The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 120–128
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The Extractive Industries and Society
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Original article
Gold in Ghana: The effects of changes in large-scale mining on artisanal and T
small-scale mining (ASM)
Paul W.K. Yanksona,⁎, Katherine V. Goughb
a Department of Geography and Resource Development’, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana
bDepartment of Geography, Loughborough University, UK
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Key words: Two scales of gold mining operations, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) and large-scale mining, have
Mining operated side by side in Ghana for decades. In the past, the two co-existed on the same mineralised land without
Gold much contact or conflict, as large-scale mining occurred underground and ASM operated mainly on the surface.
Employment With the former’s transition from an underground labour-intensive mining operation to capital-intensive surface
Urban activity, however, opportunities for wage employment have reduced leading to labour retrenchment. Using an
Ghana
informalisation theoretical framework, and drawing on fieldwork conducted in the three gold mining towns of
Obuasi, Prestea and Kenyasi, this paper explores how the interface between large-scale mining and ASM has
evolved. It is shown how the loss of wage employment opportunities in large-scale mining has contributed to the
proliferation of illegal ASM operations. As large-scale surface mining operations have reduced access to mi-
neralised land by ASM, the latter have encroached on to the concessions of the former resulting in conflicts
between these parties. It is ASM rather than large-scale mining, however, that is sustaining local economies in
Ghana. As the economic well-being of mining towns is linked largely to the fortune of their mining economies, it
is imperative that an innovative approach is adopted by the state in addressing the need for ASMs to access
mineralised land.
1. Introduction foreign mining companies. The consequent rapid rise in foreign-fi-
nanced mineral exploration and mining activities has displaced thou-
Gold mining has been carried out in the former Gold Coast, now sands of existing local artisanal and small-scale gold mine operators
Ghana, for centuries (Ofosu-Mensah, 2011a). Artisanal gold mining (Akabzaa and Darimani, 2001; Hilson, 2001, 2004), sparking conflict
started in the gold-rich areas long before modern large-scale gold between these parties over access to land (Hilson and Potter, 2005).
mining (Hilson, 2002a) and was one of the mainstays of the numerous Moreover, technological changes in large-scale mining have caused
Akan states that developed in the forest belt of Ghana (Dumett, 1979, labour contraction, reducing opportunities for wage employment and
1998; Kea, 1982). Since colonial rule and the introduction of modern, catalysing an outflow of mine-retrenched labour into illegal ASM op-
large-scale concession-based mining in Ghana, artisanal mining has erations. The rapidly rising price of gold on the world market since
been treated as an informal sector. Until the last couple of decades, the 2001 has been an added factor in the absorption of thousands of dis-
two different scales of mining co-existed, accessing the same land re- placed people from land concessions into ASM (Banchirigah, 2007).
source but mostly operating at differing depths using different techni- The rising prevalence of ASM operations has led to discussions re-
ques; artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) operated mostly on the garding the increasing incidence of informality of mine employment,
surface, while large-scale mining activities occurred underground. Al- and its corresponding marginality and illegality, despite government
though in some cases ASM took place on the active large-scale mine attempts at their formalisation. This paper makes an important con-
concessions, their operations were to some extent tolerated. tribution to the literature by exploring the relationship between actors
Since the implementation of the International Monetary Fund and engaged in the formal mining sector (i.e. large-scale mining companies
World Bank’s Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and successive and state agencies) and informal ASM. By adopting a labour in-
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Ghana in the 1980s, the formalisation approach, the effects of changes in large-scale mining on
government has established a more attractive investment climate for their relationship with ASM, particularly on the latter’s access to
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: pyankson@ug.edu.gh (P.W.K. Yankson), k.v.gough@lboro.ac.uk (K.V. Gough).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2018.09.009
Received 5 October 2016; Received in revised form 24 September 2018; Accepted 24 September 2018
Available online 06 October 2018
2214-790X/ Crown Copyright © 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
P.W.K. Yankson, K.V. Gough The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 120–128
mineralised land and changing occupational patterns, are examined in The third fieldwork stage focused on interviewing policy makers in
three gold mining towns. It is argued that as the economic well-being of Accra. Key officials in a number of Ministries, Departments and
mining towns is linked largely to the fortune of their mining economies, Agencies were interviewed along with the relevant Member of
it is imperative that an innovative approach is adopted to addressing Parliament representing the electoral constituencies of the three towns.
the needs of the expanding ASM sector. The interviews were directed at seeking information about the policies,
After this introduction, the next section presents the field research programmes and changes that have occurred regarding mining and
methods followed by a conceptual discussion of the informalisation their impact on the towns and the wider environment in the selected
framework used in analysing the relationship between large-scale settlements and beyond. Interviews with officials of the Minerals
mining and ASM. Subsequently, a brief presentation of the roles of both Commission carried out in Accra and Tarkwa by the first author in an
mining types in national development is made. Changes in large-scale earlier study on gold mining area also drawn on in this paper.
