that the oil economy and its associated political economy worsened Nigeria's already unproductive foreign-oriented economy, and made way for entrenched systemic corruption as it offered an easy

ticket for wealth accumulation for the self-serving political elites. Forest's (2012, p.34) study makes several revelations on the diverse schemes through which government officials loot oil revenue while the poor suffered.

The effect was that, the state's economic productive responsibilities towards its people, particularly in the north where the oil sector impact is far from, became almost non-existent in Nigeria (Olaitan, 1995). This turn out made the state almost an "unnecessary" entity for the people (Olaitan, 1995, p.128), as it failed to respond to their basic needs. The irony is that, despite exporting about two million barrels of oil daily, and with a GDP of over \$250 billion, average Nigerians live on less than \$2 a day (Forest, 2012, p.21), with a much lesser average in the Northeast of the country. More ironical is the economic situation in the oil-rich Niger Delta area where most people continue to wallow in poverty, while up to 95 % of the over \$300 billion realized from oil and gas since independence is controlled by a minute 0.1 percent of the population (Awa, 1983).

With particular reference to the crises in the northern region of the Nigeria, Omitola (2012) indicates that the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency hinges on the failings of successive operators of the statecraft, since Nigeria's independence, especially the mismanagement of the nation's vast resources towards growth and development both politically and economically (Omitola, 2012, p.5). For David (2013), Nigeria's current security challenges in the north, could be understood from economic predicates, as evident in the nature of the country's political economy which has the tendencies of fueling violence including terrorism. David observes for example that, since 1980s, poor Nigerians continue to suffer the socio-economic implications of oil-induced economic crisis which occurred at a period when the state's economic and political irresponsibility took a drastic turn, thereby further entrenching poverty, frustration and alienation

of the people. These have aggravated the state legitimacy crises that fuel various anti-state tendencies around the country (David, 2013, p.46). It is therefore not surprising that, the radical preachings of Muhammad Marwa against the government in the 1980s, was within the context of heightened corruption in the political elites at the expense of the poor, improprieties in state governance and government failure to respond to deteriorating economic conditions of the people, particularly in the Northeast on Nigeria where the situation was pervasive.

Considering the devastating effects of the economic crisis over the years on socio-political stability of Nigeria, Forest (2012) makes the argument that, it would be inappropriate for one to discard any causal relations between the current Boko Haram terrorism and this economic situation, given factors such as its anti-state dimension, anti-corruption dimension as well as the predominance of the poor in the sect's membership (Forest, 2012).

Uadiale (2013) supports this assertion as he argues that, in the various conflicts in Nigeria against the state, it has become evident that there are more "political questions about the allocation efficiency of the state; the control of economic resources; and the monopolization of political and economic power" (Uadiale, 2013, p.81). These issues of the country's political economy have continued to create the socio-economic and political environments which have gained the impetus for various non-state agencies to mobilize for insurgency against the government.

2.3.2 The Politics of Economic Developments in Nigeria: Colonial and Post-Colonial Eras

There is no scholarly agreement regarding the concept of development. The concept could be said to be relative, such that it lacks one precise definition. However, the guideline to Nigeria's fourth National Development plan (1980-85) makes it clear that, development should not be understood in term of material things and creation, rather, it should be in terms of the people and their

revolution. True development, it says, must mean the development of man, thus, man should be regarded as the beneficiary of development efforts (Osita-njoku, 2016). This is emphasized by Okoye (1985) who argues that, development should not be misconstrued as simply an increase in the productive capacities or income which may mean just growth without development. But for him, it should include major transformations in the socio-economic structures whose inequalities and rigidities resulting from outmoded systems, have tended to inhibit all-sided and even development of many third world societies (Okoye, 1985). These structural socio-economic impediments to development could be said to have contributed to inequalities and relative deprivations which have besieged the Northeast of Nigeria since colonial and post-colonial eras. The trajectory of Nigeria's political economy presents a case of interest for the study of political and economic development. The politics of developments in Nigeria could be traced as far as the colonial era. According to Osita-njoku (2016), the way British colonial authorities administered the people of Nigeria was determined by the former's interest of sourcing raw materials, cheap labour and huge market for their products. Ake (1981, p.37) emphasizes the point that, although the colonial authorities took interest in developments in Nigeria, particularly in infrastructure, it was directed at serving their commerce interests. In this regard, Njoku (1998) observes that, during the colonial period, the politics of development was already manifested even with the construction of railway lines through areas that had products that could yield some revenue to the center. Ake (1981) again argues that, the colonizing powers made sure that infrastructural developments was to their own benefit once it will allow for easy transfer or movement of the raw material to the collection point. Ake (1981, p.43) observes that, "following the capitalist rationality of maximum output, the British invested only in what had to and where they had to". This meant that developments in the country were pursued according to how it fed into the general interests of the

colonial authorities, leaving the center and southern Nigeria with more developments relative to the Northeast which was far from the colonial administrative seat.

It therefore follows logically why “areas in Nigeria where colonialism fostered some developments were in places which were convenient collecting centers for commodities, such as Kano; places from where the commodities could be shipped abroad, such as Lagos; places where climate was to the taste of Europeans and which could be used as administrative headquarters” (Ake, 1981, p.43). In effect, developments in Nigeria were selectively executed to the disadvantage of places like the Northeast, where Boko Haram has emerged.

By implication, what has become of Nigeria’s national development today, is a dichotomy between the centers (cities) and the far villages (periphery) where peoples’ empowerment have been low. This rural-urban developmental divide results in what Adetoye (2016) explains as rural-urban drifts because developmental attentions are concentrated on the urban cities.

Many writers blame the British colonial authorities for the nature of the political economy they created in Nigeria which to a large extent impacted on the uneven levels of development across various sections of the country. However, one may say that, post-colonial era, subsequent Nigerian governments had political and economic power, especially with the country’s oil revenues, to address the economic development imbalance that had been created. The narrative has however been that, some political elites have capitalized and mobilized on these existing socio-economic inequalities and injustices, particularly in the Northeast of Nigeria, to their personal political ambitions without addressing the issues. Clearly, as Osita-njoku (2016) indicates, Nigeria’s political autonomy in 1960 came with some expectations of its citizens that the country’s leadership will turn the economic predicaments of the marginalized around. Dodo (2009) reports

however that, even with the country's mass crude oil exploitation and export which was touted as being the remedy to Nigeria's economic problems, there still exist carryover of the exploitative tendencies of the colonial era. Development revolves around the oil sector in the south, which according to Dodo (2009) has made Nigeria's economy a mono-product, considering the less focus on agriculture since the oil exploitation.

The political economy of Nigeria which is now mainly driven by the oil sector has consequently failed in bringing the desired economic results for the people. Despite the various National Development Plans and programmes initiated at different points in time by different administrations, the politics of development has been a key factor which accounts for why they could not be effectively implemented to achieve results (Osita-njoku, 2016).

