University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs) IN PREVENTING ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF GHANA BY INNOCENT BADASU (10395034) THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AUGUST, 2018 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh DECLARATION I Innocent BADASU, hereby declare that except for references to published works and materials related to the topic, which have been duly acknowledged and referenced, this dissertation is an original work written by me, under the supervision of Professors Kwaku Danso Boafo, Ransford Gyampo and Alidu Mahama Seidu. I wish to declare that this work has not been presented in part or in whole to any other degree awarding institution or University. All sources are referenced and cited in the Bibliography. …………………………….. ………………………………………….. INNOCENT BADASU PROFESSOR KWAKU DANSO BOAFO (10395034) (PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR) DATE: DATE: ………………………….. ……………………………….. DR ALIDU SEIDU PROFESSOR RANSFORD GYAMPO (SUPERVISOR) (SUPERVISOR) DATE: DATE: i University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh DEDICATION This work is dedicated to my mom, Irene Aku Dzah. I also wish to lay this work in memory of all victims of electoral violence in Africa and all organizations working towards violence prevention. ii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I began this journey by making some hard and difficult decisions. Their consequences have been dire, full of tears but in the mist of these tough and challenging times, some amazing people were more than willing to provide the needed inspiration, unconditional support to see me through. First, I wish to express my gratitude to my doctoral thesis committee; Professors Kweku Danso-Boafo, Ransford Gyampo and Alidu Mahama Seidu whose useful suggestions and comments have helped to shape the entire thesis. For me, it was not just a period of supervision but a time that offered me the opportunity to learn and be exposed to the life ahead. To you all, I say, I am eternally grateful and hope the friendship continues as I aspire for greater heights. I wish to thank the SSRC for their generous support and for believing in my intellectual capacity. My deepest of gratitude goes to Fellows within the Next-Gen Social Science Research Council Fellowship. Professors Sara Ssali, Charles Ukeje, Akosua Adomako Ampofo, Thomas Asher, Mahmood Mamdani, Adam Branch, and Felix Kumah-Abiwu. This is to indicate how eternally indebted I feel for your incredible support. I have found friends and mentors, some of whom have made significant sacrifices to ensure my academic progress here at LECIAD. Dr Juliana Appiah, Dr Amanda Coffie, Dr Peace Meadie, Dr Boni Yao Gebe, Dr Ken Ahorsu, Dr Efua Yakohene: accept my sincerest appreciation. Auntie Julie, you have been God sent to help me deal with those nasty moments. Ken, ours is a long walk to freedom, and I appreciate. I wish to thank all colleagues and friends who have made personal contributions towards my studies. You guys are so many and I am hopeful we shall keep the trust and the bond for the next stage. I feel very much indebted to you all. Finally, I wish to thank my family for being there, my mother, Irene Dzah who has endured so much to see this day come through. Mr Steve Mawuenyega, many thanks for your support. iii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION....................................................................................................................... i DEDICATION.......................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................. iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .............................................................. ix CHAPTER ONE ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ................................................................................ 1 1.1 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ......................................................... 4 1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................................................................................... 7 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................... 7 1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................... 8 1.6 EXPLANATION OF KEY CONCEPTS ....................................................................... 16 1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY ............................................................................ 17 CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................................... 20 LITERATURE REVIEW FOR THE RESEARCH ........................................................... 20 2.0 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 20 2.1 THOUGHTS ON CIVIL SOCIETY .............................................................................. 20 2.1.1 CSOs and the Strengthening of State Capacity ....................................................... 20 2.1.2 Definitional Issues and the Evolution of CSOs ....................................................... 21 2.1.3 Civil Society-Multilateral Organizations (Global Civil Society) ............................ 26 2.2 The Democratic Recession Debate ................................................................................ 29 2.3 Electoral Violence and the Search for Definition .......................................................... 31 2.4 The Consequences of Electoral Violence....................................................................... 32 2.5 The Uniqueness of Electoral Violence and How Context Matters in Analysis and Prevention............................................................................................................................. 33 2.6 The Extent of Electoral Violence in Africa .................................................................... 35 iv University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.7 Democratic Discourse and Conflict Resolution approach towards Electoral Violence . 42 2.8 Electoral Violence Victims as Peace Ambassadors ....................................................... 45 2.9 Local Institutions and International Engagement in Electoral Violence Prevention ..... 46 CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................................... 49 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES AND CLARIFICATIONS ............................... 49 3.0 RESEARCH PARADIGMS .......................................................................................... 49 3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH ............................................................................................. 50 3.2 CASE STUDY ............................................................................................................... 51 3.3 SAMPLING OF CASE STUDY ORGANIZATIONS .................................................. 52 3.4 BRIEF OVERVIEW ON THE SELECTED CSOS ....................................................... 53 3.4.1 Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) ........................................................................ 53 3.4.2 Centre for Democratic Development (CDD)- Coalition of Domestic Election Observers .......................................................................................................................... 54 3.4.3 Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)-Civic Forum Initiative (CFI) .......... 54 3.4.4 West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP-Ghana) .................................... 55 3.5 SAMPLING METHODS ............................................................................................... 56 3.6 SAMPLING OF RESPONDENTS ................................................................................ 57 3.7 BREAK DOWN ON ELITE INTERVIEW ................................................................... 58 3.8 DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES ...................................................................... 61 3.8.1 Interview-Respondents ............................................................................................ 61 3.8.2 Focus Group Discussion (FDG) .............................................................................. 61 3.8.3 Negotiating Access to Respondents ........................................................................ 62 3.8.4 Interview Transcription ........................................................................................... 63 3.8.5 Data Analysis ........................................................................................................... 64 3.8.6 Triangulation to ensure Rigor, Validity and Reliability .......................................... 65 3.8.7 Confidentiality ......................................................................................................... 66 v University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3.8.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 66 CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................................. 67 SITUATING ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AFRICA ........................................................................................................ 67 4.0 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 67 4.1 COLONIAL POLITICS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTORAL VIOLENCE .... 67 4.2 ONE-PARTY STATE JOURNEY OF AFRICA AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF VIOLENCE .......................................................................................................................... 72 4.3 DISTORTED ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ITS ASSOCIATED GRIEVANCES .... 77 4.4 SELECTED CASES OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA .............................. 84 4.4.1 A brief history of electoral violence in Nigeria ....................................................... 85 4.4.2 The Ethiopian electoral experience ......................................................................... 92 4.5 EXISTING FRAMEWORKS FOR ELECTORAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION ........ 96 4.5.1. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) ............................ 96 4.5.2 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) .............................................. 99 4.5.3. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) ............................................................................................................................. 102 4.6 CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH SETTING .............................. 103 CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................................. 115 EXAMINING THE STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL APPROACHES OF CSOs IN ELECTORAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION IN GHANA .......................................... 115 5.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 115 5.1 CSOs AND THEIR INITIATIVES TOWARDS PREVENTING ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN THE GHANAIAN CONTEXT ................................................................ 115 5.2 THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (IEA) ................................................ 116 5.3 INSTITUTE OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (IDEG) AND THE CIVIC FORUM INITIATIVE (CFI) ............................................................................................. 127 5.3.1 Stakeholder engagement -Institutional Collaboration ........................................... 127 vi University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 5.4 COALITION OF DOMESTIC ELECTION OBSERVERS AND THE CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT (CODEO-CDD) ........................................................ 136 5.5 THE NATURE AND PROCESSES OF INTERACTION THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE CSOS AND THE STATE IN ELECTORAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION ............. 146 CHAPTER SIX .................................................................................................................... 155 EXAMINING THE STRATEGIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN ENSURING POLITICAL ACTORS’ PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESSES, INITIATIVES AND THE QUESTION OF LOSERS’ CONSENT IN GHANA ........... 155 6.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 155 6.1 CSOs AND POLITICAL ELITES IN PEACE PROCESSES AND INITIATIVES ... 155 6.1.1 The use of coalitions .............................................................................................. 155 6.1.2 Personal contacts and friends in the various political parties ................................ 161 6.1.3 Third party influence – the use of eminent Ghanaians .......................................... 163 6.1.4 Party Structures and Hierarchy .............................................................................. 164 6.1.5 Collaboration with International Partners and Donors .......................................... 165 6.2 CSOs AND LOSERS‘ CONSENT IN GHANA‘S ELECTORAL POLITICS: TOWARDS POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE PREVENTION ......................................... 168 6.3 ADOPTING THE STRATEGY OF PEACE JOURNALISM BY CSO ACTORS .... 169 6.4 THE USE OF ELECTORAL REFORMS ................................................................... 171 6.5 THE ENTICEMENT OF A POSSIBLE WIN IN FUTURE ELECTIONS ................ 173 CHAPTER SEVEN .............................................................................................................. 180 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE, IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......... 180 7.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 180 7.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS .............................................................................. 180 7.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY .................................................................................... 191 7.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE ....................................................................... 193 vii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 7.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND PRACTICE ............................................................................................................................................ 196 7.5 RECOMMENDATION ............................................................................................... 197 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 200 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 233 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................... 267 viii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFRC - Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ANC - African National Congress AU - African Union CDD Center for Democratic Development CFI - Civic Forum Initiative CoC-PP - Code of Conduct for Political Parties CODEO - Coalition of Domestic Election Observers CPP - Convention Peoples Party CSOs - Civil Society Organizations CUD - Coalition for Unity and Democracy DFID - Department for International Development EAC - East African Community EC - Electoral Commission ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States EPRDP - Ethiopian Peoples‘ Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRP - Ethiopian Peoples‘ Revolutionary Party ERP - Economic Recovery Program EU - European Union FDG - Focus Group Discussion GBC - Ghana Broadcasting Corporation ix University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ICGC - International Central Gospel Church IDEA - International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance IDEG - Institute of Democratic Governance IEA - Institute of Economic Affairs IEA-GPPP - IEA Ghana Political Parties Program IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party IMF - International Monetary Fund IPAC - Inter Party Advisory Committee KAIPTC - Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre LECIAD - Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy MEISONE - All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement MOU - Memorandum of Understanding NAL - National Alliance of Liberals NCCE - National Commission for Civic Education NDC - National Democratic Congress NEBE - National Electoral Board of Ethiopia NESTF - National Election Security Taskforce NGO - Non-Governmental Organization NLM - National Liberation Movement NNDP - Nigerian National Democratic Party NPF - National Peace Fund NPP - New Patriotic Party x University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh NRCD - National Redemption Council Decree OAU - Organization for African Unity PAMSCAD - Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment PNC - Peoples National Convention PNDC - Provisional National Defence Council PP - Progress Party PP - Political Parties PVT - Parallel Vote Tabulation SADC - Southern African Development Community SAP - Structural Adjustment Program UEDF - United Ethiopian Democratic Forces UGCC - United Gold Coast Convention UK - United Kingdom UN - United Nations UNDP - United Nations Development Program UNGA - United Nations General Assembly UNGPA - United Progressive Grand Alliance US - United States of America USAID - United States Agency for International Development WANEP - West Africa Network for Peacebuilding WTO - World Trade Organization xi University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ABSTRACT Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been called to action in instances where the state has either been deficient or ineffective in managing affairs. Undoubtedly, the process of democratization in Africa has produced mixed results due to several factors among which include poorly organized elections and its associated violence. Electoral violence prevention has become an integral part of international electoral assistance programs without the needed understanding of what works and in what specific contexts, leading to role duplication and waste of resources. Civil Society Organizations both local and international have assume prominent role in ensuring electoral violence prevention but with little success in the African context. While significant intellectual efforts have been made to respond to the phenomenon of electoral violence through understanding its causes and consequences, very little is known about the circumstances under which civil society organizations succeed in electoral violence prevention. This study, theoretically, grounded in institutionalism and elite consensus, used qualitative research tools such as unstructured in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to explore key questions such as how civil society organizations collaborate with other actors in the prevention of electoral violence in Ghana; how CSOs obtain the commitments of political elites towards electoral violence prevention; the nature of international cooperative strategies and alliances employed towards electoral violence prevention. The study focuses on Ghanaian civil society organizations such as Coalition of Domestic Election Observers, Institute of Democratic Governance, Institute of Economic Affairs, and West Africa Network for Peacebuilding that have a national coverage and a long history of engagement in the electoral processes. The data for the study was gathered with reference to the 2008, 2012 and the 2016 elections and analysed through the process of content analysis. The study has brought to the fore the following understudied phenomena: institutional rivalry that has the potential to undermine electoral violence prevention in Ghana and how CSOs mediate losers‘ consent and provide legitimacy for electoral processes and outcomes. The study finds that losers‘ consent in Ghana is mediated through two interrelated factors; the anticipation of winning future elections and the dilemma of opportunity cost associated with lack of consent. Finally, the study argues that, elite consensus must be characterized by the processes of elite congregation that will permit democratic norm diffusion thereby preventing strategic electoral violence and incidental electoral violence in Africa. xii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER ONE 1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY The search for lasting peace and security on the African continent has been of immense concern, not just to the African people and their leaders, but also to their external allies and collaborators. Peace-building processes and efforts have not only become a desirable project or enterprise but a necessary pressing social, economic and political issue (Annan, 1998: United Nations, 2008: United Nations, 2015). The search for peace on the continent must not be in the narrow sense, rather a comprehensive and integrated approach to dealing with all structural factors that would ensure national unity, social cohesion, political stability and inclusion, and ultimately a guarantee for human security on the continent (African Union Panel of the Wise, 2013). The challenge to a peaceful and prosperous African continent resides in the strategies, techniques and approaches that are to be employed to achieve peace or ensure peacebuilding. As a response to the peace and security challenges and vulnerabilities on the continent and the experimental failure of the structural adjustment programs, the international community, led by liberal democratic Western countries, pioneered the democratization project with an overwhelming local support (Olukoshi, 1998; Schalk, 2005). The adoption of liberal democracy as a way of organizing social, economic and political life in Africa received little resistance from African people, unlike colonialism and slave trade. The non-resistance and embracement of the liberal democratic ideals were largely because of the lack of moral or pragmatic support (local and foreign) for the predatory dictatorial regimes at the time and more crucially, the promise of a better society, mechanisms of accountability, representation, guarantee for personal freedom and civil liberties for the African people (Fatton, 1990; Sklar, 1983). 1 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The appealing nature of liberal democracy and the enthusiastic international development agenda (foreign aid) became the basis for most African nations to start the process of democratization which was fraught with major challenges. This brought about social division, pseudo-democratic systems and the many violent conflicts on the continent (Straus and Taylor, 2012; Hahn Niels, 2008; Ewusi, 2014). In countries where major wars have not occurred, there exist unpalatable conditions which potentially could result in conflicts. Among these include high level economic deprivation, unemployment, poverty and corruption, greed of the African elites (especially political and business elites), weak institutions and stifled political space (Kingdon & Kinght, 2007; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; Ewusi, 2014). In the immediate post-Cold War era, many African States were faced with economic crisis, poverty and low level of human development which posed significant security challenges leading to conflicts in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Rwanda etc. African States are an important source of security but many a time unable to meet their security responsibilities but rather serve as major source of insecurity (Ewusi, 2014). Conflicts, wars and unhealthy ethnic rivalry characterised many of the States such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Sudan. Largely, by the 1980s and early 1990s, security was not focused on the people but rather the state. This creates socio-political marginalization and social exclusion (Commission on Human Security, 2003). Civil Society Organizations became prominent on the continent due to democratization and the quest for enhancing state capacity through broad based participatory approach in development. The urgent need for peace, security and development created the environment for civil society to assume critical roles in the democratic process (OECD, 2007). CSOs are 2 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh an alternative voice on policy choices and in some instances the liberator of marginalised groups (Decalo, 1992). One major role CSOs play is to be an active actor in peace building. Many African States have been weak, fragile and lack the adequate capacity to address the needs of the ordinary people (Callaghy, 1994b; OECD, 2007). The weak nature of African states is not just about maladministration and poor governance but also largely due to the structural dislocation of local capacities through distorted economic policies that occurred during the implementation of SAP (Jeffries, 1992; Schalk, 2005; Shaw, 2009). Due to the weak capacity of African states to deliver efficiently and effectively in the provision of basic goods and services, emphasis has been placed on CSOs as the reliable vehicle that would keep government accountable, advance democratic governance and complement state efforts in many developing countries, not just in Africa but also in Latin America and East Asia (Rakner et al, 2007, Devarajan, 2014). The relative success story of CSOs in the development arena has created the trust necessary for CSOs to assume the critical role of peacebuilding as seen in several conflicts and post conflict societies (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006). The scholarly debate on CSOs and peacebuilding in post conflict societies has received significant attention and thorough systematic investigation (Paffenholz 2010; Richmond 2010 and 2005; van Leeuwen 2009; Kaldor 2007; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2006; van Tongeren et al, 2005). There is, however, with little emphasis on their role in the prevention of multi-party electoral violence in non-conflict societies (relatively and politically stable societies that have not witnessed wide spread conflicts or civil war due to breakdown in central government or a superior challenge mounted by non- state actors leading to socio-political disintegration). 3 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1.1 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM As part of the continent‘s resolve to respond to the errors of the past (maladies) and confront impunity, deepen democratic culture, rule of law and good governance which would in reality lay a solid foundation for sustained peace, security and development, the African Union adopted a legal framework known as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Glen, 2012). This Charter prohibits unconstitutional means (rebellion, coups, stolen elections, constitutional manipulation) of accessing political power and imposes obligation on member states to create the necessary space and an atmosphere conducive for Civil Society Organizations in peace-building processes. Whilst several efforts have been made by the international community and sub-regional institutions like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) to ensure peaceful transfer of political power through democratic means (periodic free and fair elections), the organization of elections within the African context has produced mixed results. The failures associated with multiparty elections on the continent have, in some instances, led to violent and conflict situations in the face of international monitoring and observation (Collier, 2009; Basedau et al., 2007; Kelley, 2012). Even though several efforts have been made to study such violent electoral outcomes and conflicts by scholars (Fischer, 2002; Bekoe, 2012; Birch, 2008; Hoglund et al., 2013; Straus & Taylor, 2012; UNDP, 2011), very little emphasis has been placed on civil societies and how they can respond to electoral violence and ensure non-violent elections. Much of the scholarly debate has been around ensuring competent election management body that is independent, appropriate electoral systems, impartiality of the security forces, willingness of candidates to accept election outcomes and equal access to state owned media without 4 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh recourse to how the specific initiatives or interventions of CSOs can guarantee peaceful elections (Hoglund et al., 2013; Rosas, 2010). The lack of systematic examination of the role of CSOs has created complex assumptions under which CSOs operate to prevent electoral conflicts. These complex assumptions have also created the space for ill-informed policy responses and inclusion of CSOs in the electoral process without clearly defining their limit. The lack of critical assessment of CSOs has equally encouraged misleading conclusions on their social interventions or initiatives aimed at ensuring peaceful elections. These conclusions have either undermined the full potential of CSOs in preventing electoral violence in specific contexts or exaggerated their role without emphasis on the specific needs of CSOs and how they can be addressed to enable them to assume a leading role in the peace-building process. A concomitant consequence of this problem is the misallocation of international assistance to civil society organizations (Birch & Munchlinski, 2018). The main point of contention is how does the involvement of CSOs in the electoral process influence the prevention of electoral violence with the multiplicity of actors in the prevention of election violence? Today, there appears to be a normative consensus about the need for a vibrant civil society that will be critical in the pursuit of good governance, democratization and poverty reduction (socio-economic development) (Frazer, 2011, Devarajan, 2014). Although the high human and material costs, and the various causes of electoral violence/ conflict are well documented (Frazer & Gyima-Boadi, 2011; Hoglund et al., 2013), the question of civil society‘s contribution to peace-building, especially its influential role in preventing electoral violence despite security biases, administrative incompetence by election management bodies, hostile ethnic rivalry, faulty electoral systems and constitutional lapses is comparatively an under-researched topic (Bekoe, 2010), if not largely anecdotal and this 5 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh requires urgent need for a more thorough and critical analysis that will inform future preventive action. Some studies that attempt to explain how CSOs can prevent electoral violence have limited themselves to the context of infrastructure for peace (Aniekwe & Agbiboa, 2014: Ojielo & Chuma, 2013: Lederach, 2013: Odendaal, 2013: Ryan, 2013; Alihodzic, 2012). Including CSOs in the architecture of peace further creates the problem of when to identify their specific role or to attribute success to CSOs rather than multiplicity of actors in the peace enterprise. This also may inhibit our understanding of how civil society organizations are really working towards peaceful elections as the peace institutional framework may be confronted with a number of conflict situations to deal with which may not be election related. There is a greater need to further interrogate the peace infrastructure model and specifically examine CSOs that aimed at preventing electoral violence and to what extent they play this role. The inadequate research on the topic area also makes it difficult to attribute outcomes to interventions (peace initiatives, initiatives related to peace), and how to devise remedial action or refine future approaches to prevent electoral violence, detect what went right or wrong. The above leads to knowledge gap which must be filled through a scientific enquiry. This work is based on the fact that there is limited evidence to ascertain how CSOs activities or initiatives translate into preventing electoral violence and how CSOs can sharpen their activities to remain relevant in preventing electoral violence. Indeed, there exists some amount of organizational evaluation of peace related inputs and outputs, but they often suffer from a robust and rigorous methodology, and such narrative reports may not be reliable. The self-evaluation reports of CSOs at best may be described as self-praise and publicity as it merely leads to conclusions for further improvement and unable to itemise clear results 6 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh related to the overall peace processes (Kriesberg, 2004; Mitchell, 1993; D‘Estree et al., 2001; Ross, 2004; Rouhana, 2000; Anderson & Olson, 2003). The methodological deficiencies associated with the evaluation process requires the development of new tools, techniques and methodologies to either confirm existing theories or reject and propound new ones based on critical analysis and context-specificity. Overall what existing studies have failed to address are the circumstances under which CSOs succeed in the prevention of electoral violence through losers‘ consent and how institutional rivalry undermines the quest to prevent electoral violence. 1.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS The following are the specific research questions that informed the analysis in the thesis:  What strategies are employed by civil society organizations to prevent electoral violence in Ghana?  How do CSOs interact with the state in the prevention of electoral violence?  What kinds of cooperative alliances exist between CSOs and other international actors in the prevention of electoral violence?  How do CSOs ensure losers‘ consent as means of preventing electoral violence and providing legitimacy for electoral processes and outcomes? 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY The central objective for this research is to provide insight and understanding of how CSOs are able to help prevent electoral violence through their peace-building processes in Ghana. The specific objectives are as follows: 7 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh  To identify what role CSOs play in preventing electoral violence in Ghana.  To examine the kind of interaction that exists between the state and CSOs in the prevention of electoral violence.  To identify the kind of cooperative alliances between CSOs and the international community and how these influence political actors accede to peace processes and initiatives.  To find out how CSOs ensure losers‘ consent as means of preventing electoral violence and providing legitimacy for electoral processes and outcomes? 1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The study is guided by two theoretical frameworks. These are the theory of institutionalism and Elite Consensus. It is essential to recognise institutions in understanding violence, especially political violence which may manifest in various forms such as terrorism, protests and coups, riots and rebellion and electoral violence borne out of political competition (which occupies the centre stage of this study). Various definitions have been offered regarding institutionalism or institution as a key concept (Sugden, 1986; Wells 1970, 3; Searle, 1995; Searle, 2005; Foster, 1981; Commons, 1934; March & Olsen, 1983; Diermeier & Krehbiel, 2003; Steinmo et al., 1992; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Rutherford, 2015; Thomas, 2015; Clearver & DeKoning, 2015). The elements of these definitions include procedures, rules, norms, agents and set of ideas that shape social and political structures in a given polity. The explanations have either been complimentary or promoted the aggregation of rival scholarly ideas that seek to bring some clarification to a theory that is integral to our understanding of electoral violence and the role civil society plays in ensuring a workable prevention mechanism. This breeds the lack of unanimity amongst scholars (Hodgson, 2006). 8 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Samuel Huntington in his work ‗Political Order in Changing Societies‘ delivered a solid explanation of how institutions play a role in explaining ‗disorder‘ or order in a given society (Huntington, 1968). His ideas became profound when he sought to indicate how institutions matter in the occurrence or the prevention of violence, depending on the kind of violence under consideration. Huntington made a claim and established how institutions are crucial in the explanation of political violence. His position implies that institutions can constrain political violence and at the same time trigger violence. Rod Aya (1979), has severely criticised Huntington‘s ideas on political institutions, by arguing that, there is the need to distinguish between the various sources of social upheavals emanating from policies and plans of the governing elites (state managers) and upheavals impelled by uncontrolled violence. This distinction in my view, will help to better evaluate and locate the motivation of rival groups competing for state power and the manner in which such struggles produce violence. Closely related to Huntington‘s argument is the position adopted by Posen (1993). He argues that, resorting to war or violent conflicts is an indication of the degeneration or the collapse of the ‗political centre‘ (Posen, 1993). Other scholars point to the fact that the use of violence or war is the pursuit of calculated strategy and policy through other means, a situation where institutional loyalists become warlords ( Denov & Lako, 2017; Peters, 2007; Reno, 2000; Reno, 2011) Impliedly, violence is as a result of the absence of institutions with the capacity to ‗allow solving commitment problems‘ between rival groups (Balcells, 2015). This study, however, agrees with the argument that violence is an empirical demonstration of institutional failure. Furtherance to the above, the point has been made that institutions provide and shape risks, opportunities and the capacities for the utilisation of violence to achieve political aims (Balcells, 2015; Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Vreeland, 9 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2008). This means that institutions themselves in a political system can either be targets of violence or also sources of violence. This is because rules or procedures in themselves are divisive and perform discriminatory functions. For example, rules that provide guidelines on who qualifies and who does not for purposes of electoral competition and participation. This view has been given credence when Dunning (2011) unequivocally argued that ‗electoral politics and violence are close substitutes‘ this indirectly influence the views of other scholars who point to the fact that ‗elections function peacefully only when electoral chances to a large extent reflect an equal military force of competing parties‘ (Balcells, 2015; Przeworski et al., 2012). From the above, one can articulate that institutional factors are necessary in explaining how a group‘s military capability determines its rational utilisation of violence to protest an electoral outcome (see Fearon, 1995; 2014). Institutionalism refers to the study of institutional effects (Keohane & Martin, 1995; Powell & DiMaggio, 2012; Lawrence et al., 2002). Institutions may either be formal or informal. Formal institutions are those that draw their mandate, roles, duties and responsibilities directly from acts of parliament, existing body of laws and constitutions that govern a given society. Strictly speaking, it may include institutions of state such as the police, military, parliament; judiciary and other allied institutions of state that draw their mandate from a well- known and accepted source of domestic law. Formal institutions are normally regarded as ‗parchment institutions‘ (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). Informal institutions generally are customs, conventions, norms of behaviour, socially constructed ‗rules and understandings‘ that is usually ‗embedded in culture‘ and functions outside of the official settings (Leftwich, 2009). Arguably, informal institutions include ‗unwritten rules of behaviour, kinship ties, and social norms‘ which affect social, economic and political behaviour and sometimes substitute for formal rules (Sen & Steer, 2008; Leftwich, 2009). In summary, North conceptualises both 10 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the formal and informal institutions as ―continuum from unwritten traditions and customs to written law‘ (North, 1990). The present study agrees with North that: Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players. The purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. But the objective of the team within that set of rules is to win the game. . .. Modelling the strategies and skills of the team as it develops is a separate process from modelling the creation, evolution, and consequences of the rules‘ (North, 1990). The study, however, is more inclined towards a more comprehensive and all-encompassing explanation of institutions as provided by Hodgson: ‗I prefer a broader conception of institutions that accommodates the informal basis of all structured and durable behavior. That is why I define institutions as durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions, rather than rules as such. In short, institutions are social rule-systems, not simply rules (Hodgson, 2006). Institutional theory relates to agents, structures, rules or procedures of behaviour, norms and practices that over a period assume authoritative stands and largely defines the behaviour of the people in a political community. This explains the fact that institutions are sources of ideas, creativity, and innovation that seek to order society in a way and to become avenues of socio-political legitimacy. Institutional theory or organizational factors shape knowledge and plays significant role in democratic norm diffusion. Its application to the present study is relevant in the sense that the theory sees civil society actors as informal rational organizations/institutions with shared values, democratic expectations and socially constructed rules and understandings. This therefore means CSOs operate in the realm of non-state institutions and seek to influence the policy arena. The theory also allows us to recognise that there are multiple actors that aim at preserving the democratic order and largely ensuring human security. This brings to the fore the research 11 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh question on how CSOs interact with the state in the prevention of electoral violence. Almost all institutions depend on other institutions for their efficacy and this is explored to find out what kinds of rivalry or complementarities exist between CSOs and other state institutions, and how such issues are resolved for a concerted action in preventing electoral violence. The point being made that in some instances informal institutions override formal rules further gives legitimacy to the question on how CSOs ensure losers consent in the prevention of electoral violence. Elite Consensus as indicated earlier is another important conceptual framework for the present study. Historically, the theory is associated with the seminal works of Pareto and Mosca (Sartori, 1987). Elite Consensus is part of democratic theory that provides overwhelmingly positive assumptions about the relationship between the health of democracy and elites in each society (Neuhouser, 1992; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Burton 2006). Like any other social science concept, it lacks precise definition (Wintrop, 1992). The aficionados of this theory argue that all politics or competition over governmental power is based on some form of agreement between elites. This further explains the view that the process of democratization in Africa, is in part, made up of a ‗rotation of political elites who use available economic, cultural or other related material resources to affirm their autonomy and occupy the power structures of their nations‘ (Etzioni-Halevy, 1989). This conceptualization of power relations between elites and the state seems to be an attempt to institutionalize elite rule either directly or indirectly. There are four main kinds of elite manifestations (Field & Higley,1980; Higley & Burton, 2006; Osei, 2014). These are: i) Disunified elites- these elites portray themselves as those who make governments unstable (democratic instability) due to the brutal nature in which they compete for state power. In this scenario balance of interest is almost impossible which 12 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh opens up the political system to threats of chaos and violence. ii) Ideologically unified elite- these are elites who share a common ideology for example capitalism, socialism, fascism and communism. They are diametrically opposed to other beliefs or ideologies. iii) Consensual unified elite –these categories of elites allow for political settlements, agreements, cooperation and also strive to protect agreed upon rules of the game. While they may have overlapping interests such as party membership, they are more inclined towards protecting the existing political system through consensus building and also likely to unite against threats of the system such as violence. iv) imperfectly unified elite- through the support of the electorate, these elites monopolize state power and dominate the power structures of a given system without the possibility of power alternation between and amongst groups (cited in Gel‘man & Steen, 2003). Elites are usually privilege group of individuals who enjoy substantial social advantage based on their positions, extraordinary prowess, organizational capabilities and resources. They appear to be able to control and direct the masses towards a worthy goal and at the same time towards destructive ventures such as the utilization of violence to protest or register grievances. Because of these special competencies of the elite, is important to regard them as the special intensive care unit of any democratic process. In preventing electoral violence, elite consensus over the non-use of violence becomes imperative. Such an approach helps to prevent strategic violence during post-election phase. The limitation regarding this elitist approach is that organizational capacities are diffused and no longer the preserve of the elites of the political system, this suggests the idea of governing and non-governing elites whose power dynamics are interrelated. Some amount of mobilizing power resides with the non- elites (Cammack, 1990). This is evident in popular protest and mass movements. While conceding that some amount of organizational capacity resides in the people for mass action, 13 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the elites are crucial in sustaining and drawing significant attention to the social action and their near unity to oppose that mass action undermines the mobilizing power of the masses. The elite consensus approach fails to account for the incidental violence that usually does not require strategic mobilization by party leaders or elites. The applicability of the theory is that it touches on democratic stability of which electoral violence prevention constitute an integral part. From a critical perspective, elites share consensus over ‗procedural matters‘ and not necessarily on ‗substantive issues‘ (Baylis, 2012). Under the circumstances of substantive differences in policy goals or values, elites who have repeatedly experience losses or defeats are not likely to consent to mechanisms that validate their defeats (Baylis, 2012) hence the inadequacy in relying solely on this theory to offer an extensive explanation on electoral violence prevention by CSOs. This theory also helps us to better appreciate the point that elite manipulation of issue framing and reframing plays a critical role in either violence prevention or outbreak of electoral violence. 1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY Democratic assistance to developing, emerging and fledgling democracies in recent times have revolved around the management of elections in a manner to prevent violence among the competing actors. International institutions and the international community have largely tried to provide guiding frameworks that seek to augment the competence of the state and CSOs in ensuring electoral transparency and integrity. The purpose of this international electoral assistance may be attributed to the devastating effects of elections and violence in several countries around the world, especially in Africa, East Asia and the Middle East. For some countries such as the US and the UK, electoral violence prevention schemes and frameworks have featured in their foreign aid policy through agencies such the USAID and DFID. The United Nations through the UNDP has developed electoral assistance programs 14 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh that focus on electoral violence prevention. Other global institutions such as the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, International IDEA have concerned themselves with the threat of electoral violence to human security. For this reason, the study of electoral violence prevention in a single country case study falls within the field of international affairs as elections are no longer seen as domestic affairs but largely managed and controlled by international standards that are embedded in international law. The deeper empirical insight that comes from this study has implications for other countries with shared characteristics and political context. The present study is based on the premise that various explanations of electoral violence and possible solutions have called into action civil society actors to help prevent violence without a corresponding systematic research on how these CSOs relate with other actors in the prevention of electoral violence. This study seeks to highlight how CSOs relate with other actors in the prevention of electoral violence, and how they account for losers‘ consent in Ghana.The study provides an opportunity to critically examine within the context of Ghana the set of activities undertaken by CSOs and how this help to prevent the occurrence of electoral violence. This research presents with the opportunity to highlight best practices and help to provide remedial action for future preventive action. This study is relevant to policy as it will provide the ground to clearly define what should be the limit of CSOs in electoral violence prevention, their involvement in the entire electoral process and also in specific terms develop a cooperative framework to avoid duplication and institutional rivalry borne out of the desire for social praise and recognition. Overall, the study seeks to contribute towards the debate on electoral violence prevention, specifically by CSOs. The study also helps to fill the gap on the narratives and anecdotes that have characterised efforts by CSOs in preventing electoral violence in Ghana. 