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Social transitions in the Savannah Socialtransitions in
The decline and fall of social risk management the Savannah
amongst Fulani in the subhumid zone
of Nigeria 535
Ayodele O. Majekodunmi
University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana Received 30 August 2016
Revised 8 May 2017
Accepted 31 July 2017
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to explore social risk management strategies amongst
Fulani in the subhumid zone of Nigeria; and second, to determine current status and nature of reciprocal
exchange networks, risk pooling and social support for pastoral livelihoods in North-Central Nigeria.
Design/methodology/approach – Surveys of cattle productivity and pastoral livelihoods were carried out
amongst Fulani pastoralists on the Jos Plateau: between 2008 and 2013 using participatory epidemiology
methods and the sustainable livelihoods framework. Qualitative and quantitative data on livelihood activities,
knowledge, attitudes and practices of animal husbandry and disease control, wealth grouping, herd entries
and exits was gathered to determine the current state of cattle productivity and pastoral livelihoods in the
study area.
Findings – Results show that reciprocal exchange networks for risk management have mostly disintegrated
and patron-client relationships have become an important social risk management strategy.
Practical implications – This research has significant implications for sustainability of Fulani livelihoods
and communities: decreased social risk-management strategies and increased self-reliance means that the
most vulnerable households will find it more difficult to withstand shocks and climb out of poverty. Wealthier
households may cope better with high incidence/low severity shocks like but are more vulnerable to low
incidence/high severity shocks. Likewise, decreased social cohesion reduces the ability of communities to
mobilise and act collectively in the face of community-level shocks. This is very important for engagement
with the state – a crucial process, given current levels of acrimony and conflict.
Originality/value – Given the high levels of farmer-herder conflict and civil unrest in this region over the
past 15 years this research is valuable in providing insights into economic drivers of conflict, current
dynamics of pastoral livelihoods and social cohesion within and between communities.
Keywords Livelihood diversification, Social networks, Conflict, Reciprocity, Fulani, Risk-pooling
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Gifts and exchanges are a widespread form of human cooperation across cultures. They are
important for enhancing survival in marginal environments, e.g. central place food sharing
among foragers and stock friendships among pastoralists (Hao et al., 2015; Mauss, 1990).
They serve as risk transfer/pooling mechanisms to spread risk across households. This
decreases the severity of losses and leads to higher rates of herd survival under volatile
ecological conditions (Aktipis et al., 2011; Barr and Genicot, 2008). When practiced at
community-level, traditional social networks of exchange and reciprocity are critical
components of household security, disaster relief, and social well-being. Ultimately, these
networks serve to manage risk and reduce vulnerability within communities (Baird and
Gray, 2014). They become part and parcel of the culture, an important avenue of social
interaction within the pastoral community and of social integration of pastoralists with
neighbouring groups. They also support social cohesion, group identity and the capacity for
collective action (Adger, 2003; Bollig, 1998).
However, the nature of social risk-management strategies (SRMS) and level of investment International Journal of SocialEconomics
in such networks varies depending on the level of risk exposure (Moritz et al., 2011) and in Vol. 45 No. 3, 2018pp. 535-547
response to changes in risk exposure (Baird and Gray, 2014). Two major patterns of social risk © Emerald Publishing Limited
0306-8293
management are described amongst pastoralists: reciprocal exchange networks, found mostly DOI 10.1108/IJSE-08-2016-0218
IJSE in Africa and hierarchical patron-client relationships, found mostly in the Near East
45,3 (Moritz et al., 2011). The level of risk exposure is directly proportional to level of investment in
SRMS, while the type of SRMS is determined by the covariance of risk: reciprocal exchange
networks dominate where risks are randomly distributed and roles may be reversed
each year. Where risks are less randomly distributed and some households become
consistently less vulnerable than others, there is reduced investment in exchange networks
536 as wealthier households opt out and patron-client relationships evolve (Roe et al., 1998;
Templer et al., 1993).
