

“Operation Eagle Eye”: Border Citizenship and Cross-border Voting in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

Edem Adotey

To cite this article: Edem Adotey (2023) “Operation Eagle Eye”: Border Citizenship and Cross-border Voting in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 38:1, 21-38, DOI: 10.1080/08865655.2020.1861551

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2020.1861551>



Published online: 29 Dec 2020.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 295



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Citing articles: 1 View citing articles [↗](#)



“Operation Eagle Eye”: Border Citizenship and Cross-border Voting in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

Edem Adotey 

Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana

ABSTRACT

This article examines the role of elections in bordering through disputes over cross-border voting since Ghana returned to multi-party democracy in 1992. It uses case studies from some communities that border Togo in the Volta Region of Ghana which is the epicenter of alleged cross-border voting. In these communities, “border citizenship” is expressed through the deployment of ritual space, social and political relations which is across national borders. But this begs the question whether border citizens view voting as a right or not, or more specifically, contest the border by participating in elections on either side of the border. This article argues that border citizens are not only involved in contesting the border; one can assume to have a border citizenship and still respect the border in elections by refusing the act of cross-border voting. This study not only contributes to border studies by highlighting the importance of electoral politics in the bordering process but it also brings to light the complexities of cross-border voting, since it shows that border residents in the Ghana-Togo borderland communities do not all perceive cross-border voting positively.

KEYWORDS

Ghana-Togo border; Volta Region; border citizenship; cross-border voting

Introduction

Just before the 2016 elections in Ghana, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) regional branch in the Volta Region launched a campaign dubbed “Operation Eagle Eye” which was “intended to keep surveillance along the border communities by deploying its men on election day to prevent supposed Togolese voters from entering the region to vote.”¹ This stemmed from accusations of Togolese crossing the border to vote in Ghana’s elections. Indeed, this was not the first time the issue of alleged Togolese voting in Ghana’s elections had become a major issue in Ghana’s electoral politics since the Fourth Republic (Jockers, Kohnert, and Nugent 2010; Robert-Nicoud 2019).²

These disputes are not only of considerable significance for those embroiled in them, but they also speak to the issue of citizenship in Africa’s many other borderlands with similar ethnic overlaps. In Ghana, like many of Africa’s borderlands, several ethnic groups are not in the nation-state, they are rather across nation-states or national borders (Asiwaju 1984; Miles 1987; Flynn 1997; Gordon 2001; Nugent 2002; Lentz 2003; Brambilla 2007; Moyo 2016; Nshimbi 2017). Both colonial and postcolonial

states have struggled to conceptualize this, and a return to multi-party democracy has perhaps heightened debates over where borderlanders belong.

This article seeks through these cross-border voting disputes to explore the relationship between border citizenship and cross-border voting on the Ghana-Togo border. It focuses on electoral politics because it brings to the fore tensions between border citizenship and cross-border voting and therefore very useful in helping us to understand the context in which border identities are produced and reproduced.

It uses case studies from three Ewe communities that straddle the Ghana-Togo border in the Volta Region, which is the epicenter of alleged cross-border voting. In these communities, border citizenship is expressed through the deployment of ritual space, social and political relations which is across national borders. But this begs the question whether border citizens view voting as a right or not, or more specifically, contest the border by participating in elections on either side of the border. In other words, this study seeks to understand how “cultural landscapes intersect with political boundaries” (Wilson and Donnan 1998, i).

This article argues that border citizens are not only involved in contesting the border; one can assume to have border citizenship and still respect the border in elections by refusing the act of cross-border voting. This study not only contributes to border studies by highlighting the importance of electoral politics in the bordering process but it also brings to light the complexities of cross-border voting, since it shows that border residents in the Ghana-Togo borderland communities do not all perceive cross-border voting positively.

The article is structured into five segments. This introduction is followed by the context which outlines a brief history of the Ghana-Togo border and examines what is border citizenship and cross-border voting. It then shows the methods used in the article and subsequently explores the significance of the border factor and the politics of border closures in Ghana’s electoral politics since the Fourth Republic. Finally, it analyses the relationship between border citizenship and cross-border voting to show the multi-faceted complexities of the southern Ghana-Togo border.

Borders, Border Citizenship and Cross-border Voting

This article is informed by the literature on Border Studies, which focuses on borders as socially constructed and hence bordering as a process (Newman 2006, 2011; Parker et al. 2009; Johnson et al. 2011; Paasi 2011; Van Houtum 2011; Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2012). This as Corey Johnson and Reece Jones point out has since the 1990s resulted in “attention to borders as the sum of social, cultural, and political processes, rather than simply as fixed lines” (Johnson et al. 2011, 61).

The border has played a critical component in Ghana’s elections because it not only defines the geographic space within which the elections should be held but more importantly the people who are accepted by whom to cast their votes within that space. Embedded within these debates is the concept of citizenship which as Inocent Moyo shows concerning the South African-Zimbabwean border “ignores the true dynamics; namely, the interactions across the border points to the existence of *de facto* border citizens who consider themselves to be both South African and Zimbabwean” (2016, 1).

This study draws upon Moyo's work on the South African and Zimbabwean border and his concept of border citizenship, which follows that of other scholars (Meeks 2007; Shneiderman 2013; Lamb 2014). However, it points to an important qualification of border citizenship. Moyo defines it as the "existence of a border which separates a community which regards itself as one lays a claim for their being border citizens. They silently but effectively contest this colonial and post-colonial landscape at the border in question" (Moyo 2016, 6). In effect, border citizenship is a tacit way of contesting the border. But as this study shows that border citizens may also uphold the border by rejecting cross-border voting.

