r p
b
na,
H I G H L I G H T S
c Varied antecedents underpin the dissimilar
c Replication of Kenya and Zimbabwe success
a r t i c l e i n f o
solar
ydro-
‘Solar
ange,
benefits for the whole world. Their uptake will foster the protection of
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.el
Energy
Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421(Laumanns et al., 2004; Radulovic, 2005).E-mail address: bawasius@isser.edu.ghnatural resources to serve as carbon sinks; reduction of health related
risks associated with the use of non-modern sources of energy;
increase access to modern energy; reduction of the oil dependency
risks; economic development through creation of jobs, and so on
0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.06.042
$This paper is based on the author’s doctoral thesis, which was accepted by
the University of Hull, UK in 2008. Thus, the majority of PV data cover the 1960s
through to 2007. However, the paper infuses current and relevant literature,
whenever possible.
n Tel.: þ233 27 5224939.economy is predicated on the latter paradigm’s ability to improve helping us shift towards a green economy’’ (p. 6). An enhanced
deployment and utilisation of these RETs could generate considerablecontinuing with conventional economic development paths, with
the accompanying greenhouse gases. In recent years, a green eco-
nomy development paradigm, has dominated international develop-
ment dialogues and policy debates. The advocacy for a paradigm
shift from the dinosaurian economic development models to a green
global agenda on the green economy.
The choice of renewable energy technologies (RETs) includes
photovoltaic (PV), wind, geothermal, biofuels, biogas, mini h
power, among others. According Greenpeace and EPIA, 2011 ‘
can and must be a part of the solution to combat climate ch1. Introduction
Climate change and its attendant consequences have brought
into perspective the dangers of developed and developing countries’
intergenerational welfare and social equity, and concurrently reduce
environmental risk and ecological scarcities (UNECA, 2011). A shift
from the current path of large fossil fuel consumption to the uptake
and utilisation of renewable energy technologies will enhance thedo not reside in it, but are acquired through the heterogeneity of social interactions. Findings in the
paper reveal that a gamut of socio-economic and political antecedents informed the varied dissemina-
tion outcomes of the technology in these countries. Premised on these findings, the paper recommends
critical steps, which Ghana needs to undertake to enhance the replication of the Kenyan and
Zimbabwean PV success stories.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Article history:
Received 6 February 2012
Accepted 21 June 2012
Available online 12 July 2012
Keywords:
PV
Dissemination
ReplicationPV in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana.
rivate sector alone.
disseminations of PV in these countries.
stories in Ghana demands certain factors.
a b s t r a c t
The profuse dissemination and utilisation of solar PV technology in the world is indispensable,
especially in this era of climate change. However, in the African continent, between 1960 and 2007
Kenya and Zimbabwe were among countries with the highest PV dissemination, while Ghana was
among countries with the least disseminations. Analysing empirical data through the lens of the Social
Construction of Technology (SCOT) theory, the article aims to uncover the drivers underpinning the
disparate dissemination trends of PV in the three countries within the stated period and to tease out
lessons apropos replicating the successes within Kenya and Zimbabwe in Ghana. SCOT theory is chosen
because it provides an excellent framework for analysing the social shaping of PV’s development and
diffusion processes in these countries. This theory posits that the shape and meanings of a technologyc I examined the disparate disseminations of
c Kenya’s PV market successes not down to pDeconstructing the dichotomies of sola
trajectories in Ghana, Kenya and Zimba
Simon Bawakyillenuo n
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, P. O. Box LG74, University of Ghahotovoltaic (PV) dissemination
we from the 1960s to 2007$
Legon, Accra, Ghana
sevier.com/locate/enpol
Policy
The natural resources for most of these RETs are ubiquitous.
Solar energy, for example, is the most abundant energy resource
on earth, and the reliability of PV technology has gained grounds
over the years (IEA, 2010). The global PV market has been on the
rise, particularly in this 21st Century. With a worldwide PV
cumulative installed capacity of about 1.5 GW in 2000, it rose
rapidly to roughly 40 GW in 2010, producing some 5 TW h of
electricity annually (EPIA, 2011). Although very encouraging, the
distribution of this cumulative installed capacity has been, how-
ever, very lopsided between continents and between countries.
In Africa, for example, the dissemination of the technology
has flourished in countries such as South Africa, Kenya and
Zimbabwe, while many others including, Ghana, Uganda, Malawi
among others, have lagged behind, and there is paucity of data
giving understanding to such disparities. Examining empirical
data and literature sources through the lens of the Social Con-
struction of Technology (SCOT) theory, this article unlocks the
varying antecedents that have underpinned the disparate disse-
mination trends of PV technology in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana
from 1960 to 2007. Kenya and Zimbabwe were chosen for this
failure is that the two countries have disparate institutional and
the end of 2010 (IEA, 2010; Greenpeace and EPIA, 2011) (see Fig. 1).
This rapid change in the installed capacity of PV has not only taken
place at the global level, but also at the country level. The evolution
of installed capacities in countries around the world hitherto, shows
that different countries have been at the forefront at different times.
Fig. 2 depicts the changing trends of the relative cumulative
installed capacity of PV in different countries from 2000 to 2010. In
the year 2000, Japan was the leading PV installer in the world,
followed by the Rest of the world, United States of America and
Germany. In 2004, Japan continued to lead in the global share.
However, Germany leapfrogged to second place (35%), followed by
the Rest of the world (14%) and the United States of America with
(13%). Since 2006, however, Germany became the frontrunner of the
world’s PV installation and dissemination. Germany had a share of
57%, Japan (20%), rest of the world (10%), United States (7%) and rest
of Europe (6%) of the total global PV installed capacity in 2006. In
2008, Germany had 36% share in world-wide PV installation,
followed by Spain (23%), Japan (15%), rest of the world (11%), United
States (8%), and Italy, Korea, France, China. In 2009, Germany
controlled about 53% of the global PV market and an installed PV
1
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421 411political structures, which emanated from their dissimilar poli-
tical and economic development paths in the past.
2. Global dissemination perspectives of PV
The development of PV has been rapid since its first application
in small quantities in the 1950s. It emerged in the last decade as a
potentially major technology for power generation in the world
(EPIA, 2010; Greenpeace and EPIA, 2011). The average annual
growth rate over the last decade was about 40%. With a global
cumulative installed capacity of 0.1 GW in 1992, installed PV power
capacity grew to 14 GW in 2008, 22 GW in 2009 and over 37 GW by
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
MW
1.459 1.790 2.261 2.842 3.96
0
5.000
10.000
15.000
20.000
25.000
30.000
35.000
40.000
45.000
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
in
st
al
le
d 
PV
 c
ap
ac
ity
Fig. 1. Evolution of global cumulative installed PV capacity: 2000–2010.three-country analysis, because they are among the largest PV
markets in Africa (Jacobson, 2004). In particular, the Kenyan PV
market is viewed as an archetypal success story in the developing
world (Duke et al., 2002; Otieno, 2004). In contrast, Ghana
appears to be one of the least developed PV markets in Africa.
