African Geographical Review ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rafg20 Land governance and access dynamics in Sekondi- Takoradi, Ghana Ernestina Ohenewaah Denchie, Austin Dziwornu Ablo & Ragnhild Overå To cite this article: Ernestina Ohenewaah Denchie, Austin Dziwornu Ablo & Ragnhild Overå (2021) Land governance and access dynamics in Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana, African Geographical Review, 40:4, 364-377, DOI: 10.1080/19376812.2020.1831560 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2020.1831560 Published online: 09 Oct 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 174 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rafg20 AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 2021, VOL. 40, NO. 4, 364–377 https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2020.1831560 Land governance and access dynamics in Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana Ernestina Ohenewaah Denchiea, Austin Dziwornu Ablob and Ragnhild Overåc aOperations Department, Community Water and Sanitation Agency, Cape Coast, Ghana; bDepartment of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana; cDepartment of Geography, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY The past decade’s petroleum industry-related urban expansion has fueled Received 2 April 2019 a growing demand for land with increasing conflicts in Sekondi-Takoradi. Accepted 25 September 2020 With an emphasis on land conflict resolution processes, it is argued that KEYWORDS whether conflicts are resolved by traditional authorities or the court, Land governance; legal actors with advantageous combinations of economic resources, power, pluralism; land conflicts; or state support, are likely to win. Characterized by legal pluralism, rapid petroleum industry; Sekondi- urbanization and intensifying land pressure, land conflicts remain unre- Takoradi; Ghana solved. Formal institutional mechanisms must be reformed and improved to safeguard the land interests of vulnerable social groups who often lose out in informal land access negotiations processes. 1. Introduction The increasing competition for land in African cities results in conflicts among chiefs, landowners, government agencies, private real estate developers and multinational corporations (Byerlee & Deininger, 2013; Nolte & Väth, 2015). In Ghana, land tenure systems in rapidly urbanizing communities have become less effective in managing conflicts due to high land pressure and power imbalances between interest groups (Ablo et al., 2020; Fred-Mensah, 1999; Oteng-Ababio, 2011). Oteng-Ababio (2011) intimates that the combination of and blurred boundaries between traditional land tenure systems and formal or statutory land tenure regulations, with unclear delineations of responsibilities among the actors involved, commonly results in land conflicts and governance challenges. Contestation of land in Ghana is high and deeply rooted in tenure arrangements with control over land vested in family elders, clan heads, chiefs and the state (Amanor et al., 2008; Boamah, 2014). The abuse of such authority to the detriment of others often results in contestations among user groups (Yeboah & Oppong, 2015). Struggles over land often lead to maneuvering by actors defending their territories (Boamah & Overå, 2016). In the Upper West Region of Ghana for instance, (Kansanga et al., 2019) argue that land tenure is characterized by pronounced ethno- territorial land boundary conflicts resulting from lack of documentation, weakened traditional tenure, and statutory interferences. Other scholars point to the dominance of household heads in family landholdings which leads to uneven land allocation, limiting the youth’s land-related activities (Brobbey, 2019; Kidido & Lengoiboni, 2019). The role of the state, local communities, private investors and real estate developers in land acquisitions are well documented (Ablo & Asamoah, 2018; Boamah & Overå, 2016; Wisborg, 2013; Wolford et al., 2013). Land tenancy is characterized by the co-existence of traditional and statutory CONTACT Austin Dziwornu Ablo aablo@ug.edu.gh © 2020 The African Specialty Group of the Association of American Geographers AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 365 systems resulting in overlapping rights, contradictory roles, and competing authorities. The increasing land-related conflicts and the conflicting role of actors are outcomes of a weak urban governance system and asymmetric power relations between actors where the elite class can amass wealth through land allocation, sale and usage at the expense of the less powerful members of society (Amanor et al., 2008; Oteng-Ababio, 2011). The Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly (STMA) is experiencing massive transformation due to its location close to Ghana’s oil and gas fields. Since the start of petroleum production in 2010, Sekondi-Takoradi has attracted both Ghanaian and foreign labor migrants and investors, resulting in high demand for land for business activities including real estate, office buildings, commercial areas and factories with an attendant increase in land-related conflicts (Adjei Mensah et al., 2019). Grounded in political ecology and drawing on the concepts of institutions and legal plural- ism, we highlight the increasing land disputes in Sekondi-Takoradi. The paper shows the complex intersections between traditional and statutory land governance arrangements. Analyzing the strategies and power relations involved in land conflict resolution in the STMA, we argue that, when legal pluralism persists in a situation characterized by rapid urbanization and intensifying land pressure, many land disputes remain unresolved. We recommend that formal institutional mechanisms must be put in place to safeguard the interests of vulnerable social groups. 