Yale-UN Oral History 
Ambassador George Tomeh 
Interviewed by: Jean Krasno, Ph.D. 
March 16, 1998 
Amman, Jordan 
Jean Krasno (JK): Ambassador Tomeh is Syrian, from Damascus, and was 
Ambassador of Syria in the United Nations. Very good. Now I am going to ask you the 
question. For the record, Ambassador Tomeh, would you explain something about your 
background, where you were born and educated, and when you first became involved in 
the United Nations? 
George Tomeh (GT): I was born in Damascus, Syria, in the year 1922, and from a 
Christian family that explains my first name, a Christian name. When I say 1922, this is 
the year or this is one of the years that came after World War I, and I mention this 
because in that year, the Middle East was actually divided and subdivided. For instance, 
Syria--Natural Assyria--which extends from Mount Toros in Turkey down to the desert of 
Arabia, and to Egypt, and from the Mediterranean to the desert of Iraq. So, this part, 
which actually was known as the 'countries of Damascus.' It contains now the following 
states: Jordan, Israel, greater Lebanon, and Syria. But the three first were all taken from 
Natural Assyria, which I mentioned. My very earliest memories go back to 1925. That 
was the year of the great Syrian revolt against the French occupation and colonialism. 
Some of the memories are not very pleasant, but they show the situation or the conditions 
under which my generation would grow up. Damascus was being bombarded by the 
French, and the quarter in which I had my father's house, where I lived and grew up was 
called the Midan. Not only is Damascus the oldest inhabited city in the world, but the 
Midan in Damascus is the oldest quarter of Damascus, and my memories go back to the 
house in which I was born, one of those big oriental houses wherein you have waters 
inside the house, what is called the 'Bachma', and small gardens around it, with a large 
center area--you have the center like this and the rooms are scattered around it--which 
indicates that the life was really inside the house, because you had the waters, the trees, 
the flowers, the fruits, everything. So, our house, being in the Midan, was touched by the 
bombardment, and I had five sisters and myself, besides my mother. My father was in the 
region where the revolt was taking place, so my mother was running from one room to 
the other, one room to the other, and our neighbors, who were Muslims and one of the 
leaders of the great Syrian revolution, were assuring us all the time that nothing will 
happen, nothing will happen to us, that whatever happens to them will happen to us, and 
so on, and, "We will protect you"--telling my mother, because they knew my father was 
away--"Don't be afraid in the absence of your husband, we are your brothers." They gave 
the best possible assurances that neighbors can give to neighbors. 
One very sad accident I remember is that my mother had at that time on her hands 
a baby called Michel--Michael--and, as we were running away from our house to go to 
another quarter which was a safer place, she forgot the baby in one of the rooms. When 
we went out and closed the doors and so on, and walked a few meters, my mother 
remembered that she forgot the baby in one of the rooms; she ran back to bring him. That 
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particular room, the roof of that room was touched by a bomb and parts of the roof fell on 
the head of the baby, so the baby was almost half dead when my mother brought him. 
We took a train to Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, and at that time that route or 
trip, which now by taxi you can make in two hours, used to take at least 16 hours by train, 
and when the train was going up the mountains of Lebanon you could-- I remember--you 
descended from the train and started walking. So, finally we reached Beirut. My father 
had hired a villa for us in Jounie, which is not far from Beirut, in fact a suburb of Beirut. 
And two days after we arrived there, by baby brother died, as a result of the bombing. 
And we buried him, we were all very sad about him, and so on. So, you see these are 
some of the memories of the days in which we were born and were growing up. I am sure 
we agree they are not very pleasant memories. They are rather sad, and even tragic. We 
stayed two years in Jounie, Lebanon, and then we went back to Damascus, Syria, to our 
own big house. Strangely enough, all the old trees and the plantation, the flowers, were 
blooming. It was springtime. And we felt very happy to be back in our own home. 
My studies were at the Greek Orthodox School, a famous high school, which we 
called Secondary School, in which you finished up high school and you entered 
university. But the final exam for ending the high school and entering university were 
government exams, and I passed those exams, and then I entered a competition, and 
succeeded. I was among those who succeeded, which means that the government would 
take care of my university education. And the university to which I was assigned was the 
American University of Beirut. So, I went there. I was accepted as the junior class, but 
my knowledge of English was very little, so I had to take, with other special students, 
English classes so that we could follow the courses of the university that were all given in 
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English. From the university I got a B A in philosophy, and then I left the university for 
one year. That was 1941, during World War II, and I worked for an M A , and got my M A 
from the American University of Beirut, under a professor who made a great name for 
himself in the United States when he was Ambassador of Lebanon to the United Nations. 
I mean Charles Malik, a well-known personality, and he was really a philosopher. I got 
my M A with distinction, returned to Syria, was among the first chosen to work in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, newly founded, because by that time the French, who had 
fought strongly not to leave Syria, had left Syria under the pressure of the British army, 
which was in Lebanon. 
JK: ... during the war. This is during the war? 
GT: During the war. And in fact a battle took place between the French army and the 
Syrians, and all inhabitants of Damascus they will remember that the 26 gendarmes, 
which are like policemen, were killed around the parliament by the French in a brutal 
manner. Those days are on the whole, sadly remembered because of what France did 
while withdrawing from Syria. 
At the American University of Beirut, I entered the department of philosophy, and 
my minor was in international law. And then we met Charles Malik, who was really a 
great professor in every turn of the word, a philosopher on his own right who was a 
graduate of Harvard University, and I wrote for the M A thesis a translation of the 
nomodology of Leibniz, from French--because in Syria, French was the second language. 
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My thesis was published as a book and exists now as a book, and went into a second and 
a third edition. 
JK: And then, at some point you went to London? 
GT: Yes. When I got my M A and returned to Damascus, Syria had already gained its 
full independence and had started establishing embassies, which at that time were called 
legations because embassies were only for the great powers. But afterwards, the legations 
were also called embassies. 
JK: OK. So then you established a legation in London? 
GT: In London. And I was among the first chosen to go to our London legation. At 
the same time, a legation was established in Washington, and a delegation to the United 
Nations, where you have a permanent representative. In fact, I was asked to make a 
choice of what place I wanted to go. I went to London. I did not regret it because I had 
my first contacts with actual Western civilization. 
JK: Let me just ask you, because we are at this time period, were you in Damascus 
while the meetings in San Francisco took place? 
GT: That's correct. 
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JK: Then I wanted to ask you this, because in my interview with Majid Khadduri he 
said that in San Francisco the Syrians were represented, and he was representing Iraq, and 
the issue came up of membership to the United Nations, and Syria wanted to become an 
independent country as a member of the United Nations... 
GT: Of the founding members. 
JK: ... one of the founding members. And the French objected... 
GT: That's correct. 
JK: ... and said No, that Syria was still a colony of the French. 
GT: A mandate. 
JK: A mandate. Right. OK. So, they said no, it was still a mandate. Now, Majid 
Khadduri said at that point, even during the meetings in San Francisco, the French were 
bombing, they decided to bomb Damascus. 
GT: Which they did. 
JK: Which they did. And you were there? 
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GT: I was in Damascus. 
JK: So, the French did bomb Damascus? 
GT: Yes. 
JK: How long did that go on? Was it a day? 
GT: No, more. That particular episode lasted for about a week. Because the Syrian 
government, which is now an independent government, had a small army but nothing to 
compare with the French legions that were in Damascus, so they fought. There were 
great battles that took place inside the streets of Damascus, and lots of Syrians were 
killed. At that time, to be exact, I was already in our legation in London, and the first 
meeting of the Security Council took place in London, and one of the first cases that the 
Security Council took up in London was the French attack on Syria, because Syria 
brought its case and its complaint against France, in London at the Security Council. 