As David (2013) aptly captures, this historico-economic overview serves as one of the key lenses to view and understand the socio-economic factors underlying Nigeria's various security issues, including the Boko Haram insurgency. Therefore, any efforts at enhancing development in Nigeria's northeast, should be a process which will initiate societal change in order to improve the capability of the people, institutions and values of community to meet the various increasing social, cultural, political, economic and technological demands of its people (Ibe, 1989, p.20).

2.3.3 Boko Haram Insurgency and the Political Economy of North Eastern Nigeria.

Boko Haram insurgencies in Northeast Nigeria have threatened people in various aspects of their lives including political, economic and cultural. Forest (2012) describes the sustenance of Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism as relating with the prevailing economic conditions in Northern eastern Nigeria, a region characterized with prevalent poverty and economic backwardness. Forest

further indicates that the emergence of the group is as a result of large scale socio-economic and religious insecurity, and its ideology perfectly fit into historical narratives and modern grievances (Forest, 2012). As indicated by Ajayi (2012), terrorism, as a struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed, are stirred by breeding factors such as religious manipulation, manifest poverty, and political discontent, all of which could be seen in the case of Boko Haram insurgency. In the view of David, Asuelime and Onapajo (2015), Boko Haram terrorism should not be considered as a momentary threat that would pass away merely by the counter-terrorist strategies of the Nigerian state security agencies. Rather, the authors hold the view that, the growing frustration and the political atmosphere of discontent among the populace in the mostly affected northern region, particularly the youths of the area, have been mainly provoked by the political economy of state robbery that characterizes the national economy. This has invariably heightened the level of frustration and desperation among the populace since the nation's independence in 1960. It is therefore not surprising that the supporters of the state failure thesis aptly view Boko Haram uprising as the result of the inability of the Nigerian state to address socio-economic needs and political aspiration of its populace (Alozieuwa, 2012).

At the fundamental level, the uprising of the terrorist group could be said to be largely symptomatic of the atmosphere of general human insecurity brought about by the pervasive corruption that has tainted Nigeria's political and economic history (David, Asuelime and Onapajo, 2015). It therefore suffices to say that, the controlling and counter-measures on the sect should be rooted in a long-term economic and political development of the region, so that targeted efforts would not merely be a quick-fix which would be ineffective and cause a resurfacing of other Boko Harams, perhaps under different name. A strong case is made by David, Asuelime and Onapajo (2015) who believe that unless Nigeria tackles those socio-economic issues that tend previously to

legitimize resorts to violence, the occurrence and re-occurrence of “Boko Harams” would remain a major blockade to peace, security, and development in the northern region and Nigeria at large. The authors conclude on the assumption that, one critical way to mitigate the growing tendency towards violence in the country is adequate provision of social welfare services and good education which the Nigerian government has generally fallen short thus far.

2.3.4 Impacts of Boko Haram Terrorism on the Political Economy of Northeastern Nigeria

There is no doubt that terrorism and all related violence have dire consequences on individuals, society and the state at large. The case in Nigeria’s north-east region where Boko Haram actively operates is no different from the general narrative. What has made the impact of terrorism in that part of Nigeria worse is the fact that, even without terrorism, the political economy of the area had made less developmental progress. With the continuous instability and risk of being exterminated, the region continues to suffer from the weakened political economy. According to Baiyewu (2012), cited in Titus, Fadeyi and Aminu (2017), the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on contemporary Nigerian political economy have left behind inestimable damages to every facet of life in Nigeria mostly in the northern region. Baiyewu (2012) observes for example that, the rate of reported terrorism cases has slowed down national economic growth and development, since investors are skeptical in making the decision to invest in a crisis ridden area nation like Nigeria, especially the troubled north-east. Dauda (2014) captures the direct economic impact of this situation on major towns in the Northeast as he observes that, areas such as Adamawa, Yobe and Borno, have crippled economically, as these places are the center of Boko Haram activities. The effect, according to Dauda has been that there has been an upsurge in migration of people from the north to southern parts of Nigeria (Dauda, 2014). According to Titus *et al* (2017), the rush to escape from the north

affected the viability of business establishments in the region. In addition, the security concerns caused by the terrorist group has forced some companies to relocate to other areas in Nigeria and sometimes to other countries. For instance, Titus *et al* (2017) indicate that the insecurities of the Boko Haram insurgency have had significant negative impact on the regional economy of northern Nigeria, as Lebanese and Indian expatriates who have established businesses in Kano going back decades have relocated to Abuja and the south. The authors also observe that a substantial number of foreign businesses and multinational companies have left the country altogether to relatively safer countries within the West African sub-region like Ghana (Titus *et al*, 2017, p.38).

The services sector in the terrorist-troubled area of the north has also had its share of the negative impact of terrorism. According to the Sunday Trust (2012), several businesses in the services sector including tourism, hospitality and banking, have witnessed significant reductions in their activities, due to low business activities and fears of bank robbery, as well as fears of attack on unsuspecting hotel guests. As the Economist (2014) reported, several banks had closed down their business outlets due to the reduction in economic activities in the volatile areas, while the employees in the remaining ones were increasingly demanding for their reposting to less volatile branches. The threat of attacks on hotel guests could be said to be a much feared case scenario for hotel operators, considering that similar terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia who share similar ideologies and circumstances as Boko Haram, have meted disastrous violence on hotel guests in many occasions. This development has led to the near collapse of the tourism industry in the north, as the nation loses huge foreign reserves that could have accrued from the sector.

Still on the services sector, Titus *et al* (2017) indicate also that, the transportation sector has seen the negative effects of the instability caused by Boko Haram. The authors observe that, the general

sense of danger has made transportation riskier and therefore more costly. The high cost in the transport sector has put pressure on the economic output of manufacturers, especially those involved in the fast-moving consumer goods sub-sector.

Border towns in northern Nigeria have also had to suffer the bane of Boko Haram violent atrocities and the risk of living in constant fear, as the terrorist group usually seizes border towns to be able to coordinate their movements and organized transnational crimes. In terms of economic loss, Titus *et al* (2017) indicate that border towns in northern Nigeria have also lost business activities which thrived neighbouring communities, because of the increasing restrictions on cross-border traffic over fears of losing one's life. The Sunday Trust (2012) for instance indicates that, in Kano alone, an estimated 126 industries had closed down during the heighten violence.

At the individual level, Boko Haram terrorism in the north-east has worsened the unemployment situation in the area and lead to youth agitation thereby making crime an attractive and profitable venture. People have lost their source of livelihood as terrorists who are in need of supplies continue to attack farm lands and steal livestock from headsmen. This is coupled with the loss of employable enterprises in the area which are closing down due to the security threats from Boko Haram terrorism and other related crimes (Titus *et al*, 2017). The impact of Boko Haram violence on the agriculture sector of northeast Nigeria has been that, the output from the region which constitutes some percentage to the country's national income, has fallen. This, according to the authors, have affected some food prices in the area (ibid).

