'' , - 
NON-CRCIJ! ( T Mf ] 
I YUN INTERVIEW 
\ SIR GUY MILLARD \ }'N l ! r ^ A 
I FYFIELD. ENGLAND 
APRIL 20. 1991 ... . ... .... . . vc, 
INTERVIEWERt JAMES SUTTERLIN v 1 " 
Table of Contents UNj C 1. u 
The 1956 Suez C r i s i s 
M i l l a r d ' s p o s i t i o n with Eden 1-2 
Eden's a t t i t u d e toward Egypt 2-4 
Eden's discussions with Bulganin and Khrushchev 5 
Eden's a t t i t u d e toward I s r a e l 6-7 
Eden and the United States 7-9; 14-15; 31-32 
Plans to eliminate Nasser 10-11 
Lloyd-Fawzi t a l k s 11-13 
Knowledge of I s r a e l ' s plans 13 
Eden's r e l a t i o n s with the French 14 
The c e a s e - f i r e 14; 27-28 
P r i o r m i l i t a r y planning 15-19 
UK p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n French-Israeli planning 20-23 
Eden's mental a t t i t u d e 23-24; 29-31 
Foreign o f f i c e p o s i t i o n 25-26 
The r o l e of the Un 26-27 
The o r i g i n s of peace-keeping 28-29 
M i l l a r d ' s views on the management of the c r i s i s 33-35 
YUN INTERVIEW 
SIR GUY MILLARD 
FYFIELD, ENGLAND 
APRIL 20, 1991 
INTERVIEWER: JAMES SUTTERLIN 
JS I would l i k e f i r s t to express appreciation f o r your 
willingness to p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s Yale U n i v e r s i t y oral 
h i s t o r y project r e l a t e d to the United Nations. I f I 
might I would l i k e f i r s t to ask you to indicate j u s t for 
the record what your p o s i t i o n was i n the Prime Minister's 
o f f i c e i n 1956 before and during the Suez C r i s i s . 
GM I was the Prime Minister's p r i v a t e secretary, the number 
two p r i v a t e secretary, p r i m a r i l y dealing with foreign 
a f f a i r s , r e l a t i o n s with the Foreign O f f i c e i t s e l f , but 
not e n t i r e l y because there were four of us and we a l l 
obviously had to be interchangeable and I had to deal 
with i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s as w e l l . We very often were on 
duty, f o r example, alone at Chequers i n which case one 
dealt with the whole spectrum of things, but obviously as 
I was seconded from the Foreign O f f i c e myself - there 
were two of us - we p r i m a r i l y dealt with foreign a f f a i r s , 
defense a f f a i r s and so on. Whereas the other two 
concentrated more on the i n t e r n a l side. 
JS And what had your background been i n the Foreign O f f i c e 
before assuming t h i s position? 
GM I had joined the Foreign O f f i c e j u s t before the war, I 
l e f t i t a time during the war; I came back and my f i r s t 
1 
post was i n Paris i n the Embassy f o r four years. I then 
went to Turkey f o r three years. I came back and went to 
the Imperial Defense College. And then I dealt f o r two 
years as the as s i s t a n t to the head of an o f f i c e c a l l e d i n 
those days, the A f r i c a n Department, concerned with Egypt 
and the Sudan, during which time, of course, we had the 
negotiations f o r the evacuation of the Suez Canal base, 
which was signed i n 1954. So I dealt with that i n a 
comparatively j u n i o r capacity. I had been Eden's junior 
Private Secretary for a time during the war when I came 
back from the Navy, and when he became Prime Minister, he 
asked me to go with him to 10 Downing Street. 
JS I see, so you had background both with him as a person 
and also background i n the Foreign O f f i c e with the Middle 
East question [GM: to a c e r t a i n extent], which leads me 
to my f i r s t question. Being so c l o s e l y associated could 
you give an assessment of what mental background Anthony 
Eden brought to the period of the Suez c r i s i s ? Did he do 
so with some foregone conclusions? Was t h i s a new 
subject f o r him? Was global s t r a t e g i c concern foremost 
i n h i s mind? What was h i s mentality then? 
GM Well i t c e r t a i n l y wasn't a new subject f o r him because 
he'd been dealing with foreign a f f a i r s f o r most of his 
l i f e . He was also very much preoccupied with the Middle 
East. I think he mistrusted Nasser very much from the 
time he became Prime Minister because of h i s previous 
2 
experiences as Foreign Secretary. He had met Nasser, I 
think i'm r i g h t i n saying, early i n 1955, j u s t before he 
became Prime Minister and they had a long discussion of 
the propaganda which Radio Cairo and others were beaming 
out aimed at western i n t e r e s t s i n general and B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s i n p a r t i c u l a r , and Nasser gave him a kind of 
assurance that t h i s propaganda would be reduced i f not 
eliminated. Of course i t went on more than ever. Eden, 
I think, f e l t a sense of betrayal there. Also, of 
course, when the Canal c r i s i s broke, the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n 
of the Canal, he f e l t that t h i s was a threat to h i s own 
p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n because he had been Foreign Secretary 
when the Suez Canal Base was evacuated, that agreement 
with the Egyptians whereby we removed our troops from the 
Suez Canal Zone and therefore diminished our capacity to 
react to any threat coming from the Egyptians or from the 
Middle East. That had been a co n t r o v e r s i a l matter i n the 
Conservative Party and s t i l l was very much so at the time 
of the Suez thing. I think that Eden f e l t that to a 
c e r t a i n extent h i s own p o s i t i o n was compromised by the 
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Canal. He was under very strong 
pressure from a small group of right-wing conservatives, 
the s o - c a l l e d Suez group. I don't think they were very 
important. Perhaps he overestimated t h e i r importance. 
JS In reading through the l i t e r a t u r e from the time, 
including h i s own memoirs and e s p e c i a l l y Selwyn Lloyd's, 
3 
there are frequent comparisons of Nasser with H i t l e r and 
i n f a c t some of the language i s very comparable to what 
was used more recently with regards to Saddam Hussein, 
even the expressions of concern about global o i l supplies 
and so f o r t h are s i m i l a r . Was t h i s , i n fa c t , something 
which Anthony Eden saw i n that perspective, he saw Nasser 
as a g l o b a l l y dangerous person with H i t l e r - l i k e 
tendencies? 