JK: Now, when the conflict was going on in Damascus, my understanding is that the 
Americans told the French they had to stop. 
GT: That's correct. The Americans and the British both intervened and told the 
French they had to stop, and it was only then that the French stopped their fighting in 
Syria. 
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[interrupted] 
JK: OK, so: in London, this was one of the first issues that the Security Council took 
up. 
GT: That's correct. 
JK: So, what were the discussions in London at that time? This was 1946 I believe? 
GT: 1946. Well, Syria asked for the complete withdrawal of the French army from 
Syria. 
JK: Oh, so they were still there... 
GT: France said, "We will withdraw provided two treaties are concluded between us 
and Syria, one about economic privileges for the French government, and one about 
cultural privileges. And we will enter into negotiations with Syria to conclude these two 
treaties." The Syrian delegation was headed by a very able old man of the politics of 
Syria, and of the Arab world, known from the days of the Ottoman empire, also a 
Christian Arab called Phirus Im-houly. 
JK: Im-houly? 
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GT: Houly means priest; Phirus means the change or something like that. Because 
Arab names have meanings. And I remember he had a great sense of humor. So, he said 
to the Security Council, "Why enter into negotiations to withdraw? We will give them all 
facilities to go out of Syria!" And everybody started laughing. "We will give them all the 
facilities to withdraw and we will also praise their withdrawal--there is no need for 
negotiations." It is like someone who puts a great rock in the middle of the street and on 
the rock he puts a plaque stating "Beware, there is a rock behind." But if we remove the 
rock, there is no sign, for the precision. So, this is very much like the demands of France 
from Damascus. "We will negotiate for withdrawal." But there is no need to, just 
withdraw! This statesman of Syria, there are names for him, not only in Amman, but all 
other Arab cities. He was actually a great Arab statesman, everybody used to listen to 
him. But these are some of the recollections. 
JK: So, what was the result of negotiating these two treaties? Did you do it? 
GT: They were never negotiated, and under a decision taken by the Security Council 
France had to withdraw and she withdrew. And that was on the 17th of May 1946. And 
that day became the national day of Syria, which is celebrated every year, and in all 
embassies of Syria they give a big reception and so on, to remember that date. So you 
think if I wrote my memoirs, it would be interesting for Americans? 
JK: Very. Very interesting. 
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GT: So, take me to Yale, I will teach there and at the same time I will work on my 
memoirs. 
JK: That would be very interesting! So, you were in the very first meetings of the 
United Nations that took place in 1946? 
GT: That's correct. That's correct. My recollection of the first General Assembly and 
those first meetings is really exciting. Just imagine a young man who had just graduated 
from university and finds himself taken from the limited Middle East and its life, to the 
greatest spectacle that existed in the world. Now, when I remember my being there... for 
instance, there was these statesmen who were there. A l l of our older statesmen that I told 
you about, he was almost in his 80s, Stettinius from the United States, Bevin from 
England. At that time, the Labour party had won the elections after the end of World War 
II and Churchill was out, but Churchill came and visited the United Nations and there was 
a great big reception for him. I remember that clearly. From France, the French foreign 
minister, very famous, who was one of those who fought for Syria and sent the army to 
Syria, namely a typical colonialist. So, the trends that were very apparent at that time, 
more really than really the cold war between east and west, was the third world coming 
into the front stage of world politics. Because all problems at the U N at that time were 
colonialism and how to liquidate colonialism. And also the problems of development of 
under-developed countries, took place. And at that time they changed the word 'under¬
developed' because they said under-developed means or carries with it the concept of 
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'backward people.' So, in order not to hurt these people upon the withdrawal of 
colonialism, we will call them 'developing countries.' 
JK: So, that switch in language actually took place in 1946. 
GT: Yes. 
JK: That's very interesting. It is quite a different approach than during the League of 
Nations, because the language in the League of Nations really did separate these 
countries. 
GT: 'Mandate,' and 'we will stay there until we give them direction and capabilities to 
learn how to take care of their problems,' and so on a so forth; namely, from above to 
below. But no, there was a sense of equality in 1946, even though Syria has nothing to 
compare to France of England, but at the United Nations, under the Charter, all states are 
equal. You find the Soviet Union, which is gigantic, the United States, and you find 
states like the Cote D'lvoire, for instance, or Sierra Leone, or Lebanon, or Jordan, who 
are small states of two million, or one million. The population of Syria now is about 18 
to 20 million. At that time, it was three million, the whole of Syria. Damascus, the 
capital, in which I was born and grew up, was a city of 500,000 people, half a million. 
Now the population of Damascus is five million. 
JK: It had grown tremendously. 
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GT: Yes. 
JK: Now, as long as we are talking about colonialism and the changes, what was the 
understanding of what the Trusteeship Council would be doing? 
GT: Well, the Trusteeship Council... i f you like I will bring the Charter. The main 
organs of the United Nations are the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, ... 
JK: and the General Assembly, and so forth. 
GT: The General Assembly is like the legislative power in a democratic state. 
JK: Right. 
GT: But these were the International Court of Justice. And they were all attached to 
the General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council in particular, it's objective was how to 
bring countries that were under the systems of colonialism or trusteeship or mandate, and 
so on, from that state to the state of independence, namely how to liquidate colonialism. 
JK: OK, so by 1946, the interpretation of what the Trusteeship Council would be 
doing is the liquidation of colonialism? 
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GT: Yes. 
JK: Because the agreements prior to the writing of the Charter between Winston 
Churchill and President Roosevelt... 
GT: The 'Big Four.' 
JK: Right... were really that the Trusteeship Council was going to oversee lands or 
territories that were freed from World War II, to take over the mandates of the League of 
Nations, and that nothing would be brought to the Trusteeship Council without being 
brought by Britain or France or whatever. So, Churchill agreed to that. 
GT: I have many copies of the Charter-- I will give you a copy. 
JK: No, no. I have them too. I understand what is written in the Charter. 
GT: ... because the work of the Trusteeship Council, its work, its aims, how to go 
about that, is all described in the Chapter on Trusteeship. 
JK: But what I was just saying was: what was the interpretation? When people 
arrived in 1946 and they knew that the Trusteeship Council was going to be created, 
basically the understanding really was that it was going to oversee the decolonization, 
which it did. 
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GT: Which it did. But the actual decolonization took place in the early 1960s. 
JK: Right--it didn't take place right away. 
GT: And in between came the Cold War, and the whole structure of the U N changed. 
In my time, the majority was called the 'mechanical majority,' and it was explained that if 
the delegate of the United States raised his hand to say something there will be 40 to 45 
members who would raise their hands and say the same thing at that time. But as more 
and more third world countries came as independent states of the U N , the confrontation 
between the two camps became bigger and bigger, because most of those people, like 
myself-- I told you my memories of the French days--they are nothing but to leave sadness 
in the mind of a person, and dislike and negative feelings. Now, the problem in essence, 
really, or as you say 'the bottom... ' 
JK: The bottom line. 
GT: The bottom line of it, is how to create a new world order in which these so-called 
under-developed or developing states would find their way and behave or work in a 
constructive manner with their previous masters. That was an issue. 
JK: Right, OK. Well, the other thing that went on in 1946 was the election of the first 
Secretary-General, Trygve Lie. 
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GT: Trygve Lie. 
JK: Yes. How was he particularly selected? 
GT: Before Trygve Lie, there was an American, who became very well known in 
America and in the whole world, Hiss. 
JK: Alger Hiss. 