Exchange networks are therefore negatively associated with increased livelihood
diversification, economic differentiation and market integration, all of which reduce risk,
exposure to risk and covariance of risk. Exchange networks are also negatively associated with
decreased political autonomy and social cohesion amongst pastoralists (Salzman, 2004) – a
stronger pastoral identity encourages higher investment in these networks. Many pastoral
societies today have lost their political autonomy, becoming encapsulated tribes at the mercy of
controlling interests of the State and/or host communities (Salzman, 2004). This is particularly
true of the cattle-keeping Fulani in Nigeria who lack the unity of group political action and of
collective ownership of major resources such as land. They live mostly amongst indigenous
host communities, their social relations are increasingly fragmented and community solidarity
and support face stiff competition from the struggle for limited resources. This is in direct
contrast to the “town Fulani who exited pastoralism over a century ago with a long history of
wealth and influence. They are well represented amongst the cultural and political aristocracy
of Northern Nigeria and have produced two presidents within the past 15 years of democratic
rule. The cultural links between both groups have diminished over the years as interests
diverged and “cattle Fulani” now rarely benefit from the association (Blench et al., 2006;
Stenning, 1957). For all of these reasons there is strong evidence of pervasive decline of
reciprocal exchange networks as more pastoralists pursue individualised, diversified portfolios
of economic activity (Baird and Gray, 2014).
1.1 Gift-giving and exchange amongst Fulani in Nigeria
There are various forms of gift-giving and exchange practiced amongst the Fulani. These
may take the form of milk, meat, crops, clothes, cash, small stock and most importantly,
cattle. Gifts and exchanges may be divided into three main categories.
The first is gifts to family and clan members on social, cultural and religious occasions
(births, deaths, marriages, Eid, etc.). The purpose of such gifts is mostly social, to show
affection, joy, solidarity, to foster social cohesion and kinship ties and to increase the
prestige/social standing of both parties (Moritz, 2013). However, it is also an important
source of support as one moves through the stages of life: gifts of animals to children build
responsibility and experience of caring for livestock, bride-wealth helps to establish the
family herd of a new couple, pre-inheritance enables sons to marry and support their
families. The second category is gifts given to those outside the clan/Fulani community,
particularly the host farmers amongst whom they live, cattle owners who they work for and
traditional/political leaders. These gifts promote social integration of Fulani with host
communities, and are a sort of payment or tax for the enjoyment of favours from these
groups – permission to camp and graze on their land, provision of employment and
subsistence, security and governance (Moritz, 2010; Njeuma, 2012; Waters-Bayer and Bayer,
1994; Nwabara, 1963; Stenning, 1959). The third is gifts given to support poor/unfortunate
members of the Fulani community, e.g. those who have lost their own cattle to disease,
drought, or other catastrophes. This takes two forms – redistribution and reciprocity.
Redistribution of wealth is mostly a feature of Islam – the obligatory zakat (fixed
proportion of income/assets) and voluntary gifts of alms to the less privileged and clergy.
Zakat is sometimes collected by authorities as “tax” and distributed to the needy. There is
no expectation of reciprocity with these gifts – they are given in fulfilment of the religious Social
obligation to support the poor. In effect it is a social support mechanism governed by rules transitions in
laid down in the Koran (Njeuma, 2012; Nwabara, 1963; Stenning, 1959). the Savannah
The Fulani concept of reciprocity (inuf–mutual help, sharing) is practiced
mostly amongst clan members, binding them in a social network of exchange and
reciprocity in addition to kinship ties. Households in need may be given outright gifts of
food/money/clothes/livestock in expectation of eventual reciprocation. However, cattle are 537
the most important gift as they provide milk for food as well as the opportunity to
reproduce and grow the herd. Cattle and the rights to their milk and/or offspring may be
given as an outright gift, or loaned/exchanged under various arrangements (e.g. gift of a
lactating cow which may not be slaughtered or sold without the giver’s permission; loan of
a cow until it calves, such that the calf is retained and the cow returned to owner)
(Brokensha et al., 1980; Loftsdóttir, 2001; Moritz et al., 2011; Pedersen and Benjaminsen,
2008; Stenning, 1959) stresses the importance of this support to the persistence of
Fulani communities, describing it as the “normal process of gift, exchange and loan which
allow for herd owners to recoup losses”.