Based on the findings, the article draws lessons apropos the
feasibility of Ghana replicating the high dissemination trends of
PV in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Bryne (2009) study for example,
revealed that initial attempts to replicate the success of the
Kenyan SHS niche in Tanzania, failed. The primary reason for thisSource: Adapted from EPIA, 2011.capacity of about 10 GW. Italy was second, followed by Japan, USA,
Czech Republic, Belgium, France, rest of the world, China, Korea,
Australia, Canada and Spain. Germany continues to lead in 2010,
followed by Spain, Italy, Japan, USA, the rest of the world, Czech
Republic, France, Belgium, China, Korea and other EU.
As a sub-set of the rest of the world, Africa’s share of the global
installed capacity of PV is less than 1%. On a country level,
however, as of 2007 Kenya and South Africa were leading all
the African countries with approximately 150,000 installed PV
systems each, followed by Zimbabwe (see Fig. 3). There is a clear
gulf between the disseminated PV systems in South Africa, Kenya
and Zimbabwe and the rest of the African countries.
In respect of the disparate market shares and installation figures
in different countries, most authors draw links between the coun-
tries’ dissemination rates and their prevailing conditions. For
instance, it has been argued that solar power booms in countries
where the so called boundary conditions are right (Greenpeace and
EPIA, 2011). It has been argued that the dominance of Germany in
PV installations and market shares stems from the existence of good
conditions, including the introduction of the feed-in-tariffs (FiT),
good financing opportunities, a large availability of skilled PV
companies, and a good public awareness of the technology (EPIA,
2010). It has also been argued that the sharp rise in Italy’s
installations in 2009 was attributed to the implementation of the
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
5.399 6.980 9.492 15.655 22.900 39.529
re
 
d 
P
06
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–4214120
10
20
30
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 s
ha
in
st
al
le
40
50
60
in
 g
lo
ba
l
V
2000 2004 20FiT; and Japan’s successes attributed to the subsidy for residential
PV systems (ibid). Others, including Laumanns et al. (2004) point to
the imperative of a secure financial basis for the promotion of
renewable technologies.
Addressing issues related to an institutional framework for the
analysis of solar energy technology diffusion in developing countries,
Brew-Hammond (1995) identified policy, regulatory institutions,
science and technology institutions as the key enabling agents for
solar technologies’ development. Apart from comparing skeletally,
solar issues in Ivory Coast and Ghana, this paper dwelled on the
general institutional issues of solar diffusion in developing countries.
3. Social construction of technology (SCOT) theory
Theories of social construction of technology, examine the
development of technologies, defining working or non-working
not as intrinsic properties of technology, but a socially constructed
Fig. 2. Installed solar PV capacities in various countries from 2000 to 2010.
Source: IEA, 2010; Bawakyillenuo, 2011; Greenpeace and EPIA, 2011.
150.000
150.000
84.500
8000
0
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
100.000
120.000
140.000
160.000
Es
tim
at
ed
 P
V 
un
its
 D
is
se
m
in
at
ed
Fig. 3. Estimated number of solar PV systems disseminated in selected African countr
Source: Karekezi, 2002; Edjekumhene, 2003.2008 2009 2010meaning attributed by relevant social groups. As Bijker (1995a) points
out ‘‘one artefact comprises different socially constructed artefacts,
some of which may be working while others are non-working’’
(p. 75). ‘Artefact’ as used in his analysis refers to a technology with a
clearly defined user or consumer group, because it is a term that
minimizes social and technical distinctions by refusing the language
of objects and machines.
The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) theory concep-
tualises the social shaping of technologies and the technological
shaping of societies. It examines the interplay between socio-
economic, political and cultural factors in the process of techno-
logical development and diffusion. In Bijker (1995b) version of
SCOT for instance, he notes that technologies are not only shaped
by the power strategies of different groups but also form part of
the micro-politics of power themselves. Central to this theory is
that the meaning of a technology does not reside in the technol-
ogy itself; rather, its shape and meanings are acquired through
the heterogeneity of social interactions. As Bijker (1995b) notes
5000
4.601
3000
900
5000
ies.
recovered from its negative growth rate of about 5% in 1983 to a
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421 413‘‘artefacts [technologies] areydescribed through the eyes of the
members of relevant social groups’’ (p. 252). In other words, social
groups, which may or may not be homogenous, define which
technological issue or ‘artefact’ is a problem to be addressed
(Pinch and Bijker, 1987, pp. 30, 33, 34).
Central to SCOT’s conceptualisation are: the relevant social
groups, interpretative flexibility, closure and stabilisation, and the
wider context (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). The concept of relevant
social groups denotes ‘‘institutions and organisations as well as
organised or unorganised groups of individualsy[that] share the
same set of meanings, attached to a specific artefact’’ (Pinch and
Bijker, 1987, p. 30). In SCOT the relevant social groups are
considered the agents, and the meanings they attribute to the
technology are traced to their actions.
The concept of interpretative flexibility means that ‘‘different social
groups have radically different interpretations of one technological
technology’’ (Pinch and Bijker, 1987, p. 41). The diverse interpreta-
tions which social groups accord a technology help to unravel the
problems and conflicts they have with respect to this artefact.
The concept of closure and stabilisation are two aspects of the
same process (Bijker, 1995a). It involves the process by which
different interpretations of a technology by social groups, lead to
its continual design in order to bring about solutions to the conflicts.
At a stage, when the design of the technology no longer poses a
problem to any social group, then a closure to its design is achieved
as well as the stabilisation of its final form. The fourth key concept of
SCOT—wider context, refers to the wider socio-political milieu of the
development of a technological technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1987).
3.1. Shortcomings of the social construction of technology (SCOT)
theory
SCOT has been criticised for being more agency-centred in its
approach to the neglect of structure (Russell, 1986; Klein and
Kleiman, 2002). For instance, with respect to consensus building
in the design of a particular technology, SCOT posits that it comes
about as a result of the interaction of different relevant social
groups. Deriving consensus in this manner therefore neglects the
roles and influences of social structural factors, such as econom-
ics, politics, power, ideology in the design of a particular technol-
ogy. As Russell (1986) argues ‘‘An explanation of technological
change must show not only what different social groups think of
an artefact, but also what they are able to do about it’’ (p. 336).
The theory’s methodological approach of identifying the rele-
vant social groups by ‘‘rolling a snowball’’ has also been criticised
since some relevant social groups may not be captured in the
process. The absence of such relevant social groups’ influences,
could therefore distort the complete understanding of a particular
technological artefact’s development.
