DATE DOWNLOADED: Tue Apr 30 06:11:42 2024 SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline Citations: Please note: citations are provided as a general guideline. Users should consult their preferred citation format's style manual for proper citation formatting. Bluebook 21st ed. Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani, Afro-Communitarianism or Cosmopolitanism, 56 J. VALUE INQUIRY 335 (2022). ALWD 7th ed. Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani, Afro-Communitarianism or Cosmopolitanism, 56 J. Value Inquiry 335 (2022). APA 7th ed. Ani, Emmanuel Ifeanyi. (2022). Afro-communitarianism or cosmopolitanism. Journal of Value Inquiry, 56(3), 335-353. Chicago 17th ed. Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani, "Afro-Communitarianism or Cosmopolitanism," Journal of Value Inquiry 56, no. 3 (September 2022): 335-353 McGill Guide 9th ed. Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani, "Afro-Communitarianism or Cosmopolitanism" (2022) 56:3 J Value Inquiry 335. AGLC 4th ed. Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani, 'Afro-Communitarianism or Cosmopolitanism' (2022) 56(3) Journal of Value Inquiry 335 MLA 9th ed. Ani, Emmanuel Ifeanyi. "Afro-Communitarianism or Cosmopolitanism." Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 56, no. 3, September 2022, pp. 335-353. HeinOnline. OSCOLA 4th ed. Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani, 'Afro-Communitarianism or Cosmopolitanism' (2022) 56 J Value Inquiry 335 Please note: citations are provided as a general guideline. Users should consult their preferred citation format's style manual for proper citation formatting. -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use: Copyright Information https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jrnlvi56&collection=journals&id=333&startid=333&endid=351 https://heinonline.org/HOL/License https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?operation=go&searchType=0&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0022-5363 The Journal of Value Inquiry (2022) 56:335-353 https:I/doi.org/l 0.1007/s10790-020-09778-7 Afro-communitarianism or Cosmopolitanism Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani' Accepted: 17 October 2020 / Published online: 23 November 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 1 Introduction Bernard Matolino argues that classical communitarians exaggerate the role of the community in its relationship with the individual, and for that reason, classical com- munitarianism is an ill-suited value foundation for designing modern African politi- cal systems. Matolino thus rejects communalism as a foundation for communitarian- ism, and pledges to construct a communitarian theory without communalism. He advocates what he terms Afro-communitarianism: an advocacy for respecting every citizen of the world irrespective of race, gender, religion, and other demographics. I argue that this new theory is more appropriately called cosmopolitanism, and I show that Matolino's arguments coincide with the arguments of cosmopolitans. I ques- tion the "Afro" aspect of the titling of this advocacy as "Afro-communitarianism". Matolino also argues that the debate about whether the community has primacy over the individual is inappropriate, and focuses instead on arguing only for the rights of the individual. I argue that this position robs Matolino's theory of the appellation "communitarian", which is an appellation due to any theory advocating the impor- tance of some degree or the other of the community especially in relation to the individual. Matolino's stray into cosmopolitanism is problematic because the rea- sons driving the communitarian and cosmopolitan debates are quite different. The communitarian debate is driven by concerns with the balance of rights between the community and the individual, and the cosmopolitan by concerns with the place, role and extent of the power of sovereign states in determining citizenship and tying people to societies. Matolino also does not succeed in divorcing communitarianism from communalism, and this robs him of the ability to make communitarianism a theory discussing world relations, by the standards of his conclusion that a commu- nal-based communitarianism is unsuitable for contemporary multi-ethnic African societies. This article is divided into four sections. In Sect. 1, I present Matolino's dissat- isfaction with the communal foundations of classical communitarianism (which E Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani mabrowest@yahoo.com; eiani@ug.edu.gh http://www.ug.edu.gh Department of Philosophy and Classics, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana I_) Springer involves the early socialists and nationalists, the radical communitarians, and sup- porters of consensual democracy). In Sect. 2, I present Matolino's own version of what he calls Afro-communitarianism. In Sect. 3, I argue that there is nothing Afri- can about a universalist argument against racism at the world stage, and this calls into question Matolino's decision to attach the "Afro" appellation to his theory. In Sect. 4, I argue that the issues driving the communitarian and cosmopolitan debates are quite different, and this makes a communitarian theory unfit as cosmopolitan- ism in spirit but especially in letter. In Sect. 5, I argue that Matolino's attempt to distinguish communitarianism from communalism is quite unsuccessful, and, there- fore, communitarianism is as unfit for world relations as Matolino claims it is unfit for contemporary multi-ethnic African societies. In Sect. 6, I show that Matolino appropriates not only the spirit but also (and especially) the precise arguments of cosmopolitans. In Sect. 7, I show that Matolino introduces even more confusion by saying that his advocacy against racism and world inequality is "authentically Afri- can". In Sect. 8, I remark that Matolino concentrates on arguing only for individual rights, raising the question of why his theory should be termed "communitarian" in any way. 2 Afro-communitarian democracy Matolino has recently published a book titled Afro-communitarian Democracy. Matolino argues that what he seeks to do in this book is "transcend both social- ism and consensual democracy by arguing for a political theory that is rooted in a restated Afro-communitarianism." Matolino thinks that the way socialists and sup- porters of consensus democracy have presented communitarianism is essentialist (that is, suggesting that certain ideas or practices are peculiar to the African tradi- tional past and the continent's future can only be secured by adhering to those prac- tices). Matolino criticizes these scholars for advocating an essentialist opinion of communitarianism that portrays the individual as being virtually at the mercy of the community and existing largely to simply serve community's interests. Matolino's proposal is to fashion a version of communitarianism that is free of such essential- ism. According to him, "I seek to achieve this through two moves. Firstly, I seek to appraise the shortcomings of African socialism and democracy by consensus as modes that are representative of a defensible version of communitarianism. Sec- ondly, I seek to develop the political commitment of limited communitarianism..."1 Matolino tells us that he seeks to show that the communitarianism advocated in the two theories (socialism and consensual democracy) is not defensible, and that he (Matolino) seeks to develop a defensible version of communitarianism, a version that is a "far more refined political theory than the two communitarian antecedents of socialism and consensus."2 But, at the same time, Matolino tells us that his theory Bernard Matolino, Afro-Communitarian Democracy. (London: Lexington, 2019) p. 11. 