University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh AN EXAMINATION OF ELITE CONSENSUS TOWARDS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF GHANA BY RUFUS ASHITEY ARMAH 10476125 THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEGREE LEGON JULY, 2019 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh i University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh DEDICATION The work is dedicated to the Almighty God for his abundant grace throughout my life and the years spent at the University of Ghana, Legon, especially throughout this course. Indeed, God is the greatest! I also dedicate this work to my family and friends for their support and contribution to the success of this work. To God be the glory! ii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This work started as a thought, and through further observation and deliberation, it became necessary that it be further developed and investigated in order to ascertain the truth. This would not have been possible without the ALMIGHTY GOD, whose grace, strength, and unfathomable wisdom sustained, protected, and guided me throughout this study. I also wish to thank my patient and loving supervisor, Dr Boni Yao Gebe. His excellent guidance and support made it possible for me to complete this dissertation successfully. In the process of adding skeleton and flesh to this study, which involved review of literature and the conduct of interviews, some notable individuals helped in diverse ways. I would like to acknowledge the following: the Research Fellows, my course mates and all staff at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) for providing a congenial and conducive environment which aided in the overall completion of this study. I would also like to thank Mr. Daniel Bakomora and Mr. Kelvin Ashong for their immense contribution towards the completion of the study. iii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AFRC Armed Forces Revolution Council AU African Union CDD Ghana Center for Democratic Development CHRAJ Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice CPP Convention People’s Party CRC Constitution Review Committee EC Electoral Commission ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FES Fredrich Ebert Stiftung Ghana GBA Ghana Bar Association GPRS I Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy GPRS II Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy GSGDA Ghana Shared Growth Development Agenda GJA Ghana Journalists Association IEA Institute of Economic Affairs Ghana IMF International Monetary Fund IPAC Inter-Party Advisory Committee LECIAD Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy MP Member of Parliament MDGs Millennium Development Goals NCCE National Commission for Civic Education NCP National Convention Party iv University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh NDC National Democratic Congress NDP National Development Planning NDPC National Development Planning Commission NHIS National Health Insurance Scheme NIP National Independent Party NLC National Liberation Council NMC National Media Commission NPC National Peace Council NPP National Patriotic Party NUGS National Union of Ghana Students PHP People’s Heritage Party PP Progress Party PNC People’s National Convention PNDC Provisional National Defence Council PNDCL Provisional National Defence Council Law SAP Structural Adjustment Policy TUC Trade Union Congress UG University of Ghana WTA Winner Takes All Politics v University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Table of Contents DECLARATION ................................................................................i DEDICATION ................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................ iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................... iv ABSTRACT ...................................................................................... xi CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................ 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1 1.1 Background to the Study ............................................................................... 1 1.2 Statement of the Research Problem ............................................................. 6 1.3 Research Questions ........................................................................................ 8 1.4 Research Objectives ....................................................................................... 9 1.5 Scope of the Study .......................................................................................... 9 1.6 Hypothesis ....................................................................................................... 9 1.7 Rationale of the Study ................................................................................... 9 1.8 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................... 10 vi University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1.8.1 Political Pluralism ................................................................................... 10 1.8.2 Norms of Pluralist Politics....................................................................... 11 1.8.3 Criticisms of Political Pluralism .............................................................. 12 1.8.4 Basis for Political Pluralism .................................................................... 14 1.9 Literature Review ........................................................................................ 14 1.10 Clarification of Key Concepts ................................................................... 21 1.11 Sources of Data ........................................................................................... 23 1.12 Research Methodology .............................................................................. 25 1.13 Limitations of the Study ............................................................................ 26 1.14 Organization of the Study ......................................................................... 26 References ........................................................................................................... 27 CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................. 32 AN OVERVIEW OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN GHANA .......................................................... 32 2.0 Introduction .................................................................................................. 32 2.1 Conceptualisation of Elites .......................................................................... 32 vii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.2 The Relationship between Elite Theory and The Concept of Liberal Democracy .......................................................................................................... 34 2.3 An Overview of Elite Consensus ................................................................. 35 2.4 The Relationship between Conflict, Consensus and Democracy ............. 39 2.5 Politics in Africa Before the Third Wave of Democratization ................. 41 2.6 The Ghanaian Context ................................................................................ 43 2.7 The Transition Process and the Movement towards Democratic Rule .. 44 2.8 Political Parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic ........................................... 45 2.8.1 The Regulatory Framework of Party Politics in the Fourth Republic ..... 45 2.8.2 Formation and Activities of Political Parties ........................................... 47 2.8.3 Legal Requirements for Financing Political Parties in the Fourth Republic ............................................................................................................ 48 2.8.4 Political Parties Operating in Ghana’s Fourth Republic ......................... 48 2.9 Elections in Ghana ................................................................................... 49 2.9.1 Legal Frameworks, International and Regional Commitments ............... 49 2.9.2 The President and Parliament ................................................................. 50 2.9.3 The Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) .............................................. 51 2.9.4 Role of the Media .................................................................................... 51 2.10 The Legislature in Ghana .......................................................................... 52 viii University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.10.1 Composition of the Parliament in Ghana .............................................. 52 2.11 Political Successions in the Fourth Republic ........................................... 53 2.11.1 Political Succession from 1992 to 2000 ................................................ 53 2.11.2 Political Succession from 2000 till Date ............................................... 54 2.10 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 56 References ....................................................................................................... 58 CHAPTER THREE ......................................................................... 61 AN EXAMINATION OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA ........................................................ 61 3.0 Introduction .................................................................................................. 61 3.1 Operational Benchmarks for Examining Elite Consensus in Ghana ...... 62 3.2 Elite Consensus in Ghana ............................................................................ 63 3.2.1 At the Level of Political Parties............................................................... 63 3.2.2 At the Level of Elections ......................................................................... 74 3.2.3 At the level of the legislature................................................................... 79 3.3 National Development Planning in Ghana ............................................... 88 3.3.1 National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) .......................... 89 3.3.2 National Development Policies Under the Fourth Republic .................. 91 ix University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3.3.3 An Analysis of National Development Planning in Ghana’s Fourth Republic ............................................................................................................ 93 3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................... 98 References ..................................................................................................... 100 CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................... 104 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................... 104 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 104 4.2 Summary of Research Findings ................................................................ 104 4.3 Conclusions ................................................................................................. 109 4.4 Recommendations ...................................................................................... 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................... APPENDIXES .......................................................................................... x University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ABSTRACT Consensually united elites are said to be very rare and as such limit the possibility for the spread of liberal democracy across the world. In Africa, Ghana presents itself as a case in point, not only because it is one of the most democratic countries in Africa but also the fact that political elites have been accorded the force behind this success. The study therefore examines the place of elite consensus in Ghana’s political landscape by examining the political parties, elections, the legislature and national development planning in the fourth republic. This analysis was made based on a wealth of knowledge provided by numerous scholars on the topic of elite consensus and how this concept is connected to democratic development. Within the Ghanaian political dispensation, based on some operational benchmarks, this study adopted self-perceptions expressed in qualitative, in-depth interviews with a limited number of political party executives, think-tanks, parliamentarians, civil servants and National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) officials. The study found out that political elites in Ghana are very united and as such depicts a horizontal integration of elites as explained by Higley and Burton. This has accounted for Ghana’s envious democratic strides. However, this consensus is only on issues affecting elites and not the citizens which are particularly indicative in Ghana’s legislature and national development planning since the start of the fourth republic. This finding goes against Higley and Burton’s vertically integrated elitism, which suggests a great cohesion between elites and the masses. This then confirms the hypothesis of the study which states that Ghana lacks an enduring elite consensus which has negatively affected national development. In light of these conclusions, the study prescribes some remedies in solving Ghana’s deficits on elite consensus towards national development in the long-run. They include having a third force in Ghana’s political arena, some constitutional amendments, effective civic education, procuring a national agenda on national development planning and effective conflict resolution mechanisms. xi University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background to the Study Over the years, the role of the state has evolved from the mere source of territorial protection (internal and external) to a system which provides inclusiveness and opportunities (economic, social, political and cultural) for its citizens (Tanzi, 1997). It has led to the evolution of democracy, a form of government focused on the people and where citizens are made masters of not only their destinies but also, the source of power through which leaders gain legitimacy (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). Today, democracy has gained massive support as the ideal governance system in resolving the political and socio-economic challenges of countries worldwide (Kooijmans, 2018). This is in comparison to a government by the few (for example, the Communist Party in China and Cuba) or by a single person (such as the dictatorship of the Kim family in North Korea) (Pearson Higher Education, 2010). To many political thinkers, democracy best protects human rights and produces rational policies (Pearson Higher Education, 2010). Nevertheless, democracy remains an aspiration rather than a finished product, according to many scholars (Pearson Higher Education, 2010). For this reason, democracy must follow three major benchmarks. These benchmarks include: • popular sovereignty (government policies reflect the wishes of the people, government leaders are selected in competitive elections, elections are free and fair, people participate in the political process, high-quality information is available and majority rules); • political equity (each person being of equal intrinsic value as other human beings, equal protection) and; 1 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh • political liberty(basic freedoms essential to the formation and expression of majority opinion and its translation into public policies) (Pearson Higher Education, 2010, pp. 7- 11). Scholars like Higley and Burton have tried to explain the dilemma of unequal democracies across the world. A popular theory is the structural and actor-centric approaches, postulated by Higley and Burton (1989). The structural approach considers a country’s wealth as the leading factor for democracies whiles the actor-centric approach, on the other hand, highlights the process of elite bargaining and strategic interaction (Higley & Burton, 1989). The “Third Wave” of democratization, a phrase which Huntington (1991) uses to describe the global trend that saw more than 60 countries undergo a democratic transition in the late 20th century, seems to support the actor-centric idea that democracy can thrive in all kinds of settings. This was particularly evident in Africa, a continent inhabiting some of the poorest countries and once seen as “unlikely democratizers” (Berman, 2007). Military regimes and single-party rule characterised post-colonial rule in Africa. The movement from authoritarianism in Africa acquired momentum from trends and changes on the international stage. Nonetheless, this situation in itself did not change the trajectory of events. Thirty-nine (39) heads of state were referred to as autocrats by 1990 (Baker, 1998). They had truncated the human rights of their citizens and had put a lid on opposition and dissent, even within their own party circles. More so, there was the abolishment of the individual constitutions of independent African states and those perceived to be opposed to the ruling government were abused, arrested and detained without trial. By 1997, nineteen (19) of such leaders had been ousted and yet twenty (20) of them still relished power (Baker, 1998). Out of the twenty (20), seventeen (17) were democratically elected although some of the elections were contested; two (2) lost the elections and orchestrated comebacks through coups d’état while the last one, Mswati III, King of Swaziland, is a monarch whose monarchy remained resolute (Baker, 1998). The 2 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh nineteen (19) leaders ousted, were dislodged either through a coup or an election. Some, in addition, were assassinated and yet others escaped rebel attacks. In recent years, elites have been regarded as an inherent feature of modern societies (Englelstad, 2010). The legitimacy of elites is indisputably a key requirement in every democracy (Kaina, 2009, p. 400). Ideally, elites must embrace democratic values, rule in conformity with the preferences of the electorate, and be demographically representative (Hoffmann-Lange, 1986). Sadly, they fall short of these high expectations in reality. Nonetheless, with several empirical studies on regime types, it is reasonable to embrace the idea that elites in democracies edge closer to these values than elites in non-democratic states. In a series of publications, Higley and Burton (2006); Higley, et al. (1991); Field & Higley (1980) advanced a comprehensive typology of elite structures and matching regime types. Three ideal types have been distinguished by them. These include: • Consensually united elites • Ideologically united elites • Disunited elites. Consensually united elites are made distinctive by “dense and interlocked networks of communication and influence” (Higley et al., 1991, p. 36). The interaction structure within, “provides all-important elites with access to central decision-making” (Higley et al., 1991, p. 36). Using social network analysis, there have been empirical evidence of this structure in Western democracies such as Germany, Australia and the United States of America (Osei, 2014). Also, elites within this structure share the basic norms and values of political conduct and acknowledge bargaining as an acceptable mode of conduct. This consensus on values does not automatically mean agreement on particular issues. Instead, on the rules of the game, in simpler words, elites 3 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh must agree to disagree. According to John Higley and Michael Burton, liberal democracy is only possible with a consensually united elite (2006, p. 2). Ideologically united elites, on the other hand, are heavily centralised and unified by a distinct ideology (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 12). Such structures are usually stable but unrepresentative systems, like totalitarian regimes or theocracies. Examples of these regimes include Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, the People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong and North Korea under the Kim dynasty (Sampaolo, 2016). Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe and Eritrea under Isaias Afewerki are given as examples in Africa (Drezner, 2003; Kelley, 2015). On the contrary, disunited elites are neither characterised by dense communication networks nor a major agreement on the political norms of conduct. Elites here are described as “weakly integrated” and as such always form unstable regimes that can be representative on varying scales (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 19). Present-day Cameroon is given as an example (International Crisis Group, 2010). Scholars like Cammack (1990) and Borchert (2010) have criticised Higley and Burton’s concept, indicating that the views and roles of non-elites (masses) in these structures receive little attention. To them, the mere existence of elites refutes the idea of equality, which is a fundamental feature of democracy (Borchert, 2010, p. 24). This argument adds to the larger debate on the relationship between vertical and horizontal integration. There are two dimensions pivotal to the relationship between elites and regimes. These are horizontal integration and vertical integration (Putnam, 1976; Hoffmann-Lange, 1992, p. 35; Schmidt, 2004). Broadly speaking, there is always some tension between vertical and horizontal integration (Kaina, 2009, p. 409). Horizontal integration portrays the interrelationship between 4 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh elites and the level of cooperation amongst themselves. Vertical Integration, on the other hand, deals with the relations between elites and the masses (Kaina, 2009). As described by Higley and Burton, a horizontally integrated elite structure enhances mutual understanding between elites and presents them with a “common language” established on akin experiences in their socialisation ( Higley and Burton, 2006 as cited in Kaina, 2009, p. 480f). This elite freedom fosters effective political decision-making but may, in the same vein, broaden the gap between political representatives and the electorates. On the other hand, strong vertical integration makes elites more representative and accountable to their electorates but could block political compromises and hamper the decision-making process (Kaina, 2009, p. 480f). For the proper functioning of any democratic system, both dimensions are imperative. On this account, several scholars have advocated for the inclusion of both horizontal and vertical integration in the examination of elite structures and regimes types (Schmidt, 2004; Roustetsaari, 2007). As discussed above, Higley and Burton assert that a consensually united elite is a prerequisite condition for liberal democracy (Higley & Burton, 2006). Even though the authors fail to discuss the meaning of liberal democracy in that book, their application of the concept implies that it is synonymous with “consolidated democracy”, a concept they had used in their previous publication (Higley & Gunter, 1992). Though consolidation is a contested term, it can be inferred as “the process by which democracy becomes the only game in town, a development which cannot be easily reversed” (Przeworski, 1991, p. 26). In Africa, this depicts just a handful of countries (Daloz, 2003, p. 271). Ghana falls within this bracket, not because it records huge scores in the Freedom House index, but the fact that it has 5 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh passed Huntington’s two-turnover test (if two peaceful turnovers occur after the founding elections), which is mostly seen as a benchmark for successful consolidation (Osei, 2014). 1.2 Statement of the Research Problem It has been argued that the Ghanaian democratic scene in the fourth republic exemplifies a commendable model with regards to the role of elite consensus towards democratic consolidation and national development (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Throup, 2011; Whitfield, 2009; Gyamfi- Boadi, 2009). Ghana’s present democratic dispensation is a case in point. Ever since the inception of the fourth republic, Ghana has had seven peaceful and successive electoral cycles, deemed one of the best in Africa (Frempong, 2017). Also, the practice of not only an active multiparty system, but the three turnovers and peaceful alternations of power between the two dominant parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) is one to savour (Graham, Gyampo, Pamphilious, & Yobo, 2017). In addition, Ghana’s three turnovers of power in the fourth republic, even surpasses Huntington’s (1991) two-turnover test, which says that consolidation of democracy occurs if “the party or group that takes power in the initial election and at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election”. It is, therefore, not surprising that Ghana has been adjudged the fifth most democratic country in Africa (Gwaambuka, 2018 ). Moreover, elite consensus in Ghana is said to be one which transcends the period before, during and the aftermath of elections (Frempong, 2017). Generally speaking, election outcomes in Africa are mostly open to heated conflicts between winners and losers with some popular examples of violent post-electoral crisis including, Cote d’Ivoire in 2001 and Kenya in 2007 6 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh (Osei, 2014). However, not all politicians are “dying to win” as Mueller (2011) reveals. The aftermath of the 1992 and 2012 presidential elections in Ghana was evidence of such a claim, particularly with that of the 2012 presidential election where the losing party, the NPP, used the constitution by petitioning the Supreme Court when it felt the election was rigged (Frempong, 2017). Even when the Supreme Court ruled against the NPP, the flag bearer, Akufo-Addo, quickly accepted defeat though he disagreed. This “reflects the mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules of the electoral game” as Frempong puts it (2017, p. 267). More so, scholars like Anja Osei believes Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ghana have developed a high level of trust amongst each other and thus are consensually united (Osei, 2015). This, to her, not only supports Higley and Burton’s claim that elite integration is conducive to stable democracies but also braces the idea of the actor-centric model of democracy (Osei, 2015). This again goes further to prove a high depth of horizontal elite integration as described by Higley and Burton (2006). Having said that, some scholars have criticised the notion that the Ghanaian situation epitomizes elite consensus and democratic consolidation. To them, there is a lack of effective representation of the people in the form of vertical integration as described by Higley and Burton which has adversely affected national development (Gyampo, 2017). There is a poor connection between the interests of constituents and the decisions taken by their legislators on their behalf (Gyampo, 2017). This situation has been attributed to the high level of partisanship in Ghana’s legislature. Also, democratic consolidation and national development are said to be highly threatened by “Winner takes all Politics” which annuls the claim of elite consensus, according to many scholars (Gyampo, 2015). It destroys forged cohesion for Ghana’s development with “its dangers such as the conferment of excessive powers on the president, marginalization of 7 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh perceived political opponents and the feeling of exclusion from the governance process by those who do not belong to the ruling government” (Gyampo, 2015, p. 2). Effects of this phenomenon have been the lack of policy continuity by subsequent governments and the ineffectiveness of national development planning. On top of that, adversary politics, in the view of many, nullifies the assertion of elite consensus and erodes Ghana’s democratic foundation as it undermines the country’s envious electoral successes (Gyampo, Graham, & Asare, 2017). Political parties are said to be preaching violence during election periods, do not mostly adhere to the code of conduct developed through consensus building and even go further to employ the use of vigilante groups in afflicting fear and panic in rival parties (Gyampo, Graham & Aasre, 2017). Gyampo, Graham and Asare affirm that “these acts have fuelled polarization in Ghana’s body politic and undermined the nation’s drive towards democratic maturity” (2017, p. 112). In light of these arguments made above, this research seeks to investigate the presence or otherwise of elite consensus (horizontal integration) in Ghana and to understand how it has affected the consolidation of democracy and national development (vertical integration). 1.3 Research Questions 1. What is elite consensus? 2. What is the connection between elite consensus and democratic development? 3. Does Ghana have elite consensus? 4. How have elite interactions affected democracy (horizontal elite integration) and national development (vertical elite integration) in Ghana? 8 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1.4 Research Objectives 1. To understand what elite consensus entails. 2. To find out the connection between elite consensus and democratic development. 3. To find out if Ghana has elite consensus. 4. To ascertain how elite interactions have affected democracy (horizontal elite integration) and national development (vertical elite integration) in Ghana. 1.5 Scope of the Study This study seeks to address the issue of elite interactions towards national development in Africa. The research is a case study of Ghana and specifically covers Ghana’s fourth republic (1992- date). It focuses on political elites operating at various levels of political life. These include political elites operating at the levels of political parties, elections, the legislature and national development planning. 1.6 Hypothesis Ghana lacks an enduring elite consensus which has negatively affected national development. 1.7 Rationale of the Study It is expressed that “consensually united elite” settlements are extremely rare and as such limit the likelihood for the spread of liberal democracy worldwide (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 4). Ghana, however, one of the most democratic countries in Africa, could symbolise one of these 9 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh rare cases. Though Ghana has encountered a rapid succession of different civilian and military regimes from its independence until the inception of the fourth republic in 1992, it is today, one of the most democratic countries in Africa. The positive role played by domestic elite consensus in the transition process has been emphasised by many scholars (Whitfield, 2009; Svanikier, 2007; Frempong, 2007b) and thus, presents itself as a perfect case study for this research. This study is to add to the existing literature on elite consensus in the democratization process and national development in Africa. The rationale of this study is to broaden the discussion by paying more attention to the various compositions of political elites, their interactions amongst each other and its dividends on national development, using Ghana as a case study. It goes further to understand the benchmarks of political elite consensus and its effects on socio- economic and political development. However, unlike other literature, comprehensive research is conducted on a broader scope of elite consensus which encompasses political parties, elections, parliamentarians and national development planning in Ghana. 