At the state governance level also, Boko Haram insurgent threatens the capability of Nigerian states in the north, and bring about economic crises, political instability and destruction in a way

that William *et al* (2012) believe make the government loses legitimacy. In this regard, terrorism and instability in the region affect the voting behaviours which is influenced by their level of access to life satisfaction (ibid). Likewise, as Isyaku (2013) indicates, the activities of the terrorist group pose serious dangers to Nigeria's nascent democracy and economic development.

2.4 Conclusion

Whichever justifications or objectives the Boko Haram group may have, their actions seem to have rather created some contradictions in Nigeria, particularly in the northeast, where the political economy has worsened poverty, education, job opportunities, among others. Indeed, as Ogege (2013) observes, the group has created an unstable and unsecured atmosphere of frustration and suffering, such that the damages that the group has done to Nigerian political economy are astronomical (Ogege, 2013). As Badejogbin (2013) proclaims, economies which fail to combat terrorism and ensure the safety of trade and people's movement, could expect to incur significant cost in terms of loss of investment and trade opportunities. Indeed, as observed, the case of Nigeria has shown that the political economy of a country could impact on insurgency and terrorism. The socio-economic, political and human costs of Boko Haram's activities suggest that there need to be a quick response.

CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC FACTORS AND BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

3.0 Introduction

It is a general believe in global terrorism discourse that no one factor can adequately explain the complex nature of this phenomenon. In the case of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, the problem is evidently seen to be more complex, especially considering the various attributable issues. While these complexities are recognized, this research makes cautious efforts to focus on the economic dimension- an area which this research believes goes to the core of the Boko Haram insurgency. This chapter therefore set out to interrogate the economic factors and conditions to be able to determine its relationship with the group's emergence and persistent violence.

Economic conditions, as motivating factors for terrorism, remain a subject of scholarly debate. This research thus analyses its findings with other research findings to establish areas of concurrence and divergence. Such discussions in this research are believed to contribute to the growing body of literature in the area of terrorist motivation, particularly in Nigeria and the African continent.

To achieve this task, the ensuing sections in this research present a thematic analysis of the prevailing socio-economic factors which are considered as motivating and sustaining Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria's northeastern region. Factors discussed include; economic disenfranchisement and relative development disparity, unemployment and poverty, education and literacy, and corruption and economic mismanagement.

3.1 Economic Disparity between North and South Nigeria-Factors that Account for Inequality

Economic disparities in Nigeria remain significantly high despite the economic growth over the years. For some scholars, such structural difference is deeply rooted in the colonial experiences. Poverty is one major indicator which portrays the unequal economic conditions in the country. Poverty is very real in Nigeria and over the years the quality of life of the average Nigerian citizen has progressively nose-dived. Available statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) indicate glaringly how precarious life has become for the average Nigerian citizen over the years in the face of suffocating levels of poverty. The Nigerian situation becomes more pathetic when comparisons are made with other less endowed developing countries in Africa and other parts of the world. Findings by Obadan and Odusola (2001) show for example, “that Nigeria’s per capita income remains well below the average for sub-Saharan Africa. While poverty is a general problem in Nigeria, Ngbea and Achunike (2014, p.267) indicate that “each time poverty is mentioned in Nigeria, everybody’s mind readily moves to the Northern part of the country where there is high level of illiteracy and child destitution”. This sad reality is affirmed by the NBS’s 2009/2010 harmonized Nigeria living standard survey, known as the Nigerian Poverty Profile 2010.

According to the survey, the northern states of Nigeria scored badly and accounted for the large population of the citizens living in poverty in Nigeria. On a geo-political assessment, the north-west has 77.7% of its population living in relative poverty while the north-east came second with 76.3% of its population living in relative poverty.

The north-central region has 67.5% of its population living in relative poverty (Dodo, 2012). More worrying, the NBS report reveal that 61% of Nigerians lived on less than \$1 per day in 2010

compared to 51 percent in 2004. These levels of poverty in northern Nigeria are the result of corruption and the inequitable distribution of the country's oil wealth. It is therefore not surprising that former US President, Bill Clinton, had stressed that poverty is fueling the religious violence in Nigeria, adding that the northern parts of Nigeria remain one of the poorest in the country where more direct investment and opportunities are required.

There are contending explanations for Boko Haram terrorism, but the impact of poverty on the uprising and persistence of the group is seen to be very crucial. For instance, the Institute for Security Services (2014) reports that, the emergence and prevalence of Boko Haram and its attendant security challenges in Nigeria is the fallout of mass poverty and frustration occasioned by political maladministration in Nigeria. Thus, against the background of state failure, poverty and feelings of humiliation, the radical jihadist group Boko Haram emerged with the aim of overthrowing the supposed corrupt and circular government of Nigeria, and establishing an Islamic State in the whole of the country. Awoyemi (2012) has submitted also that the Boko Haram phenomenon has deep economic roots more than any other perspectives from which the investigating intelligence can suggest.

A comparative analysis of poverty levels among the north and south states of Nigeria indicates a high level of income inequality and a degrading general standard of living, especially in the northern parts of Nigeria. Available data suggests that states with the highest percentage of people living in absolute poverty in Nigeria are those in the north. Jigawa tops the list, with 95 per cent of its citizens classified as poor. This is followed by Sokoto, with 81.2 per cent. Some of the other top-ranking states with above 70 per cent of their populations living in absolute poverty are in the north-east: Adamawa (74.2 per cent), Bauchi (73 per cent), Gombe (74.2 per cent), and Yobe (73.8

per cent). In the north-west, there is Katsina (74.5 per cent), Kebbi (72 per cent), and Zamfara (70.8 per cent), while in the north-central zone, Plateau state leads with 74.1 per cent (David, 2013).

David (2013) states that, as many as 76 per cent of northerners earn a 'daily income less than the equivalent of USD 1.24. When compared with other states in the country, the northern states, especially the northeast and northwest zones with high security risks, have the highest incidence of poverty (David, 2013). According to a Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, this disparity speaks to the vulnerability of the northeast in terms of easy recruitment for terrorism, as capitalized by Boko Haram. According to him,

Boko Haram plays blame games on the problem of disparity and corruption, and claim that Islamic education for example doesn't make people corrupt, but western education makes their leaders corrupt and that is why to them the group's cause is in the interest of the people. (Interview, 2019).

While most people agree on the existence of such disparity between north and south Nigeria, another Research Fellow at KAIPC hold the view that

the people of the Northeast to some extent share part of the blame. Historically, that region had focused very much on Islamic Religious education, with several resistances to other formal education which give employable skills.

Leadership of the area often resisted colonial attempts of introducing western education in the area. (Interview, 2019).

3.1.1 Economic Disenfranchisement and Relative underdevelopment of Northeast Nigeria

In the view of one of the Senior Research Fellow at KAIPTC, a look the fortunes of Nigeria's northeast suggests that the area has been economically disenfranchised and relatively underdeveloped. According to him,

the resources and “national cake” of the country has not been fairly shared. Particularly, the northern parts of the country have had very little share of state resources in terms of its usage for the social and economic development of the area and its people. (Interview, 2019).