mining and their effects on ASM are then explored, drawing on data
from the three case study mining towns of Obuasi, Prestea and Kenyasi. 3. Conceptual framework
The paper ends with concluding statements highlighting the need to
address the marginality of ASM in regards to accessing mineralised This paper adopts an informalisation framework to analyse the re-
land, in order to ensure their inclusiveness and the sustainability of gold lationship between the formal sector, represented by state institutions/
mining in Ghana. agencies and large-scale mining, on the one hand and informal ASM on
the other, and the effects of changes in the former on the latter. In most
2. Field research methods instances, informal denotes illegality, since ASM operators tend to
conduct mining without registering their activities and hence operate
This paper is based on research conducted as part of a major study without the legally acquired mining concessions. As lack of access by
which explored the connection between mining and urbanisation in unregistered ASM to any state support offered to registered miners
Angola, Ghana and Tanzania. In Ghana, the link between gold mining marginalises them, illegality and marginality are key concepts used in
and urban growth, livelihoods, poverty and wealth was examined in this paper. An alternative conceptual framework at times used to ana-
three gold mining towns with differing characteristics: Obuasi was se- lyse conflict between large-scale mining and ASM in accessing natural
lected to represent old mining urban centres dominated by a large-scale resources, in this case mineralised land, is political ecology. The pivot
mining company; Prestea was selected as an old mining centre with the of the political ecology framework is an analysis of power relations
presence of a large-scale mining company, though mining there is now between different actors, which can provide a way to explain the un-
dominated by ASM operations; and Kenyasi was selected to represent a even distribution of access to environmental resources (Bryant and
new mining centre dominated by ASM, though there is a large-scale Bailey, 1997). Power is thus conceptualized as the differential ability to
mining company operating nearby. control access to valuable environmental resources in order to gain the
A three-stage approach was adopted in collecting primary data in all economic benefits emanating from resource exploitation (Bryant, 1996;
three towns. Initially qualitative data was collected by conducting key Tan-Mullins, 2007). The state as a principal actor is expected to satisfy
informant interviews with a range of respondents living in the mining the competing needs of all stakeholders and, in the case of mining,
settlements, and a focus group discussion was held with young people access to mineralised land for all types of miners. Bryant and Bailey
(a mixed group of males and females) in each of the three settlements. (1997) point to the use of the political ecology framework to analyse
Often the first interviewees were an elderly man and woman who were the distribution of costs and benefits related to environmental change
asked about the history of the settlement and for their account of the and how that reinforces or reduces existing social and economic in-
changes they had observed, including the role played by gold mining. equalities and the resultant political implications. As this paper does
Perceptions about both the positive and negative effects of mining in not focus on the environmental aspects of gold mining but rather
the towns and surrounding areas were ascertained from all of the re- analyses the effects of changes in large-scale mining on ASM operations,
spondents. Although the settlements were selected as being primarily alongside changes in mining employment and the effects on the
involved in large or small-scale mining in line with the rest of the economy of the mining towns, an informalisation approach was deemed
project, in Ghana the two often go hand in hand thus in each settlement more appropriate.
miners working for a large-scale mining company as well as miners Discussions on informality have gained much currency over the last
operating in ASM were interviewed. In each settlement the ASM mining 40 years among academics and policy-making institutions, promoted in
sites were visited and informal discussions were held with miners and particular by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 1972). De-
business owners. Interviews were also conducted with officials of ser- fining the informal economy is problematic and current definitions fail
vice providers in education, health and local government, as well as a to converge around a common construct (Godfrey, 2011). What is
range of officials in local government units (the Municipal/District generally recognized, however, is that informal economic activities are
Assemblies), in particular Town Planning Officers and Environmental ‘unregulated’ or ‘escape institutional regulation’ and are largely gov-
Health Officers. erned by customs and personal ties (Godfrey, 2011). Regulation sets the
The second stage of fieldwork entailed collecting quantitative data parameters of legality using a number of dimensions, three of which are
using a household questionnaire survey. In each town, two neigh- particularly pertinent to demarcating formal and informal enterprises:
bourhoods in the central areas of the towns and two with peripheral registration and adherence to various government-defined bureaucratic
locations were selected. Each neighbourhood was divided into four procedures; payment of taxes; and compliance with official guidelines
quadrants, to ensure that there was a geographical spread of sampled on working hours, social security contributions and fringe benefits
houses, and a random sampling method was used for selecting houses (Tokman, 1991 cited in Chant, 2008; Williams and Nadin, 2012). The
within each quadrant. When the selection fell on a compound house informal economy is the source of employment and income for the vast
inhabited by more than one household, the one that was interviewed majority of urban dwellers in sub-Saharan Africa, most of whom do not
was selected using random numbers. Given the differing sizes of the have access to formal sector wage employment (Potts, 2007). ASM,
settlements, 40 questionnaires were conducted in each neighbourhood particularly gold and diamonds, has expanded in rural areas of sub-
in Obuasi (total 160), 30 in each neighbourhood in Prestea (total 120), Saharan Africa, including Ghana, where it is often combined with
and 20 in each neighbourhood in Kenyasi (total 80) resulting in a total subsistence farming, though the mining has become the primary in-
of 360 questionnaires. A range of issues was covered including: liveli- come-earning activity (Hilson, 2016; Maconachie and Hilson, 2018). In
hoods, employment, mobility, changing role of mining, and household Ghana, however, not much is known about ASM’s role in the urban
income and assets. economy, which is usually dominated by non-farm activities, especially
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commerce, even when large-scale mining is present. which for centuries had been the main medium of exchange, and Eur-
In the 1970s and 1980s, the informal economy was considered as opean imperialism which steadily marginalized Africans from the
‘income-generating activities that operated outside the regulatory fra- mining industry as a European mining monopoly emerged (Addo-
mework of the state’ (Meagher, 2013: 2). The ILO, however, subse- Fening, 1997, cited in Ofosu-Mensah, 2011b).