It is imperative first to discuss legal citizenship to be clear whom we are discussing on the Ghana-Togo borderlands. In contrast to "border citizenship," "legal citizenship" is defined by a country's laws. In Ghana, the Citizenship Act 2000 (Act 591) defines a citizen of Ghana by birth in or outside of Ghana and of a Ghanaian parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent. It is important to state that the date of one's birth is also important as the criteria for citizenship changes according to the constitution under which an individual was born.³ Ghanaian citizenship can also be acquired through adoption, marriage to a Ghanaian citizen, or naturalization. Ghanaian laws also permit dual citizenship as per Section 16 (1) of the Citizenship Act 2000 (Act 591) which states that "A citizen of Ghana may hold the citizenship of any other country in addition to his citizenship of Ghana." Thus, for this article, cross-border voting refers to Togolese Ewe (who technically could also be bi-nationals) who live on the Togolese side of the border crossing from Togo to vote in elections in Ghana. It differs from the vote of the Ghanaian diaspora in Togo coming back to vote in Ghana which the paper does not address.

The Ghana-Togo border was created by the Anglo-French agreement of 1919 (Bening 1983; Nugent 2002).⁴ Togo was a former German colony which was occupied by the French and the British in 1914 during the "First World War." After the war, the Anglo-French agreement split the former German colony between the British and French first as League of Nations mandated territories in 1922 and later United Nations trust territories in 1945. The British trust territory which was administered as part of the British colony of the Gold Coast (Ghana) joined the Gold Coast after a plebiscite in 1956. This became the international border between Ghana and Togo at independence in 1957 and 1960, respectively.

The Ghana-Togo border like many of the colonial borders which were maintained at independence divided several ethnic groups, including the Ewe who inhabit the southeastern part of Ghana and the southern part of Togo. In the Ewe communities under discussion, the Ghana-Togo border has partitioned their traditional territories and peoples into two with a part in Ghana and the rest in Togo. The Nyive are divided by a river into Ghana-Nyive and Togo-Nyive. Part of Leklebi, that is Leklebi Kame-Tornu is in Togo while the rest is in Ghana. The Ave-Dzalele in Ghana have been split from their mother state, Ave-Edzi in Togo (Bening 1983; Adotey 2018a; Adotey 2020).

The Ewe-speaking people like the Venda of South Africa and Zimbabwe "demonstrates a population which was split during the colonization process, but since independence, the respective countries have been oblivious to the fact that the colonial and post-colonial border divided people who for centuries were only separated by a river" (Moyo 2016, 2). It is, however, important to state that the Ewe-speaking people used to be and still are autonomous polities (*dukwo*). The division of the Ewe by the Anglo-French

border was resisted during the colonial period by Ewe nationalists led by the All Ewe Conference, which not only called for the unification of the Ewe in British Togoland and French Togoland but also the Ewe of the Gold Coast (Amenumey 1989; Greene 1996; Akyeampong 2001; Nugent 2002; Lawrance 2007; Skinner 2015).⁵

This challenge of the border based on historical and cultural ties has continued since independence at the micro-level. The partitioned communities and families engage in joint cross-border political, economic, social, and cultural activities. These include allegiances to chiefs across the border, leading to some of the chiefs who exercise jurisdiction across the border calling themselves “international chiefs” (Adotey 2018a). The cross-border joint activities also include funerals (Adotey 2018b). This is because as some of the chiefs categorically pointed out, it was their land that was divided and not their people and culture. From the above, these borderlanders can be defined as border citizens.

Competitive multiparty politics have also heightened the politicization of the Ewe. Unlike any other cross-border group in the postcolonial period in Ghana, the Ewe have been more politicized because the Volta Region which is inhabited predominantly by the Ewe-speaking people is regarded as the “World Bank” or major stronghold of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The border itself has also played a role in this process because the politics of border closures which is discussed later in the work.

Methods

The empirical evidence for this study is based on fieldwork carried out from 2011 to 2013 and 2017 to 2018 in Nyive in the Ho Central constituency, Ave-Dzalele in the Akatsi North constituency and Leklebi in the Afadjato South constituency, all in the Volta Region of Ghana (Figure 1).⁶

The article’s choice of the study area is informed by Anssi Paasi’s recommendation that cross-border work be

based on approaches where scholars together with border citizens make a critical examination of national or regional stereotypes, for example, consider the content of national or regional identity narratives and their impact on interaction, and correspondingly try actively to transform existing inclusive and exclusive practices and discourses. (Paasi 2011, 16)

The Ghana-Togo border is the stereotypical borderland which has been infused with political meanings. Very often border communities in the Volta Region particularly the southern section inhabited predominantly by the Ewe-speaking people have been at the heart of debates in elections in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. The Ewe in these communities are portrayed as engaging in cross-border voting for the benefit of one party, a perception which is discussed in detail in the next section.

The article draws on a variety of sources including online news portals, social media platforms, archival documents, participant observation and interviews. The media is the primary medium in which allegations and counter-allegations of “alien” voters by the political parties were made and so very useful in gauging the partisan basis of border citizenship. Colonial archival documents in the national and regional archives in Accra and Ho respectively shed light on the demarcation of the Ghana-Togo border and the subsequent nationalist agitations following its demarcation in the early twentieth century.




Figure 1. Study Areas in the Volta Region (Includes the Newly Created Oti Region). Map Created by Philip-Neri Jayson-Quashigah.

Also, participant observation in activities such as the enstoolment of chiefs and funerals provided the opportunity to witness the nature of the relationships between the partitioned communities and to put into context expressions of border citizenship.

These sources were augmented by conducting unstructured face-to-face interviews with a cross-section of inhabitants, including chiefs, elders, political activists, security agents and transport operators. Interviews as Bruce Berg notes are useful when “investigators are interested in understanding the perceptions of participants or learning how participants come to attach certain meanings to phenomena or events” (2001, 72). The

unstructured nature of the interviews also “allow researchers to gain additional information about various phenomena they observe by asking questions of participants” (ibid. 70). The unstructured interviews were critical in providing information on the people’s everyday experiences of the border considering the limitations of the colonial documents regarding period and context. Particularly, interviews with *okada* operators (commercial motor-bicycle operators) who provide the major means of transportation in these areas and security agents who man the borders provided additional insights on how these borders are crossed daily and during elections.

All these multiple sources illuminate the complex relationship between border citizenship and electoral politics.