2. Political ecology of land governance in Ghana Political ecology (PE) approaches can unravel the ‘complex relations between nature and society through analysis of social forms of access and control over resources’ (Peet & Watts, 2004, p. 4). Early PE research focused on the political dynamics of the struggles over environmental resources in developing countries (Bryant, 1998). Attention is on multilevel connections as well as decision- making and hierarchies of power that shape access to and control of resources (Svarstad et al., 2018). PE approaches are essential for exploring the continually shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources in the context of changing social relations (Robbins, 2011). To deconstruct the dynamics of power in access to land, attention must be paid to cultural processes as embedded in their political and economic contexts. In the changing urban setting of the STMA it is imperative to explore the structural power relations occurring between societies and the biophysical environments (Greenberg & Park, 1994; Peet & Watts, 2004; Svarstad et al., 2018). In their analysis of large scale land acquisition for commercial agriculture in Ghana, Schoneveld and German (2014) argue that while legal recognition of customary land rights remains essential, it does not offer customary land users the protection they need. Land users within the customary regime are responsible for contesting infringements upon their rights. The contention is that in such a context, traditional authorities can capture land rents as weaker users cannot claim or protect their rights. The growing petroleum industry and rapid urbanization are transforming land use and access rights in the Sekondi-Takoradi area. PE approaches provide an apt conceptual lens to analyze how political, social, and economic differences among actors in the oil city account for the uneven distribution of costs and benefits (Kansanga et al., 2019). We explore power asymmetries and how the increased demand for land reinforces or reduces existing social and economic inequalities with regards to access to and use of land. The paper explores the changing relationships developing through everyday interactions concerning land governance in Sekondi-Takoradi. Importantly the regulatory and mediating role of institutions as well as power dynamics is analyzed to show the factors that determine ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in land disputes. 366 E. O. DENCHIE ET AL. 2.1. Institutions, legal pluralism, and land governance The coexistence of state and traditional land administration often leads to multiple ownership claims in situations where access to wealth and authority are undergoing rapid change (Kansanga et al., 2019; Janine M; Ubink, 2008). When actors defend their claims over land, ‘several competing normative orders may be brought to bear to legitimise a specific claim, and individuals and groups may compete over who has the jurisdiction to settle disputes and set norms by precedent’ (Lund, 2011, p. 9). Authority exercised over land may involve institutional regulations that describe and prescribe human actions (Lund, 2011) or that facilitate and constrain social action (Agrawal, 2001; Schoneveld & German, 2014). Institutions describe and prescribe human activities through rule- making, and settlement of disputes. The regulation of relations between individuals could take the form of assigning statuses, ranks, and defining subjects. Institutional control also involves a stipulation of processes that one must follow in accessing land and can thus, facilitate or hinder people’s access to land (Boamah, 2014). Institutional arrangements are essential in understanding decision-making processes in land governance and dispute resolution. In the event of land conflict, institutions become ‘the primary mechanisms available to mediate, soften, attenuate, structure, mold, accentuate, and facilitate [the] outcomes and actions’ (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999, p. 637). Situations where the laws, rules and obligations that govern land ownership and rights entail a simultaneous interplay of formal and informal institutions engaged in land administration and conflict resolution, are termed legal pluralism (Crook et al., 2007). Different forms of land tenure are termed customary/traditional or state/statutory, depending on the characteristics and structures of management involved (Agbosu et al., 2007). Land governance in Ghana is characterized by legal pluralism – the co-existence of both customary and statutory land administration in a complex mix and a range of institutions claiming rights and authority over land, and therefore involving multiple bodies for resolving land conflicts (Agbosu et al., 2007; Larbi, 2006). Typical of customary land tenure which makes up 78% of land ownership in Ghana, are unwritten codes based on local practices and norms that are flexible, negotiable and location- specific (Ablo & Asamoah, 2018; Agbosu et al., 2007; Boamah, 2014). Traditional authorities are headed by a chief, who holds the allodial title of communally owned land. Traditional political institutions claim control over defined territories identified by shared culture and language (Nukunya, 2003). Colonialism altered the traditional form of land administration, leading to the state, managing 20% of land (Kasanga & Kotey, 2001). The Ghana government acquires state land through the State Land Act, 1962 (Act 125), which permits the state to take over land compulsorily for purposes of national development. In Sekondi-Takoradi, the coexistence of state and traditional land administration often leads to multiple ownership of land and land claims since processes of contestation for access to wealth and authority are undergoing rapid change (Janine M Ubink, 2008; Janine M; Ubink & Quan, 2008). Multiple ownership exists when more than one person or groups claim ownership (whether real or imagined) and possess documentation or a legitimate genealogical narrative to support their ownership of a piece of land. Studies have shown that most lands in Ghana are subject to conflicts, frustrations, competition and overlapping claims by different actors in defending their rights of ownership against rival claims (Biitir & Nara, 2016). 