1.8 Theoretical Framework 1.8.1 Political Pluralism Political pluralism constitutes the theoretical framework for the study. Robert A. Dahl and Otto Friedrich von Gierke are the main proponents of this theory. According to Robert A. Dahl, in his best-known work, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (1961), political power in the United States is pluralistic (Munro, 2018). To him, pluralism means that a group of like-minded individuals, not the people as a whole, govern the United States. These organizations which include among others, unions, trade and 10 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh professional associations, civil rights activists, environmentalists, business and financial lobbies and informal coalitions of like-minded citizens, influence the making and administration of laws and policy (Udel.edu, 2010). Here, participants in this process constitute only a tiny fraction of the populace and the public acts as bystanders. Otto Friedrich von Gierke, a German legal philosopher and an early proponent of political pluralism, emphasized the voluntary nature of some associations which have a considerable effect on pluralist theory. This is especially true in Great Britain, where Gierke’s increasing desire for national unity was overlooked (Liesangthem, 2019). He believed that the ideal state was a synthesis of cooperative associations and groups subordinated to an individual imperious will. Other scholars like Drah, see tolerance of diverse opinions and political compromise as integral within the scope of pluralist democracy (1993). To him, the pluralist model is more easily able to promote and better help to sustain democracy. Pluralist theory is both descriptive and prescriptive. It is descriptive, in the sense that it tries to explain politics within a democratic state and prescriptive because it presents a model on how a liberal democratic state should operate. 1.8.2 Norms of Pluralist Politics For pluralists, a democratic state is not solely controlled by a single group but by multiple groups (political parties) (David, 2006). Although some groups are larger, well organized and more influential than others, the ambit of their power is commonly bounded relatively to narrow interests (Socialstudieshelp.com, 2012). Pluralism invokes the independence of various groups in the political arena and as such provides a confined structure for them to conduct themselves appropriately in the political system. Due to the diversity of interests and autonomy of groups, 11 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh political parties always demand a level playing field. It is, therefore, when these rules of engagement are broken that instability is hatched which lead to the breakdown of the system. This instability creates fertile grounds for conflicts which may get very violent if not controlled. It is, therefore, imperative to practice pluralist politics within any state. Also, consensus on the rules of the game is another distinctive feature of pluralism (Socialstudieshelp.com, 2012). In stabilizing democracies, the consensus among groups on the democratic values and principles within the political arena is considered paramount. Plurality encourages civility and stresses the safeguarding of rights such as freedom of organization and expression. As a guiding principle, pluralism ensures the peaceful coexistence of diverse beliefs and interests as well as the use of the principle of good-faith in conducting negotiations. Tolerance, especially in respecting differing views during electoral competitions and subsequent acceptance of electoral results, is inherent to ensure orderly engagement as well as peaceful coexistence amongst groups within a democratic state. In situations where there are disagreements, the law court must be the last adjudicator in resolving the conflict. Individuals, including politicians, must not take the law into their hands since it destabilizes the democratic state. 1.8.3 Criticisms of Political Pluralism There are numerous criticisms against the theory of political pluralism but it will be categorized into two major components: (I) Political pluralism is a faulty description; (II) Political pluralism is a morally bankrupt system. 12 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh With political pluralism as a faulty description, a major critique is the fact that the top layers of society have a distinct advantage (Udel.edu, 2010). E.E Schattscheider, a political scientist, asserts that “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (Udel.edu, 2010). Valuable resources tend to be concentrated in the hands of the rich and already powerful members of society (elites). This leaves those at the bottom with much less to exploit. Thus, political pluralism rather encourages exactly what it preaches against, which is inequality. Success in the political sphere is dependent on mobilizing resources and in this case, a number of groups will always be disadvantaged. On political pluralism as a morally bankrupt system, the system operates best when ordinary citizens govern less. As such, the theory has been referred to as “democratic elitism”. This is a big contradiction, for how can a government of elites, in this situation, be considered democratic? Sceptics believe 90% to 95% of citizens are left on the sidelines as spectators rather than active participants. To them, there are no institutions to encourage public involvement and that, holding leaders accountable is not enough. The people (ordinary citizens) must be encouraged to formulate the policies which the nation will follow. They must learn to take decisions on their own and by so doing, take responsibility for these choices. This, in their view, is the true meaning of democracy. However, with political pluralism, popular participation is limited to the periodic task of choices in elections. To Davis, this particular participation is, at best, a pale and rather pathetic version of the active and responsible participation which was the objective of classical democracy (1964). 13 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1.8.4 Basis for Political Pluralism Within any political dispensation, particularly where democratic rule prevails, there are various interactions amongst groups. In some instances, this interaction bears misunderstandings which must be fixed amicably to ensure no group feels resentment towards the other. Political parties are the basis of any democratic system. An active multiparty system, described by Gyampo and Gans-Lartey, as “the heart and soul of every democracy”, promotes popular participation and competition (2017, p. 1). This is a cardinal feature of democracy. For this reason, not only the existence but also the active participation of political parties are indispensable for a state to be described as democratic. The study, therefore, seeks to apply political pluralism in explaining the importance of such interactions within any political system. 1.9 Literature Review Democracy is not a new concept to Africans and, in practice, it is widely seen as best for citizens since it focuses on them (Giorgis, 2017). However, democracy’s desired effects on national development are fated on the role of elites. Consensus on pertinent issues among elites is not only prerequisite for liberal democracy but by the same vein, the main channel in ensuring development (Higley & Burton, 2006). This research examines the role of elites in the pursuit of democratic consolidation and national development in Africa, Ghana to be specific. Many scholars have written numerous literature on elites, elite consensus, democracy, good governance and effects of these phenomena on Africa’s development. In reviewing these literature, it is important to first understand those related to elite consensus and democracy. John Higley and Michael Burton’s article, “Elite Foundation of Liberal 14 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Democracy” (2006), speaks volumes to that effect. This article starts by laying a bold claim that: “The sine qua non of liberal democracy is a well-articulated, internally accommodative, and relatively secure political elite…No liberal democracy ever emerged without the formation of such elite…” (2006, pp. 1-2). To prove this claim, a very large scope of historical cases are adopted by the authors. It covers revolutionary England and post-Napoleonic Europe en masse to Columbia and Taiwan during the 1980s and 1990s respectively. The theoretical content in chapters one and six alludes to the “consensually unified elite” as a needed condition for a democratic regime to crop up anywhere. To Higley and Burton, elites can choose to make “real and continuing trouble” and as a group, can be either disunited, ideologically united or consensually united based on their structural integration which is related to their collective dynamic density and value consensus degrees (2006, p. 7). This is to say that if elites want liberal democracy, liberal democracy will be practised. This assertion is very true but a major problem here is the question of legitimacy which Higley and Burton did not touch on (Kamis, 2008). Elites and non-elites are interrelated in the sense that the rule of elites must be accepted by non-elites for it to be effective. Where their rule is not respected, even with a consensually unified elite, the practice of liberal democracy will be deficient. Nonetheless, with relation to this research which is against the backdrop of African governance, a consensually united elite will surely ensure liberal democracy, as explained by Higley and Burton. This is because many countries in Africa including Ghana, practise democracy and believe in the legitimacy of a democratic government. As such, the substantial efforts for the effectiveness of the development agenda in Africa lies with the actions taken by elites. Political elites are therefore expected to follow the rules of governance enshrined in their respective constitutions and eschew any act which defeats the purposes of constitutionalism and 15 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh democratic governance. This is well explained in the book, “Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State”, edited by Boni Yao Gebe. Chapter one of this book which is Vladimir Antwi-Danso’s piece on “Democracy and Good Governance: A Sine-Qua-Non to Political Stability and Socio-Economic Development in Africa”, provides a conceptual point of view on good governance and democracy, their impact on development and how it is applied by African countries (2015). Here, he asserts that Africa’s greatest needs are ‘democracy’, ‘stability’ and ‘development’ (2015, p. 2). However, on this account, Africa’s quest for stability has been ‘tortuous’ because democracy and good governance has been elusive where governance is at best ‘neo-patrimonial’ and at worst ‘predatory’ (2015, p. 2). To him, bad leadership by African leaders coupled with the prescribed one-size-fits-all model of democracy has been Africa’s downfall. Democracy must allow inclusiveness and participation, so he advocates constitutionalism and institutionalism as integral in ensuring ‘equity’, ‘probity’ and ‘accountability’ (2015, p. 18). Moreover, Boni Yao Gebe’s chapter on “Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: towards Enforcement of Policy Instruments”, in the same book, further fortifies Vladimir Antwi-Danso’s point (2015). He defines the concept of constitutionalism as “the idea that a political system or government is placed under certain limitations and the power at the disposal of such authority is legally defined” (2015, p. 24). He argues that post-independent Africa has been a great failure in the ‘adoption’ and ‘adaption’ of constitutionalism, pluralism and democratic governance though the various “democratic waves” have highly benefitted this continent (2015, p. 55). He then scrutinises the existing regional policy instruments and protocols of the African Union, suggesting ways to extract their strengths for political development. Gebe ends by admonishing the African Union to be more ‘committed’ and ‘resolute’ in propagating 16 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the cause of political development in Africa, else these policies shall still remain dormant (2015, p. 55). The works of Vladimir Antwi-Danso and Boni Yao Gebe are very relevant to this research since they marry the idea of good governance and development together. They explain why there must be limits to the authority of incumbent governments in order to eradicate marginalization and provide breeding grounds for consensus-building and subsequent development. Narrowing the literature to Ghana is Ken Ahorsu’s chapter on “Multi-Party Democracy and Conflict Management in Africa: The Case of Ghana” from the same book (2015). This particular work interests this research a lot since the premise made by Ahorsu backed with facts expands on the keen relationship between multiparty democracy, power politics, elections and conflicts in Africa. Conflicts have always been the by-product between the synergy of the first three (multiparty democracy, power politics and elections) in Africa as indicated by him. However, Ghana’s electoral processes, like that of a select few in Africa, have deviated from that norm. This, he credits to Ghana’s pluralistic tendency under the fourth republic, thanks to its constitution in which conflict management is well entrenched (2015, p. 87). This sides with the theme, elite consensus as investigated in this research. Even so, outside the domain of electoral processes, he identifies concerns like corruption, the polarisation of national issues along party lines, the politicization of issues and ethnocentrism as a major dent on Ghana’s democratic consolidation. These conflicting notions make it difficult for one to earnestly conclude whether Ghana practises elite consensus or not since agreeing on pertinent issues transcends the scope of elections to that of the economic, religious, ethnic and cultural issues. This belief is also held by Ahorsu in his chapter where he states that for Ghana to safeguard its contemporary democratic 17 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh dispensation, it needs to “improve upon the wider socio-economic and socio-cultural difficulties in which political pluralism is embedded” (2015, p. 88). Furthermore, Alex Frempong’s work, “Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal State”, in the book, “Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State”, edited by Kwame Boafo-Arthur, gives an interesting twist to this subject-matter (2007b). It provides an in-depth analysis of the role of elites in Ghana’s first decade of the fourth republic (1993-2003). His findings prove that the first decade of the liberal democratic experiment had its ups and downs. Some of such downs are what he refers to as the “rubber-stamping of government policies” which are not in the public interest and the negative effects posed by parliament’s subservience to the executive (2007b, p. 162). In this respect, he describes the persistent, uncompromising and indiscriminate application of parliamentary majority as “inherently confrontational and not consensual” (2007b, p. 133). He ends by giving three (3) conclusions which form the basis of this research. The first is that there are no quick fixes in transforming institutions and norms of an authoritarian regime to that of democratic norms and structure as it takes several years to accomplish that. Secondly, the elite consensus on the rules of the game is important for democratic development. Notwithstanding, a flawed transition could still take a huge leap to democratic success if political elites subsequently agree on the basic rules. Lastly, he holds the belief that peaceful democratic transition is possible in Africa (2007b, pp. 162-163). The most intriguing aspect of this piece is how he relates the benchmarks of elite consensus, based on the inevitability of conflict in any society, to the institutions, eras of the two presidents as well as various elections held and its aftermath in Ghana’s first decade of the fourth republic. This piece is relevant to this research because it is an objective study which draws conclusions from not only electoral processes but a larger scope including roles played by the legislature and executive. 18 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Some years later, Alex Frempong, in his book, “Elections in Ghana (1951-2016)”, continues by accounting for the progress made by Ghana in its elections before and after independence to the latest presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2016 (2017). For the purposes of the scope of this study which is the fourth republic, elections held from 1992 to 2016 are considered. During that timeline, there have been seven (7) presidential and parliamentary elections which he considers as very successful. This reiterates Ahorsu’s point of Ghana’s electoral success, pluralist tendencies and elite consensus. Frempong attributes Ghana’s electoral success to several factors. In this book, he identifies the constitution, institutions of governance, inter-party consensus building, ethno-regional structure, the party system: two-party with active third parties, uncertainty of elections, turnovers, winners’ attitude, losers’ reaction and resilience, civil society, history of elections, the Ghanaian spirit and international support as the primal factors for Ghana’s electoral progress since the beginning of fourth republic (2017, pp. 431-437). Another scholar whose empirical materials corroborates some findings of scholars like Alex Frempong and Ken Ahorsu, who argues that change in elite behaviour has accounted for Ghana’s democratic success, is Anja Osei, in her work, “Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach” (2015). She uses social network analysis in testing the main claim of Higley/Burton’s theory which states that “liberal democracy is impossible without a consensually united elite” with Members of Parliament (MPs) elected to Ghana’s legislature in 2012. In her piece, empirical evidence shows that MPs in Ghana form “a dense and strongly connected network” bridging party and ethnic divides (2015, p. 552); also, MPs from different parties have developed a certain level of trust for one another. These findings, to her, not only proves there is elite consensus in Ghana but validates Higley & Burton’s claim that democracy can occur in any setting. This proposition made by Osei is very vital to this research since it 19 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh opens a new dimension to the study of elite consensus in Ghana, one which moves from elections to the legislative arm of government. Be that as it may, it could be said that the yardstick she uses in measuring elite consensus amongst MPs in Ghana, though tangible, is not substantive enough to draw any valid conclusions from. She fails to take into account, recurring trends practised in Ghana’s legislature, like those pointed out by Ahorsu and Frempong which includes polarisation of national issues along party lines and the uncompromising application of parliamentary majority. This again raises the question of elite consensus in Ghana. As such, many scholars in their literature have been highly critical of Ghana’s supposed democratic success and consensus amongst elites. Ransford Gyampo and Franklin Obeng- Odoom are popular critics. “Dealing with Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case of National Development Planning”, a piece written by Ransford Gyampo, examines the recent practice of development planning which is associated with limited participation and policy discontinuity (2016a). He blames this on the marginalization effects of “Winner-Takes-All” politics. This work is hinged on the National Development Plan (NDP) recommended by the Constitution Review Committee (CRC) in 2011 as a vital addition to the constitution but was later rejected by the government. The plan spells out the role and participation of all stakeholders as well as incite public interest in the planning process. According to Gyampo, when entrenched in the constitution, it makes it binding on all successive governments which will lead to policy continuity, inclusiveness and a rapid increase in the rate of economic transformation. However, the government’s refusal is mainly because it reduces their power to sabotage the policies of previous governments to score political points, as explained by Gyampo. This particular piece provides this research with an insight into a specific case study, explaining the effects of disunited elites in relation to national development in Ghana. 20 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Finally, in another series of his “Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana”, Gyampo looks at: “The Case for an Effective Council of State” (2015). This particular work looks at the excessive powers conferred on the president and the perceived marginalization of political opponents by reviewing the performance of Ghana’s current Council of State. He opines that the Council of State has been highly ineffective in bridling the powers of the executive and checking Winner- Takes-All politics. In buttressing this point, he refers to the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) - Winner Takes All (WTA) public consultations held in 2014, where a cross-section of the public describes the Council as ‘superfluous’, “toothless bulldog”, ‘unnecessary’, “too much attached to the president” and “not capable of giving independent or meaningful advice” (2015, p. 21). As far as this research is concerned, Gyampo’s piece expands the horizon to which “Winner-Takes- All” politics has engulfed Ghana’s public institutions, especially those created for the sole purpose of serving as a check to that effect. 1.10 Clarification of Key Concepts Some of the key concepts include: • Elites: Elites may be defined as persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially. In every society, there are political, business, military, religious and traditional elites (Higley & Burton, 1987). • Elite consensus: Elite consensus is the situation where elites agree on the rule of the game (agree to disagree) through the political culture of dialogue, bargaining, 21 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh compromising, accommodation and constitutionalism (Higley & Burton, 2006). • Democracy: Democracy may be defined as a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections (Dahlberg, Axelsson, & Holmberg, 2017). • Liberal democracy: it is a democracy based on the recognition of individual rights and freedoms, in which decisions from direct or representative processes prevail in many policy areas (Chan, 2002). • Democratic consolidation: Democratic consolidation is a process whose effect is the maturity of the democracy and very little possibility of an authoritarian regime. It includes the maturity of both democratic institutions and society (IGI Global, 2011). • National development: National development is the ability of a country or countries to improve the political as well as social welfare of the people such as the creation of job opportunities, safeguarding the rights of the citizenry and providing social amenities like quality education, infrastructure, electricity, potable water amongst others (Alolor, 2015). 22 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1.11 Sources of Data To achieve the objectives of the study, this research draws on a range of sources. Primary and Secondary sources of data are used. On understanding elite consensus and its connection with democratic development (objectives one and two), secondary sources of data are employed. These are historic narratives extracted from previously published scholarly work. These include books, peer-reviewed journal articles from the University of Ghana (UG) Balme Library and Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) Library as well as internet sources. On finding out if Ghana has elite consensus and ascertaining how these interactions have affected democratic governance and national development (Objectives three and four), both primary and secondary sources of data are employed. Primary sources cover raw data collected from the population interviewed. In order to enhance the findings, materials from expert interviews are used. This study adopts self-perceptions expressed in qualitative, in-depth interviews with a limited number of political party executives, members of parliament (MPs) serving in Ghana’s current legislature (2017-date), senior civil servants at parliament, Officials at the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and some think-tanks in the field of governance and leadership. These think-tank respondents are from the University of Ghana (LECIAD and the Department of Political Science), Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES Ghana) and Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana). The names and positions of the respondents are withheld due to ethical consideration. The interview guides are divided into four appendixes. Appendix 1, contains a more general outlook to the study with sections encompassing elite consensus on elections, amongst political 23 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh parties as well as parliamentarians and national development planning. This guide is shared with four (4) think-tanks; two from the University of Ghana and one from the FES Ghana and the CDD-Ghana each. Appendix 2, contains elite consensus amongst political parties and is shared between three (3) political party executives; each from the NPP, the NDC and the CPP. Appendix 3, on the other hand, is on elite consensus amongst parliamentarians and is shared to ten (10) parliamentarians from Ghana’s current legislature in the fourth republic. These parliamentarians are from the main political parties, the NPP and the NDC, with five (5) respondents from each side. Three (3) of the MPs interviewed doubles as Ministers of state. Also, two (2) other senior civil servants working at the parliament are included in this section. Appendix 4, which contains questions on the effectiveness of national development planning in Ghana and the role played by political elites in that respect, are directed to two (2) Officials from the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) of Ghana. In all, this study engages twenty-one (21) respondents. The study sees the twenty-one (21) respondents acquired as enough basis to draw well-informed conclusions on the said objectives. Secondary data used in this section include books, peer-reviewed journal articles, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana as well as reports from institutions such as CDD Ghana, Institute for Economic Affairs – Ghana (IEA-Ghana), FES Ghana and Commonwealth Observer Group. Some dissertations and theses from LECIAD as well as the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana are also consulted for the study. 24 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1.12 Research Methodology As a case study of Ghana, it is purely qualitative where both primary and secondary data are consulted. Qualitative research methodology has numerous techniques including structured, unstructured and semi-structured interviews as well as focus group discussions among others. Qualitative research methodology is the direct opposite of quantitative research methodology which employs the collection and interpretation of data using numbers or figures. It covers a wider scope of respondents and thus, can establish the basis for generalizations. The data used in quantitative research is derived from statistical findings which go to reaffirm its relevance. However, in measuring attitude and behaviour, the use of quantitative methodology is inappropriate. This is because these variables cannot be conveyed in terms of figures and also due to the fact that they can change at any given point in time under diverse circumstances. As defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990), qualitative research methodology is a type of research method that generates results not established by virtue of statistics or any other kind of quantification. They propose that a qualitative research study involves the analysis of non- mathematical deliberative procedures inferred from findings acquired from the data gathered. Qualitative research was found fitting for the study since the aim of the research is to examine interactions between elites towards national development in Ghana. This methodology proves useful to the study since it gives comprehensive details on how actions occurred in the past, occurs presently and will occur in the future as well as why it occurred, occurs and will occur. The researcher undertakes a semi-structured interview to seek expert opinions in the various fields under consideration. Data from the interviews are transcribed and analysed using content analysis. Content analysis is used for all data collected in the study. The study is based on 25 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh deductive research. Major themes are established on the basis of the responses given by research participants which are later grouped under operational benchmarks derived by the researcher. This offers a vivid depiction of all findings. Purposive sampling is utilized, with the study group comprising of political elites as well as institutions and personalities associated with the business of governance, leadership and development. 1.13 Limitations of the Study Though successfully completed, the study encountered a number of limitations. First, some MPs were reluctant to participate in the study due to an exposé recently released by the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana which to them brought their credibility to disrepute. Also, it was very difficult accessing political party executives at the time of the study as the limited voter registration exercise was also ongoing during that time. More so, the location to offices of some targeted institutions for the study was very problematic. Others, on the other hand, received the introductory letter sent by the researcher but never gave feedback. 1.14 Organization of the Study This work is organized into four main chapters: Chapter One constitutes the introduction; Chapter Two provides an overview of elite consensus and democratic governance in Ghana; Chapter Three examines elite consensus and national development in Ghana; Chapter Four consists of the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations. 