Yale-UN Oral History 
Mr. Roelof (Pik) Botha 
Jean E. Krasno, Interviewer 
March 5, 2001 
South Africa 
Jean Krasno: Mr. Botha, what I thought we would start with is, i f you could give me a 
little bit of background on yourself: where you were born and educated, and when you 
began your professional service, and ultimately became foreign minister. 
[Discussion of tape recorder, tape length.] 
Roelof Botha: I was born in a town here in South Africa called Rostenberg, about a 
hundred kilometers from Pretoria, on 27 April 1932. It was a Wednesday. 
JK: A Wednesday. [Laughing] Okay. 
RB: It was a Wednesday then. I was named after my father, Roelof Frederik Botha, 
because I was the third son in the family. In our tradition, the third son is named after his 
father. The first son is named after his father's father, the second son after the mother's 
father, and the third son after his own father. I was educated in a town called 
Broederstroom, where I matriculated. In South Africa, matriculating means, "ending 
your school." It is usually twelve years. You go to school at the age of six, and then 
after twelve years you finish school, and are then ready to go to university, i f you pass 
your final exams in such a way. You must have taken certain subjects to go to university, 
and you must pass in such a way that you get what they call "exemption" to go to 
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university. I then attended the University of Pretoria, and studied law. I matriculated in 
1949, ended my school education, and went to Pretoria University in 1950. And then at 
the end of '52, I obtained my first bachelor's degree in law. Three years later, the real 
legal degree—in South Africa you could not study what we call an " L . L . D . " until you 
first had a B.A. So it is a five to six year study. I completed my first degree at the end of 
'52, and my second degree at the end of '56. But in the meantime, I joined the 
Department of Foreign Affairs in 1953, and then continued with my legal studies 
extramurally. The classes, the lectures for the law degree at the University of Pretoria 
were given outside office hours; in other words, in the mornings, from seven-thirty to 
quarter-past-eight, and then in the afternoons from five to seven. 
JK: My goodness. So you were working and going to school. 
RB: Virtually all the students taking that course had what we call a contract with some 
attorneys or lawyers for whom they worked, or they had some other job. In my case, I 
joined the Department of Foreign Affairs in February '53 as a Cadet. That's what we 
were called at that stage, and then you were appointed on a probation[ary basis]. And 
every six months your seniors and controllers would send in a report on you and your 
adaptability and suitability for the diplomatic service. Luckily, I apparently passed, so I 
became a career diplomat. My first mission abroad was as a Third Secretary in our 
delegation in Stockholm, Sweden. That was in 1957. In '57 I was transferred there, and 
then in the beginning of 1960 I was transferred to our embassy in Germany, and then I 
was transferred back to South Africa at the beginning of '63, and I as then attached to the 
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legal team—South Africa's legal team—which was preparing for our response to the case 
Ethiopia and Liberia brought against us on the issue of what was then known as 
Southwest Africa, and later, Namibia. It was a very long, drawn out case from the early 
'60 until the judgment was given in 18 July 1966. 
JK: Right. And this was the International Court of Justice in The Hague. 
RB: The International Court of Justice in The Hague. And what happened was the 
Organization for African Unity passed a resolution which mandated Ethiopia and Liberia 
as the litigants—as the two governments of countries that would institute the proceedings 
of the case of South Africa on the issue of Southwest Africa, because Ethiopia and 
Liberia were the only two independent states in the olden days of the League of Nations. 
A l l the others came into being at a much later stage, and I think that their legal advisors 
told them, the OAU, "you'd better choose two African states that had been independent 
during the time of the League of Nations," because we were dealing with a situation of 
implementation of the mandate, which was grounded by the League of Nations to the 
then government of South Africa in 1920 or '21. So the whole case centered mainly on 
the issue of the legality of our presence in Southwest Africa, as well as the policies 
followed there. Ethiopia and Liberia made out a very, very strong case that there existed 
a norm, or a standard, but a norm in international law of non-discrimination. In other 
words, that it was against international law to allocate rights, duties, privileges, or 
responsibilities on the basis of membership in a class, a group, or on the basis of religion, 
sex, and what have you. They said that there was such an international [norm], and that 
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that is on the merits of the case. Our response to that was no, that there is not a 
prohibition of forms of discrimination as long as the discrimination is not in the 
pejorative sense of the word, that there is not to be a disadvantage of another person on 
the basis of color or religion. In other words, we went so far as to say that having 
separate toilets for men and women would also be against the law [as they argue it], but 
we said no, it isn't, because it is not a discrimination that damages the allocation of that 
discrimination in a neutral sense of the word. And so forth. 
In 1953, as I said, I joined the Department of Foreign Affairs, was transferred to 
Stockholm, Sweden in '57, to Germany in '60, and back to South Africa in '63, when I 
became a member of the South African legal team, and I remained a member of the legal 
team until the judgment on 18 July '66. We won the case in the sense that the court 
"rejected" the claims of Ethiopia and Liberia, saying that they did not have sufficient 
legal interest in the charges they made, or in the claims... 
JK: Did that mean that they were not bordering states of Southwest Africa? 
RB: No. You see, to be a litigant, in litigation you must have a 'locus standi;' you 
must have sufficient legal interest in the outcome of the case. It must affect you in a 
rather direct manner. And the Court found that as members of the old League, or what 
have you, they did not have that standing. 
JK: They did not have that standing. 
4 
RB: They lost their case on technical grounds, but for us, we considered it to be a 
major victory, because had the Court found against us, it would probably have ordered us 
to leave the territory immediately. 
JK: Right. 
RB: To vacate it, and i f you had then refused, then in terms of the Charter of the 
United Nations the Security Council could take direct action against you. They need not 
even find that there is a breach of the peace, because normally before the Security 
Council acts, there must be a breach or a threat to the peace in a given region. Then there 
are the facts, they discuss the matter, and if that is the case, they can decide on 
enforcement measures, either of an economic, and even often military, a forceful nature. 
And in the case of a judgment of the International Court of Justice, the mere fact that the 
party against whom the Court has handed down a verdict refuses to implement that 
verdict, that judgment, then the Security Council can, ipso facto, without doing anything 
else, immediately decide on enforcement measures against that government refusing to 
implement a world court judgment. So it was of very great importance to us at that time 
to win the case, or not to lose it. 
JK: Right. 
RB: So we didn't lose it, but then all hell broke loose at the United Nations. That year, 
1966, was a tumultuous year for us. Dr. Verwoerd, who was then Prime Minister of 
5 
South Africa, was assassinated in September of '66. His last public speech was on the 
evening of 18 July 1966, when he addressed the country on the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice. That was his last public statement. 
JK: And then he was assassinated. 
RB: And then he was assassinated just before the opening of Parliament that year in 
September 1966. Mr. Vorster then became Prime Minister of South Africa. And the 
legal team, including myself, had to go to the United Nations because there was a 
tremendous debate in the General Assembly as a result of the Court's judgment, with the 
emotions running very, very high, with many countries, particularly the African 
countries, demanding the resignation of the judges of the International Court of Justice, 
and some of them even implied that they were corrupted and bought and bribed and that 
sort of thing. It was a very, very emotional debate. We endeavored, our legal team and 
our delegation there, to put across our case in a dignified manner. There I learned the 
very painful lesson that it doesn't matter how much the law is on your side; you can win a 
legal battle, but i f you lose the political battle, the legal victory is of no account. It 
doesn't help you; it doesn't assist you. It's just wiped off the table; it's nonexistent. It is 
reduced to emotion and power, and so remains even today. I can only say [about] the 
guideline to morality in international affairs that there isn't, in my opinion, as yet, 
consistent morality. Even not today in international affairs. It is still power that 
determines what is right or wrong, as was proved by the whole sad Kosovar war and 
trouble, and will be proved, in my opinion, for decades to come. I do not think that in the 
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field of international relations and international law we have reached the stage where 
people are inclined to act ethically and morally and religiously in the way in which we 
ought to act, from my religious Christian point of view. I'm Christian, and Christ has 
made it quite clear to us how you should behave even towards your enemy, and I'm 
afraid that that is simply not the case, and for a long time to come power—be it economic 
power, or military power, or a combination of both—will keep on defining the degree of 
morality of mankind for a long time to come. Be that as it may, we need not dwell on 
that too long. 
As far as the rest of my career is concerned, I was a member of the South African 
delegation to the United Nations General Assembly: to its 22 n d Session, 23 r d Session, 
24 t h Session, 26 t h Session, 28 t h Session, and 29 t h Session. That is of 1966 to '68, '71, '73, 
'74. I became a Member of Parliament in 1970. 
JK: I see. 
RB: I was reelected in '74, and soon thereafter, I became our Ambassador at the 
United Nations in '74. 
JK: Okay, so you were the Permanent Representative to the U N . And I believe it was 
at the same time that Perez de Cuellar was Permanent Representative of Peru. 
RB: Yes. 
7 
JK: You were there at the same time. 
RB: Quite correct, and what happened then was my credentials were rejected. I will 
never forget, President Bouteflika was the President of the General Assembly. He was 
the President of the General Assembly, 1974. And there was a debate; I was allowed two 
or three minutes to address the General Assembly, and thereafter a vote was taken, and 
my credentials were rejected and we had to withdraw. 
JK: So South Africa had to withdraw. 
RB: Not as a member, but we could never again participate in the General Assembly 
or any of its committees. And our Board, with the words "Republic of South Africa" 
remained there, but with a vacant chair, until after Mr. Mandela became President of this 
country. So that in 1994, twenty years later, for the first time that seat was taken up again 
by a South African representative. 
JK: So your credentials were not accepted and you could not be a member of the 
General Assembly or vote, but you could remain a member of the United Nations. You 
were still a Member State. 
RB: Yes, we remained a member. But we stopped paying our fees because the 
reasoning was how could you expect us to pay for services that we are excluded from and 
join? Be that as it may, for twenty years that seat remained unoccupied. I was the last to 
8 
address the General Assembly. Twenty years later, our new government's representative, 
for the first time, again addressed them. I remained Permanent Representative of South 
Africa, but was then appointed also Permanent Ambassador to the United States of 
America. So then I had a double position of Ambassador to the United States—that is 
now in 1975—as well as Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Of course my 
head court was then shifted to Washington, and whenever there was a Security Council 
meeting, and some of the problems—there were immense problems at that time in 
Angola, Mozambique, all around South Africa, with antagonism and the hostilities 
increasing all the time with the reduction of Cuban troops in '74 in Angola, that created a 
very critical situation over the whole of Southern Africa. And eventually these led to 
war, so that we were entering in '74 very difficult years, and very, I can almost say 
"stressful" years in the whole of Southern Africa, which lasted at least until '88, when I 
eventually signed that agreement, I think on 22 December '88, at the headquarters of the 
United Nations. There is a picture of the signing (shows picture): with General Malan, 
our Minister of Defense, myself, de Cuellar, Schultz, this man was Chef de Protocol of 
the U N . . . 