This largely reflects the views of Asfura-Heim and McQuaid (2015, p.16) who maintain that:

the governments in the northeast has been unable or unwilling to provide sufficient security, roads, water, health care, or education, or reliable power. The lack of adequate services and economic opportunities affecting the northern Muslim population have caused an intense resentment of the political status quo and have fueled extremist and rejectionist thinking. In particular, there is a strong sense among the ethnic Kanuri group (from which most members of Boko Haram originate) that they have been economically marginalized and have been cheated out of their fair share of Nigeria's resources by the national government.

While most of the respondents generally agree that the northeastern part of Nigeria is economically disenfranchised and relatively underdeveloped, some do not see them as necessarily a reason to engage in terrorism.

Respondents from the Nigerian High Commission in Ghana for instance challenge the actions of Boko Haram, arguing that,

while the government of Nigeria recognizes the needs of the north, such needs are not solved by causing harm and destroying properties. Rather, such inhumane actions make the people who the sect claims to be fighting for far worse off. (Interview, 2019).

This research finds such argument valid as it is evident that the northeast of Nigeria has suffered several economic and social setbacks as a result of Boko Haram violence. Moreover, whichever gains the group has or would obtain for the people cannot offset the several lives that have been lost, or benefit the many others who have been displaced and cannot return home due to continuous insecurity.

The perceived economic exclusion of the northeast region could also be seen to be a by-product of national-level mismanagement and poor governance on the part of local northern political leaders. Politics in northern Nigeria is dominated by Muslim elites, who, like their counterparts across the country, have personally benefited from oil wealth at the expense of regional development. Indeed, as observed by a security analyst at ACSC,

Boko Haram's emergence and prevalence is fundamentally a product of economic circumstance occasioned by the greed of political elites, which in the process of responding to such political ills, the group allowed the uprising to take along other dimensions. (Interview, 2019).

These poor economic circumstances are the factors that feed into what the frustration-aggression theory cautions, as championed by scholars like John Dollard and Ted Robert Gurr. Iyekekpolo (2016) for instance categorizes economic causes of terrorism into two; first, from the standpoint of those who view economic conditions as sources of frustration, which leads to aggression and then insurgency; and, second, from the standpoint of those who view economic interest,

opportunity and greed as reasons for insurgency. While this research considers the case of Boko Haram as largely reflecting the first viewpoint, it does not rule out the group's association to the second, especially when their criminality dimension and affiliation with organized crime gangs are considered.

3.2 Economic Conditions in Northeastern Nigeria as Catalyst for the Boko Haram insurgency

3.2.1 Unemployment and Poverty

The relationship between unemployment and violence especially among Nigeria's youth has received a significant attention among scholars in the field. Although unemployment is a national phenomenon, its rate of prevalence in the northern region is the worst (David, 2013). As indicated in earlier sections, agriculture was the mainstay of the northern economy prior to the oil boom. According to David, agriculture as the major sector of employment for the people declined mainly due to leadership failure which essentially contributed to the gross underdevelopment in the region thereby aiding the crime and security bedlam in the region. The shift in the Nigerian economy towards an oil-centric system resulted in the loss of many businesses and jobs in the north. Unemployment has become alarming in Nigeria's north such that, as Faul (2014) indicates, in some parts of the northeast zone, youth unemployment is estimated to be as high as 80 percent, with even university graduates struggling to find employment. The International Crisis Group, Africa Report (2014), also finds that the decaying infrastructure, chronic energy shortages and an influx of imported products from outside Nigeria have led to massive factory closures in the north. In Kano, for instance, the report indicates that roughly 75 percent of manufacturers went out of business in the 1990s. Finding employment has largely become a matter of one's ability to leverage patron-client relationships and state connections. Therefore, it is the frustration and disaffection that have driven many young northerners to join self-help ethnic or religious groups, some of

which, like Boko Haram, are hostile to the state. In cities such as Kano and Kaduna for instance, the International Crisis Group report revealed that, many *almajir* (alms-begging street children) have joined *Yandaba* (adolescent groups that once socialized teenagers into adulthood but have now in many cases become gangs). A security analyst at the African Center for Security and Counter-Terrorism (ACSC) agrees with Olojo (2013) that:

The vulnerabilities of these many youths in the northeast could be said to have increased the supply of economically-deprived individuals in the north who are susceptible to recruitment by extremist organizations like Boko Haram. (Interview, 2019).

This lays credence to reports that have suggested that Boko Haram has been noticed for paying poor youths to firebomb schools or to spy on suspected government collaborators. As captured by Gordon (2011, p.26), the dangers of having such huge numbers of active “unemployed and underemployed young adults is that it can rapidly destabilize a society with their restive energy. Such frustrated active but unemployed youths who are disgruntled with local conditions are quick to join nationalistic movements or are quite often easy targets for radical religious movements.

The work of David (2013) situates the issue of poverty as an African general problem. The author finds that in West Africa alone, there are 11 out of the 25 poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world, and suggest that there is a positive correlation between poverty and terrorism in the region, as it has become one of the most unstable areas on the globe. This consummates the study of Yahaya (2015) which sought to find the relationship between economic determinants like poverty and incidence of terrorism. Yahaya’s study used the Johansen co-integration analysis and found a positive correlation between high poverty level and Boko Haram terrorism in northeastern

Nigeria. Yahaya indicates that in Nigeria's northeast region, there exist pervasive levels of poverty, even though the country is Africa's largest economy and is among the growing economies in the world. This could be partly attributed to the state corruption and mismanagement as explored in ensuing sections.

Like the case of unemployment, poverty in the northern region is also higher than the other regions of the country. This reality poses a dangerous avenue for insurgency and violence, as frustrated people explore alternatives which give hope of survival. It therefore suffices to say that, despite the complexities surrounding the causes of violence in Nigeria's northeast, its link with poverty as well as inequality cannot be underestimated. Indeed, as O'Neil (2002, p.9) captures, "poverty of resources, combined with poverty of prospects, choices and respect, help enable terrorism to thrive".

This research therefore finds utility in the Rational Actor Model used in this work which helps to portray what actions "rational" decision makers take when they are confronted with a situations and alternatives, bearing in mind the object of satisfying ones needs, subject to the benefits and costs associated. If some members join Boko Haram base on their economic conditions with hopes and promises of making situations better, then it could be said that such persons' decision emanated from an assessed condition whose outcome appears "rational" to the decision taker.

A security analyst interviewed at WANEP-Ghana, agrees very much with the high influence of poverty on terrorism in Nigeria, as he argues that poverty is the single biggest factor to Boko Haram insurgencies and persistence. According to him,

In the face of the complex security situation in Nigeria, it could be observed that indeed, poverty has been the single biggest and most influential factor to

the emergence and prevalence of the Boko Haram terrorist organization in northeastern part of the country. (Interview, 2019)

Commenting on the contrast of the poverty levels between the north and south Nigeria, a security analyst at the ACSC, indicates that such data on the northeast are in the public domain and some educated members of Boko Haram base on that to make claims and incite the vast uneducated people in the north against the government. The security analyst observes that

the leaders of the violent group blame the government of Nigeria for such disparity because the governance structure makes some people far well off, while other are extremely worse off. Such situation violates communitarianism, a system which Islam endorses because it allows for redistribution of concentrated wealth. This implies that since they found themselves in a context where they believe the laws allow others to live well but cannot share their wealth with others, then it was only natural that was a resulting arising against such system. (Interview, 2019).

