Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Energy Research & Social Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss Original research article Local participation, institutions and land acquisition for energy infrastructure: The case of the Atuabo gas project in Ghana Austin Dziwornu Abloa,b,⁎, Vincent Kofi Asamoahc a Department of Geography and Resource Development, Box LG 59, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana b School of Geosciences, University of South Florida, United States c Achimota School, Accra, Ghana A R T I C L E I N F O Keywords: Local participation Land acquisition Livelihood Oil and gas Ghana gas A B S T R A C T This paper examines the impacts of land acquisition for a gas processing plant at Atuabo on the livelihood of affected farmers. The paper explores the extent to which affected farmers participated in the determination of compensation paid out to them and whether and how the compensation package adequately caters for the lost livelihoods. Using the livelihood approach as a guiding theoretical tool and data produced through interviews, observation, cases studies, and informal discussions, the study found that farmers' involvement in the com- pensation process did not go beyond identification and measurement of their farms. With limited participation in the acquisition and compensation process, the farmers felt deprived of their entitlements and viewed the compensation as inadequate for their lost livelihoods and generational inheritance. It is recommended that the government actively engage with community members and traditional authorities to ensure that farmers are allocated new parcels of land for cultivation. 1. Introduction The discovery and production of oil and gas has the potential to create jobs, generate revenue for infrastructure development and pro- vide fuel for reliable energy (electricity) supply [1]. In the medium to long-term, oil and gas resources can be a game changer, catalysing processes of social and economic transformation. In 2007 Ghana dis- covered oil and gas in commercial quantities [2] offshore its western coast in two deepwater blocks which are currently operated as the Jubilee Field. Oil production from Ghana’s Jubilee Field commenced in December 2010 [2]. Many have cautioned for proper management of expectations [3,4] taking into consideration the resource curse lessons in other African countries [5]. The government of Ghana initiated various measures to ensure the country derives maximum benefits from its oil and gas resources [6,7]. In 2011, a Ghana National Gas Development Taskforce was established to review and propose approaches to ensure full utilisation of the country’s gas resource through a Gas Commercialisation Project. Based on the recommendation of the task force, the Ghana National Gas Company (Ghana Gas) was established. Ghana Gas was tasked to build, own and operate natural gas infrastructure to process, transport and market gas to meet domestic and industrial needs in the country. The production of stable indigenous gas for electric power generation is key to offsetting the country’s electricity deficit [8]. In recent years, Ghana has experienced unreliable power supply due to low water levels, which have resulted in the country’s hydroelectric dams not producing at full capacity. Unreliable gas supply from Nigeria via the West Africa Gas Pipeline and increased demand are among key factors influencing Ghana’s electricity deficit. The task force identified construction of a plant to process gas from the Jubilee Field as essential to bringing stability to the country’s energy sector. By the end of 2011, the Chinese government through the China Development Bank (CDB) granted the Government of Ghana a US$ 3 billion Master Facility Agreement (MFA) [9]. Ghana is expected to pay the US$3 billion loan over a fifteen and half year period with the supply of 13,000 barrels of oil per day [9,10] to be lifted by UNIPEC. UNIPEC is a subsidiary of Sinopec (Chinese Petroleum Company) which was awarded the contract to construct Ghana’s gas processing plant. The CBD loan forms part of a larger US$13billion loan agreement dedicated to the Western Corridor Gas Infrastructure Development Project, which is earmarked for various infrastructural projects including the con- struction and rehabilitation of roads, ports and oil and gas processing in Ghana [10]. As part of the MFA, Sinopec secured an amount of US$850 million to construct a plant to process gas from Ghana’s Jubilee oil field [11]. Construction of the gas processing plant commenced in 2012 at Atuabo, a small Nzema community along the coast in the Ellembelle https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.03.022 Received 1 June 2017; Received in revised form 22 March 2018; Accepted 23 March 2018 ⁎ Corresponding author at: Department of Geography and Resource Development, Box LG 59, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana. E-mail addresses: aablo@ug.edu.gh (A.D. Ablo), Vincent.seyram60@gmail.com (V.K. Asamoah). Energy Research & Social Science 41 (2018) 191–198 Available online 31 March 2018 2214-6296/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. T http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/22146296 https://www.elsevier.com/locate/erss https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.03.022 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.03.022 mailto:aablo@ug.edu.gh mailto:Vincent.seyram60@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.03.022 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.erss.2018.03.022&domain=pdf District of the Western Region of Ghana. The project includes the laying of pipe from the Jubilee Field to the processing plant, the building of the gas processing plant and the laying of transport pipeline from Atuabo to Takoradi (one of Ghana’s industrial hubs and oil city) where a thermal plant producing electricity from gas is located. The installation of infrastructure for processing gas from Ghana’s Jubilee Field resulted in the displacement of farmers from their land. This paper examines farmers participation in the land acquisition pro- cess, the process for determining compensation and the livelihood im- pacts of the project upon them. Drawing on the livelihood approach and data produced through interviews, observation and informal discus- sions with community members, state officials and community leaders, we argue that farmers’ involvement in the compensation process was limited. There was no active and consistent engagement between the farmers, state institutions and Ghana Gas in determining the value of crops which were destroyed when the land was cleared for construction work. Additionally, while the impression was created that community members will be prioritised for employment opportunities on the pro- ject, few of them gained employment. This we argue is due to the po- liticisation of the recruitment, a limited number of skilled labour in the community and the large numbers of Chinese workers including un- skilled labourers who were employed by Sinopec. 