JK: .. .Marrack Goulding, and Martti Ahtisaari, Virendra Dayal, and I don't know 
who that is. That's a wonderful photograph. 
RB: Right. That was quite something. 
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JK: Let me ask you about the period of time that you held both positions. Could you 
then operate as an observer at the UN? You mentioned that the Security Council would 
be meeting. Would they invite you as a participant in the discussions of the Security 
Council? 
RB: No, because you see, the Security Council is different from the General 
Assembly. It is another organ at the United Nations, within its own right in the Charter, 
which clearly describes the various functions of the various organs or institutions of the 
United Nations. Although sometimes, again as in the past, with Korea, et cetera, the 
Americans sometimes used the General Assembly to pass resolutions which they could 
not get passed in the Security Council because of the veto, which the Soviet Union 
enjoyed, and so forth. But be that as it is, I've never been refused a hearing or 
participation in the Security Council. 
Whenever there was a charge brought against South Africa by one of our 
neighboring states, mostly centering on cross-border activities of our defense force, then I 
flew from Washington to New York. I had to get the fax from home, prepare myself very 
often by working through the night to prepare my statement for the meeting of the 
Security Council, which usually started at ten o'clock, ten-thirty, eleven o'clock the next 
morning, depending on, you know how it goes there—the orchestrating and negotiations 
between the various members to try and produce a resolution, which can gain the most 
votes in support of it—that sort of thing. So I often participated in that. That was when I 
was Ambassador there, as I say. 
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On one occasion, there was a very unsubstantiated but harmful charge by some 
Swedish film producers saying that they discovered a whole heap of skulls and skeletons 
somewhere in Angola, and that we South Africans killed people there on this massive 
scale. And now they've discovered it, and even had pictures of it. I invited the whole 
press corps at the United Nations to do Namibia, then Southwest Africa. We went there 
in a plane, and I took them all over the whole Northern part of Southwest Africa at the 
time. They couldn't find a thing, couldn't see a thing, and couldn't get anybody to 
confirm this. Quite recently, it was admitted that it was a false story, a totally false story, 
fabricated. So you had a lot of these things. 
You see, on the one hand, I couldn't agree with apartheid. And in that same year, 
in one of my major speeches in the Security Council, I publicly stated that I could not 
defend a discrimination based on a person's skin color. But I then gave the history of the 
country. I said, "Look, we are moving away from it. We want to move away from it. 
Please be patient, give us time," that sort of thing. And that helped me a lot in my 
personal relationship with leaders in Africa, as well as ambassadors and representatives at 
the United Nations, because they knew it was difficult to move away from the system that 
we had, and that you could easily lose your job. I almost lost my job in 1986, when I 
stated publicly, yes, there would be a black president one day in this country, and I would 
be prepared to serve under him. And it worked out exactly that way. 
JK: Yes, you had the vision to do that. 
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RB: I said this in February '86, and in 1994, we indeed had a black president, and I 
was taken up in that government, and did serve under him, eight years later [after my 
statement]. But it was a different story in 1986; it was a very, very difficult story. But be 
that as it may, I was then appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1977, 
and traded my post as Permanent Representative to the U N , as well as Ambassador in 
Washington, and came back to South Africa, and was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 
April 1977 until May 1994. 
JK: That's a very long time serving as Foreign Minister. 
RB: It was quite a long stretch. Then in May 1994, after the elections, in which Mr. 
Mandela became President, I was appointed Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs until 
June 1996, a month more than two years, when Mr. De Klerk, who was then Deputy 
President, decided to leave the government of national unity. I was against it, I warned 
him about it, he wouldn't listen, but the moment he resigned he was the leader of the 
national party. There was no way any of us could remain, because he had the right to 
nominate the ministers in his party who should serve in the Cabinet. So the moment that 
man who has the right to nominate falls away, then there is no one to nominate us 
constitutionally. So the moment he goes, we go. This is what happened. I then left 
politics in June in 1996, and have been acting as a consultant to companies and on 
political matters as well in Africa, South Africa mostly. And I've been trying to write my 
book on my experiences, my various jobs that I had. 
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Looking back today, I think that the three major tasks that I had to face was first 
of all, the whole issue of the independence of Zimbabwe. That was a very, very difficult 
one, and I took part in the negotiations prior to the independence of Zimbabwe, from 
1977 to 1980. And I believe I played a prominent role in that. I went to London; I 
attended virtually all the meetings, difficult ones, very, very difficult. Of course, we had 
to persuade Mr. Ian Smith all the time that there was really no alternative for him but to 
accept. First, there was Henry Kissinger with a six- or seven-point plan, which was 
almost, almost accepted. It was already accepted by Nyerere [President of Tanzania] and 
Kaounda, and then, because Smith revealed the plan, the others felt slighted and the 
whole thing fell through. And years of patient negotiations then had to continue, but in 
1980 it was over, and then I negotiated what is called the "Nkomati Accord." Nkomati is 
the name of a river that runs on the border between South Africa and Mozambique. 
JK: I see. 
RB: And animosity was building up between Mozambique and us ever since '74, '75, 
'76, '77, and so on. Eventually in 1984, I succeeded in getting the two governments 
together, and we came to a development agreement, the terms of which we would have 
assisted each other, guaranteeing friendly relations, ending of assistance, either they to 
the A N C [African National Congress], or us to the rebel group they had at the time there. 
JK: Renamo. 
13 
RB: Renamo. And that was considered by the whole world as a very great 
achievement, because we received telegrams even within the Soviet government, from 
President Reagan, from all over the world. I think the world saw, in the "Nkomati 
Accord," they saw the possibility of relaxing the strained atmosphere in Southern Africa. 
They saw maybe the first little lights at the end of a long tunnel of darkness, maybe also 
moving them ahead on the issue of Namibia, or Southwest Africa, and so on. The 
Accord was indeed a very, very important event in our country, and although later on we 
had a lot of problems with the Mozambique government and our government, there was 
evidence that our military people did secretly assisted the Renamo rebels. I was very 
much against it, but it created suspicion, and the whole Accord almost came to a 
standstill at one stage because of that. But at that time, it made a tremendous 
contribution, and showed South Africans that you can come to an agreement, a peaceful 
agreement, to implement peace and not war, even with a government that does not share 
your political ideas and policies. In other words, the government of Samora Machel was 
generally regarded as a pro-Communist government, and we were exactly the opposite 
here. And here they came, being neighbors, and they took this hurdle in the interest of 
both, to come to this agreement of peace and development. 
It was an important first step to also open the way for what happened in the years 
that followed with Southwest Africa and Namibia, which was of course the far greater, 
that was by far the greater challenge was that one. There was a war then, with fifty-, 
fifty-five thousand Cuban troops already in the territory, with South Africa almost 
directly at war at times against the Cubans. There were a vast number of Soviet Russian 
technicians, and the Americans were neutral. I believe that they would have liked, like 
14 
us, to get rid of the Cuban troops, because that was their greatest fear, was the presence of 
Cuban troops in Angola. At the same time, the Americans made it clear to us that if we 
can succeed in the withdrawal of the Cuban troops, then we ought to agree to the 
independence of Namibia. "Because," and I shared that view, "it is quite clear that you 
can say that your troops are needed there to turn the possible tide of Cubans moving 
southwards. But the moment they are out, there doesn't remain much of a case for you to 
say that you want to remain there, because the threat would then have been removed." 
That was in back in the setting, the background, when I entered as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in April '77. You see, my major occupation at that stage was and remained 
Southwest Africa, Southwest Africa, and day in, day out. It became very, very difficult, 
particularly in '77. I think David Owen was then British Minister of Foreign Affairs. We 
got on quite well together, but it was not until President Reagan was elected that we for 
the first time really started to make good progress, and went ahead. Even so, it took eight 
years, until '88. 
JK: I definitely want to talk about that period, but before we move on to that, I wanted 
to ask you about a few of the things that were happening more during the 1970s, because 
during that period of time there were economic sanctions that were brought to bear 
against South Africa for both the practice of apartheid within South Africa, and the issue 
of Southwest Africa. I wanted to ask you, what were the effects of economic and 
political sanctions in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s? 
15 
RB: Of course it was damaging on the one hand; on the other hand, it also forced the 
private sector here, as well as the government, to invest in ventures, which could 
overcome the effect of sanctions. So I have always been against sanctions in any form, 
anywhere in the world. I very well remember when the Americans introduced sanctions 
against Poland years ago. I then asked Henry Kissinger, who was then Secretary of State, 
why did you do it? He said, well, he is also in two minds about the efficacy of sanctions, 
but this is to show the Communists they can't get away with murder. I then said to him, 
"Look, it is not the Communist leaders that will pay the price. It is the people of Poland. 
Those leaders will arrive in the same limousines, eat the same nice, luxurious food, and 
have the same nice, luxurious life that they have before. It is the people who will pay the 
price eventually." I do not think that sanctions really assisted us to get to the negotiating 
table. It hardened attitudes. In many cases, people act then almost revengefully, in a 
vindictive way, saying, "Alright, you try to get me down that way, I ' l l show you, you 
won't." It is that kind of mental, psychological attitude which hinders rather than 
encourages negotiations and deals and reconciliation. 
JK: But was it frustrating for South Africa in the financial sector to get loans, or to 
access accounts? 
RB: Of course it was, trade-wise we overcame the inevitable effect of sanctions to a 
large extent. We created front companies in Europe and elsewhere. They were directly 
serving on some of the companies that my department loans.. .who were even very close 
to the governments in Europe. Like, for instance, in France or Germany or Holland, 
16 
[there] would be a director of one of my companies, front companies, not knowing at all 
that it's a front company. That way, whatever the list, we provided the funds for 
activities and so on. It will be interesting one day to reveal where we operated. We even 
operated in Havana. We had a company [there]. 
JK: In Havana! 