3.2. Modifications introduced in scot in this article
To overcome these limitations of SCOT so as to provide a
comprehensive conceptual framework to underpin this paper,
some modifications have been introduced in the theory based on
Bawakyillenuo’s (2011) work. First, to help address the agency-
centeredness approach of SCOT, the concept of intermediation is
incorporated in its conceptual framework to examine the roles of
intermediary bodies that intervene between an innovation and its
potential adopters, and their influence in shaping the interpreta-
tion of the innovation and adoption. Thus, incorporated in the
modified SCOT is a more explicit discussion of the resource
(economic, political, cultural, wealth) capacity and power of
different social groups, the existing social structures, and how
these influences shape the adoption patterns of an innovation.large positive rate of 8% in 1984, and has been growing favourably
since then.
4.1. Analysis of drivers of the disparate dissemination rates of
PV—Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana
Critical analysis of the various elements in Table 1 above
shows that while Kenya and Zimbabwe have much in commonSecond, the pitfalls of applying the snowball sampling approach
(i.e., the possibility of excluding relevant social groups) in the SCOT
theory’s methodology has been reformed to incorporate such possible
exclusions through the undertaking of two fieldworks: an exploratory
study and a major fieldwork. The exploratory study is very important
because through the analysis of the data that are gathered, the
researcher will be able to tease out all the relevant social groups,
who will then be part of the sample during the major fieldwork.
4. Trajectories of solar PV dissemination in Kenya, Zimbabwe
and Ghana
An overview of the historical socio-economic and energy
profiles of the three countries between 1960 and 2007 is impera-
tive for a composite understanding of their PV dissemination
disparities. Table 1 is a summary of these profiles.
Historically, after independence in 1963, Kenya had 10 years
(1963 to 1973) of steady and rapid economic growth in a stable
political environment (see Fig. 4). This steady economic growth
was realised through the promotion of public investment, small-
holder agricultural production, and incentives for private indus-
trial investment (Acker and Kammen, 1996). During this 10-year
period, the Kenyan GDP and agriculture grew at an annual
average of 6.6% and 4.7%, respectively (Bureau of Africa Affairs,
2007a). The post-independence economic growth was interrupted
by the first and second oil shocks of 1973–1974 and 1979,
respectively. However, Kenya rebounded from both oil shocks
and recorded one of the strongest GDP growth rates (23%) in
1970; and from the mid-1980s through to the early 1990s GDP
hovered around 6.2% (Dunne and Asaly, 2005).
Zimbabwe had a chequered economic history before and after
independence (see Fig. 5). In the early 1970s, the economy
experienced a modest boom, but slumped between 1974 and
1978 (Bureau of Africa Affairs, 2007b). However, between 1979
and 1981, Zimbabwe experienced a brisk economic recovery, with
an annual real GDP growth rate exceeding 20%. The pattern of
economic growth in the remainder of the 1980s to the early part
of the 1990s was replete with fluctuations. The annual real GDP
growth rate declined in 1982, 1983, and 1984; increased in 1985;
slumped to zero in 1986; registered 3% in 1987 and averaged
about 5% in 1988 through 1991 (Richardson, 2006). According to
Richardson (2006) ‘‘Economic growth [of Zimbabwe] from 1980
to 1989 averaged 5.2% in real termsy’’ (p. 2). Similarly, real GDP
growth rate of Zimbabwe in the remainder of the 1990s to date
has also been characterised by fluctuations.
The economic growth record of Ghana has been one of uneven-
ness since independence in 1957 (see Fig. 6). With a reasonably high
GDP real growth in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Ghanaian
economy began to experience a slowdown in GDP growth in 1964.
According to Aryeetey and Fosu (2003) ‘‘Growth was turbulent during
much of the period after the mid-1960s and only began to stabilise
after 1984. In 1966, 1972, 1975–1976, 1979, 1980–1984, the growth
rate was negative’’ (p.4). The lowest growth rate of 14% was
experienced in 1975, while the highest peak rate of 9% was
experienced in 1970 and 1978 (ibid). The economy of Ghanaeconomically and on PV development, they contrast with Ghana.
Ken
Fo
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421414Kenya
1. Population (2007 est.) 34.7 m
% Rural 79%
% Urban 21%
2. Total electricity production
(2007 est.)
4.34 TW h
% Hydroelectric plants 74%
% Thermal plants 17.8%
% Solar and other plants 7.9%
3. National access to grid electricity
(2007 est.)
15%Table 1
Summary of historical demographic, socio-economic and energy characteristics of
Source: Acker and Kammen, 1996; Mapako and Afrane-Okese, 2002; Aryeetey and
Richardson, 2006; Werner et al, 2011.The PV industry started becoming active in Ghana in the 1990s,
while it grew rapidly in the1960s/1970s in Kenya and Zimbabwe.
Economic growth rates flourished in Kenya and Zimbabwe in the
early part of the 1970s to the mid-1980s, while growth was quite
turbulent in Ghana.
Examining the gathered data using the SCOT theory, an under-
standing of the disparate dissemination levels of PV in the three
countries is situated in an interconnection of contextually specific
historical processes and factors (see Table 2).
4.1.1. International funding/donor support influence
A historical factor that helps explain the high levels of PV
dissemination in Kenya and Zimbabwe compared to Ghana is the
different levels of influence exerted by western donors on PV
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
5
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e
Y
Fig. 4. Kenya’s annual economic growth rates based on changes in GDP (constant 200
Source: World Bank, 2011.
% Urban 20%
% Rural 4%
4. Number of Installed PV systems
(2007 est.)
150,000
5. Installed PV capacity
(2009 est.)
7.05 MW p
Year/period of solar PV inception 1970s
6. Past economic growth rate trends
Early 1970s–mid-1980s Steady economic growth with a
few intermittent declines
Mid 1980s–mid-1990s Steady economic growth
Mid 1990s–early 2000s Steady economic growth with
intermittent declinesya, Zimbabwe and Ghana between 1960 and 2007.
su, 2003; Edjekumhene, 2003; AEO, 2003; Dunne and Asaly, 2005; IAEA, 2006a;
Zimbabwe Ghana
12.3 m 22.4 m
68% 54%
32% 46%
8.88 TW h 5.36 TW h
49.2% 84%
50.8% 16%
Unknown o0.5
32% 43%issues in these countries. One area of donor agencies’ influence is
investment, which would have either contributed to wide dis-
semination of PV or low dissemination.