2. Conceptualising rural livelihood Within development studies, the livelihood approach represents a shift away from structural explanations towards actor-oriented approaches to explaining rural livelihood outcomes. The livelihood approach draws on Amartya Sen’s entitlement framework which focuses on peoples’ endow- ment, entitlement set and entitlement mapping to explain famine [12,13]. In a series of works, Sen explored how the combination of all resources a person owns effects the goods and services a person can legally obtain to meet their needs [14,15]. Building on Sen’s work various studies [see 16,17–20] have advanced the discussion on livelihood, with emphasis on people’s assets. For Chambers and Conway [16] livelihood comprises peoples’ capabilities or assets including resources, claims and access that provides a means of living. Livelihood from this perspective is sustainable when people can ‘cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance [their] capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable liveli- hood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short and long term’ [22 in 20, p. 31]. According to Amalric [21], early use of the livelihood framework has focused more on organizations than on households or individuals, and on the political arena more than on making a living. The utility of the sustainable livelihood approach (SLA) in this study stems from its focus on participation and entitlements of the poor in the land acqui- sition process for the gas project. The SLA focuses on assets, shocks, institutions and organization as well as power relations [17,19,22] between actors, making it relevant for examining farmers’ participation in the various processes as well as the impacts of land acquisition for the Ghana Gas project at Atuabo. 2.1. Livelihood assets and strategies Assets are basically resources individuals and households deploy in the pursuit of their livelihood. For Carney, [22], assets include material and social resource stocks like Bourdieu’s [23] notion of capital as re- sources individuals can draw on to meet their needs. Conceptualised as capital, assets are not limited to materials or purely economic notions, but also include social relations. Within the livelihood framework, five types of capital are identified; physical, social, natural, financial, and human [24]. These capital forms frequently do not exist in isolation and are often not distinguishable, and they can be converted from one form to the other [23]. For example, natural capital in the form of land signifies wealth (or what Bourdieu terms symbolic capital) and can be used as collateral to access financial capital in the form of a bank loan. This financial capital can be used to pay for education which enhances the human capital or (cultural capital in Bourdieu’s view). Similarly, a person’s social capital which is embedded in their social relations or networks can enhance their access to financial capital (loan and fi- nancial assistance from kin and friends) as well as access to land. Physical capital such as infrastructure (roads, schools, treated water) also enhances livelihoods. Chambers and Conway [17] notes that the sustainability of people’s livelihoods depends on the combinations of different assets or capitals. Bebbington [19], Scoones [17] and Carney [22] have expanded these ideas, placing more emphasis on access to assets rather than on the asset themselves. They view access to one form of capital/asset as a means of accessing other forms, in a similar way to the transmutability of capital as espoused in Bourdieu’s theory. Bebbington [19] argues persuasively for the broadening of the conceptualization of access to capital in situations where people’s livelihoods changed from being directly dependent on environmental resources to a range of other li- velihood assets. He notes that ‘assets are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give the capability to be and act’ [19, p. 2022]. Access to livelihood assets (asset portfolios) can, however, be re- duced if access to such resources are limited or totally denied. It can be enhanced when investments are made or structures are transformed from people who hitherto were denied access but are now granted the right to use such resources for their livelihoods [17,24]. Investments in energy infrastructures such as the Ghana Gas project can potentially enhance or limit the livelihood assets of the people of Atuabo. Limited access or total denial of access to assets can lead to vulnerability of livelihoods while investment in any of the assets can greatly enhance livelihoods. As Swift [24] argues, investments are assets in themselves and can be in many forms, including infrastructure, farms, skills, chil- dren’s education or social relations. Accordingly, construction of the gas project can trigger the structural transformation of farmers’ livelihoods at Atuabo either positively or negatively. An essential component of the SLA is the concept of livelihood strategies. This focuses on the various ways individuals, households and groups combine their assets to achieve livelihoods [17]. In the con- ception of livelihood strategies within the SLA, Scoones [17] outlines three broad strategies, including agriculture intensification and ex- tensification, livelihood diversification and migration as some of the ways people adapt to change. In this paper, livelihood diversification is key to examining the extent to which compensation paid to farmers constitutes enough financial capital, which they can deploy in non-farm activities or access land (natural capital) to continue on-farm liveli- hoods. Livelihood diversification aims at coping with temporary ad- versity or more permanent adaptation of livelihood activities when other options are failing to provide a livelihood [17]. 