RB: In Havana, yes. But be that as it may, in the financial field, we reached a stage 
which was tight, to say the least, which was potentially very, very dangerous for us at one 
stage, which could have led to chaos in the international financial field in the sense that 
for instance, if you could not pay your debts anymore, or get approval for the turnover of 
loans—not so much the government loans, our private sector had major loans which 
could not be renewed—but then you reach a situation, you know, where a bank in Europe 
or America could have your shipload full of food or grain or meat virtually impounded, 
confiscated, and [could then] sell the contents, which would have meant havoc in the 
South African foreign trade sector. And so luckily it did not come to that; we survived 
that, and I say luckily because you know when you enter a negotiating process, and the 
one party feels that he is being trampled upon, you're not going to get negotiations 
properly off the ground. The foolhardy people, those who do not want to deal, to make 
agreements; they are the ones that then rise. They become stronger, saying to the public, 
"Look, this Pik Botha wants to sell you out to the blacks. We have the guns, we have the 
means, let's make war and continue." That kind of sentiment becomes attractive if the 
reasonable people are not supported. I often told Western, and for that matter African, 
17 
leaders, I said, "Look, i f you could just more often, when we do change a law, or when 
we do make it clear that we are moving away from apartheid, i f you could then just say, 
'Look, this is a good thing. We support this,' so that those of us who are behind those 
steps can then say to our public, 'You see, i f you do the right things, we will get credit 
from the Western world, from America, from Britain, and so on, so let's do more of it 
and then we'll get more credit...'" 
JK: And then you'll get more credit. 
RB: But i f you do not get any credit, i f you're trampled upon, then it's almost like 
pulling the carpet from underneath your feet. They remove your power base vis-a-vis 
your own people. Your own people say, "But look, this Pik Botha is clamoring for the 
removal of apartheid, but look what he's getting—a slap in the face upon a slap in the 
face. So if this is the way it's going to be, then it's not going to be that way at all!" This 
is not always understood, that those who work very hard inside the country to affect 
change do need these visible forms of support from outside in order to move faster and 
persuade your own people that it's in our own interest to accept change. 
JK: In 1978, the Security Council passed Resolution 435, which actually established 
the United Nations Transition Assistance Group for what was to become Namibia. But 
nevertheless, that resolution wasn't put into effect until much later. What was the support 
or reaction of South Africa initially to 435? 
18 
RB: Yes, maybe we should just for a moment go back to '78. In '78.. .when was the 
resolution passed, did you say? 
JK: It was passed in 1978, although I don't recall the month. 
RB: That's right, but in that same year, the South African government accepted it. I 
was then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I got it through our Cabinet. It was not easy, it 
was very, very difficult, but I pointed out to our Cabinet that this was inevitable, and that 
unless we accepted that resolution it is quite clear to me that the five Western members of 
the Security Council were going to get at us in a big, big way, unless we accepted this 
and start serious negotiations on its implementation. I had no doubt that it was going to 
be a very arduous, i f not intractable task to implement eventually, because of the years of 
mistrust between us and SWAPO, and us and the United Nations, and the international 
juridical side of it. But I said, "Look, we better make a beginning, and the beginning is 
that we must accept it in principle." Luckily, the majority of the Cabinet members 
supported me, and the Prime Minister of the day supported me. So that was passed. 
JK: Who was Prime Minister in '78? 
RB: It was still Mr. Vorster. 
JK: It was still Mr. Vorster, okay. 
19 
RB: It was still Mr. Vorster, and Mr. P.W. Botha, who later became Prime Minister, 
was then Minister of Defense. He was very much against it, against it. 
JK: Okay, right. Now when the Western five came to South Africa, President Carter 
was President of the United States. Did you meet with the Western five? 
RB: Oh yes, quite regularly. As a matter of fact, they came out here; I think it must 
have been. 
[End of Side 1, Tape 1] 
[Beginning of Side 2, Tape 1] 
JK: We were talking about the Western five. 
RB: Let me see i f I can find a picture of them here somewhere. 
JK: What is this book? I think we should just read this into the record. 
RB: That is mine, I wrote it myself. 
JK: You wrote this! Can we just get the title of the book? NamibianIndependence 
and Cuban Troop Withdrawal. And you wrote this yourself? 
RB: Well, by and myself, but I accepted the final responsibility of it. 
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JK: We should try to get a copy of that, is it possible to get a copy of this book? 
RB: It is very, very scarce, this book. 
The five ministers at that time, and they came here, all five. They first met me in 
New York in February '78. They were Mr. Louis de Guiringaud, France; Mr. Donald C. 
Jamieson, Canada; Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher of West Germany; Mr. Cyrus L. Vance, 
and Dr. David Owen, United Kingdom. Those were the five. 
JK: And they were all the foreign ministers? 
RB: Yes, they were the foreign ministers, and they came, and for the first time in our 
history, and it was the only time that five foreign ministers from any five countries visited 
South Africa. It was of major, major importance to us moving ahead. And you see, the 
problem started because we told the DTA. 
JK: The D T A is the. 
RB: The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. 
JK: A political party in Namibia. 
21 
RB: It's a number of parties that got together and formed this alliance. I don't know 
how many of them there were before, but then they united, the white parties and black 
parties and what have you united. And the place where they met was called the 
Turnhalle. It's a German word, I think, for a gymnastics hall. And from there comes the 
word. 
JK: Okay, I see, they met in that building in Windhoek. 
RB: Because they met there and started there. And what is important is that the D T A 
then won an election. We warned the five, we warned them. I warned them in February 
that the South African government was now ready to go ahead with the Resolution 435. 
We wanted to go ahead, we were in a hurry. And we told the parties in Namibia, "You'd 
better get ready, there's going to be an election." Then SWAPO made it difficult for 
everyone; we could not stop the process in Namibia. There was no way we could, our 
own public would have rejected us, because we said there were going to be elections, we 
said we were going to go ahead, and it will be free and fair, et cetera. The U N was not 
participating, saying, "It's too fast, SWAPO is not in, give them more time," and so on, 
and we said, "Look, we are very sorry, we can't stop it." And then these five gentlemen, 
the five representatives—and France, Britain, and US of course had permanent seats 
there, a veto, and Germany and Canada were the two Western members for two years 
only, in terms of the convention of electing members of the Security Council. 
So here we were heading for a real impasse with the five saying we must call off 
the election, and us saying, "We cannot, you can ask us other things, but that's the one 
22 
thing you cannot ask us. It has gone too far." And then they came out here to threaten 
us. You can read in Cyrus Vance's book, Hard Choices, and in that book he describes in 
detail how he had already obtained President Carter's permission to go ahead with 
sanctions, severe sanctions, all around, against South Africa, i f we were going to install 
the D T A as the government of Namibia. It was an extremely difficult time and the way 
we found a modus vivendi that saved the day was that we promised the five that the Prime 
Minister and I would go to Windhoek and persuade the DTA, who won the election, that 
they can become the interim government, but [without] independence, and we would 
have to implement 435. 
We went there, the Prime Minister and myself, it was a new Prime Minister, Mr. 
P.W. Botha, it was in December '78. We did persuade them; it was a very hard and 
difficult task, but the boat almost sank. The boat almost sank. But you see, Resolution 
435 was perhaps the most important of the lot. Maybe I should just review quickly—of 
course we cannot keep on talking until midnight—about these resolutions, and how 
difficult it was to reach the settlement proposal. Let us first deal with the proposal. This 
is for Resolution 435. That resolution, after its adoption, a number of further agreements 
and understandings were reached by the parties. These included the following, which 
together with the settlement proposal formed a comprehensive whole binding on all the 
parties. They are as follows: 
• An agreement reached in '82 that U N T A G would monitor SWAPO bases in 
Angola and Zambia. And Zambia. 
• Informal understandings reached in 1982 on the question of impartiality of the 
United Nations and the representative of the Secretary-General. 
23 
• A 1982 agreement that a constitution to be drawn up by the constituent 
assembly would be formulated in accordance with certain principles and will 
be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the assembly's total membership. That 
is then after the election. 
JK: Right, so then these were important agreements. 
RB: There's another one. 
• An agreement reached in '85 that the elections would be based on the system 
of proportional representation. 
JK: And the proportional representation was something that South Africa favored. 
RB: No, I think chronologically let me say that following the unanimous adoption by 
the Security Council of the United Nations of Resolution 385—that was way back in 
'76—demanding free and fair elections in Namibia. The five Western members that I've 
mentioned, of the Security Council, approached the South African government with the 
view to developing a settlement proposal, which could lead to free and fair elections and 
independence for the territory. The South African government agreed that it would 
participate in such a process on the clear understanding that the people of the territory 
inside Southwest Africa should be allowed to decide their own future without 
intermediation from whatever quarter. Over the following two years—that's now from 
'76 onwards—over the following two years, serious and protracted discussions between 
24 
the Western five and South Africa on the one hand, and the South African government 
and the leaders of Namibia on the other hand, took place. This culminated in the 
settlement proposal, which the Western five presented to the South African government 
on 10 April '78. The objective of the settlement proposal was to bring about the 
transition to independence for Namibia acceptable to all the parties. It was formally 
endorsed by the United Nations Security Council as Resolution 435 on 29 September 
1978. 
JK: I see. 
RB: The key elements of the proposal are important. Let me mention them. The key 
elements of the proposal related to the holding of free and fair elections in the territory 
with an appropriate United Nations role. It was foreseen that the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations appoint a Special Representative, whose simple task would be to see 
that conditions were established which would allow free and fair elections, and an 
impartial electoral process. The Special Representative would be assisted by a United 
Nations Transition Assistance Group, called U N T A G . The purpose of the envisaged 
elections would be to elect representatives to a constituent assembly, which would draw 
up and adopt by a two-thirds majority a constitution for an independent and sovereign 
Namibia. In carrying out his responsibilities, the Special Representative would work 
together with the Administrator General as the representative of the South African 
government in the territory. I think from your point of view and from mine it is very 
25 
important just to dwell for a moment on the role of the Administrator General, because 
there has been a lot of misunderstanding. 
JK: A l l right, that's good. 
RB: The settlement proposal, 435, determined that the responsibility for the 
administration of Namibia during the transitional period—and this is very important—the 
responsibility for the administration of Namibia during the transitional period would be 
the primary task of the Administrator General as the representative of the South African 
government in the territory. In other words, there was no question that the U N would 
come and enter the territory and start making laws for it. Not at all. It was clearly and 
categorically stated that that would remain the task of the Administrator General. 