15 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1.6 EXPLANATION OF KEY CONCEPTS Civil Society Organizations: The World Bank has adopted this definition of civil society: ―the term civil society to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), therefore, refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations‖ (World Bank, 2010). According to Salamon et al., (2004), the following five elements are necessary for defining CSOs: they are organizations, private, voluntary, self-governing and not for profit. While these five elements may not be exhaustive in explaining CSOs, the researcher strongly believe the definition provide sufficient basis to distinguish CSOs from the market and the state. From the above, the present study conceptualises Civil Society Organizations as independent privately initiated organizations that seek to contribute towards the common good, they are self-financing through the support of the donor community. They constitute an arena for collaboration and contestation with the state in ensuring good governance, and democratic development Electoral violence: Some scholars have defined electoral violence acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process, or that arise in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of elections such as efforts to delay, disrupt or derail a poll — or to influence the outcomes: the determination of winners in competitive races for political office, or securing the approval or disapproval of referendum questions (UNDP, 2010, 2011: Fisher, 2008). Drawing from the above definition, the study 16 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh conceptualises that, electoral violence may be regarded as any form of threat, violent intimidating behaviour considered within a given political context as unacceptable, direct physical harm on opponents, state institutions & property or electoral officials with the sole aim of potentially influencing electoral results. Violence Prevention: Violence prevention for purposes of this study has been conceptualised as structural and operational. In this study, electoral violence prevention must not be construed as non-occurrence of violence but any routine action that is taken to reduce or prevent violence during or after elections. Losers’ Consent: This refers to the process by which candidates, supporters and political parties accept the outcome of elections and conferring consequential legitimacy on the winners through a public statement immediately after the declaration of results without resort to extra legal means. 1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY This study is made up of seven chapters. The details on the organization of each chapter are stated below: Chapter One: Introduction and Research Design: This chapter deals with research design, the is the introduction chapter. The chapter constitutes the introduction to the study including; background to the study, statement of the research problem, the research questions, objectives of the study, the theoretical framework, significance of the study, explanation of key concepts and the organization of the study. Chapter Two: Review of Literature: This chapter constitutes the literature review for the research. The literature review has been organised along the following themes: a critical reflection on civil society dealing with definitional issues and the evolution of the concept, 17 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the nexus between civil society and the multilateral organizations (Global Civil Society), the democratic recession debate, electoral violence and the search for definition, the consequences of electoral violence, the uniqueness of electoral violence and the essence of context in analysis and prevention, the extent of electoral violence in Africa, the democratic discourse and conflict resolution approach towards electoral violence, electoral violence victims as peace ambassadors, and finally, local institutions and international engagement in electoral violence prevention. Chapter Three: Methodological Approaches: The chapter provides details and justification on the methodology of the research. The chapter includes: the research paradigm adopted, justification for the single case study, the sampling regime adopted for the case study organizations, an overview of the selected organizations, the sampling methods, sampling of respondents, data collection techniques such as unstructured in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, the strategy of negotiating access to respondents, the interview transcription process, the data analysis, the process of triangulation and the adherence to the principle of confidentiality. Chapter Four: Situating Electoral Violence in the Political and Economic History of Africa: Chapter four is made up of three parts: the first part deals with situating the crisis of electoral violence in the political economic histories of African countries and part two gives an insight of the situation of electoral violence in Nigeria and Ethiopia, including a critical review of the prevention frameworks developed by the USAID, International IDEA and the UNDP, the final part of the chapter four provides a contextual overview of the case country referred to as the research setting . 18 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Chapter Five: Structural and Operational Activities of the Case study CSOs: This Chapter deals with the structural and operational approaches of CSOs in electoral violence prevention. The chapter was organised around the following themes: CSOs and their initiatives towards preventing electoral violence in the Ghanaian context, debate on how CSOs interact with other actors in the prevention of electoral violence. Chapter Six: Losers‘ Consent and the CSOs factor in Ghana: The chapter deals with CSOs strategies in ensuring political actors‘ participation in peace processes, initiatives and the question of losers‘ consent and the CSOs factor in Ghana. The chapter has been organised around the following themes: CSOs and political elites in peace processes and initiatives, adopting the strategy of peace journalism by CSO actors, the use of electoral reforms, the enticement of possible win in the future elections. Chapter Seven: Summary of Findings, Conclusions, Contribution to Knowledge and Recommendations: This is the final chapter of the study and it contains the summary of findings, implications for future research, conclusions and recommendations. 19 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW FOR THE RESEARCH 2.0 INTRODUCTION This section of the research seeks to provide a critical engagement with relevant existing works within which the present study is grounded. The section is in two broad themes: the first section is on civil society (organizations) and though not entirely the same, civil society and civil society organizations as a term is used interchangeably but specifically, each referring to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) which is the focus of the study. Section two of the literature review engages relevant work on electoral violence, causes and consequences and existing preventive action frameworks, detailing the state of knowledge in electoral violence prevention and the gaps in knowledge and the literature that relates to the research goal. This covers the topic under discussion: The role of Civil Society Organizations in preventing electoral violence in Africa: The Case of Ghana. 2.1 THOUGHTS ON CIVIL SOCIETY 2.1.1 CSOs and the Strengthening of State Capacity Since the end of the Cold War, global prominence and attention have been given to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Scholars, activists and researchers have equally underscored the relevance of CSOs in sustaining the gains of ‗development and democracy‘ and more importantly being a grand strategy in strengthening state capacity in the developing world, especially Africa (Lewis, 2001). As a result, development partners, donors and multilateral organizations adopted the concept as a policy tool in addressing the developmental deficiencies in Africa (Molutsi &Holm, 1990: Gellna, 1994). Massive resources have been put in ensuring that CSOs form an integral part of policy frameworks and are deeply 20 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh embedded in ‗social and political processes‘ aimed at strengthening democratic institutions in Africa (Molutsi & Holm,1990: Diamond,1994: Hadenious & Uggla, 1996: Gellna, 1994; Fukuyama, 2001). 2.1.2 Definitional Issues and the Evolution of CSOs Despite the global ubiquity surrounding civil society, an attempt for definition has produced intense debates (Edward, 2011). This debate is far from being settled as the concept and the field of civil society continues to undergo tremendous changes. While some definitions are culturally situated (Blaney and Pasha, 1993) others are geographically limited and this makes it difficult for universally applicable definitions of the concept (Brown, 2000). This thesis seeks to highlight the summary of definitions by both Putnam and Van Rooy. The works of both authors provide the connecting thread in gaining deeper insight into civil society organizations. They provided the philosophical consensus on which the debate on civil society (organizations) thrives. According to Putnam (1993 cited in Brown, 2000), civil society is made of groups with associational life that provides space for ‗interaction and cooperation‘. This argument, though not new, has provided some degree of clarity on the distinction between Putnam‘s view and the civil society view held by Marxist-Political economy analysts. Fundamentally, Putnam makes the claim that ‗good government performance‘ and ‗economic development‘ are products of ‗civic community‘ (Mouritsen, 2001). Van Rooy holds this view by asserting that this civic community primarily exists outside of the state and the market. This thesis may not focus on definitional debates and ambiguities knowing that the attempt to bring clarity to the definitional issues surrounding civil society has been effectively exhausted (Keane, 1988a; Keane, 1998; van Rooy, 1998; Alexander, 2006; Keane, 2010; Edward, 2011: Edward, 2009). 21 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh During the enlightenment era, several thinkers shaped the idea of civil society. The period was characterised by the appeal of rationality and the ‗epistemological centrality of reason and morality‘ (Laine, 2014). This means that humans could order their own course of action without the interference of any absolute authority exercising control. This further suggests that civil liberty will emerge borne out of the belief that it will create the conditions for the ‗common good‘ (Alejandro, 2002 cited in Laine, 2014). The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith, David Hume and Adam Ferguson made a profound distinction between the state and civil society. According to these thinkers, civil society is a network of human relationships, which is uniquely separated from the state. This view has been articulated by Lewis (2001), that civil society is ‗socially desirable alternative to both the state of nature and the heightened individualism of emergent capitalism‘. In a stronger voice, Adam Ferguson (1995) makes the uncontested claim that the difference between Civil Society and the state is borne out of ‗state despotism‘ that is the state‘s endeavour to constrain and ensure absolute, unlimited exercise of power (Holenstein 2009) During the modern era, some other thinkers regarded both the state and civil society as independent entities. Consequently, Hegel (1991) considers civil society as a system of social needs and expectations that is mediated by the state. From this perspective, Hegel calls for Civil Society to be regulated or controlled by the state to prevent them from becoming self- interested but rather contribute towards the common good. What he fails to address is the extent to which the state can balance or order civil society without a push-back from civil societies. His assertion also creates the false impression that states, by their nature, are the sources of the common good and wrongs of civil society must be corrected by the state. Despite Hegel‘s unintended intellectual attempt to create a master-servant relationship 22 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh between the state and civil society, he admits to a possible conflict that arises but fall short of explaining how such conflicts should be resolved. The writings of Alexis de Tocqueville have also been influential in dealing with the conflicts or the contestations between civil society and the state (Newton, 2001). He conceives civil society as the ‗independent associational life‘ that seeks to protect domination of society by the state and ensure state accountability and effectiveness (Lewis, 2001). His perspective shaped the ‗good governance agenda‘ that‘s is improving democratic institutions, and ensuring political participation (Davis and McGregor, 2000). This view suggests a kind of a balance of power or equilibrium, which Brown (2000) sees as very crucial: There is very little margin for error here—if the state is too extensive it will strangle civil society at birth, too weak and private institutions will compete for its role as provider of order; if people are too much involved in each other‘s lives then they will lose the sense of distance needed to preserve civility, too little involved and they become part of an atomised ‗mass society‘ (p. 8). Brown recognises the fragility or the institutional weakness of civil society an idea that has dominated the discourse among donors and development policy makers in promoting democratic institutions and reforms (Archer, 1994 cited in Lewis, 2000). Antonio Gramsci has led another strand of civil society thinking. Fleming (2000) admits that Gramsci‘s work has dominated discussions and the twenty-first century explanation of civil society. Gramsci provided certain defining features of civil society and regarded the concept as a ‗public sphere‘ distinct from the market and the state where ‗ideological hegemony‘ is contested (Calhoun, 2011; Lewis, 2001; Habermas 1991; Laine, 2014), This further suggests that CSOs challenge and uphold the prevailing order. This may generate elite competition and rivalry that may undermine self-sustaining institutional cooperation (Wiarda, 2003). 23 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Even though some authors have made the claim that civil society is a Western product and concept, it is important to note that the concept manifest differently in different cultures, for example the structure, character, formation and actors (Appiagyei-Atua, 2005; Harneit- Sievers 2005). This leads us to the question of how relevant civil society is to Africa (Pietrzyk, 2003). Despite the significant effort by Lewis (2001) to deeply reflect over this question, further exploration is necessary today. In responding to the question of CSOs‘ relevance, Lewis provided three different scenario answers; ‗yes perspective‘ ‗no perspective‘ and mixed perspective. Arguably, CSOs are more relevant to African needs or problems than ever. It is not surprising that the African Union has provided space for inclusion of CSOs in its activities and equally urged member states to create conducive atmosphere for CSOs to form an integral part of political processes. This validates the views of Harbeson (1994) that CSOs are critical to Africa‘s future political development; Civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago (Herbeson,1994) Despite the validity of this view to a large extent, Obadare (2011) has argued that in Africa, civil society has not demonstrated the capacity to be different from mainstream politicians or better than those entrusted with political power. This highlights the relevance of his argument on what kinds of understandings are often associated with the idea of civil society. He draws attention to the weak nature of CSOs and how they also heavily rely on the existing patron- client relationship. The theoretical reflection of Obadare (2011) has been profoundly highlighted by Darren Kew & Modupe Oshikoya (2014). Kew & Oshikoya (2014) provided empirical evidence in relation to the critique of the manifestations of CSOs in the African context. They argue that CSOs are implicated in the neo-patrimonial politics throughout Africa. They cited the case of Uganda where co-optation and state capture of CSOs is 24 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh prevalent. They were quick to point to what they described as ―Ghana: the continental success story‖. This shows how CSOs are entangled in statecraft and are unable to deliver on their mandate. Some argue that African CSOs have become a ‗holding ground or an arena of a waiting game‘ for individuals who aspire for political office (Fowler, 2012; Osaghae, 2006). Despite the validity of the critics, there is a better prospect of CSOs delivering on their mandate as citizens get more educated and make demands on both the state and civil society. To this end, the global civil society alliance, CIVICUS, aims to ‗… help advance regional, national and international initiatives to strengthen the capacity of civil society (Lewis, 2002; Batliwala, 2002; Heinrich & Fioramonti, 2007; Melena& Heinrich, 2005). Obviously, this presents a highly optimistic view about civil society organizations and how it can play the role of complementing the efforts of national governments to develop sound policies (Lewis, 2002; Fadakinte, 2015). One key area civil society organization has enjoyed positive support is the issue of good governance and the effective delivery of services. This view about civil society also inspires for local action in the agenda setting and political processes of the state. It also prepares the ground for transnational networks of civil society acting in concert to contribute towards the common good. While some hold positive view, others also vehemently disagree and posit that civil society was developed within a given socio-political setting and has little meaning to the African context (Fowler, 2012; Adebajo, 2010). The scholars with the negative or pessimistic view make the argument that civil society as conceived in the western world, especially Europe, should not be rigidly applied to the African context due to varying political culture and tradition (Lewis, 2002; Mandani, 1996; Adebajo, 2010). Any such attempt will undermine local initiative in building institutions of governance and associational life. Between the two main groups of earlier scholars, others have made a case for civil society but calling for a cautious application of the 25 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh concept in a manner that it accommodates ‗locally specific institutions and processes‘ (Hann & Dunn, 1996; Lewis, 2002; Maina, 1998). Civil society is gaining a global status which, in overall terms, swallows the argument of non-relevance in other contexts. Modern-state arrangements have boldly recognised the essence of civil society. Their transnational nature also undermines the issue of political and cultural specificity and demonstrates how dominant the liberal internationalist view has been in transforming institutions in the developing world, especially Africa. 2.1.3 Civil Society-Multilateral Organizations (Global Civil Society) One of the major factors driving the high interest in civil society is the massive support it receives from the international community. The United Nations and its affiliate agencies such as the UNDP and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization have provided space for civil society participation as part of the agenda of furthering the ideals of liberal democracy, that will allow for free markets and democratic development in other parts of the world. According to the World Bank, civil society organizations, through their social capital, help build the needed institutional capacity and political skill required to succeed in the good governance agenda. The World Bank has reposed so much confidence in CSOs, believing that they will provide support to the democratic politics that is needed to ensure development (World Bank, 1997; Grootaert, 1999: Nanda, 2006; White, 1994). At this point, the role of the CSOs have not be defined in specific terms but broadly as promoters of good governance, democratization and human rights. Fowler (2012), argues that CSOs are being integrated and their positive roles being spread through the ‗channels of international relations and more specifically, becoming an in-built part of norms of global institutions.‘ 26 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Despite long standing UN-CSO relations, global legitimacy was conferred on civil society in the global governance agenda when the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan formed the Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil society (Willets, 2006; Gillinson, 2003; Clark & Aydin, 2006; McKeon, 2009). This indicates a deeper appreciation of the role of CSOs in the UN‘s agenda of ensuring international peace and security. This bold initiative by the UN, upholds the early attempt by the Carnegie Commission on the prevention of Deadly Conflicts, which recognised CSOs as crucial actors in violent conflict prevention. Subsequently, the UN created a peace-building commission in 2005 with the mandate to ensure and boost CSO participation (United Nations, 2005; United Nations, 2003). The inclusion of CSOs in UN peace-building operations remains one of the hopes to guarantee success (Willetts, 2006; Shepherd, 2015) but I however contest that CSO participation must be proven rather than assumed. The effect of all these initiatives by the international institutions of global governance is the creation of a global civil society with assumed roles that are uncritically accepted. Several authors have interrogated the concept of global civil society and argue that it carries along virtues of sustaining and contributing towards the global common good, an arena for institutional power relations that produces contention ( Lipschutz 1992, 2000, 2005: Baker, 2002; Cox, 1999; Hopgood, 2000: Scholte , 2002: Kaldor, 2001: Kaldor, 2003:Bartelson, 2006: Anheier, 2007 Chandhoke, 2002, 2015: Hopewell, 2015). The Security Council of the UN gave mileage to the process of integrating CSOs in conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives around the world without specific well-defined roles (Paffenholz, 2014). After the multilateral institutions laid an international legal framework for civil society organizations to form an integral part of the peace-building processes, some scholars remain doubtful, prompting a rigorous research and analysis of CSO participation in peace-building 27 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh projects. Thania Paffenholz & Christoph Spurk (2006) provided a path-breaking research that became the reference point for other similar scholarly works. She argued that despite the massive support by the international community for the potential role of CSOs in peace- building activities and the overall conflict prevention project, there was no corresponding investment in research agenda to ascertain the nexus between peace-building and civil society organizations. According to her several studies are framed around ‗actor-oriented approaches‘ or an attempt to examine the general roles or functions of CSOs in specific peace-building initiatives (van Tongeren et al., 2005; Aall, 2001; Barnes, 2005; Pouligny, 2005; Debiel and Sticht, 2005; Anderson & Olson, 2003; Cuhadar 2004; Ohanyan & Lewis, 2005; Athieh et al., 2005). The appropriateness of her work stems from the effective combination of democracy theory, theory of peacebuilding and the development discourse to outline seven functions of CSOs in conflict situations but fall short of indicating how each of these functions play out at the various phases of conflicts. Eloquently, she underscored the need for a ‗functioning state‘ which will create the enabling environment for CSO activity. This points to the interaction processes between CSOs and the state and how ‗unclear power structure‘ can undermine the entire peace-building aim. The author adopted a functional analytical framework that almost indicates that CSOs are inclusive of all non-state actors that perform a combination of the seven functions that have been proposed. These functions include; advocacy through public communication, demand for an accountability mechanism, democratic or political socialization, community building through social cohesion, facilitation of dialogue & mediation between the state and the citizens and direct service provision in critical sectors (Paffenholz, 2006/ 2010). From this penumbra, Spurk (2007) strongly disagree with any attempt to see the media as civil society organization. He has silenced critics by indicating that group of journalists acting under an association can be regarded as civil society organization. Both Spurk and Paffenholz have ignored the prevailing democratic 28 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh environment at the time of writing which Larry Diamond called ‗democratic recession‘. At this level of analysis Paffenholz also missed the point on those who oppose inclusion of CSOs in peace-building process, suggesting that their inclusion makes it difficult to ensure consent of feuding parties to a given conflict (Wanis-St John & Kew, 2008). This work was also largely situated within the context of conflict-ridden societies and may not necessarily apply to relatively stable societies like Ghana yet requires significant involvement of civil society organizations to safeguard its electoral democracy. 2.2 The Democratic Recession Debate According to Larry Diamond (2008) there is very little evidence to celebrate democracy‘s triumph. He argues that increasingly, democracies around the world have been in recession or decline in some of the geopolitically strategic countries like Nigeria. His assertion has been based on the Freedom House survey and the Afro-barometer surveys. He indicated that in countries such as Ghana where some form of success stories exists, there are perilous issues and strikingly unfavourable problems that require urgent attention to retain the gains made. At the height of his democratic recession argument is the Kenyan case of electoral violence in 2007, 2017 that abruptly resulted into another setback for democracy in Africa. Under such a democratic decay, poor governance becomes a disease to be prevented. The overall picture, especially in Africa has led some to conclude that democracy has ‗plummeted‘ and by the year 2010 some argue that, there is a looming ‗democratic duress‘ (Kurlantzick, 2011). His solution to this worrying picture lies in ‗vigorous vibrant and resourceful civil society organization‘. Despite falling into the civil society organization inclusion orientation, he provided no framework within which actors can successfully engage in the electoral process and deal with electoral fraud. However, in his work ‗Facing up to the democratic Recession‘ Larry 29 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Diamond (2015) concede how a well ‗focused and committed international engagement of some countries such as Ghana could avert the democratic breakdown. Given the strong faith he has in civil society, Larry Diamond at this point did not make it explicit what kinds of cooperative alliances should exist among local and international actors. The suggestion points to the fact that strong institutions matter in facing up to the democratic recession a key element of which is electoral violence prevention. The democratic recession theory has not just been contested but appears controversial and provides a misleading picture on the progress of democracy in Africa. Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky (2015) in their work ‗The myth of democratic recession‘ strongly disagree with observers and democracy advocates who share the opinion of decline and meltdown. In their paper, the authors explain the underlying reason for the popularity of the democratic recession perception. And state unequivocally that the view of recession reflects a poor understanding of the events of the 1990 that accounted for the democratization project. In short, their rebuttal demonstrated that the opinion of democratic recession was misleading and inaccurate. What is however, intellectually intriguing is the fact that Way and Levitsky (2015) also based their analysis on data from Freedom House, Polity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Bertelsmann Democracy Index. They concluded that ‗The real story of the last decade is not democracy‘s ―meltdown,‖ but rather its resilience in the face of a darkening geopolitical landscape‘(Levitsky & Way, 2015).Despite the supporting view expressed by Straus and Taylor (2009), Francis Fukuyama‘s question of why ‗democracies are performing poorly‘ seems to have legitimised the argument that democracy is indeed in recession (Fukuyama, 2015). Observing a chain of global events relating to liberal democracy and economic growth, Dambisa Moyo, argues that the processes and systems of liberal democracy require some kind of a fundamental reform to avoid the potential risks posed by 30 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the ―patchy and anaemic global economic outlook (Moyo, 2018). It is therefore not surprising that Paul Collier will argue on how democratic competition can possibly lead to violence in ‗poor countries‘ (Collier, 2009). He based the argument on weak institutions without delineating which institutions matter. 2.3 Electoral Violence and the Search for Definition Efforts to study electoral violence as a unique field within the broader discourse of conflicts and political violence has been fraught with challenges. Due to the limited understanding of how different electoral violence is from other conflicts or political violence situations, scholars have spent great deal of time researching and providing definition to electoral violence. According to Kristine Hoglund (2009) any attempt to ‗understand the causes and consequences of electoral violence‘ must first be to conceptualise electoral violence as broadly different from other political conflicts. In her opinion, electoral violence may manifest as political conflicts that is related to existing communal violence or purely electoral fraud. It means actors, motives, activities, timing and methods are key elements in any definition of electoral violence (Bekoe, 2012). According to her, electoral fraud conceivably is related to electoral violence for as long as the rationale is to unconventionally determine or undermine the results. Her argument supports an earlier work by Laakso (2007) where he explained electoral violence as an ‗activity motivated by an attempt to affect the results of the elections – either by manipulating the electoral procedures and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results‘. Fisher (2002) provided a more encompassing explanation of electoral violence, introducing a psychological dimension of electoral violence that Hoglund alluded to as, ‗any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process‘ (Fischer 2002); related to this definition is ―acts or threats of 31 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition‘ (Sisk 2008). 2.4 The Consequences of Electoral Violence Kristine Hoglund (2009) also made a significant attempt to point out the consequences of electoral violence. With reference to Kenya, Nigeria, Togo, Zimbabwe and Cote d‘Ivoire, she points to internal displacement of persons, worsening refugee crisis, economic decline, deaths, destruction of private and state property, creation of regional vulnerability and an atmosphere of insecurity that undermine foreign interests. Due to the high cost, both material and non-material associated with electoral violence, elections are no longer seen as domestic affairs but are largely guided by international law and fall within the framework of international peace-building approach. Electoral outcomes determine availability of foreign aid and assistance, international sanctions or foreign military intervention in the cases of Cote d‘Ivoire, Gabon, Togo, Zimbabwe and Gambia. To this end, she argues that electoral violence has received significant international attention (UNDP 2009, UNGA 2010, USAID 2010; USAID, 2013), yet poorly understood in several contexts. An important component of her work to the present study is her assertion of how non-acceptance of electoral outcomes by losers provides ground for violence, yet she failed to indicate a strategy in which this can be prevented. The above points to losers‘ consent which will be explored further in the present study and ascertain how CSOs in Ghana can ensure it. Overall, her work highlighted conditions that enable the outbreak of electoral violence namely ―nature of competition and mobilization, conflict cleavages and patronage, and electoral institutions‖. In a related work, ―Dying to win: Elections, political violence, and institutional decay in Kenya‖, Mueller (2011) points to lack of losers‘ consent as predisposing issue in the 2007 post-election violence. Elections by their nature are exclusionary and produce either winners 32 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh or losers and in the African context such situations of winners or losers are inextricably linked to access to state resources and power. She argues ‗institutional incompetence, lack of faith and strong belief in the integrity of the electoral institutions prevent or makes it difficult to secure losers‘ consent. This unwillingness to accept defeat stems from perceived electoral malpractices or infractions that losers believe worked against their victory (for detail see Norris, 2012). She argues from the rationalist perspective where politicians or candidates resort to extra-institutional means of winning or protesting the outcome of elections when there are less institutional constraints in employing such a strategy. In this case candidates may resort to violence when the cost of employing such an approach is far less than the gains available to the candidate. The Kenyan example that she extensively draws from indicates how violence can be strategically instigated by political actors in order to gain power (Boone, 2009: Collier and Hoefler, 2009). An appealing recommendation from her work is the call for the private sector of Kenya to take a leading role in providing the needed incentives for political actors to respect rule of law and severely discourage impunity among political actors. While the present study identifies with such an ambitious call, it seeks to further investigate the challenges in this pursuit. Mueller fails to anticipate institutional clash and rivalry which potentially can undermine genuine intentions of preventing electoral violence. 2.5 The Uniqueness of Electoral Violence and How Context Matters in Analysis and Prevention Stephanie M. Burchard reflecting on the topical issue of electoral violence in her book ‗Electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa‘, devoted significant attention to context of electoral violence, arguing that specific cases allow for deeper analysis of the subject by identifying unique actors in a given electoral violence strategy and be able to explain the gains actors seek to make in the violence process. She introduces an ontological debate as she aligns with the contextualist (relativist) approach. Drawing extensively from the Kenyan 33 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh experience and many other African elections, she argues that electoral violence is gradually becoming part and parcel of many African elections. Data from African Conflict Location and Event Dataset convinced her to postulate that the rate of violence increases in election years in Kenya as compared to non-election years. She questions the dominant narrative that the 2013 Kenyan elections were peaceful and provided evidence of over three hundred deaths associated with the elections. She places premium on fatalities as one of the key consequences of electoral violence. In her work, she recognises that violence is ―imprecise and blunt tool‖ when accepted or ignored as normal may undermine sustained socio-economic development. One important contributions of her work stems from using the Kenyan 2007/2008 experience to advance for the categorisation of electoral violence either as strategic or incidental to ultimately influence electoral outcomes. Creditably, her arguments can be extrapolated to the Cote d‘Ivoire, Nigeria and Zimbabwe experiences, which assure some degree of external validity. Such a categorisation also helps to better identify preventive measures within the context of the political environment, institutions, formal or informal in the electoral process. Interestingly, she successfully drew attention to the admirable exhibition of losers‘ consent in the 2012 Senegalese elections. Despite a volatile pre-election atmosphere characterised by violent protests and demonstrations, the willingness of the loser to accept defeat greatly impacted on the prevention of the possible post-election violence that could have undermined the democratic gains of Senegal. Unlike, Gabon, that experienced post-election violence due to the loser rejecting the outcome of the elections and asking his supporters to step out to the streets and defend democracy. The argument that incidental violence is normally emotive response or reaction to perceived bias on the part of the electoral management, lack of independence of the electoral institutions, electoral fraud and malfeasance are tenable to the 34 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh extent that the author highlighted this in the Senegalese experience. The exciting theory of the author is a return to other ‗supporting democratic institutions‘ to concentrate on preventing strategic electoral violence. This calls for regular examination of the operational experiences of these supporting institutions in the prevention of electoral violence. Conclusively, the author highlighted the crucial role of electoral institutions and election management bodies as some of the key factors that can trigger or precipitate electoral violence (see also Hoglund and Fjelde, 2016). 2.6 The Extent of Electoral Violence in Africa Another relevant work that contributes to the current debate on electoral violence in Africa is ‗Electoral violence in Africa revisited‘ by Arthur A. Goldsmith. Goldsmith believes that the dominant view on electoral violence in Africa presents a more alarmist outlook that needs to be interrogated to deal with the unresolved question of the level of violence in Africa‘s elections. Despite admitting to the foremost statistical effort by Straus and Taylor to account for the prevalence of violence in elections, Goldsmith strongly identifies with their estimation that close to 60% of elections in Africa are branded with violence but was quick to dismiss the level of severity arguing that most of these were within low level intensity or tolerable levels. Goldsmiths‘ approach to the study of electoral violence is largely dictated by the generalist perspective. He also alluded to the work of Dorina Bekoe who asserted that in the year 2011 almost half of all African elections have been associated with significant levels of violence. In the view of Goldsmith, the methodology used in arriving at these alarmist conclusions requires further scrutiny. According to Goldsmith the four–step framework namely: ‗(1) no reported electoral Violence before or after a vote; (2) violent harassment; (3) violent repression; and (4) highly violent political campaigns with repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to at least 20 deaths‘, generally useful in getting an overview but 35 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh becomes unreliable and misleading depending on how data is collected. To him a number of the frameworks have been based on reports of United States Government or non- governmental organizations that may have their own bias which ultimately can influence the data; hence, the challenge with the ‗internal validity‘ of the conclusions drawn. Goldsmith also delved into the definitional challenges of electoral violence but argue that both the narrow and the broader conceptualisation are necessary for specific theoretical or epistemological requirements. He therefore defined ‗Electoral violence in both a restricted sense (onsets of social conflict specifically associated with an election) and a somewhat wider sense (proximate onsets of social conflict representing more generic economic or social grievances) (Goldsmith, 2015). Another important piece of contribution is the attempt to indicate when the various phases of election namely pre-election phase, election-phase and post-election phase starts and ends. To him such phases must exist within a 36-month period or 4-month period for both long and short-term electoral cycles. He asserts that elections are more likely to experience violence at the pre-election stage more than the post-election phase. This claim allows us to identify what specifically will motivate various actors to resort to violence as a strategy to influence the outcome of the elections. Convincingly, he introduces a subject of government actors or forces being the most perpetrators of pre-electoral violence and the rationale will be to intimidate opposition supporters due to the limited presence of both domestic and international observers. The argument which he missed is also the fact that opposition parties or supporters may also use violence to draw international attention to perceived electoral infractions at the pre-election stage meaning that incumbent governments do not necessarily enjoy monopoly of the use of violence at the pre-election phase. Secondly, he also indicates that losers‘ or opposition parties are prone to engaging in post-election violence, especially on grounds of electoral fraud and other forms of cheating. It is important 36 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh to note that while losers are more likely to protest the outcome of elections, such protests and demonstrations may start peacefully but due to offensive show of force or power by the security services and coordinated crackdown on protesters could result into violence. Despite the violent episodes of electoral violence in Africa, Goldsmith draws attention to highly celebrated successful elections on the continent pointing to a peaceful referendum in South Sudan, national elections in Ghana, Mozambique, Botswana, and Mauritius. While the present study largely concedes to these success, it also seeks to argue that 1) the referendum in South Sudan was not a nationally competitive elections that were to produce democratic winners and losers and to the extent of excluding a section of the political elite from accessing state power and its unlimited resources, 2) The Ghanaian experience, especially the 2008 election has also suffered from allegations of fraud, intimidation and there was intense international pressure to make Ghana succeed at all cost hence premium was not placed on the integrity of the elections but rather national peace and cohesion. The paper was without any preventive strategies but largely seek to synthesize existing literature on the prevalence of electoral violence in Africa. Collier and Vicente have made some substantial contributions to the preventive strategies of electoral violence by contextualising their study in Nigeria and specifically looking at the 2007 elections. One important argument raised by their study that requires some deeper reflection has to do with the general theory of weak opposition parties resorting to violence because other illicit strategies such as vote buying may be too costly. This raises the question of how weak parties can sustain violence, since the option of violence is also costly. It requires strong mobilization and enough material reward to keep the actors on the street until full blown crisis that may feed into other social grievances. While the approach is highly recommended to prevent incidental violence, which is usually spontaneous, there is a greater 37 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh doubt about its applicability or effectiveness in preventing strategic violence more especially at the post-election phase. The approach totally ignored rising emotions of people during highly competitive elections that can be exploited by politicians. Collier and Vicente, in their work, provided a complete departure in the study of electoral violence, which is usually to document and analyse within a given context the causes of violence, its effects or consequences and possibly recommend ways of mitigating or preventing it. Their work is a ground-breaking attempt to evaluate the contribution of a specific intervention in preventing electoral violence within the context of Nigeria. While this effort makes a significant contribution to devising strategies to prevent electoral violence, the overconcentration on quantitative analysis takes away from the richness of the work and limits thorough understanding of the nuances of the case. The methodological approach was almost parallel to mainstream political campaign; especially direct message of electorates voting against candidates based on violence record can undermine the intervention. Program implementers by this methodological approach potentially expose themselves to attacks from supporters of candidates. The experiment could have avoided the danger of directly influencing voters on who to vote for but follow neutral anti- violence campaign strategies that may not create any rivalry between anti-violence campaigners and supporters of candidates. Potentially, misinformation and deliberate lies can be used to undermine efforts of program implementers especially by candidates who feel threatened by a campaign message such as; ‗‗No to political violence! Vote against violent politicians‘‘. ‗We therefore expect that the campaign increased voter turnout and caused supporters of violent candidates to change their electoral preferences away from those candidates‘. Such a direct attempt to alter the electoral preferences of the electorate in some instances can create volatile conditions that could trigger or precipitate violence. 38 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh According to Sadiki Koko (2013), the continuous occurrence of election-related violence in many African elections, demonstrates some level of deficiency within the political culture of these countries. In his contribution to the debate on electoral violence, he asserts that despite African countries sharing similar political or socio-economic experiences, the nature of election violence across the continent varies and this requires that each specific case must be given special research priority to unravel the unique circumstances under which it occurs. This case-by-case approach towards electoral violence will deepen the understanding of relevant stakeholders and equip them with the right tools and techniques to deal with the problem of violence in African elections. The author drawing from the statement of the UNGA 2010 report, ‗there has been little academic research on the subject of election violence. Research gaps that have been generally identified include work on causes and effects of election violence, cross-national studies, efforts to understand the specific forms or variations of violence, work that is both theoretical and case-oriented, and research on the scope, gravity and timing of election violence‘, believes that gaps exist in understanding the phenomena of electoral violence and specifically sought to contribute towards ‗patterns, causes and consequences of election-related violence on the continent‘. The continent experiences ‗inconsistencies‘ in the occurrence of election violence, which the author explains to be as a result of the nature of democracy in a given African country. The nature of democracy he classified as ‗consolidating democratic states, states in advanced transitions, progressing states, states attempting transition and persistent autocratic states‘ (Koko, 2013). While these classifications are blurred, and states can fit into one or more, the argument has been raised that all states on the continent exhibit some degree of vulnerability and sensitivity towards the possibility of experiencing electoral violence. However, the author with supporting claims from Sisk (2008) argues that the more consolidated a state is the less likelihood that the political elite will resort to violence to maintain or gain political power. 39 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh There is a distinguishing factor with regards to the timing of violence. Violence occurs before elections, during elections and after elections. A clear observation made is that reasonable number of African countries experience pre-election violence yet a substantial number of them maintain a relatively peaceful atmosphere during voting process. What is therefore worrying; are the tension, and the fear that is generated during the post-election phase (after the declaration of results). The dispute over the outcome of results has led to austere violence in several situations. The Kenyan, Gabon, Cote d‘Ivoire experiences are enough testimony. This lack of losers‘ consent undermines democratic gains and creates conditions for irreparable damage to the country as witnessed in many African countries, Zimbabwe, Gabon just to mention a few. Though the author pointed to some judicial mechanisms to obtain consent, it is important to note that some political actors prefer to exercise their ‗right of difference‘ in a very expressive manner that is sometimes extra-judicial (violence). The account is that the zero-sum game politics in Africa and how it excludes losers from the economic benefits of the state are some reasons why many political actors see elections as ‗do or die affair‘ rather than a competitive and the most legitimate means of conferring state power on a group of people to govern and to protect the common good. This points to how state capacity forms an integral part of ensuring peaceful elections. Despite the weak institutional capacity to manage credible elections, many political actors also deliberately heighten tensions and exploit ‗existing socio-economic cleavages for electoral survival. An important element of the paper is its reference to national security forces and their key role in ensuring peaceful elections. The limitation with this logic is that in many African countries the national security task force which provides security during elections are biased and favouring the incumbent government. Again, the nature of electoral violence has made prosecution very difficult except arrests and detention under few 40 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh circumstances. This means the security task force is unable to prevent random electoral violence among political party supporters. The attempt by the security forces to maintain law and order under the circumstance of random electoral violence is usually met with fierce resistance by the party supporters. This may be a source of further violence. This is applicable to the cases in Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Gabon. The work failed to point to countries like Ghana where there is some amount of appreciable neutrality on the part of the security forces but again in this context the security forces often suffer from overstretched capacity in controlling well mobilise party supporters on the street. Police or security forces indiscretion, disproportionate use of force to control the crowd can spell doom for the country. The author has argued for a preventing strategy indicating that it is the most cost-effective mechanism to address the problem. Identification of key stakeholders in the process is also a bold step to establishing a ‗multi-stakeholder approach‘ to preventing electoral violence. While this stakeholder identification is a good beginning to address the problem, it creates role conflicts among actors, in the case of institutions; lack of clear mandate or overlapping role can lead to unnecessary rivalry that may create further problems for effective prevention strategy. One of the key stakeholders that, constitute the focus of this study; is the civil society organizations and their role in electoral violence prevention. The author has convincingly argued that CSOs can on their own set up a ‗dispute resolution platform or offer their services through the electoral management body.