2.2. Shocks and vulnerability of rural livelihoods In conceptualizing livelihood vulnerability Carney [22] identifies three important elements: shocks, trends and seasonality. The concep- tion of shocks is the most important to this study because appropriation of land for the gas project can occur in a manner that potentially limits the extent of farmers’ adaptation. The factors influencing the vulner- ability of Atuabo farmers are external to the local people. Institutions such as Ghana Gas, Sinopec and the Land Valuation Division (LVD) of the Lands Commission are external to the community and their activ- ities and decisions directly affect farmers in numerous ways. According to Rakodi [25, p. 14], ‘policies, the interactions of pro- cesses and institutions are factors that affect the vulnerability of in- dividuals, households and communities’. In this case, the policy of the state to build a gas plant and institutional processes leading to the ac- quisition of the land are important factors with consequences for farmers. The extent to which individuals, households and communities A.D. Ablo, V.K. Asamoah Energy Research & Social Science 41 (2018) 191–198 192 adapt to increased vulnerability is dependent on their capabilities, as- sets and their livelihood strategies. 2.3. The influence of institution and organization on livelihood resources A major critique of earlier studies of the SLA is that it pays little attention to the roles of institutions, organizations and power relations in shaping livelihoods [17,20]. Institutions are defined as ‘regularised practices (or patterns of behaviour) structured by rules and norms of society which have persistent and widespread use’ [17, p. 12]. Scoones [17] recognises the dynamic, varied and contentious nature of institu- tions, and notes that ‘institutions may thus be formal and informal, often fluid and ambiguous, and usually subject to interpretations by different actors’ [17, p. 12]. For Ellis [26] the distinction between social relations and institutions are that social relations comprise gender, caste, class, age, ethnicity, and religion while institutions entails formal rules and conventions and informal codes of behaviour (law, property rights and markets). Organizations, Ellis [26] contends, are groups of individuals bound by certain aims and objectives and may include government agencies, association, private entities and non-govern- mental organizations. Similarly, North [27] considers institutions as the ‘rule of the game’ and organizations as ‘the players’. However, de Haan and Zoomers [20] and Scoones [18] argue that institutions are not simply ‘the rule of the game’ but are embedded with power dynamics which actors can deploy to claim and contest livelihood assets. This study examines both formal and informal institutions and structures, such as membership of a lineage, land tenure and land ac- quisition and Nzema cultural norms on access to livelihood resources. The process of compulsory land acquisition for projects of ‘national interest’ can have negative effects on farmers, as this paper demon- strates. The ways by which people gain and lose access to assets are negotiated within the context of informal (customary laws) and formal (state laws) institutions [28]. The Nzema concept of land as nourisher, and the role traditional leaders play to ensure nourishment of the people [30], are vital in understanding the significance of social in- stitutions and relations in accessing livelihood assets. 3. Study area and methods Atuabo is a coastal town in the Ellembelle District of the Western Region with an estimated population of 1584 according to the 2010 population and housing census [30]. Covering a total area of about 1468 Square kilometres, the district is basically rural with only 20.6% of the inhabitants living in urban areas, a rate far below the regional average of 42.4% [31]. Agriculture (farming and fishing) employs about 70% of the active population in the district while a significant percentage of the remaining 30% work in the private informal economy [30,32]. The major food crops grown include cassava, yam, maize, paddy rice, beans, cocoyam, and vegetables while coconut is the dominant cash crop [32]. Although a coastal community, farming is the main occupation of the inhabitants. Fishing is largely artisanal relying on non-motorised canoes, beach seine and trap, and is primarily a seasonal activity occurring between August and October. Extracting vegetable oil from coconut is also a major economic activity in the community [32]. Fieldwork for this study was undertaken between June and September 2013 and in May 2016. Semi-structured and in-depth in- terviews, field observation, informal conversations, and documentary analysis were used in the data collection. The method allows for tracing the land acquisition processes, valuation of land and compensation of farmers. The Ghana Gas project covers 300 acres of land and its construction affected over 120 farmers at Atuabo and its suburbs, Assemnda Suazo, and Anokyi [32]. A.D. Ablo, V.K. Asamoah Energy Research & Social Science 41 (2018) 191–198 193 35 farmers comprising seventeen men and eighteen women were interviewed, including those cultivating food crops and perennial crops (Table 1). Issues discussed included the farmers’ level of participation in various processes and negotiations during the land acquisition process and in the valuation of their crops. The farmers’ experiences and views on the adequacy of the compensation were also discussed. Additionally, various strategies deployed by the farmers to cope with the loss of land were also discussed. Key informants were interviewed, including officials of the Eastern Nzema Traditional Council. The traditional council controls and ad- ministers all stool lands1 in its jurisdiction. The issues discussed in- cluded the roles of the council in the negotiation process, their en- gagement with the community members on the land acquisition process and their perception of the adequacy of the compensation paid to af- fected farmers. Other key informants interviewed are officials of Ghana Gas, the Land Valuation Division (LVD) of the Lands Commission (the statutory body mandated to determine compensation in times of com- pulsory land acquisition) and Imani Ghana (a policy think tank). 