GM Well, yes, I think i t i s . I think that he saw Nasser i n 
very much the same terms as perhaps President Bush sees 
Saddam Hussein now, namely as a threat to world order, a 
threat to the s t a b i l i t y of the Middle East, a threat to 
Western i n t e r e s t s i n general and to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , since perhaps we had more i n t e r e s t i n the 
Middle East than any other Western power at that time. 
JS Was the Prime Minister's approach i n dealing with t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r question, I suppose other questions as well, 
but p a r t i c u l a r l y t h i s c r i s i s which was a very serious 
one, was i t a hands-on approach from the beginning? Was 
he so-to-speak i n charge, or d i d he tend to delegate 
action with regard to Egypt and the c r i s i s to the Foreign 
Secretary? 
GM No, I think i t f a i r to say that i t was very much a hands-
on approach from the beginning. Because he f e l t i t was 
a threat to our national i n t e r e s t s , a very large threat, 
and he was convinced at that time - not only he, but I 
4 
think the government i n general and Chiefs of S t a f f -were 
convinced that there was a very serious threat to our o i l 
supplies through the Suez Canal. I t must be remembered 
that we were e n t i r e l y dependent upon Middle East o i l at 
that time. The o i l i n the North Sea had not been 
discovered or even dreamt about and you w i l l remember 
that when Khrushchev and Bulganin came to see Eden, paid 
t h i s o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Eden i n the early summer of 1956, 
he t o l d them that i n the event of a threat to our v i t a l 
i n t e r e s t s , of an int e r r u p t i o n of o i l supplies, we would 
be prepared to f i g h t . And maybe that encouraged them to 
twist the l i o n ' s t a i l , I don't know, i t has always been 
thought that perhaps i t did. 
But there was a s p e c i f i c discussion at that point with 
the Soviets? 
Yes. 
Because t h i s brings me to a l a t e r question but I think 
I ' l l jump ahead at t h i s point because l a t e r , of course, 
when the c r i s i s was i n f u l l f l u x , Bulganin sent 
threatening l e t t e r s both to the B r i t i s h and to the 
French. My question i s had there been any intermediary 
contact between the B r i t i s h , the Prime Minister, and the 
Soviets, that i s , between t h i s meeting with Khrushchev i n 
the summer and then the time when the threats came from 
the Soviets? 
I suppose during the course of the c r i s i s there had been 
messages passing to and f r o , but I don't r e c a l l any 
p a r t i c u l a r contacts with the Soviet government before the 
n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Canal, and between the v i s i t by 
Khrushchev and Bulganin and the outbreak of the Suez 
c r i s i s i n l a t e J u l y '56. 
JS From your perspective d i d you conclude that Eden had any 
p a r t i c u l a r predispositions toward I s r a e l , was he i n c l i n e d 
one way or the other toward the country or the 
leadership, or indeed toward the events which led to i t s 
creation? 
GM No, he wasn't p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o - I s r a e l . 
JS Can one say the opposite? 
GM No, I don't think one can. 
JS Do you think that he f e l t that the p a r t i t i o n and the 
establishment of the state was i n f a c t a p o s i t i v e 
development? 
GM Well, I don't think anybody r e a l l y could consider i t a 
p o s i t i v e development i n the sense that ever since then 
the Middle East has been inherently unstable and any 
B r i t i s h Foreign Secretary, e s p e c i a l l y one with the long 
background of experience that Eden had, must be obliged 
to take that into account. I t i s a threat to the 
s t a b i l i t y of the Middle East. Against that, of course, 
you must set the f a c t that the Jews now have a national 
home, which they owe very l a r g e l y to B r i t i s h p o l i c y . 
This again i s something that the Arabs held against us. 
6 
JS At that p a r t i c u l a r time, j u s t as the c r i s i s was reaching 
i t s high point, the B r i t i s h — and I believe perhaps the 
Prime Minister was d i r e c t l y involved i n t h i s but I'd l i k e 
your confirmation — d i d give warning to I s r a e l that i f 
there should be an attack against Jordan that the mutual 
assistance pact between England and Jordan would come 
into e f f e c t . Was that a serious move? Some people on 
the I s r a e l i side have suggested that t h i s was simply a 
f e i n t to disguise what the ultimate purpose was, to get 
t h e i r cooperation? 
GM No, that i s not so. C e r t a i n l y a warning was given to 
I s r a e l , yes, and I think i n f a c t some contingency 
planning was done i n the event of an outbreak of a war i n 
which the I s r a e l i s would be involved with Jordan because 
we had t h i s commitment to Jordan. 
JS So, i t was serious? 
GM Yes. 
JS And indeed that was the nature of your contact at that 
point with Israel? 
GM Yes. 
JS I want to go ahead now to one of the more controversial 
aspects of t h i s c r i s i s , and that i s the American ro l e . 
Could you describe the background of Anthony Eden's 
expectations from the American side? He was well 
acquainted, i f I'm not mistaken, with President 
Eisenhower. 
7 
Certainly, he was well acquainted with Eisenhower, and I 
think a good f r i e n d of Eisenhower up to the time of the 
B r i t i s h attack on Egypt. I think that he received 
c o n f l i c t i n g s i g n a l s . Eisenhower, I don't think, ever 
disguised h i s antagonism to the use of force i n t h i s 
c r i s i s . Foster Dulles sometimes gave very ambiguous 
messages on that and I think that maybe t h i s was one of 
the contributing causes to a misunderstanding which 
eventually arose between the B r i t i s h and the Americans. 
That was p r e c i s e l y my question because again, reading 
through the American records at l e a s t , the at t i t u d e of 
the President was quite c l e a r from the beginning. 
Yes, i t was c l e a r . I don't think he ever made i t 
s p e c i f i c , I don't think he ever s p e c i f i c a l l y s a i d that i f 
you attack Egypt we w i l l do everything i n our power to 
stop you. That c e r t a i n l y wasn't c l e a r . You know 
MacMillan paid t h i s v i s i t to Washington during the course 
of the c r i s i s and he came back with a sort of op t i m i s t i c , 
from our point of view, assessment of what the American 
action would be. I think i t i s f a i r to say that i n 
Eden's mind - and no doubt i n MacMillan's mind as well -
the thought was that when we attacked, the Americans 
would make a fuss, yes, that i t would cause a c e r t a i n 
amount of trouble and anger i n American r e l a t i o n s , but i n 
the l a s t r e sort they would not oppose us. 
Somewhat s i m i l a r to the assumption a good many years 
8 
l a t e r with regard to the Falklands at that point. 
One must remember, I think, that one of the unspoken aims 
of the whole operation which was mounted was to overthrow 
Nasser, and the American government shared t h i s aim. 
