University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY AND RELIGION IN SHAPING NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST COLD WAR YEARS BY BABAGANA MONGUNO THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMIlTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LEGON AUGUST, 2004 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh DECLARATION I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of an origin~L. research conducted by me under the supervision of Ambassador J. Q. Cleland, and that no part of it has been submitted elsewhere for any other purpose. Amb. l. Q. Cleland ~c~ (Supervisor) (Student) Date. ... :?/J~j~~+:. .. Date .. ~ . ( I~.o/.~t University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to all the innocent Nigerians who lost their lives as a result of ethnic and religious violence. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the course of preparing this work, I have incurred a lot of debt. Everyone who contributed to the research effort in any way, no matter how small needs to be acknowledged. However, the list would undoubtedly be too long but my gratitude remains profound to all. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the Director of LECIA, Professor Kofi Kumado and all the Research Fellows of LECIA. I am especially grateful to Ambassador J. Q Cleland whose advice, assistance and patience cannot be quantified. Without his support, this work would at best have been a mirage. I have also benefited immensely from the support given by Dr. Charles Quaker Dokuboh of the NlIA, Dr. Remi Oyewumi, Dr. Nowa Omoigui and Major E. V. Onumjuru. Finally, I am most grateful to Miss Isabella Erawoc, Miss Evelyn Tinkorang and Mr. Eric Amartey for typing the work and Miss Reema Baksmaty for a whole lot of support. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AMC American Muslim Council AU African Union ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FGN Federal Government of Nigeria HRW Human Rights Watch IGOs Inter-Governmental Organisations NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations NIIA Nigeria Institute of International Affairs NIPSS Nigeria Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies OAU Organisation of African Unity OIC Organisation of Islamic Conference OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries UK United Kingdom UN United Nations USA United States of America WHO World Health Organisation University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION DEDICATION ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iv TABLE OF CONTENTS v ABSTRACT ... vii CHAPTER ONE 1.1 Background To The Problem .,. 1 1.2 Statement Of The Problem 3 1.3 Objectives of the Research 4 1.4 Hypothesis '" 5 1.5 Rationale of the Research 5 1.6 Review of Existing Literature 6 1.7 Theoretical Framework 18 1.8 Definition of Key Concepts ... 19 1.9 Methods and Sources of Data Collection 21 1.10 Arrangements of Chapters ... 21 End Notes 23 CHAPTER TWO 2.0 An Overview of Nigerian Foreign Policy from Independence to the End of the Cold War... 25 2.1 The Origins of the Foreign Ministry 25 2.2 The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact 26 2.3 Nigeria's Membership of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 29 2.4 Nigeria's Decision to Join the OlC .. , 33 2.5 Other Significant Instances of Nigeria's Cold War Foreign Policy DeciSions and their Implementation 36 2.5.1 Nigeria's Attitude Towards North Africa and the Middle East 36 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.5.2 Foreign Policy During the Nigeria Civil War Years 39 2.5.3 The Formation of the ECOWAS 42 2.5.4 Diplomatic Appointments 44 Endnotes 46 CHAPTER THREE 3.0 An Evaluation of the Role of Ethnicity and Religion in Nigeria's Post Cold War Foreign Policy (1989 - 2003) 48 3.1 Nigeria's Influence on the War Against Terror 48 3.2 Islamic Militancy 58 3.3 The Sharia Uprisings 63 3.4 The "Miss World" Riots 64 3.5 The Anglican Church Crisis ... 66 3.6 The Innoculation Crisis 67 3.7 The Niger Delta Crisis 68 3.8 The llv-Jukun Riots .. . 72 Endnotes 75 CHAPTER FOUR 4.1 Conclusion and Recommendations 76 4.2 Recommendations 77 Endnotes 82 Bibliography ... 83 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ABSTRACT The end of the Cold War has brought about a new dimension in international politics, whereby the thinking of state actors and non-state is no longer guided by East-West considerations. Multi-polarity has emerged with a new set of global concerns which are influencing the domestic set up of many nation- states. Most of these concerns have tended to have ethno-religious undertones, consequently inspiring internal reaction. The "domestication" of sensitive international issues very often impacts on the foreign policy decision-making process, especially in a pluralistic society with conflicting interest groups. This has been a common feature in Nigeria's foreign policy since independence. This study examines the influence of ethnicity and religion in shaping Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The research has revealed that Nigeria's multi-cultural, multi-religious, multi-ethnic characteristic is to a very large extent, influential in her foreign policy process. The numerous crises in Nigeria are predominantly triggered by ethno-religious factors which have equally impacted on Nigeria's relations with state and non- state actors in the international community. Some contemporary global issues, particularly the war against terrorism have engendered resentment within certain segments of the Nigeria nation. Recommendations are made to reverse the destabilizing role of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's foreign policy process and improve the existing climate of suspicion and acrimony. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER ONE 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM Foreign policy is rarely conceptualized or implemented in isolation in any country. Influential domestic constituencies of all kinds - political, economic (business), intellectual, religious, cultural, environmental, military, among others have always tended to have a say in one way or the other. Thus, reflecting the usually poly-national, multi-religious and non-secular character of many modem "Third World" states, ethnicity and religion playa significant role in their foreign policy decisions. The heterogeneous nature of African "nation-states', most of which were crafted at the 1884-85 Berlin Conference which was without regard to internal cohesion, makes this a particularly Significant issue on the continent. Beyond intra-state ethnic and religious cohesion, however, there is the issue of artificial borders which have divided entire nationalities into several "modern" multinational states. With a population of well over120 million, divided into 250 ethnic groups (some of which can also be found in neighbouring countries), the Nigerian population may be almost evenly split between Christians and Moslems, many of whom also concurre~tly practise traditional religions, although reliable figures are hard to come by, given the political sensitivities of enumeration. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Since independence, Nigeria's foreign policy has placed Africa high in its priorities. Nigeria was indeed among the early agitators in the quest to create the OAU. In the 1970s it became intellectually fashionable to describe Nigerian foreign policy in terms of concentric circles in which Africa was the centerpiece. More recently, however, some observers have expressed concern that in spite of the rhetoric, Nigeria's foreign policy is increasingly gravitating towards the developed world. In other words, the centerpiece may not really be Africa, but the United States in particular and the Western world in general. After shaking off an initial colonial hangover, Cold War era Nigerian foreign policy was dominated by an aggressive desire to assist in the total liberation of the African continent from colonialism and Apartheid, while remaining either non aligned in the East -West ideological basis or benefiting on a case by case basis by playing the East against the Western bloc and vice versa. Among other factors, Nigeria's religious and ethnic antecedents have conspired to impose internal and external strains in a world which often appears, perhaps unfairly, as if it is striving to "westernize" and "integrate", taking the Judaism and Christianity as the most appropriate standard. Nigeria's_.. post-Cold War years have been characterized by increasingly acrimonious domestic bickering among competing ethno-religious power blocs, 2 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh consequently affecting foreign policy issues. Indeed, Nigeria's aspirations for a leading role in continental and world affairs may have been frustrated by her inability to free herself from divisive internal dynamics and controversial external alliances, even though she has made far reaching contributions towards freeing other states from such tensions. 