‘ The question remains, what will be compelling about this platform for other stakeholders to participate? There are instances where political party leaders have boycotted CSOs programs and platforms. Also, state institutions have cried foul of CSOs taking their jobs pointing to the fact that state agencies have the constitutional authority to undertake such initiatives. This creates a serious issue of 41 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh role conflict. Within the multi-level approach in violence prevention, who or which institution provides leadership or monitoring and who takes ultimate responsibility? Does the lack of leadership under such multi-level approach predispose volatile situations to degenerate into violence? These are questions that require further interrogation. 2.7 Democratic Discourse and Conflict Resolution approach towards Electoral Violence The theoretical foundation or policy approach towards the study of electoral violence has been parallel without a merger between the dominant strands of debate. However, Hoglund & Jarstad (2011), provided a ground-breaking research work that seeks to reveal the interplay of the democratic discourse and the conflict resolution approach. Using the experiences of the ‗conflict ridden‘ KwaZulu Natal, the authors cited election monitoring and institutional reforms around the election management body as examples of democratic discourse approach, security and mediation roles are classified as being a conflict resolution approach to election related violence. This work is a clear departure from the many of the works that treat electoral violence. It focuses predominantly on preventive strategies and the management of electoral violence. The authors identified the following as some preventive strategies; ‗monitoring, mediation, legal measures, law enforcement and self-regulating practices‘. The prevention strategies provided by the authors further corroborates the work of Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) who compared the functions of civil society organizations in democratization and peace-building and came out with seven similar functions of CSOs either in peace-building or democracy promotion. In an electoral contest, violence becomes an ‗attractive option‘ due to failed or weak institutions. Both government and opposition parties utilize violence to maintain their positions or to gain access to power. The above argument introduces the element of rationality to the electoral violence debate. This demonstrates that actors may resort to 42 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh violence when the associated material or political cost is attractive. Characterising violence as an illegitimate, evil and abnormal act through the practice of ‗naming and shaming‘ becomes effective. Politicians want to be people who have not only the technical and administrative competence to govern but also people with utmost integrity and an appealing reputation to lead the nation. The naming and shaming principle as proposed by Hoglund & Jarstad confirms Collier and Vicente‘ (2011) experiment in Nigeria, which asked voters to reject violent politicians. However, as argued earlier on, this naming and shaming can become provocative if not confrontational between anti-violence campaigners and affected politicians and their supporters. In such a volatile situation, incidental violence can be predicted. On the question of the causes of electoral violence, the authors provided the political context of the Kwa-Zulu Natal province and opined that the style of party mobilization is usually violent and results into a clash between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). The historical account of the KwaZulu Natal and how this has influenced the prevalence of election violence in the province puts to rest the point raised by Sadiki Koko (2013) on how historical events and experiences of countries either shape or predispose them to election related conflicts. The statement ‗the KwaZulu homeland, established in the early 1970s, consisted of pockets and enclaves of land and was not a clearly defined or contiguous territory. Given the structure of homeland politics, which were part of the Apartheid structure, incentives were created to play on ethnic affiliation to gain access to power and resources. The affiliation of Inkatha with homeland politics resulted in a power struggle with the ANC, dividing not only politics but society in general, and became the basis for violent mobilization‘ by the authors reflect deeply how the history of KwaZulu Natal has shape the occurrence of electoral violence in the province even though there is some general reduction in violence during elections in South Africa. A clear evidence of history accounting 43 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh for violence is summarised in the following ‗the development of two marginalized classes under Apartheid – the migrant workers living in hostels and the squatter communities – also created a volatile situation‘. In this case, the point has been made about how apartheid and the postcolonial history of KwaZulu Natal province have created the needed social grievances that feed into part politics. In this historical account, the authors have shown that success at preventing or reducing violence in a previous electoral cycle should not mean inaction in subsequent elections. In the case of South Africa, in comparative terms, the 2004 national elections could have been the basis for complacency due to its peaceful nature, yet evidence abound that the 2009 national elections became one of the most violent elections in the history of South Africa. Prevention strategies remain work in progress and must be seen as a continuous process throughout the various stages of the election. In concluding on what could be the best possible means of preventing and managing post- election violence in Africa, Omotola (2010) maintains that adherence to constitutional procedures, power sharing and electoral reforms aimed at ensuring electoral integrity are inadequate due to ‗poor execution of these mechanisms‘. In his view, electoral grievances are commonly associated with almost all elections in Africa where the ‗best riggers are the best winners‘. This view suggests that actors in electoral violence prevention must develop the strategy to deal with real or perceived electoral grievances. Omotola‘s argument is relevant to the prevent study as it leads us to better question how losers‘ consent are secured by CSOs in the face of electoral grievances especially within the Ghanaian context. Again, despite the article extensively drawing on the post-election violence in Kenya, and Nigeria, it relates to the Ghanaian context in terms of constitutional frameworks ensuring electoral justice as evident in the 2012 election petition, electoral reforms as have been associated with almost all elections in Ghana. 44 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.8 Electoral Violence Victims as Peace Ambassadors Another important element of the work of Hoglund & Jarstad (2011) is that it provides an insight into how victims of electoral violence become ‗Peace Ambassadors‘ and find better ways of preventing reoccurrence of violence ‗Victims of violence may develop negative attitudes toward the political system and democratic practices, thus hampering the consolidation of peace and democracy. Without coping mechanisms to deal with the trauma created by electoral violence, victims may themselves become perpetrators, contributing to a seemingly endless cycle of violence‘. Self-regulating mechanism such as the culture of democratic tolerance must be promoted. An acceptance of electoral loss is a major issue that needs to be interrogated for clarity, especially the circumstances under which losers accept and what role CSOs play in a given community or country. Having identified the actors that can embark on these preventive mechanisms, the authors were unable to point to the kind of operational collaborative systems that must exist among stakeholders. For instance, violence incidence reporting and deployment of the security forces to deal with violence can in it-self be a source of provocation among the population. The authors‘ conclusion on having a further research on the ‗integrated framework‘ is instructive and helps to explain the aim of the present study. This will answer the question of how applicable the framework is in other circumstances. Using past perpetrators or victims of violence as a preventive tool requires framing and reframing of issues of electoral violence prevention (Kumah-Abiwu, 2017). According to Kumah-Abiwu (2017), all elections in Ghana have been characterized with some level of violence and basing his argument on the 2015 bye- elections in Talensi in Northern Region of Ghana, concludes that ‗issue framing and reframing by the political elites‘ serves as an aiding tool for violence outbreak or prevention. In his view, the 45 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh emergence of ‗macho men for peace‘ could be a strategic reframing of electoral violence issues in Ghana, leading to prevention. The reframing presents an opportunity to redirect the energy of these individuals into becoming democratic citizenry and serves as a counter force in dealing with vigilante groups aligned with political parties in Ghana (Amankwaah, 2013; Brechenmacher, 2016; Bekoe & Burchard, 2016). The relevance of these works is to place on civil society organizations the role or the responsibility of transforming local actors of electoral violence into people who will ensure peace through socialization of their peers. 2.9 Local Institutions and International Engagement in Electoral Violence Prevention In what appears to be a concluding confidence reposed in the capacity of local institutions to take charge of ensuring violence prevention during elections, Jendayi Frazer (2011) made the point about how international interventions often suffer a setback based on the legitimate issues of sovereignty. She regarded CSOs as the ‗critical actors‘ with the needed domestic support base to prevent violence during elections. She made this point against the backdrop that these domestic democratic institutions better understand the local context and can devise creating means in preventing election related violence. She admitted that electoral violence prevention is one of the most challenging and ‗complex issues that the knowledge needed‘ for solution cannot emanate from ‗academic pieces alone‘. The field of practice, real experiments and experiences on the ground are needed. Her arguments justify this study as it seeks to examine the everyday operational experiences of selected CSOs in electoral violence prevention in Ghana and highlight lessons for the African region. Her proposal for regional intervention in violence prevention though theoretically relevant, but in practical terms creates serious challenges that may exacerbate tensions and violent situations. For example, the regional intervention efforts in the just ended Gabon elections were supporting a candidate who has rendered meritorious service to the international community. The 46 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh opposition candidate Jean Ping‘s call for recount appears to have been subtly endorsed by the EU and the AU. These scenarios make it difficult to rely on such regional efforts due to lack of neutrality and the local ownership of the democratic process. Many have called for local or national ownership of peace led initiatives to sustain democracy in Africa. Despite this desire, electoral violence in any given country presents a grave disaster to the entire security of the international community. The devastating effects of electoral violence have compelled some donor agencies and their western countries to develop frameworks for prediction and prevention. Notable among these frameworks are the USAID Electoral Security Framework, UNDP Elections & Conflict Prevention Guide, and International IDEA Electoral Risk Management Tool (Fischer et al, 2010: Sisk & Spies, 2009). These frameworks and the desire for maintaining global stability by the donor community shape various engagement and interactive processes in electoral violence prevention especially in Africa. According to Brown and Raddatz (2014) international engagement for the prevention of electoral violence is led by the donor community and their allied multilateral institutions. In their view, the engagements provide areas of cooperation and competition or rivalry for the parties involved. They argue that international engagement results into any of the following during the entire electoral cycle; institutional or capacity building of state institutions most crucially the works of the electoral commission, funding for civil society organizations violence prevention initiatives, engaging key political actors in a high-level dialogue, careful public statements sometimes with the threat of sanction or punitive action against suppliers of violence. Even though their work is situated within the context of the 2013 Kenyan elections, the observations apply to the Ghanaian experience and to some extent several African countries. This work by Brown and Raddatz (2014) enables us 47 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh to interrogate the cooperative alliances between CSOs and the donor community in electoral violence prevention in Ghana. 48 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES AND CLARIFICATIONS 3.0 RESEARCH PARADIGMS There are two main dominant opposing perspectives in the study of social science phenomena. These are subjectivism and objectivism. The subjectivist perspective is associated with nominalist ontology but strongly opposes any idea of realist ontology. In simple terms, ontology means what is in existence, its nature and how it can be studied or researched. Central to the argument of nominalist ontology is that social phenomena are internal to human conception that is, what is considered reality is mediated through human constructed ideas (Burell and Morgan, 1979; Strange, 1997; Patomaki, 2006). Ontological debates produce two main epistemological outcomes namely positivism and anti-positivism. Epistemology refers to the nature of knowledge, how it can be studied and means of validating the knowledge (Grix, 2010). The researcher‘s philosophical orientation largely determines the kind of methodological choices that are available and the accompanying decisions that are to be made to ensure desired research outcomes that are reliable, verifiable and valid. The various perspectives have been framed up by Morgan and Burell (1983) namely; interpretive, functionalist, radical humanist and structural models. Even though this study could be situated in any of the above stated perspectives, the researcher has decided to opt for the interpretive analysis. The rationale is to enable the research to immensely benefit from the inter-subjectivities of the research subjects such as the selected organizations and their actors, and respondents at large. Consequently, the study is aligned to the nominalist ontology since the subject matter under investigation requires interpretation to make meaningful meanings. Epistemologically, the 49 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh researcher is considered as an integral part of the research process in co-creating knowledge with the research subjects. To ensure synergy between the research philosophy and the methodology, the researcher has adopted a case study approach. As indicated by Yin, (Yin 2009) case study is most appropriate when a real-life context is the subject matter under study. Also, a case study approach enables the researcher to conduct in depth investigation based on why and how questions. The choice of Ghana for this study is purposive and because Ghana presents a deviant case in electoral violence prevention. To this extent, the study adopted the purposive sampling technique in identifying CSOs and respondents. Purposive sampling is deliberately selecting a group of research participants whose knowledge, expertise and experiences are of great benefit to the research goal. Representativeness is not the objective of the researcher but to provide deeper insights. This means that judgment about who is placed to provide key information was made before fieldwork started. The study relies on qualitative research methodologies such as interview with key elite informants, focus group discussion among citizens in the Six main volatile regions of Ghana. The process of content analysis has been adopted and this will be done around themes that emerged from both the elite interview and focus group discussion. 3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH Academic research can be done from three main perspectives; purely qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods. There is a degree of flexibility on the part of a researcher to determine which perspectives best suit the study, however, the nature of the study shapes the decision of the researcher. For this research, a qualitative approach has been adopted to enable the study immensely to benefit from the experiences of respondents and to generate a rich data that brings insight into CSOs and Electoral Violence Prevention in Ghana. The study adopted an 50 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh in-depth unstructured interview approach as the most suitable way to obtain data from experts and the gain greater insights into the behind the scenes negotiations that account for violence prevention in Ghana. 3.2 CASE STUDY According to Landman (2007), a study based on a single country can exhibit comparative characteristics when the study seeks to make inferences that have implications for other countries and extensively make use of concepts that are applicable to other countries. In a single country study, the contextual explanations of a deviant case serve as a useful analytical framework for comparative issues (Gerring, 2004; Lees, 2006). Case study allows for a deeper meaning and understanding of a case and the information or the findings generated become the basis for triangulation in other similar context or in cases of shared characteristics (Gerring, 2006; Creswell, 2017; Lewis, 2015). Admittedly, single country studies generally suffer from extreme counterfactuals, parsimony and lack wider applicability (George and Bennet, 2005; Van Evera,1997). However, Gerring (2004), argues that studying crucial cases allows for some degree of applicability in contexts with shared characteristics. Ghana is considered as a crucial case in electoral violence prevention and insights from this study have implications for other countries similar in political history. Establishing an empirical relationship between CSOs and electoral violence prevention in Ghana should bring about conclusions with internal validity. Cause and effect relationships are difficult to prove as result of many intervening factors and their interplay in how they shape an outcome (Beebee, et al, 2009). This research does not seek to prove causal relationships but to make empirical inference based on original field data. The selection of Ghana as a case study is to allow for deeper analysis on several CSOs and their role in preventing electoral violence. It also allows for patterns to be observed among CSOs in relation to the electoral periods under 51 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh investigation (2008, 2012, and 2016). Ghana belongs to the low intensity electoral violence (Bob-Milliar, 2014; Bekoe, 2010) yet experiences politically volatile atmosphere during elections. This worrying tensed atmosphere is enough concern to warrant continuous study and develop strategies that will serve as mitigating factors in violence prevention during elections. The international dimension is that, Ghana has received praises from the international community for its relative success at ensuring losers consent. This study will unravel the operational factors shaping the phenomena of losers‘ consent in Ghana and present lessons for other African countries. 3.3 SAMPLING OF CASE STUDY ORGANIZATIONS The case study organizations were selected using purposive sampling technique. These organizations have a long-established evidence of playing crucial roles and embarking on a series of activities aimed at preventing electoral violence. The selected organizations stand- out based on a feedback from the electoral commission on CSOs they consider as critical stakeholders in Ghana‘s electoral politics. I requested for this information in a form of a written letter addressed to the Chair of the Electoral Commission. Two weeks after, I had a call from the Research Department of the Electoral Commission for a meeting over my request. The outcome of the meeting also showed consensus on the selected case study organizations. The case study organizations are as follows; the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG), Coalition of Domestic Election Observers affiliated to the Centre for Democratic Development (CODEO-CDD) and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP-Ghana). These Civil Society Organizations may be considered as Accra-based because of the location of their operational headquarters. However, they have built networks and coalitions in a form that absorbed the community- based organizations, faith-based organizations, professional and student unions. By building 52 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh these networks, they have membership and draw on the leadership strength of the network to exert influence among the population and at the elite level. It is important to note that, the case study CSOs are national in character and heavily rely on funding from the donor community and other development partners of Ghana. 3.4 BRIEF OVERVIEW ON THE SELECTED CSOS The CSOs selected include Institute of Economic Affairs, Institute of Democratic Governance, Centre for Democratic Development-Coalition of Domestic Election Observers, West Africa Network of Peacebuilding and their work, both structural and operational, inform the analysis in the research. 3.4.1 Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) th The IEA was founded prior to the commencement of the 4 Republic. In 1989, the vision of Dr. Charles Mensa came to light, through the establishment of a public policy institute. The main goal is to ensure free market, advocate private sector led economic policies, ensure rule of law and democracy become the most preferred political game in town not just in Ghana but also in West Africa and Africa as a whole. The formative years of the IEA were within th the context of restrictive CSO activity, however, by the start of the 4 Republic in 1993, the IEA was well positioned to give meaning to the vision for which it was founded. The IEA carries out public education and research on broad range of issues such as democracy, human rights, economic, legal and political issues in Ghana. Having existed for the past 25 years, the IEA is noted for the Ghana Political Parties Program, the Presidential Debate, the Presidential Transition Act, just to mention few. The IEA has institutional alliance with several other faith-based organizations and professional associations that cut across the country. 53 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3.4.2 Centre for Democratic Development (CDD)- Coalition of Domestic Election Observers The Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) was founded in 1998 with the vision of promoting democracy, human rights, good governance, citizen participation in decision- making process in Ghana and Africa as a whole. CDD was formed to locally respond to the global aspirations of liberal democracy and ensure that liberal democratic ideas, principles, norms are consolidated in Ghana through public policy advocacy, research and citizen engagement. Two years after the formation of the CDD, it became the secretariat of the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), a semi-autonomous or affiliate organization whose operations are to help promote the vision and mission of the CDD. CODEO was primarily formed to provide a complementary role in ensuring credible, peaceful, free and fair elections in Ghana. Apart from the 1992 and 1996 general elections, CODEO has observed all elections in Ghana since 2000. CODEO, with its principle of impartiality, operates through 42 faith based CSOs and professional associations to prevent electoral fraud, violence and enhance the credibility and acceptability of electoral results in Ghana. CODEO has been known for its nationwide domestic election observation, the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), advocacy for electoral reforms and the parliamentary candidate debates and more recently, the post-election stakeholder engagements. 3.4.3 Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)-Civic Forum Initiative (CFI) The Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) has been in existence for the past eighteen years (18yrs). Its main vision is to be the leading CSO that enhances democratic practices and help in the consolidation of democracy and good governance in Ghana and the rest of Africa. IDEG‘s operational philosophy is that, sustainable development largely rests on the pillars of a democratic society. IDEG continues to serve as a coordinating secretariat for several good 54 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh governance initiatives, including the African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP), and the Governance Issues Forum. By the year 2008, IDEG has become one of the leading CSOs in Ghana in the promotion of democracy, good governance and rule of law. IDEG, as part of its interventions in Ghana‘s electoral politics, serves as the secretariat of the Civic Forum Initiative. The Civic Forum Initiative is made of several NGOs, professional associations, partner CSOs, traditional leaders, faith-based organizations, labour unions, community-based organizations. The rallying idea for the CFI, is to promote free, fair and credible elections and building consensus among the key stakeholders and individual actors in the electoral process. Election Observation, civic and voter education, promotion of peaceful elections through elite‘s pact and the Ghana speaks initiatives are some of the well- known accomplishments of IDEG. 3.4.4 West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP-Ghana) The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, a regional peace-building organization in West Africa, headquartered in Ghana, was formed to serve as a platform for CSOs coordination and contribution to peacebuilding in West Africa. It was formed in 1998, a period that coincided with civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. WANEP was inspired by the vision to prevent conflict in West Africa and to ensure that communities live peacefully and co-exist in a productive manner. The organization though regional in nature, has a strong national networks and member CSOs that enforces the strategy of locating, supporting and empowering local people to respond to conflict risk factors. This means people‘s agency in violence prevention remains a key approach to violence prevention. In Ghana, WANEP has been involved in mediation and peacebuilding initiatives in areas such as Bawku, Dagbon, Nkunya, Alavanyo, Yendi. WANEP is known for its instrumental role in the formation of the National Peace Council. WANEP is represented on the CIVIC FORUM INITIATIVE and 55 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh has developed working relations with the NCCE, National Election Security Task Force (NESTF), and National Security. 3.5 SAMPLING METHODS The study is qualitative, that means non-probability sampling techniques are at the heart of it and provides the basis for the overall research quality and integrity (Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Miles and Huberman, 1994). The study adopted two main non-probability sampling techniques namely purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques (Curtis et al, 2000). The researcher with his practical insight into the case study organizations, deliberately chose at least one specific person to interview for the study. The deliberate or purposive selection is based on the expert knowledge of these key persons and their active public involvement on peace and violence prevention issues during electoral periods. For the researcher, at this point, representativeness was not a goal since there was no known given populations of actors in violence prevention to be able to accurately approximate from the population (Abrams, 2010). The idea was to obtain rich data from the select few who will be speaking to facts, real life stories as active participants and recount experiences as witnesses to key negotiations and meetings to avert electoral violence and near national electoral disaster. According to Abrams (2010), purposive sampling allows the researcher to exercise some degree of personal judgement to ensure that a relevant respondent with the required experiences are selected to provide insight and thick descriptions on the topic of investigation. Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that such a process will lead to producing ‗believable descriptions and generate rich information‘ that enhance rigor and the credibility of the research findings. The purposive sampling strategy adopted, encountered a major difficulty as my judgement on relevant key persons could not account for some important individuals who 56 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh played key roles but are usually kept secret and the credit goes to the case study organizations or the spokespersons of these institutions. To avoid missing out on such relevant persons, the purposive sampling was accompanied with Snowballing (Heckathorn, 2011). This was to allow the intentionally selected respondent to lead the researcher to other key persons. The snowballing also became a good way of triangulating the information from other sources. To avoid the confusion surrounding the definition and the interpretation of what snowball sampling is, the researcher adopted the explanation of Gile and Handcock (2010). The two scholars conceive snowball as a process of ‗link-tracing‘ (Gile & Handcock, 2011). This became a process of referring me to persons who were involved in electoral tension mediation and reconciliation processes. Through this approach, I was able to reach out to some hard to find elites for the interview. 3.6 SAMPLING OF RESPONDENTS There was an initial idea of adopting a sampling strategy that provides me with the total number of organizations and respondents for the research. This idea was abandoned after my first visit to IDEG to negotiate access to the key persons for my interview. During this meeting, it became evidently clear that there was the need to adopt a more open, flexible approach to be able to talk to the right people and obtain rich reliable data for the research questions and objectives. This flexible approach enabled me to overcome the challenge of being fixated about the specific persons to speak to and who may not necessarily be the individuals with the first-hand information on the subject matter under investigation. Elites belong to several overlapping social clubs or associations. During the field work, some elites had to call colleagues and friends they knew had essential information that could provide more insight on the research questions. This facilitated easy access to some of the key persons who took part in the interview. Respondents were sampled through a purposive 57 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh approach first at the organizational level and second at the individual level. The purposive approach was complemented using snowballing or the process of link tracing. At the individual level, the criteria for inclusion require the person to have been an integral person in an episode that provides detail information for the study. It involves individuals who have worked and played key roles with the selected case study CSOs but have moved on to other career options or had retired. 3.7 BREAK DOWN ON ELITE INTERVIEW INSTITUTION NO OF SAMPLED ACTUAL RESPONDENT RESPONDENTS INSTITUTE OF 6 6 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (IDEG) INSTITUTE OF 4 4 ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WEST AFRICA NETWORK 4 4 FOR PEACEBUILDING WANEP COALITION OF 6 6 DOMESTIC ELECTION OBSERVERS (CODEO- CDD) ELECTORAL 6 6 58 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh COMMISSION OF GHANA NATIONAL ELECTION 7 7 SECURITY TASK FORCE- Ghana Police Service (NESTF) NATIONAL PEACE 4 4 COUNCIL NATIONAL 6 6 DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS (NDC) NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY 5 5 (NPP) NATIONAL COMMISSION 5 5 FOR CIVIC EDUCATION (NCCE) Kofi Annan Peacekeeping 3 3 and Training Centre (KAIPTC) Key Media Persons 6 6 59 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Total= 62 Respondents Total= 62 Respondents Break Down on Focus Group Discussion REGIONS COMPOSITION OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION NORTHERN REGION – TAMALE 12 ASHANTI REGION – KUMASI 11 CENTRAL REGION – CAPE COAST 8 GREATER ACCRA – ACCRA 13 EASTERN REGION – KOFORIDUA 6 VOLTA REGION -HO 10 TOTAL = 60 ELITE INTERVIEW = 62 Respondents FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION (SIX REGIONS OUT OF TEN) = 60 Respondents Total= 122 Respondents Source: (Author‘s construct, 2018) 60 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3.8 DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES The data collection process involves several strategies such as Elite Unstructured In-depth Interviews in a one on one setting, and Focus Group Discussion. Reports of the case study CSOs, memo, record of meetings, and letters constituted an integral approach to data collection. 3.8.1 Interview-Respondents Interviews form an integral part of a qualitative research process that involves primary data collection (Brinkmann, 2014). In the views of Myers and Newman (2007), interviews are the most appropriate primary data collection strategy to gain depth and rich data for greater insights. The researcher adopted unstructured interview format. However, the interview process was guided by a set of questions in the form of an interview guide. The interview guide served the purpose of keeping the interview focused and directed towards the main research questions. During the interview process, respondents had the opportunity to pause the session intermittently for receiving important phone calls and attend to other important or emergency situations. In some two instances, respondents asked other colleagues to join the interview session to respond to specific issues based on their experiences. This practice was accepted to allow for diverse perspectives and to extend maximum respect to the respondents thereby winning their trust throughout the interview process. 3.8.2 Focus Group Discussion (FDG) Focus group discussion helps to put together participants with diverse backgrounds and perspectives to share their experiences, stories and validate or question the stories of others. The nature of interaction among participants provides the opportunity to produce spontaneous insightful data (Wong, 2008; Nyumba, 2017). The focus group discussion covered six regions 61 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh out of the ten in Ghana. The FGDs took place at the regional capitals of the selected regions. The researcher set out a minimum number of five (5) and a maximum number of fifteen (15) persons to be sufficient for FGD to take place. In all the six selected regions, Eastern Region recorded the lowest number of participants for the FDG. This may be attributed to the timing of the FDG, rather than any other factor since some participants had agreed to the set date for the discussion but had to call to apologize for their inability to honour their commitment to participate due to work related engagements. The six selected regions have since the 2008 elections, featured prominently as being host to high number of hot-spot areas or constituencies based on data collected and analysed by West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP, 2016). According to the Electoral Commission of Ghana, the selected regions for the FGDs are regarded as medium to high risk areas for electoral violence (Electoral Commission, 2016; WANEP, 2016) 3.8.3 Negotiating Access to Respondents To abide by all ethical dimensions of data collection and accessing respondents, the researcher wrote to the Director of LECIAD, University of Ghana asking for a formal introduction to the study organizations and individuals involved in the interview process. These letters were obtained and dispatched to the respective individuals and organizations before the start of the fieldwork. There were several follow ups to the letters to secure a convenient date or time for the interview process. In most cases, the respondents determined the date and time for the interview session, though the researcher was also called upon in some instances to suggest periods of availability. This approach was to avoid putting pressure on the respondents thereby creating stress or discomfort that has ethical implications for the research. Every attempt was made to meet the respondent in the most relaxed, convenient, suitable environment that will stimulate a productive interview session between the 62 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh researcher and the respondent. The researcher briefed all respondents about their right to refuse consent at any stage of the interview and the focus group discussion. It is important to note that all respondents never exercised this right at any stage of the data collection process. However, interview schedule and appointments were cancelled and rescheduled to mutually agreed dates and time. 3.8.4 Interview Transcription Transcription remains an integral part of a qualitative research. Transcription borders on the representation of research participants and decisions over what mode of transcription must be adopted for a research has implication for research objectives and the overall outcome. Two main classifications of interview transcription have been identified. These are the naturalized and the denaturalized approach (Oliver et al, 2005; Cameron, 2001). Naturalism is the mode of representation of the respondent in a manner that sought to truly give a valid account of the words or the speeches as transpired during the conversation. There are no attempts on the part of the researcher to filter words or speeches. It is the painstaking process of capturing the speeches or words of the respondent verbatim including pauses, mannerism and other non- verbal gestures. That is faithfully presenting data as obtained from the respondent without necessarily interfering or filtering to conform to accepted language standards or engaging in what Schegloff (1997) claim to be an intellectual imperialism. Denaturalism does not mean an overbearing interference in the data transcription, rather this process also seeks to depict the true picture of the words and speeches of the respondents except that it tries to conform to accepted standard accents. This mode of transcription places emphasis on the accuracy and the substance of the interview. It accounts for the shared meanings and perceptions created during the interview process. To safeguard the integrity of the data transcription process, the researcher adopted a hybrid approach by making use of 63 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh both the naturalized and the denaturalized processes of data transcription. This is possible because the interviews were tape recorded using an iPad and at the same time notes were taken during the interview session. The notes reflect the meanings and insights that must be given theoretical privilege in the data analysis. The mixed approach adopted in the interview transcription process was an attempt to avoid the misrepresentation of the respondents‘ stories that could impact transparency, the rigor and trustworthiness of the interpretations from the data. 3.8.5 Data Analysis The data analysis proceeded first with the field notes and analytical memos that were written during each day of the field work. At the close of each session of the interview, the researcher played and listened to the recordings to be familiar and get immersed in the data. The idea of playing recordings of interviews in the evening was to enable me identify questions that require a follow in the next interview session. The field notes and the analytical memos became the initial attempt to identify themes for the analysis. Also, the transcription of the data formed an integral part of the data analysis. In this process of transcription, the researcher did not opt for a research assistant. The researcher arrived at this decision because he was not convinced that confidential information will be kept by the research assistant. The idea of signing a confidential form with the assistant was not convincing or persuasive enough at the time of decision making. All recorded interviews were transcribed to text. This analytical process was another way of getting very familiar with the data as proposed by Tracy (2013). The themes that emerged during the reading of the transcribed texts were useful in the data analysis as the researcher could easily identify responses or excerpts that supports the themes. 64 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The next level of the data analysis was done through matching research questions/objectives with responses from the data. Responses that related to various research questions or objectives were matched through the process of color coding. Four color codes were used namely Red Blue Green and Yellow. Red represented research question/objective 1, Blue for research question/objective 2, Green for research question/objective 3 and Yellow depicting research question/objective 4. The researcher adopted an integrated data analysis approach (Bradley et al, 2007). To ensure transparency in the data analysis, the researcher aligned the data analysis process with the framework advocated by Pope et al, (2000). According to them, the qualitative data analysis process must proceed through five stages namely; the stage of familiarization, identifying thematic framework, the stage of data indexing, data charting and finally data mapping & interpretation (Pope et al, 2000). The interpretive nature of the research allows for content analysis without resorting to any qualitative software packages for analysis (LeCompte, 2000; Pope et al, 2000). Though useful in data organization and for easy retrieval of data, no software packages can replace the analytical skills of the researcher in the data interpretation. To this extent, the researcher did not make use of any computer software for data analysis. 3.8.6 Triangulation to ensure Rigor, Validity and Reliability The process of triangulation was used to validate, authenticate data collected. Part of the strategy was to use multiple sources, respondents to ensure reliability of the initial data obtained. For instance, names of persons that come up in an interview are also interviewed to confirm or bring new insight to the stories of the respondents. The idea of using multiple respondents or sources was to ensure credibility of the data. 65 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3.8.7 Confidentiality To avoid ethical dilemma and prevent the breach of ethical rules and regulations in the conduct of this research, the researcher adopted a regime of strict anonymity and confidentiality. Names of all respondents were deliberately omitted in the main work throughout the writing process. This is to protect the identity of the respondents and ensure their safety. This principle of confidentiality was made known to interviewees or respondents during the data collection stage and it gave them confidence to volunteer highly confidential information during the interview process and the focus group discussion. In some limited cases where a respondent wants to be known and identified and named in the write up, the researcher re-emphasized the need for strict anonymity. By this principle of anonymity, the researcher will make reference to the official positions of the key informants and the participants of the focus group discussion. 3.8.8 Conclusion This chapter gave an overview of the methodological approaches and the research philosophy guiding the dissertation writing process. The chapter examined the main research strategy such as unstructured in-depth interview and the use of focus group discussion as a mechanism to link research questions to the data collection process. It also highlighted the process of data analysis and the regime adopted to ensure confidentiality and anonymity of respondents. 66 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER FOUR SITUATING ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AFRICA 4.0 INTRODUCTION This chapter seeks to provide the historical and socio-economic trends in Africa that provide the enabling atmosphere for electoral violence to continue to thrive despite attempts to develop a more robust and stronger political culture. It is imperative to accentuate the point that electoral violence is not only limited to Africa but has become a global crisis that is sweeping across Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and more recently, the 2016 US elections. Despite my claim that electoral violence is a crisis that demands global response, what makes the African situation more worrying and deeply rooted in the everyday electoral experiences of the African people requires a critical interrogation. This section situates electoral violence in the political economic histories of the African continent. The section draws from a select number of African countries to highlight how the ugly past, the challenging present and the uncertain future of African countries account for electoral violence. 