UNIVERSITY OF GHANA COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES INSTITUTE OF STATISTICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH (ISSER) MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE OF WALANTU COMMUNITY OF KASOA IN THE AWUTU SENYA EAST MUNICIPALITY BY CHARLES SENIOR AGYARKO (10941731) A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE OF STATISTICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES OCTOBER, 2023 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh i DECLARATION I hereby declare that except for the references to other people’s work, which have been duly acknowledged, this dissertation is the result of my own research work carried out in the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) under the supervision of Dr. Elizabeth Asiedua Asante. ………………………………. …………………………… Charles Senior Agyarko Dr. Elizabeth Asiedua Asante Candidate ID No.: 10941731 Supervisor Date: 31-10-2023 Date: 31-10-2023 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ii DEDICATION I sincerely dedicate this work to Dr. Eleanor Hancock, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia, for her immense contributions towards my educational journey. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I sincerely thank many people who have contributed to this academic work in various ways. Firstly, I am very grateful to Dr. Elizabeth Asiedua Asante for her expertise, and constructive criticisms in producing this scholarly work. In addition, I would like to thank my mum, Madam Gladys Awuku, and siblings Mr. Samuel Agyarko Larbi, Francis Agyarko, Charles Junior Agyarko and Nicholas Agyemang-Duah for their support and encouragements. Again, I am grateful to the officers and staff of Awutu-Senya East Municipal Assembly for their help in this work. It is also important to thank all research participants of Awutu-Senya East Municipality especially, the households and members of National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) for taking time from their busy schedules to respond to all my questionnaire and interview guide. I extend appreciation also to all faculty and staff members at the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana, Legon, for their support during my Master of Arts in Development Studies programme. Finally, I sincerely thank all colleagues in the 2021/2022 cohort of Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research Class of University of Ghana, Legon, for their cooperation throughout the programme. God bless you all. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh iv TABLE OF CONTENTS BY 1 DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................... i DEDICATION .................................................................................................................................. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii LIST OF FIGURE ........................................................................................................................ viii LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... x ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... xii CHAPTER ONE .............................................................................................................................. 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1 1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Background of the Study ....................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Research Problem................................................................................................................... 4 1.3 Research Objectives ............................................................................................................... 6 1.4 Research Questions ................................................................................................................ 6 1.5 Significance of the Study ........................................................................................................ 7 1.6 Organization of the Study ...................................................................................................... 7 CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................................. 8 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................... 8 2.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 8 2.1 Theory of Clientelism ............................................................................................................. 8 2.2 Conceptual Framework of Electoral Violence ................................................................... 11 2.3 Electoral Violence ................................................................................................................. 14 2.3.1 Pre-election Violence ..................................................................................................... 16 2.3.2 Post-Election Violence ................................................................................................... 18 2.4 Electoral Violence in the Global Context ........................................................................... 20 2.5 Nature of Electoral Violence in Africa ............................................................................... 22 2.6 The Nature of Electoral Violence in Ghana ....................................................................... 25 2.7 Typologies of Electoral Violence ......................................................................................... 28 2.7.1 The Issue of Riots ........................................................................................................... 29 2.7.2 The Issue of Threats as a Crime to Electoral Process ................................................ 31 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh v 2.7.3 The Issue of Protests and Demonstrations .................................................................. 32 2.7.4 The Issue of Intimidations and Harassment................................................................ 33 2.8 Factors Influencing Electoral Violence .............................................................................. 33 2.8.1 Institutional Factors ...................................................................................................... 34 2.8.2 Structural Violence ........................................................................................................ 36 2.8.3 Health .............................................................................................................................. 38 2.8.4 Economic ........................................................................................................................ 38 2.8.5 Culture ............................................................................................................................ 39 2.8.6 Political Symbols ............................................................................................................ 39 2.8.7 Political Ideologies ......................................................................................................... 40 2.8.8 Party’s Interest ............................................................................................................... 41 2.8.9 International Factors ..................................................................................................... 41 2.10 Effects of Electoral Violence .............................................................................................. 43 2.11 Approaches in Reducing Electoral Violence .................................................................... 44 CHAPTER THREE ....................................................................................................................... 47 METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 47 3.0 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 47 SECTION I: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .......................................................................... 47 3.1 Method ............................................................................................................................... 47 3.2 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 47 3.2.1 Target Population .......................................................................................................... 47 3.2.2 Sampling ......................................................................................................................... 47 3.2.3 Data Collection Tools .................................................................................................... 49 3.2.4 Data Analysis Technique ............................................................................................... 50 3.3 Limitations of Study ......................................................................................................... 50 SECTION II: PROFILE OF AWUTU SENYA EAST MUNICIPALITY ............................... 51 CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................................................................... 52 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ................................................................ 52 SECTION I: FINDINGS ............................................................................................................... 52 4.1 Socio-demography Characteristics ..................................................................................... 52 4.1.1 Distribution of Respondents by Age ............................................................................ 52 4.1.2 Distribution of Respondents by Sex ............................................................................. 53 4.1.3 Distribution of Respondents by Religion ..................................................................... 53 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh vi 4.1.4 Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education ................................................... 54 4.1.5 Distribution of Respondents by Occupation ............................................................... 55 4.1.6 Distribution of Respondents by Ethnicity ................................................................... 56 4.2 The Nature and Types of Electoral Violence in Walantu Community ........................... 57 4.3 Pattern of Voting .................................................................................................................. 57 4.4 Pattern of Violence around the Stage of the Election Process ......................................... 58 4.5 Factors Influencing Electoral Violence .............................................................................. 58 4.5.1 Political Parties as the Cause of Electoral Violence ................................................... 58 4.5.2 Youth as the Cause of Electoral Violence .................................................................... 59 4.5.3 Disagreements as the Cause of Electoral Violence ..................................................... 60 4.5.4 Security Personnel at Polling Stations ......................................................................... 61 4.6 Other Factors Serving as Influencers to Electoral Violence ............................................ 62 4.7 Effects of Electoral Violence on Free and Fair .................................................................. 63 4.8 Motivation to Vote ................................................................................................................ 64 4.9 Pragmatic Interventions to Reduce Electoral Violence .................................................... 65 4.10 Expectations of Voters on Violence in Future Elections of Walantu Community ....... 