1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM The highly volatile ethnic and religious atmosphere which characterizes the internal affairs of the Nigerian nation may have limited the range of freedom of the central government to such a degree that foreign policy decision making is often controversial. This is particularly so, taking into account the behaviour of the state in making foreign policy commitments without consultation with the component nationalities of the country. For example, many international treaties and agreements are signed without internal consultation. Very often, these treaties are in conflict with local customs of Nigerian nationalities who were not consulted before Nigeria entered into such agreements. Many human rights, gender and child agreements and treaties are like that. This problem may have eroded the influence enjoyed by Nigeria at regional, continental and global levels. This dis~rtation, therefore seeks to examine four basic issues with respect to Nigeria's foreign policy in the post Cold War years. Although superficially 3 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh "normal", Nigeria's increasingly precarious relations with state and non-state actors in the Western world as a result of its domestic ethno-religious policies, such as Sharia law, is examined. Nigeria's deteriorating relations with IGOs like the World Health Organisation (WHO) on sensitive matters related to development such as immunization politics are also examined. Thirdly, the effect of ethnic tensions in the oil-rich Niger Delta region and ethnic rivalries over "resource control", on Nigeria's relations with multi-national oil and gas corporations and oil importing countries are looked into. Fourthly, the inability of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to extricate itself and reverse the ethno-religious factor in its foreign relations is considered . 1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH i. To give an overview of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence till the end of the Cold War, highlighting areas where the religious and ethnic polarisation of the Nigerian SOCiety have played a role. ii. Identify the general influence of religion and ethnidty on Nigeria's post Cold War foreign policy, dting evidence of her dwindling regional and intemational influence as a result of these factors, while discussing the specific roles religion and ethnicity have played in affecting Nigeria's relations with the Western world in an age when the latter is preoccupied with fighting "religiously" motivated terror. 4 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh iii. Proffer solutions. 1.4 HYPOTHESIS This research will be guided by the assumption that ethno-religious divisions within the Nigerian nation-state play a significant role in foreign polic.y formulation and implementation. 1.5 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH The end of the Cold War has brought new variables into the arena of international politics. Domestic issues peculiar to multinational societies have been eclipsed by the shadow cast on a bipolar world. Indeed, these concerns had always displayed a tendenc.y to impact on the wider international community at a propitious moment. The dawn of unipolarity offered this opportunity for many a pluralistiC society whose foreign polic.y has been influenced by conflicting intemal interests. In the case of Nigeria, the ever increasing polarization of her domestic components along religious and ethnic lines has not stopped at the water's edge. The last fifteen years have witnessed an increase in the frequenc.y of Nigeria's foreign policy dilemmas as she grappled with the attendant complications of a federal system. Equally frequent are the occasions when the central government's judgement on international matters is impaired by the desire not to upset sectional sensibilities or to "let sleeping dogs lie". Whenever the Federal Government of Nigeria has vacillated on crucial foreign polic.y issues 5 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh for such reasons, there have been either costs or benefits which have impacted on her position and influence as a key regional and continental actor. This study therefore looks into ethno religious factors and their effect on Nigeria's relations with the international community. It attempts to provide an informed basis to resolve contentious issues and convert inherent problems into national advantages. 1.6 REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE The following works were reviewed: 1. Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy System Approach 2. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Unz and Seymour Martin Upset (eds), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 3. Frands M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro et al: Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in_Africa. 4. Martin C. Needler. Understanding Foreign Policy 5. Agyemang Attah-Poku, African Ethnicity 6. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, 7. Ade Adefuye, Culture and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Example 8. K. J. Hoslti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis In an a~empt to analyse foreign policy, Brian White has suggested that it is almost impossible to conceive or implement foreign policy free from the influence 6 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh of domestic concerns. While agreeing with William Wallace's assertion that foreign policy is the aspect of politics which links the nation state to its international environment, White adds that foreign policy is also identifiable with the most dangerous and sensitive areas of governmental activity. However, he disagrees with the widely held argument that foreign policy can and should be shielded from the dynamics of domestic politics. According to him, the separation of foreign and domestic politics has become increasingly difficult due to the changes in the conduct of international relations since the Second World War. Today, affairs between states are not strictly foreign or domestic but cover a wide variety of issues, many being non security matters. However, most of these issues affect domestic interests as much as foreign policy concerns. According to him, "Typically these issues have foreign and domestic dimensions and there is often an overlap between the two". l White's work is very informative but does not delve into the highly sensitive issues of religion and ethnicity. Michael Clarke takes a view similar to White in discussing the foreign policy system. Foreign policy decision-making, he contends is not straightforward. "Any study of a state's foreign pOlicy over a given period quickly reveals that rather than a series of clear deciSions, there is a continuing and confusing 'flow of action', made up of a mixture of political decisions, non-political deciSions, bureauc_'!Itic procedures, continuations of previous policy, and sheer accident". 2 7 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Clarke tries to buttress his point by referring to Tolstoy who did not believe that political leaders are the shapers of history; they merely have to fit into the 3 'course of events', which in reality are driven by more anonymous forces. Although Clarke acknowledges the role of the "authorized decision - maker within the state, he warns that "we should realize that the idea of decision- making does not only refer to the making of conscious choices, but also to a range of personal, organizational, institutional and environmental factors which also help account for the flow of events".4 Thus, he questions the Rational Choice Model and the absolute influence of key decision-makers in the face of pressures and demands from within the internal environment, as well as the external environment. In his study, Clarke has encapsulated the dynamics of foreign policy formulation within a state and the factors which are likely to influence eventual decisions. However, he does not discuss any specific factor in detail. David AlienS draws our attention to the role of non-state actors in the foreign policy system. He alludes to the exertion of pressure on a target government by a foreign government via a surrogate or an intermediary in the domestic environ~~nt. He emphasizes that \\..... ~ven the most powerful and relatively autonomous of states are vulnerablee~' of one sort or another from University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh outside." Although Allen's contention is profound, he overlooked the fact that non-state actors within a state can equally exert tremendous pressure on foreign governments to influence the policies of their states. Allen goes on to identify the role of religion in determining foreign policy but does not discuss the ethnic factor which quite often accompanies the religious factor; especially in pluralistic societies. Michael Smith's comparison of Foreign Policy Systems focuses on the 'openness' or 'closeness' of regimes and the problems that confront both democratic and authoritarian regimes in shaping their foreign policies. 