GT: Right. Especially when the fight against communism became basic in the U.S., 
especially in the Congress at the time, and they found out there was someone named 
Chambers, if I remember. 
JK: Right--Whittaker Chambers. 
GT: Whittaker Chambers, who disclosed that Hiss was a communist. I was in the 
United States at the time. 
JK: So, had Alger Hiss been considered to be Secretary-General? 
GT: He was actually the first Secretary-General before Trygve Lie--the acting. 
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JK: Because he had been that in San Francisco. 
GT: Because he had been in San Francisco. I remember him distinctly. A 
distinguished man, very polite, and connoisseur--being an American in that position 
would make a person feel a little different from the others. But he was a modest person, 
he was a modest person. I remember a great many members of the United Nations felt 
sad about Hiss, because he was an honest man. 
JK: A very intelligent man. 
GT: Very intelligent man. 
JK: So, how did the selection of Trygve Lie then take place? 
GT: Trygve Lie, the selection was as described in the Charter: that the Security 
Council chooses a member and refers the choice to the General Assembly. But once the 
Security Council chooses a member, it is taken for granted that he will be the Secretary-
General. So, this is how Trygve Lie was the first elected Secretary-General of the U N , as 
prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations. 
JK: So, was there any discussion at all amongst the members of the General Assembly 
about other candidates, or was it just felt that he was it. 
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GT: To the best of my recollection at that time, no. Although we Arabs, in particular, 
had our reservations about him because he was a first-class pro-Zionist. 
JK: He was a pro-Zionist? I didn't know that. 
GT: And I have collected some of his statements, someone borrowed them from me 
about two months ago who gave a lecture about Trygve Lie and his pro-Zionism, and he 
used all the statements that I had collected. If that interests you, I will look for them. If 
you feel interested in that. 
JK: Later we can talk some more about that. 
GT: By the way, I suggest that I bring you a list of books and papers, and when I 
mention about statements of Trygve Lie, we will just mention them and I will take this 
list and try to gradually copy them and send them to you, to Yale. 
JK: Well, we can discuss that after we do the interview, because I don't want to take 
the time during the interview to be taking notes. 
GT: When we start speaking about the Palestine question, there will be lots of 
documents that I will mention. 
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JK: Well, we have a depository library of U N documents at Yale, so we have access to 
that. So, we don't need you to send U N documents. 
[interrupted] 
JK: Alright, well we were just discussing that Ambassador Tomeh had published a 
book called United Nations Resolutions on Palestine, and it is from the Center for 
Research and Documentation at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut. 
Well then, let's move ahead to the next few years in which the British had said 
that they would be giving up their mandate in Palestine and that they had handed over the 
issue to the United Nations. At that point, was Syria involved in the committee that came 
up with the partition plan, and what was Syria's view of the decision on partition? 
GT: There was a resolution by the General Assembly establishing the members of the 
partition committee. Would you be interested in that? 
JK: Well, I think probably it would be best if you would just tell me your 
interpretation of it. 
GT: Well, I just wanted to make sure... "...creating a special committee on Palestine." 
Resolution 106. "...special committee to be created for the above mentioned purpose, of 
the representatives of: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, 
Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia." 
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JK: So, those were the members on the committee? 
GT: On the Special Committee, and then in my book I gave the vote on each resolution 
and final decision adopted at the 79th plenary meeting... 
JK: So, this book is a very good reference. 
GT: Those for, against, abstain and so on. But Syria was among those who voted 
against [in the General Assembly]. A l l Arab countries, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Turkey. 
JK: ... voted against it? 
GT: Voted against it. 
JK: But Jordan... 
GT: At that time Jordan was not yet a member of the United Nations. 
JK: Oh, Jordan wasn't a member yet, OK. 
GT: It became a member in the late 1950s or the early 1960s. 
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JK: Oh, I see. Then, it wasn't able to vote. It wasn't there. Interesting. So, Syria 
voted against the partition plan. Why? 
GT: In my book, I reflected the feelings of all the Arab countries at that time. They 
felt that a very important part of an Arab country, especially when you remember 
Jerusalem, which was always a very thorny and passionate issue, if I may say so. They 
felt that a part, a very dear part of an Arab country was taken apart from them, and 
because the conditions obtaining at that time were not favorable to, or could not justify, 
the partition of Palestine. Why? You had 1,200,000 Arabs. The number of the Jews at 
that time was about 400,000, a third. Theone-third was given 55 percent of the land of 
Palestine, the best part, the plains, the agricultural plains, the waters, and so on and so 
forth. Here, I have a map of the partition and the map of Palestine... 
JK: In the book? 
GT: In the book. Whereas the Arabs, who are the majority, were given 45 percent 
only, and the poorest parts of Palestine. The ownership of land is flabbergasting, in spite 
of the twenty or thirty years of colonialism, from the time that immigration to Palestine 
began to the time of the vote on partition. In twenty or thirty years of Zionist colonization 
of Palestine--there is no other description of it, because all the Jewish immigrants came as 
settlers, and that was a big issue. They did not own more than five to six percent of the 
total area of Palestine, whereas the Arabs owned 95 percent. So, how can you tolerate or 
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accept that the country of which you own 95 percent, to give 55 of it to a foreign settlers? 
I mean, suppose the establishment of a national home for the Jews was to take place in, 
say, Montana or Arizona. I once heard that in Montana or those areas, when someone 
settles forty miles from the house of his neighbor, the first would say, "It is getting 
crowded here." 
JK: In Montana, right! 
GT: So, I mean, justice-wise, human-wise, history-wise, it is unacceptable. 
The partition of Palestine, what is not realized by the West and by the world, and 
its majority was very generous to the Jews, but to the detriment of the Arabs. When you 
want to partition my country, how can I accept that? My country is dear to me. 
JK: There weren't, i f I recall correctly, there weren't any Arab countries on the 
committee. Is that correct? 
GT: No [there weren' t any]. 
JK: Why? 
GT: There were no Jews, also, on the committee, so that the committee could be 
impartial. Now, if I don't tell you later, ask me about the vote on partition, because that 
is also interesting. Now, the problem of partition led to the driving out of Palestine, one 
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million Arabs, who are now four million living in camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Israel. If you want a break down of the number of refugees in each Arab country, I have 
it. I can bring it from one of my files for you. But in connection with the problem of 
partition, I want to recommend these two books to you, which are written by Israelis, 
Simha Flatan (?)was from the Labour Party. I met him in the U N and we had spoken a 
long time together, the best book written on the problem of refugees is also by a Jew from 
Israel, Benny Morris The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. 
JK: OK, so Benny Morris and the other author is Simha Flatan (?). 
GT: They are both Israelis. If you want an American point of view, this book by 
George Ball whom I have come to know; he was Under-Secretary of State. 
JK: OK, George Ball, and the title is The Passionate Attachment. Later you can give 
me a full bibliography that we can put with this interview. 
GT: Yes. And then very little is known about how Israel was able to occupy all these 
Arab lands. Here we come to the problem of terrorism. I will not speak anything for 
myself, but I have got two books to answer that: one is written by Menachim Begin 
himself, The Revolt, in which there is a chapter entitled, We fight, therefore we are. 
Descartes said cogito ergo sum, "We think therefore we are," here, "We fight therefore 
we are." To me, it is the whole chapter: we fight, therefore we are. Just read that, and see 
what is the philosophy and ideology of Zionism. There is a body of literature on 
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terrorism in Israel itself, written by Israelis, and I have a unique collection of that. First 
Strike is about how the plan was put down and implemented by bombarding and 
destroying what would have been the nuclear factory that produces an atom bomb in Iraq. 
JK: The bombing of Osiraq. 
GT: The bombing. 