4.1 COLONIAL POLITICS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTORAL VIOLENCE In addressing the violence in African elections, it is essential to provide some understanding of how colonial politics served as a factor in today‘s electoral politics on the continent. Electoral Politics in Africa was ushered into the continent by the colonial masters, partially, as a mechanism to control, determine or dictate the pace of the decolonization process and to continue exploiting the colonies for the benefit of the European powers (Cohen, 1983).Arguably, the idea of electoral politics was also part of a strategy to institutionally transfer the ideals of liberal democracy (Jinadu, 1995; Baku, 1991) The introduction of 67 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh electoral politics did not come through only dialogue and negotiations among the local elites and their colonial counterparts, but also through protests; that were characterized with extreme violence (Blanton et al, 2001: Apter, 1972). The elitist approach towards the initial electoral politics on the continent largely excluded the majority of the population. Economic status and other property rights as prerequisite for participation in elections during the colonial era undermined inclusive governance and participation and defeated the purpose of elections as a broader mechanism for conferring legitimacy on a group of persons to exercise a governing authority (Crowder 1968; Fayam 2008; Omotola, 2010). The consideration for economic, age, educational status, tax and ownership of property as requirements for voting in elections were borne out of the risks and uncertainties that may result from the wide and extensive application of the principle of universal adult suffrage. For instance in the specific case of Gold Coast, now Ghana, the members of the Coussey Committee, argued for limited franchise based on the fact that the country needed a history of well-developed political community with a greater sense of responsibility in the exercise of their rights to avoid the collapse of the envisaged political order (Drah, 1992; Grub, 1950; Drake, 1956).The effect of this was that it brought about alienation and lack of preparation among the populace to embrace elections as a means of peacefully conferring legitimacy on an individual or a group to govern the state (O‘Toole, 2007; Omotola, 2010). According to Ake (2000), this elite-driven orientation towards democracy made the larger population unprepared and less interested in the political discourse. This institutionalized elite minority rule over a majoritarian system of electoral politics. After a short period of participating in colonial governance, some nationalists initiated the call for independence, arguing that it defied logic and undermined the principle of democracy and people‘s self- determination (Adejumobi, 2000; Nkrumah, 1955). From this point onwards, violent protests, 68 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh boycotts, guerrilla warfares and strong opposition to colonial rule emerged (Legum, 1967: Bennoune, 1973: Fage, 2002). The use of guerrilla warfare strategy was profound in countries such as Angola, South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Algeria, and to a large extent Kenya due to their peculiar historical experiences (Weigert, 2011: Young, 1970: Keller, 1995). A wave of popular support for violent protests and demonstrations swept through the continent of Africa with the final battle ending with the fall of Apartheid in South Africa (Keller, 1995: Obi, 2008). The attainment of independence by African states signified the renewal of hope and the expectation of the broadening of the limited democratic space inherited from the colonial masters. In sharing the experiences of the independence struggle in Nigeria, Wole Soyinka pointed out the power of the ordinary African in uniting for a ‗great cause, full of hopes for major political and economic changes‘ (Soyinka, 1981). The nationalists failed to embrace broader inclusive democratic space. These leaders were products of colonial governance which was authoritarian in nature and therefore lacked the needed political socialization in competitive multiparty systems (Chazan, 1993). It means, the colonial experience with a centralized authority, domination and authoritarianism influenced the post-colonial political choices of the nationalists. They sought to further constrain participation, thereby compelling Roftopoulos (2003) to remind the people of Zimbabwe that the struggle is not necessarily about the ordinary man but to sustain the benefits and the privileges of the few elites. This dashed the hope of many who thought independence was to allow for competitive democratic processes. George Ayittey (1994) explains the appalling situation as ‗Africa betrayed‘ by its own ruling elites. There was a deliberate attempt on the part of founding fathers of Africa to entrench themselves in power through the one-party ideology that was experimented in almost all African states. This occasioned the arrest, detention of state dissenters, opponents, 69 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh critics and a more strategic domination of power and resources of the state (Okuku, 2002; Abbink & Hagmann, 2016; Graf, 1988; Smith, 2003). As well, the anti-democratic experiment created socio-political winners and losers. Access to state resources was largely, dependent on the support one gave to the ruling elite. This led to a conscious effort towards elite creation and recruitment. For example, government scholarships were given to those close to state power for prestigious education abroad; and upon return they took up key government jobs due to their qualification and skills (Mackintosh, 1965). The situation exacerbated identity politics based on ethnicity. Arguably, the ‗forces of identity became the main drivers‘ of post-independent African politics (Van-Binsbergen, 1995; Okuku, 2002; Ake, 1976; Graf, 1988). The political repression and suppression of opponents based on the issue of security dilemma created intense grievances among people who felt largely excluded a situation that was later utilized in the mobilization of people for rebellion activities and in some instances direct civil war to challenge the power of the postcolonial state. The civil war in countries such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Cote d‘Ivoire may be partly explained from this perspective of political repression and exclusion. Ethnic identity with the ruling elite, to some extent, determines either group or individual life chances and a greater factor in social mobility. Inextricably, social progression was linked to one‘s identity and not necessarily based on hard work (Ake, 1976). This point is better echoed by Sklar (1979) that the postcolonial African state enables electoral politics to become the vehicle for amassing economic power and subdue opponents due to the centrality of the state in economic organization. The leaders employ various strategies meant to obtain obedience, compliance and maintain grip on state power and authority. This invasive discriminatory electoral politics sets the stage for violence in African politics. Ake (2000) rightly captures the socio-political scenario: 70 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh As they (the coalition of ethnic based political elites and their parties) pulled apart, they placed more value on capturing political power for themselves and grew increasingly fearful about what seemed to them to be the grave consequences of losing to their rivals in the competition for power. These competitions for power raise higher and higher and with it the intensity of political competition and its domination by efficiency norms. Colonial politics remains a key explanatory factor in electoral violence in Africa. The colonial powers imposed artificial ‗boundaries that coincided with ethnic divisions‘ (Ake, 1967: 5). The various administrative districts were also strategically carved out to house people with generally shared history and culture. These administrative districts became more politically functional at the introduction of electoral politics in both British and French colonies than they were in pre-colonial times. The assertion above is not to underestimate the inter-ethnic wars in those periods (Jinadu, 2010). It was not surprising that political parties and nationalist movements have had to resort to ‗stirring ethnic‘ sentiments and loyalty for mass support and mobilization (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). The outcomes of electoral processes are not necessarily seen as victory for democracy, but rather, a manifested demonstration of superiority over one ethnic group. As part of electoral politics in colonial Africa, the pattern of development also created ‗social imbalances‘ (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Social amenities and infrastructure such as roads, hospitals, and schools were built without adherence to the principles of fairness and equitable distribution of resources (Ake, 1967). Development projects were concentrated in a given location to boost the exploitative agenda of the colonial state, while need base approach towards social development was largely ignored in favor of rewarding friendly ethnic groups. This arbitrary development approach created feelings of ‗superiority and inferiority‘ among ethnic groups, leading to fragmented ruling elites who, by their socio-economic and political differences gravitated towards protecting their ‗competitive strength‘ (mass ethnic support) (Ake, 1967). Even when national unity became a desirable virtue, close to independence, the political system and the 71 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh nature of the African economy made it a non-rewarding viable social project. Inter-ethnic alliances were far from being an intelligible venture for a number of reasons: First, ethnic consciousness was already well developed before the nationalist era. Ethnic loyalty was something that made sense to a lot of people, and its utility was already demonstrated in the urban area. Secondly, the appeal to ethnicity was very likely to be successful in a society with relatively little industrialization and a rudimentary development of secondary association. Thirdly, the regions and political constituencies tended to be homogeneous in ethnicity. Thus, to win an election you had to win an ethnic group, and if this happened to be fairly large, a political base was guaranteed. Fourthly, the appeal to ethnicity had the marvellous advantage of concealing the contradictions between the interests of the bourgeoisie and those of the peasantry and proletariat (cited in Jinadu, 2010). Ethnic relations or loyalty are not damaging in themselves, however, part of the African crisis is how these cleavages have been exploited to create the conditions for electoral violence in an attempt to securing political power. From the preceding argument, ethnicity played an integral role in the decolonization process, and the political salience of colonial elections and the political economy that moored it. Arguably, the colonial approach towards governance and electoral politics has implications on contemporary elections related violence (Blanton et al, 2001) 4.2 ONE-PARTY STATE JOURNEY OF AFRICA AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF VIOLENCE Nowhere in this continent have there been two chiefs in one village, a majority chief and an opposition chief. Dating back to ancestral times, there has been only one chief who ruled for life (cited in Pitcher et al, 2009). The above words of Mobutu Sese Seko, partially reflects the resolve of some African leaders to rule with unlimited and unchallenged power. This also signifies the attempt to justify bad governance on cultural arguments, forgetting that even indigenous African standards indict the autocrats (Ayittey, 1994). They failed to meet the minimum requirement of consensus building which is a dominant feature of the indigenous African political systems. Overall, the statement portrayed the dual effect of the indigenous African political systems and the 72 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh contemporary governance in Africa. Although the assertion is a statement of fact and doubtless true to a large extent, it showed the kind of sociological innocence exhibited in Mobutu‘s interpretation of contemporary multi-party governance (Young, 1993). After independence, the nationalists who captured state power in Africa embarked on two important journeys; the practice of one-party state and the economic policy of statism (Harvey, 1966; Ayittey, 1994). The one-party state was justified under the pretext that the multi-party competitive electoral politics, inherited from the colonialist undermined national unity and cohesion (Neuberger, 1971; Schneider, 2006; Burnell, 2001; Chabal, 2002; Coleman & Rosberg, 1964). It also exposed the African society to unhealthy competition that heightens ethnic and religious affinities of the population (Ahluwalia, 2012; Ake, 1996; Kpundeh & Reiley, 1992). As a result of the above reasons, many African countries, inspired by Ghana and Tanzania, adopted the one-party system especially in the Commonwealth African countries (Feit, 1968: Zimba, 1984).It is important to recognize the point that one party system had long been established in Francophone countries, specifically in Senegal, Guinea and Cote D‘Ivoire (Zimba, 1984). In this regard, political parties by their relative power base sufficiently controlled this base such that there were no opportunities for other existing parties to win state power (Riley, 1991). Additionally, several countries also moved beyond the political strategy and implemented pieces of legislations that sought to ban other parties from participating in elections (Nabudere, 1989; Manning, 2010). The adoption of the one-party system and the proclivity of the nationalists at the time of independence to embark on nation formation through building nationally inherited territories from the colonial state, in my view, presented the dilemma of choice to the leaders. The desirability to lead the process of nation-building through aggregated national unity, though logically striking, resulted in degrading 73 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh consequences. The one party system as a means of political organization in postcolonial Africa erodes the widening elite recruitment that comes with multi-party systems, a phenomenon Kasfir(1974) describes as the unfortunate period of ‗departicipation in Africa politics‘ where the removal of ‗structures for participation was thorough‘. Noami Chazan (1982) grudgingly agrees with Kasfir (1974) and provided a more optimistic view by pointing to the new dimensions of political participation in Africa. Chazan (1982) argues that the contraction of the official politics gave rise to informal political participation. The one-party system as practiced throughout almost all African countries was characterized by heavy state repression and strategic assaults on opponents. This ‗visceral disdain for democracy‘ and multiparty democracy during the early 1960s led to political crisis and decay that made the African military respond to the situation by toppling a number of post-colonial regimes ( Eyoh, 1998). Significantly, a number of African states experienced military interventions that ubiquitously crashed the indigenous governance standards of liberty, freedom and human security. Over eighty percent of the African countries were ruled by men in the uniform and were supported by their civilian assigns and surrogates (Johnson et al, 1984). The sheer numbers of successful military takeovers led Young (1988) to conclude that the most viable means of accessing state power is through the ‗institutionalized mechanisms of coups‘. This means coups have become part of the political military culture and are seen as legitimate ways of responding to leaders that have betrayed the aspirations of its people and undermined the collective national interest of shared economic prosperity. Scholars from varied perspectives have addressed the question of military intervention in African politics in the first two decades of postcolonial Africa (McGowan, 1975; Thompson, 1980; Mazrui & Tidy, 1984). These early scholars linked the occurrence of military coups to the tenuous inter-ethnic relations argument discussed earlier. This attempt at explaining coups 74 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh in Africa shows limited depth in analyzing the political crisis at the time. The first group of scholars argues, significantly, about the structural weaknesses of the state in exercising effective political control and point to the fact that African states exhibit a paradoxical outlook. They are feeble and at the same time powerfully repressive (Migdal, 1988; Young, 2012). This explanation stems from the theory of political development. A second argument propounded by Welch and Smith (1974) draws attention to the problem of military intervention through the theory of Military Centrality .They argue that military organizations remain the most powerful force in the state due to their control of the coercive forces of the state .Civilian governments that threaten to curtail this power through budget cuts, without the needed support of the military, risks some resistance that can lead to instability. This means, when corporate interests of the military are undermined, they utilize their strength as the most cohesive elite group (Thompson, 1980). The third and probably the most distinct argument relates to the theory of ethnic antagonism. Broadly, this theory is interpreted to mean that the newly independent African countries have less of ‗integrative institutions and shared symbols of unity‘ (Jenkins & Kposowa, 1990). Ethnic rivals build their alliances in the military and topple regimes that they consider exclusionary and harmful to their will. The above three theories, while offering some great insights into political instability and the politics of violence in Africa, are limited in scope. More critically, the issues of elite disunity, turf battles due to irreconcilable personal ambitions failed to capture the attention of these scholars. The post-colonial period, in my view, can be characterized as the period of weak elite relations, which led to the many cases of political instability on the continent. For example in Ghana, violent elite disagreements brought about the introduction of the Preventive Detention Act which mandated President Kwame Nkrumah to arrest and detain elite figures whose modus operandi was considered to be detrimental to the state (Harvey, 1966: Jeffries, 1978). 75 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Associated with the one-party system is the adoption of an economic organization that projects the centrality of the state. The economic nationalism offered limited opportunities for individual and private enterprises to boom. The critical element in the state-led economic organization is how the capture and exercise of state authority determines available socio- economic opportunities. According to Anyang‘ Nyango‘(1992), the model of political and economic organization at the time of independence produced massive corruption, dashed the hopes of the people, and created a feeling of frustration and despair among the excluded segment of the population. Some political opponents in search of a greener pasture were compelled by the deplorable prevailing material conditions to migrate abroad. In a bellicose opposition, Anyang‘ Nyango‘ asserted that: Apologists for Africa's single-party regimes argue that traditional African societies were always akin to the one-party system. Despite some self-critical statements that he made in 1990, some more recent comments of Tanzania's former president Julius Nyerere indicate that he remains adamantly wedded to this view. While it is true that political parties as such did not exist in so-called traditional African societies, it also follows logically that the concept of political party cannot be used in analyzing politics in such societies. Those who justify the one-party system on the basis of our cultural heritage have, therefore, been doing so by means of false analogies and the use of anachronism (1992). From this view-point, the moral ground on which the one-party has stood for long has been dismantled and the popular support for broad based inclusive participatory democracy became the ‗only game in town‘ (Obi, 2008). The African independence leaders, realizing this could potentially threaten their political survival, revived the existing communal relations within the African context through a mode of relation well known as clientelism and neo- patrimonialism (Joseph, 1997; Chabal, 2002) The utilization of patron-client relations was meant to secure compliance, obedience and also to engineer a set of loyal foot soldiers that may resort to violence against those who oppose the regime. According to Nkandawire (2015) clientelist and neo-patrimonial practices lead to ‗economic stagnation and poor investment in infrastructure‘ undermining any serious economic industrialization. The 76 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh military was not spared the dangers associated with one party system. Many army generals and officials feeling totally excluded from the resources of the state challenged the regimes through coup d‘états. In a number of African countries, the response from the army was bloody and violently displaced some members of the population. This resulted in the crisis of bad governance. In the early 1980‘s the Berg Report described it as the ‗lost decade of the continent‘, a period within which the continent witnessed massive migration of professionals into the diaspora (Luke & Shaw, 1984). In the words of Ong‘ayo (2008) the crisis of governance was characterized by ‗heroes turning into dictators‘ and employing a systematic policy of ‗politics of exclusion and deprivation to tilt the balance of power‘ for the sole purpose of regime survival. The aim was the continuous domination of the public space and its associated economic dividends by the ruling class. 4.3 DISTORTED ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ITS ASSOCIATED GRIEVANCES As an internal acceptance of guilt to the harsh realities on the continent, African leaders appalled by the deplorable human conditions on the continent came out with what is called the Lagos Plan of Action (Shaw, 1983). This plan of action under the auspices of the OAU was to be a home-grown solution to the crisis on the continent. Part of the problem was the height of superpower rivalry. Western governments were not particularly sincere about democracy but how the autocrats serve their interest in the Cold War politics. Regimes that were seen as loyal to the hawks in Washington were heavily financed and supported to survive any domestic threat borne out of popular struggles for democracy. Those seen to be sympathetic to Moscow were brutally toppled and replaced by more friendly allies. The scale of corruption in government widened the inequality gap. This created feelings of frustration and anger towards the ruling elites. Looting of state resources to the detriment of the populace became a known factor in a number of civil wars in Africa (Azam, 2002). 77 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Though an ambitious strategy, the Lagos Plan of Action sought to deal with the medium to long term economic challenges of the continent, however, it was unable to travel beyond the walls of OAU. There was no economic might from the African community to pursue this laudable objective of self-reliance. The immediate history of bad governance and mismanagement that led to unsatisfactory growth rates in many parts of Africa equally undermined the confidence of the international community. Global projections on Africa were very alarming and pointed to massive poverty among the population with serious implications for political stability (Shaw, 1986). The annual growth rate for the continent from 1981-1985 was 1.2 percent lower than the estimated population growth of 2.9 percent; a decline of about 1.7 percent in per capita income of the continent (Ndulu, & O‘Connell, 1999; Rodrik, 2006; Fosu, 2012). The various debates about the future of Africa produced a controversial compromise with the proposition that the World Bank is to develop a new policy framework to engage African governments. This resulted in what became known as the Structural Adjustment Programs, which was adopted by almost all African countries (Ahluwalia and Zegeye, 2001). The period was characterised by a decline in donor support in the form of aid and high interest rates on commercial loans in the international capital market making African governments opted for the IMF balance of payment funding facilities and to negotiate flexible debt payment terms (Lancaster, 1983). Structural Adjustment Programs are generally a set of conditions, economic policies that were imposed by the IMF and the World Bank in an attempt to resuscitate and avoid economic bankruptcy in Africa. That meant countries in Africa in the mid-1980s and early 1990s turned to the IMF and the World Bank for loans and technical assistance to avert near economic collapse following the end of the Cold War. Throughout Africa, SAPs were implemented but with some level of variations either in name or concept note development 78 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh based on specific country needs. In some countries, this international economic engagement policy was known as Economic Recovery Program (ERP) (Kaiser, 1996). Despite the conceptual variations, SAPs were meant to achieve some measurable specific objectives among which are sustained socio-economic growth, deliberate reduction in public expenditure, adoption of a market liberalization strategy to allow the forces of demand and supply to shape economic behavior with less or minimal state intervention, privatization of state enterprises, increased domestic revenue mobilization through taxation (Spark, 1995; Brawley and Baerg, 2007). While this may sound as an economic agenda led by the IMF and the World Bank, good governance and democratic development remains an important part of the economic recovery program. Western donors at the time made political reforms in Africa a prerequisite for continuous financial support. The marriage between SAPs and democratic development produced a hostile home for mutual habitation by African countries. In simple terms the two goals were largely desirable ideas with many contradictory realities on the ground that made them sharply incompatible. The goal is not to provide an assessment of the failure or otherwise of the SAPs in Africa but to highlight how the SAP formulation and implementation approach created state vulnerabilities that led to the failure of some African States to address short to long term economic needs of their people. Interestingly, SAP has been a subject of intense debate over the years without an uncontested account of what constitutes its success or failure. To this extent, some have argued that SAP institutionalized violent protests, state repression, arbitrary rule and authoritarianism (Beckman, 1992: Mkandawire, 1995). In almost all countries that adopted SAPs, state repression and blatant disregard for human rights became a strategy to keep the adjustment programs running (Ibhawoh, 1999). SAPs were not necessarily a policy formulated through a popular support system but an externally driven 79 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh economic intervention that created unintended political consequences for adjusting states (Nyerere, 1985). They were associated with huge socio-political cost, polarized African societies into economic winners and losers (Mundial, 1990: World Bank, 1994; Sparks, 1995). One of the policy frameworks associated with SAPs is the devaluation of national currencies (Fadahunsi, 1993). This was aimed at reducing the value of the local currencies with the intent of stimulating local production for exports. By devaluating local currencies, exported products became internationally competitive and inexpensive for international demand. Even though this policy is aimed at generating revenue for both government and private investors, low level of production and other factors such as the fall in global commodity prices undermined this revenue mobilization strategy in the long term. Many of the African countries that accepted the currency devaluation experienced rising inflation, high cost of living and poor living standards (Konadu-Agyeman, 2000). In relation to this is also the debate surrounding the role of government or the state in the national economy. SAPs require radical cut or withdrawal of the state from the national economy in order to allow for the forces of demand and supply to determine the prices of goods and services. This market liberalization project sought to demand a freeze in state control in critical sectors such as agriculture, health and education that have been subsidized since independence. The removal of subsidy in these areas created deplorable human conditions resulting in massive protest by opposition forces in a number of African countries (Clapp, 1994). For example, in Nigeria, the removal of subsidy and devaluation of the local currency created an inflationary effect to the extent that Universities and the general public mounted what became known as the ‗SAP riots‘ led by notable leaders such as Professor Attahiru Jega (Lewis, 1996). 80 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Another key area affected by SAPs is employment. The desire for rationalizing public sector expenditure calls for redeployment and in some cases retrenchment of people working in the public sector. The liberalization of labour had implications for those who could be employed. Government no longer had the policy space for distributive politics by employing into the public sector at will in order to appease its followers or sympathizers. Many people became ‗economic refugees‘ in the urban areas contending the social discontent that came with SAPs (Lewis, 1996: Ibhawoh, 1999). The difficulty in securing job under SAPs brought about resentment towards governments as the situation further complicated the already non-reliable social welfare systems in many African countries. SAPs further weakened state capacity, a phenomenon that led Beckman(1992), to argue that African states were not in position anymore to ‗meet popular expectations of what it can provide in the context of submitting itself to external forces‘ (also see Ibhawoh, 1999: Riddel,1992). Emphasis was being placed on the private sector to save the ailing economy of most African states. According to Maurice Williams (1994), the end of the Cold War ushered in ‗globalization of trade and capital markets; states had to encourage their private sector to play a leading role in employment‘. Williams argued that private sector participation will result into ‗human prosperity that never happened before‘. Maurice Williams‘ assertion fails to adequately account for rising level of poverty in Tanzania during the regime of Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Sharp differential incomes between the rural-urban dwellers also constrain any positive human prosperity, as envisioned by Maurice Williams. In Ghana, for instance, the initial growth and rise in GDP during the SAP years was not sustainable due to poor worker conditions and rising urban poverty, high cost of health and education (Konadu-Agyeman, 1998: Konadu-Agyeman, 2000). The issue of unemployment and retrenchment during the SAPs years resulted in both social and political alienation and feeling of frustration among 81 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the population. This made some segments of the society susceptible to violent mobilization in an electoral contest, a situation that led Kaiser (1996) to argue that SAPs eroded social cohesion and unity in Tanzania. The search for a true African solution became more important when the SAPs were unable to meet the social and political needs of the continent, except for the short term budgetary and external debt financing. In this context, various efforts culminated in the design and implementation of Africa‘s Priority Program for Economic Recovery (APPER), United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN- PAAERD) but the increasing external debt of the African countries undermined the intended objectives of these programs (UNECA, 1990). By 1988, the external debt of the continent amounted to nearly $230 billion, a situation that affected policy choices (UNECA, 1990). Part of the African attempt at both governmental and continental level to find an alternative policy choice produced another important development initiative known as the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP). The distinguishing feature of the AAF-SAP was the principal recognition for institutional factors human needs and resources that interact to dictate the pace of development on the continent. This alternative development framework placed emphasis on case by case implementation of development initiatives that considers differences among African countries. The AAF-SAP pointed to the broader socio-economic factors such as culture, technology and the unfavourable external constrains that limit the functioning of the African state (Pender, 2001). African scholars and practitioners were vocal and extremely critical of short economic goals of SAP but unfortunately these voices witnessed a gradual decline under the influence of the IMF-World Bank led initiative that gave birth to the counter framework; Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable 82 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Growth- A long term perspective study (Mkandawire & Soludo, 2003; Loxley, 2003; Gebremariam, 2011). Despite the social loss for most of the population, SAPs provided gains for the ruling political class through land reform programs that conferred rights of expropriation and reallocation on the modern state (Anderson & Lochery, 2008). The idea of the state being the allocator of land rights in some urban areas constitute an opportunity for political parties to heighten tensions surrounding land grievances, especially during election time in order to create a state of insecurity among the population (Onoma, 2010). Parties tend to violently mobilize supporters based on land grievances and assure them of security during their reign in office. Rival land claimants turn to see their survival in the electoral victory of their parties and become readily available to exceed the threshold of tension and resort to violence to punish opposing claimants. For example, the 1991, 1997 and the 2007 elections in Kenya were largely affected by unresolved land grievances in the Rift Valley Province (Boone, 2011). In Cote d‘Ivoire, land grievances that dates to the early 1990‘s featured prominently in the 2010 post-election crisis (Sendin, 2013). The point being made here is the land rights have become a ‗patronage resource‘ to win supporters through violent means and this challenge has been exacerbated by the social and legal structuring of the Structural Adjustment Program in Africa (Boone, 2011). From a comparative fieldwork in both Kenya and Cote d‘Ivoire, Klaus & Mitchell (2015) argue that land insecurity results in the ‗pre-emptive use of violence‘ and land-based grievances accounts for ‗opportunistic‘ use of violence within an electoral contest. Access to land is a means of livelihood in Africa and therefore any social or legal attempt to either control or deny people the right to freely own land creates conditions for violence in an election time, when both social and political differences are sharply articulated. Thus 83 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh electoral violence becomes a jointly owned product arising out of the ‗strategic interest of elites and the citizens‘ (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). In what appears to be one of the major factors explaining electoral violence, Bekoe (2010), argues that the recurrent nature of violence during elections reflects ‗systemic grievances‘, notable among them is land rights and their politicization in an electoral contest. Within the context of implementing SAP, many African countries unwillingly accepted to open up for political competition through multi-party elections (Lupo, 2004). This process opened up for rival groups to compete over the control of state resources (Mkandawire & Soludo, 1999). Varyingly, a number of these elections have occurred through violence among the political actors. What accounts for the variation and inconsistency in the occurrence of electoral violence in African countries remains a major issue that must engage the attention of the world. Conclusively, it is imperative to emphasize the point that colonial politics, politics of exclusion by the independence elites who have transformed from freedom heroes to autocrats, institutionalization of one party system, ethnicity, economic distortion programs such as the IMF prescribed SAP are necessary but not sufficient triggers of electoral violence. These structural factors remain more of an aiding tool in the hands of the political elites who usually take advantage of the political, social and economic vulnerabilities of the masses. 4.4 SELECTED CASES OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICA For purposes of this dissertation and based on the preceding discussion on the overall structural susceptibility of African countries to violence during elections, the following two cases have been selected for review and to provide insight into the recurrence of electoral violence in Africa. The first case is Nigeria. Nigeria is selected to provide insight into how elite conduct plays a crucial role in electoral violence, an attempt to relate this section to the theory of elite consensus which forms part of the theoretical framework for the study. The 84 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Nigerian case study also gives us some understanding of lack of losers‘ consent which has accounted for many of the post-election violence until the political turn over in 2015 by the coalition of opposition parties. The Ethiopian case represents the nuances of unsuccessful attempt by opposition coalitions to break electoral hegemony and inconsistencies of losers‘ consent. The two cases broadly highlight how historical context shape elite behaviour and their response to electoral threats. 4.4.1 A brief history of electoral violence in Nigeria Electoral violence has been a major challenge to electoral politics since its inception in 1922. The constitutional engineering that took place prior to independence remains an instrumental structural factor in shaping the extent to which violence has dominated elections. The Macpherson Constitution, which consolidated the federal or regional governance architecture, aligned regional boundaries to ethnic zones and set the stage for confrontational politics (Owoyemi et al, 2012). Three major ethnic groups emerged at the time of independence constituting about 65% of the population namely the Housa-Fulani, Igbos and Yurobas (ibid). All three dominant groups suppressed other minority groups. Elections in Nigeria have witnessed significant levels of violence since independence, albeit the 1959 election was described as relatively peaceful and the violence was at low intensity level (Nwolise, 2007, Ugoh, 2005, Ladan-Baki, 2016). The low intensity violence in the 1959 elections may be explained as a period where unity was required to gain independence even though the actors were representing complete different ethnic group interests. One could argue that the 1959 elections were a good take-off and could be counted as one of the achievements of Nigeria‘s independence and subsequent elections in Nigeria will be improved. However, what followed was one of the most violent electoral processes in the history of the country. The federal election in 1964 was characterized by physical, structural 85 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh and psychological violence. This set the stage for a more violent clash during the 1965-66 Western Regional Elections (Nwolise, 2007). Two main political parties were at the center of this electoral battle, the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Both parties were involved in electoral manipulations and manoeuvrings that led to uncontrollable chaos, physical attacks, destruction of property and killing of opponents (Ojo & Azeez, 2002). The widespread perception of bias and vote rigging made supporters of the losing UGPA take to the streets on a mission of destroying property and killing of people believed to be associated with the NNDP (Omotosho, 2007). The NNDP being the party in power also deployed violence in many parts of opposition areas. Some estimate that over one thousand people were killed from both sides and unknown number of people got missing (Malu, 2006; Omotosho, 2007). The post-election violence was nicknamed as ―operation wet-e‖. This means using fuel to burn and destroy opponents. According to Dudley (1973) the violence got to ‗epidemic proportions‘ with grave humanitarian consequences for many Nigerians. This paved way for the bloody military response to the electoral crisis at the time, leading to the end of the first Republic in 1966. Major Nzeogwu led the intervention and he was accused by critics for killing more northerners than southerners (Yesufu, 1982; Osoba, 1996). The first military coup only lasted for few days and the country witnessed another counter coup led by Ironsi. General Gowon toppled the Ironsi regime in another coup which many believed was sponsored by the northerners (Falola & Heaton, 2008). From January to July 1966, Nigeria experienced three different military regimes. General Gowon‘s government survived until 1975. It is important to indicate that his regime was the period in which Nigeria experienced a civil war from 1967-1970 (Osoba, 1996). The military regime continued with General Murtala Mohammed taking over from Gowon in 1975 (Panter-Brick, 86 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1979). Few months on, Murtala Mohammed was assassinated and General Obasanjo was installed as the head of government until the 1979 elections. The Obasanjo regime conducted elections that also witnessed some level of violence but nothing comparable to the violence associated with the 1964-66 elections (Ochoche, 1997). The outcome of the 1979 elections was contested and challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court‘s decision to uphold the legitimacy of the winner Alhaji Shagari provoked wider public criticisms, condemnations and protests over the outcome of the ruling (International IDEA, 2000; Nwolise, 2007).In spite of the gains made during the 1979 elections, the ruling government failed the electoral litmus test during the 1983 federal elections. Large scale violence occurred during the electoral process including the post-election phase (Hart, 1993). The government, through the security services, deployed brutal force on protesters and opposition supporters. Also, the way the Courts handled electoral petition issues during the previous elections made it less attractive to losers, making them resort to violent public protests. The violence and the chaotic situation coupled with widespread public corruption gave another opportunity for the Nigerian military to intervene (Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985). General Buhari led his men to take over from the government in January 1984. By August 1985 a counter coup was successfully orchestrated by General Babangida who presided over the pedals of the Nigerian government until 1993 (Amujo et al, 2012). The next electoral process during General Babangida‘s regime took place in 1993. According to Nwolise (2007), the 1993 federal elections held under the watch of the military regime was one of ‗the most credible, secure, peaceful, free and fair elections‘ in the electoral history of Nigeria. While this may be a source of relief for the long years of misrule, electoral violence, corruption, unhealthy ethnic rivalry and elite disunity in Nigeria; the excitement was ephemeral due to Babangida‘s unpopular decision to annul the outcome of the elections 87 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh preventing the winner Chief Abiola from taking office (Lewis, 1999). Some scholars have speculated that Babangida‘s decision was as a result of the fear and insecurity of returning power to the southerners (Nwokedi, 1994; Campbell, 1994; Nwolise, 2007). The political impasse resulted in the formation of a weak interim government led by Chief Shonekan who was removed from office within a period of three months by Gen Abacha (Nwolise, 2007). General Abacha died in office giving way to General Abubakar to become head of state. General Abubakar ushered the Nigerian state to civilian rule through the 1999 elections that was flawed in all respects. Significant malpractices, fraud and irregularities were noted by reputable international observer groups such as the Carter Centre; however, Obasanjo was declared the winner of the election ((Ladan-Baki, 2016; Carter Centre, 1999). The period was marked by violent political dissent, repression and killing of known critics and supporters of the opposition who called for a nationwide protest over the electoral results (Washington Post, cited in Carter Centre, 1999). President Obasanjo faced stiff opposition in his second term bid in 2003. To win at all cost, strategic violence was employed to prevent opponents from having any chance of ever winning the elections. Intense voter intimidation, vote fraud, massive rigging and the killing of opponents were part of the entire electoral system (Lewis, 2003). The president‘s regime was under constant attack since the 1999 election and in the year 2002, it suffered deep intra- party conflicts that made some members opt for an impeachment process against him (ibid). The level of intimidation and widespread irregularities made the leader of the Commonwealth Observer Group request a private meeting with the president in order to make known these concerns (Mole, 2003). The Human Rights Watch estimates show that about hundred people were killed during the elections (HRW, 2004). The electoral violence was most severe in the southern and eastern states of Nigeria though the violence was nationwide. The nature of the 88 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh violence and the courage of the perpetrators made some observers equate the 2003 elections to ‗a low intensity armed struggle‘ (ibid). The massive support for President Obasanjo by some foreign countries such as the US and the UK made it difficult for any sustained protest against the president. This also prevented the military from taking advantage of the grievances of the Nigerian people and interfering in the electoral process. However, this attitude of allowing impunity to thrive and no justice for victims of electoral violence institutionalized the culture of violence in elections through memory and vengeance. By 2007, the stage was set for a bloodier electoral battle. According to Nwolise (2007), the level of violence in the 2007 elections completely surpassed the 1964-66 elections. The strategy had changed in a manner that well known and identifiable elites were openly involved in the instigation of violence across the country. The northern part of the country was most affected, where the two leading presidential candidates Buhari and Yar ‗Adua were coming from (Ladan-Baki, 2016). Many observers were shocked at the level of manipulation, the use of violence, intimidation of opposition figures in the 2007 elections and described it as ‗the ugliest‘, not just in the history of Nigerian politics, but anywhere else in Africa (Suberu, 2007). For some people, this appalling electoral manipulation, offensive display of violence was a ‗premeditated act on the part of the Gang of Four to secure the disguised third term‘ for outgoing president Obasanjo through the victory of Yar ‗Adua (Nwolise, 2007; Suberu, 2007). The words of Obasanjo describing the 2007 election as a ‗do or die affair for the PDP‘ are enough testimony for his disguised third term (Suberu, 2007: Omotola, 2010). All the two main losing candidates Atiku and Buhari petitioned the courts over the outcome of the elections. The most promising part of the 2007 elections for Nigeria‘s democracy was the fact that the winner, President Yar ‗Adua self-confessed to the irregularities but went ahead to ask for broad support to deal with the systemic electoral challenges. This highlights 89 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh a good signal towards preventing the collapse of the Nigerian state (Omotola, 2007). Omotola (2009) argues that how ‗losers manage their failures‘ and ‗how winners control and moderate their victory‘ can help to ensure stability or instability. Unlike the 2003 elections, many foreign and local observers condemned the electoral process and its outcome to the point of some calling for a rerun of the presidential elections (Albin-Lackey & Rawlence, 2007).Good-luck Jonathan took over after the death of President Yar ‗Adua to continue the unexpired term. The initial attempts for electoral reform by the late president were largely continued by Good-luck Jonathan (Omotola, 2010). The 2011 general elections in Nigeria were conducted within the atmosphere of greater institutional reforms that enabled fair participation of all competing candidates. Strangely, the electoral process that many people, both local and foreign observers, concluded to be the most well managed elections in the recent history of Nigeria degenerated into massive violence at the post-election phase (Akhaine, 2011). Despite the efforts made towards ensuring peaceful outcome, the warnings were quite clear about possible large scale violence. Candidate Buhari called for credible elections that will enable him to be the winner without which the Nigerian government must prepare for ‗an Egyptian style revolution‘ (Akhaine, 2011). In the estimation of Candidate Buhari, the 2011 election suffered from massive rigging; this made him to reject the outcome of the elections (Bekoe, 2011). Several people were killed, (about eight hundred), and several others were injured, especially in Northern Nigeria (Human Rights Watch cited in Bekoe, 2011; EU EOM, 2011). The violence swept across the country and in no time took a religious dimension, Christians attacking Muslims, eliciting reprisal attacks from the Muslim communities as well. This is largely attributed to the candidature of Goodluck Jonathan; his decision to contest the elections had been interpreted by many observers as undermining the unspoken convention among Nigerian 90 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh political elites about the North-South rotation of candidates for the presidency (Obi, 2011; Lewis, 2011).The question of elites‘ behavior and conduct during periods of electoral loss or win matters, as indicated earlier. The 2011 electoral crisis further brought to the fore the point about electoral reforms being necessary but insufficient in dealing with electoral violence prevention as observed from the Nigerian experience. The 2015 elections had its fair share of violence taking place, especially during the period of pre-election (EU EOM, 2015). The phenomenal element of the outcome of the election was the power shift from the incumbent president to the opposition candidate. This was the first time an incumbent president had lost re-election bid to an opposition party in Nigeria. Without official declaration of all results, the sitting President, Goodluck Jonathan went ahead to accept defeat and congratulated the opposition candidate General Buhari (Onapajo, 2015). This historic feat in the political history of Nigeria enslaved a lot of the international observers such as the African Union and the Commonwealth Observer mission groups from acknowledging the violence that also characterized the elections. The European Union Observer group, however, documented the many incidences of violence across the country (EU EOM, 2015). In addition to EU, prominent media organizations with local contacts have also reported deaths of about 55 people in River State (Ibeh, 2015). The electoral environment was characterized by deep-seated religious, ethnic and political polarization that led to violent clashes among supporters of the two leading candidates. Leading political figures framed the elections within the context of the North-South divide in Nigeria and this actually heightened tension and produced fear and expectation of violence at the end of the polls (Animashaun, 2015). 