6 He condudes that open regimes that are sensitive to the political aspirations of the society have fewer foreign policy problems than closed regimes, which are characterized by societal chaos and a threatened political order. His analysis is however too general and not entirely accurate. While Yahya Jammeh's regime is autocratic and the socio- political climate in the Gambia is exceptionally peaceful, the country's foreign policy has not been without problems. On the other hand, the socia-political restlessness which characterized the Abacha regime did not strangulate its foreign policy process. As a result, Nigeria had quite a number of friends in the intemational community. In his case study of politics in developing countries, Larry Diamond7 alludes to the role of Nigeria's autonomous interest groups and aSSOCiations. According to 9 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh him, 'these autonomous interest groups and associations had established 5uffldently broad constituencies and deep roots so that they could not have been eliminated without a level of violent repression that no Nigerian military regime - even that of Buhari and Idiagbon - has dared attempt". He goes on to re-echo the classic pluralist argument that autonomous intennediate groups "provide the basis for the limitation of state power and make the society less likely to be dominated by a centralized power apparatus". Diamond also condudes that Nigeria's volatile ethnic and religious diversity has made it difficult to institutionalize authoritarian rule because of the inclination of such groups to consider any regime as illegitimate from their point of view. Looking at Diamond's assertions on the face value, one cannot but agree with him. However, the same situation has equally been applied to democratic governments in Nigeria albeit in much subtler ways. It could also be argued that depending on the degree of ruthlessness or guile, authoritarian regimes can prevail over interest groups in Nigeria. Indeed, this was the case with Abacha and Babangida administrations. In the same study, Diamond views Nigeria's relations with the international environment as "primarily through the nexus of oil production". Although, this has been the case to a reasonable extent, he does not consider the role of other ~ .. equally influential domestic factors such as ethnidty and religion in moulding 10 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Nigeria's relations within the international environment; especially their link with the oil factor. Even though he admits the potential threat of these two elements, it is only in relation to Nigeria's internal situation. According to him, "one cannot ignore the growing inddence of religious mobilization, extremism and violence in Nigeria, which could become a growing outlet for popular frustration and cynical elite exploitation if a pluralistic democracy cannot be made to work. In a country that is roughly half Muslim and half Christian, with a bloody ethnic dvil war in its past, such religious conflict must raise profound alann".8 Indeed recent developments, especially in the post-Cold War years have shown the ethno- religious factor goes beyond Nigeria's boundaries. Nigeria's position in the West African sub-region has been collectively discussed by Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence lyons, Donald Rothchild and I. 10 William Zartman. According to them, 'West Africa is structured, in large part, by Nigeria'S poSition in the sub-region. Nigeria has been perceived by some of its neighbours as a threat, while simultaneously it has played the role of regional organizer. Political instability in Nigeria, following the cancelled elections of 1993 and the potential for serious internal conflict may lead to a change in the country's regional role. As has been the case in Central Africa and the hom of Africa, a regional structure may fall into chaos if the core state itself is besieged with int:~nal problems. This threat will remain for West Africa until the governance issue in Nigeria is settled". The authors' concerns are based on 11 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh realities which continue to pervade the Nigerian domestic environment while concurrently threatening to erode her sphere of influence in the immediate external environment. However, the authors did not focus on sources of political instability and their role in the larger regional situation. Martin Needlerl1 raises some issues regarding national interests which he contends "must have primacy in detennining foreign policy". He stresses the need to sort out authentic national interests from the spurious and warns about the self righteousness of pressure groups. He also points out the need to harmonise conflicts among the different national interests, each of then genuine. Needler's assessment of foreign policy in a democratic society suggests other factors competing with the national temperament in the fonnulation of foreign policy. "It cannot be assumed that the distinctive features of national character will embody themselves automatically in a state's foreign policy. Policy is made and executed, after all, by a specially selected elite not necessarily typical of the society as a whole, and it is shaped not only by the wishes of the national population, but also by the externally imposed neceSSities of the situation. It is thus not possible to simply deduce a nation's foreign policy from the leading features of the national temperament". 12 Although _~eedler's appraisal ought to be the norm in any pluralist society, events in recent history have shown that it is not always workable. In more 12 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh industrialized and older democracies like the United States and the United Kingdom, there is a stronger possibility that the specially selected elite can hold sway to a reasonable extent, operating under the protective shield of the overall national interest. In developing democracies, however, the role of that specially selected elite is limited in large measure and quite often subordinated by the desire to placate sharply differing domestic interests. This is often the case with Nigeria. In his very well researched study on African Ethnidty, Agyemang Attah-Poku contends that ethnicity is a universal phenomenon which embraces most sodeties on earth. Although it has played an advantageous role in the past by enabling different ethnic entities to form a united front against foreign invaders, ethnidty in recent times has been the greatest source of disunity and destruction in Africa.13 In the first three parts of his study, he discusses the major ethnic groupings on the continent, their relationship and cultural differences. In the last three parts, he discusses the role of ethnidty in Africa in the past, major paradigms and discusses some of the ethnic strifes and skirmishes. He ends his study by offering long lasting solutions to both hidden and open conflicts. This highly instructive work did not however make any attempt to discuss ways in which ethnicity has influenced any nation in the formulation and implementation of its for;ign policy. 13 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Donald Rotchild15 acknowledges existence of widespread conflicts between states and ethnic groups but insists that such occurrences can be avoided or at least managed. In a broad study, he contends that while ethnicity is usually accompanied by untold destruction, it also has the potential of a creative force which can bestow material and psychological needs in a pluralistic society. Rothchild dwells extenSively on the push and pull factors between the state and its grappling ethnic groups. He concurs with t!1e statemate that "provided that an overarching sense of shared future exists among diverse ethnic and other interests, state and ethnic leaders may be able to live with a certain amount of uncertainty and even join forces to solve common problems". Rothchild offers various alternatives in the quest to eliminate the divisive aspects of ethnidty. One of such is decentralisation and federalism. Citing recent examples such as those in Senegal, Zambia, Ghana, Niger and Mozambique, he illustrates the possibilities for broad partidpation and influence in local politics and administration. He buttresses his point by referring to the fact that federalism "has won acceptance in Nigeria and in certain cirdes in Ethiopia and South Africa".lS His study, however, is limited only to internal dynamics with regard to the ethnic factor. A!, analysis of the role of the various ethnic components in influencing the overall national interest in the international environment is lacking in this work. 14 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Ade Adefuye16 discusses Nigeria's culture and foreign policy from the First Republic to the Babangida administration. He examines the effects of culture on foreign