The Border Factor in Ghana’s Elections

To understand the importance of the Ghana-Togo border in Ghana’s elections in the Fourth Republic, some background on the major competitors, the closeness of the election results and their contested nature is important.

The two major political parties that have emerged in Ghana’s Fourth Republic are the NPP and the NDC. The electoral contests since 1992 have been fierce and disputed anytime any of these parties have lost.⁷ In 2000 and 2008 there was two presidential election runoff between the NDC and the NPP because neither of them could win more than the fifty percent of the valid votes cast as stipulated in the 1992 constitution.⁸

In 1993, the NPP authored *The Stolen Verdict* after it boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections because it claimed the 1992 presidential elections had been rigged in favor of the NDC.⁹ Similar allegations were also made after it lost the 1996 elections. The NDC also had cause to complain when it also lost the 2000 and 2004 elections.

In 2012, these contested election results took on a new twist. The NPP decided to go to court to challenge the election results declared by the Electoral Commission (EC). Led by its presidential candidate Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, it filed a petition at the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the election of the NDC’s John Dramani Mahama as president. In a trial that lasted for about eight months and carried live on television that had the country in suspense for that period, the Supreme Court in its ruling upheld the results declaring President John Mahama as the winner.¹⁰

In 2016, the ruling NDC lost to the NPP and claimed that NPP rigged the elections. Interestingly, the NDC recently rejected a claim by the Asantehene, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II that he impressed upon President John Mahama to accept the defeat to maintain peace in the country.¹¹

Among the factors underpinning these electoral disputes are allegations of a bloated electoral voter register and its attendant over voting. Other claims of electoral irregularities such as the absence of the presiding officer’s signature or those of the parties’ polling agents on the declared sheets as per Article 49 of the 1992 Constitution are also based on the distrust of the electoral register. The argument that the numbers on the electoral roll exceed qualified voters have been attributed to the registration of minors, that is people below the voting age of eighteen years, registration of deceased people, multiple registrations and the registration of non-Ghanaians or “aliens” principally Togolese.

It is this charged issue of “Togolese” voters, which is the bone of contention between the NPP and the NDC. As already noted, the Volta Region, which borders Togo is considered as the stronghold of the NDC and its “World Bank.” The suggestion is that its “depositors” may well not only be from the Volta Region but also neighboring Togo because of the cultural ties and political history. This underlines the importance of the Ghana-Togo border in Ghana’s elections.

More importantly, the Ghana-Togo border is perceived as an important factor in the victory or defeat for the two main political parties. For instance, in the 2012 elections disputed by the NPP, it alleged that there were same names on the electoral register of Ghana and that of Togo. The implication was that “aliens” from Togo participated in Ghana’s elections and voted for its opponent, the NDC which somehow contributed to the NPP’s defeat in the 2012 elections. This “evidence” was produced in 2015, when the NPP stated in a press conference that, “Using facial biometric recognition technology, the system has found 76,286 potential matches of the same people, with the same names and faces on the Ghanaian as well as Togolese voters registers.”¹²

The NDC on the other hand, pointed to the closure of the Ghana-Togo border, which denied some of its supporters the opportunity to vote as one of the reasons for losing the elections in the first round in 2008.¹³ The importance attached to this border by the NDC is also evident not only in its visibility in these borderlands through their posters and flags amongst others, but also by actively campaigning in these borderlands including the Togolese portions and encouraging them to partake in the elections. As the general secretary of the NDC, Johnson Asiedu Nketia is reported to have said,

Those who said during the voter registration that those in the Volta region are from Togo, they haven’t seen anything yet, next month we are going to Togo to meet the NDC supporters in Togo and tell them that Ghana’s constitution is not two, but just one that is being used to govern Ghana.¹⁴

From the above allegations and counter-allegations of rigged elections by both parties, it is evident that any real or imagined threat to any these parties losing the election will be highlighted and exploited for electoral gain. Hence, the issue of “Togolese” voters is no trivial matter if as the NPP claimed, over 70,000 potential “Togolese” voters were discovered in the electoral register when the 2008 presidential election runoff was won by just over 40, 000 votes.¹⁵

Thus, one way or the other victory or defeat is somehow linked with the (non)participation of “Togolese” in the elections. This view of the Ghana-Togo border explains the attempts to control movements across it during elections, which is the subject of the next section.

The Politics of Border Closures in Ghana’s Elections

Ghana shares borders with Burkina Faso to the north, Cote D’Ivoire to the west and Togo to the east. In Ghana, as in many African countries, several ethnic groups straddle the borders. These include the Mole-Dagbani in the Upper West and Upper East regions of Ghana with Burkina Faso; the Akan in the Western region of Ghana with Cote D’Ivoire; and Ga-Dangbe and Ewe in the Volta region with Togo. These borders like many in Africa are largely porous with peoples in these communities which straddle

the boundaries, moving between the two countries to partake in socio-economic and political activities (Collins 1976; Flynn 1997; Nugent 2002; Lentz 2003). Thus, the Ghana-Togo border, particularly the Volta Region is not unique its ethnic overlap or cross-border movements or relations and so raises questions about its closures during elections.

The border as Chiara Brambilla points out is “an important instrument in imposing a form of legality, that is the regulatory framework the territorial organization of European societies depends on, exported to Africa during the colonial period” (2007, 22). The post-colonial state in Africa has sought to maintain its sovereignty through the control of its inherited colonial borders (Herbst 1989; Asiwaju 1992; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018; Adotey 2020). One of the important measures used by states in enforcing its legality and protecting its interests such as smuggling of goods across the border, which affect the country’s economy as in the recent case of Nigeria is border closures.¹⁶ However, border closures have also become a tool for politicians to undermine their opponents or bolster their base in the struggle for power as the case of Ghana shows.