91 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 4.4.2 The Ethiopian electoral experience Ethiopia presents a unique political history as far as democratic elections are concerned. Unlike many African countries, Ethiopia remains arguably, one of the few African countries that did not have multi-party electoral experience until 1991. The leadership of the country has rotated among its elites through forceful seizure of governmental authority through several means. These include the brutal use of warfare or force, external or internal invasion, forced exile, death of a leader and civil war (Lyon, 1996). These experiences of the country at various times since independence has led credence to Christopher Clapham‘s claim that no leader of Ethiopia has ever peacefully left office and stayed in Ethiopia (Clapham, 2004). The significance of this assertion is how this political historical record shapes new perceptions, orientations and the overall political behaviour of the people, especially among the ruling elites in Ethiopia. The temptation from this kind of record is to make the point that peaceful democratic succession or leadership rotation in Ethiopia will be extremely difficult in the foreseeable future. In spite of the many regimes that have ruled Ethiopia, this research seeks to highlight the regime that was established after 1991 for two main reasons; the first is that the regime gravitated towards democracy and also played a solid role for the institutionalization of party politics. In 1974, a group of military men led by Colonel Mengistu Haile-Mariam inspired a nationwide revolution and resentment against the emperor and the government of Ethiopia at a time that the nation had experienced severe drought coupled with deteriorating economic circumstances (Pankhurst, 1994: Kefale, 2011). The successful revolution brought to an end the long decades of rule by Haile Sellasie. The new regime became known as the Derg which ruled Ethiopia for almost 17 years. In the seventeen-year period, the military embarked on the brutal deployment of force to quell the activities of rival revolutionary forces or political 92 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh movements. The government‘s method of deploying terror tactics in dealing with insurgency groups reached a crescendo during the fierce resistance of the Ethiopian Peoples‘ Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISONE) (Berhanu, 2003; Pankhurst, 1994). The terror strategy was unable to protect the regime when the Tigray Peoples‘ Liberation Front through its ERDP mounted a counter military attack to remove the Derg regime in 1991(Kefale, 2011: Gudina, 2003). The Ethiopian Peoples‘ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDP), shortly after taking over the government machinery, went ahead to convene a meeting to draw the roadmap for Ethiopian democracy (Doreenspleet, 2003). The EPRDF, in spite of the attempt at ensuring that the interim arrangement is inclusive, effectively used the opportunity to entrench its grip on power by making sure that members of the transitional government were affiliates of the ERDP (Kefale, 2011). Consequently, appointment to key sectors of the Ethiopian state was based on membership of the EPRDF. Opposition parties were generally weak and presented no plausible threat to the EPRDF. Their formation was along ethnic lines without the needed organizational knack to electorally challenge the hegemony of the EPRDF and above all, the opposition parties lacked a uniting factor among themselves (Joireman, 1997). From a more analytical perspective, the decision of the opposition parties to boycott the 1992-95 local, constituent assembly and federal elections to undermine the legitimacy of the EPRDF was counter-productive and self-serving. This emotive strategy inadvertently further helped in consolidating the power base of the EPRDF in the post 1991 electoral political landscape in Ethiopia. Five national elections have been held in Ethiopia, with the most recent in 2015. Given the historical context within which multi-party elections were introduced, elections in Ethiopia have suffered from structural, physical and psychological violence in the post 1991 era. 93 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh However, the 2005 electoral violence occurred at a rate that was not only alarming to human security but also it raises the question of what may be the future of electoral politics in Ethiopia. Arguably, the pre-election phase was characterized by some controversies as well as some innovative opening of the democratic space. For the first time, the electoral atmosphere was characterized by open debates among competing candidates to enable them reach out to voters with their message and policy preferences (Lyons, 2005; Abbink, 2010). Civic education through multiple channels of communication was allowed during the entire process. The major contentious issue at this stage of the process was the decision of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) to disallow for local observation by CSOs. The coalition of CSOs went to court to challenge the NEBE decision and secured a win verdict. They however, had to work within limited time and could not cover many polling areas across the country. The CSOs limited their monitoring to urban areas and most especially the national capital, Addis Ababa. About two months to the election, the fragmented opposition was able to form coalitions to present a more formidable front to the ruling party (Ishiyama, 2007). The Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) became the two main opposition parties who just like the ruling Ethiopian Peoples‘ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) enjoyed substantial ethno-religious and regional support base but the opposition had also captured the mood of the dissatisfied urban people (Abbink, 2006). The pre-election atmosphere completely changed when the Prime Minister set the tone through his remarks on the opposition, saying, ‗the ethnic hatred employed by the opposition could lead to violence after the elections‘(AFP News cited in Abbink, 2006). The major test was the management of the election results by the NEBE during the counting period. The process was associated with undue delays in releasing the results from the countryside. Both 94 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the opposition (CUD) impulsively announced their victory few days into the counting process. The Zenawi regime deployed all means necessary to control the threat of losing to the opposition. The government immediately placed a ban on all public protests to avert the oppositions call for people to demonstrate on the streets. Various arrests were made arbitrarily including leading opposition figures and leaders of CSOs (Smith, 2007; Tronvoll, 2009). The final declaration of the elections took place over three months after voting, a situation that deepened the post-election crisis especially when the opposition felt the Zenawi regime used the period to rig the elections (Smith, 2007; Abbink, 2006; Bekoe, 2012). The CUD rejected the outcome of the elections, asked its elected members of parliament (109 members) to boycott taking their seats in the National Assembly. The violence, intimidation, killings went on from both sides, that is the opposition and the ruling EPRDF. The EPRDF had a sweeping control over the army and the police and deployed them to harass, arrest and jail persons opposing the regime (Smith, 2007: Smith, 2009; Straus, 2012). The 2005 post-election violence weaken the opposition to favorably compete in the 2010 elections. The death of Zenawi in 2012 may ordinarily bring some electoral hope to the opposition for the 2015 elections. Strangely, the opposition suffered the most humiliating electoral annihilation in the 2015 elections; they secured no single seat out of the 547 seats (Arriola&Lyons, 2016; Kerry, 2015). This is a complete reversal of the gains made in 2005 elections. The 2015 election was conducted in a very repressive atmosphere not only affecting opposition candidates and their supporters but also international observers were limited to only the African Union (Kerry, 2015).The opposition possibly, for the experiences of the 2005 and 2010, electorally acquiesced to the victory of the government without any major street protests or legal petition. 95 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 4.5 EXISTING FRAMEWORKS FOR ELECTORAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION There are three main institutions or organizations that have made tremendous efforts in providing a guiding framework for preventing electoral violence around the world. These organizations are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). These institutions have a global outlook and operate in all regions of the world. It may, however, be argued that they are not local institutions operating in Africa for the sole purposes of electoral violence prevention. These organizations aim at broadly improving governance in the developing world and also believe that electoral violence remains one of the militating, paralyzing factors against the realization of their development and governance objectives in many parts of the world. 4.5.1. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) The first attempt by the USAID to provide a framework for electoral violence prevention resulted in the publication of the Electoral Security Framework which is considered as the technical mechanism for programming towards electoral violence prevention (USAID, 2010). This initial attempt received great commendation as a novel strategy to manage electoral violence in the world. In spite of its innovative nature, the framework lacked best practices for violence prevention. In the year 2013, the USAID developed a more comprehensive framework to the original electoral security framework. The Electoral security framework identified, broadly, three main factors that usually account for the occurrence of electoral violence. These issues or factors are the political history of a given country; the underlying structural factors and what is characterized as pure electoral fault lines (USAID, 2013).The above factors are briefly explained below: 96 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Historical factors: this relates to the general history of existing or old conflicts that can exacerbate in the context of identity based electoral politics. According to Orji (2013) identity politics remains a crucial factor in mobilizing for violence during elections especially within the context of unresolved historical grievances. The history helps in mapping out victims, perpetrators and the various locations of the conflict and a prediction of how the existing history of conflict can be exploited by previous victims or perpetrators. An important part of this history is also the history of electoral violence. This does not, however, suggest that a lack of history of electoral violence will be an indication of no future electoral violence (Okafor, 2015). This argument draws support from Dorina Bekoe (2011) who explains that all elections in Africa are structurally exposed to the threat of violence ( also see Mehler, 2014; Robertson, 2015) Structural Factors: These are external weaknesses that define the immediate security, political, social and economic environment within which elections are conducted (USAID, 2013). In this instance, the question of what legal frameworks regulate the management of the election is crucial. The interplay of crime levels and the presence of violent groups such as vigilante groups and militias pose a risk to the electoral process. This threat may be addressed through the issue of professionalism on the part of the security services, however, their politicization can make the process challenging (ibid). Structurally, elites play a critical role in determining what should be considered as acceptable political conduct during political campaigns. Broad economic issues dealing with unemployment, economic inequality, and urban displacement due to government projects also account for some level of risk to the electoral process (ibid). Election-Related Issues: Such election related issues include electoral legislative reforms at the pre-election phase, the level of independence of the electoral management body, the 97 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh general processes of electoral justice, and the mechanism of electoral communication that fuel rumour, create false perception among party supporters and the general public. The attempt to separate election specific issues from other factors that pose risk to the entire electoral process seems logically convincing at least theoretically. The difficulty, however, is about how plausible it is to delineate closely interrelated multi causal factors and consider them as separate entities. The USAID framework also critically examines the electoral process through the electoral cycle approach and has divided the entire election process into three main parts namely the pre-election phase, election phase and the post-election phase. Below is a diagram to illustrate the electoral cycle approach. 98 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Source: (USAID, 2013) 4.5.2 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) The UNDP remains one of the most visible attempts at ensuring global development in a manner that will ensure, sustain international peace and security. The UNDP approaches the spiky issue of electoral violence from two broad perspectives. The two perspectives are ‗democratic politics and conflict resolution or conflict management‘ (UNDP, 2010). The 99 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh UNDP Elections and Violence prevention guide also makes an attempt to provide a definition of electoral violence through the adoption of the views of Fisher (2002); which states: ―Electoral violence refers to acts or threat of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that occurs in the context of electoral competition. When the violence is targeted at the processes, the idea may be to delay, derail and undermine the outcome of the elections‖ This definition confines itself to hostilities, damages and avoids the temptation of including electoral fraud as part of the discourse on electoral violence. It is important to recognize that the UNDP, together with Fishers‘ definition was influenced by the logic that elections are not inherently violence inducing; instead, elections are usually situated within the broader complexities of the political, social, and historical structure of a given country. Under these conditions, electoral periods allow for the articulation of societal differences in the area of public policy, candidates, political parties, and identity. Hoglund (2004) argues that these societal differences that are highlighted during the electoral process provide a ‗window of vulnerability‘ in a given political community. This means the entire electoral cycle or period must be conceived as crisis management period with specific reference to the various stages of the election. The nature and level of democratization is at the heart of the UNDP approach, it places emphasis on key root causes such as the high stakes due to the erroneous expectations of winning by all candidates. The UNDP guide provides an elaborate insight into the various phases of the election, and equally establishes that elite trust in the electoral process is necessary and sufficient for violence prevention. 100 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The two diagrams below summarize the approach: The three main phases of the electoral period: (Source: UNDP, 2010) 101 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Elite trust in the electoral process exhibits an inverse relationship with electoral violence. Source: (Adapted from UNDP, 2010) 4.5.3. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) The International IDEA‘s approach to electoral violence prevention is from two main perspectives. The first approach considers the risks internal to the electoral management process, events, actors and materials. This view asserts that, the electoral process itself carries some level of risk in triggering electoral violence. For instance, the period of rule-making, that is the legal regime that will regulate the conduct of the elections in itself can be a source of protests leading to violence. Other identified internal risk factors revolve around the administrative procedure on voter registration, voter verification instruments, and campaign activities. Some level of similarity between IDEA ‗s internal factors and what the USAID refers to as election specific related factors. The second approach according to International 102 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh IDEA examines the external conditions that also affect the electoral process. These are structural issues that exist and can possibly precipitate violence during the electoral process. The external factors align with the USAID‘s structural factors. 4.6 CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH SETTING Ghana remains one of the highly praised electoral democracies, at least in comparative terms, in Africa. Since the emergence of contemporary politics (1992-present), the country has enjoyed relative stability, survived seven competitive elections culminating in three changeovers between the two-main rival political parties. These political events are no longer news to any casual observer of the Ghanaian political space, as they have burnished the image of Ghana as an entrenched democracy in Africa. According to Bekoe (2017), Ghana and her institutions deserve all the praises from the international community as an admirable democracy with profound lessons for African countries with similar history and structural experiences. In a similar vein, Gyimah-Boadi (2009), at the risk of embarking on self-praise, publicity and above all self-serving mission, in a modest argument alluded to Ghana‘s progress over successive elections as steps forward to democratic consolidation. Crawford and Abdulai (2010), however, sounded the alarm bell, indicating that, the success of Ghana remains a work in progress and any premature celebration can potentially result in not just complacency, but a complete reversal of the gains made so far. Throup (2011), in agreement, amplified this perspective that Ghana‘s competitive electoral success story provides an irresistible, tempting conclusion which could be misleading. The existence of ‗formal and substantial structural factors‘ weakens her institutions in a manner that undermine long term political and socio-economic goals. The assessment presented by these scholars creates a 103 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh fundamental fallacy and dilemma. Does relative long history of electoral success automatically result in structural economic transformation? Ake (2000) in his work ‗The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa‘, argues that political elite matter in ensuring either a stable democratic order or creating a chaotic political environment mobilizing citizens as victims and perpetrators of violence. Some scholars have underscored the importance of elites in democratic stability within the African context (Fatton, 1992; Samatar, 1999; Miller, 1974). The regular show of unity among rival political groups either for the camera or to please the peace industry has the tendency to blur the dark past of political elite relations, reconfiguration and above all elite differentiation in Ghana. The most visible political attempt made towards decolonization of the Gold Coast (GC) was the realization of the vision of George Alfred Grant that resulted in the formation of the United Gold Coast Convention, a nationalist movement for independence (Foster,1965). This was the first umbrella body to serve as a unifying platform for the notable elites to work towards achieving self-government in the Colony. The initial membership was made of conservative, aristocratic and royal elites with great sense of cohesiveness until the invitation of Kwame Nkrumah to be part of the movement (Kimble, 1963; Foster, 1965; Austin, 1970). Some of the founding members of the UGCC were, George Grant, JB Danquah, Ebenezer Ako Adjei, R.A Awoonor-Williams, Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey (Svanikier, 2007). What appears to be elite cohesiveness became threatened by the personality differences between Kwame Nkrumah and other members of the UGCC. Nkrumah resigned as General Secretary of the first party of the Gold Coast and moved on to form his own political party, Convention Peoples Party in 1949 few months after the 1948 disturbances in the Colony (Austin, 1970). To Nkrumah, other members of the UGCC adopted a rather exclusive, slow, conservative elitist approach towards self-government in the Colony. Unsurprisingly, 104 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Nkrumah and his CPP enjoyed nationwide support among the semi-educated and the masses (Arden-Clark, 1958; Arden-Clark, 1957) Nkrumah demonstrated exceptional organizational ability in persuading people for support unlike the UGCC that failed to inject dynamism and a sense of urgency into its political operations (Svanikier, 2007). The elite tension and hostility were heightened at the introduction of national elections in 1951(Austin, 1970). The political contest was between two ideologically opposing political elites- the Nkrumah‘s CPP and the Danquah led UGCC (Arden-Clark, 1958). The CPP had a wider appeal and a superior organizational structure that made it win both the 1951 and the 1954 elections (Austin. 1970). Before the CPP could contemplate the idea of electoral annihilation of its main political rival, some new alliances and regrouping had taken place in the Danquah-Busia tradition to become the National Liberation Movement (NLM) (Bretton, 1958). The NLM enjoyed massive support in the Ashanti Region, parts of the Eastern Region and the Northern Region (Rathbone, 1973). However, the new political organization, in electoral terms, presented less existential threats to the CPP as evidenced in the 1956 elections (Rathbone, 1973) for which Nkrumah and his CPP won (Whitfield, 2009; Svanikier, 2007). The outcome of the 1956 elections effectively dislodged the established conservative elites from capturing state power; and led to the emergence of new ruling elites who took over from the British at the time of Independence in 1957. This prepared the stage for bitter and acrimonious rivalry between the two elite coalitions (Rathbone, 1973). Irreparable elite disunity became the main feature of post-independence politics in Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi, 2000). Arrests and detention of opponents, dissident politicians, assassination plots, dismissal of critical members of the judiciary characterized the Nkrumah regime (Svanikier, 2007). The climax of these events was the 1966 military intervention that brought an abrupt end to the Nkrumah era (Whitfield, 2009; Austin and Luckham, 105 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1975/2013; Feit, 1968). Political parties were suspended, and open political activities were outlawed until the 1969 elections (Svanikier, 2007). Two main candidates emerged for the elections, K.A Busia of the Progress Party (PP) and Komla Gbedemah of the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL). Busia won the 1969 elections without any protest from the losing candidate and became the first offshoot of the Danquah-Busia tradition to lead Ghana as Prime Minister. His reign was short-lived due to the 1972 military interventions led by Colonel I.K Acheampong, who served as Head of State until 1976 (Rathbone, 1973; Danso- Boafo, 1996; Svanikier, 2007; Whitfield ,2009). The military in Ghana had established itself as a dominant centre of power and political control but more crucially as a mechanism to freeze inter-political class hostility. The observation here should not be over-simplified to mean a parallel interaction between the military elites and the political class. As alluded to, the military elites had strong interaction with their political counterparts (Svanikier, 2007; Osei-Kwame & Taylor, 1984) The next electoral experience was in 1979 organized by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The Peoples National Convention (PNC) led by Hilla Liman won the elections. Rawlings‘ AFRC handed over power to the Limann government. The new ruling elite under Limann drew inspiration from the Nkrumahist tradition. Jerry Rawlings returned with his men in the military and toppled the Limann government in December 1981 (Whitfield, 2009). He effectively formed the Provisional National Defense Council and served as its Chairman until 1992. Rawlings‘ era created a new elite regime and made use of moderate but willing established elites of the two-main political traditions (Svanikier, 2007). His regime silenced opponents and brutally engaged critics, this led to many of the elites fleeing to exile. The era was the height of elite disunity. The PNDC government recruited youngsters and cooperative intellectuals and rewarded them with the opportunity of political office. Consequently, the 106 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ruling coalition within the PNDC had used its leverage to creatively establish a political organization that became almost unbeatable at the polls in 1992 (Aubyn, 2002). Since winning the 1992 elections, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and its new ruling elites had established for themselves relative permanence. By the next elections in 1996, the Rawlings led NDC was more poised for electoral victory than the NPP (Ayee, 1998). The Danquah-Busia tradition has shown resilience through a repackaging political process that led to the formation of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 1992. In the year 2000, they had done all their electoral home-works that pushed the presidential election to a second round (Morrison, 2004). This allowed them to build the needed coalition with the smaller parties to win the run-off elections. Arguably, the two main political cleavages in Ghana have gone through various transformations due to military interventions, however, both the NPP and the NDC dominated the electoral space largely due to historical political affinity, family associations and the quest for personal ambitions (Morrison, 2004). The New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress loosely represent and draw inspiration from the divisions of the decolonization project (Morrison, 2001; Morrison, 2004). The two parties have strategically recruited elites and formed the necessary alliances that predisposed the country to national unity. The non-ruling elites formed Civil Society Organizations that reflected the national desire to sustain the foundations of national unity and democracy. The CSOs flourished as a product of the structural adjustment programs within the context of deliberate international financing and vibrant media (Temin & Smith, 2002). By the mid to late 2000, these CSOs had developed into a mediating platform in times of national crisis (Debrah, 2011; Frempong, 2008). According the Boafo-Arthur (2006), between 1989 and the early 1990s were dominated by the CSOs opposing and antagonizing the PNDC government for the needed 107 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh reforms towards constitutional rule and democracy. Prominent among these CSOs include the Ghana Bar Association, the Christian Council of Ghana, the Catholic Bishops Conference, Trade Union Congress and to some extent the National Union of Ghana Students (Boafo- Arthur,1997). The relations between the PNDC government and the CSOs were one of suspicion and hostility, however, some leaders also got attracted to the PNDC power basket and accepted political positions (Boafo-Arthur, 1997). The principle of co-optation was a strategic move to marshal the needed legitimacy for the regime (Hutchful, 1997). One major observation during this period, was the fact that the CSOs served as a platform for the non- ruling elites to unite towards common values and strive towards building consensus over rules of procedure but not necessarily on key or substantive issues. The political history of Ghana on the decolonization project, elite fragmentation leading to various military responses, economic decline, weak institutions and excessive partisanship fit into the structural factors that may undermine the quality and strength of Ghana‘s democracy (Osei, 2015). However, the permanence and the prevalence of the structural deficiencies has not largely explained the relative success of Ghana‘s democracy. This brings to the fore the question of elite behavior and whether the structural pre-conditions shape elite interactions (Seeberg, 2014). For the foreseeable future, Ghana‘s electoral space will be dominated by the two main political factions, allowing for elite integration that will sustain democracy in the medium term but doubtful in the long term without norm diffusion. Ghana‘s electoral experience has forced some to conclude on political settlement through the threat of chaos and the potential outbreak of violence (Whitfield, 2009; Oduro et al, 2014; Abdulai, 2017). The argument is that the country has seen three successful rotation of rival elites in government, the two main parties have all been in government and in opposition at different times creating almost an equal chance for both in winning elections in Ghana. It is almost 108 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh implausible for any group either ethnic or political in character to claim hegemony and systematically undermine other groups. This points to the fact that historical grievances are minimal among the citizens but largely profound within the political elites. To further illustrate this, Arden-Clark (1958) claimed that the most challenging, critical political and constitutional problems that he saw in Ghana was the question of relationships among elites. The first transfer of power from an elected political party – from the NDC government to the NPP government occurred in the 2000 elections (Gyimah-Boadi, 2000). The second alternation from the NPP to the NDC occurred during the 2008 elections and more recently the transfer of power from the NDC to the NPP in the 2016 elections. These elections have been associated with intense allegations of fraud and irregularities by the two main political parties, accusing each other of perpetuating fraud for unfair electoral advantage. During the 2008 elections, some of the most notable accusations were the bloated voters register, intimidation of party agents in the strongholds of the two main parties, ballot stuffing and the changing of electoral figures to favour the ruling government. During the results collation, partisan media drama over the use of the security agencies to impose state of emergency heightened the electoral temperature as this rumour was peddled as the strategy of the incumbent government to steal votes. Under this situation all predictions pointed towards Ghana becoming like Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria in experiencing large scale electoral violence. The country survived the predicted doom and failed to tip over to the zone of post- election violence. The 2012 elections came at the back of the experiences of the 2008. Some electoral reforms and innovations were introduced but this only served as partial solutions to the accusations of fraud and irregularities. The biometric machines in some voting centres broke down, making way for manual verification and voting processes to thrive, accusations of fraud and vote stealing was more pronounced than in 2008(Asunka et al, 2014). The 109 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh results were rejected by the opposition and a formal petition was filed before the supreme court challenging the validity of the outcome of the elections (Adetula, 2016). The petition was dismissed after an extended period of legal hearing. The court in a majority decision upheld the validity of the results. The 2016 election came at the back of the low level of trust for the electoral commission due to the 2012 petition (Adetula, 2016). Though the credibility of the results was upheld by the court, the petition and the live telecast of proceedings at the court damaged public trust and confidence in the EC. The appointment of a new chair for the electoral commission ahead of the 2016 elections further worsens the negative image of the EC despite the availability of clear rules and constitutional provisions on the appointment process. The 1992 constitution of the republic of Ghana in Article 70 clause 2 spells out the appointment process relating to the Electoral Commission and places this power in the President who will consult the Council of State (Republic of Ghana, 1992). Coincidentally, Ghana‘s electoral context, has to some extent followed the pattern in the United States and since 2000 elections, changes in government occur after every eight years, making the political parties and their elites to believe that losing today may also be a preparation to win tomorrow. CSOs in Ghana emerged as products of social, economic and political processes that have occurred since colonialism and to the period of transition to contemporary constitutional rule in Ghana. The post-independence socio-political environment was largely restrictive, and this affected the independence and autonomy of associational life as many of such groups and organizations were an extension of the CPP government or allies of the opposition forces (Gyimah-Boadi et al, 2000). The long period of military intervention impacted on autonomous civil society action until the introduction of multi-party constitutional rule in 1990 (Drah, 1993). The 1990 period coincided with the overall good governance agenda that 110 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ignited CSOs towards a new drive for action in areas of advocacy and democratization (Akwetey, 2007). One of the most profound effects of the 1990 political environment was the National Conference on Civil Society and the establishment of the Civil Society Coordinating Council which brought about a major shift in the relations between the government and donor partners such as the World Bank. This allowed for an amount of 600,000 dollars to be spent on CSOs through PAMSCAD (Darkwah et al, 2006; Jandoh-Gyekye, 2015). This set the tone for a new era in CSO and government interactions and allowing collaborations within CSOs in Ghana. International financing for privately initiated CSOs (new CSOs) whose objective is to promote democracy; free market policies and good governance became fashionable not just in Ghana but in other parts of the developing world (Hailey & Salway, 2016). Incrementally, the donor financing made available to these CSOs made them very visible and gradually they displaced the professional associations and member based CSOs that have exercised substantial influence in Ghana‘s political history (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). According to Apusigah et al, (2011) this was the period of ‗crowding out of member based smaller organizations through a new form of resource mobilization‘. These CSOs realizing the power of the member based social groups leverage their financial resources to form coalitions with CSOs such as the Christian Council, the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Trade Union Congress, National Union of Ghana Students, the Charismatic and Pentecostal Council to consolidate their dominance (Tsikata et al, 2013). The neo-liberal policy environment favored the new CSOs but more importantly, the organizational skills, non-partisan approach and the innovations pursued over the period have earned them an enviable place in the policy-making processes in Ghana (Hearn, 2000; Jumah, 2011). 111 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Another important factor relates to how the legal regime in Ghana supports the operations of CSOs with minimal restrictions (Arhin et al, 2015). The earliest attempts to enact laws that seek to regulate CSOs have been frontally opposed by leaders of CSOs (Brobbey, 2011). Because of these experiences, various governments have been reluctant to control CSOs through legislation or constitutional instruments (WASCI, 2015). The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, in Article 21 & 37, provided an expansive and liberal regime that facilitates the formation of CSOs in Ghana with almost no inhibition or obstruction. Contrastingly, CIVICUS‘s data points to a wave of restrictions on CSOs in many parts of Africa. Estimates suggest that over 70 countries in the world have taken one step or another to place restrictions on the operations of CSOs in governance (CIVICUS, 2011; USAID, 2015a; CIVICUS, 2014). For instance, unlike Ghana, Kenya has adopted a centralized legal regime in monitoring the registration, licensing and operations of the civil society organizations. The Kenya NGO‘s Coordination Board has been repressing civil society organizations and limiting their influence, to the extent that the Board has revoked the license of CSOs very critical of government and rely on the police to close-down offices of CSOs (Abdi, 2017). In Ghana, CSOs have three main options regarding registration to operate, namely, the company‘s code of 1963 under Act 179, the Trustees Act of 1962 under Act 106 and the NRCD 1976 Act 143 (Tsikata et al, 2013). Even though the legal regime is promising to CSOs operations in Ghana, the economic outlook and policy initiatives pose a threat to the funding of CSOs in Ghana. In 2011, Ghana adopted a post aid framework known as the Ghana Aid Strategy and Policy with the medium to long term objective of weaning the country off foreign aid and concentrate on key domestic resource mobilization options (MOFEP, 2011). The rebasing of the country‘s economy and the transition to the lower-middle income status has brought about a shift in 112 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh donor support and funding in critical sectors of the economy, including the governance sector. The impressive record of being the second largest economy in West Africa also further impedes the long-term funding for CSOs. Unsurprisingly, the 2015 CSO financial sustainability index shows that funds to CSOs in Ghana are in drastic decline and this constitute a threat to their operations in the long term, especially within the context of almost zero local private sector funding for CSOs in Ghana (USAID, 2015).The lack of interest by local private sector funding for CSOs, goes a long way to undermine the quest for local ownership of the peace project during and after elections. The historical electoral experiences of a country must be considered in any electoral violence prevention strategy. CSOs must be strategically placed to exercise convening or countervailing power on the behavior of political elites. This will greatly influence what losers do and how winners moderate their victories and persuading all actors towards nation building. The existing frameworks for electoral violence prevention in comparative terms provide a complimentary role in violence prevention during elections. All three frameworks make a strong case for both state and non-state actors as major stakeholders in the violence prevention strategy. Electoral violence prediction remains a daunting task for all stakeholders and perhaps the most challenging aspect of the prevention strategy. The framework fails to account for institutional rivalry, intense competition for resources and, in some extreme cases, role duplication. The existence of external risk factors is not sufficient enough to conclude the occurrence of violence during the electoral process which also makes timing of a prevention strategy difficult. Having examined the historical and structural factors in Africa based on the colonial politics, political party organization in the post independent era, the one party rule and its related military interventions, economic policies such as the structural adjustment program, this chapter concludes that electoral violence will continue to 113 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh threaten African democracies. There is the need for continuous reflection on the structural and operational activities that are aimed at prevention especially those by non-state actors such as CSOs. 114 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER FIVE EXAMINING THE STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL APPROACHES OF CSOs IN ELECTORAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION IN GHANA 5.0 INTRODUCTION This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the data based on the first two objectives of the study. It provides insight into the structural and operational prevention strategies that have been adopted by the selected CSOs in the Ghanaian context. Peace-building efforts are usually undertaken by multiple actors who sometimes exhibit parallel interests that can undermine the noble intentions of violence prevention in the short-to long-terms. In this vein, the chapter also highlights the varying operational activities or interventions led by CSOs to ensure electoral violence prevention during the 2008, 2012 and the 2016 elections in Ghana. The discussion and the order in which the organizations are arranged do not in any way suggest an attempt on the part of this dissertation to rank the selected CSOs. 5.1 CSOs AND THEIR INITIATIVES TOWARDS PREVENTING ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN THE GHANAIAN CONTEXT Electoral politics in any part of the world produces a political system where there are likely to be natural allies, friends, foes and political extremists. The desire to capture state power and exercise authority over the processes of resource allocation and to lead the developmental aspirations of the population is usually a function of conflicting political contestations. In many developing countries, especially those in Africa, this democratic exercise is characterized by intense rivalry, antagonism, lack of consensus among the actors and vile disunity among political elites. These kinds of awful political atmosphere breed local hatred among lower level party supporters exacerbate communal differences and provide sufficient 115 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ground for elites to easily mobilize discontent amongst the population during periods of electoral failure or desire for success at the polls. 5.2 THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (IEA) The first transfer of political power in Ghana from one political party to another took place in the year 2001. Despite the relative peaceful nature of the transfer, the country also witnessed acrimonious political environment. The leading figures of the two main political parties (the National Democratic Congress NDC and the National Patriotic Party NPP) saw themselves as enemies and bitter rivals rather than critical stakeholders in building Ghana‘s democracy. Realizing this and many other deficiencies in Ghana‘s democratic journey, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in 2003, through its network within the four main political parties, the Convention People's Party, the Peoples National Convention, the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party created an acceptable national platform to ensure a healthy interaction among key figures in the various political parties in Ghana. The IEA- Ghana Political Parties Program (IEA-GPP) became one of the earliest innovative structural initiatives to ensure inter-party engagement at the highest level. This platform coordinated by the IEA is made of the Chairmen, General Secretaries and the Policy Analysts of the various political parties holding legislative seats in Parliament. The IEA- GPP has helped in developing personal friendships and bonds among the key participants. These bonds were fostered through the monthly meetings, regional workshops, training, capacity building seminars and other events organized by the IEA. In an interview with a former National Party Chairman of the New Patriotic Party, he underscored the importance of the IEA-GPP and explained how the platform was a timely intervention to safeguard Ghana‘s democracy. Below is an excerpt from the interview with him: 116 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh What you must know is that the IEA-GPP was established during my tenure as party chairman of the ruling government. We all agreed our political system is polarized and there was an urgent need to safeguard our young democracy to the admiration of the world and continue to serve as a shining example for many countries in Africa. I remember Dr Kwabena Adjei of the NDC, agreeing with me that as party leaders, we needed to see ourselves as standards of acceptable democratic behavior and build the needed trust not just in private but also in public engagements that will diffuse tension, bitterness, violent and antagonistic reactions among our supporters. From the IEA-GPP platform, what I consider to be the most visible positive effect was the fact that all the four main parties took steps to institutionalize the invitation of other parties to their campaign and manifesto launches. The NDC is usually invited to participate and give solidarity messages during our delegate‘s conferences and we also get invitation to attend such NDC events. I have a lot of friends in the NDC and we often share our honest thoughts on some national issues in private (Field Interview, August 2017). In a similar interview with the Deputy Secretary General of the National Democratic Congress, he confirmed how the practice of inter-party engagement became institutionalised and serve as an opportunity for rival political parties to make specific demands on the ruling party in the area of national peace, cohesion and stability. According to him, all political parties especially the two main parties have committed themselves to the peace of the nation but like football players, knowing the rule does not mean some actors will not resort to nasty tackles to get a goal. For all political parties winning elections is the sole prerogative including using unacceptable ways and means to win. I just led a delegation to Cape Coast to participate and above all extend the NDC‘s well wishes and goodwill messages to the NPP. I do not remember immediately how 117 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh this practice started but I recall that the former Chairman Dr. Obed Asamoah and Dr Kwabena Adjei were very instrumental in this practice. In my speech, I emphasized the importance of peace and stability as cardinal elements of our democracy. Without peace and stability, our quest for development becomes elusive and I urged the NPP to deal with the vigilante group nonsense that is alien to our democracy. If they…… the NPP government under Nana Addo fail to give us peace we in the NDC will rise to demand it. (Field Interview, August 2017). The above excerpts illustrate a clear case of value consensus among the two-main rival political elites in Ghana. This shows that despite the recognition of their rivalry and mutual suspicion, especially during national elections, the two-political classes cooperated over what they deemed as mutual threat and discomfort for their power relations. The IEA-GPPP helped in ensuring a long-lasting platform for parties to engage despite their differences and find possible solutions to threats that undermine the peace and stability of the country. The platform enables IEA and other CSOs to build strong relationships with the political parties and leverage these informal bonds to convene critical meetings during periods of electoral crisis and highly contentious disagreements that can spark violence. The IEA-GPPP has identified structural and operational weaknesses of the political parties among which include the issue of capacity building in policy formulation and implementation. As a result, the IEA provided various training and capacity building workshops for the political parties (PP) and this served as another opportunity for party leaders, women and youth wings of the various parties to learn the virtues of democratic tolerance and to provide a sustainable mechanism for inter-party dialogue. The IEA through the GPP provides financial support in the form of allowance to the political parties‘ policy analysts. This level of cooperation 118 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh between IEA and the major political parties creates the opportunity to have access to highly influential figures in the parties. According to a Senior Research Fellow at the IEA, the GPPP is more institutionalized than the Inter-Party Advisory Committee that operates under the Electoral Commission. He alluded to the many instances where parties at IPAC meetings failed to build consensus and CSOs had to intervene, especially in the case of the 2016 elections to persuade parties to accept the electoral register as credible enough for the general elections. In his view the GPP ensures that; Those who may have to be violently fighting and inciting their supporters against each other are always here at the IEA learning and sharing experiences with their supposed political opponents. The continuous engagement in this forum in an atmosphere of friendliness, openness makes it difficult for any of the two parties to have grounds to deliberately use strategic violence based on electoral grievances. There are several avenues for dialogue from the GPP to the Inter-Party Advisory Committee. On few occasions you hear on radio and television some leaders of the two main parties making unacceptable provocative comments, verbal attacks and trying to stoke ethnicity in mobilizing for votes. We intervene in such situations by calling on those who matter in the party to restrain such individuals. Whenever we call, the leading personalities usually apologize for those unfortunate incidences and assure us of their commitment to the peace of the nation. We sometimes adopt the open condemnation approach and because this hurts the image and the reputation of the parties, we get compliance to the code of conduct and influence parties to always consider dialogue as the first option in any major disagreements. (Field Interview, August 2017) 119 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh In the run up to the 2008 elections, the IEA observed that the complex and hostile political atmosphere that could result in cross-regional violence. The threat of violence is partially explained from the seeming two-term eight years tradition in the Ghanaian electoral history where the main opposition party believes is their turn to return to power and sometimes resort to very uncompromising stance on issues. As part of efforts to commit the main actors to peace and acceptable political behavior and to ensure the acceptance of the outcome of the elections, the IEA in collaboration with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and the members of the GPPP developed a more comprehensive Code of Conduct for the political parties. All members of the GPPP had their chairmen and secretaries signing the Political Parties Code of Conduct that was launched by one of the prominent board members of the IEA, Mensa Otabil, who also enjoys significant charismatic religious following because of his status as the founding pastor of the International Central Gospel Church (ICGC), one of the influential charismatic churches in Ghana. As an innovative approach in creating moral obligations for the parties to respect and adhere to the provisions of the Code of Conduct (CoC - PP), the IEA established an enforcement task force to make sure that parties comply with the code in their campaigning operations during and after the elections. The task force was made of high-level representatives of the Political Parties, Christian Council, National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), National Election Security Task force (NESTF). The Code of Conduct for political parties and their supporters became the reference point in demanding acceptable non-violent approaches to election related issues. Rev Fred Degbey of the Christian Christian Council was appointed to chair the task force with a unanimous endorsement from the political parties. In an interview with a former party official of the NDC, he reflected on the role played by the IEA in the 2008 elections. The excerpt below provides details of the engagement. 