policy formulation and implementation and points out that the diversity of culture no doubt influenced Nigeria's domestic as well as foreign policy. His study focussed mainly on sensitive issues of the Cold War years such as the anti- apartheid movement which Nigeria championed. Other areas discussed include Nigeria's commitment to the OAU and Frontline states. Although the study is based on the effects of Nigeria's cultural heterogeneity on her external policies, it does not dwell extensively on areas of domestic friction and their implications on foreign policy, especially in the post Cold War years. However, this undoubtedly informative work draws the conclusion that "since foreign policy reflects the domestic reality, culture has invariably been an important element in Nigeria's conduct of external relations". R. A. Akindele and Segun Johnson's analysis of public involvement and shaping of Nigeria's foreign policy takes a look at the practicality of all embracing conferences in the foreign policy process.17 The All Nigeria Peoples Conferences of 1961 and 1986 are used as case studies although on a broad level. Specific areas of controversy such as religion and ethnidty are not mentioned with regard to foreig~ policy, although the authors acknowledge that "many citizens are less interested and involved in external affairs than in the politics of domestic 15 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh problems. This should however, not be used to justify excluding them from involvement and participation in the shaping and making of foreign poliCY". K. J. Holsti/7 in a very illuminating study of international politics, diSOJsses the relationship of public opinion to a government's external objectives and diplomatic behaviour. He opines that it is difficult to generalize on this subject because "the characteristics of political systems in the world today vary so immensely - from primitive, patriarchal or religious oligarchies to modem industrial democracies and totalitarian dictatorship". 18 He disputes the hypothesiS that alludes to foreign policy goals and diplomatic behaviour as necessarily a response to domestic opinions. He also rejects the notion that public feelings are neglected or considered unimportant in the foreign policy business. He however points out the fact that many government offidals have "claimed frankly that their decision could not be influenced by fickle public 19 attitudes. In the same vein, he states that there are instances where "offidals yielded to public pressures despite their own preferred policies".20 Holsti focuses primarily on sodeties where the public has free access to information from abroad and there is a great awareness of the external environment. He states further that even in highly literate SOCieties the majority of the people continue to show lack of interest and apathy in international affairs. He condudes that more research needs to be carried out in this area, especially in non-Western countries. There is, therefore, a need to fill some of 16 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh these gaps in Holsti's study with regard to non-Western countries such as Nigeria especially in more recent years. The assessment of contemporary international politics by Samuel P. Huntington27 'The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", Huntington dwells extensively on the new shifts of interests among nations. With the end of the Cold War, he concludes that several structural changes have emerged. In part one of his work, his findings are that for the first time in history, global politics is both multi-polar and multi-civilizational while non Western states are no longer influenced by westernisation. Part two of his book looks at the shifting balance of power among civilizations. The influence of the West is declining while Asian civilizations are expanding. Islam, he contends, is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours. 28 Part three deals with cultural affinities between states and the attempts being made by countries to group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization. In part four, he assesses the increasing conflict between the West and other CiVilizations, especially Islam. He also focuses on local conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims and their consequences. 17 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The final part of the work (part five) stresses the importance of Western civilization, particularly America accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi- dvilizational character of global politics. 29 1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK This study is based on the pluralist theory which contends that ''the state is not a unitary actor. It is composed of competing individuals, interest groups, and bureaucrades. To the pluralist, the state cannot therefore be viewed as a unitary actor because to do so misses the multiplicity of actors comprising the entity termed 'the State' 1If.21 This line of thought is in congruence with the basic pluralist notion that non-state actors have an important role to play in international politics. Although the realist assumption insists that factors such as ethnidty, religion and race are inescapable human phenomena, the state is a rational actor which has the ultimate decision at its disposal in spite of the fragmented nature of its entities. The pluralist theory has always been appropriate in the Nigerian context. Although for most of its post independence years, the country has been subjected to military dictatorship, it has, by virtue of its diversity had to operate within tl]e confines of representational governance. It has been suggested that "representative government would therefore be a microcosm of the larger 18 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh society, containing members drawn from all groups and sections in society, in terms of social class, gender, religion, ethnidty, age and so forth, and in numbers that are proportioned to their strength in society at large".22 This means that "only people who are drawn from a particular group can genuinely articulate its interests". It is also suggested that people are merely conditioned by their backgrounds and are incapable of or unwilling to understand the views of people different from themselves" 23 This dissertation would therefore be guided by the pluralist theory. 1.8 DEFINmON OF KEY CONCEPTS i) Ethnicity: The term 'ethnidty' is generally applied to cultural, linguistic and SOCial types. According to Andrew Heywood, 'ethnictty' unlike 'race', does not refer to genetic differences amongst humankind which supposedly distinguish people from one another on biological grounds like skin, hair colour, physique, physiognomy and the like.24 Nevertheless, both ethnic and racial cleavages have had equal significance in international affairs. Ethnicity has also been defined as a subjective perception of common origins, historical memories, ties, and aspirations, it refers to people who are linked by a conSCiousness of a special identity, who jointly seek to maximise their corporate political, _ economiC, and sodal interests. As a sense of peoplehood, it has its foundation in combined remembrances of past experience and in 19 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh common inspirations, values, norms and expectations. The validity of these beliefs is less significant to an overarching sense of affinity than 25 is the people's ability to symbolize their doseness to each other. Ethnidty, as used in this dissertation means the different cultural, linguistic and social groups that are found within nation states such as Nigeria. ii) Religion: Religion is defined as the belief in a superhuman controlling power, especially in a personal God or gods entitled to obedience or worship.26 In this study, the word 'religion' will embrace both monotheism and polytheism (the worship of a single deity and multiple deities). It will also cover animist and traditional forms of worship as found in other parts of the world, especially in Africa. iii) Pluralism: The term "Pluralism" is used to designate theories that strongly emphasize the importance of human association other than the state. In political sdence and Law, pluralist work stresses the role played in political life by associations, organizations and groups that were relatively independent of the state and one another. Pluralists contend that diversity is not only a fact but also desirable. 20 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1.9 SOURCES OF DATA COLLEcnON There has not been existing literature on this study because it is very recent. This has made it necessary to source for relevant data from informed individuals who participated actively in Nigeria's foreign policy process in the aftermath of the Cold War. Other sources include library research and interviews with individuals who worked in relevant governmental and non-governmental institutions in Nigeria. Further materials were acquired from the NIIA, ECOWAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Abuja, NIPSS, and AU and the UN. The secondary sources of data are obtained through scholany works on Ethnicity and Religion in International Politics, including books, journals and other forms of documentation . 