Base on the unemployment and poverty conditions observed in northeast Nigeria, it could be established that, in the case of Boko Haram terrorism, there is a strong correlation between these variables and is very much exploited with religious misconceptions. This assertion is upheld by a Research Fellow at KAIPC who believes that:

Religion has become the opium of the masses, therefore whatever one would say with religious colour easily attracts people, because it defines people's identity. People use religion to pursue various agenda. The case of Nigeria is peculiar because most of the country's Muslim population is found in the North and Christians in the south. The south population is

mostly educated, especially the south-eastern part, i.e. the Yoruba people, so it makes religious manipulation a bit challenging. But in the North, what makes religion a key tool for extremists is the fact that its interpretations are rested in few elites who are regarded as learned. They are therefore able to use religion as a vehicle to vent those socio-economic issues and cause anger among the mostly uneducated followers. Indeed, the causes of the problem are the economic and governance issues but religious leaders just stoke the identity of people to radicalize them into taking extraordinary measures against state structures. (Interview, 2019).

The place and influence of poverty and its relationship with Boko Haram terrorism, as seen in this research, resonates with that of Shuaibu and Salleh (2015) who find that poverty, unemployment and misconception of religion were the major factors that led to the development of Boko Haram to full terrorist organization. Blanchard (2011) aptly summarizes this as he notes that;

Understanding Boko Haram's appeal among some citizens in Nigeria's far north requires an examination of underlying development challenges facing northern Nigeria, where high rates of poverty and unemployment are exacerbated by extreme population growth and low level of literacy.

These factors combined with weak governance, rampant corruption and inadequate public service delivery, have contributed to widespread disaffection that some suggest may facilitate Boko Haram recruitment. (Blanchard, 2011, p.10).

3.2.2 Education and Literacy

The impact that education and literacy have on terrorism has been found not to be universal. In some international terrorist organizations like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, among others, it has been found that there are professionals in various fields who are fighting for the cause of the group. In the case of Boko Haram also, it is reported that some members are fairly educated and literate. However, this research argues that the easily recruited persons are in most cases the less educated or at best with radical Islamic education.

On education, the experts interviewed for this research affirmed that the low education levels in the northeast part of Nigeria is an important factor, as most uneducated people tend to take what they are being told without necessarily assessing the impacts and rational. This is supported by two separate studies by Shafiq and Sinno (2010) and Afzal (2015) which confirm that, to a large extend, high levels of education does not encourage support for extremism and violence. The studies used data from Asian and Arab countries which are experiencing extremism and terrorism and concluded on an inverse relationship between education level and support for terrorism.

The issue of low education and literacy in Nigeria's northeast has also generated a scholarly debate with some arguing and blaming the political class for not promoting education in that area so as to keep the people vulnerable to political manipulations. For instance, Musa (2012, p.118) holds the view that:

This problem is due to poverty in the north, despite that region of the country producing presidents for the country more than other regions. The north is divided between the masses who are in majority and the elites and rulers who are in a small minority. The latter made sure the former are kept illiterate and poor so that they can manipulate them. There is also this idea

of obedience to those in authority which the elites and rulers used to hold down the masses.

Others however hold the view that the leadership of the predominantly Muslim community in the northeast of Nigeria had persistently opposed any form of formal education, arguing that such form of education creates an unjust and corrupt society. Meanwhile, formal education was very much pushed at the south and structurally made the south more prone to formal and employable skills education than the north.

3.2.3 Corruption and Economic Mismanagement

Corruption continues to be a major problem in Nigeria's politics and state management. The effect of corruption is felt at local levels where human development needs lags behind, as politicians loot the state for their own riches. It is no surprise therefore that Nigeria finds a Negative correlation between Human Development Index and Corruption Perception Index. Afolabi (2013) rightly describes the corruption situation in Nigeria as he observes that

One of the most pronounced nation building problems in Nigeria is that of poor political leadership. The political leaders have been largely corrupt, inclined towards non-democratic practices and such capricious redistribution of the nation's wealth in manners that have promoted poverty among the masses and fortunes among a small privileged class.

The massive underinvestment in the social sector of Nigeria and the underdevelopment of potential human resources typified especially by the neglect of areas such as poverty alleviation and unemployment (which should have high priorities), have resulted in socio-economic disasters in the form of increased armed robbery incidences, drug and human trafficking, child

labor and abuse and terrorism which have become rampant among members of the society who feel the burden of economic and social discrimination.

According to one of the Boko Haram experts at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), one of the most common grievances among the public is widespread corruption among Nigeria's political and economic elites. This common grievance is indeed real, as consistently, the country is ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The concern for the general public is that, a culture of corruption has been developed in the country where government positions are seen as a means to generate private wealth. As the analyst indicates, alliance between the country's political and economic elites has created a profitable, self-sustaining patronage relationship which, in turn, has made elites highly resistant to changes of the status quo.

It is observed that, in the early sermons of the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammed Yusif, the radical Islamic Cleric repeatedly criticized the Nigerian government and its elite state Governors for being corrupt and mismanaging the state with improprieties which invariably benefit the rich minority in the society and marginalizes the poor majority. The ISS expert points out that

It was such high levels of corruption, state mismanagement and inequalities that Boko Haram sought to fight the “circular government” on and create an Islamic state with instilled ideals which they believed would solve the ills of the Nigerian society. The group therefore used religion to pursue political and economic agenda.

(Interview, 2019).

From a different angle, a Nigerian security officer interviewed at GAFSC sees the socio-economic problems in the northeast as to a large extent a reflection of “the structure of the country itself or the failure of the state. On a broader look along the same line of thoughts, a KAIPTC fellow sees

“the socio-economic plights of many poor people in Africa as the result of the very nature of the Africa State”. (Interview, 2019).

In it worth noting, however, that while the above discussed conditions in Nigeria’s northeast may have set the ground for or facilitated terrorism, such factors may not always be a necessary and sufficient condition for insurgency and terrorism in all situations. An expert at the West African Center for Counter Extremism (WACCE) argues for instance that:

There are places and situations where the economy could be seen to be bad, yet, such people do not necessarily pick up arms or become violent to register their displeasure. He contends that, it may have to take other factors or fault lines which may be triggered by certain occurrences. (Interview, 2019).