3. Study context and methods The Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis is the regional capital of the Western Region of Ghana. The twin city is the third-largest city in Ghana and the most urbanized and developed among the 22 districts in the Western Region (GSS, 2012). The STMA is also a major hub of industrial activity in Ghana, hosting 60% of all industries in the Western Region (Ablo, 2019). The major industrial sectors include mining and quarrying, electricity power generation, metal fabrication, manufacturing, AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 367 agro- and forest product processing, tourism, and since 2007, petroleum industry services, which have accelerated land-use change. As can be seen from Figure 1, the land cover composition in 1985 included 68% dense vegetation, 25% built environment and 7% water bodies. Satellite images from 2010 (see Figure 2) however, show a decline of dense vegetation to 32% while sparse vegetation (which did not exist in 1985) now makes up 35% of the land cover. Water bodies reduced to 2% whereas the built environment increased to 31%. The indigenous people in STMA are Ahanta and Fante, who practice a matrilineal inheritance system and lineage organization. The three traditional area administrations in the Metropolis are, Sekondi, Essikado, and Takoradi, each headed by a paramount chief (Omanhene) supported by sub- chiefs and queen mothers (respected women chosen from the royal lineage). 3.1. Land ownership, accessibility, and registration procedures in Sekondi-Takoradi In Ghana, two broad categories of land ownership exist; customary/traditional and state/public land ownership (Nyame & Blocher, 2010). Customary land ownership can further include stool land and Figure 1. Composition of land cover in STMA in 1985. Source: Composed from Landsat 4 image accessed from USDS Explorer. Figure 2. Composition of land cover in STMA in 2010. Source: Constructed from Landsat 4 image accessed from USDS Explorer. 368 E. O. DENCHIE ET AL. family land (abusua asaase). The matrilineally organized lineages (abusua) comprise of families (also called abusua). Stool lands are held through customary law by chiefs who have the allodial titles, granting them the overall capacity as custodians of the land in their jurisdiction. The three paramount chiefs in the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis exercise autonomous control over the administration of land under their authority and oversee the affairs of several communities. A jurisdictional ruling made up of several towns that are ruled by sub-chiefs, who owe allegiance to the paramount chief, has been established in a pyramidal order. The highest order of this hierarchy is the paramount chiefs, followed by each community’s divisional chiefs and sub-chiefs with queens, who owe allegiance to the next higher order through to the paramount chief. Customary land administration is organized along this pyramidal governance structure originating from the ancestral lineage of first settlers. In addition to the paramount chief, divisional and sub-chiefs also have the right and capacity to manage and lease land. Acquisition of stool land requires a visit to the chief of the area. The applicant through the Linguist (spokesperson of chief) presents two alcoholic drinks and a nonrefundable ‘knocking fee’. The chief, together with his elders, after accepting to lease land, tasks a surveyor to accompany the applicant to the site for verification and assessment of the suitability of the land for the intended use type. The lessee applies for a so-called ‘search’, which is a document from the Regional Lands Commission (RLC) confirming the land’s vacancy and ownership. A site plan is prepared after it is confirmed that the land is vacant, and the lease completed with the final payment for the land made to the lessor.1 An indenture is prepared and signed by the chief, elders and the queen mother. Similar processes are followed in the acquisition of family lands with indentures signed by the family head and family members and sometimes witnessed by the chief or the queen mother. The procedures in the acquisition of family lands can be cumbersome due to the different signatories required for the indenture. Individuals who can afford to pay a higher amount than the stated price for the indenture may obtain it within a day or two, while others must wait for several months to several years to get the agreement. Wealth and position in society are driving factors in the acquisition of signatures. Because the lease is granted to applicants before indenture preparation, it is common for applicants to develop their land before acquiring an indenture. Unless a lessee is threatened or requested to present a lease confirmation, an indenture is not considered necessary. Requests for proofs of lease or indenture are mostly carried out by the Town and Country Planning (TCP) through the STMA with a threatening message written on new buildings: ‘Stop work, produce a permit. By STMA’. Family land (Abusua asaase), is held by groups with unlimited rights of ownership and manage- ment and legally recognized in the 1992 constitution and the national land policy of 1999. Family members have user rights on family lands ‘verbally leased’ with a token of money and drinks offered to the family head in the presence of key family members as witnesses. Despite the independence and legality of families in land ownership, family heads (Abusuapanyinfo) still submit to the chiefs in land