In Kenya, donor investment on PV has been catalytic to its
market growth. Donor agencies’ investment in PV was substantial,
especially from the 1970s to the middle of the 1980s, and
eventually triggered the private market development. According
to Acker and Kammen (1996) ‘‘ythe ‘donor market’ – mostly
large-scale photovoltaic projects funded by donor agencies – was
for a number of years the only PV market in Kenya’’ (p. 87). In the
1970s and 1980s, Kenya had a comparative advantage over other
African countries in the light of donor investment in PV, because
Nairobi became the regional ‘‘hub’’ for the donor driven solar
industry. According to Jacobson (2004) ‘‘y in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, PV sales were sufficiently limited yIn East Africa,
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
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1
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1
9
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7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
ears
0 US$) from 1961 to 2009.
70% 77%
5% 17%
85,000 4600
0.22 MW p 0.55 MW p
1960s/1970s 1990s
Steady economic growth with a
few intermittent declines
Continual economic decline
Steady economic growth with a
few intermittent declines
Steady economic growth
Initial steady economic growth in
the mid-1990s, massive and continual
decline from 1999 onwards
Steady economic growth
10
15
20
25
1
9
8
3
th
 R
at
e
Y
tant
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421 41515
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
3
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6
5
1
9
6
7
1
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1
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1
1
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7
3
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5
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9
7
7
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 G
ro
w
Fig. 5. Zimbabwe’s annual economic growth rates based on changes in GDP (cons
Source: World Bank, 2011.Nairobi, served as the ‘hub’ for the regional PV supply chain’’
(p. 131). Nairobi was also the regional hub of UNEP. This therefore
created the initial PV supply chain in Kenya.
Available donor funding figures for Kenya in the 1990s for
example, give an insight on the large investments Kenya has had
compared to countries like Ghana. In 1998 the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), the private lending arm of the World
Bank Group (WBG) allocated $5 million to Kenya through the
Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative1 (PVMTI). Only this
single injection of finance exceeds the total international funding
for PV in Ghana from 1990 to 2007.
Similarly, donor funding for PV activities in Zimbabwe, argu-
ably influenced the relatively high dissemination level of PV as
compared to Ghana. As depicted in Table 3, Zimbabwe experi-
enced considerable international donor funding for PV in the
1990s. Prominent among these donor funding sources were the
UNDP-GEF and the JICA PV programmes. Like Kenya, the overall
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e
Y
Fig. 6. Ghana’s annual economic growth rates based on changes in GDP (constant 200
Source: World Bank, 2011.
1 ‘‘The Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative (PVMTI) is a strategic
intervention to accelerate the sustainable commercialisation and financial viabi-
lity of PV technology in the developing world. It is based on the premise that
private sector project design and financing on commercial basis will stimulate
more sustainable ventures than government or donor financed PV procurements’’
(IFC, 1998, p. 1).1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
ears
2000 US$) from 1961 to 2009.past international donor investment on PV in Zimbabwe sur-
passes that of Ghana.
In comparison with Kenya and Zimbabwe, past donor funding
on PV has been relatively lower in Ghana. The first major donor
PV project was the Spanish/Ghana governments’ project in 1998
and the second being the UNDP/GEF Renewable Energy Service
Project in 1999. The sum of these two major projects (US$4.5
million) is lower than the one-off IFC funding alone in Kenya or
the UNDP-GEF funding in Zimbabwe. The relatively high amount
of international investment in PV in countries such as India,
China, and South Africa in the 1990s, with their corresponding
high PV installations corroborates the catalytic role of donor
funding. India had US$15 million IFC funding in 1998; China,
US$20 million UNDP/GEF funding in 1995; and South Africa,
27 million EUR PV funding from the Dutch government and
European Commission in 1995 (IEA-PVPS T9-07, 2003).
4.1.2. Government policy direction on energy
A direct driver that arguably contributes to shaping the
disparate levels of PV dissemination in the three countries is the
different make-ups and foci of their energy policies. As will be
highlighted in this sub-section, the characteristics of each of these
countries’ energy policies a propos grid and PV have directly
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
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2
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6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
ears
0 US$) from 1961 to 2009.
market growth in rural areas. Acker and Kammen (1996)
observed that ‘‘For most rural consumers, prospects of grid
electrification are dimyFor the Kenyan government, rural elec-
Table 2
Classification of the drivers underpinning the different rates of PV development
and dissemination in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana.
Source: Author’s own construction.
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421416Direct drivers Indirect drivers
Role of international funding
Government policy direction on
energy
Disparate political historical
landscapes of the three countries
Policies on grid vis-a-vis PV
Rate of grid extension
Market approaches/access dynamics
Targeting the rural affluent group
O Entrepreneurial spirit of solar PV
businesses
Awareness creation
Adoption of favourable financing
schemes
Technical capacity building on solar
PV
Sizes of PV systems sold
Estimated number of solar PV
companies and technicians
Estimated number of other PV
institutions
Disparate historical economic forces,
especially in the rural areas
Geographic scales of drivers
International drivers National/local driversshaped the energy consumption patterns and behaviour of energy
end-users in the rural areas.
Since independence in 1963, Kenya’s national electrification
policies have been based largely on the supply of electricity from
the grid. The 1974 Rural Electrification Programme (REP)2 was
based on the extension of the grid. However, after more than
three decades as of 2007, only 4% of rural households had access
to the grid, while PV household systems (SHS) serve almost
the same percentage of rural households (3.7%) (Hankins, 2001;
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2005; Kenya National Bureau
of Statistics and ICF Macro, 2010). The annual number of homes
electrified privately with PV in rural Kenya exceeds those being
electrified through the grid (IEA-PVPS T9-07, 2003). A major
characteristic of the Kenyan REP that probably helps to explain
the high adoption rate of PV systems in rural Kenya is the slow
pace of the grid extension. In an interview with stakeholder ‘‘A’’ in
2004, he pointed out that:
Most people in rural areas in Kenya rely on solar PV to power their
electrical equipments, because the government has not honoured
its rural electrification promises3
Results of studies in Kenya support the argument that the slow
pace of the grid extension is one of the major drivers for PV’s
International funding Government policy direction on
energy
Market approaches/access
dynamics
Technical capacity building on solar
PV
Disparate economic and political
historical landscapes
2 The REP has been jointly operated by the Kenya government and the Kenya
Power and Lighting Company (KPLC)—a parastatal agency that is 51% owned by
the Kenyan government.
3 Stakeholder ‘‘A’’ is a solar PV technician for the Solarnet organisation in
Nairobi, Kenya.trification is of secondary importance compared to urban elec-
trification’’ (p. 89). Rural consumers needed to overcome many
hurdles to connect to grid: high cost; multiple organisational
barriers and bureaucratic/political lethargy (ibid). Similarly,
Jacobson (2004) contends that ‘‘ythe emergence and growth of
the solar market was strongly tied to the slow pace of grid based
rural electrification’’ (p. 134).