quently amended the definition to cover not only informal firms and Artisanal small-scale mining in Ghana became an informal in-
their workers but also unregistered or unprotected labour working in dustrial sector activity, employing thousands of people but featuring
formal sector firms. This has resulted in a more precise terminology laid largely rudimentary, unmonitored and uncontrolled practices (Hilson,
out by Chen (2012: 8), which defines economic informality in terms of 2001), though the original manual operations have become semi-me-
three central concepts: first, an ‘informal sector’ encompassing pro- chanized or mechanized (Hentschel et al., 2002). Consequently, ASM
duction and employment in unregistered enterprises; second, ‘informal covers a wide span of approaches from rudimentary gold panning, to
employment’, involving employment outside labour protection regula- sophisticated and highly mechanised small-scale mining operations
tions of a given society, whether in formal or informal firms; and third, engaging in both hard rock and alluvial mining (COWI, 2016). Artisanal
the ‘informal economy’, which covers all firms, workers, and activities small-scale miners frequently work in collectives comprising from two
that operate outside the legal regulatory framework of society and the to twenty or more people, with varying forms of commercial in-
output that they generate. Artisanal small-scale gold mining in Ghana corporation and business models. ASM units also vary in composition
exhibits these features of informality, the persistence of which has been regarding the manpower involved, often including children and
widely researched (Van Bockstael, 2014; McQuilken and Hilson, 2016; women, with individuals or groups specialising in different tasks and
Verbrugge, 2015; Hilson and Hilson, 2015; Verbrugge and Besmanaos, using different types of tools depending on whether they work on al-
2016). As Hilson et al. (2017: 82) indicate, there are various schools of luvial deposits or hard rock. In the past, most ASM operations involved
thought to explain the persistence of informality of ASM: “(1) the du- the use of simple tools, however, overtime there has been a technolo-
alists, who see the informal sector as being comprised of marginal ac- gical upgrading. In particular, the involvement of Chinese actors in
tivities that provide a safety net for the poor and are distinct from the ASM over the last decade or so has transformed the small-scale mining
formal economy; (2) the structuralists, who see the former as being sector through the introduction of new technology, such as the wide-
subordinate to the latter; and (3) the legalists, who view unregistered spread use of excavators, wash plants (trommel), crushing machines
businesses as a response by individuals to bureaucracy”. (Changfa), water platforms and suction equipment for dredging rivers
Since the early 1980s, there has been a shift of focus from in- (Crawford et al., 2016).
formality represented as a marginalized sector to ‘informalisation’ The term ASM is used to refer to both artisanal mining and small-
conceived as a wider economic response to crisis (Meagher, 1995: 259). scale mining, as this nomenclature is used interchangeably in Ghana. A
Informalisation of work has become a global trend, on the increase in distinction, however, is made between formally registered as opposed
both the global North and South (Portes and Schauffler, 1993; Meagher, to illicit miners who are referred to as galamseyors (galamsey is a cor-
1995; Potter and Lloyd-Evans, 1998; Bryceson and Potts, 2006; rupted form of the English expression ‘gather and sell’). Formally re-
Lourenco-Lindell, 2008; Schindler, 2014). Within the informalisation gistered miners have tenure security for the mining concessions they
framework, four issues emerge as key to understanding the role and operate (five years with the possibility of renewal for another five
potential of the informal sector: first, differentiation within the informal years) and the license may be transferable to another citizen with the
sector and the specific characteristics of informal labour; second, lin- consent of the Minister responsible for the sector (Mineral and Mining
kages between the informal and formal economy; third, the attitude of Act, 2006, Act 703). In contrast, galamseyors do not have mining con-
the state towards the informal sector; and fourth, the role of informal cessions and operate from sites they do not have titles to, hence are
social networks in providing an organizational structure for production operating without regulatory approval from the relevant state institu-
and marketing within the informal sector and in providing a framework tions, i.e. the Ghana Minerals Commission, Environmental Protection
for the recruitment and use of informal sector labour (Meagher, 1995: Agency, Water Resources Commission, Forestry Commission or the host
261). For this study, the issue of informal-formal sector linkages, and in Municipal Assembly. Moreover, it is claimed that they do not pay tax
particular how the state deals with the informal economy, is important and statutory fees, operate in sensitive or prohibited areas (such as
in appreciating the links between the large-scale mining (formal) and forest reserves, water bodies, sacred and culturally significant areas,
ASM (informal) sectors within Ghana’s gold mining economy, and how residential zones etc.) and pay less or no attention to human rights
the changes in large-scale mining impact on the operations of ASM (Owusu-Nimo et al., 2018). Galamseyors have extended their activities
alongside patterns of employment changes in the mining settlements. to many of the mineralised districts in Ghana and their operations take
many forms (Owusu-Nimo et al., 2018).
4. Evolution of ASM and large-scale mining in Ghana The legal form of ASM emerged in 1989 when a Small-Scale Gold
Mining Act (PNDC Law 218) was passed to provide for the licensing of
Traditional gold mining in Ghana took three forms: washing or such operations in Ghana. The Minerals Commission and the Precious
‘panning’ for alluvial gold along the banks of streams and rivers and Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC) claim that less than 30 percent
along ocean shores, particularly those near river estuaries; shallow-pit of the ASM operators in the country are duly registered and licensed
surface mining on either the crests or sides of hills or in the sedimented (Aubynn, 2009). It is difficult to estimate the total number of ga-
valleys of ancient river beds; and deep-shaft mining for reef gold. The lamseyors, as this varies seasonally and over the years; the number
size of the labour force required for traditional mining varied with the operating in any particular area depends on the richness of the ore and
type and scale of operations but the indigenous miner prospected for the galamseyors’ ability to manoeuvre around the legally acquired
and mined gold together with family members and slaves. Mining was concessions. When the quality of ore in an area declines, or the yield
seen as a supplement to subsistence farming and craftwork. Thus, al- becomes poor, the galamseyors move on to other areas. Both indigenes
though widespread, the scale of indigenous mining operations was of particular areas and migrants operate in legal and illegal ASM, re-
quite limited in size and utilized simple techniques requiring minimum sulting in it becoming difficult to distinguish between the two groups of
capital and no special skills (Ofosu-Mensah, 2011b). ASM was not operators in an active mining site at any time (Nyame and Grant, 2014).