transactions. The RLC manages the state land which is either compulsorily acquired for government projects under the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125), the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) and the State Lands (Amendment) 2005, Act 586. The RLC oversees the lease of state lands, and the process includes preparation of cadastral site plans and issuance of indentures after payment to the RLC. All land acquisition (including stool and family lands) is finalized with the issuance of land titles by the RLC while the Physical Planning Department Unit of STMA issues building permits at an extra cost. Although title registration gives a lessee the legal ownership of the land, it is generally avoided or postponed by many people due to the cost involved. The duration of lease for residential purposes is 99 years and 50 years for industrial and agricultural land uses. AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 369 3.2. Methods The study is an outcome of extended fieldwork that took place inSekondi-Takoradi between May to July 2015, and in May 2017 and November 2019. The study is grounded in a case study research design involving the in-depth investigation of contemporary phenomena (see Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2013). The case study approach enabled us to map dynamics of land conflicts, values, power relations and interrelations between people and institutions, and to understand how the oil and gas industry is transforming land access. Key informant interviews were conducted either in English or Twi depending on the language used by the informant. Interviewees were purposively selected (see Creswell, 2013) based on their position and role in land acquisition procedures, knowledge about the land tenure and involvement in conflicts or resolution processes in the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis. A total of 80 respondents were interviewed including 56 key informants and 24 community members. Table 1 is a summary of the categories of informants interviewed and the issues broached. A central part of the data collection was observation where we visited courts to observe proceeding in conflict resolution procedures. As Yin (2013) argues, observation whether through seeing, smelling, touching or hearing is an integral part of geography as it allows researchers to gain a much broader understanding of the phenomenon under study. In this study, observation data complemented data produced through interviews, which improved our understanding of the land access dynamics. The observation was carried out by sitting through court hearings relating to land conflicts. To understand these observations in their contemporary socio-political context we engaged in informal conversations with court officials and lawyers. Further, we tracked prominent land conflicts, some of which are presented as illustrative cases in this article. Additionally, we visited construction sites, areas of physical expansion, sites of relocation, and sites of boundary disputes in the STMA which provided useful data. On-site observations and informal conversations, enriched our understanding of conflict resolution processes and were also used in a data triangulation process to evaluate the reliability of the interview data. Secondary data from STMA, Ghana Statistical Service, the Town and Country Planning (TCP) Department, the Lands Commission (LC), journals and court reports were also analyzed. Table 1. Overview of informant categories interviewed and the types of data generated. Informant category No Issues discussed Paramount chief 3 Land tenure and ownership, procedures for land lease, common dispute, mode of dispute resolution, factors considered in resolutions. Divisional chief 6 Land tenure and ownership, procedures for land lease, common dispute, mode of dispute resolution, factors considered in dispute resolutions. The family head, elder 8 Land tenure and ownership, procedures for land lease, common dispute, mode of dispute resolution, factors considered in resolutions Lands Commission official 2 Land registration, validation process, monitoring mechanisms, disputes, double entries STMA TCD official 1 Land use planning, monitoring mechanisms, disputes STMA Development Planning 2 Land use planning, monitoring mechanisms, disputes, the validation process. Unit official Office of Administration of Stool 4 Land tenure, dispute, mode of dispute resolution Lands official High Court official 4 Land cases, common disputes, duration of trials, influential factor Lawyers 4 Common land cases, clients involved, duration of trials, attitude of clients, winners of cases Evicted tenants 12 Land tenure, disputes, mode of dispute resolution, mode of compensation, level of satisfaction Investors, managers, land 10 Land lease source, procedures, dispute encountered, resolution mechanism, lessees satisfaction General population 24 Awareness of land disputes, knowledge of land tenure system, resolution mechanisms, preferred methods Total No. 80 370 E. O. DENCHIE ET AL. The primary data were transcribed and thematically coded according to the central themes of land governance, conflict, conflict resolution and the dynamics of power in the process. Both the primary and secondary data were thematically analyzed to map the emerging land conflicts, the views and interests of different stakeholders, conflict resolution mechanisms and the ways in which the emergent oil and gas industry has accelerated land conflicts in the STMA. 4. Land conflicts and conflict resolution procedures in Sekondi-Takoradi The rising land demand in Sekondi-Takoradi has resulted in an increased incidence of both inter- and intra-family land conflicts and investor-land user conflicts. Various configurations of eco- nomic, traditional, and state power influence the outcomes of land conflicts. 