The Ghana-Togo border took an important turn in Ghana’s Fourth Republican elections when the NPP government closed only the Ghana-Togo border in the main presidential elections on December 7 2008. The “selective” closure of the Ghana-Togo border prompted a petition from the Volta Region House of Chiefs (VRHC) to the government.¹⁷ The president of the House, Togbe Afede IV noted,

What they are saying is that it is discriminatory and no Ghanaian can refute that. We have three main borders, you close only one. You do it not only once, you do it for the second time, I mean that shows some amount of disdain for a group of people. You are not concerned about their feelings, you are not sensitive to their feelings at all.¹⁸

The position of the VRHC chiefs was supported by the revered Catholic priest, the Right Reverend Francis Anani Lodonu, Bishop of the Ho Diocese of the Catholic Church. In his Christmas sermon in 2008 at the Sacred Heart Catholic Church in Ho, the Volta Regional capital, he noted, “I fully concur with them. If you close only borders leading to Togo which borders mainly the Volta Region, you make the people there feel like strangers.”¹⁹

Another interesting aspect of the border closure was the way it was done. It was done in an unannounced manner so as not to allow the alleged “Togolese” voters the opportunity to take pre-emptive measures such as crossing over before the day of the elections. As pointed out by Togbe Afede IV in the petition to the government earlier noted, he stated, “people have fears the government may visit them with another unannounced closure, for in the last instance neither the people nor the nation was given any prior notice.”²⁰

In response to these criticisms, prior notice was issued that the borders with Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote D’Ivoire will be closed between December 26 2008 and December 29 2008 in the 2008 presidential runoff elections. Intriguingly, the statement from the National Security Coordinator came just about a day before the closure.²¹

The NDC has not been left out of this border politics. While the NPP government through its security apparatus has sought to keep “Togolese” out by closing the borders as noted above, the NDC on the other hand has sought to play on the historical and cultural relations between these communities in the Volta Region and Togo to urge “Ghanaians” resident in Togo to participate in Ghana’s elections.

In the run-up to the 2016 general elections, the Inspector General of Police (IGP), John Kudalor advised security officers on the Ghana-Togo border not to prevent registered Ghanaian voters from crossing the border to vote in the elections. He stated,

I don't think the Togolese have any mandate to come and vote here; but you know the long standing history between the Volta Region and Togo. All that we are saying is that, any Ghanaian is free to stay anywhere and work. So if you are even living outside the African Continent and you are duly registered and your papers are ready, you can fly in, nobody can stop you at the airport. In the same wise if you find yourself in a country within our borders, I don't think anybody should be prevented.²²

The IGP's statement highlights the complicated relationship between the Volta Region and Togo and the contestations over who is a Ghanaian or Togolese and how both political actors seek to exploit it to their political advantage. What do these disputes over "Togolese" and "Ghanaian" voters mean for these borderlanders? Are borderlanders hapless victims of political parties and governments? Does border citizenship, equal to participation in electoral contests in Ghana? How does the national dialogue influence local beliefs and actions?

Elections and Bordering

The right to vote in national elections is an important aspect of citizenship and since a return to multi-party democracy, this has been a contested subject between the NPP and the NDC. These attempts by the political parties to define who qualifies to vote is evident in debates over whether Ghanaians in the diaspora should vote in Ghana's elections which eventually led to the passage of the Representation of the People Amendment Act (ROPAA), 2006 (Act 699) that permits diaspora voting even though the EC have over the years been unable to implement it.²³ The NDC opposed its passage into law under the NPP government (Bolaji 2015; Robert-Nicoud 2019).

Similarly, there have been opposing views from the NPP and the NDC over the compilation of a new electoral voters' register by the EC for the 2020 general elections. While the NDC which was supported by some think tanks asked the EC to cancel the compilation of a new register, the NPP and others supported the EC to go ahead with a new register.

The NDC filed a case before the Supreme Court challenging the EC's decision to exclude the existing voter ID card as a form of identification for the registration under a new Constitutional Instrument (C.I.), the Public Election (Amendment) Regulation, 2020 (C.I. 126).²⁴ Under this C.I. the main source identification documents acceptable as proof of citizenship that can be used to register as a voter are the passport and the Ghana Card, that is the national identification card. In the absence of these, two registered Ghanaians can vouch for a person's citizenship. A person who has already registered as a voter can guarantee for up to ten applicants.

The NDC argued that it would disenfranchise many potential registrants as many people do not possess these documents.²⁵ In a Facebook Live session on June 18 2020 by its flag bearer for the 2020 elections, the former President John Dramani Mahama argued regarding the new electoral register that

We recognize that our opponents are determined to suppress votes in areas of the country they deem not to be their strongholds, otherwise it is difficult to understand some of the

restrictions being put in the way of a wider enfranchisement of all eligible Ghanaian voters.²⁶

The Deputy Attorney-General, Godfred Yeboah Dame, on behalf of the Attorney-General, which was a respondent in the suit, on the other hand, argued that “To compile new voter ID cards with old voter ID cards would amount to importing the sins and ills of old voters registration processes.”²⁷ It could be inferred that “strongholds,” “sins” and “ills” included the Volta region and “Togolese” voters.

As this and other scholarly studies show, who defines who is a citizen has not been the sole prerogative of the state or political parties for that matter; borderlanders, in this case, members of communities that straddle the Ghana-Togo border, have been actively involved through cross-border voting (Nugent 2019; Robert-Nicoud 2019). The discussion below highlights how elections contribute to the bordering process. I will first discuss those who accept cross-border voting before turning to those who do not.

Some of these borderlanders exercise their “citizenship rights” by participating in various forms in Ghana’s elections. Thus, this is not a conspiracy theory by the NPP even though the numbers involved are difficult to establish as some people do not openly accept it. In an interesting example from Paul Nugent’s work in Batome junction on the Ghana-Togo border, it showed that not only are people involved in cross-border voting but also go a step further to be elected. In this case, the son of the chief who lived on the Togolese side of the border was elected as a District Assemblyman in Ghana (Nugent 2019, 520).