Foster Dulles had made that quite c l e a r on various 
occasions, and indeed i t was one of the American 
objectives i n withdrawing American a i d f o r the High Aswan 
Dam, that t h i s would help to p r e c i p i t a t e the overthrow of 
Nasser. 
I wanted to ask about that i n p a r t i c u l a r . Subsequently 
B r i t a i n also withdrew i t s aid from the Aswan Dam, but was 
there an i n c l i n a t i o n on the Prime Minister's part, and 
indeed on others' parts, to a t t r i b u t e Nasser's action i n 
n a t i o n a l i z i n g the Canal s p e c i f i c a l l y to the Dulles action 
i n withdrawing the Aswan aid? 
Yes, I think there was. The actual withdrawal of aid, i f 
I remember r i g h t l y , had been agreed between the B r i t i s h 
and American governments. What had not been agreed was 
the timing of the communication and the manner of i t , and 
we f e l t that we had been rushed, i n the way i n which i t 
was done. I t was done f i n a l l y without consultation and 
to some extent I think that Eden and Selwyn Lloyd and the 
government i n general a t t r i b u t e d Nasser's v i o l e n t 
reaction p a r t l y to the way i n which t h i s was done. 
You j u s t mentioned that i t was i n the mutual i n t e r e s t s of 
the U.S., of the U.K., and of France to get r i d of Nasser 
and there was, I think, some consultation between the 
U.S. and France about what to do about Nasser. Were 
other things thought of besides withdrawing the a i d from 
the Aswan Dam? Were there other ideas as to how to get 
r i d of Nasser or d i d the m i l i t a r y element begin to figure 
i n B r i t i s h thinking f a i r l y early? 
I t c e r t a i n l y figured i n B r i t i s h thinking from the time of 
the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Canal onward. In other words, 
that i f t h i s c r i s i s couldn't be s e t t l e d by diplomatic 
means then i n the l a s t resort the use of force was 
contemplated from the very beginning. The Government 
committed themselves to that, they committed themselves 
to a m i l i t a r y plan and so on, almost from the f i r s t day, 
and c e r t a i n l y one of the objectives of the m i l i t a r y 
operation would have been to overthrow Nasser. One must 
also remember that o r i g i n a l l y the operation, when i t was 
launched, i f i t was launched, was designed to be launched 
against Alexandria and to go to Cairo with the object of 
overthrowing Nasser and thereby sol v i n g the problem of 
the Canal, k i l l i n g two birds with one stone you might 
say. In the course of the planning, not f o r p o l i t i c a l 
reasons, but p r i m a r i l y for m i l i t a r y reason, I think, t h i s 
was changed. And the operation which was o r i g i n a l l y 
c a l l e d Musketeer then became Musketeer Revised. The 
objective was switched to Port Said and the Canal. 
Given what i s now happening i n Iraq, the questions I 
10 
think i s e s p e c i a l l y important as to what ultimate 
objective was foreseen at that time. Once Nasser was 
eliminated what was going to be next? 
GM I think the a t t i t u d e was that one step at a time was 
enough f o r us. Presumably one of the objectives behind 
the recent operations i n the Gulf was to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein. Unfortunately, i t hasn't happened. I don't 
think that one need have a complete plan f o r replacing a 
d i c t a t o r with some other form of government, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i f he i s a d i c t a t o r of the kind that Saddam Hussein i s . 
I t i s quite a step forward to overthrow him i n the f i r s t 
place, regardless of what comes next. 
JS The r e a l point of t h i s question, I suppose, i s the 
question of sovereignty over the Canal and the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Canal u t i l i z a t i o n . B r i t i s h 
thinking and B r i t i s h planning at the highest l e v e l , did 
i t foresee a continuation of the trend, that i s , the 
withdrawal of the B r i t i s h base and i n f a c t the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Canal, i f not nationalized by 
the Egyptians at l e a s t recognition of Egyptian 
sovereignty? 
GM Yes, I think so. The Canal always had surely been 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l , i t was an i n t e r n a t i o n a l waterway. That i s 
how we regarded i t . Not as something that belonged 
ex c l u s i v e l y to the B r i t i s h and the French. But you 
remember that Selwyn Lloyd had t h i s long negotiation with 
11 
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi i n the United Nations and 
they came to an agreement more or l e s s on s i x p r i n c i p l e s , 
one of which was respect f o r Egyptian sovereignty over 
the Canal, but i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l operation. 
I f I could skip ahead to those t a l k s f o r a moment. 
Indeed they d i d reach agreement on quite a few of the s i x 
points at that stage. There are various versions of 
exactly who i n i t i a t e d those t a l k s , whether i t was Selwyn 
Lloyd or Dag Hammarskjold. Do you have any p a r t i c u l a r 
views on that? Do you r e c a l l exactly how you saw i t from 
Number Ten Downing Street, so to speak? Was i t the 
Secretary General of the United Nations who was 
intervening, i f you w i l l , i n order to bring the three 
p a r t i e s together, or was i t a B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e ? 
I'm a f r a i d I can't r e c a l l at t h i s point. 
There i s another re l a t e d question. The Secretary 
General, Dag Hammarskjold, as those t a l k s were concluded, 
I believe had the impression that r e a l l y substantial 
progress had been made and that the key to the c r i s i s had 
been found. That does not r e f l e c t the thinking of the 
French. I wondered about the B r i t i s h , whether the Prime 
Minister f e l t that the problem was at a hopeful stage? 
I don't think i t affected our thinking e i t h e r r e a l l y 
because i f you remember, the r e s o l u t i o n which was passed 
i n the UN was divided into two parts. The f i r s t part 
approved the s i x p r i n c i p l e s and the second part c a l l e d 
12 
f o r Egypt to put forward a scheme f o r t h e i r operation. 
That part f a i l e d ; i t was vetoed. So no, our government 
would not have regarded the upshot as an adequate 
s o l u t i o n to the c r i s i s . 
We got a l i t t l e ahead of the story there. I want to go 
back to ask when, i f i t can be defined, on the B r i t i s h 
side there was f i r s t an awareness of the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
I s r a e l i n i t i a t i n g an attack against Egypt, i f not the 
question of B r i t i s h and French p a r t i c i p a t i o n ? 