considered an illegal activity and the land rights of the artisanal miners There is a history of foreigners, especially from neighbouring West
were not questioned by any governing authority. The emergence of African countries, settling in mining communities since Independence
modern mining from the second half of the 19th century, however, saw (Nyame et al., 2009) but the recent ‘gold boom’ in Ghana has quickened
the native gold mining industry in Ghana decline due to various factors: the pace of immigration of foreigners, including the Chinese, into gold
the emancipation of slaves, the demonetization of gold dust (1889), mining areas and illegal ASM in particular. Drawing on media reports
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from China, Crawford et al. (2016) claim that at the height of Chinese ASM. These include the involvement of the local chief in such opera-
involvement in 2012 and 2013, almost 50,000 Chinese nationals mi- tions through, for instance, land trading between the miners and local
grated to Ghana to engage in small-scale gold mining. The entry of the land owners, and the range of employment opportunities provided by
Chinese was a significant factor in the increased contribution of the the sector (Banchirigah, 2007; Nyame and Blocher, 2010). The pro-
sector in gold production from 11 percent in 2005 to 36 percent in 2013 liferation of illegal ASM has also been attributed to the scarcity of land
(Crawford et al., 2016). In the gold marketing chain, however, trading as a result of: the granting of concessions to large-scale mining firms,
channels are entangled making it hard to distinguish between formal the high transaction cost involved in obtaining licenses and the non-
and informal sectors in the downstream segment of the ASM chain (Fold transferability of mining rights (Andrews, 2003; Hilson and Potter,
et al., 2013). 2005; Sinding, 2005;), and the endemic poverty of rural areas, un-
Large-scale mining, with its long history of operation in Ghana employment, social or regulatory exclusion (Hilson, 2012; Andrews,
(Dumett, 1998; Ofosu-Mensah, 2011a), contributed substantially to the 2015). The cost of processing the ASM application fee at the Minerals
economy until it began to experience difficulties from the early 1960s Commission is GHC 19,169 (US$ 4,564 at exchange rate US$
through to the mid-1980s. The implementation of economic recovery 1=GHC4.2; Personal Communication with Nelson Ahedor, Minerals
and structural adjustment policies in the early 1980s helped to reverse Commission, Ghana, May 31, 2017). The formalisation process of ASM
the decline of the mining sector (Addo-Fening, 1997 cited in Ofosu- has not been effective because the government has little or no incentive
Mensah, 2011b; Akabzaa, 2009). Today, the large-scale mining sector to do so as the PMMC charged with buying gold does not make any
makes substantial financial contributions to the national economy in distinction between purchases from legal and illegal ASM. This is at
the form of corporate income tax, royalties, employee income tax, so- variance with the role of the policy making institutions that are tackling
cial security payments and a national reconstruction levy. Companies the illegal mining problem (Hilson and Potter, 2005). Discussions on
holding a mining license are required to pay between 3 and 6 percent of the formalisation of ASM have rather focused on two main issues: first,
their gross revenues in royalties (Larsen et al., 2009). Furthermore, improved working practices, both for the sake of the miners and the
most large-scale mining companies engage in corporate social respon- environment; and second, operators’ access to mineralised land (Fold
sibility directed at the surrounding communities affected by their et al., 2013). It is the latter that is of interest to this paper.
mining activities (Yankson, 2010). Turning to land issues, the most pivotal development in the re-
The contribution of the mineral sector to wage employment in lationship between large-scale mining and ASM was the former’s switch
Ghana, however, is limited. Aryee (2013) claimed that in 2011, 28,000 from underground to surface mining beginning in the 1980s. All major
people were employed in the large-scale mining sector, including gold new mines that came on stream after 1986 are open-pit, requiring a
mining. The majority of gold miners today work in the ASM sector, considerable degree of land alienation. The decisions regarding access
which is notoriously difficult to measure; recently it has been estimated to land by large-scale mining are taken at the national rather than the
that the sector employs one million workers and supports approxi- local level. Access to land by ASM is supposed to be through a for-
mately 4.5 million more (McQuilken and Hilson, 2016). Hilson et al. malisation process but the operators encounter difficulties in at-
(2018) claim that much of this energy is driven by ‘necessity’ rather tempting to access licenses due to insufficient geological knowledge,
than ‘opportunistic’ entrepreneurship, though as Langevang et al. shortage of capital, relatively high cost and bureaucracy (Banchirigah,
(2012) have indicated, it can be hard to distinguish between the two. 2007; Fisher, 2007; Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007). Moreover, some ASM
operators in Ghana, and elsewhere in Africa, do not intend to regularise
5. Linkages between ASM and large-scale mining in Ghana their businesses (Andrews, 2015). Marginalisation of ASM in terms of
access to mineralised land is thus a recurring issue its relationship with
The regulatory environment for mining and access to land are major large-scale mining. Information obtained from the Minerals Commis-
aspects of the interface between formal and informal mining econo- sion, however, seems to indicate that they have taken steps to ease the
mies. The beginning of the edging out of indigenous gold producers and registration bottlenecks such as: establishment of district offices close to
their criminalisation stems from the Mercury Ordinance of 1932, which prospective ASM miners; fast and quick inspection of proposed ASM
banned the use of mercury for processing gold in artisanal mining. The concessions by district officers; payment of processing fees at the dis-
Colonial Office calculated that this would undermine Ghanaian arti- trict offices of the Minerals Commission; decentralisation of the pro-
sanal production and thereby propel them towards employment in cessing of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) permits to regional
European-owned mines The post-independence era was marked by state and district levels; and joint inspection of ASM concessions by EPA and
ownership of mineral resources acquired through the take-over of Minerals Commission officials. Moreover, the EPA permit process is
various foreign large-scale mining companies (Gough and Yankson, gradually being devolved to district and regional levels (Institute of
2012). Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER, 2017).