However, these reciprocal exchange networks are more flexible than those found in
other pastoral communities (e.g. osotua amongst the Maasai and iribu amongst the Afar)
where social interactions, status, prestige and perceptions of wealth are based on
reciprocal exchange networks which are obligatory and strictly enforced (Aktipis et al.,
2011; Davies and Bennett, 2007; Hao et al., 2015). Fulani who escape misfortune may help
the less fortunate, but if they do not, such people seek employment as hired herders
or farm labourers until they earn enough to purchase cattle and re-enter pastoralism
(De St Croix, 1945). So support is optional and there are mechanisms to cope with lack of
support. The Habana’i system of the Woodabe subgroup seems to be the strictest
manifestation of Fulani reciprocity – supporting others is viewed as a serious obligation,
with social pressure to participate and the threat of social and supernatural consequences
for non-compliance (Loftsdóttir, 2001).
2. Study area and survey design
The Jos Plateau in North-Central Nigeria is an area of 8,000 km2 with an average altitude
of 1, 280 m. The Plateau shows high ethno-linguistic diversity, with many small
indigenous tribes. In addition there are significant populations of Nigerians from other
tribes, who form the majority in urban centres and a minority (mostly Fulani) in rural
areas. The high concentration of Fulani makes this an important cattle producing area
with ~ 7 per cent of the national herd. The diversity of the population has led to tensions
along ethnic, religious and political lines, erupting in widespread violence in 2001.
Since that time there have been repeated riots, bombings and violent incidents across the
Plateau (Majekodunmi et al., 2014).
Two surveys of cattle health and production and rural livelihoods were carried out
amongst Fulani pastoralists on the Jos Plateau: a longitudinal survey of trypanosomiasis in
30 villages across the Jos Plateau in 2008 (Majekodunmi et al., 2013); a longitudinal
investigation of epidemiology and control of bovine endemic disease in six villages in
Bokkos and Pankshin Local Government Areas in 2012-2013 (Majekodunmi et al., 2017).
Both surveys included a significant socio-economic component using participatory methods.
Participatory questionnaires covering the past one year were conducted at household level
in both cases and updated monthly over 18 months in the latter study. Qualitative and
quantitative data on livelihood activities, knowledge, attitudes and practices of animal
husbandry and disease control, wealth grouping, herd entries and exits was gathered to
determine the current state of cattle productivity and pastoral livelihoods in the study area.
In 2008, 66 households were surveyed and in 2012-2013, 36 households.
IJSE 3. Results and discussion
45,3 No instances of gifts or exchanges of cattle to support community members were recorded,
either as zakat or inuf. This does not indicate a total disintegration of reciprocal exchange
networks – they persist but the nature of the gifts/loans/exchanges has changed with
changing needs and lifestyle. Cultivation and increasing engagement with the cash economy
means that exchanges of farm produce are now common and loans are mostly made in cash,
538 to enable households to pay school fees or hospital bills, or start a trade. As cash, crops and
other products (clothes, household items) gain importance as exchange commodities, the
status of cattle is also changing. The availability of alterative currencies for transactions has
increased the socio-cultural importance of cattle which are now reserved for only the most
important social functions – bride-wealth, inheritance, slaughter at weddings and
“big sallah” (Eid al Adha). Small ruminants, cash and crops are now mostly used for gifts,
reciprocal exchange and slaughter at births, naming ceremonies and “small sallah” (Eid al
Fitr). Perhaps the best illustration of the increased socio-cultural importance of cattle is
given by one of the respondents who recently started to trade in cattle: no animals from the
family herd were involved; instead he paid cash for a new, smaller “trade herd”. The reason
he gave was that the family herd was his inheritance and his identity, and could not be used
for business.
Exchange of farm produce continues the trend of risk transfer, as households which have
a bountiful harvest this year can share their surplus with less fortunate neighbours, with the
expectation that they will also receive help if the tables are turned next year. However, cash
loans to pay school fees or start a trade are a departure from the conventional remit of
SRMS – these loans are made to enable households capture opportunities, rather than to
cope with risks (Baird and Gray, 2014).