This brings me back to what I said about Jordan. There 
was a very great deal of tension at that time between 
I s r a e l and the neighboring Arab countries, stimulated by 
Nasser who'd created t h i s Middle East command, and there 
were constant boarder raids against I s r a e l p r i m a r i l y from 
Egypt but also, I think, from Jordan, and t h i s i s what 
gave r i s e to the threat of m i l i t a r y operations between 
I s r a e l and Jordan i n which we might become involved. So 
to that extent c e r t a i n l y the prospect of I s r a e l i 
involvement was already taken into account. The actual 
knowledge of the p o s s i b i l i t y of an I s r a e l i attack on 
Egypt d i d not come to our notice u n t i l the French t o l d 
us, the French having been i n contact the I s r a e l i s on 
t h i s question f o r a considerable period of time. 
But at l e a s t from the f i r s t of September. 
I don't know. 
This brings me to ask how would you define or comment on 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet and 
fo r that matter Pineau who seems to have been very 
important on the French side. Was there a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of t r u s t , confidence, had they known each other f o r long? 
Relations were very good. Mollet was very pro B r i t i s h , 
i f I may say so. In f a c t our r e l a t i o n s with the French 
government at that time were a great deal easier than 
they were subsequently a f t e r General De Gaulle assumed 
power. Mollet knew England well, he was a professor of 
English I think, or a teacher, and was very well disposed 
and a very easy man to deal with, and c e r t a i n l y r e l a t i o n s 
were good between him and Eden, and Pineau as well. I 
don't think they had known each other f o r a very long 
time, but we had very easy r e l a t i o n s with the French 
Government at that time. I t ' s one of the sad things 
about Suez that probably we had a better r e l a t i o n s h i p 
with the French at that time than we had for many many 
years a f t e r . A r e l a t i o n s h i p which was, of course, 
damaged by what happened. 
Why, because of French d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the B r i t i s h 
m i l i a r y performance? 
No, because the French f e l t that we l e t them down by 
c a l l i n g the operation o f f . 
Which brings me to another question which comes l a t e r i n 
the s e r i e s . The I s r a e l i s were a c t u a l l y the f i r s t to 
accept the ceasefi r e , i n fac t they accepted before the 
14 
B r i t i s h had hardly landed. What was the reaction i n the 
PM's o f f i c e to that? 
GM I think i t caused a c e r t a i n amount of consternation, but 
the f a c t i s the I s r a e l i s accepted the cease f i r e because 
they had already obtained t h e i r objectives. They were on 
the Canal. But I think also that at that time, the 
thought was gaining ground that we would have to c a l l the 
operation o f f anyway because of American pressure. 
JS And what was the most e f f e c t i v e form of American 
pressure, the f i n a n c i a l pressure, or were there others? 
GM C e r t a i n l y I think the most e f f e c t i v e was f i n a n c i a l 
pressure, yes. 
JS And you d i d see that at the time as d i r e c t pressure? 
GM Yes. 
JS Which brings me back to the question of Foster Dulles. 
A great deal has been written about the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between Eden, or at l e a s t the a t t i t u d e of Eden toward 
Foster Dulles. Could you j u s t from your own experience 
elaborate on t h i s at a l l , any personal i n s i g h t s as to 
basis f o r the d i s t r u s t i f that was the correct 
cha r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , or simply d i s l i k e ? 
GM Eden didn't l i k e Foster Dulles very much, that's true. 
I don't know whether Foster Dulles l i k e d Eden, probably 
he d i d not. They were very d i f f e r e n t animals. Eden was 
an i n s t i n c t i v e person of tremendous charm, about as 
d i f f e r e n t an animal from Foster Dulles as you could 
15 
imagine. Foster Dulles was very l e g a l i s t i c , he expressed 
himself i n a very involved way which caused a ce r t a i n 
amount of mistrust on Eden's part and of course the 
mistrust was enormously increased by what happened over 
the thing c a l l e d the Suez Canal Users Association over 
which Eden f e l t that he'd been completely betrayed and 
deceived by Dulles. 
JS Could you elaborate on that, why? 
GM Well because as we understood i t when Dulles produced 
t h i s plan i n London the object was to form an association 
to c o l l e c t the dues, to deny them to Nasser unless he 
accepted as s a t i s f a c t o r y the i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime fo r the 
canal. And i f he didn't accept that, i f necessary to 
force our way through. And t h i s was the subject of an 
agreed statement both i n London and i n Washington. Eden 
made the statement i n the House of Commons and i t was 
read out i n Washington by Dulles himself, or perhaps by 
a spokesman, i n exactly the same terms. But Dulles 
almost immediately afterwards denied i t by saying that he 
never r e a l l y had any intention of fo r c i n g a way through, 
that t h i s was never h i s concept of the organization. I 
think somebody said, "well you've taken a l l the teeth 
out of t h i s " , and he said "as f a r as I'm concerned i t 
never had any teeth." 
JS This idea I think was f i r s t formulated by Dulles, t h i s 
Users Association, did you on the B r i t i s h side see i t at 
16 
that time as simply a delaying device or d i d you think of 
i t as something serious that might, i f i t hadn't l o s t i t s 
teeth, have offered a solution? 
GM Eden thought i t was put f o r t h s e r i o u s l y by the American 
government, yes. Later he c e r t a i n l y came to regard i t as 
a delaying device, which I think i t was. I think Dulles' 
t a c t i c s , although perhaps we didn't r e a l i z e i t at the 
time, Dulles' t a c t i c s throughout the c r i s i s were to put 
every possible obstacle i n the way of the use of force 
and t h i s was one of them. 
JS And t h i s i s something that has always puzzled me - why 
then, at l e a s t from the B r i t i s h perception - d i d the 
Americans, and Dulles i n p a r t i c u l a r , object so strongly 
when B r i t a i n and France took the matter to the Security 
Council? 
GM That i s more a question f o r the American government I 
think. My understanding was that Dulles perhaps was 
a f r a i d of f a i l u r e - there i s always a problem i n the UN 
whether a matter can be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y resolved there, i t 
i s subject to the Soviet veto, and so on. But I think 
also there was the problem of the Panama Canal and he was 
a f r a i d of the repercussions of discussion i n the UN and 
resolutions of the UN on that problem. 
JS There had been, as you have said, m i l i t a r y contingency 
planning at l e a s t on the B r i t i s h side from the time of 
the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Canal - perhaps before, I 
17 
don't know as to that. But my question here i s , was the 
Prime Minister involved d i r e c t l y i n the m i l i t a r y planning 
as well as the p o l i t i c a l aspects. 