4.1. Intra-family land disputes Due to the increased demand for land for petroleum industry-related activities, family members are leasing family lands without authorization. Conflicts arise when family members lease lands with- out consulting family heads or those with user rights. Family heads and other rightful signatories are often not informed when the land is leased and these transactions often go unnoticed, particularly when plots are located at the periphery of the city, until lessees start developing the land. In one such case the interviewee, a 54-year old trader, only got to know from a family member that his plot of land had been leased after the lessee had almost completed a residential building on the land. This resulted in conflict between him and the cousin who leased the land without authorization. Conflicts also emerge over inherited lands even when they are not currently being used. Here one sibling leased inherited land to investors without the consent of other siblings. Other disputes stem from encroachment, distribution of lease money, and falsification of signatures in land transactions. Intra-family dispute resolution is led by family heads, who are usually highly respected older male family members. The disputing factions meet in their family house (Abusuafie) to present their cases to the elders. The resolutions may be a reallocation of income from the lease, redefinition of land boundaries and compensation. According to 48-year old male interviewee: You know, families are supposed to be there for each other in times of crisis and merry. If you are good to me by giving your time, energy and assets when needed, I am likely to defend you in a case. But if you are close- fisted in the family, you should know that you are tagged, and that label will affect the outcome of your [land] case. Thus, whether or not the complainants are the rightful access holder of a piece of land is one of the many factors that influence the outcome of intra-family dispute resolution mechanisms. This point is highlighted by a 53-year old female interviewee: In the family, we have the rich against the poor, women against men, and the educated against the illiterate, people who are influential in the family affairs versus the less prominent ones. There is no way for the less favoured ones to win against the powerful and influential members of the family [in land disputes]. So, to seek a fair judgment, I sought for the court. Where internal dispute resolution does not result in a fair outcome, family members may proceed to court. According to a family head, people’s status in the family is crucial in determining the outcomes of land disputes resolution. He notes that elderly, wealthy, and respected family members are favorably treated: There are times when you need to get some people closer so that they can help in times of crisis. In our family, we have a few rich men, and they usually assist us with funds for funerals. How can I deny such person access to family lands? AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 371 Another family elder echoed the view above, arguing that ‘we go to them [wealthy family members] for loans, business capital and other favors and yet they want to contest them on lands that the rich can develop for a business that we can benefit from’. These comments highlight how hierarchical social relations within the family can influence the outcome of land disputes. The significant role of social relationships and status within the family creates an environment for biases in conflict resolution. An individual’s standing in the family is a contributing factor in determining the outcome of their claims to land. Less privileged family members are likely to lose in land conflict resolved at the family level. The asymmetric power relations among family members and the influence of ‘family elites’ some- times result in disputes being sent to court. In the formal courts, everyone is treated more equally than in family meetings. Intra-family disputes are often sent to court because of the need for a neutral arbiter to enforce a solution, or because these disputes arouse the most bitter emotions. But even in the formal courts wealthy and educated family members, who can procure the services of an attorney, still have advantages over less privileged family members, who cannot afford the services of a lawyer. 4.2. Inter-family land conflicts Inter-family land conflicts involve two or more separate households in disputes about boundaries and ownership rights. Such conflicts have always existed but have intensified as the demand for and value of land has increased after the oil and gas discovery. Previously peripheral lands have become attractive locations for pipe- and tank farms, warehouses, and other facilities to service the petroleum industry. A significant cause of these conflicts is the lack of formal records on demarcation and ownership by the families involved. Inter-family disputes are first settled by the traditional authority led by the chief and elders. Here, land titles and the ability to convincingly articulate acknowledged narratives of ancestral land occupancy are vital in determining ownership. Where both families lack doc- umentation or collaborated genealogical stories, discernment is used in favor of persons who are omanba pa (‘a good citizen’). Some families, therefore, question the legitimacy of such rulings. According to a family head: ‘What would you do as a chief or family elder upon realising that land passed on through several generations has been lost due to a biased judgment resulting from who knows what profit they stand to gain? I strongly believe that the case should be reviewed at a higher level and we [the family] will pursue it to even the Supreme Court if we have to.’ Indeed, there are also doubts about the fairness of chiefs’ rulings that rely on discernment when there are no documents to support ownership. However, one elder discussing the same case revealed that oral claims are not a hundred per cent proof of ownership, particularly when both parties lack direct witnesses or evidence to support their case. In his view, ‘historical narratives are easily twisted since the original occupants and witnesses are usually deceased’. Thus, without concrete proof of ownership, the chief relies on discernment in determining the rightful owner. Here, the ability to present a coherent narrative recognized by the chief, his elders and other powerful family and community members as a legitimate version of the lineage history, is an essential form of arguing for one’s case in such negotiations. 4.3. Conflicts between investors and land users There are also conflicts between evicted land users and investors, as in the following case narrated by a 43-year old woman: I have been living on this land with my three children after my boyfriend run away to Accra. I used the right means to acquire this plot. The landowner takes monthly rent for my stay. I somehow protect the land from encroachment. So, for another buyer to come and tell me to move within a month is unfair. At least a proper 372 E. O. DENCHIE ET AL. notification of six months would have been better; that is why I am refusing to move. It will take time to get new land. Besides, this container needs to be moved to the new site, and that comes at a cost. But the money offered by the so-called new owner is not enough’. People temporarily using land for farming, shops, or mechanical workshops, are not given adequate notice by landowners when the land is leased to investors. Without written contracts between temporary land users and landowners, most evictions have no consequences to landowners. In one case of temporal land use, the landowner argued: ‘He was only a tenant and I decide who to sell my land to. He has been occupying the land for 12 years. If he had any intention of keeping the land he would have purchased and registered it’. Many land users complain about the short notice, no compensation and forced evictions when land is leased to investors. One tenant complained: ‘The man [landowner] gave me two weeks to move out with my family, which is an insult to us. As if that was not enough, he only paid 200 cedis [US$ 35] compared to the yearly rent of 600 cedis [US$ 105].’ Many investors claim that they are usually not aware of tenants on the land until the later stages of the land transaction. As an investor recounted, ‘a tenant attacked me with curses without telling me her reason. I later found out that she was operating a hair salon on the land I bought, and she was forced out without compensation. I felt bad, so I decided to compensate her myself.’ Conflicts also arise when temporary land occupants lease land without authorization from landowners. This is particularly the case when landowners not resident in Ghana give the land to caretakers (usually family members). The caretakers take advantage of the surge in land demand and lease land without the consent of landowners. A23-year old hairdresser narrated: ‘The caretaker was acting as if she was the landowner, and I had no idea. She charged me a one-year rent advance for my shop and is now asking me to relocate because someone is coming to build on the land. She [caretaker] is refusing to refund my money even though I’ve only exhausted six months.’ 4.4. The courts and land conflict resolution in Sekondi-Takoradi Land-related cases are handled by the Land and Commercial Division of the High Court in Sekondi. Preliminary processing of cases involves the police, the Metropolitan Assembly, chiefs, the Office of Administration of Stool Land, Lands Commission, or individual families. Proceedings on land cases at the High Court require that litigants employ the services of a lawyer, though litigants may opt to defend themselves. According to court officials, there has been an increase in land disputes since 2007 due to the petroleum industry and increased demand for land. The court system is however slow, ponderous, and costly. This is mainly to the disadvantage of the poor, as the case below illustrates. 4.5. Case study 1: the three migrant brothers Three brothers migrated from northern Ghana to Sekondi-Takoradi 11 years ago. They initially worked for market traders as head porters (Kayaye). In 2007, a chief granted them a piece of land to be used for five years. They paid an annual rent and started farming maise and vegetables. When their father died, the brothers traveled back to their hometown for the funeral and were away for two months. Unfortunately, as one of the brothers explained, ‘upon our return, our land had a new supposed owner [who] asked us to vacate the land within two months. Upon our refusal, the new owner started the foundation of his building and uprooted our crops.’ The brothers went to the chief to make a complaint, but they were told to comply with the eviction. The chief subsequently offered the brothers US$ 106 as compensation, which they refused since they contend that the crops on the land were worth more than the compensation amount. To resolve the dispute, the brothers went to court upon the advice of the police. They hired a lawyer at the beginning of the hearing but decided to represent themselves in court after four consecutive adjournments. One and a half year later, no judgment has been passed on the case. One of the AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 373 brothers said: ‘We are planning to abandon the case and return home [to northern Ghana] or better still find somewhere else to farm because we have lost more than enough money on this case’. The cost involved in resolving land disputes in court dissuaded the three brothers from continuing with the court hearing. Other litigants confirmed that high costs and long duration of court processes often contribute to the abrupt discontinuity of court cases. However, a lawyer informed us that ‘the adjournments are necessary to allow us to do more research on the case.’ In nine of the 12 land cases that we followed, a lawyer was engaged, while in the remaining three cases, the use of an attorney was discontinued due to the cost and the series of adjournments. According to a court official, adjournments are necessary because ‘the court must give a hearing to every case and looking at the number of cases versus number of judges and even courtrooms we cannot conclude within a short frame of time’. Another court official added: ‘Some litigants do not show up for hearings, which drags the case”. Similar assertions were made by two lawyers that their opposing lawyers do not show up with their clients causeing delays in the process. Table 2 provides the estimated costs, status, and duration of some land cases. The delays in courts may also result from the spike in land disputes, the inadequate number of court officials considering the increasing number of land litigations, the attitude of some lawyers and absenteeism of litigants. Thus, resolving land cases in court requires time, money and energy, and litigants without these resources often end up abandoning their case. As the case below illustrates, displacement can have serious livelihood implications. 4.6. Case study 2: forced eviction The Sekondi Zone of the Ghana National Association of Garages was established in 1983 to offer financial assistance and negotiate government welfare services on behalf of their members. The Association’s 1010 registered members (884 males and 126 females) include auto sprayers, auto mechanics, auto body welders, auto brake/clutch liners, electrical workers, blacksmiths, and spare parts traders. For decades, the Association’s members operated their workshops from a land area in Tanokrom close to the airport granted to them by the Aviation Department. In addition to the quarterly payment of rent, association members paid levies to the STMA. However, according an executive, the growth of the petroleum industry and increased ‘demand for land [which] has led to forced relocation from our site by the STMA to make way for the construction of a shopping mall.’ The relocated garage association members were offered new land on the outskirts of the city in the suburb Mampong. The relocation was agreed upon by STMA, the Traditional Authority and the Table 2. Cost and duration of court cases. Category of Estimated Duration of Current use of Estimated cost (US respondent Type of land case hearing Status of case a lawyer $) Plaintiff Compensation 1 year, 3 months Ongoing Yes 365 Plaintiff Ownership 2 years Closed/ Yes 652 Solved Plaintiff Ownership 8 months Ongoing Yes 156 Plaintiff Ownership 3 years Ongoing Yes 782 Plaintiff Ownership 1 year Closed/ Yes - Solved Plaintiff Encroachment 6 months Ongoing Yes 104 Defendant Compensation 1 year, 2 months Ongoing No 260 Defendant Boundary 9 months Ongoing No 156 Defendant Ownership 2 years, 7 Closed/ No 469 Solved Defendant Boundary 3 years, 8 months Discontinued Yes 260 Defendant Encroachment 6 months Ongoing Yes 156 Defendant Ownership 1 year Closed/ Yes 313 Solved Source: Fieldwork, 2015. 374 E. O. DENCHIE ET AL. executives of the Association of garages. According to STMA, the relocation was part of its goal of decongesting the city. STMA’s agenda of attracting commercial investment by foreign investors to the city, promoting growth and bolstering its image as an ‘oil city’ is however evident. Association members alleged that the influential investors have colluded with chiefs and elders in the city, leaving the artisans with little say in the decision of relocating them from their working space. As a car mechanic noted, ‘most of us [artisans] have refused the proposition deeming it as an unfair eviction because of inadequate consultation with members on the eviction, lack of proper notice before the eviction, bias by the authorities in favor of their eviction, and involvement of our executives in political party issues’. Meanwhile, the interviewed artisans claim that the new location lacks adequate electricity supply (low voltage), is far from the city center and major roads, and the poor state of the roads to the new site makes access difficult. Indeed, the Shopping Mall was erected and has been operational since 2018. A representative of the Sekondi Zone of the Association notes that: Despite our resistance, the authorities forcefully evicted our members. Many of us have lost our [movable metal/wooden] containers [functioning as workshops], tools, machines and other valuable items. The containers were removed with bulldozers under the guidance of military men. So far, only four masters [workshop owners in favor of the relocation] are stationed in the new site. The rest of us [artisans] are scattered throughout the metropolis.’ 4. Discussion While land conflicts in Ghana is not a new phenomenon (Brobbey, 2019; Kansanga et al., 2019) this study draws attention to and explains the more recent role of the petroleum industry in accentuating land conflicts as outlined in other studies like Ablo and Asamoah (2018) and Obeng-Odoom (2014). The study shows that both formal and informal institutions play inter- related roles in land management in Sekondi-Takoradi. At the traditional institutional level, chiefs and families rely on the social norms in land acquisition but still require documentation from formal institutions like the RLC and TCP to enforce their decisions made through informal negotiations according to the customary land tenure system. Thus, a plurality of institutional rules and relations is activated in land acquisition processes (Adjei Mensah et al., 2019). Importantly, the increased demand for land stemming from increased industrial and commer- cial activities in the oil and gas sector requires that