2 Ibid. Springer 336 E. I.Ani is "deeply rooted in the politics and structures of communitarianism." As a pre- liminary remark, this comes off as a contradiction. For, if Matolino aims to fashion a new version of communitarianism, it cannot be rooted in the status quo structure of communitarianism that he seeks to overturn. If, on the other hand, Matolino argues that his version is in fact rooted in the structure of communitarianism that existed before him, then he implies that both the socialists and the proponents of consen- sual democracy have been misreading such a communitarianism and been getting it wrong. Which of these positions is indeed Matolino's? Let us find out. Matolino begins with the early nationalists and proponents of African socialism, particularly Julius Nyerere who aimed to organize his society and country along the lines of a family. In the family setting nothing belongs to anyone including the fam- ily head, and this informs the version of communitarianism that Nyerere advocated.4 But Matolino cites several scholars who showed that Nyerere's idea was a grave misunderstanding of African communitarianism.5 Matolino cited Johnson as show- ing that Nyerere ruined Tanzania despite his good intentions. Matolino also cited Ayittey as writing: Nyerere, however, misunderstood his own African heritage. His claim of "communal ownership of the means of production" was incorrect. As I made abundantly clear earlier, all the means of production in indigenous Africa were privately owned. Three economic factors of production-labor, capital, and the entrepreneur-were owned by the peasants, not their chiefs or the state. Land, the other factor, belonged to the ancestors. The chiefs and kings held land only in trust, it did not belong to them or the state. Further- more, the African emphatically does not "regard all men as his brethren." Oth- erwise, there would be no tribal wars or tribalism. Like many other African leaders, Nyerere displayed a woeful lack of understanding of his own black African heritage and culture. Such leaders attempted to graft an ideology onto an African culture they did not understand.6 Matolino charges the nationalists and socialists (Julius Nyerere, Leopold Seng- hor, and Kwame Nkrumah) of exaggerating the importance of the community at the expense of the individual within the community. Indicting Nyerere, Matolino writes, The fact that we ended up with a utopian community meant that the possibility of resuscitating or working with a genuine mode of community as an inspira- tion for our social and political arrangements was lost. This meant that this was a lost opportunity to work with a real model of community that was not only attainable but one that would apply to real human conditions. An orienta- tion that takes difference seriously, instead of glossing over it and attempts to account and address that difference is not the same as a utopia that seeks to Ibid. 4 Ibid, p. 21. 5 Ibid. 6 George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 117. Cited in Matolino op. cit., p. 22. I_) Springer Afro-com m unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 337 engrave similarity on the founding epitaph of community. By effectively end- ing up with a false account of community, the implication was just as bad as having a foreign system imposed on our social and political structures.7 Matolino equally charges proponents of consensual democracy of exaggerating the community and agreement at the expense of individual differences and free- dom. He particularly faulted Wiredu's argument that human interests are the same at rock bottom, that differences are only a matter of perception, and that deliberation can always eliminate those differences. Matolino also faults those Kwame Gyekye described as radical communitarians. The biggest proponent, Ifeanyi Menkiti, had argued that personhood is not a static individual feature as conceived by Western scholars, that it is the community that grants personhood to individuals, that the community grants such a status according to the contributions the individual makes to the community.8 Menkiti had also argued that people can fail to become persons, that priority is given to the duties the individual owes the community, and what- ever rights the individual has are secondary to their duties.9 Gyekye had argued that this version of communitarianism is exaggerated.10 Citing the disagreement between Gyekye and Menkiti, Wiredu had expressed preference for Menkiti's position, and Matolino identifies this as further confirming Wiredu's penchant for an exaggerated version of communitarianism."1 Matolino has argued that exaggerating the nature of traditional societies will not help Africa in any way to fashion systems that will put her on the part of growth.1 2 In chapter three of his book, Matolino attempts to outline a new form of com- munitarianism that is free of the features of traditional societies. He argues that it is possible to outline a communitarianism that is applicable to modern Africa and to other societies. Matolino writes, What I have in mind is to develop a political theory that is of a communitarian nature while not overly relying on descriptions of traditional African socie- ties or arrangements thereto. Secondly, I seek to show what the basis of the political communitarian theory I have in mind could amount to. If we remove the traditional antecedent of African communalism, what could be the pos- sible basis on which any communitarian framework can claim to be African? In answering to this question I wish to take the debate on African commu- nitarianism to a higher level of abstraction by showing that it is possible to formulate a distinct African theory of communitarianism without relying on 7 Matolino op. cit., p. 25. 8 Ifeanyi Menkiti, "Personhood and Community in African Traditional Thought" in R. A. Wright, ed., African Philosophy: An Introduction. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), 171-181, p. 172. 9 Ibid p. 180. 10 Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 35-41. " Matolino, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 12 Ibid, pp. 23-24; 58; 76-82; 127-128; 144. Springer 338 E. I.Ani essentialism as nationalists/socialists and supporters of consensus have tended to do.13 In his reformulation of communitarianism, Matolino argues that what should be dispensed is that aspect for which traditional societies are best known: communal- ism. Explaining his reason for this decision, he writes, "While it can be the case that certain values transcend age and place, applying with equal force and staying with the same persuasion for all people, I have found it hard to recognize communalist values as having that sort of endurance."14 Matolino argues that the biggest prob- lem with radical communitarians is their tendency to regard the past as possessing remedies for contemporary problems. Matolino argues that this tendency is blind to the fact that "... humanity and the spaces it inhabits do not only go through physi- cal changes but also go through changes in values and systems that support those values."1 5 Matolino points out that there are scholars who have not presented features of traditional African societies in an essentialist way, but nevertheless describe these features as salient. He identifies Thaddeus Metz as advocating this approach, and argues that he will also depart from such a position. He analyzes Metz's position as follows: It is plausible to follow Metz's strategy by not always insisting on a pristine past or some aspect of that past. It may be sufficient to point that there is, as Metz calls it, a salient approach. It could be the case that this salience is owed to the fact that these features have been handed down from one generation to the next or that a sufficient degree of these features have remained over all these generations. They have survived the attempt to discard them through both colonialism and modernization. The importance of the community, for example, in an individual's framework remains relevant in significant ways.16 So although Matolino thinks that Metz is not guilty of essentialism as radical communitarians are, Matolino thinks Metz also points to aspects of tradition that stand out as distinguishing tradition. Matolino thinks we need systems that transcend references to features of past societies. This departure informs Matolino's search for an alternative value for communitarianism. 