1.10 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS Chapter One consists of the research design. This includes the background to the problem, hypothesiS, rationale, literature review, theoretical framework, definition of key concepts, sources of data and arrangement of chapters. Chapter Two provides an overview of Nigeria's foreign policy from independence until the end of the Cold War. 21 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Chapter Three examines the role of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (1989 - 2003) and proffer solutions. Chapter Four consists of the conclusion and recommendations. 22 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh End Notes 1. Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy System Approach, New York: Edward Elgar Publisher, 1989, p. 5-6. 2. Ibid, p. 27 3. Ibid 4. Ibid, p. 28 5. Ibid, p. 61 6. Ibid, p. 193 -194 7. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), PolitiCs in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, New York: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1990, p. 386. 8. Ibid, p. 404 9. Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro et al: Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa., New York: Brookings Institutions PubrlShers, p1996, p. 143. 10. Martin C. Needler. Understanding Foreign Policy, Colorado: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc, 1996, p. 12 11. Ibid, p. 22 - 23. 12. Agyemang Attah-Poku, African Ethnicity, Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1998, p. 45. 13. Adam Przeworki, Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 33. 14. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation, New York: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997. 15. Ade Adefuye, Culture and ForeiOn pOlicy' The Nigerian Example 1992, p. 179. 16. R. A. Akindele and Segun Johnson, "Public Involvement and Participation in the Shaping of Nigeria'S Foreign Policy ' Reflections on the All-Nigeria peoples Conferences of 1961 and 1986 n A Joint Essay in "The Structure and Process ... NIIA and Vantage Publishers Limited, 1989. 17. K. J. Hoslti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, New York: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1995, p. 260. 18. Ibid, 19. Ibid, p. 261. 23 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 20. Ibid, 261 21. Paul R. Viotti and Marl< V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism4 New Jersey: Macmillan, 1993, p. 228. 22. Andrew Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts: An Introduction, New Yorl<: St. Martins, 1994, p. 182. 23. Ibid, p. 183. 24. Ibid, p. 183 25. Ibid, 343 26. Donald Rothchild, op. cit., p. 24. 27. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash ofCiv,7izations and the Remaking of World Order, London: The Free Press and Design, 1997, p. 20 -21. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 24 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.0 AN OVERVIEW OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY FROM INPEPENDENCE TO THE ENP OF THE COLP WAR 2.1 THE ORIGINS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY What is today known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria (the governmental department charged primarily with the conception/formulation and implementation of foreign policy) was known as the External Affairs Department prior to Nigeria's attainment of independence on 1st October 1960. This department was within the Chief Secretary's Office in compliance with colonial guidelines. In 1957, this department was relocated to the Prime Minister's Office and it performed routine administrative and protocol duties. On Independence day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations was established. The Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became the first Foreign Minister from 1st October 1960 to 17 July 1961. His first task was to set up Nigeria's miSSions abroad and intensify the recruitment of staff. The ministry was however saddled with the misfortune of lacking qualified personnel and specialists ( an affliction common to almost all institutions in newly independent African states). Balewa's successor, Jaja Wachukwu therefore had to carry out a reorganisation of the ministry in great detail. The milit9ry intervention of 15th January 1966 paved the way for a Federal Military Government headed by Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. This 2S University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh government was itself toppled after only six months. The new Head of State, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon was faced with severe domestiC crisis which threatened to split the country along ethnic lines. The crisis had a direct effect on Nigeria's extemal relations. With the advent of military rule, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was transformed into the Ministry of External Affairs and within a short pericxl it nudged the FGN into playing a more significant role in international politics, especially within the continent of Africa. Indeed, this aspect has been acknowledged by Ray Ofoegbu as one of the positive contributions of military rule in Nigeria, a by-product of the professional preparations of the Nigerian military leadership. According to him, 'The preparations induded extensive training in Ghana and Britain; and international peace-keeping roles in Zaire, India/Pakistan and Tanzania.1 2.2 THE ANGLO-NIGERIAN DEFENCE PACT One of the first controversial foreign policy decisions in which the Nigerian government got itself entangled was the making and termination of the Anglo- Nigerian Defence Pact. Barely a month after independence (November 1960), the Nigerian Parliament ratified a defence pact between Nigeria and her erstwhile colonial master, Britain. This was cemented in spite of the vociferous objection by the politically sensitive Nigerian public. However, on 21st January 1962, th~ .. pact was abrogated by the Prime Minister himself in an unexpected announcement. This abrogation generated the same degree of controversy which 26 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh greeted the signing of the pact. It is worthy of note that there was no consultation at any level which resulted in the termination of the pact. There was no cabinet meeting, neither was there a parliamentary debate which led to the dissolution. This, in itself has ever since been a source of bewilderment. The pact has also provided fodder for the perennial controversy over the primacy or relative significance of the domestic over the external factors in foreign policy decision making in Africa.2 The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact is one of many foreign policy decisions taken by African states which have resulted in differing opinions. While to some observers, African leaders have hijacked and personalised foreign policy decision making, another school of thought holds the opinion that these leaders are actually left without any real freedom of action by the twin hazards of overwhelming international economic and political forces on the one hand and domestic interest groups with a commensurate amount of influence on the other. A third category views such leaders as "merely playing the role of arbiters among foreign and domestic groups". 3 The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact has the greater significance of revealing the true nature of the internal dynamics of the Nigerian nation and how it brings itself to bear on the foreign pOlicy decision-making process. There was a widespread conviction that Britain virtually arm-twisted her former colony into signing the pact after losing out in the 1956 Suez crisis. Driven by the desire to 27 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh establish a military base in the Northern Nigerian dty of Kano as an alternative to those in cairo, Tripoli and Khartoum, British Defence Secretary Duncan Sandys exerted pressure on the Nigerian leader and eventually dinched' the deal for Whitehall. The polarising nature of the pact was manifested by the inherent mutual suspidon between the North and the South. The Northern leaders who endorsed it shared the belief that it was an insurance against a combined effort by the East and West to wrest power from the North and pose a threat to their existence. Another reason why the Northern Region embraced the pact was because it would serve as a necessary stop-gap measure until the newly opened Nigerian Military Training College could serve as an instrument for counterbalancing the disproportionate percentage of Southern entrants into the officer corps of the Anny. 4 Apart from the Northerners who dung on to the pact, there were several Southerners from the mainly Eastern National Coundl of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC) party who supported the pact as a means of funning a common front with the mainly Northern NPC as a counterweight to the predominantly Western Action Group (AG). Domestic interests were equally involved in the abrogation of the pact. The suspicion between the AG, NCNC and NPC which represented the three major Nigerian ethnic groups (Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa) was convenient for the existence of the pact. As soon as it became apparent to the North that an AG-NCN(; ' alliance was just a mirage, the need to hold on to it became less important. 