UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON LEGON CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DIPLOMACY (LECIAD) DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDE AND THE RETURN OF COUP CULTURE IN WEST AFRICA- A CASE STUDY OF MALI AND BURKINA FASO BY EMMANUEL NTIRI ASANTE (10403492) THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LEGON JANUARY 2023 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh i DECLARATION I, EMMANUEL NTIRI ASANTE, do hereby declare that this dissertation is my original work under the supervision of Dr. Juliana Appiah of the Legon Center of International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), at the University of Ghana in partial fulfillment of the award of a Master of Arts (MA) in International Affairs, and that, to the best of my knowledge have not been fully or partially submitted for any purpose other than the works duly cited. ………………………………… ………………………………… EMMANUEL NTIRI ASANTE DR. JULIANA APPIAH (STUDENT) (SUPERVISOR) DATE: 25th January, 2023. DATE: 25th January, 2023. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ii DEDICATION I dedicate this work to my Family. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My heartfelt gratitude goes to God Almighty for seeing me through this program. My sincere appreciation also goes to my supervisor, Dr. Julian Appiah, for her patience, indispensable directions, and guidance till my successful completion and to all lecturers at LECIAD. To my family, thank you for being a big support throughout this period. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Apostle George A. Damuah for his prayers and support. Finally, I would like to say thank you to all who contributed to the success of this dissertation. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AU - Africa Union CMLN - Committee for National Liberation CSO - Civil Society Organization ECOMICI - ECOWAS Mission in Cote ’Ivoire ECOMOG - ECOWAS Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States EU - European Union MOTI - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization NMLA - National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad OAU - Organization of African Unity PDGG - Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance RECs - Regional Economic Communities UN - United Nations UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh v LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1: Coups in West Africa Between August 2020 and February 2022 ……………………..27 Table 3.1: Demographic Summary of Respondents ……………………………………………….48 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh vi TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................. i DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................... iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... iv LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... v TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. vi ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................................. 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Background ........................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Problem Statement ................................................................................................................ 3 1.3 Research Questions ............................................................................................................... 4 1.4 Objectives of Study ............................................................................................................... 4 1.5 Rationale of Study ................................................................................................................. 5 1.6 Scope of Study ...................................................................................................................... 5 1.7 Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................................... 6 1.8 Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 9 1.9 Research Methodology ........................................................................................................ 17 1.9.1 Sources of Data ............................................................................................................... 18 1.9.2 Data Analysis .................................................................................................................. 20 1.10 Ethical Consideration .......................................................................................................... 20 1.11 Limitations of the study ....................................................................................................... 21 1.12 Arrangement of Chapters .................................................................................................... 22 CHAPTER TWO .......................................................................................................................... 23 OVERVIEW OF THE ECOWAS MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY COUPS ..................... 23 2.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 23 2.1 Definition and Concept of Coup ......................................................................................... 23 2.2 History of Coups in West Africa ......................................................................................... 25 2.3 Underlying Causes of Coups in West Africa Over the Years ............................................. 27 2.3.1 Internal Factors .............................................................................................................. 27 2.3.2 Corruption and Economic Mismanagement .................................................................... 29 2.3.3 Insecurity ........................................................................................................................ 30 2.3.4 Personalization of the Military ........................................................................................ 31 2.3.5 Under-Resourced Military .............................................................................................. 31 2.3.6 Relatively Low Levels of Education ................................................................................ 32 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh vii 2.4 External Factors .................................................................................................................. 33 2.5 ECOWAS’ Protocols and Inventions to Promote Democracy and Good Governance in West Africa ..................................................................................................................................... 34 2.5.1 The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance ...................................................... 34 2.5.2 The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security ......................................................................................... 36 2.5.3 Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa .............................. 38 2.6 The ECOWAS’ Role in Preventing Unconstitutional Changes in Government in West Africa ............................................................................................................................................ 40 2.7 Challenges Confronting the ECOWAS in Addressing the Prevalence of Coups in West Africa ............................................................................................................................................ 42 2.8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 44 CHAPTER THREE ...................................................................................................................... 46 ASSESSING THE RESURGENCE OF MILITARY COUPS IN MALI AND BURKINA FASO .............................................................................................................................................. 46 3.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 46 3.1 Demographics of Respondents ............................................................................................ 46 3.2 Objective 1: The Underlying Factors Motivating Military Officers in Mali to Stage Coups in Recent Years .............................................................................................................................. 47 3.2.1 Historical Antecedents of Coups in Mali ......................................................................... 47 3.2.2 Internal Ethnic Unrest ..................................................................................................... 49 3.3.3 Moral Responsibility of the Military to Restore Security and Order .............................. 51 3.3.4 Under-Resourced Military .............................................................................................. 52 3.3.5 Poor Governance Weak Democratic Institutions ............................................................ 53 3.3.6 External Influences .......................................................................................................... 54 3.4 Factors Motivating the Military Officers in Burkina Faso to Stage Coups in this current Democratic dispensation ................................................................................................................ 55 3.4.1 Historical Antecedents .................................................................................................... 55 3.4.2 Insecurity ........................................................................................................................ 58 3.4.3 Under-resourced Military ............................................................................................... 59 3.4.4 Other Factors that are Contributing to the Resurgence of Military Coups in Mali and Burkina Faso .................................................................................................................................. 60 3.5 Objective 2. To Ascertain if the Resurgence of Military coups in West Africa, particularly Mali and Burkina Faso, is a Sign of democratic backslide in West Africa .................................... 60 3.5.1 There is No Perfect Democracy ...................................................................................... 61 3.5.2 Recent Incidents of Military Coups in West Africa are Non-Representational .............. 62 3.5.3 There are Still Thriving Democracies in West Africa ..................................................... 63 3.6 Efforts of ECOWAS In Preventing the Resurgence of Coups in West Africa ................... 64 3.6.1 Inadequate Intelligence Gathering .................................................................................. 65 3.6.2 Limited Powers ................................................................................................................ 66 3.6.3 Reactionary Approach..................................................................................................... 68 3.6.4 Ineffectiveness of Sanctions ............................................................................................. 69 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh viii 3.7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 70 CHAPTER FOUR ......................................................................................................................... 72 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................... 72 4.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 72 4.1 Summary of Findings .......................................................................................................... 