3 An Alternative Value for Communitarianism Matolino then writes that he will take a route that is different from those of both Metz and the nationalists. This is how he describes his route, 14 Ibid, p. 89. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid, p. 92. I_) Springer Afro-comm unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 339 My strategy however is different from both Metz's suggested approach and one that has been adopted by nationalists/socialists. My strategy is not to confirm the existence of traditional mores nor to search for salient features. What I seek to do is offer an assessment of what a modern form of communitarian political outlook will be considering all that we know. All that we know will ultimately include Africa's recent histories both externally and internally generated as well as the sorts of things that we think are ultimately important in determin- ing political value.1 7 Matolino argues that the difference between his version of communitarianism and those of Gyekye, Metz, Wiredu, and others in various positions regarding the issue is that, according to Matolino, "they tend to overemphasize the originality of some communalistic values and the permanence of those values as if the station of Africa has not been radically and unalterably affected by some other facts... both internally and externally generated."18 Matolino then argues that the sort of communitarianism he has in mind is one that can respond to current African reality.19 Prior to stating his version of communitarianism, Matolino points out that politi- cal theories are supposed to reflect "values of a nonpolitical nature that are broadly shared by members of society" and that such values shape the polity and direct how institutions and other contents attain the values.2 0 As a result, Matolino argues that his own version of communitarianism rejects the prioritization of community "over other features in the definition of personhood", rather, "... the other features could and should take priority over the sociality of the self."2 1 Matolino accuses previous versions of communitarianism of whittling away "... the nonsocial features of the self to a negligible role." 22 Another feature of communitarianism Matolino rejects is Wiredu's argument that human interests are collapsible into a rock bottom identity.23 Defending his rejection, Matolino argues that human interests have a dual charac- ter, sometimes drifting toward cooperation and sometimes toward irreconcilability. According to him, "One and the same person may feel inclined to agree with others yet at other times she may maintain her contrary position to the end." 24 Matolino points out that people "do not easily divorce themselves from their deeply ingrained interests" and that people are "more attached to their interests than communitarians are willing to acknowledge." Acknowledging this fact should lead to the formulation of a political community that "... takes individuated interests seriously" instead of "glossing over differences in favor of some communally shared good."25 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid, p. 104. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid, p. 105. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid, p. 106. 25 Ibid, p. 107. Springer 340 E. I.Ani These arguments lead Matolino to argue that his version of communitarianism is one "... that is generic to all humanity as opposed to one that is specific to com- munitarian aggregations."26 For a new form of communitarianism, Matolino presses that we should focus on a human value rather than a specific communitarian ethos. He points out that Africans are not so different from other humans as to "... deserve a special theory of identity, social and political organization."27 Matolino argues that the version of communitarianism needed is what other people may find attractive, given that humanity is now more interconnected than ever before. Matolino then opines that, politically, "... democratic pluralism is the dominant system, and Africa is expected to keep up with this idea and practice."28 Proceeding from this statement about pluralism, Matolino argues that there is some- thing fundamental about people of different races, language, cultural practices, gen- der, geographical location, social and political systems, that makes them all human persons.29 That very human nature common to every person, Matolino argues, is what should inform the value of communitarianism. Such communitarianism is one that should be equipped to tackle some of the difficulties experienced between peo- ple of different origins and circumstances in life. Matolino writes, "Since the type of value I have in mind is essentially conceived as primarily human and applicable to the sort of interaction that humans are expected to have by virtue of their nature, I will chart my path to that proposal by considering some difficult moments in human affairs and interaction. I will chart my path via the route of racial discrimination and will employ the best way of eliminating racial inequality."3 0 Citing Paul C. Taylor's description of racism as "... an ethical disregard for peo- ple who belong to a particular race," Matolino explores implications of the word "disregard", such as "... withholding of respect, concern, goodwill, or care from members of a race."31 "Disregard" covers all kinds of attitudes "... from outright hatred, to the simple failure to notice that someone is suffering, to the related failure to notice that there is a person in front of you, as opposed to the personification of a pre-existing stereotype."32 Matolino argues that these failures are in fact violations of a value that is universalizable, encapsulated in the idea that "... humans are fun- damentally equal and deserving of respect or equal treatment." Matolino argues that we all have the obligation to "treat any member of the human specie with the respect due to members of this specie."33 It means recognizing the inherent value or worth in a person irrespective of race or any other demographic description."34 Matolino argues that this kind of recognition helps us to transcend privileging our own views, 26 Ibid, p. 108. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Matolino, op. cit., p. 108. 31 P. C. Taylor Race: A Philosophical Introduction. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2004), p. 33. Cited in Matolino op. cit, p. 108. 32 Taylor, op. cit., p. 34. 33 Matolino op. cit., p. 109. 