28 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Having considered the internal factors, it would be appropriate to discuss the external influences. The recurring crescendo in international politics of that era was the Cold War which hardly inspired a climate of growth for newly independent African states. The pro western Balewa government was visibly seeking avenues to prevent a communist infiltration and the pact offered a safeguard. A major source of pressure for the ratification of the pact was the increasing tensions between Nigeria and Ghana. On the attainment of a republican status, Ghana under the leadership of President Kwame Nkrumah was perceived by Nigeria to be aligned to the Eastern Bloc; a perception which made Lagos uncomfortable. Apart from overtly supporting subversive activities in Nigeria (the AG plot to oust the Balewa administration), Nkrumah was also accused by the Nigeria Government of supporting efforts to detach the British camerouns from Nigeria. A final straw was the Osagyefo's detennination to impose political union as a step to the unification of Africa. For the Balewa government, all these were suffident reason to take precautionary measures against potential Ghanaian aggression, hence the signing of the Defence Pact. 2.3 NIGERIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC) Nigeria's decision not only to join but remain a member of the Inter- Governmental organization known as OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting 29 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Countries) is generally accepted as a rational choice that was fuelled by nationalistic considerations. However, it has been suggested that prior to Nigeria joining this body as its eleventh member in 1971, there were indeed domestic interests at play despite the overall national interest. According to P.e. ASiodu, a one-time Federal Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum Resources in the Gowon government, ''The then Federal Executive Counal was sharply dMded over the issue".5 While one faction rationalized its objection to membership on the grounds that it was not in the country's best interest to get involved in Middle East politics, the other insisted that such an occurrence was most unlikely. It has been hinted in various Nigerian drdes that there was an underlying suspicion of motives even within the central government. This was buttressed by the fact that in the past, the Islamic North had attempted to court the fratemity of some Middle East countries. A case in mind was the invitation extended to Saudi Arabia's King Faisal to visit the Northern Region by its Premier, Ahmadu Bello. This had aroused widespread criticism, especially in the Christian South whose press considered the invitation of monarchs and Heads of State as the sole prerogative of the Prime Minister and not a Regional Premier. Nigerian policy within OPEC itself, has revolved around Saudi Arabia which is the largest exporter of oil and consequently the most important member because of her extensive reserves and enormous crude output. This automatically gave Riyadh le~erage in the oil industry as a price leader. Naturally, other members (Nigeria indusive) always took into account Saudi oil polides. A very crudal 30 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh factor was the Saudi influence on Nigeria as a result of Islamic ties between the former and latter. According to Soremekun, ''The Saudis themselves are very conscious of these links and on a rather testy occasion during the 1978 oil glut, Sheikh Yamani, due largely to this cultural factor, was compelled to remark that "Nigeria's plight is very close to my heart".6 Shehu Shagari's tenure as Nigeria'S President during the Second Republic (1979- 1983) was characterized by the unending debate over Nigeria'S continuing membership of OPEC. Both protagonists and antagonists straddled the perilous Nigerian ethno-religious divide and based their cases mainly on the state of the national economy. The Military Government of Generals Buhari and Idiagbon were equally concerned with the weak state of the economy and the decline in oil prices. The regime by its nature was not susceptible to domestic influences. However, Buhari's antecedents in the oil ministry and his faith gave his administration added sympathy in its dealings with Riyadh when Nigeria was granted an unprecedented increase in its quota by OPEC. The ethnic and religious dimensions may be accidental in much the same way as they could have been deliberate. It is indeed interesting to note the faith and ethnic origins of Nigeria's most prominent oil ministers, who indude the following: 31 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh • Shettima Ali Monguno - A Northern Moslem • Major General Muhammadu Buhari - A Northern Moslem . • Dr Rilwanu Lukman - A Northern Moslem • Professor Jubril Aminu - A Northern Moslem A scrutiny of the names listed above could imply an attempt by a particular group to dominate the oil portfolio. However, it could also be a calculated effort at acquiring a firmer foothold with the most influential OPEC member. This "theocratic flavour", although noticeable became much more pronounced under the Babangida administration.7 It was during this administration that Dr Lukman became visible as one of the leading advocates for Nigeria to join the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). It was also during this period that he was suddenly appointed Nigeria's oil minister amidst a doud of speculation and fingers pointing towards Riyadh, in the heartland of the Islamic world. The significant point about Lukman's tenure is the fact that for the first time in its existence, OPEC had endorsed the appOintment of one person (Lukman) as its president eight consecutive times. While a religious connotation can be suggested, it can also be implied that the perpetuation of Lukman as OPEC's President was designed to keep Nigeria from "straying away" from the organisation. 32 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.4 NIGERIA'S DECISION TO JOIN THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COIC) The Government of President Ibrahim Babangida has been singled out by most observers as the architect of Nigeria's association with the Organization of Islamic Conference. This is probably due to the fact that it was during the Babangida years that the orc issue reached a crescendo. The reality however is that the seeds of this association were sown long before the General became Nigeria's President. Tracing the roots of the Nigeria-orC affair, Cohen opines that the act of arson carried out on the sacred AI Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem by Israeli government agents embittered the Moslem world thus leading to a decision to organise a summit of Islamic Heads of State in September 1969 in Rabat. 8 The summit resolved to foster doser cooperation among Islamic countries. Prior to the establishment of the orc in 1971, Moslem groups in Nigeria had formed ties with similar bodies in other countries, especially in the Middle East. Prominent among such was the dose relations between Premier Ahmadu Be"o's government in Northern Nigeria and Islamic governments in the Middle East and North Africa. This led to Bello being "charged with the responsibility of looking into the possibility of the creation of a permanent forum at which Islamic governments could interact on a regular basis'S Shortly after, a report, to which Bello contributed, was submitted to the Sixth Session of the Muslim ~or1d Congress held in 1966. It is therefore not surprising that when the trumpet was sounded for the 1969 Rabat Summit, a delegation of Nigerian Moslems led by the late Sheikh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi answered the call and 33 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh pledged support for the formation of the OIC on behalf of Nigeria's Moslem population. The reaction to this development in Nigeria was a series of official and unofficial question marks. "In what capacity did the delegation attend the Conference? Was it an official delegation? Did it have any support from the Nigerian Government?l1 The complexities of the day which included Nigeria's secularity, and the conduct of a dvil war founded on ethno-religious grounds, compelled General Gowon to distance his government from the delegation in a statement to