3.3 Economic factors that motivate individual recruits into the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria

Admittedly, individual reasons for joining Boko Harm varies. Several motivating factors for terrorism have been advanced in available literature. It is considered that Religious beliefs, influences of friends and family, security protection, desperate economic conditions, forced recruitment, the need for revenge, among others, have been explored in different ways. According to a security analyst at WACCE,

The economic factors have become a major contributor to the prevalence of the Boko Haram group. As individual rational actors, prospective Boko Haram fighters, particularly the youth, make considerations of the perceived costs and benefits of the intended activities to be able to make a determination. (Interview, 2019)

A Fellow Researcher at KAIPTC also explains that most individuals in the northeast whose economic situation were dire, sought to improve their economic condition through the hope they found in the group. The lack of government presence and effective governance structures in peripheral communities created a governance vacuum in the area which Boko Haram exploited by giving help to the local people. The research fellow indicates that;

The northeastern people are not well taken care of and, the vast the majority are jobless. Unfortunately, most of them do not have skills. So, even if jobs are made available, there are no skills. Such persons in the rural communities where there are few or no government facilities are left with no choice but to support a group which has occupied an ungoverned a state territory and is acting as a government (Interview 2019).

He also makes the point that

some of people live on the practice where families shove male children into the streets to go and fend for themselves. The effect is that such system breeds foot soldiers exploited by extremist groups. (Interview, 2019).

The Nigerian security officer at GAFSC shares this view as he observes that:

Most of the people are ordinary persons who don't have anything doing, and the state has failed them in terms basic necessities it is supposed to provide for every member of the country. The failure of the state has therefore rendered the people vulnerable and made them ready tools for such extremist violence (Interview, 2019).

Liolio (2013) makes a similar observation as he stresses that;

the successful recruitment of the people into the group depend on the nature of the economic and poverty levels in the area. In most situations insurgents gain members by claiming their struggle is for the people and that they would provide basic necessities for the general population if supported. The insurgents may succeed if such society embedded by poverty, illiteracy, ineptitude, corruption, and hatred for modernization and globalization, supports the cause of the group. Such society inevitably would become recruitment target of the terrorists.

On the argument that the people of northeastern Nigeria decide to join Boko Haram for the cause of their religion, an expert at KAIPTC makes a challenge that;

Mostly it is the leaders who use religion, but most followers are fighting for different reasons which economics is a major feature. He argues that some are fighting for revenge because their communities were attacked by the people who were supposed to protect it, some for their own security. Very few are fighting for religious reasons, most of them are fighting for the socio-economic security reasons (Interview, 2019).

Mercy Corps (2016) investigated into the key motives for why the youth to join Boko Haram, so that government actors, donors and civil society can design responsive programmes to reduce youth participation in the violence. Through the research, the researchers spoke directly to some youth who were involved in Boko Haram activities to learn why they joined or were vulnerable to recruitment. The researchers spoke with 47 of such former members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Gombe states, in addition to dozens of youth who did not join, family and friends

of Boko Haram members, and community leaders. The research, among other things, found the following

The youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support. Boko Haram has exploited common desires of youth in this region, to get ahead economically and distinguish themselves in their communities. Many youths described either accepting loans prior to joining or joined with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses.

Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. That support later waned as Boko Haram's tactics became more brutal.

In the midst of challenges, the local strategies to prevent violence and support youth exercised by so many communities can form a strong foundation for the future of youth and stability in Northeast Nigeria. (Mercy Corps, 2016, p.1).

These findings support this research's argument that the youth who are a main target of recruitment for the terrorist group, are in fact easily recruitable because they lack a good foundation to make personal progress and rather find hope in violent crimes. A Nigerian Security officer at GAFSC makes a simple but relevant point as he explains the situation in northeast Nigeria that:

When people are given skills and have jobs, they would not think of going to join an organization that they know they might end up being killed. Some of

them are actually hopeless so, it is easier for them to join because of the way the state is constituted (Interview, 2019).

This may appear as a simple and straight forward way out, but as recounted by a military staff at the Nigeria High Commission in Ghana, the Niger Delta insurgency was tamed when a similar approach was employed by the Nigerian government. He states that:

It was realized that the insurgents were mainly concerned about the lack of economic benefits and opportunities for them even though vast of the nation's resources were extracted from their lands. As the people were engaged in other productive alternatives, the insurgency was to some extent tamed. (Interview, 2019)

While a security analyst at WANEP believes in this approach, he cautions that:

It may take time and real efforts by government and relevant agencies to cause that social change in the lives and conditions of the people in Nigeria's northeast. It cannot be achieved overnight, but it is a good starting point because it makes way to work on the minds of the people, thus, being able to give them some hope in the system and in the government. (Interview, 2019).

3.4 Economic Activities Boko Haram Engages in and its Benefits for the Group

The initial focus of Boko Haram during the peaceful phase suggested that the group may have sought to redress injustices and marginalization suffered in the northeast of Nigeria. However, the observed subsequent change in focus and the introduction of criminality reflect the assumptions of the rational actor model, where their actions appear to emanate from calculated thoughts based on perceived costs and benefits. This research therefore advance that, it is not out of place to conclude that their “grievances” have now become their source of “greed”, an analogy which fits into Paul Collier’s greed-grievances proposition.

Except for a Nigerian security officer interviewed whose military experiences with Boko Haram convince him otherwise, all of the respondents agree that the group engages in some direct activities which carries economic benefits for the group. Some scholars believe that the group engages in a number or all of such transnational and network activities including; small arms trade, drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, robbery, money laundering, human trafficking, providing protection for cartels involved in illicit trading, collecting taxes from places they are able to occupy, attacking mining sites, racketeering, among others.

One KAIPTC research fellow for example believes that the group engages in transnational organized crime. For him,

The group is doing drugs in the Sahel and all over the region. One kilo of cocaine from southern America through them to Asia creates a lot of money. So, drug trafficking is one. Human trafficking is another source of revenue for them. Collecting taxes, the places where they are occupying, they take taxes from the. Robbing financial institutions, banks is also another source of income. Arms trafficking all over Sahel region and the Lake Chad area is also another source of income. Also, some of Boko Haram members are now attacking mining and oil exploration areas. They also engage in kidnapping. Once they kidnap you, they demand huge ransom which on the average has been estimated to fund an entire attac. (Interview, 2019).

Iyekepolo (2016) makes similar observation as he states that:

At the inception of Boko Haram, the movement's motivation was easily traced to religious ideology that favored fundamentalism. But this has long changed

to accommodate the now famous construct of the 'terror economy' as conceived by Napoleoni. The terror economy model for explaining the terrorists' actions premise its assumption on the belief that the act is nourished by economic thoughts rather than any other consideration. Thus, the current modus operandi of the Boko Haram including kidnappings for ransom and human trafficking is a phenomenon that is increasingly becoming a thriving criminal business with annual net returns in billions of US dollars across the world. The Boko Haram group has also perfected its armed robbery operations. Up till now, there is no known record of any failed Boko Haram bank robbery operation. Thus, in the process, they cart away huge sums of money that increases their financial fortunes.