26 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh References Abdulai, A., & Crawford, G. (2010). Consolidating Democracy in Ghana: Progress and Prospects? Democratization, 17(1), 26-67. Ahorsu, K. (2015). Multi-Party Democracy and Conflict Management: The Case of Ghana. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 57- 92). Accra: Black Mask. Alolor, R. (2015). LinkedIn SlideShare. 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Chan, S. (2002). Liberalism, Democracy and Development. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. Dahlberg, S., Axelsson, S., & Holmberg, S. (2017). The Meaning of Democracy. Retrieved May 22, 2019, from University of Gothenburg: https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssests/1672/1672839_2017_16_dahlberg_axelsson_holmber g.pdf Daloz, J. (2003). "Big Men" in sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate Positions and Resources. (M. Dogan, Ed., & E. C. Power, Trans.) Leiden, Boston: BRILL. David, H. (2006). Models of Democracy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 27 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Davis, L. (1964, March 17). The Costs of Realism: Contemporary Restatement of Democracy. Western Political Quarterly, 43. Drah, F. (1993). Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Accra: Woeli Publishing Services. Engelstad, F. (2010). Democratic Elitism: Conflict and Consensus. (H. Best, & J. Higley, Eds.) Massachusetts: Brill, Leiden and Boston. Field, G., & Higley, J. (1980). Elitism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Frempong, A.K.D. (2007b). Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal state. In K. Boafo-Arthur (Ed.), Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State (pp. 128-163). Dakar: Codesria Books. Frempong, A.K.D. (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951-2016). Accra, Ghana: Digibooks Ghana Ltd. Gebe, B. Y. (2015). Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: Toward Enforcement of Policy Instruments. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 23-56). Accra: Black Mask. Graham, E., Gyampo, R., Pamphilious, F., & Yobo, E. (2017). The Third Peaceful Transfer of Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, 10(5). Gwaambuka, T. (2018). The African Exponent. Retrieved December 27, 2018, from https://www.africanexponent.com/post/8848-african-democracy-stagnant-and-uninspiring Gyamfi-Boadi, E. (2009). Another Step Forward for Ghana. Journal of Democracy, 20(2), 138- 152. Gyampo, R., & Gans-Lartey, E. (2018). Assessing Internal Party Democracy in Africa. Retrieved 2019 March, from Research Gate Web site: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford_Gyampo/publication/326422749_ASSESSING_I NTERNAL_PARTY_DEMOCRACY_IN_AFRICA/links/5b4c948545851519b4c10f58/ASSES SING-INTERNAL-PARTY-DEMOCRACY-IN-AFRICA?origin=publication_detail Gyampo, R. (2015). Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case for Effective Council of State. Journal of Politics and Governance, 4(1-4), 17-24. Gyampo, R. (2016a). Dealing with Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case of National Development Planning. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA Ghana). Gyampo, R. (2017). Assessing the Quality of Parliamentary Representation in Ghana. African Review, 44, 69. 28 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Gyampo, R., Graham, E., & Asare, B. (2017). Political Vigilantism and Democratic Governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic. African Review, 112-135. Higley, J., & Burton, M. (1989). The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns. American Sociological Review, 54(1), 17-32. Higley, J., & Burton, M. (2006). Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Higley, J., & et al. (1991). Elite Integration in Stable Democracies: A Reconsideration . European Sociological Review , 7(1), 35-53. Higley, J., & Gunter, R. (1992). Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (1986). Eliten and Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik. (M. Kaase, Ed.) Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (1992). Eliten, Macht und Konflikt in der Bundesrepublik . Opladen: Leske + Budrich . Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. IGI Global. (2011). Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/chile- under-the-government-of-sebastin-piera/41255 Kaina, V. (2009). Eliteforschung. (V. Kaina, & A. Rommele, Eds.) Ein Studienbuch, Wiesbaden : VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften. Kamis, B. (2008, April 1). Book Review: John Higley and Michael Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 229 pp.): G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order & Imperial Ambition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, 300 pp.). Steven Slaughter, Liberty beyond Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalising Age ( Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 257 pp.). Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 36(2), 386-390. Kooijmans, E. (2018, March 21). Is Democracy the Best Form of Governance? Retrieved March 5, 2019, from New College of Humanities: https://www.nchlondon.ac.uk/2018/03/21/democracy-best-form-government/ Mueller, S. (2011). Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence and Institutional Decay in Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Affairs, 29(1), 99-117. 29 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Munro, A. (2018, December 13). Robert A. Dahl. (i. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Producer) Retrieved January 9, 2019, from Encyclopaedia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-A-Dahl#ref1178987 Osei, A. (2015). Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach. African Affairs(114/457), 529-554. Osei, A. (2014). From Conflict to Consensus? Elite Integration and Democracy in Ghana. Comparative Sociology, 13(4), 503-530. Parry, G. (1969). Political Elite. London: George, Allen and Unwin Ltd. Pearson Higher Education. (2010, January 10). Democracy and American Politics. Retrieved February 16, 2019, from Pearson Higher Education: https://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/samplechapter/0/2/0/5/0205771297.pdf Putnam, R. (1976). The comparative study of political elites. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roustetsaari, I. (2007). Nordic Elite in Comparative Perspective . Comparative Sociology , 6(1-2), 158-189. Schmidt, C. (2004). Theoretische und Praktische Aspekte der Eliteforschung . Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies, 36(1), 29-43. Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What Democracy Is...and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3), 75-88. Socialstudieshelp.com. (2012). Retrieved January 1, 2019, from www.socialstudieshelp.com/APGOV_pluralism.htm Svanikier, J. (2007). Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership Diversity and Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana. Comparative Sociology, 6(1-2), 112-135. Tanzi, V. (1997, September). The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: A Historical Perspective. IMF Working Paper, 1-28. Throup, D. (2011). Assessing Risks to Stability. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Udel.edu. (2010). Critique of Pluralism.Retrieved January 1, 2019, from https://www1.udel.edu/htr/Psc105/Texts/critique.html 30 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Udel.edu. (2010). Pluralism. Retrieved January 1, 2019, from www1.udel.edu: https://www1.udel.edu/htr/Psc105/Texts/pluralism.html Whitfield, L. (2009). "Change for a Better Ghana": Party Competition, Institutionalization and Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Elections. African Affairs, 108(433), 621-641. 31 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER TWO AN OVERVIEW OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN GHANA 2.0 Introduction This research is deeply rooted in the foundation and principles of elite consensus and its effects on national development in Africa, specifically, Ghana. Per the objectives of this study, ascertaining the entirety of the scope pertaining to elite consensus and its connection with democracy is crucial to the outcome of this research. To delineate the truism or otherwise of elite consensus in Ghana, this chapter provides an overview of elite consensus and its relationship with conflict in any democratic dispensation. In the context of Ghana’s fourth republic, this chapter further provides a historical antecedence of democratic governance in the country as well as the provision of the legal frameworks of some crucial democratic institutions charged with democratic consolidation and development. 2.1 Conceptualisation of Elites Elite theories were basically developed in the field of sociology to rationalize man’s behaviour in a social setting (Bottomore, 1964). However, the elite theory of politics was developed to the calibre of theory in the field of political science by two Italian sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) (Parry, 1969). In the field of politics, the 32 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh significance of the elite theory posed a difficulty in democratic theory, which as a result was revised by numerous scholars (Parry, 1969). The root of elitist doctrine is that existing in several societies may be a minority of the population which takes the main decisions in that society. Considering the fact that decisions made cover such a wide scope affecting the universal aspect of the society, they are often referred to as “political decisions” (Parry, 1969). This is so even where the minorities taking these decisions are not politicians in the general sense of members of a government’s legislature. As such, in broader terms, the elitist theory reckons that every society constitutes two groupings of human beings: a) The elite or the minority within a social collectivity (such as a society, a state, a religious institution, a political party) which exercises a preponderant of influence within the collectivity, and; b) The masses of the majority which is governed by the elite (Parry, 1969). For some, elites are the decision-makers in a society whose power is not subjugated to control by anybody in society (Bottomore, 1964). For others, elites are the sole originator of values in the society or comprise the integrating force in the society without which it may collapse. Elites have been regarded as a major threat to the very survival of democracy (Bottomore, 1964). The existence of elites in society is seen as the very denial of democracy. Elites with phenomenal access to principal positions in society or wielding disproportionate control over crucial and critical policies can understandably seem to be living conflictions to the concept of government by the people (Bottomore, 1964). Notwithstanding, other writers see the elite as the citadel of democracy, protecting it from the menace of totalitarianism. 33 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.2 The Relationship between Elite Theory and The Concept of Liberal Democracy Contemporary elite theorists are more receptive to democracy than their classical counterparts. This may be an act of inevitability rather than rational estimation (Ikpe, 2010, p. 178). It became fashionable for regimes of all shades and colours to insist on acquiring the power to rule from the people, hence the resort to democracy. It is, however, important to note that none of the states that claimed to exercise democracy was able to satisfy the Greek model conceptualization of people’s direct participation in governmental business. Yet, there was the need to sustain elite domination in democracies, especially in the liberal/capitalist states that were encountering the Marxist-socialist challenge with the likelihood (real or imagined) of proletarian revolutions (Ikpe, 2008, pp. 109-110). These new elite theorists define democracy from the minimalist angle, which lays down the criteria of democracy including regular electoral competitions, usually in a multiparty system and thus, governmental succession by constitutional electoral procedures which guarantees the rule of law (Qadir, et al, 1993, p. 416 cited in Ikpe, 2010, p. 178). For instance, the definition of democracy by Joseph Schumpeter, who is largely considered as the father of contemporary democratic elitism, is obviously elitist. For him, democracy is simply a tool for constituting and authorizing governments; neither a type of society nor a set of moral objectives (Schumpeter, 1969). Equivalently, the conceptualization of democracy by Giovanni Satori is to emphasize democracy as a political system in which the impact of the majority is assured through elective and competitive minorities to whom it is entrusted. It is a process in which leaders compete at elections for the authority to govern. Satori argues that democracy, like any other form of 34 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh government, depends on the quality of its leaders. Democrats, as Satori cautions, should acknowledge this fact and safeguard the elite’s leadership of democracies without a sense of guilt (Satori, 1965, pp. 124-127). All the same, Robert Dahl, another popular name within the circles of contemporary elitist theory, detected that the conclusion that elitism directly contradicts democracy is always ineludible, so as such, a direct linkage between elitism and democracy is not only indefensible but also unpalatable. Nonetheless, Dahl posits that practically speaking, democracy is elitist in nature since it is the rule of multiple minorities. Thus, the rule of the elite of numerous groups within society (Dahl, 1963, p. 133). In all, the circumstance of mass participation in democracies seems to be proving elite theories right. Even in nominal and perfunctory undertakings like voting, the masses are still involved less than the elite, not to talk of more deliberative forms of participation like policy formulation. 2.3 An Overview of Elite Consensus It is widely argued that the unity of a state’s elite helps to establish the state’s democratic progress (Gould & Szomolanyi, 1997). Theorists emphasize that a proviso of a stable democracy is that the parameters of a democratic political system are agreed upon by elites. However, in situations where they fail to unite behind the concepts of democratic procedures and norms as the “only game in town”, the feasibility of democratic institutions is jeopardized, creating a case where elites may endeavour to rule by non-democratic means rather than relinquish their claims to power (Gould & Szomolanyi, 1997). According to Burton and Higley, “elites are people who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions and powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national 35 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh political outcomes regularly and substantially” (1987, p. 295). The disproportionate power and influence of elites make them matter most for the consolidation and stability of democracy, not only in their conduct but also in their beliefs. Elite norms and beliefs are often important because, primarily, they are more likely to have detailed systems of political beliefs; more likely to have control over political events and more likely to be directed in their actions by their beliefs. Secondly, elites also play a critical role in framing political culture and in indicating what types of behaviour are proper. More so, elites lead partially by example, good or bad; when they are condescending of the rules and norms of democracy, their followers are more likely to exhibit same (Diamond & Plattner, 1999, p. 66). Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the political culture of accommodation, bargaining and constitutionalism must not be constricted to the elite level; instead, the elites must involve the masses and to lift their political consciousness, advance democratic practices and marshal participation (Diamond & Plattner 1999, p. 20). Elite consensus rates elites by the range to which they share close views and by the extent of access to pivotal decision-making. At the two sides of the coin are “strongly unified elites” and “divided or disunited elites” (Burton & Higley, 1987, p. 9). Strongly unified elites are made distinct, first, by implicitly shared consensus about the codes and rules of political conduct and subdued partisanship; also, by comparatively effective and reliable access to each other and the foremost decision-makers. They see politics as a positive-sum game, which when played by the rules, will bring forth benefits in the long run, even in the midst of problems during elections (Burton & Higley, 1987). The above-elucidated factors are practically absent among weakly unified elites. There is neither a shared understanding of the rules of the game nor a reliable and consistent source to crucial decision-makers. Elites within this particular bracket are either ‘in’ or 36 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ‘out’. To them, politics is a zero-sum game that must generally be ‘waged’ as aggressively and brutally as on the battlegrounds. Between the two divergent views, lies an entire scale of varied motive games and behaviours consisting balance of power, temporary alliances and log-rolling of interests without regard to the rest of society (Gould & Szomolanyi, 1997). Scholars of the New Elite Framework further assert that until an agreement between elites is reached, either by a historic compromise happening once or through gradual change, stable democracy is not likely. Thus, divided elites must struggle over and agree on procedural consensus before a prospective sustainable development can be a reality (Frempong, 2007b). Political opponents under such circumstances, need not necessarily like each other, but there must be tolerance of one another and the general recognition that each has a crucial and legitimate role to play. Civility and tolerance in public debate must be encouraged as part of the ground rules in society. Irrespective of who wins elections in a democratic system, both factions must agree to work together in solving the common problems of the society. The losers of the election must have the reassurance that they will not be assassinated or imprisoned. Rather, there must be an enabling environment for opposition to continue to engage in public life in the understanding that its role is equally important; and that it is devoted to the basic legitimacy of the state and to the democratic process itself (Frempong, 2007b). Higley and Burton hit the bull’s eye when they stressed that “although the groups are forever quarrelling, an operational code of “give to get” eschews mutually destructive struggles” (1998, p. 98). The elite pact, courtesy elite consensus, is prerequisite for the transition from an autocratic regime towards a democratic order. Pacts, as defined by O’Donnell and Schmitter, is “an explicit but not always publicly explicated or justified, an agreement among a select set of actors which 37 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh seek to redefine rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interest of those entering it” (1986, p. 37). An elite pact may arise as a result of a decrease in the ability of the ruling party to control society by force or the widened elite realization that the persistent entrenched stances among the elites serve none of their interest. Most importantly, it attempts to harmonize the core values of contending parties in society. More so, a pact as such may exhibit undemocratic attributes like the provision of amnesty to outgoing/incumbent regime, but at the foundation is a negotiated agreement by core political opponents to abide with the newly designed democratic structure. It is in regard to these that an elite pact epitomizes an important step towards elite consensus. Nonetheless, it does not automatically mean that the actual elite consensus has been accomplished. This is because elites can arrive at a calculated compromise out of mutual self- interest without harmonizing their core values and beliefs. This merely renders pact as temporary tactical agreements among elites. Along these lines, while elite settlements or pacts may bear tacitly contained and definitively restrained practices among contending political elites, they may continue to cling to their most valued beliefs (Higley & Burton 1998, p. 115; O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986, p. 37; Gould & Szomolanyi 1997). The consensus is more than the overall sum of ideas of the individuals in a group. During deliberations, ideas add up on the next, producing new ideas until the best decision surfaces. This effect is called the creative interplay of ideas. Creativity plays a substantive role in the discussion on the best alternative for the group and the more people are committed to this collaborative effort, the more possibilities and ideas are produced. As such, the indiscriminate, uncompromising and persistent exercise of a parliamentary majority that is characteristic of 38 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh many political administrations worldwide impede the growth of elite bond and national development (Frempong, 2007b). The objective has usually been winning the vote, no matter the alternative option that might be in the interest of the larger group; instead of persuasion, it rather resorts to the power of dominion. When the volition of the majority supersedes the interests of the minority, it is fundamentally conflictual. Consensus seeks to take into consideration every disagreement and resolve each of them before a decision is made. More importantly, this practice spurs an atmosphere in which all contributions are valued and everyone is respected. 2.4 The Relationship between Conflict, Consensus and Democracy The main premise of liberal democracy is that: for the management of state affairs, there should be an open and free field for members of society to compete to exercise the power to control and manage the material resources of the state for and on behalf of the entire population, irrespective of race, religion, gender or political conviction (Hagan, 1995, p. 83). Also, all governments rely on a certain blend of coercion and consent but democracies are exclusive with the rate at which their stability is dependent on the consent of bulk of those governed (Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1995, p. 9). Significant to this research, is the fact that democracy has as its key paradox, conflict and consensus. This is exhibited in numerous ways: • While democracy involves a set of rules for regulating conflict, this conflict must be regulated within defined limits and generate compromises, consensus or other concessions that all parties accept as legitimate. An overplay on one side of the equation 39 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh can endanger the whole undertaking. As such, democracy must discover a system to mitigate conflict and rift with consensus (Diamond & Plattner 1999, p. xiii). • Democracy is essentially a system of the institutionalized struggle for power. In the absence of conflict and competition, there is no democracy. However, any society that permits political conflict is likely to become so conflict-inflicted that civil peace and stability can be threatened (Frempong, 2007b). • In between elections, citizens must be able to impact public policy via numerous non- electoral means such as social movements and group associations, which constantly involve competition and cooperation among citizens (Frempong, 2007b, p. 129). • Democracy is characterized by dissent and division but on the grounds of cohesion and consent. It demands that citizens assert themselves, but also accept the authority of the government (Frempong, 2007b, p. 129). • A democratic society is expected to be committed to citizens who accept the unavoidability of conflict as well as the exigency for tolerance. To establish a democratic culture, individuals and groups must be ready, at minimal, to tolerate each other’s differences, acknowledging that the other side has a well-founded right and a legitimate point of view (Frempong, 2007b, p. 129). • More so, coalition building is the basis of democratic actions. It enlightens interest groups to negotiate with others, accommodate, compromise and work within the parameters of the constitution. In so doing, all factions with differences learn how to peacefully argue, how to embark on their goals in a democratic way and climactically how to exist in a diversified world (Frempong, 2007b, p. 129). 40 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh • The recent boom of democratic interest in African governance is stimulated by the acknowledgement that conflict is inevitable and endlessly existent in all societies to some degree; and that democracy acts as a conflict management mechanism in all societies (Ahorsu, 2015, p. 58). The structural elements and their consequences on politics, ambitions of the elite, and the contingencies of political parties in Ghana are as competitive, vibrant and vitriolic as they are in other African countries. Nonetheless, Ghana has fixed its electoral predicament effectively and largely consolidated its democratic dividends (Ahorsu, 2015). 2.5 Politics in Africa Before the Third Wave of Democratization Baker pinpointed seven tactics used by those African leaders who still clung on to political power before the third wave of democratization (1998). Some were successful while others failed in the use of such tactics to hold on to power. These various tactics included buying off the opposition with state resources or luring them into the ruling party. According to Oquaye, this strategy was used by Ghana’s former president, Rawlings to infiltrate the Nkrumahists camp during the 1990s (1995). To him, the Nkrumahists struggled to reorganize themselves majorly because the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) has penetrated their ranks through John Tettegah and Kojo Tsikata by the merciless use of state funds. The second was the containment of the opposition by offering partial concessions to them. This was executed by dividing the ranks of the opposition, including division along the line of ethnicity and their representatives; strife in leadership power and inciting distrust of one group to make a deal with the incumbent. Coercing the opposition using the military and imprisonment of opposition members on the basis of mere accusations (Baker, 1998). 41 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Another tactic used is the forging a stronger support base of the ruling party. This meant establishing an effective party instrument and forging alliances in addition to bringing forth younger persons into the limelight and introducing other ethnic groups into the ruling party. Marshalling one’s own ethnic group was a major gimmick adopted by African leaders to keep them in power. In this respect, there is a form of client-patron relationship where the client’s security is catered for by the patron and the client in return pledges support for the patron (Clapham, 1998). Such a relationship, when needed, is established by the leader with other ethnic groups for their support. In Clapham’s view, this type of relationship is deficient in two respects in that there is an unequal exchange of benefits based on the impartiality of the parties and it may incite ethnic conflict although it can be handled on ethnic to ethnic bases (1998). This tactic may also amount to square pegs in round holes. It was argued out differently by Bernheim. According to him, the client-patron relationship is far better than that of the politician-follower relationship because citizens can be served better by patrons as clients than followers (Burnheim, 1985). In Ghana, this relationship has become constricted to a level where clients or followers hold a lot of power in deciding who is to fill the position of a District Chief Executive (Aidoo, 2008). Some leaders also intentionally manipulate ethnicity so as to parade multi-party politics as divisive which can generate instability (Baker, 1998). Others manipulate the rules associated with multiparty politics. This could result from the intentional procrastination in legitimatizing and registering opposition parties so that they have very insufficient or no time to coordinate and partake in the political process. Cameroon’s president, Paul Biya, was successful in standardizing a one-round election to establish the winner in the presidential elections (Baker, 42 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1998). He also formulated a law which forbade political party coalition knowing a little could be a threat to his reign. More so, Ghana’s Rawlings lifted the ban on party politics just four months to elections whereas, in Burkina Faso, it was only five months. Although they cannot be said to be fully democratic, the few countries that held multi-party elections before 1990 were Zimbabwe, Comoros Islands, Angola, Mauritius, Botswana, Gambia and Senegal (Baker, 1998). 2.6 The Ghanaian Context There are several accounts for the liberalization of the political space in Ghana. All the same, it has been argued that the frame and momentum of Ghana’s transition have been guided by domestic and international factors (Boafo-Arthur, 1991). The journey of Ghana’s strife towards the institutionalization of democratic rule begun in the year 1988 when the PNDC government conducted district assembly elections. However, the year 1990 could be labelled as the turning point in Ghana’s transition process (Aidoo, 2008). It was at this time that opposition contingents began to lump pressure on the regime to return the country to constitutional rule. It is worth noting that the actual transition was dependent on the disposition of Rawlings. When Rawlings seized power, rises in oil price on the international market caused a severe blow on the economy of developing countries, including Ghana. Numerous attempts to revive the economy during the early days of the regime fell short, forcing the PNDC to accept the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The achievements of these measures expedited the lifting of the economy from its plight. The economy, it must be noted, was in a perilous state and the embracement of such 43 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh initiative and demands which were subsequently made on the government to better the wellbeing of the citizens triggered the movement for democracy (Aidoo, 2008). When the PNDC came into the picture, non-democratic processes and features were not new to Ghana’s post-colonial politics. However, they became systematic and pronounced during the era of the PNDC (Oquaye, 1993). There was a perpetual disregard for due process, detention without trials, arbitrary arrests and post-factum decrees were used to subdue political opponents. The middle class and the opposition felt resentment for the authoritarian style of leadership of the PNDC which handicapped civil liberties. Boafo-Arthur has contended that there were “feeble but persistent calls…to return the country to constitutional rule” (1991). These efforts, however, “were not backed by any sustained public agitations strong enough to compel the PNDC government to concede” (Boafo-Arthur, 1991). The broadcast and print media which were to be the opposition’s mouthpiece were bowdlerized. The media, pro-democratic groups and civil society organizations including political parties were silenced through legislative and other illegal means. 