JK: OK, on partition. 
GT: On partition: One of the causes is that there existed in Palestine a party called the 
Ihud-- Ihud means 'one' in English or in French--namely, the party that would unite Arabs 
and Jews together. This party was created by a great Jew called Magnus, Judah Magnes. 
He was the president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He was an anti-Zionist, and 
he was calling for a unitary state, or a federal state, made of the Arabs and Jews together. 
And the Arabs were all for that. I myself, I would now call for a federal state of Jews and 
Arabs together. The personality of Judah Magnus in this whole story because very few 
people know about that. This is maybe the first time that they hear about it. I have books 
by Judah Magnus and about Judah Magnus. If when you are interested in the 
bibliography at the end of our talk, I will also give you books on him. 
JK: Good, good. 
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GT: One last point about the bibliography and the sort: there is also a great movement 
of anti-Zionism in the United States itself. The leader was a fantastic man, as to 
knowledge, ethics, and he was a friend of mine, a great friend of mine. During times of 
crisis he would come like a bigger brother and see how things were going with me. 
Rabbi Elmer Berger. I would give special mention to Rabbi Elmer Berger. 
JK: OK, good. So, at the time then, Syria objected to the partition plan. 
GT: Yes. 
JK: Then, when the mandate ran out and the British left, war broke out. So, what was 
Syria's role in the war at that time, then? 
GT: You know, in these books that I already gave you, you will find the answer: first, 
about the reality about the war in 1948, how it happened and why it happened—because so 
far, the real history has not been known. But these Israeli writers who wrote about the 
birth of Israel will give you the answer, and I accept their answer. 
JK: But from your experiences at the time, what was Syria's role in the 1948 war? 
GT: Syria was like any other state, whose objectives at that time was not to destroy 
Israel, but to save Palestine, or to save Arab Palestine, because David Ben-Gurion and 
Weizmann and all these big Zionists made it no secret that they wanted all of Palestine, 
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and even Jordan, and they say, "Jordan has been taken from the Israeli state as it should 
be." So, the aim was really to stop the expansionism, which exists up to this very 
moment, of Zionists in Palestine. 
JK: OK, so the Syrians, with the Egyptians... and who were the other Arab countries 
that were involved? 
GT: Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan. Jordan played a very important role because 
the Chief of Staff and top leader and General and all the Arab armies was King Abdullah. 
JK: Right, right. 
GT: A Jordanian. Jordan. Now, how they were able to occupy all these parts of 
Palestine, which did not belong to them? When we come to the bibliography that I want 
to give you, but I'll mention now because the answer is there-- I have already given you 
The Revolt of Menachim Begin. You will find in these books explanations of how they 
conquered Jerusalem, how they conquered Jaffa. 
JK: Well, could you tell me what was Syria's view of the Palestinians and whether 
they should stay in Palestine or whether they should leave during the war? What was 
Syria's view on that? 
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GT: It is a very long... and history will prove it... and these books written by the 
Israelis will also confirm it... that this whole idea that the Arab leaders called on the radio, 
and told them, "Get out, we will bring you back when our army comes," is completely 
false. 
JK: Oh, that's false? 
GT: Yes. 
JK: So, what was the view? 
GT: To finish the first, this book of Menachim Begin himself details the tragedies that 
happened in Deir Yassin, namely how these various places ended up occupied, but ... 
JK: So, from Syria's point of view, there was no communication to the Palestinians to 
leave for now, and that Syria would help them in the future. 
GT: No, you cannot... 
JK: OK, so from that point of view, it was that they should stay and stay in their 
villages? 
26 
GT: Yes. So, there are... look here: I have written in Arabic about the expression of 
the Arabs. How they themselves tell you about it. 
[interrupted] 
JK: So, we were talking about your involvement with the U N . When were you 
Ambassador to the UN? 
GT: I was Ambassador to the U N in 1965 to 1972. Prior to that I was a member of the 
United Arab Republic, which was the union of Syria and Egypt under Gamal Abdel 
Nasser. I also was in the United Nations and re-wrote, in one night without sleeping a 
moment, the speech of Abdel Nasser that was delivered at the General Assembly. 
JK: Which did what? What did the speech say? I'm sorry I missed that part. 
GT: I wrote, or re-wrote, the speech of President Nasser to the General Assembly when 
all the heads of state came in 1960. 
JK: In 1960? 
GT: Yes. I put the whole night into it; I did not sleep, and then the next morning 
Gamal Abdel Nasser himself and Hammud Hussein Hakud 1 don't know if you have 
heard the name... 
27 
JK: Yes, yes. 
GT: A great, great writer. He came to me and thanked me. I had an American 
secretary, an older girl who knew Arabic, and to whom I was dictating-- I dictated the 
speech—and she would comment now and then and read it to me. So, all these are part of 
my biography. 
JK: Good, good. So, you were in the U N as Ambassador from Syria to the United 
Nations during the 1967 war? 
GT: During the 1967 war, yes. 
JK: OK. Good. Well, explain to me: Jordan was a member of the Security Council 
in 1965 and 1966. 
GT: Yes. 
JK: Then there were new elections for the Security Council for 1967? 
GT: No, forgive me: not for 1967. I was leading the Syrian delegation, but I was not a 
member of the Security Council. I became a member and the President of the Security 
Council in 1969-70. 
28 
JK: Exactly. And that was the point I was wanting to make. During that period of 
1967-68, or at least during the year of 1967, there was no Arab country on the Security 
Council. 
GT: That's correct. 
JK: OK. 
GT: And this is a point to be investigated: if you are interested I will tell you exactly, 
because I would suggest to the Syrian government to investigate that particular point, 
because the Syrian delegation, or the Syrian government or Syrian foreign ministry, was 
responsible for that absence. 
JK: In what way? How did it happen? How did that actually happen? 
GT: You are interested in that? 
JK: Yes. 
GT: OK. Unfortunately, pettiness is not the property of any one people. Any people 
could act with pettiness, and petty members and people who destroy things. This is very 
personal. Do you want to put it here? 
29 
JK: Yes, because I would like to know what was going on in terms of selecting the 
Security Council at that time. 
GT: OK. I was appointed to the United Nations in 1965. In 1966, during the General 
Assembly of 1966, Syria presented itself as a candidate for two important posts in two 
councils: for the Economic and Social Council and for the Security Council. And I 
received the orders to start the work, to lay the groundwork for the election. I 
immediately answered to the foreign ministry—this is very, very personal--that "this is 
absolutely wrong, I don't approve of it, and i f you want to insist on it I will submit my 
resignation now." Because these seats are very important in the life of the United 
Nations, when a state wants to present its candidacy for one council, it starts preparing for 
that three or four years ago, to get the approval of its group, the approval of another 
group. You know, there is the Third World group, the Western powers, America, the 
Soviet Union, and so on and so forth. And no great power ever—not even the greatest--
except those who are nominated to the permanent members of the Security Council, who 
would even think of presenting its candidacy in one year for two important seats. 
Because ultimately, we lost the two seats, as I warned the government. The Under¬
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who was a petty individual in my country, wanted to show 
the government a failure by me, personally. So, he insisted on putting our candidacy for 
the two seats, including the Security Council. I told the government in a letter—I have a 
copy of it that I can show to you, and I will write it in my memoirs--that even India, for 
instance, which is about 1 billion people now, but less then, 650 million I think. 
30 
JK: It's close. 