34 Ibid. I_) Springer Afro-comm unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 341 and this is better than a value that is based on seeing one as related through blood or linguistic ties, which Matolino accuses the communitarians of propagating.3 5 Matolino anticipates an objection that the title of his book and his arguments do not support a thesis about regard for people of every race. Matolino dismisses this objection as essentialism. According to him: If regard is taken to extend to all humans, it might be objected by Metz and Wiredu and their friends, that what I am proposing is not a new value but a tried and tested Kantian universalizable principle. If that is the case, then there is nothing particularly African about what I am proposing. Since there is noth- ing specifically African about my proposal, the communitarianism I am argu- ing for could just as well be a communitarianism of any place. Thus, the title of this project as well as any argument about its Africanity is nothing but a pretense. Such an accusation is nothing more than the essentialism that I have found problematic. 36 4 Questioning the "Afro"Appellation in Matolino's Theory I am not convinced by Matolino's dismissal of such a concern as essentialist. There is a problem with Matolino's theory that is bigger than the question of whether some Africans would judge Matolino's contribution as African or not. But Matolino appears quite concerned about this question because he has titled a very non-com- munitarian theory as communitarian, with the appellation "Afro" added for empha- sis. But let me attend to this bigger issue to show that this kind of concern is superfi- cial and not deserving the grip it has on Matolino. The bigger issue is that there is a contradiction when a theory is advanced say- ing that we should treat all members of the human race with equal respect, and the theory is tagged "Afro-communitarianism". Any theory advocating a mutual respect among members of the entire human race, by virtue of what all humans share as humans, is a universalist theory. So now we need to attend to the inevitable ques- tion: Why was the term "Afro" included as the title of a universalist theory? There are two possible reasons. The first is that an African is proposing this universalist theory. But this would mean that all the universalist theories proposed in history should have had the names of the origins of their authors attached. In that case we would be talking about Euro-liberalism, Euro-capitalism, Euro-socialism, Euro- majoritarian democracy, the Euro-multiparty system. The basic and inalienable rights, which are simply human but first articulated systematically by Europeans, would be Euro-human rights. Individually speaking, we would see these rights as Euro-originated: Euro-right to free speech, Euro-right to privacy, and so on. It does not stop there but extends out of philosophy into other fields of study that have uni- versal applicability. Although some of these fields of study originated elsewhere, we 3 Ibid. 36 Ibid, pp. 109-110. Springer 342 E.1. Ani would need to acknowledge the origin of the currently advanced form of study of these fields as Euro-mathematics, Euro-physics, Euro-chemistry, and so on. The major problem with tagging universalist theories (theories that are univer- sally applicable) with the names of their geographical origins is that the relevance of the geographical origin is indirectly proportional to the universal applicability of the theory: the more universally applicable the theory is, the less relevant the geographi- cal origin. This is why, for instance, it is funny to say that 2+2=4 or gravitation is European. Matolino cannot escape my charge by pointing out that others such as Metz and Wiredu have committed the same error. First of all, neither of these scholars added "Afro" (or a similar designation) to their communitarian or other theories. Second, the terminology "communitarianism", which they employ, is used elsewhere, and we have German communitarians such as George Hegel.37 Interestingly, Matolino refers to the positions of Metz and Wiredu as "Afro-centric" because they were "dogmatic or romantic about the nature of communal value in traditional, or any other, community."38 Since Matolino's own proposal is a universal advocacy for the respect for all persons regardless of origin, why then does he add the terminology "Afro" to his "communitarianism", instead of something like "world communitari- anism"? What, indeed, is African in his proposal? 5 Questioning the"Communitarian"Appellation in Matolino's Theory The second problem with Matolino's advancement of communitarianism as a theory covering the entire human race is that this scope of coverage contradicts the very meaning of communitarianism. The issue driving the communitarianism debate is that of whether or not the community has priority in its relationship with the indi- vidual, and if the community does, to what extent it does. The classical communitar- ians say it does, and more recent opinions are saying "not so much". The issue at the heart of communitarianism as a theory is, therefore, that of the matter of priority of rights in the relationship between the community and the individual. When we transpose this issue to cosmopolitanism, it does not fit. It is meaning- less to say, for instance, that the world is superior to the individual, that the indi- vidual is superior to the world, or that the statuses of the individual and the world are those of moral equality. This can only tell us that the community in reference is the local community where the individual actually lives and does his or her daily business, the community that is affected by the individual's conduct: whether and to what extent that local and situated community has the right to take away the indi- vidual's rights, and (yet to come into the debate) which of the individual's rights that local and situated community can take away and for what reason. Matolino invites 37 See Dismas A. Masolo, "Western and African Communitarianism: A Comparison" in Kwasi Wiredu, ed., A Companion to African Philosophy. (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 483-498. 38 Matolino, op. cit., p. 113. I_) Springer Afro-com m unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 343 this confusion of issues by appropriating the very arguments of cosmopolitans and calling it communitarianism. I guess this is why Western communitarians stick to the community-versus-individual-rights-which-is-superior issue and never confuse their communitarianism with cosmopolitanism. Matolino himself admits this much when he writes, "The first, and commonly shared, factor among all communitar- ians is that communitarianism is a theory about the nature of the relationship that exists between individuals and the community."39 Those advocating African Social- ism are saying that community ownership has priority over individual ownership.40 Those advocating consensus democracy are saying that community unity in decision and action should be prioritized over individual interests. The spot-on communitar- ians, of which Matolino is part, are debating the priority of the community quite directly.41 Matolino claims that his new version of communitarianism is one that tackles racism. He argues that racism violates the idea that "... humans are fundamentally equal and deserving of respect or equal treatment," and opines that as citizens of the world we all have the obligation to "treat any member of the human specie with the respect due to members of this specie" recognizing the inherent value or worth in a person irrespective of race or any other demographic description."42 Matolino's con- cern about inter-racial relations is fine. The problem is that communitarianism