Furthermore, past Kenyan government policies, especially
duties and tariffs waiver on PV, also help to explain the country’s
high adoption rate of the technology. From 1986 to 1991, the
Kenyan government removed all import duties on all solar
modules, which were then reintroduced in 1992 (Jacobson,
2004). Nonetheless, in 1996 import duties on PV modules with
or without diodes were reduced from 53% to 27%, but were
removed again from 2000 to 2002 (Duke et al., 2002; Jacobson,
2004; Magambo, 2004). The removal of duties on the PV modules
prevented the high increase in PV modules’ prices, and thereby
stimulated sales and demand as many could then afford to
purchase them. While the removal of the import duties on PV
modules and the onwards reduction in their prices benefitted
many, especially low income groups, private businesses also
gained from the high patronage by consumers and the savings
made from the import duties exemptions.
Past rural electrification policies in Zimbabwe also paralleled
those of Kenya. With extensive coal reserves, the emphasis of
Zimbabwe’s rural electrification policies after independence was
on the extension of the existing national grid. However, as shown
in Table 1 above, as of 2003 only 5% of rural households had
access to electricity from the grid; with almost the same percen-
tage (i.e., 4.6%) of rural households privately adopting PV (United
Nations Development Programme , 2000). Like Kenya, it could be
argued that the main focus of the Zimbabwean Rural Electrifica-
tion Programme and the pace of the national grid extension to the
rural areas, are part of the processes that shape the high adoption
pattern of PV in rural households. According to the IEA-PVPS T9-
07 (2003) ‘‘In its effort to promote rural electrification, the
[Zimbabwean] government initiated a ten-year programme in
1997, under which local economic centres, are electrified by
existing grid extension. No special programmes [were] planned
for households’’ (p. 32).
Other features of Zimbabwe’s energy policies, especially in the
1990s that have accounted for the high dissemination of PV are
taxes and import duties’ waivers. During the GEF/UNDP PV
project (i.e., 1993–1998), all PV components imported under the
project were duty-free.4 This had the possibility of reducing prices
and enhancing end-users’ affordability. As Mapako (2002) reveals
‘‘Over the five-year period, over 9000 45-watt systems were
delivered under subsidised conditionsyin the form of duty
waiver on imported components and a low interest rate of 15%
per annum for clients purchasing systems under the [GEF/UNDP]
project’’ (p. 21).
The past rural energy policy approach of Ghana was akin to
those of Kenya and Zimbabwe—grid focused. However, while
Kenya and Zimbabwe have considerable low levels of rural elec-
trification through the grid, it is relatively higher in Ghana—17%.
This indicates that the implementation of grid-based rural electri-
fication programme in Ghana, although not excellent, has been
more rapid compared to Kenya and Zimbabwe. The government of
4 However, all other solar PV importations attracted duties during the GEF/
UNDP project’s period and post-GEF/UNDP project phase (United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, 2000).
rural areas’’ (p. 1069). This also manifests the entrepreneurial
spirit of PV companies in Zimbabwe at the time.
In contrast, PV companies in Ghana have not adopted this
approach of targeting affluent rural dwellers. The few PV busi-
nesses in the country – all of which were established in the 1990s
and 2000s, are located in the capital city of Accra, except one,
which is also located in the capital city of Northern region –
Tamale. These private businesses have rarely promoted PV tech-
nology in rural areas. The absence of a rural focus by these
businesses in the country emerged per the views of the director of
Solar Light Company in Accra during an interview in 2005:
‘‘The PV businesses currently operating in Ghana were all
established in the 1990s and 2000s, especially 1998, when the
country experienced power crisis. Thus, we entered the market to
Table 3
kdo1990s International donor funding for PV in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana.
Source: IFC, 1998; Davidson and Mwakasonda, 2003; Energy Commission-Ghana, 2003
Donor Country Year A
P
I
P
110 PV household systems and a water pump –
L
M
S
I
under phase 4 of the SHEP
2002 2002
2003 2003
2004 2004
2005 2005 –
2006 k 2006 –
a This amount is part of the total amount US$350 m required to implement the
whole of SHEP-4.
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421 417Ghana’s expenditure on the national grid over the years has been
considerable compared to PV (see Table 4). Thus, grid extension to
rural Ghana is one of the key drivers of the low dissemination of PV
compared to Kenya and Zimbabwe. For example, during one focus
group discussion in 2006, some rural interviewees in Ghana
indicated that ‘‘We will wait for the national grid no matter how long
it takes’’. This could be because they had seen evidence of the grid
extension.5
Other aspects of Ghanaian government energy policy that have
driven the low dissemination of PV in Ghana are the import duties
on PV components and the high tariffs on PV systems vis-a-vis the
national grid. Whilst grid users in Ghana benefit from tariff subsidy,
PV users do not, which drives a lot of people to crave for the grid.
4.1.3. Market approaches/access dynamics
The diverse market approaches used to disseminate PV in the
three countries by both private and public sectors in the past have
influenced the disparate dissemination levels. While Kenya and
Zimbabwe share similarities regarding the market approaches/
access dynamics to the development of PV market, Ghana’s
approaches are different.
4.1.3.1. Targeting the rural affluent social group. One of the market
approaches used by private businesses in Kenya and Zimbabwe
to disseminate PV to rural areas at the early stages of its
development and later on, was through targeting affluent rural
communities without electricity. A catalyst group in these
countries demonstrated the possibility of commercially viable
private sector sales of PV systems directly to the rich rural off-grid
population (Jacobson, 2004). The successes of these catalytic or
pioneer social groups, which took place without donor assistance
boosted other private businesses’ entry into the PV rural market.
The market for PV in rural Kenya was initiated in 1984 by one
Harold Burris in the south of Mount Kenya (Acker and Kammen,
1996). Firstly, Burris trained a group of about a dozen local
technicians to market and install PV lighting systems, by reaching
out to the high-income households on the southern and eastern
UNDP-GEF Zimbabwe 1993–1998
JICA Zimbabwe 1997–1999
GTZ Zimbabwe 1992–1994
Chinese government Zimbabwe 1999
Italian government Zimbabwe
IFC Kenya 1998–2008
Spanish/Ghana governments Ghana 1998
UNDP/GEF Ghana 1999–2004sides of Mount Kenya, the rich white coffee and tea farms (Acker
and Kammen, 1996; Hankins, 2001). Burris’ successes attracted
other local entrepreneurial groups and individuals to join the
rural PV market (Duke et al., 2002). The market approach of
targeting well-off individuals within the rural areas was also used
to market PV systems in rural Zimbabwe at the early develop-
mental stage of the technology. In the 1980s according to
Mulugetta et al. (2000) ‘‘ysolar companies largely targeted the
affluent rural dwellers or urban dwellers with second homes in
5 As of 2007 all the then 120 district capitals of Ghana had been connected to
the grid. Thus, a lot of extension poles had passed through many villages before
reaching the district capitals. Upon seeing the extension poles, many rural people
are therefore full of the expectation of grid extension.ighting of rural schools and clinics US$92 thousand
arket development PV US$ 5 million
treet and community lighting, vaccine refrigeration US$2million
nstallation of PV in rural communities US$2.5million
Table 4
Comparison of government funding between the national grid and PV in Ghana
from 1996–2006.