120 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh In 2008, I was deeply involved in all operations of our party across the country as deputy general secretary in charge of operations. For the IEA, I think they limited themselves to the presidential debate and the outdooring of the code of conduct for the political parties that my party participated in. However, we had to attend a crisis meeting convened by Mensa Otabil. I had a call from Rev Cephas Amartey who said Mensa Otabil will like to meet some key persons in the NDC. I immediately move to Ato Ahwoi and Totobi and convinced them that because Rev Cephas Amartey was involved, it was difficult to disregard the request from Otabil. These elders of our party agreed with me and we made it to the meeting with Otabil at his Trassaco Residence. The meeting was to negotiate with us over the fears of the NPP in conceding defeat. I asked Otabil what exactly the fear of the NPP and he is replied in a very profound statement, ‗fear has no logic, it‘s a question of survival and personal security‘. We assured him to simply encourage President Kufour and the NPP to concede defeat and there will be no issues. Not long after this meeting, I remember the NPP abandoned its court attempt to stop the EC from declaring the results and President Kufour had issued a statement calling for calm across the country and indicating his willingness to hand over to the winner of the elections. (Field Interview July 2017). According to Whitfield (2009), the NPP panicked when they noticed their defeat. They were not prepared to leave power so soon and could not contemplate their security in opposition. The meetings convened among the important elites also give an indication of how the rival elite class is prepared to negotiate in turbulent situations of mutual insecurity. Another interviewee who was part of several closed-door mediation processes and also a Senior Fellow at IDEG shared more insight into President Kufuor‘s press statement to the nation. 121 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh His statement was timely and calmed tension at the time. He was briefed that his party had lost the election, some limited high-profile elites within the political class knew about the results because of CODEO‘s vote tabulation that was done at KAIPTC and the subsequent speculation from the major media houses. There was an unusual uneasiness in Burma Camp, outside of the barracks, soldiers sympathetic to both sides were grouping and remain on high alert to monitor events and the President needed to show leadership. At that point, he had only one option, to protect his legacy against the wishes of his party men and meet the constitutional deadline to hand over. A crucial precedent has been set by Rawlings, his party lost in 2001 and they accepted to leave without a drop of blood. All presidents will continue to remind themselves of this history and will be persuaded to accept defeat. (Field Interview, July 2017). To buttress the above point, an interview with a close aide to former president Kufour reveals that the President at the time was under intense internal pressure to do something by preventing the EC from declaring the final results. The internal pressure was overwhelming at the time for President Kufour. Some of our party men decided to go to court. Many called to express their fears about how they cannot live under an NDC government and something must be done. Mind you the international community was also mounting pressure on the President to avert any possible constitutional crisis; the fact is the entire Kufour legacy was under threat should violence break out in the country. Faced with the electoral dilemma, we thought a press statement to assure the nation of our commitment to the constitutional provisions of handing over before the 7th January deadline was most appropriate 122 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh especially at a time when so many rumours were on the airwaves. (Field Interview, August, 2017). Another area of intervention from the IEA was the organization of the presidential debate in 2008. While the debate sought to provide mechanisms to ensure accountability, allow citizens to listen to the various candidates articulate their policy priorities, it also provided some unintended consequences for violence prevention. Various competing candidates appear on the same national platform to debate ideas and in the end further commit themselves to the stability of the country and pledge to accept the results as the sovereign will of the Ghanaian people. The 2008 IEA debate was for the first time attended by the candidates of the two main parties unlike previous debates where incumbent party candidates failed to attend (Gyampo, 2009). According to Gyampo (2009) any evaluation of presidential debates in Ghana‘s electoral politics must go beyond the arguments of ‗enhancing the electoral fortunes of the participating candidates. He argues that emphasis should be placed on the overall impact on democratic norm diffusion at the level of elites and the larger citizenry. The tradition of presidential debates has been popularized by the IEA. In the 2012 elections, learning from the experiences of the 2008, the IEA repeated its actions on the code of conduct for parties and the presidential debate. The 2012 presidential debate was unique in several ways but more profoundly the participation of a sitting president. Having provided leadership in the organization of presidential debates for over a decade, the IEA at least theoretically was positioned technically and institutionally to foresee, predict, adopt creative cooperation mechanisms to resolve third party interests. The 2016 presidential debate organization was marred by controversies and personality clashes that took away the usual national excitement accompanying the debates. The IEA failed to secure the 123 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh participation of the two main political parties; NCCE-GBC announced a rival platform for presidential debates. This generated intense public debate about who has the mandate, the technical expertise and experience in organizing debates. The IEA and the NCCE became embroiled in this intense rivalry. An interview with a Senior Fellow of the IEA reveals; The IEA has a long history of good working relationship with the NCCE until recently when the relationship went bad. The NCCE is financially deficient in what it must do to bring about civic education towards democratic consolidation in Ghana. The CSOs like the IEA seeing the lacuna take up the challenge to raise money through donor support to embark on these activities. Governments usually provide insufficient funds for the operations of the NCCE, the reason why we partner them in our activities. They have offices in all regions and almost all districts in this country which helps in the mobilization of communities to participate in our district or regional workshops. We made some mistakes in managing our relations with the NCCE but let me tell you that this whole issue is because the ruling NDC government stoked the rivalry. (Field Interview, July 2017). The NCCE perspective was ascertained through an interview with one of its Directors who is described as the longest serving officer of the NCCE. The extract below details his account on the history of the presidential debate in Ghana and the kind of relationship that exist between the IEA and the NCCE. We at the NCCE have supported the IEA with our men and women across the country in the organization of several activities including the presidential debate for the past 20 years. What surprises us is that after the collaboration and the partnership, the IEA takes credit for everything done. This presidential debate… the idea came from our first Chairman. The records are here in our archives, the exchange of letters and 124 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh notes of meetings between the IEA and the NCCE over the use of debates among candidates to educate the public during elections. This whole concept is original to the NCCE… the IEA cannot deny it. The only difference is that the IEA got money to implement it first in 2000 and we had to support them to succeed. There is nothing wrong supporting them, but my only concern is that after they rely on our workforce on the ground to carry out these programs no credit or recognition is given us. Presidential debate is the baby of the NCCE, the puzzle is that IEA has gone ahead to name the baby and announce it to the world. I have never seen the IEA defend the NCCE when people mount baseless attacks on the institution and its personnel. When people say we lack expertise or do not have capacity what exactly do they mean…… look u have come here as a researcher check the qualification of our staff, we have lawyers, master‘s degree holders in diverse fields………. What we don‘t have is simply enough funds over the years. Now that we have the money look at the beautiful platform we created for the presidential debate…. well attended by the diplomatic community, various groups across the country. (Field Interview, August 2017). The institutional clash between the IEA and the NCCE was extended to the political parties. According to a senior party official of the NDC, the IEA must check its operations and extend respect to the NDC. Look we have always been participating in the IEA debates since 2004, President John Mahama is the first president to have honored that platform in 2012, we don‘t fear debates…. Our problem is the kind of Civil Society dictatorship that is being practiced by the IEA in recent times……. I have been there for meetings in the past, but the IEA must learn to respect the political parties especially the NDC. They cannot talk to us anyhow and expect us to honor their invitations. Our message is that 125 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh we are willing to debate but certainly not on the biased IEA platform. (Field Interview, May 2017) Another interviewee, who is a leading member of the NPP and presently serving as Cabinet Minister, has this to say why their party failed to show up at the IEA platform: Our inability to attend the IEA debate was because of the campaign schedule we had. The timing was not favorable for us even though we had initially agreed to honor their invitation. I am sure in future if things go right our candidate who is now the president will be more than willing to debate anybody on any national platform. CSOs especially the IEA, IDEG, CODEO-CDD …. have earned their place in our democracy and we cannot ignore them. They have played their role well and for me they are almost serving as guardians of acceptable behavior in our politics. (Field Interview, September 2017). However, the tradition of policy debates among leading candidates for the presidency has become entrenched to the point where the flagbearers of the two main parties were calling the bluff of each to meet for a debate. This situation, many saw as a healthy development in Ghana‘s electoral politics, meaning the culture of inter-party debates in a well-managed civil platform has become very entrenched. The IEA has made several proposals for structural legislative reforms key to this research is the Presidential Transition Act, 2012, (Act 845). This Act was initially proposed and developed by the IEA for the consideration of parliament and was passed in 2012. It became an important framework for the transfer of power from the NDC to the NPP after the 2016 elections. 126 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh From the above discussion, the IEA intervenes in two broad ways in electoral violence prevention. First, it sustains inter-elite dialogue among key influential personalities and other CSOs in Ghana to obtain consensus on contentious issues. The inter-elite dialogue is extended to political parties and their leaders such that in periods of electoral tension and strong disagreement, the IEA puts together men and women with diverse background to mediate and negotiate behind the scenes for peaceful outcome. Secondly, the IEA embarks on citizen engagement through public debates, lectures, training and capacity building to create a critical mass of people to cherish specific democratic norms. The IEA also suffers from the accusations of bias and lack of political neutrality. This challenge sometimes undermines the capacity of the IEA to obtain attendance or ensure participation in events and programs by the injured political parties and their leaders. The major challenge is that some amount of frosty relations exists between the political parties and the IEA. Another issue or challenge is limited funding that prevents the opening of regional and district offices that will support operational activities. There is also the challenge of limited number of staff hence the reliance on external experts and short term consultants, whose political persuasions sometimes become questionable by the political parties. 5.3 INSTITUTE OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (IDEG) AND THE CIVIC FORUM INITIATIVE (CFI) 5.3.1 Stakeholder engagement -Institutional Collaboration The Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) is one of the CSOs that played a pivotal role in the 2008 elections in Ghana. The pre-election phase was characterized by disagreements between the political parties, especially the two main ones, the NDC and the NPP. Both parties had accused each other of registering minors, illegal voters in their strongholds making the electoral register bloated. The then opposition NDC particularly issued several 127 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh public statements concerning the bloated register and asked the Electoral Commission (EC) to clean the register before the elections. The public uproar and the protest by the opposition parties ruined the credibility of the existing new register for the elections. As a measure to restore public confidence, EC called on all Ghanaians, especially CSOs, to think through and make proposals on how best to make the voter register acceptable to all parties to prepare for credible polls. IDEG accepted the EC‘s appeal and formed the CIVIC FORUM INITIATIVE (CFI). The membership of the IDEG-CFI is made of various organizations in all regions and districts in Ghana. IDEG-CFI, in collaboration with the EC embarked on citizen education over the voter register exhibition process as part of measures to produce a credible register that would allow eligible voters to vote in the elections. The voters register education and exhibition took place in all districts across the country with the participation of representatives of political parties at the district level. Special attention was given to areas designated as flashpoints, areas volatile and susceptible to electoral violence. The voter education was further sustained through collaboration with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE). Both IDEG-CFI and NCCE led nationwide public education that took place in all regions and all districts with NCCE operational offices. As part of the campaign against election violence, the IDEG led team developed short videos, films and documentaries on electoral violence from countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. The videos and documentaries also included the devastating effects of war on countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Central African Republic and Rwanda. These documentaries were publicly screened in all volatile communities across the country. There was large community attendance. Below is an interview with a team member of the 2008 citizen engagement coalition: 128 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Showing them videos, films, and documentaries from these worn torn countries was a humbling moment for the participants and the community members. I remember in Tamale, after our public screening, many people wanted to be volunteers for the program and lead us to people who usually cause trouble during elections. We recruited some of these people to be part of our early warning team and provided them with the needed training. The advantage is that they are friends with the so- called trouble makers and share information among themselves. Our community volunteers then passed on the information to us anytime there is a looming violence. These volunteers are financially rewarded for their time and, so they tend to be quite honest with us. In many instances, the security especially the police, had to rely on our intelligence on the grounds to act. (Field Interview March 2017). Drawing from the focus group discussion, a participant who was an IDEG-CFI volunteer in the 2008 elections and now a political party activist has this to say about the IDEG-CFI initiative: In 2008, I was not an active member of the NPP but now I am, I participated in the film shows that the IDEG team undertook. I learnt a lot from those documentaries, seeing people killed, tortured and attacked had effect on me…. the scenes from the documentaries were scary and my prayer was that this should never happen in Ghana. The discussion session for people to express their views about the documentaries was revealing, I hope you had witnessed this for yourself. I am not sure any of the people who watched these documentaries will engage in violence in any way. At the time my problem was how such a good initiative will not get to everybody in the country. (Excerpt from Focus Group Discussion, June, 2017). 129 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The participant below, in the focus group discussion, shared another insightful perspective on the IDEG-CFI initiative: In my view, the initiative was good, but I also think that it achieved only short-term goals. After a certain number of days, people forget their experiences from these documentaries and are more than willing to fight for their parties including using violence on opponents. They have their masters who command them, and they must obey. They benefit from violent activities; they are organized and rewarded. (Extract from Focus Group Discussion, June 2017). In a related perspective another participant argues that: We we listen to our big men in the party. We wait for their decisions and follow. I don‘t like violence but if our people at the top think that we need to protest or use violence, we will take part if they come around to organize us, we shall follow them. (Extract from Focus Group Discussion, June 2017) IDEG-CFI coalition provided leadership in mediating between the two main political parties. IDEG over the years has provided avenue for policy dialogue, debates and ensured inter-party relations on various platforms. Based on this strength, IDEG-CFI intervened in collaboration with the National Peace Council to prevent and avert a near large scale violence in the 2008 elections. In what appears to be a delay, in the release of the final results, the supporters of the then opposition NDC had trooped to the operational Headquarters of the Electoral Commission (EC) to demand for the immediate release of results. This protest was largely due to unconfirmed rumors that the ruling government was influencing the EC to change results in its favor. The rumors were carried by some radio stations and leading personalities of the opposition party. The number of opposition supporters kept increasing until it reached 130 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh an alarming level. Some of these protesters at the EC headquarters carried machetes, cutlasses, stones and other offensive heavy sticks in readiness to fight. There was a rumour of a counter-mobilization by the ruling NPP. The appearance of the police and the military reinforcement team incensed the crowd and fed into the unconfirmed rumour that the government was determined to use the military to intimidate the opposition and change the results after which a state of emergency will be declared. The attempt by NPP lawyers to secure an injunction from the supreme court, to prevent the EC from declaring the final results worsened the electoral drama and lend credence to the protesters‘ claim. IDEG-CFI, realizing the danger, provided leadership by putting together a team of highly respectable personalities with varied background to meet with Prof. Evans Atta Mills, the then opposition candidate at his campaign headquarters. These personalities were members of the IDEG Board, heads of other religious organizations and members of the CFI platform. 2008 election was the most dramatic one. Many CSOs activities took place but for me the most critical intervention was led by IDEG-CFI. I remember their visit to Prof Mills to appeal to him to speak to calm the tension that was coalescing at the EC headquarters. The way they came, the personalities involved in the delegation were too influential to ignore. Their appeal to Prof was timely. Before their arrival, we were completely confused how this will turn out and brainstorming how to deal with the riled crowd of supporters. After assuring Prof Mills that they were making similar visit to the NPP government and using their contacts within the EC to pressure them to do the right thing, Prof asked me and other colleagues to go make sure the crowds dispersed. Sincerely, it was the most challenging assignment for us. Prof. Mills expected us to get them to leave the EC premises but looking at the angry numbers we were even afraid to show up. We got to the EC headquarters with food, water and 131 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh other items to win over the leadership of the crowd. I addressed them letting them know Prof was thankful for their vigilance and resilience to protect the votes. After gaining their confidence, I told them Prof wants everybody to go home to avoid the NPP using them as a ploy for police and military brutalities. Let us avoid them using state of emergency to change the results, we have won, and nothing will change it, return home and prepare for the victory…… I then resorted to cheering them sing the Victory of the NDC is coming again and let the people say Ehe edzor bodoor. This was how we prevented and survived the odds in 2008. (Field Interview, July 2017). The above statement shows that party supporters sometimes exhibit agency without necessarily being organized or mobilized by the elites. The spontaneous reaction of supporters about things they consider unacceptable and inimical to their interests point to how incidental electoral violence occurs. However, for this kind of incidental violence to be sustained for days and weeks, there is the need for elite financing and mobilization. In the same vein, elites can intervene to prevent the initial violence from escalating. Another interviewee, who was one of the leading spokespersons for the NPP has this perspective to share about the tension and why the rumoured state of emergency was not possible: Look, our security forces are divided along the two main political parties. It will be difficult to use them to change results or refuse to accept an electoral loss. I will not deny that there was no pressure within the party, many of our supporters felt the NPP must continue to be in power. As I sit here in my office as a minister, the police and the military guys keep coming to privately show their party cards for favours and provide information on their colleagues who are NDC. Knowing this, if you want to use them for any major operation in a highly tensed electoral atmosphere, expect 132 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh some of them to disobey your instructions or not carry it out as expected. The problem is that in Ghana after eight years, two-terms, there is a general expectation of a change in government, so some members of the security services are expecting a change and will not be willing to be part of any attempt to subvert the constitution. You can tell from how careful they usually are in very difficult electoral situations. (Field Interview August 2017). From the lessons learnt in 2008, IDEG-CFI continued their citizen engagement programs across the country in partnership with the NCCE during the 2012 elections. IDEG through the support of the National Peace Council, National House of Chiefs, Otumfour Osei Tutu II, the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Christian Council, office of the Chief Iman organized the first ever peace summit that produced the Kumasi Declaration or what became popularly known as the ‗Kumasi Accord‘. The peace summit was attended by all candidates for the presidential election, heads of all security agencies, the military high command, the Chief Justice, Speaker of Parliament, all two living former presidents, Rawlings and Kufour. The peace summit was well attended by the members of the Diplomatic Corps, and the donor community in Ghana. The peace summit received praise and commendation from all sides of the political divide in Ghana. The platform was seen as credible, with an enormous convening power. This was because IDEG secured the participation of all major and relevant actors in Ghana‘s electoral politics. The event was televised on all major TV and Radio stations in the country. The 2012 elections were not without tension, the rejection of results by the opposition NPP worsened this tension. After the press conference to reject the outcome of the elections, the supporters of the opposition NPP gathered at Circle, a central business district of Accra, to protest the outcome of the elections. This situation potentially was going to damage and affect Ghana‘s reputation, 133 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh especially if the protest turned violent. Several open statements were made for calm and appeal made to the NPP to change its decision, but their supporters kept moving from various parts of the country to Accra for the protest. In an interview with a board member of IDEG- CFI, he observed that public statements for condemnation of election violence has its limitations and required using other ways of engaging political actors. Below is a reflection on his experiences. We realized our public statements for peace were not really working under the circumstance; we marshalled our partners especially the members of the CFI, Peace Council and with two special representatives from the Ghana Federation of the Disabled (GFD). We privately visited the Presidential Candidate of the NPP and appealed to him to respect his commitment to peace and non-violence in expressing concerns over the elections as contained in the Kumasi Declaration that he signed before the whole country prior to the elections. Our representatives from the GFD spoke in a passionate manner appealing to the heart of Nana Addo to consider the plight of many suffering disability people who will be unable to survive and run for cover when the country degenerate into violence. Before we left his residence, we had his assurance that all will be done to prevent violence. (Field Interview, March 2017). According to the National Peace Council Chair: The Kumasi Accord became the moral reference point to deal with the grievances; I called the EC Chair to immediately convene an IPAC meeting. And we all moved in to be part of the meeting. We requested the representative of the NPP to present in a formal document reasons why they were rejecting the outcome of the elections. This meeting was long and travelled very late into the night. We later suggested to all parties that the EC has the mandate to declare the results and any person who feels 134 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh dissatisfied should proceed to court. We use moral persuasion to appeal to the NPP. IDEG and I also initiated private meetings with the chairman of the NDC and the NPP. What helped our case were also the internal disagreements within the NPP over the use of the street protests. Some key figures felt their candidate should accept the outcome of the election for the nation to move on. (Field Interview, May 2017). In the 2016 elections, IDEG organized another peace summit, but this time with some challenges from key partners: According to a Senior Research Fellow at IDEG some changes were observed with the kind of cooperation that they had with the Asanteman Council. The extract below explains his views; We decided our venue was going to be Kumasi for two main reasons; a city identified as a flashpoint and to work with the secretariat of the Asanteman Council and the National House of Chiefs. We initially had the support of Otumfour Osei Tutu II. In the middle of our preparations we no longer get feedback from the Asanteman Council and Otumfour was no longer responding to our calls. We could not go ahead to hold the program in Kumasi when we do not have final confirmation from Otumfour, so few days to the program we had to cancel the venue. This explains the delay in the 2016 peace accord. Another challenge that came up was the UNDP‘s attempt to solely deal with the Peace Council. They wanted to organize the summit on their own without involving IDEG, but Prof Emmanuel Asante insisted that IDEG should be a partner institution. We had to use University of Ghana, Legon. Mr Kofi Annan had to persuade almost all candidates to attend the event and commit to peace. The event was well attended. For some candidates, IDEG had to buy their domestic air-ticket to travel to Accra for the event since they were on the field campaigning. (Field Interview, March 2017). 135 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The Chairman of the National Peace Council argues that, political parties must begin to own the peace process and take steps to make sure the nation goes through elections with minimum tension. The interview below illustrates his point: I made a point during the peace summit that we cannot continue to repeat the same thing every election year. I do hope we have had enough of the signing of the accords and the declarations and we will want to see political parties take specific actions in ensuring that we go through elections with minimum tension and violence free. (Field Interview, May 2017). The IDEG-CFI, operational activities in electoral violence prevention reveals the crucial nature of private meetings and mediation efforts as key elements in violence prevention. This means mediation should be timely and appropriately respond to the actors who really matter. Access to these key actors must be sustained through personal or organizational contacts, and the use of third parties. IDEG faces the challenge of limited funding and limited staff and in some limited instances accused of bias and being selective in its public condemnation of wrongful acts by political parties and their leaders. 5.4 COALITION OF DOMESTIC ELECTION OBSERVERS AND THE CENTRE FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT (CODEO-CDD) Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO-CDD) intervenes in the electoral process with the overriding aim of preventing violence, documenting violence for stakeholder remedial action, providing an avenue for electoral integrity by lending credibility to the process and commanding legitimacy for the outcome. The above aims are achieved through a set of bold innovative activities in election observation, parallel vote tabulation (PVT) and timely stakeholder engagement by the Advisory Board throughout the entire electoral 136 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh process. In election observation, CODEO has established a long tradition of trust as an impartial local CSO Observer group. CODEO places emphasis on the pre-election environment and usually deployed observers across the country for a long-term observation ahead of the Election Day. The organization strategically placed observers in communities, constituencies and regions that are designated as flashpoints for potential violence. According to a senior staff of CODEO; We placed observers in trouble communities to work with constituency and regional coordinators to report to us verifiable actions of the political parties and other actors that undermine the integrity of the process. Our observers adhere to strict rules of reporting what they noticed or witnessed in their coverage areas and not hearsays. Their report is sent to us and we then compile monthly reports. I remember in 2008, we produced reports from March- December before the Election Day updates. On Election Day, we issued statements to brief the media and the public about our assessment of opening of polls and close of polls. Our observers get first-hand information, and this enables us to devise strategies and advise how our board members can engage other stakeholders. (Field Interview, May 2017) Apart from the pre-election observation, CODEO deployed Election Day observers across the country (to all constituencies in Ghana) with an additional special mandate of transmitting results from polling stations to a tally headquarters situated at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC). The tally headquarters was made available to international observers, selected members of the security agencies, leaders of faith-based organizations, and the electoral commission. To ensure acceptability of its outcome, CODEO Board members, supported by a staff of experts embarked on a stakeholder education and outreach to brief those who mattered in Ghana‘s electoral politics about the novelty and the 137 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh rationale in introducing the parallel vote tabulation (PVT). This outreach was led by Justice VCRAC Crabbe and Prof Miranda Greenstreet. The advisory board was able to mobilize elites and the political class to support the PVT as a well-intended mechanism to ascertain the accuracy of final results as declared by the electoral commission. In 2008 elections, voting went on peacefully, what I consider to be our major problem at the time was the rumors about vote fraud, cooked figures, and EC changing figures in favor of the ruling government during the Run-Off. Something, in my opinion, that made the NDC supporters marched to the EC headquarters. What you must know is that by the time these rumors were flying in town especially in the media, we had estimated who won or lost the elections. We followed up to the Tain Constituency for the final part of the run-off but even before then we knew who had won the elections. Our figures confirm the accuracy of the results declared by the EC. Now when we have these estimates on who wins or loses the election, we wait until the official results are declared by the EC before we make our figures known. However, when we noticed unjustifiable protest or dispute over the figures, our board takes the initiative to privately persuade the loser either directly or indirectly in accepting the outcome of the elections. In these private meetings, we bring the evidence to the party involved through engaging their high-profile personalities, we also make our figures public to ensure citizens have confidence in the accuracy of the results. (Field Interview, May 2017). 138 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The accuracy of the PVT is illustrated in the figures obtained from the field for the 2008, 2012 and the 2016 elections and summarized as follows: Candidate Party Margin of Error PVT Estimates Official or in Percentage Certified Results (-+) (%) declared by the EC in Percentage (%) Nana Addo New Patriotic Dankwa Akufo- Party (NPP) - 1.6 49.8 49.1 Addo + John Evans Atta National Mills Democratic - 1.6 47.4 47.9 Congress (NDC) + Paa Kwesi Convention Nduom Peoples Party - 0.1 1.3 1.3 (CPP) + Edward Nasigrie Peoples National Mahama Convention - 0.2 0.8 0.9 (PNC + Emmanuel Democratic Ansah Antwi Freedom Party - 0.0 0.3 0.3 (DFP) + Kwesi Amoafo Independent Yeboah Candidate - 0.1 0.2 0.2 + Kwamena Adjei Reformed Patriotic - 0.0 0.1 0.1 Democrats + 139 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh (RPD) Thomas Ward Democratic Brew People‘s Party - 0.0 0.1 0.1 + This is an estimate of the PVT in comparison with the certified results for the first round of polls on December 7, 2008. Source: CODEO, 2008 Report. Candidate Party Margin of Error PVT Estimates Final or in Percentage Certified Results (- +) (%) declared by the EC in Percentage (%) Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo- New Patriotic - 1.7 49.81 49.77 Addo Party (NPP) + John Evans Atta Mills National - 1.7 50.19 50.23 Democratic + Congress (NDC) The PVT estimates for the second run of the presidential elections December 28, 2008. Source: CODEO 2008 Report. Results of 2012 Elections in Ghana Candidate Party Margin of Error PVT Estimates Final Results by in Percent (%) the EC in (- +) Percentage (%) John Dramani National Mahama Democratic 1.33 51.38 50.70 Congress (NDC) Nana Addo New Patriotic Dankwa Akufo- 140 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Addo Party (NPP) 1.35 47.17 47.74 Paa Kwesi Progressive Ndoum Peoples Party 0.04 0.53 0.59 (PPP) Henry Herbert Great Lartey Consolidated 0.02 0.34 0.35 Peoples Party (GCPP) Ayariga Hassan Peoples National Convention 0.03 0.18 0.22 (PNC) Michael Abu Convention Sakara Forster Peoples Party 0.02 0.18 0.18 (CPP) Jacob Osei Independent Yeboah Candidate 0.02 0.13 0.14 Akawsi Addai United Front Odike Party 0.01 0.08 0.08 (UFP) Source: CODEO, 2013. 2016 Results in comparison with the PVT Estimates Candidate Party Margin of Error PVT Estimates Official Results in Percentage in Percentage Declared by the EC in (- +) (%) Percentage (%) Nana Addo New Patriotic Dankwa Akufo- Party 1.29 53.75 53.85 Addo NPP 141 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh John Dramani National Mahama Democratic 1.25 44.32 44.40 Congress NDC Paa Kwesi Progressive 0.16 1.07 1.00 Ndoum Peoples Party PPP Ivor Kobina Convention 0.04 0.27 0.24 Greenstreet Peoples Party CPP Edward Nasigre Peoples National 0.10 0.26 0.21 Mahama Convention PNC Nana Konadu National 0.04 0.18 0.16 Agyeman Democratic Party NDP Jacob Osei Independent 0.03 0.15 0.15 Yeboah Candidate Source: CODEO, 2016. The PVT by CODEO has served as a mechanism to verify the accuracy of final results as declared by the EC. From the PVT results, the final results declared by EC reflect the actual winners or losers in the electoral contest of 2008, 2012 and the 2016 elections. Despite this empirical work by CODEO, the two main political parties dispute the results and figures produced by the EC and often both parties claim victory simultaneously. According to the Administrator of CODEO secretariat: 142 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh From my experience as EC official and now as coordinator of CODEO, the accuracy of final results declared by the EC cannot be questioned. We have used the PVT since 2008, 2012 and 2016 elections to verify results. When the political party officials unnecessarily shout about EC stealing results, I find those statements as a deliberate sabotage of the hard work of the people in the EC. Have you asked yourself why parties after finally accepting the results fail to call on the EC to undertake investigation into their claims of vote fraud. In 2012, during the election petition, the winning party quoted our figures to defend the accuracy of the results as declared by the EC. During the 2016 Elections, in one of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee meetings, the Chairperson of the EC made it known to all political parties that if there was any interruption in results transmission, she was going to rely on CODEO PVT to declare provisional results. (Field Interview, April 2017) The above indicates some level of a healthy collaboration between CODEO and the EC; however, one interviewee, a senior staff of CODEO, shares a different perspective and shows that institutional rivalry exists between CODEO and the EC. The new chairperson during the 2016 elections, made some serious allegations against us here at CODEO. She described as a group of former EC officials in CSOs who have ganged up against her. This was when we asked her to adhere to strict procedures agreed by the Commission and not resort to unilateral decisions. In the past some EC officials at the District level drove away CODEO Observers and denied access to tallying centres. (Field Interview, July 2017) Another scenario or moment when the EC had to rely on CODEO and other CSOs to deal with contentions over the election was in 2015, a period for preparation towards the 2016 143 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh elections. According to a Senior Research Officer at the Electoral Commission, CSOs have helped the EC in its work over the period. In his views; I don‘t know about other African countries but here in Ghana, we in the EC cannot function and operate smoothly without the needed support of CSOs. In many instances that EC and political parties have adopted entrenched positions on an electoral issue, we had to use CSO platforms for dialogue and mediate for an acceptable outcome. In preparation for the 2016 elections, the opposition wanted a new register at a time we consider not feasible, several IPAC meetings were held but no success until the EC put together a Panel of Independent Eminent People from CSOs to take views from all citizens including the political parties about the voters‘ register. This committee was chaired by Justice VCRAC Crabbe who is also the Board Chair of CODEO. We relied on CSOs to massage or cool down the electoral temperature for our operations as a Commission. One of our biggest challenges is suspicion real or imagined among party leaders and supporters especially the opposition. CSOs bring about the needed transparency on our work and help boost public confidence…... Electoral business is public business and calls for transparency. (Field Interview, July 2017). Despite the level of transparency that characterized the work of the EC and the vibrant involvement of CSOs, the allegations of vote fraud, adoption of vote rigging tactics remain a feature of the electoral process in Ghana without the needed evidence. In the 2008 EU Observer report on Ghana‘s elections, the EU alleged vote fraud and rigging in some constituencies in the Ashanti and the Volta regions during the run-off (EU EOM,2009). They based their conclusions on what they described as ‗dramatic increase‘ in voter turn-out in the run off in some constituencies, the pre-election controversy over the voters‘ register and by extension suspected the political parties of deploying the vote rigging machinery (EU EOM, 144 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2009; Jockers et al, 2009). This unconfirmed rumors and allegations contained in the EU report received further legitimacy when Abdulai and Crawford (2010) referred to them as part of systemic challenges that makes it almost ‗premature for any analyst to conclude that Ghana‘s democracy is consolidated‘. What these scholars missed out is the question of whether ‗dramatic‘ higher turnouts in run-offs necessarily reflect vote fraud and vote rigging? Do these not bother on deviant voter behaviour and require further interrogation for alternative explanations? On the issue of ‗bloated voter register‘ was it not the case that the authors were persuaded by the fraudulent political elite sensationalism and emotive language in the media? The false interpretation of these unique phenomena has been demonstrated in the extract below: In the first round of the elections people felt aggrieved and didn‘t vote with the mind that they were punishing the leaders of the party they love and support. Sometimes we beg them to vote, and they tell us in the face what have you guys done for us. However, when there is a run-off and they see the possibility of their rival group capturing state power, they step out massively to vote to avoid it but sometimes this remedy is too late. This behavior accounts sometimes for the higher turnout that we see during run-offs in Ghana. (Extract from Focus Group Discussion, 2017) Similarly, this interviewee, a political party activist of the NDC, provided some explanations that support the above illustration; In the second round of elections, some people who didn‘t believe we can win the election decided not to waste their time by being in a long queue to vote. After the first-round shows Prof. Mills can win, they became motivated to be part of the victory by voting in the run-off. We appealed to them, we campaigned the more and we get them out to vote with our message. (Field Interview August 2017). 145 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh In an affirmation of the point raised about the voter behaviour in second round of elections, an NPP activist has this to say: I do not discount vote buying and other malpractices in our elections, but we need to deeply explore the issue of voter turnout during run-offs. It goes beyond the malpractices that the two main parties are usually accused of. Some people simply turn out in their numbers to vote when there is a run-off particularly when they were not able to vote in the first round of elections (Field Interview, August 2017) 5.5 THE NATURE AND PROCESSES OF INTERACTION THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE CSOS AND THE STATE IN ELECTORAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION Within the Ghanaian context, CSOs are avenues of institutional platform to gain legitimacy to persuade public opinion. CSO activities are signs of an active citizen engagement and a strong indication of an entrenched political culture. Gyimah-Boadi (2004) observes that CSOs have been working towards enhancing Ghana‘s democratic processes since the inception of the fourth republic. Electoral violence prevention requires the involvement of many stakeholders and CSOs have developed relations with other civic state actors, the security sector, electoral commission and the judiciary. These institutions work towards ensuring peaceful elections and an outcome that is acceptable to competing political parties and their candidates. The critical nature of their role suggests that these non- partisan political elite classes will deal with each other based on trust and confidence. Among the stakeholders, there is a fundamental recognition for the role of each other and the emphasis on the need to work towards synergy and harmony of action. However, the relations are characterized by cooperation and contestation in many instances. Though this phenomenon may not pose any immediate short-term disaster, it suggests clouds of uncertainty in the long term, especially in instances that their work or results on elections are markedly different from each other and 146 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh that of the electoral commission. The chaos anticipated under this situation could be explosive and undermine the integrity of elections in the country. In our work, we invite state institutions and other CSOs to participate in our public events. In developing our 2016 flashpoints for early warning purposes, we organized a validation workshop that involved the security especially the police, electoral commission staff, NCCE, people from academia. The workshop helped to receive information from other actors on the field and make the necessary amendments in our programs and activities. We do not necessarily involve others in our program design and project concepts, if we do, what then will be our unique identity and brand as a CSO? The involvement takes place when we need to engage the broader public and to let people know what we are doing. (Interview August 2017). Another CSO Senior Staff and Research Fellow, point to a relation that is built on reward and payment. The partnership is driven by service and payment as rewards for the staff of other state institutions. The service and monetary relations seem risky and does not help in building institutionalized relations based on clear set of principles, memorandum of understanding, mutual respect and cordiality. Another challenge with the money-reward and service relations is that it deepens suspicion in a manner that erodes trust; state civic organizations may begin to exhibit some level of distrust on grounds of perceived cheating and exploitation. In instances where the state civic organizations can mobilize the required resources for their activities, the temptation of not valuing the relations with the CSOs become very high. This token-approach towards the relation with the state organizations bothers on sustainability of the partnership. The NCCE has offices in all districts in the country, when we are going to any district or region for a program, its only prudent we rely on their staff and logistics to 147 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh mobilize people to participate and in return we also pay them for their services. This we have done during the organization of the presidential debates since its inception. The amount they are paid is determined by us, this is also dictated by our budget for the program and usually they accept what we offer for their time and services, this is an additional income, so you should expect people to take it especially when they are poorly paid by their employer and sometimes experience delay in the payment of salaries. (Interview, August 2017) This portrays a fundamental flaw in the relation due to lack of sufficient mechanisms to institutionalize the relations beyond the individual beneficiaries or staff of the NCCE. Potentially, the relation is open to chaos in circumstances where the NCCE can mobilize the needed resources for their programs. The idea of not involving them in determining fees and payment procedures gives an impression of exploitation of the NCCE staff by the CSOs. The CSOs are unwilling to disclose how much is usually budgeted for during project proposal to donors and the actual amount they have allocated or paid to NCCE staff and the staff of other state agencies they engage. Some of the CSOs think they are the most knowledgeable and smartest people around. They propose high figures to donors for funding yet pay us poorly for our services and collaboration. They treat their own staff doing the same work with us differently. I don‘t think they pay us what exactly they quote in their budget to donors. I have been to a number of workshops where some of the participants receive more money than others not because of their distance back home but because they are the staff of the CSO organizing the event, and some people too on their perceived importance. (Field interview, August 2017). 