2.7 The Transition Process and the Movement towards Democratic Rule The transition to democratic rule in 1992, is Ghana’s third in the string of transitions from military rule in history. It first occurred in 1969 when the National Liberation Council (NLC) relinquished power to the Progress Party (PP) after winning elections held in that year. The second was from the Armed Forces Revolution Council (AFRC) to Dr Hilla Liman upon the latter’s victory in the 1979 general elections and the third was from Rawlings’ Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) to the National Democratic Congress (NDC) led by Rawlings (Bluwey, 1998). 44 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh As argued by Bluwey, Rawlings was an “unwilling convert” to democracy, who was not prepared to surrender power to a civilian government (1998). He pinned Rawlings’ change of mind to surrender power to a civilian regime on changes in the international political economy. That, along with harsh economic conditions prevailing in the country, forced Rawlings’ hand to convert to democratic rule. Although Rawlings was reluctant to return the country to democratic rule, he initiated certain actions in the early years of his military regime that implied that he would return the country to democratic rule “within the shortest possible time” (Bluwey, 1998). 2.8 Political Parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic 2.8.1 The Regulatory Framework of Party Politics in the Fourth Republic Based on the democratic status of a country, there are different laws regulating the activities of political parties (Karvonen, 2007). Likewise, laws in Ghana overseeing the conduct of political parties during the rule of the PNDC government were halted resulting in the inhibition on the freedom to form political parties. Political parties and their activities were rejuvenated after the approval of the 1992 Constitution which provided the rules guiding them and their operations in Article 55 (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Electoral laws as well had a correlation with the key conditions for the activities of parties and the conduct of politicians in the political domain (Grofman & Lijphart, 1986 cited in Karvonen, 2007). It is in the event of competitive elections that the operations of political parties and politicians are brought to bear on the political procedure. 45 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The 1992 Constitution was to come into force from the day that the referendum was undertaken. Therefore, the determination of party rules and regulations along with its implementation was left in the hands of the PNDC government. As reported by Arnon, states that have party laws had in the past experienced a breakdown of their democratic system (1995). Ghana encountered the abatement of its constitution in 1960, 1969 and 1979. According to Arnon, a political party law is therefore inherent to guarantee free association of political parties (1995). At the same time, it provides the state with the ability to ban parties whose operations might endanger the stability of the democratic state. In Ghana, the principal laws guiding the activities of political parties and party politics are Article 55 and 56 of the 1992 Republican Constitution, the PNDCL 281 of 1992 (amended in 2000), the Representation of the People Law (PNDCL 284) of 1992 (amended in 2000), the Public Elections Regulations (C.I. 15) of 1996, the Political Parties Law of 2000 (Act 574) and the Political Parties Code Conduct of 2000 (amended in 2004). The aim of the code is to direct political parties in their day to day operations, particularly during election campaign periods (International IDEA, 2007). Article 3(1) of the 1992 Constitution prohibits Parliament from enacting a law proclaiming a one-party state, by that, bolstering Article 55 which afforded the state with the foundation for instituting multi-party democracy (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). This was to forestall a particular party from taking advantage of its majority in parliament to establish a one-party structure. This is hinged on the lessons from Nkrumah’s use of the legislature to pass laws making Ghana a one-party state. In such a case, parliament had developed into a rubber stamp and sheer annexe of the Convention Peoples Party’s desire to hold onto political power. The 1992 constitution, also outlawed the overthrow of a democratically elected government in Article 55(2&3) (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). 46 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.8.2 Formation and Activities of Political Parties In Ghana, the creation of a political party is exclusive to every Ghanaian wielding the franchise to vote in national elections as stipulated in Article 55(1&2) (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Article 55 of the Constitution articulates the provisions for registering a political party. There are stipulated criteria which must be satisfied before the party can commence its operations. Article 55(7) states that the political party should be broad-based and founding members must hail from every district of the country (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). The number of districts in 1992 was 110. Presently, the number is 275 (Districts.ghana-net.com, 2019). Article 55(7b) states that the political party must have branches in each region and be organized in at least two-thirds of the districts (Constitution of Ghana). More so, neither of the party’s name, colour, emblem, motto nor any other symbol should have an ethnic, religious, regional or sectional association as particularized by section 7(c) of Article 55 (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). To forward democracy, the operations of political parties as laid down in Article 55(3) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Political Parties Act 1(3) laid out the key goals of political parties which are: To shape the political will of the people; To annunciate information on political ideas;, To set sail economic and social programmes which are national in character; To sponsor candidates for presidential and parliamentary elections (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). The operations of political parties must not be seen to contradict the constitution of the Republic of Ghana. As such, the Electoral Commission must make certain that the constitution of a party satisfies the initial criteria before it is registered. 47 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.8.3 Legal Requirements for Financing Political Parties in the Fourth Republic In recent times, political party financing has become a controversial issue in Ghanaian politics. Political parties are expected to fund themselves with the capital they raise. Within the legal regulation on party financing, there are no rigorous ways of assessing the source of funding political parties and their activities. Under the constitution, in Article 55(14a), it is required for political parties to declare their assets and revenues and their sources to the Electoral Commission (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). In addition, as stated in Article 55(14b) their audited accounts are expected to be published annually (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). However, political parties for unknown reasons have not fully complied to the above directives. They usually complain of the time constraint in the preparation and integration of such financial statements from constituency accounts into the national ones (Field Interview, 2019). The constitution does not specify any punitive measures for violators of this provision. Yet, section 30(1) of the Political Parties Act 2000, made available a provision for the transgression of any section of the Act. Any violation under this Act is “punishable with a fine not exceeding ten million cedis or a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or both”, ACT 574 Section 30(3) (The Political Parties Law, 2000). 2.8.4 Political Parties Operating in Ghana’s Fourth Republic Currently, Ghana has more than 20 registered political parties, including the 5 most popular parties (Index Mundi, 2018). These five parties are the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), Conventions People’s Party (CPP), the Peoples Progress Party 48 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh (PPP) and the People’s National Convention (PNC). However, the political party landscape in Ghana is dominated by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) on one side and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) on the other (Miessner, 2010). Both parties have a different programmatic orientation with which they place much emphasis on; the NPP sees itself as liberal, while the NDC terms itself as social democratic (Miessner, 2010). Many scholars have stressed the importance of the two core political traditions in the country: the Busia-Danquah tradition and the Nkrumah tradition (Osei, 2015). These political factions were the cause of bitter elite struggles between the 1960s and the 1990s but positioned the foundation for today’s two-party system by framing the political scope into easily recognisable blocs. The NDC identifies itself with the Nkrumah tradition because of its socialist ideals whiles the NPP labels itself as the descendant of the Busia-Danquah tradition due to its liberal ideals (Osei, 2015). 2.9 Elections in Ghana 2.9.1 Legal Frameworks: International and Regional Commitments Ghana is a party to all the key regional and international commitments and instruments relating to human rights and the conduct of elections. These include: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981), International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1996), ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance 49 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh (2001), African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007), The Commonwealth Charter (2012) (The Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016). The 1992 Constitution of Ghana guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms, which includes the freedom of expression, assembly, association and participation in elections. The major documents containing the legal and regulatory framework for the conduct of elections are: Constitution of Ghana (1992, as amended by Act 527 of 1996), Representation of the People Act (1992, as amended), Presidential Elections Act (1992, as amended), Electoral Commission Act (1993, as amended), Political Parties Act (2000), Representation of the People (Constituencies) Instrument (2004), Political Parties Code of Conduct (2012), Public Elections Registration of Voters Regulations (CI 91 of 2016), Public Elections Regulations (CI 94 of 2016) (The Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016). 2.9.2 The President and Parliament The President of Ghana is elected into office for a four-year term and can serve a maximum of two terms (Boakye, 2018). The President is elected in a single national constituency on the foundation of a majority system. For the candidate to be elected in the first round, he/she needs to obtain at least 50% - plus 1 of the valid votes cast. Where none obtains such majority, the two leading candidates compete in a run-off election. Whichever candidate bags the most votes in the run-off is the winner. The Parliament of Ghana is made up of 275 members, elected from single-member constituencies under the practice of the first-past-the-post system (The Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016). Likewise, the term of a Parliament is four years. 50 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.9.3 The Electoral Commission of Ghana (EC) The Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act cater to the creation of the EC as an independent body. Article 43(1) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana stipulates that the EC shall be composed of seven members – a Chairperson, two deputy Chairpersons, and four other members (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). The President appoints the chairperson and other members of the EC, on the advice of the Council of State for an undefined timeframe. The major responsibilities of the Electoral Commission are to: compile the register of voters and revise it as at when it may be determined by law; embark on programmes for the expansion of the registration of voters; demarcate the electoral boundaries for local and national government elections; execute and supervise all public elections and referendums; and educate the public on the electoral process and its purpose (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). 2.9.4 Role of the Media The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Article 163, states that “all state-owned media shall afford fair opportunities and facilities for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions” (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Thus, all presidential candidates are entitled to be provided with a fair share of space on state-owned media during the campaign period. The National Media Commission (NMC) is requisitioned by law (Article 55(11)) to advance and ensure the freedom and independence of the media; hold the highest journalistic standards; and, mediate and settle complaints made against or by the press or other mass media (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). 51 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh With the media reporting on election campaigns, there is no election-specific code of conduct for journalists. Nonetheless, the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA) published guidelines encouraging journalists to: conduct themselves to the highest standards; report accurately and without bias, and particularly to ensure that the ruling party of government does not gain unfair access to the media; enable voters to make informed and intelligent choices during elections; check facts meticulously; focus on issues; and, not to compromise their integrity by accepting bribes or other inducements (Atawura, 2017). 2.10 The Legislature in Ghana 2.10.1 Composition of the Parliament in Ghana The legislative arm of government in Ghana passes bills approved by the president to become the laws which safeguard the constitutional rights of citizens (Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2011). Article 93 states that elected body comprises of “no less than 140 members” (Constitution of Ghana, 1992) but currently houses 275 members (Districts.ghana-net.com, 2019). According to Article 94, “a Member of Parliament must be a Ghanaian and must have attained the age of 21 years and be a registered voter” (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Article 94 further demands that “a Member of Parliament must hold current residence in the area he or she represents or has lived in the area for at least 5 to 10 years preceding his or her election”. In addition, all taxes must be paid as stated in Article 97 (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). The Leadership in Parliament includes The Speaker of Parliament, First Speaker of Parliament, Second Speaker of Parliament, Majority Leader, Minority Leader and Committees of Parliament (Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2011). 52 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2.11 Political Successions in the Fourth Republic 2.11.1 Political Succession from 1992 to 2000 The first elections in the fourth republic were undertaken to re-establish democratic rule in the country. The main competitors were the National Democratic Congress (Progressive Alliance) led by Rawlings and the New Patriotic Party with Albert Adu Boahen as their leader. Other political parties in contention were the PNC, led by Hilla Liman, the NIP, represented by Kwabena Darko, as well as the PHP, led by Emmanuel Erskine. Rawlings won the election with a final result of 58.4% votes as against the NPP’s 30.3% votes (Atindow, 2018). The parliamentary election was held on 29th December 1992 with a total voter turn-out of 28.1%. The NPP boycotted the election with only the NDC, the National Convention Party and Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere, including independent candidates contesting. The NDC was victorious, acquiring 189 seats (African Elections Database, 2017). In January 1993, democratic governance was finally re-established in Ghana. However, doubts and mistrusts about the Interim National Electoral Commission, not to mention the violence that featured in the 1992 elections forced the formation of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) by the EC. This gave aggrieved parties the chance to voice their grievances as they were brought to the negotiation table (Frempong, 2007a). The general elections held in 1996 were less contentious due to the creation of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC). The 1996 presidential election held on 7th December was contested by three political parties. These parties included the ruling party, NDC (Progressive Alliance) led by Rawlings, the NPP (Great Alliance) represented by Kufuor and the PNC led by Edward Mahama. At the end of the election, the NDC (Progressive Alliance) amassed 57.375% with the NPP (Great Alliance) attaining 39.67%. The parliamentary elections were conducted on the 53 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh same day with the NDC obtaining 133 seats against the NPP’s 60 seats (African Elections Database, 2017). The credence of all the major actors in Ghanaian politics were boosted through the IPAC initiative which bore consensus in many areas of the electoral politics (Frempong, 2007a). 2.11.2 Political Succession from 2000 till Date During the early part of Rawlings’ second term, a grave political issue cast long and deep shadows on the political atmosphere. The issue was whether he would live up to the constitutional term limit and hand over power in 2000. Frempong states that “Rawlings retained the assets of youth, dynamism and popularity, showed unremitting interest in power and influence and seemingly had a hold on the security agencies” (2007b). The 2000 election was conducted in December with the NDC and the NPP as the main contenders. Professor J.E.A Atta Mills contested on the ticket of the NDC while Mr John Agyekum Kufuor contested on the ticket of the NPP. This particular election went into a run-off which was held on 28th December 2000. It ended in a 56.90% victory for NPP as against 43.10% for the NDC. In the parliamentary elections, the NPP swept 99 seats with the NDC securing 92 seats out of a total of 200 seats (African Election Database, 2017). This symbolized the first turn-over for Ghana and exhibited the depth of democracy it has come to cherish. It established Ghana as an example for other West African countries. From this phase, Ghana began its journey to a de-facto two-party system. The 2004 elections, just like the previous ones, followed a similar pattern. The 2004 election was largely peaceful with power being retained by the NPP. J.A Kufuor of the NPP had 52.45% votes in the presidential elections and 128 seats in the parliamentary elections. Atta Mills of the NDC also had 44.64% votes in the presidential election and secured 94 seats in 54 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the parliamentary elections. The PNC and the CPP were the other parties who contested in the parliamentary elections including one independent candidate (African Elections Database, 2017). The 2008 elections made witness to the country’s second alternation of power as the incumbent NPP gave way to the opposition NDC. It also produced another presidential run-off. Atta Mills of the NDC emerged victorious by a narrow victory of 50.23% of the vote, while the incumbent NPP’s Nana Addo gathered 49.77%. In the parliamentary elections, the NDC pulled 114 seats while the NPP obtained 107 seats. In spite of severe contestation for the presidency, Ghana looked to be deviating from other African nations who had been involved in conflicts but managed to consolidate the transition. The 2012 elections also witnessed a ferocious competition between the two de-facto parties. John Mahama of the NDC retained power with a close 50.63% while Nana Addo of the NPP was defeated with 47.81%. In the parliamentary elections, the NDC won 148 seats while the NPP pulled 123 seats (Frempong, 2017). This election resulted in the famous “2012 Election Petition” that served as a test to the depth and in-grafting of Ghana’s democratic course. The NPP unhappy with the outcome of the elections sent the case to the Supreme Court for hearing and verdict. At the end of proceedings, the court ruled in favour of the NDC, with the NPP accepting the court ruling. The 2016 election won back power for the opposition NPP after two unsuccessful tries (Graham, et al, 2017). For the presidential elections, the NPP led by Nana Akufo-Addo got 53.80% while the incumbent NDC led by John Mahama had 44.40%. In the parliamentary elections, the NPP had 169 seats while the NDC won 106 seats (Frempong, 2017). This particular election offered a different scope in Ghanaian elections. Among the candidates who filed for the election was a woman, Nana Konadu Agyemang Rawlings, who broke away from the NDC to form the NDP 55 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh (National Democratic Party). This was the first in the history of Ghana, setting another precedent for elections and democratic consolidation in Ghana (Aryee, 2017). 2.10 Conclusion From this chapter, it has been established that in making sense of the word, elite, classical elitist theorists such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels and Wright Mills, in their famous works, provide a foundational basis for its conceptualisation. A recurrent theme which cuts across these works is the assertion that elite minority hold absolute power over the masses and are not accountable to them. However, with the popular practice of liberal democracy today, the oligarchical conception of the elite, as portrayed by classical elitist theorists, has metamorphosed to the contemporary egalitarian viewpoint. Here, the masses are now said to wield power over elites with the latter bounded within the confines of regular electoral competition and accountability. It must be noted that some contemporary elitist scholars believe elites, even though confined within these restrictions, still possess absolute power over the masses. Away from the ambit of the correlation between elites and democracy, this chapter sheds comprehensive light on interrelations between elites under the heading, elite consensus. Generally, elites may be divided in what is termed as “disunited elites” or united under a “strongly unified elites”. Strongly unified elites agree on pertinent issues while disunited elites do not. It is with this knowledge that many scholars posit that for a country to exude democratic consolidation and enjoy subsequent development, its elites must be strongly unified. This chapter ends by providing a historical account to the case study of this research, Ghana, in the context of its fourth republic. This is followed by an overview of the legal frameworks, 56 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh functions and composition of political parties, elections and the legislature before zeroing in on the political successions since the start of the fourth republic. Ever since Rawlings agreed to a shift from military to democratic rule, there have been seven elections so far and three turnovers between the two dominant political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Presidents from 1992 to date, in the order of succession, are Jerry John Rawlings (1992-2001), John Agyekum Kufuor (2001-2009), John Evans Atta Mills (2009- 2012), John Mahama (2012-2016) and currently, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo (2016-date). 57 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh References African Elections Database. (2017). Elections in Ghana. Retrieved May 18, 2019, from http:/africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html Ahorsu, K. (2015). Multi-Party Democracy and Conflict Management: The Case of Ghana. In B. Y. Gebe, Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 57-92). Accra: Black Mask. Aidoo, T. M. (2008). Political Stability in Ghana: since the 1992 Re-Democratization Wave. Germany: VDM & Co. Arnon, D. (1995). Parties Law in Democratic Systems of Government. Journal of Legislative Studies, 1, 283-300. Aryee, J. (2017). Ghana's Elections of 7th December 2016: A Post-Mortem. South African Journal of International Affairs, 24(3), 311-330. Atawura, P. (2017). Regulatory Framework of the Media in Ghana. Retrieved June 23, 2019, from Philipatawura's Blog: https://philipatawura.wordpress.com/2017/05/02/regulatory- framework-of-the-media-in-ghana/amp/ Atindow, M. (2018). The Journey of Presidential Elections in Ghana from 1992 to 2016. Retrieved May 18, 2019, from Modern Ghana. Bluwey, G. (1998). State Organizations in the Transition to Constitutional Democracy. (K. Ninsin, Ed.) Accra: Freedom Publications. Boafo-Arthur, K. (1991). The International Community and Ghana's Transition to Democracy. (N. K.A., Ed.) Accra: Freedom Publications. Boakye, B. (2018). Electoral Politics in Ghana's 4th Republic (1992-2016) and its Implications on Future Elections. SSRN Electronic Journal. Bottomore. (1964). Elites and Society. Great Britain: Penguin Books. Burnheim, J. (1985). Is Democracy Possible? Berkeley: California University Press. Burton, M., & Higley, J. (1987). Elite Settlements. American Sociological Review. Clapham, C. (1998). Third World Politics: Introduction. London and Sydney: Croom Helm. Constitution of Ghana, 1992. Dahl, R. (1963). A Perfect Democratic Theory. Chicago: Pheonix. 58 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. (1999). Democratization in Africa. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press. Diamond, L., Linz, J., & Lipset, S. (1995). Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. Districts.ghana-net.com. (2019). Ghana Districts. Retrieved June 13, 2019, from http://districts.ghana-net.com/index.html Frempong, A.K.D (2007a). Constitution-making and Constitutional Rule in Ghana. In J. Ayee, Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development (pp. 51-76). Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Frempong, A. K.D (2007b). The Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal State. In K. Boafo-Arthur, Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Dakar: Cordesria Books. Frempong, A. K.D (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951-2016). Accra: Digibooks Ghana. Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung. (2011). The Law-Making Process in Ghana: Structures and Procedures. Accra: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung Ghana. Gould, J., & Szomolanyi, S. (1997). Elite Fragmentation in Industry and the Prospect for Democracy. Intermarium, 1(2). Graham, E., & et al. (2017). The Third Peaceful Transfer of Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Journal of Pan African Studies, 10(5), 99-128. Grofman, B., & Lijphart, A. (Eds.). (1986). Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press. Hagan, G. (1995). Democracy as a Conflictual System- the Needed Cultural Premise. (M. Oquaye, Ed.) Accra: Gold Type. Higley, J., & Michael, B. (1998). Elite Settlement and the Taming of Politics. Government and Opposition, 33(1), 98-115. Ikpe, U. (2008). Obsolescence of Citizens: Theory of Democracy in the Age of Globalization? Unilag Journal of Politics, 4, 104-132. Ikpe, U. (2010). State-Society Interactions: A Conceptual and Comparative Introduction to Political Sociology. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited. Index Mundi. (2018). Ghana Political Parties and Leaders. Retrieved June 22, 2019, from Index Mundi Website: https://www.indexmundi.com/ghana/political_party_and_leaders.html 59 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2007). Political Parties in West Africa: The Challenge of Democratization in the Fragile States. Retrieved June 2019, from International IDEA Website: www.idea.intpartiesuploadGhana%20laid%20out.pdf Karvonen, L. (2007). Party Politics, 13(4), 437-455. Meissner, K. (2010). Elections and Conflict in Ghana. International Policy Analysis, 1-10. O'Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press. Oquaye, M. (1993). Law, Justice and the Revolution. (E. Gyamah-Boadi, Ed.) Dakar: Codesria. Oquaye, M. (1995). The Ghanaian Election of 1992 - A Dissenting View. African Affairs, 94(375), 259-275. Osei, A. (2015). Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach. African Affairs(114/457), 529-554. Parry, G. (1969). Political Elite. London: George, Allen and Unwin Ltd. Satori, G. (1965). Democracy Theory. New York: Praeger. Schumpeter, J. A. (1969). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd. The Commonwealth Observer Group. (2016). Ghana General Elections: 7 December 2016. The Commonwealth. London: The Commonwealth Secretariat. 60 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER THREE AN EXAMINATION OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA 3.0 Introduction After the digestive overview of elite consensus, liberal democracy and the linkages between the two, as well as the provision of a historical overview of democratic governance in Ghana’s fourth republic, this penultimate chapter takes the research a notch higher. This time, with much focus on Ghana. Elites in the daily execution of their mandated roles interact with each other in numerous ways and on varying issues affecting national development. In Ghana, just like in any part of the world, political elites are the major agents of democracy, not to mention, the pivot on which developmental goals are structured and subsequently achieved. This is to say, their operations, especially interactions amongst each other, is crucial to the very survival of the state (Field Interview, 2019). The prime focus of this chapter is to examine elite consensus and national development in Ghana. Knowing consensus-building amongst political elites transcends the scope of elections to the entirety of political engagement, here, a larger scope will be adopted for examination. This includes different political portfolios such as the executive, parliamentarians and political parties operating at the levels of partisan politics, elections, the legislature and national development planning in Ghana. With regards to the executive, national development planning in Ghana’s 61 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh fourth republic under the auspices of the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) will be examined. 