King Hassan of Morocco. Consequently, the delegates were refused accreditation although they were accorded an observer status. Gowon's announcement that Nigeria had no intention of becoming a full fledged member of the OlC was endorsed by General Murtala Muhammed's regime (even though Muhammed himself was a devout Moslem). This trend reduced in subsequent governments (Obasanjo and Shagari governments). The Buhari/Idiagbon Government was also pushed into the OlC saga during its short life span. Fresh efforts were made for Nigeria to graduate from observer to full member status by highly influential Moslem lobby groups which had strong business bonds with their counterparts in the predominantly Moslem Arab Wond. The lobby from Arab countries was equally intense and laced with oblique assurances of financial support. It is very poSSible, though not verified, that Buhari's reputation as a very devout Moslem could have rekindled the embers of agitation for complete membership. According to Olukoshi, the Buhari government refused to take any hasty deciSion based on the advice of External 34 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Affairs Minister Ibrahim Gambari who cited the 1979 Constitution which is specific on the maintenance of secularity. Furthermore the potential threat to national unity was also a factor to contend with.12 The emergence of General Babangida as President (another Moslem leader) signalled a fresh onslaught by OIC enthusiasts. The president referred the matter to Foreign Minister Bolaji Akinyemi who offered advice identical to his predecessors. The President, who was under pressure to call the bluff of the West which was imposing "inconsiderate" financial conditions on Nigeria, decided to reject Akinyemi's counsel and endorsed the attendance of an offidal delegation to the Fez ministerial meeting of January 1986. Nigeria's formal application was accepted during the morning session of 9th January 1986. The backlash that ensued as soon as the membership became public knowledge was near fatal. There was an instant Christian-Moslem stand off which the government tried to defuse by explaining the situation off with the excuse that the organisation itself was more political than religious and Nigeria stood to gain tremendously from the financial fallouts. However, this offidal line did not command general sympathy and the government reverted the country to its original observer status. 13 3S University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.5 OTHER SIGNIFICANT INSTANCES OF NIGERIA'S COLD WAR ERA FOREIGN POLIcy DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 2.5.1 Nigeria's Attitude Towards North Africa and the Middle East: As discussed earlier, Nigeria's interactions with North African states presented serious challenges to the various governments of the post independence era. As a result of the polarized nature of Nigerian society, and the substantial autonomy enjoyed by the regional governments, it was almost impossible for the central government to maintain normal relations not only with the Arab countries of North Africa but also those in the Middle East, particularly Israel. Adefuye observes that the Northern Region's contact with North Africa might not have attracted critidsm if the Sardauna's14 emphasis had been on trade rather than' religion which he allowed to dictate his attitude to the Arab-Israeli dispute. The increasing ferocity with which the Sardauna condemned Zionist aggression and the paSSion with which he embraced the Islamic countries led to sharp criticisms in the Southern press of Nigeria. The fact that he was the Vice President of the World Islamic League did not help matters. His visits to the Middle East and Pakistan urging various leaders to organise an All Muslim States' summit was considered as the role of the Prime Minister and not a Regional Premier. Indeed, this caused the Prime Minister some discomfort because the Sardauna was the leader of_ _~ is own political party. 36 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Relations with Israel were subjected to the same degree of internal squabbling amongst the three regions. Even before independence, both the Eastern and Western regional governments had entered into trade agreements with Israel. When the Federal Government signed a loan agreement with Israel, the Nigeria People's Congress (NPC) called on the Federal Government to end all negotiations with and withdraw recognition of Israel. When the Federal Government refused to do that, the Northern government dissociated itself and refused to have anything to do with the loan agreement.15 Shortly after, the Sardauna announced that Israel would not be allowed to take part in any development programme in Northern Nigeria. Other incidents which increased friction between Federal and Regional Governments included the 1962 Signing of two trade agreements with Egypt and Israel. The Northern Regional government called on the Federal Parliament not to ratify the agreement with Israel but the FGN ratified it without sending it to Parliament. These domestic rifts produced reactions from some countries. In 1962, exports from Nigeria which were considered to be produced by companies either owned completely by or in partnership with Israeli concerns were banned by the Jordanian government. Again, a similar problem arose when a Nigerian contingent to the Commonwealth Education Conference in India stopped in Cairo to change planes. The Egyptian Government invited both the Federal and Northern government Ministers of Education to stay in Cairo as guests of the 37 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh government but did not extend the same courtesies to the Western and Eastern Ministers. The Arab-Israeli crises brought out the partisan qualities of Nigerian politics even at the diplomatic level where attitudes were supposed to reflect the national interest. The pro-Israel stance of both Premier Akintola of the Western- Region and Premier Okpara of the Eastern Region were commensurate with the anti Israel stance of Premier Ahmadu Bello of the Northern Region. While the two Southern Premiers professed love and commitment to Israel, their Northern counterpart declared that Israel did not even exist. It was only by sheer will power that the Federal Government refrained from being drawn into taking sides with any of the regional governments. According to Adefuye, it was in apparent deference to northern Moslem sentiments that Nigeria did not open an embassy in Tel Aviv even though Israel had one in Lagos. It is interesting to note that throughout the period between 1960-1965, Nigeria's partidpation in the Arab- Israeli debates at the United Nations was very minimal and marked by caution. Nigeria's contribution to the debate during that period was a two minute speech urging both sides to compromise. Even the voting pattern was marked by sensitivity towards the attitude of the internal interest groups. The Arab-Israeli issue was put to vote seventeen times. Nigeria voted six times in favour of pro - Arab resolutions, four times for resolutions which favoured neither side and abstained"" on seven occasions. Indeed the Federal Government was placed in a very delicate situation by virtue of the fact that it was a coalition government 38 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh made up of two parties which had opposing policies on the Middle East as a result of their cultural peculiarities of the peoples they represented. While the leader of the NPC, (the party of the Prime Minister) was Ahmadu Bello, a great grandson of Usman Oanfodio who considered it a religious obligation to support the Arab cause, the NCNC showed sympathy for the Israeli cause although it pressed for a non-aligned policy. In order to enhance national unity and stability, Sir Abubakar's Federal Government had to demonstrate its neutrality by steering a middle course. This made the FGN vulnerable to accusations of weakness and lack of decision. When the coalition broke down later, the NCNC chieftains went to town and condemned the NPC attitude towards Israel as rooted in religious bigotry. 