GM Yes, there was a small committee of ministers set up -
the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State f o r War, 
the Secretary f o r Defense, one or two others, senior 
ministers who were consulted throughout, yes, on m i l i t a r y 
planning. But obviously the primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y lay 
with the Chiefs of S t a f f . But the Prime Minister was 
kept informed, yes. 
JS Because t h i s brings me back again to the question of, 
what was the objective of the i n i t i a l m i l i t a r y planning? 
I think there was a reserve c a l l - u p , things l i k e that. 
Was a landing already foreseen at t h i s e a r l i e r stage, and 
eventually plans to advance to Cairo? Or were there 
simply contingencies of an undefined nature for which 
m i l i t a r y force might be necessary? 
GM I think the planning was f a i r l y s p e c i f i c . But i t was 
held i n reserve, the operation was held i n reserve u n t i l 
i t was judged that i t became necessary. The o r i g i n a l 
i n t e n t i o n was to t r y and s e t t l e t h i s by p o l i t i c a l means, 
obviously, but the m i l i t a r y aspect was kept i n reserve i f 
a l l else f a i l e d . And t h i s was something on which Eden 
and the B r i t i s h government never deceived the American 
government. He made i t c l e a r throughout to Eisenhower 
and Foster Dulles that i n the l a s t r esort we were 
18 
prepared to use force to achieve what i n our view would 
be a s a t i s f a c t o r y settlement. This I think was why 
Foster Dulles made increasingly f r a n t i c , or increasingly 
vigorous, e f f o r t s to put obstacles i n our way. 
JS I want to go back now to the I s r a e l i side f o r a minute. 
As we have mentioned, the French had contact, be i t only 
through m i l i t a r y channels i n i t i a l l y , but when the stage 
of the Sevres meeting was reached Ben-Gurion was there, 
Perez was there, Golda Meir. So the French had very high 
l e v e l contacts with the I s r a e l i side. My question i s , 
again - was there any contact between Anthony Eden and 
Ben Gurion or someone of that stature on the I s r a e l i side 
before the Sevres meeting which Selwyn Lloyd attended? 
GM No. 
JS None? 
GM No. 
JS That was e n t i r e l y on the French side? This leads to 
another question and that i s with regard to the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t e l l i g e n c e services. Let me give you 
a background f o r t h i s question. C h r i s t i a n Pineau 
contends that i n f a c t the Americans were informed of the 
plans through i n t e l l i g e n c e channels. My question i s -
was there any such assumption on the B r i t i s h side, or 
indeed, were you aware of t h i s through B r i t i s h 
i n t e l l i g e n c e p r i o r to the b r i e f i n g of the Prime Minister 
Eden about the French/Israeli plans. 
19 
GM I c e r t a i n l y was not aware of i t and c e r t a i n l y I think 
that our government was unaware that the Americans had 
been informed about the French plan, i f i t ' s true - I 
doubt i t ' s true. But I know nothing about what contact 
there was between i n t e l l i g e n c e services. I know very 
l i t t l e about i n t e l l i g e n c e services, but I very much doubt 
i f i t ' s true because my understanding i s that t h i s French 
plan was elaborated with the I s r a e l i s i n the utmost 
secrecy and indeed, i t was treated with the utmost 
secrecy by our Government once the plan was revealed to 
us. 
JS That was exactly my next question because I think that 
General Challe and another Frenchman came to London and 
f i r s t informed Anthony Eden of the plan. How narrow was 
the c i r c l e to which that was kept on the B r i t i s h side, 
how many people knew about i t ? 
GM Very narrow indeed. I was present at that meeting, i t 
was at Chequers, and Nutting was there. He obviously 
knew, and the head of the Foreign O f f i c e , Kirkpatrick. 
Selwyn Lloyd was r e c a l l e d from New York, as you know, and 
I suppose the senior ministers who were members of the 
Egypt Committee were probably involved. Perhaps not a l l 
of them. 
JS C e r t a i n l y the timing i t s e l f , i f t h i s was the very f i r s t 
that was heard of i t on the B r i t i s h side, then Selwyn 
Lloyd could not have known about the planning at the time 
20 
he was i n New York. And i t was evident that l a t e r the 
Ambassador there had not been informed even at the time 
the ultimatum was sent. Is that correct? Pierson Dixon 
was the Ambassador, I believe. 
GM In the UN, yes, he was Ambassador. No, he didn't know 
anything. 
JS Could you give the atmosphere of that meeting? That was 
a very important meeting that you were part of. Was 
there some surprise, shock, dismay, or simply i n t e r e s t at 
the ingenuity of what was being proposed? 
GM I t was c e r t a i n l y intense i n t e r e s t . Surprise, yes, shock, 
perhaps not so much. I mean, yes i t was a t o t a l surprise 
to Eden, c e r t a i n l y to me, and to Anthony Nutting. He was 
shocked, Eden was rather l e s s shocked f o r a spe c i a l 
reason, because t h i s expedition was ready and waiting. 
The shipping had been commandeered, r e s e r v i s t s had been 
c a l l e d up, the tanks had been loaded, and a l l that was 
s i t t i n g , waiting, and quite obviously couldn't be kept 
waiting i n d e f i n i t e l y . You e i t h e r had to launch the 
expedition or c a l l the whole thing o f f . And therefore, 
the problem was that you needed a pretext. I think many 
people thought that i f i t had been possible to launch an 
expedition i n the f i r s t few days a f t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of 
the Canal, that t h i s would have been accepted as a f a i t  
accompli by world opinion. I think that's probably true, 
but i f you wait three months before you launch an 
21 
expedition obviously the thing acquires a t o t a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t aspect, as indeed we saw i n the Gulf. We had 
to have a whole seri e s of UN resolutions, a kind of 
umbrella. We didn't have that umbrella. The French had 
produced t h i s ingenious scheme i n order to j u s t i f y r e a l l y 
the launching of the operation. 
JS And was Anthony Eden's decision made i n the course of 
that meeting to j o i n i t ? 
GM Oh no, of course not, no, we had to consult with Selwyn 
Lloyd who returned two days l a t e r , I think, and with his 
colleagues. 
JS So within t h i s l i m i t e d c i r c l e , he d i d consult before 
making decisions? 
GM Oh yes. The French, of course, had already taken t h e i r 
d ecision. 
JS Yes. Looking back, i t i s always s u r p r i s i n g to think that 
the Prime Minister of England, of the UK, and the French 
Prime Minister could have believed that t h i s could have 
been c a r r i e d out without some cooperation from the United 
States. Was t h i s question even raised i n the meeting, 
that i s , what are the Americans going to do? 