3.1 Operational Benchmarks for Examining Elite Consensus in Ghana The previous chapter provided this study with an exhaustive overview of elite consensus. Based on this insight and that of think-tank interviewees of the study, the operational benchmarks for examining elite consensus in Ghana will be derived. Recurrent themes of elite consensus as illustrated in the previous chapter as well as through the submissions of think tank interviewees, forming the benchmarks and therefore the basis of this research are as follows: • There must be evidence of elite pact, especially during the transformation from authoritarianism to democratic rule. • There must be inter-party and intra-party consensus. • There must be a mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules of the political game – Implicitly shared consensus about the codes and rules of political conduct. • There must be the absence of adversary politics – Adversary politics is when there is a deep and broad disagreement between the main political parties (Tutor2u, 2018). • Due to the inevitability of conflict, there must be an effective conflict resolution mechanism well entrenched in the constitution to handle conflicts amongst elites. • There must be the presence of the elite culture of accommodation, bargaining and compromises. • There must be subdued partisanship – Politics must be seen as a positive-sum game; absence of indiscriminate, uncompromising and persistent use of parliamentary majority. 62 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh These benchmarks will serve as the general criteria in uncovering the truth to the assertion of elite consensus in Ghana. 3.2 Elite Consensus in Ghana Elite consensus is the dominant, organised or philosophical group of thinkers in a society, having agreed upon an idea of how to lead that society. The point is that elite consensus is best looked at from deducing the concept of the idea of the state. Do we have any idea of what Ghana is? Where are we going as a nation? When you take countries like Japan, Britain, Israel and the US, there are several evidence showing they have an idea of what their states and their stances in the world are. One analyst made an argument that in the developed world, elite consensus is the reincarnation of a nation’s will. Can we say the same for Africa or Ghana? – A think-tank interviewee (Field Interview, 2019). In the quest to ascertain whether there is indeed elite consensus in Ghana, these benchmarks as outlined above must be indicative or otherwise in the ascribed roles and dealings amongst numerous political actors, operating at different levels of political life. These political actors are politicians operating at the levels of political parties, elections and the legislature. 3.2.1 At the Level of Political Parties In accordance with the tenets of democracy, there must be rule of law that shall synchronise freedom of expression, the press and all facets of the democratic state. This synchronism is to advance the tenets of democratic politics which calls for consensus in diversity. The legal framework establishing the foundation for the formation of political parties must also guide the conduct of politicians in the pursuit of political goals that italicise party formation (Jonah, 2005). Political parties, described by Gyampo and Gans-Lartey (2017, p. 1) as “the heart and soul of every democracy”, relays the import of their unparalleled usefulness in any multi-party democracy. One which cannot be overemphasised. In all, the success of not only the democratic 63 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh benchmarks but also the subsequent national development of a state is highly predicated on the stability within and amongst political parties as well as the conduct of their politicians. In essence, political parties in the execution of their day-to-day activities, especially those pertaining to relations with other parties, must inherently exude consensual tendencies. In this study, as explained early on, operational benchmarks extracted from the wealth of knowledge in the previous chapter and the submissions of think tanks will serve as criteria for determining elite consensus in Ghana. This section, within the scope of elite consensus in Ghana, pays particular attention to elite consensus amongst political parties. The criteria to be used in this section include: • Internal consensus within political parties • Elite pact and inter-party consensus building • Mutual respect for the rules of the political game • Absence of adversary politics 3.2.1.2 Analysis of Elite Consensus Amongst Political Parties in the Fourth Republic 3.2.1.2.1 Internal Consensus within Political Parties In the bid to forging a stronger elite bond amongst opposing political camps, it is inherent that these same tendencies first exist within the parties (Gyampo & Gans-Lartey, 2017). In a situation where executives, politicians and other key members of a particular political party are engulfed in gross dispute or divided along various lines, it becomes virtually impossible to build consensus externally with other parties in the pursuit of national development. This is because 64 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh political parties pave way for a nationalistic purview on decisions taken for national development and as such any disruption within one, disrupts the sequence with which these set targets are achieved. Political parties in Ghana’s fourth republic have not fallen short of such ordeal. Allegations of corruption, for one, which damaged the process by which candidates were chosen at the constituency level went against the democratic tenet of competitive election which is also contradictory with the provision on internal democratic practice (Afrimap, OSIWA & IDEG, 2007). For example, NDC MPs in the first parliament of the fourth republic were forced to step down without defeat at the primaries before the 1996 elections. Also, the NDC, in the year 2000, failed to organise primaries in numerous constituencies in an attempt to retain most of the MPs from the previous parliament. This position vexed several MPs who later decided to contest as independent candidates (Afrimap, OSIWA & IDEG, 2007). Another evidence of lack of internal party consensus can be seen in the popular Swedru Declaration where Rawlings failed to consult party executives before single-handedly appointing Prof. John Evans Atta Mills as his successor. This situation angered some party members who had the dream to contesting that position in the 2000 election (Bokpe, 2010, p. 22). The NPP has also had its fair share of internal disputes, one with a raging fiery in the course of the fourth republic (Meissner, 2010). Party primaries have proven to be a major problem for the NPP, especially when in some cases, seasoned Members of Parliaments (MPs) and other key figures in the party failed to win. Many business people drained large sums of money contesting in the primaries for parliamentary candidates with clear expectations of recouping their investments if they won. In such circumstances, there have been violent and chaotic situations amongst party members and their supporters with common claims of rigging and corruption. It 65 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh has been argued that these conflicts have within the years caused an internally outstanding party- divide which has damaged the party in the periods leading to elections. The 2008 elections, for example, which the NPP lost was seen as a manifestation of such a problem. (Meissner, 2010; Frempong, 2012). The ripple effect of these events has resulted in “…the ‘Pro-Rawlings’ and ‘Anti-Rawlings’ syndicates currently existent in the NDC and even today, in the NPP, we have the Akyem and the Ashanti factions. As such there is no unity of purpose” – think-tank (Field Interview, 2019). All political party executive interviewees for this study are in agreement with this assertion. One even goes further to say, “the most harm done in my party today is not even from relations with other parties but those within” (Field Interview, 2019). 3.2.1.2.2 Elite Pact and Inter-Party Consensus Building • Elite Pact Elite pact as explained in the previous chapter is, in simple terms, a situation in which opposing elite groups come together in signing a crucial agreement in order to stop an uprising from the masses or foreseen outcomes which will lead to their destruction and that of the society (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). Pacts can be a one-time deal which may happen in a democratic scene or not and has been instrumental in the transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracies. Ghana’s transition from military rule to a democracy in 1992 is an example of an elite pact. This transition was crucial to the very survival of the elites existing at that time, particularly, those within the PNDC and the very survival of an increasingly impoverished masses (Gyimah-Boadi, 66 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2004; Frempong, 2007b). The PNDC, led by Rawlings, only reluctantly accepted a constitutional multiparty rule under intense pressure from domestic and external forces in the early 1990s. On the international front, the popular trend of pro-democracy associated with the post-Cold War order had begun to have a contagious effect across Africa. Domestically, there were increasing and persistent demands from various civil society groups including the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) for change and political reform (Ninsin, 1998, p. 14; Frempong, 2007a, p. 134). In the end, the ruling PNDC accepted the demands of the opposition and the country as a whole to hold democratic elections and made several arrangements to that effect. Another evidence of elite pact can be seen with the formation of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) after many controversies surrounding the 1992 presidential election. This was a recommendation by the Commonwealth Observer Group after their observation of the 1992 presidential election (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016). According to a think-tank interviewee, knowing their legitimate hold to power was undermined by such tantrums surrounding the previous election, the NDC was again forced to sit together with the opposition parties and the EC in drawing strategic agreements on electoral conduct to ensure election outcomes are generally accepted (Field Interview, 2019). Similarly, an integral elite pact worth mentioning is the Accra Declaration, a peace pact, signed by the presidential candidates of the political parties contesting the 2016 elections. It was organised by the National Peace Council (NPC) on December 1, 2016, after a series of inter- party tensions leading to that elections. These candidates made public affirmations against “electoral violence, impunity and injustice in pursuit of strengthening democracy, stability and peace in Ghana” (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016, p. 21). 67 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh • Inter-Party Consensus Building There are numerous evidence of inter-party consensus building or otherwise in Ghana’s relatively long history of elections and party politics in the fourth republic. It must be said that the start of the fourth republic was not as rosy as many expected. The democratic transition was ‘acrimonious’ as a think-tank interviewee puts it (Field Interview, 2019). He further explains, the PNDC made a deliberate transition of self-succession,…even Obed Asamoah had indicated that they wanted to keep the acronym, ‘PNDC’, for the new party, and this is the acronym used by the former military regime, but on second thought, they settled for ‘NDC’ which later won the elections in a controversial manner. The controversies surrounding the presidential election will later force the opposition to boycott the parliamentary election the next year, 1993. Such an election was unlikely to be free, transparent and fair (Agyeman-Duah, 2005, pp. 8-9). This particular event generally shows a great failure on the topic of inter-party consensus building at the start of the new republic. However, it may be argued that though generally constrictive, it shows, to some extent, inter- party consensus from a minimalist angle. To some, the mere fact that the opposition in Ghana around that time could come together, reach an agreement and rally behind the idea of a boycott in the impending parliamentary election is a sign of inter-party consensus-building (Frempong, 2012). More so, the opposition was praised for not using a violent approach to vent their frustration but rather chose a path of “least resistance and demonstrated amounts of tolerance in circumstances which, elsewhere in Africa, could have easily deepened national cleavages and even lead to war” (Agyemang-Duah, 2005, p. 11). This happening put pressure on the NDC government to largely work within the constitution and to seek consensus on some various issues with the opposition. It later reflects in Rawlings’ inaugural address in which he promised to establish the culture of tolerance, consultation and consensus-building based on mutual respect (La Verle, 1994). 68 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh This promise given by Rawlings later gave birth to the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) in March 1994. This will become a manifestation of inter-party consensus in the form of an elite pact. The IPAC will be extensively discussed in the subsequent section on elite consensus on elections. However on inter-party consensus building, IPAC provided an atmosphere for what a political party executive interviewee describes as “a medium for parties to come together as one in discussing some trends they see to be inconsistent with the proper conduct of elections and thereby after deliberations agree on the rules of the game acceptable to every party” (Field Interview, 2019). Notwithstanding, a think-tank interviewee in his submission, though in complete agreement with what the previous interviewee said, adds that, the IPAC produced much disappointment when the NPP sent the EC and the NDC to court following the way and manner the EC chairperson by then, Afari Gyan, conducted the 2012 elections (Field Interview, 2019). “During that time, the NPP was taken by surprise with the EC declaring No Verification! No Vote!. A requirement which the NPP said was not discussed at the IPAC level” (Field Interview, 2019). 3.2.1.2.3 Respect for the Rules of the Political Game …When you talk about consensus, it is whether they (Political elites) are agreeable on the rules of the game, the basic tenets surrounding the political game. If democracy is practised, to what extent are political elites agreeable on the tenets of democracy. Democracy is about conflict and consensus. We agree to disagree. - A think-tank interviewee (Field Interview, 2019). As argued by Anderson and Mendes (2005, p. 97), it is when losers of an election whelm their negative experiences and accede to being governed by opponents they disagree with that democracy endures and blossoms. Losers, however, accept to live with the reality of their defeat when they believe that they lost fairly and that the electoral procedures and institutions provide 69 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the likelihood for their victory in the future (Frempong, 2012, p. 56). Can the same be said for Ghana? Ghana, since the commencement of the fourth republic, has witnessed seven general elections with each outcome accepted by the losers, but with the exception of the 1992 and 2012 elections. These elections though not accepted by the losers, did not have much adverse effect on the post- electoral atmosphere at the said times. Before the 1992 elections, a major conflict in the transition process was agreeing on its modalities. This was characterised by biases and uncertainties as the PNDC refused to spell out a clear timetable for the transition. The government was accused of packing the constitution- drafting Consultative Assembly with pro-government ‘identifiable bodies’ at the implicit exclusion of those with anti-government viewpoints. Political amnesty to political detainees was also refused by the government and it is said to have kept a tight lid on the whole process (Gyimah-Boadi, 1991). For the first time in Ghana’s history, the incumbent military head of state competed for the presidency. This in effect is what a think-tank interviewee sternly refers to as “the incumbent regime playing the role of both the referee and a player at the same time” (Field Interview, 2019). In such circumstances, the opposition and incumbent government at the time did not agree on the rules of the electoral game so in actual sense, there were no rules of political engagement to be respected at that time. One party executive interviewee further laments on the drawing up of the 1992 constitution, stating, “…even though some people from the opposition were made to help draft it, the government by then undermined some suggestions raised by them” (Field Interview, 2019). However, with the subsequent elite pact agreed upon by the political parties and the EC initiating inter-party consensus building through the IPAC, election outcomes after the 1992 elections will 70 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh later be accepted and respected by all parties involved. “Afari Gyan (The then chairperson of the Electoral Commission) after this period successfully mediated numerous electoral conflicts” as a think-tank interviewee establishes (Field Interview, 2019). This phenomenon, unfortunately, did not rub off on the 2012 elections. After the 2012 elections, John Mahama of the NDC was declared president for winning but the NPP rejected the results, leading to a nine-month petition trial at the supreme court, which confirmed Mahama’s victory (Frempong, 2017). As already explained above, the NPP disputed the outcome of the election because it felt the election was rigged. Also, to them, prior to the election, there was no consensus on some processes initiated by the EC during the of conduct the elections. This goes against the benchmark on the respect for the rules of the game for elite consensus to be seen as existent in Ghana. Nonetheless, the fact that even though the NPP, led by Akufo-Addo, felt jilted by the outcome of the ruling by the Supreme Court, still accepted the results speaks volumes to the respect for the rule of law and constitutionalism. This “reflects the mutual acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules of the electoral game” as Frempong puts it (2017, p. 267). It must be added that the first alternation in power, where the sitting president gave up power after the end of his tenure in office was indeed a huge boost on constitutionalism and the respect for the rules of the political game. This set a precedence which made it difficult for successive heads of state to deviate from (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016). 71 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3.2.1.2.4 Absence of Adversary Politics By the way, I would not be a hypocrite. We all do the same thing. We all undermine each other. That is how the political game is. We are to keep a check on each other. When in opposition and you are always in tune with whatever the government in power does, one, they will relax and not do better; Two, to be frank, it tarnishes our image as an opposition fighting to win back power. Politics is a game, where there are always winners and losers. No party will like to be on the losing side so must do everything in their power to undermine the other; and lastly, if we are to all agree on everything then, come on, there is no need for an opposition. It should be made a de jure one-party state then like it is in China – a political party executive (Field Interview, 2019). Deep hatred in the political arena, particularly amongst political parties, has been a major problem for many developing democracies worldwide (Paalo, 2017). “A recipe for disaster” as summed up by a think-tank interviewee (Field Interview, 2019). In Ghana’s situation, there are divided takes on the extent to adversary politics in the country and on how it has, is and will be affecting democracy. All think-tank interviewees for this study believe that Ghana’s level of adversary politics will surely damage its democracy in the near future. One bluntly professes this current situation as a “time bomb”, with another equating political elite confrontations in Ghana to the manifestation of “the infighting, selfishness and the parochial elite desires…” (Field Interview, 2019). Another speaks of the popular use of the threat of violence as a campaign strategy and hallmark of partisan politics in Ghana (Field Interview, 2019). When asked what he means by the phrase, “Threat of Violence”, he quickly answers with, to him, a series of rhetorical follow-up questions: “Whenever it is an election period, are you not afraid? Don’t you hear of people who send their children abroad? And others gathering foodstuffs at home in case of electoral violence?”. This, in his view, is because “many politicians proclaim that if they do not win the election, there will be violence and it is seen anytime election approaches. However, we do not talk much about it since we have not experienced any election-related wars yet like it is in other countries”. 72 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Many instances of adversary politics in Ghana are given by numerous scholars. Prime to adversary politics in Ghana is political vigilantism which Gyampo, Graham and Asare (2017, p. 115) describe as covering an extensive range of violent acts spanning from dissident violence to the legal exertion of physical coercion by a government or its representatives. Political vigilantism is said to have plagued all the three turnovers of political power in the fourth republic in 2001, 2009 and 2017 (Gyampo, Graham & Asare, 2017). “The incident which characterised the just ended Ayawaso West Wuogon by-election, where vigilante groups were posing as members of the National Security, is an example of what political parties are putting the country through...” as expressed by a think-tank interviewee (Field Interview, 2019). He confidently adds, “…it was a dress rehearsal for the 2020 elections. It is imminent”. Other instances of adversary politics in Ghana’s fourth republic include electoral conflicts as ensuing in Odododiodoo, Bawku and even in Tamale where a CPP Chairman was killed in 2004 (Field Interview, 2019). On a tangent with the submissions of the think-tank interviewees, all political party executive interviewees but one, though acknowledging the presence of adversary politics in Ghana, insist it is at a minimum and not a threat to democracy (Field Interview, 2019). To add, they emphatically indicate that, there are various measures being taken to curb that issue, mainly through inter-party consensus building. One cites the just-ended meeting organised by the ruling government in conjunction with other political parties in finding ways to combat political vigilantism as evidence of such measures. Even so, it is somewhat surprising if not contradictory to have all political party executive interviewees giving a poised ‘No!’ to the question on them trusting other political parties to uphold electoral and constitutional laws (Field Interview, 2019). 73 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3.2.2 At the Level of Elections The political elites in Ghana do not have consensus on elections because otherwise, I think the issues surrounding the electoral commission will not be as pronounced as they are. There are permanently some issues and conflicts surrounding the activities and initiatives around the electoral commission. We have also seen that in the more recent past, the head of the commission has been changed twice. I do not think this spells the existence of a consensus and I do not think it is healthy. The electoral commission should be carried by a strong consensus among political actors but I don’t see this in Ghana – a think-tank interviewee (Field Interview, 2019). The previous chapter provided a concise overview of presidential and parliamentary elections held since the inception of the fourth republic in Ghana. The preceding section on elite consensus amongst political parties has already elaborated much on elections in Ghana since contesting and winning periodic elections are the pinnacles of partisan politics, without which political parties lose their relevance. This section will continue with the analysis by dwelling much on specific benchmarks relating to the organisation and aftermath of elections organised in Ghana’s fourth republic. Some crucial emerging issues relating to elite consensus will be expounded under the following criteria: • Mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game • An effective conflict resolution mechanism, well entrenched in the constitution to handle electoral conflicts amongst political elites. 3.2.2.1 Analysis of Elite Consensus on Elections in the Fourth Republic 3.2.2.1.1 Mutual Respect for the Rules of the Electoral Game With regards to mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game, much on this topic has already been highlighted in the previous section but it is only prudent these points are rehashed. 74 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The peaceful alternations in power in 2001, 2009 and 2017 largely demonstrate a high level of mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010; Throup, 2011; Whitfield, 2009; Gyamfi-Boadi, 2009). Also, the institutionalisation of the IPAC and its role in drawing electoral reforms and harnessing the different concerns of political parties into a uniform code of conduct acceptable by all has indeed been the hallmark of successful successive elections after its disastrous start in 1992 (Aryee, 1998). The Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) was established in March 1994 to help the EC to mediate electoral related disputes arising among and between the various political parties (Aryee, 1998). it was formed on the basis of a recommendation by the Commonwealth Observer Group of the 1992 elections and comprises of representatives of all operational political parties (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2016). The committee is chaired by the chairperson of the EC, who is seen as a neutral person to assist in amicably resolving electoral disputes. It is important to note that the IPAC only exists as an advisory body to the concerns of political parties and as such does not have the agency to enforce resolutions (Aryee, 1998). The role played by IPAC, as not only a conflict resolution mechanism but also a tool in fostering democratic consolidation in Ghana ever since the bizarre start which eclipsed the 1992 presidential election, has been praised by all and sundry. A think-tank interviewee in his submission refers to the IPAC as Ghana’s ‘Messiah’ for the democratic laurels chalked in the fourth republic. “…it is just an advisory board and yet, most of the activities which happen in periodic elections since 1996 to date is seen as normal. All, would not have been possible if not for the work of the IPAC” (Field Interview, 2019). He goes on to give examples of these activities as including, “voting on the same day for both presidential and parliamentary elections, 75 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh voter ID cards and the formation of party agents at polling centres during the conduction of elections amongst others”. In the view of another, the platform given through IPAC does not exist in many African countries and as such led to Ghana’s upper hand in the jurisdiction of electoral politics in Africa (Field Interview, 2019). He uses the cases of Ghana and Zambia. …so let us take Zambia for example. In 1991, they had one of the best transitional elections in Africa while Ghana’s in 1992 was marred by numerous problems. However, by 1996, when because of the IPAC, all political parties had agreed to a number of reforms, the electoral outcome will go on to be acceptable by all. Meanwhile, in Zambia, things had gone the other way and the opposition was going to reject the election results. Singing the same chorus as the think-tank, are the political party executive interviewees. They all agree to the magnanimous contributions of IPAC in bestowing on Ghana an envious position among the best in electoral successes, not only in Africa but the world as a whole (Field Interview, 2019). Notwithstanding, these same think-tank interviewees point out recent trends which have downplayed the once respected rules of electoral engagement. The popular 2012 election petition is a case in point. In their view, the NPP not accepting the election results partly because they did not agree with some initiatives passed by the EC during the conduct of that election goes against the mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game (Field Interview, 2019). However, in as much as this particular development made it defective, the decision for the NPP to use a constitutional prerogative in venting their displeasure as against violent options at its disposal is, otherwise, seen by many as a solidification of the respect for the rules of the political game (Frempong, 2017). The turn of events after the 2012 election has put a huge incision into the modalities for the conduct of subsequent elections. It has gotten to a stage where the relevance of the IPAC is being questioned. A think-tank interviewee voices out his shock when he heard one of the Electoral 76 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Commissioners recently insisting that the IPAC was no longer needed. “…this comment coming from a political party would have made sense but it coming from an Electoral Commissioner should alert us on the path we are paving towards subsequent elections…the IPAC was relevant, is and will forever remain relevant” (Field Interview, 2019). Anyway, in answering a particular question, an MP interviewee stumbles on this same issue and his remarks may serve as a rebuttal of a sort. To him, “the problem, the deputy EC has with some IPAC members is that having agreed on a number of issues at the IPAC level, some go back and do contrary since there are no laws to hold them accountable”. (Field Interview, 2019). However, he maintains that “we have gotten far thanks to these political and electoral systems courtesy IPAC and as such the Deputy EC should not have spoken in that manner”. 