Source: Bawakyillenuo, 2011.
Years National grid (Akosombo) Years Solar PV
1996 m 1996 –
1997 US$130 m to extend the grid
under phase 3 of the Self Help
Electrification Program (SHEP)
1997 –
1998 1998 US$2 MOE-Ghana/Spanish
government
1999 k 1999 m
2000 US$3.131 m to implement
RESPRO (GEF $2.5 m &
MOE-Ghana $500,000)
m 2000 k
2001 US$105 ma to extend the grid 2001.
rea of support Total amount
V programme US$7million
nstallation of clusters of PV systems US$10million
V water pumping US$6.5millionmeet the urban electricity demand due to this crisis. However,
when the crisis was over, many PV businesses became defunct.
Those currently operating are very small, because the market is
not guaranteed. Also, we have not ventured into the rural areas,
because of financial risks’’.
4.1.3.2. Awareness creation. Another phenomenon that has under-
pinned the differences in PV dissemination levels in the three
countries is the level of awareness creation.6 According to
Hankins (2004) ‘‘yPV markets grow in an organic manner.
Consumer demand grows once awareness is built upy’’ (p. 34).
6 It should be noted that awareness creation and targeting of affluent people
are complementary.
While the level of education on PV is low in Ghana as a result of
the overreliance on the national grid (Bawakyillenuo, 2009), it has
been very high in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Hankins (2000) indicated
tha
PV
 the estimated total number of PV companies and technicians
in each country;
 the number of subsidiary institutions supporting the PV
industry in each country.
The different sizes of PV systems being sold in the market in
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421418demonstrations in schools and houses to educate potential
clients; direct marketing at district agricultural shows; visits to
consumer homes by sales agents and technicians; education of
consumers and sales agents through educational seminars;
advertisement in newspapers, and encouraging early adopters to
tell others about the utility of the technology (Acker and
Kammen, 1996; Hankins, 2001; Duke et al., 2002).
Through inferences, it can be argued that the high level of PV
awareness in rural Zimbabwe has also been created through similar
approaches since these are some of the most effective approaches
that can be used to reach and convince the affluent segment of the
rural population. The GEF PV project complemented this awareness
creation in Zimbabwe. According to Mulugetta et al. (2000) ‘‘y the
[Zimbabwean] GEF Solar projecty enhanced national public aware-
ness of the benefits of PV electricityydue, in no small measure, to
the publicity that was undertaken yto popularise the technology
across the countryy’’ (p. 1074).
4.1.3.3. Adoption of favourable financing schemes. The adoption of
favourable financing schemes in Kenya and Zimbabwe would seem
to have enhanced the high level of PV adoption. Some private PV
businesses in Kenya have used consumer financing schemes such
as the Hire Purchase (HP) credit system. Through the HP system
workers in both rural and urban Kenya are able to purchase PV
systems on credit and pay on a monthly instalment basis. By 2001,
about five major HP firms were supplying household PV systems to
the Kenyan market, with over 10% of the PV market (Hankins,
2001). Also of note is the Kenyan consumer micro-credit scheme,
introduced in 1998 by the PVMTI. This scheme promoted the
installations of hundreds of systems (Jacobson, 2004). With respect
to Zimbabwe, the 1997 JICA project also utilised the Energy Service
Company (ESCO) approach to disseminate the PV systems
(Mapako, 2002), while the GEF project used a revolving fund
financing scheme that helped increase the accessibility of PV
systems to many consumers in both rural and urban areas.7
According to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) (1998) ‘‘The major driving force for the
achievement of the Zimbabwe GEF is the revolving fund,
managed by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), which
provided low-interest loans to potential PV owners’’ (p. 14).
Contrastingly, in Ghana the few existing PV businesses continue
to rely solely on the cash sales module, with only few people able
to afford the technology through it.
4.1.4. Technical capacity building on PV
The diversity of the three countries’ technical capacities for PV
is another variable that feeds into the disparate levels of PV
dissemination. The line of reasoning herein is that the better
developed the technical capacity for PV in a country is, the higher
the level of PV adoption and vice-versa. Key elements of technical
capacity building on PV, in the context of this analysis are:
 the various sizes of the PV systems being sold in the three
countries;
7 The basic tenet of revolving fund is that an organisation gets a reserve of
money to set up the operational structures and to lend to borrowers at an agreed
interest rate. Thus, in the GEF/UNDP project, this reserve money was given to(p.thet ‘‘by 1999, 3-4% of rural population [in Kenya] had acquired a
system, and at least 70% knew what such a system was’’
95). Awareness creation approaches in rural Kenya included:AFC.peo
syst
chaugh experience using automatic batteries for TV power that majority of rural
ple started with the ‘do-it-yourself’ installation, which involves purchasing
ems one piece at a time and installing by themselves. In most cases, however,the
enothe three countries is one of the technical capacity elements that
has contributed to the high levels of PV adoption in Kenya and
Zimbabwe, and the low adoption level in Ghana. While PV
markets in Kenya and Zimbabwe seemed to have a range of low
and high wattage sizes of PV modules that can satisfy different
income levels; in Ghana, only high wattage PV systems were
available, satisfying the few high income social group. Unlike
Kenya and Zimbabwe, where PV components can be bought piece
at a time, in Ghana PV businesses only sell the entire package to
consumers (Bawakyillenuo, 2011).
For example, in the Kenyan PV market, the low cost 12 Wp
amorphous silicon module8 (a-Si) PV system is the smallest PV
module system and is found in many shops. The biggest module is
over 60 Wp. Findings in the BCEOM, EAA and FONDEM Consortia’s
(2001) study on Kenya PV market indicated that the small size PV
systems (12 Wp to 40 Wp) constituted 70% of the market, 45% of
which belonged to the 12 Wp a-Si module. Indeed, authors such
as Duke et al. (2002), and Hankins (2001) argue that most PV SHSs
in rural Kenya are based on the 12 Wp a-Si module systems due
to their relatively low cost and the opportunity to buy their
components piece by piece9 at a time. The situation is similar in
Zimbabwe where a range of PV system module sizes are available,
spread fairly evenly from 12 Wp to 60 Wp (United Nations
Development Programme , 2000). Davidson and Mwakasonda
(2003) argued that ‘‘One reason for y the large number of PV
systems in Zimbabwe has been the low-cost silicon-type PV
modules imported from Botswana and South Africay[while]
some companies in Zimbabwe have also been known to sell do-
it-yourself PV kits, thus making the dissemination of the PV
technology user friendly’’ (p. 30).