is not about whether individuals are discriminatory toward one another, or about equality between individuals, but about the balance of the power between an individual and his or her community. By going from the debate about the individual-community power balance to the issue of the relationship between individuals of (in fact) differ- ent communities, Matolino strays into the relationship between communities. Ordi- narily, there is nothing wrong in trying to improve the relationship between indi- viduals across communities. The only problem (which is pedagogical) is that such a project already has a different name, and it is disingenuous to write as if it does not. When Matolino advocates the recognition of "inherent value or worth in a person irrespective of race or any other demographic description," this advocacy can hardly earn the appellation "communitarianism."43 The problem with communitarianism is precisely that of the extent of community power over those of individuals living in it. A little historical detour should help drive deeper my point about the very ration- ale motivating communitarianism. When communitarians argue that the collective 39 Ibid, p. 127. I will later point out that this understanding about communitarianism is still a bit vague. 40 See Leopold S. Senghor, On African Socialism. London: Paul Mall Press. 1964; Kwame Nkrumah, African Socialism Revisited. (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1967); Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968). 41 See, for instance, Menkiti op. cit.; Gyekye op. cit.; Bernard Matolino, "Radicals versus Moderates: a Critique of Gyekye's Moderate Communitarianism." South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2009): 160-170; Mohammed Majeed, "Moderate Communitarianism is Different: A Response to J. 0. Famakinwa and B. Matolino." Journal of Philosophy and Culture, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2018): 3-15; Jona- than Chimakonam and Victor Nweke, "Afro-Communitarianism and the Question of Rights." Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 157 (2018): 78-99. 42 Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, p. 109. 43 Ibid. Springer 344 E. I.Ani has rights over the individual, they do not refer to a world collective (which is con- tradictory in scope). They mean a local community with geographical and cultural boundaries that secure its identification as a community. German communitarians were not concerned about the relationship between Germans as individuals, but about the priority of German culture over the individual aspirations of Germans, and this concern stemmed from the influx of individualism from France (which was defining French culture after the French revolution)." I understand that in the light of the ethnic diversity bedeviling Africa's political experiment, Matolino seeks to express the importance of the trans-cultural community like his predecessors did of the primordial community. But such a project is more appropriately called cosmo- politanism and loses the name communitarianism, for it departs from the very issue giving meaning to communitarianism, and communitarianism will always carry with it its original issue of contention. Matolino, therefore, shares in the same fallacy committed by Wiredu and all those who extend communitarianism beyond the tribe to an entire multiethnic Afri- can country. Nyerere amplified this fallacy by going even beyond the scope of the modern multi-ethnic state to regard communitarianism as cosmopolitanism and interpret the Ujamaa family as the entire world in which the African is obliged to treat "all men as his brethren."45 Like Matolino himself cited (and which I cited earlier), Ayittey tells us this universalist (and somewhat heroic) notion of family is partly responsible for Nyerere's administrative failures. In debates about universalism and particularism, communitarians are on the side of particularism. Apart from the German communitarians, the Anglo-Saxon com- munitarians directed their political theories to the building and enhancing of pri- mordially distinguishable societies whose members share a common history and culture. In the migration debate, some of these communitarians are the most outspo- ken against open borders. Most notably, David Miller and Michael Walzer argued against open borders because unrestricted immigration will dilute the culture and cohesion of Western societies, which in turn will wither down the allegiance that the primordial Westerner has to the Western state.46 In defence of communal purity against the cultural dilution of immigration, Walzer argues, Admissions and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be communities of character, historically stable, ongoing associations of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some spe- cial sense of their common life.47 This is a little detour into immigration, but it shows the contest between particu- larism and universalism. Indeed, Ango-Saxon communitarianism emerged precisely 44 See, for instance, Masolo (2004: 485) for a partial rendition of this narrative. 45 Ayitey, op. cit., p 117; cited in Matolino, op, cit., p. 22. 46 David Miller, On Nationality. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), and Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice. (New York: Basic Books, 1983). 47 Walzer, op. cit., p. 62. I_) Springer Afro-com m unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 345 as a reaction to the universalist posture of liberal theories. According to Daniel Bell, "Whereas Rawls seemed to present his theory of justice as universally true, commu- nitarians argued that the standards of justice must be found in forms of life and tradi- tions of particular societies and hence can vary from context to context... Michael Walzer developed the additional argument that effective social criticism must derive from and resonate with the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and places... Rawls has since tried to eliminate the universalist presupposi- tions from his theory" particularly in his Law of Peoples (2020: pars 1 and 2).48 I sincerely commend Nyerere and Matolino's articulation of a theory of world- wide solidarity, but I think it is simply incorrect to call such theory communitarian- ism. That is an identity politics that presupposes anything coming out of Africa must be termed "communitarian" (irrespective of content). I also agree that the world can be considered a family of persons. The major problem is that neither world citizen- ship nor world relations are the reason or motivation for the communitarian project in Africa. The reason is that whether it is in the West or in Africa, communitarianism everywhere was a reaction to individualism, whilst cosmopolitanism was a reaction to nationalism and statism: particularly the extent of the power of states to determine people's identity. And some nationalists or statists are in fact communitarians. This further muddles the idea of equating communitarianism with cosmopolitanism. 