72 4.2 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 75 4.3 Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 77 References ...................................................................................................................................... 80 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ix ABSTRACT West Africa was plagued by an avalanche of military coups post-independence in the 1960s. The post-Cold War era witnessed a gradual decline in the incidents of coups with several States in West Africa embracing democracy as a system of governance. ECOWAS and governments of member states have been building on this foundation to promote good governance, peace, security, and development in the sub-region. There has been a resurgence of military coups in West Africa in recent years which threatens not only the democratic gains but the peace and security of the sub-region. The objective of the study was to examine the underlying causes for the resurgence of military coups in West Africa, specifically assessing the factors motivating some military officers in Mali and Burkina Faso to stage coups in this democratic dispensation, ascertain if West Africa was in a democratic backslide due to the resurgence of military coups and if ECOWAS was to be partly blamed for the resurgence of the military coups. The study adopted the Greed and Grievance theory in explaining the research phenomenon. The study employed the qualitative method using the case study research design and relied on both secondary and primary data. Secondary data was obtained from an extensive review of literature on the research topic. Primary data were obtained from four experts who are senior officials from the Malian and Burkina Faso Embassies, the ECOWAS Secretariat, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration in Ghana. Findings from the study revealed that insecurity caused by jihadist activities was a major factor motivating some officers of the military in Mali and Burkina Faso to stage coups. Findings also revealed that both militaries of Mali and Burkina Faso were highly under-resourced. This resulted in high casualties during combat with the jihadist groups which infuriated some officers to stage coups. Findings further revealed that Mali had a peculiar challenge with internal ethnic unrest and external influences. The old nemesis of corruption and bad governance also persists in Mali and Burkina Faso contributing to the resurgence of military coups in the two states. Findings from the study also revealed that the recent incidents of military coups in West Africa are non- representational and that there are still thriving democracies in West Africa. This, therefore, refutes the thesis statement that West Africa is in a democratic backslide as a result of the resurgence of coups in some states. Finally, the study also revealed that ECOWAS’ reactionary approach to coups and ineffective sanctions make ECOWAS partly responsible for the resurgence of coups in West Africa. Based on the findings the study recommends that the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso strengthen their democratic institutions to enable them effectively perform their constitutional mandates and prevent easy takeovers by the military. The governments of Mali and Burkina Faso should also invest in their security forces particularly the police force and the military to effectively combat the jihadist groups. The study also recommends that ECOWAS applies more punitive sanctions to coup makers to serve as a deterrent to other officers of the military with similar ambitions. The study concludes by admitting that the resurgence of military coups in West Africa poses a threat to democracy in the sub-region but at the moment does not constitute a democratic backslide. The study also concluded by noting that it will take the collective effort of governments of ECOWAS states, ECOWAS as a sub-regional bloc, civil society organizations, and the entire citizenry of West Africa to protect and advance the course of democracy within the sub-region. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background Edward Luttwak in his work, ‘Coup d’état; a practical handbook’ defined military coup as ‘an infiltration of small but important aspect of the state setup, which is utilized in displacing government from its control of the remainder’ (Luttwak, 1969 p.12). Historically, military coups became a common phenomenon in the political scene of most African and West African countries, with many viewing military coups as an institutional means of changing legitimately elected civilian regimes (Dwyer, 2015). Over the past six decades, 215 coups have been attempted in 43 countries across the African continent (Harkness, 2016). The 1960s post- independence and Cold war period saw the African continent become a hotbed for the prevalence of coup d’états. In the 1960s and 1970s, African countries recorded a coup or coup attempt every 55 days, and only seven African States recorded no activity of coups within the period (Kposowa & Jenkins, 1993). West Africa has been particularly noted for its notoriety of military coup d’états since several of its states gained independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. West Africa had the most coups on the continent between 1958 and 2008, accounting for 44.4 percent of all coups (Yoroms, 2014). Annan (2014), emphasized this point when she noted that there were over 37 successful coups and 80 failed coup attempts in West Africa between 1960 and 2004. Furthermore, of the over 40 coups and attempted coups that have occurred in Africa since 2010, twenty (20) of them have occurred in West Africa and the Sahel region (Harkness, 2016). It is worth mentioning that out of the 20 coups that have occurred in West Africa since 2010, twelve of them occurred in former French colonies which have often been the case in most of the coups that have occurred in Africa in general (Suleiman & Onapajo, 2022). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2 The end of the Cold War era, however, ushered in a new dispensation where many developing countries particularly African states embraced western democracy as an integral system of governance to accelerate national development and promote nation-building (Deng, 2018). This resulted in the establishment of democratic institutions, multiparty systems, constitutionalism, and rule of law through the judicial process as well as periodic elections to either maintain or change government (Gyimah-Boadi, 2015). This was a major step taken by several States in Africa and West Africa to curtail the occurrence of military coups and maintain peace, security, and stability. The role of regional and sub-regional bodies like the African Union and the ECOWAS in achieving this feat cannot be overlooked. Within the last two decades, the Africa Union has instituted some major mechanisms to address the issues of unconstitutional change of government and to promote democracy and good governance in Africa. The first is the Constitutive Act of the African Union established in July 2000 (Souaré, 2009). Article 4 (m) of the Constitutive Act accentuated the need for African countries to uphold democratic values and principles through popular participation and good governance (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000). The basis for the call is to accelerate socio-economic development on the continent and also ensure peace, security, and stability (Amvane, 2015). The “Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes in Government” also referred to as the Lomé Declaration was also adopted in July 2002. The Declaration was adopted as part of efforts to curb the menace of military coups and unconstitutional change of government on the continent (Souaré, 2009). Five years later the AU again established the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance at the 8th ordinary summit in Addis Ababa in 2007 (Jaafar, 2017). This was to ensure elections are conducted in a free, fair and transparent manner to prevent post-election conflicts and ensure political stability (Ibid). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3 In 2001, the ECOWAS also adopted an additional protocol that is the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. The ECOWAS viewed democracy and good governance as prerequisites for peace, security and stability in the sub-region (Addo, 2017). The ECOWAS Mechanism and recent Accra Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa are just a few of several mechanisms and interventions by AU and ECOWAS to promote democracy, peace and security in Africa and within the sub-region. Collaborative efforts by the AU, ECOWAS and member states have significantly contributed to stability in West Africa and Africa as a whole (Ibid). Remarkably, military coups sharply reduced from 14 in the 1990s to 7 incidences in the 2000s (Africa Leadership Change Dataset, 2021). Despite these gains and the expansion of democracy and democratic institutions across West Africa, the sub-region is gradually relapsing into the era of military coups and unconstitutional governance. 1.2 Problem Statement Post-independence the West African sub-region was saddled by rampant military coup d’états. This did not only distort the political stability of the sub-region but also retarded the economic growth of countries in the sub-region. Embracing democracy as a new system of governance in the early 1990s post-Cold War was considered a shift from unconstitutional changes of government and military rule to democratic governance in West Africa. The African Union and the sub-regional bloc ECOWAS have been instrumental in West Africa’s gradual shift towards democratic governance. Despite intermittent internal conflicts mostly due to election disputes, the issue of unconstitutional change of government was almost a thing of the past in West Africa. Countries like Ghana, Senegal, and Benin have been shining examples of West Africa’s inclination towards democracy, particularly with smooth transfers of power from one government to University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 4 another including opposition parties (Kohnert, 2023). This has particularly been the case since the early 2000s. In recent years there has been a surge in attempted and successful military coups in West Africa. Between August 19, 2020, and February 1, 2022, there have been six military coups in West Africa; two failed and four were successful. This implies that there has been a coup attempt every three months in West Africa since that period. This situation has raised serious concerns within the West African and international community on the depth of democracy within the sub-region. There is also growing concern about democratic backslide and the return to coup culture in West Africa. The study, therefore, seeks to unravel the underlying causes of the sudden rebirth of military coups in West Africa and to also determine if these sudden events of military coups imply a democratic backslide and a return to coup culture in West Africa. 1.3 Research Questions  What are the underlying factors that are motivating military officers in West Africa particularly Mali and Burkina Faso to stage coups in this democratic era?  Is the resurgence of military coups a sign of recession in the democratic journey in the West African sub-region?  Is the sub-regional bloc ECOWAS, partly to be blamed for the current resurgence of coups in West Africa? 1.4 Objectives of Study The study seeks to accomplish the following objectives:  To assess the underlying factors motivating military officers in West Africa particularly Mali and Burkina Faso to stage coups in this current democratic era.  