GT: ... who is the greatest member, would not think of presenting its candidacy to two 
seats in one year. This is stupid. Syria is a small country. If we get one seat, let us say 
the Economic and Social Council, that's enough. So, I was opposed by Japan, India, and 
Iraq. And in vain did I tell and write and speak on the telephone from New York, that 
"this is wrong, this is wrong, this is wrong. We will lose two seats, and especially the 
Arab seat in the Security Council." And when the elections took place, it is exactly wh at 
happened. Japan succeeded by taking the seat on the Security Council, and Iraq 
succeeded in taking the Economic and Social Council. So, no Arab state. Later, to prove 
the pettiness of this colleague that I am thinking about, I wrote a special letter to the 
minister of foreign affairs, and to the president himself, Hafez Assad, about the grave 
mistake that was done, and to make an inquiry into the problem: "nominate some high 
official in whose integrity you believe, and let him make a report about this failure and its 
causes." And that did not take place. 
JK: So, the result of that is that during the 1967 war, there was no representative of the 
Arab countries on the Security Council. 
GT: Yes. What I told you, nobody knows. Muhammed el-Farra knows because we are 
very close, we used to work always together. 
31 
JK: So, when the Security Council convened to discuss the 1967 war, where was 
Syria? Where were you? 
GT: I was in the U N , leading the Syrian delegation. And this petty man that I told you 
about, they sent him to me to be with the delegation in 1967. And I said, "Alright, come. 
Welcome." This point is very important for this story, because the non-existence of an 
Arab member in the Security Council when Resolution 242 was discussed was very, very 
detrimental to Syria. 
JK: Now, Syria and Jordan were invited to sit in on the Security Council discussions. 
So, you went to the Security Council chambers, is that correct? 
GT: Let me say this: in accordance with the Charter, any state that is involved in any 
great development, like war or so on, has the right to ask the Security Council to accept 
its representative, namely the representative of that state, to address the Council. So, 
Egypt was not a member, Jordan was not a member, I was not a member, I mean, Syria 
was not a member. But we were all invited to attend all the sessions of the Security 
Council and to give our point of view. So, this is what happened. 
JK: So, you were able to speak? 
GT: Yes. This is a right given by the Charter to any party to a great dispute that 
threatens world peace and security. You will find it in the Charter. 
32 
JK: So, you as representing Syria were in the Security Council chamber when they 
met. 
GT: That's correct. 
JK: Now, I understand that the president of the Security Council asked that the 
Council move to a consultation room at the side of the chamber to meet in a closed 
session during that time. Is that correct? 
GT: Yes. 
JK: OK. So then at that point, Syria was not involved in the discussion? 
GT: No. 
JK: How long did they meet in closed session? 
GT: I wouldn't say a very long time, maybe the duration of a session or two but not 
much longer. 
JK: So, a few hours? 
33 
GT: A few hours, yes. 
JK: So at that point you were not able to hear what they were saying? 
GT: No, but the importance really of the absence or the non-presence of a member is 
that when decisive resolutions like 242 are being discussed, Mohammed, for instance was 
very much inside those discussions, because Egypt accepted 242. Jordan accepted. Syria 
did not accept. Now, this is another problem or another aspect that should be investigated, 
because Syria only later accepted. The all-Arab group was divided into two: those who 
accepted 242 and those who did not accept 242. Syria was among those who did not 
accept. They have a point of view. And what I said on this issue, namely the non-
acceptance of 242, I can show it to you in the records of the Security Council, which I 
have. 
JK: OK, so what were the objections by your government to 242 at that time? 
GT: It is difficult to say, because I used to ask for instructions from my government. I 
received the telegram saying, in translation from Arabic, there is an Arab idiom which 
says, "Send a wise man, and don't instruct him." 
JK: And don't instruct him. 
GT: So, they tell me to instruct them, in other words. 
34 
JK: Oh, they'd tell you to instruct them. 
GT: Yes, well that is very pretentious, to say that. 
JK: So, what were the aspects of 242, at the time, that were basically unacceptable? 
GT: May I take this? I have to answer you by the text. I will read some of the 
paragraphs of 242 and show you where the... 
JK: ... where you objected. OK. 
[interrupted] 
GT: There were seven Arab states that did not accept the resolution. These are: Syria, 
Kuwait, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. 
JK: OK. Very good. 
[interrupted] 
JK: OK, so there were different aspects of the resolution 242. 
35 
GT: [reading:] "Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the 
Middle East..." The grave situation in the Middle East' is misleading because what is the 
core of the problem is the Palestine problem. So, i f it was as specified 'its continuing 
concern' with the grave Palestine problem, it would be more accurate to say that. 
[reading:] "Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and the 
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in 
security... Affirms"--these are the operative paragraphs--"that the fulfillment of Charter 
principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace, on the following 
principles: the application of... withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict; termination of all claims of states... of belligerents; and 
respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political 
independence of every state in the area, and its right to live in peace within secure..." 
"... for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." 
"... for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of 
every state in the area." 
"At the same time, while assuring and emphasizing that all member states ... the 
acceptance of the Charter of the U N have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance 
with Article 2 of the Charter, affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the 
establishment of a just and lasting peace, which should include the application of both the 
following principles:" Here we come to the first: "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 
from territories..." Not from the territories occupied—up to now we are discussing 
withdrawal from all territories, or withdrawal from territories that is indefinable. 
36 
JK: OK--so that language was... 
GT: That language... 
JK: ... was unacceptable. 
GT: It was unacceptable. Because, if we will like, I will bring the Charter--the Charter 
has made the withdrawal of the occupied territories by force an absolute demand. Not a 
relative demand. 'Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories' made it relative. 
And in fact, Israel has said, "I am not going to withdraw from the Golan Heights." 
JK: OK, so you felt that the resolution wasn't specific enough, by naming the 
territories themselves? 
GT: Then, to prove my point, also, usually resolutions like this, when it comes to 
interpretation, people go back to what every member of the Council stated in explaining 
his understanding. The American delegate, Arthur Goldberg, who himself was a great 
Zionist, and in one of the sessions of the Security Council I told him, "I am very sorry—I 
regret to tell you, Ambassador Goldberg, that when I listen to you, I am bewildered 
whether you are speaking for the great United States of America or for Israel." And he 
answered me, and insulted me, and later apologized, and so on and so forth. But that was 
a factor up to the present time. 
37 
Withdrawal is enunciated in absolute terms in the Charter, not in relative terms, 
namely putting conditions on withdrawal. The French representative on the Security 
Council explained his words by saying that, "To me, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 
from territories occupied implies from all occupied territories," because he, when 
translating into French, states "des territoires occupees" which means all territoires, all 
territories. 
JK: OK, so the French version would have been acceptable? 
GT: Yes. Because... 
JK: But not the English version. 
GT: But not the English version. The Soviet representative and the Chinese, they all 
said, "Our understanding is that withdrawal should be from 'all occupied territories' not 
from 'occupied territories.' From all the occupied territories." And up to the present that 
you and I are speaking and discussing, this is the main problem in the text of 242. So, 
these are number two. 
The Spanish and Latin Americans agreed with the French, and said also in 
Spanish, withdrawal means 'de los territorios,' de toutes les territoires, or from all 
territories. So, i f you are interested, I have a collection of the debates of 1967 in one 
volume, which was given to me by the library of the U N , and you will find there my 
interpretation or my version, as to why we did not accept. 
38 
JK: OK, so that's there. 
GT: Now, we are now in the year 1998. Between 1998 and 22 November 1967, how 
many years do we have? 
JK: About 31 years. 
GT: Meanwhile, the Israeli Knesset, Parliament, issued a law not allowing any 
government in Israel to return the Golan Heights to Syria. So, on what are we going to 
negotiate? 
JK: OK, so the issue is still there, after all these years, and they didn't withdraw. 