A recent fascinating study on elections and borderlands in Ghana also affirms cross-border voting and points to it as an expression of citizenship. Nathalie Raunet Robert-Nicoud notes that

the most important decisions about who belongs to the nation are made at the local level since cross-border voters are not merely instrumentalized by political parties, but also engage in the practice of cross-border voting as a means of realizing and expressing their local belonging and fulfilling their local obligations. (Robert-Nicoud 2019, 5)

Data gathered from this study also indicate that some members of these border communities on the Togo side of the border have exercised their citizenship rights by participating in the national elections, first by registering in the electoral register and subsequently acquiring the Voter ID card. The former, which is the most important requires producing evidence of Ghanaian citizenship and as such to acquire the Voter ID card means one has proven that he/she is a Ghanaian. As the author was made aware this was not the only ID they possessed. Some also had the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) card of Ghana which entitled them to health care in Ghana.²⁸ It is also worth noting that the NHIS card used to be accepted to prove nationality and register to vote but this is no longer the case following a Supreme Court ruling.²⁹

Interestingly, these border citizens did not only acquire the Voter ID card but also participated in the process of registering others for the card. As one border citizen indicated he was among the officials who were employed by the EC to compile the electoral register in his constituency.³⁰ This is not implausible considering that individuals other than officials of the EC have assisted in compiling the electoral register. This is due to limited staffing of the EC because of lack of funds. The EC, therefore, relies on paid volunteers, mostly teachers, students, and civil servants to assist with the registration

process. These actions of the border citizens also indicated their commitment and involvement in the Ghanaian electoral process.

However, beyond possessing these identity cards these border citizens have participated in the various elections by casting their votes.³¹ As some of the border citizens argued it was their civic duty to take part in elections in Ghana. As citizens they argued if they did not others will decide who should rule over them.³² The border closures during elections did not seem to deter them; rather it made them more determined to partake in the elections. When asked how they managed to cross the border when it was closed during elections, one replied: “I can say I’m going to my farm, but before they realize, I’m in Ghana.”³³ It is also worth noting that in some of the areas people’s farms and homes straddle the border, so it is very easy to move between Ghana and Togo. In another border town, the author was shown an “unapproved” route from Togo to Ghana used by *okada* operators to transport people to Ghana (See Nugent 2002, on unapproved routes for smuggling).³⁴

The participation in elections does not just end with casting their votes. In some instances, some have even served as representatives of political parties during elections.³⁵ In Ghana, political parties can have their representatives at the polling stations to observe and endorse the counted results at each polling station to ensure its credibility. This involves signing the Declaration of Results forms, the so-called Pink Sheets.³⁶ It is from the results at the polling stations that the total is generated at the constituency, regional and national levels. Some of these border citizens have served as their party representatives in this important role. It is worth point out that in the disputed 2012 elections the key issue was with alleged irregularities on some of the Pink Sheets (Baneseh 2015).³⁷

Among the reasons that Robert-Nicoud adduces regarding cross-border voting on the Ghana-Togo border is that the “legal criteria fall short of describing who the electorate is, and that local gatekeepers intervene in the process of inclusion in the national sphere of enfranchisement” (2019, 4). This study, however, argues that the problem is not one of legal clarity because as noted earlier The Citizenship Act 2000 (Act 591) clearly spells out who a citizen of Ghana is. Rather, it is because the law seeks to define citizenship within the context of an inherited “Westphalian template of the nation-state and its imposition on an otherwise heterogeneous African socio-political context” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018, 23). As A. I. Asiwaju also rightly argues “there is an obvious difficulty in applying the legal definition of ‘citizen’ and ‘alien’ as contained in the largely Western-oriented constitution of most modern African states” (Asiwaju 1984, 246).

These border citizens ignore this definition of citizenship because it fails to consider the pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial political and socio-cultural relations. In other words, their identity predates the modern state and transcends it. Therefore, for these border citizens by belonging to a traditional state that is astride the border they claim to belong not to either Ghana or Togo but to both and implicitly a way of contesting the border. As one borderlander stated “we are one people, my father is here, and my mother is on the other side.”³⁸ Cross-border voting is accordingly justified by belonging to these bisected traditional states and the cross-border socio-cultural relations.

It is, however, important to point out that the paper in no way suggests that all cross-border voting is solely motivated by the above reasons. As Robert-Nicoud (2019) shows it is sometimes motivated by other reasons, such as vote-buying, personal aggrandizement,

or the collective development of the village. This also means that not all cross-border voting is a tacit way of contesting the border but rather also a way of taking advantage of the border. Let us now turn to opposition to cross-border voting.

In some of the communities under this study, some of the chiefs who called themselves “international chiefs” meaning their authority was across the border, and therefore border citizens were opposed to cross-border voting. For instance, a chief in one of the border towns in Togo argued that the international borders have come to stay, and it is important that one recognizes the sovereignty of each state and so one cannot participate in the elections of another country.³⁹ In essence, while they did not see any contradiction in extending their authority and jurisdiction across borders, they had a problem with participating in the electoral process of another country.

Another important point regarding cross-border voting is the attitude of chiefs and their peoples on the Ghana side of the border to this phenomenon. On the Ghana side, chiefs opposed to cross-border voting reiterated the point that the authority of the modern state is supreme, and its borders ought to be respected.⁴⁰ As one chief categorically stated he does not tolerate any such activity in his jurisdiction.⁴¹ The position of these traditional leaders is worthy of note regarding the actual act of cross-border voting in border communities because chiefs as the leaders in these local communities are involved in similar roles played by chiefs in other African countries such as the education of their people on the electoral process and encouraging their participation in elections (Williams 2004). The recognition of the importance of chiefs in this regard is borne out by the appeal from the flag bearer of the NDC to chiefs in parts of the Volta Region to encourage their people to register in the 2020 voter registration exercise. As he put it, “Whichever registration it is, I will like to plead with Togbui to beat the gong to all our people to come out and register so that in December they can register and exercise their votes” in the 2020 national elections.⁴² Furthermore, as the gatekeepers in these communities, their stance on cross-border voting may influence border citizens who feel they have a “right” to vote in these communities.