66 SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS .................................................................................. 66 4.11 Nature and Types of Violence ........................................................................................... 66 4.12 Factors Influencing Electoral Violence ............................................................................ 69 4.13 Performance of the EC ...................................................................................................... 71 4.14 The Presence of Security Personnel at Polling Stations.................................................. 73 4.15 Effects of Electoral Violence .............................................................................................. 74 4.16 Youth, Unemployment and Poverty as a Cause of Electoral Violence .......................... 76 4.17 Performance of the EC ...................................................................................................... 79 4.18 The Presence of Security Personnel at Polling Stations.................................................. 80 4.19 Effects of Electoral Violence .............................................................................................. 81 4.20 Pragmatic Interventions to Reduce Electoral Violence .................................................. 83 CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................................................ 85 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................. 85 5.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 85 5.1 Summary of Findings ........................................................................................................... 85 5.2 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 87 5.3 Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 89 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh vii References ....................................................................................................................................... 92 Appendix A ................................................................................................................................... 112 Appendix B ................................................................................................................................... 117 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh viii LIST OF FIGURE Figure 2.1: A diagrammatical expression of factors stimulating electoral violence………….…...13 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh ix LIST OF TABLES Table 2:1 Showing the various Vigilantism Groups of NDC and NPP in Ghana…………………....30 Table 4.1: Age Distribution of the Respondents..................................................................................58 Table 4.2: Gender Composition of Respondents..................................................................................59 Table 4.3: Distribution of Respondents by Religion............................................................................60 Table 4.4: Distribution of Respondents Level of Education.................................................................60 Table 4.5: Distribution of Respondents by Occupation........................................................................61 Table 4.6: Distribution of Ethnic Composition of Respondents...........................................................62 Table 4.7: Respondents Years Lived in the Community .....................................................................63 Table 4.8: NDC and NPP as the Cause of Electoral Violence..............................................................67 Table 4.9: Youth Participation in Politics as a Cause of Electoral Violence.......................................68 Table 4.10: Distribution of Misunderstanding that Erupts Electoral Violence...................................69 Table 4.11: Distribution of the Security Personnel at the Polling Stations.........................................70 Table 4.12: Distribution of Other Stimulants to Influence Electoral Violence...................................71 Table 4.13: Distribution of Respondents Reasons to Vote...................................................................72 Table 4.14: Distribution of Respondents views on Measures of Reducing Electoral Violence ...........74 University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ANC African National Congress ASEM Awutu-Senya East Municipality AU African Union CAR Central African Republic CDD Centre for democratic Development CI CODEO Constitutional Instruments Coalition of Domestic Electoral Observer EC Electoral Commission EMB Electoral Management Board FOV Fanon’s On Violence FP Inkatha Freedom Party ICC International Criminal Court IPAC Inter-Party Advisory Committee LI Legislative Instrument MP Member of Parliament NCCE National Commission for Civic Education University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh xi NCRB National Crimes Records Bureau NDC National Democratic Congress NELDA National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy NEST National Elections Security Taskforce NPP New Patriotic Party OECD Organisation for Economic Community and Development OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PRS Proportional Representation System SCAD Social Conflict in Africa Database SIM Social Identity Model SSA Sub-Saharan African TEIN TESCHART TESCON UN Tertiary Education Institutions Network Tertiary Student Charter Tertiary Education Students Confederation United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh xii ABSTRACT From the late 1980’s, countries on the African continent saw competitive multi-party democracy after several decades of military rule. Within this political process, elections were embraced as a core feature of modern governance and adopted as a medium of democratic practices. However, over the years, a number of countries including the developed peripheries have experiences of electoral violence. Despite its successful transfer of power, Ghana, a beacon of democracy is not exempted from this surging phenomenon despite. This study examined the effects of electoral violence in the Walantu Community of Kasoa in the Awutu Senya East Municipality in 2016 and 2020 election years. The study adopts a mixed approach with a sample size of 110, through a simple random and purposive sampling techniques. The study observed that electoral violence is caused by physical, psychological and structural variables. Furthermore, the study found that intimidations, insults, threats, verbal exchanges, burning of motorbikes were the main types of electoral violence in the Walantu Community, and this threatens individual’s participation and the country’s consolidation of democratic activities at large. The study makes a clarion call by recommending state’s economy be broadened through tax incentives or rebates to young entrepreneurs to serve as motivation to vigorously pursue job creation. Again, the study recommends that the government through partnerships with the private sector liaises with the ministry in charge of youth affairs through the National Youth Authority to provide skills development and vocational trainings, and entrepreneurial promotions to boost creation of jobs for the teeming youth. Again, the study recognized the role stakeholders play to curb electoral violence. Based on that, the study makes a clarion call by drawing the attention of all election stakeholders, including the National Peace Council to be strengthened to liaise with the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), and other state institutions to re- educate the public especially the party foot soldiers on peace campaigns. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.0 Introduction General elections in multi-party democracies are now characterized by violence, a pervasive feature undermining democracy. This phenomenon is common in both emerging and developed democracies, and renders democratic practices unstable and antithetical with both democratic regions, and those that are yet to adopt the practices. This study examines electoral violence, which has become rampant especially in emerging and fragile democracies. The study looks at a period of electoral violence in the 2016 and 2020 elections years in the Walantu Community of Kasoa in the Awutu- Senya-East Municipality of Central Region of Ghana. Ghana continues to rank high on governance levels, measuring its performance on the rule of law, media freedom, and other indicators of democratic consolidation, including electoral participation making Ghana to pride itself as gateway of democracy Africa. Recognizing these accolades and democratic successes, this study discusses the core effects of electoral violence on Ghana’s democracy. It looks at how this phenomenon is gaining grounds in Ghana’s politics by focusing on the experience of Awutu Senya East Municipality (ASEM) in the 2016 and 2020 election years. 1.1 Background of the Study Elections are a form of political participation that demonstrates a revelatory foundation entry into democracy. Citizens cast their ballots through voting, and through voting, citizens are seen as given the means of influencing decision-making process in governments. However, in recent times, there has been growing experiences of election violence around the globe. Both developed and developing countries are susceptible to election violence: intimidations, threats, attacks, fighting, shooting, group riots, and clashes between opposing supporters (Birch, 2020). This has prevailed due to the University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 2 competitive acceptance of multi-party system embraced by countries around the world. Kleinfled (2021) maintains that electoral violence has sprung up around the world’s competitive democracy. In the 2020 United States of America for instance, during presidential elections, supporters of former US President, Donald Trump, unofficially declared victory for their candidate, which had not been declared by the Election Commission. Therefore, when the announced declaration turned out to be different, the supporters engaged in violent protests on the street emboldened President Trump to concede defeat (Hessen, 2022). Ware (2022) observed that violence during the election season undermines democracy in the United States of America. In a similar situation of competitiveness, Kleinfled (2021) observed electoral violence in Indonesia, transitioning to democracy after years of authoritarian military rule under Suharto administration. The country transitioned to democracy in 1998, and began engaging in electoral processes. According to Mambor (2019), Indonesia began witnessing electoral riots and protest among the competing candidates and their political parties. Orji (2017) categorized electoral violence into external and internal. The internal category is attributable to Olawale et al. (1995) work which presented work on communal clashes, and how this has affected inter-group community relations in Africa. The internal category of electoral- related violence threatens inter-group relations. On the other hand, the external category involves high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and chronic poverty resulting in under-development. For instance, ‘winner takes-all’ system compels one sided political party, to be in charge of all national resources, including states assets. Moreover, Orji (2017) maintains that certain sections of the citizenry are denied access to opportunities and resources to either study or work to better their lives. In Orji’s (2017) view, the internal factors relate to a situation that facilitates electoral violence. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 3 In Africa, the phenomenon is observed to be much worse in Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Congo, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Zimbabwe and many other countries (see Norris, 2012; Daxecker, 2014; Shenga & Pereira, 2019; Fielding, 2018; Birch & Muchlinski, 2017; Goldsmith, 2015 and Onapajo, 2017). According to Gyimah-Boadi (2009), the trend of such violence places a dent on Africa’s democracy, and makes citizens trust and aspirations with democracy falling short as electoral violence has displaced many from their countries and rendering some families homeless and refugees. Records indicate that Ghana has staged eight consecutive general elections: 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, with smooth transfer of power from one government to the other. Orji (2017) categorized electoral violence into external and internal. The internal category is attributable to Olawale et al. (1995) work which presented work on communal clashes, and how this has affected inter-group community relations in Africa. The internal category of electoral- related violence threatens inter-group relations. On the other hand, the external category involves high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, and chronic poverty resulting in under-development. For instance, ‘winner takes-all’ system compels one sided political party, to be in charge of all national resources, including states assets. Moreover, Orji (2017) maintains that certain sections of the citizenry are denied access to opportunities and resources to either study or work to better their lives. In Orji’s (2017) view, the internal factors relate to a situation that facilitates electoral violence. In Agreement with Orji (2017), and Aryee (2017), Election Management Board (EMB), in some countries also called Electoral Commission (EC) is the organizer of all elections in contemporary democracies, and the claim that the organizer of the election is manipulative of elections result is a mere perception. Nevertheless, the EC’s perceptual failure to organize free and fair elections triggers University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 4 electoral violence. Furthermore, Orji’s (2017) identifies that electoral violence erodes the people’s trust in the judicial system. Orji (2017) further contends that the injustices which the court system demonstrates during settlement of electoral disputes offend the people, especially if the ruling party does not favour of the party-complainant. Hence, elections are held in various democratic states in nearly all countries around the world and electoral violence takes place at all levels of the electioneering process. Elections characterized by violence has the tendency to result in casualty, coerce and harm human life, properties and infrastructures. Aning and Danso (2012) state that Africa has registered electoral violence in varied ways, which according to Höglund & Jarstad (2010), constitutes a threat to democratic practice in Africa in two major ways. Firstly, electoral violence undermines the practice and quality of the outcome of elections in many ways. Secondly, its intensity erodes unity that may have existed among communal groups, which at a larger extent may generate civil wars. Ghana continues to rank high on governance levels, measuring its performance on the rule of law, media freedom, and other indicators of democratic consolidation, including electoral participation making Ghana to pride itself as gateway of democracy Africa. Recognizing these accolades and democratic successes, this study discusses the core effects of electoral violence on Ghana’s democracy. This study details how this phenomenon is gaining a space in Ghana’s politics by focusing on the experience of Awutu Senya East Municipality (ASEM) in the 2016 and 2020 election years. 1.2 Research Problem This study examines electoral violence which has become rampant especially in emerging and fragile democracies. Hence, the study looks at a period of electoral violence in the 2016 and 2020 elections University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 5 years in the Walantu Community of Kasoa in the Awutu Senya-East Municipality of Central Region of Ghana. The Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG), measures and monitors governance performance in African countries to keep track on their democratic practices. One of these democratic practices is election. Ghana began embracing elections in her democratic and good governance principles with the aim of meeting citizenry socio-economic needs. However, incidences of electoral violence have accompanied elections ever since Ghana embraced democratic practices. A number of studies have been conducted on electoral violence and vigilantism in Ghana (see Danso & Lartey, 2012; Gyampo et al. 2017; Amankwah, 2013; Kumah-Abiwu, 2017; Bjarnesen, 2021; Aning et al. 2016), making electoral violence a relevant subject-matter for discussion as its continuous occurrence could threaten Ghana’s consolidation of democracy (Gyampo et al. 2017). In recognition of the up surging occurrences of electoral violence, the Ghana Police Service in 2020 declared Awutu Senya-East Municipality as one of the hotspots of electoral violence. Therefore, it is worthwhile to interrogate the nature and effects of electoral violence on free and fair elections by focusing on the Walantu Community of Kasoa in the Awutu Senya-East Municipality in the 2016 and 2020 election years. Research such as by Adzimah-Alade et al. (2020) examined electoral violence and vigilantism in Ghana through content analysis and archival technique, and found that criminal behaviour and activities are born- out of the influence of intimidations, threats, fighting and coercion. The scholars’ findings show that aggrieved party supporters resorted to vigilantism and violence as tool to redress grievances. This study also seeks to examine the manifestation of electoral violence in the recently declared hotspot - Walantu Community of Kasoa in the Awutu Senya-East Municipality. The Walantu Community is a minority establishment of Kasoa in the Awutu Senya- East Municipality. A detailed investigation of the community will provide the nexus of factors determining violence during election. The experiences of electoral violence in this minority University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 6 community within Kasoa will be useful information for policy and planning by the Electoral Commission and Ghana Security in subsequent election years. 1.3 Research Objectives The general objective of the study was to examine the nature and effects of electoral violence on free and fair elections in Ghana through a study of the experiences of the Walantu Community in the Awutu Senya East Municipality in the 2016 and 2020 elections. The study seeks to achieve the following specific objectives: (i) To understand the nature and types of electoral violence in Walantu Community. (ii) To investigate the elements that influence the risks of electoral violence in Walantu Community. (iii) To investigate the effects of electoral violence in Walantu Community. (iv) To examine the role of pragmatic intensions in reducing the incidence of electoral violence at Walantu Community. 1.4 Research Questions The study sought to address the following questions: (i). What are the nature and types of electoral violence in Walantu Community? (ii). What are the potential elements influencing electoral violence in Walantu Community? (iii). What are the effects of electoral violence in Walantu Community? (iv). What are the pragmatic interventions adopted in reducing electoral violence in Walantu Community? University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 7 1.5 Significance of the Study The study seeks to examine violence in Ghanaian politics and other emerging democracies and throw more light by deepening understanding and prescribing solutions to issues affecting Ghana’s electoral system. The study provides valuable information on the causes and effects of electoral violence in Ghanaian politics. This information is important to election management, policy, planning and intervention by the Electoral Commission of Ghana, the Coalition of Domestic Electoral Observers (CODEO), political parties, political researchers, and other key stakeholders on elections such as the National Peace Council, peace negotiators, development practitioners, and civil societies. The study findings of the study will serve as a guide to future scholars writing on political violence. 1.6 Organization of the Study The study is structured into five chapters. Chapter One presents the introduction, background of the study, the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, and organization of chapters. Chapter Two reviews the related literature on the subject, including the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Chapter Three features the method and methodology. Chapter Four presents the findings of the study and analysis. Chapter Five provides a summary, draws conclusions, and makes recommendations. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 8 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 2.0 Introduction Chapter Two presents the literature review of the study. The chapter focuses on theoretical review, followed by conceptual framework, and the empirical review. Other thematic areas of the subject- matter were also reviewed. 2.1 Theory of Clientelism Generally, using elections to select leaders is a mechanism that allows citizens greater say over how they are governed, and provides a nonviolent alternative to the use of force to arbitrate between rival claims to rule. However, in practice, these expectations often fail to conform to reality of election. Outside the Western world perspectives, theories such as clientelism, vote-buying, and intimidation have been employed by many authors to explain the subversion of electoral processes through violence (Birch et al, 2020). The theory of clientelism is utilized in this chapter to explain the causes and dynamics of electoral violence. According to Lemarchand (1972) and van de Walle (2007), Africa is often described as a continent in which politics is structured by clientelism. On the governance landscape, voting is considered a key factor in a functioning democracy as governments are expected to provide basic amenities to the citizenry. However, in most developing countries, many forms of clientelism exist between patron and clients, and accepted forms of service performed by politicians are expected from constituencies to be favoured during voting (Kitschelt & Altamirano, 2015). Clientelism describes the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or defined groups in exchange for political support (Hopkin, 2006). According to Scott clientelism is defined “as an instruments friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 9 influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower stats (clients) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including services, to the patron” (1972:92). For Hopkin (2006), the term is a form of personal, dyadic exchange usually characterized by a sense of obligation, and often, by an unequal balance of power between those involved. These relationships involved ‘the patron providing clients with access to the basic means subsistence, and the clients reciprocating with a consideration of economic goods and services, and social acts of deference and loyalty (Muno, 2010). Muno (2010) identified core concepts of clientelism. Key characteristics of clientelism include the following elements: (a). the relationship is dyadic; (b). the relationship is asymmetrical; (c). the relationship is personal and enduring; (d). the relationship is reciprocal, and (e). the relationship is voluntary. Two of the key concepts - the relationship is