The Economic Recovery and Structural Adjustment Programmes Despite these strategies, the formalisation of ASM has not been
(ERP/SAP) adopted in 1983 reversed the nationalist mining policy and successful because the policy framework for Ghana’s mineral sector has
SAP conditionality compelled the Ghanaian state to encourage private largely prioritised the development of large-scale activities (McQuilken
participation in the mining sector. The establishment of the Minerals and Hilson, 2016). The weakness of local government has been another
Commission and the promulgation of the Minerals and Mining Code in factor, since the concentration of power within the centrally appointed
1986 were significant institutional developments that reflected the new District Chief Executives undermines the participation of the other re-
policy paradigm (Akabzaa and Darimani, 2001). The Precious Minerals source users, traditional authorities and assembly members, and can
Marketing Corporation was also established, which became the sole result in political and economic rent seeking behaviour by the District
governmental agency for the purchase of the mineral output of small- Assemblies (Hirons, 2014). There is also a sizeable gap between what
scale miners, though the government has since opened up the mar- the government believes ASM is and what it actually is. As Hilson and
keting to private licensed buyers. The Small-Scale Mining Law passed in Hilson (2015: 2) argue “This misdiagnosis has spawned a regulatory
1989 gave legal status to the sector making the Small-Scale Mining apparatus that has proved to be a formidable barrier for ASM operators
Project (a department of the Minerals Commission) responsible for re- who are attempting to transition to the formal economy”. Moreover,
gistering and supervising small-scale miners, including assigning them institutional changes have impeded rather than facilitated formalisation
specific areas to operate in. Due to frustrations associated with the re- of ASM, including changes in the role of various agencies and the ra-
gistration process, many opt to operate illegally as galamseyors dical change in the administrative set up when the Small Scale Mining
(Akabzaa and Darimani, 2001). Project (SSMP) was launched in the early 1990s (Hilson et al., 2017).
Additional factors have emerged to explain the persistence of illegal Conflicts have increasingly arisen between the large-scale mining
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companies, which have legally acquired their mining concessions, and 5.1. Obuasi
the numerous small-scale or artisanal miners operating illegally in the
large-scale mining concessions (Hilson, 2002a,b; Nyame and Blocher, Obuasi is the principal gold mining settlement in Ghana, located in
2010; Nyame and Grant, 2014; Geenen, 2014; Andrews, 2015). Re- the southern part of the Ashanti Region. Although artisanal gold mining
cently, Patel et al. (2016) examined the spatial relationship between has been carried out in Obuasi for centuries, it rose to prominence when
large-scale mining and ASM in southern Ghana, where the Central, the British opened a series of gold mines at the end of the 19th century,
Western, Eastern and Ashanti Regions intersect, by mapping the spatial the most important being the Ashanti Goldfields Company (AGC)
overlaps between the two. They show that there is substantial resource (Dickson, 1969). The population of Obuasi increased from around
competition between the two mining types, particularly in the pro- 20,000 in 1960, to 30,000 in 1970, then almost quadrupled in size over
specting concessions of large-scale mining. These circumstances can at the next 30 years, with an additional 50 percent expansion in the fol-
times lead to violent confrontations (Eshun, 2005) with galamsey op- lowing decade rising to approach 170,000 people in 2010. Today,
erators objecting to the acquisition of large tracts of mining lands by the Obuasi is one of the world’s richest mining operations. Even though
large-scale mining companies. The prevailing legal and traditional in- AGC, now Anglogold Ashanti (AGA), has a concession over the entire
terpretation of the mineral land ownership rights, coupled with the lack area, artisanal gold mining still takes place (Ofosu-Mensah, 2011a). The
of political will to enforce the laws on illegal encroachment of property, interface between ASM and large-scale mining is central to under-
have combined to feed into a tense relationship between ASM and standing employment opportunities and livelihood choices in Obuasi.
large-scale mining operators in which the former have limited scope to Before the 1990s when surface mining was adopted, securing em-
pursue their mining activities (Aubynn, 2009). The earlier legal fra- ployment with AGC was not difficult. In the words of the Municipal
mework - the Mining and Mineral Law of 1986 (PNDC 153) - did not Chief Executive (MCE):
help, though this was corrected in the later version of the framework Those times if you were schooling in Obuasi immediately you fin-
(Mineral and Mining Law, ACT 709 of 2006) (Banchirigah, 2007). ished standard 7 and you wanted to work you were employed that
Despite this, the Minerals Commission has not been very successful in week. Nobody lacked employment in Obuasi. The mine could employ
persuading large-scale mining companies to release their unproductive 18,000. At the least it was employing about 14,500. So if you multiply
mining sites within their concessions to ASM, and land allocated to those employed by their dependents you will be talking about 75,000
ASM is often of dubious mining quality. As the District Officer of the people and the population then was not up to 100,000 so there was no
Minerals Commission for Wassa West Small-Scale Mining District in- unemployment in Obuasi.
timated: From the 1950s into the early 1980s, ASM was operating minimally
In Prestea another area has been relinquished for ASM purposes. on the periphery of Obuasi. This situation changed with the retrench-
This new area may be divided into around 200 ASM concessions but to ment of mine workers that reconfigured the town’s employment land-
be honest no one really knows if there is gold in that area. There is no scape, impacting not just on the miners who had lost their jobs but also
geological data for that area yet. And in general, as far as I know, there on the market traders, masons, carpenters etc. who relied on the pre-
has not been carried out a proper prospecting of the areas designated sence of large-scale mining for their livelihoods. Thus the rise of ASM,
for ASM by the Minerals Commission. The areas have mainly been se- specifically the illegal element since the 1980s, has to be situated
lected because they were available. within the broader historical context of changing occupational oppor-
The challenge of the lack of mineralised land for ASM was echoed at tunities in Obuasi. Former large-scale mining employees entered ASM
the Head Office of the Minerals Commission in Accra. Prospective ASM after losing their jobs, showing how the histories of the two mining
operators have no alternative but to operate illegally on the concessions sectors are inextricably interlinked. When people could no longer ob-
of large-scale mining, which are known to contain gold, leading to tain work with AGC they reverted to informal mining. As the Chairman
conflicts. Despite rising concern among government regulatory agen- of the Small-scale Miners’ Association explained:
cies, little has been done to address the causes of these conflicts. This is This made some of the people rethink that in the past before the
a major source of concern for large-scale mining companies as the op- advent of AGC our forefathers were mining the gold using the local
erations of illegal ASM interfere with their operations, while galamsey materials so why don’t we revert to that for us to have our daily bread.