Another technical capacity element that has accounted for the
disparities in PV dissemination levels in the three countries is the
total number of companies and technicians involved in the PV
industry, as a large number of PV businesses augment awareness
and vice-versa. As indicated above, while there is high awareness on
PV in Kenya and Zimbabwe, it is low in Ghana. The PV businesses
profiles in the three countries are as follows. The Kenyan market has
more than ten major PV importers, 100 to 200 PV retailers and
agents, and approximately 500–1000 installers (Hankins, 2000; ESD,
2003). For Zimbabwe, by 1993, there were approximately 10
companies in the PV business, but by September 1998 this had
increased to about 73 companies and retailers (Bacon, 1998). The
2005 data on Zimbabwean PV organisations reveals 15 PV compa-
nies with extensive distribution and installation networks in the
country (SolarbuzzTM, 2005). For Ghana, the situation is different: as
of 2007 there were only seven small PV companies in Ghana, located
in the urban areas (Bawakyillenuo, 2011).
Available data also show that there are more subsidiary
institutions to support the PV industry in Kenya and Zimbabwe
than in Ghana. In Kenya, there are approximately 15–20 small
scale manufacturers of PV lamps and battery control units or
8 As at 2002, the 12-peak-watt a-Si module was sold as low as $US50, because
competition for customers has increased among retailers (Duke et al., 2002).
9 In the early days of PV development in Kenya, installers and companies sold
entire package to consumers. However, by the 1990s consumers had gainedrge regulators which help protect the batteries are left out (Hankins, 2000).
charge regulators (BCEOM, EAA and FONDEM Consortia’s , 2001;
IEA-PVPS T9-07, 2003) and three principal battery manufacturers
(ESD, 2003). As of 1998, there were four local companies produ-
cing PV lamps and four battery10 companies that serviced the
solar market in Zimbabwe (United Nations Development
Programme , 2000). By contrast, the PV market in Ghana lacked
these subsidiary local organisations, with almost all PV compo-
the largest indicator of this form of ‘elite’ political instabilityy’’
(p. 28). This period of political instability in Ghana did not create a
congenial atmosphere for FDI in the PV industry compared to
Kenya and Zimbabwe. Unlike Kenya and to some extent Zim-
babwe that allowed foreign entrepreneurs to stay after indepen-
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421 419nents being imported.
4.1.5. Disparate economic and political historical landscapes
Disparate economic and political histories of Kenya, Zimbabwe
and Ghana in the 1970s and 1980s also account for their
dissimilar dissemination levels of PV.
4.1.5.1. Political historical landscapes. Analysis of the political
histories of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana in the 1970s and
1980s, demonstrates that the political status of these countries
in these periods have influenced the development disparities of
their PV industries.
Since independence in 1963, Kenya has consistently main-
tained a remarkable political stability. This is especially relevant,
as a stable political environment is fundamental to attracting
foreign direct investments (FDI). Suffice to mention that Kenya is
one of the few African countries that have never experienced a
coup d’e´tat since independence. It can therefore be argued that
Kenya’s political stability indirectly impacted the growth of its PV
industry, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, when the technology
was gradually being transferred to Africa. Jacobson (2004) for
instance, observed that, ‘‘Kenya’s position as the regional ‘hub’ for
solar equipment in the 1980s is due largely to its ties to ‘the
west’y [because]yin the decades following independence in
1963, Kenya had developed a reputation as a stable, pro-capitalist
country that was a reliable Cold War ally to the U.S and the UK’’
(p. 132). This unique political11 stability and the pro-capitalist
approach helped Kenya to attract relatively high levels of foreign
investment and donor assistance (ibid).
The 1970s and 1980s in the political history of Zimbabwe
represent the colonial and post-independence epochs, respec-
tively. Prior to independence in 1980, developments in all sectors
of the economy, including energy provision, were skewed in
favour of the white settler regime (Davidson and Mwakasonda,
2003). Hence, it could be argued that native Zimbabweans that
were deprived of electricity but had disposable income started
patronising PV. In particular, Zimbabwe’s proximity to South
African and Botswana, (both with a relatively well developed
PV sector), enabled people to import the low-cost silicon-type PV
modules. Also immediately after independence, Zimbabwe
experienced relative political stability, which might have boosted
foreign direct investment in PV.
On the other hand, while Ghana attained independence in
1957, it got entangled in a prolonged political instability until
1992. From 1966 to 1992, Ghana was successively ruled by
different military governments through coup d’e´tats12 which is
unparalleled in any other country in Africa. According to Aryeetey
and Fosu (2003) ‘‘yone characteristic of the political economy of
Ghana has been the high incidence of coup d’e´tats [as] existing
evidence suggests that among African countries, Ghana has had
10 Data on product manufacturer in 2005, however, indicate that one battery
manufacturing company currently exists (SolarbuzzTM, 2005).
11 While Kenya had such political stability at the time, several of its
neighbours were either still embroiled in independence struggles (e.g., Uganda,
Sudan, Mozambique) or were practising socialism (e.g., Tanzania, Somalia,
Ethiopia)—both being distastes of foreign investors.
12 In all, five military coup d’e´tats took place in Ghana from 1966 to
1992—1966, 1972, 1978, 1979 and 1981 (Asare and Wong, 2004).4.1.5.2. Historical economic landscapes. The relative historical
economic development trends of Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana
in the 1980s also offer explanatory power apropos their uneven
dissemination levels of PV technology. For instance, the Kenyan
economy recorded strong economic growth in the 1970s and
1980s—the periods that PV began to attract attention in rural
areas. This growth was largely due to expanding exports of Kenya’s
principal export commodities (coffee, tea and horticulture) (Acker
and Kammen, 1996). Thus, in the 1980s and early 1990s coffee and
tea growers in the rural economy had high earnings. These farmers
together with rural civil servants, rural business entrepreneurs,
constituted an affluent ‘‘rural middle class’’ with purchasing power,
but with little hope of getting connected to the national grid.
Jacobson (2004) opines that ‘‘Income from tea farming has, in fact,
contributed significantly to the growth of the [Kenya] solar
market’’ (p. 129).