GT: Yes. And there is a law not allowing them to withdraw. So, suppose they sent me 
to negotiate with the Israelis? On what should I negotiate, with the existence of this law? 
Resolution 191, which was voted after the assassination of Count Bernadotte, and 
in honor to Count Bernadotte, adopted some of his recommendations. Count Bernadotte 
recommended to the General Assembly that all Arabs-- I will read the text if you like-¬
who are willing to go back to Israel or Palestine and live in peace with their neighbors, 
should be given the right of return, or if they don't return, to be compensated for their lost 
territories. Resolution 191, November 1948. Until now, how many years, 1948 to 1998? 
39 
JK: Fifty. Fifty years. 
GT: What happened to this? Now, I can bring you instances and instances of... You 
will read yourself all these resolutions. About Jerusalem, that the attitude of asking 
Israelis not to change anything on the status of Jerusalem, or demolish buildings or 
change it. Because all of it is of historical significance. And UNESCO imposed 
sanctions on Israel because of what it did in Jerusalem. 
[interrupted] 
JK: OK--we have been talking about the events around 1967, and at the time, before 
the war, General Fawzi, the Egyptian general, had come to Damascus. 
GT: ... to Damascus, right. 
JK: ... to discuss, I believe, some information that he had received from the Soviet 
Union, that there were Israeli troops building up along the border with Syria. Were you 
aware of the discussions at that time? 
GT: Yes. I was aware of the fact that coordination was taking place between the 
Syrian government and the Egyptian government regarding how to react or to act with 
Israel. 
40 
JK: Yes, right. 
GT: So, in fact there was more than that: my recollection is that President Nasser was 
very, very careful not to be pushed or to indulge in any action against Israel which is the 
result of hard-headedness or a nervous reaction. That was not only the wish of Nasser but 
there was actually an established mechanism between the two armies or the two 
governments in order to avoid any hasty action. There was no doubt that in Syria there 
was lots of talking wildly by some members of the government, and I believe that was 
made for local consumption. 
JK: By 'talking,' what kinds of things were they saying? 
GT: Yes. 
JK: Talking, making comments against Israel? 
GT: Against Israel, yes. 
JK: Do you know who it was who General Fawzi met with? Did he meet with the 
military? 
GT: In his capacity as Chief of Staff of the two countries or the coordinator between 
the two, undoubtedly he was meeting on the highest level, with the Minister of Defence, 
41 
who at that time was Hafez al-Assad, the Chief of Staff, and so on. There was 
coordination going on between the two countries. What is not really well known, and 
which led to the catastrophe is that, although I am from Syria, the ruling party in Syria 
was made of men who did not have a great experience in matters of war and peace. 
[end of tape 1, side 2] 
[tape 2 side, 1] 
GT: The problem came from Arab publishing houses, and I refrained because there is 
something to be said against the behavior of the Syrian government at this time. 
JK: ... at that time. 
GT: I regret to say that, unfortunately, but what you can conclude from that, you are 
free to make some conclusions. But I cannot say more than that. I mean, I myself, I was 
critical of some behaviors, some declarations, and I did warn the government against that, 
to precipitate a war, because I knew, and I was telling the government, that Israel was not 
only prepared, or very well prepared, and even planning, among other possibilities the 
possibility of war. In fact I went as far as telling them that according to my knowledge 
and my information, Israel is planning to take the Golan Heights and plans have already 
been prepared and made. But this is too much to say, to take the Golan Heights. I mean, 
I did warn them against that. 
42 
JK: Well, what I was wondering is that had the Soviets in New York, when you were 
in New York, had they come to you and told you that they thought that Israel was 
building up forces? 
GT: No. 
JK: So, you didn't have that information in New York? 
GT: No. On the contrary, the Soviets were on the side of "take it easy, take it easy, 
take it easy." But the year 1967, was from the beginning of the year an explosive year. 
You know, the problem of the refugees, the occupation of the whole of Palestine, the 
belligerency of Israel. Now, if you want to know how the whole thing started, if you want 
to reach that point? Or do you have questions before asking that? 
JK: No, how did the whole thing start? 
GT: Well, let us say first of all, I brought one volume of the treaty series because it 
contains the armistice agreements. The armistice agreements that were concluded at the 
end of the 1948 war created two demilitarized zones between Israel and Syria, and if we 
had the map here, Syria had a part of the shore of Lake Tiberias, and most of the clashes 
that took place took place around that bit of Lake Tiberias, and what Israel did in the 
demilitarized zones. At that time, I remember that Dr. el-Farra of Jordan was a member 
of the Security Council, and through Ambassador el-Farra, I asked U-Thant to submit to 
43 
the Security Council a report about the actual situation of the demilitarized zones. Israel 
has violated all of the agreements on these areas, established forces there, established 
citadels and sorts of big defense, not only for defense but for attack also. These two, if 
you really note here, the two reports submitted by U-Thant to the Security Council on the 
actual situation of the demilitarized zones. I can't find them in my files here, I will 
photostat them and send them to you. 
JK: OK--or if you just give me the document numbers then we could get them from 
our own library. We have a documents library for the U N right at Yale. 
GT: Oh--well I will look, and I might find them before even you leave Amman. In that 
case, I will give you the numbers and that will be enough. 
JK: OK. Good. So, you had asked U-Thant to make a report on this. Was this prior 
to the 1967 events? 
GT: It was prior to the confrontation, prior to the war. But those two reports speak in 
no ambiguous language about the terrible violations that Israel has committed in the 
demilitarized zones. For instance, the demilitarized zones were on the part of Syria, and 
there were Syrians there who owned farms. A l l these were taken over by Israel. And 
complaint after complaint, and petition after petition, led nowhere. So, the ground was 
prepared, unfortunately, for an explosion. The existence of the refugees, the continuous 
attacks of Israel, the fortifications on the borders of Syria, the spying, et cetera. There 
44 
was a very famous case at that time of a certain spy who came from Argentina, Jorge 
Keohane, a very famous case. He was able to penetrate the government and become 
friends to all the big shots. Unfortunately I didn't have any chance to talk with him. Not 
even in government parties and the receptions and so on, when you see all these people. 
The Keohane case is a very important case at this point, because he was able to penetrate 
the Golan, to take pictures of the fortifications and the planning, and so on and so forth, 
and send them back to Israel, until he was caught in flagrante delicto, namely sitting on 
the machine and sending by symbols all the information that he collected. In fact, he was 
discovered by the Egyptian intelligence because he appeared in a picture taken in the 
Golan Heights, with Syrian officials and Generals, and Egypt warned Syria against that, 
"this was this man, we know him. He is a well-known Israeli spy." 
So, you see, lots of these things happened, and so we go back to May 14th, 1967. 
On May 14, 1967, an item appeared on the front page of the New York Times, and in the 
center of the page--I also can provide you with that--that "Levi Eshkol, he was Prime 
Minister, declared today that the Syrian government or the Syrian army is preparing itself 
for an attack against Israel. We have decided to march on Damascus, occupy Damascus, 
and replace the existing government with a more moderate government." Item in the 
newspaper. I went to U-Thant immediately, and U-Thant, when he read the news and he 
couldn't believe it. Then he called some of his colleagues, Ralph Bunche, and started 
discussing it, and made a declaration that same day, that the news appearing that day that 
Israel is planning to march on Damascus and upset the government and put a new, modest 
government in its place, is alarming. From here on, things went up, climbing, so to say 
45 
like you are climbing a scale or stairs, until we reached the explosion, which was the 
attack on Syria and Egypt on the early morning of June 5th, 5:00 in the morning. 
JK: Now, U-Thant received information that Nasser wanted to remove the United 
Nations troops--UNEF. 