dyadic, and the relationship is reciprocal were given prominence in this section. The relationship of dyadic. Under this concept of clientelism, there exist a social relationship between two persons – patron and client, which is paramount (Landé, 1977). The two, patron and client engage in direct face-to-face interactions and transactions between them. This view made Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) observe clientelism as a principal-agent-relation, where electoral constituencies are principals and politicians are agents. In Tambe & Monyake (2023) studies, the authors concluded that clientelism tends to increase voter turnout. The co-authors further argued on a country’s material impact of personal clientelism. This is because voters who had declared having received material benefit, gifts, money in exchange for their vote are more likely to live in poorer African countries. A recent growing literature by the World Bank (The World Bank, 2017) demonstrate the increasing acceptance of political clientelism as a viable tool of profitable electoral University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 10 mobilizations, by tracing its origin from economic development, weak legal environment and violence (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). The increasing attempts by political parties both the incumbent and the opposition parties to engage in violence is conditioned with the aim to increase voters turnout (Sarkar & Sinha, 2018). According to Chatterjee (2004), parties seeking electoral mobilization often face incentive to cultivate and exploit the vulnerability of political society, illustrating a classical feature of political clientelism. The second key concept of clientelism that this study considers is the reciprocal relationship. In reciprocal relationship, exchange of material or immaterial of goods is an essential feature of clientelism. Numerous studies and evidence show that political clientelism and violence have a strong relationship. A study in Oyo State Nigeria from 2007 to 2015 by Abebeyi (2021) found that political clientelism is a significant factor behind political violence. In Latin American, countries struggle resemble similar features of political clientelism and violence. Gay (2012) enumerated the length politics of clientelism and violence in recent experiences in Brazil. Further, Berenchot (2019) revealed how political competition from India and Indonesia incentivizes politicians to foment religion and ethnic violence. In a cross-national analysis of clientelism and voter intimidation in seven African countries, Rauchenbach et al. (2019) found that voters living in incumbent strangleholds are mostly likely to receive clientelism benefits before elections, whereas, those living in opposition strongholds are most vulnerable to violent intimidation. Similarly, in an empirical study conducted by Forsberg (2018) on some selected African countries, the author found consistent positive and statistical relationship of political violence with post-election violence. The the theory the author offered indicated that clientelism increases the risk of electoral violence. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 11 It is to be mentioned that inadequate necessities life including food, water, fuel to cook food, and medical supplies are heightened by clientelistic practices, making foot soldiers to ‘die’ at all cost for their patrons during elections Kitschelt & Altamirano (2015). Rachenbach et al. (2019) modelled the assumptions of clientelism and the empirical finding that incumbent party supporters aggressively offer support to their patrons when seeking reelection to office. They maintained that election regulates the allocation of resources, as supporters give out all their best to retain their patrons into power to fulfil the promises made to them. Thus, as Transparency International (2019) and Lodge (2019) observed, clientelism has revealed itself as a problem in governance, worsening in many poor democracies, especially in the Africa. 2.2 Conceptual Framework of Electoral Violence Electoral violence raises doubt about the acceptance of elections as a democratic practice. In the diagrammatical expression of the conceptual framework below (Figure 2), electoral violence is the dependent variable, which is impacted by variables such as roles of Electoral Management Boards (EMB), the presence of political vigilantism, and the issue of ‘winner takes-all.’ Activities of Electoral Management Boards (EMB) form a basic igniting factor of electoral violence. The EMB, which in certain democracies, are known as Electoral Commission (EC), is an institution with high level of variation on the quality of electoral management (Norris, 2016). The EMB performs various roles, which are recognized by the constitutions of the states as conventions and principles that uphold the practice of democratic governance. Problems, including mistrust in the electoral system by political parties with competing candidates, delays in ballot count, severe electoral mismanagement, inaccurate or incomplete voter registers, flawed ballot paper design, and faulty equipment affect the smooth running of the election process, its quality and electoral behavior, University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 12 undermining its integrity. Electoral integrity fosters participation in elections, whereas electoral malpractices reduces it. Electoral integrity, according to Carroll and Davis-Roberts, “refers as international standards and global norms governing the appropriate conduct of the elections” (2013, p.5) These are outlined standards endorsed in authoritative protocols and guidelines notably prescribed by the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, and by regional bodies such as the African Union (AU). Democracies that sees elections as free and fair tend to be well participated on election’s day by voters, and during election campaigns; those who trust Election Management Board (EMB) are more likely to vote (Shenga & Pereira, 2019). However, those who view the opposition as being denied of inclusion by the EMB including denying them access to the national voter’s register or even prevented them from running fairly in an election are less likely to cast a vote. This resonates the issue of trust resulting in distortions and distractions influencing the transparency of the electioneering process (Shenga & Pereira, 2019). Political parties and their competing candidates would experience mistrust during electioneering processes that are not transparent, and which could favour one competitor. This breeds tensions, charging the environment to breed violence, conflict, and other acts that put peace into disarray (Classen et al., 2012). The second dimension in the diagram is vigilantism, created when people are lured into vigilante groups from poverty and unemployment. Ghana’s electoral processes is characterized by political vigilantism. Gyampo et al., describe political vigilantism as a “violent display of brute force to protect the interest of a group that one belongs to. It consists of acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established socio-political order, which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of subversion” (2017, p. 14). Raleigh maintains elites University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 13 resort to vigilante as violent tools to deliberately “undermine political opposition, promote ideologies, counter multiparty democracy, and gain political initiative” (2014, p. 291). Vigilantism is a motivator to electoral violence. Figure 2.1: A diagrammatical expression of factors stimulating electoral violence The chances of the violence being orchestrated is high when the foundation for violent protests is laid to register the displeasure of each political party’s vigilante group at supposed compromise of the electoral processes. The action of vigilante groups and their violent reaction to other competing candidates or political party’s opponents becomes perceived as a normal participation in party Source: Author’s Construct, 2023 Electoral Commission Electoral Management Board aspects The presence of political vigilantism, (lured by poverty to unemployment) The issue of winner takes-all University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 14 management, political campaigns and elections. This process automatically creates conditions for large- scale political violence to destabilize democracy (CDD-Ghana, 2015). Third variable is the ‘winner takes-all’ syndrome, which is seen as unavoidable in most developing democracies. The ‘winner takes-all’ syndrome is the practice where after the declaration of elections results, the elected political party takes charge and manages all state resources without considering the expertise of the opponent parties. This syndrome encourages vigilantism as supporters, sympathizers, and party foot soldiers to dominantly claim ownership of state resources. In sum, key variables for shaping the quality of elections include Electoral Management Board (EMB), vigilantism and winner takes all syndrome. Aspects of poor management capacity and handling of electoral processes include intentional and unintentional errors, logistical difficulties, all leading to mistrust in the electoral system by the competing political parties and candidates (Clark, 2015; James, 2013; van Ham and Lindberg, 2015). Political vigilantism – political party’s brutal “militias” groups and ‘winner takes-all’ power dominance by winning political party are central to this framework. The above variables demonstrate evidence of the validity of the conceptual framework supporting this study. 2.3 Electoral Violence In an attempt to enhance the understanding of electoral violence, specific definitions have been developed by many scholars. Electoral violence is “a subset of activities within a larger political conflict, part of the trajectory of violent ethnic or communal disturbances clustering around the electoral events” (Homolkova, 2017). For Straus and Taylor (2012) electoral violence is a “physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 15 electoral result” (cited in Birch and Muchlinski, 2017, p. 219). Fischer (2008) defines electoral violence as, “any random or organized act that seeks to determine delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, physical assault, ‘forced protection’, blackmail destruction of property or assassination’ (cited in Birch and Muchlinski, 2017, p. 219). Another definition is by Sisk (2008) who describes the term as, acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process. Electoral violence may be employed to influence the process of elections– such as efforts to delay, disrupts, or derail a poll and to influence the outcomes, “the determining of winners in competitive races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions” (cited in Birch and Muchlinski, 2017, p. 219). Birch and Muchlinski (2019) raise two key components of Sisk’s definition, the temporal link, and the casual link. Whiles the temporal link falls between the violence and elections, the casual link is found between the two. Electoral violence as “an act or threat that is of coercion, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the competition” (UNDP, 2011: p.16). This means that various nature of violence such as insults, fighting, intimidations are applied to hurt other members for the competing parties to deter or discourage members of the opposing parties to restrain from voting. Electoral violence is a “physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced result” (Straus & Taylor, 2012, p. 5). Kumah-Abiwu (2017) suggests two approaches to electoral violence - the first approach focuses on conflict-prone conditions at the national (macro) and local (micro) levels, and the second approach focuses on issues of framing and reframing created by political elites. He agrees with Galtung (2011) that electoral violence focuses on three dimensions – the physical, psychological, and structural. These dimensions aim to intimidate, harm, and distort the election process. Physical electoral violence relates to bodily attacks on politicians or, by ardent supporters during the electioneering University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 16 processes, and when results are announced, lead to fatalities (Albert, 2007). Physiological electoral violence manifests in a manner during the climate of the electioneering process. In essence, electoral-related violence is employed as a tool by or against political opponents to destabilize the electoral process. Electoral violence is used to intimidate potential opposition voters, and opponent may use it to threaten as well as prevent voters from taking part in the voting process (Fielding, 2018). Election violence should be seen as an effective intimidating tool with the objective of dissuading the masses from participating in a political process. 