Gifts to host farmers/authorities have also declined and are now quite rare. Only 4 out of
36 households paid any “tax” and all payments were in cash. The interdependence and
reciprocal exchange systems that existed between herders and farmers have broken down
as milk and manure provided by pastoralists to farmers have been replaced by inorganic
fertiliser and powdered/evaporated milk (Awogbade, 1983; Blench et al., 2006). Relationships
are now characterised by competition and tolerance rather than cooperation. The increasing
importance of formal state governance over informal customary authorities has also played
a part: people now tend to claim rights from the state rather than favours from individuals
or traditional rulers.
On the Jos Plateau, one of the “gifts” extended to host farmers in the past was to accept
their sons as herd-boys, train them in livestock husbandry, and pay them with a heifer after a
stipulated period of service. This exchange of knowledge and livestock for labour and access
rights enabled many indigenous farmers to acquire cattle and strengthened the bonds
between the two communities. However, this practice was not observed during this study and
seems to have ended a generation ago. All the indigenous farmers we came across who had
lived with Fulani as herd-boys were over 50 years old and all hired herders observed were
Fulani employed by fellow Fulani. One practice which does persists is the gift of manure.
This is not sold despite the fact that it is a valued commodity. The nearest farming neighbours
are allowed to collect it from cattle enclosures during the planting season.
3.1 Hired herders
The majority of households (88 per cent) used hired herdsmen, who were paid at the annual
rate of one heifer valued at ~$308 (65 per cent) or $150 cash (23 per cent) annually
(Majekodunmi et al., 2016). The use of hired herders is not new amongst Fulani in Nigeria. It is a
long-standing institution but was limited to the margins of society: only the wealthiest
households needed the additional labour, and only the poorest or unluckiest households needed
the employment. Average figures for Fulani communities lead us to expect 10 per cent poor,
80 per cent in the middle group and 10 per cent better off (FEWSNET, 2004). This means that Social
10 – 20 per cent of the population would be actively engaged in hired herding. The high transitions in
proportion of households using hired herders here shows that the practice has risen the Savannah
dramatically in importance. This is linked to the changed distribution of wealth groups as seen
in the next section, but is mostly in response to natural resource conflict, insecurity and uptake
of alternative livelihood strategies.
Higher population densities of people and livestock as well as increasing encroachment 539
of farms on erstwhile grazing lands have led to competition and conflict over natural
resources in rural areas. Cattle must now be herded by older, more experienced hands to
avoid damage to crops and subsequent conflict with farmers, important than ever given the
recent ethno-religious conflicts in North-Central Nigeria (Higazi, 2011). Fulani have
extensified their cattle management as a consequence of restricted access to natural
resources which forces them to move their animals in the wet season in addition to the
customary dry season transhumance in search of adequate pasture and water
(Majekodunmi et al., 2013, 2014). Armed robbery and cattle rustling by organised gangs
are also increasingly common in Plateau state, as economies of conflict are established in the
wake of violence and insecurity (Higazi, 2013, 2016) such that it is no longer safe for young
boys to herd cattle and adult herdsmen are required. Livelihood diversification amongst
Fulani is also rising as more youth participate in education, paid employment and trade.
This has reduced the availability of family labour for herding, especially long distance
transhumance which is disruptive to other pursuits. Taken together, restricted access to
natural resources, insecurity and diversification have significantly increased demand for
experienced herders and given rise to the patron-client dynamic as an important feature of
social structure and interaction.
3.2 Wealth grouping and income diversity
Using the pastoral wealth ranking criteria developed by the Famine EarlyWarning Systems
Network (FEWSNET, 2004), wealth grouping by cattle herds showed that 43.9 per cent of
Fulani households on the Jos Plateau were “better off”, 50 per cent were in the “middle”
group and only 6.1 per cent were “poor”. The proportion of better off herders is higher than
average figures for pastoralists quoted above. This pastoral population is relatively
wealthy, with very few poor households and therefore limited need for inuf.