GM In the meeting with Challe and Gazier I don't r e c a l l i t 
being r a i s e d . That's a point on which my memory f a i l s 
me, I'm a f r a i d . 
JS And by entering i n t o t h i s plan, was t h i s a way i n which 
then Anthony Eden and the B r i t i s h government hoped to 
22 
achieve the objective which you already mentioned - that 
i s , the ultimate elimination of Nasser and a change i n 
status, or at l e a s t an improvement i n what existed so f a r 
as the Canal was concerned. 
GM Well the primary aim obviously was the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Canal, to reverse what had 
happened, to reverse the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , the sole 
control of the Canal by Egypt. The secondary aim was the 
overthrow of Nasser i n the same way you could say that 
about the recent Gulf - the primary aim was to l i b e r a t e 
Kuwait, the secondary was to overthrow Saddam Hussein. 
JS With somewhat s i m i l a r r e s u l t s . . . 
GM With somewhat s i m i l a r r e s u l t s . . . In both cases I think we 
could say that we won the war and l o s t the peace. 
JS Could you comment on Eden's mental a t t i t u d e as the c r i s i s 
heightened? Did he become t o t a l l y preoccupied with i t , 
were there signs of s t r a i n , and on whom did he r e l y most 
heavily during these d i f f i c u l t days f o r advice and 
counsel? 
GM There were c e r t a i n l y signs of s t r a i n , yes. I t was a 
tremendous c r i s i s p o l i t i c a l l y f o r Eden and f o r the 
Government as a whole, and i n a way f o r the nation. You 
must remember that there was very strong support f o r Eden 
i n the country over Suez and o r i g i n a l l y , when the f i r s t 
debate took place i n the House of Commons, the Labor 
Party perhaps were the most b e l l i g e r e n t of a l l , saying 
23 
that "Nasser must be made to disgorge", and so on. As 
time went by of course t h e i r belligerence evaporated and 
they came to see some p o l i t i c a l advantage i n opposing the 
Government. The consensus disappeared. 
JS So that the domestic s i t u a t i o n became a s t r a i n , i f I may 
use that word, on the Prime Minister as well as the way 
i n which the matters were developed... 
GM Oh c e r t a i n l y , the s t r a i n was enormous, of course. The 
uproar i n the House of Commons was almost unbearable for 
those who had to take part i n i t . But as f a r as who he 
r e l i e d on, he r e l i e d on Selwyn Lloyd,obviously, he was 
Foreign Secretary, and on the Head of the Foreign O f f i c e , 
JS And who was viewed as completely loyal? 
GM Sorry? 
JS And who was viewed as completely l o y a l at that point, by 
the Prime Minister? 
GM Well I think the members of t h i s - as I say, the small 
so-called, I think i t was c a l l e d the Egypt Committee -
yes, I think they were a l l behind him, with MacMillan 
perhaps most of a l l . He c e r t a i n l y r e l i e d on MacMillan. 
Anthony Head was another very close counselor and fr i e n d 
of Eden's. He was t o t a l l y l o y a l c e r t a i n l y throughout. 
The one who expressed doubt almost from the beginning 
about the m i l i t a r y option was Walter Monckton. 
JS Who eventually resigned, i s that right? Now I want to 
bring i n the question of the Foreign O f f i c e at t h i s 
24 
point. I suppose you i n a sense were i n addition to 
Selwyn Lloyd himself, representing the Foreign O f f i c e . 
But were you able to r e f l e c t i n the Prime Minister's 
presence, so to speak, some of the views i n the Foreign 
O f f i c e where there were some questions ( c e r t a i n l y , a f t e r 
the action began) as to the wisdom of the course? In 
other words, were these doubts brought to the Prime 
Minister's action? 
Oh, c e r t a i n l y a f t e r the action began, yes, there's no 
question about what the reaction of the Foreign O f f i c e 
was, at l e a s t of many of i t s members, perhaps not a l l of 
them. So i t wasn't r e a l l y necessary to bring these to 
h i s attention, i t was obvious. But up to that point, the 
Foreign O f f i c e - at l e a s t at a c e r t a i n l e v e l - were not 
f u l l y i n the pi c t u r e . 
I t has been s a i d that there was a general p r e d i s p o s i t i o n 
toward the Arab world i n the Foreign O f f i c e rather than 
toward I s r a e l . Number one, would you confirm that, and 
number two, i f true, did that have any e f f e c t at a l l on 
the course of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r action, or on the Prime 
Minister's thinking? 
Well I don't think i t had any e f f e c t on h i s thinking or 
h i s actions because i f he had taken the views of the 
Arabists, so to speak, i n the Foreign O f f i c e into 
account, he wouldn't have done i t , or he would have done 
i t d i f f e r e n t l y . But i t ' s c e r t a i n l y true, I think, 
c e r t a i n l y true i n our Foreign O f f i c e that the Arabists 
form a powerful element. I'm not saying that they 
d i c t a t e B r i t i s h p o l i c y even towards the Middle East, but 
they are a powerful element, of course they are - and 
r i g h t l y so, r e a l l y . They've been trained to take a 
professional view of the Arab world. 
JS But i n the end that did not have any e f f e c t , r e a l l y ? 
GM Well, as I said, they weren't i n the p i c t u r e . Below a 
c e r t a i n l e v e l , they weren't i n the p i c t u r e . 
JS Let's move on now to the actual period of the c o n f l i c t , 
the issuance of the ultimatum by the UK and by France. 
At t h i s point then the UN became very very much involved 
because the action - aside from that which was taking 
place on the front, so to speak - was mainly i n New York. 
Did the Prime Minister have any p a r t i c u l a r attitude 
toward the UN, or indeed, toward Dag Hammarskjold? I 
believe that Selwyn Lloyd had met Dag Hammarskjold 
before. Was the Prime Minister acquainted with him? 
GM Yes, he must have been. I'm a f r a i d I don't know how well 
acquainted he was. 
JS Did he look at the organization i n New York as an 
organization on which one could r e l y , or not? 
GM No, I don't think he did. I think he thought that i t was 
u n l i k e l y that a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n to the c r i s i s would 
emerge from the UN. The UN a f t e r a l l has no independent 
existence at a l l , or very l i t t l e independence apart from 
26 
the s t a f f who run i t . I t ' s only what i t s members w i l l 
vote f o r . 