To ascertain if West African is in a democratic backslide due to the recent increase in University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 5 military coups in the sub-region.  To assess if ECOWAS is partly to be blamed for the resurgence of military coups in West Africa. 1.5 Rationale of Study Acknowledging the abundant literature available, this paper will be seeking to add up to the existing knowledge on this recurrent phenomenon which now seems to be a norm as well as alternative means of disposing a sitting government. Using Mali and Burkina Faso as case studies contributed to obtaining an in-depth understanding of some of the underlying factors accounting for the recent surge in military coups within the ECOWAS sub-region. The study also contributes to understanding how lapses of the ECOWAS bloc seem to have encouraged this phenomenon. The study can also be relied upon by ECOWAS, governments, and civil society organizations in West Africa in developing policies and frameworks that will enhance democracy, peace, and security within the sub-region. 1.6 Scope of Study In consolidating the democratic gains attainted after the third wave of coups in the 1990s, the African Union and ECOWAS instituted mechanisms to address the issue of unconstitutional change of governments in the West African sub-region. The institution and implementation of these mechanisms and frameworks proved successful as the sub-region witnessed a significant decline in the prevalence of military coups. The study, therefore, explored and analyzed the causal factors behind the new trend of military coups in the West African region using the events in Mali (May 2021) and Burkina Faso (January 2022) as case studies. This study was limited to West Africa due to the recent increase in the number of military takeovers in the sub- region compared to other regions on the Africa continent. The study also selected West Africa University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 6 because of the role of its sub-regional bloc ECOWAS in extensively developing mechanisms and protocols that promote democracy, peace, and security within the sub-region. 1.7 Theoretical Framework This study is underpinned by the Greed and Grievance theory, which was propounded by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). The basic tenets of the theory are ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ a two-baseline argument as suggested by name of the theory. The greed and grievance theory is often used by researchers of armed conflict to explore the causes of civil war and has currently been extended to other forms of violent conflicts including rebellion and insurgency (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2003). The greed and grievance theory is largely premised on the perception of deprivation of certain gains and needs by one warring faction against the other (Cederman & Vogt, 2017). Proponents of the theory of greed and grievance argue that the concept of “greed” is based on fierce competition over natural resources within the State (Hoth & Mengal, 2016). They also suggest that the motivation of warring factions in an armed conflict is the desire to better their current situation. In doing this they perform a cost-benefit analysis to assess if the rewards they will obtain by starting a rebellion or armed conflict will be greater than not engaging in such a conflict (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). In the analysis, a rebellion, insurgency or violent conflict will likely occur when the rewards and personal gains of such actions are greater than not engaging in such violent activities. When the deprivation is premised on economic considerations it is regarded as a vertical inequality and the cause of the war or violent conflict is attributed to greed (Hoth & Mengal, 2016). Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2007) also asserted that rebellion must be of significant financial University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 7 value particularly in the case of natural resources to result in violent conflict. This is witnessed in the case of several resource-based violence like the violent conflict in Sierra Leone (1991- 999) over diamonds popularly referred to as the blood diamonds which resulted in the death and disfiguration of several Sierra Leonians (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). The violent conflict the erupted in the Niger Delta in Nigeria in the 1990s was also oil resource-driven (Evans & Kelikume, 2019). Murshed & Tajoeddin (2009) also argued that combatants are also likely to start or sustain a rebellion when they are assured of a ready supply of finance from the sympathetic diaspora community. Conflicts driven by the acquisition of personal gains and power are therefore fueled by greed. The second aspect of the theory “grievance” advances that war or violent conflicts are likely to occur when some groups or elements within the state or community feel marginalized and unfairly treated (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). This occurs because there are visible inequalities in access to vital socio-political or economic needs or resources. The deprived group tends to wage war, start a rebellion or even join an existing violent conflict to ameliorate its self from the injustices it might be suffering from (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). When the deprivation is caused by ethnicity, religion, or gender bias then it is regarded as horizontal inequality and the cause of the war or violent conflict is attributed to “grievances” (Hoth & Mengal, 2016). Initially, there were arguments that inequality did not contribute to the risk of civil wars. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003) ethnicity or religious diversity played very little or no role in the eruption of civil war. They suggested that the diminished capacity of the state due to poverty or inadequate resources rather contributes to civil wars. Collier and Koeffler (2004), also emphasized poverty as a major cause of conflict, especially in poor countries. They opined that poverty makes soldiering more attractive, and generally lowers the opportunity cost of war in poor nations. They further noted that violent conflicts result in greater poverty because of University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 8 the destructiveness of war creating a vicious cycle of poverty-conflict-poverty. This Collier and Hoeffler termed the poverty trap (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Other armed conflict scholars and political scientists have posited a different view that relative deprivation which results in the grievance is a major source of conflict (Olson, 1965; Gurr, 2015). The argument is that ethnicity and religion have strong, easy, quick, and efficient amalgamation power compared to other transient interests that may motivate individuals or groups to engage in armed conflicts (Gurr, 2015). In essence, it is more likely for people from the same ethnic background or religion to stage a rebellion when they feel marginalized or deprived due to common or shared values, historical ties, and fraternity. The greed and grievance theory other than the basic distinction between vertical and horizontal inequality is complementary to understanding the underlying causes of wars and violent conflicts. According to Qadir and Khan (2015), critics of the greed and grievance theory argue that the theory fails to explain how historical events and contexts affect the eruption and trajectory of violent conflicts. Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) specifically, noted that horizontal inequalities or grievances were useful in explaining the cause(s) of conflicts but do not provide adequate insight into why the violent conflicts persist. Critics also argue that the presence of greed or grievance is not a sufficient condition for the eruption of violent conflicts as violent conflicts will require institutional breakdown to be successful (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009; Hoth & Mengal, 2016). Despite these criticisms, the greed and grievance theory is appropriate for this study because it provides a foundation for deep probing of the underlying causes of the resurgence of military coups in West Africa. It provides a framework or guides to analyze and juxtapose the vertical University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 9 inequalities and horizontal inequalities and how each dependently or interdependently triggers armed conflicts and, in this regard, motivates some officers of the army to overthrow constitutionally elected governments in West Africa. Also, West Africa has been a hotbed for military coups and violent conflict for several decades. Some of the poorest countries in the world are located within the sub-region providing some credence to the poverty trap as espoused by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), as a cause and consequence of violent conflicts. Furthermore, several violent conflicts in West Africa have had ethnic underpinnings including the Liberian Civil Wars 1989-1996; 1999-2003, the Biafran War 1967, and the Konkomba-Nanumba war in Ghana in 1994 (Anna, 2014; Rapanyane, 2021; Yaro & Longi, 2022). In considering the factors accounting for the resurgence of military coups in West Africa greed and grievance provides a good foundation to assess the role of deprivation of basic needs amongst the general population and inadequate logistics of the military and corruption in contributing to the resurgence of military coups in the sub-region. The theory also helps in scrutinizing ethnicity and religion in ascertaining their roles or otherwise in the resurgence of military coups in West Arica. The greed and grievance theory based on its tenets is therefore suitable for understanding the resurgence of military coups in West Arica particularly Mali and Burkina Faso. 1.8 Literature Review In this section, the study reviewed journal articles and other scholarly literature on coups in Africa and the role of regional and Sub-regional blocs like the African Union and ECOWAS in preventing and addressing the coup phenomenon. The literature review also paid particular attention to military coups in the West African sub-region since the early 1960s. The objective of the literature review is to first identify some existing gaps in the literature that will be University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 10 addressed by this study. Secondly, data from the literature relevant to the study will be relied upon as secondary data to address the research objectives and questions. Eizenga (2021) in his article “Military Coups in Burkina Faso” provided an elaborate account of military coups in Burkina since the country gained its independence in 1960. The article provided a detailed and chronological account of all the coups that had occurred from 1966 to 2015 in the country. The article was divided into two main parts, the first section reflected on the first 27 years post-independence, and the aspect focused on Blaise Compaoré’s 27 years in power after he staged the 1987 coup. The historical accounts provided by Eizenga revealed that between 1966 and 1987 Burkina Faso witnessed a successful military coup almost every four years resulting in a total of five successful coups. The paper also reviewed the dynamics that led to the overthrow of Blaise Compaoré who had held onto power for 27 years after the last coup he staged in 1987. Compaoré was overthrown through massive street protests and demonstrations for attempting to unlawfully change the constitution to extend his tenure in office. According to Eizenga the factors that led to the overthrow of Compaoré were no different from the factors that resulted in the previous five coups that occurred between 1966 to 1987. He identified undemocratic governance and poor economic mismanagement leading to hardships as the major causes of the military coups that had occurred between 1966-2014. He also noted that aside from the 2015 failed military coup, all the successful military coups have had some popular street support. According to Eizenga, the coups from 1966-2014 have been triggered by public protests and demonstrations which are then preceded by military intervention. These public protests he opined are either organized or supported by labor organizations, civil society organizations, opposition political parties, and student movements against incumbent regimes for poor governance and economic mismanagement. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 11 Eizenga work’s although very elaborate in providing factual accounts of military coup events from independence to 2015 in Burkina Faso was extensively narrative. The study provided a general account of coup events without conducting an in-depth analysis of why the coups kept resurging. Despite mentioning that street protests almost always preceded military coups, the paper failed to mention if street protests were seen as an invitation for the military to act, a motivation for some military officers to achieve their political ambitions, or were outrightly misinterpreted by the military. Despite these challenges, the elaborate historical recount of military coups in Burkina Faso provides a solid foundation to understand the resurgence of military coups in Burkina Faso in recent years which is an objective of the study. It also provides a basis for further analytical studies into the factors motivating military leaders in staging coups in West Africa during the current dispensation a gap in Eizenga’s work that this study filled. Matei (2021) conducted a study to ascertain the role of military interventions in undermining or consolidating democracy within a state using Mali as a case study. In her work titled “The Hot and Cold Relationship between Military Intervention and Democratic Consolidation,” Matei referred to Mali as a praetorian state due to the frequent involvement of the military in the country’s politics. Aside from citing the four successful military coups that occurred in Mali (1968,1991,2012 and 2020) to justify her assertion, she highlighted negative colonial legacies, weak state institutions, poor governance, the precarious security situation in northern Mali, history of military interventions and ineffective international assistance and aid as causes of military coups in Mali over the years. According to Matei, Mali’s military interventions have had both positive and negative effects University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 12 on the governance structure of the country. Matei argued that while the 1968 military intervention was a replacement of an authoritarian regime with another replica the 1991 military intervention led to the democratization of Mali. Although she admits that military intervention was not always the best approach, she acknowledged that some regimes particularly notoriously authoritarian regimes required the use of force and thus military intervention to oust them from power and develop a road map for democratic governance. Matei, also noted that the 2012 and 2020 military coups were attacks on democracy that did not only negatively impact Mali but could have also influenced some military officers within the sub-region to take similar actions resulting in sporadic incidents of military coup attempts in recent years. Matei concluded that Mali’s political institutions within the 21st century are weak, corrupt, engaged in internal fighting, and incapable of governing the country. This she argues has counted for the susceptibility of Mali to military coups and the resultant negative effects. Matei’s study helps in appreciating the causes of military coups in Mali which can be extended to the West African sub-region. Matei’s conclusions on why she regards Mali as susceptible to Military coups also provide a platform to understand and further explore the recent resurgence of military coups in West Africa making a comparative analysis with the situation in Burkina Faso. Matei’s study focused primarily on Mali, and therefore there is a need to conduct a study to ascertain if her findings are reflective of the situation in other West African countries like Burkina Faso which has recently relapsed into military coups. This study’s approach to using Mali and Burkina Faso as case studies create an opportunity to juxtapose the findings and draw more concrete conclusions. Ajayi and Olu-Adeyemi (2015), also conducted a study on the resurgence of military-political University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 13 adventurism in West Africa to determine its implications for the survival of democracy. The study also sought to identify predisposing factors driving the resurgence of military coups and to proffer solutions that will help sustain democracy within the sub-region. According to Ayai and Olu-Adeyemi (2015), the democratization efforts of the 1990s appeared to have quelled the prevalence of military coups which they referred to as military political adventurism in their studies. They however recounted that the turn of the millennium (the beginning of the year 2000) witnessed a resurgence of military inventions in several countries in West Africa. Probing into the causes of the resurgence of military coups in West Africa, their study findings revealed bad governance, corruption, poverty, insecurity, nonavailability of tangible democratic dividends, the selfish ambition of some military officers, and the half-hearted response of ECOWAS to unconstitutional governance as major predisposing factors. On ECOWAS, they further opined that ECOWAS often turned a blind eye to the unconstitutional actions of the incumbent civilian government to maintain power which is against ECOWAS’ Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. They also argued that ECOWAS’ reactive approach and use of rhetoric instead of a more proactive approach in dealing with the coup phenomenon somewhat influences or emboldens some military officers to stage coups to oust unpopular and ineffective regimes within the sub-region. They proposed strict adherence to good governance, inclusive democracy, accountability, and transparency under the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance as measures to enhance democracy and curb the resurgence of military coups. They also recommended that ECOWAS takes a more decisive, proactive, and leadership role in the issue of governance within the sub- region. The work of Ajayi and Olu-Adeyemi (2015) is relevant to this study as it provides useful insight University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 14 into the causes of the resurgence of military coups in West Africa. It also helps in understanding the role of ECOWAS in curbing the resurgence of military coups within the sub-region and if ECOWAS should be partly blamed for the current coup situation in West Africa. The study, therefore, provides insight into addressing two of the three research objectives. Ajayi and Olu- Adeyemi’s study assessed the resurgence of military coups in West Africa between 2000 and 2015. There have been dozens of coups within West Africa between 2015 and 2022. Between 2020 and 2022 there have been six coup attempts four successful and two failed. Ajayi and Olu-Adeyemi’s study, therefore, provides an opportunity for further study to ascertain if the factors that accounted for the resurgence of military coups in West Africa years back are the same. This is an important gap this study will address and also proffer solutions if the causes are the same or similar to prevent future occurrences. Okeke (2018), in his work Theories of Military in African Politics, acknowledges the existence of a coup culture among most African states, with the general African populace accepting unconstitutional military incursion in politics as a viable and legitimate means of changing corrupt and poorly performing civilian regimes which had become a major characteristic of most governments during the post-independence period. He identified how the struggle for political power along ethnic lines, in addition to the lack of economic development which led to harsh economic conditions, high living standards, and lack of social amenities played a significant role in the high prevalence of military coups during that period. The influence of external factors such as the cold war was also an underlying cause of the post-independence military overthrow of several civilian governments in Africa. According to Okeke, the failures of military rulers and regimes to address pertaining economic and social issues caused the flurry of military takeovers on the African continent. This he opined led to the African populace desiring and embracing western democracy thus the spread University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 15 of liberal democratic values across Africa. In his attempt to identify the causal factors for the resurgence of military coups, he outlined how weak democratic foundations of most African states enabled some military leaders to easily exchange their military uniforms for suits (overthrow civilian regimes) during the period of political reforms. He further highlighted the worsening economic conditions of several African states and the continued prevalence of corruption as factors that accounted for the gradual return of military coups in Africa. Okeke also argued that the lack of severe punishment for coups makers by the regional/sub-regional blocs AU and ECOWAS and the decision to allow some coup makers to participate in elections after they handed over power to transitional governments encouraged the return of the coup phenomenon in Africa. Okeke’s work extensively contributes to this study by addressing several aspects of the study’s objectives such as the factors motivating some officers of the military to stage coups in West Africa in recent years. It also addresses the role of regional and sub-regional blocks in preventing or somewhat driving the resurgence of military coups. The study, however, focused on the entire African continent making it difficult to deeply probe into individual states to ascertain the pertinent factors that affect individual states, and how similar or different these factors may be. The current study fills the gap by conducting a case study of two West African states Mali and Burkina Faso to gain a deeper insight into the causal factors of the resurgence of military coups in the two states. Jude Okafor and Uzodinma Okafor authors of ECOWAS and Democratic Reversal in West University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 16 Africa: Revisiting Military Incursions on the State Leadership, also acknowledge how most states in Africa after the transformational effects of the third wave of democracy have fallen short in their democratization journey (Okafor & Okafor, 2015). They point out how the winner-takes-all electoral system threatens the democratic process and poses a recipe for political instability. They further opined that the military resorted to coups as the only way to government change when self-seeking political elites, solely focus on amassing wealth and staying in the helms of power for as long as they live while ignoring their social, economic, and political duties to the state and its people. Concerning ECOWAS, the sub-regional bloc, they argued that the bloc had put in several interventions