2.5.2 Foreign Policy During The Nigerian Civil War Years: The remote and immediate causes of the Nigerian Civil War are attributable to various factors but most significant among them was the preponderance of ethnic and religious sentiments in the body politic of the entire Federation. These factors, as we have already diSCUSsed, were not limited to the national boundaries but were also projected onto the international scene and had considerable influence on the way Nigeria related to many key actors in the international environment during the war. Much credit has been given to the Biafran propaganda machinery in the conduct of the war. It has even been suggested that the skilful use of propaganda by the Biafrans actually prolonged a 39 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh war they would have lost in a matter of months. The Biafran strategy was to present their case to the international community in such a way that they would evoke profound sympathy for their cause. In doing so, they called on the rest of humanity to come to their rescue because they faced imminent extermination as a people. They referred to the pogroms of May and October 1966 and lamented that as a result of persecution, they had been herded into a corner with no outlet except the Atlantic Ocean. Pictures of children afflicted with the killer disease Kwashiorkor were splashed on the front pages of international newspapers and magazines. The Igbos were relentless in stressing the futility of a union in an inherently heterogeneous society. They insisted that they were hounded out of what they considered their motherland by the Hausa-Fulanis who were determined to dominate the rest of the federation and destroy whoever opposed them. The Igbos asserted that anybody who hoped to bind the various ethnic groups into one country was living in a fool's paradise. Lord Frederick Lugard, the architect of the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 had indeed made a fatal mistake they suggested. In fact, the propaganda warned that the aim of the North was to complete the Jihad of 1804 by extending its frontiers to the Atlantic Ocean. Reaction to the propaganda was instant. Biafra was recognized by four African countries, namely: Gabon, Tanzania, Ivory Coast, and Zambia. It is believed that the urge to support fellow Catholics "and the attitude of the French Government might have influenced the decision by Gabon and Ivory Coast to recognize Biafra. 16 In the case of Zambia, 40 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh it was widefy befieved that President Kenneth Kaunda who is a devout Catholic was overcome by the plight of his fellow Catholic Biafrans. Kirke-Greene makes reference to General De Gaulle of France who was quoted as asking why the Igbos who are generally Christians and live in the South in a certain way have 17 their language dependent on another ethnic faction of the Federation. President Nyerere of Tanzania was perhaps the staunchest supporter of Biafra and he made several passionate appeals to the OAU for recognition. Also of significance was Biafra's appeal to Italy portraying the conflict as an ethno- refigious motivated crisis. Religious chords were pulled by both parties with predictable results. Biafra's comparison of her situation to the sorrows of Jews during the Second World War was enough reason for Israel to support her against the predominantly Moslem North which had antagonized her during the era of Ahmadu Bello. While the FGN tried desperately to water down insinuations of a religiously inspired war, its case was not made any better by the fact that there was a large number of Moslems on the Federal side whose army was commanded by the Hausa-Fulani Prince of Katsina Emirate, Brigadier Hassan Usman Katsina. Added to this was the ease with which the FGN secured the support of the Government of Egypt whose Airforce pilots and Jets carried out bombing missions against Biafra. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.S.3 The Formation of The ECOWAS: The reasons which led to the fonnation of the ECOWAS in 1975 are multiple, but the fundamental concerns raised by the founding fathers include a strong desire for regional integration as well as the establishment of a common market. However, in the case of Nigeria there were other pressing issues which impacted on her. These included the bitter lessons learnt from the Civil War which raised the issue of good neighbourliness. If Nigeria had been surrounded by hostile neighbours she would probably have lost the war (Adefuye). The fact that these countries were not used as staging posts for enemy forces was comforting but that did not eliminate the possibility of France influendng her surrogates against Nigeria in future. It was therefore expedient for Nigeria to encourage the formation of such a regional body in order to enhance her security.18 Another reason (often overlooked) is the need to re-establish ethnic ties amongst African peoples who were separated from each other as a result of the partition of the continent by the colonial powers. People of the same ethnic stock were strangers across borders. In the case of Nigeria, the Kanem Bomu Empire which was in present day Northern Nigeria, included parts of Chad Republic before the partition of the 19th Century. Today, there are members of the Kanuri and 42 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Shuwa ethnic groups in both countries just as there are Fulanis, Ekoi and about five other ethnic groups in both Nigeria and cameroun. In the 19705, General Gowon appointed H.E. Bello Malabu (President Ahmadou Ahidjo's former village chief) as Nigeria's Ambassador to Cameroun. Indeed Nigeria-cameroun relations were at their best during his tenure and Nigeria did not consider Cameroun a Francophone country in the Spirit.19 Other cases of ethnic groups shared commonly are the Hausas and Kanuris in Niger Republic, the Yorubas in Nigeria and Benin. About 95% of the population of Porto Novo (now Cotonou) are Yorubas. The Fulanis also stretch across the borders of Nigeria and Niger Republic. An interesting point is the aversion of some ethnic groups for international borders because it stifles their economic growth. An example is the proclivity of the fishing communities in Bakassi to have two villages with one name on either side of the Nigerian and camerounian borders so that when they can shift their village when the water recedes and return when the rains arrive. The problem of large ethnic groups sitting across borders is a universal one and could often have grave consequences as is the case with the Turks in Iraq and Turkey, Germans in Austria, Russian immigrants in Euro~, Mexicans in the United States, and Ewes in Ghana and Togo. Nigeria - 43 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh has been able to manage this issue as a result of the sensitivities of the various nationalities.2o 2.5.4 Diplomatic ApPOintments; The Nigerian Constitution is specific on the importance of equal representation in public service. This has been enshrined in the Constitution in the interest of peace and stability. This applies to diplomatic appointments. The practice has been for the Senate to confirm diplomatic appointments with the various states. It is also the practice to appoint seasoned diplomats to countries considered to be of great importance to the nation's interest. In the case of Nigeria, it has been observed that most heads of government have tended to favour people from their ethnic or religiOUS background in making ambassadorial appOintments to some key Missions such as London, Washington, and the UN. This is probably because the President (or Head of State as the case may be) feels such a person could best represent certain domestic interests abroad. Some examples include the posting of Alhaji Sule Kole, a northerner to london during Gowon's tenure; the posting of Gambari, a Muslim to the UN during the Babangida years; Hassan Wakili, a Northern Muslim to Washington during the Abacha years, Alhaji Abubakar Alhaji , a Muslim Northerner to london during the Babangida years; Joseph Garba, a Northerner to the UN during the Babangida year; Maitama Sule, ..... . a Northern Moslem to the UN during Shagari's tenure and a host of similar postings. Indeed, the practice has also been to post Moslems to countries such 44 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan while Christians are accredited to Israel and the Vatican. The same pattern is applied to the postings of Defence Advisers and Attaches. 4S University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh END NOTES 1. Ray Ofoegbu, ''The Structure and Process of FOreign PoliCY Fonnulation and Implementation: A Study of the Ministry of External Affairs" An Essay in "The Structure and Processes NIIA and Vantage Publishers Limited lbadan , 1989, p. 78 2. Olatunde JB Ojo, ''The Making and Tennination of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact". NlIA and Vantage Publishers Limited lbadan, 1989, p 255. 3. Ibid 4. Ibid, P 257. 5. Kayode Soremekun, Nigeria's Membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Essay written in ''The structures and processes of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria, 1960-1990", Ed Gabriel 0 Olusanya and RA Akindele, NIIA and Vantage Publishers International Ltd, Ibadan, 1990,p 296. 6. Ibid, P 299. 7. Ibid, P 301. 8. C, Cohen, Democracy(Athens: University of Georgia Press,1971),p6. 9. Adebayo Olukoshi, The Long Road to Fez : An examination of Nigeria's Decision to Become a Full Member of The Organization of Islamic Conference, NlIA and Vantage Publishers International Ltd, Ibadan, 1990, p 488. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid.p494. 12. Newswatch, 17 February 1986,p.17 13. Ade Adefuye, Culture and Foreign Policy: the Nigerian Example, NIIA Press Lagos, 1992. p 43. 14. Ibid, pp 44-45. 15. Ibid, P 45. 16. Ibid, P 57. 46 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 17. AHM Kiri