2.3.1 Pre-election Violence Bekoe (2012) and Höglund (2009), identifies electoral cycles into three phases namely (i). pre- electoral violence, (ii). election day violence, and (iii). post-electoral violence. Fischer (2002) expanded on Bekoe’s (2012) and Höglund (2009) point that election violence takes place at every level of an electoral activity: i. during the registration process (identify conflict), ii. During campaign period (campaign conflict), iii. during election day (ballot conflict), iv. after election results and determined (results conflict), and v. after establishment of government (representation conflict). Höglund outlines the commencement of the first phase to be “the day a voter or party registration begins, or the day initiating the campaign period, a period leading up to the inauguration of the newly elected body” (2009, p. 415). In the pre-elections season, influencing elections aims to “shape voting behaviour, preferences and patterns, or the day initiating the campaign period” followed by election day, and concluded by a “period leading up to inaugurate of the newly elected body” (Straus and Taylor, 2012, p. 20). The pre- election season recognizes activities of electoral violence in “coercion, vandalism, arbitrary arrests and other physical or psychological abuse” (Clae, 2019, p. 3). Thus pre-election violence comprise University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 17 direct physical violence, “assaults, threats and political violence assassinations (Höglund, 2009, p. 413). It includes intimidations (Fischer, 2002) and “hostage-taking, kidnapping and extortion, clashes between various groups of supporters, attacks and bomb scares” (UNDP, 2009, p. 20). It is important to also reveal that pre- electoral violence activities could emerge from multi-perpetrators which includes “political parties and candidates, citizens, the state security (police, army units, special security services (rebel, factions, militias, and vigilantes’ groups), and civil societies (politically mobilize youth groups martial arts clubs)” (UNDP, 2009, p, 13). In Höglund (2009) study, the author conceptualizing electoral violence, and argues that electoral processes relate to motives, timing, actors, activities and target and identifies that the nature of politics, elections, and electoral institutions acts based on the intensity and forms of electoral violence. Many studies on election violence have concentrated on a number of cases with extreme levels of election violence including Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Kenya have observed that electoral violence result from varied and distinct forms of manipulations. According to Pagat (2019), events including political campaigns during the political process often become a direct personal communication to market party policies and programmes to party supporters. During this stage, campaigns become highly participative and the pre-election phase witnesses intimidations, aggressive and reviling speeches against competitors attacks on opponents (Birch et al., 2000, p. 5). Straus and Taylor assert that the motive behind employing election violence to influence the electioneering process is to “shape voting behavior preferences and pattern” (2012, p. 5). This implies that the disaggregated objective of pre-election violence is to disrupt the electoral campaigns and eliminate or weaken strategies of political contenders or even intra-party colleagues and their supporters to establish one’s own domineering position (Birch et al., 2020; Höglund, 2009). Another University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 18 motive influencing pre-election violence is to “influence the actual participation in the voting turn- out” generating electioneering insecurity (Fischer, 2002, p. 13). Complementing this view, Birch et al. (2020) argue that such occurrences take place primarily to halt the flow and provision of information to other competing opponents. Pagat (2018) reports that political parties prepare during electioneering periods to campaign for votes has the tendency to trigger dominant political parties to engage in violence, but could also motivate the aim of perpetrating the violence (Wahman and Goldring, 2020). Pre-election violence could also occur from the period where the electoral management board (EMB) decides to enroll illegible voters onto the national voters’ register. But shortcomings during the registration exercise could result in inaccuracies of data is the beginning point of registering the violence. Another feature that associates with pre-election violence is the unequitable offering of the media coverage to the political parties. This de facto by a section of the state-owned and a number of private broadcasting houses monopolize by the incumbent does not allow for equitability in media coverage of other parties (Höglund, 2009). This prevents opposition parties from being heard on their programmes being campaigned by the voting populace. Therefore, pre-election could occur and exacerbated when the election processes are not clear, intending to favour one candidate or political opponents, neglecting the involvement of other key election actors, aiming to influence the entire electoral processes (Toby, 2022). Importantly, it is therefore worthy bearing in mind that because electoral contests are seen as struggle for political power as pre-election violence distort smooth running of election, and continuous occurrence of pre-election will culminate in communal tensions. 2.3.2 Post-Election Violence The issue of elections degenerating into chaos and conflicts has become one of the main tproblems University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 19 of democratic societies. Elections in most liberal democracies are typically characterized by irregularities, which in turn fuel violent expression of dissatisfaction during and after the voting processes. By definition, post-election violence is “any random or organized acts to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay or to otherwise influence an electoral process” (Fischer, 2002, p.3). Post-election violence takes place after voting, delay, and disrupt outcome of the polls and derail the entire society. Goldsmith (2015) asserts that post-election violence seems a preference of the opposition, perhaps due to quixotic intentions to overturn the unwanted results, or to demonstrate through force the losing side’s resolve to do better in next time’s elections. Bayne (2008) identifies four broad forms of post-election violence: spontaneous violence which breaks out at party’s stronghold, normally after the declarations of election results; organized attacks, organized retaliatory attacks by the political party’s members, especially the youth; excessive use of force by on security agencies; and, the main opposition party’s members and other civilians in particular. As an attempt, post-election violence is often used in response to election outcomes to suppress protests by supporters of the loosing political party. In a post-election violence Commission of Inquire hearing set-up in Kenya, it was reported that within communities, households turned against each other, businesses were looted and livelihoods shattered, and unity among the local folks was segmented (Mott, 2008,. In a study by Onyancha (2015) of post-election violence, the author observed that women and girls were subjected to sexual violence due to outbreak of violence, many of which were motivated by ethnicity. Additionally, female genital mutilation became prevalent as there was no recognition of formal laws. Again, Onyancha reports instances where families including children were compelled to witness sexual University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 20 violation of parents, siblings, and relatives. Those responsible for these acts were identified as ordinary citizens, members of criminal organizations, and individuals from the security forces. In his study, Teshome (2009) examined the 2005 post- electoral violence that killed more than 40, 000 people. He observes that, Kenya’s pre-election up to that day of voting was remarkably peaceful. However, post-elections were marred by the most horrific violence in the country’s history. Similar studies by Ouma (2011) reports in his findings that numerous individuals perished in the violence that ensued after the elections, majority of victims being innocent civilians. Widespread massacres associated with post-election violence saw huge number of casualties and extensive damage to property amounting to millions in losses. As a result of the post-election turmoil, Ouma reports that 1333 Kenya’s citizens lost their lives and approximately 600,000 were forced to flee their homes. This created a huge number of displaced citizens, and as a result caused social trauma as people sought shelter makeshift settlements scattered throughout their nation. In this light, post-election violence threatens the security and economic wellbeing of societies. It infringes on the individual’s right and freedom to vote, valued as the opportunity to affect political decision-making. The consequence of post-election elections is that any “feeling of being involved, …. having political influence” and “inclusion identity, and self-determination” is completely erased from citizens (Hickman, 2011, p. 29). 