both militarily and diplomatically. They cited the creation of ECOMOG in 1990 as a military strategy for restoring peace and political stability in conflict states within the sub- region. They also noted that the establishment of protocols including the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 are all efforts by ECOWAS to promote democracy in West Africa and curb the prevalence of unconstitutional change of government in the sub-region. They further acknowledged the establishment of the ECOWAS court, and the mediation and reconciliation roles played by ECOWAS all to promote political stability through democratic governance within the sub-region. They however concluded that despite the immense efforts by ECOWAS, leaders within the sub-region are not living up to their mandate making light the efforts of ECOWAS. The paper is relevant to the study because it contributes to the understanding of the political architecture of West Africa and the challenges to democratic sustainability in the sub-region. It also explored the role of ECOWAS in contributing to democratic sustainability in West Africa. The study took a rather general approach to analyzing military incursions in ECOWAS University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 17 and democratic reversals. This study, however, employs the case study approach to understanding the causes of military coup resurgence and democratic backslides in West Africa. The use of the case study approach affords for deeper probing and more in-depth analysis to unravel the factors militating for the resurgence of military coups in West Africa and ECOWAS’ role in halting the democratic decline. Chidime (2013) also asserted that socioeconomic factors significantly contributed to military incursions in West Africa. In his work, Military Coups in West Africa, the African “Phenomenon that is Self-inflicted”, Chidume describes the African armed forces as seeing itself as the only competent institution that is capable of saving its state, thus its obligation to intervene and overthrow civilian regimes that confronted by a legitimate crisis. In the article, Chidume outlined how economic hardships, continuous practice of corruption and mismanagement among governments and their agents, as well as the continuous play of tribal and ethnic politics, formed the main underlying factors that prelude military coups and interventions in the sub-region. The work of Chidume is also relevant to this study as it highlights the existential threats to democracy and how it prepares fertile grounds for military interventions in the West African States. Chidume’s work although very insightful is almost a decade old and there might be emerging threats to democracy in recent years as well as new factors motivating some officers within the military to stage coups in this democratic dispensation. This is an important gap the study will be addressing within its findings. 1.9 Research Methodology In executing this study, the qualitative case study research method was used. This type of research method involves the empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 18 within a real-life context using multiple methods of data collection (Yin, 2009). A case study entails a comprehensive study of the social unit of society which may be a person, family group, institution, community, or event (Thomas, 2021). This study also employed the purposive sampling technique in selecting four officials, one from the Malian Embassy, Burkina Faso Embassy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ghana, and the ECOWAS Secretariat in Accra Ghana. The purposive sampling technique involves selecting respondents on the bases of their perceived knowledge, expertise, and experience about the phenomenon under study as well as the objectives of the study. The four selected respondents were selected based on their experience, in-depth knowledge, and understanding of ECOWAS and the political happenings within the sub-region, particularly the political situations in Mali and Burkina Faso. 1.9.1 Sources of Data In gathering materials for the study, both primary and secondary data were used.  Primary Data Collection The study collected primary data through interviews of four officials from the Malian Embassy, Burkina Faso Embassy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ghana, and the ECOWAS Secretariat in Accra Ghana. Interview is a qualitative approach to collecting data, involving direct, individual, or group discussions between a researcher and participants (Kallio et al., 2016). Interviews were deemed appropriate to understand the research topic “Democratic Backslide and the return of coup culture in West Africa-A case study of Mali and Burkina Faso”. This because interviews allowed participants to share detailed knowledge and experiences on the topic without much limitations providing useful insights to address the research objectives and questions. A semi-structured interview guide was used to facilitate the interviews. A semi-structured University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 19 interview guide is a primary data collection instrument that contains a set of predetermined questions that do not limit the response of an interviewee (Kallio et al., 2016). Semi-structured interview guides are useful in conducting interviews as they include predetermined questions to moderate the responses of interviews but allow for adjustments (ask follow up questions) based on respondents’ answers during the interview. The researcher utilized the semi- structured interview guide to ask follow-up questions, where necessary to obtain more clarity on specific issues which helped in addressing the research objectives. All four officials purposively selected for the study were interviewed face-to-face and each interview was conducted within 30 minutes. The official from the Malian Embassy was interviewed on November 2, 2022 in his office and the interview lasted 27 minutes. The interview was voice recorded using a mobile phone to facilitate transcription after seeking and obtaining permission from the official. The interview with the official from the Burkina Faso Embassy was conducted on November 3, 2022 at his office. The interview lasted 24 minutes and was also audio recorder using the mobile phone after obtaining permission from the official. The official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration was interviewed at his office on November 8, 2022 at his office at the Ministry in Accra. The interview lasted 25 minutes and was audio recorded using a mobile phone after obtaining permission form the official. The last interview with the official from the ECOWAS Secretariat in Accra was conducted on November 10, 2022 at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Accra. The interview lasted 29 minutes and was audio recorded using the mobile phone after permission was obtained. The research expressed his profound gratitude to each official and reassured them of the purpose of the interviews for academic purposes. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 20  Secondary Data  Data from this section was obtained from:  Policy documents,  Journal articles,  Books,  Newspaper reports  Internet. 1.9.2 Data Analysis The thematic analysis was used in analyzing the primary data obtained from the four expert interviews. According to Braun and Clarke (2012:57) cited in Braun and Clarke (2015), thematic analysis is “a method used for systematically identifying, organizing and offering insight into patterns of meaning (themes) across a data set. The interview data obtained through a recorder was manually transcribed verbatim. The transcribed interviews were reviewed severally to generate initial codes to reduce the large volume of data into smaller meaningful fragments. The next step was to search for themes by examining the codes to identify patterns that fit into themes that could be used to address the research objectives and questions. Preliminary themes were developed and after several reviews the final themes were developed. The interview data were coherently presented under the themes generated to address the research objectives. 1.10 Ethical Consideration The study considered two main ethical issues which are consent and confidentiality. Consent in research refers to formally obtaining the approval of a participant or respondent to participate University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 21 in a study (Williams & Pigoet, 2017). Express permission was sought from all four respondents through formally written letters. Each participant was also briefed on the purpose of the study and was allowed to ask questions on issues they were unclear about before proceeding to conduct the interviews. Confidentiality entails protecting the personal data (such as name or any detail traceable to the person) of respondents or participants in a study (Williams & Pigeot, 2017). It requires seeking the express permission of the respondents before publishing their names in the study or withholding their names and other personal information upon request. The four senior officials requested their names be withheld in the study as such their names were represented by respondents with a prefixed number in their responses to enable easy differentiation by readers. 1.11 Limitations of the study This study like other studies has some limitations. The main limitation of the study is the number of respondents interviewed which is four. The number of respondents for the study could have been increased to include military officers both active and retired as the study significantly revolved around them. Military officers in Ghana could have been interviewed to ascertain why there have been no recorded military coup attempts since the fourth Republic began in 1992 and why the situation has been different in Mali and Burkina Faso. Also, interviewing military officers from the two countries (Mali and Burkina Faso) would have contributed more to understanding the research phenomenon which is the resurgence of military coups in West Africa. These limitations were a result of time constraints as well as the accessibility and willingness of the military officers to participate in the study. Despite this limitation, the study still addressed the research objectives and questions based on the in-depth knowledge, experience, and expertise of the selected expert officials. Also, the strategic University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 22 selection of the respondents from the four key institutions (Mali Embassy – Ghana, Burkina Faso Embassy – Ghana, ECOWAS Secretariat – Ghana, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration – Ghana) that are relevant to the study also enhanced the quality of the data obtained and the conclusions drawn from the study findings. 1.12 Arrangement of Chapters This work is divided into four chapters: Chapter One is the introduction which entails the background to the study, problem statement, research objectives and statements, scope of the study, rationale/significance of the study, thesis statement, theoretical framework, literature review, research methodology, limitation of the study and arrangement of chapters. Research Design. Chapter two deals with the Overview of Coup Culture and Prevalence in West Africa and the ECOWAS’ management of military coups. Chapter Two presented an overview of the ECOWAS management of military coups in West Africa. It provided an insight into the concept of a coup, the history of coups in West Africa, the causes of coups in West Africa in the past, the various ECOWAS mechanisms and protocols on democracy and good governance, and ECOWAS management of military coups in West Africa. Chapter Three entailed a case study on the assessment of the resurgence of military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso. The capture also presented the views of the respondents interviewed for the study. Chapter Four provided a summary of key findings from the study, conclusions drawn from the findings, and recommendations proffered to the various stakeholders including governments of West African States particularly Mali and Burkina Faso, ECOWAS, Civil Society Organizations, and Policy think thanks based on the research findings. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 23 CHAPTER TWO OVERVIEW OF THE ECOWAS MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY COUPS 2.0 Introduction This chapter presents an overview of the prevalence of military coup d'états and coup culture in West Africa and the ECOWAS' management of same. In detail, the chapter begins by providing an overview of the concept of coups, the history of coups in West Africa, and the underlying causes of coups in the sub-region. The second aspect of the chapter assesses the various ECOWAS protocols established to promote good governance and democracy and to avert or significantly reduce the incidents of coups in the sub-region. The final part of the chapter examines the role(s) the ECOWAS directly plays in preventing coups in the sub-region, its response when they occur, and the challenges it faces in resolving them. 2.1 Definition and Concept of Coup The term coup d’état predates the 19th century but gained popularity in the 20th century. The word coup originally stemmed from the French word coup d’état and is literally used to describe the overthrow of a government (Selbin, 2018). The coup concept is not highly contested as compared to concepts such as democracy although there are some minor variations in the definition. While there is a consensus on what constitutes a coup in academia, the term is often subjectively interpreted within the political space (Marsteintredet & Malamud, 2019). One of the classical definitions of a coup was proffered by Luttwak (1969 p.12) who defined it as “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state’s apparatus which is used to displace the government from the control of the remainder”. Several years after his definition, Bogdanor (1987) cited in Bertelson (1997 p.324) also defined a coup as "a stoke of state; a seizure of power by a group using the permanent employees of the state… to capture and University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 24 paralyze the nerve ends of continuing government". A more recent definition was advanced by Powell and Thyne (2011, p.252), they defined a coup as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive”. From the definitions, a coup can be generally defined as a seizure of power from a government or an illegal removal or overthrow of a government usually by elements in the state such as the military, rebel group, or political faction. Coups are often bundled together with other internal activities within the state, which include insurrections, rebellion, and revolutions that essentially destabilize a state by overthrowing a government (Selbin, 2018). Bogdanor (1987) cited in Bartelson (1997 p.324), however, one can essentially distinguishes a coup from a revolution by expressing that: coup d’état is distinguished from a revolution in that it does not aim to alter the social and political structure, but merely to substitute one ruling group for another. The coup operates essentially by detaching the employees of the state from their loyalty to legitimate government. A Coup is a concept that has several adjectives attached, each conveying a specific message that can be de-encrypted to determine the nature of the coup (Marsteintredet & Malamud, 2019). Military coup and constitutional coups are common adjectival usage of the concept. In recent years however, several other adjectives have emerged to qualify coups including "presidential", "electoral", "parliamentary", "judicial", neo-liberal, and a host of others (Ibid). It is worth noting that in reality, the concept of a coup is more intricate than what is projected in academia. The subjective interpretations carry significant weight within the political space as varied interpretations are ascribed to the same event (Helmke, 2017). A belligerent opposition attempting to stage a coup or after successfully executing a coup can refer to the event as liberation or a freedom action against authoritarianism and dictatorship and often justify the act as a way to restore or institutionalize democracy (Marsteintredet & Malamud, 2019). The overthrown government will simply refer to the action as a coup and the perpetrators as coup mongers or coup makers. As Wardlaw (1989) will succinctly put it, one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 25 This notwithstanding, the European Union (EU) and countries like the United States take a very strong stance against coups and institute harsh punitive measures against coup regimes or countries. The United States, for instance, suspends foreign aid to recipient countries that experience coup d’etat (Marinov & Goemans, 2014). The African Union also has the power to suspend member states from the organization and recently applied that power against Sudan in June 2019. Despite the seemingly global frown on coups between 1950 and 2010, 457 coup attempts were recorded with 227 (49.7%) being successful and 220 (50.3%) failing. Of these figures, Africa recorded the highest number of coups and coup attempts 36.5% (Sagdic, 2021). A coup can fail, resulting in no change of regime, replace an incumbent leader or government with a dictator or replace a dictatorship with a democratic government (Derpanopoulos et al., 2016). Whatever the cause or trigger or outcome may be, Marsteintredet and Malamud (2019) assert that a coup is the greatest threat to the survival of democracy. 2.2 History of Coups in West Africa Coups are not new to West Africa as the sub-region has been synonymous with coup d’états over the past six decades. It is no surprise that the first coup that occurred on the continent happened in Togo, a West African country in 1963, just three years after the country gained its independence (R. First, 1970). Ghana, the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence, also experienced the first of its series of coups in 1966 (Gebe, 2008). Earlier in January that same year, Burkina Faso had witnessed its first coup d’état followed by Nigeria’s bloody military coup barely two weeks after, on January 15, 1966 (Phelan, 2016; Nwosu, 2020). Two years after in 1968, the President of Mali, Modibo Keita, was overthrown by a bloodless coup led by the country’s military (Matei, 2021). Almost all the coups within that period and the ensuing years involved the military. Since that period there have been several coups and attempted coups in the sub-region. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 26 Between the late 1950s and 2012, there have been over two hundred (200) coups and coup attempt in Africa, majority of which have occurred in West Africa (Barka &Ncube, 2012). A study conducted by Yoroms (2014), revealed that between 1958 and 2008 West Africa recorded the highest number of coups in Africa constituting 44.4%. Between 2010 and 2022 there have been 40 coups and attempted coups in Africa and, unsurprisingly, half of them have occurred within the West African and Sahel regions. Since 2019, there have been seven (7) coups in West Africa, five were successful and two failed. There has also been a trend in the incidence of coups that have occurred on the continent and specifically in West Africa. The majority of the coups that have occurred in Africa post-colonial independence to 2008 occurred in former French colonies (Zounmenou, 2009 cited in Suleiman & Onapajo, 2022). Twelve (12) of the twenty (20) coups that occurred in West Africa since 2010 happened in former French colonies likewise six (6) of the last seven coups and attempted coups in the sub-region since 2019 (Suleiman & Onapajo, 2022). For easy reference, the last six coups and attempted coups that have occurred in the sub-region have been captured in Table 2.1. Table 2. 1: Coups in West Africa Between August 2020 and February 2022 Country Former Colonial Administrator Coup Date Coup Outcome Leaders Involved Targeted Government Mali France August19, 2020 Successful Assimi Goita (Military) President Ibrahim Keita Mali France May 24, 2021 Successful Assimi Goita (Military) President Bah Ndaw Niger France March 31, 2021 Failed Unknown President- Elect Mohamed Bazoum Guinea France September 5, 2021 Successful Mamady Doumbouya (Military) President Alpha Conde Burkina France January 24, Successful Paul-Henri President. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 27 Faso 2022 Damiba Roch Kabore Guinea Bissau Portugal February 1, 2022 Failed Unknown President Umaro Embalo Source: Compiled by Researcher West Africa has been a hotbed for coups and particularly, military coups. The next aspect of this chapter delves into the factors responsible for the high incidence of coups in the sub region. 2.3 Underlying Causes of Coups in West Africa Over the Years It is common knowledge that Africa has the highest incidence of coups in the world. West Africa consists of sixteen countries approximately 30% of the continent in terms of representation by states. Despite the sub-region constituting about one-third of the continent, West Africa is the bloc with the highest prevalence of coups on the continent 44% between 1958 and 2008 and about 50% between 2010 and 2022 (Yoroms, 2014). This section of the chapter undertakes an in-depth review of existing literature to ascertain the underlying causes of coups in the sub-region and what makes West Africa the hotbed of coups on the continent. The causes of coups in West Africa can be categorized under internal factors and external factors. Internal factors are the factors that emanate from within the state that threatens not just the democracy but political stability, peace, and security of the state. External factors, on the other hand, involve global dynamics and powerplay and how they invariably impact a state or region. 2.3.1 Internal Factors  Superficial Democratic Credentials Although democracy appears to be thriving in most countries in the sub-region the reality is that the gains are more modest than what is projected (Suleiman & Onapajo, 2022). For University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 28 instance, a major attribute or determinant of democracy is periodic elections. Periodic elections are a common practice in West African states and this gives the impression that states are adhering to the tenets of democracy. The real issue is that most elections in the sub-region are not conducted within a transparent free and fair environment (Annan, 2014). This sparks election disputes and even when the disputes are purportedly settled losers still feel aggrieved. In light of this aggrieved elements within the state seize the minutest opportunity to create political turmoil through which they plan and execute a coup (Ibid). In closely contested elections even the “losers” have significant numbers which they can rely on in the event of a coup to give false legitimacy to their action (Norris, Cameron &Wynter, 2018). There have also been several undemocratic attempts by presidents to alter the constitution to extend term limits. While some have been unsuccessful others have been successful. In either case, one thing has been common, these actions have been met with stiff opposition some of which later result in an overthrow of the government (Tull & Simons, 2017). An independent and functional judicial service is another important element required to classify a country as democratic. All countries in West Africa have established judicial services and a supreme court is the apex court of the various states (Suleiman &Onapajo, 2022). The challenge however lies with the independence of the courts and also accessibility by citizens and perceived adjudication of justice (Ibid). A survey conducted by Afrobarometer in 2017 revealed that very few Africans have access to judicial services specifically courts. The number is even lower among marginalized groups including women and the uneducated. In Burkina Faso for instance, only 4% of marginalized groups made direct contact with courts within the past five years, and 6% in Senegal (Logan, 2017). Low confidence in the judiciary to adjudicate justice, particularly in cases involving government over a prolonged period creates room for coup d'états (Ibid). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 29 Press freedom is also essential to democratic governance. Much has been done to promote media pluralism in West Africa. This, however, is not an indicator of press freedom or liberalization. There are still several hurdles impeding objective media reportage (Marc, Verjee & Mogaka, 2015). Threats, murder, torture, kidnapping, and imprisonment are tools employed by some governments to intimidate, manipulate and shape the media narrative (Ibid). As Wade (2017) opined, suppression easily leads to revolts and this can be used to undermine a democratically elected government. The following highlight the fact that although states in West Africa are making some efforts at promoting democracy there is still much work to be done to consolidate the democratic gains. These democratic inefficiencies become breeding grounds for coups to be easily executed by malicious elements within the state and coup makers. 2.3.2 Corruption and Economic Mismanagement According to Mishra and Toprak (2022) allegations of corruption and economic mismanagement have been trumpeted by coup mongers/makers as justification for coups in the sub-region since post-colonial independence. Liedong (2017) agrees that corruption and economic mismanagement are prevalent and endemic across the African continent and suggest that this makes the use of such allegations an easy and populist tool to stage a coup. Mishra and Toprak (2022) suggested that, if it (the trick) worked in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s it will probably work now as little has changed since then in terms of accountability and transparency. Monyake (2018) also notes that the coup-makers in a bid to win over the public promise anti- corruption measures and prudent economic management of state resources which they hardly adhere to. Data from Transparency International an organization that ranks countries based on a corruption perception index revealed that several West African countries were lowly ranked. Out of 181 countries, Guinea Bissau was ranked 165th, Nigeria, 154th, Guinea 150th, Mali 136th, University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 30 and Niger 124th (Transparency International, 2022). Corruption and economic mismanagement create widespread poverty. Poverty coupled with high levels of unemployment often results in mass public demonstrations that can create political tensions within a state (Liedong, 2017). According to Annan (2014), nefarious elements within the state and the military easily seize such opportunities to overthrow the incumbent government and assume power sometimes unwilling to hold elections and return the country to democratic governance. 2.3.3 Insecurity There has been growing insecurity within the West African sub-region over the past decade. Insurgencies, jihadist and terrorist activities have increased in several countries in the sub- region (Ibrahim, 2017). Despite urgent calls by citizens and the security services for government to act and address the situation, very little has been done over the years (Ibid). About 7569 people have lost their lives in Burkina Faso between 2015 and 2021 due to jihadist and terrorist activities in the country, while 1.6 million people have been displaced (Moderan & Koné, 2021). In 2021 alone there was 1337 violence-related crisis resulting in 2294 deaths in the country (Ibid). These and several incidents increase tension in the country and a burning desire to change a leader (President of the country) by every means possible, particularly, when national elections seem too far(Ibid). Similarly, insecurity was also an underlying factor in the 2012 and 2020 coups in Mali (Fornof &Cole, 2020). Mishra and Toprak (2022) succinctly capture this phenomenon when they opined that the proliferation of insurgent groups, jihadists, and extremists coupled with weak, fledging, and transitional democracy have provided fertile grounds and given the military the impetus to intervene in civilian and political matters across Africa. This assertion applies to West Africa also which has become the hotbed for coup resurgence. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 31 2.3.4 Personalization of the Military Instead of building a national military force whose objective is to protect and maintain the territorial integrity of the state at all times, some leaders rather build the military on ethnic and political lines (Englebert, 2018). According to Herbst (2014), this phenomenon is more entrenched with African dictators who seek to hold onto power in perpetuity. They recruit more soldiers from their ethnic backgrounds and indiscriminately promote others to high ranks in the military without merit (Ibid). The first challenge is, that such actions create factions within the army and internal wranglings. This often leads to one faction staging a coup to overthrow the government and install a leader who is tribally affiliated with them (Mishra & Toprak, 2022). Secondly, the military owes little allegiance to the state. In the event of an issue with the leader (president), the military could handle it as a personal affair by toppling the leader rather than considering the broad implications for the state (Ibid). This situation is seen in Guinea where Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, a member of the French legionnaire in France, was asked by then-President Alpha Conde to return to Guinea. The main objective of the call was for Doumbouya to help him (Alpha Conde) solidify his power in the state, which was experiencing some political upheavals. The latter ended up overthrowing the former, citing widespread corruption and human rights abuse as reasons for the coup (Devermont, 2021). In 2015, an elite presidential guard with assistance from some members of the Regiment of the Presidential Security, ousted the interim president from power two weeks before the elections (Mohammed & Kuo, 2015). There appears to be low professionalism amongst the military within the sub-region due to poor recruitment practices. An unprofessional military or armed force is often a recipe for disaster even in fledging democracies (Mishra & Toprak, 2022). 2.3.5 Under-Resourced Military As noted, the rising incidence of insurgencies and terrorist activities have been cited severally University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 32 by coup makers as reasons for staging coups in the sub-region (Ibrahim, 2017). Some of these coups have gained support from the general public due to the insecurities created by the terrorists and insurgents (Bermeo, 2016). Identifying insecurity as a cause of coup in West Africa without probing further to ascertain the underlying factors of insecurity within the sub- region, does not suffice in addressing the issue. Several of the armed forces in the sub-region are under-resourced and this makes combating insurgents and terrorist groups that are sometimes funded by well-resourced networks a herculean task (Englebert, 2018). Several of the countries in West Africa particularly, the francophone countries, rely on French military support to fight insurgents. This shows the level and capacity of most of the military within the sub-region (Addo, 2017). Although Nigeria is still battling Boko Haram, the country's military, in terms of resources, is largely internally dependent. This is, however, not the case in countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso that largely depend on French support (Englebert, 2017). When people lose faith in the ability of a government to protect them, they could seize other opportunities which can be undemocratic to remove the government from power. This has partly been the case in West Africa in recent years. 2.3.6 Relatively Low Levels of Education Some of the countries with the lowest literacy rates in the world are in West Africa. Guinea, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin all have less than 50% literacy rates (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2017). As established earlier, allegations of corruption and economic mismanagement have been used severally to justify coups in Africa and particularly in West Africa. Some of the coups have been widely supported by citizens based on the reasons provided by the coup makers. A country with a highly educated population is less likely to support a coup or military takeover based on allegations of corruption or economic mismanagement. Citizens are more likely to demand alligators use the appropriate democratic University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 33 channels to address these issues. The same cannot be said about countries with relatively low literacy rates that rely on others for information (Hiroi &Omori, 2013). This assertion is supported by a study recently conducted by Voldant (2019), to determine the impact of literacy rates on democratic desire. Findings from the study indicated a significant positive relationship between literacy rates and democratic desires. In essence, the study revealed that higher rates of education produce a greater desire to be governed democratically. This partly explains why coup-makers in West Africa find it convenient to stage coups and justify them with allegations of corruption and economic mismanagement, a trend they continue once they ascend to power. 2.4 External Factors West Africa has suffered the brunt of global power politics and this dates back to the Cold War era when the two major powers the United States and the Soviet Union developed means to assert their influence on the continent (Chidume, 2013). Each power block needed to have a ruling government that supported either the communist or capitalist ideology. Coups became an effective tool for regime change (Ibid). The remnants of global politics and powerplay are still present today on the continent and in West Africa. There have been a series of allegations and media reports on Russia's involvement in the recent coups in Mali. Colonel Assimi Goita the Malian military officer who led the coup and subsequently declared himself the provisional leader of the country is reported to have received training and assistance from the United States (Suleiman & Onapajo, 2022). Foreign influence is also seen in the covert coup staged in Chad in the Sahel region. President Idriss Deby was killed by rebels in a battle just a day after he got re-elected for his sixth term as president. Despite a provision in Chad's constitution that states that the speaker of parliament should be installed as interim president upon the demise of an incumbent president the country's University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 34 military bypassed the country's constitution to install Mahamat Deby the son of the late president as the leader of the country (Akinpelu, 2022). This action was supported by France whose foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian justified the military’s action by stating it was necessary for security reasons. The move emboldened the military to take further steps in dissolving Chad’s parliament and suspending the constitution (Ibid). At the UN Security Council China supported Russia to prevent France’s motion to impose economic and border sanctions on Mali due to the military coup. This move had support from the two other members of the security council the United States and the United Kingdom but could not be implemented (Suleiman and Anapajo, 2022). China also condemned the putsch in Guinea but has been silent on the coups in Mali (Ibid). The quest for strategic influence in Africa is currently being reenacted by foreign powers. The use of coups to impose governments that suit their interest is at play and is rife in West Africa. 