148 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Suspicion remains one of the features that characterized the relations between the CSOs and the state institutions in electoral violence prevention. This suspicion is driven by money matters where there is very little transparency and the staffs of state institutions feel cheated and aggrieved over how much money these CSOs are making. This claim has been supported by CSO leaders in the excerpts below; I worked with the EC for over 22 years before joining CODEO. From my experience, EC officials feel the money given to CODEO for election work should have been given to them. They think we make money in the name of election work and because they are mandated to organize elections all such monies must be given to them. This is where our problems begin. This sometimes creates a clear case of misunderstanding between us and the state agencies and institutions. One embarrassing episode was the clash between our officers and the staff of the NCCE in some constituencies over who owns the parliamentary debate process. NCCE staff in some districts and constituencies attack us for not giving them enough and on our publicity, materials not having enough space for advertisement for the NCCE. They fight us with the suspicion that we leverage on their community experience to get people to patronize our programs. (Field Interview, August 2017) We approached CHRAJ and a couple of institutions to be part of our network for our 2016 election activities. The first experience was that, the staff kept asking how much we were going to pay them; you find that they are in a hurry to know the money involved and their personal benefits in the program. There is no mechanism for part of the money to be paid directly to the institution. (Field Interview, August 2017). A key strategy employed by CSOs in their relations is advocacy. This advocacy has taken several forms. This includes an open condemnation of acts and omissions considered to be 149 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh dangerous to the security and stability of the state, mounting sustained pressure for relevant state institutions to act. Another form of advocacy has also been where expert knowledge and best of ideas are exchanged with state actors and other relevant stakeholders to ensure the desire systemic change. In the operations of the selected CSOs two main strategies are employed in their advocacy, namely, soft advocacy approaches and hard advocacy approaches. In employing soft advocacy approaches, CSOs rely on their research, knowledge and evidence to make persuasive suggestions for action. This takes the form of proposals for a broader national debate, exchange of memos among actors and high-level meetings among the most relevant personalities for cross fertilization of ideas to set an agenda for open media discussions to persuade public opinion. Hard advocacy approaches as indicated relies on the use of open condemnation, the principle of naming and shaming. The choice of an approach affects the kind of relations that exist between the state institutions and the CSOs in electoral violence prevention. An interview with Director of a CSO reveals: We usually use our nationwide early warning system based in the ten regions of Ghana to produce monthly reports and make this public and give direct copies to the election security task force and other relevant security agencies in the country. We give them copies to ensure they have first-hand information on what is happening on the ground based on our work. Our expectation has always been that after receiving these kinds of briefings the needed security arrangements are made to avert any potential outbreak of violence. If after all these engagements, there is an outbreak of violence we see it as lack of proactive action on the part of the security. At this point, we are expected to openly criticize and strongly condemn the people who failed to act. We know they are not very happy with our condemnation and harsh criticisms, but this is our work, we do it without fear or favor. We praised when necessary and we 150 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh criticized in the strongest of terms when it matters most. (Field Interview August 2017) These interviewees put the relations in a more nuanced perspective and highlighted episodes that result in low moments in the relations. CSOs and state institutions intensely interact in their quest to prevent electoral violence despite the recognition for stand-alone CSOs initiatives. In stand-alone activities such as public advocacy, the interaction becomes indirect as targets of these advocacies are state institutions or persons within the state agencies. The extract below is an interview with a former member of the National Election Security Task Force: My problem with some of the CSOs is that during elections many of them want to be seen doing the best peace work, I don‘t know if that is a desire to please donors and make more money. They sometimes do not necessarily understand how the police and the security operate in very difficult political circumstances. They only step out there and attack us for not acting but we do act. Sometimes we are completely overwhelmed by the situation at hand, the political interest involved in so huge that you are in a dilemma over what should be the best approach and option out of the situation. Then what you hear on the radio and TV is some unappreciative CSOs violently attacking the integrity of the very institution that is supposed to work. Don‘t forget we are humans and we have feelings like them and choosing to be in the uniform is a very difficult task. When they are sleeping and enjoying luxury we are in the night in some of the remotest places of this country to keep the peace. (Field Interview August 2017). Another member of the 2016 National Election Security Task Force explains his experience with the CSOs: 151 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Yes, their work is to hold us accountable and may be part of the accountability strategy is to openly criticize us. That is fine, and I have no problem with that, but you should know that some issues are better handled indoors, they have access to us so why go to the media? They pride themselves as very knowledgeable and with the technical know-how on what must be done but I think sometimes they fail to exercise best of judgement, maturity and discretion. (Field Interview August 2017). The interviewee above seems to be comfortable with soft advocacy strategies and believe this will enhance the relations rather than the hard advocacy strategies that can result in conflicts and personality attacks. One of the Directors of the NCCE in an interview reveals that, These CSOs run to us in the name of partnership for civic education, we willingly agree to partner them, yet they are the first to attack the NCCE. We expect them to know our challenges and rather be part of advocacy that makes government release funds to us on time. We have never seen any of the CSOs claiming to be our partners fighting for us, all they do is to criticize us for not doing our work. How do you work when the tools you need are not in your hands? I hold the view that they criticize us sometimes just to be seen by the public as doing their work. (Field Interview August 2017). For instance, the IEA using its media network insisted the NCCE has low capacity to be able to manage and organize presidential debates. The Executive Director of IEA, argues that the NCCE has not been tried and tested and has no record of credibility to provide an independent platform (Allotey, 2016). In what appears to be a direct response to the IEA, a Deputy Commissioner of the NCCE resorted to another media platform to express 152 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh displeasure about the IEA. He says ‗I am shocked the IEA can use such words against the NCCE, what exactly does she mean that we lack credibility and capacity? Can she have a reflection on what is the NCCE mandate? The issues raised by her against the NCCE are ridiculous‘ (Allotey, 2016). A Deputy Chair of the Electoral Commission brings insight into EC-CSOs relations and explains the lack of solidarity from the CSOs especially in the context of 2016 elections: I recall that CDD conducted a research on the EC ahead of the 2016 elections, at a time when all odds were against the commission. Their research shows that the commission exercises a significant level of independence in its work and that we will organize and deliver credible polls. I only saw a mild press release without any strategic effort to sustain the findings of the research in the public domain. There was no official person in the CDD-CODEO who was made to create extensive awareness on this positive view about us yet look at how they were all loud about the commission just few months ago demanding for the resignation of some commissioners. They found it useful to widely circulate their pre-election survey that paints a bad picture about us. (Field Interview, August 2017). The CDD Pre-election survey was a subject of public debate especially because of the findings that 50% of Ghanaians believe the EC is compromised and could declare wrong results. The same CDD research work revealed respondents support for electoral violence (CDD, 2016). In a related development, the CDD issued press statement to condemn the EC over what they describe as ‗unfair and abuse of administrative justice‘ (CDD, 2016). An attempt to further disqualify some candidates from contesting the elections despite the Supreme Court ruling, asking EC to allow the candidates to correct the errors on their forms was considered a move to collapse the ‗democratic experiment and create a constitutional 153 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh chaos‘ (CDD, 2016). The language of the text is strong and sometimes misinterpreted by the public and this contributes to negatively affecting the image of the EC. The above issues raised clearly illustrate a deep level of grievances in the relations between the CSOs and the state institutions. At best the relations can be explained as extending friendship to unavoidable adversary. This makes each partner suspicious and cautious in any partnership or operations. 154 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER SIX EXAMINING THE STRATEGIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN ENSURING POLITICAL ACTORS’ PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESSES, INITIATIVES AND THE QUESTION OF LOSERS’ CONSENT IN GHANA 6.0 INTRODUCTION This chapter deals with the analysis of the following objectives: to identify strategies employed by CSOs to get political actors accepts peace processes and initiatives; and to explain how CSOs account for losers‘ consent in the context of Ghana. Based on the theoretical frameworks guiding the study; which are, institutionalism and elite consensus, the analysis highlights elite role and establishes a strong inference that political elite behaviour plays a crucial role in the stability of a democracy, especially in the context of electoral democracy. Political elites are diffused in all segments of the society. They exercise a lot of influences that may be religious, cultural, social, economic and political. Their mobilizing power and the resources they control place them in the unique role of winning support for or against democracy. The elites also foster strategic contacts and communications with non- elites that reinforces the dominance and the substantial influence they wield. Precocious as they may be, elites are fundamentally, the embodiment of social values placing in them both sociological and political salience. 6.1 CSOs AND POLITICAL ELITES IN PEACE PROCESSES AND INITIATIVES 6.1.1 The use of coalitions The selected CSOs for the study have created several coalitions, forums or platforms for harnessing their collective strength and minimizing individual institutional weaknesses in 155 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh engaging the state. These coalitions are in themselves a mechanism for mobilizing like- minded elites towards a goal that overlaps with the function of the state. Violence prevention during elections remains a top priority for the Ghanaian state. Civic action at elite level to support electoral violence prevention overlaps with the state‘s interest of ensuring national security, public order and stability. The coalitions are means of shaping public opinion, demonstrating acceptability and overall, exercise an overwhelming convening power that attracts political actors. Using coalitions to persuade political actors for peaceful elections can be useful especially in contexts where coalition members truly represent various segment of the population. The caution is that, coalitions are likely to fail to achieve their goals if they are sectarian, partisan and not inclusive of the broader population of the society. In the case of IDEG-Civic Forum Initiative, a coalition that was built in the heat of the 2008 elections included faith- based organizations, professional unions, and student associations, traditional leaders whose members span across various political and ethnic divisions in Ghana. Though the use of coalitions is desirable, a critical reflection on the Ghanaian situation reveals how the selected CSOs for the study have strategically used ‗coalition formation‘ as a means of elite congregation to reconcile ideational and threatening differences among political actors. The unintended consequence is that, these CSOs exercises dominance and takes significant credit for the outcomes of initiatives. This development has implications for synergy among the partner organizations. The members of the coalition had credibility that also shaped their acceptance by the main political actors in the elections. Below is an interview with a leading Convener of the Civic Forum Initiative (CFI): Our coalition knew who had won the 2008 elections even ahead of the official declaration by the Electoral Commission. Some of our coalition members equally 156 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh belong to other platforms and CSO networks that enable us to share information about the results. When the two main parties begin to claim victory at the same time, we usually know who won and who is also saving face and attempting to reduce the effect of electoral disappointment at the general elections. For the public this is a source of panic and fear especially in our polarized political environment. But for us at IDEG-CFI, we use the opportunity to reach out to the winners and losers‘ to be circumspect and allow the EC to do its work until results are officially declared. Using the coalition approach allows us to share data from the field, compare it to other sources for verification. The coalition makes us stronger, our messages and facts become believable and ultimately accepted by the political parties through dialogue. The use of believable evidence, dialogue and persuasion form the cornerstone of our strategies to get the political elites to accept our call for peace. (Field Interview, March 2017) From the above interview, the coalition represents a unified force within the polarized political environment in Ghana. This explains the fact that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are sensitive to the political context they operate in and seek to modify, adjust and adapt to local realities. In the Ghanaian context, coalition of CSOs are more likely to get or win-over politicians towards peace processes and initiatives as evidenced in the organization of the Kumasi Accord during the 2012 general elections. The 2012 Peace Summit was led by the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) and the National Peace Council (NPC). The Institute of Democratic Governance–National Peace Council (IDEG-NPC) initiative, were irresistible and political parties risk a huge backlash if they should ignore such platforms that are national in character and inclusive of all relevant actors or stakeholders in the country. Though the use of coalitions must be encouraged, it presents the challenge of credit taking. 157 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The question of who takes the final credit for work done remain unresolved and can create serious challenges for future collaborative work among the network members. According to a Senior Fellow at IDEG, After the successful organization of the Kumasi Declaration in 2012 by IDEG and the National Peace Council, some donors (UNDP) decided to take credit without due recognition for IDEG and its partners as those who initiated the idea. What we saw in 2016 elections was an attempt by a major donor to hijack the process of organizing the Peace Accord and literally forcing the Peace Council to buy into their nefarious operations by side-stepping IDEG in the process. Rev. Professor Emmanuel Asante, Chair of the Peace Council was honest and sincere with the donor and said without IDEG, they are unable to put together a successful program, IDEG must be part of this arrangement for the program to be successful. The Peace Accord in 2012 was inclusive and well attended due to the maneuverings of IDEG. We risk all the embarrassment if we decide to steal their concept and make it our own and publicly deny them their rightful place. This will be immoral and unacceptable. (Field Interview, March 2017). The National Coordinator of the Coalition for Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) further elaborates the unresolved question of credit taking. CODEO has had its share of fight over who takes credit for collaborative works, initiatives and peace interventions. In most instances, we take steps to avoid any public notice of these conflicts and differences. We lost it with the National Commission of Civic Education (NCCE) in the 2016 elections. Our officials fail to communicate properly and that annoyed one of the directors of the NCCE in the Weija-Gbawe District and she brought an ongoing program to an end in the full glare 158 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh of political party representatives, media, and community leaders. The problem started with why NCCE as a partner organization was not recognized and acknowledged on the program banner and the brochure distributed to participants. (Field Interview, May, 2017) The Chairman of the National Peace Council, provides further proof to the claim of donor interference: Yes in 2016 elections, a major donor, the UNDP approached us to replicate the 2012 Peace Accord. But we made it clear to them that the concept was original to IDEG and it will be wrong to enter into any partnerships without the involvement of IDEG. We had some initial challenges, but this was resolved through further dialogue on the matter and finally the donor accepted that IDEG be brought into the negotiations on how the Peace Accord can be organized during the 2016 elections. (Field Interview, May 2017) The above situation reaffirms Jarstad and Belloni‘s (2012) view that when local and international peace-building actors meet, they are constantly in a situation of bargaining over interests, norms, organizational practices and visibility. The bargain could be characterized by frictions that are manageable or sometimes at levels that result in unexpected outcomes. The interference in the coalition by the donor created some problems for the 2016 event. The entire program was delayed and not well advertised as compared to the 2012 event. The timing of the event became problematic as the organizers had difficulties in getting the needed support and cooperation from the Asanteman Council, specifically, the Office of the Asantehene Otumfour Osei Tutu II. According to a Senior Research Fellow of IDEG, 159 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh I didn‘t know we would have challenges dealing with Otumfour in 2016. He was very supportive in the 2012 Kumasi declaration and so we had agreed to take the 2016 event to KNUST, Kumasi. We have direct access to him; however, he was no longer picking our calls, his office not responding to our letters and the liaison officer we had in the Asanteman Council keeps telling us the King has been very busy. At a point we were told we could meet him to discuss the event when he is back from a trip to South Africa. He came back, and we could not meet him despite several efforts. We later realized that some divisional chiefs who were close to the NPP were influencing him not to be part of the event. Some of these chiefs accused him of helping the NDC in the 2012 elections. The several attacks and insults on him were some of the reasons he was unwilling to support the event in 2016. We could not have the program in Kumasi without the participation of the Asantehene so we later changed the venue to University of Ghana, Legon. We had problems with candidates because some were already on the field campaigning for votes, but we finally managed to get them to attend, for the small parties we had to pay them, buy domestic air tickets for them to show up at the program (Field Interview, May 2017). The coalition becomes what I refer to us the platform of experts, elites and group of influencers that set the national agenda for violence prevention. Despite the changes faced by the coalition, they regulate and moderate political grievances that could impact the overall stability of the nation. The coalitions are usually based on shared norms of the member organizations and the use of service and payment options. This suggests that while some organizations are attracted to the coalitions as a way of fulfilling their mission and vision, others also consider the substantial material rewards or payments that accrue to them. The coalitions are fostered by a major CSO who then extends invitations to as many other 160 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh institutions or organizations as possible for membership. The concept notes and the main vision of the coalition are communicated to the invited organizations. The selected CSOs for the study have coalitions whose membership overlaps but are unwilling to participate in the coalition of other CSOs. For instance, the Institute of Economic Affairs is not part of the Civic Forum Initiative. For the 2016 elections, both the CDD-CODEO and IDEG jointly participated in the deployment of election observers. The coalition when formed is never formally dissolved and takes on a live of their own but under the guidance of a convener. They, therefore, constitute some enduring relations for future work. This means, the network of coalitions is formed on an ad-hoc basis to respond to an issue but often exhibit features of permanence. 6.1.2 Personal contacts and friends in the various political parties CSOs in Ghana have had personal friends and contacts in the various political parties, especially the four main parties with a record of parliamentary seats since the start of the fourth republic. The parties include the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the Peoples National Convention (PNC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). These contacts have been created over a long period of CSO- Political party engagement. These engagements take the form of workshops, training programs, policy dialogues, public lectures that are attended by party leaders and functionaries. For example, the Institute of Economic Affairs-Ghana Political Parties Program is one platform that such personal contacts and friendships are developed. All the selected CSOs have their events attended by the main political parties despite occasional boycotts associated with the IEA programs. During moments of electoral tensions, CSOs make good use of the contacts they have in the political parties and directly hold talks with the needed stakeholders within the 161 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh party. These talks are done on phone or sometimes face-to-face meetings that are not disclosed to the public or the media. These behind the scenes talks and negotiations shape and influence the overall behaviour of the political parties in accepting to keep the peace of the nation above all considerations. The board members of the selected CSOs play an important role in this regard. Due to their social standing and enviable reputation, they have access to key political figures and can speak to influence them towards the path of peace. This does not necessarily mean political parties are simply out there to cause chaos or violence but the nature of electoral contests in Ghana, where the winner takes all have heightened tension and raised public fear and anxiety during all elections since 1992, have called for this. Political parties especially the two main parties; NDC and NPP usually have a section in their manifesto that talks about the peace and security of the state. At least from this angle of reflection, the parties openly demonstrate their support for ensuring the peace of the nation. The challenge is when electoral defeats create general political insecurity and vulnerability among the population. Some individual members of the two main political parties have formed militant political wings known as vigilante groups. According to a leading convener of the Civic Forum Initiative: Political parties and their functionaries are our strategic partners. We have no choice but to deal with them at all levels. The engagement is not only during elections or election years; the work we do means that we need to build bridges ahead of the rainy day. Key persons in the various political parties are our friends and people we discuss pertinent national issues with. I personally know the moderates and the hardliners in the two main parties. Depending on the nature of the issue, we know those to reach out to and get compliance. In 2012, we got some moderates to openly 162 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh express their disagreement over the party‘s decision to challenge the electoral results in Court (Field Interview May 2017). 6.1.3 Third party influence – the use of eminent Ghanaians The use of eminent and distinguished Ghanaians to speak to leaders of the various political parties throughout the electoral cycle has helped influence political actors to either show up at events aimed at violence prevention or to further commit to peace by using dialogue or peaceful means to seek redress over electoral grievances. Since the 2008 elections, CSOs have made good use of the expertise of the former UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan and the Asantehene Otumfour Osei Tutu II. According to the Chair of the National Peace Council: Mr. Annan had to intervene to persuade some political party leaders to show up at the 2016 Peace Accord event held at the University of Ghana. Some political parties were not willing to participate but we had to rely on eminent Ghanaians to get them. IDEG has been doing well in mobilizing the party leaders but during the 2016 elections they had some challenges and we had to fall on Mr. Annan, and Dr. Ibn Chambas. I think 2016 was not a very good year for CSOs. Remember the IEA also had a similar challenge in getting some political party leaders to accept their presidential debate platform? (Field Interview, May 2017). The use of these persons as crisis managers during moments of electoral tension and disputes over contentious elections are best for the short-term but with long-term implications. The eminent persons usually prioritize peace over electoral integrity; electoral justice and this may explode when hot-headed desperate candidates emerge. Their role, though very useful in such critical times, appears to be creating a scenario of wound dressing without the needed 163 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh healing leading to a situation of negative peace. Meaning that, the immediate short-term goal of peace may end up creating long-term electoral grievances that may ultimately undermine sustainable peace and electoral violence prevention in Ghana. Also, the willingness of the political elites to accept the platforms of CSOs for dialogue and mediation gives an indication of the presence of political elites with a democratic attitude who are prepared to play their electoral politics within certain established rules and processes. To a large extent, this amounts to the exhibition of some form of political discipline because of democratic norm diffusion through the activities of CSOs. 6.1.4 Party Structures and Hierarchy CSO programs and activities are carried out throughout the country and not limited to the capital, Accra. Some programs or events are targeted towards specific constituencies in regions outside of Greater Accra. National party leaders are not necessarily required to attend these events but to help in coordinating their local party activists to participate. These local contacts are sometimes secured through the party structures and the hierarchy in Accra. The political parties are centrally controlled and managed from the various headquarters in Accra. The main political parties in Ghana are administered through four layers; the first layer is the national secretariat presided over by the national executives, the second layer is the regional secretariat led by the regional executives, the third layer is the constituency secretariat and the fourth layer is the branch or polling station executives. There is a strong sense of party discipline, where directives of the party are determined by the national executive committee and implemented by all organs or layers of the party structure across the country. To this extent, the local party activists are more likely to attend a CSO program knowing that the program has the endorsement of his or her party. Using party structures and the top hierarchy requires the CSOs sending official letter to the National Headquarters of the party and obtain 164 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh a reply that will facilitate the attendance of regional, constituency and local activists. The programs target local political party elites with enormous social, political and cultural influences in the constituencies. According to a Senior Program Director at the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Our peace initiatives are not limited to Accra only; we try to cover all volatile and contentious areas during the election cycle. Obtaining a local attendance require that we inform their national leaders in Accra who will inform their base to attend or give us a sort of consent to engage their members in our operational areas. We sometimes, depending on on……. the budget for the program, pay some key participants including the political party actors. We usually do not disclose payments and how much goes to the key participants. The essence here is that we get these political actors socialized in peace programs and events (Field Interview, August 2017) The engagement with local elites is in recognition of how instigators and perpetrators of violence are diffused which calls for transfer of norms of violence prevention to the local communities. These local elites are community leaders whose social standing makes them ideal to provide immediate leadership in potential electoral crisis situations. 6.1.5 Collaboration with International Partners and Donors Electoral violence prevention has become a key element of the international electoral assistance programs of development partners, donors and other international institutions whose core values are embedded in supporting fledgling democracies. CSOs in Ghana have developed partnership with foreign Missions, Embassies, UN Agencies and other international institutions. This makes them strong for financing of their programs and activities towards election violence prevention. The selected CSOs have a strong relationship 165 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh with the donor community in Ghana and are also the organizations that receive the highest amount of grants for democracy related projects. During their public events and behind the scene negotiations, these CSOs make good use of their partners believing that they constitute a source of strength that consolidate their convening powers. These partners form an integral part of the activities of the CSOs and rely on the evidence-based strategy of the CSOs to confer international legitimacy on the electoral processes and the outcome. This means apart from funding, donors attend events that bring the political class or elites together. According to a Senior Research Fellow with IDEG: Our work relies heavily on funding from the donor community. They therefore constitute a major pillar around the work we do. For instance, in 2012 Peace Summit in Kumasi, we ensured that the donor community and the diplomatic community were highly represented. They were made to witness the signing of the peace accord by the various candidates and deliver solidarity messages. In 2016 elections for instance, we decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the Head of the United Nations Office for the Sahel and West Africa, should speak at the event on behalf of the diplomatic community. Their presence adds a lot of legitimacy to our platforms and makes it attractive to the political elites. In extending invitations to the political party leaders, we sometimes indicate to them those members of the diplomatic and the donor community who are attending the programs. After the public events, the CSOs and their partners further engage the key political party leaders, candidates in various discussions that commit the main players in the election to peace and non-violence approach in seeking electoral redress (Interview, July 2017). In the words of the National Coordinator of CODEO, he elaborates further that: 166 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh We know our communities across the country and understand the socio-political dynamics, donors and the international community may have to limit their role to funding and supporting local capacity in electoral violence prevention. They still set the agenda because we may have to depend on their funding. These days we face a lot of funding issues, especially delays in the release of grants. The international community usually visits us to know the amount of work CODEO is doing. They no longer sit far away from us and only rely on our official reports. In the last two elections, 2012, 2016, the EU Observer Mission visited our situation room, relied on our PVT for the accuracy of results declared by the EC. AU and ECOWAS officials also visited us and we made available to them our situation rooms in the ten regional capitals and briefed them on the early warning mechanisms developed to address election-related disputes (Interview, July 2017). The above statement points to the fact that the donor community remains pivotal in the peace-building processes and the quest to prevent election violence. The lack of local funding for peace initiatives and electoral integrity projects creates some uncertainty over the future of election violence prevention in Ghana, within the context of decline donor support. There is a seeming donor fatigue and competition for the resources to be invested in other countries or other areas. This threatens how coalitions can survive and may result in the end of their existence, especially in instances where coalitions are held together by material rewards and payments. The donor funding also questions the ownership of the peace processes. What appears to be refreshing is the declaration contained in the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance, where the participation of CSOs in electoral and governance processes has been enshrined. This gives pan-African legitimacy to the interventions by CSOs and the prospects of better relations between the CSO and the AU‘s 167 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit. The chapter five, six and seven of the Charter clearly provide the legal, policy and administrative regime for CSOs to continue to provide national mechanisms for election monitoring and observation (Elvy, 2013; AU, 2007). The selected CSOs in their election violence prevention strategies have given meaning to the Charter and contribute towards operationalizing chapter five, six and seven of the Charter. Creatively harnessing options for local funding may be the future towards election violence prevention in Ghana. 6.2 CSOs AND LOSERS’ CONSENT IN GHANA’S ELECTORAL POLITICS: TOWARDS POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE PREVENTION In electoral democracy, the proper functioning of the structures and political institutions largely depends on two main actors; the winners and the losers. Elections provide the institutional mechanisms by which legitimate winners or losers are declared with implications for overall democratic stability, democratic representation and public accountability (Moehler, 2009; Fjelde, & Höglund, 2016). Political actors who are institutionally declared winners or losers have choices to make that can enhance democracy or go against the democratic system (Lago & Coma, 2017). While this action may take place at any stage of the electoral process, empirical evidence supports the argument that the most crucial part of the decision-making process occurs at the post-election phase (Anderson et al, 2005). The post-election phase that usually include result tabulation and declaration appears to be the stage at which democracy in the developing world is on the edge of chaos and characterized with intense fear about the behaviour of the competing political parties, candidates, supporters or sympathizers and the state security (Przeworski, 1991). This puts significant role in the losing side to grant consequential legitimacy (losers‘ consent) by accepting the electoral process and its outcome and look forward to another chance in the future (Anderson & Mendes, 2006). Lindberg (2009), from a more robust perspective, argues that the electoral 168 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh process, specifically the post-election phase, provides an opportunity for change as well as challenges that must be resolved to sustain the democratic development. In the context of Ghana, the following factors have shaped the culture of losers‘ consent. 6.3 ADOPTING THE STRATEGY OF PEACE JOURNALISM BY CSO ACTORS In Ghana, CSOs have equally considered the post-election behaviour of political actors as a make or break for electoral democracy and they have employed several strategies to prevent any structural or functional altercations that undermine the democratic or political cohesion in the country. One of the first and foremost strategies employed by the CSOs has to do with peace journalism. The use of peace journalism prepares citizens and politicians in ways that make the democratic process self-enforcing. Peace journalism is usually the process by which IDEG-CFI, CODEO, WANEP, IEA, National Election Security Task Force and the National Peace Council organize regular press conferences to address the nation and remind all actors about their moral responsibility to protect the peace of the nation regardless of the outcome of the election results. The coalition also monitors the media landscape and adopts the name and shame principle on political parties, candidates and key individuals who resort to intemperate or inflammatory language that has the capacity to incite party supporters. For instance, during the results tabulation and declaration phase of the 2016 elections, the Chair of the Peace Council use the media to strongly register the displeasure of the peace council at the premature proclamation of victory by the opposition NPP and the counter claims of victory by the governing NDC. This inspired the head of the National Election Security Task Force (NESTF) to also use the media to caution individuals and political parties about behaviours that undermine national peace and security. The Chair of the National Peace Council reveals a greater insight into the peace journalism process: 169 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The Peace Council and its partners, the CSOs, NESTF and the Electoral Commission needed to take over the news and the media in general with timely public engagements and briefings that diffuse the rumours that are usually associated with the result tabulation and declaration. I remember close to 16 press conferences and media briefings by various stakeholders took place during the period of tabulation and announcement of the provisional results for the 2016 elections. We adopt this approach to bring about transparency and keep the citizens in the known of every step of the process. This prevents them from believing deliberate lies that are sometimes thrown out there by the political parties, their agents or supporters. The peace journalism approach helps us to shape and determine to a large extent the public opinion during this critical phase of the electoral process. We as a council sometimes prompt relevant stakeholders like the EC, the security services and the political parties to use the media to diffuse the tension and shame those whose conduct incite violence (Field Interview May 2017). The Peace Council and its partners make the headlines as critical newsmakers and watch out for those who will want to use the media to create confusion and tell lies for political gain. This approach of peace journalism reaffirms faith and confidence in the seminal works of Johan Galtung (2000, 2008, and 2013). This type of approach relies on truth telling by the elites and the conscious attempt to expose lies with propaganda value. It also requires a great deal of creativity that transforms and prevents violence. Galtung (2008) places this role in the hands of journalists but I argue that, this is an important political and moral project to be limited to journalists. The elites with the right information must speak in live broadcast without any expurgation from the journalists. This dimension to peace journalism allows for 170 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh uninterrupted process of truth telling in a manner that provides solution ahead of violence outbreak. The National Coordinator of CODEO emphasizes: Ours is to make sure the political parties serve as a watchdog on each other and provide an atmosphere that enhances our democratic values. We encourage their vigilance and point out to them their commitment to the peace of the nation. We rely on moderate politicians on both side of the political divide and ask them to provide leadership by calling for calm among their supporters as the EC works hard to declare provisional and ultimately final results for the presidential elections. The various press briefings also allay the fears of citizens and make them have confidence that the electoral process will be free and fair and the results will reflect their sovereign will. We lead the agenda on peace journalism and reminded citizens that Ghanaians have nowhere to run to in the event of large-scale violence and war. (Field Interview May 2017) 6.4 THE USE OF ELECTORAL REFORMS Apart from resorting to peace journalism as a measure to deal with the electoral atmosphere, citizen‘s perceptions and public opinion, the works of CSOs translate into actionable proposals for electoral reform. The inter-elite dialogue and mediation processes culminate into the demand for electoral reforms by major actors such as the political parties. The demand for reforms is the avenue to assuage and persuade the political actors into believing that the reforms are in their favour and may guarantee their victory in the next elections. The proactive nature of the CSOs intervention from the pre-election to the post-election phase allows them to make credible inputs for reforms that will enhance transparency and the integrity of the electoral process. The politics of electoral reform by both CSOs and the political parties help in making sure that the main actors have an avenue to express their 171 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh displeasure in ways that does not include using violence. The advocacy thus takes the form of structural and operational reforms. In the estimation of the Director of Research at the headquarters of the Electoral Commission of Ghana; All our elections have come with reforms at the end of the day. Election management is a very dynamic field, what the parties accept today become unacceptable tomorrow because they lost the last elections. Accepting to deal with their grievances and work towards reforms builds confidence and trust for future elections. For my stay here at the EC for such a long time, reforms have come from CSOs, political parties and the EC itself. Our willingness to accommodate these reforms and operationalize some of the proposals by CSOs has deepened trust for our work among the key stakeholders. For me the most contentious issue has always been around the voters register. Political parties especially the two major parties are always suspicious and so at the least given opportunity they go out there to make so much noise about things that can be resolved without the kind of sensationalism that we see. In 2016 elections for instance, we had to rely on a special committee to address the concerns of the political parties and this committee was made of CSO leaders and key persons. Note that the EC based on the recommendations of the Supreme Court in the 2012 election petition, constituted an electoral reform committee and this included CSO representation (Field Interview, August 2017) Electoral reforms hinge on innovations and ideas that must appeal to the main political actors or the stakeholders. This requires CSOs to have strategic ways of identifying reforms that will persuade actors not to resort to system-undermining practices. According to the National Coordinator of CODEO: 172 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh We ensure that disappointed losers do not undermine the system and resort to destructive ways that threaten the stable functioning of the democratic process. We demand evidence for the reasons by which they may not want to accept the outcome of the elections. In areas where the political parties have genuine grievances, we encourage the EC to swiftly respond to them. In some instances, we provide both short and long-term reforms that will prevent future occurrence (Field Interview, July 2017) The above demonstrates how electoral reform processes are by products of elite‘s consensus building and bargaining and sometimes disagreements. This reinforces the argument that elite acceptance of the electoral processes and outcomes provides more mass support. This confirms the assertion by Debrah (2015) that ‗electoral reforms are instigated‘ by political elites involving both losers and winners including civil society organizations. 