GT: Here is a point, also, to be very careful about. If you read what Nasser did was 
not... what did you say? That he remove... 
JK: He requested the removal of the troops, of the peacekeeping troops. 
GT: No, what he requested was that in case of an attack on Syria, which is in the 
treaty... which concluded a treaty with Egypt, that in case there is an Israeli attack, the 
Egyptian army will come to the help of Syria, in accordance with the treaty between the 
two countries and registered in the United Nations. So, if that such a thing happens—and 
it did happen—Egypt would come to the help of Syria. What he requested is that a 
regrouping of the United Nations forces so that if this situation arises, the Egyptian army 
can cross to help Syria. So, the two things are different. He did not ask their removal. 
JK: He did not ask for them to be removed? 
GT: No, he asked for them to be regrouped. And we have to recognize that there is a 
difference between the two. My own view is that Nasser was very, very careful. He 
46 
wasn't, as described by Ben Gurion or even by Hitchoff (?) at one time, an angry young 
man. No, he was a statesman in every sense of the word. What he was afraid of did 
actually happen. The sudden attack of Israel. Up until the midnight of Monday the 5th, 
at 2:00 to 3:00am Sunday night, he was being assured by the Soviets that Israel would not 
attack. And that is historical, on record. 
JK: And then the attack actually took place... 
GT: The attack actually took place. 
JK: At around 3:00 or so. 
[interrupted] 
JK: OK, then, did U-Thant come and talk to you in New York about the withdrawal of 
the U N troops before he decided to do that? 
GT: It was debated in the Security Council. So, the debates of the Security Council 
that ended ultimately by the attack by Israel, the ceasefire resolutions, and so on, started 
to the best of my recollection, in April of that year, and went on through May and went on 
through June until the war exploded. So, i f you want to know that, to review the 
discussion of the Security Council, for clarification of that period, is a sine qua non. 
47 
JK: Yes. But what I was just asking was that U-Thant had gotten the message that, 
from what I had understood, that the troops were to be removed. That the General, 
actually General Fawzi sent a message to General Rikhye, the Indian who was the 
commander in the field, that they were requesting the withdrawal of the troops. And then 
it was General Rikhye who informed U-Thant. 
GT: I have read and reread the text of the message of Nasser to General Fawzi to the 
Indian, several times, and you can find the text in the monthly report that appears from 
the UN--it is called UN Monthly--and which was reporting the events and the declarations 
and so on, day by day, and hour by hour. 
JK: OK, so then why was it interpreted--if it was only a regrouping of the troops--why 
was it interpreted as removing the troops? Because then that was what was done. 
GT: Because when he sent that demand, the Israeli army took steps that seemed to be 
initiating the war. In fact, the troops were moved to the zone of the U N troops, and 17 
Indian soldiers were killed by the Israelis, and that was debated in the Security Council. 
The Indian Ambassador came and objected and said, "We did not send our soldiers to be 
killed in war. We sent them to establish peace." So, so far what I have recommended 
here are the two reports of U-Thant on the actual status of the DZ (demilitarized zone), 
the actual text of the message of Nasser, which is a historical document now and 
everybody should read it to form his judgment what is was that he really requested. I am 
48 
convinced, having followed the events, that he did not at all mean to remove the U N 
forces. 
JK: OK, so then when U-Thant did remove them, why didn't he object? Because 
Nasser didn't object then. 
GT: That is a very good question. 
JK: If he didn't want them removed, why didn't he obj ect? 
GT: Why didn't he object? Well, you will have to read the records of the Security 
Council and all the statements that were issued at that time by Egypt, U-Thant, Syria, el 
Farah, Tomeh, et cetera. 
JK: So, did U-Thant come to talk to you about it at all? 
GT: No. 
JK: No, he didn't? 
GT: Because if he wanted to talk about it, he would talk to Al-Houni. Al-Houni is 
dead now. You could not ask him that question. But to my knowledge, if you ask el-
Farah about it--because el-Farah and Houni were very, very close together. 
49 
JK: Who is Houni? 
GT: Houni was the Egyptian Ambassador to the United Nations at that time. 
JK: I see--the Egyptian Ambassador. So, what was Syria's response to the removal of 
the U N Emergency Force? 
GT: Am I speaking on a sworn statement? Unfortunately, if I were responsible at that 
time, I would have reacted in a completely different manner. If you consider this is a 
reply to your question. But, you know, it was a frontal attack on Israel, especially after 
what appeared in the New York Times on May 14th. 
JK: So, did Syria... 
GT: ... which as I said, sincerely alarmed U-Thant. And if you want, this is on the 
side: i f you calculate 25 years after 1967, what year would that be? 
JK: Oh, I'm sorry, how many years after 1967? 
GT: 25. Add 25. 
JK: 1992. 
50 
GT: 1992. In 1992, the State Department convened a conference to study the 1967 
war. To that conference were invited most of the people who were in 1967 in one 
capacity or the other with the U N or with his own government. And they invited me as 
an observer. The government told me. I told them, "No, I will not go as an observer and 
hear a rewriting of history by Israel and the U.S. I will go as a full-fledged delegate, 
because I was in the midst of the battle." They said, "Nothing would make us happier 
than to go!" So, I went. Believe it or not, the first day of the conference was spent on my 
reading the news that appeared in the New York Times on May 14, and how this led to 
war. And they made sociological and psychological and historical explanations all about 
this, all about me reading this article and telling U-Thant, and U-Thant making a 
statement to the effect that this is alarming. It was really mad. And I told them that I 
never thought that I could trigger history up to this degree. But that was the case. 
Anyhow, they were taking notes of those meetings, each one. The Israeli delegation came 
prepared with the largest number of their experts and historians. 
JK: What I was wondering was, in 1967, what was Syria's response to the removal of 
the U N troops? 
GT: Of course. 
JK: Did they approve of it or disapprove of it? 
51 
GT: To answer, approve or disapprove, I am unable to answer. But on the whole, the 
most that I can say is that the Syrian government was belligerent, and sort of having seen 
the moment they wanted to come had come. They were very excited about war with 
Israel. I have an explanation for that, but I don't know whether the time is propitious in 
order to give my interpretation. 
JK: A lot of these things were happening within a few days of each other, and as you 
said these were escalating. So, the next step was that Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran. 
GT: They did that and Israel immediately declared this action to be casus belli. So the 
war was declared. 
JK: Basically at that point? 
GT: Basically at that point. 
JK: In your interpretation, why would Nasser make a move like that, knowing what 
the reaction would be? 
GT: He was challenged by... I should say, and I don't think I am mistaken, by Arab 
public opinion that wanted him to go to war. 
JK: So there was a certain pressure? 
52 
GT: Much great pressure. 
JK: Yes. 
GT: And Syria, the Syrian government was leading in that direction against Nasser. 
They wanted Nasser to go to war. This is... I don't know... is this on record now? 
JK: Yes. But I think there is a certain understanding that there was. 
GT: I am telling you sort of confidentially, my own interpretation, and I might be 
wrong for all... Ideologically speaking, this is an interpretation, I might be wrong. 
JK: Well, then, when the war was completed, and we have gone through some 
discussion of resolution 242. The Security Council, several years later, passed resolution 
338. Now, Syria, as you have clearly stated earlier today, did not accept resolution 242. 
But within 338, one of the stipulations is the acceptance of 242. So, by that time, Syria 
had changed its mind. Why was that? 
GT: You are speaking about the results of the 1973 war. 
JK: Right, the 1973 war. 
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GT: Because 338 was the resolution adopted after the armistice or the ceasefire in 
1973. Well, why the change? It is that under American pressure, they gave them the 
impression that once you accept resolution 242, it means the withdrawal of Israel, it 
means the return of the Golan, it means that we are in the best of all possible worlds. 