JK: Right. And U N T A G was simply to assist. 
RB: Yes, and in this regard, in this primary task of administering the territory, he, the 
Administrator General, will work closely together with the Special Representative of the 
United Nations Secretary-General, in order to ensure the orderly transition to 
independence. Now, this was a key factor, because if these two—our Administrator 
General and the Secretary-General's Representative—if they were two people who were 
at loggerheads with each other, where the chemistry was so far apart, or so mutually, 
what shall I say, unacceptable, then we would never have had a process at all. But 
luckily, in the end, a man like Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, whom I then already knew well from 
26 
my days at the United Nations, and Mr. Louis Pienaar, who was Administrator General 
then in Namibia—he is a steady, stable type of person who does not easily get upset or 
emotional about matters. Being a lawyer, he acts fairly judicially. A bit too meticulous, I 
sometimes thought, and too much of a hair-splitter, so to say, to my taste. But 
nevertheless, I think it was the right choice, difficult as it could be, with all respect, 
because I appointed a Permanent Representative myself there to work under him. 
JK: Oh, you did? 
RB: Oh yes, Mr. Carl von Hirschberg. An outstanding man, he was my assistant at the 
United Nations, and he was also our Permanent Representative at the United Nations. So 
he knew everything about it. He was very, very intellectual, well developed man with a 
very, very good sense of justice and fairness, and that sort of thing. Knowing the world, 
knowing the U N . So the team that we put together, you see, Mr. von Hirschberg would 
phone me and say, "Martti Ahtisaari is very upset because of this and this and this," but 
his boss, the Administrator General wouldn't move. So then I phoned the Administrator 
General. Then I can't say to him, "My man complained about you." I must ask him for a 
report to me, and then in giving me a report on what is going wrong or what has gone 
wrong, I can then react by saying, "Please, man, we can't afford to have a stalemate over 
this, we must make progress, don't you see this?" and then I would try to persuade him. 
What is important is really just to look at the tasks, because in these tasks you see the 
Secretary-General's man, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, had to assist. 
27 
JK: That's right. 
RB: They had to work together. What were the tasks? Administer the day to day 
running of the territory. It's a government; it's a government by one man. Prepare 
regulations in regard to the procedures to be followed during the election: very important, 
not easy. Repeal—listen to this—all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, 
regulations, or administrative measures which might breach or inhibit the objective of 
free and fair elections. You mustn't forget, tremendous charges were leveled against us 
at the United Nations over many years, and there were still discriminatory or restrictive 
laws on the statute books. So we agreed it will be removed. Make arrangements for the 
release—very important, this one—we had to make arrangements for the release, prior to 
the beginning of the electoral campaign, of all alleged Namibian political prisoners or 
detainees, so that they can participate fully and freely in the electoral campaign without 
risk of arrest, detention, intimidation, or imprisonment. 
JK: Right. 
RB: A l l such prisoners held by South Africa were released some years before that 
already. We released them. Should a dispute in this regard, namely on the release of 
prisoners, should it arise it is to be resolved to the satisfaction of the United Nations 
Special Representative, acting on the independent advice of a jury of international 
standing, who will be designated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as legal 
advisor to the Special Representative. Another task was the preparation for the reception 
28 
of Namibian refugees, who were outside who had returned, or Namibians detained or 
otherwise outside the territory who returned. Another task was to ensure the good 
conduct of the police forces, which are primarily responsible for maintaining law and 
order. Not the U N T A G . It was our police, the Namibian police. 
JK: Yes, it was the police of Southwest Africa. 
RB: During the transition period, take the necessary actions to ensure their suitability 
for continued employment during the transition period. In other words, after the 
transition period there is independence, and surely the country doesn't want to be without 
a police force in that time. Talks could be held for retaining their services. From this it 
must be clear to you that what was needed was the close cooperation between the 
Administrator General and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The 
Administrator General, in fact, acted as the sole administrative authority of Namibia 
during the transition period, and was assisted by the existing civil service there, the 
government departments throughout the territory. Now if you bear in mind the 
requirements of impartiality also as far as South Africa and the various political parties 
inside the territory are concerned, it should be noted that all political office bearers in the 
territory were required to vacate—listen to this—their positions before the date of 
implementation. In this regard, the position of tribal authorities, such as traditional chiefs 
and headmen, remained unaltered, and they were not affected by the requirements 
regarding political parties as such. Remember there was an interim government, a second 
tier government, a third tier. We had to disband all of them. Otherwise, SWAPO would 
29 
have said it's not impartial. Similarly, we had told the five and the U N and the Secretary-
General, "Look, irrespective of the wild and irresponsible language used to Committees 
in the United Nations, as long as your representative and you, Mr. de Cuellar, remain 
impartial and show to us your impartiality, we can go ahead. 
JK: Right. So were you satisfied that Martti Ahtisaari and Perez de Cuellar in the U N 
in that regard did remain impartial during that transition period in 1989? 
RB: Yes, yes, in my own mind, I am quite satisfied. Some times there were 
differences of opinion that did arise, but when it comes to Mr. Martti Ahtisaari—Dr. de 
Cuellar was in an almost different position, he was closer to the elements most hostile to 
us—whilst Mr. Martti Ahtisaari was in the territory, and cooperated with all the elements. 
He had to cooperate with SWAPO, as well as the Administrator General, as well as the 
other political parties. And at that time, I already knew him quite well, and everything 
went well. The implementation date was 1 April '89. The previous evening he invited 
me, or I think the Administrator General invited me and Mr. Martti Ahtisaari and his 
senior staff to a dinner in the Administrator General's official residence. 
JK: In Windhoek. 
RB: In Windhoek. During that evening, I was informed confidentially that there were 
indications that SWAPO was on the point of infiltrating into Namibia from the North, 
30 
from Angola, irregularly, and armed SWAPO members in an attempt to cause havoc in 
Owamboland in the Northern part. 
JK: And what kind of information were you getting? Was this intelligence? Was it 
news reporting? 
RB: Yes, it was intelligence. We had an intelligence agency, and quite a number. I 
couldn't check at that stage, but I did mention it to Martti Ahtisaari. He said that he was 
convinced, at that stage, that SWAPO would be most stupid to do a thing like that. 
Everything is in place, it's kick-off tomorrow, and the whole world will be watching it. 
And he said to me he could not understand how SWAPO could be that stupid to allow 
such an ostensibly irregular campaign of terrorism of an armed, aggressive nature to take 
place. I remember saying goodnight to him, I said to him, "Martti, I haven't checked it, I 
have no confirmation yet, but I'm giving this to you as a friend so that both you and me 
and all of us are prepared and ready i f something goes wrong." 
JK: Was it from satellite information, or on the ground intelligence? 
RB: No, our security services. We had them all over the place, and they picked it up 
from reliable sources. It's the normal thing. The British have a service, the Americans 
have the CIA and others, and so did we. And so on. Just at that critical stage, Mrs. 
Margaret Thatcher was in the country. She visited. The British troops were going I think 
to provide the communication systems, or something like that. Communications. And 
31 
they had troops to take care of that. She visited them in the territory to show her 
friendship to them and her support, and so on. She was always very good at that. And as 
I drove to the airport to meet with her—she was then on her way back to Britain by 
aircraft—and I rushed to the airport to get there in time to at least pay my respects to her. 
On the way to the airport, I received confirmation that the SWAPO guerilla fighters had 
indeed crossed the border in large numbers. I think the figure was already over three 
hundred. 
JK: Three hundred persons. 
RB: Yes. At that stage, the crisis suddenly became critical, very critical and explosive. 
Because by that time, the South African troops, in terms of the agreements with the 
United Nations and others, had already been confined to their barracks, so that here was 
now an open field for three hundred armed men to cross the border and cause havoc, 
which would have resulted automatically in the white farms of the North grouping 
together immediately and starting their own war against SWAPO, a new war. And I 
discussed this with Mrs. Thatcher at Windhoek airport, and I said to her—I remember it 
very well—that I think we'll have no choice but to allow our troops to leave their 
barracks to go and form a buffer against any southward movement of SWAPO, which 
would result in fact in a civil war. 
JK: So this was the defense force. 
32 
RB: Yes, now let me just finish. Mrs. Thatcher then said to me that no, I couldn't do it 
without United Nations agreement. But I said to her, "But look, Mrs. Thatcher, i f the 
dam wall breaks, and people drown and are killed, will you accept the responsibility? 
Who must accept the responsibility? Must we simply tell the farmers of the North...?" 
She said, "No," she said to me, "Mr. Botha, you cannot do this on your own. The British 
government will not support it." I then found Martti Ahtisaari. He said to me that he had 
conveyed the news already to de Cuellar, he had not yet received a reply, and could I 
phone de Cuellar. So I phoned de Cuellar. And he said, well, he would have to wait for 
more information from Ahtisaari. And I said to him, "Dr. de Cuellar, the situation is 
getting critical by the minute, not hour, [but] by the minute. We're heading for a war. 
The dam wall is going to break. May I take it that you agree?" And he was still hedging 
and moaning about, and so on and so on. I said, "Look, I understand you, and I must go 
now, people are calling for me, some generals want to meet. I take it you say yes, thank 
you very much Dr. de Cuellar." And I put down the phone. And he did not repudiate 
me. So I took it as a yes, and I told the South African general to go ahead, and I told 
Margaret Thatcher that I had the Secretary-General's okay, and I phoned Martti Ahtisaari 
and told him also it was okay. And then our troops were released, and there were quite a 
lot of skirmishes, and then Mt. Etjo followed all that, you see. 
JK: What was Martti Ahtisaari's response to you when you informed him that the 
defense forces were going t o . ? 
33 
RB: He accepted it, because I phoned his boss, the Secretary-General, and he accepted 
that I did phone him. He at first said to me—he called me Pik, I called him Martti then— 
he said to me, "It was not quite my understanding that the Secretary-General had agreed." 
I said, "Martti, please, I will accept the responsibility that he agreed. You need not. And 
I authorize you here today whatever will or might go wrong, I am prepared to give you 
my word of honor that I will say that I've told you he said so, and that you accepted my 
word for it, and I will accept that responsibility." 
JK: And then ultimately, he did accept that responsibility for having authorized it. 
RB: Yes, there were some very unpleasant letters between him and me. They are all in 
here (indicating the book); all of them are in here. 