These activities have become a great source of wealth for the group. For example, the International Business Time Index (2014) reported that, Boko Haram was worth \$25 million. The report further confirms the stated sources as it explains that the group gets money from kidnapping, drug trafficking, robbery, among others. Kidnapping has particularly become one of Boko Haram's primary economic exploits. According to Titus, *et al* (2017), the group secured \$3 million (N493,650,000) and the release of 16 prisoners in exchange for a French family of seven it abducted in northern Cameroon. Also, they are suspected of carrying out dozens of other abductions-for-ransoms in northern Nigeria. It has become obvious also that the kidnap victims are mid-level officials, or their relatives, who were not wealthy enough to have security details, but could afford modest ransoms of about \$10,000 (N1, 645,500) (Titus, *et al* ,2017).

Although most people admit that Boko Haram engages in these economic activities, a Nigerian security officer at GAFSC stresses that such acts occur continuously, but it is difficult to detect or

trace such dealings because those people involved in such activities operate undercover and could have even infiltrated the government machinery, making it hard to exactly associate the crimes with the sect.

3.5 Other Economic Issues on Boko Haram Terrorism

Aside the main focus on the economic motivations of terrorism for both individual Boko Haram recruits and the larger organization, this research brings forth other economic issues of concern which has a bearing on the persistence of the terrorist group. The researcher came across puzzling questions like whether there are other actors who benefit from the continuous existence of Boko Haram for which reason they support and fuel their activities. Also, there is the concern for why Boko Haram continues to operate when the President of Nigeria, Mahmoud Buhari had declared them defeated. The researcher asks whether there are internal beneficiaries of the continuous existence of the group for which the country's counter measures appears to be costing the country more and more?

Probes into these boggling questions generated some responses, which are although not exhaustive, but serve as basis for further research on that aspect of the terrorist group. According to a security analyst at WANEP-Ghana,

The prolonged fight on Boko Haram may be more that what appears on the face of it. The Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) appears to be “managing” the Boko Haram violence in such a way that outright quash of the group is deferred so that there would be a reason for the government to still commit funds towards a “blotted defense budget” in the name of fighting Boko Haram (Interview, 2019).

While this view may come as a very strong position to accept, it is also difficult to understand the reason why even with the combined strength of the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and that of the capacity of NAF, the terrorist group still persist and continue to cause havoc. Considering also that, the estimated militants of the terrorist group is in the few thousands, it raises concerns of whether it is a case of numerical and logistical strength or commitment.

On the suspicion of “external manipulative invisible hand” most of the respondents could not find any evidence to conclude that there exists an external economic interest in the resource around Lake Chad Basin where Boko Haram continues to cause instability.

Although it is difficult for outsiders to validate, some ex-combatants of the terrorist group who have been interviewed by some researchers have made allegations of seeing training personnel of foreign governments who train Boko Haram fighters in the Sambisa forest. Some reports have also indicated how foreign interests in the Lake Chad Basin have brought in external supports, arms and logistics to ensure the continual existence of insecurity in the region, while natural resources are extracted in the shadows.

3.6 Conclusion

Terrorism has become a global phenomenon, and although the circumstances may vary from one situation to another, it becomes imperative, particularly for African governments, to take a cue from the experience of Nigeria’s battle with Boko Haram in the northeastern part of the country, since the issue of poverty, unemployment, lack of education, among others, are common issues in the region and could create or facilitate violent activities. There should be a look at the center of gravity of most insurgent groups in Africa, to understand what compels them to rebel or terrorize governments and others. At the heart of these issues are socio-economic problems and grievances

resulting from long decades of poor governance, elite delinquency and social injustices facing the deprived majority. This would therefore require that, as evident from the Nigerian experience, socio-economic issues which give rise to general dissatisfaction and marginalization are addressed, in order to reduce the tendencies of insurgency.

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This research sought to interrogate the economic motivations of terrorism, with particular emphasis on the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria. The Rational Actor Model was adopted to examine how the current make-up of the terrorist group fits into economic principles of rational decision making involving perceived threats and benefits. Considering the prevalence of poor economic conditions in Nigeria's northeast, the study sought to test the hypothesis -“the rising and persistence of Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria is predominantly caused by economic factors”

The specific objectives of the study were to find out the nature of the economic conditions in northeast Nigeria and the level of disparity when compared with the conditions in the south. The study sought to understand how such economic conditions have been a catalyst and motivation for individuals and the group's insurgency. Finally, the research sought to know what economic activities Boko Haram engages in and how they benefit the group. The outcome of the research is presented below.

4.1 Summary of findings

This research finds that, although the economic dimension of terrorism alone does not present a full account for Boko Haram's insurgency and persistence, elements in this dimension such as pervasive poverty, high unemployment, low level of education and employable skills, low economic development and marginalization, have influenced and impacted on the local support for the group. More revealing, a Nigerian army officer at GAFSC sees poverty as the “single

biggest” factor of terrorism in northeastern Nigeria. This finding digresses from that of Fwatshak (2012) who finds that, it is rather religion which has had the most influence on Boko Haram emergence and persistence. For Fwatshak, Boko Haram’s uprising was the result of their strong desire to reform the society along Islamic lines, with the believe that all the problems of society were the results of deviation from Islamic pattern of governance. However, Fwatshak’s position has overtime been seen to be a secondary factor rather than a root cause. Religion, this research found, has only been used as a vehicle through which leadership of the group has appealed to the conscience of the many supporters. Religion carries some sentimental attachments for its followers, it is therefore relatively easier to mobilize and gain the commitment of people for a cause on religious primordial sentimental lines. This is evident in the approach that was used by the founder of Boko Haeam, Muhammed Yusif, whose initial preaching to his followers rebuked the Nigerian circular government and the ills of society due to western education. He constantly used religion to speak to the minds of the people that it is only Islamic values based on Sha’ria principles that will rid the Islamic community off the wrongs and injustices against them. The people believed as they were told that their actions against the government and any other person who oppose them, are actually in reverence to their Religion and its values.

This research also gathered that, even though most of Nigeria’s past Presidents have come from the north, the sect considers the north as relatively deprived in terms of developments, compared to the south which has been given more attention by the political elites. Even though it is evident that the northeast of Nigeria lacks several socio-economic opportunities in terms of social and economic developments, the problem becomes more glaring when comparison is made with the lots of the south. The leadership of Boko Haram therefore sought to create a general sentiment of

state neglect for the people of the north, thereby stirring up resentments among the people against the government and institutions which were deemed to be working with or for it.

This finding is in agreement with that of David (2013) who makes a comparison among various states of Nigeria and finds that, the northern states, especially the northeast zone has high risk of insecurity and terrorism because it has the highest incidence of poverty which makes the area prone to easy recruitment for violence.

Also, the absence of the state governance and machinery in some vast areas in the northeast of Nigeria provided a fertile ground for the sect to create their own state of a sort. Through the social and economic support Boko Haram offered to the local people, the group gained their trust and support. Boko Haram therefore became a government for the local people by executing the responsibilities of the Nigerian government to them. By these actions of the group, it is found many of the vibrant youths saw better prospects in the terrorist organization and made the decision to join as means of survival.. This indicates that because of their conditions and state neglect, many people saw better hope in the terrorist group than they saw in the government.