operators resent their livelihood activities being constrained by foreign So we reverted to digging the ground to look for the little we would get
companies’ legal rights to land. According to the Minerals Commission, to go and sell. We didn’t encroach on where the mines were working
however, the lack of formalisation of illegal small-scale mining is the but went to places that they had abandoned and planted trees.
main bottleneck to their accessing mineralised land, as the government According to the Chairman, in July 2011 there were over 10,000
has demarcated large areas (about 350 square km) in several parts of small-scale miners in Obuasi, most of whom were illegal ASM opera-
the country for ASM, which are being geologically investigated for al- tors. Their rise to prominence in the local economy makes their mar-
luvial and hard rock gold deposits. This land would be licensed to ASM ginalisation problematic as they fill a void in employment and income
if proved viable. An additional factor that has greatly affected ASM is generation, which large-scale mining has unable to.
local operators, both registered and galamseyors, working with foreign The key challenge facing the illegal ASM operators is how to access
partners irrespective of the law stating that the sector is reserved for a suitable mineralized area, which is especially problematic since the
Ghanaian citizens and the ban on sub-leasing concessions (Crawford whole of Obuasi and its surrounding areas are part of the mining con-
et al., 2016). The development of extensive collaboration between cession of AGC (now AGA). A focus group discussion with small-scale
Ghanaian and Chinese miners, as well as with traditional authority and miners in Obuasi gives an indication of how they try to surmount this
government officials, has facilitated access of the latter to mineralised challenge:
land and hence into galamsey. This has also been a source of violent Before the surface mining emerged, we were working at places
conflict, however, with clashes between local villagers and Ghanaian where they had their waste and we were using our might to dig the
and Chinese ASM over access to land resources. ground but it wasn’t big. So it was when the surface mining emerged
We now turn to a consideration of the implications of these dy- that the small-scale mining also picked up but the company was also
namics between ASM and large-scale mining for the livelihoods of the protecting its resources so we have passed through a lot of hardships
populations in our three case study mining towns, starting with Obuasi here in Obuasi.
before turning to Prestea and then Kenyasi. In protecting its concession against intrusion by the numerous il-
legal ASM operators, AGC had to fight back using the state security as
echoed in the words of the MCE:
Unfortunately in trying to fight them, there were a lot of
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P.W.K. Yankson, K.V. Gough The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 120–128
confrontations, inflicting cutlass wounds and so on. Now the mines the focus group discussions noted: ‘Because there are no jobs the boys
introduced guard dogs and the people also became very wild and the are now illegal ASM operators. Previously one felt shy to be a galamsey
security would also not spare anyone they get. worker, but now that is the order of the day’. A young man added: ‘To
As the numbers of illegal ASM operators increased, the conflict be a galamsey worker is not our wish but because there are no jobs, that
between them and AGC escalated as the former turned their attention to is why we are doing it’. Many of the inhabitants expressed a strong
encroaching on the underground mining operations using the old desire for underground mining to reopen, seeing it as the solution to the
abandoned mine shafts of AGC to get to the ore underground and even lack of employment in the town and the growing number of illegal ASM
stealing ore following blasting by AGC. The MCE of Obuasi recalled operators. Thus, in Prestea the lack of employment opportunities in
how: large-scale mining, as a result of the closure of the underground mine,
What happened was that at one point, after the confrontation, with has compelled retrenched and new miners to turn to galamsey for their
the military and the police, we don’t know what happened, the galamsey livelihoods, as was vividly expressed by one participant in the FGD in
people also found themselves in the underground and running their Prestea: ‘Previously, the mines were employing 5,000 workers but now
own shifts and so on and you know the underground it was do or die there is no more underground so a lot of workers are now staying home.
affair. If you go there they will attack you. It was bad. We had to em- As a result of that, those who didn’t know anything about galamsey are
ploy a lot of diplomacy to get them to agree to leave where they were now involved in the galamsey’. Again, this shows how closely linked
operating because where the galamseyors were operating would have ASM and large-scale mining are, with miners moving between formal
collapsed this mine. and informal mining operations as opportunities change over time.
This illustrates how ASM and large-scale mining are very closely
interlinked in the context of Obuasi and the types of conflicts that can 5.3. Kenyasi
arise between informal and formal mining operations.
Kenyasi is located in the heart of the Brong-Ahafo Region and is the
5.2. Prestea centre of the multi-national mining company Newmont’s Ahafo op-
erations. The town is the capital of Asutifi District, which is primarily
Prestea is located at the north-eastern part of the Western Region, in rural with subsistence agriculture being the main economic activity.
the most intensively mined district (Wassa West District) in Ghana and Hence Kenyasi differs from Obuasi and Prestea in that mining is a fairly
possibly in the whole of Africa. Several multi-national mining compa- recent activity but similar to the other towns both large-scale mining
nies operate in the area along with numerous small-scale mining ac- and ASM are present. According to the 2010 Ghana Population and
tivities. Prestea is entirely the creation of various large-scale mining Housing Census, the population of the two adjacent urban settlements
companies that worked the Prestea concession, starting in the 1920s Kenyasi 1 and Kenyasi 2 is 5,347.
with the British Ariston Gold Mining Company. After independence, the Gold mining in the area stems from the arrival of Newmont Gold
mine became a state gold mining corporation, which was acquired by Mining Company in the mid-2000s, located on the Ahafo concession.