JK: Right. Now let me just ask you a few other questions on this. The Southwest 
African police had not been confined to barracks in the North. 
RB: No, because in terms of the agreement... 
JK: .. .they didn't have to be, right. 
RB: They were to police the territory until independence. 
JK: And what was the role of the Koevoet at that time? 
34 
RB: It ended. 
JK: Officially, but unofficially. 
RB: Well, you know, there have been such a lot of allegations and counter-allegations 
and claims and counter-claims. I was Minister of Foreign Affairs, I was not the Minister 
of Police. I had no jurisdiction over these people. This all had been very painful for me 
to see that people almost expected me to accept responsibility for everything that went 
wrong in the country. I was not the Prime Minister or President. I was the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. And as such, I did my utmost to alleviate the affect of sanctions because 
I knew what sanctions might do economically to the country in the long run. You' l l 
never regain those markets. Zimbabwe never regained the markets lost by Ian Smith, 
never. And look at what a mess the country is in today. A terrible mess, and the main 
reason is of an economic nature, make no mistake. And I wanted to avoid that at all 
costs, damage I wanted to avoid at all costs, but I sometimes get the impression that 
people always held me responsible for what went wrong. I was not in charge. I ended 
the war. I succeeded in making an agreement with the Cubans and the Angolans to get 
rid of the Cubans, and gave independence to the territory. And that paved the way. I 
concluded the Nkomati Accord. I assisted in getting the independence of Zimbabwe, and 
I did play a role inside this country to get rid of apartheid, and predicted in '86 there 
would be a [black] president. That's my record. It's recorded. I need not try and bluff 
anyone or hide behind anything. That's my record. It's recorded. 
35 
JK: Now shortly after that, I believe around April 8 t h, there was a meeting at Mt. Etjo 
that did conclude a cease-fire. And you were present at that meeting. 
RB: Very much so. 
JK: I have a picture of you in that meeting, and Chester Crocker was there. 
RB: I suggested it. 
JK: You suggested the meeting? 
RB: Sure. 
JK: Okay, good. 
RB: I suggested the meeting. Just one moment, put off the [machine]. 
[Tape is stopped for a moment.] 
JK: Okay, so we were talking about the meeting at Mt. Etjo. 
RB: Just before we get there, I just want to mention a very important aspect about 
U N A V E M . About Cuban troop withdrawal and U N A V E M . Despite the fact that the 
36 
Resolution 435 and the settlement proposal had not dealt with matters other than 
domestic Namibian questions, don't forget that when it was adopted in '78, South 
African government had already, at that time, expressed concern regarding the presence 
of foreign military elements in Angola, of specific concern was the presence of a large 
number of Cuban troops in Angola. These forces had to come to the aid of the M P L A in 
the period leading up to final departure of the Portuguese from Angola, and their numbers 
had increased as the war between the M P L A and UNITA had escalated. One of the 
problems which the South African government foresaw was that the presence of a large 
foreign military force in Angola, which would be seen as the ally of only one of the 
political parties, namely SWAPO, could have a seriously disruptive effect on the free and 
fair elections which were envisaged in terms of the Resolution 435. The South African 
government thus at an early stage stated that in order for the process leading to the 
independence of Namibia to proceed, agreement would have to be reached regarding an 
acceptable time table for the total withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. The South 
African position on this issue, which soon came to be termed "linkage," was the subject 
of considerable discussions. As a matter of fact, it formed the key to the eventual 
implementation of Resolution 435. Initial reaction to this position adopted by the South 
African government was uniformly hostile in the U N and elsewhere. With the start of the 
latest round of discussions in May '88, it appeared that it was becoming more generally 
recognized that a successful solution of the problems of the whole of the southwestern 
area of Africa would come about only i f a serious attempt was made also to solve the 
vexing question of the Cuban troop presence in Angola. For a number of reasons, this 
was a complicated matter, which it soon became clear, would require skillful negotiation 
37 
to resolve. On the one hand, Angola-Cuba did not wish to have the question of 
"linkage," the existence of which they had consistently denied, overtly exposed in any 
solution which would be achieved. They didn't want this linkage thing to be dragged into 
the implementation of Resolution 435. On the other hand, they—that's Angola and the 
Cubans—were also faced by a dilemma, since if it be came obvious that the Cuban 
presence in Angola was the only remaining obstacle to implementation of the process 
which would bring independence to Namibia, and the matter was not resolved because of 
Angolan-Cuban unwillingness to address the issue, they ran the risk of being seen to 
stand in the way of independence for the territory. Additionally, Angola-Cuba argued at 
that time that the Cuban presence in Angola was based on an international treaty between 
the two countries. Any decision regarding the future disposition of Cuban troops in 
Angola would thus be a matter for decision between the two countries concerned, and 
only them. They would take their own sovereign decisions. South Africa accepted this 
point of view. I trusted them. It was understood that they could not merely, you know, 
override that. 
JK: And you were involved in these negotiations. 
RB: Every one of them. But nevertheless, I made it clear that progress towards 
implementation of Resolution 435 depended on the achievement of a firm and 
satisfactory agreement on a schedule for the withdrawal of the Cubans, acceptable to all 
the parties. Discussion of this matter took place at all the meetings which were held 
during the course of 1988, as already indicated to you earlier, and an agreement on the 
38 
schedule for the redeployment to the north and the stage, and total withdrawal of the 
Cubans from Angola, was reached on 13 October '88 at Geneva. It was included in the 
bilateral agreement signed between Angola and Cuba on 22 December '88 at the United 
Nations Headquarters, where I was also present to sign on behalf of South Africa. 
Now, an important aspect relating to Cuban troop withdrawal—please remember 
this—was the requirement that the movements of these troops in redeploying northwards, 
and in withdrawing from Angola in accordance with the agreed time table be suitably and 
effectively monitored. In this regard, Angola-Cuba had at an early stage of negotiations 
regarding a possible withdrawal schedule indicated that they would request monitoring 
and verification of the troop movements by the Security Council of the United Nations. 
Consequently, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, abbreviation U N A V E M , 
was created to undertake this task. Very important. 
Now, let us return to 1 April '89. That was the day on which the implementation 
of U N Security Council Resolution 435 was due to commence. To the dismay of the 
whole world, I can tell you, and in violation of its own commitment to the Secretary-
General to observe a cease-fire and to confine its personnel to bases north of latitude 
sixteen degrees south, SWAPO chose to mount large-scale armed incursions across the 
border from Angola into Namibia on that very day. 
JK: Now why do you think that Sam Nujoma decided to do that? 
RB: Let us just go a little bit further. South Africa had confirmed the formalization of 
the de facto cessation of hostilities proposed by the Secretary-General in a letter by 
39 
myself, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 21 March 1989. SWAPO also accepted this 
cease-fire in a letter by Mr. Sam Nujoma on 18 March '89 to the Secretary-General. The 
reply to a question in the House of Commons on 4 April '89—this is important—on the 
incursions, the British Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher responded in the British 
Parliament as follows: She said, "The Secretary-General's report to the Security Council 
specifically confirmed that there has been large scale incursions from Angola to Namibia 
by armed SWAPO personnel. It is a most serious challenge to the authority of the United 
Nations and the internationally agreed arrangement for Namibia's independence, and I 
certainly condemn it. There has been no provision in the United Nations' plan for 
SWAPO to have bases in Namibia. Indeed, SWAPO committed themselves to the 
Geneva Accord on which they are required to stay north of the 16 t h parallel in Angola. It 
is this breach by SWAPO which has led to the most regrettable fighting and loss of life. I 
would emphasize that the South African units involved are acting with the authority of 
the United Nations. It is now important that the authority of the United Nations be 
upheld, and the agreements implemented in full." Similarly, while certain elements of 
the United Nations vacillated, and sought a compromise to accommodate the 
infringement by SWAPO, or the relevant agreements, the State Department in 
Washington, United States, published a legal analysis of the incursions which concluded 
unequivocally that the SWAPO incursions were "flagrant violations of the Geneva 
protocol." In light of this grave situation, the joint commission created by the protocol of 
Brazzaville of 13 December 1988, met at Mt. Etjo, Namibia, on 8 to 9 April, 1989, for an 
extraordinary session. Delegations of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of 
40 
Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, parties to the New York Accord of 22 December 
'88, attended this meeting. 
JK: Okay, now just... 
RB: Just a moment, this is important. You can't just skip over this, because this 
almost wrecked the whole process. We were never closer to a cessation of the 
implementation than here. Delegations from the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics participated in their capacity as observers. 
JK: Right. And on the US side it was Chester Crocker? 
RB: Yes, and on the Soviet side the man's name almost sounded like "Indonesi" or 
something like that. At this meeting, the threat to the continued implementation of the 
Namibian peace then was effectively addressed. Leaders of the delegations of Angola, 
Cuba, and South Africa signed the Mt. Etjo declaration late on Sunday, 9 April '89, in 
which they reaffirmed their commitment to fulfill the obligations undertaken in the 
accord of 22 December '88, for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the 
Southwestern region of Africa, and in conformity with United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 632 of 16 February '89. Further, it was determined that in order to facilitate 
the restoration of peace, and to promote the full application of Resolution 435. The 
Security Council of the U N and the subsequent agreements subscribed to by the parties, 
as well as their restoration of the situation in existence on 31 March '89—the night 
41 
before—the parties agreed to a package of recommendations which were formulated as 
an annexure to the Mt. Etjo Declaration. And that saved the day. 
We also—I was a member of the three parties—we urged the Secretary-General, 
then, of the United Nations, to urgently adopt all the necessary measures for the most 
rapid and complete deployment of U N T A G so that it could fully and effectively carry out 
its mandate. They were not in place. 
JK: No, they were not. 
RB: Member States of the United Nations, particularly those who are members of the 
Security Council, were urged to extend their full cooperation to the Secretary-General 
regarding the task assigned to U N T A G . The sequence of events leading up to this 
important declaration is set out in a number of documents of which I can give you a list. 
JK: Perhaps we can just get a copy of this? And then we could have a copy for the 
records. 