Income diversity was high at 66 per cent. In total, 39 per cent of households supplemented
their income with crops, 14 per cent with off-farm activities such as petty trade and
commercial driving and 16 per cent with both crops and off-farm activities. Income diversity
has had significant effects on annual income levels: households with diversified incomes made
significantly more than those relying on livestock alone (Majekodunmi et al., 2017).
3.3 Trends in risk and resilience
Majekodunmi et al. (2014) compared cattle productivity on the Jos Plateau between 2008 and
1975 (Pullan and Grindle, 1980), identifying several important trends in risk and resilience:
• mean herd size has increased and is more variable showing increased wealth in the
system and increased economic differentiation;
• variability in annual change in herd size, reproductive performance, natural herd
growth (potential offtake) and actual offtake has decreased, indicating increased
stability in cattle productivity; and
• variability in purchase and sale prices has decreased and on average, herders earn
$120 more per animal sold (after adjusting for inflation), indicating increased market
integration and stability and their positive effect on income.
IJSE Taken together, these factors indicate that the overall livestock enterprise is more stable and
45,3 pastoralists have developed their livestock assets and levels of market integration over the
years, leading to reduced demand for SRMS.
The established risks of disease and poor nutrition (Pullan, 1980a, b) have decreased over
the years, mitigated by increased access to drugs and increased mobility. Pastoralists face the
“new” risks of increased natural resource conflict and insecurity (Majekodunmi et al., 2013)
540 which differ from the “old” risks in two ways.
First, there is a fundamental difference in the covariance of these risks. Rather than
affecting one household this year and another the next, all households are affected
simultaneously. Therefore social risk management strategies designed to share risk
between affected and unaffected households are not quite fit for purpose (Galvin, 2008;
Gray et al., 2003).
Second, these risks do not lead to a catastrophic loss of animals as do drought or disease.
Instead they affect productivity, management, production costs and margins in the cattle
enterprise. As income from cattle is most vulnerable to these risks they will have more
severe effects on households which rely solely on cattle for their livelihood. Income diversity
reduces vulnerability to risks and households with alternative income streams are more
resilient. This demonstrates the increased importance of livelihood diversification in
moderating covariance of risk: these risks affect everybody but vulnerability and resilience
vary widely between households.
The ultimate goal of both livelihood diversification and reciprocal exchange networks is
to manage risk and uncertainty, with the additional benefit of building social capital with
the latter. Reciprocal exchange can be viewed as a traditional means to this end, while
livelihood diversification is an emerging strategy (Baird and Gray, 2014). Both serve the
same functions and participation is motivated by similar incentives and constraints. So how
do both systems affect each other when found together? Where livelihood diversity is
prevalent do social exchange networks become functionally redundant? In their
investigation of the effects of livelihood diversification on social networks of exchange,
(Baird and Gray, 2014) found that increasing levels of livelihood diversification lead to the
modification and decline of reciprocal exchange. The results of this study confirm this trend,
showing clearly that the high levels of livelihood diversification amongst Plateau Fulani and
the wealth and resilience it brings have both altered the nature and reduced the need for
SRMS within these communities.
Conflict and insecurity. Increasing competition and conflict over natural resources is
probably the single biggest trend affecting vulnerability and pastoral livelihoods in
Africa today (Mwiturubani and van Wyk, 2010; Young and Goldman, 2015; Reda, 2015;
Human-Rights-Watch, 2006). It has affected all aspects of life for Plateau Fulani, reducing
security of land tenure and forcing pastoralists to extensify their cattle production to
maintain their herds. Extensification has been a successful adaptation so far, allowing cattle
to maintain good productivity levels. However it is not without cost as herd splitting makes
management more difficult, reduces milk available for household consumption and sale by
women, increases security risks and labour costs and reduces the ability to invest in further
intensification and crop-livestock integration measures such as pasture improvement.