4. Land tenure and land acquisition in Ghana Land ownership in Ghana is predominantly customary – mainly stool, skins, clans and families. The customary land regime constitutes about 78% of land ownership in the country, while the rest is privately owned or under state control [33]. Land management is governed by both customary and common laws [34]. These ownership and man- agement structures have bearing on access to land and livelihood. The term customary land does not connote universality across Ghana since the land tenure system varies spatiotemporally. In Southern Ghana, among the Ewes and the Ga-Adangme where a patrilineal system of inheritance ascension operates, the land is usually vested in families [35]. However, amongst the Akan group with matrilineal inheritance, the land is vested in stools even though families can sometimes own land [36]. The position of the chief as the occupant of the stool is that of the custodian of the land in trust for the people [35,37]. It means that all subjects of the chief have right to the land for economic activities. Among the Nzemas, part of the larger Akan group, ownership of land is intricately linked with membership of a lineage which is shaped by their conception of life and is the main reason for the matrilineal in- heritance system. Regardless of the land tenure type, Article 20(1) of Ghana’s con- stitution allows for compulsory acquisition of land for town and country planning, defence, public safety and other purposes that will benefit the nation as a whole [28,34,35,38]. The construction of a gas processing plant to transport and process gas from Ghana’s oil fields to augment the country’s energy deficit is a strategic investment that warrants compulsory land acquisition within the terms outlined in the constitu- tion. Article 20(2) of the constitution requires the state to promptly pay an adequate and fair compensation to landowners. Further, Article 20(3) requires that where the compulsory acquisition of land by the state results in the displacement of occupants, the state shall resettle those affected on another suitable land that will ensure economic sus- tainability and with due regards to their social and cultural values [38]. Large-scale land acquisitions, whether by the state through com- pulsory acquisition or by investors, has implication for livelihood. In their study of compulsory land acquisition in Ghana, Larbi, Antwi and Olomolaiye [28] conclude that compulsory land acquisition has largely had negative effects on communities including exacerbating poverty, landlessness and increased tension between the state and affected communities. Other studies by Aha and Ayitey [39] on large-scale land acquisition for biofuel investments shows limited farmers’ participation in the processes leading up to the land acquisition. The authors argue this often creates tenure insecurity and uncertainty while farmers are also not paid fair and adequate compensation. But as Boamah and Overa [40] show, social institutions play a crucial role in mediating the impacts of these large-scale land acquisitions. They demonstrate how disposed farmers draw on social networks to acquire new productive lands. Irrespective of the context, large-scale land acquisition either by the state or by private investors affects the livelihood of people [41–43]. The institutional context and level of actors’ participation in the processes relating to land acquisition – as we argue in this paper – has significant implications for livelihoods. The next section presents the chieftaincy institution and the livelihoods of the people of Atuabo, the site of the Ghana Gas project. 5. Land access, and participation and compensation processes associated with the Ghana Gas project in Atuabo 5.1. Land administration systems in Atuabo The institution of chieftaincy plays an important role in Ghanaian society. Consequently, chieftaincy plays out in the Ghana Gas land acquisition, compensation and the drive towards achieving alternative livelihoods in the community. The chieftaincy institution is one of the most important customary institutions in Ghana and is categorised into centralised and non-centralised systems [44]. Under the centralised system, societies recognise the position and the authority of chiefs/ kings as rulers over a clearly delimited area; whereas, in non-cen- tralised systems, societies, lineages or small kin groups provide the largest political units. Most ethnic groups in southern Ghana including the Akan, Ga-Adamgme and Ewe have centralised customary systems [37]. Chiefs are the custodians of stool land and in the case of Atuabo, it is the Omanhene. The chief is responsible for keeping the land in trust for the people who have the right to use the land for ‘nourishment’. For farmers to access and cultivate land in Atuabo, they must inform and ask permission from the chief. This permission is usually sorted by presenting a bottle of schnapps and some amount of money to the chief. Under the stool land administration, an individual is only allowed to cultivate food crops for sustenance. In Atuabo, 15 of the 35 farmers interviewed access their land through this arrangement. A second land administration system identified at Atuabo is the freehold system where the land is accessed through familial lineage. The people of Atuabo are Nzemas and are part of the larger Akan group made of seven acephalous, dispersed matrilineal clans [45]. Like other Akan groups, all Nzemas by birth are members of their mother’s lineage [45] which entitles them to land vested in the lineage. The head of each lineage (abusua kpanyinli in Nzema), usually a male descendant from the matrilineal lineage, is the leading representative of the lineage (he is not necessarily the eldest of the lineage). Among other things, he presides over legal issues, marriages, funerals, succession, and im- portantly, the allotment of land to family members. He defends the lineage of all land arbitrations [29]. The study found that 14 informants in Atuabo accessed their land through their matrilineal kinship. Under the freehold system, farmers are free to cultivate any type of crop. Although rights of inheritance are only through membership of a maternal lineage, children could inherit farms or land from their Table 1 Community and Gender of farmers interviewed. Source: Authors’ fieldwork, 2013. Communities Men Women Total Atuabo 9 8 17 Assemda Suazo 7 8 15 Anokye 1 2 3 Total 17 18 35 1 Stool lands are parcels of lands belonging to a chiefdom/kingdom held in trust for the community by the chief. A.D. Ablo, V.K. Asamoah Energy Research & Social Science 41 (2018) 191–198 194 fathers. When the child dies, the farm could be passed on to the next generation (third generation), but thereafter the land then reverts to abusa system where the maternal family of the grandfather claims rent for the land or the land would revert to the man’s maternal family after his death. Such lands can only be used for the cultivation of food crops. This practice is considered an extension of the role of fathers to nurture of children and wives. A third land administration system and means of accessing land found at Atuabo is the abusa system. Abusa is a contract where a portion of land is given to an outsider who is not a member of the family to cultivate. In accordance with the rules of the abusa system, a third of the produce from the farm goes to the landowner or the holder of the land right. The remaining two-thirds is for the tenant. Within the Nzema culture, it is a responsibility imposed on landowning families to give land to those who do not have it, so that they can feed themselves. This responsibility is referred to as neazo. In this study, six interviewees access their land through neazo and they mainly cultivated food crops. The abusa system permits the landowner to cultivate coconut in-be- tween the food crops of the tenants. In such instance, the tenant does not pay a third of the product to the landowner but vacate the land when the shades of the coconut can no longer allow cultivation of food crops. 