And that was not the case. Now, as we calculated, it is almost 30 years since resolution 
242 was adopted, but Israel is still occupying the Golan; Israel has adopted a law not to 
return the Golan, has annexed the Golan. Israel is in occupation of the security zone in 
Lebanon. In spite of the fact that a peace was concluded between Israel and Jordan, there 
are Jordanian territories that are still under the domination and occupation of Israel. And 
especially if you come into the question of water, that will become very clear. 
JK: That is a very good point. I had actually wanted to ask you that: what is the 
connection to water, to the water issues? 
GT: The water issue was one of the immediate causes for the outbreak of hostilities, or 
that led to the hostilities. 
JK: At what particular time? Which hostilities? 
GT: Let us say we are speaking of between January and June 1967. 
JK: OK. 
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GT: Israel was starting to divert the tributaries of the Jordan River, all of which have 
their fountainhead in the Golan. And when the Israelis would start diverting the waters of 
the Jordan, Syria would attack them. And vice versa: when the Syrians were doing any 
work on the tributaries of the Jordan, Israel would destroy whatever they had done. 
JK: I see. So, the water issue is very important. 
GT: I will show you an historical document that is related directly to the Golan 
Heights. Do you mind? 
[interrupted] 
JK: We are looking at a document called 'the Zionist Organization's Memorandum to 
the Supreme Council at the Peace Conference' on February 3rd, 1919. It took place in 
Paris. So, now, there is a statement in here on the water issue. 
GT: Yes, on the water issue. The boundaries of Palestine: this document contains the 
minimum Zionist demands for the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine. 
[reading] 'Address to the Supreme Council...'--by the way, this reminds me of a book that 
is not directly related to the Middle East but is very significant, like the Oslo agreements, 
about agreements which put an end to every possible agreement. It became a bestseller in 
the United States the last time I was there, namely in the early 1990s: A Peace to End all 
Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. 
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Where this quotation comes from, "a peace to end all peace," from a French General, after 
"the war to end all war." That was the title given to World War I. They seem to have 
been pretty successful in Paris at making a peace to end peace. Archibald Waven, later 
Field Marshall Earl Waven, who entered Jerusalem, an officer who served under El-Amin 
in the Palestine campaign, commenting on the treaties bringing the First World War to an 
end. 
So, I will go back to water. You should stop me more in diverting myself. 
JK: So, the point that you are trying to make is that very early on the water issues were 
key. 
GT: Here are the boundaries of Palestine. This is dated 1 February 1919, when even 
the mandate was not yet given to Britain in order to facilitate the establishment of a 
Jewish state or a Jewish national realm. You know the map? You have an idea about the 
map? 
JK: Yes. 
GT: OK. [reading] 'The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out 
below. Starting on the north at a point on the Mediterranean sea in the vicinity of Sidon, 
and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon, as far as al-Qir'awn, Jishal 
al-Qir'awn is in that area, following the dividing line between the two basins in Syria 
' thence in a southerly direction, following the dividing line between the eastern and the 
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western slopes of the Great Plain of Hauran, which was called in history the 'granary of 
Rome,' when it was all planted with their wheat and Rome was to take their wheat--'to 
eastwards following the known watersheds to the Naher Mourainyi (?), close to and into, 
and west of the Hejaz Redue (?).' 
If we had the map, I could show you. 
JK: OK. So, in the language there, it is talking about the watersheds, so initially it 
was to include areas that were important to water and to agriculture? 
GT: [reading] 'The details of the deliminations or any necessary adjustment of detail 
shall be settled by a special commission on which there shall be Jewish representation.' 
So, the line I have drawn here is Sidon, from Syria, and this is the last point mentioned 
here. Now, this line contains the Golan Heights, if we go to a place in Jordan and stand 
up, we can see all that under our own eyes. That line includes the Golan; afterwards I 
think the Golan is mentioned by name. 
JK: So, do you recommend for people doing research to read this document and study 
that further? 
GT: Yes. 
JK: OK. Well, now you mentioned to me to ask you about the role of President 
Johnson at the time. 
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GT: OK. You will mark that, because somewhere here the Golan is mentioned. I am 
interested because all the headwaters of the water that we need come from that area. 
JK: OK. So, that would be important for someone doing research to read that 
document and to study that? 
GT: No, but you see that as of February 1919, before even beginning the immigration 
to Palestine, Israel asked for the Golan Heights. 
JK: So, that was part of the plan, to include the watershed area? 
GT: So, it proves definitively that the conception of Zionism of their own tiny state, 
look how tiny it is! 
JK: So, that was the general concept? 
GT: Yes. 
JK: OK, so can we move on, because I only have a few more minutes, but I wanted to 
ask you because you mentioned to me... 
GT: About Johnson. 
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JK: ... President Johnson, right. 
GT: Why secure boundaries was mentioned in 242, thus opening the door for any 
state—it might be Syria or Jordan or it might be also Israel, but it happened to be Israel—in 
asking an adjustment of the frontiers to the detriment of the existing situation? 
JK: Now, you are talking about the language in 242 that takes about secure 
boundaries? 
GT: Secure boundaries. Who is to define which are the secure boundaries? That Israel 
had boundaries according to the partition plan, boundaries after the war of 1948, 
boundaries after the 1956 attack on Egypt and the occupation of the Suez Canal, 
boundaries after the 1967 war? So, there is no end to it. But where it came from? It 
came from a statement given by President Johnson in 1967 at the General Assembly when 
the General Assembly was discussing the situation in the Middle East. He said... 
[reading] "Address by U.S. President to U.S. Congress on the State of the Union," 
Washington, January 10th, 1967. "... communication between the Syrian Ba'ath party 
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." 
JK: So, this was an address that President Johnson made to the General Assembly? 
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GT: And they put in the idea that after peace, we cannot at all return to the former 
borders, to the previous borders that worked before the war, in order to establish security 
for each state in the region. And he brought as an example the situation of Israel, which 
has narrow distance at one point between the sea and the borders, and therefore should be 
expanded. 
JK: So, that was Johnson's speech? 
GT: That was Johnson's speech. 
JK: And the idea is, the language that was from that speech then got carried into the 
creation of 242? 
GT: Yes. Yes. [reading] "Statement by U.S. President Johnson on the first Security 
Council ceasefire resolution," Washington, June 6th, 1967. If you like, you can take a 
copy. 
JK: We can mark that. 
GT: If you doubt what I am saying! 
JK: Then we will mark that down as something that we need to look at. 
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GT: So, this is the origin of secure borders. 
JK: Yes. Interesting. Now, we are running out of time, so I want to thank you very, 
very much. I appreciate your taking all this time, because we have spent quite a bit of 
time doing this today. 
GT: I would be very gratified if I am sure that I was of service to you. 
JK: Absolutely. And I want to also put on the record that we have made a 
bibliography of the wonderful books that you have suggested, and so that will be 
available also for research. 
GT: Let me just add for your information that on the acute and most important 
problem, such as the problem of refugees, the books that I told you about are written by 
Israeli authors and they explain the reality of this kind of Israel. It wouldn't be as Syrian 
Ambassador, representing the Arab point of view. No, this is what all the Israelis 
themselves are saying now. One last thing: all this could be put in the context that now a 
revival of real Palestinian history is taking place, not only among Arabs and Americans, 
but among Europeans and Americans and scholarly people and writers and researchers 
and so on. As an example of this, I want to give you this book along with the one I gave 
you on Jerusalem for your library at Yale. 
JK: Thank you so very much. 
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