A few weeks after the final field studies were completed, a violent clash in the
long-running conflict in Riyom and Barkin Ladi LGAs spread into Bokkos LGA which had
been free of religious and inter-tribal violence until then. After two days of fighting,
18 Ron-Kulere indigenes and 24 Fulani were killed, over a hundred houses torched and
hundreds of Fulani were driven out of the area – taking refuge in neighbouring Bauchi and
Kaduna states. The Southern Kaduna Peoples Union promptly called for their expulsion by
the state government (Viewpoint, 2013; Daily_Trust, 2013). Bokkos LGA has now joined the
number of conflict prone areas in Plateau state with uneasy relations between Fulani
and Indigenes. The murder of the Saf Ron-Kulere, paramount traditional ruler of the area in Social
2016 by “suspected herdsmen” has worsened an already tense situation (Viewpoint, 2016). transitions in
These are just two examples of the high insecurity in the rural Middle Belt of Nigeria, the Savannah
caused by criminal activities and natural resource conflict. The frequency of these attacks is
rising, with 60 recorded throughout 2015 and the same number in the first half of 2016
(Burton, 2016).
Cattle rustling has risen to alarming levels in Nigeria over the last two decades due to 541
several factors: opportunities for crime created by civil conflicts; access to semi-automatic
weapons; increasing demand for beef; ready markets for quick disposal of stolen cattle; easy
long distance communication and transport links. All of these factors made it a very
attractive economic venture for organised crime cartels and terrorist groups (primarily Boko
Haram) who now run it as a well organised, profit-focussed enterprise, with frightening
levels of violence(Alemika, 2013; Kwaja, 2014). Such cattle rustling operations are active in 8
of the 17 LGAs of Plateau state (including Bokkos) and the Joint Task Force set up by the
Federal Government to ensure peace in the state recorded 160 attacks, 2,500 cattle stolen
and 260 deaths within their first few months of operation (Azeez and Yahaya, 2016).
During the time of this study, at least three of the study households suffered cattle thefts.
The thieves were immediately pursued and cattle recovered in all cases, without involving
the police or Joint Task Force. It was common knowledge that several local youths, both
Fulani and indigenes were involved with criminal gangs responsible for cattle rustling and
armed robbery.
Most violent incidents in rural areas of Nigeria are now heedlessly attributed to “Fulani
herdsmen” and labelled terrorist attacks, so much so that the Institute for Economics and
Peace (2015) listed “Fulani herdsmen […] operating in Nigeria’s middle belt and the Central
African Republic” as the fourth most deadly terrorist group of 2014, ahead of Al Shabaab
and the Taliban. Undoubtedly, Fulani are responsible for many of these incidents, motivated
by revenge for loss of lives and cattle in previous clashes and disputes over land and
grazing rights. However, many are simply crimes for economic gain. And very little is said
about violence against the Fulani, often viewed as justified reprisal attacks rather than
terrorist activities. Thousands of Fulani have lost their lives and property in such attacks
and many more have been displaced. The Kachia grazing reserve received 1,200 internally
displaced Fulani from Southern Kaduna and Plateau states in 2011 alone (Ducrotoy, 2015).
The IDP camp in Bauchi state to which Fulani from Bokkos fled in 2013 already housed
48,000 people, mostly from previous conflicts in Plateau state (Daily_Trust, 2013). The
Buhari administration has done little to address this rural violence, either in terms of
increased security or dialogue.
These criminal activities and the continuing political, religious and tribal polarisation of
Nigerian society have aggravated and eclipsed the natural resource competition/conflicts
such that it will be very difficult for Fulani to acquire grazing rights in new areas within the
humid and sub-humid zone by peaceful means. The ill-advised Grazing Reserve Bill
(Federal Republic of Nigeria National Assembly, 2011), which sought to forcibly acquire
grazing land for Fulani in all 36 states of the Federation, provoked a furious backlash from
private citizens, civil society groups and state governments alike and many areas of
potential transhumance/settlement are now closed to Fulani. Extensification, which has
been successful so far, may therefore prove to be an unsustainable adaptation. The greatest
grievance of other ethnic groups against the Fulani is their expectation of grazing rights free
of charge as a fundamental right, while everyone else must pay for land and inputs for their
livelihoods. A shift to more intensive production would reduce the requirement for large
areas of natural pasture. Reducing herd sizes and greater investment and diversification
into off-farm enterprises would have the same effect. Majekodunmi et al. (2017) have shown
IJSE that this livelihood strategy produces the best outcomes as households with smaller herds
45,3 and higher cash incomes from diverse sources were the most successful and had the
greatest prospects for sustainability.