This research found no specific demographic profile of Boko Haram members who joined the group out of economic hopelessness. It was found that there were people who had been to school and had attained degree and other certificates but could not get employment and therefore destroyed their certificates to join Boko Haram due to the prospects the group offered. Drop outs, basic school leavers, Islamic education pupils and those with no form of formal education were all found to be part of the group due to unemployment. Despite their ununiformed demographic profiles, unemployment was a common factor that pushed them to the terrorist organization, with hopes of improving their lives and helping their families.

Interestingly, this research observed that most of the local people are increasingly withdrawing their support for the terrorist group as the sect became extreme and indiscriminately violent. This confirms the findings of Mercy Corps in their research “Motivations and Empty Promises” which focused on Boko Haram ex-combatants. Some ex-fighters revealed that their reason for supporting and joining the group waned when the group started attacking fellow Muslims and also realized that the promises of group were not being fulfilled. They researchers found that, the perception of many youths who joined the group based on their initial conviction of the sect changed after realizing the activities and direction of the group. Local counter-narratives on the hypocrisy of Boko Haram and the corrupt and greedy nature of the sect resulted in the reduction of local support for the group.

Another observation made through this research is that, while it has been established that predominantly, the group mobilized on grievances such as social injustices and neglect, economic underdevelopment, corruption and mismanagement by the political elites of the north, the actions of the group has rather worsened the plights of the very people it sought to fight for. This assertion, to a very large extent, could be said to be valid, considering that the increased insecurity created by the Boko Haram sect in northeastern Nigeria has forced some businesses to close down or relocate, many individuals have lost their direct and indirect jobs, transport system has become expensive, as well as many people being displaced and properties destroyed.

This research found in other reports that a number of individuals who were recruited into Boko Haram on economic ground cites influences from social and business peers. The conditions of friends, business colleagues or family members who had joined were very much influential factor

on many others who wanted to make living as well. Mercy Corps (2016) for instance reports that most youths saw in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support.

Finally, this research finds a general convergence on the fact that, although Boko Haram on the face of it may be fighting a cause, it has become very criminal in nature, as some of its actions have pointed to what could be referred to as “mercenaries for criminal profit”. Most of the terrorism experts and scholars who were interviewed for this research responded affirmatively that, the group now harbours criminals who are not fighting any ideological or religious war per se, but are engaging in criminal activities such including drug trafficking, small arms trade, kidnapping for ransom, robbery, money laundering, human trafficking, seizure of mines and other mineral resource fields, providing protection for cartels in illicit trading, collecting taxes from places they are able to occupy, for their economic benefits. Such criminalities are believed to serve the interests of the top leadership of the terrorist group and its external partners as well as the individual criminals.

4.2 Conclusions

Basing on the findings observed in this research, the researcher makes the following conclusions which border on the research objectives;

Terrorism as a whole is contextual and it does not arise out of a vacuum. In the case of Boko Haram terrorism, this research concludes that key contextual factor such as economic and social grievances of deprivation against Nigeria’s northeast region provided the drive for insurgency and support among the local people. Such grievances are manifested in pervasive level of poverty, low level of education and literacy, slow pace of development and industrialization. These factors

mentioned lay credence to the research's hypothesis, as these economic factors have been seen to have played significant role in the uprising and persistence of Boko Haram.

The huge developmental gap between Nigeria's northeast and the southern regions have been manipulated by leadership of Boko Haram to elicit sentimental support of the locals for the terrorist group and a hatred for the Nigerian government. The constant reference to such disparity between the north and south of Nigeria and the high level of corruption and political improprieties of the elites in power, created a sense and need for Boko Haram to get rid of the "circular" government and institute a system which will sanitize the rot and ensure equity.

Based on the analysis presented in this report, it could be concluded that the conflict in Nigeria's northeast is most accurately viewed as a counterinsurgency problem rather than a pure counterterrorism problem. Boko Haram is a regional insurgent group with local and national political objectives—though it lacks a political front. It uses subversion, guerilla tactics, and terrorism to carve out living space for itself and to further its aims of eventually overthrowing the Nigerian government. Its emergence and persistence have been driven by a number of underlying contextual factors and proximate causes, including decades of poor governance, elite delinquency, and extreme economic inequality.

The research also makes the conclusion that, Boko Haram's claim of fighting a cause on religious grounds and backing is rather misleading, especially considering the group's current mode of operation and criminal elements introduced in their activities. The group is now seen operating in the "war economies" making greed out of grievances. Aside themselves and their affiliates, it is difficult now to say who they are fighting for and for what cause. Indeed, these criminality

dimension of the group continue to attract organized groups into a marriage of convenience by indulging in criminal activities which accrue economic benefits to the group and its members.

This research infers that, if the Nigerian government is ineffective in dealing with the underlying economic factors and reversing current conditions and dynamics on the ground, the northeast would continue to be a fertile place for expansion and persistence of terrorism. Even if Nigeria defeats Boko Haram militarily but the causal or exacerbating factors continue to exist, insurgency and terrorist activities could still emerge, perhaps under splinter faction or different extremist groups.

4.3 Recommendations

Having considered the problem at hand and the findings herein; this research makes the following recommendations;

Instead of relying mainly on military actions against Boko Haram, the Nigerian government has to redirect more of its resources in the fight against terrorism towards economic and social empowerment of the local people who are easily lured by the financial inducement tactics used by Boko Haram. Such empowerment would provide safe alternatives for the teeming youth population and make terrorism less attractive to them. This in effect will deny Boko Haram of the support and fighters who are easily recruited because of poor socio-economic conditions.

Social and economic interventions of government should be designed in consultation with the locals, especially the youths, to effectively analyze and understand the drivers of social support for Boko Haram. This will enable the Nigerian government and state authorities to implement soft approach policies or measures that address the often misdiagnosed reason why youths in the north decide to join terrorism and what they need to thrive.

The Nigerian government must revive existing preventive programmes such as the Nigerian Government's Strategy for Reconstruction in the northeast, and the President's Committee for the Northeast Initiative (PCNI), to control the socio-economic problems that are motivating and sustaining insurgency and terrorism in the region, and redirect attention to non-violent productive activities.

Also, the government of Nigeria needs to collaborate with religious authorities and traditional leaders in the local communities where Boko Haram operates, to design effective counter narratives and appropriate communication tools that will help to disabuse the religious narratives used by the terrorist group in mobilizing for support. In this regard, influential local religious and traditional leaders should be well trained and resourced to deliver resounding anti-violence messages and appropriate interpretation of religious prescriptions. Local NGOs and the media would also be of great service when their efforts are coordinated and directed.

Finally, government must extend governance and state structures to areas which are usually seen as far detached from state control. Government must support and protect poor communities, especially border towns, and work with local authorities to gain the trust of the people to ensure that they contribute to intelligence gathering efforts in identifying people with extremist and radical views, as well as those who are exploiting local conditions to recruit people for terrorist groups.

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