5.2. Actors participation in the determination of compensation for the gas project To highlight the livelihood impacts of the land acquisition for the gas project, the paper examines the level of participation by various actors in the compensation process and how that influences the ade- quacy of the compensation. Various actors expressed different views regarding levels of involvement in the determination of compensation paid for lost crops and livelihoods. According to affected farmers, their engagement in the process in- cluded their participation in the identification and measurement of farmlands which were aimed at avoiding conflicts over ownership and boundaries. They were, however, not part of any discussions about how much was to be paid for their crops. For the farmers, full participation entails meeting officials of Ghana Gas and LVD to value the cost of land preparation and how much they earned from the farms, which must be included in the final determination of the compensation. Study parti- cipants contend that identification and measurement of farms without any further engagement with Ghana Gas does not constitute partici- pation. The above contention was articulated by a farmer from Assemnda Suazo who stated ‘I think involvement includes many things. Can you imagine going to the market and take somebody’s items and pay the person without asking about the price? That is what happened in this case. What about the fact that we had our crops destroyed? It is not as though they paid us at that time. I think they [Ghana Gas] were just poor in dealing with us’. The farmer’s reference to a market in the Ghanaian context connotes negotiations or haggling over price or the value of an item. Additionally, the farmer refers to the destruction of their crops because, according to them, they had no information about the date when the land will be cleared for construction work to commence. This resulted in the destruction of crops since farmers were unable to harvest them. Traditional authorities also claimed they did not play any significant roles in the evaluation process. In their view, their participation in the process was largely ceremonial and the compensation processes were non-engaging. According to an elder, ‘If they had engaged us well, we would have known exactly when they were coming and inform our people accordingly to harvest their crops’. This quotation refers to the destruction of crops, because farmers were not informed about when Sinopec would move in and start construction work. On the part of the LVD, officials were of the view that the processes as far as their role as an institution were concerned involved the farmer's participation. The Western Regional Valuer, for example, asked, ‘How could we have identified the farms and their owners without their [farmers] cooperation? If they told you we did not involve them, that cannot be the case. Maybe, they were not talking about us’. From the perspective of the LVD, the farmers fully participated in the land ac- quisition process since they were present when the lands were identi- fied, measured and accordingly signed certificates to that effect. In addition to identifying and measuring the land, the LVD also estimated the current value of the land and crops, and anything on the land, such as houses or any other structures and investments. This process, however, does not include the views of farmers. The LVD of- ficial also notes: ‘we [LVD] estimate an amount below which no land ac- quiring entity can pay the farmers, but I can also tell you in most cases, the land acquiring entities, then sit with the farmers and negotiate how much they could add to our estimates’. The LVD simply provides the minimum compensation below which the land acquiring entity cannot pay af- fected inhabitants. The director of the LVD, notes that in most cases ‘any payment above the estimates stipulated by the LVD is a matter of negotiation between the community and the company involved’. In most cases in Ghana the final compensation to farmers is not solely based on what the LVD recommends, rather an outcome of negotiation between the land ac- quiring entity and the local community. This was not the case at Atuabo. The LVD official present when the compensation was paid to the farmers observed that the exact amounts estimated by LVD were what was paid to the farmers. Additionally, contrary to provisions in Article 20(2) which requires prompt payment of compensation, farmers at Atuabo received their compensation six months after the land was acquired. Officials of Ghana Gas explained that the seeming lack of engage- ment with the farmers on the determination of compensation estimates arose because of the farmers’ lack of understanding of the position of the law. Ghana Gas’ position is that accusation of the company for non- involvement is out of place since LVD is the body with the mandate to carry out such functions (estimation of values of property): LVD per- formed its role and Ghana Gas honoured its recommendations. 5.3. Fairness and adequacy of compensations for crops and lost livelihoods What constitutes ‘fair and adequate compensation’ is a matter of debate. There have been discrepancies in payment of compensation depending on the purpose for which the land has been acquired. Lands acquired for commercial purposes attract higher compensation com- pared to land acquired for government infrastructural projects. It is almost impossible, however, to determine ‘adequate compensation’ for land as societies ascribe different values to land. Among the Nzemas the function of land is ‘nourishment’ and as a farmer expressed, ‘my land is my identity, and how much money do you [the researchers] think can adequately compensate me?’