3.4 Social cohesion and political autonomy
Political autonomy is weak amongst the Fulani on the Jos Plateau as pastoralists still have
542 very poor representation in and engagement with state authorities (Okello et al., 2014).
The situation is particularly poor in Plateau as the state government is controlled by
Berom elites who are hostile to Fulani (Higazi, 2013). Fulani leadership structure on the
Plateau is very democratic and individual households tend to be quite independent of
the Ardo (chief ). Apart from its effects on representation and engagement with state
authorities, this leadership mechanism does not encourage strong social cohesion and
cannot enforce sanctions for not participating in social institutions. Again, many Plateau
Fulani belong to the Izala sect of Islam which places more emphasis on personal
responsibility and individual endeavour than on collective rites and hierarchies
(Higazi, 2013; Moddibbo, 2012). Indigenous communities control natural resources and
Fulani depend on their goodwill for access to these resources. Resources are preferentially
allocated to cultivation such that there is competition rather than cooperation amongst
pastoralists as well as between pastoralists and indigenes. This has been the root
cause of the most protracted violence recorded on the Jos Plateau, in Riyom and Barkin
Ladi LGAs, where displaced Fulani from many areas have congregated, displaced the
indigenous Berom and taken over the land for their own settlements, farming and grazing
(Higazi, 2013; Taft and Haken, 2015).
And so the nature of social cohesion and political autonomy has been altered by conflict
and insecurity. Social cohesion is now often informed by feelings of isolation from and
defence against non-Fulani, as well as more benign motivations of shared identity. Political
autonomy is often asserted by aggression, violence and vengeance for grievances.
For Fulani households who have lost cattle due to violence or theft, the accepted solution to
rebuilding the herd is pursuit and recovery of their cattle in the case of theft (which is often
successful) or raiding the cattle of indigenous farmers.
4. Conclusion
This research shows a marked decline amounting to a virtual cessation of the exchange of
cattle for social support and the rise of patron-client relationships as a social risk
management strategy. There were several reasons for this: high proportion of better-off
households: increasing economic differentiation; reduced risk and increased resilience and
market integration in cattle production; high rates of livelihood diversification, with strong
effect on covariance of risk; rising demand for experienced herders, low political autonomy
and reduced social cohesion due to the hardships of natural resource conflict, violence and
insecurity. Essentially, people are richer, more resilient and more selfish. All of these have
served to erode reciprocal exchange networks and promote patron-client relationships as the
main social risk management strategy. The lack of social support through reciprocal
exchange networks is mitigated by opportunities for employment, leading to the ongoing
evolution of patron-client relationships. Thus social risk management options are still
available to poor pastoralists. When compared to reciprocal exchange networks however,
patron-client relationships achieve lower redistribution of wealth and maintain social
differentiation within the society. They do not offer the opportunity to rapidly rebuild one’s
herd and regain independence and self-esteem in the way that reciprocal exchange of cattle
does (Basset, 1994).
These results point to the emergence of a more individual lifestyle, as observed in
pastoral societies across Africa (Baird et al., 2009; Little, 2003, McCabe et al., 2010).
Reciprocal exchange as a social risk management strategy is proven to increase Social
herd survival and the sustainability of pastoral communities (Hao et al., 2015; Moritz transitions in
et al., 2011). However, risks to pastoralists have changed in recent decades and the the Savannah
growing restriction in access to natural resources may now be the greatest challenge faced
by Africa’s pastoral populations (Davies and Bennett, 2007; McKune and Silva, 2013;
Nori et al., 2008). Reduced investment in social risk management strategies and increasing
social differentiation at a time of insecurity as well as constrained access to natural 543
resources may have serious implications for the sustainability of Fulani pastoralism in
North-Central Nigeria. These natural resource issues and associated conflicts have
different effects on pastoral societies across the continent. In some societies, such as the
purely pastoral Afar in Ethiopia, it reinforces SRMS as the bonding social capital
conferred by SRMS is increasingly valuable. In others, it is accompanied by a decline
and shift in gift-giving as is commonly found amongst Maasai (Baird and Gray, 2014;
Coast, 2002; Homewood et al., 2009; McCabe 2003) and has been seen in the Fulani in this
study, who are primarily agro-pastoralists.