Besides chiefs, other border citizens on both sides of the border were also opposed to cross-border voting. It was not only at the regional level where the NPP’s Volta Regional branch was ready to swoop like an eagle on “aliens” in the news item noted in the introduction. At the village level, some borderlanders held the view that when it came to elections one can only vote in one country.⁴³ Others pointed out that when it came to elections, they did not take part because as one noted she did not want any problem with the security officials for doing something illegal.⁴⁴ Thus, like the chiefs, there was a clear distinction between the “local” represented by the traditional state and the “national” represented by the modern state. In this regard, they did not see anything wrong with accessing social facilities such as health care and education across the border because these facilities by their location are perceived as belonging to the local sphere. The fact that in some of these communities members on both sides of the border contribute communal labor or money towards its construction provides a sense of collective ownership by the traditional state and further legitimizes this view. As one chief pointed out are they are “one people” and it is for this reason that those on the Togo side contributed to putting up the clinic in Ghana by providing communal labor.⁴⁵ However, voting is perceived as being about the sovereignty of a nation and the

duty of its citizens. The paper thus suggests that some “local” rights, such as healthcare, may be delineated from “national” rights, such as voting.

It is, however, worth noting that in some of these communities, people are also influenced by the politicized dialogue of cross-border voting. The impact on local beliefs is evident in NPP supporters/sympathisers who are Ewe being involved in policing the border because they believed that the “Togolese” Ewe would vote for the NDC and not the NPP. That they did not see any contradiction in the fact that even though they were Ewe but they supported the NPP and as such so could these borderlanders points to a deep acceptance of this politicized narrative at the local level. In some of these communities, some of these border citizens opposed to cross-border voting even took it to a notch higher by attempting to physically prevent others from voting in similar circumstances described by Robert-Nicoud at Deme on the day of the 2016 elections when some positioned themselves at a vantage point to prevent others from crossing over from Togo into Ghana to vote in the elections (2019, 1). During the 2020 voter registration exercise, one NPP representative intimated he had sustained a cut in a scuffle with a “Togolese” to prevent him from registering.⁴⁶

The above illustrations show the different expressions of border citizenship and highlight the importance of electoral politics to bordering. In other words, it shows the complex nature of border citizenship and how electoral politics complicate the bordering dynamics.

Conclusion

This study explores the role of elections in bordering on the Ghana-Togo border, specifically the southern part of the Volta Region which has been a site of contestation over “Togolese” voters between the two major political parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, the NPP and the NDC, the latter allegedly benefiting from these votes. The politicization of cross-border voting stems from the belief that it will or will not inure to their benefit.

However, these allegations, and counter-allegations of cross-border voting in Ghana’s national elections belie the complex question of identity for members of traditional polities truncated by the international border. This study shows that defining the citizenship of these borderlanders is not the sole work of the state or the political parties for that matter. Actively involved in defining who is a Ghanaian citizen are these borderlanders who can be described as “border citizens” through cross-border political, economic, social, and cultural activities.

It further demonstrates how these border citizens define their citizenship through cross-border voting by acquiring a Voter ID card and casting their votes in the general elections and hence contest the border. Nonetheless, not all border citizens accept cross-border voting. In some cases, they have expressed their citizenship by rejecting or preventing others from acquiring a voter’s ID card or casting their votes in Ghana’s elections. In other words, some border citizens view cross-national voting as a “right” while others do not. Some perceive voting as a right because they belong to a traditional state which straddles both countries and as such entitles them to all the rights of both countries. Those who do not perceive it as a right delineate economic and social rights of the local sphere represented by the traditional state from the political rights in the national sphere of the modern state.

This study thus highlights the importance of electoral politics in bordering by showing how border citizenship may or may not affirm the border. Consequently, border citizenship may or may not be important in determining electoral behavior.

Notes

1. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NPP-launches-Operation-Eagle-Eye-to-prevent-Togolese-voters-482840>. Accessed October 29 2019.
The Volta Region is one of the sixteen administrative regions in Ghana. It shares a border with Togo. The Oti Region was part of the Volta Region until the creation of six new regions in 2019. For this paper, the Volta Region includes Oti Region.
In 2016, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which is currently in power was the major opposition party and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) was in power.
2. The Fourth Republic refers to the period from 1992 to the present when Ghana returned to multi-party democracy. The other “Republics” also refer to periods of elected governments in contrast to the other periods of military regimes in the country’s history.
3. See, Government of Ghana, Citizenship Act, 2000 (Act 591), Part I.
4. See, Togoland Partition between British and French, ADM 39/1/199, Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD), Accra.
5. On Ewe unification see the following archival records, All Ewe Conference, VRG 1/2/51, PRAAD, Ho; Ewe Question, (unlabeled) PRAAD, Ho; Ewe Unificationist Propaganda, VRG 1/2/54, PRAAD, Ho; Unification Matters, (unlabeled) PRAAD, Ho; Unification of Eweland, Vol. 2a, KE/C 209, PRAAD, Ho; Unification of Eweland, Vol. 2b, KE/C 209, PRAAD, Ho.
6. These communities belong the Ewedome, one of the three major Ewe subgroups. The others are the Tongu and Anlo. Some of the Anlo towns border Togo and communities such as Aflao display these transnational traits.
7. The first elections in the Fourth Republic were held in 1992 and has since been held every four years. The NDC won the 1992 and 1996 elections. In 2000 it lost to the NPP which won the elections again in 2004. In 2008 the NPP lost to the NDC which also won again in 2012. In 2016, the NDC lost to the NPP.
8. Article 63 (3) states,

A person shall not be elected as President of Ghana unless at the presidential election the number of votes cast in his favour is more than fifty per cent of the total number of valid votes cast at the election.
9. It was supported in this position by the other parties that contested the elections, namely the People’s Heritage Party (PHP), the National Independence Party (NIP) and the National Convention Party (NCP).
10. For details of the judgment see <http://www.myjoyonline.com/docs/full-sc-judgement.pdf>. Accessed October 24 2019.
11. <https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2019/september-14th/video-manyhia-persuaded-losing-candidate-in-2016-polls-to-accept-defeat-asantehene-reveals.php>. Accessed October 29 2019; <https://citinewsroom.com/2019/09/mahama-wasnt-persuaded-to-concede-defeat-in-2016-polls-julius-debrah-2/>. Accessed October 29 2019.
12. <http://nanaakufoaddo.org/docs/Case%20for%20new%20register%20statement%20by%20Dr.%20Bawumia.pdf>. Accessed November 4 2019.
13. https://nai.uu.se/news/articles/ghanaian_elections_narrow/. Accessed October 24 2019.
14. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NDC-will-campaign-in-Togo-Asiedu-Nketia-480896>. Accessed November 1 2019.
15. <http://africanelections.tripod.com/gh.html>. Accessed October 30 2019.
16. <https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerias-land-borders-closed-all-goods-customs-chief-says>. Accessed June 19 2020.