2.5 ECOWAS’ Protocols and Inventions to Promote Democracy and Good Governance in West Africa Democracy and good governance are prerequisites for political stability peace and security. The ECOWAS, aware of the fragile status of peace and security in the sub-region adopted some key protocols to promote democracy and good governance in West Africa. There is also effective collaboration and cooperation between the ECOWAS and the African Union to address the challenges of bad governance and unconstitutional change of government. Three major protocols that relate to good governance and democracy, prevention of unconstitutional changes of government, and conflict prevention management and resolution are discussed. 2.5.1 The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Member states of the ECOWAS on December 21, 2001, adopted the Protocol on Democracy University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 35 and Good Governance (PDGG) as a supplementary Protocol to the ECOWAS Mechanism in Dakar, Senegal. The protocol, as the name suggests, was developed to address governance deficits in the sub-region and avert the consequences of bad governance which includes coups or unconstitutional changes of government (Addo, 2017). To ensure this objective is achieved, the Protocol strictly charges governments and leaders of member states to adhere to the tenets of good governance and democracy (Ibid). It further admonishes heads of government (presidents) of ECOWAS countries to refrain from unconstitutional ascension to power and unconstitutionally altering the Constitution to maintain power or extend term limits (Basiru, Salawu & Adepoju, 2019). The PDGG specifically states that there should be no substantial amendments made to electoral laws six months before elections except it is done with the utmost consent of all political actors in the country (Addo, 2017). The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance calls on ECOWAS states to conduct, transparent, free and fair elections to elect leaders into office. In this regard governments of member states are to ensure that elections are conducted on specific dates or periods as enshrined in the constitution or electoral laws (Ibid). This is to ensure that incumbents do not manipulate the data to obtain undue advantage or disadvantage other contesting parties. Member states are at liberty to request assistance from the ECOWAS during elections in the form of pre-election assessment and monitoring during the actual elections (Ibid). Article 19 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance also enjoins governments of member states to establish non-partisan security apparatus, which includes the armed forces and police service (ECOWAS, 2001). The security services owe allegiance to the state and should not allow themselves to be manipulated by any leader or government in contravention of the constitution. To ensure that the armed forces do not interfere with executive governance Article 20 of the PDGG bars the armed forces from engaging in a trade union or political University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 36 activities, especially at the barracks (Ibid). The leadership of ECOWAS also understands the adverse role poverty plays in fueling coups and creating political instability. As a result three articles (Articles 25, 26, and 27) in the PDGG effectively capture measures to alleviate poverty in the sub-region and promote social dialogue (Ibid). The PDGG frowns on marginalization and discrimination of any sought which includes but is not limited to religion, ethnicity, and political affiliations. Such actions cause dissension and could trigger coups and instability (Addo, 2017). In general, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance succinctly captures the appropriate measures and strategies that member states can adopt and implement to promote peace, security, and stability in the sub-region. The solution proffered in the PDGG is good governance and democracy. Without good governance, it will be difficult for any entity including ECOWAS to prevent an unconstitutional change of government. 2.5.2 The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security Members states of the ECOWAS on July 24, 1993, adopted the Revised ECOWAS Treaty. The Revised Treaty was a response to the increased intra-state and inter-state conflicts that plagued the sub-region between the late 1980s and early 1990s (Addo, 2017). The Revised ECOWAS Treaty contained provisions aimed at preventing, managing, and resolving intra-state and inter- state conflicts. While the document contained useful provisions, the ECOWAS was still working on developing a more comprehensive framework to address the rising civil wars, political conflicts, and instability still prevalent in West Africa (ECOWAS Commission, 2018). These efforts culminated in the adoption of Decision A/DEC.11/10/98 relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping, and Security commonly referred to as the ECOWAS Mechanism (Ibid). Although the Decision University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 37 A/DEC.11/10/98 was first adopted on October 31, 1998, in Abuja the ECOWAS was officially signed into a Protocol in Lomé Togo on December 10, 1999. The ECOWAS Mechanism establishes a comprehensive legal framework for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts as well as for conducting peacekeeping exercises and maintaining security in West Africa (Ibid). Kabia (2016) opines that despite the Mechanism being conflict prevention, management and resolution oriented it acknowledges the role rule of law, and good governance in maintaining peace, security, and stability as well as promoting sustainable development in the sub-region. This is first explicitly captured in the Mechanism’s preamble and Article 2 (c, d) and. Article 2 (c) specifically enjoins member states to uphold the tenets of democratic governance and also invest in establishing democratic institutions (ECOWAS, 1999). Article 2 (d) also encourages member states to protect the fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens and persons living within the territory and also uphold the rules of international humanitarian law. These provisions demonstrate the importance ECOWAS attaches to democratic governance (Ibid). The Mechanism's emphasis on the Early Warning System in Chapter (4), Articles 23 and 24 is essential in addressing the resurgence of coups in West Africa. The EWS when efficiently deployed can inform governments of member states on impeding dangers or likely coup attempts from intelligence gathered or critical assessment of the political climate of a country (ECOWAS, 1999; ECOWAS Commission, 2018). The information can be useful in assisting governments to take alternative causes of action to avert such calamities from occurring. In the event of a conflict (coup), the Mechanism has provisions to resolve the conflict and return the country to constitutional governance. Article 25 stipulates that the Mechanism shall be applied in the event of an overthrow or an attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government (Basiru, Salawu & Adepoju, 2019). In general, the Mechanism contains useful provisions and University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 38 guidelines when effectively implemented could prevent unconstitutional changes in government in West Africa. 2.5.3 Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa The resurgence of military coups in Africa and particularly, West Africa resulted in the Africa Union and other RECs holding an urgent three-day meeting in Accra, Ghana between 15-17 March 2022 to find solutions to the menace (Kodjo, 2022). Decisions taken at the meeting pending adoption at the upcoming Extraordinary Session of the AU Heads of State and Government, in May 2022, have been referred to as the Accra Declaration. As the hosting REC and subregion with the prevalent resurgence, the Chairman of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government and President of the Republic, Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo- Addo, intimated zero tolerance for the unconstitutional overthrow of a government, unconstitutional manipulation to extend term limits and all other forms of unconstitutional change of government. Present at the Forum were representatives of African Civil Society Organizations, professional bodies, academia, and other key stakeholders (Ibid). The emphatic message by the ECOWAS Chair set the tone for deliberations on the imminent issue at hand. At the Reflection Forum, twenty-four (24) commitments were made by participants. The major highlights and commitments at the Forum are highlighted and discussed in this section. First participants committed to remaining resolute in condemning all forms of constitutional changes of government in Africa, coup perpetrators and attempts to manipulate or manipulation of the democratic process to alter the constitution and extend term limits without recourse to national democratic principles (Africa Union, 2022). Participants also committed to employing effective measures to address challenges, particularly socio-economic inequalities, which include but are not limited to gender, age, religion, ethnicity, and political affiliations. They also called for greater media pluralism and the need for governments to allow citizens channels University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.ghUniversity of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 39 their aggrievances through the media without censorship and effectively respond to those issues (Ibid). The fourth commitment calls on African governments to assiduously work to address the factors that instigate unconstitutional changes of government including manipulating the constitution or electoral laws a few months before elections without the consent of the majority of political actors in the country (Ibid). There was also a call on African leaders to decriminalize legitimate opposition party activities and to increase collaboration in with opposition parties to accelerate national development. African leaders were also encouraged to seize the digital revolution to communicate more with the citizenry particularly the youth to bridge the information gap and also steer them away from misinformation which is often used as a tool to disrupt stable governments (Ibid). Governments also reiterated their commitment to reject internal and external influences that harper peace and security and to collectively mobilize resources within the continent to fund peace initiatives (Ibid). In general, the tenets of the Forum hinge on democracy and good governance as major solutions to the resurgence of unconstitution