. Indeed, the farmers view above stems from the differential significance of land to people which is influenced by societal norms, values, culture and belief systems. As outlined in Article 20(3) of Ghana’s constitution, compensation for compulsory land ac- quisition must not only ensure the economic stability of those affected but must be done with regards for the social and cultural values of people. In Atuabo, both food and cash crop farmers did not feel adequately compensated. Coconut and oil palm farmers felt there should have been an agreed price for each coconut and oil palm tree based on their ma- turity. Such agreement would have required thorough engagement between the farmers, traditional authorities, Ghana Gas and the LVD. A coconut farmer at Assemnda Suazo said ‘we had trees [coconut and oil palm] on our farms, and they were talking about measurement. All I wanted was that my trees are counted and the money paid accordingly’. Another farmer notes that he would have become ‘a rich man’ if the compen- sation was paid for the number of trees and their maturity on the farm in addition to compensation for the land. Generally, the farmers felt they were cheated and a farmer who owned seven acres of coconut and oil palm farm expressed his A.D. Ablo, V.K. Asamoah Energy Research & Social Science 41 (2018) 191–198 195 frustration: ‘Considering how much I earn from my coconut farm alone and what they paid me, the money looks like a peanut. At least they should have asked me how much I earn anytime I harvest the coconuts. If they think I will lie, they could have waited for me to collect and sell them in their presence for them to have an idea. In fact, it is such a great loss, and the compensation [is small and] I just don’t want to talk about it’. The farmer received US$ 2750 as compensation. According to this farmer, he earns a little over US$226 every three months. He also earns between US$11 and US$45 biweekly from his oil palm trees intercropped with the coconuts de- pending on the season. A copra merchant buys 100 pieces of coconut for US$4 while a big bunch of oil palm sells for about US$1.8. While the coconut is collected every three months, the oil palm is harvested every two weeks during the peak season between March and July. The local variety of coconut cultivated in the area has a lifespan of 80–100 years (Communication with Eastern Nzema Traditional Council, 2013). A coconut tree bears between 70 and 150 fruits a year depending on the stage of life and care. Clearly, the farmers felt if they were actively engaged in the process, these details would have been taken into con- sideration in determining the compensation. Food crops are valued less than perennial crops. A woman who received US$4.30 for her cassava and pineapple farm expressed her shock: ‘When they mentioned my name, and I saw that amount [US$4.30] against it, I thought it was a mistake but that is what they said my crops were worth. It was my farm, and I know how much I earned from it. I am not exaggerating, but I can tell you the pineapples alone can fetch me more than US$23 per season. It was painful and unimaginable but that is exactly what happened to me’. Another farmer who cultivates cassava and vegetables also felt badly treated and notes that: ‘The money they gave me, how many months am I supposed to use it? I had cultivated my land for decades, now they have taken it and in its place, they gave me US$33’. Officials of Ghana Gas note that the compensation amounts paid to farmers were estimates submitted to it by a statutory body, LVD which they deemed fair and adequate. The official, however, acknowledged that the compensation given to the farmers for lost livelihoods falls short of being adequate since it is difficult to arrive at what constitutes ‘adequate compensation’. The official notes: ‘Yes, in the legal sense, [the compensation is adequate]. But adequacy as in the sense, [of the receiver maintaining the same level or improved livelihood] there was no way it can be. In any case, it was a compulsory acquisition. The people never in- vited us to come and take their land for compensation because they were tired keeping their lands. If you think about intergenerational inheritance, then you can see that no amount of money can compensate people for their land. We are all Ghanaians, and we know what land means to us. In fact, the monies given to the farmers for their crops were peanuts and I am sure it is finished long ago’. He further notes that cash alone is inadequate to compensate for lost livelihoods and claimed that ‘it is for this reason the company will implement its alternative livelihood programme in the project’s catchment areas’. No details on the type and timeline for any such al- ternative livelihood project was provided at the time of the data col- lection. Rural livelihoods depend greatly on natural resources including land, as in the case of Atuabo [9]. Farmers experienced different levels of shocks because of the loss of their farms. As one of the farmers put it ‘It is hard to wake up one day realising that you do not have a farm any- more. Even though we knew about it [losing their lands] for some time….it was hard to imagine. The farm was all I had and unfortunately, my area was part of the earliest to be cleared. I felt even worse off when crops on the farm were destroyed because we were not aware of the date they will start clearing the land. It was a hard moment’ (A 42-year-old food crop farmer at Atuabo). Contrary, officials from Ghana Gas were of the view that once the farmers were informed about the acquisition and their lands mea- sured, the company had no obligation to inform them any further about the commencement of construction work. The company believed the farmers should have harvested the crops soon after the lands were identified. Clearly, there was limited communication and engagements between Ghana Gas and the local farmers. Beyond the lack of participation and farmers feeling inadequately compensated, the people of Atuabo felt they were deprived of any job opportunities on the project. A key expectation was that the gas project, and Ghana’s oil and gas industry in its entirety, will employ a sig- nificant number of people. In Atuabo, farmers who lost their lands had hopes of finding work as labourers during the construction stage of the gas plant. However, the project failed to provide the expected jobs for the community members. This was attributed first, to the fact that Sinopec had a large Chinese workforce that travelled with the company to Ghana. During our visit to the construction site, we noted that many of the workers were Chinese nationals, except for housekeeping roles which Ghanaians were doing. Secondly, members of the Atuabo com- munity blamed the CEO of Ghana Gas whom they accused of ensuring that the few employment opportunities available were taken by locals from his hometown, Esiama. As an informant observed, ‘It all