3.2.2.1.2 An Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanism Well Entrenched in the Constitution The inevitability of conflict in society’s every dispensation suggests the keen association between conflict and consensus in ensuring harmonious living amongst humans (Frempong, 2007b; Ahorsu, 2015). Owing to this established fact, it is, therefore, obligatory for states to provide a well-fortified conflict resolution mechanism in their respective constitutions in order to manage elite conflicts emanating from the execution of their mandates as prescribed by law (Agyeman-Duah, 2005). In Ghana, there are many conflict resolution mechanism entrenched in the 1992 Constitution. In fact, many believe that “the decisive origins of the 1992 Constitution, notwithstanding, its provisions for governance, guiding principles on policy, checks on governmental powers, and exhaustive provisions for human rights…” (Ahorsu, 2015, p. 87) made it a progressive conflict 77 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh mitigation constitution. The creation of mandatory institutions such as the National Media Commission (NMC), National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Electoral Commission (EC) considerably promoted human rights, furthered the amicable resolution of conflicts and aided in the consolidation of democracy (Ahorsu, 2015, pp. 75-86). The judiciary has equally been mentioned among the lots for ably adjudicating political crisis through its traditional jurisdiction and special arrangements throughout the pre-election to the post-election periods (Kotey, 1995). The EC, in particular, has quintessentially and creatively, through its inter-party dialogue programme, been instrumental to the peaceful resolution of electoral crisis in unexpected ways (Meissner, 2010). The role played by the EC in the creation and execution of the IPAC exemplifies such amicable feat. In addition, the media, security sector and civil society groups have all been credited for Ghana’s success in conflict resolution as enshrined in the 1992 Constitution, especially during the election seasons. From the above, it is clear that conflict resolution mechanisms in Ghana’s 1992 Constitution are well entrenched. Yet, their effectiveness have been questioned by many scholars and citizens alike. “In terms of the institutions, they are there….but they are highly ineffective in many respects….take the NMC for example, they do not have control of sensitive content running through the media which can cause high levels of tension during election periods…” (Field Interview, 2019). “What is the relevance of CHRAJ today? It is an epiphany of our digression on the topic of rule of law” (Field Interview, 2019). Another think-tank interviewee hits at the progress made by the NCCE, …many citizens of voting ages today do not even know why they vote. They have no idea what voting means to them, their families and the country as a whole. They are not given the necessary information to help them make informed decisions when voting and the manifestation of such a problem is the large number of rejected ballots during each election (Field Interview, 2019). 78 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh He then reveals, “ you will be surprised to know that many politicians do not even have civic education”. This assertion is later denied by the political party executive interviewees, with all in unison as they address the issue of civic education as a major problem but not to their respective politicians. One suggests “…the education on civil rights and responsibilities must not only be limited to the NCCE but to all political parties” (Field Interview, 2019). Many reasons are given for the ineffectiveness of these institutions but chief among them is the lack of funding which one think thank interviewee deems as “a deliberate attempt by the government to make them financially handicapped” (Field Interview, 2019). In addition, these institutions are said to have lost their independence to the government. Another, though in praise of the achievements of the judiciary especially in handling electoral related cases, advises “ not to accept things on the face value. You have to ask yourself if, for example, the appointment of the supreme court judges and their vote is based on an objective basis or they vote for those who appointed them” (Field, Interview, 2019). 3.2.3 At the level of the legislature The legislative arm of government, which is the lawmaking body of any democratic state, wields the major push in spurring national development agendas (Gyampo, 2016b). Policies enacted by the executive will have to be passed by the legislature. Likewise, a nation’s budget must be approved by this body before it finally takes effect. This is to show how powerful the legislature is as depicts the true meaning of the popular expression, “government of the people, for the people and by the people” (Whitfield, 2009). In this respect, a contravening legislature ostensibly equals a waning state. As such, consensus- building must be subscripted to the daily activities within the parliament in ensuring a uniform 79 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh approach to developmental issues. Aside from partisan affiliations, the legislature in Ghana’s fourth republic also has a dense ethnic cleavage (Osei, 2015) which means twice as much consensus-building efforts will be needed to bridge these divides (Ahorsu, 2015). In assessing elite consensus between parliamentarians in Ghana’s fourth republic, the following criteria will serve as a yardstick. There must be: • the presence of the elite culture of accommodation, bargaining and compromises; • subdued partisanship. 3.2.3.1 The Presence of the Elite Culture of Accommodation, Bargaining and Compromises In its strictest sense, the legislature is supposed to be an arena for exhibiting and advancing the traits of accommodation, bargaining, compromises and tolerance in the pursuit of national development (Gyampo, 2016b). Where these aforementioned traits are inexistent in any legislature, laws and policies passed will not be nationalistic in nature and not disposed to a uniform outlook to national development issues. It is therefore incumbent on all parliamentarians to develop a level of trust for each other, be open-minded on issues discussed on the floor of parliament and be ready to make compromises when need be with the general public in mind. Only when these requirements are fulfilled, would a nation’s drive to development thrive. A common deficiency of most developing democracies, particularly in Africa, is the lack of trust amongst parliamentarians (Osei, 2014). In situations where parliamentarians, especially those from opposing camps, do not trust each other, the subsequent consensus-building eminent to every legislature is said to be defeated. Simply put, the purpose of the legislature which is to reach a consensus on national issues is defeated. 80 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh In the Ghanaian dispensation, the word ‘trust’, as used in the everyday sense, is understood and applied differently in diverse walks of life. Some believe trust is simply having “a hundred percent confidence in someone or something” while others see it to mean having “an appreciable level of confidence or faith in someone or something” (Field Interview, 2019). In effect, the latter agrees to the possibility of having trust in someone or something, whereas the former holds on to the exact opposite. Actually, definitions of trust as defined in many works have keywords and phrases like “confidence in someone or something”, “honesty and integrity of a person or thing”, “reliability of a person or a thing’, ‘truth’ as well as “firm belief in a person or a thing” (Ozer & Zheng, 2017; Robins, 2010). In view of such subjectivities, this study found it wise to provide an operational definition of ‘trust’ within the context of parliamentarians which was later communicated to the respondents. This was in order to provide informed answers to questions enveloping such parameters. Trust, therefore as used in this study, is the belief that a parliamentarian is honest, will not do anything to harm a fellow colleague or the national agenda, can be relied on in providing objective analysis on issues and commands integrity. On that note, think-tank interviewees on the question of trust amongst parliamentarians in Ghana’s fourth republic share similar views. Generally, they all believe that at a personal level, parliamentarians have a high level of trust for each other but on national issues, there is none (Field Interview, 2019). One starts by referring to the question of trust amongst parliamentarians as ‘ambivalent’ and in explaining, he says, “when the press is gone and there is no party issues or votes to be conducted on the basis of party, they are very united” (Field Interview, 2019). Another stresses, “they sympathise with each other and do a lot of favours for each other”. In expatiating, he gives an instance where an MP in opposition lobbied through a minister for an 81 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh acquaintance of his to be employed by one of the ministries. This was at a time when it was announced that there was no vacancy there. In this light, the statement, “A fellow MP’s problem is yours”, which an MP interviewee makes, corroborates this example. Contrarily, although believing in the assertion of a personal cohesion amongst parliamentarians, another think-tank interviewee believes there is no trust in the actual sense of their job description since “they go the extra mile to undermine each other on the floor of parliament” (Field Interview, 2019). On the same topic of trust, most MP interviewees claim they trust their opponents in parliament with only two (2) saying otherwise. It must be noted that a chunk of the MP interviewees who claim to trust their opponents give answers like “Yes, to some extent”, “Yes, to a greater extent” and “Yes, but not entirely”. Just like the think-tank interviewees, they see the rapport shared with their counterparts as more on a personal level than on national issues with some giving comments such as “most of us are classmates from university”, “I know them without their party colours”, “it depends on the policy on the floor” among others (Field Interview, 2019). When asked if they believe their counterparts in parliament trust them, there were mixed responses including “I hope so”, ‘no’, ‘yes’, “I think so”, “To a greater extent” and “that, I cannot tell”. On the question of consensus-building in the deliberation of issues in parliament, think-tank interviewees share a similar point of view. To one, “if the issues are not thorny or controversial and are not partisan, they all agree…however, issues that are normative or intrinsic like the Right to Information bill, there is no form of consensus” (Field Interview, 2019). He goes on to refer to such a situation as “Benign consensus” since all sides in parliament “tacitly agree not to push it for their sakes and not the country as a whole”. Another, driving home his point, cites “gender issues and issues on MP loans as well as ex gratia” as examples of concerns parliamentarians have consensus on. 82 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Asked how these deliberations have affected national development, all think-tank interviewees assert that deliberations amongst parliamentarians have not brought about the right policies for development (Field Interview, 2019). A think-tank interviewee refers to some of the boycotts in parliament on issues like National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and others have been detrimental to development. Contrary to the take of think-tank interviewees on deliberations of issues in parliament, a senior civil servant interviewee in parliament believes there is largely consensus-building on issues of national importance. He argues that “at the committee level, they agree on all issues…however, on the floor of parliament, they show their partisan colours in order to put on a good show for their supporters”. (Field Interview, 2019). In answering why it is so, he reveals that “ at the committee level, deliberations are away from the public eye unlike on the floor of parliament so as such they are free to express their views, listen to that of their counterparts and later reach a consensus after some compromises”. He ends by stressing that the scenario created by these parliamentarians are not unique to only Ghana but in all democracies, even developed ones. To make his point clearer, he uses Canada as an example, “I have witnessed it there before”. Another civil servant interviewee cites the example the Office of Special Prosecutor Bill, which was largely agreed on at the committee level as a manifestation of the true consensus building in parliament as he reiterates, “you will be amazed how the two political parties worked together to get that passed” (Field Interview, 2019). In tune with his submission, those given by the MP interviewees align with the idea of consensus building and compromises in parliament though many believe there are numerous challenges (Field Interview, 2019). Before diving into these issues, the study found it relevant to first ask respondents some traits they like or dislike about their counterparts in parliament which then 83 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh form the basis for subsequent questions. Interestingly, the traits liked and disliked from each camp were much alike if not the same. Many describe their opponents as ‘resolute’, “passionate about national development issues”, “serving as a good check on the incumbent”, “highly knowledgeable” and ‘professionals’. “I believe what I have noticed is that we all have love for Ghana” is one’s response while another speaks of how “...resolute they are in the decisions they take, whether right or wrong and are prepared to bear the consequences whether good or bad…to me that is a mark of leadership” (Field interview, 2019). Another in expressing the same point uses a stronger word in the form of ‘belligerence’ which he quickly explains, “….and it is not in the sense that they like to fight each other but the fact that they strive and push themselves to the limit to get things done though they go a bit too far sometimes”. On traits they hate about their counterparts, most referred to their “uncompromising nature” on the floor of parliament, as others describe them as “…not open-minded on issues discussed” and “being too partisan” (Field Interview, 2019). Now, with the topic on deliberations in parliament, some make known that through meetings, negotiations and discussions, especially at the leadership and committee levels, deadlocks are broken and consensus subsequently achieved on major issues (Field Interview, 2019). One cites “external funding for specific projects” as one area where there is consensus since both majority and minority agree on the projects needed as a nation. Another cites “pre-sitting at the leadership level…where the minority concerns are also tabled for discussion”. “Even when we deliberate on an issue and there is a stalemate, the speaker calls for a leadership consult. They go out, consult and consensus is reached by the time they walk back in”, an MP interviewee explains (Field Interview, 2019). 84 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh However, on many occasions, where issues are ‘thorny’ and ‘partisan’ in nature as many MP interviewees describe, consensus on such issues have been difficult to reach (Field Interview, 2019). In most cases, these deadlocks are broken with a vote and as such the majority always carry the day, as they all put it. One goes further to say, “in many cases, the opposition either boycotts the voting process or stages a walkout to vent their displeasure”. Finally, with the main question on whether parliamentarians are divided or united, all MP interviewees firmly believe they are united though they all qualify this unity. On a more general basis, fitting the specific context, they all assume to be divided or united (Field Interview, 2019). “Politically, because of our ideological differences, we cannot be together but generally, we are all friends and relate as such”, as one puts it. Another in exhibiting the tight bond between parliamentarians extends an invitation to “…the coffee shop. Your first round of drinks is on me. come here and see for yourself…we are very good friends…”. In providing much elaboration on their key differences on national development issues, an MP interviewee gives an analogy to be considered by this research. “It is like embarking on a journey to Kumasi. One may think passing through Koforidua will be better while another may believe the route through Nsawam is best. The destination is Kumasi and getting there is the mission of both parties though the approach is different. It is the same for us”, he accents (Field Interview, 2019). 85 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3.2.3.2 Subdued Partisanship Well, by logic, we have a rubber-stamp parliament, so when it comes to passing policies and laws, parliament is not making much difference so the bus stops with what is coming out of the executive. So when it comes to moving development forward in terms of policies and laws, the cabinet or the government is the deciding factor. – a think thank interviewee (Field Interview, 2019). It has been argued that the level of partisanship in Ghana’s legislature, in the fourth republic, is beyond reproach (Gyampo, 2016b). Many have criticised the practice of majoritarian rule in Ghana’s parliament as being a major impediment to development since the views of the minority on such issues are sidelined. Others speak of other problems like the subservience of the legislature to the executive as well as the continual practice of the whip system as factors stifling consensus building and the advancement of the genuine concerns of the electorates (Gyampo, 2017). All the above-mentioned factors are touched on by the respondents for this study. In the earnest view of a think-tank interviewee, “ the constitutional provision of having a majority of ministers from parliament is creating a problem for this country. It has fizzled out the objective analysis of parliamentarians on national issues and the inability to reach a consensus with the minority” (Field Interview, 2019). To him, this provision encourages MPs from the ruling government to undermine the genuine concerns of the minority on primal issues and has “initiated the contest of “who shouts loudest in agreement to government policies” as a candidate for a ministerial appointment”. Another think-tank in accord with this submission, concludes by saying, “a scenario like this, always ends with boycotts or staging walkouts by the minority and this affects consensus building” (Field Interview, 2019). He continues, “unfortunately, we have never had a hung parliament (a parliament with no majority) to see how that situation would have panned out…who knows, the ruling government under such circumstances will be forced to build some sort of consensus with the opposition”. 86 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Historical factors are a major reason given for the legislature’s subservience to the executive. “ Due to the numerous coups in this country since the first in 1966, legislatures have been abolished till the start of a new republic whiles the executive arm still stays. This has diminished their importance in that sense, hence, it playing second-fiddle to the executive” (Field Interview, 2019). This brings the topic of “the whip system” into the limelight. When asked if they are influenced by their political parties in their decision-making, all MP interviewees but three, say yes (Field Interview, 2019). Various reasons are given for responding with the affirmative, yet, the practice of the whip system cuts across all answers. “The whip system allows parliamentarians to tow the lines of their parties. It is expected”, one MP interviewee affirms. In their views, this system has its pros and cons. For pros, an MP interviewee who sounds like a strong advocate for the whip system argues, “sometimes, individual MPs have wrong perceptions or inadequate information on certain policies so as such towing the party line is best since it is collective minded”. Likewise, one insists, “some of us came to parliament recently so lack knowledge on how some similar policies fared in the past. Therefore, towing the party line in such cases is best for the country since it has a historical ring to it”. “...we don’t understand but we have faith”, another confesses (Field Interview, 2019). For the cons, some express their deep frustration with the system when one reveals, “on some occasions, I walk out or give excuses just to avoid voting on issues I personally would not have voted for but for party sake, I must” (Field Interview, 2019). In another’s view, “as a party, we must think of the whole population and not party sympathisers or supporters but sadly that is the situation we find ourselves”. He adds, “…I will not blame political parties for this situation 87 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh though because the constitution we work with has provided breeding grounds for such things, especially with the majoritarian rule”. On the topic of majoritarian rule, one MP interviewee discloses, “this system we have adopted today makes it difficult for MPs, both majority and minority, to reach crucial agreements since deadlocks are broken with special votes and with that the majority always wins” (Field Interview, 2019). “…well, I must add that there have been some few instances where the majority has lost a vote”, he intersects. The reason he gives for these instances is that “sometimes, MPs from the majority in parliament intentionally seclude themselves by not attending that fateful sitting”, though he admits, “it rarely happens”. It is also important to mention that all political party executive interviewees confirm their influence on parliamentarians when asked if they do (Field Interview, 2019). 3.3 National Development Planning in Ghana There have been numerous pathways to development in Africa. For years, these tendencies have been tailored toward particular ideologies such as capitalism, socialism or to some extent African socialism (Blair, 1993). In the search of the factors impeding Africa’s development, Achille produces two factors responsible for inhibiting development in Sub-Saharan Africa: First and foremost, there is a persistent structural constraint, which impedes the sustained growth. Secondly, there is a lack of leadership more explicitly, lack of development behaviour-oriented leadership and good governance to catalyse the process. In fact, good leadership envisions development and endeavours, sound public finance management; hence public expenditure management as a tool to attain its development vision, with efficiency and discipline in the best interest of the country (2007, p. 54). Similarly, Ghana, ever since the start of her existence, has had similar issues with development up to now (Gyampo, 2016a). Ghana, before and after her birth, has experienced a very long history and tradition of national development planning from the time of the British Governor, Sir 88 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Guggisberg, to the era of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and now, the latest under the fourth republic (Vordzorgbe & Caiquo, 2001; Amoako-Tuffour & Armah, 2008). Before independence, two major development plans had been undertaken in the country, “The Guggisberg Development Plan (1919-1929)” and “The Burns Development Plan (1950-1960)”. After independence, there were other plans such as the Nkrumah’s Developmental Plans (1951- 1966), The Two Year Development Plan of the National Liberation Council, The One Year Development Plan of the Progress Party, The Five Year Development Plan of the National Redemption Council and The Provisional National Defence Council’s (PNDC) Economic Recovery Programme (Killick, 2010; Tandoh-Offin, 2013). With the inception of the fourth republic, developmental plans under each regime include, Vision 2020, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I, 2002-2005), the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006-2009), Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I (GSGDA I, 2010-2013), Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda II (GSGDA II, 2014-2017) and currently the seven- year Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development which started from 2018 (Field Interview, 2019). 3.3.1 National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) 3.3.1.1 Legal Framework Underpinning the Establishment of the Commission The 1992 constitution of Ghana in Article 36 (5) specifies that “within two years after assuming office, the President shall present to parliament a coordinated programme of economic and social development policies including agricultural and industrial programmes at all levels and in all regions of Ghana” (Constitution of Ghana, 1992). Correspondingly, various presidents in the 89 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh fourth republic have presented before the floor of Parliament a document containing their social and economic development policies under a couched theme. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) was set up under Article 86 and 87 of the 1992 Constitution as part of the Executive. The National Development Planning Commission Act, 1994, (Act 479) and the National Development Planning (System) Act, 1994, (Act 480), gives the core legal framework for the setting up of the commission and the execution of its functions (NDPC, 2015). Other laws of relevance to the commission’s work are: the Local Government Act (Act 462) 1993, Local Government Service Act (Act 656) 2003, Petroleum Revenue Management Act (Act 815) 2011, Civil Service Act (PNDC Law 327) 1993, and Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund Act, (Act 877), 2014. (NDPC, 2015). 3.3.1.2 Composition and Functions of the Commission Article 86 of the 1992 Constitution states that the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) shall consist of the following (Commissioners): • A chairman who shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State; • The Minister responsible for Finance and such other Ministers of State as the President may appoint; • The Government Statistician; • The Governor of the Bank of Ghana; • One representative from each region of Ghana appointed by the Regional Coordinating Council of the region; and 90 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh • Such other persons as may be appointed by the President having regard to their knowledge and experience of the relevant areas and roles pertaining to development, economic, social, environmental and spatial planning (NDPC, 2015). In accordance with the provisions under Article 87 of the Constitution, the core mandate of the commission is to “advise the President on development planning policy and strategy” and “at the request of the President or Parliament, or on its own initiative,” execute the following: • Study and make strategic analyses of macro-economic and structural reform options; • Make proposals for the development of multi-year rolling plans taking into consideration the resource potential and comparative advantage of the different districts of Ghana; • Make proposals for the protection of the natural and physical environment; • Make proposals for ensuring the even development of the districts of Ghana by the effective utilisation of available resources; and • Monitor, evaluate and coordinate development policies, programmes and projects (NDPC, 2015). 3.3.2 National Development Policies Under the Fourth Republic 3.3.2.1 Ghana’s Vision 2020 Under constitutional provisions, Ghana’s first president of the fourth republic, Jerry John Rawlings, in 1995, presented to parliament the first policy framework for a long-term national development plan called, Ghana-Vision 2020 (The First Step: 1996-2000). The aim of this plan was to transform the country into a middle-income one in 25 years. More so, the framework set a precedent on the Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development Policies, where 91 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the Directive Principles of State Policy expects every president to hand into Parliament within two years of assuming office (NPDC, 2015). A medium-term plan, together with a “Programme of Action for the First Medium-Term Plan (1997-2000)”, was subsequently generated. However, both experienced delays in production, with the Programme of Action being released late in June 1998. With the change in government in 2001, general long-term plan, Vision 2020, was abandoned. The main reason given by the new government for the cancellation of the plan was that there were persistent and extensive disparities between plan goals and the actual performance as amongst other reasons. 3.3.2.2 Beyond Vision 2020 Vision 2020 was replaced by the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I, 2002-2005) and thereafter the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006-2009) (NDPC, 2015). The substitution of ‘Ghana’ with ‘Growth’ in GPRS II was informed by what an NDPC interviewee describes as “…a needed redistribution of resources and focus since it was realised that there was increasing inequality even with reduced poverty” (Field interview, 2019). With the change in government in 2009, GPRS II was replaced by the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda: 2010-2013 (GSGDA I), which was succeeded by the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda: 2014-2017 (GSGDA II) (NDPC, 2015). The emphasis on “shared growth” was established on the new government’s belief that elevated growth by itself would not reduce or end poverty unless it is followed by policies to make growth inclusive or ‘shared’ (Field Interview, 2019). As such, the GSGDAs showcased a combination of principles of equity and the standards of high rates of economic growth that characterised GPRS I and GPRS II, respectively. Today, the new government has replaced GSGDA II with the seven-year 92 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development which started in 2018 (Field Interview, 2019). 