17. The Volta Region House of Chiefs is one of the regionally mandated chieftaincy institutions under the 1992 constitution. For its functions, see Chapter Twenty-Two of the 1992 Constitution and the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759).
18. http://www.africanelections.org/print_article.php?news=1942&link=/coted. Accessed October 25 2019.
19. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Selective-closure-of-borders-weaken-national-unity-155181>. Accessed October 25 2019.
20. http://www.africanelections.org/print_article.php?news=1942&link=/coted. Accessed October 25 2019.
21. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/All-Ghana-s-borders-to-be-closed-155185>. Accessed November 1 2019.
22. <https://www.pulse.com.gh/ece-frontpage/election-2016-we-will-not-stop-togo-voters-igp/2bvfh4j>. Accessed October 25 2020.
23. The EC recently announced that it will be unable to implement it in the 2020 general elections. It attributed it to the failure of parliament to act on the Constitutional Instrument (CI) that will provide the legal framework for its implementation. See <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/general-election-ec-can-t-implement-ropaa-in-2020.html>. Accessed November 9 2020.
24. <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/supreme-court-rules-on-ndc-ec-case-june-23.html>. Accessed June 19 2020.
25. The National Identification Authority (NIA) is in the process of registering and issuing the Ghana Cards.
26. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/1010498/new-register-ruling-we-hope-verdictll-promote.html>. Accessed June 19 2020.
27. <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/supreme-court-rules-on-ndc-ec-case-june-23.html>. Accessed June 19 2020.
28. The NHIS was introduced in 2003 to replace the “Cash and Carry” system which required patients to pay upfront for medical services. It is important to state that health care is not free. Besides premiums paid by subscribers in the informal group, there is 2.5% Health Insurance Levy on some selected goods and services which goes into a National Health Insurance Fund to subsidize it. The NHIS covers only some of the popular diseases in Ghana such as malaria, diarrhoea, hypertension, diabetes, and asthma amongst others. See <http://nhis.gov.gh/>.
29. See “Ramadan and Another v Electoral Commission and Others” (Reasons for Decision) (J1/11/2014, J1/9/2014) [2014] GHASC 161 (July 30 2014) <https://ghalii.org/gh/judgment/supreme-court/2014/161>. Accessed September 18 2020.
30. Personal Interview: March 9 2013. Togo-Nyive, Togo.
31. Personal Interview: March 11 2013. Togo-Nyive, Togo; September 2 2013. Ave-Edzi, Togo. January 18 2018. Leklebi Kame-Tornu, Togo.
32. Personal Interview: March 11 2013. Togo-Nyive, Togo.
33. Personal Interview: January 18 2018. Leklebi Kame-Tornu, Togo.
34. Personal Interview: September 2 2013. Ave-Edzi, Togo. In the 2020 voter registration exercise carried out between June 30 and August 6, the NPP had compiled a comprehensive list of “unapproved routes” which its foot soldiers were patrolling to prevent people from coming in from Togo (Copy in author’s possession).
35. Personal Interview: October 27 2012. Ghana-Nyive, Ghana.
36. See, Article 49 (3) of the 1992 Constitution.
37. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/486267/ghana-wins-pink-sheets-battle.html>. Accessed June 25 2020.
38. Personal Interview: October 27 2012. Ghana-Nyive, Ghana.
39. Personal Interview: February 16 2013. Togo-Nyive, Togo.
40. Personal Interview: October 27 2012. Ghana-Nyive, Ghana; August 18 2013. Ave-Atanve, Ghana.
41. Personal Interview: September 25 2012. Ghana-Nyive, Ghana.

42. <https://www.modernghana.com/news/1011203/come-out-and-register-whether-ec-compiles-new-regi.html>. Accessed June 23 2020.
43. Personal Interview: February 15 2018. Leklebi-Kame, Ghana.
44. Personal Interview: March 9 2013. Togo-Nyive, Togo.
45. Personal Interview: February 16 2013. Togo-Nyive, Togo.
46. Personal Interview: August 9 2020, Ave-Posumonu, Ghana.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Mjiba Frehiwot, Samuel Ntewusu, and Frank Afari for their insightful comments and to Philip-Neri Jayson-Quashigah for the map. The fieldwork for this article was funded by the American Council of Learned Societies' African Humanities Program, dissertation and postdoctoral fellowships (F'12 and F'17).

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

The fieldwork for this article was funded by the American Council of Learned Societies' African Humanities Program, dissertation and postdoctoral fellowships (F'12 and F'17).