boils down to the Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana Gas Company; he is from Esiama and brought a lot of them to work here while we watch. Can you imagine even the community relation officer [of Ghana Gas] does not come from here, he’s from Alabokazo? Those two [the CEO and the community re- lations officer] made sure our people were not employed’. Although Ghana Gas has a local office at Atuabo, most of the youth claimed they were unsuccessful in getting cleaning jobs. Those who were successful at getting jobs at Sinopec were paid US$3 per day for 12 h work. This low wage by Sinopec was a disincentive for qualified Ghanaians to seek employment with the company. It is noteworthy that most of the farmers lack the expertise and experience in the construction sector. Our observations suggest the only jobs open to them were in security, manual labour, housekeeping and other unskilled jobs. 6. Discussion of findings The discovery and production of oil and gas in commercial quan- tities has the potential to promote the social and economic transfor- mation of societies [1]. In several developing countries including Ghana, various approaches such as processing of gas are deployed to increase the benefits from the extractive sector. In addition to Ghana’s local content law [2,6,7,46], processing gas from the Jubilee Field is essential for stabilising energy supply and potentially promote a broad- based structural transformation of the country’s economy. Critical to ensuring that national development projects do not have negative consequences for societies is active participation of all actors in such development initiatives. The successful mobilisation of liveli- hood assets [22] in rural communities is influenced by the organisa- tional and institutional context of the community [26,27]. Embedded within these institutions are gender, age and social positions which mediate different ways of accessing land, the type of crops grown, the compensation one can claim and the resources available for adaptation strategies. 6.1. Institutions, entitlement and livelihood adaptation strategies in Atuabo The study identified three main avenues by which people access to land at Atuabo. The first is access to family land through matrilineal kinship. Kinship ties entitle farmers to cultivate crops without ‘institu- tional restrictions’ that exist in other ways of accessing land. The second is access right granted by the paramount chief (the Omanhene). Regarded as the nourisher of his subjects, the chief not only grant access but also influences the type of crop farmers cultivate. As part of his responsibility and in response to the changes induced by the gas pro- ject, the chief is supposed to make land available to landowning fa- milies and farmers in general who were disposed of their land. Social relations [18,23] therefore, are an important asset that can be drawn on to access new parcels of land and adapt to changes induced by the gas processing plant. A third avenue through which farmers access land in Atuabo is the abusa system where the cultural norms require land- owners to grant the land right to other members of the community who A.D. Ablo, V.K. Asamoah Energy Research & Social Science 41 (2018) 191–198 196 do not have land. The institutional configuration of the community [47], including social relations or social capital, are part of farmers’ entitlement [13] and plays an important role in access to land [19]. The abusa system enables some farmers who lost their lands to access other parcels of land for farming. Drawing on Sen’s [12–14] entitlement framework and mapping out the land access rights of the farmers, we found that the type of access right a farmer has determined the type of crops they produced. This link between land access and crop choice has implications for the value of the compensation they receive, since cash crops were valued higher than food crops. We concur with Bebbington [19], Scoones [17] and Carney [22], therefore, that there is a need to focus on people’s access to livelihood assets since access to one form of asset is a means to access other forms. The gas project is enabled by an institutional framework for com- pulsory land acquisition for projects that are in the ‘public interest.’ However, the same law that entitles the state to take control of land belonging to individuals and stools for national development (Article 20(1)) also provides for prompt payment of ‘fair and adequate’ com- pensation [28,38,48]. Furthermore, from a sustainable livelihoods perspective Article 20 (2) and Article 20 (3) are intended to ensure that events driven by organizations and institutions external to rural com- munities do not exacerbate their vulnerability [19,25] and increase poverty [18,21]. Our findings indicate that participation and compen- sation processes, and the value of compensation paid to farmers, simply meet statutory requirements and, in practice, have exacerbated the vulnerability of farmers in Atuabo. Additionally, while farmers in Atuabo feel entitled to employment opportunities on the project, their lack of requisite skills and experience (human capital) [22] have limited their chances of securing employment as an adaptation strategy. 6.2. Local participation in the determination of compensation In general, participation by actors at all levels is important for the success of development projects and for ensuring that those affected are adequately compensated. Contestation about participation processes in resource governance is not uncommon, reflecting tensions among dif- ferent stakeholders. In the case of the Atuabo gas project, key stake- holders include the Government of Ghana (represented by Ghana Gas and LVD), chiefs and the community members. Based on our findings, we argue that the eventual determination of the value of compensation that farmers receive for lost livelihood should be an outcome of active deliberation between all these actors, which has not been the case in Atuabo. Our study found that Ghana Gas failed to involve farmers and tra- ditional authorities in any of the decision-making processes, beyond informing them about decisions taken by the company. For example, because farmers and traditional authorities were not actively engaged by Ghana Gas, some farmers were not able to harvest their crops before the lands were cleared for construction. The non-participatory nature of the activities of Ghana Gas created shocks [22,25] and increased the vulnerability of the farmers. If the farmers were informed in time about the commencement of the construction, they could have harvested their crops which are an important resource [16,23] that