3.3.3 An Analysis of National Development Planning in Ghana’s Fourth Republic When asked about Ghana’s approach to national development planning since 1992, a commissioner at the NDPC in answering states, “We have been trying to use a participatory approach with all sections of society. The government sector, civil society, and academia are all mobilised towards our national development” (Field Interview, 2019). Contrary to this view, in his “Winner-takes-all” series, Gyampo in his analysis partly equates the issues with Ghana’s development planning today with the “…limited public awareness and low participation of opposition parties and civil societies” (2016a, p. 4). As reported by him, “even though there is a mechanism that promotes inclusivity in development planning, it exists mostly in theory” (Gyampo, 2016a, p. 3). He then quotes an interviewee in his work, a Planning Analyst at the NDPC, who says, “we do not have resources to meaningfully organise seminars and workshops and the few that are organised, the quality of participation is always poor and nothing to write home about” (Gyampo, 2016b, p. 4). With the question on whether Ghana’s vision of development has been balanced, both interviewees from the NDPC believe it is, with one making reference to the “Directive Principles of State Policy” which in his view, “…makes sure that we cover all aspects of development so it is balanced” (Field Interview, 2019). With regards to “The Directive Principles of State Policy”, Article 34 (6e) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, states that “the State shall take appropriate measures to ensure that whenever practicable, a government shall 93 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh continue and execute projects and programmes commenced by the previous government”. Also, in Article 36 (1), the State shall take all necessary action to ensure that the national economy is managed in such a manner as to maximise the rate of economic development and to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every person in Ghana and to provide adequate means of livelihood and suitable employment and public assistance to the needy” (Judicial Service of Ghana, 2019). Now, where it gets interesting is on the issue of continuity in policies championed to drive Ghana’s development. All interviewees in this section, both the NDPC commissioners and the think-tanks, are of the view that there has been no continuity in policies with regards to national development planning in Ghana (Field Interview, 2019). A think-tank interviewee indicates, “ on continuity of policies, it is more than obvious that there is none and history is witness to that fact. One which calls for no debate on this issue”. However, an NDPC commissioner, despite vexed on the problem of continuity, adds, “but it has been changing with the seasons”. In explaining this point, he insists that with specific policies like it was with the vision 2020 and the subsequent ones, with the exception GPRS I which was later changed to GPRS II, the various governments who brought their policies stuck with them. “However, true, in respect to intergovernmental continuity there is none”, he admits (Field Interview, 2019). This then begs the question on the effectiveness of the NDPC. In mentioning some remarkable achievements for Ghana’s vision to development, some strides like “ poverty reduction, especially when we started the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is a huge achievement. Ghana was one of the first countries to reach that target”, an NDPC commissioner projects (Field Interview, 2019). The other, also speaks of the “National Health Insurance Scheme as a great feat”. He pinpoints this achievement as “…a policy subsequent administrations after Kufuor’s regime continued so there is some consensus of sorts on that”. 94 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh All think-tanks but one on the subject of the effectiveness of the NDPC, share a common answer (Field Interview, 2019). Three (3) of them maintain that the NDPC is not effective while the other is of the opposite view. The main reason given for their ineffectiveness is the lack of continuity. According to one, Rawlings’ PNDC era saw a lot of local government reforms carried to the letter. He got people who could do the job for him, however, ever since democracy came into the scene in 1992, which policies have you seen to be successful? In the first year, the government will talk of austerity measures, in the second year, no money so nothing happens, the third year, somehow they start releasing something and the election year, which is the fourth year, the market is flooded. As such, there is no long term planning like Kwame Nkrumah had and during Chairman Rawlings’ time as well (Field Interview, 2019). On another’s account, I think Ghanaians and the larger society are losing out on many benefits because projects are stopped…There are lots of examples. I travel to Ho quite often and during the late days of the Mahama administration, finally, the renovation on the last stretch of road leading to Ho was started but work stopped again for a number of years which has recently been started again. I do not see the rationale behind that. However, still, on this same topic, the dissenting think-tank makes a compelling argument, …I do not know whether it is on the basis of laws that establish the NDPC and the roles they are supposed to play. If that is the case, I think they have lived up to their mandate. They do national development planning from national, regional to local levels. They have set up a mechanism of accountability to ensure that those plans are respected. They collate views which are then turned into policy in the short, medium and long terms for the country. He continues, After they have done that, the other part is where the problem lies. The question now becomes how effective have the new governments made the NDPC in terms of policy continuity. These (NDPC) are bureaucratic elites who are minded to development issues and public policy. If others (governments) come and they want to change the set targets of the commission, how is it the NDPC’s fault? The analogy given is confirmed by the NDPC commissioners, who shift the blame on the ineffectiveness of national development planning to subsequent governments (Field Interview, 2019). This brings the question of how political elites have affected national development to light. Here, an NDPC interviewee makes the point, “I think most of our visions have been 95 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh politically motivated rather than technically motivated” (Field Interview, 2019). He further enunciates this point by providing some examples, For example, the last two regimes, Atta Mill’s “Better Ghana Agenda”, I will say was superficial since it lacked any comprehensive meaning. Does adding one borehole make Ghana better in the larger sense? Also, on Akufo-Addo’s “Ghana Beyond Aid”, it came out of his own political vision, and not nationally motivated. In fact, how can we be talking about “Ghana Beyond Aid”, when aid is the country’s lifeline presently? Although in agreement with him, the other NDPC interviewee speaks of some recent efforts made in the hopes of achieving consensus on national development planning between the political parties. Some few years ago, we tried to formulate a national 40-year developmental plan. What we tried to do was to bring representatives from all political parties to form a group to go around the country to have a census on what kind of future we want for ourselves. That approach was critical that we try to bring in all the various political parties so they have a common agenda….it is something the Constitutional Review Committee in their findings, recommended (Field Interview, 2019). The outcome of the recommendation given by the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), particularly on national development, is what Gyampo refers to as “one palpable feature and result of Winner-takes-all politics” (2016a, p. 2). “Winner-Takes-All” politics, in his definition, “connotes an extremely divisive and partisan sub-culture that excludes all other citizens who are not part of the ruling party from national governance and decision making in a manner that polarises the nation and dissipates the much needed talents and brains for national development” (2016a, p. 2). Even though the government accepted the recommendations made by CRC for “a comprehensive long term, strategic multi-year rolling National Development Plan”, it did not side with the provision for the development plan to be well entrenched in the constitution. The reason given by the government was that the effects of those propositions would lead to “a command model of development planning and tie the hands of successive governments to ideological interests and 96 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh policies of a particular political party” (Gyampo, 2016a, p. 1). Gyampo makes the case that, “ an entrenched plan can promote inclusive governance, policy continuity and accelerated national development” (2016a, p. 1). On a related note, according to a think-tank interviewee, there is a growing phenomenon where political parties come with their manifestos into government and are immediately transferred into public policy. “…so you will see a lot more of ‘ticking’ by any political party for the last 6-7 years when it comes to policy implementation” (Field interview, 2019), he declares. ‘Ticking’, as used in his submission, refers to “the actual tick to show they are meeting their manifesto promises”. “…to an extent where there are no promises to suggest the continuation of all government projects and you see a lot of variations”, he concludes. In another’s view, they stick to their manifestos but “ I think that on economic issues, there is some form of a little bit consensus”. This consensus, to him, is seen in situations where “governments come into power and decide to continue some commitments already signed with international institutions like the IMF by the previous governments…they even extend it in many cases” (Field Interview, 2019). The study is then hit with another twist stemming from a controversial argument raised by a senior civil servant interviewee at the parliament. He argues, “this analogy goes to invalidate the question of elite consensus in Ghana since the consensus being reached is with supranational and international organisations on their programs and not ours as Ghanaians. Are those policies formulated by our governments?” (Field Interview, 2019). He goes on further, to me, the question of elite consensus on national development issues should not be judged on consensus reached by subsequent governments but between subsequent governments and international institutions since our policies ever since the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, has been based on underlining conditions existent in the international system at any given point in time. Form the NLC, which unlike Nkrumah, ascribed to liberal standards dictated by the USA in a cold war period, to a socialist PNDC government which was forced to swallow the bitter pill of policies emanating from the Bretton Woods institutions in the form of Structural Adjustment 97 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Programme (SAP). This was due to the defeat of the Soviet Union and the institutionalisation of a unipolar world with the USA as the superpower. Now, these same institutions tell us not to recruit in the public sector, reduce public spending which we call “our policies” and you talk of elite consensus on developmental issues? Come on! Let us cut a clear line between rhetoric and reality. 3.4 Conclusion This chapter starts with the provision of some operational benchmarks for examining elite consensus in Ghana’s fourth republic. In total, these benchmarks are six (6) and are spread across the examination of elite consensus at the levels of political parties, elections and the legislature. At the level of political parties, the benchmarks used are internal consensus within political parties, elite pact and inter-party consensus building, mutual respect for the rules of the political game as well as the absence of adversary politics. At the level of elections, mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game and an effective conflict resolution mechanism well entrenched in the constitution to handle electoral conflicts amongst political elites, are the benchmarks used. With the section dedicated to elite consensus in the legislature, the benchmarks used are the presence of the elite culture of accommodation, bargaining and compromises as well as subdued partisanship. The next section looked at was national development planning in Ghana. Here, a historical overview of development planning in Ghana is given. This starts by touching on development planning from the time of Guggisberg in 1919, through to the PNDC era, but with much focus on the planning initiated ever since the start of the fourth republic in 1992. In evaluating elite consensus amongst subsequent governments in the fourth republic, the NDPC, an institution, part of the executive arm of government which advice, plans and implements national development policies, is examined. But first, the composition and functions, as well as a brief historical overview of national developmental policies of each regime under the 98 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh commission, are established. These include the Vision 2020 of the Rawlings administration, before the GPRS I & II, GSGDA I and GSGDA II as well as the Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development of the Kufuor, Atta Mills, Mahama and Akufo-Addo administrations respectively. Finally, with the analysis of national development planning in Ghana’s fourth republic, focus areas like the approach to development in the fourth republic, the balanced nature of Ghana’s vision to development, the issue of policy continuity, the role of political elites in developmental planning and the effectiveness of the NDPC are discussed under this section. 99 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh References Achille, T. (2007). Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy for Sustained Growth to Breakthrough in the 21st Century: Revisiting the Development Literature and Paving the Way Ahead. Retrieved July 14, 2019, from A World Bank Institute Working Paper: http://www.worldbank.org Afrimap, OSIWA, & IDEG. (2007). Ghana: Democracy and Political Participation. Dakar: Open Society Initiative for West Africa and Institute for Democratic Governance. Agyeman-Duah, B. (2005). Elections and Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Critical Perspectives (18). Ahorsu, K. (2015). Multi-Party Democracy and Conflict Management: The Case of Ghana. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 57- 92). Accra: Black Mask. Amoako-Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (2008). Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa: Perspectives and Lessons from Ghana. Lexington, Kentucky: Lexington Books Publication. Anderson, C., & Mendes, S. (2005). Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes, Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential. British Journal of Political Science, 35. A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. National Democratic Congress (NDC). Accra. Thursday, July 4, 2019. A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. New Patriotic Party (NPP). Accra. Thursday, July 4, 2019. A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. Conventions Peoples Party (CPP). Accra. Wednesday, June 26, 2019 A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Senior Research Fellow. Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD). University of Ghana. Tuesday, June 18, 2019. A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Senior Lecturer. Department of Political Science. University of Ghana. Friday, June 21, 2019. A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Researcher. Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES Ghana). Accra. Wednesday, July 3, 2019. A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Researcher. Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana). Accra. Friday, July 12, 2019. Aryee, J. (1998). The 1996 General Elections. In J. Aryee, Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Accra: University of Ghana, Dept. of Political Science. 100 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Blair, T. (1993). The Poverty of Planning. London: Redwood Press Limited. Bokpe, S. J. (2010). The Price of Breaking Away. Africa Watch, p. 22. Constitution of Ghana, 1992. Frempong, A.K.D (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951-2016). Accra, Ghana: Digibooks Ghana Ltd. Frempong, A.K.D.(2012). Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic: in the Context of the Post-Cold War Africa. Accra: Alex K. D. Frempong. Frempong, A.K.D (2007a). Constitution-making and Constitutional Rule in Ghana. In J. Ayee, Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development (pp. 51-76). Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Frempong, A.K.D. (2007b). The Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal State. In K. Boafo-Arthur, Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Dakar: Cordesria Books. Gyampo, R. (2017). Assessing the Quality of Parliamentary Representation in Ghana. African Review, 44, 69 Gyampo, R., & Gans-Lartey, E. (2018). Assessing Internal Party Democracy in Africa. Retrieved 2019 March, from Research Gate Web site: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford_Gyampo/publication/326422749_ASSESSING_ INTERNAL_PARTY_DEMOCRACY_IN_AFRICA/links/5b4c948545851519b4c10f58/ASSESSING- INTERNAL-PARTY-DEMOCRACY-IN-AFRICA?origin=publication_detail Gyampo, R., Graham, E., & Asare, B. (2017). Political Vigilantism and Democratic Governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic. African Review, 112-135. Gyampo, R. (2016a). Dealing with Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case of National Development Planning. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA Ghana). Gyampo, R. (2016b). The State of Political Institution in Ghana. Tema: Digibooks Ghana Ltd. Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1991). Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery. Boulder, Colorado: Rienner. 101 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004). Africa: The Quality of Political Reform. In E. Gyimah-Boadi, Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress (pp. 5-27). London: Lynne Rienner. Jonah, K. (2005). Inter-Party Dialogue in Ghana. Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). Judicial Service of Ghana. (2019). The Directive Principles of State Policy. Retrieved July 14, 2019, from Judicial Service of Ghana Web site: https://judicial.gov.gh/index.php/the-directive- principles-of-state-policy Killick, T. (2010). Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana. New York: Routledge Publishers. Kotey, N. A. (1995). The Supreme Court and Conflict Resolution in the Fourth Republic. In M. Oquaye, Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Ghana (pp. 277-280). Accra: Gold Type Ltd. La Verle, B. (1994). Ghana: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress Meissner, K. (2010). Elections and Conflict in Ghana. International Policy Analysis, 1-10. NDPC. (2015). Introduction to National Development Planning Commission. Retrieved July 13, 2019, from National Development Planning Commission: https://s3-us-west- 2.amazonaws.com/new-ndpc- static1/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2017/10/24/NDPC_Final_Brochure.pdf Ninsin, K. A. (1998). Ghana: Transition to Democracy. Dakar: Freedom Publications. O'Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press. Osei, A. (2014). From Conflict to Consensus? Elite Integration and Democracy in Ghana. Comparative Sociology, 13(4), 503-530. Osei, A. (2015). Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach. African Affairs(114/457), 529-554. Ozer, O., & Zheng, Y. (2017). Trust and Trustworthiness. In K. Donohue, E. Katok, & S. Leider, The Handbook of Behavioral Operations (pp. 287-312). Wiley. Paalo, S. (2017). Political Party Youth Wings and Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case of Ghana. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 8(1), 1-14. Robins, B. G. (2010). What is Trust? A Multidisciplinary Review, Critique and Synthesis. Sociology Compass, 10(10), 972-986. 102 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Tandoh-Offin, P. (2013). Development Planning in Ghana Since 1992: Implications for the Decentralization . Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy, 1(2), 93-107. Ten (10) Members of Parliament. Personal Interview. Ghana’s Current Legislature (2017-Date). Accra. Thursday June 13, 2019 – Monday July 15, 2019. The Commonwealth Observer Group. (2016). Ghana General Elections: 7 December 2016. The Commonwealth. London: The Commonwealth Secretariat. Tutor2u. (2018). Adversary Politics. Retrieved July 14, 2019, from Tutor2u: https://www.tutor2u.net/politics/reference/adversary-politics Two (2) Senior Civil Servants. Personal Interview. Parliament of Ghana. Accra. Monday 15, July 2019. Two (2) Officials. Personal Interview. National Development Planning Commission (NDPC). Accra. Wednesday July 17, 2019. Vordzorgbe, S., & Caiquo, B. (2001). Report on Status Review of National Strategies for Sustainable Development in Ghana. Accra. . 103 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh CHAPTER FOUR SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 Introduction This final chapter provides a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study. It collates the findings derived from chapters one to three and based on the study’s research objectives, draws some conclusions. This goes to ascertain the validity of the study’s hypothesis. 4.2 Summary of Research Findings This research aimed to ascertain if there was elite consensus in Ghana and how their interactions affected democracy and national development so it became imperative that we understood what elite consensus involved in relation to democracy. Previous chapters implied that elite consensus is a broad agreement on how to govern a society by those with societal influence and power with the focus on those operating at the levels of political parties, elections, the legislature and national development planning under Ghana’s fourth republic. In any democratic dispensation, elites agree and respect all the tenets of democracy, of which Higley says are the desiderata of liberal democracy, and this is affirmed in all the primary and secondary data used in the study. 104 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The study also highlighted operational benchmarks used to gauge whether Ghana has elite consensus or not, and how this affected national development with the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) of the fourth republic under the microscope. Respondents who participated were think-tanks, political party executives, parliamentarians, and officials of the NDPC. Below is the summary of research findings per the benchmarks used: Elite Consensus at the Level of Political Parties • Internal Consensus within Political Parties The study confirmed that internal conflicts within political parties were a big issue which is seen in the cases of both the NDC and NPP. The corruption allegations, the undemocratic practice during parliamentary primaries and the lack of consultancy in decision-making and the chaotic nature of party primaries caused by key party figures losing elections are examples of internal conflicts of the NDC and NPP respectively. These have caused deep party divides within the NDC and the NPP. • Elite Pact and Inter-Party Consensus Building There are numerous evidences of elite pacts in Ghana’s fourth republic such as the agreement reached by the PNDC government and the opposition in reinstalling democratic governance in 1992, the institutionalization of the IPAC after the chaos surrounding the 1992 elections and the Accra Declaration, where presidential candidates of the 2016 elections signed a peace pact to eschew electoral violence before and after elections. The failure of the opposition in accepting the 1992 presidential election results and the subsequent boycott of the parliamentary elections the next year were signs of failure in inter- 105 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh party consensus building. However, some saw the above examples as a score for inter-party consensus since the opposition parties united to boycott the impending parliamentary election. This led to the birth of the IPAC, which chalked up successes until the infamous 2012 elections when the NPP refused to accept the election results. • Respect for the Rules of the Political Game This section provided us with evidence of politicians respecting the rules of the political game, although at the beginning of the fourth republic (1992), this was not so- the failure of the 1992 elections due to disagreements between the incumbent government and the opposition on transition modalities. This led to the creation of IPAC in 1994, which has often been credited as the brain behind Ghana’s electoral successes since 1996. Its basic shortfall came during the 2012 elections when the NPP refused to accept the results on the grounds of misinformation and disagreements. However, the NPP accepted the verdict of the Supreme Court after the disagreement which is seen as great respect for the rules of the game. Also, the peaceful transition of power from President JJ Rawlings qualifies as an instance where respect was given to the rules of the political game. • Absence of Adversary Politics Both the think-tanks and political party executives interviewed acknowledged the existence of adversary politics but were divided on the issue of how it affected democratic consolidation in Ghana. The think-tanks and one political party executive interviewee believed it dented politics in Ghana which could have a snowball effect on democracy if not curbed. Adversary politics in the form of political vigilantism was cited as a major threat to Ghana’s democratic development. 106 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh The rest of the political party respondents believed otherwise because according to them much is being done in the form of encouraging inter-party consensus, anti-vigilantism campaigns, among others. Elite Consensus at the Level of Elections • Mutual Respect for the Rules of the Electoral Game The peaceful transition in power since the inception of the fourth republic demonstrated a high level of mutual respect for the rules of the electoral game. Also, the creation of the IPAC which collates the differing views of political parties into electoral reforms acceptable by all is seen as an electoral feat in Ghana’s fourth republic. The IPAC has received praises in publications of numerous scholars and respondents of this study. However, the aftermath of the 2012 elections is said to have marred their integrity and cast doubts on their reliability and relevance in subsequent elections. • An Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanism Well Entrenched in the Constitution There are numerous conflict resolution mechanisms entrenched in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana which include the Electoral Commission (EC), National Media Commission (NMC), National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the Judiciary. These institutions promote human rights, aid in the amicable resolution of conflicts and in the consolidation of democracy. However, their effectiveness have been questioned. The NMC is said to be highly inefficient since contents on the media are not well regulated. CHRAJ is described as not checking leaders 107 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh who abuse their power while the NCCE is said to have failed in the promotion and advocacy of civic education. The main reasons given for their ineffectiveness are lack of capital and their subservience to the ruling government. Elite Consensus at the Level of the Legislature • The Presence of the Elite Culture of Accommodation, Bargaining and Compromises On the topic of ‘Trust’ amongst parliamentarians in Ghana’s legislature, all the think-tanks interviewees believed parliamentarians trust each other only at a personal level, not on national issues. However, all senior civil servant interviewees believed there is trust among parliamentarians at both personal and national levels. This assertion is corroborated by a majority of the MP interviewees. However, just like the thoughts of the think-tanks, they believed it to be at a more personal level than on national issues. On consensus building on national issues, all think-tanks believed there is no consensus on issues of national importance but rather issues that benefit MPs collectively and not on those affecting the masses. The MPs, on the other hand, claim there is consensus on national issues, especially at the committee and leadership levels. Notwithstanding, when issues in parliament are thorny and partisan in nature, deadlocks are not broken by consensus but with a vote and the majority always wins. This is according to the MP respondents. • Subdued Partisanship Many argue that the level of partisanship in Ghana’s legislature is very high. This is said to be evident in the subservience of the legislature to the executive and political parties through the 108 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh practice of majoritarian rule and the whip system. Genuine minority views on such issues are undermined since the majority always carries the day in this system and as such negatively affects consensus building in parliament. National Development Planning in Ghana The study found out that there is no policy continuity with regards to national development in Ghana. Subsequent governments in the fourth republic have been blamed for not continuing the policies of their predecessors which has led to the inefficiency of the NDPC. 4.3 Conclusions The study started with an aim, which was to investigate elite consensus in Ghana and its effects on democratic and national development. To reach this goal, some research questions and objectives were developed to guide this study. After the acquisition of knowledge and evidence, there are enough bases to make some key conclusions. These conclusions are arranged in order of the research questions and objectives of the study. • Elite consensus is indeed the agreement between the influential actors in society to obey the rules of conduct governing their interactions with each other. • A democracy can only be developed and consolidated with a consensually united elite. • Political parties in Ghana’s fourth republic lack consensus within their parties. • Elite consensus amongst political parties is at an appreciable level, mainly because IPAC is currently losing its relevance. • Elections have been highly successful in the fourth republic partly due to IPAC’s efforts and elite consensus in elections. 109 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh • Ghanaian parliamentarians trust each other hence fall into the category of horizontal integration and this corroborates the findings of scholars like Anja Osei. • Ghanaian parliamentarians have a strong consensus at a personal level and not on national issues and thus score low on the scale of vertical integration. • On national development planning in Ghana, there is no consensus amongst elites on the best policies for the country and as such led to policy discontinuity between subsequent governments of the fourth republic. The study portrays the topic, elite consensus in a country, as not exclusive to a single aspect of the political life but only possible within a larger framework. This is proven by the study since the findings suggest a keen association between consensus building from the levels of political parties, elections, the legislature to national development planning. They are all interconnected in the sense that they bear overlapping tendencies. Here, a lack or abundance of consensus in one inherently affects consensus in another. As such, elite consensus in a country cannot be generalized if consensus within an aspect of political life is deficient. In light of the above conclusions, the findings generated confirm the hypothesis of the study. Indeed, Ghana lacks an enduring elite consensus which has negatively affected national development. 