RB: Yes. The achievement of a comprehensive settlement to the problems of 
Southwestern Africa in my opinion marks a milestone in developments securing a lasting 
peace in our subcontinent. While the signature of the peace accords in New York on 22 
December 1988 in itself was symbolic of the desire of the parties involved to eschew 
violence and conflict as a means to secure political solutions, and visibly demonstrated 
that preference to follow the path to peace through dialogue. The signing of documents 
42 
alone will not be enough, and would not be enough to ensure the continued success of the 
new direction, which is emerging in relation to conflict resolution in the whole of 
Southern Africa, and in the continent as a whole. These sentiments expressed by myself 
at the signing ceremony in New York on 22 December 1988 were to become the focus of 
attention sooner than anyone expected. The peace accords, which had emerged from a 
period of painstaking negotiation during which mutual confidence and step-by-step 
agreement had played a crucial part, faced a severe test from the very start of their 
implementation. The cross-border incursion into Namibia by SWAPO on 1 April was a 
flagrant violation of SWAPO's commitments. It was a challenge to the international 
community, and the authority of the United Nations. In the event, the parties to the 
network of agreements—South Africa, Angola, and Cuba—although we were 
ideologically enemies of each other, opposing each other totally, but through the Mt. Etjo 
Declaration, we acted swiftly to reconfirm our individual commitments. If anything, the 
concerted action by these three countries to adopt measures to buttress the agreements 
reached previously underscore the high premium which each of them placed on the 
successful implementation of the package of agreements to which they subscribed. And 
this to me is one of the greatest lessons, and it is a lesson that has either been forgotten or 
not observed fully. Here was South Africa, Cuba, Angola. You could hardly find at that 
time in history. 
[End of Side 2, Tape 1] 
[Beginning of Tape 2, Side 1] 
JK: So you mentioned that you had asked to have this meeting at Mt. Etjo. 
43 
RB: Yes, but let me just complete the sentence when we were cut off because I think it 
is important for the United Nations and the world to remember one thing. 
JK: Okay. 
RB: Here were parties, countries opposing each other. You could not get two 
countries further apart than South Africa and Cuba. But when we saw there was a win-
win situation for both of us, we did make concessions and sacrifices and made a deal. 
And when that deal was threatened, we acted swiftly to remove the threat, and we saved 
it. We saved the situation for the world, for the United Nations, and for the people of 
Namibia and for Africa. We didn't then, as is often happening now with negotiations on 
Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and so on, adopt this attitude today and another one tomorrow, 
and say [we're] an ally of this country today and [an] ally of another one tomorrow. We 
treated each other with respect. We did not agree ideologically, but we respected each 
other and trusted one another. And that is why we could have this meeting at Mt. Etjo. 
The way I did it was I immediately called of course Martti Ahtisaari, who called de 
Cuellar, and we called the Americans. We said to the Americans, "Can you get the 
Soviet Union, urgently, to please exert severe pressure on all concerned? We need an 
urgent, urgent meeting, otherwise this whole thing will erupt into a civil war, and the 
whole implementation of Resolution 435 will be scattered. So everybody cooperated to 
get this meeting at Mt. Etjo together. 
44 
JK: So who spoke to Sam Nujoma? Because someone spoke to him during this. 
RB: I can't say. I take it the Americans spoke to him; the Russians might have spoke 
to him; the United Nations people must have spoken to him. Maybe even the 
Angolans... 
JK: ...the Angolans or the Cubans... 
RB: .mus t have spoken to him, and the Cubans. Because I had my meeting with the 
Angolans and the Cubans. And the three of us immediately agreed: We must save the 
situation. Now I didn't go there then to yell at Sam Nujoma or the SWAPO. I didn't go 
there to try and vindicate myself or say look, "I warned you, I told you so, we had that 
secret information it would happen." No, I didn't do it. It is futile to go to negotiations 
in that spirit. I went there to resolve the issue, and knew that it would be difficult for 
both the Angolans and the Cubans. Difficult to come to an agreement which would have 
instituted a tighter grip on SWAPO and their movements and their future movements, 
because they were friends. They were ideological friends, and SWAPO was enjoying the 
hospitality of Angola, and the friendship of Cuba for a very, very long time. So I 
couldn't go there thinking that suddenly the Angolans and the Cubans would now 
embrace Pik Botha of apartheid South Africa, and thank him for trying to control 
SWAPO. No, I went there knowing that this was the position, but I went there saying, 
"In the interest now of Angola, of Cuba, of South Africa, and the whole of southern 
Africa, we must stick to the rules we agreed upon. If we reopen, gentlemen, all the talks 
45 
now, we will still be talking for the next ten years as we have done up to now." And they 
agreed to that. 
JK: Okay. Now, I was at a lunch with Marrack Goulding just last week, and I said 
I'm going to be interviewing Pik Botha. I said, "What should I ask him?" He said, "You 
should ask him why he thinks Sam Nujoma directed some of his troops across the border 
that day." 
RB: I have never really—it's strange, through all these years—succeeded in.. . . 
Although Mr. Nujoma and I are good friends today—I could go to Windhoek tomorrow 
and the President, he's now President, will receive me with a smile and we'll talk about 
old days, everything forgiven, forgotten, and we're trying to assist one another, we are 
both Africans trying to do the best for our people and country. And I would have been 
hesitant to reopen the issue and perhaps cause some unpleasantness. But at the time, it 
was believed that they wanted to establish bases inside Namibia as part of a show of 
strength and power, with a view to impress the people of Namibia that "Look, here we 
are, we are there, we are not leaving, it's our country, and you'd better vote for us or...". 
There was a school of thought, who thought that that might have been one of the reasons 
behind these incursions. I'm not in a position to really confirm it. 
JK: Okay. I wanted to be sure to ask you this, because I had also interviewed 
Ambassador Legwaila, who became the Deputy under Martti Ahtisaari. So he told me 
that—when you and I were discussing earlier that occasionally you had met with Louis 
46 
Pienaar—so Legwaila would tell me that there were times, especially on principles of 
registration for voting and a few things, that there were some difficulties between the U N 
and Louis Pienaar. And that sometimes then they would come to Pretoria and meet with 
you. What was the nature of these meetings? 
RB: It is not "sometimes," but often. 
JK: Okay, often! Often is a better word, then. 
RB: I was the link between everything that happened in Namibia at that time, and our 
President. This was a very difficult, let me say to you, but interesting and challenging 
position to be in. Just to give you another example, people convicted of murder inside 
Namibia were not executed there; they, as far as I can remember, didn't have the facilities 
to execute a person in Windhoek. So that was done in Pretoria in the Pretoria Central 
Prison. Namibian prisoners sentenced to death would then be taken to Pretoria to be 
executed, and Martti Ahtisaari discovered a case of two or three of them that might be 
due to be hanged, and he called me immediately on the phone and followed it up with a 
letter to say that if that happens then he quits. He would never be able to stomach that. 
JK: Oh, my God, so it was that critical. 
RB: Then I phoned the President, and arranged for the Minister of Justice to meet with 
me and the President, fly down to Cape Town. On that occasion, I told the President, I 
47 
said, "Look, I must be honest with you. Send these people back, please, to Namibia. If 
one day a new government there then wants to hang them, it's for that government to do 
so, not for us. Don't touch it. We cannot do it. It's foolish, it's stupid." And I also 
issued a threat that day. I said I would not be able to proceed if this request of Mr. Martti 
Ahtisaari is not granted. 
JK: Now at that time it was President Botha, or President de Klerk. 
RB: No, Botha. He was still. Botha. 
JK: A l l right. 
RB: De Klerk never had anything to do with Namibia except attending its 
independence celebrations. 
JK: At the end, okay. 
RB: At the end, to take the glory. That's what he did. As a matter of fact, he opposed 
me in the Cabinet most severely, in respect to many, many matters. Abolishing the local 
government, the second and third tier governments in Namibia, which I needed to 
implement 435, he opposed it strenuously in the government. He wouldn't do so. Of 
course, he and Louis Pienaar were great friends. So Pienaar used to use him sometimes 
to further a particularly conservative point of view of Pienaar. And then Pienaar would 
48 
inform him so that he knew how to talk against me or argue against me. So just take it 
from me, Mr. de Klerk, not only did he do nothing at all to facilitate the independence of 
Namibia, he did his best to delay it and to make it as difficult as possible for me. This is 
known to Martti Ahtisaari, it is known to my colleagues. It's not that much of a secret. It 
has just not been stated. I suppose people are frightened sometimes to talk the truth, but I 
have reached a stage in my life where I don't need to fear to say the truth. So they often 
came to see me, they phoned me virtually every day. I had my personal assistant, Carl 
von Hirschberg. He was extremely well known to all these gentlemen, all of them. 
JK: And this was your deputy, to Pienaar. 
RB: Not my deputy. He was Pienaar's deputy, but seconded by me from my 
department. And Pienaar's whole office was run by my department: the typists, the 
security, and their salaries. Even his salary was paid by us, I think. And the building was 
Foreign Affairs', and the offices, and the stationary, and the bills and the costs, and so on 
and so on and so on. Without Foreign Affairs, 435 would never have been implemented. 
It was the only department that really wanted it to be implemented. A l l the other 
government departments would have preferred not to implement it. 
JK: So you really had a tough battle. You had to deal with a lot of resistance. 
RB: Naturally, and this was known to Chester Crocker. He knew it. He knew from 
experience. One day, ask him. He knew from experience that he had to help me to get a 
49 
certain proposal accepted by my Cabinet. He realized what the difficult ones were, and 
he also assisted me tremendously, Crocker, in showing understanding of the difficult 
position we were in. Namely, that there were a lot whites in this country. At that stage, 
you can go and check it, it's all recorded in our Hansard, it's like your records in the 
United Nations, that's a full record of every word spoken in our Parliament, called 
Hansard after the British concept of keeping records. 
JK: Yes, right. 
RB: But it is in our Hansard that I was accused of selling Namibia down the drain to a 
bunch of Communists, that the red flag will fly in Windhoek, that now our troops will not 
fight on the northern border anymore, but on the southern border on the banks of the 
Orange River, which is our northern border with Namibia, and Pik Botha will go down in 
history as the greatest traitor this country has ever produced. These were the things that 
were said quite openly, and it's against that current that I had to move internally and 
elsewhere. Now luckily, I had in the Cabinet colleagues like the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Commerce and Industries, and persons like that who were on my side, saying 
clearly that unless we get rid of this tremendous burden, it will sink us, it will make us 
vulnerable. It was lying ahead for us. I knew it at the time. [There were] tremendous 
challenges on South Africa herself. So my purpose was [to] make peace with 
Mozambique, which I did through the Nkomati Accord, get Zimbabwe independent so 
that we get the burden of Ian Smith off our shoulders, and then resolve Namibia so that 
we get rid of that burden. Only thus would we possibly be able to deal with the 
50 
tremendous challenge then of the A N C and the imprisonment of Mr. Mandela, and the 
banning of the political parties in this country. But you cannot enter into serious 
discussions which would have been monumental in transforming this country, i f you are 
still engaged too much peripherally on your borders with problems like Mozambique 
stresses and strain, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, and the Cubans in Angola. And I saw it as 
my task to resolve those heavy problems. And I did so without sanctions ever having 
been introduced against us either on account of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, or Namibia. 