6 Communitarianism as Different From Communalism To successfully appellate his theory as communitarianism, Matolino attempts to separate communitarianism from communalism, reject communalism and transport communitarianism to where it can label a defence of the need to respect persons irrespective of their origins. Such a movement is fallacious. One cannot, for the sake of convenience, advocate a terminology for something to which it is not applicable. Matolino writes, A communitarian theory, however, does not always have to depend on anti- quated realities of communal societies. A communitarian theory may be able to articulate and defend ethos that are not necessarily consistent with ones found in actual traditional communalistic societies. The key difference between communalism and communitarianism is to be found in communalist theories or practices that are normally restricted to the local understanding of life. Never extending beyond the clan, family, or restricted sense of community as one based on kinship or the institution of kingship, communalist practices are of a sort that is true of traditional tight knit societies.49 As I have shown, neither the history of communitarianism nor its logical meaning supports this argument in favour of divorcing communitarianism from 48 Daniel Bells, "Cosmopolitanism" Stanford Encycopaedia of Philosophy, pars 1 and 2. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/ (accessed 23 January 2020). 49 Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, p. 69. Springer 346 E. I.Ani communalism. John Goodwyn Barmby first coined the word "communitarianism" in 1841 in reference to the preoccupation of the utopian socialists with the com- munal way of life. There are already other names for an advocacy for improved rela- tions between different members of a multiethnic society, people of different races, or different members of the world: it is cosmopolitanism. And if the society under the scope of advocacy is also a sovereign state, the terminology is patriotism. Matolino's central point is that other communitarians refer to a specific era (the communalist era) and how things were done in that era. But Matolino argues that his version of communitarianism refers to the modern pluralist world of different races and cultures, and advocates understanding and mutual respect between these races and cultures. The fact is that communitarianism derives its name precisely from the era that Matolino rejects, and he cannot easily transpose the same name to a differ- ent socio-economic reality. The reason for this is that names automatically invoke the realities they represent, and communitarianism stands for collective reasoning within the local community where one lives. Communitarianism and cosmopolitan- ism are, therefore, not exactly the same. To aid his advocacy for a universal coverage of communitarianism, Matolino criticizes radical communitarians of advocating communitarianism based on com- munalism, and hence downplaying individual rights. 50 This enables Matolino to advocate a communitarianism that is not based on the communal and filial structure of traditional African societies, a communitarianism that recognizes the value of all human beings. In effect, Matolino replaces the communal foundations of commu- nitarianism with a cosmopolitan foundation. But the reason why cosmopolitanism rather than communitarianism is used to describe the advocacy for a community of humanity is that a global human community lacks the socio-political features of a specific and locally situated community. A local community functions as a real community where mutual aid is facilitated by common experience, but this does not apply to the relationship between different parts of the world where selfish interna- tional geopolitics and inter-racial tensions dominate relations. The behavior of coun- tries to one another can never be communal in the sense attributed to the behavior of members of a local community to one another. As such, the notion of "citizens of the world" will remain too idealistic to attract the designation "communitarian". But relations among such multicultural "citizens" can attract the term "cosmopolitan". I have just argued that communitarianism does not reflect the reality of a world community. My next point is that communitarianism is not even a suitable ideal for a world community. It is helpful at this point to say something about the relationship between ideals and reality. When an ideal is not supported in any way by reality, when an ideal is not even remotely bridgeable with practice, such an ideal is utopian. The German communitarians advocated the theory of communitarianism because they know it is a good idea for people who are already united by language and eth- nicity. This is the reason why even Matolino (as we have seen) argues that the com- munitarianism advanced by other African communitarians (which is based on com- munalism) is unsuitable for multiethnic African countries. But if communitarianism s Ibid, pp. 60-74. I_) Springer Afro-com m unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 347 is inseparable from its communal underpinnings, then it is as unsuitable as a theory for world relations as Matolino argues it is unsuitable for contemporary multi-ethnic African societies. Beyond this, it is also arguable that a communitarian ideal is uto- pian in global relations, even without a communal foundation. But what is impor- tant is that, proceeding from my point that communitarianism can never be cleanly divorced from communalism, "communitarianism" is unsuitable even as an ideal for world harmony, as much as (or much more than) it is unsuitable as an ideal for con- temporary multiethnic (including contemporary African) societies. 7 Appropriating the Spirit and Letter of Cosmopolitanism A glance at Matolino's defence of his theory is in fact a defence of cosmopolitan- ism.51 Any document today attempting to define cosmopolitanism argues that it is the view that all citizens, regardless of their origins, belong to the same community (for summary see, for instance, "Cosmopolitanism" in Stanford Encyclopaedia and Encyclopaedia Britannica). And Matolino takes exactly the same position when he claims that his theory seeks to "build a genuine community of humanity."52 Philo- sophical cosmopolitans are seen as moral universalists arguing that everyone irre- spective of origin should be subjected to the same moral standards (such as respect), a central feature we can see throughout Matolino's proposal. Since Matolino advo- cates these cosmopolitan ideas in a different name, it leads to having two theories with roughly the same set of general premises and conclusions: only the titles of the theories are different. But one does not take over a theory's body and simply change the title. For the sake of coherence, the title that bears no shade of resemblance to cosmopolitanism (Afro-communitarianism) would need to stand down and stop parading itself as cosmopolitanism in another dressing. Advancing cosmopolitanism in the guise of Afro-communitarianism means that the proponent should automatically make the kind of arguments that lead cosmopol- itans to find cosmopolitanism important. These are arguments such as that the Euro- pean enlightenment "could not see beyond its own lights", and that it was too versed in its narrative of "the height of human achievement" that anything less achieving was seen as "inferior and in need of education."53 Cosmopolitanism also obliges its proponent to argue that no civilization is the only civilization. Matolino makes simi- lar arguments. He writes: While there are many civilizations and all can stand as civilizations in their own right, what they are not entitled to claim offhand is superiority to other civilizations. On the contrary they should seek to recognize other civilizations as projects in the common pursuit of not only living life but also making sense of life. There is so much that each civilization can learn from others and that 51 Ibid, pp. 109-119. 52 Ibid, p . 