110 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 4.4 Recommendations The fact that there is a strong bond among elites in Ghana on the general principles of governance but not on national development issues hold two major implications on the country’s future socio-political landscape. Politically, it is going to be difficult to break the current political system in Ghana’s fourth republic. This is because there is a tight grip on constitutionalism by the political elites, unlike the preceding republics. The large consensus on the principles of governance means democratic laurels as enjoyed by Ghana will continue to thrive. However, socio-economically, since elite consensus in Ghana has not yet translated into national development, it will be difficult to change the current plight of citizens. From the study, it is seen that the periodic exercise of changing political leaders every four years has had less effect on changing the current developmental problems. This is because the root of Ghana’s woes is the existing structure (systems of governance like the constitution) and not the agency (political power wielded by politicians). The structure inhibits political leaders to be accountable to the masses. With a stable political atmosphere like it is in Ghana’s fourth republic, there will be no viable reason to instigate any revolution like it ensued in its previous republics since harmony at the top trickles down to the masses. Thus, the continuous inverse relationship between democratic development and national development. Nonetheless, the researcher puts forward the following recommendations based on the findings of the research: • A Third Force in the Political Arena: There is the need for a third force in Ghana’s political arena. Ever since the start of the fourth republic, the dominance of the NDC and the NPP has portrayed Ghana as a two-party state and as such made it possible for the 111 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh phenomena of majoritarian rule and the whip system to thrive. With an active third party in parliament, the structure within which such phenomena thrives will be highly unstable. This will force a lot of compromises and consensus building amongst parliamentarians as well as between themselves and the executive. With time, a third party in the political arena will dilute and eliminate majoritarian rule and the whip system in parliament. • Constitutional Amendment: From the study, the recent trends of adversary politics is seen as a threat to subsequent elections. More so, in recent times, decisions taken at the IPAC level is not adhered to by some political parties since those decisions are not bound by law. This is an imminent threat not only to electoral politics in Ghana but democracy as a whole. As such, the IPAC must be made constitutional so decisions taken become legally binding. This will force all political parties to respect the mutually accepted decisions emanating from discussions and compromises reached through this platform. With that, subsequent elections will continue to be successful. Also, the constitutional mandate which allows a majority of ministers to be taken from parliament must be scrubbed off. This provision serves as a luring mechanism for political parties and the executive to ensure parliamentarians tow party-lines. With the eradication of this provision, parliamentarians will be allowed to give objective analyses on policies during discussions and deliberations in parliament. • Effective Civic Education: The lack of civic education is undoubtedly a major problem in Ghana. Many Ghanaians are not well informed about their rights and responsibilities as citizens. This has created apathy and the dwindling sense of patriotism, especially among 112 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh the youth. Civic education must not only be limited to the NCCE but also political parties, schools and every public institution. They must be tasked with educating citizens on what it means to be a Ghanaian. This will make citizens well informed when making some critical decisions like voting and provide a better understanding of the country’s goals. In the long run, patriotism will be uplifted and apathy eschewed. • Procuring a National Agenda on National development Planning: As revealed by the study, there have been recommendations for a national agenda with which subsequent ruling governments must refer to in enacting policies for national development. However, these recommendations have not been considered by the respective governments. It is imperative for the constitution to harbour a long-term national development plan for Ghana. One which spells out what Ghana is, who Ghanaians are, what the values of the country are, what the national goals are locally and in the international system and with this knowledge, draw up a long-term national development plan from which political parties will draw for their manifestos. The NDPC, along with the various political parties in the country must meet and come out with this holistic plan. This will not only ensure policy continuity but also engage the right policies needed for a uniform ethno-regional development. • Effective Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: The ineffectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms like the NCCE, CHRAJ AND NMC has been associated with the lack of capital. These institutions are primal to the very survival of Ghana’s democracy and as such must be accorded such importance. They must be highly resourced in order for them 113 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh to judiciously execute their mandate as prescribed by law. In providing requisite funding, it makes them more effective and as such better poised to safeguarding Ghana’s cherished democracy. 114 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh BIBLIOGRAPHY A. BOOKS/ BOOK SECTIONS Afrimap, OSIWA, & IDEG. (2007). Ghana: Democracy and Political Participation. Dakar: Open Society Initiative for West Africa and Institute for Democratic Governance. Ahorsu, K. (2015). Multi-Party Democracy and Conflict Management: The Case of Ghana. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 57-92). Accra: Black Mask. Aidoo, T. M. (2008). Political Stability in Ghana: since the 1992 Re-Democratization Wave. Germany: VDM & Co. Amoako-Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (2008). Poverty Reduction Strategies in Africa: Perspectives and Lessons from Ghana. Lexington, Kentucky: Lexington Books Publication. Antwi-Danso, V. (2015). Democracy and Good Governance: A Sine-Qua-Non to Political Stability and Socio-Economic Development in Africa. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State (pp. 1-22). Accra: Black Mask. Aryee, J. (1998). The 1996 General Elections. In J. Aryee, Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Accra: University of Ghana, Dept. of Political Science. Blair, T. (1993). The Poverty of Planning. London: Redwood Press Limited. Bluwey, G. (1998). State Organizations in the Transition to Constitutional Democracy. (K. Ninsin, Ed.) Accra: Freedom Publications. Boafo-Arthur, K. (1991). The International Community and Ghana's Transition to Democracy. (N. K.A., Ed.) Accra: Freedom Publications. Bottomore. (1964). Elites and Society. Great Britain: Penguin Books. Borchert, J. (2010). "They Ain't Making Elites Like They Used to": The Never Ending Trouble with Democratic Elitism. (H. Best, & J. Higley, Eds.) Leiden, Boston: BRILL. Burnheim, J. (1985). Is Democracy Possible? Berkeley: California University Press. Chan, S. (2002). Liberalism, Democracy and Development. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge. Clapham, C. (1998). Third World Politics: Introduction. London and Sydney: Croom Helm. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Dahl, R. (1963). A Perfect Democratic Theory. Chicago: Pheonix. Daloz, J. (2003). "Big Men" in sub-Saharan Africa: How Elites Accumulate Positions and Resources. (M. Dogan, Ed., & E. C. Power, Trans.) Leiden, Boston: BRILL. David, H. (2006). Models of Democracy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. (1999). Democratization in Africa. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press. Diamond, L., Linz, J., & Lipset, S. (1995). Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. Drah, F. (1993). Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Accra: Woeli Publishing Services. Engelstad, F. (2010). Democratic Elitism: Conflict and Consensus. (H. Best, & J. Higley, Eds.) Massachusetts: Brill, Leiden and Boston. Field, G., & Higley, J. (1980). Elitism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Frempong, A.K.D. (2017). Elections in Ghana (1951-2016). Accra, Ghana: Digibooks Ghana Ltd. Frempong, A.K.D. (2012). Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic: in the Context of the Post-Cold War Africa. Accra: Alex K. D. Frempong. Frempong, A.K.D (2007a). Constitution-making and Constitutional Rule in Ghana. In J. Ayee, Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development, Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Frempong, A.K.D. (2007b). The Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal State. In K. Boafo-Arthur, Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State. Dakar: Cordesria Books. Gebe, B. Y. (2015). Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: Toward Enforcement of Policy Instruments. In B. Y. Gebe (Ed.), Constitutionalism, Democratic Governance and the African State, Accra: Black Mask. Grofman, B., & Lijphart, A. (Eds.). (1986). Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press. Gyampo, R. (2016b). The State of Political Institution in Ghana. Tema: Digibooks Ghana Ltd. Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1991). Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery. Boulder, Colorado: Rienner. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004). Africa: The Quality of Political Reform. In E. Gyimah-Boadi, Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress, London: Lynne Rienner. Hagan, G. (1995). Democracy as a Conflictual System- the Needed Cultural Premise. (M. Oquaye, Ed.) Accra: Gold Type. Higley, J., & Burton, M. (2006). Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Higley, J., & Gunter, R. (1992). Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (1986). Eliten and Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik. (M. Kaase, Ed.) Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Hoffmann-Lange, U. (1992). Eliten, Macht und Konflikt in der Bundesrepublik . Opladen: Leske + Budrich Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Ikpe, U. (2010). State-Society Interactions: A Conceptual and Comparative Introduction to Political Sociology. Lagos: Concept Publications Limited. Killick, T. (2010). Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana. New York: Routledge Publishers. Kotey, N. A. (1995). The Supreme Court and Conflict Resolution in the Fourth Republic. In M. Oquaye, Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Ghana, Accra: Gold Type Ltd. La Verle, B. (1994). Ghana: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress Ninsin, K. A. (1998). Ghana: Transition to Democracy. Dakar: Freedom Publications. O'Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press. Oquaye, M. (1993). Law, Justice and the Revolution. (E. Gyamah-Boadi, Ed.) Dakar: Codesria. Ozer, O., & Zheng, Y. (2017). Trust and Trustworthiness. In K. Donohue, E. Katok, & S. Leider, The Handbook of Behavioral Operations, Wiley. Parry, G. (1969). Political Elite. London: George, Allen and Unwin Ltd. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Putnam, R. (1976). The comparative study of political elites. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Satori, G. (1965). Democracy Theory. New York: Praeger. Schumpeter, J. A. (1969). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd. B. JOURNAL ARTICLES Abdulai, A., & Crawford, G. (2010). Consolidating Democracy in Ghana: Progress and Prospects? Democratization, 17(1). Agyeman-Duah, B. (2005). Elections and Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Critical Perspectives (18). Arnon, D. (1995). Parties Law in Democratic Systems of Government. Journal of Legislative Studies, 1. Aryee, J. (2017). Ghana's Elections of 7th December 2016: A Post-Mortem. South African Journal of International Affairs, 24(3). Baker, B. (1998). The Class of 1990: How Have the Autocrat Leaders of Sub-Saharan Africa Fared under Democratization? Third World Quarterly, 19(1). Berman, S. (2007). Lessons from Europe. Journal of Democracy, 18. Bokpe, S. J. (2010). The Price of Breaking Away. Africa Watch, p. 22. Boakye, B. (2018). Electoral Politics in Ghana's 4th Republic (1992-2016) and its Implications on Future Elections. SSRN Electronic Journal. Burton, M., & Higley, J. (1987). Elite Settlements. American Sociological Review. Cammack, P. (1990). A Critical Assessment of the New Elite Paradigm. American Sociological Review, 55(3). Davis, L. (1964, March 17). The Costs of Realism: Contemporary Restatement of Democracy. Western Political Quarterly, 43. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Gould, J., & Szomolanyi, S. (1997). Elite Fragmentation in Industry and the Prospect for Democracy. Intermarium, 1(2). Graham, E., Gyampo, R., Pamphilious, F., & Yobo, E. (2017). The Third Peaceful Transfer of Power and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, 10(5). Gyampo, R. (2015). Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case for Effective Council of State. Journal of Politics and Governance, 4(1-4). Gyampo, R. (2016a). Dealing with Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case of National Development Planning. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA Ghana). Gyampo, R. (2017). Assessing the Quality of Parliamentary Representation in Ghana. African Review, 44, 69. Gyampo, R., Graham, E., & Asare, B. (2017). Political Vigilantism and Democratic Governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic. African Review. Gyamfi-Boadi, E. (2009). Another Step Forward for Ghana. Journal of Democracy, 20(2). Higley, J., & Burton, M. (1989). The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns. American Sociological Review, 54(1). Higley, J., & et al. (1991). Elite Integration in Stable Democracies: A Reconsideration . European Sociological Review , 7(1). Higley, J., & Michael, B. (1998). Elite Settlement and the Taming of Politics. Government and Opposition, 33(1). Ikpe, U. (2008). Obsolescence of Citizens: Theory of Democracy in the Age of Globalization? Unilag Journal of Politics, 4. Kamis, B. (2008, April 1). Book Review: John Higley and Michael Burton, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, 229 pp.): G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order & Imperial Ambition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, 300 pp.). Steven Slaughter, Liberty beyond Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalising Age ( Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 257 pp.). Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 36(2). Karvonen, L. (2007). Party Politics, 13(4). Mueller, S. (2011). Dying to Win: Elections, Political Violence and Institutional Decay in Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Affairs, 29(1). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Oquaye, M. (1995). The Ghanaian Election of 1992 - A Dissenting View. African Affairs, 94(375). Osei, A. (2014). From Conflict to Consensus? Elite Integration and Democracy in Ghana. Comparative Sociology, 13(4). Osei, A. (2015). Elites and Democracy in Ghana: A Social Network Approach. African Affairs(114/457). Paalo, S. (2017). Political Party Youth Wings and Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case of Ghana. International Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 8(1). Robins, B. G. (2010). What is Trust? A Multidisciplinary Review, Critique and Synthesis. Sociology Compass, 10(10). Roustetsaari, I. (2007). Nordic Elite in Comparative Perspective . Comparative Sociology , 6(1- 2). Schmidt, C. (2004). Theoretische und Praktische Aspekte der Eliteforschung . Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies, 36(1). Schmitter, P., & Karl, T. (1991). What Democracy Is...and Is Not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3). Svanikier, J. (2007). Political Elite Circulation: Implications for Leadership Diversity and Democratic Regime Stability in Ghana. Comparative Sociology, 6(1-2). Tandoh-Offin, P. (2013). Development Planning in Ghana Since 1992: Implications for the Decentralization. Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy, 1(2). Whitfield, L. (2009). "Change for a Better Ghana": Party Competition, Institutionalization and Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Elections. African Affairs, 108(433). C. REPORTS/ PAPERS/ DOCUMENTS/ DISSERTATIONS Adenyikor, Priscie D. “The Consolidation of Africa’s Contemporary Democratic Dispensation: The Case of Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire”. Diss. University of Ghana, 2018. Constitution of Ghana, 1992. Danso, Sampson. “Ghana’s Vision for Development: A Case Study of Ghana Vision 2020 and the GPRS I and II”. Thesis. University of Ghana, 2014. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung. (2011). The Law-Making Process in Ghana: Structures and Procedures. Accra: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung Ghana. Jonah, K. (2005). Inter-Party Dialogue in Ghana. Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). Meissner, K. (2010). Elections and Conflict in Ghana. International Policy Analysis. Tanzi, V. (1997, September). The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: A Historical Perspective. IMF Working Paper. Tetteh, Patrick K. “Partisan Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana’s Fourth Republic”. Thesis. University of Ghana, 2011. The Commonwealth Observer Group. (2016). Ghana General Elections: 7 December 2016. The Commonwealth. London: The Commonwealth Secretariat. Vordzorgbe, S., & Caiquo, B. (2001). Report on Status Review of National Strategies for Sustainable Development in Ghana. Accra. D. Internet Sources Achille, T. (2007). Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy for Sustained Growth to Breakthrough in the 21st Century: Revisiting the Development Literature and Paving the Way Ahead. Retrieved July 14, 2019, from A World Bank Institute Working Paper: http://www.worldbank.org Atawura, P. (2017). Regulatory Framework of the Media in Ghana. Retrieved June 23, 2019, from Philipatawura's Blog: https://philipatawura.wordpress.com/2017/05/02/regulatory- framework-of-the-media-in-ghana/amp/ African Elections Database. (2017). Elections in Ghana. Retrieved May 18, 2019, from http:/africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html Alolor, R. (2015). LinkedIn SlideShare. 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Retrieved 2019 March, from Research Gate Web site: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ransford_Gyampo/publication/326422749_ASSESSING_I NTERNAL_PARTY_DEMOCRACY_IN_AFRICA/links/5b4c948545851519b4c10f58/ASSES SING-INTERNAL-PARTY-DEMOCRACY-IN-AFRICA?origin=publication_detail IGI Global. (2011). Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/chile- under-the-government-of-sebastin-piera/41255 Index Mundi. (2018). Ghana Political Parties and Leaders. Retrieved June 22, 2019, from Index Mundi Website: https://www.indexmundi.com/ghana/political_party_and_leaders.html International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2007). Political Parties in West Africa: The Challenge of Democratization in the Fragile States. Retrieved June 2019, from International IDEA Website: www.idea.intpartiesuploadGhana%20laid%20out.pdf Judicial Service of Ghana. (2019). The Directive Principles of State Policy. Retrieved July 14, 2019, from Judicial Service of Ghana Web site: https://judicial.gov.gh/index.php/the-directive- principles-of-state-policy Kooijmans, E. (2018, March 21). Is Democracy the Best Form of Governance? Retrieved March 5, 2019, from New College of Humanities: https://www.nchlondon.ac.uk/2018/03/21/democracy-best-form-government/ Munro, A. (2018, December 13). Robert A. Dahl. (i. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Producer) Retrieved January 9, 2019, from Encyclopaedia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Robert-A-Dahl#ref1178987 NDPC. (2015). Introduction to National Development Planning Commission. Retrieved July 13, 2019, from the National Development Planning Commission: https://s3-us-west- 2.amazonaws.com/new-ndpc- static1/CACHES/PUBLICATIONS/2017/10/24/NDPC_Final_Brochure.pdf Pearson Higher Education. (2010, January 10). Democracy and American Politics. Retrieved February 16, 2019, from Pearson Higher Education: https://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/samplechapter/0/2/0/5/0205771297.pdf Socialstudieshelp.com. (2012). Retrieved January 1, 2019, from www.socialstudieshelp.com/APGOV_pluralism.htm University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh Tutor2u.com. (2018). Adversary Politics. Retrieved July 14, 2019, from Tutor2u: https://www.tutor2u.net/politics/reference/adversary-politics Udel.edu. (2010). Pluralism. Retrieved January 1, 2019, from www1.udel.edu: https://www1.udel.edu/htr/Psc105/Texts/pluralism.html E. INTERVIEWS A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Senior Research Fellow. Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD). University of Ghana. Tuesday, June 18, 2019. A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Senior Lecturer. Department of Political Science. University of Ghana. Friday, June 21, 2019. A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Researcher. Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES Ghana). Accra. Wednesday, July 3, 2019. A Think-Tank Interviewee. Personal Interview. Researcher. Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana). Accra. Friday, July 12, 2019. A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. National Democratic Congress (NDC). Accra. Thursday, July 4, 2019. A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. New Patriotic Party (NPP). Accra. Thursday, July 4, 2019. A Political Party Interviewee. Personal Interview. Party Executive. Conventions Peoples Party (CPP). Accra. Wednesday, June 26, 2019. Ten (10) Members of Parliament. Personal Interview. Ghana’s Current Legislature (2017-Date). Accra. Thursday, June 13, 2019 – Monday, July 15, 2019. Two (2) Senior Civil Servants. Personal Interview. Parliament of Ghana. Accra. Monday 15, July 2019. Two (2) Officials. Personal Interview. National Development Planning Commission (NDPC). Accra. Wednesday, July 17, 2019. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh APPENDIXES APPENDIX 1 INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THINK-TANKS This interview is undertaken by Rufus Ashitey Armah to solicit information on the topic; An Examination of Elite Consensus towards National Development in Africa: A Case of Ghana. This is an academic exercise for the award of Masters’ degree at LECIAD (University of Ghana). You are assured of your confidentiality and any information that you may give. Please, give your utmost cooperation and assistance. Name………………………………………………………………………. Institution………………………………………………………………… Office/Position………………………………………………………… Main Business: Elite Consensus, Democratic Consolidation and National Development in Ghana – Interview Guide for Think-Tanks Questions: 1. In your view, what does elite consensus mean? OR How would you describe elite consensus? 2. What are the necessary factors or benchmarks for elites to be seen as unified and not divided? University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3. Based on the benchmarks given, can activities of political parties in Ghana be described as consensual or confrontational? Why? 4. Do you believe Ghana has elite consensus in the area of elections? Why? 5. Is there a conflict resolution mechanism well entrenched in the constitution? If yes, how effective has it been? 6. In your opinion, do parliamentarians trust each other? 7. Is there consensus-building in the deliberation of issues in parliament? Why? 8. How has that affected national development? 9. Within the scope of the ruling governments, has there been continuity in the national development policies and projects started by previous governments? 10. Generally speaking, does Ghana have elite consensus? 11. How have the answers given above affected democratic consolidation in Ghana? OR How have elite interactions affected Ghana’s democratic consolidation since the inception of the fourth republic? 12. How have elite interactions affected national development in Ghana? 13. Do you see the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) as effective? Why? 14. Are there any recommendations you can give to forging a much tighter elite bond and national development in Ghana? Is there anything more you would like to add? Thank you. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTY EXECUTIVES This interview is undertaken by Rufus Ashitey Armah to solicit information on the topic; An Examination of Elite Consensus towards National Development in Africa: A Case of Ghana. This is an academic exercise for the award of Masters’ degree at LECIAD (University of Ghana). You are assured of your confidentiality and any information that you may give. Please, give your utmost cooperation and assistance. Name………………………………………………………………………... Institution………………………………………………………………… Office/Position………………………………………………………… Main Business: Elite Consensus, Democratic Consolidation and National Development in Ghana – Interview Guide for political party executives Questions: 1. What rules (documents) govern the conduct of politics in the country, in your party as well as relations between your party and other political parties? 2. Do the party executives and members adhere to such rules? 3. What is your party’s stance on those who break constitutional and electoral laws? 4. Are they punished? 5. Are party members and executives in particular informed about the party’s constitution and electoral laws? University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 6. What do you think about constitutional and electoral laws in relation to interparty consensus building? 7. Are they adequate, need change or addition? 8. What challenges do you face in the implementation of the laws? 9. Which active role did your party play in the institutionalization of democratic rule in the wake of the fourth republic? 10. Do you trust other political parties to uphold constitutional and electoral laws? 11. In your opinion, is there consensus-building between political parties in Ghana? Can you give instances of such a claim? 12. How would you describe your party’s relationship with other political parties? 13. Does your party influence its members during the decision-making process in parliament and in government? 14. In your opinion, do other political parties do the same? 15. What accounts for the nature of party politics we are experiencing now? Is there anything more you would like to add? Thank you. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh APPENDIX 3 INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS This interview is undertaken by Rufus Ashitey Armah to solicit information on the topic; An Examination of Elite Consensus towards National Development in Africa: A Case of Ghana. This is an academic exercise for the award of Masters’ degree at LECIAD (University of Ghana). You are assured of your confidentiality and any information that you may give. Please, give your utmost cooperation and assistance. Name………………………………………………………………………... Institution………………………………………………………………… Office/Position………………………………………………………… Main Business: Elite Consensus, Democratic Consolidation and National Development in Ghana – Interview Guide for Parliamentarians Questions: 1. Do you trust your opponents in parliament? 2. Do you believe these opposing counterparts in parliament trust you? 3. How will you describe your relationship with other parliamentarians from different parties? How do you relate with each other both in and outside parliament? 4. Have you ever been influenced by your party to make decisions you would have otherwise not made? 5. In your opinion, are parliamentarians in your party and in opposing camps influenced by their political parties to take certain decisions? University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 6. If any, what are some traits you like about your opposing counterparts in parliament? 7. If any, what are some traits you dislike about your opposing counterparts in parliament? 8. In parliament, have these traits mentioned above influenced your decision-making in any way? 9. Has there been any occasion where there have been compromises between parliamentarians during a deadlock in parliament? 10. If yes, how was the deadlock broken? If No, what was the reason for that failure, in your opinion? 11. In your opinion, generally speaking, are MPs in parliament divided or united? 12. In your opinion, how have decisions made in parliament affected national development in Ghana? 13. Are there any recommendations you can give to forging a much tighter elite bond and national development in Ghana? Is there anything more you would like to add? Thank you for your time. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh APPENDIX 4 INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING COMMISSION This interview is undertaken by Rufus Ashitey Armah to solicit information on the topic; An Examination of Elite Consensus towards National Development in Africa: A Case of Ghana. This is an academic exercise for the award of Masters’ degree at LECIAD (University of Ghana). You are assured of your confidentiality and any information that you may give. Please, give your utmost cooperation and assistance. Name………………………………………………………………………... Institution………………………………………………………………… Office/Position………………………………………………………… Main Business: Elite Consensus, Democratic Consolidation and National Development in Ghana – Interview Guide for National Development Planning Commission. Questions: 1. What has been the approach to planning Ghana’s development since 1992? 2. Would you say that Ghana’s vision for development has been balanced or in other words, do the country’s visions for development cover the aspects thus political, social and economic? 3. Is there an element of continuity in policies championed to drive Ghana’s development? 4. What are the processes involved and the outcomes of Ghana’s vision for development? University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 5. What are some of the remarkable achievements of Ghana’s vision for development? 6. What are some of the challenges that have impeded Ghana’s vision for development? 7. Have political elites affected the realization of these policies positively or negatively? Why? 8. Should political parties in government be the chief architects of the country’s vision for development? Why? 9. What will you recommend for Ghana to be able to achieve its desired objective of national development? 10. Are there any useful lessons Ghana can draw to inform better development policymaking? Is there anything more you would like to add? Thank you.