2.4 Electoral Violence in the Global Context In both developed and emerging democracies, elections are a core tenet of rule of law and governance processes. Elections enable citizens to choose leaders to manage state resources. However, during electioneering processes, several violent acts are recorded. This sub-section University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 21 discusses the occurrences of electoral violence in the global, African, and Ghanaian settings. As indicated earlier, violence is also found in developed democracies as well as in developing countries. Scholars argue that electoral violence, even incidents that occur with some irregularity, indicates more widespread systematic complaints (Höglund, 2018). In the United States of America, electoral violence has become common in the last half decade (Kleinfield, 2021). Kleinfield postulates that political violence has a long history, and indicates that electoral violence phenomenon emerged in 1960 led by strong, clandestine ideological groups. The 1960- 1970 period witnessed violence, and since inception, political violence has shifted to the right with the rise of militias. The situation appears to be up surging even as the US, which claims to be the champions of global democracy. In the 2020 elections, the country has recorded more levels of political violence, marring the voting process and its aftermath. According to the 2016 elections reports former President Trump (then Presidential Candidate of the Republican Party) met with hate crimes targeted at minority communities. The Southern Poverty Law Center r nine hundred reports of “harassment and intimidation" in the next ten days after the elections (Hesson, 2022). Ware (2022) observes that political violence leading up to the 2020 US elections could not only prevent citizens from voting, but could the propensity to undermine the US democracy, and its democratic stability in many ways. Recent polls violence could undermine national and citizen confidence in the US democracy. For example, as the 2020 United States Presidential elections drew nearer, suspects were arrested by the military for plotting to kidnap democratic Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer (Hesson, 2022). Similarly, the phenomenon undermines the confidence of America’s and its ability to promote liberal democracy. Chowdhury (2019) reports that the Indian states of Bilhar, Andhar, Pradesh, Raastham, Uttar, and University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 22 West Bengal had more than 150, 000 people arrested before the 2014 national elections because the people were identified as violent. Coercion use in India’s politics is meant to support the aim a political party wants to execute in exercising superiority over its opponents. Vaishnar (2017), in a survey of voters, reports about politicians who agree to use violence as a form of coercion in elections. Wambua (2017) observes that, since the restoration of populist politics in 1991, Kenya has experienced periodic electoral violence. Analysis such conflicts, however, Wambua (2017) observes a consistent tendency to view causes as the only, or primary, manifestation of evil race. In other words, the author acknowledges a desire on the part of the state and non-state actors to deliberately ‘realize’ the ethnic conflict that has caused the country to remain in the wounds of electoral conflicts and pains. 2.5 Nature of Electoral Violence in Africa In the wake of transitioning from frequent military coup d’états to democratic regimes, elections have been identified as core tenet of good governance. Through elections, Africa has recorded a significant incidents of electoral violence in the past decades. The North African region, democratic regimes are more vulnerable to electoral violence. In the Northern African bloc, the political diffusion faced by those countries made them experience varied electoral violence. Countries within Arab States constitute the ‘Arab Spring’ movement, which includes Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2009) report electoral violence in the African ‘Meghrebian’ countries of Egypt in 2005 and Morocco 2007 elections in a case study, to demonstrate viable alternatives including fraud and knowledge and support, built from Muslim Brotherhood. According to the authors, violence employed in these countries during electioneering periods was both rational and effective. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 23 Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta see vote-buying as greatly experienced in the Moroccan 2007 election. Dwelling on the empirical literature, though electoral violence does happen; however, they are not severe when compared to the other non-‘Maghrebian’ African countries. Electoral violence is minimal, as elections are less conducted. In this, authoritarian regimes are commonly seen among these countries where elections do not usually offer with credence. Another example from the same scholars is the state of other electoral manipulation that takes place as a result of the electoral system itself. Greffrath and Duvenhage work focused on Egypt, as unfavourable electoral system with competing competitors in the political systems. The Southern African countries have embraced multi-partism practice, but relatively not a quite long ago. Some of the countries in the Southern Africa countries includes Lesotho Zanzibar, Swaziland, Seychelles, Mauritius and host of others. Pottie (2010) points that electoral violence experienced by these countries are not different from what its colleagues within the Sub-Saharan African experience. However, recongising that elections are marred by violence. Onwueghuchulam (2021) reports recent killings in the Kwazalu-Natal (KZN) province of South Africa during electoral violence, and made the Southern bloc fragile. Onwueghuchulam (2021) further builds on growing literature and asserts that South Africa with the political violence in Kwazulu-Natal is not disjointed from the concept of political socialization, indicating how electoral violence is so much ubiquitous in the African soil. The author utilizes Fanon’s On Violence (FOV) and builds on the subject- matter, stating that the Southern African bloc is volatile. For example, Onwueghuchulam (2021) contends how violence in South Africa have become eminent that two leading political parties – Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and African National Congress (ANC) – are the brain behind such violence due to political struggle dynamics as apartheid supported the political structural regime. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 24 In Central Africa, election violence has led into series of political violence and electoral conflicts, including coup d’états. Central African countries have recorded military interventions in their electoral processes, fragile and weak state institutions, high internal ethnic tensions, and armed insurgencies which mete out atrocities to the citizenry. Historical records show that Central African Republic (CAR) in post-independence period is recognized by cycles of violence and non- democratic transfers of power. It is reported that the upsurge in cases of political turmoil has resulted in the formation and deepening of rebel groups and about 3 million cases of homelessness (Bertlesmann Transformation Index, 2022). In West African, countries such as Nigeria experienced political violence during their 2023 general elections. Ikeji (2015) observed biased military involvement in elections including (i). serving as members of the elections monitoring team; (ii). standing for elections as political candidates; (iii). providing administrative assistance or support for elections; (v). voters’ registration and (vi). securing sensitive electoral materials or providing security against violence or electoral crimes before, during, and after elections. However, Ikeji (2015) holds that the fifth aspect has caused a major controversy over the need of the law, and the need to deploy the military for electoral purpose. According to Nigeria’s Election Violence Tracker (2022), the country faced violence from jihadist groups, criminals, and other armed groups engaging in attacks against the local communities and voters (Nwolise, 2007). Bardall asserts that occurring from the date of voter registration to the date of inauguration of a new government, election violence may take place in public or in private, including in the family, the general community, online and via media, or be perpetrated or condoned by the state” (2015, p. 5-6). Electoral contest posits the idea of struggling for political power to manage state resources when elections are won. This is a situation required by the laws of most African University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 25 countries compelling them to practice multiparty system, which permits all qualified candidates and political parties for political power. Hence, electoral violence has become a phenomenon commonly witnessed where there is the struggle for political power. 2.6 The Nature of Electoral Violence in Ghana In spatial mapping of conflict zones study by Kendie et al. (2014), a number of factors triggered violence in Ghana. According to the authors, varied causes ranging from religious differences to land, chieftaincy and ethnic differences, political and economic marginalization. For the purposes of the study, political dimension of the violence or conflict is more relevant continent that it is mapped to contribute to the phenomenon. For Seine & Tsikata (2004) political violence between supporters of the differing political parties started independence and had become part of the political scene predating from anti-colonial struggle. As is in many emerging democracies, elections in Ghana are not conducted in vacuum, rather they are based on prescribed rules and legislations. For example, in 2016 and 2020, the Constitutional Instruments (CI. 91), and (CI. 126) respectively were the legislations that controlled the elections. Since the inception of multi-party democracy, successive elections in Ghana have been accompanied by a certain degree of electoral violence (Gyampo et al. 2017). They are triggering mainly by contesting political parties, in particular, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and New Patriotic Party (NPP) (Danso & Lartey, 2012; Amankwah, 2013). Kendie, Osei-Kuffour & Boakye (2014) mentioned, taking part in democratic processes are a fundamental right of all citizens. However, the right to participate has turned to be chaos, suppress and intimidating, threatening the electoral processes. A number of electoral violence have been University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 26 experienced. The Electoral Commission provided a list of 81 constituencies with the potential for electoral violence. Notably among them are Ayawaso West Wuogon, Atiwa, Odododiodio, Wenchi, Talensi and many other constituencies. Several other civil society organizations also listed and monitored activities in areas they designated as hotspots for electoral violence (Kendie and Bukari, 2012). These violence activities were executed by the youth. According Aning, Danso, & Salihu (2016), and Kumah-Abiwu (2017) maintained that youth represented a greater proportion of political party membership in Ghana. The involvement of youth groups emerged when Ghana embraced multi- politics in 1992. The authors reiterated that political party’s youth wings were structured, and became operational to serve as a supporting base to the political parties. To marshal strong supporting base, Aning and Danso further reiterated that the youth wings were integrated, thereby involving them in the political party’s activities. The political parties in particular, the NDC and NPP, have created student and youth wings at the various campuses. The Tertiary Education Students Confederation (TESCON) of the NPP, Tertiary Education Institutions Network (TEIN) of the NDC, and the Tertiary Student Charter (TESCHART) of CPP, have been designated as breeding grounds for young politicians. However, youth involvement breeds violence due to their youthful exuberance, leading to the formation of many vigilante groups between the two leading political parties in Ghana, the NDC and NPP. It is relevant to point that most youth groups serve as party foot soldiers. Bob-Milliar (2014), maintained that most party foot soldiers engage in non-violent political campaigning and behave like activists elsewhere in advanced democracies. Nonetheless, Bjarnesen (2021) pointed out that NDC and NPP foot soldiers have increasingly being trained to operate as agents for their political parties University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 27 during election periods. In most cases, these foot soldiers are body-builders who are ‘machomen’ Bjarnesen, 2021; and (Utas, 2021). Debrah (2014) recognize machomen live in imaginary world of Ghanaian politics. They engage in fighting and protecting their candidates and political parties. Other violence engaged in by the