53 Ibid. Springer 348 E. I.Ani each civilization can teach and influence others on. But what will not help is to specify the conditions under which a civilization realizes itself and insist that these conditions and outcomes are the only possible truth.54 What has all this got to do with Afro-communitarianism? And since cosmo- politanism emerged in the wake of post-modernism, proponents of cosmopolitan- ism actually depend on post-modern arguments to advance their cause, since post- modernism criticizes the assumption by modernists that modern truths are the only truths. Matolino also makes this argument, rejecting "... systems that were oppres- sive of other people, systems that were self-indulgent, and systems that operated as if they had ultimate truths that have always been overturned and overthrown by new truths. Truths that asked for, and forced a recognition." One of Matolino's principal defences of his proposal for world solidarity is that "... humanity is now more interconnected than ever before" and "Politically, whether we object to the system or not, democratic pluralism is the dominant sys- tem."56 But these are among the arguments of the most famous contemporary cos- mopolitan, David Held, who argued that the international security crises, the finan- cial crises, and climate change make the fates of countries increasingly inter-linked, making cosmopolitanism the only way forward.57 It may be objected that apart from Matolino, some other scholars within the Afri- can communitarian tradition have advanced versions of communitarianism that could be considered as logically compatible with cosmopolitanism. Consider, for instance, Thaddeus Metz and Jonathan Chimakonam among others.58 To this objec- tion I need clarify that no other scholar has situated his communitarianism in an explicitly world setting. And worse, none of them directly appropriated the argu- ments of cosmopolitans like Matolino did. When African communitarians empha- size the priority of the community over the individual, they project it as a lesson from Africa that the world can learn, but one cannot accuse them of being cosmo- politans, or of taking the argument of cosmopolitans. So it is one thing to advance a theory of communitarianism that can possibly fit into the cosmopolitan project, but it is quite another to advocate cosmopolitanism directly (in letter as well as in spirit) and then say it is communitarianism. 54 Ibid, p. 110. 55 Ibid, p. 111. 56 Ibid, p. 108. 5 David Held, Cosmopolitanism: ideals and realities. (London: Polity Press, 2010). 58 Thaddeus Metz, "African Communitarianism and Difference." In Elvis Imafidon, ed., Handbook of the African Philosophy of Difference (Gewerbestrasse Switzerland: Springer. 2020), pp. 31-51. Jonathan Chimakonam, Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. (Gewerbestrasse Switzer- land: Springer, 2019), pp. 15 1 - 1 6 5 . I_) Springer Afro-comm unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 349 8 The Authentic African or the Universal? Matolino complicates things even further when he writes that he is advocating a "pure" and "authentic" African theory.59 According to him, "What I simply pro- pose is that if we wish to find an authentically African mode of charting a path for development and true freedom, there is need to consider a value that is an inescap- able frame of reference for many an African. The value I have in mind is that of communal connectedness that exists at some level of consciousness of the African's being."60 Elsewhere, he writes, "Though there is value in borrowing freely and mix- ing African consensus with other polities, there is more to be yielded in advancing a specific theory that is purely African; at least for the benefit of the growth of African political theorization."61 Indeed, Matolino uses the word "authentic" at least 47 times across his two recent books.62 To be fair, Matolino uses authenticity in several ways including referring to truthfulness or the validity of a claim.63 But Matolino also uses this word when he refers to what is authentically African. He is dissatisfied when others claim African authenticity to their theories.64 In connection to this dissatisfaction he uses termi- nologies such as being "authentically African", "authentically communitarian", "tra- ditional authenticity", "authentic mode of being African", "authentic sense of Afri- can values", "authentic African development", "authentic African interpretation", "authentic African polity", "authentic experiences of being African", "authentic version of African life", "authentic African rootedness", "authentic frame of Afri- can reference", "authentic traditional framework", "authentic communitarian frame- work", "authentic contribution to the communitarian project."65 However, referring to his own theory as authentically African commits two errors. First it contradicts his dissatisfaction with the authenticity preoccupation of classical communitarians in Africa. Second, it shows that Matolino, contrary to his criticism of the classical communitarians, is open to the idea that there are essential- ist or at least salient features of Africanness, a purity about Africans that is untainted by foreign influence. He even sneaks in such an admission, an admission of what he precisely rejects, when he wrote, "The value I have in mind is that of communal connectedness that exists at some level of consciousness of the African's being."66 I take it that this is a contradiction since this lone sentence is directly up against the entirety of Matolino's project. But given that the only African theories that claim 59 See Bernard Matolino, Consensus as Democracy in Africa. Grahamstown: NISC/AHP, 2018), p. 49; Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, p. 15. 60 Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, p. 15. 61 Matolino, p. Consensus as Democracy, 49. 62 Matolino, Consensus as Democracy; Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy. 63 Matlino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, pp. 88, 126, 154. 64 See Matolino, Consensus as Democracy, pp. 173; Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, pp. 10, 20-28, 32-35, 57, 60, 67, 96, 120. 65 See Matolino, Cosnensus as Democracy, pp. 6, 7, 10, 15, 120, 190; Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, pp. 10, 15, 20, 23, 27, 32, 60, 67, 81, 96, 115. 66 Matolino, Afro-communitrian Democracy, p. 15. Springer 350 E.1. Ani any supposed African purity are those advocating communal relations among mem- bers of a close-knit African traditional community, it is difficult to see how Matoli- no's advocacy for world cosmopolitanism is purely or authentically African. To confirm his desire to be seen as proposing an authentically African theory, Matolino pleads not to be interpreted as advocating a universalist theory. The reason he gives is that he is simply philosophizing. He writes, While I do not wish to advocate a straight universal principle of both philoso- phizing and the legitimate subjects of philosophizing, what I will insist on is that this is philosophy after all. When we philosophize, no matter where we are and what our background is and whatever we are dealing with, whatever we do ultimately must be seen as philosophizing. In this respect, I share the desire by old communitarians to be recognized as engaged in the task of phi- losophizing.67 Apart from the fact that is it is not clear why Matolino shuns away from being seen as a universalist (even whilst advocating a universalist theory) it is not also clear why a theory should not been seen as a universalist one because its proponent is "philosophizing". Apart from these, Matolino's attempt to distinguish himself from those he refers to as "communitarians" suggests that his theory is not