6.5 THE ENTICEMENT OF A POSSIBLE WIN IN FUTURE ELECTIONS Closely related to the use of electoral reforms is the enticement of a possible win in future elections. This makes the cost of accepting the outcome far less than the cost of violent protests over a particular loss. Due to the extensive peace campaigns around elections, political parties have, over the years, also devoted their manifestos to peace, security and stability of the nation; for instance, the National Democratic Congress in their 2016 Manifesto, on page 3, presented a vision of ―A Peaceful and Prosperous Nation towards Industrialization and Transformation‖ (NDC-Manifesto, 2016). The New Patriotic Party (NPP) in their 2008 Manifesto, articulated that, the presidency of Mr Kufour has created ―an atmosphere of peace and stability which is the envy of the rest of Africa‖ (NPP Manifesto, 2008).The parties sometimes accuse each other of being violent and some actors go to demonstrate why a particular party should be voted against because they are not committed to 173 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh peace. This results in framing and reframing of violence as an electoral issue for the voter. In a typical fashion, leading political actors attack their opponents about who is the most violent and this generates intense public debate. The combine effect is that the general public is made very much aware and conscious of electoral violence as an unacceptable political behaviour that threatens collective human security of the nation. This critical elite voice on electoral violence complements the works of CSOs in Ghana. The excerpts below illustrate the framing and reframing among political elites and the two main political parties; The NPP has a record of being the most violent party in Ghana; Ghanaians must reject them in the upcoming December 2008 elections. Our peace is what we have as a nation, we in the NDC, ours is to ensure stability and national cohesion, our country is full of violence and hardship whenever the NPP is in office (Interview excerpt from ModernGhana.com, retrieved in July 2017). In a reframing scenario; It is very unfair to label the NPP as a violent party. When some people within the party go lawless and commit wrongdoing, we need to deal with them without bringing in the entire political party. We have condemned their actions and the law enforcers must do their work in investigating the violence and the wrongdoing (Interview excerpt from Ghanaweb, retrieved in July 2017) Acid bathing must have no place in Ghanaian politics. What is more surprising is that it was done on a fellow party man. Their violent record threatens our peace. The stabbing to death of a fellow party man is alien to the Ghanaian and should not be entertained in our body politics. In response, the NPP rejected the above claims by President Mahama and said the President was being dishonest and completely ignores the violence in his party the NDC (Interview excerpt from Myjoyonline.com, retrieved in July 2017) President Mahama has been describing the NPP as violent but what happened in the internal elections of the NDC makes the party the most violent political party in our history. The NDC must learn from the NPP how to conduct not just credible internal elections but how to be an epitome of peace and non-violent political party. Their elections in the entire ten regions was chaotic and full of violence incidences from Bawku to Ningo-Prampam (excerpts from a feature article from Modernghana.com, retrieved in August, 2017) 174 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The framing and reframing of electoral violence in this scenario are not only limited to the national elections but also the intra-party primaries and by-elections. Open condemnation, attacks and counterattacks for electoral violence appears to be entrenched in the political culture among the political elites, to the extent that, sometimes these elites demand from CSOs to be louder in condemning electoral violence. For example: Now the CSOs have abandoned their duty and their neutral outlook, their loud silence on the 2016 post-election violence in the country is worrying. They need to speak out and out rightly condemn what is happening, the violence across the country. They are the public and moral vanguards of our society. Their loud silence in this particular matter is worrying and undermines their social standing in the Ghanaian political stage. We are tempted to believe they are biased, hypocritical and engage in double standards (Excerpt of NDC press conference, retrieved in July, 2017) The central argument is that the two main political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), have an almost equal chance of winning future elections in Ghana and usually try to associate their rival with violence or being the perpetrator of violence. Being branded violent political party affects the image of the party with some perceived electoral consequences or advantage to the opponent. The idea of winning future elections is an important factor in influencing the decision of losing elites and political parties. The importance of winning future elections is demonstrated in the following excerpts: A former General Secretary of the NPP says: I concede that the CSOs play a crucial role in persuading us to accept the outcome of the elections particularly in 2008 and 2012. While admitting to their hard work of negotiations and persuasive messages, the ultimate decision to accept the outcome is our own decision. Sometimes you have a situation where our people on the ground call to insist we should not accept while others think that we should accept and prepare for the next elections. Those who call to say we should accept usually make 175 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the point that four years will soon come and we cannot afford to create a violence situation that will hurt the reputation of the party and its leaders. Our time will soon come; we shall return to power soon, no need to fight over what we have lost. (Field Interview, July 2017) A Deputy General Secretary of the NDC, states his opinion about the enticement of winning future elections: Why do you fight when you need to go prepare for the next elections; just know that Ghanaians are watching you and your party; your time will soon come, no party will rule this country for more than eight years; that is, for two terms. Yours is to accept the outcome now and forge ahead for the future opportunities. We in the NDC lost in 2000 elections and peacefully accepted the loss, we returned to power in 2009 after winning the 2008 elections. What has changed that we will not accept the 2016 defeat? We have set an enviable record and precedence for all parties to follow, the electoral contests are at the polling stations when you lose it there, massing up and misbehaving at Obra Spot in Circle cannot change the results. (Field Interview, July 2017) The above reflects some of the ways by which losers are made to accept the results of the elections and how the fears of the losers are managed. This means that there is a strong relationship between the expectation of winning future elections and letting go of the immediate electoral loss. The losers‘ consent has manifested in various forms namely; voluntary and non-voluntary acceptance. For the 2008 and the 2016 elections the consent of the loser was a political consent, a process by which the result as declared by the electoral commission is accepted without a legal or extra-legal protest. Interestingly, the 2012 presidential election witnessed street protests over the final results and a subsequent legal 176 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh challenge at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Ghana. The legal challenge was within the remit of the law and, also the Peace Accord that was signed in Kumasi. Politically, the Peace Accord imposed on all candidates to use peaceful means to seek redress over legitimate electoral grievances. The majority decision by the Supreme Court to validate the outcome of the 2012 presidential election was a source of non-voluntary acceptance. The speech of the Presidential candidate for the NPP just after the Supreme Court verdict evidently supports the claim of non-voluntary acceptance. Below is an excerpt from the speech delivered: The Supreme Court of our land has spoken, declaring that the 2012 presidential election has been validly won, by the candidate of the NDC. While I strongly disagree with the decision of the Court, I accept it, I accept it believing that we must not embark on the path that destroy but builds; we are accepting in the interest of the nation and will not be asking for judicial review. I am saddened by the verdict and many of our supporters are, even in our disappointment we, must accept the verdict of the court, the court brings finality to the electoral dispute. We have a chance to be a worthy opposition and prepare for the battle in the 2016 elections (Excerpts from the speech delivered by Candidate Nana Akufo-Addo in the aftermath of the 2012 election petition, retrieved in August 2017). Partially, the speech as delivered gives the impression of non-voluntary acceptance but more crucially, it also highlighted the phenomenon of elite consensus in frightening electoral situations. The speech also puts the losing party on the alert to watch out for the next elections, an indication that there is a good time ahead of the loss and the disappointment. The willingness of political actors to negotiate and move on in the interest of the nation is usually harnessed by the CSOs. The interview with serving Minister of State and Presidential Spokesperson shows how Ghanaian political elites are conscious of their ideational and threat consensus in defending democracy: If you believe in electoral politics as a cardinal pillar of our democratic society then you must equally be willing in some extreme or difficult circumstances to privilege the collective good over the personal loss or disappointment at the polls. Losing an election is bitter; it comes with fears that do not have any logic but political elites 177 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh must show their democratic credentials by learning to be great sportsmen through positive reactions to electoral defeats. At this stage of our democratic journey where CSOs and political actors have worked towards electoral transparency, I think refusing to accept results may have to be backed by some extraordinary electoral fraud or cheating that so visible. There is a cost in not accepting the results. Some people may judge your party as putting the country at risk as evidenced in our 2012 election petition. Others think that you are a bad loser that should not be given a chance at the polls. Only few minds saw our legal protest as a way of building a solid democratic institution. (Field Interview August 2017). There is a critical mass of elites and CSOs whose normative goal is to defend the tenets of democracy in Ghana. This helps the CSOs to mobilize for civic campaigns and put together a stronger resistance movement in the face of electoral violence either by the opposition political parties or the ruling government. This sometimes manifest in individuals taking on the role of peace ambassadors throughout the electoral cycle. The losers‘ consent has been situated in the political culture of ―accept and let the nation move on‖. However, some scholars have anticipated institutionalized constraints and the nature of popularity of the candidate to be the major influencing factor in the utilization of violence or accepting an electoral loss (Hafner-Burton et al, 2013; Fjelde, & Höglund, 2016). The empirical argument is that these two factors are insufficient to guarantee losers consent. This means constitutional constraints are likely to be manipulated by desperate losers who fear losing power to the opponents. The presence of credible CSOs who can exercise significant convening power in a manner that lead to elite congregation that minimizes the fears associated with electoral loss among political elites could be a major factor. This means that institutionalized constraints may have to be genuinely activated by principled democrats that 178 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh constitute the core of elite congregation that prevents or reduces political elite hostility and antagonism. Conclusion: This chapter has explored the strategic choices and operational manoeuvrings of CSOs in ensuring that they obtain the commitments of political elites for election violence prevention. The chapter has identified the use of coalitions or coalition formation by the CSOs, engagement with party structures & hierarchy, and the collaboration with donors and international partners, whose role no longer limited to funding for programs. The chapter finds that coalition of CSOs and their networks exercises significant convening power that political elites cannot ignore. Engaging moderates and principled democrats in the various political parties to commit to violence prevention, provides an opportunity to unite against election violence. This chapter also finds that international actors are integral elements to electoral violence prevention but with a decline in donor funding and almost zero local funding for CSO electoral integrity projects, the future of electoral violence prevention and the question of the ownership of the peace process in Ghana remains open. The challenge of funding has the potential to diminish the influence of the CSOs and undermine their noble objectives of creating an environment for sustainable political stability. The chapter concludes that the question of losers‘ consent is better addressed by credible CSOs than constitutional constraints on the incumbent. The African Union Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance provides prospects for a pan-African approach towards electoral violence prevention in ways that explore local funding on the continent. 179 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER SEVEN SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE, IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7.0 INTRODUCTION This chapter constitutes the discussion of findings of the study and presents summary of key findings based on the research goals. The Chapter includes summary of the study based on the various chapters, an evaluation of the contribution to knowledge within the context of the study, and the conclusions of the study. This study makes a modest recommendation that is aimed at stimulating further thinking around CSOs and their collaborative activities towards electoral violence prevention in Africa. The discussion of findings is aligned with the research objectives… 7.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS The first objective for the study was to find out what role CSOs play in electoral violence prevention within the context of Ghana. The study relied not only on the duty bearers, that is the CSOs but more critically the political elites to highlight what appears significant in election violence prevention by the CSOs. This objective constituted the first part of the Chapter five. The entire chapter five is written as an empirical chapter to provide greater insight into the phenomena of election violence prevention in Ghana by the CSOs. The role of CSOs in electoral violence prevention has been categorized into two main issues namely; structural interventions and operational activities that are often undertaken during the entire electoral cycle. The study identified the following as the main structural interventions or roles played by CSOs: 180 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh  The IEA- Ghana Political Parties Program (IEA-GPPP). This platform provides the rare opportunity for rival political party leaders to interact in an atmosphere devoid of rancour, acrimony and antagonism. The platform has been a ground to secure consensus among the political parties on key national issues. Beyond consensus on national issues, the platform has strengthened existing personal relations among members of the different political parties. This has consequently minimized inter-elite antagonism among the key leaders of the various political parties. This finding is situated within the theory of institutionalism where institutions serve as a political centre to hold competing actors together and define a pattern of behaviour among political elites. Importantly, the finding gives a deeper insight into how institutions either formal or informal serves as the platform for democratic norm transfer and norm diffusion not just among political elites but also the citizens.  The CSOs developed a Code of Conduct for Political Parties (COC-PP) during the electioneering period. The Code of Conduct has been the reference point to demand for acceptable democratic behaviour. To ensure compliance, the CSOs instituted an inclusive Task Force to monitor, name and shame the political parties that violate the provisions of the COC-PP. The task force partially addresses the challenge of lack of legal enforcement associated with Code of Conducts. The task force introduces the element of social enforcement. The name and shame strategy by the members of the task force serve as a restraining factor on the behaviour of the political party leaders. This novel approach points to the fact that legal enforcement mechanisms partially explains compliance and commitment to democratic norms and values. The finding helps to stress the theoretical argument that elite compliance and commitment to democratic norms must be enhanced through social enforcement mechanisms developed by both formal and informal institutions. This provides further insight 181 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh about the social rule-based approach to defining institutions as indicated by Hodgson (2006).  Another major structural intervention is the initiation of the Presidential Transition Act 2012, (Act 845). Despite its weakness, the Act 845 anticipates acrimonious transfer of power in instances where a new political party has won the presidential elections and imposes the legal obligation on both the incoming government and the outgoing to constitute a transition team that will enhance a smooth transfer of power. Both the spirit and the letter in the Act 845 points to consequential inter-elite engagement for power transfer. Apart from the above structural interventions, CSOs regard elections as a dynamic field that requires operational activities that can give meaning to the structural interventions. The study identified the following operational activities that run through elections 2008, 2012 and the 2016. These operational activities are usually developed due to lessons learnt from previous elections or the conduct of political actors.  The formation of the Civic Forum Initiative as a measure to address the grievances associated with the electoral register in the 2008 elections. The forum which includes faith-based organizations and other like-minded CSOs became the platform to provide legitimacy to the electoral processes and succeeded in gaining public support for the Electoral Commission (EC). This operational intervention largely helped to reconcile the competing claims of the two main political parties about the voters‘ register.  CSOs developed a nationwide peace messaging campaign throughout the entire country. They focused on regions regarded by the EC and the Ghana Police Service as volatile areas vulnerable to electoral violence outbreak. The peace messaging 182 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh highlighted the horror, the devastating material and human damages that are associated with electoral violence from other African countries. This citizen-centred approach to election violence prevention has in part brought about attitude transformation.  Based on the experiences of the 2008 elections, CSOs developed a framework to better engage the political parties in the 2012 elections. The peace summit organized was well attended not just by political party leaders but almost any identifiable influential elite. The signing of the Peace Accord by the candidates in the elections was a refreshing moment to signal the unreserved commitment of all stakeholders to the peace of the nation. The Peace Accord became the basis to demand from the losing candidate of the 2012 elections to avoid street protests by supporters and to challenge the results in court. The Peace Accord reinforced peaceful mechanisms for seeking redress over electoral grievances.  The behind the scene mediations and negotiations of the CSOs prevented a near bloody clash between the supporters of the two main political parties in the specific case of the 2008 elections during the period of result tabulation and declaration. This signifies how creative inter-elite engagement can be very beneficial in preventing strategic electoral violence. Similar mediations and negotiations took place in the context of the 2012 as well as the 2016 elections.  Consistent deployment of short-term and long-term domestic election observers whose operations cover almost the entire regions and constituencies across the country. The use of the local observers as agents to provide timely information on 183 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh potential hotspots to be processed as part of national early warning systems. These early warning structures feed into the early response mechanisms such as the deployment of local preventive diplomacy. CSOs use the election observation processes to deter fraud and other irregularities that may undermine the integrity of the election results.  The study identified the use of Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) by the CSOs as a means of independently verifying the results of the Electoral Commission. The PVT since 2008 has been deployed to monitor and to guarantee the integrity of the election results. The PVT has accurately estimated the winners and the losers in the 2008, 2012 and the 2016 elections. This minimizes the rumor, suspicion and the unsubstantiated allegations of vote rigging and vote stealing by the EC. The PVT results have also been used as evidence to validate the results of the 2012 elections during the election petition at the Supreme Court. The PVT results are usually collated hours ahead of the collation of the EC. This enables members of the advisory board of the CSOs to initiate their private talks and engagement with the various political parties. The PVT provides an evidence-based approach towards electoral transparency and fairness. The second objective for the study is to find out the nature, and processes of collaboration or interaction between the CSOs and the state in electoral violence prevention. This is in recognition of the fact that CSOs have a standalone and collaborative program with the state institutions with the aim of preventing electoral violence. Based on this objective, the study found the following complex mix of relations between the CSOs and the state. 184 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh  The relations between the CSOs and the state in electoral violence prevention are guided by value or democratic norm consensus. Some state institutions see the relations as the most critical way to deliver on their mandate, hence the willingness to accept for joint or cooperative programs. The relations are characterized with mistrust and suspicion due to poor handling of credit taking and lack of recognition of the inputs from the state institutions.  There is an intense institutional rivalry not just between the state institutions and the CSOs but also among the CSOs themselves over competition for the same donor funding, credit taking in terms of who is doing the best election violence prevention work, social standing in the public or reputational management. This rivalry has also created duplication of activities. Donor funding could be better served through coalitions that can avoid role duplication.  In some instances, payments and financial reward systems have determined the nature of the relations between the CSOs and the state institutions. There are no formal ways to negotiate the nature and the amount to be paid to the staff of the state institutions leaving the relations exposed to exploitation by the CSOs. The reward and payment system potentially could undermine the interaction processes in instances where state institutions can generate or raise donor funds independently. This was the case in 2016 elections when the GBC-NCCE announced a rival platform for presidential debates.  The approach to the relations between the CSOs and the state institutions has been guided by two main strategies; the use of soft advocacy and hard advocacy. The soft 185 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh advocacy strategies include the exchange of memos, letters, use of evidence in reports to persuade, validation workshops and other formal meetings that seek to make new proposals for change. The hard advocacy includes the use of open condemnation and criticisms that make the headlines in the media space and sometimes touches on the very technical and leadership competences of the state institutions. The findings relating to the second objective of the study raises empirical issues for the theory of institutionalism. While many adherents of institutionalism strongly insist on institutional collaboration and stakeholder engagement to enhance electoral transparency and integrity, they fail to anticipate a possible chaos or anarchy in instances of intense rivalry between and among institutions. The new perspective for the theory of institutionalism is that organizational goals, vision, and mandate are sources of cooperation and collaboration among institutions but at the same time sources of potential conflict as demonstrated in the finding. The third objective of the study seeks to examine the strategies employed by CSOs to get political actors to participate in peace processes and initiatives in Ghana. The study reveals that CSOs employ a variety of strategies in persuading political elites to accept their platform for peace processes. Key among these strategies includes;  The CSOs make good use of coalitions and networks that are broad based. The approach minimizes the accusations of political bias and favouritism by the political elites. The members of the coalition and the network including faith-based organizations form a major political block or elite group that cannot easily be ignored by the political party elites who are electorally vulnerable to winning the needed support during the general elections. 186 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh  The CSOs often rely strongly on their personal friends or long-standing networks they have in the various political parties to reach out to key persons in the political party establishment. The short and long-term CSOs-political party engagement initiatives have built some reasonable trust among the CSOs and the political parties.  Another important avenue that CSOs use to secure the participation of political parties in their programs is the use of eminent Ghanaians- what I call the use of third-party influence. In some instances, these third parties are associated with the CSOs as board members but based on their social, political, cultural, professional and religious standing, they enjoy an enviable reputation that allow them to exercise some amount of personal influence within the political parties. Empirically, the CSOs have made good use of the offices of key persons such as Mr Kofi Annan, Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Professor Akua Kuenyehia and Professor Mirinda Greenstreet just to mention a few.  Also, the CSOs engage the structures of the political parties directly by way of extending formal invitation to them to participate in events. In these circumstances, the CSOs craft their programs such that the political parties find it not just useful but very beneficial to their political brand and image building in the public.  Finally, the CSOs strategically make good use of donors and the members of the diplomatic community especially Western missions and embassies to attract political party leaders to their platforms. This strategy confers both local and international legitimacy on the operations of the CSOs. To this extent, the political party leaders and candidates risk losing the goodwill of the diplomatic community by not attending or committing to such programs and activities. The above findings show that, theoretically, elites assume a powerful role in society but are equally vulnerable under some circumstances and a genuine counter elite movement 187 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh through institutional frameworks can limit the nature of political action or behaviours exhibited in tensed situations. This finding provides an empirical evidence to support the theoretical argument that, political elites in Ghana are consensually unified to the extent that it allows for inter-elite engagement and genuine counter-elite movement. This relates to the four classification and the manifestations of elites as proposed by (Field & Higley,1980; Higley & Burton, 2006). The fourth objective of the study is to find out how CSOs ensure losers consent in Ghana as a means of preventing electoral violence and providing legitimacy for electoral processes and outcomes. The study uncovers the following mechanisms and processes that confer electoral legitimacy thereby accounting for losers‘ consent.  To confer legitimacy on electoral processes, CSOs and their partners strategically adopt peace journalism during the result tabulation and declaration stage to reduce public fears and anxiety that is usually associated with elections in Ghana. In this peace journalism, there is an open condemnation for unacceptable political behaviours. This is where coalition of CSOs and their networks have a substantial voice as representing the public interest.  The CSOs and their partners have use electoral reforms as means of dealing with both short and long-term electoral grievances among the political parties and most especially the two leading parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The proactive nature of the CSOs intervention from the pre-election to the post-election phase allows them to make credible inputs for reforms that will enhance transparency and the integrity of the electoral process. The politics of electoral reform by both CSOs and the political parties help in making sure 188 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh that the main actors have an avenue to express their displeasure in ways that does include using violence.  Closely related to the electoral reform advocacy is the enticement for a win in future elections. The CSOs negotiate with both the losers and the winners for harmonious co-existence. They ensure the winners make concessions that minimize the fears of the losers. Losers consent in Ghana‘s electoral democracy is shaped by two factors, the opportunity cost associated with not accepting the results of the elections and the expectations of possibly winning the future elections based on appropriate political behaviour. The four objectives for the study have produced the following interrelated specific findings.  Significant political discipline that enables for inter-party dialogue, mediation and regulation of electoral grievances through institutional mechanisms. There is the willingness on the part of the political elites to resolve contentious issues on platforms created by either CSOs or CSOs in collaboration with state civic organizations and some traditional leaders. This plays into the overall finding of elite consensus in Ghana. Ghana in empirical and theoretical terms experiences unified elite consensus that enables inter-party movement against threats of violence.  The availability of highly respectable, distinguished personalities and eminent citizens with international clout who are willing to serve as mediators and negotiate with the political elites on CSO platforms. This bolsters local capacity for preventive diplomacy. These individuals serve as crisis managers during periods of tension and disagreements. These behind the scene negotiations have so far in the short to medium 189 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh term prove very successful. This relates to the social mechanisms of institutions in ensuring democratic stability and order.  The innovative programs such as election observation, parallel vote tabulation, and advocacy by CSOs have largely accounted for electoral integrity, and transparency. Since 2008, the electoral results as declared by the EC reflect the actual winners and losers in the 2008, 2012, 2016 elections. This finding raises the question of insider- outsider perspectives on electoral integrity in Ghana.  The major political parties deliberately play the public against the E.C to have reasons for rejecting E.C decisions. This accounts for some political elites sabotaging the work of the EC. The use of rumours and unsubstantiated allegations against the EC has created mistrust and suspicion. CSOs serve as mediating platform to calm the electoral atmosphere that suit the operations of the EC and moderate the entrenched positions taken by political parties.  CSO- state civic organization relations are characterized by intense institutional rivalry, suspicion due to no formal framework guiding the relations. Credit taking for successful interventions has been a major source of problem. Recognition after work is poorly handled by the CSOs accounting for personality clashes and conflicts  Losers consent is constantly mediated through the possibility of a future win and the opportunity cost associated with unacceptable post-election political behaviours. The space for dialogue for reforms to deal with specific electoral grievances has also been a key factor in persuading losers. The implication for the theory of institutionalism is that when institutions established a kind of acceptable behaviour through norms and 190 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh conventions, these practices get diffused and are no longer the preserve of the originating organization or participating political elites. The practices take on a life of their own and become a restraining factor for all actors and serve as the basis for a well-defined political culture. This phenomenon expands the boundaries of social enforcement mechanisms put in place by the CSOs. This finding also relates to the theoretical argument that, losing political elites will be unwilling to provide legitimacy to mechanisms that validate their perpetual loss except that they anticipate winning in the future elections. Overall, institutional constraints or constitutional limitations must be complemented by a well-coordinated CSO activities such as advocacy, mediation, dialogue and political settlements.  International actors remain key to the election violence prevention in Ghana especially in funding. The international actors with their local counterparts facilitate high level political dialogue and adopt a discreet approach to issuing threats of sanctions or punitive measures against the use of violence. CSOs initiatives and violence prevention strategies have given meaning to the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. This presents an exciting prospect of a pan- African approach to election violence prevention in Africa. 7.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY Chapter 1: The chapter introduces the study by giving insight into the background, the research problem for investigation. The gaps identified were crafted into four main research questions and objectives that guided the entire study. The chapter also provided justification for the study and stated the main argument of significance. The Chapter also entailed the 191 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh theoretical framework and a brief on the methodological choices for the research. The final part of the Chapter provided explanations to key concepts and the organization of the study. Chapter 2: The Chapter is made of the literature review for the study. This chapter has been organized around two broad themes. The first section dealt with the definitional issues around the concept of Civil Society and proceeded to reflect on Civil Society Organizations. The reflection looks at how the concept and the idea of CSOs have been given prominence by the global community and the democratic recession debate. The second theme was centered on electoral violence, its causes and consequences and drawing examples from different African contexts. The chapter also looked at prevention strategies in the extant literature. Chapter 3: The chapter provides the full insight into the methodological orientations, philosophy and the key choices made by the researcher. The Chapter dealt with the philosophical underpinnings of the research process identifying with the qualitative research paradigm. The chapter also included the case study approach, and how the case study organizations were selected. It also provided a brief overview of the case study organizations and indicated the sampling regime that guided the study and why these sampling tools were deemed appropriate towards achieving the research goal. The chapter detailed how data was collected and the various sources that were engaged in the research process. It provided insight into how access to respondents was negotiated, and the entire process of data analysis. Chapter 4: This chapter made the effort to situate electoral violence within the structural challenges that many African countries face. The chapter looked at the political and the economic history of the African continent and provided relevant and key examples from several African countries. The chapter looked at the following key structural issues; the colonial politics and its implications for electoral violence, the question of one-party state experiments in Africa, the distorted economic policies and their associated grievances, 192 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh specifically looking at the Structural Adjustment Programs. The chapter then proceeded to reflect on the empirical evidence on violence in African elections by critically reviewing both the Nigerian and Ethiopian cases. The chapter reviewed existing policy frameworks for electoral violence prevention by donors and the international community. This included the frameworks by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Institute for Democracy and Elect oral Assistance (International IDEA). The chapter ended with a contextual overview of the Ghanaian political setting and explanations on political elite configurations since independence. Chapter 5: This chapter constituted the first empirical chapter based on the first two objectives of the study. The chapter detailed the structural and the operational activities of the selected CSOs. The chapter was organized around the following sub-themes; CSOs and their initiatives towards violence prevention in the Ghanaian context, and the nature and processes of interaction that exist between the CSOs and the state in electoral violence prevention. The chapter highlighted the works of CODEO-CDD, IEA, and IDEG, including their partners and collaborators. The Chapter six is the second and final empirical chapter for the study. It mainly touched on the last two objectives of the study. The Chapter reflected on the kinds of strategies the CSOs deploy to get political party elites and leaders to be part of peace processes and initiatives. The chapter highlighted two themes; CSOs and Political Elites in Peace Processes and Initiatives and the nexus between CSOs and losers‘ consent in Ghana. 7.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE Tracy (2013) argues that, the idea of significant contribution to knowledge as a requirement for doctoral thesis or dissertation has been met with conceptual misunderstandings and varied 193 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh interpretations making it vague, confusing and problematic to gauge. Baptista et al (2015) make the point that, the concept of significant contribution to knowledge has been best inappropriately defined. This dissertation is guided by the assertion of Burrel & Morgan (2017) that the contribution to knowledge must be evaluated by the new insights that the study or the research brings to the existing stock of knowledge and the extent to which the findings provoke interests in the research. Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) believes that an essential element such as concept development and theory building must be encouraged as part of contribution to knowledge. The first part of the study‘s contribution is the empirical attempt to bring new insights into the issue of CSOs and electoral violence prevention in Ghana. The study, empirically, unravelled the hidden issue of institutional rivalry, and personality clashes that have implications not just for policy but for practice and remedial action in electoral violence prevention. This challenges existing knowledge that relies on the inclusive stakeholder approach to violence prevention without anticipating that actors are divergent and may have different motivations and interests. This contribution to the field gives us an insight into how democratic actors who seek consensus building may themselves be working apart. The new insights of institutional clashes will inform a rethinking around the existing theoretical frameworks of multi-stakeholder approach that has dominated electoral violence prevention (Hoglund et al, 2011). The second contribution of the study is the application of the theory of elite consensus to enhance the understanding of the classification of electoral violence by Stephan Burchard (2015). Burchard provided two main classifications; strategic electoral violence and the incidental electoral violence. The present study has made a bold attempt at clearly differentiating between the two classifications. The study argues that an important difference 194 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh between the two is the question of deliberate, calculated mobilization or actions of high- profile political actors that prime supporters of candidates to protest in ways that can become violent. The present study has extended the existing knowledge by indicating that preventing strategic electoral violence requires not just elite consensus but also, the associated processes of elite congregation. Elite congregation in the context of the study, refers to elite assembly which is representative of the substantive stakeholders in each electoral cycle whose shared aspirations are aimed at preserving the democratic order and unite against threats and sources of violence. Third, empirically, the study has demonstrated what exactly works in the context of Ghana. Mediation, dialogue and the inter-party engagement interventions known as local preventive diplomacy during result declaration and the post-election phase have proven to be effective in averting tensed situations that could slip into large scale violence. This challenges the conclusions from the recent work by Sara Birch & David Muchlinski (2018), they argue that, capacity building is the most effective means of electoral violence prevention. This new understanding has implications for donors. It will shape new thinking around what specific operational activities of CSOs must be given priority funding. Another significant contribution to knowledge is in the area of losers‘ consent. The present study is a pioneering effort to enhance the understanding of losers‘ consent in Ghana‘s electoral politics. The study, through its methodological approach, obtained rich data from key political figures about the culture of losers‘ consent in Ghana. The findings of how losers‘ consent is mediated in Ghana by CSOs, is a novel way of contributing, from an African perspective to a field of knowledge that has been dominated by studies from western societies and contexts. 195 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh According to Tracy (2013), concept development must be considered a significant contribution to knowledge especially in the social sciences. This study guided by the argument of Tracy (2013), makes the assertive effort in developing and introducing the concept of elite congregation in the field of electoral violence prevention. The study proposes that, the idea of elite consensus must be enhanced through mechanisms of elite congregation that will facilitate democratic norm transfer and diffusion among non-elites. This means that constant interaction must be promoted by civil society organizations. 7.4 THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND PRACTICE The present study has some implications for both further research and practice to bring a lot more empirical evidence in validation of some of the claims that have been made. The study uncovers the willingness of prominent Ghanaians to offer their services to CSOs. To assume that this may be the case in all African countries may be problematic without the needed empirical evidence gathered in a systematic way. CSOs may have different strategies and leadership in other African countries and be inspired by completely different motivations for their work and may not be able to distinguish themselves to earn national recognition in ways that give them leverage to facilitate inter-political elite dialogues and obtain their commitments. This calls for further studies and research in other African countries. From a practical perspective, CSOs in other African countries should be looking at what structural factors must be addressed both short and long-term to replicate the operational interventions that have been highlighted in the Ghanaian context. This will place them in a better position to expect some degree of success. This reflection is in no way to suggest that structural and operational interventions are mutually exclusive. In fact, as evidenced in the Ghanaian experience, the two approaches can run concurrently. 196 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh This study has identified ‗the opportunity cost of fighting‘ and the ‗expectation of winning future elections‘ as mechanisms by which CSOs mediate losers consent thereby preventing post-election violence in Ghana. However, the factors shaping the opportunity cost argument has not been made clear which must be the basis for future research. The present study could speculate about the high economic stakes that the political elites and their business associates have in the country, but it may also be possible that the consent is entirely externally driven in the case of some other African countries. Hence the need for further research to enhance our understanding of the opportunity cost involved in fighting. This study has introduced a key element of elite mobilization of popular discontent as part of strategic election violence tactics which is missing or less pronounced in the case of incidental electoral violence. This understanding also introduces the question of elite agency and popular agency. Further research must be concerned about how this dichotomy is shaped, who influences who and at what given time and context? Empirically, are they mutually exclusive? 7.5 RECOMMENDATION The study seeks to make the following recommendations based on the ideas and findings that came out of the research. These recommendations may not be taken as consultancy manuals but an attempt to begin a new debate and thinking that can help in electoral violence prevention in Africa. To resolve the issue of institutional rivalry, the main sources of these rivalry must be looked at again. The existing relations are exposed to manipulation, cheating, adversarial and one- sided depending on who holds the donor funding. To avoid this, the study is proposing a workable framework of interaction that can take the form of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This MOU should have clear areas of cooperation, roles and specific responsibilities. 197 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The MOU can be creatively done such that it precedes any given operational activity towards violence prevention. Another way is also to develop a broad cooperating framework or strategic plan for partnerships out of which ad hoc and short-term MOUs are developed. The MOU should create avenues for resolving disputes among partners and network members. It should also spell out how success is shared among collaborative institutions. The CSOs must have Officers or Managers whose role is to work on their relations with the state civic organizations. As CSOs experience decline in donor funding, the options for local funding is not only desirable but an attempt at working towards ownership of the electoral violence prevention processes. This I alluded to as a refreshing Pan-African approach towards peace-building and electoral violence prevention in Africa. The concept of national peace funds can be explored with realistic local sources of funds. Implementing creative fundraising initiatives through a coalition of CSOs may be another way of pooling resources together for the National Peace Fund (NPF). This study seeks to recommend coalition building and formation of networks under genuine leaderships. The formation of a National Working Group Against Electoral Violence appears plausible to minimise intense competition over credit-taking. This may be helpful in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. This recommendation is to encourage collaborative initiatives rather than stand-alone CSO programs that achieve little results. Part of the coalition and network building strategy is to involve key state institutional heads such as the Police Service, Judiciary, and the Legislature. These networks can draw their strength from the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. In authoritarian regimes, there is the need to complement the AU Charter with the UN General Assembly Resolution 65/283 of 2011, 66/291 of 2012, 68/303 of 2014, 70/304 of 2016 and the UN Security Council 198 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh document S/2009/189. These are normative and legal frameworks that support the innovative ways by which CSOs can enhance peaceful processes through mediation and dialogue. Overall, it is important to note and appreciate the electoral and political context in which CSOs make efforts to prevent electoral violence. The political context can be a limiting factor to the kinds of impact CSOs make. For example, in Kenya, the existence of a strict state legal regulation of CSOs has had a limiting impact on their influence in electoral processes and outcomes. Regimes with limited space for CSO activities will constrain the work of the CSOs, as in the case of Ethiopia and Uganda. The evolution of the practices of CSOs in Africa is partially constrained by the uncertainties of state craft, and multiparty politics that remain enduring. The nature of the state and its leadership are key elements to understanding how CSOs in other African countries can replicate the Ghanaian experience. 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Evaluating Track Two Diplomacy in Pre-Negotiation: A Comparative Assessment of Track two Initiatives on Water and Jerusalem in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY. 264 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Harneit-Sievers, A. (2005). ―Zivilgesellschaft‖ in Afrika: Anmerkungen aus historischer Perspektive, Vortrag Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Unpublished Manuscript. Leftwich A. (2009). Analyzing the politics of state business relations: A methodological concept note on the historical institutionalists approach. Discussion Paper No. 21. DFID. Available at http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/ProPoor_RPC/IPPGDP23.pdf Lyons, T. (2006). Ethiopia in 2005: the beginning of a transition? CSIS Africa Notes. Mouritsen, P. (2001). What's the Civil in Civil Society? Robert Putnam's Italian Republicanism. EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2001/4, European University Institute. Norris P. (2012). Why electoral malpractices heighten risks of electoral violence. American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, APSA. Oduro, F., Mohammed, A., & Ashon, M. A. (2014). A dynamic mapping of the political settlement in Ghana. ESID Working Paper No 28. Okuku, J. (2002). Ethnicity, state power and the democratization process in Uganda. Nordic Africa Institute. Discussion Paper 17. Paffenholz, T., & Spurk, C. (2006). Civil society, civic engagement, and peacebuilding. A Research Paper by the Social Development of the World Bank, Washington D.C. Paffenholz, T., & Spurk, C. (2007). The different roles of Civil Society in Peacebuilding: New insights from a functionalist perspective. In the 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago. Przeworski, A., Rivero, G., & Xi, T. (2012). Elections under the Shadow of Force. New York University. Unpublished manuscript. Rakner L. Menocal A. and Fritz V. (2007) Democratisation‘s Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned. Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 1; available at http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/241.pdf. Riley, S. P. (1991). The democratic transition in Africa: an end to the one-party state? (Research Paper, No. 245). Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. Ross, H. (2001). Conceptualising Success in Conflict Resolution Intervention: Evaluation Guidelines. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Cuernavaca, Mexico. Sisk, T. D. (2008). Elections in fragile states: Between Voice and Violence. In International Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California. 265 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Steer L. & Sen K. (2008). Informal Institutions in Transition. How Vietnam‘s Private Sector Boomed Without Legal protection. Discussion Paper 19, IPPG, accessible at: http://www.ippg.org.uk/ PDF/Vietnam%2019.pdf. Straus, S., & Taylor, C. (2009). Democratization and electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2007. In the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada. Wanis-St. John, A., and. Kew D, (2006). The Missing Link? Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Contributions to Sustained Peace. Paper presented at the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California. 266 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh APPENDIX UNSTRUCTURED ELITE INTERVIEW GUIDE (IDEG, CDD, CODEO, IEA and WANEP) Section One: ✓ What specific roles, initiatives and interventions did you take or play during the 2008, 2012 and 2016 elections in ensuring violent free elections? ✓ In your opinion how did these interventions account for electoral violence prevention? ✓ What changes occur in your electoral violence prevention strategy from one election cycle to the other? ✓ Which of the three electoral cycles do you find most challenging in terms of violence prevention? What in your view makes the particular election cycle the most challenging? What were the unique circumstances? What strategies are employed to ensure that political elites participate in processes leading to electoral violence prevention? Examples like the Peace Accord and the pledge to accept outcome of results Section two: ✓ In your intervention to prevent electoral violence how do you engage other state actors? ✓ Does this interaction or engagement become a source of rivalry or unhealthy competition? Any details on specific episodes? ✓ What is the level of collaboration with other CSOs in the prevention of electoral violence? Section Three ✓ Electoral violence remains a joint product of interaction between the political elites and the masses. Despite Ghana not in the electoral violence category of Kenya and 267 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Cote d‘Ivoire, low level intensity violence has characterized all elections in Ghana. What in your opinion are the intervening factors that prevent large scale electoral violence? ✓ As a civil society organization, what roles do you play to ensure losers‘ consent in an election? (Rumors of international appointments, awards, exit cash and a guarantee of support for future elections, electoral reforms) ✓ What cooperative alliances do you have with the donor community in preventing electoral violence? 268