Prestea Goldfields in the 1980s and later by Prestea Golden Star Contrary to expectations, very few local residents have obtained em-
Resources (GSR). Prestea witnessed very rapid population growth up to ployment with Newmont but many locals have turned to work as ga-
the 1960s reaching 13,246 in 1960, then increased only slightly to lamseyors, both out of necessity and as opportunities for entrepreneurial
15,143 in 1970, rising to almost 17,000 in 1984. With the revival of the activities have arisen (Kala, 2016). As a young, male small-scale miner
mining industry in the district in the mid-1990s, there was a corre- from Kenyasi explained:
sponding increase in the population to 21,844 in 2000 and subse- I was looking forward to being employed by Newmont but I didn’t
quently approaching 27,000 in 2010, two-thirds of whom were born in get hired. But when I looked at galamseyors and the fact that when they
Prestea. return from work they buy food, I decided to do that. And now I realize
The Prestea underground mining operation declined considerably it is a good thing to do and better than employment at Newmont.
from 1973, leading to its eventual closure in 1992. The revival of the As in the case of many galamsey operators, this young man entered
mining sector in the 1990s, however, resulted in new investment being into ASM by default but views his illegal informal activity as more
channelled to Wassa West District by a number of multinational mining appealing than working in large-scale mining. This attitude relates to
companies, largely for surface mining rather than underground opera- the fact that Kenyasi has a different historical trajectory to Obuasi and
tions. As in Obuasi, this switch in type of mining operation resulted in Prestea; galamsey operators in Kenyasi do not experience the same
the retrenchment of most miners, many of whom moved into the illegal stigma because the area has no ‘golden age of large-scale mining’ to use
ASM sector. Prestea, however, turned into an illegal ASM haven at- as a reference point.
tracting workers from other areas where underground miners had been Another perceived advantage of galamsey is the associated increase
retrenched. In 2007, the central government banned illegal ASM from in commercial activities in the town arising from artisanal miners’ daily
operating in the Prestea area because of conflicts with large-scale expenditure. As an elderly man explained:
mining. As an illegal ASM operator explained: ‘It worried us a lot but we The changes that I observed since I was growing up are about
couldn’t challenge the government, but we were very sad because it was hardships that people were going through previously. Newmont came
our source of livelihood'. The government, however, lacked the political here but it wasn’t many people they could employ. After the galamsey
will to sustain the ban resulting in illegal ASM operating in many lo- started there have been a lot of advantages because the enhanced
cations in and around Prestea. According to the Member of Parliament purchasing power of galamsey operators supports commercial activities.
for Prestea-Huni-Valley, no concessions could be given to ASM opera- I have observed the hardships that people used to go through when I
tors as the mineralised land has been given on concession to large-scale was growing up being replaced with favourable changes. The town is
mining, including Prestea town. He questioned, however, how a tra- developing with the benefits accruing from the galamsey, which exceeds
ditional town such as Prestea could be located within a mining con- that of Newmont.
cession claiming, “If tomorrow the mining company decides to mine at As most employees of Newmont live in Sunyani, about one hour’s
the chief’s palace, the chief and indigenous community have nothing to journey from Kenyasi and are bussed to work in the mine daily, the
say”, highlighting the precariousness of the town’s situation. residents of Kenyasi have not benefitted from the arrival of large-scale
The recourse to galamsey as an occupational solution, despite all the mining in terms of direct employment nor do they reap the benefits of
associated dangers, was a logical response to the underground mine the purchasing power of Newmont employees.
closure, especially for the many young men in Prestea who faced a lack The relationship between ASM and large-scale mining with respect
of alternative income-generating activities. As a young woman in one of to land access also differs in Kenyasi from Obuasi and Prestea. This is
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P.W.K. Yankson, K.V. Gough The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 120–128
because galamsey activities in Kenyasi occur outside the concession Table 1
owned by Newmont Mining Company, hence there have been no con- Occupation of employed persons (15 years and above) in the surveyed towns
flicts over land. The importance of galamsey for Kenyasi was brought (percentage).
home to many residents when the settlement’s power generation plant Source: Ghana, Census Reports: 1960 Population Census of Ghana: Vol. 4:
broke down and the galamsey operators were no longer able to work. Economic Characteristics of Local Authorities, Regions, Total Country; 2010
When this happened, taxis were no longer patronised and commercial Population and Housing Census.
activities around the pits slowed down considerably as many artisanal Obuasi1 Prestea2 Kenyasi3
miners returned to their hometowns due to lack of earnings. This shows
how dependent Kenyasi is on galamsey and how ASM activities inject Industrial Sector 1960 2010 1960 2010 2010
Agriculture, fishing, hunting 10.6 10.1 55.6 44.5 54.6
much more cash into the local economy than any income earned in Mining and quarrying 45.4 13.3 21.7 18.5 11.8
large-scale mining. The case of Kenyasi thus illustrates the way in which Manufacturing 9.5 10.5 6.2 7.3 7.0
expectations of benefits from formal mining activities are not necessa- Construction 1.9 3.2 0.5 1.6 1.1
rily met, and that the economic bene Electricity, gas, water, sanitary 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.2fits of informal mining activities
services
can be central to the economy of a small town. Commerce 20.5 27.2 8.8 13.8 7.3
Transport, storage, 1.7 3.9 2.3 2.2 1.8
communications
6. Impact of changes in large-scale mining and ASM on Services 9.2 17.4 3.3 9.6 12.4
employment All others 0.9 7.5 0.9 –
Persons seeking work for the – 6.5 – 2.3 3.8
The changing relationship between large-scale mining and ASM first time
outlined above has implications for employment within the mining Total population 11,533 68,345 64,978 66,626 47,602
settlements. In Table 1, the Ghana Population and Housing Census 1 Obuasi Urban Council Area (1960); Obuasi Municipal Assembly Area
Reports show that there has been a decline in formal mining employ- (2010).
ment in Obuasi. In 1960, when there was virtually no galamsey op- 2 Wassa-Fiase-Mpohow Local Council (1960); Prestea-Huni Valley District
eration in Obuasi, just under half (45.5 percent) of the employed per- Assembly (2010).
sons (15 years and above) were engaged in mining and quarrying, 3 Asutifi District (Kenyasi) (2010).