could aid their adaptation and transition, considering the changes induced by the gas project. The valuation done by the LVD involved the farmers, albeit on a limited scale. The LVD did not engage the farmers and discuss with them the criteria used in determining the amount to be paid. This low level of participation shows three things. First, it portrays the potential of states to act as an ‘authoritarian entity’ that can take land because it has the power to, and pay whatever it deems fit for the livelihoods of people on the land. This is not unique in the case of Atuabo as other compulsory land acquisitions in Ghana [28,38] and other African countries [49] have also had little participation by affected commu- nities. Second, it depicts a classic example of a top-down approach to development planning and management. The land acquisition process and compensation decisions were taken by state institutions with lim- ited inputs from the Atuabo farmers. Third, it displays institutional weakness and an asymmetric power relation across the scale. There is an asymmetrical power relationship between the farmers, traditional authorities and state institutions. This affects farmers’ abilities to mo- bilize livelihood resources [18–21,25,26] and negotiate for an adequate compensation for their lost livelihood. 6.3. A fair and adequate compensation for lost livelihoods in Atuabo? An important question is whether the compensation paid to farmers for the lost livelihood is adequate. What constitutes adequate com- pensation is subjective. As we have argued for the case of the Atuabo gas project, arriving at adequate compensation will require active participation by all stakeholders (including farmers) in the processes and at various stages in determining how much is paid. Such a level of participation would have ensured that the views of farmers were taken into consideration. It would also create a sense of satisfaction among affected farmers when their perspectives were considered. This is re- levant because socio-cultural values and relations that the Nzemas have for their lands [29] cannot be satisfied merely through financial re- wards. Local participation that creates an atmosphere of trust and re- spect for inhabitants’ cultural values and norms by the government in acquiring the land for national development could have increased farmers’ sense of satisfaction. Our findings support a central claim of the sustainable livelihoods approach, which is that livelihood assets are not simply resources on which people depend but also give people the capability to be and to act [19]. Critically, the level of compensation paid to the affected farmers may not promote their capabilities in adapting to the changes taking place in their community. By failing to take into consideration farmers’ views and the inter- generational significance of cash crops (coconut and oil palm), the gas project did not adequately compensate farmers. Some farms were an inheritance handed to these farmers by their parents, which they will also hand over to their children. Additionally, the compensation paid to farmers did not value farmers’ labour in cultivating crops. The land acquisition process adopted by Ghana Gas as an external organization [16,19–21] effectively appropriated land from farmers in the Atuabo area. The sudden loss of land, an important asset [19,20,25] for rural livelihood, was experienced as a shock to the farmers [16,17,22,50] and was compounded by an atmosphere of uncertainty that surrounded the project. The external nature of the influence, which farmers had no power to prevent, derives from the power of the state to acquire land in any part of the country for projects deemed to be in the ‘national in- terest’. Farmers’ vulnerability does not end with the immediate loss of land and livelihoods but has long-term consequences. 7. Conclusion The construction of the Atuabo Gas processing plant carries with it huge expectations to provide a catalyst for national development by stabilising the supply of gas for electricity generation, providing quality jobs and subsequently increasing government revenue [32]. The loca- tion of the gas processing plant may attract related business and, po- tentially, may put in motion a process of transforming Atuabo into a modern industrial port city. The gas infrastructure project, however, has a dual effect and produced winners and losers. At the national scale, gas used for power generation from the project will reduce by half the US$ 3 million per day that Ghana’s main power producer (the Volta River Authority) spends on fuelling its thermal power plants. However, by drawing on the SLA [12,13] which focuses on peoples’ capabilities and assets [see 16,17–20] we have shown the various ways by which the gas project has negatively affected farmers in Atuabo. The limited scope of affected farmers’ participation in processes relating to land acquisition and compensation payments exacerbated the stress and shocks [20] farmers experienced from compulsory purchase of their A.D. Ablo, V.K. Asamoah Energy Research & Social Science 41 (2018) 191–198 197 land by the state. Additionally, the capability [12,13,17,18] of farmers to respond and adapt to the changes induced by the gas project was also adversely affected by these processes, and their low level of participa- tion in land acquisition. Farmers lost land and other livelihood re- sources to the project and were inadequately compensated. In the case of farmers who do not own the land on which they had their farms, they did not only lose their livelihood source but did not receive compen- sation since the compensation for the land is paid to the landowners. Beyond farmers, local businesses that depended on the produce of farmers (coconut, oil palm fruit) as raw materials or a trading com- modity were also adversely affected (although beyond the scope of our study). Our case study of Atuabo has shown that land acquisition for energy infrastructures and its related business, while essential for national development, can have detrimental consequences for rural livelihoods. If the presence of the gas plant attracts other businesses and eventually transforms the local economy of Atuabo, this could limit the availability of land for agricultural purposes. 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for the gas project Fairness and adequacy of compensations for crops and lost livelihoods Discussion of findings Institutions, entitlement and livelihood adaptation strategies in Atuabo Local participation in the determination of compensation A fair and adequate compensation for lost livelihoods in Atuabo? Conclusion References