foot soldiers include verbal intimidation, shootings, protests, threats, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination (Fischer, 2002). As Straus and Taylor (2012) mentioned, electoral violence is a physical violence and coercive that threatens consolidation of democracy. It is relevant to state that electoral system of Ghana is marred by plethora of these unrecognised political groups. These networks formed by political party’s big men are used to execute political activities for party’s interest or gains. Would the passage of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999) deter party foot soldiers at the existence of these groups? In Awutu Senya East Municipality, the 2020 electioneering period witnessed several violent acts. Such communities as Walantu, Church of Christ, Ofaakor, Nklu, and Nkwanta were reported to be hotspots, and recorded clashes between the NDC and the NPP. Violent activities included voter harassment, firing of warning shots, vigilantism, and many unacceptable behaviours that threatened the peaceful flow of the electioneering processes. In the 2020 electioneering period, two people were shot dead at the Church of Christ polling station at Kasoa (www.graphiconline.com). During the voter registration exercise, the Member of Parliament (MP) of the area, Hawa Koomson, fired a warning shot at a registration centre when chaos erupted (www.ghanaiantimes.com). In the incident, three motor cycles were burnt and the Election Commission officials bolted from the centre after gun- wielding men disrupted the registration process. Additionally, if elections outcomes do not favour certain political parties, supporters register their displeasure through street protests and University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 28 demonstrations. Table 2:1 showing the various vigilantism groups of NDC and NPP in Ghana Source: Compiled from the literature by the Author, 2023 2.7 Typologies of Electoral Violence The adoption of electioneering processes has enlightened societies in democratic states. The adoption of the processes and the subsequent acceptance of multi-party politics demonstrates the quest of countries to strive for democratic processes. Although politics has become a common phenomenon, politics and elections have been fraught with conflicts, and in recent decades, marred by violence, No. Groups Name Location Political Affiliation 1. Azorka Boys Tamale NDC 2. Al Jazeera Tamale NDC 3. Task Force Asawase NDC 4. Burma Camp Yendi NPP 5. Bolga Bull Dogs Bolgatanga NPP 6. Dazota (Don’t Fear) Bolgatanga NPP 7. Invincible Forces Bolgatanga, Asawase NPP 8. The Hawks Bolgatanga, Asawase NDC 9. Aluta Boys Bolgatanga NDC 10. No Weapon Sankore NDC 11. Salifu 11 Goaso NDC 12. Cyborg Killers Asawase NDC 13. Kandahar Boys Asawase NDC 14. Delta Forces Asawase NPP 15. Bamba Boys Asawase NPP 16. Alidu Mafia’s Asawase, Oforikrom NPP 17. Maxwell Boys Asawase NPP University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 29 which in recent times have been an integral process in many states, especially in developing democracies (Birch, 2020). Birch (2020) argues that the means by which power is organized in a society largely explains which elections are characterized by violence to some extent. This includes the ‘winner-takes-all’ syndrome in most democracies, especially in developing countries. This sub- section presented a number of electoral-related typologies, including threats, riots, intimidations and harassment, and protests and demonstrations. 2.7.1 The Issue of Riots Elections are held around the world, and celebrated for long, arduous, and continuing democratic practices (Rajah, 2020). Riots is defined be “an incident in which a crowd or more people damaged or seized property, assaulted someone or forced a victim to perform some action” (Bohstedt, 1983, p. 5). Soule (2018) suggests that several voters are skeptical about protest, hence, having effects on electoral outcomes as well as having profound impact on voter behaviour. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 30 Iyers (2015) studies the trends or trajectory of riots since India’s independence in 1947 until 2015, and finds that riots are mostly featured in religion. For example, in India, the causes of riots and the role of political competition play a role in influencing elections. Jha (2014) finds a correlation between periods of unrest and increase vote share does not attempt to establish a causal relationship. Wilkinson (2013) observes that violence is less likely to enter states with a very high number of political parties and where the ruling party is based on a minor vote. Iyers (2015) demonstrates how religious riots have complete underpinnings in social, economic, and political factors, and reveals how riots could be used as a tool to influence voter behaviour in party politics. Utilizing data on Hindu-Muslim riots in over 21 years, combined with electoral and demographic data, Iyers’ (2015) findings show a causal link between electoral politics and communal riots, and convey the extent to which violence could distort electoral processes. While Iyers’ (2015) findings are based on a robust check on the economic analysis performed in the author’s interpretation, the result does imply that such riots are caused by electoral factors. Nevertheless, Iyers’ (2015) study could be that most riots are as a result of political calculations employed to frighten opponents during electioneering. This systematically show that political parties could set riot for electoral benefits. Newburn (2021) reveals the various conditions that contribute to outbreak of social tensions, together with social and psychological interpretations of the macro- and micro-level interactions that may distort social identity, and translate anger about governance into violence. Borch (2012) contributes to the discourse and observes that one of the consequences of the backlash against the traditional, psychological, and sociological portrayals of crowd is to minimize interest in studying riots. Newburn (2021) recognizes the limitations on crowd and classifies riots into three groups. Newburn (2015, 2016a) mentions the extent of the approaches and focuses on the attention of not University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 31 only the economic, social, and political approaches. Newburn (2016a) focuses on the elements of Waddington’s flashpoints model together with the Social Identity Model (SIM) to demonstrate the rate at which contextualized and interactional levels minimize the propensity of violent clashes. 2.7.2 The Issue of Threats as a Crime to Electoral Process The electoral process is a complex combination of interrelated participation processes, including voter registration, candidate selection, and electioneering. As a true democratic practice, elections can attract threats from various groups whose motivations may not be related to national issues raised in the wake of the elections (ACE, 2002). Mitra and Shajahan (2022) examine how crime and threats are employed to influence elections. Analysing India’s National Crimes Records Bureau’s (NCRB) dataset from 1981 to 2007 with disaggregated category, the authors establish the rate of threats and crime and suggest that threats are crimes used for intimidation. The authors maintained that in an election year, violent crimes increase by about 61% when compared with other non-violent crimes. The authors use violence during elections with 26 years of the district-level data on reported crime cases. Furtherance to that, the authors find that there is an upsurge in cases of violence during election years when compared with non-election years. Moreover, the authors relate to criminalization in politics in most developing countries in general and, India in particular. University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 32 2.7.3 The Issue of Protests and Demonstrations Over the years, states have recorded several protests and demonstrations during electioneering, notably in post-elections periods. Asante and Helbrecht (2018) observe the effects of protests and demonstrations on history, especially in Africa, compared to the West. However, this misconception depicts some level of understanding. In Asante and Helbrecht (2018), the authors recent works have shown that Africa has witnessed four waves of protests. The first wave is believed to have occurred during the struggle for independence in many African countries; the second wave is associated with the difficulties of structural adjustment programmes that have involved most African countries; the third is the democratic or political revolution that swept through many parts of Africa in the 1990s; and the fourth (the most recent) wave is understood as a ‘global apologetic that is broadly defined as anti-capitalist’ (Seddan & Zeiling, 2005). Protests and demonstrations for political reasons are common in modern democracies as crowds and mobs use these violent acts to register their displeasure. Asante and Helbrecht (2018) use protest logics theoretical model to focus on a Ghanaian experience of protest. Asante and Helbrecht (2018) utilise secondary data in a study on protests in Ghana and other African countries through desk reviews. The authors focus on key concepts in Ghana, including urban protests, during the analysis of the online database. Asante and Helbrecht (2018) further review more than sixty published papers on protests in Ghana and Africa and reveal a historical development of three revolutions – Proletarian, Republican, and Corporatist. The authors observe two remaining arguments of appeal – independence and partiality. More so, protests involving liberal themes are common in the Ghanaian context, and issues such as gender, disability, and homosexuality were recorded. Similarly, the authors indicate that while political parties and politicians have been involved in many protests in Ghana, the parties and University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 33 politicians are often led to proletarian or proletarian movements. Another finding is that more youth are involved in violent protests due to unemployment. Therefore, protests and demonstrations are often an upsurging phenomenon pervading in cultures that have maturely recognized democracy, and as well as emerging geographies. This shows that threats and demonstrations influence voter participation during voting. 2.7.4 The Issue of Intimidations and Harassment Most elections around the globe are characterized by electoral intimidations and violence. The intimidations, threats, or coerce, could be used by any other person or persons to interfere with other persons’ right to vote. Globally, increasing number of elections remain vulnerable to electoral intimidations and harassment. In qualitative desk review, using theories such as social movement and conflict and conflict resolution on electoral violence have taken a paradigm shift as intimidation and harassment manifest in many ways (Claes, 2015). According to Claes (2015), the chaos includes insults, hate speeches, attacks on people’s character and ethnicity, physical attacks, arson, theft of ballot boxes, and murder. Political parties and their candidates can undermine the electoral process through such illegal activities as vote buying, attacks, threats to the opposition party, defamation, trial speeches, and hatred. Claes (2015) reports on the intimidations and harassment in Nigeria’s 2011 elections, which showed some democratic qualities at the ballot, but recorded as the worst in the country. 