traditional informal land access negotiations needs to be legitimized through formal institutional arrangements. The increased demand for land in the STMA has complicated land acquisition due to conflicting interests in land ownership between various actors hoping to cash in on the oil industry. The chiefs’ interests in land are connected to the establishment of authority (see also Boamah, 2014), and cultural and religious practices through ancestral lineages. Thus, chief’s interest in preserving their cultural and economic interest is fundamental to struggles for land with neighbors, the state (Ablo & Asamoah, 2018) and boundary conflicts with neighboring chiefs (Yeboah & Oppong, 2015). In the STMA, chiefs’ desire to assert authority over land under their jurisdiction has heightened in recent times due to increased land prices and demand. Land governance organizations in STMA operate using a set of ‘working rules’ that define and give meaning to actors (Azadi, 2020; Leach et al., 1999). The growth of the petroleum industry and the accompanying investment, in-migration, and population growth has set in motion urban sprawl as Sekondi-Takoradi is now branded as an ‘oil city’ with an accelerated demand for land. Although the social norms in land governance are still enforced by the chiefs and their elders, in the context of increased demand and land commodification, the effectiveness of the redistribution norms embedded in the existing customary land tenure system when addressing conflicts is waning (see also Azadi, 2020). As seen from the various illustrative cases, while traditional institutional arrangements and conflict resolution mechanisms are the first point of redress in any land AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 375 conflict, ultimately, the court system backed by formal land registration processes emerge as the most relevant and just institution for all parties in land disputes. The changing economic and political context in Sekondi-Takoradi is stretching the cultural norms embedded in the notion of chiefs as custodians of lands on behalf of (all) community members and transforms social relations in the struggle over land ownership and access. We argue that land access negotiation processes through family history narrations, court hearings, bureaucratic procedures and city governance is not happening in a social vacuum. Rather power relations based on economic wealth, education, gender, local citizenship, and family hierarchy position are at play and influence the outcome. The legal pluralism (Agbosu et al., 2007) characterizing land governance in STMA implies that outcomes of processes handled by traditional informal institutions are intertwined with outcomes of processes handled by formal institutions such as the LC, the TCP, the Office of Administration of Stool Land and the STMA active in land governance through the provision of search reports, land titles and building permits. Both formal and informal institutions regulate access to land and play diverse roles in settlement of land disputes, and land governance embedded in both these systems tends to favor the most resourceful stakholders in the land. For many disadvantaged groups, the court system offers a better chance of proper redress in land disputes than traditional systems of dispute resolution. However, for people who are illiterate or semi-literate, poor and/or newcomers lacking a beneficial social network and family connec- tions, the social, cultural and economic barriers to approaching formal courts and successfully engaging in court hearings are often unsurmountable. The costly and slow procedures in the courts thus hamper the potential of protecting the legal rights of disadvantaged people. 5. Conclusion This study reveals that there is a limit to the regulatory authority and efficiency of both informal and formal institutions. Individual family members may forward their cases to either the palace or the court when dissatisfied with settlements at the family level. The increased demand for land in the STMA is due to the high expectations for industrial development in the ‘oil city’. During land conflict resolution, economic power is helpful in combination with other statuses. We conclude that individuals or groups with a combination of both financial and traditional power or state support are likely winners in land conflicts. Paradoxically, it those in need of land to engage in small-scale or informal economic activity who also are the most in need of support to benefit from formalized procedures for land access. To ensure that the increased economic opportunities associated with the oil and gas industry developments can be available to ordinary citizens in the ‘oil-city’ (Overå, 2017) and not only those with sufficient financial capital and powerful social positions, the STMA should strengthen land governance systems to advance more democratic and just land access dynamics and conflict resolution processes. The reinforcement of preexisting disparities has altered power relationships and the distribution of costs and benefits from increased land investments in Sekondi-Takoradi. As we have shown, land conflicts often remain unresolved when legal pluralism persists in a situation characterized by rapid urbanization and intensifying land pressure. There is, therefore, the need for the government of Ghana to reform and improve the capacity of formal institutional mechanisms to safeguard the land interests of vulnerable social groups, such as women, migrants, and the poor, who often lose out in informal land access negotiations processes to the advantage of the more powerful members of families, investors and the bureaucracy. There is the need for the government to provide legal aid to vulnerable social groups who cannot afford the services of a lawyer in land disputes. 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