Similarly, economic growth in Zimbabwe was fairly steady
from the latter part of 1970s through to the latter part of the
1980s. This was due largely to export earnings from the then
commercial farms and ranches, agro-processing industries (e.g.,
tea, sugar, coffee, tobacco), located in the rural areas and
employed many people.14 Like Kenya, there was a rural middle
class in the 1980s in Zimbabwe (comprising civil servants,
employees in the commercial agricultural sector, private entre-
preneurs) with purchasing power for PV systems. Indeed, the
work of authors such as Mulugetta et al. (2000) shows that the
emergence and development of the Zimbabwean PV market was
driven by rural middle class purchasing power.
In contrast, Ghana had a turbulent economic growth in the
1970s and the first half of the 1980s, with predominantly
negative growth rates. One of the underpinning factors of this
decline was the political instability in those years, because the
years in which negative growth was experienced generally coin-
cided with coup d’e´tats. Thus, the prevailing economic situation
at the time could not have helped create a rural middle class to
start purchasing PV. Although pockets of rural affluent groups
would have existed, the political instability might have derailed
all investment plans.
5. Conclusions
This article aimed to critically examine the various trajectories
that underpinned the lopsidedness of PV dissemination in Kenya,
Zimbabwe and Ghana between 1960 and 2007 through the lens of
the SCOT theory. Premised on the tenets of SCOT, the discussions
13 The cedi, with its symbol—GHb, is the currency of Ghana. As at 2005 (when
the fieldwork for this paper was conducted), GHb9,127.42 was the equivalent of
US$1.
14 As of 1997 for example, Zimbabwe was the second largest exporter of
tobacco in the world and employed about half a million people in the rural areasdence, the first military government of Ghana in 1966, expulsed
almost all foreign nationals in the retail trading sector. First, it
required all retail trading concerns, whose capital outlay did not
exceed half a million cedis13 at the time to be reserved for
Ghanaians; and second, the ‘‘Alien Compliance Order’’ was intro-
duced to evict all resident foreigners without proper documenta-
tion (Asare and Wong, 2004).(United Nations Development Programme, 2000).
in th
perio
men
insti
and
of th
How
of th
solel
to th
struc
polit
state
there
Gove
help
featu
T
Ghan
and
answ
inter
mental issues impeding PV dissemination in the country. Thus, in
Edjekumhene, I., 2003. Status of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Systems in
West Africa. Background Paper (1st Draft) Prepared for the West African Regional
da
Energ
PV
Energ
Ea
ab
Europ
fo
m
S. Bawakyillenuo / Energy Policy 49 (2012) 410–421420order for the latter answer to take effect, the following recom-
mendations are imperative, starting with their perceived feasi-
bility: most feasible—1, to the least feasible—4:
1. Continual political stability is needed in Ghana, because it is
the beacon that attracts foreign direct investments into
many countries. Especially, with the introduction of FiT in
Ghana, foreign investors in PV will have the desire to invest
in the industry. However, without the assurance of a long
term political stability, many investors will be dissuaded
from investing in the technology in the country.
2. Rural economies, especially agriculture should be strength-
ened to yield more returns. As the Kenyan and Zimbabwean
success stories revealed, with good returns from income
generating activities in rural areas, individuals and families
without access to the national grid will adopt PV to enhance
lighting, entertainment, and education of children.
3. The technical capacity for PV should be stepped up in the
country. Besides government creating a congenial policy
environment to attract the establishment of PV companies,
subsidiary supply chains and entrepreneurs, there is the
need for the creation of technical institutions, and also
departments at the various Universities in the country for
the studies of PV and other RETs. In addition, hands-on
trainings, workshops and seminars on PV and other RETs
should be instituted and ran very often for electrical artisans
and others wishing to work on RETs issues. These trainings,
workshops and seminars will enable them to upgrade or
acquire new skills and knowledge, necessary for quality
assessment, installations and maintenance of PV and RETs
in general.
4. The national grid should be de-politicised while PV is
promoted, especially in the remotest parts of the country.
The empty promise of the extension of the national grid tobe re
resolmination of the technology in the three countries.
he biggest question emerging from these findings is that can
a replicate the enhanced PV dissemination stories in Kenya
Zimbabwe? The answer is NO and YES. In other words, the
er is NO because there are still outstanding structural
mediary problems impeding PV dissemination, that have to
solved. On other hand, it is YES, because if these problems are
ved there will be a closure and stabilisation on the funda-shape
disseenya and Zimbabwe compared to Ghana. These findings
fore contrast Hankins’ (2000) argument that ‘‘ythe [Kenyan]
rnment’s hands-off approach to the off-grid private sector has
ed the PV industry to flourish’’ (p. 98). Clearly the extant
res of these intermediary structures between 1960 and 2007
d the significant roles the private market played in thement
in Krate dissemination levels of the technology within the
d in question, attributable to a host of drivers. The establish-
t of the right conditions or agents such as good policies,
tutions, awareness creation, favourable financing schemes,
technical capacity, as noted in the literature are indeed, some
e factors that spur on the dissemination of the technology.
ever, the findings in this paper also show that the flourishing
e PV technology in Kenya and Zimbabwe were not driven
y by such good conditions; neither did bad policies alone led
e low dissemination in Ghana. Rather, the synergy of several
tural intermediary phenomena including, the economics and
ical landscapes of the nations, international influence, the
of the energy industry and so on, coupled with the afore-
ioned agents mediated the ascendancy in PV disseminationcoun
dispais paper reveal that the different social groups (the three
tries) with their varied interpretative flexibility of PV hadeven the remotest parts of the country in the past by pdvironment (KITE). [Online]. Available: /http://www.reeep.org/media/downloa
ble_documents/WE%20background%20paper.pdfS [accessed: 18/07/06].
y Commission-Ghana (EC-GH), 2003. Reconnaissance/Feasibility Studies for Solar
Rural Electrification in Off-grid Communities in Ghana. (Unpublished).
y for Sustainable Development (ESD), 2003. Study on PV Market Chains in
st Africa. Report for the World Bank, October 2003, by Energy for Sustain-
le Development (ESD), Nairobi, Kenya.
ean Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA), (2010). Global Market Outlook
r Photovoltaics until 2014. [Online]. Available: /http://www.epia.org/filead
in/EPIA_docs/public/Global_Market_Outlook_for_Photovoltaics_until_2014.REEEP Consultation Meeting in Accra. Kumasi Institute of Technology and
Enpoliticians to secure votes, stymied the adoption of PV.
Politicians should be discouraged from such rhetoric; aware-
ness should be created on grid supply zones as well as the
rationale for PV supply to remotest areas; establishment of
favourable financing schemes – concession and fee-for-
service models – for PV in rural areas; and offer the same
subsidies to PV users, which grid consumers are benefiting.
Acknowledgements
This study was made possible through the support of the
International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Canada, under
its Think Tank Initiative (TTI). However, the views expressed
herein do not necessarily represent those of IDRC or its Board of
Governors, but the author.
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