2.8 Factors Influencing Electoral Violence Birch, Daxecker, and Hӧglund (2020) report that there are four main global factors that increase the risk of electoral-related violence; whether perpetrated directly by a political party, or through state University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 34 security or the youth wings of armed parties outsourced to militias and gangs, or marshalled by ordinary citizens. The four forces are (i). a highly competitive election that could change the balance of power; (ii). partisan divisions based on identity; (iii). electoral rules that make it possible to win by exploiting identity divisions; and (iv). weak institutional constraints on violence, particularly the bias of the security sector towards a group leading the perpetrators to believe that they will not be responsible for the violence. A careful review of the literature reveals that, scholars have categorized causes of electoral valence into institutional, structural, and international. 2.8.1 Institutional Factors Records show that electoral violence remains a challenge in electoral processes, especially in Africa, even where elections remain the dominant mechanism for accessing political power. Institutions contribute to worsening violence associated with elections. In the literature, two prominent institutions are found - formal and informal institutions. Hanne and Höglund (2016) study electoral institutions and electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa, and indicate that institutions’ final framework on elections have the propensity to influence the risk of physical violence and coercive intimidation in respect to electioneering processes. To evaluate the study, Hanne and Höglund (2016) analyse datasets on monthly observations, including all countries holding executive or legislative elections in the sub-Saharan origins from 1990 to 2010. Similarly, data on electoral violence from 1990 to was obtained from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD, Version 3.0), by concentrating on regimes or practicing National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset by following the method of Huber. The authors discover University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 35 that electoral institutions are important in shaping government and opposition forces to engage in electoral violence when ruling party candidates do not meet the expectations of the competing parties. Again, Höglund (2016) reveal EMBs are independent, but focus on Proportional Representation System (PRS) and assert that with a greater number of legislative seats per each constituency, there is a significant reduction in political actors engaging in and encouraging violent electoral strategies. However, the authors do not rely on primary data for arrive at such findings. Arriola and Johnson (2012) postulate that in every five elections around the globe, it is marred by physical violence since the inception of Third Wave of Democratisation. In an attempt to establish the relationship between patronage politics and electoral violence in unconsolidated way, the authors dwell on an original cross-national dataset of electoral violence in Africa from 1985 to 2005 and reveal electoral violence is linked to the abilities of support systems, such as informal institutions, to respond to elite demands of resources, as evidence depicts redistribution process through competition. Also, the study finds that institutional structure is a negative predictor of post-electoral violence when the incidence or intensity of pre-election violence is considered. Thus, the study indicates that democracies with equal representation are less likely to engage in such violence, and countries that use electoral systems no longer exist. Further, Arriola and Johnson (2012) conduct a log arithmetic and argue that institutions that impact the likelihood of electoral violence are electoral administrative bodies. Unfortunately, Arriola and Johnson’s (2012) work is criticised for solely relying on primary data. Considering the informal institution, literature states the informal institution is associated with the belief that electoral violence is common among multi-ethnic societies, stemming from the polarisation University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 36 of ethnicity (Hanne & Höglund, 2016). The authors estimate log odds for the Fearon Index (FI) and convey that ethnic groups with greater fractionalization are associated with a lower likelihood of pre- election violence. Dixon (2009) asserts that ethnicity yields differences to increase the likelihood of conflicts while ethnic differences reduces it. Politics based on ethnicity is the default rule only in countries with weak political institutions (McVeigh, 2006; Hironaka, 2005). Qualitative studies on political violence has focused on cross-border, intra-group and identity building processes that can lead to political violence (Wimmer, 2013). Political scholars assert that electoral violence is associated with the exaggeration of differences within groups, the devaluation of members, and the restriction of group affiliation. 2.8.2 Structural Violence Structural violence is indirectly embedded in social structures, but could be worse than physical violence in leading to death or causing people to lead miserable lives for being politically repressed, economically exploited, or deprived of the freedom to be close to loved ones (Alert, 2003). According to Ali (2011), structural violence manifests in the form of exclusionary or discretionary policies against certain groups. Galding (1991) describes structural violence as a living term accumulation of policies; and the exclusion of policies or discrimination, ethnic, religious, and regional segregation. In areas where social distancing is deeply rooted, angry people can find ways to deal with the problems. One of the methods employed in such situations is weaponry (as a means of violence against social injustice). Violence is a system of domination, exploitation, and humiliation to force victims into subjugation (Galding, 1991). Morgan, Sunar, Fry, Carter, Leckman, Keverne and Old (2014) emphasise structural violence as a systemic act which is often subtle, invisible, and taken for granted, even more difficult to find out University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 37 that it is to make a guilty because violent actors are almost impossible to detect, hidden behind anonymous institutions or long ago the violence continued. Lee (2019) lists examples of structural violence in health, economics, gender, and radical disparities. These variables are fought over, hence, creating distortions. In the same vein, structural violence denies certain people the opportunity to exercise their franchise due to structural differences. Galtung Institute (2016) distinguishes between structural-specific and cultural violence, and groups it into physical and verbal violence. For Galtung (2016), cultural violence includes the beliefs and attitudes of groups that define their heritage; cultural elements such as religion, art, thought, language, science; and other social examples used to combine these beliefs to support or justify direct or cultural violence. In all, political parties have common structural problems of tension that relate elites’ preferences for a dominant role in their party financiers who, together with the political ‘godfathers’, control the structures of the party at every level (Aryee, 2008). In a study by Morgan et al., (2014) and Gultung, (1996), it was found that violence takes place when formal structures and administrative rules or regulations are employed as a technique to manipulate election to favour one entity. It is non-formal when it does not assume with formal features. Non- formal violence is experienced in health and economic (Sandler & Keith, 1995); cultural (Galtung, 1990, and Toffler, 1990); political symbols (Galding, 1991); party ideologies and affiliations, and party’s interest (Galtung, 1996). University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 38 2.8.3 Health Health concerns have become serious issues when discussing electoral violence since it causes injury and deaths for humanity. During violence activities in electoral processes, people become victims leading to injury, indicating that where violence persist health is compromised, making more people fall victimised to violence or lose their lives due to violent act. Since electoral processes involve voters, they are attacked by their opponents through physical means including fighting, beating and insulting, resulting in injuries. It is also to be stated that violence attacks the well-being of voters, minimising their extent of happiness. Thus, in all violent activities threatens the life, happiness and democracy in both developed and emerging democracies. 2.8.4 Economic Economic violence, according to Galtung (1967) is noted and created by unjust economic power conditioned due to certain existing social structures or groups who possess more capital, wealth or power or resources than other groups, making them more powerful. This group is also materially rich utilising their privilege status to exploit other groups. The political elites use the political power in their means to control such minor groups, especially the youth with the hope of meeting their wishes. Activities pushed by the politicians to be engaged in by the youth includes violence, protest, demonstration and riots, with a promise that they will be repaid contingent on winning political power to satisfy their economic woes. Galtung further elaborates that the unjust economic structures created by the political elites are seen as the states inability or failure to provide basic needs to the disadvantaged. Such poor people suffer poverty, hunger, and malnutrition while the rich political elites live in relative luxury. More so, poverty, healthcare, joblessness worsens the economic violence. All these unfair conditions lead individuals to believe that they have not received a fair share of the benefits and resources available in society. Hence, the inequalities created in wealth University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh 39 orchestrated economic violence. 2.8.5 Culture According to Galtung (1962, p. 6; and Galtung, 1996), ‘the legitimisation of the culture aspects, which justifies the direct or structural violence, is known as cultural violence.’ Further, Galtung defined culture ‘as the totality of values, norms, attitudes, beliefs, gender relations, child-rearing practices, governance.’ He posits cultural violence as violence where those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of man’s existence-exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art. Attitudes, assumptions, emotional impulsivity, and violent tendencies all come from a person’s history based on where one finds himself (Whittington & McGuire, 2020). It has become a culture that in every general election especially in developing democracies, it is characterised by threats, fights, insults, protest, and riots. Violence is unacceptable solution to redress electioneering misunderstanding or problems; as violence clashes between the competing candidates and the political parties during electioneering could distort the process. It is important to highlight that violence is deadly, beginning from anger, intolerance, impatience, unfair treatment and aggressions. 2.8.6 Political Symbols These are signals of a distant complex referent that evokes “pride, anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, or promises of future greatness”, (Edelman, 1985, p. 5). According to Mendelberg (2022), political symbols shows social status that evokes-based on emotions such as ‘glories and humiliations’. Symbols connects status, emotions, and objects or acts representing social values. Political symbols signals what kinds of people demonstrating a particular behaviour, which are worthy in the eyes of society as a whole. Symbols differentiate the use of authority for a particular group