Never, ever. Sanctions were introduced because of apartheid inside South Africa. 
JK: So then, you've mentioned that on the case of the executions that you went to 
President Botha. Was he supportive of you in this effort? 
RB: Yes, immediately. 
JK: Okay. 
RB: Immediately. He saw the point. I don't think I argued for more than five 
minutes. I just went in there and I said to him.... I was very agitated, myself, that day, I 
was ready to have a fight with my colleague, the Minister of Justice, as I've never had 
before, and we often fought very, very much, the two of us were in very, very many 
pressing, what shall I say, disputes throughout the whole period of implementation. I had 
to take the [issue of the] admission of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees to South Africa three times to the capital. It was turned down three times. The 
51 
fourth time they agreed. But three times the Cabinet turned it down, thinking that here is 
the United Nations: the United Nations will just be coming into South Africa and start 
ruling us, start being the friend of the A N C , and give the impression to all the people, 
black and white, that we have now been swallowed up by the United Nations. [They 
thought] we would lose support, vote, and respect of our people. I knew the United 
Nations. The United Nations with all its emotions, particularly in the General Assembly, 
and all its, what I call burdensome committees, cumbersome committees, which were 
created in the old days more for blowing off steam than for establishing anything really 
substantial. But I knew France was there, America was there, Britain was there. And 
even, for that matter, the Soviet Union, a responsible state, whether you agreed with their 
policies or not. For that matter, the People's Republic of China, a responsible state, 
whether you agreed with them or not. These were not states and others that would simply 
run away with emotional nonsensical attitudes and say, "We are swallowing up South 
Africa now," and so forth. They wouldn't do that, they haven't got the funds, they 
haven't got the means to do so. 
JK: Exactly. 
RB: It was extremely difficult for me. It was the Minister of Justice who opposed me 
every time. And I said to him, "My dear colleague, you often say to me that I've got to 
accept you, the Minister of Justice, and you know better in your particular field what can 
be done. Now will you not for a moment accept that I'm the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
I've been almost brought up in the United Nations environment, and this is my 
52 
environment, and when I say it is perfectly safe and it is desirable to have the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, it will save us money, it will save us trouble, 
because they will know how to work with these people, and we don't." These were the 
skirmishes, these were the unpleasant hour-long talks that I had to face, but I don't 
complain. It was interesting. In the end, I got Namibia independence. 
JK: That's right. 
RB: And I consider that to be my great achievement. And I think if that was the only 
thing I did, was to stop the war, get the Cubans to withdraw, end the war, and give 
Namibia independence, I personally, with humility, great humility, say that I have a 
feeling of.that is my reward. That has enriched my life. 
JK: But I'm very interested to hear that President Botha really was very supportive of 
what you were doing, and that. 
RB: Not always. There were difficult negotiations in the beginning, centering on the 
security, and the Cuban threat, and what was considered to be the Cuban menace, and 
these close relations with Savimbi of UNITA. It was very difficult for me to persuade 
him always that we were doing the right thing, we could not carry that burden any longer: 
we were running their budget up to a billion Rand per year, responsible for all the defense 
equipment and troops and our young people were dying there in a war. And we spent 
billions and billions in what I considered at that stage to be a futile effort, and I said to the 
53 
Prime Minister then, later President Botha, "Look, Savimbi says he's got the majority. 
Now if he has the majority, we cannot fight this election for Luanda. There will be an 
election one day, and so on. We can't stay there forever. We can keep on supporting 
him financially, but not militarily any longer. If we can get rid of the problem of 
Namibia, the whole world will change, there will be a less tense attitude in southern 
Africa, we will be able to prepare the way for the release possibly of Mandela, and get 
down to our real great task, and that is to settle with the ANC. But we cannot do so 
unless we first remove Namibia from the agenda of the United Nations. 
JK: Okay, so that would be the argument that you would present to Botha. That was 
the political picture. 
RB: Yes. 
JK: And did the rest of the Security Council... 
RB: Eventually he, with hesitation, but yes, eventually he did. It was difficult. 
Sometimes he would recall me from Brazzaville, for instance, because of something he 
read in one of our papers, which I was supposed to have said in Brazzaville and which 
went now against what he told me or expected from me. Then I would say to him, 
"Please can't I just complete the discussions." Botha would say, "You get onto the 
aircraft, you fly back, and tomorrow morning you're going to account for what you said 
here in the Cabinet." And I would fly overnight, attend the cabinet meeting, work out my 
54 
strategy, go in there, apologize, say, "You're absolutely right, Mr. President," and I 
would put across to him a formulation which is really what I did, but [stated] in a 
different way, and claiming that this was his real idea, and then he claims credit for it, 
and I accept it, and the I fly back to Brazzaville and implement it. It was also a way to 
know how to handle the man. 
JK: Okay. 
RB: But he, in the end, assisted me and authorized me to conclude the agreements, to 
conclude the negotiations, and to sign that wonderful agreement in the Headquarters 
office of New York—there's the picture—where I've not been allowed to address the 
General Assembly since 1974, eventually we signed in that same building on one of the 
main issues on the United Nations agenda since the end of the Second World War. 
JK: One of the things that Joseph Legwaila mentioned to me [was] when they would 
come to the Pretoria, with Louis Pienaar they would come to meet with you, and he 
would mention, "Well, i f we can't get this satisfied, then the Security Council might 
impose additional economic sanctions," or something like that. Did that ever become a 
useful piece of leverage in your arguments? The threat of the Security Council? 
RB: No, I can't even recall. Certainly not. I don't know who your informant there is. 
That was not the way Mr. Martti Ahtisaari operated, or de Cuellar. No, no. Don't forget 
55 
that the ambassadors of the five, who initiated this whole settlement proposal, I saw them 
also every day. Don't forget that. 
JK: Okay, so the Western five, with their ambassadors. 
RB: And don't forget, I quoted to you what Margaret Thatcher said in the Parliament 
in Britain about SWAPO infringement. So no, no, I don't know where your informant 
got hold of that. Ahtisaari could phone me any time of the day or night directly. There 
was no instruction from me that he must work through Louis Pienaar. 
JK: No, no, but I mean. 
RB: He could phone me, and the same applied. . Maybe sometimes, you see, Piennar 
I think didn't like these people to come to me or by themselves. Maybe he wanted to be 
present, it's in the interest of everybody and so on and so on. But there was never, ever 
any threat of imposing more sanctions against South Africa, because after this initial 
infringement, there was just one other terrible misunderstanding of a secret that our 
military people claimed that they picked up of some United Nations unit reporting a 
further SWAPO thrust of a military nature. I phoned Ahtisaari and warned him about it, 
and released it to the press, and eventually proved that it was false. I don't know who 
ever sent out that false signal, but luckily the relationship between me and Ahtisaari was 
such that the two of us could say this to each other and not hold it against each other. No, 
no, I cannot remember. As we were moving ahead, closer to the election time, things 
56 
improved, and more and more of the parties accepted that there is going to be an election. 
The only thing that was uncertain was the eventual result. 
JK: So just in terms of part of what we've been studying here is the use of leverage. 
What do people use as leverage to convince people of a particular position. And your 
view was much more of a holistic view that you needed to resolve these different 
confrontations in order to move ahead, for South Africa to move ahead in terms of its 
own development. And so leverage of any action by the Security Council as far as you 
were concerned was not useful to you in convincing anyone that . . 
RB: You must try to remember, it goes now back to the time I was appointed Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in '77, even before the adoption of Resolution 435. And I was 
responsible for persuading the South African Cabinet to accept 435. And ever since that 
time in '78, we were working on it, until '88. 
JK: Okay. 
RB: Until '88. Ten years—'78 to '88. And there was the government of Carter, and 
that was followed by Reagan, virtually his whole term office, and Chester Crocker. 
There was never a question that Crocker would say to me, "Look, you better hurry up 
or...". No, because that is not his way of working. That is not his way of working. We 
worked on a basis of mutual trust. So there were no Security Council threats in that case 
at all. That's why, also, we never got sanctions as a result of Namibia, because I resumed 
57 
negotiations every time there was an impasse or a stalemate. I never allowed it to break 
down completely. I always came back, went back to my colleagues. Then I suppose, you 
know, the Americans with their CIA and the British with their MI5 or what have they got, 
MI6, they have spies, they have ambassadors here, they know what's going on here. 
There are no secrets after a while. They attend cocktail parties, they hear how a 
colleague of mine talks against me, and says that Pik Botha is trying to bluff the Cabinet 
in giving Namibia away. They realized my difficulties, and the difficulties I had to 
shoulder. They didn't try to make life more difficult for me. They did assist behind the 
scenes. 
JK: I see. One other issue that I wanted to ask you about was Walvis Bay. How was 
it arranged that Walvis Bay would not be a part of the discussions? In other words, in the 
independence of Namibia... 
RB: Well, we insisted, because Walvis Bay was since the previous century an intimate 
part of the Cape of Good Hope Province. And the Cape of Good Hope is an integral part 
of the provinces of the Republic of South Africa. It is South African territory, just as 
Gibraltar is British, and just as Alaska is American, and just as quite a number of these 
odd situations do exist somewhere in the world. 
JK: Right. 
58 
RB: So there was never any question: Walvis Bay was recognized as irrevocably part 
of the Republic of South Africa since it became a union of South Africa in 1910, and in 
the previous century, in 1881, in terms of agreements between Germany and Britain, 
written into agreements that were older than a hundred years. And nobody ever 
questioned it, nobody ever queried it, everybody accepted it. In the world court case that 
Ethiopia and Liberia brought against us, the issue of Walvis Bay was brought forward; 
we won the point downright from the court. It's part of South Africa, out and out. So 
here you have a world court decision, now what more do you want? But suddenly, at the 
assistance of SWAPO and others, Walvis Bay now had to become part of Namibia before 
independence. And I said, "But on what basis do you want to take a piece of my country, 
that has been a piece of my country for over a hundred years?" It never had anything to 
do, it was not part of Namibia, not in mandate days of the League of Nations, not in the 
United Nations days, nowhere else in those early days did everybody ask for it. It's just 
now lately, lately, lately. And I said, "Look, maybe we can resolve this issue later when 
there's a new government, governing it together, administering it together, and preparing 
it because there are a lot of South African companies operating there under South African 
laws with South African protection. Their court of law is in the Cape, not in Windhoek. 