And matters at the UN took a rather complex turn when the 
question moved from the Security Council to the General 
Assembly where the veto does not apply. Was t h i s a 
matter of grave concern, or was t h i s simply one other 
element i n a very complex p i c t u r e as f a r as #10 Downing 
Street was concerned. 
You mean a f t e r the m i l i t a r y operation was launched? 
Yes. 
I don't think that was an element of great concern. No, 
I think the American at t i t u d e had much more weight. 
And the Americans by then had introduced the resolution 
c a l l i n g f o r immediate withdrawal. We've already spoken 
of the means of American pressure that the Americans used 
but, going ahead now to the outcome when the B r i t i s h did 
agree to withdraw, what do you think was the major 
element i n bringing the B r i t i s h to t h i s decision before 
the French took a s i m i l a r one? 
I think i t was the pressure on the pound and the American 
r e f u s a l to allow us to exercise our drawing r i g h t s i n the 
IMF. 
So that remained then a d e c i s i v e element. (GM: yes) . 
What about the a t t i t u d e of the Commonwealth? And i n t h i s 
connection, the influence of Lester Pearson, the 
Canadian. Was h i s voice heard strongly i n London, i n the 
Prime Minister's o f f i c e ? Was there a very serious 
concern as to the e f f e c t the continuation of the action 
would have on the Commonwealth? 
GM I suppose i n the minds of those who place very great 
importance on the Commonwealth, yes. The Commonwealth 
a f t e r a l l was divided on t h i s issue and Menzies, the 
Prime Minister of A u s t r a l i a , was very supportive of Eden 
throughout the c r i s i s , even to the end. Lester Pearson 
was h e l p f u l i n c l e a r i n g up the mess afterward, so to 
speak, i n evolving the scheme fo r the UN forces to take 
over. I think i t was h i s idea as f a r as I remember. The 
people who obviously weren't h e l p f u l were the Indians but 
I doubt i f that was a very powerful f a c t o r i n Eden's 
thinking. 
JS The o r i g i n of the peacekeeping idea has been examined and 
reexamined. But as f a r as you are aware i t originated 
then i n New York, or at l e a s t with Lester Pearson, and 
not i n London. There has been some suggestion that there 
was a proposal made I think by Selwyn Lloyd i n Commons 
for an idea somewhat s i m i l a r to t h i s that there should be 
a UN force that could take over. 
GM I'm not sure where the idea originated honestly but I 
think that when i t was put forward i n New York we saw 
t h i s as a h e l p f u l way of getting ourselves o f f the hook. 
JS You did? And there was, though on the B r i t i s h side, at 
l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , almost a determination that the B r i t i s h 
28 
troops should be part of t h i s peacekeeping force. Why 
was that? 
I think purely a matter of prestige, r e a l l y . We didn't 
want to be t o t a l l y humiliated i n the aftermath of t h i s 
d i s a s t e r . And i t would have been p o l i t i c a l l y h e l p f u l for 
the Government to be able to say, "Well the B r i t i s h 
troops are s t i l l there." 
In t h i s connection, how much influence d i d the reporting 
and advice received i n London from your permanent 
representative i n New York have? I ask t h i s because the 
point has frequently been made that i t was t o t a l l y 
u n r e a l i s t i c , given the circumstances i n New York, to 
think that the B r i t i s h forces could have a part i n the 
peacekeeping. The s i t u a t i o n was not recognized as being 
impossible? 
No doubt i t came to be recognized as such. Maybe at the 
outset, we had hoped that i t might be possible. 
At what point d i d the Prime Minister's health become a 
fac t o r i n the s i t u a t i o n , i f at a l l ? 
He wasn't well - I don't think t h i s r e a l l y a ffected i t . 
I t c e r t a i n l y didn't a f f e c t f o r example h i s handling of 
the House of Commons, r e a l l y . The man was t o t a l l y - as 
f a r as t h i s was possible - was i n control i n the House at 
that time when the pressures were enormous. The 
opposition was making the most tremendous row i n the 
House of Commons. I t was quite amazing a c t u a l l y that his 
health stood up to a l l that but he never l o s t control of 
himself i n the House of Commons. But obviously the 
s t r a i n s on a man who was already i l l undoubtedly were 
enormous. 
Do you think that i t affected the course of events i n any 
way? 
I think maybe that he was more s e n s i t i v e to c r i t i c i s m and 
so on than he might otherwise have been but I doubt 
whether things would have been changed very much even i f 
he had been i n f u l l possession of h i s health. 
Which leads into the next question. Once the action was 
over, the decision had been taken to withdraw, the French 
appear to have retained t h e i r sang-froid and Pineau even 
played a c e r t a i n r o l e i n arranging f o r the withdrawal of 
the I s r a e l i forces from Gaza and Sharm e l Sheikh. The 
B r i t i s h , at l e a s t looking at i t from the outside, had 
more d i f f i c u l t y coming to grips with the defeat. Do you 
have any p a r t i c u l a r explanation of that? Was t h i s 
r e l a t e d to the Prime Minister's health, the problem of 
taking strong leadership i n the midst of d i s a s t e r , so to 
speak? Or were there other elements involved? 
I think the experience was more traumatic f o r the B r i t i s h 
than i t was f o r the French, p a r t l y because we'd always 
had much c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s with the United States. 
Therefore t h i s very serious breach with the United States 
was more of a shock to the B r i t i s h government than i t 
would have been to the French. For a f t e r a l l , they'd 
often been at loggerheads with the Americans - perhaps 
not at loggerheads but they had much l e s s close 
r e l a t i o n s . They'd also had the problem of the war i n 
A l g e r i a and so on which had caused s t r a i n s on r e l a t i o n s 
with the United States. So I think the whole experience 
was l e s s traumatic for them. 
JS Whereas i t was very traumatic f o r ... 
GM Very, yes. And also I think perhaps the humiliation was 
more deeply f e l t i n t h i s country because a f t e r a l l the 
war was not so f a r away and we'd emerged triumphantly as 
v i c t o r s with enormous prestige r e s u l t i n g from the war. 
Whereas the French had had a d i f f e r e n t experience. 
JS In the planning i n i t i a l l y of the whole conduct of the 
c r i s i s on the B r i t i s h side, I asked e a r l i e r as to the 
basis of the assumption that i n the end the Americans 
would not react with decisive pressure against m i l i t a r y 
action. But I d i d not ask whether one other element was 
present i n B r i t i s h thinking and that i s , the e f f e c t of 
the US e l e c t i o n s . I t has been sai d by some that the 
B r i t i s h , and the French as well, thought that the United 
States would be immobilized, the President i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
because of the immanence of US e l e c t i o n s . And i t was on 
that basis that conclusion was made that i t was safe. 