ORCID

Edem Adotey  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8007-7950>

References

- Adotey, E. 2018a. 'International Chiefs': Chieftaincy, Rituals and the Reproduction of Trans-border Ewe Ethnic Communities on the Ghana-Togo Boundary. *Africa* 88, no. 3: 560–78. doi:10.1017/S0001972018000220.
- Adotey, E. 2018b. Where is My Name? – Contemporary Funeral Posters as an Arena of Contestation and (Re)Negotiation of Chiefly Relations among the Ewe of Ghana and Togo. *History in Africa* 45: 59–69. doi:10.1017/hia.2018.4.
- Adotey, E. 2020. An Imaginary Line? Decolonisation, Bordering and Borderscapes on the Ghana–Togo Border. *Third World Quarterly*. doi:10.1080/01436597.2020.1813019.
- Akyeampong, E.K. 2001. *Between the Sea and the Lagoon, an Eco-social History of the Anlo of Southeastern Ghana c. 1850 to Recent Times*. Athens: Ohio University Press; Oxford: James Currey.
- Amenumey, D.E.K. 1989. *The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political History*. Accra: Ghana Universities Press.
- Asiwaju, A.I., ed. 1984. *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's International Boundaries 1884–1984*. London: C. Hurst & Co; Lagos: University of Lagos Press.
- Asiwaju, A.I. 1992. Borders and Borderlands as Linchpins for Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons of the European Experience. *Afrique et Développement [Africa Development]* 17, no. 2: 45–63.
- Baneseh, M. A. 2015. *Pink Sheet: The Story of Ghana's Presidential Election Petition : [?] As Told In The Daily Graphic*. Accra: Graphic Communications Group Limited.
- Bening, R.B. 1983. The Ghana-boundary, 1914–1982. *Africa Spectrum* 18, no. 2: 191–209. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40174115>.

- Berg, B.L. 2001. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*, (4th ed). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Bolaji, M.H.A.-G. 2015. The African Union's Call for Global Pan-Africanism and the Ghana-diaspora Relations in the 21st Century. *Journal of Black Studies* 46, no. 1: 62–101. doi:10.1177/0021934714557329.
- Brambilla, C. 2007. Borders and Identities/Border Identities: The Angola-Namibia Border and the Plurivocality of the Kwanyama Identity. *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 22, no. 2: 21–38. doi:10.1080/08865655.2007.9695675.
- Collins, J.D. 1976. The Clandestine Movement of Groundnuts across the Niger-Nigeria Boundary. *Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines* [Canadian Journal of African Studies] 10, no. 2: 259–78. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/483833>.
- Flynn, D.K. 1997. 'We are the Border': Identity, Exchange, and the State Along the Bénin-Nigeria Border. *American Ethnologist* 24, no. 2: 311–30. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/646753>.
- Gordon, D. 2001. Owners of the Land and Lunda Lords: Colonial Chiefs in the Borderlands of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 34, no. 2: 315–38. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3097484>.
- Greene, S.E. 1996. *Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast: A History of the Anlo-Ewe*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- Herbst, J. 1989. The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa. *International Organization* 43, no. 4: 673–92. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706803>.
- Jockers, H., D. Kohnert, and P. Nugent. 2010. The Successful Ghana Election of 2008: A Convenient Myth? *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 48, no. 1: 95–115. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40538349>.
- Johnson, C., R. Jones, A. Paasi, L. Amooore, A. Mountz, M. Salter, and C. Rumford. 2011. Interventions on Rethinking 'the Border' in Border Studies. *Political Geography* 30: 61–69. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.01.002.
- Lamb, V. 2014. 'Where is the Border?' Villagers, Environmental Consultants and the 'Work' of the Thai–Burma Border. *Political Geography* 40: 1–12. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.02.001.
- Lawrance, B.N. 2007. *Locality, Mobility and Nation: Periurban Colonialism in Togo's Eweland, 1900–1960*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.
- Lentz, C. 2003. 'This is Ghanaian Territory!': Land Conflicts on a West African Border. *American Ethnologist* 30, no. 2: 273–89. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3805377>.
- Meeks, E. V. 2007. *Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona*. Texas: University of Texas Press.
- Miles, F.S.W. 1987. Partitioned Royalty: The Evolution of Hausa Chiefs in Nigeria and Niger. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 2: 233–58. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/161013>.
- Moyo, I. 2016. The Beitbridge–Mussina Interface: Towards Flexible Citizenship, Sovereignty and Territoriality at the Border. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*. doi:10.1080/08865655.2016.1188666.
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. 2018. Decolonising Borders, Decriminalising Migration and Rethinking Citizenship. In *Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-colonial Southern Africa, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development*, ed. H.H. Magidimisha, et al. US: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59235-0_2.
- Newman, D. 2006. Borders and Bordering Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue. *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 2: 171–86. doi:10.1177/1368431006063331.
- Newman, D. 2011. *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Doris Wastl-Walter, 33–48. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Nshimbi, C.C. 2017. Life in the Fringes: Economic and Sociocultural Practices in the Zambia–Malawi–Mozambique Borderlands in Comparative Perspective. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*. doi:10.1080/08865655.2017.1300780.
- Nugent, P. 2002. *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands*. Athens: Ohio University Press; Oxford: James Currey; Legon: Sub-Saharan.
- Nugent, P. 2019. Boundaries, Communities and 'Re-Membering': Festivals and the Negotiation of Difference. In *Boundaries, Communities and State-Making in West Africa: The Centrality of the Margins*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781139105828.013.

- Paasi, A. 2011 *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Doris Wastl-Walter, 11–32. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Parker, N., and N. Vaughan-Williams. 2012. Critical Border Studies: Broadening and Deepening the ‘Lines in the Sand’ Agenda. *Geopolitics* 17, no. 4: 727–33. doi:10.1080/14650045.2012.706111.
- Parker, N., N. Vaughan-Williams, L. Bialasiewicz, S. Bulmer, B. Carver, R. Durie, J. Heathershaw, et al. 2009. Lines in the Sand? Towards an Agenda for Critical Border Studies. *Geopolitics* 14, no. 3: 582–87. doi:10.1080/14650040903081297.
- Robert-Nicoud, N.R. 2019. Elections and Borderlands in Ghana. *African Affairs*, 1–20. doi:10.1093/afraf/adz002.
- Shneiderman, S.B. 2013. Himalayan Border Citizens: Sovereignty and Mobility in the Nepal-Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) of China Border Zone. *Political Geography* 35: 25–36. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.04.001.
- Skinner, K. 2015. *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and Nationalism, 1914–2014*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Houtum, H. 2011 *The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Doris Wastl-Walter, 49–62. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Williams, J.M. 2004. Leading from Behind: Democratic Consolidation and the Chieftaincy in South Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, no. 1: 113–36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876176>.
- Wilson, T. M. and H. Donnan. eds. 1998. *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.