This should be viewed as evolution of the culture, rather than as a loss. It is a natural part
of the adaptation of the Fulani’s livelihood strategies to cope with changing conditions.
As part of this process we see extensification, market integration and diversification of
livelihood strategies amongst the Plateau Fulani (Majekodunmi et al., 2017).There is a
notable absence of efforts to intensify production as successfully done by pastoralists
elsewhere in Africa (Bencherifa and Johnson, 1990; Boutrais, 1996; Buhl, 1999; BurnSilver,
2007; Demirag, 2004; Homewood et al., 2009; Moritz, 2003, 2012; Moritz et al., 2009; Ramisch,
1998; Requier-Desjardins, 2001); Extensification here has also not led to specialisation as
seen elsewhere (Adriansen, 2006; Manderscheid et al., 2002; Sikana et al., 1993). They remain
agro-pastoralists without achieving truly integrated mixed farming, and so must maintain
two fronts, pursuing cultivation and off-farm activities at home and managing their cattle
in remote locations for most of the year. This is becoming increasingly difficult and may not
be sustainable in the long-term.
These livelihood adaptations are accompanied by shifts in the social structure as Fulani
society becomes more inward looking and closed off from non-Fulani, but within the
community, society is less cohesive and the lifestyle is becoming less communal and more
individual. Thus there is a decrease in both bonding (intra-community) and bridging
(inter-community) social capital. Increases in education and livelihood diversity represent
efforts to develop bridging social capital but the current situation is a far cry from the
heyday of farmer-herder interdependence. This flux of inter- and intra-community relations
will be an important determinant of conflict resolution and lasting peace and security in
Nigeria’s diverse middle belt. It is impossible to predict the outcomes but it is clear that
long-term solutions and adaptations are required.
This research has significant implications for sustainability of Fulani livelihoods and
communities: decreased SRMS and increased self-reliance means that the most vulnerable
households will find it more difficult to withstand shocks and climb out of poverty.
Wealthier households may cope better with high incidence/low severity shocks like illness
or temporary restrictions in mobility but are more vulnerable to low incidence/high severity
shocks such as extended droughts or loss of mobility as a livelihood strategy. Likewise,
decreased social cohesion reduces the ability of communities to mobilise and act collectively
in the face of community-level shocks. This is very important to improve farmer – herder
relations and for engagement with the State – a crucial process, given current levels of
acrimony and conflict and decline in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms which have
left the state as the only viable mediator for lasting change. These findings can be
consolidated by future research into reciprocal exchange of other commodities amongst and
studies in other Fulani communities across Nigeria.
IJSE Acknowledgements
45,3 The author would like to thank the management and staff of the Nigerian Institute for
Trypanosomiasis and Onchocerciasis Research in Vom, Nigeria for their assistance facilitating
this project. The author would also like to thank Dr Alexandra Shaw and Professor Susan
Welburn for their support, advice and contributions to the wider project. Sincere appreciation
goes to the pastoralists and community leaders of study villages on the Jos Plateau.
544 Funding: this study was funded by the UK’s Biotechnology and Biological Sciences
Research Council (BBSRC) Grant Number BB/H009213/1under the ‘‘Combating Infectious
Diseases in Livestock for International Development’’ (CIDLID) scheme.
Conflict of Interest: the author declares that they have no conflict of interest.
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Further reading
The National Grazing Routes and Reserves Act Bill (2011), HB.11.10.130.
Corresponding author
Ayodele O. Majekodunmi can be contacted at: amajekodunmi@ug.edu.gh
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