which dropped to just 13.3 percent in 2010 (with no means of ascer-
taining which sector they were employed in). The capital-intensive for Obuasi (30.6 percent) and Prestea (44.2 percent) and also in Kenyasi
mechanization programme implemented during the 1980s and 1990s (from 6.3 percent in 2001 to 31.3 percent in 2011), reflecting a move
resulted in staffing at Ashanti Goldfields Company (AGC) being reduced into galamsey as large-scale mining employment contracted. The in-
from approximately 10,000 in 1996 to less than 6,600 in 2003, while crease in mining as an activity is most prominent in Kenyasi due to
the town grew from around 61,000 in 1984 to approaching 116,000 in mining being a relatively recent activity (Gough et al., 2018). The 2010
2000. By 2010, the total number of employees of AngloGold Ashanti at census shows that the district is still predominantly rural with agri-
the Obuasi mine was just 4,225 plus 1,497 contractors1, which culture employing over half (almost 55 percent) of the economically
amounted to 3.4 percent of the total urban population. As indicated active labour force, whilst almost 12 percent was engaged in mining,
above, many of the retrenched workers from the large-scale mining most likely in ASM (Table 1).
companies found their way into illegal ASM in Obuasi and elsewhere.
The reduction in the workforce of large-scale mining is a clear indica-
tion of its declining importance, giving rise to the enhanced role of 7. Conclusion
illegal ASM in generating employment. As Table 1 shows, commerce
has now become the dominant sector in Obuasi, employing over a This paper has shown how mining employment is clearly in-
quarter (27.2 percent) of the inhabitants; commerce comprises the formalising in Ghana, as miners retrenched from large-scale mining,
buying and selling of goods and services at di erent scales of operation, together with those entering mining for the first time, are becomingff
though most of the enterprises are micro and small-scale informal en- ASM operators. Conflict over access to mineralised land has intensified
terprises. as even registered miners experience difficulties accessing land, com-
In Prestea, mining and quarrying employed 22 percent of the town’s pelling illegal ASM operators to extend their operations into the mining
population in 1960, declining in the intervening years as a result of the concessions of large-scale mining companies. This has made the illegal
closure of the town’s underground mining operation in 1992. In the status of galamsey operations more apparent, incurring the wrath of the
2010 Population and Housing Census, 18.5 percent of employed per- large-scale mining companies and central government. As demon-
sons aged 15 years and above were engaged in mining, many of whom strated in the case of Obuasi and Prestea, the conflict over access to
presumably were in the illegal ASM sector. Like Obuasi, the enhanced mineralised land is a consequence of the state’s preference for large-
contribution of commerce, largely an informal economy activity, in the scale mining in terms of land allocation, combined with the high cost
employment structure of Prestea between 1960 and 2010 is clear. and bureaucratic bottlenecks encountered by ASM in the formalisation
Table 2 shows the main source of income of households surveyed in process. Where galamsey operations have not extended onto the con-
2011 and 10 years previously. No distinction was made between those cession of large-scale mining companies, as in the case of Newmont in
involved in large-scale mining and ASM but a greater proportion of the Kenyasi, there has not been any direct conflict between the formal and
sampled households had members operating in ASM. Despite the loss of informal operators. In this instance, chiefs, farmers and other land-
wage employment from large-scale mining, in 2001 the main source of owners have released land to ASM operators without being constrained
income for households in Prestea was from mining (26.7 percent) fol- by the illegal status of ASM, illustrating how reactions to informal ac-
lowed by skilled work (21 percent), whereas in Obuasi, which is more tivities are inconsistent (Schindler, 2014).
dominated by large-scale mining, it was skilled work (19.4 percent) As demonstrated in this paper, ASM has become critical for the
followed by mining (10 percent). By 2011, the proportion of households economy of mining towns in Ghana, both in terms of generating em-
with mining as their main source of income had increased appreciably ployment and the expenditure of the operators who are sustaining the
sale of goods and services. Yet without formal recognition, many illegal
ASM operators will continue to encounter difficulties. Until recently,
1 www.anglogoldashanti.co.za/subwebs/…/reports10/…/ghana.htm(ac- attempts by the state to formalise ASM in Ghana were largely un-
cessed 23-05-2013) successful, hence as Hilson et al. (2017) have stated, there is the need to
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P.W.K. Yankson, K.V. Gough The Extractive Industries and Society 6 (2019) 120–128
Table 2
Main sources of income for households in the mining towns, 2001 and 2011 (percentages).
Source: Authors; household survey, 2011
Main household income source 2001 2011
Obuasi Prestea Kenyasi Mean Obuasi Prestea Kenyasi Mean
None* 31.3 20.0 27.5 26.7 2.5 1.7 3.8 2.5
Farming 6.3 7.5 28.7 11.7 5.6 7.5 28.7 11.4
Mining 10.0 26.7 6.3 14.7 30.6 44.2 31.3 35.3
Small Trade
Trade general 14.4 14.2 12.5 13.9 18.1 12.5 8.8 14.2
Petty food & drink trade 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.7 0.0 0.8
Trade in agriculture products 0.6 0.0 2.5 0.8
Big Business
Trade in mining products 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.0 1.3 1.1
Shop 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.8
Guesthouse / hotel 1.3 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3
Blue-collar workers
Casual labourer 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.3
Unskilled work 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.0 1.3 0.6
Skilled work 19.4 20.8 15.0 18.9 20.6 24.2 20.0 21.7
Formal employment 4.4 3.3 1.3 3.3 5.0 1.7 1.3 3.1
Other 11.3 2.5 5.0 6.9 13.8 4.2 2.5 8.1
* A large proportion of those listing ‘no household income’ in 2001 had no work then because they were still children, students or simply unemployed.
‘reconceptualise formalisation’ of the sector. Since land is key to ASM reviewers and the Editor Gavin Hilson helped improve the paper con-
formalisation (McQuilken and Hilson, 2016), the processes involved in siderably.
acquiring land need to be streamlined to encourage galamseyors to opt
to be registered. Accessing land is highly complex, however, with References
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