What i s your r e c o l l e c t i o n ? 
GM I don't think that i s true at a l l and I think that, i f 
31 
anything, we should have to have taken into account the 
fa c t that the US elections were imminent and that t h i s 
would make the American government more, rather than 
l e s s , s e n s i t i v e to what they would regard as a 
c o l o n i a l i s t action. And I think we didn't take that 
s u f f i c i e n t l y into account. But c e r t a i n l y I don't think 
anybody on our side thought that the imminence of 
ele c t i o n s would cause the United States to be paralyzed 
on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r issue. 
JS Was the completely opposite true? That i s , was there an 
assumption that the very strong US reaction was motivated 
by domestic p o l i t i c a l concerns on the American side to 
ensure that Eisenhower would win the vi c t o r y ? 
GM I think that i s the conclusion we drew l a t e r , yes. 
JS But only l a t e r ? 
GM Yes. 
JS Not during the action? When t h i s was over, i f i t can be 
considered to have been over, d i d the Prime Minister 
reach any o v e r a l l conclusions as to what d i r e c t i o n 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y should take i n the l i g h t of the changed 
s i t u a t i o n i n the Middle East, or was i t no longer 
possible f o r him to give that kind of d i r e c t i o n to 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y ? 
GM Well you must remember that he went o f f a f t e r Suez. He 
was s i c k , he went o f f to Jamaica and was away from the 
country f o r two or three weeks, I think. Rab Butler took 
32 
over as acting head of the government and i n e f f e c t was 
l e f t with the job of c l e a r i n g up the mess. Eden a f t e r 
a l l , h i s health was affected, h i s p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n was 
very s e r i o u s l y damaged. I think not many people thought 
that he could r e a l l y survive t h i s blow as Prime Minister 
and i n f a c t , he only lasted another two months. I t 
r e a l l y wasn't possible f o r him, I think, to do very much 
planning f o r the future. 
JS And what were your, we might say, o v e r a l l conclusions and 
impressions, perceptions as p r i v a t e secretary to the 
Prime Minister at t h i s c r i t i c a l point? What did you 
emerge with as a s k i l l e d observer of people and of 
foreign p o l i c y ? What conclusions did you reach as to the 
operation of government i n the foreign p o l i c y f i e l d as a 
r e s u l t of your p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n these events? 
GM Well I think the only conclusion I could draw was that a 
very serious mistake had been made, with consequences 
that were seen as pretty disastrous at the time but which 
i n the l i g h t of hindsight, became rather l e s s disastrous. 
A f t e r a l l , Sadat - when he eventually replaced Nasser -
was a considerable improvement. Our r e l a t i o n s with other 
Arab countries, strangely enough, a c t u a l l y improved with 
the exception of Libya where there was a revolution and 
which was a s p e c i a l case, as well as i n Iraq where there 
was also a revolution, making i t also a s p e c i a l case. 
With Jordan, where they had been very strained because of 
33 
the domination of King Hussein by Nasser, by the Arab 
n a t i o n a l i s t pressure you might say, our r e l a t i o n s 
improved l a t e r . With Saudi Arabia they improved very 
considerably l a t e r f o r s i m i l a r reasons. With the Gulf 
states also, they had been subject to very serious 
n a t i o n a l i s t , fundamentalist pressure. And there again, 
we eventually achieved a much more s a t i s f a c t o r y 
r e l a t i o n s h i p on the basis of t h e i r independence. So, 
while there were very serious negative consequences, the 
p i c t u r e wasn't perhaps quite as black as might have been 
feared, p a r t i c u l a r l y by some of the Middle East experts. 
And out of t h i s , as a f i n a l question, the experiences of 
t h i s c r i s i s i n which the UN played a prominent r o l e , did 
you have the sense - you yourself, or others i n 
leadership there - of a change i n the a t t i t u d e toward the 
UN, assessment of increased importance on the part of the 
UN or indeed of the Secretary-General, himself? 
Yes, I think that one of the lessons to be drawn from the 
circumstances was that we couldn't ignore the UN i n the 
future. 
To get ahead of the story here, the same Secretary-
General was i n o f f i c e l a t e r at the time of the Congo 
c r i s i s , do you think that t h i s caused the B r i t i s h side to 
have greater respect for the Secretary-General, or a 
greater concern. 
I was i n charge of the A f r i c a n Department during the 
c r i s i s , the l a t t e r part at any rate. The Congo c r i s i s 
caused extreme i r r i t a t i o n to the B r i t i s h government, at 
l e a s t the Conservative government at that time, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y Douglas-Home, who f e l t that the UN had far 
exceeded t h e i r mandate i n t r y i n g to suppress the 
independence of Katanga. 
Do you see a l i n e leading from Dag Hammarskjold i n the 
Suez to Dag Hammarskjold i n the Congo as f a r as B r i t i s h 
a t t i t u d e s were concerned? 
Not r e a l l y , questionable to say the l e a s t . 
Thank you very much. 
INDEX OF NAMES 
Ben-Gurion, David 
Bulganin, N i k o l a i 
Butler, Rab 
Challe, General 
Dixon, Pierson 
Douglas-Home, Alec (Lord 
Dulles, John Foster 
Eden, Anthony 
Eisenhower, Dwight 
Fawzi, Mahmoud 
Gazier, A l b e r t 
Hammarskjold, Dag 
Head, Anthony 
Hussein, Saddam 
Khruschev, N i k i t a 
K i r k p a t r i c k , Ivor 
Lloyd, Selwyn 
MacMillan, Harold 
Meir, Golda 
Menzies, Robert 
Mollet, Guy 
21 
5, 6 
23 
23, 26 
24 
Home)7, 40 
9, 10, 17-19, 21 
2-9, 11, 15-19, 21-28, 32, 38 
8, 9, 21, 37 
13 
26 
13, 30, 40 
2, 23, 27, 28, 38 
4, 12, 26, 39 
5, 6 
23 
4, 11, 13, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 
30, 33 
8, 24 
21 
32 
14 
36 
Monckton, Walter 
Nasser, Gamal Abdel 
Nutting, Anthony 
Pearson, Lester 
Perez, Shimon 
Pineau, C h r i s t i a n 
Sadat, Anwar 
28 
3, 4, 10-12, 15, 18, 26, 
27, 38, 39 
23, 24 
27, 28 
21 
15, 16, 22, 35 
38 
37 
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