com- munitarian. Why then does he title his theory with the "communitarian" appella- tion? The argument he provides to distinguish himself from "communitarians" is also unsuccessful. He writes: While we must be sensitive to the local condition and reflect accordingly in our philosophizing, I am firmly of the view that communalist inspired ethos and polities are highly limited. While they refer to a specific era and to a spe- cific way in which things are done by particular people, they fail to apprehend the inevitability of change and the many ways in which we could share the same sort of values to avoid parochially based differentiation.68 9 The Primacy of the Community In the debate about the nature of communitarianism, Matolino argues that his posi- tion (which he regards as "Modern Afro-communitarianism") is the same as that of Michael Onyebuchi Eze who argued that neither the individual nor the community has primacy over the other, both have to recognize each other's existence, and that the relationship between the two is "contemporaneous".69 Matolino approves Eze's argument that the community must respect the individual's capacity for choice, which can lead to an acceptance, rejection or defiance of community values.70 67 Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, p. 110. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid, p. 114. 70 Ibid p. 115. I_) Springer Afro-comm unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 351 Matolino writes that this clarification is necessary because he (Matolino) might be accused of privileging the individual over the community and, hence, being a lib- eralist. But I have cited Matolino as arguing that his version of communitarianism rejects the prioritization of community "over other features in the definition of per- sonhood," rather, "... the other features could and should take priority over the soci- ality of the self." 71 If Matolino regards other aspects of the self as having priority over the sociality of the self, then Matolino's theory is closer to liberalism than to communitarianism. There is another reason why Matolino's theory is technically liberalism. Gyekye had argued, in his advocacy for moderate communitarianism, that the statuses of the individual and the community are those of moral equality.72 But he contradicts this position by saying that the community has the rights to abridge individual rights when individuals do not take their responsibilities seriously.73 This introduces ten- sion into the moral equality argument. Matolino has amply criticized Gyekye for saying that the community has the right to abridge individual rights.74 Matolino's criticism implies that it is contradictory to say one is a communitarian and then argue that individuality and community have equal moral standing. It is, therefore, puzzling for Matolino to adopt this position, and say that both have equal moral standing. 75 Matolino then proceeds to introduce more problems in his theory. To avoid com- mitting the mistake for which he criticized Gyekye, Matolino avoids any mention of the superior status of the community in its relationship with the individual. But this is also a problem because a theory arguing only for individual rights (without men- tioning anything in favour of the community) is technically liberalism. The hang- ing question is this: what is the warrant for calling this a communitarian theory? Mesembe Edet makes a similar point when he criticizes Matolino in these words, "If the individual 'dictates' for the community and not the other way round, then Limited Communitarianism commits tu quoque. Matolino's over commitment to the metaphysics of inviolable individual rights lead him to this fallacy." 76 Anyone can contribute to the communitarianism debate, including an individualist who can argue that the individual has a higher moral worth than the community. The fact that one contributed to a debate about communitarianism does not automatically make one's contribution a communitarian theory. To recall, Matolino had also claimed that his theory is "deeply rooted in the poli- tics and structures of communitarianism."77 But given his position that the relationship between the individual and the community is that of moral equality, one wonders which "politics and structures of communitarianism" such a position is rooted in. I have no 71 Ibid, p. 105. 72 Gyekye, op. cit., p. 41. 73 Ibid, p. 65. 74 Matolino, Radicals versus Moderates, p. 169. 75 Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, p. 136. 76 Mesembe Edet, "The Limitations of Bernard Matolino's Limited Communitarianism: Continuing the Conversation on Personhood in African Philosophy," Filosofca Theoretica Vol. 4, No. 2 (2015): 104. 77 Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, p. 11. Springer 352 E. I. Ani problem with Matolino's cosmopolitan proposal. But I think that he is not bold enough to title it correctly. And without boldness, change cannot come to any society. For example, as much as 7 times in his two recent books, Matolino has expressed fear of being branded as a liberalist, and pleaded and argued not to be seen as one.78 Matolino in fact fears that his being branded as a liberalist would mean that his pro- ject, in his words, "should not be countenanced as an authentic contribution to a serious communitarian project."79 In an attempt to broaden the meaning of communitarianism to include his theory, Matolino writes, "The first, and commonly shared, factor among all communitarians is that communitarianism is a theory about the nature of the relationship that exists between individuals and the community."8 0 This definition of communitarianism is too broad, since individualism would also claim the same definition. Communitarianism is not simply any theory about the relationship between the individual and the commu- nity, but a theory that says something or the other (radical, moderate, or however it is said) about the importance (however slight) of the community in the relationship. It is the reason for the very adjective "communitarian" and anything falling outside it does not logically earn the adjective "communitarian". 10 Conclusion I have argued that Matolino's proposal that Afro-communitarianism is a theory advo- cating equal relations between citizens of the whole world is not convincing, since such a proposal already exists and is called cosmopolitanism. The attachment of the appellation "Afro" to such a theory begs the question. The proposal is also not "com- munitarianism" because communitarianism is about the balance of rights between the individual and the community (as two entities in a bipolar contention) rather than about relations between individuals across different societies or races. Matolino's attempt to divorce "communitarianism" from "communalism" is unsuccessful because the later is what gives meaning to the former. Matolino does not also help his theory by expressing the exact arguments of cosmopolitans. And all of this shows that Matolino's argument that his theory is deeply rooted in the politics and structure of communitarianism is not correct. Acknowledgements I am grateful to the editorial team of this journal for their facilitation of the review and production process, and to the anonymous reviewer of this article for his or her helpful suggestions. Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. 78 Matolino, Consensus as Democracy, pp. 9, 90, 99, 120; Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, pp. 18, 60-61, 114-115. 79 Matolino, Afro-communitarian Democracy, p. 115. 80 Ibid, p. 127. I_) Springer Afro-comm unitarianism or Cosmopolitanism 353