That's the legal position. A l l the contracts, et cetera, are governed by South African law. 
A l l the agreements for shipping, international trade et cetera. How do you think you 
change that just overnight because you suddenly want to have a new owner of the farm? 
It doesn't happen that way." And then, the West agreed with me that they would not 
raise this issue. 
59 
JK: So the Western five agreed with you on that. 
RB: They agreed, yes. But at a meeting in New York—at a meeting, I can't tell you 
exactly when it occurred—but at a meeting in New York, Genscher that day, with the 
five sitting there, and I with my staff, said to me he regretted to inform me, but they feel 
they must make a concession on the issue of Walvis Bay, and Walvis Bay better form 
part of the negotiations, to become part of Namibia. And at that point, I disciplined 
myself with a smile. Genscher wanted to continue this conversation he was reading from 
a piece of paper which the five had drafted. I looked at my Director-General of my 
department, Dr. Brandt Volie, and said to him, "Brandt, this is goodbye time," and I 
stood up, and greeted the five foreign ministers. I wished them good luck, and withdrew. 
I phoned Prime Minister Vorster—he was still Prime Minister then, so it must have been 
'78—and said to him, "Here, this is what I have done. I hope you agree, fully agree," and 
I said, "I'm flying back to South Africa. As far as I'm concerned, the negotiations are 
dead." I got into the plane and flew back. 
JK: You actually did? You left and flew back? 
RB: Yes. Of course I did. 
JK: Okay, so that was a lesson that they learned that that was non-negotiable. 
60 
RB: Yes, but the point is this: they might be powerful in there, but in l i f e . I was 
prepared to stick out my neck to get Cabinet approvals which no other one would have 
got two or three years earlier, to stand all this vicious propaganda against me that I'm a 
traitor and have sold my country's interests down the drain. I was prepared to accept a 
one man-one vote election in Namibia and see SWAPO into power. Now to come and 
introduce an issue that for more than a hundred years did not form an issue, there was no 
controversy. There was a State Department official judicial opinion from the best judicial 
experts in the world, saying internationally it belongs to South Africa, it cannot be taken 
away unless South Africa gives it away. Now to come.. .these particularly Western five, 
against the advice of their own legal people, against the international legal position.... 
Britain clung to Gibraltar, wasn't prepared to give it to Spain—but I must give Walvis 
Bay away. How do I defend that to our people here? By that time, I had persuaded our 
people to accept the concept of one man-one vote in Namibia, which laid the foundation 
for the later negotiations on South Africa. Now to come at that extremely critical stage, 
to take a further cut and say to our people, "Look, I've just surrendered Walvis Bay," it 
would have wrecked the further talks and negotiations altogether. It would probably have 
cost me my job, because people would say, "Look, we trusted this bastard, but look what 
he's up to now. We have trusted what he said, we must withdraw, but now he's 
withdrawing now from our own territory. He's even giving that away." So I had no 
choice. The only way I could save the talks was to be absolutely firm on Walvis Bay. 
That was to save my power base for affecting later changes. I knew if I did that it was 
the end of me. 
61 
JK: Okay, that's very important to understand that. I don't think that people 
understand that issue very well. And that's excellent, that's an excellent description. 
RB: And I happened to be the Minister, who eventually, as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, before 1994, did pass the law to make Walvis Bay part of Namibia. I was the 
one. 
JK: Now explain that. Explain that next step. Why then, after the independence of 
Namibia, one could make that step? 
RB: Namibia was independent, I had succeeded in my purpose, and nothing could 
happen now that could wreck the negotiations or the independence of Namibia. And the 
pressure was mounting, that here we still sit with something that looks now like an ex-
colonial little appendix. And Namibia was independent, and Mr. Ben Gurirab, the 
Foreign Minister became a great friend of mine, we were also at one point enemies at the 
U N , invited me to Windhoek. He had a long talk with me and he said, "Please, my 
brother," he said, "the war days are over. I know it's a difficult position, but I will help 
you to make it as easy as possible. We'll make statements, we'll make concessions, we'll 
try and do it mutually in such a way that we don't frighten your people in Walvis Bay." 
And to that, I agreed. I came back, got Cabinet approval, drafted the legislation, put it 
through myself in Parliament, and Walvis Bay became legally, orderly, peacefully part of 
Namibia. 
62 
JK: And about what year was that, do you recall? Because you said it was before. 
RB: It was '93. 
JK: So it was before the '94 elections. 
RB: Of course it was. 
JK: And so it was still with President de Klerk. 
RB: It was one of the last pieces of legislation that I pushed through Parliament, was 
this one. 
JK: Interesting. 
RB: But then Namibia was independent. The five wanted me to do this at the stage 
when we still had this heavy road to travel with negotiations. And I could only take so 
much weight before crashing, and that would have been the last straw. 
JK: Right, that would have been the last straw. 
RB: But in '93, it wasn't the last straw. 
63 
JK: This is very important for diplomatic history. 
RB: Now I've got to go, lady. 
JK: Now you've got to go. Well, I think that we covered everything, unless you have 
just a general statement, because I just wanted to know your opinion, how you thought 
that U N T A G had ultimately performed its job. 
RB: Very well, in my opinion. There were, as you could expect anywhere, sometimes 
misunderstandings, mistrust sometimes between our military establishment in Walvis 
Bay, because Walvis Bay was part of South Africa, and we had a base there, but by and 
large—I say, by and large—Mr. Martti Ahtisaari fulfilled a monumentally important task 
there. I believe that that paved the way for him to become eventually president of 
Finland, which he did. And it was very interesting some ten years later; he was here in 
South Africa and invited me for breakfast in his hotel suite in Johannesburg. We 
nostalgically went through the old days, the difficult years, the challenges, and so on, but 
we became very, very good friends. And U N T A G performed well, responsibly, and 
Namibia became an independent state where there is today stability. The white people 
did not leave the country. 
JK: They didn't leave, no. 
64 
RB: Mr. Nuj oma is tightening the economic belt, even of his Cabinet ministers.... 
And by and large, I have great respect for his leadership and his presidency. You go to 
Windhoek—I believe Windhoek is the cleanest city maybe in the world. 
JK: I know, it is amazing. 
RB: While Johannesburg is perhaps the most ugly, dirty city in the world. Certainly 
Windhoek is clean. And that requires the right discipline, the right attitude. And I can 
look back at the situation, don't forget, there remained another border problem, and that 
was in olden days, the Orange River—it was not the, what they call the tolvic, or the 
middle of the river, that formed the border in terms of the old agreement between Britain 
and Germany, it was the northern bank of the river, the northern bank. And that I also 
changed after Namibia's independence, to make it, as is usual, the middle of the river or 
the tolvic, as is more normal. 
No, certainly as I said to you, I look back at that challenge as to one thing I did 
that was of a tremendous enrichment to me. I felt enriched that God had given me the 
chance and the opportunity to play a role in achieving Namibia's independence, 
persuading the authorities of Angola and Cuba and I believe, the Soviet Union, to 
implement Cuban troop withdrawal. We ended a war; we prepared the way for South 
Africa, the South African government to release Mr. Mandela, and to start the most 
historically important discussions I think were ever held this century in Africa, because it 
was important that the southern part of Africa should come to peace with itself, for the 
whole continent. That's why we had no choice but to prepare the way, to pave the way to 
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create the kind of atmosphere which might facilitate the onward movement of the very 
difficult talks between the South African government of which I was one member, and 
Mr. Mandela's team. Namibia played, and the historians have not seen it yet, played an 
exceedingly important role. This was '88 when we signed this agreement, and Mr. 
Mandela had just been released at the beginning of 1990, a month or so before Namibia's 
independence. And that, as the Swedish foreign minister said to me, in Windhoek at the 
time, virtually the whole world attended celebrations. We gave a reception, the 
Administrator General, which was attended by just about the whole world. I think we 
expected five hundred guests, and seven hundred turned up. 
JK: There was tremendous enthusiasm. 
RB: Which to me was a tremendous reward by itself. I saw it. It was there, it's going 
to change. And the Swedish foreign minister said to me at the time, he said to me, 
"Look, have a bit of patience, you've done a great thing, we admire your people now. 
But there will still be a mistrust that you haven't changed irrevocably, despite Namibia's 
independence. Your main test now lies ahead. It's a good one. This will start changing 
the vote. But be patient." And it turned out to be exactly like that, that Namibia paved 
the way, it removed the suspicions, it assisted us in persuading the world that what we are 
doing is indeed irreversible, irrevocable. "Irreversible" was the key phrase then. And I 
used Namibia to persuade other governments to accept that what we were going to plan 
with respect to the Republic of South Africa would be like Namibia. And that helped a 
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lot. It played a tremendous role. Don't forget, in '88, the Berlin Wall had not come 
down. 
RB: And virtually not one of you, any of you, expected it. 
JK: No, we didn't know. 
RB: Not the CIA, not the Germans, no one. I know that. So it was in that atmosphere 
that I assisted in making Namibia independent and obtaining Cuban troop withdrawal. 
Paving the way, making it easier, lessening the tension for the great steps that we were 
going to take in respect to '88. 
JK: Right. Well, thank you so very much for taking the time to do this, and I think 
it's very important that we have gotten a chance to talk to you and hear your point of 
view. Many people said to me, "You must interview Pik Botha," so I'm really glad that 
we were able to do that. 
RB: I will lend you this. If you find another one, send it back. Otherwise, take your 
time. I have only two more. If I find more—I'm unpacking my documents—I will let 
you know and then you can keep it. I want to give one to each of my grandchildren, and I 
don't even have one for each of them. I have five [grandchildren] and I have two books. 
But I must still look through my goods that are still packed. But here are all your records, 
all your dates, all the documentation in one body. 
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JK: Okay, I will turn this off now. Thank you. 
[End of Tape 2, Side 1] 
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